T85n2800_廣百論疏卷第一
大正藏第 85 冊 No. 2800 廣百論疏卷第一
No. 2800 [cf. No. 1571]
廣百論疏卷第一
凡佛品章文理復隱末學凝滯尚困蒙泉爰有軌辨才樂□義窟之秘嵩巖之穴未方言阿奔瀉龍門之箭非喻碧雞振翼青目愧其連環白馬飛翰平赤髭著其半棰既耽玩而先覺思硌迪於後昆遂握管□毫述為論疏約文申義十卷勒成辨志離經達□明白歷覽則思過其半。研吟則目擊道存。而今而後學無學人始可與論實矣位師昔上京講肆仆已資訓淹中今流沙播遷走復從游瀨下師則老氏嘉遁喜蔥嶺之非遙。仆乃無姓窮涂愴瓜州之寔遠昧法師之釋論。銷旅客之繁憂。贊天人之德音。托語懷於一序耳。
廣百論疏卷第一
西明寺沙門文軌撰
破常品第一。聖天菩薩本造。護法菩薩釋。
夫以述曰。聖天本論有二百頌。二十五頌製爲一品。合有八品。大分為二。前之七品廣破耶宗。后之一品廣立正義。破邪宗中。前之兩品破常。后之五品破無常。破常中。前之一品總破諸常。后之一品別破我常。今此破常品者即是先總破諸常也。護法釋論有三千餘頌。解釋本文分為三分。初兩行頌文致敬聖天即為序分。次論曰為顯下。解釋頌本即為正宗。后諸有大心下。勸學發願即為流
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 《廣百論疏》卷第一
（大正藏第85冊 No. 2800）
No. 2800 [cf. No. 1571]
《廣百論疏》卷第一
每當品章的文理隱晦，後學之人感到困惑停滯，如同矇昧的泉水。於是有文軌辨才，樂於探究義理的深奧，如同嵩山巖穴般深邃。還未及用方言來比喻，就像阿水奔瀉，如同龍門之箭般迅猛。不能用碧雞振翅來比喻，青色的眼睛也慚愧於其連環之美，白馬飛馳，赤髭也只能甘拜下風。我沉溺於佛法，並希望能先覺悟，從而啓發後人。於是握筆撰寫論疏，用簡練的文字來闡述深奧的義理，十卷書得以完成。辨別志向，通達經典，明白曉暢，如果能瀏覽一遍，就能發現自己過錯的一半。如果能深入研究，就能親眼見到真理的存在。從今以後，無論是有學之人還是無學之人，都可以與他們討論真理了。過去在京城講學時，我已積累了一些經驗。現在流沙播遷，我又跟隨老師遊學于瀨下。老師則像老子一樣隱居，慶幸蔥嶺並不遙遠。我卻像無姓之人一樣窮途末路，悲嘆瓜州確實遙遠。希望法師的解釋，能消除旅客的憂愁，讚美天人的德音，將心懷寄託於一篇序言之中。
《廣百論疏》卷第一
西明寺沙門文軌撰
破常品第一。聖天菩薩（Āryadeva）本造。護法菩薩（Dharmapāla）釋。
解釋說：聖天菩薩（Āryadeva）的本論有二百頌，每二十五頌組成一品，共有八品。大致分為兩部分。前面的七品廣泛地破斥外道的宗義，後面的一品廣泛地建立正義。在破斥外道宗義中，前面的兩品破斥常，後面的五品破斥無常。在破斥常中，前面的一品總的破斥各種常，後面的一品分別破斥我常。現在這個破常品，就是先總的破斥各種常。護法菩薩（Dharmapāla）的釋論有三千多頌，解釋本文分為三個部分。最初的兩行頌文，致敬聖天菩薩（Āryadeva），作為序分。其次，'論曰'以下，解釋頌文的本身，作為正宗。最後，'諸有大心下'，勸勉學習，發起願心，作為流通分。
【English Translation】 English version: Guang Bai Lun Shu (Commentary on the Hundred Verses Treatise) - Volume 1
(Taisho Tripitaka Volume 85, No. 2800)
No. 2800 [cf. No. 1571]
Guang Bai Lun Shu (Commentary on the Hundred Verses Treatise) - Volume 1
Whenever the meaning of the chapters and verses is obscure, later learners feel confused and stagnant, like a murky spring. Therefore, Wen Gui (文軌) with his talent and wisdom, delights in exploring the profoundness of the doctrines, as deep as the caves of Mount Song (嵩山). Before even using local dialects to describe it, it's like the rushing waters of the A River, as swift as an arrow from Dragon Gate (龍門). It cannot be compared to the flapping wings of the Green Chicken (碧雞), the blue eyes are ashamed of its continuous beauty, the white horse gallops, and the red beard can only admit defeat. I am immersed in the Buddha's teachings, and hope to awaken first, so as to enlighten later generations. Therefore, I hold the pen and write this commentary, using concise words to explain profound meanings, completing ten volumes. Discriminating aspirations, understanding the scriptures, being clear and thorough, if one can browse through it once, they can discover half of their mistakes. If one can study it deeply, they can witness the existence of the truth. From now on, whether they are learned or unlearned, they can discuss the truth with them. In the past, when lecturing in the capital, I had accumulated some experience. Now, with the shifting sands, I follow my teacher to study in Lai Xia (瀨下). The teacher is like Lao Tzu (老子), living in seclusion, rejoicing that the Pamir Mountains (蔥嶺) are not far away. I am like a nameless person at the end of the road, lamenting that Guazhou (瓜州) is indeed far away. I hope that the Dharma master's explanation can dispel the worries of travelers, praise the virtuous sounds of gods and humans, and entrust my feelings to a preface.
Guang Bai Lun Shu (Commentary on the Hundred Verses Treatise) - Volume 1
Written by the Shramana Wen Gui (文軌) of Ximing Temple (西明寺)
Chapter 1: Refuting Permanence. Originally composed by Bodhisattva Āryadeva (聖天菩薩). Explained by Bodhisattva Dharmapāla (護法菩薩).
Explanation: Bodhisattva Āryadeva's (聖天菩薩) original treatise has two hundred verses, with twenty-five verses forming one chapter, totaling eight chapters. It is roughly divided into two parts. The first seven chapters extensively refute the doctrines of external paths, and the last chapter extensively establishes the correct meaning. In refuting the doctrines of external paths, the first two chapters refute permanence, and the last five chapters refute impermanence. In refuting permanence, the first chapter generally refutes all kinds of permanence, and the last chapter specifically refutes the permanence of self. This chapter on refuting permanence is the first to generally refute all kinds of permanence. Bodhisattva Dharmapāla's (護法菩薩) commentary has more than three thousand verses, and the explanation of the text is divided into three parts. The first two lines of verses pay homage to Bodhisattva Āryadeva (聖天菩薩), serving as the introductory section. Secondly, 'The treatise says' and below, explains the verses themselves, serving as the main section. Finally, 'All those with great minds' and below, encourages learning and inspires vows, serving as the concluding section.
通。
論云。稽首妙慧至我當釋 述曰。此致敬聖天即序分也。護法菩薩將欲解釋聖天菩薩所制論本。先申歸敬表盡誠也。上三句申敬。下一句釋敬。妙慧者。聖天菩薩通真達俗故云妙慧。此即直贊也。如日輪垂光破闇開凈眼者。喻況也。如世日輪有其二用。一舒光破闇。二照色開眼。遠布微言廣百論者。合說也。聖天妙慧亦爾。一布微言破無明闇。二照真俗開發慧眼。言遠布者。提婆所制之論是佛去後八百年時流至一千后故言遠布也。微言者。此論非直破有亦復遣無。有執皆除發言無當故曰微言。廣百論者。提婆造論凡有百部皆名百論。並以百聖依隨而行無越此路。此則言百論。為欲顯多非謂數唯有百。其猶百王不易百味食等。然此百論之上並置別名。如舊百論名經百論。以長行直說名修多羅故。故彼論云修妒路。修妒路者即是經也。舊云。論有百偈故以百為名。此論有二十品品各五偈。后十品無益此立故不翻者此謬也。檢尋梵本但有十品。又此論有八品。品二十五頌合二百頌。何得云論有百偈故以百為名耶。又如舊百字論應名字百論。提婆臨終血書名字。此論字唯一百。復是百聖之所隨行故云字百論也。又為國王太子哭喪悲泣不已作論喻之因名教化百論也。今此百論顯理既周破執又廣。故言廣百論也。百聖
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 論中說：『稽首妙慧，至我當釋。』意思是，這是致敬聖天（Āryadeva）菩薩，也就是序分。護法（Dharmapāla）菩薩將要解釋聖天菩薩所著的論典，首先表達歸敬之意，以示盡誠。前面三句是表達敬意，後面一句是解釋敬意。『妙慧』指的是聖天菩薩通達真俗二諦，所以稱為『妙慧』。這是一種直接的讚美。『如日輪垂光，破闇開凈眼』，這是一種比喻。就像世間的太陽，有兩種作用：一是散發光芒，破除黑暗；二是照亮萬物，開啟眼睛。『遠布微言，廣百論』，這是合在一起說的。聖天菩薩的妙慧也是如此：一是傳播精微的言論，破除無明黑暗；二是照亮真俗二諦，開發智慧之眼。『遠布』的意思是，提婆（Deva，聖天菩薩的另一個名字）所著的論典，是在佛陀涅槃后八百年時流傳開來，到一千年后仍然流傳，所以說是『遠布』。『微言』的意思是，這部論典不僅破斥『有』，也破斥『無』，去除一切執著，所說的言論沒有偏頗，所以說是『微言』。『廣百論』的意思是，提婆菩薩所造的論典總共有百部，都叫做『百論』，並且有一百位聖者依隨這些論典而修行，沒有超出這個範圍。這裡說『百論』，是爲了顯示數量眾多，並非真的只有一百部。就像一百個國王不會改變一百種食物的味道一樣。然而，這百部論典之上都另有別名，比如舊的《百論》叫做《經百論》，因為用長行文直接敘述，就像修多羅（sūtra，經）一樣。所以那部論典說『修妒路』，『修妒路』就是經的意思。舊的說法是，這部論典有一百首偈頌，所以用『百』來命名。這部論典有二十品，每品各有五首偈頌，後面的十品沒有實際意義，所以沒有翻譯，這種說法是錯誤的。查閱梵文字，只有十品。而且這部論典有八品，每品二十五頌，總共二百頌，怎麼能說這部論典有一百首偈頌，所以用『百』來命名呢？又比如舊的《百字論》應該叫做《名字百論》，提婆菩薩臨終時口述了這部論典的名字。這部論典只有一百個字，而且是一百位聖者所依隨修行的，所以叫做《字百論》。又因為國王太子為提婆菩薩的去世而悲傷哭泣不止，提婆菩薩爲了開導他們而作論，所以叫做《教化百論》。現在這部《百論》既能周全地闡明道理，又能廣泛地破除執著，所以說是『廣百論』。百聖（Baisheng） English version The treatise says: 'I bow to the wondrous wisdom, and I will now explain.' This means paying homage to Āryadeva (Holy Deva), which is the introductory section. The Bodhisattva Dharmapāla (Protector of Dharma), intending to explain the treatise composed by Āryadeva, first expresses reverence to show utmost sincerity. The first three lines express reverence, and the last line explains the reverence. 'Wondrous wisdom' refers to Āryadeva's understanding of both the true and conventional truths, hence the name 'wondrous wisdom.' This is a direct praise. 'Like the sun casting its light, breaking darkness and opening pure eyes,' this is a metaphor. Just as the worldly sun has two functions: one is to emit light and dispel darkness; the other is to illuminate all things and open eyes. 'Widely spreading subtle words, the extensive Hundred Treatises,' this is said together. Āryadeva's wondrous wisdom is also like this: one is to spread subtle words and dispel the darkness of ignorance; the other is to illuminate the true and conventional truths and develop the eyes of wisdom. 'Widely spreading' means that the treatise written by Deva (another name for Āryadeva) spread eight hundred years after the Buddha's Nirvana and continued to spread after a thousand years, so it is said to be 'widely spreading.' 'Subtle words' means that this treatise not only refutes 'existence' but also refutes 'non-existence,' removing all attachments, and the words spoken are without bias, so it is said to be 'subtle words.' 'Extensive Hundred Treatises' means that the treatises composed by Deva total one hundred, all called the 'Hundred Treatises,' and one hundred saints follow these treatises to practice, without exceeding this scope. Saying 'Hundred Treatises' here is to show a large number, not that there are only one hundred. Just as a hundred kings will not change the taste of a hundred foods. However, these hundred treatises all have separate names, such as the old 'Hundred Treatises' called the 'Sūtra Hundred Treatises,' because it is narrated directly in prose, like a sūtra. So that treatise says 'sūtra,' and 'sūtra' means scripture. The old saying is that this treatise has one hundred verses, so it is named 'Hundred.' This treatise has twenty chapters, each with five verses, and the last ten chapters are not practical, so they are not translated, which is wrong. Checking the Sanskrit text, there are only ten chapters. Moreover, this treatise has eight chapters, each with twenty-five verses, totaling two hundred verses, so how can it be said that this treatise has one hundred verses, so it is named 'Hundred'? Also, the old 'Hundred-Character Treatise' should be called the 'Name Hundred Treatise,' and Deva dictated the name of this treatise at the time of his death. This treatise has only one hundred characters and is followed by one hundred saints for practice, so it is called the 'Character Hundred Treatise.' Also, because the king and prince were saddened and wept incessantly at Deva's death, Deva wrote a treatise to enlighten them, so it is called the 'Edification Hundred Treatise.' Now this 'Hundred Treatises' can comprehensively explain the principles and widely refute attachments, so it is said to be the 'Extensive Hundred Treatises.' Baisheng (Hundred Saints)
【English Translation】 The treatise says: 'I bow to the wondrous wisdom, and I will now explain.' This means paying homage to Āryadeva (Holy Deva), which is the introductory section. The Bodhisattva Dharmapāla (Protector of Dharma), intending to explain the treatise composed by Āryadeva, first expresses reverence to show utmost sincerity. The first three lines express reverence, and the last line explains the reverence. 'Wondrous wisdom' refers to Āryadeva's understanding of both the true and conventional truths, hence the name 'wondrous wisdom.' This is a direct praise. 'Like the sun casting its light, breaking darkness and opening pure eyes,' this is a metaphor. Just as the worldly sun has two functions: one is to emit light and dispel darkness; the other is to illuminate all things and open eyes. 'Widely spreading subtle words, the extensive Hundred Treatises,' this is said together. Āryadeva's wondrous wisdom is also like this: one is to spread subtle words and dispel the darkness of ignorance; the other is to illuminate the true and conventional truths and develop the eyes of wisdom. 'Widely spreading' means that the treatise written by Deva (another name for Āryadeva) spread eight hundred years after the Buddha's Nirvana and continued to spread after a thousand years, so it is said to be 'widely spreading.' 'Subtle words' means that this treatise not only refutes 'existence' but also refutes 'non-existence,' removing all attachments, and the words spoken are without bias, so it is said to be 'subtle words.' 'Extensive Hundred Treatises' means that the treatises composed by Deva total one hundred, all called the 'Hundred Treatises,' and one hundred saints follow these treatises to practice, without exceeding this scope. Saying 'Hundred Treatises' here is to show a large number, not that there are only one hundred. Just as a hundred kings will not change the taste of a hundred foods. However, these hundred treatises all have separate names, such as the old 'Hundred Treatises' called the 'Sūtra Hundred Treatises,' because it is narrated directly in prose, like a sūtra. So that treatise says 'sūtra,' and 'sūtra' means scripture. The old saying is that this treatise has one hundred verses, so it is named 'Hundred.' This treatise has twenty chapters, each with five verses, and the last ten chapters are not practical, so they are not translated, which is wrong. Checking the Sanskrit text, there are only ten chapters. Moreover, this treatise has eight chapters, each with twenty-five verses, totaling two hundred verses, so how can it be said that this treatise has one hundred verses, so it is named 'Hundred'? Also, the old 'Hundred-Character Treatise' should be called the 'Name Hundred Treatise,' and Deva dictated the name of this treatise at the time of his death. This treatise has only one hundred characters and is followed by one hundred saints for practice, so it is called the 'Character Hundred Treatise.' Also, because the king and prince were saddened and wept incessantly at Deva's death, Deva wrote a treatise to enlighten them, so it is called the 'Edification Hundred Treatise.' Now this 'Hundred Treatises' can comprehensively explain the principles and widely refute attachments, so it is said to be the 'Extensive Hundred Treatises.' Baisheng (Hundred Saints)
隨行我當釋者。釋申敬意也。提婆所制所百聖隨行廣百之論我當解釋。故申歸敬也。
論云。論曰為顯至故造論斯 述曰。此下解釋頌本即是正宗有三。一敘論起意。二彰品次第三舉頌別解。敘論起意中。初標后釋。此即標也。人法二執皆有我及我所。總攝一切遍計所執皆盡。此遍計所執體性及其相貌並悉非有故曰皆空。因此空理顯三脫門故曰方便開示。聖天造論由此意也。
論云。執見事性至即二非有 述曰。此釋也。由執人法二種事性為方便故。即起男女色聲香等十相分別。隨取二執事性十相分別為依止故。生邪愿樂愿作天王或人王等。既顯人法二事性空即顯空解脫門。十相分別亦即隨滅即顯無相解脫門。事相既為何所求愿。即顯無愿解脫門。故云既顯事空二即非有。二執 解脫門義廣如余處。
論云。其我所事至先破常事 述曰。此彰品次第也。生欣樂者難除。起厭離者易舍。故今論初先破難除所執常也。前云我我所事。今云其我所事者。前據執見我及我所有殊。今就略文去我但云我所。問。既云略。何不云我而言我所。答。我所名寬通內及外。我名是狹不通於外。故不云我也。
論云。故說頌曰至如實號如來 述曰。此下舉頌別解也。有二十五頌。初五頌總相破常。后二十頌別指破
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『隨行我當釋者。釋申敬意也。』意思是說，我將解釋提婆（Āryadeva）所著的《百論》（Śataśāstra），爲了表達敬意，故先申明歸敬之意。
『論云。論曰為顯至故造論斯』，『述曰。此下解釋頌本即是正宗有三。一敘論起意。二彰品次第三舉頌別解。敘論起意中。初標后釋。此即標也。人法二執皆有我及我所。總攝一切遍計所執皆盡。此遍計所執體性及其相貌並悉非有故曰皆空。因此空理顯三脫門故曰方便開示。聖天造論由此意也。』這段話的意思是：論中說，爲了顯明至理，所以造此論。下面解釋頌文的根本，這是正宗，有三個方面：一是敘述造論的起因，二是闡明品目的次第，三是逐個解釋頌文。在敘述造論起因中，先標示后解釋，這裡是標示。人與法的兩種執著，都包含『我』和『我所』。總括一切虛妄分別的執著都包含在內。這些虛妄分別的體性和相貌都是不存在的，所以說是『空』。因為這個『空』的道理，可以顯現三種解脫門，所以說是方便開示。聖天（Āryadeva）造論就是出於這個目的。
『論云。執見事性至即二非有』，『述曰。此釋也。由執人法二種事性為方便故。即起男女色聲香等十相分別。隨取二執事性十相分別為依止故。生邪愿樂愿作天王或人王等。既顯人法二事性空即顯空解脫門。十相分別亦即隨滅即顯無相解脫門。事相既為何所求愿。即顯無愿解脫門。故云既顯事空二即非有。二執 解脫門義廣如余處。』這段話的意思是：這是解釋。由於執著人與法的兩種事性作為方便，就產生了男女、色、聲、香等十種相的分別。隨之取著二種執著的事性和十種相的分別作為依靠，就產生了邪惡的願望和快樂，例如希望成為天王或人王等。既然顯現了人與法的兩種事性是空性的，就顯現了空解脫門。十種相的分別也隨之滅除，就顯現了無相解脫門。事相既然是空性的，又有什麼可以求愿的呢？這就顯現了無愿解脫門。所以說，既然顯現了事物的空性，兩種執著就不存在了。關於兩種執著和解脫門的意義，在其他地方有詳細的解釋。
『論云。其我所事至先破常事』，『述曰。此彰品次第也。生欣樂者難除。起厭離者易舍。故今論初先破難除所執常也。前云我我所事。今云其我所事者。前據執見我及我所有殊。今就略文去我但云我所。問。既云略。何不云我而言我所。答。我所名寬通內及外。我名是狹不通於外。故不云我也。』這段話的意思是：這是闡明品目的次第。產生欣喜和快樂的人難以去除執著，產生厭惡和遠離的人容易捨棄執著。所以現在這部論首先破除難以去除的執著，也就是常。前面說『我』和『我所』的事，現在說『其我所事』，是因為前面根據執著的見解，『我』和『我所』有所不同。現在就簡略的文字來說，去掉『我』，只說『我所』。有人問：既然說是簡略，為什麼不說『我』而說『我所』呢？回答：『我所』這個名稱範圍寬廣，包括內在和外在。『我』這個名稱範圍狹窄，不包括外在。所以不說『我』。
『論云。故說頌曰至如實號如來』，『述曰。此下舉頌別解也。有二十五頌。初五頌總相破常。后二十頌別指破』這段話的意思是：所以說頌文說到了如實之相，名為如來（Tathāgata）。下面開始逐個解釋頌文。總共有二十五頌，最初五頌總的破除常，後面二十頌分別指明破除。
【English Translation】 English version: 'Following, I shall be the explainer. 'Explanation expresses reverence.' This means that I will explain the Śataśāstra (Hundred Treatise) composed by Āryadeva, and to express reverence, I first declare my intention to pay homage.
'The treatise says: 'The treatise says that this treatise is created to reveal the ultimate truth.' 'Commentary says: Below, the explanation of the verses is the main subject, which has three aspects: first, narrating the intention of the treatise; second, clarifying the order of the chapters; and third, explaining each verse separately. In narrating the intention of the treatise, first the heading is given, then the explanation. This is the heading. The two attachments to persons and dharmas both contain 'I' and 'mine'. All conceptual attachments are included. The nature and appearance of these conceptual attachments are all non-existent, so it is said to be 'empty'. Because of this principle of emptiness, the three doors of liberation are revealed, so it is said to be a convenient demonstration. Āryadeva created this treatise with this intention.
'The treatise says: 'Grasping the nature of things leads to the two non-existences.' 'Commentary says: This is the explanation. Because grasping the nature of the two kinds of things, persons and dharmas, is a convenience, the ten aspects of discrimination, such as male and female, form, sound, and smell, arise. Following and grasping the nature of the two attachments and the ten aspects of discrimination as a basis, evil desires and pleasures arise, such as wishing to become a king of gods or a king of men. Since the emptiness of the two natures of persons and dharmas is revealed, the door of emptiness liberation is revealed. The discrimination of the ten aspects also disappears, revealing the door of signlessness liberation. Since the nature of things is empty, what is there to seek or desire? This reveals the door of wishlessness liberation. Therefore, it is said that since the emptiness of things is revealed, the two attachments do not exist. The meaning of the two attachments and the doors of liberation is extensively explained elsewhere.
'The treatise says: 'The matter of what is mine leads to first refuting the constant matter.' 'Commentary says: This clarifies the order of the chapters. Those who generate joy and pleasure are difficult to remove, while those who generate aversion and detachment are easy to abandon. Therefore, this treatise first refutes the difficult-to-remove attachment, which is permanence. Previously, it was said 'the matter of I and mine', now it is said 'the matter of what is mine', because previously, according to the view of attachment, 'I' and 'mine' are different. Now, in terms of concise text, 'I' is omitted, and only 'mine' is said. Someone asks: Since it is said to be concise, why not say 'I' but say 'mine'? The answer is: The name 'mine' is broad, encompassing both internal and external. The name 'I' is narrow, not encompassing the external. Therefore, 'I' is not said.
'The treatise says: 'Therefore, the verse says, up to the real name Tathāgata.' 'Commentary says: Below, each verse is explained separately. There are twenty-five verses. The first five verses generally refute permanence, and the last twenty verses specifically point out the refutation.'
常。總相破中一頌為五。第一頌約生果破。第二一頌約有性破。第三一頌約無因破。第四一頌約闕喻破。第五一頌約愚智破。生果即正破有性即助破。無因即顯邪宗不立。闕喻即顯因有相違。愚智即破貶責外人。生果破中初舉頌后解釋。此即舉頌也。上半立到二量。下半讚美一人。二量者謂比量聖言量。一人者謂如來也。一切為果生者。此立比量正破勝論等生果常法。彼立宗六句義。一實有九法。謂地水火風空時方意我。二德有二十餘法。謂色聲香味觸苦樂貪嗔癡數量合離愚智勤惰好醜等。三業謂往來遲速屈申俯仰等。四有謂實德業。自體非無名之為有。如此性有非實德業。別有體性遍一切法也。五同異。如實望實為同。望德等為異。如此同異亦非前實等。別有體性。如是一一法上各別有也。舊云總相諦別相諦者。即此大有同異二句也。六和合謂我與法合即有和合性生。如薩婆多僧和合性也。實德兩句通常無常。謂實句中虛空時方意我五實一向是常。地水火風通四大通常無常。謂空劫中有四極微散在處處。后劫成時有情業力令諸極微兩兩和合各各生一細果。其一細果量等二微。如此細果復兩兩合更生粗果。如此漸增乃至和合生器世界。后劫壞時極粗大果先為災壞。漸漸壞至最初細果。粗細之果悉皆壞盡。最細極微不為
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 常。總相破中一頌分為五部分。第一頌是關於生果的破斥。第二頌是關於有性的破斥。第三頌是關於無因的破斥。第四頌是關於缺少比喻的破斥。第五頌是關於愚昧和智慧的破斥。生果是直接破斥，有性是輔助破斥。無因是爲了顯示邪宗不能成立。缺少比喻是爲了顯示因有互相矛盾之處。愚昧和智慧是爲了破斥和貶低外道之人。 在生果的破斥中，先提出頌文，然後進行解釋。這裡就是提出頌文。上半部分確立了比量和聖言量這兩種量。下半部分讚美瞭如來一人。所謂二量，指的是比量和聖言量。所謂一人，指的是如來。 『一切為果生者』，這是確立比量，直接破斥勝論等所主張的生果常法。他們立宗有六句義：一是實，有九種法，即地（prithvi，堅性）、水（jala，濕性）、火（agni，熱性）、風（vayu，動性）、空（akasha，無礙性）、時（kala，時間）、方（dik，空間）、意（manas，感覺器官）、我（atman，靈魂）。二是德，有二十多種法，即色（rupa，顏色）、聲（shabda，聲音）、香（gandha，氣味）、味（rasa，味道）、觸（sparsha，觸感）、苦（duhkha，痛苦）、樂（sukha，快樂）、貪（raga，貪婪）、嗔（dvesha，嗔恨）、癡（moha，愚癡）、數量（sankhya，數量）、合（samyoga，結合）、離（vibhaga，分離）、愚（ajnana，愚昧）、智（jnana，智慧）、勤（yatna，努力）、惰（alasya，懶惰）、好（shubha，好）、丑（ashubha，丑）等。三是業，指往來、遲速、屈伸、俯仰等動作。四是有，指實、德、業的自體，不是無，所以名為有。如此，『性有』並非實、德、業，而是別有一種體性，遍及一切法。五是同異，如實望實為同，望德等為異。如此，同異也並非前面的實等，而是別有一種體性。像這樣，每一種法上都各自有這種體性。舊譯的『總相諦』、『別相諦』，就是指此處的『大有』和『同異』這兩句。 六是和合，指『我』與法結合，就有了和合性產生，如薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）僧團的和合性。實、德兩句通常是無常的。實句中，虛空、時、方、意、我這五種實一向是常。地、水、火、風這四大，通常是無常的。在空劫中，有四種極微散佈在各處。后劫形成時，有情眾生的業力使得這些極微兩兩結合，各自產生一個細果。這一個細果的量等於兩個極微。如此，這些細果又兩兩結合，產生更粗的果。如此逐漸增加，乃至和合產生器世界。后劫壞滅時，最粗大的果首先被災難破壞，漸漸壞滅到最初的細果。粗細之果全部壞滅。最細的極微不會被...
【English Translation】 English version Constant. This verse in the 'Destruction of General Characteristics' is divided into five parts. The first verse refutes based on the arising of effects. The second verse refutes based on inherent nature. The third verse refutes based on the absence of a cause. The fourth verse refutes based on the lack of analogy. The fifth verse refutes based on foolishness and wisdom. The refutation of arising effects is the direct refutation, while the refutation of inherent nature is the auxiliary refutation. The absence of a cause is to show that the heretical doctrines cannot be established. The lack of analogy is to show that the causes have contradictory aspects. Foolishness and wisdom are to refute and denigrate those of external paths. In the refutation of arising effects, the verse is first presented, and then explained. Here, the verse is being presented. The first half establishes the two means of valid cognition: inference (anumana) and scriptural authority (agama). The second half praises the one, the Tathagata (Tathagata, Thus Come One). The two means of valid cognition refer to inference and scriptural authority. The one refers to the Tathagata. 『All that arises as an effect,』 this establishes inference and directly refutes the doctrine of the Vaisheshika school (Vaisheshika) and others, which asserts that effects are produced from a permanent substance. They establish six categories of meaning: First, substance (dravya), which has nine elements: earth (prithvi, solidity), water (jala, liquidity), fire (agni, heat), wind (vayu, motion), space (akasha, unobstructedness), time (kala, time), direction (dik, space), mind (manas, the internal organ), and self (atman, soul). Second, quality (guna), which has more than twenty elements: color (rupa, color), sound (shabda, sound), smell (gandha, smell), taste (rasa, taste), touch (sparsha, touch), pain (duhkha, suffering), pleasure (sukha, happiness), greed (raga, greed), hatred (dvesha, hatred), delusion (moha, delusion), number (sankhya, number), conjunction (samyoga, combination), disjunction (vibhaga, separation), ignorance (ajnana, ignorance), knowledge (jnana, knowledge), effort (yatna, effort), laziness (alasya, laziness), good (shubha, good), bad (ashubha, bad), and so on. Third, action (karma), which refers to movements such as going and coming, slowness and speed, bending and stretching, looking up and looking down. Fourth, inherence (samavaya), which refers to the self-nature of substance, quality, and action, which is not non-existent, and is therefore called inherence. Thus, 'inherent nature' is not substance, quality, or action, but rather a separate nature that pervades all dharmas. Fifth, similarity and dissimilarity (samananya and vishesha), such as substance viewed in relation to substance is similar, and viewed in relation to quality, etc., is dissimilar. Thus, similarity and dissimilarity are also not the aforementioned substance, etc., but rather a separate nature. In this way, each dharma has its own separate nature. The old translations of 'general characteristic truth' and 'specific characteristic truth' refer to the 'great inherence' and 'similarity and dissimilarity' in this context. Sixth, combination (samyoga), which refers to the combination of the 'self' and dharmas, which produces the nature of combination, such as the combination nature of the Sarvastivada (Sarvastivada) sangha. The categories of substance and quality are usually impermanent. In the category of substance, space, time, direction, mind, and self are always permanent. The four great elements of earth, water, fire, and wind are usually impermanent. During the empty eon, there are four types of ultimate particles scattered everywhere. When the subsequent eon forms, the karma of sentient beings causes these ultimate particles to combine in pairs, each producing a subtle effect. The measure of this one subtle effect is equal to two ultimate particles. Thus, these subtle effects combine in pairs again, producing a coarser effect. In this way, it gradually increases until the vessel world is produced through combination. When the subsequent eon is destroyed, the coarsest effect is first destroyed by disasters, gradually decaying to the initial subtle effect. All the coarse and subtle effects are destroyed. The finest ultimate particles will not be...
災壞。此則四大極微是常。所生之果並是無常。德句之中謂數體周遍一切實德業上。又如極微之上有微德亦是其常。自余苦樂色聲香等即是無常。大有同異一向是常。業及和合一向無常。今所破者但破其常。於此常中有生果常不生果常。如四大極微能生細果。空生聲德。我生思德。時生芽德等名生果常。如大有同異及微德圓德並數等。但依實等上顯不能生他名不生果常。又薩婆多等立虛空涅槃樂等亦是不生果常也。今言一切者。如生果微等。此即有法也。生者。此生果極微應從他生。此即宗法也。合是立宗。為果者。為此極微果從生故。此意兼取宗之生字助成因也。頌文簡略不言兩喻。或可一切生三字是立宗。為一字是立因。謂為此一切果從生故。此意並取宗生喻果助成因也。果一字是同喻。謂從二微已去所生之果能生他故。即從他生以為喻也。頌文存略不言異喻。一切生果常法皆從緣生(宗)能生果故(因)諸能生果者皆從緣生猶如粗果(同喻)若非緣生皆不生果如空花等(異喻)以此比量生果常法必從緣生生已歸滅。定言無常也。所以無常性者。此引聖言量成上比量也。比量道理諸法既是無常。佛智無常。所以稱理而說。何但聖言成比量。亦比量成聖言也。故除佛無有如實號如來者。此讚美一人也。佛證無常說無
常理非不如說獨號如來。除佛已外諸外道師所說乖理非如來也。問。佛既五眼圓明六通具足見境無礙獨號如來。何不頌初先美乃在比量后贊。答。若對自宗贊佛然後論法。今對外道立理然後美人。良由理無獨論人有偏信故。先立道理然後美人也。
論云。論曰諸有至比量安立 述曰。此下解釋也。初釋頌后通難。釋頌中有三。初釋第一句。次釋第二句。后釋下兩句。釋第一句中。初正釋。次反破。后顯意。正釋即令生之法從生。返破即令非生之法非有。顯意即令從生之法歸滅。正釋中初敘計即釋一切兩字。后正破相釋為果生三字。世間者虛妄也。鄙執者惡見也。他論者諸外道小乘也。常住句義者極微等也。謂勝論等虛妄惡見異大乘宗他論所說常極微等。多分非是五根五識現量所取。如極微虛空時方意我微圓德等。並非色根現量所取。其大有同異若依色等可見等者即現量取。若依極微不可見等者非現量取。故云多越現量所行境界也。其極微等既非現量所取。何以有智得者。以能生果比量安立也。謂世間現見瓶等粗果無不依彼細凡等生。故知第三細果亦依初二極微生也。又若無意及神我。苦樂善惡由誰而生。若無虛空聲從何起。若無時者芽等豈生。立比量云。第三細果苦樂聲等定有所因(宗)以是果故(因)猶如粗
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：通常的道理不如佛陀所說的真理，佛陀是獨一無二的如來（Tathagata，如實而來者）。除了佛陀之外，其他外道導師所說的與真理相悖，不能稱為如來。問：佛陀既然具有五眼圓明、六神通具足，見境沒有障礙，是獨一無二的如來，為什麼不在讚頌的開頭先讚美佛陀，而要在比量之後才讚美呢？答：如果是對自己的宗派讚美佛陀，然後再論述佛法，那麼可以先讚美佛陀。但現在是對外道闡述道理，所以要先確立道理，然後再讚美佛陀。這是因為道理不能單獨成立，而人們對人會有偏信，所以要先確立道理，然後再讚美佛陀。
論中說：『論曰諸有至比量安立』。疏中說：『此下解釋也。初釋頌后通難。釋頌中有三。初釋第一句。次釋第二句。后釋下兩句。釋第一句中。初正釋。次反破。后顯意。正釋即令生之法從生。返破即令非生之法非有。顯意即令從生之法歸滅。正釋中初敘計即釋一切兩字。后正破相釋為果生三字。世間者虛妄也。鄙執者惡見也。他論者諸外道小乘也。常住句義者極微等也。謂勝論等虛妄惡見異大乘宗他論所說常極微等。多分非是五根五識現量所取。如極微虛空時方意我微圓德等。並非色根現量所取。其大有同異若依色等可見等者即現量取。若依極微不可見等者非現量取。故云多越現量所行境界也。其極微等既非現量所取。何以有智得者。以能生果比量安立也。謂世間現見瓶等粗果無不依彼細凡等生。故知第三細果亦依初二極微生也。又若無意及神我。苦樂善惡由誰而生。若無虛空聲從何起。若無時者芽等豈生。立比量云。第三細果苦樂聲等定有所因(宗)以是果故(因)猶如粗』
【English Translation】 English version: Ordinary reasoning is not as good as the truth spoken by the Buddha, who is uniquely called Tathagata (the Thus Come One). Apart from the Buddha, the teachings of other non-Buddhist teachers are contrary to reason and cannot be called Tathagata. Question: Since the Buddha possesses the perfect clarity of the Five Eyes and is endowed with the Six Supernatural Powers, seeing all realms without obstruction, and is uniquely called Tathagata, why not praise the Buddha at the beginning of the eulogy, but instead praise after establishing reasoning? Answer: If praising the Buddha for one's own school and then discussing the Dharma, then it would be appropriate to praise the Buddha first. But now, when explaining the principles to non-Buddhists, it is necessary to establish the reasoning first, and then praise the Buddha. This is because reasoning cannot stand alone, while people may have biased beliefs about individuals. Therefore, it is necessary to establish the reasoning first, and then praise the Buddha.
The treatise says: 'The treatise says all have to be established by inference'. The commentary says: 'This explains below. First explain the verse and then generally refute difficulties. There are three parts to explaining the verse. First explain the first sentence. Second explain the second sentence. Third explain the last two sentences. In explaining the first sentence. First explain directly. Second refute inversely. Third reveal the meaning. Direct explanation is that the law of causing birth is from birth. Inverse refutation is that the law of not causing birth is non-existent. Revealing the meaning is that the law of causing birth returns to extinction. In the direct explanation, first narrate the calculation to explain the two words 'all'. Then directly break the appearance to explain the three words 'fruit birth'. 'Worldly' means illusory. 'Base clinging' means evil views. 'Other theories' means all non-Buddhist and Hinayana schools. 'The meaning of permanent' means extremely subtle particles, etc. That is, the permanent extremely subtle particles, etc., spoken by the Vaisheshika school and other illusory evil views different from the Mahayana school and other theories. Most are not taken by the direct perception of the five roots and five consciousnesses. Such as extremely subtle particles, space, time, direction, mind, self, subtle round virtues, etc. are not taken by the direct perception of the color root. The great have similarities and differences. If relying on color, etc., those that are visible, etc., are taken by direct perception. If relying on extremely subtle particles, those that are invisible, etc., are not taken by direct perception. Therefore, it is said that it mostly exceeds the realm of direct perception. Since the extremely subtle particles, etc., are not taken by direct perception, how can those with wisdom obtain them? They are established by inference of the fruit that can be produced. That is, the world directly sees coarse fruits such as bottles, etc., all relying on those fine ordinary beings to be born. Therefore, it is known that the third fine fruit also relies on the first two extremely subtle particles to be born. Also, if there is no intention and divine self, from whom do suffering, joy, good, and evil arise? If there is no space, from where does sound arise? If there is no time, how can sprouts, etc., be born? Establishing the inference says: The third fine fruit, suffering, joy, sound, etc., must have a cause (thesis) because it is a fruit (reason), just like coarse.'
果(喻)又極微空等體定是有(宗)能生果故(因)猶如粗果(喻)。
論云。既能生果至如粗色等 述曰。此正破也。既能生果者。即是立因。亦應比度從緣而生者。即是立宗。如粗色等者。即是同喻。
論云。若非緣生至如空花等 述曰。此反破也。若汝圓執生果常法不從緣生者。生果常法無勝體用(宗)非緣生故(因)如空花等(喻)生果常法不能生果(宗)非緣生故(因)無體用故(因)如空花等(喻)或可以此反破之文為前量。異喻如前釋頌作之。外人本以能生果因證極微等決定是有。此則極微等是有法宗有是法宗於法宗中有是言顯即是法自相。然意許此有不從緣生即是法差別。今論主還用彼因難極微等從緣而生。即與外因作法差別相違過也。
論云。若許彼義至如所生果 述曰。此顯意。頌文成立從生意欲令即歸滅也。汝若為理所逼許極微等從緣生者。此則應如所生粗果生必歸滅理數然也。
論云。所以佛說至如苦樂等 述曰。此釋第二句頌也。比量道理既成。明知聖言非謬。佛既有此誠說。汝等何所致疑。苦樂緣起必定無常。勝論同前故引為喻。
論云。是故唯佛至無掛礙故 述曰。此釋下兩句也。唯佛獨有如理如量二智慧見真俗二境無有掛礙。如見而說得名如來。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 果（喻，指由極微產生的粗果）又極其微小，空無自性等，一定是存在的（宗，論題），因為它能產生果（因，理由），就像粗果一樣（喻，例子）。
論曰：既然能產生果，就像粗色等。 述曰：這是直接駁斥。『既然能產生果』，這是立因。也應該比量推論『從因緣而生』，這是立宗。『如粗色等』，這是同喻。
論曰：如果不是因緣所生，就像虛空中的花等。 述曰：這是反駁。如果你們固執地認為產生果的常法不是從因緣所生，那麼產生果的常法就沒有殊勝的體用（宗），因為它不是因緣所生（因），就像虛空中的花等（喻）。產生果的常法不能產生果（宗），因為它不是因緣所生（因），因為它沒有體用（因），就像虛空中的花等（喻）。或者可以用這段反駁的文字作為前面的量。異喻可以按照前面解釋頌文的方式來做。外道本來用能生果的因來證明極微等一定是存在的。這裡極微等是有法，宗是有是法，宗於法宗中有『是』這個詞，顯示的就是法的自相。然而，外道認為這個『有』不是從因緣所生，這就是法的差別。現在論主反過來用他們的因來論證極微等是從因緣而生，這就與外道的因構成了法差別相違的過失。
論曰：如果承認那個道理，就像所生的果一樣。 述曰：這是顯明意圖。頌文成立從因緣而生，是想讓它最終歸於滅亡。如果你們因為道理所迫，承認極微等是從因緣而生，那麼就應該像所生的粗果一樣，生了必定歸於滅亡，這是理所當然的。
論曰：所以佛說，就像苦樂等。 述曰：這是解釋頌文的第二句。比量的道理既然成立，就明白聖人的話不是謬誤的。佛既然有這樣的誠實之言，你們還懷疑什麼呢？苦樂的緣起必定是無常的。勝論與前面相同，所以引用作為比喻。
論曰：所以只有佛才能如理如量地了知，因為沒有掛礙。 述曰：這是解釋下面的兩句。只有佛才具有如理智和如量智這兩種智慧，能夠見到真諦和俗諦這兩種境界，沒有掛礙。像這樣見到並說出來，才被稱為如來。
【English Translation】 English version: The result (example, referring to the gross result produced by extremely small particles) and also extremely small particles, emptiness of inherent existence, etc., must exist (thesis, proposition), because it can produce results (reason, justification), just like gross results (example, illustration).
Treatise says: Since it can produce results, like gross colors, etc. Commentary says: This is a direct refutation. 'Since it can produce results,' this is establishing the reason. It should also be inferred through inference that 'it arises from conditions,' this is establishing the thesis. 'Like gross colors, etc.,' this is a similar example.
Treatise says: If it is not produced by conditions, like flowers in the sky, etc. Commentary says: This is a counter-refutation. If you stubbornly insist that the permanent dharma that produces results is not produced by conditions, then the permanent dharma that produces results has no superior essence or function (thesis), because it is not produced by conditions (reason), like flowers in the sky, etc. (example). The permanent dharma that produces results cannot produce results (thesis), because it is not produced by conditions (reason), because it has no essence or function (reason), like flowers in the sky, etc. (example). Or, this passage of counter-refutation can be used as the previous inference. The dissimilar example can be made according to the previous explanation of the verse. The outsider originally used the reason of being able to produce results to prove that extremely small particles, etc., must exist. Here, extremely small particles, etc., are the subject possessing the property, the thesis is the existence of this property, and the word 'is' in the thesis regarding the property indicates the self-nature of the dharma. However, the outsider believes that this 'existence' is not produced by conditions, which is the difference of the dharma. Now, the treatise master uses their reason to argue that extremely small particles, etc., are produced by conditions, which constitutes a fault of contradiction in the difference of dharma with the outsider's reason.
Treatise says: If you admit that principle, like the produced result. Commentary says: This clarifies the intention. The verse establishes that arising from conditions is intended to ultimately lead to extinction. If you are forced by reason to admit that extremely small particles, etc., are produced by conditions, then it should be like the produced gross result, which is bound to perish after being born, this is a matter of course.
Treatise says: Therefore, the Buddha said, like suffering and happiness, etc. Commentary says: This explains the second line of the verse. Since the reasoning of inference is established, it is clear that the words of the sage are not false. Since the Buddha has such sincere words, what do you still doubt? The arising of suffering and happiness is certainly impermanent. The Vaisheshika school is the same as before, so it is cited as a metaphor.
Treatise says: Therefore, only the Buddha can know as it is and measure as it is, because there is no obstruction. Commentary says: This explains the following two lines. Only the Buddha has the two wisdoms of knowledge as it is (如理智, Rulizhi) and measurement as it is (如量智, Ruliangzhi), which can see the two realms of truth (真諦, zhendi) and conventional truth (俗諦, suti) without obstruction. Seeing and speaking like this is called Tathagata (如來, Rulai).
論云。若爾所餘至從緣生故 述曰。此下通外難。先難后通。此難也。外人云。若以極微等能生果故。如粗果等從緣而生是無常。爾者我宗之中所餘大有及同異等既不生果。此應是常。以大有等既不生果。不可以如粗果比度從緣生故。此難意云。極微能生果可使是無常。大有不生果此則應是常。此當因明義唯難也。又薩婆多等難云。勝論極微能生果可使是無常。我宗虛空涅槃不生果此應即是常。
論云。雖爾既無至應比非有 述曰。此通宗也。雖汝宗中有不生果大有性等。薩婆多等虛空涅槃應是常。爾然有等既無能生果用。如兔角等永無過去滅無。應比非有也。大有性等及虛空等並悉非有(宗)無生果用故(因)如永滅無(喻)。
論云。為顯此言至故復頌曰 述曰。此下第二頌約有性破。即助前頌破生果常。又兼破不生果常也。初生起。次舉頌。后解釋。此生起也。恐外人猶執有常生果有無常生果。何得以無常例常。又有常生果有常不生果。雖破生果之常。不生果者此不可破。今為顯此前頌破生果常言決定。又為兼顯此破不生果常言決定。復說此頌也。
論云。無有時方物至有性而常住 述曰。此舉頌也。上半令有法從緣生。下半令生者必歸滅。時謂春夏等四時過去等三時。方謂東西等十
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論中說：『如果這樣，那麼其餘的，因為是從因緣而生……』 述記中說：『這以下是通用的外道詰難。先詰難，后解釋。這是詰難。外道說：如果因為極微等能夠產生結果，就像粗果等從因緣而生是無常。那麼我宗派中的其餘的大有以及同異等既然不產生結果，這應該是常。因為大有等既然不產生結果，不可以像粗果一樣，用從因緣而生來比量。』 這個詰難的意思是說：極微能夠產生結果，可以說是無常。大有不產生結果，這應該就是常。這在因明義理上只是詰難。另外，薩婆多等詰難說：勝論的極微能夠產生結果，可以說是無常。我宗派的虛空、涅槃不產生結果，這應該就是常。
論中說：『即使這樣，既然沒有……應該比作非有。』 述記中說：『這是通達本宗的觀點。即使你們宗派中有不產生結果的大有性等，薩婆多等宗派的虛空、涅槃應該是常。然而，大有等既然沒有產生結果的作用，就像兔角等永遠沒有過去滅亡一樣，應該比作非有。』 大有性等以及虛空等，全部都是非有（宗），因為沒有產生結果的作用（因），就像永遠滅亡一樣（喻）。
論中說：『爲了顯示這個意思……所以又說了頌。』 述記中說：『這以下第二個頌是就「有性」來破斥。也就是幫助前面的頌來破斥「生果常」。又兼帶破斥「不生果常」。』 首先是生起，其次是舉頌，然後是解釋。這是生起。恐怕外道仍然執著有常生果，有無常生果，怎麼可以用無常來類比常？又有常生果，有常不生果。即使破斥了生果的常，不生果的常卻無法破斥。現在爲了顯示前面頌破斥生果常的說法是決定的，又爲了兼帶顯示這個破斥不生果常的說法是決定的，所以說了這個頌。
論中說：『沒有有時方物……有性而常住。』 述記中說：『這是舉頌。上半句使有法從因緣而生，下半句使生者必定歸於滅亡。時，指春夏等四時，過去等三時。方，指東西等十方。
【English Translation】 English version: The treatise says: 'If so, then the rest, because they arise from conditions...' The commentary says: 'The following is a general refutation of externalists. First refute, then explain. This is the refutation. Externalists say: If because the ultimate particles and the like can produce results, like coarse fruits and the like arising from conditions are impermanent. Then the remaining 'great existence' (Mahā-bhāva) and 'identity and difference' (Tādātmya-vaidharmya) in my school, since they do not produce results, should be permanent. Because 'great existence' and the like do not produce results, they cannot be compared to coarse fruits using the reasoning of arising from conditions.' The meaning of this refutation is: Ultimate particles can produce results, so they can be said to be impermanent. 'Great existence' does not produce results, so it should be permanent. This is only a refutation in the meaning of Hetu-vidyā (logic). Furthermore, the Sarvāstivādins and others refute, saying: The ultimate particles of the Vaiśeṣika school can produce results, so they can be said to be impermanent. The 'space' (Ākāśa) and 'Nirvāṇa' of my school do not produce results, so they should be permanent.
The treatise says: 'Even so, since there is no... it should be compared to non-existence.' The commentary says: 'This is to clarify the view of our school. Even if there are 'great existence-nature' (Mahā-bhāva-svabhāva) and the like in your school that do not produce results, the 'space' and 'Nirvāṇa' of the Sarvāstivāda school should be permanent. However, since 'great existence' and the like have no function of producing results, like a rabbit's horn that never has past extinction, it should be compared to non-existence.' 'Great existence-nature' and the like, as well as 'space' and the like, are all non-existent (thesis), because they have no function of producing results (reason), like eternal extinction (example).
The treatise says: 'To show this meaning... therefore, the verse is spoken again.' The commentary says: 'The following second verse refutes based on 'existence-nature' (Bhāva-svabhāva). That is, it helps the previous verse to refute 'permanent result-production' (Nitya-phala-utpāda). It also refutes 'permanent non-result-production' (Nitya-aphala-utpāda).' First is the arising, then the quoting of the verse, and then the explanation. This is the arising. Fearing that externalists still cling to permanent result-production and impermanent result-production, how can the impermanent be used to analogize the permanent? There is also permanent result-production and permanent non-result-production. Even if the permanence of result-production is refuted, the permanence of non-result-production cannot be refuted. Now, to show that the previous verse refuting the permanence of result-production is definitive, and also to show that this refutation of the permanence of non-result-production is definitive, this verse is spoken.
The treatise says: 'There is no time, direction, object... existence-nature and permanent dwelling.' The commentary says: 'This is quoting the verse. The first half of the verse makes existence-dharma (Bhāva-dharma) arise from conditions, and the second half makes those that arise inevitably return to extinction. Time refers to the four seasons such as spring and summer, and the three times such as past. Direction refers to the ten directions such as east and west.
方。物謂根塵色心等諸物。此言無有三世四時十方根塵色心一切諸物體是其有而非緣生也。故知無有時方物類從緣所生竟不歸滅而常住也。
論云。論曰諸有至應從緣生 述曰。此下解釋也。有四。一釋頌文。二結頌義 三顯頌成。四引頌證。釋頌文中有兩釋。初以有性證緣生。后以緣生證有性。初中初釋上半。后釋下半。此即釋上半也。西方二釋。一釋云。比量有三種。一共相。二自。三他。有法喻因立敵俱許名共比量。有法因喻唯自所許非他所許名自比量。有法因喻唯他所許非自所許名他比量。今文中初三句約依他起性立其比量。次三句約遍計所執性立他比量。后兩句牒宗結破。初三句立共比量者。謂彼所立時方物類皆是識心所現相分是他依起性。今立此等並從緣生是共比量。時方物等定從緣生(宗)以有性故(因)諸有性者皆從緣生如苦樂等(同喻)若非緣生即非有性如空花等(異喻)次三句立他比量者。謂就外人。非依他起時方物上橫計實有常。時方物是遍計所執性。今立此等皆無有性是他比量。時方物等定無有性(宗)非緣生故(因)諸非緣生皆無有性如空花等(同喻)若有性者即從緣生如苦樂等(異喻)后兩句牒宗結破者。此時方物若依他起是有性者。應從緣生也。略不結他比量宗也。二釋云。此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『方』指的是方位。『物』指的是根、塵、色、心等事物。這裡說的是，沒有在三世、四時、十方存在的，作為根、塵、色、心等一切諸物體的『有』，不是由因緣所生的。因此可知，沒有時間、空間、物體種類是從因緣所生，最終不會消滅而常住的。
論中說：『論曰諸有至應從緣生』 述曰：以下是解釋。有四個方面：一是解釋頌文，二是總結頌義，三是顯明頌的成立，四是引用頌來證明。解釋頌文中有兩種解釋。首先以『有性』證明『緣生』，然後以『緣生』證明『有性』。首先解釋上半部分，然後解釋下半部分。這裡是解釋上半部分。 西方有兩種解釋。一種解釋說：比量有三種，一是共相，二是自比量，三是他比量。有法、喻、因，立論者和對方都認可的，稱為『共比量』。有法、因、喻，只有自己認可，對方不認可的，稱為『自比量』。有法、因、喻，只有對方認可，自己不認可的，稱為『他比量』。現在文中前三句是依據依他起性建立比量，中間三句是依據遍計所執性建立他比量，后兩句是複述宗義並進行破斥。前三句建立共比量，意思是：他們所立的時、方、物類，都是識心所顯現的相分，是依他起性。現在我們立論這些都是從因緣所生，這是共比量。時、方、物等必定是從因緣所生（宗），因為具有『有性』（因），凡是具有『有性』的都是從因緣所生，比如苦樂等（同喻），如果不是從因緣所生，就沒有『有性』，比如空花等（異喻）。中間三句建立他比量，意思是：對於外道之人，在依他起性的時、方、物上，橫加計度認為真實存在且恒常。時、方、物是遍計所執性。現在我們立論這些都沒有『有性』，這是他比量。時、方、物等必定沒有『有性』（宗），因為不是從因緣所生（因），凡不是從因緣所生的都沒有『有性』，比如空花等（同喻），如果有『有性』，就是從因緣所生，比如苦樂等（異喻）。后兩句複述宗義並進行破斥，意思是：這時、方、物如果是依他起性，具有『有性』，就應當是從因緣所生。這裡省略了總結他比量的宗義。第二種解釋說：
【English Translation】 English version: 'Direction' (方) refers to spatial orientation. 'Things' (物) refer to objects such as roots, dust, form, and mind. This says that there is no 'existence' (有) in the three times (三世), four seasons (四時), and ten directions (十方) of all objects such as roots, dust, form, and mind, that is not produced by conditions (緣生). Therefore, it is known that there is no time, space, or category of objects that are born from conditions and ultimately do not perish but are permanent.
The treatise says: '論曰諸有至應從緣生' The commentary says: The following is an explanation. There are four aspects: first, explaining the verse; second, summarizing the meaning of the verse; third, clarifying the establishment of the verse; and fourth, citing the verse to prove it. There are two explanations for explaining the verse. First, 'existence' (有性) is used to prove 'conditioned arising' (緣生), and then 'conditioned arising' is used to prove 'existence'. First, explain the first half, and then explain the second half. This is the explanation of the first half. There are two explanations in the Western tradition. One explanation says: There are three types of inference (比量): first, common characteristic (共相); second, self-inference (自比量); and third, other-inference (他比量). A subject (有法), example (喻), and reason (因) that are accepted by both the proponent and the opponent are called 'common inference'. A subject, example, and reason that are only accepted by oneself and not by the opponent are called 'self-inference'. A subject, example, and reason that are only accepted by the opponent and not by oneself are called 'other-inference'. Now, the first three sentences in the text establish inference based on the dependent nature (依他起性), the middle three sentences establish other-inference based on the completely imagined nature (遍計所執性), and the last two sentences reiterate the thesis and refute it. The first three sentences establish common inference, meaning: the time, space, and categories of objects that they establish are all appearances manifested by the mind of consciousness (識心), which are of dependent nature. Now we assert that these are all born from conditions, which is common inference. Time, space, and objects are certainly born from conditions (thesis), because they have 'existence' (reason), and whatever has 'existence' is born from conditions, such as suffering and joy (positive example); if it is not born from conditions, it does not have 'existence', such as empty flowers (negative example). The middle three sentences establish other-inference, meaning: for externalists, they superimposedly imagine that time, space, and objects of dependent nature are real and permanent. Time, space, and objects are of completely imagined nature. Now we assert that these have no 'existence', which is other-inference. Time, space, and objects certainly have no 'existence' (thesis), because they are not born from conditions (reason), and whatever is not born from conditions has no 'existence', such as empty flowers (positive example); if it has 'existence', it is born from conditions, such as suffering and joy (negative example). The last two sentences reiterate the thesis and refute it, meaning: if time, space, and objects are of dependent nature and have 'existence', then they should be born from conditions. Here, the conclusion of the other-inference is omitted. The second explanation says:
中但破外人妄執一切常法。亦不勞律以依他遍計二性。別破文中初三句是同喻。次三句是異喻。次一句是立因。后一句是立宗。如前釋中破依他性比量作之。
論云。若從緣生至無容常住 述曰。此釋下半也。時方物類既從緣生。當知必有滅壞隨逐。無容有生有滅而是常住也。此中有二比量。滅必隨逐者破聲論外道等計。彼計聲從唇舌眾緣而生。生已常住竟無壞滅。故立量破云。聲定滅壞(宗)從緣生故(因)如苦樂等(喻)無容常住者破勝論等計。彼計。如器世界一生已后經劫而住無有滅相。唯至劫盡三災壞時方有滅相。此世界雖有初生后滅。兩相中間一劫但有住相而無生滅。即是常住。故立量破云。世界決定唸唸無常(宗)有生滅故(因)如苦樂等(喻)。
論云。如是說已至如未來法 述曰。此第二釋也。前釋以有性證緣生既竟故云如是說已。今釋以緣生證有性故言或復也。欲知諸法是有。必須觀從緣生。如現在色心等是也。若觀彼法非從緣生即非有性。如未來色心等是也。此但指事非立比量。此意云。法若有性即從緣生。若非緣生即非有性。此時方物若是有性不離緣生。若非緣生即非有性。何得妄執有性非生。
論云。為辨此言至時方等言 述曰。此結頌義也。聖天菩薩為欲辨此若有性從
緣生。依緣生知有性。非緣生非有性。義決定無著故說此頌云。
論云。此顯所說至皆無諍論 述曰。此結頌成。聖天此頌所說道理決定成就。謂生果常不生果常。若是有性即從緣生。又依緣生方知有性。若非緣生即非有性。如此道理若三世四時十方處所內外色心物類差別遍九十六道一切宗處皆無諍論。以理決成不可破故。
論云。如說菩薩至出生緣外 述曰。此引頌證也。比量既爾。聖語亦真。言理符契。故引為證。如經所說是諸菩薩以後得智遍修諸法如實觀察。不見少物如微塵許體是其有出緣生外。是故當知但是有性必從緣生。生定歸滅是無常性。此義成立。
論云。又彼非處方便慇勤 述曰。此下一頌約無因破。即顯邪宗不立也。初正釋頌文。后因破異執。釋文中初一句正破。第二句縱破。下兩句結破。正破有四。一直非。二徴問。三舉頌。四解釋。此直非也。非處者無理之所也。方便者矯陳所以也。慇勤者自強不息也。謂汝雖自強不息欲于無理處矯陳所以。成已妄立徒自劬勞也。
論云。何以故 述曰。此徴問也。
論云。頌曰非無因有性 述曰。此舉頌也。勝論等立常云。空等是常(宗)非所作故(因)諸非作者皆悉是常(此無同喻)若非是常即有所作猶如瓶等(異喻)論
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：緣起而生。依靠緣起之理，可知事物具有自性。如果不是緣起所生，則不具有自性。這個道理是確定的，不會引起任何爭論，所以才說了這首偈頌。
論中說：『這表明所說的道理，都不會引起爭論。』解釋說：這是總結偈頌的成就。聖天菩薩這首偈頌所說的道理是確定成立的。無論是生果是常還是不生果是常，如果事物具有自性，那麼它一定是依靠因緣而生。而且依靠因緣生起，才能知道它具有自性。如果不是依靠因緣生起，那麼它就不具有自性。這樣的道理，無論是在過去、現在、未來三世，還是春夏秋冬四季，還是十方處所，還是內外色心等物類的差別，遍及九十六種外道宗派，都不會引起任何爭論。因為這個道理已經通過理證確定成立，是不可駁倒的。
論中說：『如經中所說，乃至出生緣之外。』解釋說：這是引用偈頌來證明。既然比量是這樣，那麼聖人的言語也是真實的。言語和道理相符，所以引用它作為證明。如經中所說，那些菩薩們在獲得后得智（Prajna-paramita，般若波羅蜜多）之後，普遍地修習諸法，如實地觀察，看不到任何事物，哪怕像微塵一樣細小，其本體是具有超出因緣之外的自性。所以應當知道，凡是具有自性的事物，必定是從因緣而生。生起之後必定歸於滅亡，這就是無常的性質。這個道理是成立的。
論中說：『又彼非處方便慇勤。』解釋說：下面一首偈頌是針對無因而生的觀點進行破斥，也就是爲了表明邪宗的觀點是不能成立的。首先正確地解釋偈頌的文義，然後通過因明來破斥不同的執見。在解釋文義中，第一句是直接破斥，第二句是縱容性地破斥，下面兩句是總結性地破斥。直接破斥有四個方面：一是直接否定，二是提出疑問，三是舉出偈頌，四是解釋偈頌。這裡是直接否定。『非處』指的是沒有道理的地方。『方便』指的是虛假的陳述。『慇勤』指的是自強不息。意思是說，即使你自強不息，想要在沒有道理的地方虛假地陳述，最終也只是徒勞。
論中說：『何以故？』解釋說：這是提出疑問。
論中說：『頌曰：非無因有性。』解釋說：這是舉出偈頌。勝論派等認為，空等是常（宗），因為不是被製造出來的（因），所有不是被製造出來的東西都是常（沒有同喻），如果不是常，那就是被製造出來的，就像瓶子一樣（異喻）。
【English Translation】 English version: Origination arises from conditions. Knowing that existence has nature depends on origination. If it does not arise from conditions, it does not have nature. This meaning is definite and without attachment, hence this verse is spoken.
The treatise says: 'This shows that what is said is all without dispute.' The commentary says: This concludes the verse's accomplishment. The principle stated in this verse by Aryadeva (聖天, Shengtian) is definitely established. Whether the produced result is permanent or the unproduced result is permanent, if something has nature, it arises from conditions. Moreover, one knows it has nature by relying on origination. If it does not arise from conditions, it does not have nature. Such a principle, whether in the three times, the four seasons, the ten directions, the internal and external distinctions of form and mind, or the differences among the ninety-six heterodox paths, is without dispute. Because it is decisively established by reason and cannot be refuted.
The treatise says: 'As it is said that Bodhisattvas, up to outside the conditions of birth.' The commentary says: This cites the verse as proof. Since the inference is thus, the words of the sage are also true. The words and principles agree, so it is cited as proof. As it is said in the sutra, those Bodhisattvas, after obtaining the wisdom gained later (Prajna-paramita，般若波羅蜜多), universally cultivate all dharmas, observing them as they truly are. They do not see any object, even as small as a mote of dust, whose substance has a nature that exists outside of arising from conditions. Therefore, one should know that whatever has nature must arise from conditions. Arising is destined to return to extinction, which is the nature of impermanence. This meaning is established.
The treatise says: 'Moreover, in an inappropriate place, diligent effort.' The commentary says: The following verse refutes the view of causelessness, which is to show that the heretical doctrines cannot be established. First, the meaning of the verse is correctly explained, and then different views are refuted through reasoning. In explaining the meaning, the first sentence is a direct refutation, the second sentence is a concessive refutation, and the following two sentences are a concluding refutation. There are four aspects to the direct refutation: first, direct negation; second, posing a question; third, citing the verse; and fourth, explaining the verse. Here is direct negation. 'Inappropriate place' refers to a place without reason. 'Effort' refers to false statements. 'Diligence' refers to self-strengthening without ceasing. It means that even if you are self-strengthening without ceasing, wanting to falsely state something in a place without reason, you will only be toiling in vain.
The treatise says: 'Why is that?' The commentary says: This is posing a question.
The treatise says: 'The verse says: There is no existence with nature without a cause.' The commentary says: This is citing the verse. The Vaisheshika (勝論, Shenglun) school and others assert that space and so on are permanent (thesis) because they are not made (reason). All things that are not made are permanent (no similar example). If something is not permanent, then it is made, like a pot (dissimilar example).
主云。夫為正因須具三相。今此非作。一則非遍宗法。所遍有性無故。二非同品定有。更無共許常故。但有第三異品無相。以瓶等無常有所作故。三中闕二與無不殊。因既是無。宗豈得立。問。空非所作立敵同知。何故乃言非遍宗法。答。勝論空有非作不無。大乘空無非作不有。問。兔角體無。非作仍有。虛空不有。非作寧無。答。非作之言有遮有表。勝論兼表。大乘但遮。故非作因非遍宗法。此則隨一所依不成過攝。
論云。論曰彼雖至說有道理 述曰。此下解釋也。初總非。后別破。此總非也。
論云。如是句義至不極成故 述曰。此下別破也。初顯宗因過。后顯同喻過。此即初也。如是汝立比量句義有所立一分不極成過。能立所依不極成過。故無道理也。謂宗有二分。一有法分。二法分。此二分合方名為宗。若隨闕一即非宗也。謂有法必須共許。不許即非法。依法即要須違敵。不違即無簡別。今勝論宗云虛空是常者。常違大乘容有簡別。虛空非有豈是宗依。故是所立宗中一分有法不極成也。因有三相。一遍是宗法。二同品定有。三異品遍無。其遍是宗法須有所遍有如為依。今勝論因云非所作者。空既非有非作無依。故是能立所作不極成也。
論云。既不許有至比量不成 述曰。此顯同喻過也
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 主張說：如果作為正確的理由，必須具備三個特徵。現在這個『非所作』（非由造作產生）不具備這些特徵。第一，它不是普遍存在於宗法（pakṣa-dharma，論題的性質）中，因為它所普遍存在的『有性』（bhāva，存在）不存在。第二，它不是在同品（sapakṣa，相似實例）中必然存在，因為沒有共同認可的『常』（nitya，永恒）存在。它只有第三個特徵，即在異品（vipakṣa，相異實例）中沒有相應的性質，因為瓶子等無常的事物都是『所作』（kṛta，被造作的）。這三個特徵中缺少兩個，與『無』（abhāva，不存在）沒有什麼區別。既然理由是『無』，論題怎麼能成立呢？ 提問：『空』（śūnyatā，空性）不是『所作』，這是論敵雙方都知道的，為什麼還要說它不是普遍存在於宗法中呢？ 回答：勝論（Vaiśeṣika）認為『空』是有，不是『所作』，也不是『無』。大乘（Mahāyāna）認為『空』是無，不是『所作』，也不是『有』。提問：兔角（śaśa-viṣāṇa）的本體是『無』，不是『所作』，但仍然是『有』。虛空（ākāśa）不是『有』，不是『所作』，怎麼能說是『無』呢？ 回答：『非所作』這個詞語，既有遮止的意思，也有表述的意思。勝論兼有表述的意思，而大乘只有遮止的意思。因此，『非所作』這個理由不是普遍存在於宗法中。這屬於隨一所依不成過（ekāśrayāsiddha，理由所依的對象不存在的過失）。 論中說：論曰：他們即使說了，也是有道理的。述曰：下面是解釋。先總的否定，後分別破斥。這裡是總的否定。 論中說：論曰：像這樣，句子的意義直到不極成故。述曰：下面是分別破斥。先顯示宗因的過失，后顯示同喻的過失。這裡是顯示宗因的過失。像這樣，你所立的比量句子的意義，有所立的一部分不極成過（asiddha，未被證實），能立所依不極成過，所以沒有道理。所謂宗有兩部分，一是有法分（dharmin，具有性質的主體），二是法分（dharma，性質）。這兩部分合在一起才叫做宗。如果缺少任何一部分，就不是宗。所謂有法必須是雙方都認可的，不認可就是非法。依法就必須要與論敵相違背，不相違背就沒有簡別。現在勝論的宗說『虛空是常』，『常』與大乘相違背，容許有簡別。虛空不是『有』，怎麼能是宗的所依呢？所以這是所立宗中一部分有法不極成。理由有三個特徵：一是普遍存在於宗法中，二是在同品中必然存在，三是在異品中普遍不存在。其中普遍存在於宗法中，需要有所普遍存在的『有』作為所依。現在勝論的理由說『非所作』，空既然不是『有』，『非所作』就沒有所依。所以這是能立所作不極成。 論中說：既然不許有，直到比量不成。述曰：這是顯示同喻的過失。
【English Translation】 English version: The proponent says: To be a valid reason (hetu), it must possess three characteristics. Now, this 'non-origination' (akṛta, not made or caused) does not possess these characteristics. First, it is not universally present in the subject property (pakṣa-dharma, the property of the thesis), because the 'existence' (bhāva, being) in which it is universally present does not exist. Second, it is not necessarily present in similar instances (sapakṣa, similar examples), because there is no commonly accepted 'permanence' (nitya, eternal) that exists. It only has the third characteristic, which is the absence of a corresponding property in dissimilar instances (vipakṣa, dissimilar examples), because impermanent things like pots are all 'originated' (kṛta, made or caused). Lacking two of these three characteristics is no different from 'non-existence' (abhāva, non-being). Since the reason is 'non-existence,' how can the thesis be established? Question: 'Emptiness' (śūnyatā, voidness) is not 'originated,' which is known by both the proponent and the opponent. Why then say that it is not universally present in the subject property? Answer: The Vaiśeṣika school believes that 'emptiness' is existent, not 'originated,' and not 'non-existent.' The Mahāyāna school believes that 'emptiness' is non-existent, not 'originated,' and not 'existent.' Question: A rabbit's horn (śaśa-viṣāṇa) is 'non-existent' in its essence, not 'originated,' but it is still 'existent.' Space (ākāśa) is not 'existent,' not 'originated,' so how can it be said to be 'non-existent'? Answer: The term 'non-originated' has both a negating and an expressing meaning. The Vaiśeṣika school includes the expressing meaning, while the Mahāyāna school only includes the negating meaning. Therefore, the reason 'non-originated' is not universally present in the subject property. This falls under the fallacy of unestablished basis (ekāśrayāsiddha, the fallacy where the object on which the reason relies does not exist). The treatise says: The treatise says: Although they say it, there is reason. The commentary says: The following is an explanation. First, a general negation, then a separate refutation. This is the general negation. The treatise says: The treatise says: Like this, the meaning of the sentence until not fully established. The commentary says: The following is a separate refutation. First, the fault of the thesis and reason is shown, then the fault of the example is shown. This is the showing of the fault of the thesis and reason. Like this, the meaning of the sentence of your established inference has the fault of one part of the established not being fully established (asiddha, unproven), the fault of the basis of the establishing not being fully established, so there is no reason. The so-called thesis has two parts, one is the subject (dharmin, the subject possessing the property), and the other is the property (dharma, the property). These two parts together are called the thesis. If any part is missing, it is not a thesis. The so-called subject must be agreed upon by both parties, and if it is not agreed upon, it is illegal. According to the law, it must be contrary to the opponent, and if it is not contrary, there is no distinction. Now, the Vaiśeṣika's thesis says 'space is permanent,' 'permanent' is contrary to Mahāyāna, and distinction is allowed. Space is not 'existent,' how can it be the basis of the thesis? Therefore, this is one part of the established thesis, the subject, not being fully established. The reason has three characteristics: one is that it is universally present in the subject property, the second is that it is necessarily present in similar instances, and the third is that it is universally absent in dissimilar instances. Among them, being universally present in the subject property requires the 'existence' in which it is universally present as the basis. Now, the Vaiśeṣika's reason says 'non-originated,' since emptiness is not 'existent,' 'non-originated' has no basis. Therefore, this is the establishing being not fully established. The treatise says: Since it is not allowed to exist, until the inference is not established. The commentary says: This shows the fault of the example.
。論主云。我大乘中除汝自宗常外更無共許常物可為同喻。故汝比量不得成就。
論云。設復強說終成非理 述曰。此下縱破也。一直非。二徴問。三舉頌。四解釋。此即直非也。設汝強以方便說云。虛空是有(宗)余無性法所不攝故(因)諸無性法所不攝者皆悉是有如色心等(同喻)若非是有即非余無性法之所不攝如空花等(異喻)雖有此說終成非理也。
論云。何以故 述曰。此徴問也。
論云。頌曰有因即非常 述曰。此舉頌也。此頌意云。汝立常法。為當有因。為當無因。若無因者。如空花等體即非有。若有因者。如心心法即非是常。
論云。論曰縱彼至相應所生 述曰。此下解釋也。初正釋頌文。后因破異執。初中初正破。次結過後通難。此即正破也。空等非常(宗)以有因故(因)諸有因者皆悉非常如苦相應詐如苦受相應心心法也(同喻)如熾火所生灰炭等也(同喻)為成文故離合論之。
論云。此因便能違害根本 述曰。此結過也。即是法差別相違過也。外人比量以虛空為有法自相。是有為法自相。法自相中有常無常意但取常不取無常。此常是法差別。今外人立因為成其常。論主今難。空既有因即成無常。此之無常與常乖反名曰相違。故是法差別相違因過。其法自相等
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：論主說：『在我大乘的教義中，除了你們自宗所堅持的「常」之外，沒有其他共同認可的「常」的事物可以作為類比。因此，你們的比量無法成立。』
論中說：『即使勉強立論，最終也會變得不合道理。』 述曰：『以下是縱容對方假設進行駁斥。分為四個部分：一、直接否定；二、提出疑問；三、引用頌文；四、解釋頌文。這裡是直接否定。假設你勉強用方便之說，說虛空是存在的（宗），因為它不被任何無自性的法所包含（因），凡是不被無自性的法所包含的事物都是存在的，比如色法和心法等（同喻）。如果不是存在的，就不會不被無自性的法所包含，比如空花等（異喻）。』雖然這樣說，最終還是不合道理。』
論中說：『為什麼呢？』 述曰：『這是提出疑問。』
論中說：『頌曰：有因即非常。』 述曰：『這是引用頌文。』這首頌的意思是說：你所立的常法，是有因的呢？還是無因的呢？如果是無因的，就像空花等，其體性就不是存在的。如果是有因的，就像心和心法，就不是常。』
論中說：『論曰：即使他們…相應所生。』 述曰：『以下是解釋頌文。首先是正面解釋頌文，然後因為駁斥不同的執著，首先是正面駁斥，然後總結過失，普遍責難。這裡是正面駁斥。』空等不是常（宗），因為它們有因（因），凡是有因的事物都不是常，比如與苦相應的，比如與苦受相應的心和心法（同喻），就像熾熱的火焰所產生的灰燼和木炭等（同喻）。爲了使文句完整，所以離合地論述它。
論中說：『這個因便能違害根本。』 述曰：『這是總結過失。』這就是法差別相違的過失。外道比量以虛空為有法自相，是有為法自相。法自相中有常和無常，意圖只取常而不取無常。這個常是法差別。現在外道立因是爲了成就其常。論主現在責難說，空既然有因，就成了無常。這個無常與常相違背，叫做相違。所以是法差別相違的因過。其法自相等。
【English Translation】 English version: The master of the treatise said, 'Within my Mahayana teachings, apart from the 'permanent' (nitya) that your own school insists upon, there is no commonly accepted 'permanent' thing that can serve as a similar example. Therefore, your inference cannot be established.'
The treatise says, 'Even if you were to forcefully argue, it would ultimately become unreasonable.' Commentary: 'The following is a refutation by indulging the opponent's assumption. It is divided into four parts: 1. Direct negation; 2. Raising a question; 3. Quoting a verse; 4. Explaining the verse. This is direct negation. Suppose you forcefully use expedient speech, saying that space is existent (thesis), because it is not encompassed by any dharma without self-nature (reason), whatever is not encompassed by dharma without self-nature is existent, such as form and mind, etc. (example). If it were not existent, it would not be not encompassed by dharma without self-nature, such as a flower in the sky, etc. (counter-example).' Even with such a statement, it ultimately becomes unreasonable.'
The treatise says, 'Why is that?' Commentary: 'This is raising a question.'
The treatise says, 'Verse: That which has a cause is impermanent.' Commentary: 'This is quoting a verse.' The meaning of this verse is: The permanent dharma that you establish, does it have a cause or is it without a cause? If it is without a cause, like a flower in the sky, its nature is not existent. If it has a cause, like mind and mental factors, it is not permanent.'
The treatise says, 'Treatise: Even if they...arise from association.' Commentary: 'The following is an explanation of the verse. First, a direct explanation of the verse, then because of refuting different attachments, first a direct refutation, then a conclusion of faults, a universal difficulty. This is direct refutation.' Space, etc., is not permanent (thesis), because it has a cause (reason), whatever has a cause is not permanent, such as that which is associated with suffering, such as mind and mental factors associated with the feeling of suffering (example), like ashes and charcoal, etc., produced by a blazing fire (example). In order to make the sentence complete, it is discussed separately and together.
The treatise says, 'This reason can then contradict the root.' Commentary: 'This is concluding the fault.' This is the fault of contradiction of the difference of dharma. The externalist's inference takes space as the self-characteristic of the subject, which is the self-characteristic of conditioned dharma. Within the self-characteristic of dharma, there is permanence and impermanence, intending to only take permanence and not take impermanence. This permanence is the difference of dharma. Now the externalist establishes the reason in order to accomplish its permanence. The master of the treatise now objects, saying that since space has a cause, it becomes impermanent. This impermanence contradicts permanence, and is called contradiction. Therefore, it is the fault of the reason contradicting the difference of dharma. Its self-characteristic of dharma, etc.'
四宗並是所立皆名根本。由因破本故名違害根本。
論云。雖無生因至即為極成 述曰。此通難也。外伏難云。論主既以從因所生心心法等為其同喻。則空等上無彼生因。所言有因有不成過。論主今通云。因有二種。一生。如種生芽等。二了。如燈了物等。其心心法等如彼芽等從因而生。其虛空等如闇中物由因顯了。雖空等上無彼生因而有了因。以有因之言總攝生了故極成也。如聲言所作但是咽喉等作。瓶言所作但是泥輪等作。兩作雖殊總言所作。得是正因。今此亦爾。
論云。複次有執至比量不成 述曰。此下因破異執也。初敘難。后正破。此敘難也。非但前破勝論。亦復因破數論。故言複次也。數論師難言。我立諸法性皆是常。汝立諸法皆無常性。由汝所立一切無常我立常宗。遂無同喻。亦由我立一切常住故汝立無常。喻亦不成。此則過失是同。何偏難我乃云無常理是常義非耶。
論云。此亦不然過同前過故 述曰。此下正破也。初同前破。后顯異破。此同前三破也。一同前能生果不生果常破。二同前若有性從緣生非緣生非有性破。三同前無因非有有因非常破。
論云。又彼雖立至及非有故 述曰。此下顯異破。此明我無常宗有同法喻。汝執常宗無同法喻。故有異也。有三。一顯內喻成
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 四宗（Sizong，四種根本主張）都是各自所建立的，都被稱為根本。因為破斥對方的根本主張，所以叫做違害根本。
論中說：『即使沒有生因，達到極致也成為極成。』 述記中說：這是通用的責難。外人反駁說：論主既然以從因所生的心和心法等作為同喻，那麼在虛空等之上沒有那樣的生因，所說的『有因』就有了不成立的過失。論主現在解釋說：因有兩種，一是生因，如種子生出芽等；二是了因，如燈照亮物體等。那些心和心法等，就像芽等一樣從因而生；而虛空等，就像黑暗中的物體一樣由因顯現。雖然虛空等之上沒有那樣的生因，但有了了因。因為『有因』這個詞總括了生因和了因，所以是極成的。就像說『所作』，只是咽喉等的作用；說『瓶』，只是泥輪等的作用。兩種作用雖然不同，但總稱為『所作』，就可以作為正因。現在這裡也是這樣。
論中說：『其次，有人執著乃至比量不成。』 述記中說：下面是用因來破斥不同的主張。先敘述責難，然後正式破斥。這裡是敘述責難。不只是前面破斥勝論，也用因來破斥數論，所以說『其次』。數論師責難說：我立諸法的自性都是常，你立諸法都是無常的自性。由於你所立的一切都是無常，我立常宗，就沒有同喻。也由於我立一切常住，所以你立無常，比喻也不成立。這兩種過失是相同的，為什麼偏偏責難我，說無常的道理是常義，而不是常理呢？
論中說：『這也是不對的，過失和前面的過失相同。』 述記中說：下面是正式破斥。先是和前面一樣破斥，然後顯示不同的破斥。這裡和前面三種破斥相同。一是和前面能生果、不生果的常破斥相同；二是和前面若有自性從緣生，非緣生，非有自性的破斥相同；三是和前面無因不是有，有因不是常的破斥相同。
論中說：『而且他雖然立乃至以及非有，所以。』 述記中說：下面是顯示不同的破斥。這裡說明我的無常宗有同法喻，你執著的常宗沒有同法喻，所以有不同。有三點。一是顯示內喻成立。
【English Translation】 English version: The four doctrines (Sizong, four fundamental tenets) are all established by themselves and are called fundamental. Because refuting the other party's fundamental tenets is called violating the fundamental.
The treatise says: 'Even without a productive cause, reaching the ultimate becomes established.' The commentary says: This is a common refutation. An outsider retorts: Since the treatise master uses mind and mental functions, etc., produced from causes as a similar example, then there is no such productive cause on emptiness, etc., and the so-called 'having a cause' has the fault of not being established. The treatise master now explains: There are two kinds of causes, one is the productive cause, such as a seed producing a sprout, etc.; the other is the revealing cause, such as a lamp illuminating objects, etc. Those mind and mental functions, etc., are produced from causes like sprouts, etc.; while emptiness, etc., are revealed by causes like objects in the dark. Although there is no such productive cause on emptiness, etc., there is a revealing cause. Because the word 'having a cause' encompasses both productive and revealing causes, it is established. Just like saying 'what is made' is only the function of the throat, etc.; saying 'a pot' is only the function of the clay wheel, etc. Although the two functions are different, they are generally called 'what is made', which can be used as a valid reason. It is the same here.
The treatise says: 'Secondly, some hold on to, until the inference is not established.' The commentary says: Below, the reason is used to refute different views. First, the refutation is narrated, and then it is formally refuted. Here, the refutation is narrated. It is not only the previous refutation of Vaisheshika, but also the use of reason to refute Samkhya, so it is said 'secondly'. The Samkhya master refutes: I establish that the nature of all dharmas is permanent, and you establish that all dharmas are impermanent in nature. Because everything you establish is impermanent, I establish the permanent doctrine, so there is no similar example. Also, because I establish everything as permanent, your establishment of impermanence is not established as an analogy. These two faults are the same, why do you specifically refute me, saying that the principle of impermanence is the meaning of permanence, and not the principle of permanence?
The treatise says: 'This is also not right, the fault is the same as the previous fault.' The commentary says: Below is the formal refutation. First, it is refuted in the same way as before, and then different refutations are shown. Here it is the same as the previous three refutations. First, it is the same as the previous refutation of the permanent of being able to produce a result and not being able to produce a result; second, it is the same as the previous refutation that if there is a nature that arises from conditions, it is not from conditions, and it is not a nature; third, it is the same as the previous refutation that without a cause it is not existent, and with a cause it is not permanent.
The treatise says: 'Moreover, although he establishes, until and because it is non-existent.' The commentary says: Below is the display of different refutations. Here it is explained that my impermanent doctrine has a similar example, and your permanent doctrine that you hold on to does not have a similar example, so there is a difference. There are three points. First, it shows that the internal analogy is established.
。二破外救義。三結宗顯異。此即顯內喻成也。先敘外計。次顯喻成。后引外證。數論師立苦樂癡三德體是其常為二十三諦。自性名之為隱。大我慢等相有生滅名之為顯。此敘外計也。由此顯相有生滅故。足能顯汝宗中有無常。有性以為同喻。破汝宗中三德常性也。苦樂癡三定是無常(宗)以有性故(因)如所生果(喻)問。佛法義中不立隱性。何故論主以之為宗。答。此之三德本是佛法三毒三受種子伏在阿賴耶識中生滅相續。外道不了謂為隱性體是其常。論主取此以之為宗。故無過也。又釋。此令外人自立比量。縱非所許亦得為宗。此顯喻成也。即彼數論金七十論中自遮破顯相是常。由大慢等相改易故。及遮非有。由大慢等用苦樂癡為其體故。故此顯相證無常喻理得成就。此引外證也。
論云。若說顯相至何所造耶 述曰。此下破外救義也。有三。初破相無生滅。次破相有隱顯。后破體無位有。此破相無生滅也。若汝說言相雖隱顯以用三德為其體故。二無生滅者。此牒救也。前位無等者正破也。謂若無生滅者。大等前位生我慢等。后位之時應當無減也。我慢等后位從大等前位正生之時應亦無增也。若無增減者。汝師劫比羅等諸造論者為誰造耶。以弟子等不可轉愚成智無增益故。何所造耶。以所造論是聲唯量所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 二、破斥外道的辯解，三、總結並彰顯本宗的差異。這即是彰顯內喻的成立。首先敘述外道的計論，其次彰顯比喻的成立，最後引用外道的證據。 數論師主張苦、樂、癡三種屬性是實體，它們是常恒不變的，構成二十三種實體（tattva）。自性（Prakriti）被稱為『隱』（avyakta），大我慢（Mahat-ahamkara）等具有生滅變化的現象被稱為『顯』（vyakta）。這是敘述外道的計論。 由於這些顯現的現象有生滅變化，足以顯示你的宗派中存在無常的事物。以有生滅的性質作為共同的比喻，破斥你宗派中三德（triguna）常恒不變的性質。苦、樂、癡三種屬性必定是無常的（宗），因為它們具有生滅的性質（因），就像所產生的果實一樣（喻）。 問：佛法義理中不設立隱性的概念，為什麼論主以此作為宗呢？答：這三種屬性本質上是佛法中的三毒（貪嗔癡）、三受（苦樂舍）的種子，潛伏在阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijnana）中，生滅相續不斷。外道不了解這一點，認為它們是隱性的實體，並且是常恒不變的。論主取用這一點作為宗，所以沒有過失。另一種解釋是，這是爲了讓外道自己建立比量（anumana）。即使不是我們所認可的，也可以作為宗。 這是彰顯比喻的成立。即在數論的《金七十論》（Samkhyakarika）中，他們自己遮破了顯相是常恒不變的觀點，因為大我慢等現象會發生改變。並且也遮破了顯相不存在的觀點，因為大我慢等的作用以苦、樂、癡為本體。因此，用這些顯相來證明無常的比喻在道理上是能夠成立的。這是引用外道的證據。 論中說：『如果說顯相，那麼是誰創造了它們呢？』 以下是破斥外道的辯解，分為三個部分：首先破斥顯相沒有生滅，其次破斥顯相有隱顯，最後破斥本體沒有位次的有。這是破斥顯相沒有生滅的觀點。如果你說顯相雖然有隱顯，但以三德作為其本體，所以沒有生滅，這是重複外道的辯解。『前位無等者』，這是正式的破斥。如果說沒有生滅，那麼大等（Mahat）在前位產生我慢等（Ahamkara）時，大等應當沒有減少。我慢等在後位從大等前位產生時，也應當沒有增加。如果沒有增減，那麼你的老師迦毗羅（Kapila）等造論者是誰創造的呢？因為弟子等不可能從愚笨轉變為智慧，沒有增益，所以是誰創造了呢？因為所造的論是聲音，僅僅是衡量的標準。
【English Translation】 English version 2. Refuting the Outsider's Defense, 3. Concluding and Highlighting the Differences of Our School. This is to demonstrate the establishment of the internal analogy. First, narrate the outsider's theory; second, demonstrate the establishment of the analogy; and finally, cite the outsider's evidence. The Samkhya school asserts that the three attributes of suffering (dukha), pleasure (sukha), and delusion (moha) are entities, and they are constant, constituting the twenty-three principles (tattva). Primordial Nature (Prakriti) is called 'unmanifest' (avyakta), while phenomena such as Mahat-ahamkara (Great Ego-sense) that have arising and ceasing are called 'manifest' (vyakta). This is a narration of the outsider's theory. Because these manifest phenomena have arising and ceasing, it is sufficient to show that there are impermanent things in your school. Using the nature of having arising and ceasing as a common analogy, refute the constant nature of the three attributes (triguna) in your school. The three attributes of suffering, pleasure, and delusion must be impermanent (thesis), because they have the nature of arising (reason), like the fruit that is produced (example). Question: The Buddhist doctrine does not establish the concept of the unmanifest. Why does the treatise-maker use this as the thesis? Answer: These three attributes are essentially the seeds of the three poisons (greed, hatred, delusion) and the three feelings (suffering, pleasure, indifference) in Buddhism, latent in the Alaya-vijnana (store consciousness), arising and ceasing continuously. The outsiders do not understand this and think that they are unmanifest entities and are constant. The treatise-maker uses this as the thesis, so there is no fault. Another explanation is that this is to allow the outsiders to establish their own inference (anumana). Even if it is not what we acknowledge, it can be used as the thesis. This is to demonstrate the establishment of the analogy. That is, in the Samkhya's 'Golden Seventy' (Samkhyakarika), they themselves refute the view that the manifest is constant, because phenomena such as Mahat-ahamkara change. And they also refute the view that the manifest does not exist, because the function of Mahat-ahamkara has suffering, pleasure, and delusion as its essence. Therefore, using these manifest phenomena to prove the analogy of impermanence can be established in reason. This is citing the outsider's evidence. The treatise says: 'If we talk about the manifest, then who created them?' The following is to refute the outsider's defense, divided into three parts: first, refute that the manifest does not have arising and ceasing; second, refute that the manifest has unmanifest and manifest; and finally, refute that the essence does not have positional existence. This is to refute the view that the manifest does not have arising and ceasing. If you say that although the manifest has unmanifest and manifest, it takes the three attributes as its essence, so it does not have arising and ceasing, this is repeating the outsider's defense. 'The former position without equality,' this is the formal refutation. If it is said that there is no arising and ceasing, then when Mahat (Great) produces Ahamkara (Ego-sense) in the former position, Mahat should not decrease. When Ahamkara arises from the former position of Mahat in the latter position, it should also not increase. If there is no increase or decrease, then who created your teachers Kapila (Kapila) and other treatise-makers? Because disciples cannot transform from foolishness to wisdom, without increase, so who created them? Because the created treatise is sound, it is merely a standard of measurement.
攝亦不增故。此難意言。弟子若無所益。不勞為之造論。既其轉愚成智即是前減后增。又論若本來自有。何須汝師更造。如其先無今有亦是前減后增。增減顯然理有生滅也。
論云。若謂諸法至有何隱顯 述曰。此破相有隱顯也。外人救云。弟子舍愚成智。此是智顯愚隱。我師製造諸論。此亦本隱今顯。隱顯自可有殊。而體無生滅者。此亦不然也。下論主正破云。若無生滅者。即前位不滅后位不生。生滅既無便無差別。若無差別即無增減。增減既無有何隱顯。
論云。又離體外至體應然 述曰。此下破體無位有也。初破體無隱顯。后破體無生滅。此即初破也。外人救云。二十四諦前後諸位有隱有顯。體皆三德而無隱顯。論主破云。位依體立離體無位。位有隱顯。體亦應爾也。三德之體有隱有顯(宗)不異位故(因)如位(喻)又前後之位應無隱顯(宗)不異體故(因)如體(喻)。
論云。汝雖不欲至必應信受 述曰。此破體無生滅也。三德之體應有生滅(宗)不異位故(因)如位(喻)又前後之位應無生滅(宗)不異體故(因)如體(喻)此以前文成位隱顯。是生滅故得為喻也。
論云。如是所立至定非有故 述曰。此結宗顯異也。文中先顯我有。后顯他無。故有異喻也。
論云。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
『攝亦不增故』。這是爲了反駁對方的觀點。如果弟子沒有獲得任何益處，那就不值得為他們造論。既然他們從愚昧轉變為智慧，那就是之前的減少和之後的增加。而且，如果論著本來就存在，為什麼需要你的老師再去創造？如果它先前不存在而現在存在，這也是之前的減少和之後的增加。增加和減少是顯而易見的，這意味著事物有產生和消滅。 論中說：『若謂諸法至有何隱顯』。這是爲了駁斥事物本體的隱藏和顯現。外道辯解說：『弟子捨棄愚昧而獲得智慧，這是智慧的顯現和愚昧的隱藏。我的老師創造論著，這也是原本隱藏的現在顯現。隱藏和顯現自然可以有不同，但本體沒有產生和消滅。』論主反駁說：『如果沒有產生和消滅，那麼之前的狀態就不會消滅，之後的的狀態就不會產生。既然產生和消滅不存在，那就沒有差別。如果沒有差別，那就沒有增加和減少。既然沒有增加和減少，那又有什麼隱藏和顯現呢？』 論中說：『又離體外至體應然』。這是爲了駁斥本體沒有狀態而狀態有的觀點。首先駁斥本體沒有隱藏和顯現，然後駁斥本體沒有產生和消滅。這是第一次駁斥。外道辯解說：『二十四諦的前後狀態有隱藏和顯現，但本體都是三德，沒有隱藏和顯現。』論主反駁說：『狀態依賴於本體而存在，離開本體就沒有狀態。狀態有隱藏和顯現，本體也應該如此。』三德的本體有隱藏和顯現（宗），因為它與狀態沒有不同（因），就像狀態一樣（喻）。而且，前後的狀態應該沒有隱藏和顯現（宗），因為它與本體沒有不同（因），就像本體一樣（喻）。 論中說：『汝雖不欲至必應信受』。這是爲了駁斥本體沒有產生和消滅。三德的本體應該有產生和消滅（宗），因為它與狀態沒有不同（因），就像狀態一樣（喻）。而且，前後的狀態應該沒有產生和消滅（宗），因為它與本體沒有不同（因），就像本體一樣（喻）。這以前面的論證成立了狀態的隱藏和顯現，因為有產生和消滅，所以可以作為比喻。 論中說：『如是所立至定非有故』。這是總結宗派並顯示差異。文中先顯示我方有，后顯示對方沒有，所以有不同的比喻。 論中說：
【English Translation】 English version:
'Because appropriation does not increase.' This refutes the opponent's argument. If the disciples gain nothing, then it is not worth creating treatises for them. Since they transform from ignorance to wisdom, that is previous decrease and subsequent increase. Moreover, if the treatises originally existed, why would your teacher need to create them? If it previously did not exist and now exists, that is also previous decrease and subsequent increase. Increase and decrease are obvious, which means that things have arising and ceasing. The treatise says: 'If it is said that all dharmas... what concealment and manifestation?' This is to refute the concealment and manifestation of the essence of things. The outsider argues: 'Disciples abandon ignorance and attain wisdom; this is the manifestation of wisdom and the concealment of ignorance. My teacher creates treatises; this is also the manifestation of what was originally concealed.' Concealment and manifestation can naturally be different, but the essence has no arising and ceasing. The treatise master refutes: 'If there is no arising and ceasing, then the previous state will not cease, and the subsequent state will not arise. Since arising and ceasing do not exist, then there is no difference. If there is no difference, then there is no increase and decrease. Since there is no increase and decrease, then what concealment and manifestation is there?' The treatise says: 'Moreover, apart from the essence... the essence should be so.' This is to refute the view that the essence has no states, but the states do. First, refute that the essence has no concealment and manifestation, and then refute that the essence has no arising and ceasing. This is the first refutation. The outsider argues: 'The previous and subsequent states of the twenty-four tattvas (twenty-four categories of existence) have concealment and manifestation, but the essence is all three gunas (three qualities or attributes), without concealment and manifestation.' The treatise master refutes: 'States depend on the essence for their existence; without the essence, there are no states. States have concealment and manifestation; the essence should also be so.' The essence of the three gunas has concealment and manifestation (thesis), because it is not different from the states (reason), just like the states (example). Moreover, the previous and subsequent states should have no concealment and manifestation (thesis), because it is not different from the essence (reason), just like the essence (example). The treatise says: 'Although you do not desire... you must believe and accept.' This is to refute that the essence has no arising and ceasing. The essence of the three gunas should have arising and ceasing (thesis), because it is not different from the states (reason), just like the states (example). Moreover, the previous and subsequent states should have no arising and ceasing (thesis), because it is not different from the essence (reason), just like the essence (example). This uses the previous argument to establish the concealment and manifestation of the states, because there is arising and ceasing, so it can be used as a metaphor. The treatise says: 'Thus, what is established... is definitely non-existent.' This is to summarize the sect and show the difference. The text first shows that we have, and then shows that the other does not have, so there are different metaphors. The treatise says:
又所立義至即可成立 述曰。此下半頌結破也。初生起。次舉頌。后解釋。此生起也。
論云。故次頌曰至真見說非有 述曰。此舉頌也。若因具有三相。比量始可得成。如其隨有所闕比量必無成理。故能立者總名因也。今外道立因既闕三相。雖欲成立空等常宗。如來真見說非有也。或可世間智人照實理者名真見也。
論云。論曰諸有至乃名能立 述曰。此下解釋也。初依頌解釋。后因破異執。前中初示正立。次非邪立。后破救立。此示正立也。如因明中。聲論許瓶無常。然不許聲無常。故佛法立云。聲是無常。所作性故。此所作性具有三相。能成聲論所不許義。名能立也。
論云。若離正因至終不得成 述曰。此非邪立也。若汝離此三相。正因但有虛言義終不立。
論云。有言無因義得成者 述曰。此破救立也。一外救。二內破。三外責。四內通。此外救也。外人意云。法若無常。不由因轉為常。法若是常。不由因變無常。此則法性楷定非人所為。何要須因方成宗義。故空等常住無因自成也。
論云。諸有所立一切應成 述曰。此內破也。常無常法雖實楷定。但由妄執不與法同故。須約因方顯宗義。若汝無因義得成者。諸有所立一切應成也。謂大乘經部立空有名無體。薩婆多等立空
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 又所立的論點如果完備即可成立。解釋說：這以下是後半頌的總結和破斥。首先是生起，然後是舉頌，最後是解釋。這裡是生起。
論中說：所以接著說頌詞，直到『真見說非有』。解釋說：這是舉頌。如果作為論證的『因』具備三種特性（三相），那麼比量才能成立。如果缺少任何一種特性，比量就無法成立。所以，能成立論點的東西總稱為『因』。現在外道所立的『因』既然缺少這三種特性，即使想成立空等常宗，如來的真見也說這是不存在的。或者，世間有智慧的人能夠照見真實道理的，稱為『真見』。
論中說：論曰，諸有，直到『乃名能立』。解釋說：這以下是解釋。首先依據頌詞解釋，然後因為破斥不同的執著。前面部分首先展示正確的立論，然後否定錯誤的立論，最後破斥救援性的立論。這裡是展示正確的立論。例如在因明學中，聲論學派承認瓶子是無常的，但不承認聲音是無常的。所以佛法立論說：聲音是無常的，因為它是被製造出來的（所作性）。這個『所作性』具備三種特性，能夠成立聲論學派所不承認的意義，這被稱為『能立』。
論中說：如果離開正確的『因』，直到『終不得成』。解釋說：這是否定錯誤的立論。如果你離開這三種特性，正確的『因』就只是空話，論點最終無法成立。
論中說：有人說沒有『因』，論點也能成立。解釋說：這是破斥救援性的立論。第一是外救，第二是內破，第三是外責，第四是內通。這是外救。外人的意思是說，法如果無常，不是因為『因』的作用而轉變為常；法如果是常，也不是因為『因』的作用而變為無常。這說明法性是固定的，不是人為的，為什麼需要『因』才能成立宗義呢？所以空等常住的法，不需要『因』也能自己成立。
論中說：凡是所立的論點，一切都應該成立。解釋說：這是內破。常與無常的法雖然確實是固定的，但因為妄想執著，不與法相同，所以需要通過『因』來顯明宗義。如果你們認為沒有『因』，論點也能成立，那麼凡是所立的論點，一切都應該成立。例如，大乘經部宗立論說空有名無體，薩婆多等宗立論說空...
【English Translation】 English version Furthermore, the established thesis can be established if it is complete. Explanation: The following is the summary and refutation of the second half of the verse. First is the arising, then the quoting of the verse, and finally the explanation. This is the arising.
The treatise says: Therefore, the verse is quoted next, until 'true view says non-existence'. Explanation: This is the quoting of the verse. If the 'cause' (hetu) used for argumentation possesses three characteristics (trilaksana), then inference (anumana) can be established. If any of these characteristics are missing, inference cannot be established. Therefore, that which can establish a thesis is generally called 'cause'. Now that the 'cause' established by the heretics lacks these three characteristics, even if they want to establish the eternal doctrines such as emptiness, the Tathagata's true view says that these do not exist. Or, those wise people in the world who can see the true principle are called 'true view'.
The treatise says: The treatise says, 'All that exists,' until 'is called the establisher'. Explanation: The following is the explanation. First, the explanation is based on the verse, and then the different attachments are refuted because of it. The first part shows the correct establishment, then negates the wrong establishment, and finally refutes the rescuing establishment. This is the demonstration of correct establishment. For example, in Hetuvidya (the science of logic), the Sautrantika school admits that a pot is impermanent, but does not admit that sound is impermanent. Therefore, the Buddhist Dharma establishes the thesis: Sound is impermanent, because it is produced (krtakatva). This 'being produced' possesses three characteristics and can establish the meaning that the Sautrantika school does not admit. This is called 'the establisher'.
The treatise says: If one departs from the correct 'cause', until 'ultimately cannot be established'. Explanation: This is the negation of the wrong establishment. If you depart from these three characteristics, the correct 'cause' is just empty words, and the thesis ultimately cannot be established.
The treatise says: Some say that without a 'cause', the thesis can also be established. Explanation: This is the refutation of the rescuing establishment. First is the external rescue, second is the internal refutation, third is the external accusation, and fourth is the internal communication. This is the external rescue. The heretic's meaning is that if a dharma is impermanent, it is not transformed into permanence by the action of 'cause'; if a dharma is permanent, it is not transformed into impermanence by the action of 'cause'. This shows that the nature of dharma is fixed and not man-made. Why is 'cause' needed to establish the doctrine? Therefore, the eternally abiding dharmas such as emptiness can be established by themselves without 'cause'.
The treatise says: Whatever thesis is established, everything should be established. Explanation: This is the internal refutation. Although the dharmas of permanence and impermanence are indeed fixed, because of delusional attachment, they are not the same as the dharma, so it is necessary to use 'cause' to clarify the doctrine. If you think that without 'cause', the thesis can also be established, then whatever thesis is established, everything should be established. For example, the Mahayana Sautrantika school establishes the thesis that emptiness has name but no substance, and the Sarvastivada school establishes the thesis that emptiness...
有體有名。數論師等立空三德為性。勝論師宗九實所攝。如此等宗若不立因並應成就也。
論云。縱一切成仁今何吝 述曰。此外責也。縱一切成於仁何損。仁今不許一何吝耶。
論云。我亦無吝至汝亦不許 述曰。此內通也。彼一切宗立自不成。非是我心有所吝惜。此無因立一切皆成。非我獨遮。汝亦不許。何偏責我有吝惜耶。
論云。複次有餘至曾不差違 述曰。此下因破異執也。初敘執。次總非。后正破。敘執中初敘述邪宗。后敘非正義。此敘述邪宗也。舊云夷陀或云皮陀或云毗陀並訛也。應云吠陀。此云明也。諸婆羅門計四明。聲體是常住。尋本無始故初不待緣。窮末無終故后無壞滅。雖梵王等說但是誦者而非造者。此之常聲效能詮顯五色諸根所不取義。謂虛空極微諸常住法及五色根心心法等其色聲等色根取者不言可知。故言性自能顯越諸根義也。此云常聲詮顯諸法。云善決定善。云惡定惡終不改易。故云為決定量曾不差違也。
論云。現比等量至皆難信受 述曰。此敘非正義也。現量依士夫。謂依士夫五根證境起現量也。比量依見。如見煙比火等。聞嘶比馬等。嗅香比沈等。嘗甘比蜜等。觸重比金等。如所作比無常等。此則六識了境俱名為見。依此諸見起比量也。等者等聲量也。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『有體有名』：數論師等認為空、三德（sattva，rajas，tamas）為自性。勝論師宗認為九種實體所包含。如果這些宗派不設立『因』，那麼一切都應該成立。
論中說：『縱然一切都成就了仁，現在又吝惜什麼呢？』 解釋說：這是外來的責難。縱然一切都成就了仁，又有什麼損失呢？現在你不允許任何一個成立，又吝惜什麼呢？
論中說：『我也不是吝惜，而是你也不允許。』 解釋說：這是內部的溝通。他們一切宗派都認為自己不能成立，不是我心中有所吝惜。這種沒有『因』的立論，一切都會成立，不是我獨自遮止，你也不允許，為什麼偏偏責備我吝惜呢？
論中說：『再次，其餘的直到從未差違。』 解釋說：這是下面用『因』來破斥其他宗派的執著。首先敘述執著，其次總的否定，最後正式破斥。敘述執著中，先敘述邪宗，后敘述非正義。這裡敘述邪宗。舊譯的夷陀，或者皮陀，或者毗陀，都是錯誤的。應該說是吠陀（Veda）。意思是『明』。諸婆羅門認為有四明。聲音的本體是常住的。追尋本源沒有開始，所以最初不依賴因緣。窮盡末端沒有終結，所以最後沒有壞滅。雖然梵天等說，但只是誦讀者而不是創造者。這種常住的聲音，效能詮釋顯現五色諸根所不能獲取的意義。例如虛空、極微等常住的法，以及五色根、心、心法等。那些色聲等色根所能獲取的，不用說也知道。所以說，自效能顯現超越諸根的意義。吠陀說常住的聲音詮釋顯現諸法，說善就決定是善，說惡就決定是惡，終究不會改變。所以說是決定的量，從未差違。
論中說：『現量等量直到都難以信受。』 解釋說：這裡敘述非正義。現量依賴士夫（pudgala），意思是依賴士夫的五根來證明境界，從而產生現量。比量依賴見，例如見到煙就比量有火等，聽到嘶鳴就比量有馬等，嗅到香味就比量有沉香等，嚐到甘甜就比量有蜂蜜等，觸到沉重就比量有金子等。例如所作的比量是無常等。這裡六識了別境界都叫做見。依賴這些見而產生比量。『等』是指等同於聲量。
【English Translation】 English version: 'Having substance and name': The Samkhya school and others posit space and the three Gunas (sattva, rajas, tamas) as nature. The Vaisheshika school holds that it is encompassed by the nine substances. If these schools do not establish a 'cause,' then everything should be accomplished.
The treatise says: 'Even if everything is accomplished in benevolence, what is there to be stingy about now?' Explanation: This is an external accusation. Even if everything is accomplished in benevolence, what loss is there? Now you do not allow any one thing to be established, so what is there to be stingy about?
The treatise says: 'It is not that I am stingy, but that you also do not allow it.' Explanation: This is an internal communication. All their schools believe that they cannot establish themselves; it is not that I am stingy in my heart. This kind of argument without a 'cause' would allow everything to be established; it is not that I alone am preventing it, you also do not allow it, so why do you accuse me of being stingy?
The treatise says: 'Furthermore, the rest until never deviating.' Explanation: This is using 'cause' to refute the attachments of other schools. First, describe the attachments, second, generally negate them, and finally, formally refute them. In describing the attachments, first describe the heretical schools, and then describe the non-orthodox meaning. Here, the heretical schools are described. The old translations of 'Yi Tuo,' or 'Pi Tuo,' or 'Pi Tuo' are all incorrect. It should be 'Veda.' This means 'illumination.' The Brahmins believe in the four illuminations. The essence of sound is permanent. Tracing back to the origin, there is no beginning, so initially it does not depend on conditions. Exhausting the end, there is no end, so ultimately there is no destruction. Although Brahma and others speak of it, they are only reciters and not creators. This permanent sound has the ability to interpret and manifest meanings that the five sense organs cannot grasp, such as space, atoms, and other permanent dharmas, as well as the five sense organs, mind, and mental functions. Those that can be grasped by the sense organs of form and sound are self-evident. Therefore, it is said that the nature itself can manifest meanings that transcend the senses. The Veda says that the permanent sound interprets and manifests all dharmas, saying that good is definitely good, and saying that evil is definitely evil, and it will never change. Therefore, it is said to be a definite measure that never deviates.
The treatise says: 'Direct perception and other measures until are difficult to accept.' Explanation: This describes the non-orthodox meaning. Direct perception relies on the pudgala (individual), meaning that it relies on the five senses of the pudgala to prove the realm, thereby giving rise to direct perception. Inference relies on seeing, such as seeing smoke and inferring fire, hearing a neigh and inferring a horse, smelling a fragrance and inferring incense, tasting sweetness and inferring honey, touching heaviness and inferring gold. For example, the inference of something made is impermanent. Here, the six consciousnesses distinguishing realms are all called seeing. Inference arises based on these seeings. 'Other' refers to being equal to the measure of sound.
比量通依士夫及見故。言現比量等依士夫見也。此即牒正義也。士夫有失等者。外人非也。士夫。有失者。如乘舟東逝則謂河岸西移。指按一目便見兩日。幻事謂為象馬。旋火謂之為輪。故知士夫五根有多過失也。見是疑因者。如人苦寒遠見霧等謂之為煙。遂立比量云彼處有火(宗)以現煙故(因)如廚等處(喻)住彼求火被凍而死。又如盲人慾有所至。以杖尋路得知數步無有坑坎。便立量言。未行之處皆悉平坦(宗)是所行處故(因)如已行處(喻)去杖前行墮險而死。故知依彼六識之見而起比量。未可指的乃是疑為誤因故也。能依士夫現量。能依見比量。能依士夫及見聲量。皆難信受也。
論云此亦不然 述曰。此總非也。
論云。與前所說非愛過咎不不相離故 述曰。此下正破也。初破述己宗。次破非正義。后總結破。此即初也。汝今所執聲常之宗。與前生果即非常。不生即非有。有性從緣生。非生非有性。有因即非常。無因即非有。如此過咎所不愛義不相離故。故汝述宗理不然也。
論云。若所依止至便成自害 述曰。此下破非正義也。但隨救即破復科數。若言所依士夫及見有過。即云能依現比聲量亦有失者。汝吠陀弟子及汝吠陀本師亦是士夫。心中比度亦是其見。依此士夫及見所起現比
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『比量』（Anumana，推論）的有效性依賴於『士夫』（Pudgala，人）及其『見』（Dṛṣṭi，見解），因此，所謂的『現量』（Pratyakṣa，現量）、『比量』等都依賴於人的見解。這實際上是重複了正確的觀點。如果說『士夫』有缺失等問題，那是外道的觀點。『士夫』有缺失，例如，乘坐船隻向東行駛，卻說河岸向西移動；按壓一隻眼睛，卻看到兩個太陽；將幻術變出的東西誤認為是象馬；旋轉的火焰被看作是輪子。因此，可知人的五根有很多過失。如果說『見』是可疑的原因，例如，有人在寒冷中遠遠看到霧氣等，就認為是煙，於是就立下『比量』說：『那個地方有火（宗），因為有煙（因），就像廚房等地方（喻）。』結果住在那裡的人爲了尋找火而被凍死。又如盲人想要去某個地方，用手杖探路，得知幾步之內沒有坑洼，就立下『比量』說：『未行走的地方都是平坦的（宗），因為是可行走的地方（因），就像已經行走的地方（喻）。』結果丟掉手杖向前走，掉進危險的地方而死。因此，可知依賴於六識的見解而產生的『比量』，是不可靠的，是可疑的錯誤原因。無論是依賴於『士夫』的『現量』，還是依賴於『見』的『比量』，還是依賴於『士夫』及其『見』的『聲量』（Śabda，聖言量），都難以令人信服。
論中說：『這也不對。』意思是總體的否定。
論中說：『因為它與前面所說的非可愛過失無法分離。』這是正式的駁斥。首先駁斥自己的宗派，然後駁斥非正義，最後總結駁斥。這是第一個。你現在所堅持的『聲常』（Śabdanitya，聲音常住）的宗派，與前面所說的『生果即非常』（產生的果就是無常），『不生即非有』（不產生就是不存在），『有性從緣生』（有自性的東西從因緣生），『非生非有性』（不是產生也不是有自性），『有因即非常』（有原因就是無常），『無因即非有』（沒有原因就是不存在）等過失所不喜歡的意義無法分離。所以你所說的宗派道理是不成立的。
論中說：『如果所依賴的達到，就會變成自害。』這是駁斥非正義。只是隨著救護就進行駁斥和科判。如果說所依賴的『士夫』和『見』有過失，就說能依賴的『現量』、『比量』、『聲量』也有缺失，那麼你吠陀（Veda，吠陀經）的弟子和你吠陀的本師也是『士夫』，心中的比度也是他們的『見』，依賴這些『士夫』和『見』所產生的『現量』、『比量』
【English Translation】 English version The validity of 『Anumana』 (inference) depends on 『Pudgala』 (person) and their 『Dṛṣṭi』 (view), therefore, so-called 『Pratyakṣa』 (perception), 『Anumana』 etc. all depend on the views of people. This is actually repeating the correct view. If it is said that 『Pudgala』 has defects etc., that is the view of outsiders. 『Pudgala』 has defects, for example, when riding a boat eastward, one says that the riverbank is moving westward; pressing one eye, one sees two suns; mistaking illusory things for elephants and horses; seeing a rotating fire as a wheel. Therefore, it can be known that human's five senses have many faults. If it is said that 『Dṛṣṭi』 is a doubtful cause, for example, someone in the cold sees fog etc. from afar and thinks it is smoke, then establishes an 『Anumana』 saying: 『There is fire in that place (thesis), because there is smoke (reason), like in a kitchen etc. (example).』 As a result, the person living there freezes to death while looking for fire. Also, if a blind person wants to go somewhere, uses a cane to explore the road, and learns that there are no pits within a few steps, then establishes an 『Anumana』 saying: 『The places not yet walked are all flat (thesis), because they are walkable places (reason), like the places already walked (example).』 As a result, he drops the cane and walks forward, falling into a dangerous place and dying. Therefore, it can be known that the 『Anumana』 arising from the views of the six consciousnesses is unreliable and a doubtful cause of error. Whether it is 『Pratyakṣa』 relying on 『Pudgala』, or 『Anumana』 relying on 『Dṛṣṭi』, or 『Śabda』 (scriptural testimony) relying on 『Pudgala』 and their 『Dṛṣṭi』, all are difficult to be believed.
The treatise says: 『This is also not right.』 Meaning a total negation.
The treatise says: 『Because it cannot be separated from the undesirable faults mentioned earlier.』 This is a formal refutation. First refute one's own school, then refute non-righteousness, and finally summarize the refutation. This is the first. The doctrine of 『Śabdanitya』 (sound is eternal) that you now adhere to cannot be separated from the undesirable meanings of the faults mentioned earlier, such as 『produced result is impermanent』, 『not produced is non-existent』, 『having nature arises from conditions』, 『neither produced nor having nature』, 『having cause is impermanent』, 『without cause is non-existent』. Therefore, the doctrine you speak of is not established.
The treatise says: 『If what is relied upon is achieved, it will become self-harm.』 This is refuting non-righteousness. Just follow the rescue and refute and classify. If it is said that the 『Pudgala』 and 『Dṛṣṭi』 relied upon have faults, and then say that the 『Pratyakṣa』, 『Anumana』, and 『Śabda』 that can be relied upon also have defects, then your disciples of the Veda and your teachers of the Veda are also 『Pudgala』, and the inferences in their minds are also their 『Dṛṣṭi』. The 『Pratyakṣa』 and 『Anumana』 arising from relying on these 『Pudgala』 and 『Dṛṣṭi』
及聲常言亦是之量。皆有過失。亦不可信。云何獨言他不可信。汝今所發士夫見言有過失故不可信者。非但破他亦自害也。
論云。若汝意謂至所立宗義 述曰。此破轉救也。外人轉救云。非但吠陀聲為定量。我及我師所發言詞亦是定量。自余言聲非是定量論主破云。此無成立比量道理。但汝實愛自宗有此妄執也。汝本宗立吠陀聲常為決定量。今為難逼便言我及我師所發之言亦是定量。此則自違所立宗義。即是自教相違過也。
論云。又以比量至則為自害 述曰。此破常聲所立因喻也。外人量云。此明論聲非士夫造(宗)能造者名不可知故(因)諸能造者名不可知者皆非士夫造如虛空等(同喻)又此明論聲體是常住(宗)能造之人不可得故(因)如虛空等(喻)論主破云。汝初因云能造者名不可知者。此明論如聲。為如空等能造者名不可知故非夫造耶。為曠野中丘並能造者名不可為知是士造耶。此則汝因有不定過。又汝自許此明論聲無有造者。然佛弟子不許此義。此則復因有隨一不成過。又此二量以空為喻。大乘不許。喻亦不得成。故汝因喻應更須立也。設復強為方便立聲常因。因若得成則為自害。謂本為成常須立因喻。因喻若有便即非常。以有因法皆非常故。
論云。又明論聲至餘聲無常 述曰
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
以及聲稱自己的言論也是可靠的標準，這些都存在過失，因此不可信。為何唯獨說別人的話不可信呢？你現在所說的，認為士夫（pudgala，指人）的言論因為有過失所以不可信，這不僅否定了別人，也傷害了自己。 論中說：『如果你的意思是說，對於所建立的宗義……』 述曰：這是爲了駁斥對方的辯解。外人辯解說：『不僅僅是吠陀（Veda，古印度教的聖典）的聲音是可靠的標準，我和我的老師所說的話也是可靠的標準，其餘的言論則不是可靠的標準。』論主駁斥說：『這沒有成立比量的道理，只不過是你實在太愛自己的宗派，所以有這種虛妄的執著罷了。』你原本的宗派主張吠陀的聲音是永恒不變的可靠標準，現在爲了應對詰難，就說我和我的老師所說的話也是可靠的標準，這便違背了自己所建立的宗義，也就是自教相違的過失。 論中說：『又以比量……則為自害』 述曰：這是爲了駁斥常聲所立的因喻。外人立量說：『這部《明論》的聲音不是士夫所造（宗），因為能造它的人的名字不可知（因），凡是能造者名字不可知的，都不是士夫所造，比如虛空等（同喻）。』又說：『這部《明論》的聲音是常住的（宗），因為能造它的人不可得（因），比如虛空等（喻）。』論主駁斥說：『你最初的因說能造者名字不可知。這部《明論》的聲音，是像虛空一樣，因為能造者名字不可知所以不是士夫所造呢？還是像曠野中的土丘一樣，雖然能造者名字不可知，但卻是士夫所造呢？』這樣，你的因就有了不定過的毛病。而且，你自己承認這部《明論》的聲音沒有製造者，然而佛陀的弟子們並不認可這種說法。這樣，你的因又有了隨一不成過的毛病。而且，這兩個比量都以虛空作為比喻，大乘佛教並不認可，所以這個比喻也不能成立。因此，你的因和喻應該重新建立。假設你勉強方便地建立聲音是常的因，如果這個因能夠成立，那麼就會傷害你自己。因為本來爲了成立『常』，必須建立因和喻，如果有了因和喻，那麼就不是『常』了，因為有因法的都是無常的。 論中說：『又《明論》的聲音……其餘聲音無常』 述曰：
【English Translation】 English version:
And claiming that one's own words are also a reliable standard, all of these have faults and are therefore untrustworthy. Why only say that others' words are untrustworthy? What you are saying now, that the words of a pudgala (person) are untrustworthy because they have faults, not only negates others but also harms yourself. The treatise says: 'If you mean that, regarding the established tenet...' Commentary: This is to refute the opponent's defense. The outsider defends by saying: 'Not only is the sound of the Veda (ancient Hindu scriptures) a reliable standard, but also the words spoken by me and my teacher are reliable standards, while other words are not reliable standards.' The treatise master refutes by saying: 'There is no reason to establish this inference, it is just that you love your own sect too much, so you have this false attachment.' Your original sect claimed that the sound of the Veda is an eternal and unchanging reliable standard, but now, in order to cope with the difficulties, you say that the words spoken by me and my teacher are also reliable standards, which violates the tenet you have established, that is, the fault of contradicting your own teachings. The treatise says: 'Also, with inference... then it is self-harming.' Commentary: This is to refute the cause and analogy established for permanent sound. The outsider establishes the inference by saying: 'The sound of this Ming Lun (Treatise on Clarity) is not made by a pudgala (subject), because the name of the maker is unknowable (cause), and whatever is made by someone whose name is unknowable is not made by a pudgala, like space, etc. (example).' And says: 'The sound of this Ming Lun is permanent (subject), because the maker is unobtainable (cause), like space, etc. (analogy).' The treatise master refutes by saying: 'Your initial cause says that the name of the maker is unknowable. Is the sound of this Ming Lun, like space, not made by a pudgala because the name of the maker is unknowable? Or is it like a mound in the wilderness, although the name of the maker is unknowable, it is made by a pudgala?' In this way, your cause has the fault of being uncertain. Moreover, you yourself admit that the sound of this Ming Lun has no maker, but the disciples of the Buddha do not accept this statement. In this way, your cause also has the fault of being partially unestablished. Moreover, these two inferences both use space as an analogy, which is not recognized by Mahayana Buddhism, so this analogy cannot be established. Therefore, your cause and analogy should be re-established. Suppose you forcibly and conveniently establish the cause of sound being permanent, if this cause can be established, then it will harm yourself. Because originally, in order to establish 'permanence', it is necessary to establish cause and analogy, and if there is cause and analogy, then it is not 'permanent', because whatever has a cause is impermanent. The treatise says: 'Also, the sound of Ming Lun... other sounds are impermanent.' Commentary:
。此又立量破也。此明論聲定是無常(宗)是聲性故(因)如所餘聲(喻)。
論云。亦不可說至成常無常 述曰。此破遮救也。
論云。不可說言至非道理故 述曰。此又破轉救也。
論云。若法隨人至取所餘見 述曰。此又重破也。若法隨人情計而轉。謂情計其常法即常。情計無常法即無常者。應舍自宗所執聲常。取所餘見立聲無常。何為因執聲是常耶。
論云又立常者至或舍自意 述曰。此又責無同喻立義不成。謂外人立云。明論聲常(宗)無造緣故(因)諸無造緣者皆悉是常如虛空等(同喻)若是無常即有造緣如瓶盆等(異喻)然大乘宗中不許空常故無同喻。但有異喻宗不成也。言或舍自意者。設汝方便強立量云明論常言決定是實(宗)余不實言所不攝故(因)如余實言(喻)既汝期心強立常因。因若成翻失常性。常性既失則違本心。故云或舍自意也。
論云。是故彼宗至都無實義 述曰。此總結破也。
論云。複次有餘至即名能立 述曰。此下頌約闕喻破也即顯因有相違。初生起。次舉頌。后解釋。生起中初破唯異能立。后顯因有相違。初中有四。一敘計。二總非。三徴問。四正破。敘計中有四。一標宗。二釋義。三舉法。四結定。此即標宗也。諸外道等為立常宗既
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這又是建立論式來破斥對方的觀點。這裡說明論題的聲音一定是無常的（宗），原因是聲音具有聲的性質（因），就像其餘的聲音一樣（喻）。
論中說：『也不可說……成為常或無常』，這是爲了駁斥對方的辯護。
論中說：『不可說……因為不合道理』，這是又一次駁斥對方的轉救。
論中說：『如果法隨著人們的情感計算而轉移……採取其餘的見解』，這是又一次的重複駁斥。如果法隨著人們的情感計算而轉移，意思是如果情感計算它是常法，那麼它就是常法；如果情感計算它是無常法，那麼它就是無常法。那麼就應該捨棄自己宗派所執著的『聲音是常』的觀點，而採取其餘的見解，認為聲音是無常的。為什麼還要因為執著于『聲音是常』呢？
論中說：『又建立常的觀點的人……或者捨棄自己的意願』，這是又一次責備對方沒有同喻，導致建立的論式不能成立。意思是外道建立論式說：論題的聲音是常的（宗），因為沒有造作的因緣（因），凡是沒有造作因緣的事物都是常的，比如虛空等（同喻）；如果是無常的，那麼就有造作的因緣，比如瓶子、盆子等（異喻）。然而，大乘宗派中不承認虛空是常的，所以沒有同喻。只有異喻，因此論式不能成立。『或者捨棄自己的意願』，意思是假設你爲了方便，勉強建立論式說：論題中常的言論一定是真實的（宗），因為它不被其餘不真實的言論所包含（因），就像其餘真實的言論一樣（喻）。既然你一心想要勉強建立常的因，如果這個因成立了，反而會失去常的性質。常的性質既然失去了，就違背了你原本的心意。所以說『或者捨棄自己的意願』。
論中說：『因此，他們的宗派……都沒有實際意義』，這是總結性的駁斥。
論中說：『再次，有其餘的人……就叫做能立』，這下面是用缺少比喻來破斥對方的觀點，即顯示因有相違之處。首先是生起，然後是舉頌，最後是解釋。生起中，首先破斥唯有異喻的能立，然後顯示因有相違之處。首先，在第一部分中有四個方面：一是敘述對方的觀點，二是總體的否定，三是提問，四是正式的破斥。敘述對方的觀點中有四個方面：一是標立宗，二是解釋意義，三是舉出法，四是總結確定。這裡就是標立宗。
【English Translation】 English version: This is again establishing a logical argument to refute the opponent's viewpoint. Here it clarifies that the sound of the proposition must be impermanent (thesis), because sound has the nature of sound (reason), just like other sounds (example).
The treatise says: 'It cannot be said...becoming permanent or impermanent,' this is to refute the opponent's defense.
The treatise says: 'It cannot be said...because it is unreasonable,' this is another refutation of the opponent's counter-argument.
The treatise says: 'If a dharma changes according to people's emotional calculations...adopt the remaining views,' this is another repeated refutation. If a dharma changes according to people's emotional calculations, meaning if emotions calculate it as a permanent dharma, then it is a permanent dharma; if emotions calculate it as an impermanent dharma, then it is an impermanent dharma. Then one should abandon the view held by one's own school that 'sound is permanent,' and adopt the remaining view that sound is impermanent. Why still cling to 'sound is permanent'?
The treatise says: 'Moreover, those who establish the view of permanence...or abandon their own intention,' this is another accusation that the opponent lacks a similar example, leading to the failure of establishing the argument. It means that the externalists establish an argument saying: the sound of the proposition is permanent (thesis), because there is no causative condition (reason), all things without causative conditions are permanent, such as space (similar example); if it is impermanent, then there is a causative condition, such as bottles, basins, etc. (dissimilar example). However, the Mahayana school does not acknowledge that space is permanent, so there is no similar example. There is only a dissimilar example, therefore the argument cannot be established. 'Or abandon their own intention' means that if you, for convenience, forcibly establish an argument saying: the permanent statement in the proposition must be true (thesis), because it is not included in the remaining untrue statements (reason), just like the remaining true statements (example). Since you wholeheartedly want to forcibly establish the cause of permanence, if this cause is established, it will instead lose the nature of permanence. Since the nature of permanence is lost, it violates your original intention. Therefore, it is said 'or abandon their own intention.'
The treatise says: 'Therefore, their school...has no real meaning at all,' this is a concluding refutation.
The treatise says: 'Furthermore, there are others...which is called establishment,' this below is using the lack of analogy to refute the opponent's viewpoint, which shows that the cause has contradictory aspects. First is the arising, then the quoting of the verse, and finally the explanation. In the arising, first refute the establishment of only dissimilar examples, and then show that the cause has contradictory aspects. First, in the first part, there are four aspects: one is to narrate the opponent's viewpoint, two is the overall negation, three is the question, and four is the formal refutation. There are four aspects in narrating the opponent's viewpoint: one is to establish the thesis, two is to explain the meaning, three is to cite the dharma, and four is to summarize and determine. Here is the establishment of the thesis.
無同喻。迷情不息遂云。宗成但須異喻。不必要藉同喻方成。
論云。異法遍故 述曰。此下釋義也。三義為三。此第一義也。立同爲表。立異為遮。同法喻言諸所作者但表瓶之所作。皆無常者但表瓶之無常。其異法喻言若是其常者即遮瓶之無常。見非所作者即遮瓶之所作。所以同法不表異喻力劣不成能立。異喻能遮同法用勝獨得立宗。此則異喻外遮勢力遍其同法。同法直能內表為用不至異中。故言異法遍故唯能立也。有人釋言。異法遍故者。凡所立宗皆有異喻。若內法喻或有或無。既異法喻遍一切宗。故唯異喻名能立者。此亦不然也。準下破文云若無同喻何所遍耶者。此以同喻為其所遍。何得以宗為所遍耶。有人破此釋云。如掌珍論中真性有為空如幻緣生故者。此無異喻。以一切法無非空故。又如數論立一切常亦無異喻。以一切法無非常故。此則諸宗不必皆有。何得釋言遍一切宗者。此不然也。如掌珍云。為遮異品立異法喻。異品無故遮義已成。是故頌中不說異喻者。此釋喻中不說于異喻所以不言。此宗雖無異喻。即次文云。辨釋時假立比量亦無有過者。此明有異喻也。辨釋時者對敵立論時也。謂眼等是空(宗)以緣生故(因)諸緣生者皆悉是空猶如幻事(同喻)若非是空即非緣生猶如兔角(異喻)本立空宗
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 無同喻。迷情不息，遂云：『宗（命題）成立，但須異喻（反例），不必要藉同喻（正例）方能成立。』
論曰：『異法遍故。』 述曰：此下解釋意義。三義為三，此為第一義。立同喻為表詮，立異喻為遮詮。同法喻（相似例）說『凡是所作的，都像瓶子一樣是所作的』，只表詮瓶子的所作；『凡是無常的，都像瓶子一樣是無常的』，只表詮瓶子的無常。而異法喻（相異例）說『凡是常的，就遮止瓶子的無常』，『見到不是所作的，就遮止瓶子的所作』。所以同法喻不能表詮，異喻力量弱，不能成立能立（論證）。異喻能遮止同法喻，作用殊勝，獨自能成立宗（命題）。這是因為異喻從外遮止的勢力遍及同法喻，而同法喻只能從內表詮，作用不能到達異喻。所以說『異法遍故』，唯有異喻才能成立能立。
有人解釋說：『異法遍故』，是指凡是所立的宗（命題）都有異喻，而同法喻或者有或者沒有。既然異喻遍及一切宗（命題），所以只有異喻才能稱為能立。這種說法也是不對的。根據下面的破斥文『如果沒有同喻，什麼才能遍及呢？』，這裡是以同喻作為其所遍及的對象，怎麼能以宗（命題）作為所遍及的對象呢？
有人反駁這種解釋說：例如《掌珍論》中說『真性是有為的，就像幻象一樣是因緣生起的』，這裡就沒有異喻，因為一切法沒有不是空的。又如數論立『一切都是常的』，也沒有異喻，因為一切法沒有不是常的。這樣看來，各種宗（命題）不一定都有異喻，怎麼能解釋成遍及一切宗（命題）呢？
這種說法也是不對的。如《掌珍論》說：『爲了遮止異品（不同的類別），才立異法喻。』異品沒有，遮止的意義已經成立，所以頌中沒有說異喻。』這是解釋比喻中沒有說異喻的原因。這個宗（命題）雖然沒有異喻，但接下來的文字說：『辨釋時，假立比量也沒有過失。』這說明有異喻。『辨釋時』是指與對方辯論時。例如：眼等是空（宗），因為是因緣生起的（因），凡是因緣生起的都是空，就像幻事一樣（同喻），如果不是空，就不是因緣生起的，就像兔角一樣（異喻）。本意是立空宗（命題）。
【English Translation】 English version Without a similar example (同喻, tongyu). If delusion does not cease, then it is said: 'The proposition (宗, zong) is established, but only a dissimilar example (異喻, yiyu, counter-example) is needed; it is not necessary to rely on a similar example (同喻, tongyu, positive example) for it to be established.'
The treatise says: 'Because the dissimilar method is pervasive.' (異法遍故, yifa bian gu) The commentary says: This below explains the meaning. The three meanings are as three; this is the first meaning. Establishing the similar example is for expression; establishing the dissimilar example is for negation. The similar-method example (同法喻, tongfa yu, example of similarity) says, 'Whatever is made is made like a pot,' only expressing the making of the pot; 'Whatever is impermanent is impermanent like a pot,' only expressing the impermanence of the pot. But the dissimilar-method example (異法喻, yifa yu, example of dissimilarity) says, 'Whatever is permanent negates the impermanence of the pot,' 'Seeing what is not made negates the making of the pot.' Therefore, the similar-method example cannot express negation, and the power of the dissimilar example is weak, unable to establish the proof (能立, nengli). The dissimilar example can negate the similar example; its function is superior, and it alone can establish the proposition (宗, zong). This is because the power of the dissimilar example to negate from the outside pervades the similar example, while the similar example can only express from the inside, and its function does not reach the dissimilar example. Therefore, it is said, 'Because the dissimilar method is pervasive,' only the dissimilar example can establish the proof.
Someone explains, 'Because the dissimilar method is pervasive' means that every established proposition (宗, zong) has a dissimilar example, while the similar example may or may not exist. Since the dissimilar example pervades all propositions (宗, zong), only the dissimilar example can be called the proof. This explanation is also incorrect. According to the refutation below, 'If there is no similar example, what can pervade?' here the similar example is taken as what is pervaded; how can the proposition (宗, zong) be taken as what is pervaded?
Someone refutes this explanation, saying: For example, in the Adornment of the True (掌珍論, Zhangzhen Lun), it says, 'True nature is conditioned, like an illusion arising from causes,' there is no dissimilar example here, because there is no dharma that is not empty. Also, like the Samkhya school establishing 'Everything is permanent,' there is no dissimilar example, because there is no dharma that is not permanent. Thus, various propositions (宗, zong) do not necessarily have dissimilar examples; how can it be explained as pervading all propositions (宗, zong)?
This explanation is also incorrect. As the Adornment of the True says: 'In order to negate the dissimilar category (異品, yipin, different class), the dissimilar-method example is established.' Since the dissimilar category does not exist, the meaning of negation is already established, so the verse does not mention the dissimilar example.' This explains why the dissimilar example is not mentioned in the analogy. Although this proposition (宗, zong) does not have a dissimilar example, the following text says: 'When explaining, there is no fault in hypothetically establishing the inference.' This shows that there is a dissimilar example. 'When explaining' refers to when debating with the opponent. For example: The eye, etc., is empty (宗, zong), because it arises from causes (因, yin, reason), whatever arises from causes is empty, like an illusion (同喻, tongyu, similar example); if it is not empty, it does not arise from causes, like a rabbit's horn (異喻, yiyu, dissimilar example). The original intention is to establish the proposition of emptiness.
為破有執。外人不執兔角為有。論主不可立之為空故。此兔角非所立。空名為不空。此之不空即非緣生故成異喻。問。外人亦不然。為無執幻事為有。論云亦不可立之為空。幻事二言同成異。今答以事。然空元來共許耶。為同今體故言假立得成異喻故無有過。又數論顯相亦許無常所作異喻也。立常宗即有異喻。故得破言異喻不遍一切宗耶。
論云。比量本為遮余義故 述曰。此第二義也。夫立比量之意為遮余義。謂若立無常比量本為遮常。若立常比量為遮無常。立異法喻本亦為遮。順比量勝其同法故唯異喻名能立也。
論云。現見遮相所雜糅緣能顯義故 述曰。此第三義也。立比量言及比量智並遮相所雜糅故方成比量也。如青有二相。一自相。二共相比量。名言但詮青之共相不詮自相。以青自相離名言故。若詮青共相之時。要遮黃等方顯此青。謂非非青故名之為青。若不遮非青喚青。應目黃等比量。意識亦爾。不能緣青自相但取共相。取共相時亦遮余取此。故此青言青智要有遮相雜糅方能詮青及緣青也。異喻亦爾。要有遮相所雜糅方成異喻。此既義同比量故唯異喻名能立也。
論云。為定此義至理應常住 述曰。此舉法也。外人唯立異喻之法。此比量言。空等是常(宗)非所作故(因)諸所作者皆
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：爲了破除對『有』的執著，外道不執著于『兔角』是『有』。論主不應該將它設立為空，因此這個兔角不是所要建立的。『空』這個名稱意味著『不空』，而這個『不空』不是緣起產生的，因此構成了不同的比喻。問：外道也同樣不認為幻事是『有』。論中說也不應該將幻事設立為空。『幻事』這兩個詞語同樣構成了不同。現在用『事』來回答。然而，『空』本來就是共同認可的嗎？因為與現在的本體相同，所以說假立，才能構成不同的比喻，因此沒有過失。此外，數論的顯相也認可無常所作的比喻。如果設立常宗，就有了不同的比喻。因此可以反駁說，不同的比喻並不適用於一切宗派嗎？
論中說：『比量本來是爲了遮遣其他意義。』 解釋說：這是第二個意義。建立比量的意圖是爲了遮遣其他的意義。也就是說，如果建立無常的比量，本來是爲了遮遣常。如果建立常的比量，是爲了遮遣無常。建立異法比喻，本來也是爲了遮遣。因為順比量勝過其同法，所以只有異喻才能成立。
論中說：『現見遮遣的相與所雜糅的緣，才能顯現意義。』 解釋說：這是第三個意義。建立比量的言語以及比量的智慧，都與遮遣的相雜糅，才能構成比量。例如，青色有兩種相：一是自相，二是共相。比量的名言只是詮釋青色的共相，不詮釋自相。因為青色的自相離開了名言。如果詮釋青色的共相時，需要遮遣黃色等，才能顯現這個青色。也就是說，因為不是非青色，所以稱之為青色。如果不遮遣非青色而稱呼青色，就應該把黃色等也看作是比量。比量的意識也是如此，不能緣取青色的自相，只能取共相。取共相的時候，也要遮遣其他的，才能取這個。因此，這個青色的言語和青色的智慧，必須要有遮遣的相雜糅，才能詮釋青色和緣取青色。不同的比喻也是如此，必須要有遮遣的相雜糅，才能構成不同的比喻。既然這個意義與比量相同，所以只有不同的比喻才能成立。
論中說：『爲了確定這個意義，道理應該常住。』 解釋說：這是舉例說明。外道只建立異喻的法。這個比量的言語，空等是常（宗），不是所作的緣故（因），凡是所作的都是...
【English Translation】 English version: To refute the attachment to 'existence,' the non-Buddhist does not adhere to the 'rabbit's horn' as 'existent.' The proponent should not establish it as emptiness, therefore this rabbit's horn is not what is to be established. The name 'emptiness' implies 'non-emptiness,' and this 'non-emptiness' is not produced by dependent origination, thus forming a dissimilar example. Question: The non-Buddhist also does not consider illusion to be 'existent.' The treatise states that illusion should also not be established as emptiness. The two words 'illusion' similarly constitute dissimilarity. Now, we answer with 'thing.' However, is 'emptiness' originally mutually acknowledged? Because it is the same as the present entity, it is said to be provisionally established, thus forming a dissimilar example, and therefore there is no fault. Furthermore, the manifest aspect of Samkhya also acknowledges the impermanent-made example. If the permanent thesis is established, there will be a dissimilar example. Therefore, can it be refuted that the dissimilar example does not apply to all schools?
The treatise states: 'Inference is originally for the purpose of negating other meanings.' Explanation: This is the second meaning. The intention of establishing inference is to negate other meanings. That is, if an inference of impermanence is established, it is originally to negate permanence. If an inference of permanence is established, it is to negate impermanence. Establishing a dissimilar example is also originally for negation. Because the similar inference surpasses its similar example, only the dissimilar example can be established.
The treatise states: 'The directly perceived aspect of negation and the conditions that are mixed together can manifest meaning.' Explanation: This is the third meaning. Establishing the words of inference and the wisdom of inference are both mixed with the aspect of negation, thus forming inference. For example, the color blue has two aspects: one is the self-aspect (svalaksana), and the other is the common aspect (samanya-laksana). The words of inference only explain the common aspect of blue, not the self-aspect. Because the self-aspect of blue is separate from words. If the common aspect of blue is explained, it is necessary to negate yellow, etc., in order to manifest this blue. That is, because it is not non-blue, it is called blue. If non-blue is not negated and blue is called, then yellow, etc., should also be regarded as inference. The consciousness of inference is also like this, it cannot grasp the self-aspect of blue, but only the common aspect. When grasping the common aspect, it is also necessary to negate others in order to grasp this. Therefore, this word of blue and the wisdom of blue must have the aspect of negation mixed in order to explain blue and grasp blue. The dissimilar example is also like this, it must have the aspect of negation mixed in order to form a dissimilar example. Since this meaning is the same as inference, only the dissimilar example can be established.
The treatise states: 'In order to determine this meaning, the principle should be permanent.' Explanation: This is giving an example. The non-Buddhists only establish the dharma of dissimilar examples. This word of inference, emptiness, etc., is permanent (thesis), because it is not made (reason), whatever is made is...
是無常猶如瓶等(異喻)文中但覆成云。瓶等是所作決定是無常。空等既非作理應即是常。此則舉瓶所作無常反證空非所作是常住。故知異法勝因法喻。
論云。此言為顯異法決定 述曰。此結定也。
論云。此亦不然至顯正理故 述曰。此總非也。
論云。所以者何 述曰。此徴問也。所以非汝唯異能立不然者何。
論云。唯顯異義所遮事境名為同喻 述曰。此下正破也。破三義為三。破初義中。初示意。次正破。后遮救。此即示意。即示立同喻之意令外人了知擬生正破也。如立聲無常(宗)所作性故(因)諸所作者皆無常譬如瓶等(同喻)若是其常見非所作如虛空等(異喻)此異喻云若是其常者遮同喻無常也。見非所作者遮同喻所作也。此則瓶事是異喻義。所遮之境名同法喻。此意云。得成異喻要有所遮。所遮若無異喻不立。何得立異而無同喻。
論云。其異法喻至何所遍耶 述曰。此正破也。夫言遍者行自分及他分有能遍有所遍可名為遍。既不立有同法喻。是則異喻但行自分不行他分。既無所遍能遍不成。何名為遍。
論云。不可說言自體自遍 述曰。此遮救也。汝不可救言。異喻向自異喻之中名之為遍。以同法喻亦得遍。自同法喻中不名遍故。
論云。又諸比量
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『是無常猶如瓶等(異喻)』文中，但覆述成為云。『瓶等』是所作，決定是無常。『空等』既然不是所作，理應就是常。這便是舉『瓶』是所作，是無常，反過來證明『空』不是所作，是常住。所以知道異法勝過因法譬喻。 論中說：『此言為顯異法決定』，註釋說：『這是結論。』 論中說：『此亦不然』，註釋說：『這是總體的否定。』 論中說：『所以者何？』，註釋說：『這是提問。』為什麼說你僅僅用異法就能成立是不行的呢？ 論中說：『唯顯異義所遮事境名為同喻』，註釋說：『下面是正式的破斥。』破斥三種意義分為三部分。破斥第一種意義中，先示意，然後正式破斥，最後遮止救護。這便是示意，即顯示建立同喻的意義，讓外人瞭解，準備進行正式的破斥。例如，立論：『聲是無常(宗)，因為是所作性(因)，凡是所作的都是無常，比如瓶等(同喻)，如果它是常，就不是所作，比如虛空等(異喻)』。這個異喻說，如果它是常，就遮止了同喻的無常。見不是所作，就遮止了同喻的所作。那麼，瓶的事情就是異喻的意義。所遮止的境，叫做同法喻。這個意思是說，要成就異喻，必須有所遮止。所遮止的如果沒有，異喻就不能成立。怎麼能立異喻而沒有同喻呢？ 論中說：『其異法喻至何所遍耶？』，註釋說：『這是正式的破斥。』所謂『遍』，就是在自身部分和他身部分都有能遍和所遍，才能叫做『遍』。既然不成立有同法喻，那麼異喻就只在自身部分執行，不在他身部分執行。既然沒有所遍，能遍就不能成立。怎麼能叫做『遍』呢？ 論中說：『不可說言自體自遍』，註釋說：『這是遮止救護。』你不能辯解說，異喻在自身異喻之中就叫做『遍』。因為同法喻也可以在自身同法喻中，但不叫做『遍』。 論中說：『又諸比量』
【English Translation】 English version: 'That impermanence is like a pot, etc. (heterologous example)' in the text, but it is repeated as 'cloud'. 'Pot, etc.' are made, and it is determined that they are impermanent. Since 'emptiness, etc.' are not made, they should be permanent. This is to prove that 'emptiness' is not made and is permanent by citing that 'pot' is made and is impermanent. Therefore, it is known that the heterologous dharma surpasses the causal dharma analogy. The treatise says: 'This statement is to show the determination of heterologous dharma.' The commentary says: 'This is the conclusion.' The treatise says: 'This is also not so.' The commentary says: 'This is a general negation.' The treatise says: 'Why is that?' The commentary says: 'This is a question.' Why do you say that you can only establish it with heterologous dharma? The treatise says: 'The object of affairs obscured by the meaning of heterology is called a homologous example.' The commentary says: 'The following is a formal refutation.' The refutation of the three meanings is divided into three parts. In the refutation of the first meaning, first indicate the intention, then formally refute, and finally prevent rescue. This is to indicate the intention, that is, to show the meaning of establishing a homologous example, so that outsiders can understand and prepare for a formal refutation. For example, establish the proposition: 'Sound is impermanent (thesis), because it is produced (reason), whatever is produced is impermanent, like a pot, etc. (homologous example), if it is permanent, it is not produced, like emptiness, etc. (heterologous example)'. This heterologous example says that if it is permanent, it obscures the impermanence of the homologous example. Seeing that it is not produced obscures the production of the homologous example. Then, the matter of the pot is the meaning of the heterologous example. The object obscured is called a homologous dharma example. The meaning of this is that to achieve a heterologous example, there must be something obscured. If there is nothing obscured, the heterologous example cannot be established. How can a heterologous example be established without a homologous example? The treatise says: 'Where does the heterologous dharma example extend to?' The commentary says: 'This is a formal refutation.' The so-called 'extend' means that there must be an encompassing and an encompassed in both its own part and the part of others to be called 'extend'. Since it is not established that there is a homologous dharma example, then the heterologous example only operates in its own part and does not operate in the part of others. Since there is no encompassed, the encompassing cannot be established. How can it be called 'extend'? The treatise says: 'It cannot be said that the self is self-encompassing.' The commentary says: 'This is to prevent rescue.' You cannot argue that the heterologous example is called 'extend' within its own heterologous example. Because the homologous dharma example can also be in its own homologous dharma example, but it is not called 'extend'. The treatise says: 'Also, all inferences'
至然後方成 述曰。此下破第二義也。初示意。次正破。后遮救。此則示意也。如意聲無常比量欲遮余常義。要有同喻助因證成無常。然後方能遮余常義。若闕同喻因即無力。無常不成。何能更遮余常住義。
論云。同法若是無異法應非有 述曰。此正破也。夫宗不能自立必須以因證成。然彼因力復尚羸。更引同喻相助。同喻既其成就方以異喻簡之。今既內喻是無因即無扶助宗義。既自不立異喻。何所簡耶。簡義既其不成。異喻理應非有。
論云 離其同異至余同類義故 述曰。此遮救也。外人救云。離其同異二聚法外別有非同非異聚法。如兔角等非常無常能助拾因成立宗義。何必要須同喻助耶。今論主遮云。依因法如立聲無常。其兔角等非無常故即異品。若立聲常其兔角等非是常故亦異品。既離二品之外更無別法。何得救云別有非同非異聚法能助因耶。
論云。由此即破至能顯于義 述曰。此破第三義也。由此破第二義即亦破第三義也。謂若有所遮同法。能遮可有雜糅。所遮同法既無。異喻竟何所雜。此之二義同以有遮故類破也。
論云。又以不見至未曾見有 述曰。此顯因有相違也。外人量云。空等是常(宗)以不見所作故(因)若是無常見有所作猶如瓶等(異喻)論主破云。若以不見
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 至然後方成，述曰：此下破第二義也。初示意，次正破，后遮救。此則示意也。如意聲無常比量欲遮余常義，要有同喻助因證成無常，然後方能遮余常義。若闕同喻，因即無力，無常不成，何能更遮余常住義？
論云：『同法若是無，異法應非有。』述曰：此正破也。夫宗不能自立，必須以因證成。然彼因力復尚羸，更引同喻相助。同喻既其成就，方以異喻簡之。今既內喻是無，因即無扶助宗義。既自不立，異喻何所簡耶？簡義既其不成，異喻理應非有。
論云：『離其同異，至余同類義故。』述曰：此遮救也。外人救云：離其同異二聚法外，別有非同非異聚法，如兔角等，非常無常，能助拾因成立宗義。何必要須同喻助耶？今論主遮云：依因法如立聲無常，其兔角等非無常故，即異品。若立聲常，其兔角等非是常故，亦異品。既離二品之外，更無別法，何得救云別有非同非異聚法能助因耶？
論云：『由此即破，至能顯于義。』述曰：此破第三義也。由此破第二義，即亦破第三義也。謂若有所遮同法，能遮可有雜糅。所遮同法既無，異喻竟何所雜？此之二義，同以有遮故類破也。
論云：『又以不見，至未曾見有。』述曰：此顯因有相違也。外人量云：空等是常（宗），以不見所作故（因），若是無常見有所作，猶如瓶等（異喻）。論主破云：若以不見
【English Translation】 English version 『To then, it becomes complete.』 A commentary states: The following refutes the second meaning. First, it indicates the meaning; second, it directly refutes; and third, it blocks rescue attempts. This is to indicate the meaning. For example, if the inference of 'sound is impermanent' intends to negate the meaning of 'remaining permanent,' it must have a positive example (sādṛśya-dṛṣṭānta) to assist the reason (hetu) in proving impermanence. Only then can it negate the meaning of 'remaining permanent.' If the positive example is lacking, the reason is powerless, and impermanence cannot be established. How can it further negate the meaning of 'remaining permanent?'
The treatise says: 'If the similar property does not exist, the dissimilar property should not exist.' A commentary states: This is the direct refutation. A thesis (pakṣa) cannot establish itself; it must be proven by a reason. However, if the power of that reason is still weak, a positive example is introduced to assist. Once the positive example is established, it is then distinguished by a negative example (vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta). Now, since the internal example is non-existent, the reason has no support for the thesis. Since it cannot establish itself, what is there for the negative example to distinguish? Since the meaning of distinction cannot be established, the negative example should not exist.
The treatise says: 'Apart from the similar and dissimilar, up to the meaning of other similar categories.' A commentary states: This is to block rescue attempts. An outsider attempts to rescue by saying: Apart from the two categories of similar and dissimilar properties, there is another category of properties that are neither similar nor dissimilar, such as rabbit horns, which are neither permanent nor impermanent, and can assist in establishing the meaning of the thesis by gathering reasons. Why is it necessary to have a positive example to assist? Now, the treatise master refutes by saying: According to the method of reason, such as establishing 'sound is impermanent,' rabbit horns, etc., are not impermanent, so they are in the dissimilar category. If 'sound is permanent' is established, rabbit horns, etc., are not permanent, so they are also in the dissimilar category. Since there is no other property apart from these two categories, how can one rescue by saying that there is another category of properties that are neither similar nor dissimilar that can assist the reason?
The treatise says: 'Therefore, this refutes, up to being able to manifest the meaning.' A commentary states: This refutes the third meaning. By refuting the second meaning, the third meaning is also refuted. That is to say, if there is a similar property that is to be negated, the negation can have mixtures. Since the similar property to be negated does not exist, what can the negative example be mixed with? These two meanings are both refuted by the category of having negation.
The treatise says: 'Also, because of not seeing, up to never having seen.' A commentary states: This reveals that the reason has contradiction. An outsider infers: 'Space, etc., is permanent (thesis), because it is not seen to be produced (reason). If it were impermanent, it would be seen to be produced, like a pot, etc. (negative example).' The treatise master refutes by saying: If because of not seeing
所作為因欲成虛空有(有法自相)常(法自相)終無此義。以一切兔角等處未曾見有。以非依因成有常故。但成非有非常故。
論云。故說頌曰至應言常性無 述曰。此舉頌也。上半牒計。下半例破。此頌同舊百論中。汝以作不作相違故。作法既是無常。不作法即是常。我以作不作相違故。作法既是有。不作法應是無文也。
論云。論曰見所至皆是常住 述曰。此下解釋也。初釋頌。后通難。釋頌中有四。一牒計。二例破。三釋成。四結意。此即牒計也。空等是常(宗)以非作故(因)諸所作者皆是無常猶如色等(異喻)文但覆云汝見所作無常。即言非作常住者即釋上半。
論云。既見所作至應許無體 述曰。此例破也。一例破常二例破有。既見所作等例破常也。諸所作者等例破有也。
論云。以非作因至皆可得故 述曰。此釋成也。何以例破常及有者。以非作因於同品樂等遍無。異品龜毛等有故也。謂空等非常(宗)非所作故(因)諸非所作皆悉非常如龜毛等(同喻)若非常即有所作如苦樂等(異喻)空等是無(宗)非所作故(因)諸非所作皆悉是無如兔角等(同喻)若非是無即有所作如苦樂等(異喻)文中但釋成破有故。故以非作因於苦樂等有曾所未見龜毛等無皆可得也。不釋成破常。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 以作為的因緣想要成就虛空的存在（存在的自性），或者常恒（法的自性），最終都不會有這樣的道理。因為一切如同兔角等處，從未見過它們存在。因為不是依靠因緣而成就的存在，所以不是常恒的緣故。只能成就非有和非常的緣故。
論中說：『所以說了偈頌，直到應該說常性不存在。』 述記說：『這是舉出偈頌。上半部分是照錄對方的計論，下半部分是舉例破斥。』這個偈頌與舊《百論》中的相同。『你因為有作為和無作為相互對立的緣故，有作為的法既然是無常的，那麼無作為的法就是常的。我因為有作為和無作為相互對立的緣故，有作為的法既然是存在的，那麼無作為的法就應該是沒有的。』
論中說：『論曰：見到所作的，都是常住的。』 述記說：『這下面是解釋。』先解釋偈頌，后總的進行辯難。解釋偈頌中有四個部分：一是照錄對方的計論，二是舉例破斥，三是解釋成立，四是總結意思。這裡就是照錄對方的計論。虛空等是常恒的（宗），因為不是被製造出來的（因），凡是被製造出來的都是無常的，就像色等（異喻）。文中只是反過來說：『你見到所作的是無常的。』就說不是被製造出來的就是常住的，這就是解釋上半部分。
論中說：『既然見到所作的，直到應該承認沒有自體。』 述記說：『這是舉例破斥。』一是舉例破斥常恒，二是舉例破斥存在。『既然見到所作的』等是舉例破斥常恒。『凡是被製造出來的』等是舉例破斥存在。
論中說：『因為不是作為的因，直到都可以得到。』 述記說：『為什麼舉例可以破斥常恒和存在呢？』因為不是作為的因，在同品（相同性質的事物）如苦樂等中普遍沒有，在異品（不同性質的事物）如龜毛等中有。意思是說，虛空等不是常恒的（宗），因為不是被製造出來的（因），凡是不是被製造出來的都不是常恒的，如同龜毛等（同喻），如果不是非常恒的，那就是被製造出來的，如同苦樂等（異喻）。虛空等是沒有的（宗），因為不是被製造出來的（因），凡是不是被製造出來的都是沒有的，如同兔角等（同喻），如果不是沒有的，那就是被製造出來的，如同苦樂等（異喻）。文中只是解釋成立破斥存在，所以用不是作為的因，在苦樂等有，曾經所未見的龜毛等沒有，都可以得到。沒有解釋成立破斥常恒。
【English Translation】 English version The attempt to establish the existence of space (有法自相, yǒu fǎ zì xiàng - the intrinsic nature of existence) or permanence (常, cháng - the intrinsic nature of dharma) as a result of action (所作為因, suǒ zuò wéi yīn) will ultimately be futile. This is because things like rabbit horns (兔角, tù jiǎo) have never been seen to exist. Because it is not existence achieved through causes, it is not permanent. It can only achieve non-existence and impermanence.
The treatise says: 'Therefore, the verse is spoken, up to the point where it should be said that permanence does not exist.' The commentary says: 'This cites the verse. The first half quotes the opponent's argument, and the second half refutes it with examples.' This verse is the same as in the old Śataśāstra (百論, Bǎi Lùn): 'Because you have action and non-action as opposites, since action is impermanent, then non-action is permanent. Because I have action and non-action as opposites, since action exists, then non-action should not exist.'
The treatise says: 'The treatise says: Seeing what is made, all are permanent.' The commentary says: 'What follows is the explanation.' First, the verse is explained, then a general refutation is made. There are four parts to the explanation of the verse: first, quoting the opponent's argument; second, refuting with examples; third, explaining the establishment; and fourth, summarizing the meaning. This is quoting the opponent's argument. Space, etc., is permanent (宗, zōng - thesis), because it is not made (因, yīn - reason), whatever is made is impermanent, like form, etc. (異喻, yì yù - dissimilar example). The text simply reverses it, saying: 'You see that what is made is impermanent.' Saying that what is not made is permanent is explaining the first half.
The treatise says: 'Since seeing what is made, up to the point where it should be admitted that there is no self-nature.' The commentary says: 'This is refuting with examples.' First, permanence is refuted with examples, and second, existence is refuted with examples. 'Since seeing what is made,' etc., is refuting permanence with examples. 'Whatever is made,' etc., is refuting existence with examples.
The treatise says: 'Because it is not the cause of action, up to the point where all can be obtained.' The commentary says: 'Why can permanence and existence be refuted with examples?' Because the cause of not being made is universally absent in similar things (同品, tóng pǐn) like pleasure and pain, but present in dissimilar things (異品, yì pǐn) like turtle hair (龜毛, guī máo). The meaning is that space, etc., is not permanent (宗, zōng - thesis), because it is not made (因, yīn - reason), whatever is not made is not permanent, like turtle hair, etc. (同喻, tóng yù - similar example), if it is not impermanent, then it is made, like pleasure and pain, etc. (異喻, yì yù - dissimilar example). Space, etc., does not exist (宗, zōng - thesis), because it is not made (因, yīn - reason), whatever is not made does not exist, like rabbit horns, etc. (同喻, tóng yù - similar example), if it does not not exist, then it is made, like pleasure and pain, etc. (異喻, yì yù - dissimilar example). The text only explains the establishment of the refutation of existence, so the cause of not being made is used, which is present in pleasure and pain, etc., and absent in turtle hair, etc., which has never been seen, and all can be obtained. There is no explanation of the establishment of the refutation of permanence.
以除非常宗外無是常法可為異喻。其苦樂等即同龜毛同品所攝。其非作因於此同品一分轉故。亦是正因。若作此釋。非常比量則無異喻。然因無所濫比量得成思之。
論云。如是非作至非正能立 述曰。此結意也。此非作因既于異品定有同品遍無故。違能立因之所依。謂虛空等有法自相非正能立也。問。準前例破之文。非但破空等是有。亦復破空等是常。何故今結但言違害有法自相。答。外執空等有體遂即妄立為常。提婆意拔有根常條自然隨破。故但言害所依自相。
論云。為不爾耶至自相差別 述曰。此下通難也。有四。一外人進退難。二論主破進通。三外人約退難。四論主破退通。外人進退難中。初述道理。次正設難。后結難成。此述道理也。將欲說難先述相違因理以爾論主也。為不爾耶者。先定論主語也。據相違因道理為不如此耶。相違因有三。一違他許。二違自許。三違共許。如聲論師對佛弟子。立宗云聲常。立因云所作性故。佛弟子若作相違難云。聲是無常(宗)所作性故(因)猶如瓶等(同喻)此違他許也。若作相違難云。聲非耳識所變(宗)所作性故(因)猶如瓶等(喻)此違自許也。若作相違難云。聲應非聲(宗)所作性故(因)猶如瓶等(同喻)此違共許也。此諸三種相違因中。若不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 以除非常宗（指不以『常』為根本立場的宗派）外，沒有什麼是常法可以作為反例（異喻）的。苦、樂等感受與龜毛一樣，都屬於同一類（同品）所包含的事物。因為『非作因』（不是被製造出來的原因）在這一類事物的一部分中存在，所以也是正因（正確的理由）。如果這樣解釋，那麼『非常』的比量（推理）就沒有反例了。然而，即使沒有可以濫用的理由，比量仍然可以成立，應該這樣思考。
論中說：『像這樣，非作因…直到…不能成立。』意思是總結前面的論述。這個『非作因』既然在異品（不同的類別）中必定存在，在同品（相同的類別）中普遍不存在，就違背了能立因（能夠成立理由的因）所依賴的事物。也就是說，虛空等作為有法（具有某種性質的事物），其自身特性不能正確地成立。問：按照前面的例子來駁斥，不僅駁斥了虛空等是『有』，也駁斥了虛空等是『常』。為什麼現在總結時只說違害了有法自身的特性？答：外道執著虛空等是有實體的，於是就妄加設立為『常』。提婆菩薩的意圖是拔除『常』的根本，『有』的錯誤自然也就隨之被破除了。所以只說損害了所依賴的自身特性。
論中說：『難道不是這樣嗎？…直到…自身特性的差別。』下面是通難（普遍的詰難），共有四點：一是外人的進退兩難，二是論主破斥進難，三是外人針對退難，四是論主破斥退難。在外人的進退兩難中，首先闡述道理，然後正式提出詰難，最後總結詰難成立。這裡是闡述道理。將要提出詰難，先闡述相違因（互相矛盾的理由）的道理。『難道不是這樣嗎？』，首先確定論主的立場。根據相違因的道理，難道不是這樣嗎？相違因有三種：一是違揹他人的觀點，二是違背自己的觀點，三是違背共同的觀點。例如，聲明論師對佛弟子，立宗說聲音是常，立因說是被製造出來的。佛弟子如果提出相違的詰難說：聲音是無常（宗），因為是被製造出來的（因），就像瓶子等（同喻）。這就是違揹他人的觀點。如果提出相違的詰難說：聲音不是耳識所變現的（宗），因為是被製造出來的（因），就像瓶子等（喻）。這就是違背自己的觀點。如果提出相違的詰難說：聲音應該不是聲音（宗），因為是被製造出來的（因），就像瓶子等（同喻）。這就是違背共同的觀點。在這三種相違因中，如果不...
【English Translation】 English version Apart from those sects that do not fundamentally adhere to 'permanence', there is no permanent dharma that can serve as a counter-example (heterogeneous example). Feelings of suffering and pleasure, like rabbit's horns, belong to the same category (homogeneous class). Because the 'non-created cause' exists in a portion of this category, it is also a valid reason (hetu). If explained in this way, then the inference (anumana) of 'non-permanence' would have no counter-example. However, even without a reason that can be misused, the inference can still be established; one should think in this way.
The treatise states: 'Like this, the non-created cause... until... cannot be established.' This means summarizing the preceding arguments. Since this 'non-created cause' is definitely present in the heterogeneous class (different category) and universally absent in the homogeneous class (same category), it contradicts the basis upon which the establishing reason (sadhana-hetu) relies. That is to say, entities like space (akasha), as subjects (dharmin) possessing certain properties, cannot have their own characteristics correctly established. Question: According to the previous examples of refutation, not only is the 'existence' of space refuted, but also the 'permanence' of space is refuted. Why does the summary now only state that it contradicts the inherent characteristics of the subject? Answer: The externalists cling to the idea that space and other things have substance, and then falsely establish them as 'permanent'. Aryadeva's intention is to uproot the foundation of 'permanence', and the error of 'existence' will naturally be refuted along with it. Therefore, it only says that it harms the inherent characteristics upon which it relies.
The treatise states: 'Is it not so?... until... the difference in their own characteristics.' What follows is a general refutation (samanya-dushana), consisting of four points: first, the dilemma of the externalist's advance and retreat; second, the treatise master's refutation of the advance; third, the externalist's argument against the retreat; and fourth, the treatise master's refutation of the retreat. Within the externalist's dilemma of advance and retreat, first the principle is explained, then the challenge is formally presented, and finally the establishment of the challenge is summarized. Here, the principle is explained. Before presenting the challenge, the principle of contradictory reasons (viruddha-hetu) is explained. 'Is it not so?' first establishes the treatise master's position. According to the principle of contradictory reasons, is it not so? There are three types of contradictory reasons: first, contradicting the views of others; second, contradicting one's own views; and third, contradicting common views. For example, a grammarian, addressing a Buddhist disciple, posits the thesis that sound is permanent, and the reason is that it is produced. If the Buddhist disciple raises a contradictory challenge, saying: sound is impermanent (thesis), because it is produced (reason), like a pot (example). This contradicts the views of others. If a contradictory challenge is raised, saying: sound is not transformed by ear-consciousness (thesis), because it is produced (reason), like a pot (example). This contradicts one's own views. If a contradictory challenge is raised, saying: sound should not be sound (thesis), because it is produced (reason), like a pot (example). This contradicts common views. Among these three types of contradictory reasons, if not...
遮礙自所許宗共所許宗唯違他許。如此一因乃于自宗境上方作相違。于相違中有自相差別。廣如因明疏述。若違自許及違共許非相違也。
論云。今此所依至競常無常 述曰。此正破設難也。此非作因所依空等非但我許。汝亦許之。何得例破作相違。云空等非有此則違共許。故非相違也。此即進難不退。非作因所依空等唯我獨許汝不許者。空等既無因不成就。無容依此不成之因競虛空等常及無常也。
論云。故非作因至所依自相 述曰。此結難成也。
論云。有釋此言至無自害失 述曰。此下論主破退通也。初非古通。后自正通。初中初敘。后非。此即敘也。有舊注百論師通此難言。我言不許依他緣生也。俗諦中聚極微外別有散住常性極微。此頌中言常性無者。但言無聚微之外散住常微。此則唯違於他無自害失。
論云。此釋不然至聚散有無 述曰。此非也。彼諸外道但依總相。以非作故建立一切虛空神我及極微等常法為有。但應破云。空等一切常法是無。以非作故。如龜毛等。何勞偏就極微分別聚有散無以通外難耶。
論云。如是釋者至不可為難 述曰。此下自正通也。初正通難。次去伏疑后引頌證。此即通難也。但諸外道所立虛空及神我等無為常法並是遍計所執自性我。百論宗都
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 遮礙自所許宗（自己所承認的宗派）共所許宗（共同承認的宗派）唯違他許（僅僅違揹他人所承認的）。如此一來，這個『因』僅僅在自己宗派的範圍內才構成『相違』。在『相違』中，有『自相』的差別，詳細內容如同因明疏述所說。如果違背自己所承認的或者違背共同承認的，那就不算是『相違』。 論中說：『現在這個所依，直到爭論常與無常。』 述曰：這正是爲了駁斥對方的設難。這個作為『因』的所依，比如『空』等，不僅僅是我承認的，你也是承認的。怎麼能用類比的方式來駁斥『相違』呢？如果說『空』等不存在，這就違背了共同的承認，所以不是『相違』。這實際上是進一步的質難，而不是退讓。作為『因』的所依，比如『空』等，不是隻有我承認而你不承認的。『空』等既然沒有『因』，『因』就不成立。既然『因』不成立，就不能依據這個不成立的『因』來爭論虛空等是常還是無常。 論中說：『所以不是作為『因』，直到所依的自相。』 述曰：這是總結前面的質難已經成立。 論中說：『有人解釋這句話，直到沒有自害的過失。』 述曰：下面論主駁斥退讓的說法。先是否定舊的解釋，然後自己給出正確的解釋。先是敘述，然後是否定。這部分是敘述。有舊的《百論》註釋者解釋這個質難說：我所說的不承認是依他緣生。在俗諦中，在聚集的極微之外，另外存在分散的、具有常性的極微。這頌中所說的『常性無』，只是說沒有聚集的極微之外分散存在的常微。這樣就僅僅是違背了他人，而沒有自害的過失。 論中說：『這種解釋不對，直到聚集和分散的有無。』 述曰：這是否定。那些外道只是依據總相，因為『非作』的緣故，建立一切虛空、神我以及極微等常法為『有』。只需要駁斥說：『空』等一切常法是『無』，因為『非作』的緣故，就像龜毛等。何必偏偏就極微來分別聚集的有和分散的無，以此來應對外道的質難呢？ 論中說：『如果這樣解釋，直到不可以作為質難。』 述曰：下面是自己給出正確的解釋。先是正確地解釋質難，然後消除疑惑，最後引用頌文來證明。這部分是解釋質難。只是那些外道所建立的虛空以及神我等無為常法，都是遍計所執自性我。《百論》的宗
【English Translation】 English version Obstructing what is accepted by oneself (svasvīkṛta-siddhānta), what is accepted in common (prasiddha-siddhānta), and only contradicting what is accepted by others (paraprasiddha). Such a reason (hetu) only constitutes a contradiction (viruddha) within the scope of one's own tenet. Within contradiction, there are differences in 'self-nature' (svalakṣaṇa), as detailed in the commentaries on logic (hetuvidyā). If it contradicts what one accepts or what is commonly accepted, it is not a contradiction. The treatise (śāstra) says: 'Now, this basis (āśraya), until arguing about permanence (nitya) and impermanence (anitya).' The commentary (bhāṣya) says: 'This is precisely to refute the opponent's objection. This basis for the reason, such as 'emptiness' (śūnyatā), is not only accepted by me, but also by you. How can you use analogy to refute the contradiction? If you say that 'emptiness' etc. do not exist, this violates common acceptance, so it is not a contradiction.' This is actually a further challenge, not a retreat. The basis for the reason, such as 'emptiness' etc., is not only accepted by me and not by you. Since 'emptiness' etc. have no cause (hetu), the reason is not established. Since the reason is not established, one cannot rely on this unestablished reason to argue whether space (ākāśa) etc. are permanent or impermanent. The treatise says: 'Therefore, it is not a reason, until the self-nature of the basis.' The commentary says: 'This concludes that the previous challenge has been established.' The treatise says: 'Some explain this statement, until there is no fault of self-harm (svahāni).' The commentary says: 'Below, the author of the treatise refutes the explanation of retreat. First, it refutes the old explanation, then it gives its own correct explanation. First is narration, then negation. This part is narration. Some old commentators on the Śataśāstra (Hundred Verse Treatise) explain this difficulty by saying: What I say is not accepted is dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). In conventional truth (saṃvṛtisatya), apart from the aggregates of ultimate particles (paramāṇu), there are separate, dispersed, permanent ultimate particles. What this verse says about 'no permanence' (nityatā nāsti) only means that there are no dispersed permanent particles apart from the aggregates of particles. This only contradicts others and does not have the fault of self-harm.' The treatise says: 'This explanation is not correct, until the existence and non-existence of aggregates and dispersion.' The commentary says: 'This is negation. Those non-Buddhist schools (tīrthika) only rely on the general characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). Because of 'non-action' (akriyā), they establish all space, self (ātman), and permanent phenomena such as ultimate particles as 'existent' (asti). One only needs to refute by saying: 'Emptiness' etc., all permanent phenomena are 'non-existent' (nāsti), because of 'non-action', like turtle hair etc. Why bother specifically distinguishing between the existence of aggregates and the non-existence of dispersion in ultimate particles to respond to the non-Buddhist objection?' The treatise says: 'If explained in this way, until it cannot be used as an objection.' The commentary says: 'Below is the author's own correct explanation. First, it correctly explains the objection, then it eliminates doubts, and finally it cites verses to prove it. This part explains the objection. Only those unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) permanent phenomena such as space and self established by the non-Buddhists are all imagined self-nature (parikalpita-svabhāva) selves. The tenet of the Śataśāstra (Hundred Verse Treatise) completely
不許有。故作相違無自害失。汝不可難言。今此所依空等常法共許為有非相違也。
論云。色等極微至亦不得成 述曰。此去伏疑。伏疑曰。空等唯他有容可作相違。極微既因立。豈非遮共許。今去此疑雲。我大乘宗色等極微雖依世俗依他起性非有似有假許為有。而是所作。汝若立此共許極微以為宗者。汝非作因既不成就。我若於此不成因上作相違者亦不成也。汝因既言非作。我又用作相違。明知所破極微非是兩宗共許。共許微者不入宗中。何得引此以為疑難。
論云。頌中應言至常住性無 述曰。此引頌證也。頌中應言常性無者。謂常性所依空等性無也。頌意正破所依有法。空等之體是有法自相相違因過。兼破能依宗法。常性是法自相相違因過。何故於此引頌釋者。恐不解頌意者。但謂正破能依常性。若深悟頌者。方知正破空等有法。故我通難云。空等無為都不許有。此則正約有法破也。
論云。若言空等至有法自相 述曰。此外人約退難也。若論主言虛空神我及極微等並是遍計所執性自體非實有。今所設難唯違他者。此則所依空等無故。能依非作亦即不成。但應與我作不成過。何得妄作相違難耶。
論云。此亦不然 述曰。此下論主破退通也。初非后釋。此即初非也。
論云。但
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 不應該有（相違）。如果故意製造相違，卻沒有損害自身，這屬於『失』（過失）。你不能以此來責難，因為現在所依賴的空等常法，是雙方都認可存在的，所以不是相違。
論中說：『色等極微至亦不得成』。解釋：這是爲了消除疑惑。疑惑是：空等只有對方才認可，或許可以作為相違的理由。但極微既然是因（能立），難道不是遮蓋了雙方都認可的嗎？現在消除這個疑惑說：我大乘宗認為，色等極微雖然依賴世俗的依他起性，並非真實存在，而是看似存在，假立為有，而且是所作（有為法）。你如果用這個雙方都認可的極微作為宗（立宗），那麼你的因（能立）就不能成立。我如果在這個不成立的因上作相違，也是不能成立的。你的因既然說是『非作』，我又用『作』來相違，明顯可知所要破斥的極微並非兩宗都認可的。雙方都認可的極微不應納入宗中，怎麼能用這個來作為疑難呢？
論中說：『頌中應言至常住性無』。解釋：這是引用頌文來證明。頌中應該說常性無，指的是常性所依賴的空等性無。頌文的意思是主要破斥所依賴的有法。空等的本體是有法，這是自相相違的因過。同時也破斥能依的宗法，常性是法，這是自相相違的因過。為什麼在這裡引用頌文來解釋呢？是恐怕不理解頌文的人，只認為主要破斥能依的常性。如果深刻領悟頌文的人，才能知道主要破斥的是空等有法。所以我通難說：空等無為，根本不認可它存在。這正是針對有法來破斥。
論中說：『若言空等至有法自相』。解釋：這是對方試圖通過退避來避免責難。如果論主說，虛空、神我以及極微等，都是遍計所執性，自體並非真實存在，現在所提出的責難只是針對對方。這樣，所依賴的空等不存在，能依的『非作』也就不能成立，只能給我造成不成過，怎麼能妄作相違的責難呢？
論中說：『此亦不然』。解釋：下面是論主破斥退避並進行解釋。先否定，后解釋。這裡是先否定。
論中說：『但』。
【English Translation】 English version: There should be no (contradiction). If a contradiction is deliberately created without harming oneself, it is a 'fault' (error). You cannot use this to criticize, because the permanent dharmas such as emptiness, which are relied upon, are recognized by both sides as existing, so it is not a contradiction.
The treatise says: 'Even the ultimate particles of form, etc., cannot be established.' Explanation: This is to eliminate doubts. The doubt is: Only the other party recognizes emptiness, etc., so it may be used as a reason for contradiction. But since the ultimate particles are the cause (hetu), doesn't it cover up what both sides recognize? Now, eliminating this doubt, it is said: Our Mahayana school believes that although the ultimate particles of form, etc., rely on the dependent-arising nature of the mundane world, they are not truly existent, but appear to exist, falsely established as existent, and are conditioned (saṃskṛta). If you use these ultimate particles, which are recognized by both sides, as the subject (paksha), then your cause (hetu) cannot be established. If I make a contradiction on this unestablished cause, it also cannot be established. Since your cause says 'non-action,' and I use 'action' to contradict it, it is clear that the ultimate particles to be refuted are not recognized by both schools. The ultimate particles recognized by both sides should not be included in the subject, so how can this be used as a difficulty?
The treatise says: 'In the verse, it should be said that there is no permanent nature.' Explanation: This is quoting the verse to prove it. In the verse, it should be said that there is no permanent nature, which refers to the absence of the nature of emptiness, etc., on which the permanent nature relies. The meaning of the verse is mainly to refute the existent dharma (bhava) on which it relies. The essence of emptiness, etc., is the existent dharma, which is the fault of self-contradictory cause. At the same time, it refutes the probandum (sadhya) of the proposition, that permanence is a dharma, which is the fault of self-contradictory cause. Why is the verse quoted here for explanation? It is feared that those who do not understand the meaning of the verse will only think that it mainly refutes the permanent nature of the probandum. If those who deeply understand the verse will know that what is mainly refuted is the existent dharma of emptiness, etc. Therefore, I generally criticize by saying: Emptiness, etc., are unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), and it is not recognized that they exist at all. This is precisely to refute based on the existent dharma.
The treatise says: 'If it is said that emptiness, etc., are the self-grasped nature.' Explanation: This is the other party trying to avoid criticism by retreating. If the author of the treatise says that space, self, and ultimate particles, etc., are all the self-grasped nature of the completely conceptualized nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), and their own nature is not truly existent, and the criticism now raised is only directed at the other party. In this way, the emptiness, etc., on which it relies does not exist, and the 'non-action' of the probandum cannot be established, and it can only cause me the fault of non-establishment, how can it be a false criticism of contradiction?
The treatise says: 'This is also not so.' Explanation: Below, the author of the treatise refutes the retreat and explains it. First negate, then explain. Here is the first negation.
The treatise says: 'But'.
說遮遣余有類物為此因故 述曰。此下釋也。初略釋。后廣釋。此略釋也所作依瓶等有法是有體物之流類。覆在非作之外名余有類物也。遮遣者此非所遮遣所作余物類也。此中意言。立非所作者但說遮遣。余有類所作性不別詮顯非所作性。如此非所作汝我因許空等上有。即是極成。故能違害有法自相。
論云。因有三種至如所知等 述曰。此下廣釋也。初舉因例。次顯因成。后結因用。此舉因例也。一所作者。謂聲瓶等為咽喉泥輪等所作。此所作法是有義故。依有體辯名有體法也。二非作者。謂龜毛等不為咽喉泥輪等所作。此非作法是無義故。依無體辯名無體法也。三所知者。謂瓶聲龜毛等併爲心識之所了名無體法也。知此所知法義遍有無通依有體無體辯故名通二法法也。若有體法必須依彼有體有法。有法若無即不成就。若無體法若通二法通依有體無體有法。有法縱無並因成。外就此義可如因明疏述。
論云。今所立因至非作自性 述曰。此顯因成也。今立宗云空等是無。因云以非作故者。于空等上但遮眾緣所作之義。不欲別詮非作自性。如此非作我汝因許。豈非極成。
論云。此因同類至有法自相 述曰。此法因用也。外人宗云空等是常者。意立空等是有。此有即以色等有法為其同品。龜毛等無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 說遮遣其餘的有類事物作為這個原因，述曰：以下是解釋。先是簡略的解釋，然後是詳細的解釋。這裡是簡略的解釋：『所作』依賴於瓶子等有法，是有實體事物的流類。又在『非作』之外，稱為其餘的有類事物。『遮遣』是指這並非所要遮遣的『所作』之外的其餘事物種類。這裡的意思是說，立『非所作』，只是說遮遣，其餘的有類事物的『所作性』，不特別闡明『非所作性』。如此『非所作』，你我因許的空等之上都有，這就是極成，所以能夠違害有法的自相。
論中說：『因有三種，至於所知等』，述曰：以下是詳細的解釋。先舉出因的例子，其次顯示因的成立，最後總結因的用處。這裡是舉出因的例子。第一種是『所作』，指聲音、瓶子等為咽喉、泥輪等所作。這個『所作』法是有意義的，依賴於有實體來辨別，稱為有體法。第二種是『非作』，指龜毛等不為咽喉、泥輪等所作。這個『非作』法是無意義的，依賴於無實體來辨別，稱為無體法。第三種是『所知』，指瓶子、聲音、龜毛等都被心識所瞭解，名為無體法。知道這個『所知』法的意義，普遍存在於有和無之中，可以依賴於有實體和無實體來辨別，所以稱為通於二法的法。如果有體法必須依賴於那個有實體的有法，有法如果不存在，就不成立。如果無體法或者通於二法的法，可以依賴於有實體和無實體的有法，有法即使不存在，因也能成立。關於這個意義，可以參考因明疏述。
論中說：『現在所立的因，至於非作自性』，述曰：這是顯示因的成立。現在立宗說空等是無，因為說『以非作故』，在空等之上只是遮止眾緣所作的意義，不想要特別闡明『非作』的自性。如此『非作』，我你因許，難道不是極成嗎？
論中說：『這個因同類，至於有法自相』，述曰：這是法因的用處。外人的宗義說空等是常，意思是立空等是有。這個『有』就以色等有法作為它的同品，龜毛等無。
【English Translation】 English version: It is said that refuting other existing categories of things is the reason for this. Commentary: The following is an explanation. First, a brief explanation, then a detailed explanation. This is the brief explanation: 'That which is made' relies on entities such as pots, which are existing categories of substantial things. Furthermore, outside of 'non-made,' it is called other existing categories of things. 'Refuting' means that this is not the kind of 'made' things outside of 'non-made' that are to be refuted. The meaning here is that establishing 'non-made' only speaks of refutation; the 'made nature' of other existing categories of things does not specifically elucidate 'non-made nature.' Such 'non-made' exists on things like space, which you, I, and the cause acknowledge, and is thus self-evident, so it can contradict the self-nature of the entity.
The treatise says: 'There are three types of cause, such as what is known, etc.' Commentary: The following is a detailed explanation. First, examples of causes are given; second, the establishment of the cause is shown; and finally, the use of the cause is concluded. This is giving examples of causes. The first is 'that which is made,' referring to sounds, pots, etc., which are made by the throat, clay wheel, etc. This 'that which is made' dharma has meaning, and is distinguished based on existing entities, called existing entity dharma. The second is 'non-made,' referring to things like turtle hair, which are not made by the throat, clay wheel, etc. This 'non-made' dharma is meaningless, and is distinguished based on non-existing entities, called non-existing entity dharma. The third is 'what is known,' referring to pots, sounds, turtle hair, etc., which are all understood by consciousness, called non-existing entity dharma. Knowing that the meaning of this 'what is known' dharma universally exists in both existence and non-existence, it can be distinguished based on existing and non-existing entities, so it is called a dharma that is common to both dharmas. If an existing entity dharma must rely on that existing entity entity, and if the entity does not exist, it is not established. If a non-existing entity dharma or a dharma common to both dharmas can rely on existing and non-existing entity entities, the cause can be established even if the entity does not exist. Regarding this meaning, one can refer to the commentary on the Hetuvidya treatise.
The treatise says: 'Now the established cause, as for non-made nature.' Commentary: This shows the establishment of the cause. Now, establishing the thesis that space, etc., is non-existent, because it is said 'because of being non-made,' only prevents the meaning of being made by various conditions on space, etc., and does not want to specifically elucidate the nature of 'non-made.' Such 'non-made,' which you, I, and the cause acknowledge, is it not self-evident?
The treatise says: 'This cause is of the same kind, as for the self-nature of the entity.' Commentary: This is the use of the dharma cause. The outsider's thesis says that space, etc., is permanent, meaning to establish that space, etc., exists. This 'exists' takes existing entities such as form as its similar class, and turtle hair, etc., does not.
為其異品。此非作因既于同品色等上無。于其異品龜毛等有。是故汝因正能違害有法自相。
論云。又說頌曰至謂空等為常 述曰。此下一頌約愚智破也。即責外人。愚夫即外道。智者即小乘。雖復愚智有殊。執常並皆乖理。故今論主貶黜責之。上半破外道。下半破小乘。破外道中。初舉頌。后解釋。此即舉頌也。
論云。論曰隨有至故名愚夫 述曰。此下解釋也。此釋愚夫。
論云。于尋思地至所緣皆妄 述曰。此釋妄分別也。文中初總舉推求。次別舉利智后合明虛妄。
論云。非如夢智至而可信依 述曰。此釋下句也。
論云。複次有餘至實有常住 述曰。此下半頌破小乘也。初生起。次舉頌。后解釋。生起中初廣破常執。后正生下頌。廣破常執中。初敘執。后非破。敘執中初敘立宗。后敘引證。此立宗也。有釋迦弟子薩婆多等諸小乘師。執虛空等體是實有常住湛然。
論云。故契經說至虛空顯了 述曰。此下敘引證也。即引聖言以證虛空實有常住也 初引經文。后釋經義。即引經文即引成立世界經也。彼經云。比丘白佛一切草木依何而住。佛言。依大地而住。比丘白佛。大地依何。佛言。依金剛輪。比丘白佛。金剛輪依何。佛言。依水輪。比丘白佛。水輪依何。佛言。依
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 是與它不同的類別。這個作為原因的『非作因』，既然在同類別的顏色等事物上不存在，卻在不同類別的龜毛等事物上存在。因此，你的『因』恰恰能夠違背有法（dharmin）自身的特性。 論中說：『又說頌曰』到『謂空等為常』。註釋說：下面這首偈頌是針對愚人和智者進行破斥的。這裡是責備外道。愚夫就是外道，智者就是小乘。即使愚人和智者有所不同，但他們執著于常的觀點都是不合道理的。所以現在論主貶低並責備他們。前半部分破斥外道，後半部分破斥小乘。在破斥外道中，先舉出偈頌，然後解釋。這裡就是舉出偈頌。 論中說：『論曰隨有』到『故名愚夫』。註釋說：下面是解釋。這裡解釋愚夫。 論中說：『于尋思地』到『所緣皆妄』。註釋說：這裡解釋虛妄分別。文中先總的提出推求，然後分別提出利智，最後合起來說明虛妄。 論中說：『非如夢智』到『而可信依』。註釋說：這裡解釋下句。 論中說：『複次有餘』到『實有常住』。註釋說：下面半首偈頌破斥小乘。先是生起，然後舉出偈頌，最後解釋。生起中先廣泛破斥常的執著，然後正式生起下面的偈頌。在廣泛破斥常的執著中，先敘述他們的主張，然後進行非難破斥。在敘述他們的主張中，先敘述他們的立宗，然後敘述他們的引證。這裡是立宗。有釋迦弟子薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）等各位小乘師，他們認為虛空等的本體是真實存在、恒常不變、清凈寂然的。 論中說：『故契經說』到『虛空顯了』。註釋說：下面敘述引證。就是引用聖言來證明虛空真實存在且恒常不變。先引用經文，然後解釋經義。引用的經文就是《成立世界經》。那部經中說：比丘問佛，一切草木依靠什麼而存在？佛說：依靠大地而存在。比丘問佛：大地依靠什麼？佛說：依靠金剛輪（vajra wheel）。比丘問佛：金剛輪依靠什麼？佛說：依靠水輪（water wheel）。比丘問佛：水輪依靠什麼？佛說：依靠...
【English Translation】 English version: It is a different category from it. Since this 'non-productive cause' (ahetu) as a cause does not exist in similar categories such as colors, but exists in different categories such as tortoise hair, therefore, your 'reason' (hetu) is precisely able to contradict the self-nature of the subject of the argument (dharmin). The treatise says: 'Moreover, a verse is spoken' to 'regarding space, etc., as permanent'. The commentary says: The following verse refutes both the foolish and the wise. Here, it is rebuking the non-Buddhists. The foolish are the non-Buddhists, and the wise are the Hinayana (Small Vehicle). Even though the foolish and the wise are different, their attachment to permanence is unreasonable. Therefore, the author of the treatise now belittles and rebukes them. The first half refutes the non-Buddhists, and the second half refutes the Hinayana. In refuting the non-Buddhists, first the verse is presented, and then explained. Here, the verse is presented. The treatise says: 'The treatise says, according to what exists' to 'therefore called foolish'. The commentary says: The following is an explanation. Here, the foolish are explained. The treatise says: 'In the realm of seeking' to 'all objects are false'. The commentary says: Here, false discrimination is explained. The text first generally presents seeking, then separately presents sharp intellect, and finally combines them to explain falsity. The treatise says: 'Not like dream wisdom' to 'and can be trusted and relied upon'. The commentary says: Here, the following sentence is explained. The treatise says: 'Furthermore, some others' to 'truly existing and permanent'. The commentary says: The following half-verse refutes the Hinayana. First, there is arising, then the verse is presented, and finally explained. In the arising, first the attachment to permanence is widely refuted, and then the following verse is formally arisen. In widely refuting the attachment to permanence, first their assertion is narrated, and then refuted. In narrating their assertion, first their thesis is narrated, and then their evidence is narrated. Here is the thesis. There are Sarvastivadins (Sarvastivada, those who believe in the existence of everything) and other Hinayana teachers, disciples of Shakyamuni, who hold that the substance of space, etc., is truly existing, permanent, and serenely still. The treatise says: 'Therefore, the sutra says' to 'space is manifest'. The commentary says: The following narrates the evidence. That is, quoting the holy words to prove that space is truly existing and permanent. First, the sutra is quoted, and then the meaning of the sutra is explained. The quoted sutra is the Sutra on the Establishment of the World. That sutra says: A monk asked the Buddha, what do all the grasses and trees rely on to exist? The Buddha said: They rely on the earth to exist. The monk asked the Buddha: What does the earth rely on? The Buddha said: It relies on the vajra wheel (vajra wheel). The monk asked the Buddha: What does the vajra wheel rely on? The Buddha said: It relies on the water wheel (water wheel). The monk asked the Buddha: What does the water wheel rely on? The Buddha said: It relies on...
風輪。比丘白佛。風輪依何。佛言。依虛空。比丘白佛。虛空依何。佛言。汝問太過。言虛空者無色無見無對。當何所依。然藉光明虛空顯了。今又存略不具引也。無色者無青黃等色處也。無見者既無有色不可見也。無對者無十色處相對礙也。夫有色有見有對礙物可有所依 空既無色無見無對。當何所依也。既言虛空無所依。止恐人便即謂無虛空。所以復言然藉光明虛空顯了。謂若無虛空總是障礙光明等色則不得生。今既得生。知空是有。非但因空生彼光明色等。亦因光明色等知有虛空。此則空望光明是其生因。光明望空是了因也。
論云。此經義說至因光明顯 述曰。此下釋經義也。文有三。一以文顯意有。二以果顯因有。三以用顯體有。此即以文顯其經意。所說常空是實有也。
論云。或有疑難至應無體相 述曰。此下以果顯因有也。佛恐有人疑難云。佛既不說虛空別有所依。如風輪等依虛空等。如是虛空應無體相也。虛空是無(宗)無所依故(因)諸無所依者皆悉是無如兔角等(同喻)若非是無即有所依如風輪等(異喻)。
論云。為釋此難光明等色 述曰。此為釋也。釋此疑難故說虛空容受有對光明等色。光明等色若無便不知虛空等色是有。
論云。以果顯因有實體相 述曰。此顯
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 風輪（Vāyu-cakra）。比丘問佛：『風輪（Vāyu-cakra）依靠什麼？』佛說：『依靠虛空（ākāśa）。』比丘問佛：『虛空（ākāśa）依靠什麼？』佛說：『你問得太過分了。所說的虛空（ākāśa），沒有顏色，不能看見，沒有對礙，應當依靠什麼呢？然而憑藉光明，虛空（ākāśa）才得以顯現。』現在只是簡略地說，沒有完全引申。沒有顏色，是指沒有青色、黃色等顏色之處。不能看見，是指既然沒有顏色，就不可見。沒有對礙，是指沒有十色處相對阻礙。有顏色、能看見、有對礙的事物可以有所依靠。虛空（ākāśa）既然沒有顏色、不能看見、沒有對礙，應當依靠什麼呢？既然說虛空（ākāśa）沒有所依靠，只是恐怕人們就認為沒有虛空（ākāśa），所以又說憑藉光明，虛空（ākāśa）才得以顯現。意思是說，如果沒有虛空（ākāśa），所有障礙光明的顏色等就不能產生。現在既然能夠產生，就知道虛空（ākāśa）是存在的。不僅僅因為虛空（ākāśa）產生那些光明顏色等，也因為光明顏色等知道有虛空（ākāśa）。這樣，虛空（ākāśa）對於光明來說是它的生因，光明對於虛空（ākāśa）來說是它的了因。
論中說：『此經的意義說到因光明而顯現。』解釋說：『下面解釋經文的意義。』文中有三點：一是以文顯意有，二是以果顯因有，三是以用顯體有。這裡是以文來顯明經文的意義，所說的常空是真實存在的。
論中說：『或者有人懷疑，乃至應無體相。』解釋說：『下面以結果來顯示原因的存在。』佛恐怕有人懷疑說：『佛既然不說虛空（ākāśa）另外有所依靠，如同風輪（Vāyu-cakra）等依靠虛空（ākāśa）等。這樣，虛空（ākāśa）應當沒有體相。』虛空（ākāśa）是無（宗），沒有所依靠的緣故（因），所有沒有所依靠的事物都是沒有的，如同兔角等（同喻），如果不是沒有，就有所依靠，如同風輪（Vāyu-cakra）等（異喻）。
論中說：『爲了解釋這個疑難，光明等色。』解釋說：『這是爲了解釋。』爲了解釋這個疑難，所以說虛空（ākāśa）容納有對的光明等色。光明等色如果沒有，就不知道虛空（ākāśa）等色是存在的。
論中說：『以結果來顯示原因有實體相。』解釋說：『這是顯示。』
【English Translation】 English version Vāyu-cakra (wind-wheel). A Bhikṣu (monk) asked the Buddha: 'What does the Vāyu-cakra (wind-wheel) rely on?' The Buddha said: 'It relies on ākāśa (space).' The Bhikṣu (monk) asked the Buddha: 'What does ākāśa (space) rely on?' The Buddha said: 'You ask too much. What is called ākāśa (space) has no color, cannot be seen, and has no opposition. What should it rely on? However, ākāśa (space) is revealed through light.' Now it is only briefly stated, not fully extended. 'No color' means there is no place with colors like blue or yellow. 'Cannot be seen' means that since there is no color, it cannot be seen. 'No opposition' means there is no mutual obstruction of the ten color-spheres. Things with color, that can be seen, and have opposition can have something to rely on. Since ākāśa (space) has no color, cannot be seen, and has no opposition, what should it rely on? Since it is said that ākāśa (space) has nothing to rely on, it is only feared that people will immediately think there is no ākāśa (space). Therefore, it is further said that ākāśa (space) is revealed through light. It means that if there were no ākāśa (space), all colors that obstruct light would not be able to arise. Now that they can arise, it is known that ākāśa (space) exists. Not only do those colors of light arise because of ākāśa (space), but also because of the colors of light, it is known that there is ākāśa (space). Thus, ākāśa (space) is the productive cause for light, and light is the revealing cause for ākāśa (space).
The treatise says: 'The meaning of this sutra speaks of being revealed by light.' Explanation: 'The following explains the meaning of the sutra.' There are three points in the text: first, to reveal the meaning of existence through the text; second, to reveal the existence of the cause through the effect; and third, to reveal the substance through the function. Here, the meaning of the sutra is revealed through the text, and the constant emptiness spoken of is truly existent.
The treatise says: 'Or someone may doubt, even to the point of saying it should have no substance.' Explanation: 'The following uses the result to show the existence of the cause.' The Buddha feared that someone might doubt and say: 'Since the Buddha does not say that ākāśa (space) relies on anything else, like Vāyu-cakra (wind-wheel) relying on ākāśa (space), then ākāśa (space) should have no substance.' ākāśa (space) is non-existent (thesis), because it has nothing to rely on (reason). All things that have nothing to rely on are non-existent, like rabbit horns (example of similarity). If it is not non-existent, then it has something to rely on, like Vāyu-cakra (wind-wheel) (example of difference).
The treatise says: 'To explain this difficulty, colors such as light.' Explanation: 'This is for explanation.' To explain this difficulty, it is said that ākāśa (space) accommodates colors such as light that have opposition. If there were no colors such as light, it would not be known that colors such as ākāśa (space) exist.
The treatise says: 'To reveal that the cause has substantial form through the result.' Explanation: 'This is to reveal.'
意也。世尊為此則以光明果顯虛空因有實體相也。
論云。又說虛空至能作所依 述曰。此以用顯體有也。虛空實有(宗)能作所依故(因)如風輪等(喻)。
論云。此亦不然非經義故 述曰。此下非破也。初總非。后別破。此總非也。汝向釋經並乖聖旨故不然也。
論云。若謂虛空至如龜毛等 述曰。此下別破也。有三。一破以果顯因有。二破約用顯體有。三破以文顯意空有。此即破以果顯因有也。虛空之體應有生滅(宗)是有果法故(因)如色心等(喻)生滅既隨。體則無常。汝等何故妄執空常。若汝執空無生滅者。汝所執空應無體相(宗)無生滅故(因)如龜毛等(喻)。
論云。為顯風輪至故作是說 述曰。此破約用顯體有也。泛明輪依有其三種。一同聚依。謂同時極微相持為依。二同類依。謂前後自類相望為依。三異類依。謂輪依風異類為依。今此經意為顯風輪離前念同類。況在二依之外無別第三異類所依。如地輪等依風輪等。所以經說風輪依空。空者無也。此言風輪空無異類所依故言風輪依空。非謂別有虛空之體為風輪依也。依者但遮風輪異類所依。不遮風輪前念同類生起所依。現在同聚生起所依。故作是說也。外人以彼虛空能為風輪作所依用證其體有。今論主釋云。空者無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 意思是說，世尊因此用光明果來顯示虛空因具有實體相。
論中說：『又說虛空至能作所依』，述記中解釋說：『這是用作用來顯示本體存在。』虛空確實存在（宗），因為它能作為所依賴之處（因），就像風輪等（喻）。
論中說：『這也不對，因為不符合經義』，述記中解釋說：『下面進行駁斥。先總的駁斥，後分別駁斥。這裡是總的駁斥。你之前的解釋經文都違背了聖人的旨意，所以是不對的。』
論中說：『如果認為虛空至如龜毛等』，述記中解釋說：『下面進行分別駁斥，分為三部分。一是駁斥用果來顯示因存在，二是駁斥用作用來顯示本體存在，三是駁斥用文字來顯示意義上的空有。這裡是駁斥用果來顯示因存在。』虛空的本體應該有生滅（宗），因為它是有果之法（因），就像色心等（喻），生滅既然相隨，本體就應該是無常的。你們為什麼妄自執著于空是常的呢？如果你們認為空沒有生滅，那麼你們所執著的空應該沒有本體相（宗），因為它沒有生滅（因），就像龜毛等（喻）。
論中說：『爲了顯示風輪至故作是說』，述記中解釋說：『這是駁斥用作用來顯示本體存在。』普遍說明輪所依賴的有三種：一是同聚依，指同時的極微互相支援作為依賴；二是同類依，指前後同類的相互依存；三是異類依，指輪依賴於風這種異類作為依賴。現在這部經的含義是爲了顯示風輪脫離了前唸的同類，更何況是在二依之外沒有別的第三種異類所依賴。就像地輪等依賴於風輪等。所以經中說風輪依賴於空，空就是沒有。這裡說風輪空無異類所依賴，所以說風輪依賴於空。不是說另外有虛空的本體作為風輪的依賴。依賴只是爲了排除風輪異類所依賴，不排除風輪前念同類生起所依賴，現在同聚生起所依賴。所以這樣說。』外人認為虛空能夠作為風輪所依賴的作用，來證明它的本體存在。現在論主解釋說，空就是沒有。
【English Translation】 English version: The meaning is that the World Honored One (世尊) (Buddha) uses the fruit of light to reveal that the cause of emptiness (虛空) (space) has a substantial form.
The treatise says: 'Furthermore, it is said that emptiness (虛空) (space) is the basis of action,' and the commentary states: 'This uses function to reveal the existence of substance.' Emptiness (虛空) (space) truly exists (thesis) because it can serve as a basis of dependence (reason), like wind wheels (風輪) (wind circles) and so on (example).
The treatise says: 'This is also not right, because it does not accord with the meaning of the scriptures,' and the commentary states: 'Below is the refutation. First, a general refutation, then separate refutations. This is the general refutation. Your previous explanations of the scriptures all contradict the Buddha's intent, so they are not right.'
The treatise says: 'If it is thought that emptiness (虛空) (space) is like turtle hair (龜毛) (non-existent),' and the commentary states: 'Below are separate refutations, divided into three parts. First, refuting the use of fruit to show the existence of cause; second, refuting the use of function to show the existence of substance; third, refuting the use of text to show the emptiness or existence in meaning. This is refuting the use of fruit to show the existence of cause.' The substance of emptiness (虛空) (space) should have arising and ceasing (thesis) because it is a dharma (法) (phenomenon) that has a result (fruit) (reason), like form (色) (rupa) and mind (心) (citta) and so on (example). Since arising and ceasing follow, the substance should be impermanent. Why do you stubbornly cling to the idea that emptiness (虛空) (space) is permanent? If you believe that emptiness (虛空) (space) does not have arising and ceasing, then the emptiness (虛空) (space) you cling to should not have a substantial form (thesis) because it does not have arising and ceasing (reason), like turtle hair (龜毛) (non-existent) and so on (example).
The treatise says: 'To show the wind wheel (風輪) (wind circle), therefore it is said,' and the commentary states: 'This is refuting the use of function to show the existence of substance.' It generally explains that there are three kinds of dependence for a wheel: first, dependence on a common aggregate, referring to simultaneous extremely small particles supporting each other as dependence; second, dependence on the same kind, referring to the mutual dependence of preceding and succeeding entities of the same kind; third, dependence on a different kind, referring to the wheel depending on wind, a different kind, as dependence. Now, the meaning of this scripture is to show that the wind wheel (風輪) (wind circle) is detached from the preceding thought of the same kind, let alone having a third kind of different dependence outside of the two dependencies. Just like the earth wheel (地輪) (earth circle) and so on depend on the wind wheel (風輪) (wind circle) and so on. Therefore, the scripture says that the wind wheel (風輪) (wind circle) depends on emptiness (虛空) (space), and emptiness (虛空) (space) is nothingness. Here it says that the wind wheel (風輪) (wind circle) is empty of dependence on a different kind, so it is said that the wind wheel (風輪) (wind circle) depends on emptiness (虛空) (space). It is not saying that there is another substance of emptiness (虛空) (space) as the dependence of the wind wheel (風輪) (wind circle). Dependence is only to exclude the wind wheel's (風輪) (wind circle) dependence on a different kind, not to exclude the wind wheel's (風輪) (wind circle) dependence on the arising of the preceding thought of the same kind, and the present dependence on the arising of the common aggregate. Therefore, it is said in this way.' Outsiders believe that emptiness (虛空) (space) can serve as the function on which the wind wheel (風輪) (wind circle) depends, to prove its substance exists. Now the author of the treatise explains that emptiness (虛空) (space) is nothingness.
也。風輪依空即無所依。所依體無用亦非有。何得以用而顯體耶。此即隨一不成過也。
論云。為顯虛空至非常住體相 述曰。此下破以文顯意有也。論主云。小乘之人不了經旨遂妄解釋顯有常空我。今釋此經正意顯常空無也。經文有五句。初釋上三句明虛空實無。后釋下兩句明虛空假有。釋上三句中。初順顯經意。次引經帖成后反顯經理。此即順顯經意也。為顯虛空無同聚同類異類三種生起所依。如過去等無三種依。故無別實有常住體相也。此比量云。所執常空無實體相(宗)無所依故(因)諸無所依者皆無實體相如過去等(同喻)若有實體相即有所依如色受等(異喻)。
論云。故復經說至當何所依 述曰。此引經帖成也。
論云。不見實有至生起所依 述曰。此反證經理也。不見實有而無所依。空無所依明非實有。或可此文即是前量異法喻也。
論云。又顯虛空至實有體相 述曰。此下釋經下兩句明虛空假有也。有四。一正釋經文。二通經妨難。三執實違經。四立假無過。此即正釋經文也。文中初順釋經意。次引經帖成。后遮其外執。世俗諦中有通假實。如色等四塵即是實有。於四塵上建立瓶等即是假有。光明等色既是色塵二是實有。于光明等上建立虛空故是假有。然青等實色及與假
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
也。風輪（Vayu Mandala，指支撐世界的風輪）依靠虛空，即無所依靠。所依靠的體性若無作用，也並非實有。怎麼能以作用來顯現體性呢？這便是隨一不成（ekatva-siddhi，指僅憑一個例子無法證明普遍規律）的過失。
論中說：『爲了顯示虛空乃至非常住的體相』。述記中說：以下破斥以文字顯現意義的觀點。論主說：小乘之人不瞭解經文的旨意，於是妄加解釋，認為虛空、自我（Atman）是常有的。現在解釋此經的真正含義，是爲了顯示常有的虛空是不存在的。經文有五句。最初解釋前三句，說明虛空實際上不存在。之後解釋后兩句，說明虛空是假有的。在解釋前三句中，首先順應地顯示經文的含義，其次引用經文來印證，然後反過來顯示經文的道理。這便是順應地顯示經文的含義。爲了顯示虛空沒有同聚（sajatiya，同類）、同類（ सजातीय，相似）、異類（vijatiya，不同類）這三種生起的所依。如同過去等事物沒有這三種所依。所以沒有別的實有的常住體相。這個比量（anumana，推理）是：所執著的常有的虛空沒有實體的體相（宗），因為它沒有所依靠（因）。凡是沒有所依靠的事物，都沒有實體的體相，如同過去等事物（同喻）。如果存在實體的體相，那麼就有所依靠，如同色、受等（異喻）。
論中說：『所以經中又說乃至當依靠什麼』。述記中說：這是引用經文來印證。
論中說：『不見實有乃至生起的所依』。述記中說：這是反過來證明經文的道理。不見實有而無所依靠。虛空沒有所依靠，說明它不是實有的。或者可以說，這段文字就是前面比量的異法喻（vyatireki-dṛṣṭānta，反例）。
論中說：『又顯示虛空乃至實有的體相』。述記中說：以下解釋經文的后兩句，說明虛空是假有的。有四個方面：一是正面解釋經文，二是疏通經文的妨難，三是執著實有就違背經文，四是建立假有就沒有過失。這便是正面解釋經文。文中首先順應地解釋經文的含義，其次引用經文來印證，然後遮止其外道的執著。在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，世俗諦）中，有共通的假有和實有。例如色等四塵（caturbhūta，四大）就是實有的。在四塵之上建立瓶子等事物，就是假有的。光明等色既然是色塵，那麼它們是實有的。在光明等之上建立虛空，所以虛空是假有的。然而青色等真實的顏色以及假...
【English Translation】 English version:
Also, the Vayu Mandala (wind-wheel, the support of the world) relies on space, which means it has nothing to rely on. If the nature of what is relied upon has no function, it is also not truly existent. How can its nature be manifested through its function? This is the fallacy of 'ekatva-siddhi' (proving a universal rule with only one example).
In the treatise, it says: 'In order to reveal the nature of space, up to its impermanent nature.' The commentary says: The following refutes the view that meaning is revealed through words. The treatise master says: Those of the Hinayana school do not understand the meaning of the sutras, and thus interpret them wrongly, believing that space and Atman (self) are permanent. Now, explaining the true meaning of this sutra is to reveal that permanent space does not exist. There are five sentences in the sutra. The first explains the first three sentences, clarifying that space does not actually exist. The latter explains the last two sentences, clarifying that space is conventionally existent. In explaining the first three sentences, first, the meaning of the sutra is revealed accordingly; second, the sutra is quoted to confirm it; then, the principle of the sutra is revealed in reverse. This is revealing the meaning of the sutra accordingly. It is to show that space has no 'sajatiya' (homogeneous, same class), ' सजातीय' (similar), or 'vijatiya' (heterogeneous, different class) as a basis for arising. Just as the past, etc., have no such three bases. Therefore, there is no separate, truly existent, permanent nature. This anumana (inference) is: The permanent space that is clung to has no substantial nature (thesis), because it has nothing to rely on (reason). Whatever has nothing to rely on has no substantial nature, like the past, etc. (example). If there were a substantial nature, then it would have something to rely on, like form, sensation, etc. (counter-example).
In the treatise, it says: 'Therefore, the sutra also says, up to what should be relied upon?' The commentary says: This is quoting the sutra to confirm it.
In the treatise, it says: 'Not seeing real existence, up to the basis of arising.' The commentary says: This is proving the principle of the sutra in reverse. Not seeing real existence and having nothing to rely on. Space has nothing to rely on, indicating that it is not truly existent. Or it can be said that this passage is the 'vyatireki-dṛṣṭānta' (negative example) of the previous inference.
In the treatise, it says: 'Also showing space, up to the nature of real existence.' The commentary says: The following explains the last two sentences of the sutra, clarifying that space is conventionally existent. There are four aspects: first, explaining the sutra directly; second, clearing up difficulties in the sutra; third, clinging to real existence violates the sutra; fourth, establishing conventional existence has no fault. This is explaining the sutra directly. The text first explains the meaning of the sutra accordingly, then quotes the sutra to confirm it, and then prevents its external clinging. In 'saṃvṛti-satya' (conventional truth), there is common conventional existence and real existence. For example, the 'caturbhūta' (four elements) such as form are truly existent. Establishing things like a pot on the four elements is conventionally existent. Since light and other colors are form elements, they are truly existent. Establishing space on light and other things, therefore space is conventionally existent. However, real colors such as blue and false...
立虛空。俱言藉諸光明而顯了者。若光明了青等。青等先自有。光明但為眼識作見緣。不由光明立青等故青等是實有。若光明了虛空。虛空本自無。光明但為意識作知緣。于上假立虛空性。故虛空是假有。論主云。今經為顯虛空因光明等。諸無礙色依世俗諦強假施設立有虛空。譬如因色等四塵假立瓶等。故經說言。然藉光明虛空顯了。非謂同彼青等實色為光明顯而是實有。此則顯了雖通 有實有假。不可依此。因光明顯即設虛空。離光明等實體相也。
論云。雖因影闇至假立虛空 述曰。此下通經妨難也。初通影闇顯空難。后通佛說無空難。此通初難也。外人伏難言。若論主言。虛空無體依光明等無礙色上假立虛空。故經說言。然藉光明虛空顯了者。影闇等色亦是無礙。依影闇上應立虛空。何故不言然藉影闇虛空顯了。論主通言。雖因影闇無礙色上得立虛空。然影闇中眼有影闇隔礙。雖見所餘障礙之物而不明瞭。或有影闇之色極大重時。眼唯見此極重影闇。更不見余有障礙色。既不能了余有礙物。焉了影闇是無礙耶。故經不說然藉影闇虛空顯了。于光明等無礙色中眼無障礙。對余礙色見光明無障顯現。即便依此光明等上假立虛空。故經說言然藉光明虛空顯了。
論云。勿謗虛空至無有虛空 述曰。此通佛
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 建立虛空。都說憑藉各種光明而顯現的。如果光明照亮青色等事物，青色等事物原本就存在。光明只是為眼識提供看見的條件，不是因為光明才建立青色等事物，所以青色等事物是真實存在的。如果光明照亮虛空，虛空原本不存在。光明只是為意識提供知覺的條件，在上面假立虛空的性質，所以虛空是假有的。論主說，現在這部經是爲了顯示虛空是因光明等無礙色，依據世俗諦強行假立而有虛空。譬如因為色等四塵假立瓶子等。所以經上說，『憑藉光明，虛空才顯現』。不是說像青色等真實色一樣，因為光明照亮它就是真實存在的。這說明顯現雖然貫通有真實有虛假，不能依據這一點，因為光明顯現就設立虛空，離開光明等實體相。
論中說：『即使因為影和暗而假立虛空』。解釋說：以下是貫通經文來防止詰難。首先貫通影和暗顯現虛空的詰難，然後貫通佛說沒有虛空的詰難。這裡貫通第一個詰難。外人反駁說，如果論主說，虛空沒有實體，依據光明等無礙色上假立虛空。所以經上說，『憑藉光明，虛空才顯現』。那麼影和暗等色也是無礙的，依據影和暗上應該建立虛空。為什麼不說『憑藉影和暗，虛空才顯現』？論主解釋說，即使因為影和暗無礙色上可以建立虛空，但是影和暗中眼睛有影和暗的阻隔。即使看見其餘障礙之物也不明瞭。或者有影和暗的顏色非常重的時候，眼睛只看見這極重的影和暗，再也看不見其餘有障礙的顏色。既然不能瞭解其餘有礙之物，怎麼了解影和暗是無礙的呢？所以經上不說『憑藉影和暗，虛空才顯現』。在光明等無礙色中，眼睛沒有障礙。對著其餘有礙色，看見光明沒有阻礙地顯現，就依據這光明等假立虛空。所以經上說『憑藉光明，虛空才顯現』。
論中說：『不要誹謗虛空，直到沒有虛空』。解釋說：這裡貫通佛
【English Translation】 English version Establishing space. All say that it is manifested by means of various lights. If light illuminates blue and other things (qing deng, blue etc.), blue and other things exist originally. Light only provides the condition for eye consciousness to see, it is not because of light that blue and other things are established, so blue and other things are real. If light illuminates space (xukong, space), space originally does not exist. Light only provides the condition for consciousness to perceive, and the nature of space is falsely established on it, so space is falsely existent. The treatise master says that this sutra is now to show that space is due to light and other unobstructed colors, and space is forcibly and falsely established according to mundane truth. For example, because of the four elements such as color, bottles and other things are falsely established. Therefore, the sutra says, 'Space is manifested by means of light.' It does not mean that like real colors such as blue, it is real because light illuminates it. This shows that manifestation penetrates both the real and the false, and one cannot rely on this, because light manifests and then establishes space, apart from the entity of light and so on.
The treatise says: 'Even if space is falsely established because of shadow and darkness.' Explanation: The following is to connect the scriptures to prevent refutation. First, connect the refutation of shadow and darkness manifesting space, and then connect the refutation of the Buddha saying that there is no space. Here is the first refutation. An outsider rebuts, if the treatise master says that space has no substance, and falsely establishes space based on unobstructed colors such as light. Therefore, the sutra says, 'Space is manifested by means of light.' Then shadow and darkness and other colors are also unobstructed, and space should be established based on shadow and darkness. Why not say 'Space is manifested by means of shadow and darkness?' The treatise master explains that even if space can be established on unobstructed colors such as shadow and darkness, the eyes are blocked by shadow and darkness in shadow and darkness. Even if you see other obstructing things, it is not clear. Or when the color of shadow and darkness is very heavy, the eyes only see this very heavy shadow and darkness, and can no longer see other obstructing colors. Since you cannot understand other obstructing things, how can you understand that shadow and darkness are unobstructed? Therefore, the sutra does not say 'Space is manifested by means of shadow and darkness.' In unobstructed colors such as light, the eyes are not obstructed. Facing other obstructing colors, seeing the unobstructed manifestation of light, space is falsely established based on this light and so on. Therefore, the sutra says 'Space is manifested by means of light.'
The treatise says: 'Do not slander space until there is no space.' Explanation: Here connect the Buddha
說無空難也。外人難言。若此虛空實無體者。佛應直說無有虛空。何須說言無色無見無對無依然藉光明虛空顯了耶。論主通言。世俗說有。佛亦說有。世俗說無。佛亦說無。一切世間皆云虛空。佛若言無便違世俗。故隨世俗言無色等依光明顯假立虛空。非謂此言別顯實有常住虛空。
論云。又若虛空至無對無依 述曰。此明執實違經也。文中初破執實。后顯違經。汝云所執常有虛空應當有色有見對有依(宗)藉諸光明而顯了故(因)猶如青等色(喻)此破執實。既有色等。何故經說無色等耶。此顯違經。
論云。世俗假有至不相應故 述曰。此立假無過也。若於光明無礙色上假立虛空。即無虛空有色等過。以所立空順無礙色與質礙色義不應故。其無礙色雖順虛空。然是有色等。虛空自是無色等。以假實殊義用別故。
論云。又此虛空至之所了知 述曰。此下正生下頌也。初明虛空唯散心知。后明散心不緣實境。此即初也。汝宗虛空四諦不攝。十智之中非九智知。謂非苦集滅道法。非盡及無生八無漏智現量境界。既非心法亦非他心現量境界。唯為世俗一智所知。於世俗智中有定有散。汝必應許唯分別散心所緣之境。非是定心現量境也。若外人言空處等至緣于虛空即是定心現量境者。此中文意立量破云
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於沒有空難的說法，外道之人難以理解。如果這虛空確實沒有實體，佛陀應該直接說沒有虛空，何必說『無色、無見、無對、無依』，仍然憑藉光明才能顯現虛空呢？論主的普遍解釋是：世俗說有，佛也說有；世俗說無，佛也說無。一切世間都說有虛空，佛如果說沒有，就違背了世俗。所以順應世俗的說法，說無色等，依靠光明而顯現，是假立的虛空，並非說這是另外顯現一個真實存在、常住不變的虛空。
論中說：『又如果虛空到無對無依』，註釋說：這是說明執著虛空為實有，就違背了佛經。文中先破斥執著虛空為實有，后說明違背佛經。你說你所執著的常有虛空，應當有色、有見、有對、有依（這是宗），因為它憑藉各種光明才能顯現（這是因），就像青色等顏色一樣（這是比喻）。這是破斥執著虛空為實有。既然有色等，為什麼佛經又說無色等呢？這是說明違背佛經。
論中說：『世俗假有到不相應故』，註釋說：這是建立假有無過的說法。如果在光明無礙的色法上假立虛空，就沒有虛空有色等過失。因為所建立的虛空，順應無礙色，與有質礙的色法在意義上不相應。那無礙色雖然順應虛空，但它是有色等。虛空本身是無色等。因為假和實不同，意義和作用也不同。
論中說：『又此虛空到之所了知』，註釋說：這以下是正式引出下面的頌文。先說明虛空只有散亂心才能認知，后說明散亂心不能緣取真實境界。這就是開始。你所宗的虛空，不被四諦所包含，在十智之中，不是九智所能認知的。也就是說，它不是苦、集、滅、道法，不是盡智和無生智這八種無漏智慧的現量境界。既然不是心法，也不是他心的現量境界，那麼它只能被世俗的一種智慧所認知。在世俗智慧中，有定心和散心。你必定應該承認，虛空只是分別散亂心所緣取的境界，而不是定心的現量境界。如果外道之人說，空處等至所緣取的虛空，就是定心的現量境界，那麼，這段文字的意思是立一個量來破斥：
【English Translation】 English version: It is said that there is no calamity of emptiness. Outsiders find it difficult to understand. If this emptiness truly has no substance, the Buddha should directly say that there is no emptiness. Why would he say 'no form, no seeing, no opposition, no reliance,' and still rely on light to reveal emptiness? The treatise master's general explanation is: The mundane world says there is, and the Buddha also says there is; the mundane world says there is not, and the Buddha also says there is not. All the world says there is emptiness. If the Buddha said there is not, it would contradict the mundane world. Therefore, in accordance with the mundane world's saying, it is said that there is no form, etc., relying on light to appear, which is a provisional establishment of emptiness. It is not to say that this is separately revealing a truly existent, permanent emptiness.
The treatise says: 'Moreover, if emptiness reaches no opposition, no reliance,' The commentary says: This clarifies that clinging to emptiness as real violates the scriptures. The text first refutes clinging to emptiness as real, and then clarifies the violation of the scriptures. You say that the emptiness you cling to as permanent should have form, seeing, opposition, and reliance (this is the proposition), because it relies on various lights to appear (this is the reason), just like the color blue, etc. (this is the example). This is refuting clinging to emptiness as real. Since there is form, etc., why do the scriptures say there is no form, etc.? This clarifies the violation of the scriptures.
The treatise says: 'The mundane world provisionally has, up to not corresponding,' The commentary says: This establishes the faultlessness of provisional existence. If emptiness is provisionally established on unobstructed form, then there is no fault of emptiness having form, etc. Because the established emptiness accords with unobstructed form, and its meaning does not correspond with obstructive form. Although unobstructed form accords with emptiness, it has form, etc. Emptiness itself has no form, etc. Because the provisional and the real are different, and their meanings and functions are different.
The treatise says: 'Moreover, this emptiness, up to that which is known,' The commentary says: The following is the formal introduction to the verse below. First, it clarifies that emptiness is only known by a distracted mind. Then, it clarifies that a distracted mind cannot perceive a real state. This is the beginning. The emptiness that you uphold is not included in the Four Noble Truths. Among the Ten Wisdoms, it is not known by the nine wisdoms. That is to say, it is not suffering, accumulation, cessation, or the path; it is not the direct perception of the wisdom of exhaustion and the wisdom of non-arising, these eight non-outflow wisdoms. Since it is not a mental phenomenon, nor is it the direct perception of another's mind, then it can only be known by one wisdom of the mundane world. Among mundane wisdom, there is concentration and distraction. You must admit that emptiness is only the state perceived by a discriminating, distracted mind, and not the direct perception of a concentrated mind. If an outsider says that the emptiness perceived by the attainment of the sphere of emptiness, etc., is the direct perception of a concentrated mind, then the meaning of this passage is to establish a measure to refute it:
。汝所執空非定心境(宗)四諦不攝故(因)如非擇滅(喻)。
論云。除五識身至緣實有境 述曰。此明散心不緣實境也。于散心意識中。有是現量。有非現量。五識所引。或鄰次意識。或同時意識。諸部論師有許是現量。故今除之唯取其餘散心意識。言有漏者簡無漏。不定者簡定心。外門者簡自證分。分別意識者簡五識。即正指有法體也。謂除五識身所引意識其餘有漏不定外門分別意識(有法)決定不能緣實有境(宗法)除五識身所引意識其餘有漏不定外門分別意識之所攝故(因也)如緣兔角龜毛等心(同喻)。
論云。故說頌曰至亦不見此義 述曰。此舉頌也。諸有智慧之人依世間真正道理尋求推度。亦不見此實有常住虛空之義。
論云。論曰諸有至種種影像 述曰。此解釋也。文中初明實無後明假有。
論云。複次為破至故說頌曰 述曰。此下二十頌別指破常也。有六。第一一頌破虛空。第二三頌破常時。第三一頌破自然。第四兩頌破常因。第五七頌破極微。第六六頌破涅槃。第一一頌破虛空中。初生起。次舉頌。后解釋。此生起也。小乘外道立宗云空等是常。立因云由遍滿故。此無同喻。今論主為破彼執故說此頌。
論云。非唯有一分至各別有有分 述曰。此舉頌也。上半
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：你所執著的空不是定心所緣的境(宗)，因為它不被四諦所包含(因)，就像非擇滅一樣(喻)。
《成唯識論》中說：『除了五識身…到…緣實有境』。窺基法師解釋說：『這是說明散亂的心不能緣到真實存在的境。在散亂的意識中，有的是現量，有的不是現量。五識所引發的，或者鄰近的意識，或者同時的意識，各部論師有的允許是現量。所以現在排除這些，只取其餘散亂的意識。』『有漏』是簡別無漏，『不定』是簡別定心，『外門』是簡別自證分，『分別意識』是簡別五識。這就是正指有法(Dharmin)的體性。也就是說，除了五識身所引發的意識，其餘有漏、不定、外門、分別意識(有法)，決定不能緣到真實存在的境(宗)，因為它們是被除了五識身所引發的意識，其餘有漏、不定、外門、分別意識所包含的(因)，就像緣兔角、龜毛等的心一樣(同喻)。
《成唯識論》中說：『所以說偈頌說…到…也不見此義』。窺基法師解釋說：『這是舉出偈頌。』那些有智慧的人，依據世間真正道理尋求推度，也不見這真實存在、常住的虛空的意義。
《成唯識論》中說：『論中說，諸有…到…種種影像』。窺基法師解釋說：『這是解釋。』文中先說明實無，后說明假有。
《成唯識論》中說：『再次，爲了破除…到…所以說偈頌說』。窺基法師解釋說：『下面二十頌分別指明破除常。』有六個部分：第一，一頌破虛空；第二，三頌破常時；第三，一頌破自然；第四，兩頌破常因；第五，七頌破極微；第六，六頌破涅槃。第一，一頌破虛空中，先是生起，其次舉出偈頌，最後是解釋。這是生起。小乘外道立宗說，空等是常。立因說，因為遍滿的緣故。這沒有同喻。現在論主爲了破除他們的執著，所以說這個偈頌。
《成唯識論》中說：『不是隻有一部分…到…各自有有分』。窺基法師解釋說：『這是舉出偈頌的上半部分。』
【English Translation】 English version: The 'emptiness' (空, śūnyatā) you adhere to is not an object (境, viṣaya) of a concentrated mind (定心, samādhi) (thesis), because it is not included in the Four Noble Truths (四諦, catvāri-āryasatyāni) (reason), just like non-selective cessation (非擇滅, apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha) (example).
The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra (成唯識論) states: 'Except for the five consciousnesses (五識身, pañca-vijñāna-kāya)... to... objects that are truly existent (緣實有境)'. Kuiji (窺基) explains: 'This explains that a distracted mind (散心, vikṣipta-citta) cannot cognize truly existent objects. Among distracted consciousnesses, some are direct perception (現量, pratyakṣa), and some are not. Those induced by the five consciousnesses, or adjacent consciousnesses, or simultaneous consciousnesses, are considered direct perception by some schools of philosophers. Therefore, we exclude these and only take the remaining distracted consciousnesses.' 'Defiled (有漏, sāsrava)' distinguishes from undefiled (無漏, anāsrava); 'unsettled (不定, aniyata)' distinguishes from concentrated mind (定心, samādhi); 'external (外門, bāhya-dvāra)' distinguishes from self-cognition (自證分, svasaṃvedana); 'discriminating consciousness (分別意識, vikalpa-vijñāna)' distinguishes from the five consciousnesses. This precisely points to the nature of the subject (有法, dharmin). That is, except for the consciousnesses induced by the five consciousnesses, the remaining defiled, unsettled, external, discriminating consciousnesses (subject) definitely cannot cognize truly existent objects (thesis), because they are included in the defiled, unsettled, external, discriminating consciousnesses excluding those induced by the five consciousnesses (reason), just like the mind that cognizes rabbit horns (兔角, śaśa-viṣāṇa) and turtle hair (龜毛, kūrma-loma) (example).
The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra states: 'Therefore, it is said in the verse... to... also do not see this meaning'. Kuiji explains: 'This cites the verse.' Those who have wisdom, based on the true principles of the world, seek and infer, also do not see the meaning of this truly existent, permanent space (虛空, ākāśa).
The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra states: 'The treatise says, all who... to... various images'. Kuiji explains: 'This is an explanation.' The text first explains the absence of reality, and then explains the existence of the provisional.
The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra states: 'Furthermore, in order to refute... to... therefore it is said in the verse'. Kuiji explains: 'The following twenty verses specifically point to the refutation of permanence.' There are six parts: first, one verse refutes space; second, three verses refute permanent time; third, one verse refutes nature; fourth, two verses refute permanent cause; fifth, seven verses refute atoms; sixth, six verses refute Nirvana. First, one verse refutes space, first is the arising, then the citing of the verse, and finally the explanation. This is the arising. The Hinayana (小乘, Hīnayāna) heretics establish the thesis that space, etc., is permanent. They establish the reason that it is pervasive. There is no similar example for this. Now, the author of the treatise, in order to refute their attachment, therefore speaks this verse.
The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra states: 'Not only is there one part... to... each has its own part'. Kuiji explains: 'This cites the first half of the verse.'
正破。下半結破。
論云。論曰時方至故名有分 述曰。此下解釋也。初釋頌文。次結過失。后破救義。釋頌文中。初釋分有分。次別釋上半頌。后別釋下半頌。此總釋分有分也。時謂三世四時。方謂東西等十方。物謂內外色心等物。類謂時方及物各有流類也。差別謂自類中種種不同也。如此時方物類差別不同故名為分。虛空體一遍合多分故名有分。如人有子謂之有子。子但名子。母名有子也。
論云。非有一分至周遍相應 述曰。此下釋上半頌即正破也。初須責后例破。此須責也。論主責云。非一空體常遍實有名為有分。能與一切時方物類一一別分周遍相應。此中應總作比量云。有分虛空成無量分(宗)與無量分不相離故(因)猶如諸分(喻)又應別作比量言。春時一分所合虛空(有分)與秋等時分必無合義(宗)與春時分不相離故(因)如春時分(喻)余時方等唯作可知。
論云。勿復令此至一切相應 述曰。此例破也。汝若固執一有分空與一切分遍相應者。即復令此所相應分一一遍與一切相應也。謂一一諸分應成有分(宗)與有分空不相離故(因)如有分空(喻)又應別作此比量。謂春時一分與餘三時應不相離(宗)與有分空不相離故(因)如有空分(喻)余時方等唯此應作之。
論
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 正破。下半結破。
論云：論曰時方至故名有分 述曰：此下解釋也。初釋頌文。次結過失。后破救義。釋頌文中。初釋分有分。次別釋上半頌。后別釋下半頌。此總釋分有分也。時謂三世四時。方謂東西等十方。物謂內外色心等物。類謂時方及物各有流類也。差別謂自類中種種不同也。如此時方物類差別不同故名為分。虛空體一遍合多分故名有分。如人有子謂之有子。子但名子。母名有子也。
論云：非有一分至周遍相應 述曰：此下釋上半頌即正破也。初須責后例破。此須責也。論主責云：『非一空體常遍實有名為有分，能與一切時（時間）方（空間）物類一一別分周遍相應。』此中應總作比量云：『有分虛空成無量分(宗)，與無量分不相離故(因)，猶如諸分(喻)。』又應別作比量言：『春時一分所合虛空(有分)，與秋等時分必無合義(宗)，與春時分不相離故(因)，如春時分(喻)。』余時方等唯作可知。
論云：勿復令此至一切相應 述曰：此例破也。汝若固執一有分空與一切分遍相應者，即復令此所相應分一一遍與一切相應也。謂一一諸分應成有分(宗)，與有分空不相離故(因)，如有分空(喻)。又應別作此比量。謂春時一分與餘三時應不相離(宗)，與有分空不相離故(因)，如有空分(喻)。余時方等唯此應作之。
論
【English Translation】 English version Direct refutation. The latter half concludes the refutation.
Treatise says: The treatise says that it is called 'having parts' because of time and direction. Commentary says: This explains the above. First, it explains the verse. Second, it concludes the faults. Third, it refutes the saving meaning. In explaining the verse, first, it explains 'parts' and 'having parts'. Second, it separately explains the first half of the verse. Third, it separately explains the second half of the verse. This is a general explanation of 'parts' and 'having parts'. 'Time' refers to the three times and four seasons. 'Direction' refers to the ten directions such as east and west. 'Things' refer to internal and external forms, mind, and other things. 'Categories' refer to the streams and categories of time, direction, and things. 'Differences' refer to the various differences within the same category. Because of such differences in time, direction, things, and categories, it is called 'parts'. The substance of space is one and pervasive, combining with many parts, hence it is called 'having parts'. It is like a person having a child is called 'having a child'. The child is only called 'child'. The mother is called 'having a child'.
Treatise says: Not one part to universally correspond. Commentary says: This explains the first half of the verse, which is the direct refutation. First, there must be a rebuke, then an example refutation. This is the rebuke. The author of the treatise rebukes, saying: 'Not one space-substance, constant, pervasive, and real, is named 'having parts', capable of corresponding universally and separately with all times (shí, time), directions (fāng, space), and categories of things.' Here, a general analogy should be made, saying: 'Space having parts becomes limitless parts (thesis), because it is not separate from limitless parts (reason), like all parts (example).' Also, a separate analogy should be made, saying: 'The space combined with one part of spring (having parts) must have no meaning of combination with the parts of autumn and other times (thesis), because it is not separate from the part of spring (reason), like the part of spring (example).' The rest of the times and directions can be understood accordingly.
Treatise says: Do not let this correspond to everything. Commentary says: This is the example refutation. If you stubbornly insist that one space 'having parts' corresponds universally with all parts, then it would follow that each of the corresponding parts would universally correspond with everything. That is, each and every part should become 'having parts' (thesis), because it is not separate from the space 'having parts' (reason), like the space 'having parts' (example). Also, a separate analogy should be made. That is, one part of spring should not be separate from the other three seasons (thesis), because it is not separate from the space 'having parts' (reason), like the space part (example). The rest of the times and directions should be made accordingly.
Treatise
云。故此有分至成無量分 述曰。此釋下半頌即結破也。初結后釋。此結也。由隨諸分故此有分成無量分。
論云。即此諸分至成余物類 述曰。此釋也。即此虛空既成多分。一一別分自名虛空。更不待余時方物類名虛空也。或余物類者。即神我等諸名字也。若一一別分名為虛空及名神我等者。即違汝宗空及我等是遍是常也。或可釋云。即此多分虛空但隨自所依立名。不待余時方立名也。如與春時合空但依春時無障礙義以立其名。更不待余秋冬等時分立其名也。余時方等亦爾。此既虛空隨自所依各別立名。故知虛空成無量分也。或余物類者。非但於時此方物上無障礙義說名虛空。亦於時方物上畢竟無義說名龜毛兔角。然兔之與角。龜之與毛並是物類故言物類。然角不在兔。毛不在龜故。兔角龜毛表其無義也。此則虛空兔角並是約義立名。不可依名執有實體。問。虛空許假有不可謗言無。兔角本表無。何得引來類。答。約義有無異。虛空兔角殊。窮體並皆無。故得引為例。
論云。故汝所執至因義不成 述曰。此結過失也。故汝所立虛空常住以遍滿為因。此不成也。以此虛空成無量分非遍滿故。即是隨一不成過失。
論云。若言空等至此亦不然 述曰。此下破救義也。初牒救總非。后以理逐破。此牒
【現代漢語翻譯】 云。故此有分至成無量分（因為這個原因，所以虛空可以被分割成無數份） 述曰。此釋下半頌即結破也。初結后釋。此結也。由隨諸分故此有分成無量分。（這是對下半頌的解釋，即總結並破斥。先總結后解釋。這是總結。由於隨著各種分割，所以虛空可以被分割成無數份。）
論云。即此諸分至成余物類（這些分割成的部分，就變成了其他種類的東西） 述曰。此釋也。即此虛空既成多分。一一別分自名虛空。更不待余時方物類名虛空也。（這是解釋。這些虛空既然已經分割成很多部分，每一個單獨的部分都可以被稱為虛空，不再需要等待其他時間、空間或物體來命名為虛空。）或余物類者。即神我等諸名字也。（或者『其他種類的東西』，指的是神我之類的名字。）若一一別分名為虛空及名神我等者。即違汝宗空及我等是遍是常也。（如果每一個單獨的部分既可以被稱為虛空，也可以被稱為神我等，那就違背了你們宗派所說的虛空和神我是普遍存在且永恒不變的說法。）或可釋云。即此多分虛空但隨自所依立名。不待余時方立名也。（或者可以解釋為，這些分割成的虛空只是根據它們所依賴的事物來命名，不需要等待其他時間或空間來命名。）如與春時合空但依春時無障礙義以立其名。更不待余秋冬等時分立其名也。（比如與春天結合的虛空，只是根據春天無障礙的意義來命名，不需要等待其他秋冬等時間來命名。）余時方等亦爾。（其他時間和空間也是如此。）此既虛空隨自所依各別立名。故知虛空成無量分也。（既然虛空隨著它所依賴的事物分別命名，就知道虛空可以被分割成無數份。）或余物類者。非但於時此方物上無障礙義說名虛空。亦於時方物上畢竟無義說名龜毛兔角。（或者『其他種類的東西』，不僅僅是在時間、空間、物體上無障礙的意義上說虛空，也在時間和空間物體上根本沒有意義上說龜毛兔角。）然兔之與角。龜之與毛並是物類故言物類。（然而兔子和角，烏龜和毛都是物體，所以說是『物類』。）然角不在兔。毛不在龜故。兔角龜毛表其無義也。（然而角不在兔子身上，毛不在烏龜身上，所以兔角龜毛表示沒有意義。）此則虛空兔角並是約義立名。不可依名執有實體。（這樣，虛空和兔角都是根據意義來命名的，不能根據名稱就認為有實體。）問。虛空許假有不可謗言無。兔角本表無。何得引來類。（問：虛空允許是假有，不能誹謗說沒有。兔角本來就表示沒有，怎麼能拿來類比呢？）答。約義有無異。虛空兔角殊。窮體並皆無。故得引為例。（答：從意義上來說，有和沒有不同，虛空和兔角不同。但從本質上來說，都是沒有的，所以可以拿來做例子。）
論云。故汝所執至因義不成（所以你所堅持的，作為原因的意義是不成立的） 述曰。此結過失也。故汝所立虛空常住以遍滿為因。此不成也。（這是總結過失。所以你所建立的虛空常住，以普遍充滿作為原因，這是不成立的。）以此虛空成無量分非遍滿故。（因為這個虛空可以被分割成無數份，所以不是普遍充滿的。）即是隨一不成過失。（這就是隨一不成立的過失。）
論云。若言空等至此亦不然（如果說虛空等等，在這裡也是不成立的） 述曰。此下破救義也。初牒救總非。后以理逐破。此牒（這下面是破斥辯解的意義。先引用辯解，然後總的否定。然後用道理逐一破斥。這是引用）
【English Translation】 Cloud. Therefore, it can be divided into countless parts. Commentary: This explains the latter half of the verse, which is both a conclusion and a refutation. First the conclusion, then the explanation. This is the conclusion. Because it follows various divisions, it can be divided into countless parts.
Treatise: These divisions become other kinds of things. Commentary: This is the explanation. Since this space has been divided into many parts, each separate part is called space. It does not need to wait for other times, directions, or types of objects to be named space. Or 'other kinds of things' refers to names like 'Atman' (self). If each separate part is called space and also called Atman, then it violates your sect's doctrine that space and Atman are pervasive and eternal. Or it can be explained as: these many divisions of space are named according to what they depend on, without waiting for other times or directions to be named. For example, space combined with springtime is named based on the meaning of unobstructedness in springtime, without waiting for other times like autumn or winter to be named. The same applies to other times and directions. Since space is named separately according to what it depends on, it is known that space can be divided into countless parts. Or 'other kinds of things' means that not only is the meaning of unobstructedness in time, direction, and objects called space, but also the meaning of utter non-existence in time, direction, and objects is called 'turtle hair and rabbit horns'. The rabbit and its horns, the turtle and its hair, are all objects, hence the term 'objects'. However, horns are not on rabbits, and hair is not on turtles, so 'rabbit horns and turtle hair' represent non-existence. Thus, both space and rabbit horns are named according to their meaning. One should not cling to the name and assume a real substance. Question: Space is allowed to be hypothetically existent, and one cannot slander it as non-existent. Rabbit horns inherently represent non-existence. How can they be used for comparison? Answer: In terms of meaning, existence and non-existence are different. Space and rabbit horns are distinct. But in essence, both are non-existent, so they can be used as examples.
Treatise: Therefore, your assertion that the cause is not established. Commentary: This concludes the fault. Therefore, your established permanence of space, with pervasiveness as the cause, is not established. Because this space can be divided into countless parts, it is not pervasive. This is the fault of one aspect not being established.
Treatise: If you say space, etc., this is also not the case here. Commentary: This below refutes the meaning of the defense. First, it cites the defense and generally negates it. Then, it refutes it with reason. This cites.
救總非也。若汝救言。空等體一遍周法界。然由分別之心隨其諸分差別假說虛空有其方分。然虛空體實無方分故。遍滿因無不成過者。此不然也。
論云。實無方分不離如前所說過故 述曰。此下以理逐破也。有四。一同前過失破二顯因相違破。三別立比量破。四宗因不成破。此同前過失破也。空等既無實無方分。遍一切分隨所遍分成無量分。如此等過汝不離也。
論云。瓶等亦應至與義相違 述曰。此顯因相違破也。依第一義瓶等之應實無方分(宗)假立方分故(因)如虛空等(喻)瓶等既其實無方分。便同空等有遍滿因。汝立空常竟無同品。但以瓶等為其異品。此遍滿因無同可有于異有之。四相違中違法自相也。
論云。又虛空等至境界而立 述曰。此別立比量破也。初兩句有法。次兩句宗法。次兩句立因。次四句同喻。后四句顯意。顯意云。此虛空等名言之聲。唯依世俗所知境界和合法上而假建立。不可依此假立名言即執所詮空等以為實有。
論云。又若可說至所依不成 述曰。此宗因不成破也。空等(有法)非常(宗法)非遍(宗法)非實有。虛空等性(宗法)可說有方分故(因)猶如青等(喻)外人宗云空等是遍。因云可說有方分故。今論主即以此因在於異品青等之上。反破外人
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：救總的觀點並非正確。如果你說，空（Śūnyatā，佛教中的空性概念）等的本體遍佈整個法界（Dharmadhātu，宇宙萬有），然而由於分別心的作用，隨著各個部分的差別，才假說虛空有其方位。然而虛空的本體實際上沒有方位，因此，遍滿一切的因沒有不成立的過失——這種說法是不對的。
《論》中說：『實際上沒有方位，不離如前所說過的緣故。』 述曰：下面用道理來逐一駁破。有四種方式：一、用之前的過失來駁破；二、顯示因相違背來駁破；三、另外建立比量來駁破；四、宗和因都不成立來駁破。這裡是用之前的過失來駁破。空等既然實際上沒有方位，遍佈一切部分，隨著所遍佈的部分成為無量部分。如此等等的過失，你無法擺脫。
《論》中說：『瓶等也應該達到，與意義相違背。』 述曰：這是顯示因相違背來駁破。依照第一義諦，瓶等實際上沒有方位（宗），因為假立方位（因），如同虛空等（喻）。瓶等既然實際上沒有方位，便和空等一樣具有遍滿的因。你所立的空常，最終沒有同品，只是用瓶等作為它的異品。這個遍滿的因，沒有同品可以有，卻在異品上存在。這是四相違中的違法自相。
《論》中說：『又，虛空等，依世俗境界而立。』 述曰：這是另外建立比量來駁破。開始兩句是有法，接著兩句是宗法，再接著兩句是立因，再接著四句是同喻，最後四句是顯意。顯意是說，這虛空等名言的聲音，只是依據世俗所知的境界和合法上而假立的，不能依據這假立的名言，就執著所詮釋的空等認為是實有。
《論》中說：『又如果可說，所依不成立。』 述曰：這是宗和因都不成立來駁破。空等（有法）非常（宗法），非遍（宗法），非實有。虛空等性（宗法），可說有方位（因），猶如青等（喻）。外人的宗是說空等是遍。因是說可說有方位。現在論主就用這個因，在異品青等之上，反過來駁破外人。
【English Translation】 English version: The view of Jiuzong is not correct. If you say that the essence of Śūnyatā (emptiness in Buddhism) and so on pervades the entire Dharmadhātu (the universe), but due to the function of the discriminating mind, with the differences of each part, it is falsely said that space has its directions. However, the essence of space actually has no direction, therefore, the cause of pervading everything does not have the fault of not being established - this statement is incorrect.
The 'Treatise' says: 'In reality, there is no direction, not apart from what was said before.' Commentary says: Below, it is refuted one by one with reason. There are four ways: 1. Refute with the previous faults; 2. Show that the cause contradicts; 3. Establish another analogy to refute; 4. The thesis and the cause are not established. Here, it is refuted with the previous faults. Since emptiness and so on actually have no direction, pervading all parts, becoming countless parts with the pervaded parts. You cannot get rid of such faults.
The 'Treatise' says: 'Jars and so on should also reach, contradicting the meaning.' Commentary says: This shows that the cause contradicts to refute. According to the first principle, jars and so on actually have no direction (thesis), because directions are falsely established (cause), like space and so on (example). Since jars and so on actually have no direction, they have the cause of pervading like emptiness and so on. The emptiness and permanence you established ultimately have no similar examples, but only use jars and so on as its dissimilar examples. This cause of pervading has no similar examples that can exist, but exists in dissimilar examples. This is the self-contradiction of violating the law among the four contradictions.
The 'Treatise' says: 'Also, emptiness and so on are established based on worldly realms.' Commentary says: This establishes another analogy to refute. The first two sentences are the subject, the next two sentences are the thesis, the next two sentences are the cause, the next four sentences are the similar example, and the last four sentences are the meaning. The meaning is that the sound of the name of emptiness and so on is only falsely established based on the worldly known realms and the combined Dharma. One cannot rely on this falsely established name and cling to the emptiness and so on that are interpreted as real.
The 'Treatise' says: 'Also, if it can be said, the basis is not established.' Commentary says: This refutes that the thesis and the cause are not established. Emptiness and so on (subject) are not permanent (thesis), not pervasive (thesis), not real. The nature of emptiness and so on (thesis) can be said to have direction (cause), like blue and so on (example). The outsider's thesis is that emptiness and so on are pervasive. The cause is that it can be said to have direction. Now the commentator uses this cause on the dissimilar example of blue and so on to refute the outsider.
成相違過。謂空等非常是法差別相違。空等非遍是法自相相違。空等非實有空等是有法自相相違。然以前文已作相違因難。今此但約宗因顯不成過。虛空等性既非常遍。即是所立一分能別不成。又此空等既非實有。虛空等性此即可說有方分因無所依處。即是能立所依不成。
論云。複次或有至知實有時 述曰。此下三頌破常時。初一頌破時作用。即約用隨緣緣轉破。第二一頌破時功能。即約因不離果破。第三一頌破時常住。即約因必變異破。第一破時作用中。初生起。次舉頌。后解釋。生起中初敘外執情。后明頌所為。敘執情中。證時有。后立時常。此證時有也。或有執時真實常住者。此立宗也。以見種等至隨其榮悴者。此立因也。此所說因至如實有時者。此立喻也。此文意云。時體實有。以現見種子水土人功眾緣和合。然于春時即生。秋時不生。故知其時有卷舒作用。謂于春時有舒作用故。種子緣合則生令枝條榮茂。秋時有卷作用。雖種等緣合則不生令枝條枯悴。此所說因具有離合者。離即異喻。合即同喻也。此比量云。時體實有(宗)有作用故(因)諸有作用悉皆實有猶如色等(同喻)若非實有即無作用如龜毛等(異喻)。
論云。時所待因至故復言常 述曰。此立時常也。時體無生(宗)不見因故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 構成相違的過失。所謂的『空』（Śūnyatā，佛教中的空性概念）等不是『非常』（anitya，無常），這是法差別上的相違。『空』等不是『遍』（vyāpaka，周遍），這是法自相上的相違。『空』等不是『實有』（satya，真實存在），『空』等是『有法』（dharmin，具有性質的事物）自相上的相違。然而，在前面的文章中已經提出了相違的因難。現在這裡只是依據宗和因來顯示不成立的過失。虛空等的體性既然不是『非常』和『遍』，這就是所立宗的一分，能別不成。又，這『空』等既然不是『實有』，虛空等的體性就可以說有方分，因無所依之處，這就是能立所依不成。
論中說：『複次或有至知實有時』。註釋說：這下面三頌是破斥『常時』（nityakāla，常恒的時間）的。第一頌破斥時間的作用，即依據『用』（kārya，作用）隨緣而轉來破斥。第二頌破斥時間的功能，即依據『因』（hetu，原因）不離果來破斥。第三頌破斥時間常住，即依據『因』必定變異來破斥。第一破斥時間作用中，先是生起，然後舉頌，最後解釋。生起中，先敘述外道的執情，然後說明頌的用意。敘述執情中，先證明時間存在，后立時間常恒。這是證明時間存在。『或有執時真實常住者』，這是立宗。『以見種等至隨其榮悴者』，這是立因。『此所說因至如實有時者』，這是立喻。這段文字的意思是說，時間的體性是真實存在的，因為現在看見種子、水土、人工等眾多因緣和合，然後在春天就生長，秋天就不生長。所以知道時間有卷舒的作用。所謂在春天有舒的作用，所以種子因緣和合就生長，使枝條繁榮茂盛。秋天有卷的作用，即使種子等因緣和合也不生長，使枝條枯萎凋零。這段所說的因具有離合。離就是異喻，合就是同喻。這個比量是說：時間的體性是真實存在的（宗），因為有作用（因），凡是有作用的都真實存在，猶如色等（同喻），如果不是真實存在的就沒有作用，如龜毛等（異喻）。
論中說：『時所待因至故復言常』。註釋說：這是立時間常恒。時間的體性沒有生（宗），因為沒有看見原因（hetu，原因）。
【English Translation】 English version It constitutes the fallacy of contradiction. That 『emptiness』 (Śūnyatā, the Buddhist concept of emptiness) and so on are not 『impermanent』 (anitya), is a contradiction in terms of the difference of dharmas. That 『emptiness』 and so on are not 『pervasive』 (vyāpaka), is a contradiction in terms of the self-nature of dharmas. That 『emptiness』 and so on are not 『real』 (satya), 『emptiness』 and so on are contradictions in terms of the self-nature of 『dharmin』 (that which possesses qualities). However, the difficulty of contradiction has already been raised in the previous text. Now, this only shows the fallacy of non-establishment based on the thesis and the reason. Since the nature of space and so on is neither 『impermanent』 nor 『pervasive』, this is a part of the established thesis, and the distinguishing characteristic cannot be established. Moreover, since this 『emptiness』 and so on are not 『real』, it can be said that the nature of space and so on has spatial divisions, and the reason has no basis, which means that the basis of the proof cannot be established.
The treatise says: 『Furthermore, some to know that time is real.』 The commentary says: The following three verses refute 『eternal time』 (nityakāla). The first verse refutes the function of time, that is, refutes it based on the 『function』 (kārya) changing according to conditions. The second verse refutes the function of time, that is, refutes it based on the 『cause』 (hetu) not being separate from the effect. The third verse refutes the permanence of time, that is, refutes it based on the 『cause』 necessarily changing. In the first refutation of the function of time, first there is arising, then quoting the verse, and finally explaining. In the arising, first narrate the views of externalists, and then explain the intention of the verse. In narrating the views, first prove the existence of time, and then establish the permanence of time. This is to prove the existence of time. 『Some hold that time is real and permanent,』 this is establishing the thesis. 『Seeing seeds, etc., to follow their flourishing and withering,』 this is establishing the reason. 『The reason stated here to when time is real,』 this is establishing the example. The meaning of this passage is that the nature of time is real, because now we see that seeds, water, soil, human effort, and many other conditions come together, and then they grow in spring but not in autumn. Therefore, we know that time has the function of contracting and expanding. The so-called expanding function in spring is why seeds and conditions come together and grow, causing the branches to flourish. The contracting function in autumn is why even if seeds and other conditions come together, they do not grow, causing the branches to wither. The reason stated here has separation and combination. Separation is the counter-example, and combination is the example. This syllogism says: The nature of time is real (thesis), because it has function (reason), whatever has function is real, like form, etc. (example), if it is not real, it has no function, like turtle hair, etc. (counter-example).
The treatise says: 『The cause that time depends on, therefore it is said to be constant.』 The commentary says: This is to establish the permanence of time. The nature of time has no arising (thesis), because no cause is seen (hetu).
(因)如虛空等(喻)時體無滅(宗)以無生故(因)如虛空等(喻)時體是常(宗)無生滅故(因)如虛空等(喻)。
論云。為破彼執故說頌曰 述曰。此明頌所為也。
論云。若法體實有至故成所生果 述曰 此舉頌也。上半牒計。下半正破。
論云。論曰時用至隨緣而轉 述曰。此下解釋也。初釋頌文。次顯頌意。后示正義。釋文中初破時用即正釋文。后破時體即遮救義。此即破時用正釋文也。如春時舒用要待種子水土人功日等眾緣和合方立。若無種子水土等緣。時之舒用必不得有。卷用亦然。要待風寒霜等眾緣和合方立。若無風寒霜等眾緣。時之卷用亦不得生。此中文意有二比量。一云。時從他生(宗)體相有故(因)猶如色等(喻)二云。時體是果(宗)從他生故(因)猶如色等(喻)。
論云。體相若無至興廢不成 述曰。此破時體即遮救義也。外人救云。用雖隨緣而體無取捨。以用逐體不從他生。論主破云。時之體相若無取卷舍舒或取舒舍卷差別者。諸有舒興卷廢等作用不成也。謂時體應無興廢作用(宗)無取捨故(因)如龜毛等(喻)。
論云。又時作用至定是無常 述曰。此下顯頌意也。頌文雖令時從他產生所生果。然意正欲令成無常也。初破時用。后破時體。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『如虛空等』（喻，比喻）時，其本體沒有生滅（宗，結論），因為它是『無生』的（因，理由），『如虛空等』（喻，比喻）時，其本體是常恒的（宗，結論），因為它『無生滅』（因，理由），『如虛空等』（喻，比喻）。
論曰：爲了破斥他們的執著，所以說了這首偈頌。述曰：這說明了偈頌的目的。
論曰：如果法的本體是真實存在的，那麼就會成為所生的結果。述曰：這是引出偈頌。上半部分是重複對方的觀點，下半部分是正式破斥。
論曰：時間的作用隨著因緣而轉變。述曰：下面是解釋。首先解釋偈頌的文字，然後闡明偈頌的意義，最後展示正確的道理。在解釋文字中，首先破斥時間的作用，然後破斥時間的本體，也就是遮止救護的意義。這裡是破斥時間的作用，正式解釋文字。比如春天舒展的作用，需要等待種子、水土、人工、陽光等眾多因緣和合才能成立。如果沒有種子、水土等因緣，時間的舒展作用一定不會有。捲縮的作用也是這樣，需要等待風寒霜等眾多因緣和合才能成立。如果沒有風寒霜等眾多因緣，時間的捲縮作用也不會產生。這段文字中有兩個比量：一是，時間是從他處產生的（宗，結論），因為它的體相是存在的（因，理由），就像顏色等（喻，比喻）；二是，時間的本體是結果（宗，結論），因為它從他處產生（因，理由），就像顏色等（喻，比喻）。
論曰：如果本體和相狀沒有取捨捲縮舒展或者取舒舍卷的差別，那麼興盛和衰敗就不會成立。述曰：這是破斥時間的本體，也就是遮止救護的意義。外人辯解說：作用雖然隨著因緣而改變，但是本體沒有取捨。因為作用是跟隨本體的，不是從他處產生的。論主破斥說：時間的本體和相狀如果沒有取卷舍舒或者取舒舍卷的差別，那麼諸如舒展興盛、捲縮衰敗等作用就不會成立。也就是說，時間的本體應該沒有興盛衰敗的作用（宗，結論），因為它沒有取捨（因，理由），就像烏龜的毛等（喻，比喻）。
論曰：而且時間的作用一定是無常的。述曰：下面是闡明偈頌的意義。偈頌的文字雖然說時間是從他處產生，成為所生的結果，但是其意義正是要說明它是無常的。先破斥時間的作用，后破斥時間的本體。
【English Translation】 English version: 'Like space' (analogy), time's essence is without cessation (thesis), because it is 'unborn' (reason), 'like space' (analogy), time's essence is constant (thesis), because it is 'without birth and cessation' (reason), 'like space' (analogy).
Treatise says: To refute their attachment, therefore the verse is spoken. Commentary says: This clarifies the purpose of the verse.
Treatise says: If the essence of a dharma is truly existent, then it becomes a produced result. Commentary says: This introduces the verse. The first half restates the opponent's view, the second half directly refutes it.
Treatise says: Time's function changes according to conditions. Commentary says: The following is the explanation. First, the verse's words are explained, then the verse's meaning is clarified, and finally, the correct principle is shown. In explaining the words, first the function of time is refuted, then the essence of time is refuted, which is to block the meaning of rescue. Here, the function of time is refuted, and the words are formally explained. For example, the function of spring's expansion requires the convergence of numerous conditions such as seeds, soil, water, human effort, and sunlight to be established. If there are no conditions such as seeds and soil, the function of time's expansion will certainly not exist. The function of contraction is also like this, requiring the convergence of numerous conditions such as wind, cold, and frost to be established. If there are no conditions such as wind, cold, and frost, the function of time's contraction will also not arise. There are two inferences in this passage: first, time is produced from others (thesis), because its essence and characteristics exist (reason), like colors, etc. (analogy); second, time's essence is a result (thesis), because it is produced from others (reason), like colors, etc. (analogy).
Treatise says: If the essence and characteristics have no differentiation of taking and relinquishing contraction and expansion, or taking expansion and relinquishing contraction, then flourishing and decline will not be established. Commentary says: This refutes the essence of time, which is to block the meaning of rescue. The outsider argues: Although the function changes according to conditions, the essence has no taking or relinquishing. Because the function follows the essence, it is not produced from others. The treatise master refutes: If the essence and characteristics of time have no differentiation of taking contraction and relinquishing expansion, or taking expansion and relinquishing contraction, then functions such as expansion and flourishing, contraction and decline, will not be established. That is to say, time's essence should have no functions of flourishing and decline (thesis), because it has no taking and relinquishing (reason), like turtle hair, etc. (analogy).
Treatise says: Moreover, time's function is certainly impermanent. Commentary says: The following clarifies the meaning of the verse. Although the verse's words say that time is produced from others and becomes a produced result, its meaning is precisely to establish that it is impermanent. First, the function of time is refuted, then the essence of time is refuted.
此破時用也。如光影色等依大地而轉故云地色也。時之作因決定無常(宗)依他轉故(因)如地色等(喻)。
論云。即以此事至何容常住 述曰。此破時體也。即以此前地色喻事為后比量作同法喻。謂用所依時定是無常(宗)為無常用為所依故(因)如地色等(喻)。
論云。故善時者至名之為時 述曰。此下示正義也。初示時體。后顯難知。此示時體也。有佛世尊名善時者。作如是言。由隨眾生業力差別。業能吹物名為業。風業風所引四大種別自類為因展轉相續終而復始無有斷絕。隨日月等所行道度故有冷暖所觸不同。依此分位假立時稱。非即別有真實常時。
論云。時雖具有至言無因等 述曰。此顯難知也。雜心論云。相似相續不知無常也。如今河還謂昨河。昨燭還同今燭。此等並是不知無常。
論云。複次有執至隨用產生 述曰。此第二頌破時功能。即約因不離果破也。初生起。次舉頌。后解釋。生起中初敘計。次總非。后別破。此敘計也。外人執時亦常亦遍。攝藏無量生芽莖等差別功能。然此功能欲生果時。要待種子水土人功等外緣之所擊發。此之功能方起作用。彼芽莖等果隨此作用而得產生也。
論云。此亦不然 述曰。此總非也。
論云。時所依體至豈可擊發
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
這是用來破斥『時』（Kala，時間）的。比如光影、顏色等依大地而運轉，所以說是『地色』。『時』作為因，決定是無常的（宗），因為它依他而轉變（因），就像地色等（喻）。
論中說：『即以此事，至何容常住』。述記中解釋：這是破斥『時』的本體。即以前面的地色比喻作為後面的比量，作為同法喻。意思是說，作為所依的『時』，一定是無常的（宗），因為無常的事物才能作為所依（因），就像地色等（喻）。
論中說：『故善時者，至名之為時』。述記中解釋：下面是闡述正確的含義。先闡述『時』的本體，后顯示其難以理解。這是闡述『時』的本體。有佛世尊，名為善時（Subhuti，須菩提），這樣說：由於隨著眾生業力的差別，『業』能推動事物，名為『業』。風業風所引導的四大種，各自以同類為因，輾轉相續，終而復始，沒有斷絕。隨著日月等所執行的軌道和角度，所以有冷暖觸覺的不同。依據這些分位，假立『時』的名稱。並非另外有真實常住的『時』。
論中說：『時雖具有，至言無因等』。述記中解釋：這是顯示『時』難以理解。《雜心論》中說：相似的相續，不知道是無常的。比如現在這條河流，還以為是昨天的河流；昨天的蠟燭，還以為和今天的蠟燭一樣。這些都是因為不知道無常。
論中說：『複次有執，至隨用產生』。述記中解釋：這是第二頌，破斥『時』的功能。即從因不離果的角度來破斥。先是生起，其次舉頌，然後解釋。生起中，先敘述對方的觀點，然後總的否定，最後分別破斥。這是敘述對方的觀點。外人認為『時』也是常也是遍的，攝藏著無量生芽、莖等差別功能。然而這些功能想要產生果實的時候，要等待種子、水土、人工等外緣的擊發。這些功能才起作用，那些芽、莖等果實隨著這些作用而得以產生。
論中說：『此亦不然』。述記中解釋：這是總的否定。
論中說：『時所依體，至豈可擊發』。
【English Translation】 English version:
This is used to refute 『Kala』 (time). For example, light, shadow, and color depend on the Earth to revolve, hence the term 『Earth-color』. 『Time』 as a cause is definitely impermanent (thesis), because it depends on others to transform (reason), like Earth-color, etc. (example).
The treatise says: 『Considering this matter, how can it be permanent?』 The commentary explains: This refutes the substance of 『time』. The previous analogy of Earth-color is used as a similar example for the subsequent inference, serving as a positive example. It means that 『time』 as a basis of dependence is definitely impermanent (thesis), because impermanent things can serve as a basis of dependence (reason), like Earth-color, etc. (example).
The treatise says: 『Therefore, the one named Good Time, speaks of time』. The commentary explains: Below is the explanation of the correct meaning. First, the substance of 『time』 is explained, then its difficulty to understand is shown. This explains the substance of 『time』. There was a Buddha, named Subhuti (Good Time), who said: Due to the differences in sentient beings' karmic forces, 『karma』 can propel things, and is called 『karma』. The wind karma and the four great elements guided by the wind karma, each take their own kind as the cause, continuously succeeding each other, ending and beginning again, without interruption. Following the paths and degrees traveled by the sun, moon, etc., there are differences in the sensations of cold and warmth. Based on these divisions, the name 『time』 is provisionally established. There is no separate, real, and permanent 『time』.
The treatise says: 『Although time possesses, it is said to be without cause, etc.』 The commentary explains: This shows that 『time』 is difficult to understand. The Tattvasamgraha says: Similar continuations do not recognize impermanence. For example, the river now is still thought to be the river of yesterday; the candle of yesterday is still thought to be the same as the candle of today. These are all because of not knowing impermanence.
The treatise says: 『Furthermore, some hold, that it generates according to use』. The commentary explains: This is the second verse, refuting the function of 『time』. That is, refuting from the perspective of the cause not being separate from the effect. First, there is the arising, then the verse is cited, and then explained. In the arising, first the opponent's view is narrated, then a general negation, and finally separate refutations. This is narrating the opponent's view. Outsiders believe that 『time』 is both permanent and pervasive, containing the immeasurable functions of generating sprouts, stems, and other differences. However, when these functions want to produce fruit, they must wait for the external conditions such as seeds, water, soil, and human effort to trigger them. These functions then take effect, and those sprouts, stems, and other fruits are generated along with these effects.
The treatise says: 『This is also not so』. The commentary explains: This is a general negation.
The treatise says: 『The substance on which time depends, how can it be triggered?』
述曰。此下別破也。一破功能可擊。二破時有功能。三顯用但眾緣。四責計時無用。此即破功能可擊也。所依時體若定是常無遷變者牒計。能依功能不離體故(因)猶如其體(喻)亦應是常無有遷變當可擊發(宗法)。
論云。不見所依至芽等功能 述曰。此破時有功能也。時定無有生芽等能(宗)體無變故(因)猶如種等未變位(喻)。
論云。即此擊發至芽等作用 述曰。此顯用但眾緣也。即此擊發功能因緣謂種子水土等。即足自有產生芽等作用也。
論云。何須妄計無用時耶 述曰。此責計時無用也。
論云。又說頌曰至皆成所生果 述曰。此舉頌也。上半立理。下半結破。
論云。論曰諸法至能生詎有 述曰。此下解釋也。初釋上半。次釋下半。后破救義。此釋上半也。諸是因法要待自所生果起因之勝體勝用成立方得因名。所生之果若也未生。能生之因作用未立詎得因名。立比量言。未生果因不得因名(宗)無因用故(因)猶如兔角(喻)。
論云。由是所執至定是無常 述曰。此釋下半頌也。由是汝執常時能生之因必待余麥等種子等法擊發成別麥等因故。猶如苦樂待苦樂別緣成別受因。故是無常也。謂常時之因定是無常(宗)必待余法成別因故(因)如苦樂等(喻)
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：以下是分別破斥的過程。第一，破斥時間具有可被擊發的功能。第二，破斥時間本身具有功能。第三，闡明作用僅僅依賴於眾多因緣。第四，責難認為時間具有作用是無用的。這裡是破斥時間具有可被擊發的功能。如果所依賴的時間本體是恒常不變的，那麼根據你的觀點，能依賴的功能不離開本體（原因），就像本體一樣（比喻），也應該是恒常不變的，可以被擊發（結論）。
論云：不見所依至芽等功能 述曰：這是破斥時間本身具有功能。時間如果是恒定的，就沒有產生嫩芽等功能（結論），因為本體沒有變化（原因），就像種子等沒有變化的狀態（比喻）。
論云：即此擊發至芽等作用 述曰：這是闡明作用僅僅依賴於眾多因緣。即這種擊發功能的原因和條件，比如種子、水、土壤等，就足以自然而然地產生嫩芽等作用。
論云：何須妄計無用時耶 述曰：這是責難認為時間具有作用是無用的。
論云：又說頌曰至皆成所生果 述曰：這是引用偈頌。上半部分闡述道理，下半部分總結破斥。
論云：論曰諸法至能生詎有 述曰：以下是解釋偈頌。首先解釋上半部分，然後解釋下半部分，最後破斥辯解的觀點。這是解釋上半部分。諸法作為原因，要等待自身所產生的果的生起，原因的殊勝本體和殊勝作用成立，才能獲得原因的名稱。如果所產生的果還沒有產生，能產生的原因的作用還沒有建立，怎麼能獲得原因的名稱呢？可以這樣立一個比量：未產生果的原因不能稱為原因（結論），因為沒有原因的作用（原因），就像兔角（比喻）。
論云：由是所執至定是無常 述曰：這是解釋下半部分偈頌。由於你所執著的恒常的時間，作為能產生的原因，必須等待其他的麥子等種子等法擊發，才能成為不同的麥子等的原因。就像苦和樂必須等待苦和樂不同的因緣，才能成為不同的感受的原因。所以，時間是無常的。也就是說，恒常的時間作為原因，一定是無常的（結論），因為它必須等待其他法才能成為不同的原因（原因），就像苦和樂等（比喻）。
【English Translation】 English version: Statement: The following is a separate refutation. First, refute the notion that time has a function that can be triggered. Second, refute that time itself has a function. Third, clarify that the effect depends only on numerous causes and conditions. Fourth, criticize the idea that time has a function as useless. This is to refute the notion that time has a function that can be triggered. If the time-essence on which something relies is fixed, constant, and unchanging, then according to your view, the function that relies on it does not leave the essence (reason), just like the essence (analogy), it should also be constant and unchanging, and can be triggered (conclusion).
Treatise says: 'Not seeing the reliance... to the function of sprouts, etc.' Statement: This is to refute that time itself has a function. If time is fixed, it does not have the ability to produce sprouts, etc. (conclusion), because the essence does not change (reason), like the state of seeds, etc. that have not changed (analogy).
Treatise says: 'That is, this triggering... to the function of sprouts, etc.' Statement: This clarifies that the effect depends only on numerous causes and conditions. That is, the causes and conditions of this triggering function, such as seeds, water, soil, etc., are sufficient to naturally produce the function of sprouts, etc.
Treatise says: 'Why falsely posit useless time?' Statement: This is to criticize the idea that time has a function as useless.
Treatise says: 'Also, a verse says... all become produced fruits.' Statement: This is quoting a verse. The first half explains the principle, and the second half summarizes the refutation.
Treatise says: 'Treatise says: All dharmas... how can there be a producer?' Statement: The following is an explanation of the verse. First, explain the first half, then explain the second half, and finally refute the defending viewpoint. This is explaining the first half. All dharmas, as causes, must wait for the arising of the fruit produced by themselves, and the excellent essence and excellent function of the cause are established, then they can obtain the name of cause. If the fruit produced has not yet been produced, and the function of the producer has not yet been established, how can it obtain the name of cause? A syllogism can be established like this: a cause that has not produced a fruit cannot be called a cause (conclusion), because it does not have the function of a cause (reason), like a rabbit's horn (analogy).
Treatise says: 'Therefore, the constant time you hold... is definitely impermanent.' Statement: This is explaining the second half of the verse. Because the constant time that you hold, as a producer, must wait for other wheat, etc., seeds, etc., to be triggered, then it can become the cause of different wheat, etc. Just like suffering and happiness must wait for different causes and conditions of suffering and happiness, then they can become the cause of different feelings. Therefore, time is impermanent. That is to say, constant time as a cause must be impermanent (conclusion), because it must wait for other dharmas to become a different cause (reason), like suffering and happiness, etc. (analogy).
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論云。豈不因法至名用方顯 述曰。此下破救義也。有六。一無體后名救二能同體遍破。三時處決定救。四遍無時處破。五引他同己救。六示正異邪破。先體后名救中。初先體后名救。后待后前名救也。此先體后名救也。文中初述道理。次引喻成。后舉法合。
論云。又未生果至如稻麥種 述曰。此待后前名救也。非但後果生已前法始得因名。縱後果未生前法已得因稱。未生果因亦得因名(宗)待當果故(因)如稻麥種(喻)種是因義故得為喻。
論云。汝所立時至便成因果雜亂 述曰。此能同體遍破也。時之功能一一遍常(宗)不異時體故(因)猶如時體(喻)是則起一生麥之用生一麥果之時。於此一麥果處應生一切粟等果也。此比量云。時之功能生一麥果時處應生一切粟等諸果(宗)以遍常故(因)如生粟等諸果功能(喻)如此麥生時處既有粟等諸果同生。此則因果成雜亂失也。
論云。我立功能至故無此失 述曰。此時處決定救也。諸果欲生必依時托處。功能雖遍終不異果同生。故無因果雜亂之失。
論云。汝立功能至時處決定 述曰。此遍無時處破也。如生麥一能則遍生粟時處。生粟一能亦遍生麥時處。一一功能既常既遍。自應能生一切諸果。豈由時處有生不生而妄輒許
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
論中說：『難道不是因為有了法，才通過名稱來彰顯嗎？』 述記說：『以下是破除對方的辯解，共有六點：一、無體后名救；二、能同體遍破；三、時處決定救；四、遍無時處破；五、引他同己救；六、示正異邪破。』 先說無體后名救中的，首先是先有體後有名救，然後是待後果前有名救。這裡是先有體後有名救。文中先敘述道理，然後引用比喻來論證，最後舉出法來印證。
論中說：『又如未生的果，就像稻麥的種子。』 述記說：『這是待後果前有名救。』 不僅是後果產生后，之前的法才能獲得因的名稱，即使後果尚未產生，之前的法也已經可以被稱為因。未生之果的因，也可以稱為因（宗），因為它等待著將來的果（因），就像稻麥的種子（喻），種子具有因的意義，所以可以作為比喻。
論中說：『你所立的時，如果功能一一普遍恒常，就會造成因果雜亂。』 述記說：『這是能同體遍破。』 時間的功能一一普遍恒常（宗），因為它與時間本體沒有差異（因），就像時間本體一樣（喻）。這樣，當產生一株麥苗的功能產生一株麥苗的果實的時候，在這個麥苗果實的地方，就應該產生一切粟米等的果實。這個比量是說：時間的功能在產生一株麥苗果實的時處，應該產生一切粟米等諸果（宗），因為它普遍恒常（因），就像產生粟米等諸果的功能一樣（喻）。如果在這個麥苗產生的時候和地方，同時有粟米等諸果產生，那麼因果就成了雜亂的錯誤。
論中說：『我所立的功能，是依時托處而生，所以沒有這種過失。』 述記說：『這是時處決定救。』 諸果想要產生，必須依靠時間和處所。功能雖然普遍，但終究不會與不同的果實同時產生，所以沒有因果雜亂的過失。
論中說：『你所立的功能，如果普遍恒常，那麼在產生麥苗的一個功能，就應該普遍地在產生粟米的時間和處所產生。』 述記說：『這是遍無時處破。』 就像產生麥苗的一個功能，就應該普遍地在產生粟米的時間和處所產生；產生粟米的一個功能，也應該普遍地在產生麥苗的時間和處所產生。每一個功能既然恒常又普遍，自然應該能夠產生一切諸果，怎麼能因為時間和處所的不同，就隨意地允許或不允許產生呢？
【English Translation】 English version:
The treatise says: 'Isn't it because of the Dharma (法, law, principle) that names are used to manifest it?' The commentary says: 'The following refutes the opponent's defense, with six points: 1. Saving by name after no substance; 2. Universal refutation by the same substance; 3. Saving by fixed time and place; 4. Refutation by universality without time and place; 5. Saving by citing others as the same as oneself; 6. Refutation by showing the correct difference from the incorrect. First, in saving by name after no substance, first is saving by substance before name, then saving by name before consequence. Here is saving by substance before name. The text first describes the principle, then uses metaphors to prove it, and finally cites the Dharma (法, law, principle) to confirm it.'
The treatise says: 'Also, like the unborn fruit, like the seeds of rice and wheat.' The commentary says: 'This is saving by name before consequence.' Not only after the consequence is produced can the previous Dharma (法, law, principle) obtain the name of cause, even if the consequence has not yet been produced, the previous Dharma (法, law, principle) can already be called a cause. The cause of the unborn fruit can also be called a cause (thesis), because it awaits the future fruit (reason), like the seeds of rice and wheat (metaphor), the seed has the meaning of cause, so it can be used as a metaphor.
The treatise says: 'If the time you establish has functions that are universally constant, it will cause confusion of cause and effect.' The commentary says: 'This is universal refutation by the same substance.' The function of time is universally constant (thesis), because it has no difference from the substance of time (reason), like the substance of time (metaphor). Thus, when the function of producing a sprout of wheat produces the fruit of a sprout of wheat, in the place of this sprout of wheat fruit, it should produce all the fruits of millet, etc. This syllogism says: The function of time should produce all the fruits of millet, etc., in the time and place of producing a sprout of wheat fruit (thesis), because it is universally constant (reason), like the function of producing the fruits of millet, etc. (metaphor). If at the time and place of this sprout of wheat being produced, there are also fruits of millet, etc., being produced at the same time, then the cause and effect become a confused error.'
The treatise says: 'The function I establish arises depending on time and place, so there is no such fault.' The commentary says: 'This is saving by fixed time and place.' If fruits want to be produced, they must rely on time and place. Although the function is universal, it will ultimately not be produced at the same time as different fruits, so there is no fault of confusion of cause and effect.
The treatise says: 'If the function you establish is universally constant, then one function of producing wheat should universally produce at the time and place of producing millet.' The commentary says: 'This is refutation by universality without time and place.' Just like one function of producing wheat should universally produce at the time and place of producing millet; one function of producing millet should also universally produce at the time and place of producing wheat. Since each function is constant and universal, it should naturally be able to produce all fruits, how can it be arbitrarily allowed or disallowed to produce based on the difference in time and place?
時處決定。
論云。若言論主至同斯過者 述曰。此引他同己救也。如汝宗中阿賴耶識亦有生果種種功能。與我時能義亦相似。此則過失。是同不應偏難。
論云。此亦不然至有雜亂失 述曰。此下示正異邪破也。文中初明我無過。后明汝有失也。我宗唯立因緣容可限以時處。汝立時能常遍何得局以處時。故我無過。汝有失也。因緣謂現行能熏等。
論云。又說頌曰至豈得名得常 述曰。此下一頌破時常住。即約因必變異以破也。初舉頌。后解釋。此舉頌也。所立時因必須變異(宗)余法因故(因)如麥種等(喻)此量是上半頌意也。時必無常(宗)有變異故(因)如麥種等(喻)此量是下半頌意也。
論云。論曰世間至方能為因 述曰。此下解釋也。初釋頌文。后通外難。釋頌文中。初釋上半。后釋下半。此釋上半也。文中初示道理。后正結破。世間共許生果功能所依種子等法。必舍前瘦小位所生果相而取后肥大位能生因相。如是體相轉變已後方為芽等所生果因。如是轉變已後方為因性。理無差失。此即敘述因果道理以示外人即為同喻。所立常因應亦同此等者。此即結破。即是宗因。比量同前。
論云。既許轉變無容常住 述曰。此釋下半頌也。比量同前。
論云。豈不世間
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 時處決定。
論中說：『如果言論的主張者也犯有同樣的過失』，註釋說：『這是引用對方的觀點來為自己辯護。』例如，你們宗派中的阿賴耶識（Ālayavijñāna，儲存識）也具有產生結果的各種功能，與我所說的『時能』（根據時間而產生作用的能力）在意義上相似。如果這樣，這就是過失，是相同的，不應該只責難我。
論中說：『這也不對，』註釋說：『下面是指出正確的不同之處，駁斥錯誤的觀點。』文中首先說明我方沒有過失，然後說明對方存在過失。我方只是認為因緣（hetupratyaya，產生結果的條件）可以在時間和空間上有所限制。你們所說的『時能』是常遍的，怎麼能侷限於時間和空間呢？所以我方沒有過失，而你們存在過失。因緣指的是現行能熏等。
論中說：『又說了頌詞：』註釋說：『下面用一首頌詞來破斥時間是常住的觀點。』這是通過因必定會發生變異來破斥常住的觀點。首先舉出頌詞，然後進行解釋。這是舉出頌詞。所立的時因必須變異（宗），因為它是其他法的因（因），例如麥種等（喻）。這個量是上半頌詞的意思。時間必定是無常的（宗），因為它有變異（因），例如麥種等（喻）。這個量是下半頌詞的意思。
論中說：『論中說，世間』註釋說：『下面是解釋頌詞。』首先解釋頌文，然後迴應外來的責難。在解釋頌文的部分，首先解釋上半部分，然後解釋下半部分。這是解釋上半部分。文中首先闡述道理，然後正式得出結論並進行駁斥。世間普遍認可的產生結果的功能所依賴的種子等法，必定會捨棄之前瘦小的狀態所產生的果相，而採取之後肥大的狀態，作為能產生結果的因相。像這樣，體相轉變之後才能成為芽等所生結果的因。像這樣轉變之後才能成為因的性質，道理上沒有差別。這實際上是敘述因果的道理，向外人展示，就如同一個比喻。所立的常因也應該與此相同，這實際上是得出結論並進行駁斥。也就是宗和因，比量與之前相同。
論中說：『既然允許轉變，就不能是常住的』註釋說：『這是解釋下半頌詞。』比量與之前相同。
論中說：『難道世間』
【English Translation】 English version: Determination by Time and Place.
The treatise states: 'If the proponent of the argument also commits the same fault...' The commentary says: 'This is citing the opponent's view to defend oneself.' For example, in your school, the Ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness) also has various functions of producing results, which is similar in meaning to my 'temporal capacity' (the ability to produce effects according to time). If so, this is a fault, it is the same, and you should not only criticize me.
The treatise states: 'This is also not right...' The commentary says: 'Below, it indicates the correct difference and refutes the wrong view.' The text first clarifies that I have no fault, and then clarifies that you have a fault. My school only establishes that conditions (hetupratyaya, conditions for producing results) can be limited by time and place. Your 'temporal capacity' is constant and pervasive, how can it be limited by time and place? Therefore, I have no fault, but you have a fault. Conditions refer to the present active potential, etc.
The treatise states: 'Also, a verse is said...' The commentary says: 'Below, a verse is used to refute the view that time is permanent.' This is refuting the view of permanence by the fact that causes must change. First, the verse is cited, and then it is explained. This is citing the verse. The established temporal cause must change (thesis), because it is the cause of other dharmas (reason), such as wheat seeds, etc. (example). This measure is the meaning of the first half of the verse. Time must be impermanent (thesis), because it has change (reason), such as wheat seeds, etc. (example). This measure is the meaning of the second half of the verse.
The treatise states: 'The treatise says, the world...' The commentary says: 'Below is the explanation of the verse.' First, the verse is explained, and then external criticisms are responded to. In the part explaining the verse, first the first half is explained, and then the second half is explained. This is explaining the first half. The text first explains the principle, and then formally draws a conclusion and refutes it. The seeds and other dharmas on which the function of producing results depends, which are universally recognized in the world, must abandon the fruit aspect produced by the previous thin state and take the subsequent fat state as the causal aspect that can produce results. In this way, after the transformation of the substance and appearance, it can become the cause of the results produced by sprouts, etc. In this way, after the transformation, it can become the nature of the cause, and there is no difference in principle. This is actually narrating the principle of cause and effect, showing it to outsiders, just like a metaphor. The established permanent cause should also be the same as this, which is actually drawing a conclusion and refuting it. That is, the thesis and the reason, the measure is the same as before.
The treatise states: 'Since change is allowed, it cannot be permanent...' The commentary says: 'This is explaining the second half of the verse.' The measure is the same as before.
The treatise states: 'Is it not the world...'
至而得名因 述曰。此下通難也。一徴問。二挑答。三設難。四為通。此即徴問也。論主豈可不見世間亦許粟麥種等。未生果位體之與相俱未轉變。雖無果作用而得名因耶。粟麥種等求生果位亦得因名(宗)待常果位故(因)如粟麥種未生果位為果作用而得名因耶。既未生果已后因名。何得難言因必變異。
論云。不爾世間至必有變異 述曰。此挑答也。論主挑答言。汝徴問不爾。果未生位體相未變。但是世間假立因稱。若實成因。要待將至過去臨滅之位體相轉變果正生起方是實因。汝之時因果未生位不得因名(宗)無轉變故(因)猶如虛空(喻)。
論云。為不根塵至生諸識耶 述曰。此設難也。為不如根塵生識之時。不至滅相正在現在。又未變異正在生相即有作用生諸識果。何必要待根塵轉變方生識耶。
論云。此亦將滅至故不相違 述曰。此下為通也初論主自通。后引異部通。此即自通也。如我大乘義宗。生相在現在。而此生相更不經停即入過去滅相。此之現在根塵即是將至滅位。體相轉變方能生識。故我所說義不相違。
論云。有餘師說至便成疏遠 述曰。此引異部通也。經部師義。一切因果法不同時。根塵生識亦前後立。其與眼識同時根塵但與后念眼識作因也。外人所設因不變難
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 至而得名因，窺基法師解釋說：下面是總體的辯論。一、提出疑問。二、反駁回答。三、設定難題。四、解釋疏通。這裡是提出疑問。論主難道沒有看到世間也認可粟麥種子等，在未產生果實的狀態下，其本體和相狀都沒有轉變，即使沒有果實的作用，也可以稱為『因』嗎？粟麥種子等爲了產生果實，也可以稱為『因』（宗），因為它等待著果實產生（因）。如同粟麥種子在未產生果實的狀態下，爲了果實的作用而稱為『因』嗎？既然在未產生果實之後才稱為『因』，為什麼還要說『因』必定要變異呢？
論主說：不是這樣的，世間（的因）必定有變異。窺基法師解釋說：這是反駁回答。論主反駁回答說：你提出的疑問不對。果實在未產生的狀態下，本體和相狀沒有改變，但這只是世間假立的『因』的稱謂。如果說是真實的『因』，就要等到將要到達過去、臨近滅亡的狀態，本體和相狀轉變，果實才真正產生，這才是真實的『因』。你所說的『因』在果實未產生的狀態下不能稱為『因』（宗），因為它沒有轉變（因），就像虛空一樣（喻）。
論主說：難道不是根和塵在產生諸識的時候（也是如此）嗎？窺基法師解釋說：這是設定難題。難道不像根（indriya）和塵（visaya）在產生識（vijnana）的時候，不是到達滅亡的狀態，而是正在現在的狀態，又沒有變異，而是正在產生的狀態，就已經有了作用，產生了諸識的果實。為什麼一定要等到根和塵轉變才能產生識呢？
論主說：這也是將要滅亡的狀態，所以不相違背。窺基法師解釋說：下面是解釋疏通。先是論主自己解釋疏通，然後引用異部的觀點來解釋疏通。這裡是自己解釋疏通。如我大乘（Mahayana）的義宗（artha-sampradaya），生相（utpada-laksana）存在於現在，而這個生相不會停留，立即進入過去滅相（nirodha-laksana）。這個現在的根和塵，就是將要到達滅亡的狀態，本體和相狀轉變才能產生識。所以我所說的義理不相違背。
論主說：有其他學派的學者說，（如果根塵和識）同時產生，就會變得疏遠。窺基法師解釋說：這是引用異部的觀點來解釋疏通。經部師（Sautrantika）的觀點認為，一切因果法不同時。根和塵產生識也是前後相續的。與眼識（caksu-vijnana）同時的根和塵，只是與后唸的眼識作為因。外人所設定的『因不變』的難題。
【English Translation】 English version Regarding 'named as cause,' Master Kuiji explains: The following is a general debate. First, raising a question. Second, refuting the answer. Third, setting up a difficulty. Fourth, explaining and clarifying. This is raising a question. Can't the proponent see that the world also acknowledges that seeds of millet and wheat, etc., even in the state where they have not yet produced fruit, their essence and characteristics have not changed, and even without the function of fruit, can still be called 'cause'? Seeds of millet and wheat, etc., in order to produce fruit, can also be called 'cause' (thesis), because they are waiting for the fruit to be produced (reason). Like seeds of millet and wheat in the state where they have not yet produced fruit, are they called 'cause' for the function of fruit? Since they are called 'cause' after not yet producing fruit, why insist that 'cause' must change?
The proponent says: It is not so; worldly (causes) must have change. Master Kuiji explains: This is refuting the answer. The proponent refutes the answer, saying: Your question is incorrect. In the state where the fruit has not yet been produced, the essence and characteristics have not changed, but this is only a nominal 'cause' established by the world. If it is a real 'cause,' it must wait until it is about to reach the past, near the state of extinction, the essence and characteristics change, and the fruit is truly produced; this is the real 'cause.' What you call 'cause' cannot be called 'cause' in the state where the fruit has not yet been produced (thesis), because it has not changed (reason), just like space (example).
The proponent says: Isn't it the same when roots (indriya) and objects (visaya) produce consciousnesses (vijnana)? Master Kuiji explains: This is setting up a difficulty. Isn't it like when roots and objects produce consciousnesses, they are not reaching the state of extinction, but are in the present state, and have not changed, but are in the state of arising, and already have the function, producing the fruit of consciousnesses. Why must we wait for the roots and objects to change before consciousnesses can be produced?
The proponent says: This is also the state of about to perish, so it is not contradictory. Master Kuiji explains: The following is explaining and clarifying. First, the proponent explains and clarifies himself, then quotes the views of other schools to explain and clarify. This is self-explanation and clarification. Like my Mahayana school's meaning-tradition (artha-sampradaya), the characteristic of arising (utpada-laksana) exists in the present, and this characteristic of arising does not stay, but immediately enters the past characteristic of extinction (nirodha-laksana). These present roots and objects are about to reach the state of extinction, and the essence and characteristics change before consciousnesses can be produced. Therefore, what I say is not contradictory.
The proponent says: Some scholars of other schools say that (if roots and objects and consciousnesses) arise simultaneously, they will become distant. Master Kuiji explains: This is quoting the views of other schools to explain and clarify. The view of the Sautrantika school is that all causal laws are not simultaneous. The production of consciousnesses by roots and objects is also sequential. The roots and objects that are simultaneous with eye-consciousness (caksu-vijnana) only serve as the cause for the subsequent thought of eye-consciousness. The difficulty of 'cause not changing' set up by outsiders.
望此所宗極為遼落也。前約隨自意語釋。后約隨他意語釋也。
論云。複次有餘至生一切果 述曰。此下一頌破自然。初生起。次舉頌。后解釋。生起中初敘其外計。后顯頌所為。此敘外計也。此外道計一切諸法皆是自然。于自然中有因有果。若自然果即本無今有體是無常。若自然因本有今有體是其常。其自然因任運能生無常諸果。本來自爾不由人功。其自然果任運從彼自然因生。法性自爾亦不由人造。為此因果並是自然。若無自然之因。果即不得生起。若無自然之果。焉知有彼自然。故經云。犢子生已則能飲乳。龜鱉生已則能入水。當知自然。又云飛鳥色異誰之所染。棗刺頭尖誰之所削。此等並由自然常因使其如此。
論云。為破彼執故說頌曰 述曰。此顯頌所為也。
論云。若本無今有至因則為妄立 述曰。此舉頌也。上半牒計。下半正破。若諸果法本無今有皆用自然常為因者。汝既許果亦是自然。何須更立自然因體。此比量云。一切果法不更須因(宗)是自然故(因)如自然因(喻)若汝執言果雖自然須因者。立量破云。自然之因應更須因(宗)是自然故(因)如自然果(喻)。
論云。論曰若一至常住為因 述曰。此下解釋也。一釋頌文。二立量責。三顯過失。四破救義。釋文中初
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：希望他們所遵循的宗旨非常空虛寂寞。之前的約定是按照自己的意思解釋，之後的約定是按照他人的意思解釋。
《論》中說：『此外還有剩餘的，直到產生一切果。』 述記說：『下面用一頌來破斥自然論。首先是生起，其次是舉頌，然後是解釋。生起中，先敘述外道的計較，然後顯示頌的作用。』 這是敘述外道的計較。這些外道認為一切諸法都是自然而有的。在自然之中有因有果。如果自然果是本來沒有現在有的，那麼它的體性就是無常的。如果自然因是本來有現在也有的，那麼它的體性就是常的。這種自然因能夠任運產生無常的諸果。本來就是這樣，不是人為的。自然果也任運地從自然因產生。法性本來就是這樣，也不是人造的。因此，因和果都是自然而有的。如果沒有自然之因，果就不能生起。如果沒有自然之果，怎麼知道有自然之因呢？』 所以經中說：『小牛生下來就能喝奶，烏龜和鱉生下來就能入水，應當知道這是自然。』 又說：『飛鳥的顏色不同，是誰染的呢？棗樹的刺頭尖尖的，是誰削的呢？』 這些都是由自然常因使它們如此。
《論》中說：『爲了破斥他們的執著，所以說了這個頌。』 述記說：『這是顯示頌的作用。』
《論》中說：『如果本來沒有現在有，直到因則成為虛妄的。』 述記說：『這是舉頌。上半部分是陳述他們的計較，下半部分是正式破斥。如果諸果法本來沒有現在有，都用自然常作為因，既然你承認果也是自然而有的，為什麼還要設立自然因的體性呢？』 這是比量：一切果法不需要再有因（宗），因為是自然而有的（因），就像自然因（喻）。如果你堅持說果雖然是自然而有的，但還是需要因，那麼可以立量破斥：自然之因應該再需要因（宗），因為是自然而有的（因），就像自然果（喻）。
《論》中說：『論曰：如果一個直到常住作為因。』 述記說：『下面是解釋。一是解釋頌文，二是立量責難，三是顯示過失，四是破斥救義。』 解釋文中，首先是...
【English Translation】 English version: The doctrine they adhere to is extremely desolate. The former agreement was to interpret according to one's own meaning, and the latter agreement was to interpret according to others' meaning.
The Treatise says: 'Furthermore, there are remainders, up to the production of all fruits.' The commentary says: 'The following verse refutes naturalism. First is the arising, then the quoting of the verse, and then the explanation. In the arising, first is the narration of the external views, and then the showing of the verse's purpose.' This is the narration of the external views. These non-Buddhist paths (外道, wàidào) consider all dharmas to be natural. Within nature, there are causes and effects. If a natural effect is originally non-existent but now exists, then its nature is impermanent. If a natural cause is originally existent and now exists, then its nature is permanent. This natural cause can spontaneously produce impermanent effects. It is naturally so, not by human effort. The natural effect also spontaneously arises from the natural cause. The nature of dharma is naturally so, not created by humans. Therefore, both cause and effect are natural. If there is no natural cause, the effect cannot arise. If there is no natural effect, how can one know there is a natural cause?' Therefore, the scripture says: 'A calf can drink milk after being born, and turtles and turtles can enter the water after being born. It should be known that this is natural.' It also says: 'The colors of flying birds are different, who dyed them? The tips of jujube thorns are sharp, who sharpened them?' These are all made so by the constant natural cause.
The Treatise says: 'To refute their attachment, this verse is spoken.' The commentary says: 'This shows the purpose of the verse.'
The Treatise says: 'If originally non-existent but now existent, up to the cause becomes false.' The commentary says: 'This is quoting the verse. The first half states their view, and the second half formally refutes it. If all fruit dharmas are originally non-existent but now existent, and all use the constant natural as the cause, since you admit that the effect is also natural, why do you need to establish the nature of the natural cause?' This is a syllogism: all fruit dharmas do not need a cause (thesis), because they are natural (reason), like the natural cause (example). If you insist that although the effect is natural, it still needs a cause, then you can establish a syllogism to refute it: the natural cause should need a cause (thesis), because it is natural (reason), like the natural effect (example).
The Treatise says: 'The Treatise says: If one up to permanence as the cause.' The commentary says: 'The following is the explanation. First, explain the verse, second, establish a syllogism to blame, third, show the fault, and fourth, refute the saving meaning.' In the explanation, first is...
釋上半。后釋下半。此釋上半即牒計也。
論云。法應自然至不待因故 述曰。此釋下半也。若待因起非謂自然。既許自然不待因起。是則果法自然而有。何用妄立自然常因。比量同前。
論云。又體自然至因義不成 述曰。此立量責也。若汝所計自然體常無有變易。果未生位未有功能。于正生位亦應如是。以自然體前後一故。此即畢竟無生。果能不成因義也。自然之體于果生位不能生果(宗)是自然故(因)如未生位自然(喻)。
論云。計自然常至微細常因 述曰。此顯過失也。如麥種子及水土人功等能攝受自所生麥果作決定因緣。汝若計有自然常因。麥果即從自然而生。便失此攝受決定因緣能生自果也。又汝宗成立初二細微云。第三細果定有所因(宗)以是果故(因)猶如粗果(喻)此則以有所生粗果證有自宗所許微細常。此如眼識了別安危事故知有眼根也。汝若計有自然常因第三細果即自然生。便失極微細常因也。故言計自然常便失二事。
論云。若謂自然至後方能生 述曰。此下破救義也。初牒救。次總非。后別破。此牒救也。
論云。是亦不然 述曰。此總非也。
論云。自然常有至眾緣常合 述曰。此下別破也。一破待緣方生。二破起一總用。三破緣合能生。四
【現代漢語翻譯】 釋上半。后釋下半。此釋上半即牒計也。
論云。法應自然至不待因故 述曰。此釋下半也。若待因起非謂自然。既許自然不待因起。是則果法自然而有。何用妄立自然常因。比量同前。
論云。又體自然至因義不成 述曰。此立量責也。若汝所計自然體常無有變易。果未生位未有功能。于正生位亦應如是。以自然體前後一故。此即畢竟無生。果能不成因義也。自然之體于果生位不能生果(宗)是自然故(因)如未生位自然(喻)。
論云。計自然常至微細常因 述曰。此顯過失也。如麥種子及水土人功等能攝受自所生麥果作決定因緣。汝若計有自然常因。麥果即從自然而生。便失此攝受決定因緣能生自果也。又汝宗成立初二細微云。第三細果定有所因(宗)以是果故(因)猶如粗果(喻)此則以有所生粗果證有自宗所許微細常。此如眼識了別安危事故知有眼根也。汝若計有自然常因第三細果即自然生。便失極微細常因也。故言計自然常便失二事。
論云。若謂自然至後方能生 述曰。此下破救義也。初牒救。次總非。后別破。此牒救也。
論云。是亦不然 述曰。此總非也。
論云。自然常有至眾緣常合 述曰。此下別破也。一破待緣方生。二破起一總用。三破緣合能生。四
【English Translation】 現代漢語譯本 解釋上半部分，然後解釋下半部分。這裡解釋上半部分就是重複之前的觀點。
論中說：『法應當是自然而然的，不需要依賴因緣。』 述曰：這是解釋下半部分。如果依賴因緣而生起，就不能稱之為『自然』。既然承認『自然』，就不依賴因緣而生起。那麼，果法就是自然而有的，何必虛妄地設立一個『自然常因』呢？比量推理與之前相同。
論中說：『如果自然之體是常恒不變的，那麼...因的意義就不能成立。』 述曰：這是立論來責難對方。如果你所認為的『自然』之體是常恒不變，沒有變易的。那麼，在果還沒有產生的時候，它沒有產生果的功能，在果正在產生的時候，也應該像果未產生時一樣。因為『自然』之體前後是一樣的。這樣，果就畢竟不能產生，產生果的功能就不能成立。『自然』之體在果產生的時候不能產生果（宗），因為它是『自然』的（因），就像果未產生時的『自然』（喻）。
論中說：『如果認為自然是常恒的，那麼...就會失去微細常因。』 述曰：這是揭示過失。比如，麥子的種子以及水土、人工等，能夠攝受並決定產生麥子果實的因緣。如果你認為存在『自然常因』，那麼麥子果實就應該從『自然』而生，就會失去這些攝受和決定產生果實的因緣。而且，你們宗派成立的最初兩個細微的觀點說，第三個細微的果一定有所依賴的因（宗），因為它是一個果（因），就像粗大的果實一樣（喻）。這就是用有所生的粗大果實來證明你們宗派所承認的微細常因。這就像通過眼識能夠分辨安危事故，從而知道有眼根一樣。如果你認為存在『自然常因』，那麼第三個細微的果就應該自然產生，就會失去極其微細的常因。所以說，認為『自然』是常恒的，就會失去兩件事。
論中說：『如果認為自然...之後才能產生。』 述曰：下面是破斥對方的辯解。首先重複對方的辯解，然後總的否定，最後分別破斥。這裡是重複對方的辯解。
論中說：『這也是不對的。』 述曰：這是總的否定。
論中說：『自然常有...眾多因緣經常聚合。』 述曰：下面是分別破斥。一，破斥等待因緣才能產生。二，破斥產生一個總的作用。三，破斥因緣聚合就能產生。四 English version Explaining the first half, then explaining the second half. This explanation of the first half is simply reiterating the previous view.
The treatise says: 'Dharma should be natural and spontaneous, not dependent on causes and conditions.' Commentary: This explains the second half. If it arises dependent on causes and conditions, it cannot be called 'natural.' Since 'naturalness' is admitted, it does not arise dependent on causes and conditions. Then, the fruit-dharma is naturally existent, so why falsely establish a 'natural constant cause'? The analogy is the same as before.
The treatise says: 'If the nature of the natural is constant and unchanging, then... the meaning of cause cannot be established.' Commentary: This establishes an argument to challenge the opponent. If what you consider to be the 'natural' nature is constant and unchanging, without alteration, then when the fruit has not yet arisen, it has no function to produce the fruit, and when the fruit is in the process of arising, it should be the same as when the fruit has not yet arisen. Because the 'natural' nature is the same before and after. In this way, the fruit ultimately cannot arise, and the function of producing the fruit cannot be established. The 'natural' nature cannot produce the fruit when the fruit arises (thesis), because it is 'natural' (reason), like the 'natural' when the fruit has not yet arisen (example).
The treatise says: 'If it is thought that nature is constant, then... the subtle constant cause will be lost.' Commentary: This reveals the fault. For example, the seed of wheat, as well as water, soil, and human effort, can gather and determine the causes and conditions for the production of the wheat fruit. If you believe that there is a 'natural constant cause,' then the wheat fruit should arise from 'nature,' and these causes and conditions that gather and determine the production of the fruit will be lost. Moreover, the first two subtle views established by your sect say that the third subtle fruit must have a dependent cause (thesis), because it is a fruit (reason), just like a coarse fruit (example). This is using the coarse fruit that is produced to prove the subtle constant cause admitted by your sect. This is like knowing that there is an eye-sense through the eye-consciousness being able to distinguish between safe and dangerous events. If you believe that there is a 'natural constant cause,' then the third subtle fruit should arise naturally, and the extremely subtle constant cause will be lost. Therefore, it is said that believing that 'nature' is constant will lose two things.
The treatise says: 'If it is thought that nature... can only produce later.' Commentary: Below is the refutation of the opponent's defense. First, repeat the opponent's defense, then generally negate it, and finally refute it separately. Here is the repetition of the opponent's defense.
The treatise says: 'This is also not right.' Commentary: This is the general negation.
The treatise says: 'Nature is always present... numerous causes and conditions often gather.' Commentary: Below is the separate refutation. One, refuting that it can only produce by waiting for causes and conditions. Two, refuting the production of a general function. Three, refuting that the gathering of causes and conditions can produce. Four
破緣能資助。五破自然是常。六示其正義。七結非邪執此破待緣方生也。汝云自然既是常有種等眾緣並是自然之果。自然應令常起常合。何故復言待緣方生。
論云。眾緣合時至總用可得 述曰。此破起一總用也。眾緣雖別然共生一果。即是總用。除此何處更有總用。
論云。又自然性至如未生位 述曰。此破緣合能生也。汝之自然于緣合位亦不能生(宗)與未生位體無別故(因)如未生位自然(喻)。
論云。又常住法至緣何能助 述曰。此破緣能資助也。此之自然緣不能助(宗)體相凝然不可改轉故(因)如虛空等(喻)。
論云。若許自然至應是無常 述曰。此破自然是無常也。汝之自然應是無常(宗)從緣改轉故(因)如所生果(喻)。
論云。是故唯有至能生其果 述曰。此示其正義也。
論云。非所立常能離前失 述曰。此結非邪執也。
論云。複次有諸至能生於果 述曰。此下兩頌破常因也。初頌破因有常無常但許無常不許常。后頌破常有因非因設二許即非無常。前頌中初生起。次舉頌。后解釋。生起中初敘計。后遮破。此敘計也。即勝論等宗計虛空極微等體是其常能生果也。或是九十五種外道之中有立常因外道計也。用此常因能生於果。于生果時體無改
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 能破斥『緣』的資助作用。第五，破斥『自然』是常有的觀點。第六，闡明正確的道理。第七，總結『自然』並非正確的見解。這種破斥是針對『待緣方生』的觀點。你認為『自然』既然是常有的，那麼種子等眾緣也都是『自然』的結果。『自然』應該使事物恒常生起、恒常結合。為什麼又說要等待因緣才能產生呢？
論中說：『眾緣聚合之時，總體的作用才能顯現。』這是破斥產生一個總體的作用。眾多的因緣雖然各不相同，但共同產生一個結果，這就是總體的作用。除了這個，哪裡還有其他的總體作用呢？
論中說：『而且，『自然』的性質，如同未產生時的狀態。』這是破斥因緣聚合能夠產生『自然』。你的『自然』在因緣聚合的狀態下也不能產生（宗），因為它和未產生時的狀態本體沒有區別（因），就像未產生時的『自然』一樣（喻）。
論中說：『而且，常住不變的法，因緣又怎麼能資助它呢？』這是破斥因緣能夠資助『自然』。這個『自然』，因緣不能資助它（宗），因為它的本體和相狀是凝固不變、不可改變的（因），就像虛空等（喻）。
論中說：『如果承認『自然』會改變，那麼它應該是無常的。』這是破斥『自然』是無常的觀點。你的『自然』應該是無常的（宗），因為它會隨著因緣而改變（因），就像所產生的果實一樣（喻）。
論中說：『因此，只有因緣和合才能產生結果。』這是闡明正確的道理。
論中說：『並非你所主張的常法能夠避免前面的過失。』這是總結『自然』並非正確的見解。
論中說：『再次，有各種因緣聚合才能產生結果。』這是下面兩頌破斥常因。第一頌破斥『因』是常還是無常，只承認無常，不承認常。后一頌破斥常有的『因』，不是『因』。假設兩種都承認，那就不是無常。前一頌中，首先是生起，其次是舉頌，最後是解釋。生起中，首先是敘述對方的觀點，然後是遮破。這裡是敘述對方的觀點。也就是勝論等宗派認為虛空、極微等本體是常有的，能夠產生結果。或者是在九十五種外道之中，有主張常因的外道，認為用這種常因能夠產生結果。在產生結果的時候，本體沒有改變。
【English Translation】 English version It can refute the assistance of 'causes and conditions' (hetu-pratyaya). Fifth, refute the view that 'nature' (prakrti) is permanent. Sixth, clarify the correct principle. Seventh, conclude that 'nature' is not a correct view. This refutation is aimed at the view of 'dependent origination' (pratītyasamutpāda). You believe that since 'nature' is permanent, then seeds and other causes and conditions are all the result of 'nature'. 'Nature' should cause things to arise constantly and combine constantly. Why do you say that it needs to wait for causes and conditions to arise?
The treatise says: 'When various causes and conditions come together, the overall function can be manifested.' This is to refute the generation of an overall function. Although the numerous causes and conditions are different, they jointly produce a result, which is the overall function. Where else is there another overall function besides this?
The treatise says: 'Moreover, the nature of 'nature' is like the state before it is produced.' This is to refute that the aggregation of causes and conditions can produce 'nature'. Your 'nature' cannot be produced even in the state of aggregation of causes and conditions (thesis), because its substance is no different from the state before it is produced (reason), just like 'nature' in the state before it is produced (example).
The treatise says: 'Moreover, how can causes and conditions assist a permanent and unchanging dharma?' This is to refute that causes and conditions can assist 'nature'. Causes and conditions cannot assist this 'nature' (thesis), because its substance and characteristics are solidified and unchangeable (reason), like space and so on (example).
The treatise says: 'If you admit that 'nature' changes, then it should be impermanent.' This is to refute the view that 'nature' is impermanent. Your 'nature' should be impermanent (thesis), because it changes with causes and conditions (reason), like the produced fruit (example).
The treatise says: 'Therefore, only the combination of causes and conditions can produce the result.' This is to clarify the correct principle.
The treatise says: 'The permanent dharma you advocate cannot avoid the previous faults.' This is to conclude that 'nature' is not a correct view.
The treatise says: 'Furthermore, various causes and conditions come together to produce the result.' The following two verses refute the permanent cause. The first verse refutes whether the 'cause' is permanent or impermanent, only admitting impermanence and not admitting permanence. The latter verse refutes the permanent 'cause', which is not a 'cause'. If both are admitted, then it is not impermanent. In the previous verse, first is the arising, then the quoting of the verse, and finally the explanation. In the arising, first is the narration of the opponent's view, and then the refutation. Here is the narration of the opponent's view. That is, the Vaisheshika school and other schools believe that the substance of space, atoms, etc., is permanent and can produce results. Or among the ninety-five heretical paths, there are heretics who advocate a permanent cause, believing that this permanent cause can produce results. When producing results, the substance does not change.
變也。
論云。此亦應以果相違因為喻遮造 述曰。此遮破也。因有二種。一與果相違。如花生果。果起花已。二果不相違。如眼生識。識生眼在。如父生子。子起父存。今此應以果相違因遮遣破計。謂汝之常因於生果時必定改變(宗)能生果故(因)如花生果(喻)問。若以花能生果為喻體即改。若以眼能生識為喻體即不變。此立能生果因豈非不定。答。如前論云。眼根將滅方能生識。此即根必變異方為因也。父之生子義亦同此。然世間之子生父在者。約相續道中假說。非其實也。
論云。又說頌曰至世所未曾見 述曰。此舉頌也。上半責破。下半釋破。常與無常本不同相。何以依常而起無常。以於世間竟無如此從於常因生無常果。因果相故。
論云。論曰諸行至生異類果 述曰。此下解釋也。初釋上半。后釋下半。釋上半中。初釋。次難后通。此即釋也。諸有為行謂若從因起皆似自因。故不可言從彼常因生於無常異類之果。
論云。豈不現見至因果異類 述曰。此難也。月愛珠者其體堅白。十五日夜月圓滿時。月光照燭引出清流。此豈非是世間現見因果異類乃言果法必似因耶。
論云。我亦不說至決定相似 述曰。此通也。我亦不說從因生果。如尼俱陀子小樹大稱為異類。要須若
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 變異性。
《論》中說：『這也應該用與果相違的因作為比喻來遮止造作。』 述曰：這是遮破對方的觀點。因有兩種：一種是與果相違，如花產生果，果實產生后花就凋謝；另一種是果不與因相違，如眼產生識，識產生時眼還在。又如父親生兒子，兒子出生時父親還活著。現在應該用與果相違的因來遮遣破斥對方的計較，即你所說的常因在產生果的時候必定會改變（宗），因為它能夠產生果（因），就像花能生果一樣（喻）。』問：如果以花能生果為喻，本體就會改變；如果以眼能生識為喻，本體就不會改變。那麼，建立能生果的因，豈不是不確定嗎？答：如前面的論述所說，眼根將要壞滅的時候才能產生識，這就是說根必須變異才能成為因。父親生兒子也是同樣的道理。然而，世間所說的兒子出生時父親還活著，是從相續的道理中假說的，並非真實情況。
《論》中說：『又說了頌詞：乃至世間所未曾見。』 述曰：這是舉出頌詞。上半部分是責備破斥，下半部分是解釋破斥。常與無常本來就不同，怎麼能依靠常而產生無常呢？因為世間從來沒有見過從常因產生無常果的事情，因果的性質不同。
《論》中說：『論曰：諸行乃至生異類果。』 述曰：這以下是解釋。先解釋上半部分，后解釋下半部分。在解釋上半部分中，先解釋，然後提出疑問，最後進行解釋。這就是解釋。諸有為行，即從因產生的，都類似於自己的因，所以不能說從那常因產生無常異類的果。
《論》中說：『難道沒有看見乃至因果是異類的嗎？』 述曰：這是提出疑問。月愛珠（Chandra-kanta stone）的本體堅硬潔白，在十五日夜晚月亮圓滿的時候，月光照耀就能引出清澈的水流。這難道不是世間現見的因果是異類嗎？怎麼能說果法必定類似於因呢？
《論》中說：『我也不說乃至決定相似。』 述曰：這是解釋。我也不說從因生果，就像尼拘陀（Nyagrodha）的種子小，樹大，被稱為異類。必須要像……
【English Translation】 English version: Changeability.
The Treatise says: 'This should also use the cause that contradicts the effect as a metaphor to prevent fabrication.' Commentary: This is refuting the opponent's view. There are two types of causes: one that contradicts the effect, such as a flower producing fruit, where the flower withers after the fruit is produced; the other is where the effect does not contradict the cause, such as the eye producing consciousness, where the eye remains when consciousness arises. Another example is a father begetting a son, where the father is still alive when the son is born. Now, one should use the cause that contradicts the effect to refute the opponent's argument, that is, the constant cause you speak of must change when it produces the effect (thesis), because it can produce the effect (reason), just like a flower produces fruit (example).' Question: 'If the flower producing fruit is used as a metaphor, the substance changes; if the eye producing consciousness is used as a metaphor, the substance does not change. Then, is establishing the cause that can produce the effect not uncertain?' Answer: 'As the previous discussion said, the eye-organ can only produce consciousness when it is about to perish, which means that the root must change to become the cause. The principle of a father begetting a son is the same. However, the worldly saying that the father is still alive when the son is born is a provisional statement from the perspective of continuity, not the actual situation.'
The Treatise says: 'Also, a verse was spoken: up to what has never been seen in the world.' Commentary: This is citing a verse. The first half is to blame and refute, and the second half is to explain the refutation. Constant and impermanent are fundamentally different, so how can impermanence arise from constancy? Because the world has never seen an impermanent effect arising from a constant cause, the nature of cause and effect is different.
The Treatise says: 'The Treatise says: All phenomena up to producing effects of different kinds.' Commentary: The following is an explanation. First, explain the first half, and then explain the second half. In explaining the first half, first explain, then ask questions, and finally explain. This is the explanation. All conditioned phenomena, that is, those that arise from causes, are similar to their own causes, so it cannot be said that an impermanent effect of a different kind arises from that constant cause.
The Treatise says: 'Have you not seen that cause and effect are different kinds?' Commentary: This is asking a question. The Chandra-kanta stone (moon-loving pearl) is hard and white in substance. On the night of the fifteenth day when the moon is full, the moonlight can draw out clear water. Is this not a worldly example of cause and effect being different kinds? How can it be said that the effect must be similar to the cause?
The Treatise says: 'I also do not say up to being definitely similar.' Commentary: This is the explanation. I also do not say that the effect arises from the cause, just like the seed of the Nyagrodha (banyan) tree is small and the tree is large, which is called a different kind. It must be like...
體若相大小色貌一切皆同。但說有為因果不相離相所謂無常。如此無常通因及果決定相似。
論云。以於世間至不同相故 述曰。此釋下半頌也。即釋破也。一明常因無同品。二明無常有喻成。三結因果必相似。四立量重破執。此即明常因無同品也。除汝所執極微空等常因之外。世間阿處見此例耶。
論云。世間共見至因定無常 述曰。此明無常有喻成也。勝論所立因有二種。一常。謂二極微生第三果者。此名細因細果。二無常。謂此第三彼第三共合生第七果等。此名粗因粗果。今以粗因粗果為喻破其細果細因也。第三細果應從無常因生(宗)是果性故(因)猶如粗果(喻)或可汝之細因定是無常(宗)是因性故(因)猶如粗因(喻)或可合說立比量云。細因細果俱是無常(宗)是因果故(因)如粗因果(喻)問。細果無常自他同許立為宗法。豈不相符合。若軍論細果實是相符。今與因合宗非成己立。
論云。是故色等至定不相離 述曰。此結因果必相似也。無常宗因既有同喻。故知因果不離無常。無常既同故名相似也。然勝論宗極微非色。色是德句。今以對心通名為色。等者等取心等一切因果也。
論云。為決此義至所因色等 述曰。立比量重破執也。為欲決此無常因果相似之義。復作此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果它們的體性、形狀、大小、顏色、外貌一切都相同，只是說有為法的因果之間存在不相離的關係，這就是所謂的無常。如此的無常，貫通原因和結果，可以確定它們是相似的。
《論》中說：『因為在世間……到……不同相的緣故。』 述記說：這是解釋下半頌。也就是解釋破斥。第一，說明常因沒有同品。第二，說明無常有比喻可以成立。第三，總結因果必定相似。第四，建立比量再次破斥執著。這也就是說明常因沒有同品。除了你所執著的極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）、空等常因之外，世間上在哪裡見過這樣的例子呢？
《論》中說：『世間共見……到……因定無常。』 述記說：這是說明無常有比喻可以成立。勝論（Vaiśeṣika，印度哲學流派）所立的因有兩種：一是常，指兩個極微產生第三個果；這叫做細因細果。二是無常，指這第三個和另一個第三個共同結合產生第七個果等；這叫做粗因粗果。現在用粗因粗果作為比喻來破斥他們的細果細因。第三個細果應該從無常的因產生（宗），因為它是果的性質（因），就像粗果一樣（喻）。或者，你的細因一定是無常的（宗），因為它具有因的性質（因），就像粗因一樣（喻）。或者可以合起來說，建立比量說：細因細果都是無常的（宗），因為它們是因果（因），就像粗因果一樣（喻）。問：細果的無常，自他和他人共同認可，立為宗法，難道不是相互符合嗎？如果勝論認為細果確實是相符的，現在與因結合，宗就不是爲了成立自己的觀點。
《論》中說：『是故色等……到……定不相離。』 述記說：這是總結因果必定相似。無常的宗和因既然有相同的比喻，所以知道因果不離無常。無常既然相同，所以叫做相似。然而勝論所宗的極微不是，是德句。現在用對心通稱作色（rūpa，物質、顏色），『等』字等同於取心等一切因果。
《論》中說：『為決此義……到……所因色等。』 述記說：建立比量再次破斥執著。爲了決斷這無常因果相似的意義，再次作此
【English Translation】 English version: If their substance, shape, size, color, and appearance are all the same, and it is only said that there is an inseparable relationship between the cause and effect of conditioned dharmas, this is what is called impermanence (anitya). Such impermanence, pervading both cause and effect, can be determined to be similar.
The Treatise says: 'Because in the world... to... different appearances.' The Commentary says: This explains the latter half of the verse. That is, it explains the refutation. First, it shows that permanent causes have no similar instances. Second, it shows that impermanence can be established with a metaphor. Third, it concludes that cause and effect must be similar. Fourth, it establishes a syllogism to refute attachments again. This is to show that permanent causes have no similar instances. Apart from the permanent causes you cling to, such as atoms (paramāṇu, the smallest unit of matter), space, etc., where in the world have you seen such an example?
The Treatise says: 'Commonly seen in the world... to... the cause is definitely impermanent.' The Commentary says: This explains that impermanence can be established with a metaphor. The causes established by the Vaiśeṣika (an Indian philosophical school) are of two kinds: one is permanent, referring to two atoms producing a third result; this is called subtle cause and subtle effect. The other is impermanent, referring to this third and another third combining to produce the seventh result, etc.; this is called coarse cause and coarse effect. Now, the coarse cause and coarse effect are used as a metaphor to refute their subtle effect and subtle cause. The third subtle effect should arise from an impermanent cause (thesis), because it is the nature of an effect (reason), just like a coarse effect (example). Or, your subtle cause must be impermanent (thesis), because it has the nature of a cause (reason), just like a coarse cause (example). Or, it can be said together, establishing a syllogism: both subtle cause and subtle effect are impermanent (thesis), because they are cause and effect (reason), just like coarse cause and effect (example). Question: The impermanence of the subtle effect is acknowledged by both oneself and others, and establishing it as the subject of the thesis, isn't it mutually consistent? If the Vaiśeṣika believes that the subtle effect is indeed consistent, now combining it with the cause, the thesis is not to establish one's own view.
The Treatise says: 'Therefore, form, etc.... to... are definitely inseparable.' The Commentary says: This concludes that cause and effect must be similar. Since the impermanent thesis and reason have the same metaphor, it is known that cause and effect are inseparable from impermanence. Since impermanence is the same, it is called similarity. However, the atom upheld by the Vaiśeṣika is not *, * is a term of quality. Now, what is related to the mind is generally called form (rūpa, matter, color), and 'etc.' is equivalent to taking all causes and effects such as the mind.
The Treatise says: 'To resolve this meaning... to... the caused form, etc.' The Commentary says: Establishing a syllogism to refute attachments again. In order to resolve the meaning of this similarity of impermanent cause and effect, this is made again
比量言也。一切細果所因色等(有法)等取空等諸法常因豈是無常(宗法)果無常故(立因)譬如粗果所因色等(同喻)。
論云。複次有作至根亦應知 述曰。此下一頌破常有因非因設二俱許即非常也。初生起。次舉頌。后解釋。生起中初敘其外計。后顯頌所為。此敘外計也。虛空我等是遍是常。若於一分或時或方眾緣和合。即但依此時方之分發生音聲及苦樂等。下反解言。若言發聲及苦樂等要遍所依虛空我者。所發聲等既遍空等聲境。住遠近耳應聞苦樂。住遠近身應受。既無此事。故知空等隨緣合處即發聲等。余不合處不發聲等。
論云。為破彼見故說頌曰 述曰。此明頌所為也。
論云。若一分是因至種種故非常 述曰。此舉頌也。上半牒計。下半設難。設難有二。謂汝宗空等應成種種(宗)一分作因余非因故(因)如大地等(喻)汝宗空等定是無常(宗)以種種故(因)猶如聲等(喻)。
論云。論曰若謂至自果不生 述曰。此下解釋也初正釋頌。后兼釋頌。正釋中初釋頌文。后助頌意。釋頌文中初釋上半。后釋下半。此釋上半也。
論云。空等即應至定是無常 述曰。此下釋下半也。
論云。又此空等至可證非常 述曰。此下助頌意也。初令空等無常。后令空等無果
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這是通過比量（anumāna，一種推理方法）進行的論證。一切微細結果的起因，例如色等（rūpa，有法），以及空等（ākāśa，諸法），如果它們是常因，難道不是無常的嗎（宗法）？因為結果是無常的（立因），例如粗大結果的起因，例如色等（同喻）。
論中說：『此外，有作用直至根，也應當知道。』 述記中說：下面這一頌是爲了破斥常有因並非因，假設二者都允許，那就不是常了。首先是生起，其次是舉頌，然後是解釋。生起中，首先敘述外道的計較，然後顯示頌的作用。這是敘述外道的計較。虛空（ākāśa）、我（ātman）等是普遍的、是常的。如果在某一部分，或者在某個時間、某個方向，眾多因緣和合，那就僅僅依據此時方的區分，發生音聲以及苦樂等。下面反駁說，如果說發聲以及苦樂等，需要普遍所依的虛空、我等，那麼所發出的聲音等既然遍及虛空等聲境，住在遠處或近處的耳朵都應該聽到苦樂，住在遠處或近處的身體都應該感受到。既然沒有這件事，所以知道虛空等隨因緣聚合之處就發出聲音等，其餘不聚合之處就不發出聲音等。
論中說：『爲了破斥他們的見解，所以說了這首頌。』 述記中說：這說明了頌的作用。
論中說：『若一分是因，乃至種種故非常。』 述記中說：這是舉出頌文。上半部分是陳述對方的觀點，下半部分是提出詰難。提出的詰難有二：即你的宗義，虛空等應該成為種種（宗），因為一部分作為原因，其餘部分不是原因（因），例如大地等（喻）。你的宗義，虛空等一定是無常的（宗），因為是種種的緣故（因），猶如聲音等（喻）。
論中說：『論曰：如果說乃至自果不生。』 述記中說：下面是解釋頌文。首先是正式解釋頌文，然後是輔助解釋頌文。正式解釋頌文中，首先解釋上半部分，然後解釋下半部分。這是解釋上半部分。
論中說：『空等即應乃至定是無常。』 述記中說：下面是解釋下半部分。
論中說：『又此空等乃至可證非常。』 述記中說：下面是輔助解釋頌文。首先是使空等成為無常，然後是使空等沒有結果。
【English Translation】 English version: This is an argument through inference (anumāna, a method of reasoning). All subtle results' causes, such as form (rūpa, the subject of the argument), and phenomena like space (ākāśa, all dharmas), if they are permanent causes, are they not impermanent (thesis)? Because the result is impermanent (reason), like the causes of coarse results, such as form (example).
The treatise says: 'Furthermore, it should also be known that there is function up to the root.' The commentary says: The following verse is to refute the idea that a permanent cause is not a cause; if both are allowed, then it is not permanent. First is the arising, then the quoting of the verse, and then the explanation. In the arising, first is the narration of the externalist's view, and then the showing of the verse's function. This is the narration of the externalist's view. Space (ākāśa), self (ātman), etc., are pervasive and permanent. If in a certain part, or at a certain time, in a certain direction, many conditions come together, then based only on the distinction of this time and direction, sounds and suffering and joy, etc., arise. The following refutation says, if it is said that the production of sounds and suffering and joy, etc., requires the pervasive reliance on space, self, etc., then since the sounds, etc., that are produced pervade the sound-sphere of space, etc., ears that are far or near should hear suffering and joy, and bodies that are far or near should experience them. Since this does not happen, it is known that space, etc., produce sounds, etc., only where conditions come together, and do not produce sounds, etc., where they do not come together.
The treatise says: 'To refute their view, this verse is spoken.' The commentary says: This explains the function of the verse.
The treatise says: 'If one part is the cause, then up to being various, therefore it is impermanent.' The commentary says: This is quoting the verse. The first half states the opponent's view, and the second half raises a challenge. The challenge raised has two parts: namely, your tenet, space, etc., should become various (thesis), because one part acts as a cause and the rest does not (reason), like the earth, etc. (example). Your tenet, space, etc., must be impermanent (thesis), because it is various (reason), like sounds, etc. (example).
The treatise says: 'The treatise says: If it is said, up to the self-result not arising.' The commentary says: The following is the explanation of the verse. First is the formal explanation of the verse, and then the auxiliary explanation of the verse. In the formal explanation of the verse, first is the explanation of the first half, and then the explanation of the second half. This is the explanation of the first half.
The treatise says: 'Space, etc., should then up to definitely be impermanent.' The commentary says: The following is the explanation of the second half.
The treatise says: 'Also, this space, etc., up to it can be proven to be impermanent.' The commentary says: The following is the auxiliary explanation of the verse. First is making space, etc., impermanent, and then making space, etc., without result.
。此令空等無常也。此虛空等決定非常(宗)是種種相所依止故(因)如錦繡等(喻)問。此與前量何異。答。前量于空等上一分作因一分非因故成種種。此量于空等上為眾多果依有眾多相故成種種。此為異也。
論云。又如前說至聲等自果 述曰。此令空等無果也。此虛空等緣合之時應不生果(宗)與未合時體是一故(因)猶如與緣未合空等(喻)。
論云。複次有作至不變故常 述曰。此下兼釋頌也。頌文正破吠世。兼意亦破僧佉也。初破計生起。次指頌顯破。后依頌解釋。破計生起中初起敘計。后非破。此敘計也。僧佉此云數。即慧能數度諸法故名為數。從數論故名數論 論能生數亦名數論。造數論師名劫比羅。此云黃也。以頭面俱黃狀同金色。世間共號為黃仙人。舊云迦毗羅者訛也。此師宗義廣有二十五諦。謂自性大我慢五唯量五大五知根五作業根心根知者。中有其四。一本非變。即自效能生大等非他生故。二變非本。即五大十一根唯從他生不生他故。三亦本亦變。即大我慢五唯量。此從他生亦生他故。四非本非變。即神我諦不從他生不生他故。略有三。一自性即初諦。二變異即中間二十四諦。三神我即最後諦。更略為二。一我即神我諦。二我所即又此初諦名為自性。如是二十三諦之自性故。舊
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這是爲了說明空等是無常的。這個虛空等肯定是無常的（宗），因為它們是種種現象所依賴的基礎（因），就像錦繡等一樣（喻）。問：這與前面的論證有什麼不同？答：前面的論證是說，在空等之上，一部分是原因，一部分不是原因，所以形成了種種現象。而這個論證是說，在空等之上，因為有眾多果所依賴的眾多現象，所以形成了種種現象。這就是不同之處。
論中說：『又如前說至聲等自果』。註釋說：這是爲了說明空等沒有結果。這個虛空等在因緣聚合的時候，應該不會產生結果（宗），因為它們與未聚合時的本體是一樣的（因），就像與因緣未聚合的空等一樣（喻）。
論中說：『複次有作至不變故常』。註釋說：下面兼帶解釋頌文。頌文主要是爲了破斥吠世（Vaisheshika，印度哲學流派）。兼帶的意思也是爲了破斥僧佉（Samkhya，印度哲學流派）。首先破斥他們關於事物生起的觀點，然後指出頌文來顯明破斥，最後依據頌文來解釋。在破斥關於事物生起的觀點中，首先敘述他們的觀點，然後進行破斥。這裡是敘述他們的觀點。僧佉，意思是『數』，也就是慧能計算和衡量諸法，所以叫做『數』。因為是從數論出發，所以叫做數論。論中說能生數的也叫做數論。創造數論的老師叫做劫比羅（Kapila），意思是『黃』，因為他的頭和麵都是黃色的，像金子的顏色一樣。世間上都稱他為黃仙人。舊譯迦毗羅是錯誤的。這位老師的宗義廣泛地有二十五諦。分別是：自性（Prakriti，根本原因）、大（Mahat，智性）、我慢（Ahamkara，自我意識）、五唯量（Tanmatras，五種感覺的潛在形式）、五大（Mahabhutas，五種元素）、五知根（Jnana-indriyas，五種感覺器官）、五作業根（Karma-indriyas，五種行動器官）、心根（Manas，心）。其中有四種：一是本非變，也就是自性，能生大等，不是由其他事物所生。二是變非本，也就是五大和十一根，只是由其他事物所生，不能生其他事物。三是亦本亦變，也就是大、我慢、五唯量，這些是從其他事物所生，也能生其他事物。四是非本非變，也就是神我諦（Purusha，精神自我），不是從其他事物所生，也不能生其他事物。簡略來說有三種：一是自性，也就是最初的諦；二是變異，也就是中間的二十四諦；三是神我，也就是最後的諦。更簡略地分為兩種：一是我，也就是神我諦；二是我所，也就是又，這個最初的諦叫做自性，像這樣是二十三諦的自性。舊
【English Translation】 English version: This is to illustrate that emptiness and so on are impermanent. This emptiness and so on are definitely impermanent (thesis), because they are the basis upon which various phenomena depend (reason), just like brocade and embroidery (example). Question: What is the difference between this and the previous argument? Answer: The previous argument stated that on emptiness and so on, one part is the cause and one part is not the cause, thus forming various phenomena. This argument states that on emptiness and so on, because there are numerous phenomena upon which numerous results depend, thus forming various phenomena. This is the difference.
The treatise says: 'Furthermore, as previously stated, up to sound and so on as their own results.' The commentary says: This is to illustrate that emptiness and so on have no result. This emptiness and so on, when conditions are combined, should not produce a result (thesis), because their essence is the same as when they are not combined (reason), just like emptiness and so on when conditions are not combined (example).
The treatise says: 'Furthermore, some assert up to unchanging, therefore constant.' The commentary says: Below, it also explains the verse. The verse is mainly to refute the Vaisheshika (a school of Indian philosophy). The implied meaning is also to refute the Samkhya (a school of Indian philosophy). First, it refutes their view on the arising of things, then it points out the verse to clarify the refutation, and finally it explains based on the verse. In refuting the view on the arising of things, it first narrates their view, and then refutes it. Here it narrates their view. Samkhya means 'number,' that is, wisdom can calculate and measure all dharmas, so it is called 'number.' Because it is based on number theory, it is called Samkhya. The treatise says that what can produce numbers is also called Samkhya. The teacher who created Samkhya is called Kapila, which means 'yellow,' because his head and face are yellow, like the color of gold. In the world, he is commonly known as the Yellow Immortal. The old translation 'Kapilavastu' is wrong. This teacher's doctrine extensively has twenty-five Tattvas (principles). They are: Prakriti (primordial nature), Mahat (intellect), Ahamkara (ego), Tanmatras (five subtle elements), Mahabhutas (five gross elements), Jnana-indriyas (five sense organs), Karma-indriyas (five action organs), Manas (mind). Among them, there are four types: First, the origin but not transformation, which is Prakriti, can produce Mahat and so on, not produced by other things. Second, transformation but not origin, which are the five gross elements and eleven organs, only produced by other things, cannot produce other things. Third, both origin and transformation, which are Mahat, Ahamkara, and the five subtle elements, these are produced by other things and can also produce other things. Fourth, neither origin nor transformation, which is Purusha (spiritual self), not produced by other things, nor can it produce other things. Briefly, there are three types: First, Prakriti, which is the first Tattva; second, transformation, which are the twenty-four Tattvas in the middle; third, Purusha, which is the last Tattva. More briefly, it is divided into two types: First, 'I,' which is the Purusha Tattva; second, 'mine,' which is also, this first Tattva is called Prakriti, like this is the nature of the twenty-three Tattvas. Old
云。冥諦者以冥然未有顯相故名為冥。此義翻也。又此自性正二十三諦之時轉名最勝。又此自性薩埵剌阇答摩合成同一作用亦名一物。謂我思慮欲須人天等身受用之時。此薩埵等三德和合。欲為神我造人天身時。如從睡覺眼開身動形貌稍大即名為大。舊云從冥生初覺者取寤覺義也。大之後持己云我。起陵物心即名我慢。我慢之後即變成五唯。從此五唯一分成境即是五大。一分為根即十一根。既成人天身已我即受用也。然此二十三諦展轉變異差別增長名曰無常。三德自性曾無改轉即名為常。今敘此計也。謂一時方分中諸法起時。但從自性一物。大慢等二十三諦諸果展轉變異差別增長。大等無常。一物是常也。
論云。此亦不然至義相違故 述曰。此下非破也。初略后廣破。此略破也。果因既言同體。何得有常無常。此義相違也。
論云。大等皆用至猶如大等 述曰 此下廣破也。初以大等例自性。后以變分例不變。此即初也。大等變時自性(有法)應變(宗)不異自性故(因)猶如大等(喻)大等變時自性應是無常(宗)不異自性故(因)猶如大等(喻)。
論云。又此自性至應是無常 述曰。此以變分例不變也。此之自性一分變時自餘量無不變之分(有法)應亦隨變(宗)不異同性故(因)猶如一
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 云。『冥諦』（Prakrti，本性）之所以被稱為『冥』，是因為它冥然未有顯現的相狀。這是從意義上翻譯的。而且，這個『自性』（Prakrti），在構成二十三諦（tattva，真實）的時候，又被稱作『最勝』（Pradhana）。此外，這個『自性』由『薩埵』（Sattva，悅性）、『剌阇』（Rajas，動性）、『答摩』（Tamas，惰性）三種屬性合成，它們共同作用，也可以被看作是一個東西。當『我』（神我，Purusha）思慮想要獲得人、天等身體來享受時，這『薩埵』等三種屬性就會和合。當想要為『神我』創造人天身體時，就像從睡夢中醒來，眼睛睜開，身體活動，形貌逐漸變大，這就叫做『大』（Mahat，覺性）。舊譯說從『冥』產生『初覺』，就是取其醒悟覺知的含義。在『大』之後，執持自己，說『我』，產生凌駕于外物之上的心，就叫做『我慢』（Ahamkara，自我意識）。『我慢』之後，就變成五『唯』（Tanmatra，五種感覺的潛在形式）。從這五『唯』中，一部分分化成外境，就是五大（Mahabhuta，地、水、火、風、空五種元素）；一部分分化成根，就是十一根（indriya，五根、五作用根和意根）。既然已經成人天之身，『我』就可以受用了。然而，這二十三諦輾轉變化，差異增長，叫做『無常』（anitya，impermanence）。三德的自性從來沒有改變和轉動，就叫做『常』（nitya，permanence）。現在敘述這種計度。所謂在同一時間、同一方位中，諸法生起時，都只是從『自性』這一物，『大』、『慢』等二十三諦的諸果輾轉變化，差異增長。『大』等是無常的，『一物』是常的。
論中說：『這也不對，因為意義上是相違背的。』 解釋說：下面不是破斥。先是簡略地破斥，然後是廣泛地破斥。這是簡略的破斥。既然說果和因是同體，怎麼能有常和無常呢？這在意義上是相違背的。
論中說：『大等都是作用，就像大等一樣。』 解釋說：下面是廣泛的破斥。先用『大』等來比喻『自性』，後用變異的部分來比喻不變異的部分。這是開始的部分。『大』等變化時，『自性』（有法）應該變化（宗），因為不異於『自性』（因），就像『大』等（喻）。『大』等變化時，『自性』應該是無常的（宗），因為不異於『自性』（因），就像『大』等（喻）。
論中說：『又，這個自性，乃至應該是無常的。』 解釋說：這是用變異的部分來比喻不變異的部分。這個『自性』，一部分變化時，其餘沒有不變異的部分（有法），也應該隨著變化（宗），因為不異於同一種性質（因），就像一...
【English Translation】 English version It is said. 'Prakrti' (冥諦, the unmanifested principle) is called 'Prakrti' (冥) because it is obscure and has no manifest appearance. This is a translation of the meaning. Moreover, this 'Prakrti' (自性), when it constitutes the twenty-three 'tattvas' (諦, realities), is also called 'Pradhana' (最勝, the chief). Furthermore, this 'Prakrti' is composed of three attributes: 'Sattva' (薩埵, goodness), 'Rajas' (剌阇, passion), and 'Tamas' (答摩, darkness). They work together and can also be regarded as one thing. When 'I' (Purusha, 神我, the self) contemplates wanting to obtain human, heavenly, or other bodies to enjoy, these three attributes, 'Sattva' and the others, will combine. When wanting to create human or heavenly bodies for 'Purusha', it is like waking up from sleep, opening the eyes, moving the body, and the appearance gradually becoming larger, which is called 'Mahat' (大, intellect). The old translation says that 'initial awareness' arises from 'Prakrti', which takes the meaning of awakening and knowing. After 'Mahat', holding onto oneself, saying 'I', and generating a mind that surpasses external things is called 'Ahamkara' (我慢, ego). After 'Ahamkara', it transforms into the five 'Tanmatras' (唯, subtle elements). From these five 'Tanmatras', one part differentiates into the external environment, which is the five 'Mahabhutas' (大, gross elements: earth, water, fire, wind, and space); one part differentiates into the roots, which are the eleven 'indriyas' (根, sense faculties: five sense organs, five action organs, and the mind). Since one has already become a human or heavenly body, 'I' can then enjoy. However, these twenty-three 'tattvas' transform, change, and increase in differences, which is called 'anitya' (無常, impermanence). The nature of the three attributes has never changed or moved, which is called 'nitya' (常, permanence). Now, this calculation is being described. It is said that when dharmas arise in the same time and direction, they all arise from the single entity of 'Prakrti', and the fruits of the twenty-three 'tattvas', such as 'Mahat' and 'Ahamkara', transform, change, and increase in differences. 'Mahat' and the others are impermanent, and the 'one entity' is permanent.
The treatise says: 'This is also not right, because it contradicts the meaning.' The commentary says: What follows is not a refutation. First, there is a brief refutation, and then a broad refutation. This is the brief refutation. Since it is said that the fruit and the cause are of the same substance, how can there be permanence and impermanence? This contradicts the meaning.
The treatise says: 'Mahat and the others are all functions, just like Mahat and the others.' The commentary says: What follows is a broad refutation. First, 'Mahat' and the others are used as an analogy for 'Prakrti', and then the changing part is used as an analogy for the unchanging part. This is the beginning part. When 'Mahat' and the others change, 'Prakrti' (the subject) should change (the thesis), because it is not different from 'Prakrti' (the reason), just like 'Mahat' and the others (the example). When 'Mahat' and the others change, 'Prakrti' should be impermanent (the thesis), because it is not different from 'Prakrti' (the reason), just like 'Mahat' and the others (the example).
The treatise says: 'Also, this Prakrti, even should be impermanent.' The commentary says: This is using the changing part as an analogy for the unchanging part. When one part of this 'Prakrti' changes, the remaining part that does not change (the subject) should also change along with it (the thesis), because it is not different from the same nature (the reason), just like one...
分變時自性(喻)此之自性應是無常(宗)有多作用故(因)猶如大等(喻)。
論云。又以前頌兼破此執 述曰。此指頌顯破也。如前頌意正破吠世。言其兼亦破僧佉。
論云。由彼所計至轉名最勝 述曰。此下依頌解釋也初釋上半。后釋下半。釋上半中初法次譬后合。此即法也。第一薩埵其性明白。第二剌阇其性躁動。第三答摩其性闇昧 舊云貪瞋癡。或云染塵黑。或云喜憂闇。或云樂苦舍。義皆同也。三法和合同隨於一分變成大等轉名最勝者。若三法和同隨於一時一處變成大等果法者即轉名最勝。若所變之果名為大等。余時余處不變者即仍舊名自性也。此即有用無用故成種種。
論云。譬如大海至駭浪奔濤 述曰。此譬也。大海法然隨於一處一時為風等所擊變成波浪。余不擊時處依舊湛然。此即有用無用成種種也。
論云。如是所執至無所轉變 述曰。此合也。
論云。是即自體至相非常住 述曰。此釋下半頌也。初約有用無用種種破。后約多用多體種種破。此即初也。
論云。又三自性至定是無常 述曰。此約多用多體種種破也。文中初令自性隨作用應成多。次須令最勝隨自性亦成多。后令自性最勝是無常。並立比量可解。
論云。複次有執至而起諸果 述曰。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
分變時自性（Prakṛti，本性，根本）的自性應是無常的（Anitya，無常）（宗），因為它有多種作用（因），猶如大等（Mahat，大覺）等（喻）。
論曰：又以前面的頌（偈頌）兼破此執。 述曰：此指頌文顯明地破斥此種執見。如前面的頌文之意，主要是破斥吠世（Vaiśeṣika，勝論派）。說它兼帶也破斥僧佉（Sāṃkhya，數論派）。
論曰：由彼所計，至轉名最勝。 述曰：下面依據頌文解釋。先解釋上半部分，后解釋下半部分。解釋上半部分中，先是法，然後是譬喻，最後是合。此即是法。第一薩埵（Sattva，悅性），其性明白。第二剌阇（Rajas， रजस्， रजस् गुण， 憂性），其性躁動。第三答摩（Tamas， तमस्， तमस् गुण， 暗性），其性闇昧。舊譯為貪瞋癡，或云染塵黑，或云喜憂闇，或云樂苦舍，意義都相同。三法和合同隨於一分變成大等，轉名最勝者。若三法和同隨於一時一處變成大等果法者，即轉名最勝。若所變之果名為大等，余時余處不變者，即仍舊名自性。此即有用無用，故成種種。
論曰：譬如大海，至駭浪奔濤。 述曰：這是譬喻。大海法爾，隨於一處一時為風等所擊，變成波浪。余不擊時處，依舊湛然。此即有用無用，成種種也。
論曰：如是所執，至無所轉變。 述曰：這是合。
論曰：是即自體，至相非常住。 述曰：這是解釋下半頌。先從有用無用種種破，后從多用多體種種破。這是第一個方面。
論曰：又三自性，至定是無常。 述曰：這是從多用多體種種破。文中先令自性隨作用應成多，其次須令最勝隨自性亦成多，最後令自性最勝是無常。並立比量可解。
論曰：複次有執，至而起諸果。 述曰：
【English Translation】 English version:
The nature of Prakṛti (self-nature, fundamental principle) at the time of differentiation should be impermanent (Anitya) (thesis), because it has multiple functions (reason), like Mahat (great intellect) and so on (example).
Treatise says: Moreover, the previous verse also refutes this view. Commentary says: This refers to the verse explicitly refuting this view. As the meaning of the previous verse mainly refutes the Vaiśeṣika school. Saying that it also refutes the Sāṃkhya school.
Treatise says: According to their view, up to the transformation being called the most excellent. Commentary says: Below, it is explained according to the verse. First, the first half is explained, then the second half. In explaining the first half, first the dharma (principle), then the analogy, and finally the synthesis. This is the dharma. First, Sattva (clarity), its nature is clear. Second, Rajas (passion), its nature is restless. Third, Tamas (darkness), its nature is obscure. The old translations are greed, anger, and ignorance, or defilement, dust, and darkness, or joy, sorrow, and darkness, or pleasure, suffering, and equanimity. The meanings are all the same. The three dharmas harmonize and become Mahat in one part, and the transformation is called the most excellent. If the three dharmas harmonize and become the fruit of Mahat at one time and place, then the transformation is called the most excellent. If the transformed fruit is called Mahat, and it does not change at other times and places, then it is still called Prakṛti. This is because of usefulness and uselessness, thus becoming various.
Treatise says: For example, the great sea, up to the frightening waves and surging tides. Commentary says: This is the analogy. The great sea naturally, in one place and at one time, is struck by the wind and so on, and becomes waves. When it is not struck at other times and places, it remains still. This is because of usefulness and uselessness, thus becoming various.
Treatise says: As such, the held view, up to no transformation. Commentary says: This is the synthesis.
Treatise says: That is, the self-nature, up to the characteristics being impermanent. Commentary says: This is the explanation of the second half of the verse. First, it is refuted from the various aspects of usefulness and uselessness, then from the various aspects of multiple functions and multiple entities. This is the first aspect.
Treatise says: Moreover, the three self-natures, up to definitely being impermanent. Commentary says: This is refuted from the various aspects of multiple functions and multiple entities. In the text, first, let the self-nature become multiple according to the function, then it is necessary to let the most excellent also become multiple according to the self-nature, and finally let the self-nature and the most excellent be impermanent. And establish a comparison that can be understood.
Treatise says: Furthermore, some hold, up to arising various fruits. Commentary says:
此下七頌破極微也。有四。第一一頌破極微因同處。第二一頌破極微因異處。第三三頌破極微無方分。第四兩頌破微體是常。初破極微因同處中。初生起。次舉頌。后解釋。生起中有五。一敘計。二責破。三外救。四重非。五徴問。此即敘計也。勝論計云。極微體性是常是實。若一一別住不能生果。若兩兩和合猶如夫妻相助有力。即近能生果。遠有所成。雖果體之起遍入因中。然因體常無所虧損也。
論云。此亦不然至定是無常 述曰。此責破也。論主責云。汝計不然。和合解常義不成故。如二極微共和合時。一微在東。一微在西。東微西面西微東面共相觸對。東微東面西微西面不相觸對。此即一微自有觸對分無觸對分。既有方分定是無常也。所執極微必有方分(宗)有和合故(因)如瓶盆等(喻)所執極微定是無常(宗)有方分故(因)如瓶盆等(喻)。
論云。若言極微遍體和合無方分者 述曰。此外救也。二極微因欲生果時。即相涉入遍體和合。既無東西之異焉有方分之過。
論云。此亦不然 述曰。此重非也。
論云。何以故 述曰。此徴問也。
論云。頌曰至非遍體和合 述曰。此舉頌也。上半牒計。下半責破。勝論立因極微有二相。一微相。二圓相。所生果有二相。一非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 以下七頌是用來破斥極微的。分為四個部分。第一頌破斥極微因同處；第二頌破斥極微因異處；第三頌三頌破斥極微無方分；第四頌兩頌破斥微體是常。首先破斥極微因同處，其中分為：初生起，次舉頌，后解釋。生起中又有五：一敘計，二責破，三外救，四重非，五征問。這裡是敘述計度。勝論的計度是：極微的體性是常是實。如果一一單獨存在不能產生結果。如果兩兩和合，就像夫妻互相幫助一樣有力，就能近距離地產生結果，遠距離地有所成就。即使果體的生起遍入因中，然而因體是常，不會有所虧損。
論中說：『此亦不然』到『定是無常』。這是責破。論主責備說：你的計度不對，和合與常的意義不能成立。如果兩個極微共同和合時，一個微粒在東邊，一個微粒在西邊，東邊的微粒西面與西邊的微粒東面互相接觸。東邊的微粒東面與西邊的微粒西面不互相接觸。這就是一個微粒自身有接觸的部分和沒有接觸的部分。既然有方分，必定是無常的。所執著的極微必定有方分（宗），因為有和合的緣故（因），就像瓶盆等（喻）。所執著的極微必定是無常的（宗），因為有方分的緣故（因），就像瓶盆等（喻）。
論中說：『若言極微遍體和合無方分者』。這是外救。兩個極微因為想要產生結果時，就互相涉入，遍體和合。既然沒有東西的差異，哪裡會有方分的過失呢？
論中說：『此亦不然』。這是再次否定。
論中說：『何以故』。這是征問。
論中說：『頌曰』到『非遍體和合』。這是舉頌。上半部分是陳述計度，下半部分是責備破斥。勝論建立因，極微有二相：一微相，二圓相。所生果有二相：一非微相，二非圓相。
【English Translation】 English version: The following seven verses are to refute the paramāṇu (extremely small particle). There are four parts. The first verse refutes the paramāṇu due to the same location. The second verse refutes the paramāṇu due to different locations. The third three verses refute the paramāṇu having no directional parts. The fourth two verses refute the paramāṇu's substance being permanent. First, refuting the paramāṇu due to the same location, which includes: first, arising; second, citing the verse; and third, explaining. Arising includes five aspects: 1. stating the theory; 2. criticizing the refutation; 3. external defense; 4. repeated negation; 5. questioning. This is stating the theory. The Vaiseṣika (school of Hinduism) theory states: the nature of the paramāṇu is permanent and real. If they exist separately, they cannot produce results. If they combine in pairs, like husband and wife helping each other, they have the power to produce results in the near distance and achieve something in the far distance. Even if the arising of the result-substance pervades the cause, the cause-substance is permanent and will not be diminished.
The treatise says: 'This is also not so' to 'is definitely impermanent'. This is the criticism and refutation. The author of the treatise criticizes: Your theory is not correct, because the meaning of combination and permanence cannot be established. If two paramāṇus combine together, one particle is in the east and one particle is in the west. The west side of the eastern particle touches the east side of the western particle. The east side of the eastern particle does not touch the west side of the western particle. This means that one particle has a touching part and a non-touching part. Since it has directional parts, it must be impermanent. The paramāṇu that you adhere to must have directional parts (thesis), because it has combination (reason), like bottles and basins (example). The paramāṇu that you adhere to must be impermanent (thesis), because it has directional parts (reason), like bottles and basins (example).
The treatise says: 'If it is said that the paramāṇu combines throughout its entire body without directional parts'. This is an external defense. When two paramāṇus want to produce a result, they interpenetrate each other and combine throughout their entire bodies. Since there is no difference between east and west, how can there be the fault of directional parts?
The treatise says: 'This is also not so'. This is repeated negation.
The treatise says: 'Why is that?' This is questioning.
The treatise says: 'The verse says' to 'not combined throughout the entire body'. This is citing the verse. The first half states the theory, and the second half criticizes and refutes it. The Vaiseṣika establishes the cause, the paramāṇu has two aspects: one is the paramāṇu aspect, and the other is the round aspect. The produced result has two aspects: one is not the paramāṇu aspect, and the other is not the round aspect.
微相。一塵大故。二非圓相。橫長故。以二微共和生於一果。其果量長大遍含二因故也。雖含二因亦不越因量。論主責云。在因微圓二相。于果既則非有。是故諸因極微非是遍體和合。以其二因遍體相入所生一果亦入因中三實處同微圓應等。既其一果非微非圓。當知二因體非遍合。果括二因成廣長故。舊百論云。問曰二微塵非一切身合果不圓故。即此義也。
論云。論曰若諸至非少分合 述曰。此下解釋也。初釋頌。次外救。后責破。釋頌中初牒計。后正破。此牒計也。
論云。是則諸微至應亦微圓 述曰。此下正破也 初徴次進難后結過。此徴破也。若汝許諸極微遍體和合。理應初二因微同一處。所生實果復不起因量。理亦應與自因遍合。此則二因一果三物同處也。此中比量云。所生實果應亦微圓(宗)以與因微無別處故(因)猶若因微(喻)。
論云。若爾應許至余可知故 述曰。此進難也。前直破第三果實亦微圓。今更進難六句並非根境也。若汝為難所逼即許果實亦微圓等者。汝則應許一切六句皆非五根所了知境。此中量云。所餘德等諸句並非根境(宗)與細因果無別處故(因)謂依細實方有色等德行等業有同異等。並與細因果實無別處也。如細因果(喻)由見所依余可知故者。此釋進難意
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 微細的粒子（微相），是構成一個微塵的根本原因（一塵大故）。兩個微塵並非是圓滿的相（二非圓相），因為它們有橫向和縱向的長度（橫長故）。這兩個微塵共同作用，產生一個果實。這個果實的體積和大小，普遍包含了兩個原因（因），因此比原因更大（其果量長大遍含二因故也）。雖然包含了兩個原因，但果實的體積也不會超過原因的體積（雖含二因亦不越因量）。 論主的責難是：原因中的微小和圓滿的相，在結果中已經不存在了（在因微圓二相，于果既則非有）。因此，所有的原因極微都不是整體和合的（是故諸因極微非是遍體和合）。因為兩個原因整體相入，所產生的一個果實也進入原因之中，三個實體在同一個微小之處，圓滿的程度應該相等（以其二因遍體相入所生一果亦入因中三實處同微圓應等）。既然這個果實既不是微小的，也不是圓滿的，那麼就應該知道兩個原因的本體不是整體和合的（既其一果非微非圓。當知二因體非遍合）。果實包含了兩個原因，所以變得廣闊和長遠（果括二因成廣長故）。 舊《百論》中說：有人問，兩個微塵不是以整體結合的，所以果實不是圓滿的（問曰二微塵非一切身合果不圓故）。說的就是這個意思。
《論》中說：如果所有的極微不是以少部分結合的（論曰若諸至非少分合）。 述曰：以下是解釋（述曰）。首先解釋頌文，然後是外人的辯護，最後是駁斥。解釋頌文中，首先是陳述對方的觀點，然後是正式駁斥。這裡是陳述對方的觀點（此下解釋也。初釋頌。次外救。后責破。釋頌中初牒計。后正破。此牒計也）。
《論》中說：那麼所有的極微到達之處，也應該是微小和圓滿的（論云。是則諸微至應亦微圓）。 述曰：以下是正式駁斥（述曰）。首先是提問，然後是進一步的責難，最後是總結過失。這裡是提問和駁斥（此下正破也 初徴次進難后結過。此徴破也）。如果你允許所有的極微以整體和合，那麼按照道理，最初的兩個原因微塵應該在同一個地方，所產生的果實也不應該超過原因的體積。按照道理，也應該和自身的原因整體結合。這樣，兩個原因和一個果實，三個物體就在同一個地方了（若汝許諸極微遍體和合。理應初二因微同一處。所生實果復不起因量。理亦應與自因遍合。此則二因一果三物同處也）。 這裡可以用比量來說明：所產生的果實也應該是微小和圓滿的（宗），因為它和原因微塵沒有不同的地方（因），就像原因微塵一樣（喻）（此中比量云。所生實果應亦微圓(宗)以與因微無別處故(因)猶若因微(喻)）。
《論》中說：如果這樣，就應該允許其餘的也是可以知道的（論云。若爾應許至余可知故）。 述曰：這是進一步的責難（述曰）。前面直接駁斥了第三個果實也是微小和圓滿的。現在更進一步責難，六句（六句指實、德、業、同異、和合、勝）並非是根和境（根指五根，境指五境）的結合（今更進難六句並非根境也）。如果你因為被責難所迫，就允許果實也是微小和圓滿的等等，那麼你就應該允許所有的六句都不是五根所能瞭解的境界（若汝為難所逼即許果實亦微圓等者。汝則應許一切六句皆非五根所了知境）。 這裡可以用比量來說明：其餘的德等諸句，並非是根和境的結合（宗），因為它和微細的原因和結果沒有不同的地方（因），也就是說，依靠微細的實體，才會有顏色等德行，以及同異等業（此中量云。所餘德等諸句並非根境(宗)與細因果無別處故(因)謂依細實方有色等德行等業有同異等）。並且和微細的原因和結果沒有不同的地方。就像微細的原因和結果一樣（如細因果(喻)）。因為看到所依靠的，其餘的就可以知道（由見所依余可知故者）。這是解釋進一步責難的意思。
【English Translation】 English version The subtle particles (Mikra-samjna) are the fundamental cause of a dust mote (Eka-dusta-hetu). The two particles are not a perfect sphere (Dvi-na-vrtta-samjna), because they have horizontal and longitudinal lengths (Dirgha-ayatana-hetu). These two particles act together to produce a fruit. The volume and size of this fruit universally contain the two causes (Hetu), and are therefore larger than the causes (Tasmat phala-parimana-dirghatvam dvau hetu-samgraha-hetu). Although it contains two causes, the volume of the fruit will not exceed the volume of the causes (Api dvau hetu-samgraha-hetu, na hetu-parimana-atikramati). The Acharya's (teacher's) criticism is: the subtle and perfect aspects in the cause no longer exist in the result (Hetu-mikra-vrtta-samjna, phale na santi). Therefore, all the cause-atoms are not entirely combined (Tasmat sarva-hetu-paramanu na sarva-sharira-samyoga). Because the two causes entirely penetrate each other, the one fruit produced also enters the cause, and the three entities should be equal in the same subtle place, and the degree of perfection should be equal (Yatah dvau hetu-sarva-sharira-pravesha, utpanna-eka-phala api hetu-madhye pravesha, traya vastu eka-mikra-sthala, vrtta-parimana samana syat). Since this fruit is neither subtle nor perfect, then it should be known that the essence of the two causes is not entirely combined (Yatah eka-phala na mikra na vrtta. Tatah dvau hetu-sharira na sarva-samyoga). The fruit contains the two causes, so it becomes broad and long (Phala dvau hetu-samgraha, tatah prasarita-dirgha-hetu). The old Sata-sastra says: Someone asked, 'The two dust motes are not combined as a whole, so the fruit is not perfect' (Prasnah dvau paramaanu na sarva-sharira-samyoga, phala na vrtta-hetu). This is what it means.
The Sastra says: If all the atoms are not combined in small parts (Sastra uktam yadi sarva-paramanu na alpa-bhaga-samyoga). Commentary: The following is an explanation (Bhasya). First explain the verse, then the outsider's defense, and finally the refutation. In explaining the verse, first state the other party's point of view, and then formally refute it. Here is a statement of the other party's point of view (Adhah vyakhyanam. Prathamam sloka-vyakhyanam. Tatah bahir-raksa. Antatah khandanam. Sloka-vyakhyane prathamam para-paksa-kathanam. Tatah aupacarikam khandanam. Atra para-paksa-kathanam).
The Sastra says: Then all the atoms that arrive should also be subtle and perfect (Sastra uktam. Tatah sarva-paramanu agamanam api mikra-vrtta syat). Commentary: The following is a formal refutation (Bhasya). First is the question, then further criticism, and finally the conclusion of the fault. Here is the question and refutation (Adhah aupacarikam khandanam. Prathamam prasnah tatah adhikam ninda antatah dosah-samapti. Atra prasnah khandanam). If you allow all the atoms to combine as a whole, then according to reason, the initial two cause-atoms should be in the same place, and the fruit produced should not exceed the volume of the cause. According to reason, it should also be entirely combined with its own cause. In this way, the two causes and one fruit, the three objects are in the same place (Yadi bhavan sarva-paramanu sarva-sharira-samyoga anumodeti, tatah yukti-anusarena prarambha-dvau hetu-paramanu eka-sthala syat, utpanna-phala api na hetu-parimana-atikramati. Yukti-anusarena api sva-hetu sarva-samyoga syat. Ita riti, dvau hetu eka-phala, traya vastu eka-sthala santi). Here, the analogy can be used to illustrate: The fruit produced should also be subtle and perfect (Paksa), because it has no different place from the cause-atom (Hetu), just like the cause-atom (Drstanta) (Atra upama-vacana uktam. Utpanna-phala api mikra-vrtta syat (Paksa) yatah hetu-paramanu saha bhinnah sthala na asti (Hetu) yatha hetu-paramanu (Drstanta)).
The Sastra says: If so, then it should be allowed that the rest can also be known (Sastra uktam. Yadi evam, tatah avasesa api jnata anumodeta). Commentary: This is further criticism (Bhasya). The previous directly refuted that the third fruit is also subtle and perfect. Now, further criticize that the six sentences (the six sentences refer to substance, quality, activity, similarity and difference, combination, and superiority) are not a combination of root and object (root refers to the five roots, and object refers to the five objects) (Adhunika adhikam ninda. Purvam trtiya-phala api mikra-vrtta asti pratyakhyata. Adhuna adhikam ninda, sat-vakya (sat-vakya vastu, guna, kriya, samata-bhinata, samyoga, sresthata nirdisanti) mulam vastu-samyoga na santi). If you are forced by criticism, you allow the fruit to be subtle and perfect, etc., then you should allow that all six sentences are not the realm that the five roots can understand (Yadi bhavan ninda-pidita, phala api mikra-vrtta ityadi anumodeti, tatah bhavan sarva-sat-vakya panca-mula jnata-kshetra na santi anumodeta). Here, the analogy can be used to illustrate: The remaining sentences such as virtue are not a combination of root and object (Paksa), because it has no different place from the subtle cause and effect (Hetu), that is to say, relying on the subtle entity, there will be virtues such as color, as well as activities such as similarity and difference (Atra upama-vacana uktam. Avasesa guna ityadi vakya mulam vastu-samyoga na santi (Paksa) yatah mikra-hetu-phala saha bhinnah sthala na asti (Hetu), arthat, mikra-vastu asrita, varna ityadi guna bhavisyanti, tatha samata-bhinata ityadi kriya). And there is no different place from the subtle cause and effect. Just like the subtle cause and effect (Yatha mikra-hetu-phala (Drstanta)). Because seeing what is relied on, the rest can be known (Yatah asrita drstva, avasesa jnata saknoti). This is the meaning of explaining further criticism.
也。由此比度之心見彼所依之實非是根境。余能依德等亦非根境。類可知故。此比量云。能依德等皆非根境(宗)以其所依非根境故(因)如細果實(喻)。
論云。是則違害世間自宗 述曰。此結過也。世間汝宗並皆許彼實德業等是其根境。今言實等非根境者。有二宗過也。
論云。若言實果至分明可見 述曰。此外救也。文中初救后釋。救意云。所生果實與其因微雖遍體合無別處所應亦微圓是不可見。然由實果之上有粗長量德可見之法積集力故。令其果實亦可得見。下釋可知。
論云。此但有言至何事余言 述曰。此下責破也。有六。一責救不當。二尋救逐破。三遮其外難。四依遮進徴。五總結救非。六許德破實。此即責救不當也。量德與實體性不同。縱見塵長何關細果。細果之處不異因微。應類因微非根所見 如此之責如絕救辭。乃至見德何成釋難。
論云。若所依實至應舍自相 述曰。此尋救責破也。若所依實果之上有如是塵長量德相現者。應舍所依實句之體同彼能依德句之相。既成能依德句他相應舍所依實句自相也。此比量云。此之果實應舍自相(宗)現他相故(因)諸現相者皆舍自相如花現果相(喻)。
論云。亦不可說至應捨實體 述曰。此遮其外難也。外難云。頗胝
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
也。由此比度之心，可見彼所依之實（dharmin，事物所依賴的實體）並非根境（indriya-gocara，感官的對象）。其餘能依之德等，也非根境。因為可以類推得知。此比量（anumāna，推理）云：能依之德等皆非根境（宗），以其所依非根境故（因），如細小果實（喻）。
論云：是則違害世間自宗。述曰：此為總結過失。世間與汝宗派都承認彼實德業等是其根境。今言實等非根境者，便犯了二宗相違之過。
論云：若言實果至分明可見。述曰：這是外人的辯解。文中先提出辯解，後進行解釋。辯解的意思是：所生的果實與其因微（原因的微小部分）雖遍體結合，沒有其他處所，應該也是微小而圓，不可見的。然而由於實果之上，有粗長量德（粗大的長度等屬性）等可見之法積聚的力量，使得果實也可以被看見。下面的解釋可以理解。
論云：此但有言至何事余言。述曰：此下是責難和駁斥。有六點：一、責難辯解不恰當；二、追尋辯解並加以駁破；三、遮止外來的責難；四、依據遮止進行進一步的質問；五、總結辯解錯誤；六、承認德而否定實。這裡是責難辯解不恰當。量德與實體性不同。縱然看見塵土的長度，與細小果實有什麼關係？細小果實之處與因微沒有區別，應該像因微一樣，不是感官所能見到的。如此責難，就像斷絕了辯解的言辭，乃至見到德，又如何能解釋難題？
論云：若所依實至應舍自相。述曰：這是追尋辯解並加以駁破。如果所依賴的實果之上，有如此塵土般的長度等屬性顯現，就應該捨棄所依實句的本體，如同能依德句的相。既然成了能依德句的他相，就應該捨棄所依實句的自相。此比量云：此果實應捨棄自相（宗），因為顯現他相的緣故（因），凡是顯現他相的，都捨棄自相，如花顯現果的相（喻）。
論云：亦不可說至應捨實體。述曰：這是遮止外來的責難。外人責難說：頗胝（sphatika，水晶）
【English Translation】 English version:
Also, by this discerning mind, it can be seen that the dharmin (the entity that is relied upon, the substance) is not an indriya-gocara (object of the senses). Other dependent qualities, etc., are also not indriya-gocara. Because it can be known by analogy. This anumāna (inference) states: Dependent qualities, etc., are all not indriya-gocara (thesis), because their dharmin is not an indriya-gocara (reason), like a tiny fruit (example).
The treatise says: 'This then contradicts the world's own tenets.' The commentary says: This is a concluding fault. The world and your school both admit that those real qualities, actions, etc., are their indriya-gocara. Now, saying that the real qualities, etc., are not indriya-gocara commits the fault of contradicting two tenets.
The treatise says: 'If it is said that the real fruit is clearly visible.' The commentary says: This is an outsider's defense. The text first presents the defense and then explains it. The meaning of the defense is: Although the produced fruit and its causal minute parts (the minute parts of the cause) are combined throughout the body and have no other location, they should also be minute and round, and invisible. However, because on top of the real fruit, there is the power of the accumulation of visible dharmas such as coarse length qualities, etc., the fruit can also be seen. The explanation below can be understood.
The treatise says: 'This only has words, what other words.' The commentary says: Below is the criticism and refutation. There are six points: 1. Criticizing the defense as inappropriate; 2. Pursuing the defense and refuting it; 3. Preventing external criticism; 4. Based on the prevention, making further inquiries; 5. Concluding that the defense is wrong; 6. Admitting qualities while denying reality. Here, it is criticizing the defense as inappropriate. The quantitative qualities are different from the nature of the substance. Even if the length of dust is seen, what does it have to do with the tiny fruit? The place of the tiny fruit is no different from the causal minute parts, and should be like the causal minute parts, not seen by the senses. Such criticism is like cutting off the words of defense, and even seeing the qualities, how can it explain the difficult problem?
The treatise says: 'If the dharmin is real, it should abandon its own characteristic.' The commentary says: This is pursuing the defense and refuting it. If on top of the real fruit that is relied upon, there appears such a dust-like length quality, then the substance of the phrase 'dharmin real' should be abandoned, like the characteristic of the phrase 'dependent quality'. Since it has become the other characteristic of the phrase 'dependent quality', it should abandon the self-characteristic of the phrase 'dharmin real'. This anumāna states: This fruit should abandon its own characteristic (thesis), because it manifests another's characteristic (reason), and all those that manifest another's characteristic abandon their own characteristic, like a flower manifesting the characteristic of a fruit (example).
The treatise says: 'It also cannot be said that it should abandon the substance.' The commentary says: This is preventing external criticism. The outsider criticizes and says: Sphatika (crystal)
迦寶其色本白。置青等色上即現青等色相。然不失本白色之相。此則汝因有不定過。謂為如眾花現他相故即失自相耶。為如頗胝迦寶現他相故不失自相。今論主遮云。汝不了別此為難。此寶無常前後異故。前不至后剎那別故。現青相時白相即滅。白相生已青相已已。此之實果若同彼寶既現他相。應舍自實體也。
論云。德依于實至誰現誰相 述曰。此依遮進徴也。汝今既許舍自實體成他德體。既成他體便無自體。自體既無他即非有。誰為能現之實體。誰為所現之德相耶。
論云。故不可言至而現他相 述曰。此總結救非也。
論云。如是即應至自所立宗 述曰。此許德破實也。縱如汝救實果之體應令微圓是不可見。然由量德之力是可見者。此則量德自是可見。實果修是不可見性。此亦違汝自所立宗。以汝宗中唯有因實是不可見。果即是可見性故。
論云。複次有說至居處不同 述曰。此下一頌破極微因異處也。初生起。次舉頌。后解釋。生起中初敘頌正意。次敘頌兼意。后總顯頌意。敘正意中。初敘計后責破。此敘計也。此勝論宗中異計云。兩因極微既有形質更相障礙。居處各殊相鄰而住。共生一果。此一實果同二因量。一果之量既同二因。故果可見因不可見也。此計大同俱舍已前舊婆沙義
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 迦寶其色（Kāpotha，一種寶石）本身是白色的。當放置在青色等顏色上時，它會呈現出青色等顏色的表象。然而，它並沒有失去原本白色的本性。這說明你的論證存在『不定過』（Anityatva，不確定性）。你是認為，就像眾多的花朵呈現出其他顏色，因此就失去了自身原有的顏色呢？還是像頗胝迦寶（Sphatika，水晶）呈現出其他顏色，但並沒有失去自身原有的顏色呢？現在論主駁斥說，你沒有分辨清楚這一點，就拿來作為論據。這種寶石是無常的，前後狀態不同。前一個剎那（Kshana，極短的時間單位）和后一個剎那不同。當呈現青色表象時，白色表象就已經消失了。當白色表象產生時，青色表象已經滅去了。如果這個真實的果（Phala，結果）和那種寶石一樣，既呈現出其他顏色，就應該捨棄自身的實體（Sva-rupa，自身本性）。 論中說：『德依于實至誰現誰相』。這是依據遮遣的方式進行反問。你現在既然允許捨棄自身的實體，而成就其他的德體（Guna-dravya，屬性的實體），既然成就了其他的實體，就沒有了自身的實體。自身的實體既然沒有了，其他的實體也就不是真實存在的。那麼，誰是能夠呈現的實體？誰是被呈現的德相呢？ 論中說：『故不可言至而現他相』。這是總結，說明上述的辯駁並非沒有道理。 論中說：『如是即應至自所立宗』。這是允許德（Guna，屬性）來破斥實（Dravya，實體）。縱然像你所辯解的那樣，真實的果的本體，應該令極微（Paramanu，最小的物質單位）和圓（Mandala，圓形）是不可見的。然而，由於量德（Parimana-guna，度量屬性）的力量，它是可以被看見的。那麼，這個量德自身就是可見的，而真實的果的修（Samskara，習性）是不可見性的。這也違背了你自身所立的宗義。因為在你的宗義中，只有因實（Karana-dravya，原因的實體）是不可見的，而果（Phala，結果）就是可見的。 論中說：『複次有說至居處不同』。下面用一頌（Karika，偈頌）來破斥極微因（Paramanu-karana，最小的原因單位）處於不同位置的觀點。首先是生起（Utpatti，產生），其次是舉頌，最後是解釋。在生起中，首先敘述頌的正意，其次敘述頌的兼意，最後總括地顯示頌的意義。在敘述正意中，首先敘述對方的觀點，然後進行責難和破斥。這裡是敘述對方的觀點。勝論宗（Vaisheshika，印度哲學流派）中有不同的觀點認為，兩個作為原因的極微既然有形質，就會互相障礙，處於不同的位置，相鄰而住，共同產生一個果。這一個真實的果的量（Parimana，度量）和兩個原因的量相同。一個果的量既然和兩個原因相同，所以果是可見的，而原因是不可見的。這種觀點非常類似於俱舍宗（Abhidharma-kosa，佛教論藏）之前的舊婆沙（Vibhasa，註釋）的觀點。
【English Translation】 English version: The Kāpotha gem is inherently white. When placed upon colors such as blue, it exhibits the appearance of those colors. However, it does not lose its original white nature. This indicates that your argument suffers from the fallacy of 'indefiniteness' (Anityatva, uncertainty). Do you mean that, like numerous flowers exhibiting other colors, they lose their original color? Or like the Sphatika crystal exhibiting other colors, it does not lose its original color? Now, the proponent refutes, saying that you have not clearly distinguished this point before using it as an argument. This gem is impermanent, with different states before and after. The previous moment (Kshana, an extremely short unit of time) is different from the subsequent moment. When the appearance of blue is exhibited, the appearance of white has already vanished. When the appearance of white arises, the appearance of blue has already ceased. If this real result (Phala, consequence) is like that gem, exhibiting other colors, it should abandon its own entity (Sva-rupa, own nature). The text states: 'Since attribute depends on substance, who manifests whose appearance?' This is a counter-question based on the method of negation. Since you now allow the abandonment of one's own entity to achieve another attribute-substance (Guna-dravya, the substance of attribute), since another entity is achieved, there is no self-entity. Since the self-entity does not exist, the other entity is not truly existent. Then, who is the substance that can manifest? Who is the attribute-appearance that is manifested? The text states: 'Therefore, it cannot be said that it manifests another appearance.' This is a conclusion, indicating that the above refutation is not without reason. The text states: 'Thus, it should lead to your own established doctrine.' This is allowing attribute (Guna, quality) to refute substance (Dravya, entity). Even if, as you argue, the essence of the real result should render the atom (Paramanu, the smallest unit of matter) and the circle (Mandala, circular shape) invisible. However, due to the power of the attribute of measure (Parimana-guna, the attribute of measurement), it is visible. Then, this attribute of measure itself is visible, while the Samskara (Samskara, habit) of the real result is of an invisible nature. This also contradicts your own established doctrine. Because in your doctrine, only the cause-substance (Karana-dravya, the substance of cause) is invisible, while the result (Phala, consequence) is visible. The text states: 'Furthermore, some say that they reside in different places.' Below, a verse (Karika, verse) is used to refute the view that the atomic causes (Paramanu-karana, the smallest units of cause) are located in different positions. First is the origination (Utpatti, arising), second is the quoting of the verse, and finally is the explanation. In the origination, first the main meaning of the verse is narrated, second the implied meaning of the verse is narrated, and finally the meaning of the verse is summarized. In narrating the main meaning, first the opponent's view is narrated, then criticism and refutation are carried out. Here, the opponent's view is narrated. In the Vaisheshika school (Vaisheshika, a school of Indian philosophy), there is a different view that since the two atoms acting as causes have form and substance, they will obstruct each other, reside in different positions, live adjacently, and jointly produce a result. The measure (Parimana, measurement) of this one real result is the same as the measure of the two causes. Since the measure of one result is the same as the two causes, the result is visible, while the cause is invisible. This view is very similar to the old Vibhasa (Vibhasa, commentary) view before the Abhidharma-kosa (Abhidharma-kosa, Buddhist Abhidharma).
。然計生果是常不同彼也。
論云。是則極微至及有分過 述曰。此責破也。此破有三意。一既許極微鄰次別住。則見和合共生果義。二若許極微和合一處。則違自執更相礙義。三若許和合不同一處。則兩因微各有觸著不觸著分。便顯極微有方分義 應隨三意立三比量。第一量云。初二因微定不和合(宗)居處別故(因)如瓶盆等(喻)第二量云。初二因微無相礙義(宗)在一處故(因)如一因微自望己體(喻)第三量云。初二因微必有方分(宗)居處別故(因)如稻麥聚(喻)。
論云。有說極微至非斷非常 述曰。此下敘頌兼意也。頌意正破勝論。兼意亦破小乘。即破俱舍已后薩婆多義。初敘計后顯意。此敘計也。由無間隔故得名和合。由不相觸故無方分過。雖極微體實無方分實無流轉。然由積集東西差別如稻麥聚似有方分。此處雖滅鄰次續生。猶若駛河似有流轉。剎那剎那展轉相續。猶如燈焰前滅後生。後生有因所以非常。前滅有果所以非斷。
論云。為顯破彼故復頌曰 述曰。此總顯意也。
論云。於一極微處至許因果等量 述曰。此舉頌也。上半通破。前兩計難令極微必有方分。以東西二微更相觸著或相擬對故。下半別結破 初計兩因處既各別。一果通括二因。此則果大因小。其
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：然而，計生果（kalpanā-siddha-phala，假想的果）終究與彼（真實存在的果）不同。
論中說：『如果是這樣，那麼極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）就存在至及有分（avayavin，有組成部分的物體）的過失。』
述記中說：『這是責難和破斥。』這裡破斥有三重含義：第一，既然允許極微鄰近且各自獨立存在，那麼就無法實現和合共同產生果的意義。第二，如果允許極微和合于同一處，那麼就違背了自身所執著的互不相礙的意義。第三，如果允許和合但不在同一處，那麼兩個作為原因的極微各自具有接觸或不接觸的部分，這就明顯表明極微具有方分（方向性的部分）的意義。應當根據這三重含義建立三個比量（anumāna，推理）：第一個比量是：最初的兩個作為原因的極微必定不和合（宗），因為它們所處的位置不同（因），就像瓶子和盆子等（喻）。第二個比量是：最初的兩個作為原因的極微沒有互相妨礙的意義（宗），因為它們處於同一處（因），就像一個作為原因的極微自身看待自己的本體（喻）。第三個比量是：最初的兩個作為原因的極微必定具有方分（宗），因為它們所處的位置不同（因），就像稻麥堆積在一起（喻）。』
論中說：『有人說，極微非斷非常。』
述記中說：『下面敘述頌文並闡釋其含義。頌文的含義主要是爲了破斥勝論派（Vaiśeṣika）。兼帶的含義也破斥小乘（Hīnayāna），即破斥《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa）之後的薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）的觀點。』首先敘述他們的觀點，然後闡明破斥的含義。這裡是敘述他們的觀點。由於沒有間隔，所以被稱為和合。由於不互相接觸，所以沒有方分的過失。雖然極微的本體實際上沒有方分，也沒有流動和運轉，但是由於積聚時東西方向存在差別，就像稻麥堆積在一起一樣，看起來好像有方分。這裡雖然滅亡，但在鄰近處相續產生，就像快速流動的河流一樣，看起來好像有流動和運轉。剎那剎那地輾轉相續，就像燈焰一樣，前一刻熄滅后一刻產生。后一刻的產生有原因，所以不是斷滅。前一刻的熄滅有結果，所以不是恒常。
論中說：『爲了顯示破斥他們的觀點，所以再次頌曰。』
述記中說：『這是總的顯示其含義。』
論中說：『在一個極微之處，允許因果等量。』
述記中說：『這是舉出頌文。上半部分是通用的破斥。前兩個觀點的責難使得極微必定具有方分，因為東西兩個極微互相接觸或者互相擬對。下半部分是分別總結破斥。』最初的觀點是兩個作為原因的極微所處的位置各自不同，一個作為結果的極微卻能普遍包含兩個作為原因的極微，這就導致果大於因，
【English Translation】 English version: However, kalpanā-siddha-phala (imagined result) is ultimately different from that (the real result).
The treatise says: 'If this is the case, then the paramāṇu (ultimate particle) has the fault of leading to avayavin (that which has parts).'
The commentary says: 'This is a criticism and refutation.' This refutation has three meanings: First, since it is admitted that paramāṇus exist adjacently and independently, then the meaning of combination and jointly producing a result cannot be achieved. Second, if it is admitted that paramāṇus combine in one place, then it violates the meaning of mutual non-obstruction that they themselves adhere to. Third, if it is admitted that they combine but not in the same place, then the two causal paramāṇus each have parts that are touching or not touching, which clearly shows that the paramāṇu has the meaning of having directional parts (avayava). Three anumānas (inferences) should be established according to these three meanings: The first anumāna is: The initial two causal paramāṇus definitely do not combine (thesis), because they are in different locations (reason), like bottles and pots, etc. (example). The second anumāna is: The initial two causal paramāṇus have no meaning of mutual obstruction (thesis), because they are in the same place (reason), like a single causal paramāṇu looking at its own essence (example). The third anumāna is: The initial two causal paramāṇus must have directional parts (thesis), because they are in different locations (reason), like a pile of rice and wheat (example).'
The treatise says: 'Some say that the paramāṇu is neither permanent nor impermanent.'
The commentary says: 'Below, the verse is narrated along with its meaning.' The meaning of the verse is mainly to refute the Vaiśeṣika school. The accompanying meaning also refutes the Hīnayāna, that is, refutes the views of the Sarvāstivāda after the Abhidharmakośa. First, their view is narrated, and then the meaning of the refutation is clarified. Here, their view is narrated. Because there is no gap, it is called combination. Because they do not touch each other, there is no fault of having directional parts. Although the essence of the paramāṇu actually has no directional parts and no flow or movement, because there are differences in the east-west directions when they accumulate, like a pile of rice and wheat, it seems as if they have directional parts. Although it ceases here, it continues to arise adjacently, like a fast-flowing river, it seems as if there is flow and movement. Moment by moment, they continue to arise in succession, like a lamp flame, the previous moment extinguished and the next moment arising. The arising of the next moment has a cause, so it is not annihilation. The extinguishing of the previous moment has a result, so it is not permanent.
The treatise says: 'In order to show the refutation of their views, it is again said in verse.'
The commentary says: 'This is a general display of its meaning.'
The treatise says: 'In one place of a paramāṇu, it is allowed that the cause and effect are equal in quantity.'
The commentary says: 'This is citing the verse. The first half is a general refutation. The criticism of the first two views makes it necessary for the paramāṇu to have directional parts, because the east and west paramāṇus touch each other or are in opposition to each other. The second half is a separate summary of the refutation.' The initial view is that the locations of the two causal paramāṇus are different, but one resultant paramāṇu can universally include the two causal paramāṇus, which leads to the effect being larger than the cause,
量不等。如何汝許因果等耶。
論云。論曰如是至有方分失 述曰。此解釋也。如是所說兩微相觸或相擬對。謂極微相畢竟不能顯無方分遮有方分也。此中正釋前頌兼亦生起后頌文。此文偏釋上半也。
論云。何以故 述曰。此下三頌極微無方分也。有三。初一頌約果西方等破。第二頌約行用依行者破。第三頌約初中後分破。初頌中初生起。次舉頌。后解釋。此即生起也。即徴其前文以乃言所說極微竟不能遮有方分故。
論云。頌曰微若有東方至如何是極微 述曰。此舉頌也。上半難令有方分。下半破令無極微。若能照光微在東。即所照青微在西。其所照青微即有東分。承光西分發影。故言微若有東方必有東方分也。
論云。論曰是諸至定有方分 述曰。此下解釋也。初釋上半。后釋下半。此釋上半也。所立極微定有方分(宗)承光發影處不同故(因)如山壁等(喻)。
論云。既有方分至造世間萬物 述曰。此釋下半頌也。文中初順釋文。次立比量。后結過失。立比量云。所執極微非實非常(宗)可分折故(因)如瓶盆等(喻)。
論云。複次所執至則無所行 述曰。此下一頌約行依行者破。行依即順破。行者即反破。上半約行依破。下半約行者破。上半中初生起。次舉頌。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 量不等。如果你們認可因果是相等的，這怎麼說得通呢？
論中說：『論曰如是至有方分失』，這是解釋說明。像這樣所說的兩個極微相互接觸或相互靠近，意思是說極微畢竟不能顯示沒有方分，從而遮蔽有方分。這裡正是解釋了前面的偈頌，同時也引出了後面的偈頌。這段文字偏重解釋了上半部分。
論中說：『何以故』，下面這三頌是關於極微沒有方分的論述。分為三個部分。第一頌從結果（西方等）的角度來破斥。第二頌從作用（行用）和所依（行者）的角度來破斥。第三頌從初、中、后三個部分來破斥。第一頌中，先是生起，然後舉出偈頌，最後是解釋。這裡就是生起。即是追問前面的文句，因為所說的極微最終不能遮蔽有方分。
論中說：『頌曰微若有東方至如何是極微』，這是舉出偈頌。上半部分是難詰極微有方分，下半部分是破斥極微沒有極微。如果能照亮的光的極微在東方，那麼被照亮的青色極微就在西方。被照亮的青色極微就有東方的部分，承受光線的西邊部分發出影子。所以說，極微如果有東方，必定有東方的部分。
論中說：『論曰是諸至定有方分』，這是下面的解釋。先解釋上半部分，后解釋下半部分。這裡是解釋上半部分。所立的極微一定有方分（宗），因為承受光線和發出影子的地方不同（因），就像山壁等（喻）。
論中說：『既有方分至造世間萬物』，這是解釋下半部分偈頌。文中先順著文意解釋，然後建立比量，最後總結過失。建立比量說：所執著的極微不是真實的，也不是永恒的（宗），因為可以分割和折斷（因），就像瓶子和盆子等（喻）。
論中說：『複次所執至則無所行』，下面這一頌是從作用（行）和所依（行者）的角度來破斥。行依是順著破斥，行者是反過來破斥。上半部分是從作用所依的角度破斥，下半部分是從行者的角度破斥。上半部分中，先是生起，然後舉出偈頌。
【English Translation】 English version The quantities are unequal. How can you accept that cause and effect are equal?
The treatise says: 'The treatise says, 'Thus, until there is a loss of direction,' this is an explanation. As such, the two atoms that are said to touch or approach each other mean that the ultimate atom ultimately cannot show that there is no direction, thereby obscuring the existence of direction. This is the correct interpretation of the previous verse, and it also gives rise to the subsequent verse. This text focuses on explaining the first half.
The treatise says: 'Why?' The following three verses are about the absence of direction in ultimate atoms. It is divided into three parts. The first verse refutes from the perspective of the result (the West, etc.). The second verse refutes from the perspective of function (action) and dependence (the actor). The third verse refutes from the perspective of the beginning, middle, and end. In the first verse, there is first arising, then citing the verse, and finally explanation. This is arising. That is, questioning the previous text, because the ultimate atom that is said cannot ultimately obscure the existence of direction.
The treatise says: 'Verse: If the atom has an East, how can it be the ultimate atom?' This is citing the verse. The first half is difficult to question the ultimate atom having direction, and the second half is to refute the ultimate atom having no ultimate atom. If the atom of light that can illuminate is in the East, then the atom of blue that is illuminated is in the West. The atom of blue that is illuminated has the eastern part, and the western part that receives the light emits a shadow. Therefore, it is said that if the atom has an East, it must have an eastern part.
The treatise says: 'The treatise says, 'These are all definitely directional,' this is the following explanation. First explain the first half, then explain the second half. This is explaining the first half. The established ultimate atom must have direction (thesis), because the places where it receives light and emits shadows are different (reason), like mountain walls, etc. (example).
The treatise says: 'Since there is direction, to create all things in the world,' this is explaining the second half of the verse. The text first explains according to the meaning of the text, then establishes a syllogism, and finally summarizes the faults. Establishing the syllogism says: The ultimate atom that is clung to is not real, nor is it eternal (thesis), because it can be divided and broken (reason), like bottles and basins, etc. (example).
The treatise says: 'Furthermore, what is clung to will have nothing to do,' the following verse refutes from the perspective of function (action) and dependence (the actor). Action-dependence is refuting along with it, and the actor is refuting in reverse. The first half refutes from the perspective of action-dependence, and the second half refutes from the perspective of the actor. In the first half, there is first arising, then citing the verse.
后解釋。生起中初立量破。后徴所以。此立量破也。初兩句立宗。次一句立因。次三句同喻。后兩句異喻。謂所執極微定有方分(宗)行所依故(因)諸行所依者皆有方分如能行者(同喻)若無方分則無所行如虛空等(異喻)行所依者如大地。中極微是比丘。行用所依也。又如二因微欲生果時更相趣向名之為行。此之極微為其行用作所依也。如能行者者。謂能行人也。即人色身假名行者。如此色身行者有方分也。
論云。何以故 述曰此徴所以也。
論云。頌曰要取前舍後方得說為行 述曰。此舉頌也。
論云。論曰進所欣至所未曾見 述曰。此下解釋也。初釋頌文。后合頌意。此釋頌文也。如人欣東厭西。東名為前。西名為后。依此前後東西方別。取東舍西乃起行用。若離東西前後方分欲起行用未見此事也。此舉前量同喻道理以示外人。
論云。極微既是至定有方分 述曰。此合頌意也。
論云。若無所行至行者為無 述曰。此下半頌約行者反破也。初生起。次舉頌。后解釋。此生起也。若汝不許有所行處及能行用二種別者。是則應機行用所依色身假者亦應無也。
論云。故說頌曰至行者應非有 述曰。此舉頌也。
論云。論曰依前後方分至應如不動 述曰。此下解也
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 后解釋。生起中，首先確立量（anumana，推理）來破斥對方的觀點。之後提出疑問，詢問原因。這是確立量來破斥對方的觀點。開始的兩句是立宗（paksha，論題），接下來一句是立因（hetu，理由），再接下來的三句是同喻（sapaksha，同類例子），最後兩句是異喻（vipaksha，反例）。意思是說，你們所執著的極微（paramanu，最小的物質單位）必定有方分（avayava，組成部分），因為它是『行』（gati，運動）所依賴的（宗）。凡是『行』所依賴的，都有方分，比如能運動的物體（同喻）。如果沒有方分，那就沒有所運動之處，比如虛空等（異喻）。『行』所依賴的，比如大地。這裡的極微，是指比丘（bhiksu，佛教僧侶）。是『行用』（kriya，作用）所依賴的。又比如兩個極微想要產生果（phala，結果）時，互相靠近，這叫做『行』。這個極微是其『行用』的所依賴之處。『如能行者』，是指能夠行走的人。也就是人的色身（rupa-kaya，物質身體），假名為『行者』。如此色身的『行者』是有方分的。
論中說：『何以故？』（為什麼呢？）述記中說：這是提出疑問，詢問原因。
論中說：『頌曰：要取前舍后，方得說為行。』述記中說：這是引用頌（偈頌）。
論中說：『論曰：進所欣，至所未曾見。』述記中說：下面是解釋。先解釋頌文，后總結頌的意義。這是解釋頌文。比如人喜歡東方，厭惡西方。東方名為『前』，西方名為『后』。依據這前後東西的方位差別，取東方，舍西方，才能產生『行用』。如果離開東西前後這些方分，想要產生『行用』，這是從未見過的。這裡是舉出前面量（anumana，推理）中的同喻的道理，來向外人展示。
論中說：『極微既是至，定有方分。』述記中說：這是總結頌的意義。
論中說：『若無所行至，行者為無。』述記中說：下面用後半頌，從『行者』的角度反過來破斥對方的觀點。先是生起，然後引用頌，最後是解釋。這是生起。如果你們不承認有所運動之處和能運動的兩種差別，那麼，應該連隨順機緣而運動的，作為『行用』所依賴的色身假名也應該不存在了。
論中說：『故說頌曰：至行者應非有。』述記中說：這是引用頌。
論中說：『論曰：依前後方分至，應如不動。』述記中說：下面是解釋。
【English Translation】 English version: Later, an explanation. In initiating the refutation, first, an inference (anumana) is established to refute the opponent's view. Then, a question is raised, asking for the reason. This is establishing an inference to refute the opponent's view. The first two sentences establish the thesis (paksha), the next sentence establishes the reason (hetu), the following three sentences are examples of similarity (sapaksha), and the last two sentences are examples of dissimilarity (vipaksha). It means that the extremely small particle (paramanu) you adhere to must have parts (avayava), because it is what 'movement' (gati) relies on (thesis). Whatever 'movement' relies on has parts, such as an object that can move (example of similarity). If there are no parts, then there is no place to move, such as empty space (example of dissimilarity). What 'movement' relies on is like the earth. Here, the extremely small particle refers to a bhiksu (Buddhist monk). It is what 'action' (kriya) relies on. Also, for example, when two extremely small particles want to produce a result (phala), they move closer to each other, which is called 'movement'. This extremely small particle is what its 'action' relies on. 'Like a mover' refers to a person who can walk. That is, the material body (rupa-kaya) of a person, nominally called 'mover'. Such a 'mover' with a material body has parts.
The treatise says: 'Why?' The commentary says: This is raising a question, asking for the reason.
The treatise says: 'The verse says: Only by taking what is in front and abandoning what is behind can it be called movement.' The commentary says: This is quoting a verse.
The treatise says: 'The treatise says: Advancing to what is desired, reaching what has never been seen.' The commentary says: Below is the explanation. First, explain the verse, then summarize the meaning of the verse. This is explaining the verse. For example, a person likes the east and dislikes the west. The east is called 'front', and the west is called 'behind'. Based on the difference in direction between front and back, east and west, only by taking the east and abandoning the west can 'action' arise. If one wants to generate 'action' without these directional parts of east, west, front, and back, this has never been seen. Here, the principle of similarity in the previous inference is given to show to outsiders.
The treatise says: 'Since the extremely small particle is reaching, it must have parts.' The commentary says: This is summarizing the meaning of the verse.
The treatise says: 'If there is no place to move, then the mover does not exist.' The commentary says: Below, the second half of the verse is used to refute the opponent's view from the perspective of the 'mover'. First, there is initiation, then a quote from the verse, and finally an explanation. This is initiation. If you do not admit the difference between a place to move and the ability to move, then even the material body, which moves according to conditions and is relied upon by 'action', should not exist.
The treatise says: 'Therefore, it is said in the verse: Then the mover should not exist.' The commentary says: This is quoting the verse.
The treatise says: 'The treatise says: Relying on the parts of front and back, it should be like being unmoving.' The commentary says: Below is the explanation.
。有四。一示道理。二釋頌文。三結過失。四別申難。此示道理也。依前東方后西方處乃起取東舍西行用。東西之方非有。行用理亦應無。若其爾者。世間之人雖復有行應當不動也。世間行人應當不動(宗)以無方分及行用故(因)如虛空等(喻)。
論云。若汝撥無至行者亦無 述曰。此釋頌文也。既無所行之處又無能行之用。是則行用所依色身行者亦應無也。
論云。執此極微便著邪見 述曰。此結過失也。由汝妄執極微實常無有方分。便即謗無行處行用及無行者。撥世共知成邪見也。
論云。又諸極微至句義差別 述曰。此下別申難也。頌文之外別申破也。所執極微若無相趣行用如虛空等。云何能造有方分果。有方分物始可眼見。既無此物眼何所見。由有實句可余句義成。實句既非眼見。余句理非根境。云何汝立六句差別。
論云。複次若執至故說頌曰 述曰。此下一頌約初中後分破也。初生起。次舉頌。后解釋。此生起也。夫論色者無論粗細皆有三分。並是眼見。眼中勝者無過天眼。此之極微既無三分。理即非色。天眼又不能見。明知體無。此比量云。所執極微都無所有(宗)無初中後分故(因)猶如空花(喻)。
論云。極微無初分至皆所不能見 述曰。此舉頌也。準長行
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：有四點：一是揭示道理，二是解釋頌文，三是總結過失，四是分別闡述詰難。這是揭示道理。依據前面所說的從東方到西方，然後從西方到東方，從而產生取東舍西的行動。東西方向並非真實存在，行動的道理也應不存在。如果這樣，世間之人即使有行動，也應當是不動的。世間行人應當不動（宗），因為沒有方分以及行動（因），如同虛空等（喻）。
論中說：『如果你們否定有…到行動者也無。』這是解釋頌文。既然沒有可行之處，又沒有能行之用，那麼行動所依賴的色身和行動者也應該不存在。
論中說：『執著於此極微，便會產生邪見。』這是總結過失。由於你們妄自執著極微是真實常存且沒有方分的，便會誹謗沒有行處、行用以及沒有行者，否定世間共識，從而形成邪見。
論中說：『又諸極微…到句義差別。』這是下面分別闡述詰難。在頌文之外分別闡述破斥。所執著的極微如果沒有相互趨向的行動，如同虛空等，怎麼能造出有方分的果？有方分的物體才可能被眼睛看到。既然沒有此物，眼睛看到什麼？由於有真實的句子，其餘句子的意義才能成立。真實句子既然不是眼睛所見，其餘句子道理上也不是根境。你們如何建立六句差別？
論中說：『複次若執…故說頌曰。』這是下面用一首頌從初、中、后三個部分來破斥。首先是生起，其次是舉頌，最後是解釋。這是生起。凡是討論色法，無論粗細，都有初、中、后三個部分，並且都是眼睛可見的。眼中最殊勝的莫過於天眼。此極微既然沒有初、中、后三個部分，道理上就不是色法，天眼也不能看見。這明顯說明它本體不存在。這個比量是：所執著的極微根本不存在（宗），因為它沒有初、中、后三個部分（因），猶如虛空中的花朵（喻）。
論中說：『極微無初分…到皆所不能見。』這是舉頌。參照長行。
【English Translation】 English version: There are four points: first, to reveal the principle; second, to explain the verse; third, to conclude the fault; and fourth, to separately elaborate on the refutation. This is to reveal the principle. According to what was said before, from east to west and then from west to east, thus arising the action of taking the east and abandoning the west. The directions of east and west are not truly existent, and the principle of action should also not exist. If this is the case, even if people in the world have actions, they should be motionless. Worldly practitioners should be motionless (thesis), because there are no directions and actions (reason), like empty space, etc. (example).
The treatise says: 'If you deny that there is... then the actor is also non-existent.' This is to explain the verse. Since there is no place to go and no function to act, then the physical body and the actor on which the action depends should also be non-existent.
The treatise says: 'Clinging to this ultimate particle will lead to wrong views.' This is to conclude the fault. Because you falsely cling to the ultimate particle as being real, permanent, and without directions, you will slander that there is no place to go, no function to act, and no actor, denying the common knowledge of the world, thus forming wrong views.
The treatise says: 'Also, the ultimate particles... to the difference in the meaning of sentences.' This is to separately elaborate on the refutation below. Separately elaborating on the refutation outside of the verse. If the ultimate particles that are clung to do not have mutually approaching actions, like empty space, etc., how can they create a result with directions? Only objects with directions can be seen by the eyes. Since there is no such object, what do the eyes see? Because there are real sentences, the meaning of the remaining sentences can be established. Since real sentences are not seen by the eyes, the remaining sentences are not, in principle, sense objects. How do you establish the sixfold distinction of sentences?
The treatise says: 'Furthermore, if clinging... therefore the verse is spoken.' This is to refute using a verse from the three parts of beginning, middle, and end. First is the arising, second is the quoting of the verse, and third is the explanation. This is the arising. Whenever discussing form, whether coarse or fine, there are three parts: beginning, middle, and end, and all are visible to the eyes. The most excellent among the eyes is the divine eye. Since this ultimate particle does not have the three parts of beginning, middle, and end, it is not, in principle, form, and the divine eye cannot see it either. This clearly shows that its substance does not exist. This syllogism is: the ultimate particle that is clung to does not exist at all (thesis), because it does not have the three parts of beginning, middle, and end (reason), like a flower in empty space (example).
The treatise says: 'The ultimate particle has no beginning part... to all cannot be seen.' This is to quote the verse. Refer to the prose.
釋。
論云。論曰若執至都無實物 述曰。此下解釋也。初正釋此頌文。后通顯前頌意。釋文中初釋上半。后釋下半。此釋上半也。由是常故無生住滅三時分。由是一故無前中後分。
論云。是則極微至計為實有 述曰。此釋下半頌也。
論云。此中正破至凈眼所見 述曰。此通顯前頌意也。上半五頌雖復云。然本意元欲破邪兼意亦為顯正也。
論云。複次為破至故說頌曰 述曰。此下兩頌破極微體是常也。初頌約果壞破常。后頌約有對破常。前中初生起。次舉頌。后解釋。此生起也。為破第三實果與初二因微同居一處及顯初二因體定是無常說此頌也。
論云。若因為果壞至二體不同處 述曰。此舉頌也。上半進徴。下半退責。進徴兩句各有一量。初句量云。初二因微必有變壞(宗)為余礙逼故(因)如塵色等(喻)后句量云。初二因微必定無常(宗)為他壞故(因)如塵色等(喻)退責準長行可解。
論云。論曰諸有至果所侵逼 述曰。此下解釋也。初釋上半。后釋下半。釋上半中。初引例總責。次別起兩徴。后依徴逐破。此即引例總責也。但是有礙之物來相逼時。必次移處相避。如其不移本處。體必變壞。如是因果所侵逼亦應爾也。比量如前。
論云。或相受入至注
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 釋（解釋《成唯識論》）。
論中說：『如果認為根本沒有真實存在的物體。』 述記中說：『以下是解釋。首先正式解釋這首偈頌的文句，然後貫通顯明前面偈頌的意義。解釋文中，先解釋上半部分，后解釋下半部分。這裡是解釋上半部分。』因為是常的緣故，沒有生、住、滅這三個時間階段的區分。因為是同一的緣故，沒有前、中、后這三個階段的區分。
論中說：『那麼，極微（最小的物質單位）就被認為是真實存在的。』 述記中說：『這是解釋下半部分偈頌。』
論中說：『這裡主要是爲了破斥邪說，同時也爲了顯明正理。』 述記中說：『這是貫通顯明前面偈頌的意義。前面五首偈頌雖然這樣說，但本意原本是爲了破斥邪說，兼帶也爲了顯明正理。』
論中說：『再次，爲了破斥…所以說了這首偈頌：』 述記中說：『以下兩首偈頌破斥極微的本體是常。第一首偈頌從果的壞滅來破斥常，后一首偈頌從有對立的事物來破斥常。前面是生起，然後是舉出偈頌，最後是解釋。這裡是生起。爲了破斥第三個真實果與最初兩個因微同處一地，以及顯明最初兩個因的本體一定是無常，所以說了這首偈頌。』
論中說：『如果因為果的壞滅…兩個本體不在同一處。』 述記中說：『這是舉出偈頌。上半部分是遞進式地質問，下半部分是後退式地責難。遞進式質問的兩句各有一個量（推理）。第一句的量是：最初兩個因微必定有變壞（宗），因為有其他障礙逼迫的緣故（因），如同塵土顏色等（喻）。后一句的量是：最初兩個因微必定無常（宗），因為被其他事物破壞的緣故（因），如同塵土顏色等（喻）。後退式責難可以參照長行文來理解。』
論中說：『論中說：凡是有…被果所侵逼。』 述記中說：『以下是解釋。先解釋上半部分，后解釋下半部分。解釋上半部分中，先引用例子總的責難，然後分別提出兩個質問，最後依據質問逐一破斥。這裡就是引用例子總的責難。凡是有障礙的事物來互相逼迫時，必定依次移動位置來躲避。如果它不移動原來的位置，本體必定變壞。像這樣，因果互相侵逼也應該這樣。』比量如同前面所說。
論中說：『或者互相容納…』
【English Translation】 English version Explanation (of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra).
The Treatise says: 'If one insists that there are absolutely no real entities.' The Commentary says: 'The following is an explanation. First, it formally explains the verses, then it comprehensively clarifies the meaning of the previous verses. In the explanation, it first explains the first half, then the second half. This is the explanation of the first half.' Because it is permanent, there is no distinction of the three times of arising, abiding, and ceasing. Because it is one, there is no distinction of before, middle, and after.
The Treatise says: 'Then, the paramāṇu (ultimate particle) is considered to be real.' The Commentary says: 'This explains the second half of the verse.'
The Treatise says: 'Here, the main purpose is to refute heterodox views, and also to reveal the correct principle.' The Commentary says: 'This comprehensively clarifies the meaning of the previous verses. Although the previous five verses say this, the original intention was to refute heterodox views, and also to reveal the correct principle.'
The Treatise says: 'Furthermore, in order to refute... therefore, this verse is spoken:' The Commentary says: 'The following two verses refute that the substance of the paramāṇu is permanent. The first verse refutes permanence from the destruction of the effect, and the second verse refutes permanence from the existence of opposing things. The preceding is the arising, then the quoting of the verse, and finally the explanation. This is the arising. In order to refute that the third real effect and the first two causal paramāṇus are in the same place, and to reveal that the substance of the first two causes must be impermanent, this verse is spoken.'
The Treatise says: 'If because of the destruction of the effect... the two substances are not in the same place.' The Commentary says: 'This is quoting the verse. The first half is a progressive questioning, and the second half is a regressive blaming. The two sentences of the progressive questioning each have a pramāṇa (inference). The pramāṇa of the first sentence is: the first two causal paramāṇus must have change and destruction (thesis), because they are forced by other obstacles (reason), like dust and color, etc. (example). The pramāṇa of the second sentence is: the first two causal paramāṇus must be impermanent (thesis), because they are destroyed by other things (reason), like dust and color, etc. (example). The regressive blaming can be understood by referring to the prose text.'
The Treatise says: 'The Treatise says: All that have... are encroached upon by the effect.' The Commentary says: 'The following is the explanation. First, the first half is explained, then the second half is explained. In the explanation of the first half, first, examples are cited for a general blame, then two questions are raised separately, and finally, each is refuted according to the questions. This is the general blame by citing examples. Whenever things with obstacles come to force each other, they must move their positions in order to avoid each other. If it does not move from its original position, the substance must change and be destroyed. In this way, the cause and effect should also be like this when they encroach upon each other.' The pramāṇa is as before.
The Treatise says: 'Or mutually accommodate...'
赤镕銅 述曰。此別起兩徴也。此之果實入極微因中。為是因果異體同居不相損壞。如以細流之水溉粗沙聚耶。為是果入因中令因轉變不守本質。如藥汁注赤镕銅變成金等耶。
論云。若許如前至一切粗物 述曰。此下依徴逐破也。有二。此破依前徴有兩重。此初連。汝之因微不共生果(宗)以支離故(因)如水入沙聚(喻)既其因微不能生果。果即非有粗物便無也。
論云。又若同彼至體是無常 述曰。此後重破也。汝之因微體是無常(宗)有細分故(因)如水沙聚(喻)。
論云。若許如后至何待徴難 述曰。此破依后徴也。若許因變其果方生如藥注銅轉為金者。此則變壞義成。豈待徴難。
論云。若並不許至諸有礙物 述曰。此釋下半頌也。若汝不許如前二徴。應許因微與其果實各各別處(宗)以為礙故(因)如非因果諸有礙物謂瓶盆等(喻)。
論云。又說頌曰至諸佛未曾說 述曰。此下一頌約有對破常。初舉頌。后解釋。此舉頌也。上半正破。下半引證。正破即立比量。引證即聖言量。立比量者。極微無常(宗)以有對故(因)諸有對者皆悉無常猶如色等(同喻)若非無常即非有對如兔角等(異喻)聖言量者。佛但說言諸行無常。曾不說言極微常住也。此則先明道理。后引
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：赤镕銅（比喻：燒紅的銅）的論述是：這是另外提出的兩種質疑。果實進入極微因中，是因果異體同處而不互相損壞，就像用細小的水流灌溉粗糙的沙堆嗎？還是果實進入因中，使因轉變而不保持原來的本質，就像藥汁注入燒紅的銅中變成金子一樣呢？
論中說：『如果像前面所說的那樣，一切粗大的物體...』論述是：下面是根據提出的質疑逐一進行駁斥。有兩種情況。這裡駁斥依據前面的質疑，有兩重含義。這是第一重，你的極微因不能共同產生果實（宗），因為它們是分離的（因），就像水進入沙堆一樣（喻）。既然極微因不能產生果實，那麼果實就不是實在的，粗大的物體也就沒有了。
論中說：『又如果像那樣，體性是無常的...』論述是：這是第二重駁斥。你的極微因體性是無常的（宗），因為它們有細微的組成部分（因），就像水和沙堆一樣（喻）。
論中說：『如果像後面所說的那樣，還等待什麼質疑呢？』論述是：這是駁斥依據後面的質疑。如果認為因轉變后才產生果實，就像藥注入銅中轉變為金子一樣，那麼這種轉變和壞滅的意義就成立了，還等待什麼質疑呢？
論中說：『如果都不允許，那麼一切有障礙的物體...』論述是：這是解釋下半頌。如果你不允許像前面兩種質疑那樣，就應該承認極微因和它的果實各自處於不同的地方（宗），因為它們是有障礙的（因），就像非因果的各種有障礙的物體，如瓶子、盆子等（喻）。
論中說：『又說了頌詞：諸佛未曾說...』論述是：下面一頌是就『有對』來破斥常住。先舉出頌詞，後進行解釋。這裡是舉出頌詞。上半部分是正面破斥，下半部分是引用論證。正面破斥就是建立比量，引用論證就是聖言量。建立比量是：極微是無常的（宗），因為它是有對的（因），凡是有對的事物都是無常的，就像顏色等（同喻）。如果不是無常的，就不是有對的，就像兔角等（異喻）。聖言量是：佛只是說諸行無常，從來沒有說過極微是常住的。』這是先闡明道理，后引用聖言。
【English Translation】 English version: The commentary on 'Red Molten Copper' states: These are two separate challenges raised. Is it that when the fruit enters the extremely minute cause, the cause and effect exist in different forms but coexist without damaging each other, like irrigating a coarse sand pile with a thin stream of water? Or is it that the fruit enters the cause, causing the cause to transform without maintaining its original essence, like pouring medicinal juice into red molten copper and turning it into gold?
The treatise says: 'If it is allowed as before, all coarse objects...' The commentary states: Below, each refutation follows the challenge. There are two aspects. This refutation relies on the previous challenge and has two layers. This is the first layer: Your extremely minute causes cannot jointly produce the effect (thesis) because they are discrete (reason), like water entering a sand pile (example). Since the extremely minute causes cannot produce the effect, then the effect is not real, and coarse objects would not exist.
The treatise says: 'Also, if like that, the substance is impermanent...' The commentary states: This is the second layer of refutation. Your extremely minute causes are impermanent in substance (thesis) because they have minute components (reason), like water and a sand pile (example).
The treatise says: 'If it is allowed as after, what is there to wait for in terms of challenges?' The commentary states: This refutes based on the latter challenge. If it is thought that the effect arises only after the cause transforms, like medicine poured into copper turning into gold, then the meaning of transformation and destruction is established. What is there to wait for in terms of challenges?
The treatise says: 'If neither is allowed, then all obstructive objects...' The commentary states: This explains the latter half of the verse. If you do not allow either of the previous two challenges, then you should admit that the extremely minute causes and their effects each exist in different places (thesis) because they are obstructive (reason), like non-causal obstructive objects such as bottles and basins (example).
The treatise says: 'Also, the verse says: All Buddhas have never said...' The commentary states: The following verse refutes permanence based on 'having opposition' (有對). First, the verse is presented, then explained. Here, the verse is presented. The first half is a direct refutation, and the second half is a citation for proof. The direct refutation establishes a syllogism, and the citation is a scriptural authority. The syllogism is: Extremely minute particles are impermanent (thesis) because they have opposition (reason). All things that have opposition are impermanent, like colors, etc. (homologous example). If something is not impermanent, then it does not have opposition, like rabbit horns, etc. (heterologous example). The scriptural authority is: The Buddha only said that all conditioned things are impermanent; he never said that extremely minute particles are permanent. This first clarifies the reasoning, then cites the scriptures.
佛言如品初所釋。
論云。論曰現見至云何常住 述曰。此下解釋也。初釋上半。后釋下半。釋上半中。初護法正釋。次破古異釋。后類破實方。此正釋也。初立量破。后顯過失。此立量破也。如理頌中作之。
論云。對礙與常至理所不然 述曰。此顯過失也。此因但于異品石等上有。既無同品。即同品無故。汝所立極微有對而是常者。此是法自相相違過也。故言對礙與常互相違。反而言常法與對礙法同一微體者理不然也。
論云。復有別釋至名為有對 述曰。此下破古異釋也。有五。一敘釋。二正非。三牒救。四責破。五通難。此敘釋也。此謂初兩因微更互相余。或可因是果余兩微同處但名余物共合。此則以因對因名有對也。復與第三變壞實果而作生因。此則以因對果名有對也。此比量云。初二因微定是無常(宗)作物共合變壞生因故(因)如水土種子望其芽等(喻)。
論云。不爾極微至其義明瞭 述曰。此正非也。論主非云。汝以因對因。以因對果解有對義以障無常。甚不明瞭。不如以有礙義證無常宗分明可見。故汝釋不爾。
論云。若謂極微至是無常者 述曰。此牒救也若汝意謂。彼外道計二因極微遍禮和合。所生實果亦入因中。三實同處互無障礙。又彼異計二因極微雖互相
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 佛說如《品》一開始所解釋的那樣。
論中說：『論曰：現見至云何常住』 述曰：這以下是解釋。先解釋上半部分，后解釋下半部分。在解釋上半部分中，先是護法（Dharmapāla）的正確解釋，其次是破斥古代不同的解釋，最後是類比破斥實在的方位。這是正確的解釋。先建立量式進行破斥，后顯示過失。這是建立量式進行破斥。如理頌中這樣做。
論中說：『對礙與常至理所不然』 述曰：這是顯示過失。這個因只在不同的類別，如石頭等上面有。既然沒有相同的類別，即因為沒有相同的類別，你所建立的極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）有對礙（pratighāta，阻礙）卻是常住的，這是法自相相違的過失。所以說對礙與常互相違背，反過來說常法與對礙法在同一個微體上，道理是不成立的。
論中說：『復有別釋至名為有對』 述曰：這以下是破斥古代不同的解釋。有五個步驟：一是敘述解釋，二是正式否定，三是重複辯護，四是責難破斥，五是總括難題。這是敘述解釋。這裡說的是最初兩個因微（hetu-paramāṇu，作為原因的極微）互相剩餘，或者可以說因是果的剩餘，兩個微粒同處，但稱為剩餘的物體共同結合。這就是以因對因稱為『有對』。又與第三個變壞的實在果（satya-phala，真實的果）而作為生因。這就是以因對果稱為『有對』。這個比量是：最初兩個因微一定是無常的（宗），因為它們作為物體共同結合，變壞生因的緣故（因），就像水土種子對於它們的芽等（喻）。
論中說：『不爾極微至其義明瞭』 述曰：這是正式否定。論主否定說：你用因對因，用因對果來解釋『有對』的意義，以遮障無常，非常不明確。不如用有礙的意義來證明無常，宗義分明可見。所以你的解釋是不成立的。
論中說：『若謂極微至是無常者』 述曰：這是重複辯護。如果你的意思是說，那些外道認為兩個因微普遍禮拜和合，所產生的實在果也進入因中，三個實在同處，互相沒有障礙。又那些不同的觀點認為兩個因微雖然互相...
【English Translation】 English version: The Buddha spoke as explained in the beginning of the 『Chapter』 (品, pǐn).
The Treatise says: 『The Treatise says: 「Visible… how can it be permanent?」』 Commentary says: The following is the explanation. First, the upper half is explained, then the lower half is explained. In explaining the upper half, first is Dharmapāla』s correct explanation, second is refuting the ancient different explanations, and last is analogously refuting the real directions. This is the correct explanation. First, establish the logical argument to refute, then reveal the faults. This is establishing the logical argument to refute. It is done this way in the 『Verse of Reason』 (如理頌, rú lǐ sòng).
The Treatise says: 『Obstruction and permanence… are not reasonable.』 Commentary says: This reveals the faults. This reason (因, hetu) only exists in different categories, such as stones. Since there is no similar category, that is, because there is no similar category, your established paramāṇu (極微, jí wēi, the smallest unit of matter) which has pratighāta (對礙, duì ài, obstruction) but is permanent, this is the fault of the self-contradiction of the dharma (法, dharma). Therefore, it is said that obstruction and permanence contradict each other. Conversely, to say that permanent dharma and obstructive dharma are in the same subtle body is not reasonable.
The Treatise says: 『There is another explanation… called having obstruction.』 Commentary says: The following is refuting the ancient different explanations. There are five steps: first, narrating the explanation; second, formally negating; third, repeating the defense; fourth, blaming and refuting; fifth, summarizing the difficulties. This is narrating the explanation. This says that the initial two hetu-paramāṇu (因微, yīn wēi, causal subtle particles) mutually remain, or it can be said that the cause is the remainder of the effect, and the two subtle particles are in the same place, but are called remaining objects jointly combined. This is called 『having obstruction』 by cause against cause. Furthermore, with the third changed and ruined real effect (實果, shí guǒ, satya-phala) as the cause of production. This is called 『having obstruction』 by cause against effect. This analogy is: the initial two causal subtle particles must be impermanent (thesis), because they jointly combine as objects, causing the change and ruin of the cause of production (reason), like water, soil, and seeds in relation to their sprouts, etc. (example).
The Treatise says: 『If not, the paramāṇu… its meaning is clear.』 Commentary says: This is formally negating. The author of the treatise negates, saying: You use cause against cause, use cause against effect to explain the meaning of 『having obstruction』 in order to block impermanence, which is very unclear. It is better to use the meaning of having obstruction to prove impermanence, the thesis is clearly visible. Therefore, your explanation is not established.
The Treatise says: 『If it is said that the paramāṇu… is impermanent.』 Commentary says: This is repeating the defense. If you mean that those heretics believe that the two causal subtle particles universally worship and combine, and the real effect produced also enters into the cause, and the three realities are in the same place, without mutual obstruction. Furthermore, those different views believe that although the two causal subtle particles mutually...
礙。而所生實果即入因中。因果同處亦無障礙。然此極微雖有礙他極微等義。自因果中則無障礙。此則因微之上有礙不礙。而以有礙解有對者。他不全許。即有隨一不成過失。故須別立余物共合變壞生因名為有對。以此有對證無常者。
論云。是則但應至是有礙義 述曰。此責破也。若汝為有礙義他不全許。即以因對因以因對果解有對義者。如此所釋是則但應如此品初以能生果比度極微是無常義。何以頌中乃云有對。故知此言有對之者是有障礙義也。
論云。雖不全許至礙余物故 述曰。此通難也。雖彼外道計二因一果三實同處互不相礙。而望余因果極微即相障礙。又彼異計一果二因雖不相礙。而二因微即自相礙。又望余極微因果亦相障礙。此則極微之上雖不令許一切皆障。然許礙余極微物。故明知有礙亦得極成無隨一過。
論云。既破極微至方實常耶 述曰。此下類破實方也。初約因破。后立量破。此即約因破也。上下頌本但破諸常。然無明文正破方體。故今護法乘便破之。彼計方有二種。一細二粗。細者非五根境。粗者是五根境。然但是常。由初二因微故生第三果實。此之果實有東西南北等別。即證有粗方。由粗方故比知亦有常細實方。如見果實知有因微也。今此既破極微實果亦即非有。既無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
存在阻礙。而所產生的實際結果會立即進入原因之中。原因和結果在同一處也沒有阻礙。然而，這個極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）雖然具有阻礙其他極微等的意義，但在其自身的原因和結果中則沒有阻礙。這樣，在這個原因的極微之上，既有阻礙也有不阻礙。而用『有礙』來解釋『有對』（sapratigha，有對礙，指有障礙、有抵抗）的人，他人並不完全認可。這就存在隨一不成（ekatara-asiddha，因明術語，指論證的理由不被雙方認可）的過失。所以需要另外建立一個事物，共同結合、變化、毀壞，作為產生原因的『有對』。用這個『有對』來證明無常（anitya，事物生滅變化的本性）。
論中說：『那麼就應該只說到有礙的意義。』註釋說：這是責難駁斥。如果你們爲了『有礙』的意義，他人不完全認可，就用原因對原因，用原因對結果來解釋『有對』的意義。這樣解釋，那麼就應該像這一品開始時，用能產生結果來比量極微是無常的意義。為什麼頌文中卻說『有對』呢？所以知道這裡說『有對』的人，是有障礙的意義。
論中說：『雖然不完全認可，但阻礙其他事物。』註釋說：這是通用的責難。雖然那些外道認為二個原因和一個結果，三個實體在同一處，互相不阻礙。但相對於其他原因和結果的極微來說，就互相阻礙。而且他們不同的觀點認為，一個結果和二個原因雖然不互相阻礙，但二個原因的極微就自身互相阻礙。而且相對於其他的極微，原因和結果也互相阻礙。這樣，在這個極微之上，雖然不讓他們認可一切都有阻礙，但認可阻礙其他的極微事物。所以明確知道『有礙』也可以成為極成（prasiddha，因明術語，指雙方都認可的事實），沒有隨一不成的過失。
論中說：『既然破除了極微，那麼方和實是常嗎？』註釋說：這下面是類似地破除實和方。開始是根據原因來破除，後面是建立量來破除。這裡就是根據原因來破除。上下頌的原本只是破除各種常，但沒有明確的文字正面破除方的本體。所以現在護法（Dharmapāla，佛教論師）順便破除它。他們認為方有兩種，一是細的，二是粗的。細的不是五根（pañcendriya，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身）的境界，粗的是五根的境界。然而這只是常。由於最初的二個原因的極微，所以產生第三個結果的實體。這個結果的實體有東西南北等的區別，就證明有粗的方。由於粗的方，所以比量知道也有常的細的實體方。就像見到結果的實體，就知道有原因的極微一樣。現在既然破除了極微，實際的結果也就不是有了。既然沒有
【English Translation】 English version:
There is obstruction. And the actual result that is produced immediately enters into the cause. There is no obstruction between cause and effect being in the same place. However, although this paramāṇu (smallest unit of matter) has the meaning of obstructing other paramāṇus, etc., there is no obstruction in its own cause and effect. Thus, on this cause's paramāṇu, there is both obstruction and non-obstruction. And those who explain 'sapratigha' (having counter-force, referring to having obstruction and resistance) with 'having obstruction,' others do not fully accept. This results in the fallacy of ekatara-asiddha (a term in logic, referring to the reason for the argument not being accepted by both parties). Therefore, it is necessary to establish another thing, jointly combining, changing, and destroying, as the 'sapratigha' that produces the cause. Use this 'sapratigha' to prove anitya (impermanence, the nature of things arising and ceasing).
The treatise says: 'Then it should only be said to have the meaning of obstruction.' The commentary says: This is a criticism and refutation. If you, for the meaning of 'having obstruction,' others do not fully accept, and use cause against cause, and cause against effect to explain the meaning of 'sapratigha.' With this explanation, then it should be like at the beginning of this chapter, using the ability to produce results to infer that paramāṇus are impermanent. Why does the verse say 'sapratigha'? Therefore, knowing that those who say 'sapratigha' here have the meaning of having obstruction.
The treatise says: 'Although not fully accepted, it obstructs other things.' The commentary says: This is a common criticism. Although those heretics believe that two causes and one effect, three entities are in the same place and do not obstruct each other. But relative to other causes and effects of paramāṇus, they obstruct each other. Moreover, their different view is that although one effect and two causes do not obstruct each other, the two causes' paramāṇus obstruct each other themselves. And relative to other paramāṇus, cause and effect also obstruct each other. Thus, on this paramāṇu, although they do not allow everything to have obstruction, they allow obstructing other paramāṇu things. Therefore, it is clear that 'having obstruction' can also become prasiddha (a term in logic, referring to a fact accepted by both parties), without the fallacy of ekatara-asiddha.
The treatise says: 'Since paramāṇus have been refuted, are space and reality permanent?' The commentary says: Below is a similar refutation of reality and space. Initially, it is refuted based on cause, and later it is refuted by establishing a measure. Here it is refuted based on cause. The original verses above and below only refute various permanences, but there is no clear text directly refuting the substance of space. Therefore, now Dharmapāla (Buddhist philosopher) conveniently refutes it. They believe that space has two types, one subtle and one coarse. The subtle is not the realm of the five indriyas (sense organs: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body), and the coarse is the realm of the five indriyas. However, this is only permanent. Due to the initial two causes' paramāṇus, the third result's entity is produced. This result's entity has distinctions such as east, west, north, and south, which proves that there is coarse space. Due to the coarse space, it is inferred that there is also permanent subtle entity space. Just like seeing the result's entity, one knows that there are cause's paramāṇus. Now that paramāṇus have been refuted, the actual result is also non-existent. Since there is no
實果粗方即無。依何能顯細方實有耶。
論云。又方不定至非實非常 述曰。此立量破也。待東名西。待西名東。待遠名近。待近名遠。待粗名細。待細名粗。如此彼兩寂非實常也。方非是實(宗)待緣立故(因)如此彼寂(喻)。
論云。由上所說至不能歸信 述曰。此下釋下半頌也。初釋頌。次舉疑。后析破。此釋頌也。
論云。諸行無常至何廢常耶 述曰。此下舉疑也。疑曰。佛說無常之言但指有為諸行。無為非行。既非諸行。何廢自是其常。何得輒引佛言證彼常住之法。
論云。然所立常至二無所作 述曰。此下析破也。初折開二常。后依開責破。此折開二常也。能生果者名有所作。不生果者名無所作。
論云。若有所作非謂無為 述曰。此下責破也。此破有作常也。極微空等非是無為(宗)有所作故(因)猶如瓶等(喻)。
論云。若無所作但有名相 述曰。此破無常也。初破后證。此破也。大有性等既無所作即無所有。但是從想立名名有等也。大有性等都無實體(宗)無所作故(因)猶如龜毛(喻)。
論云。故契經說至都無實義 述曰。此證也。邪執既摧。信心稍發。故引佛語得作證成。
廣百論疏卷第一
神龍三年三月僧崇晃寫
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果說粗大的方塊是不存在的，那麼又依據什麼才能顯示微小的方塊是真實存在的呢？
論中說：『又方塊是不定的，以至於它不是真實的，也不是永恒的。』解釋說：這是立論來破斥對方的觀點。依賴於東，才有名為西；依賴於西，才有名為東；依賴於遠，才有名為近；依賴於近，才有名為遠；依賴於粗大，才有名為微小；依賴於微小，才有名為粗大。像這樣，彼此雙方都是寂滅的，不是真實的，也不是永恒的。方塊不是真實的（宗），因為它依賴於因緣而生起（因），就像彼此寂滅一樣（喻）。』
論中說：『由於上面所說的道理，以至於不能產生歸依和信仰。』解釋說：下面是解釋下半頌。首先解釋頌文，然後提出疑問，最後分析破斥。這裡是解釋頌文。
論中說：『諸行是無常的，那麼憑什麼廢除常呢？』解釋說：下面是提出疑問。疑問是：佛陀所說的無常，只是指有為的諸行。無為不是行，既然不是諸行，憑什麼廢除它自身的常呢？怎麼能隨便引用佛陀的話來證明那些常住不變的法呢？
論中說：『然而所建立的常，如果有所作為，就不是無為；如果無所作為，那麼兩種常都沒有作用。』解釋說：下面是分析破斥。首先分開兩種常，然後依據分開的結果進行責難和破斥。這裡是分開兩種常。能夠產生結果的，叫做有所作為；不能產生結果的，叫做無所作為。
論中說：『如果有所作為，就不能說是無為。』解釋說：下面是責難和破斥。這裡是破斥有所作為的常。極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）、空等不是無為（宗），因為它們有所作為（因），就像瓶子等一樣（喻）。
論中說：『如果無所作為，那就只有名稱和概念。』解釋說：下面是破斥無常。首先破斥，然後證明。這裡是破斥。大有性等既然無所作為，那就什麼都沒有，只是從想像中建立名稱，名為有等。大有性等都沒有實體（宗），因為它們無所作為（因），就像龜毛一樣（喻）。
論中說：『所以契經說，一切法都沒有真實的意義。』解釋說：這是證明。邪惡的執著既然被摧毀，信心稍微產生，所以引用佛陀的話來作為證明。
《廣百論疏》卷第一
神龍三年三月僧人崇晃書寫
【English Translation】 English version: If coarse squares are non-existent, then based on what can it be shown that subtle squares are truly existent?
The Treatise says: 'Furthermore, squares are indefinite, to the extent that they are neither real nor permanent.' Commentary: This establishes an argument to refute the opponent's view. Dependent on east, there is the name west; dependent on west, there is the name east; dependent on far, there is the name near; dependent on near, there is the name far; dependent on coarse, there is the name subtle; dependent on subtle, there is the name coarse. Like this, both sides are extinguished, neither real nor permanent. A square is not real (thesis), because it arises dependent on conditions (reason), like the extinction of both sides (example).'
The Treatise says: 'Due to what was said above, to the extent that it cannot generate refuge and faith.' Commentary: Below is the explanation of the second half of the verse. First, explain the verse; then, raise a doubt; finally, analyze and refute. Here is the explanation of the verse.
The Treatise says: 'All conditioned things are impermanent, so what abolishes permanence?' Commentary: Below is the raising of a doubt. The doubt is: The impermanence spoken of by the Buddha only refers to conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta-dharma). The unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) is not a phenomenon; since it is not a phenomenon, what abolishes its own permanence? How can one casually cite the Buddha's words to prove those permanent and unchanging dharmas?
The Treatise says: 'However, the established permanence, if it has action, is not unconditioned; if it has no action, then both permanences have no function.' Commentary: Below is the analysis and refutation. First, separate the two permanences; then, based on the separation, criticize and refute. Here is the separation of the two permanences. That which can produce a result is called having action; that which cannot produce a result is called having no action.
The Treatise says: 'If it has action, it cannot be said to be unconditioned.' Commentary: Below is the criticism and refutation. Here is the refutation of permanence with action. Extremely small particles (paramāṇu), space, etc., are not unconditioned (thesis), because they have action (reason), like bottles, etc. (example).
The Treatise says: 'If it has no action, then there are only names and concepts.' Commentary: Below is the refutation of impermanence. First refute, then prove. Here is the refutation. Great existence, etc., since they have no action, then they have nothing; they are only names established from imagination, named existence, etc. Great existence, etc., have no substance (thesis), because they have no action (reason), like turtle hair (example).
The Treatise says: 'Therefore, the sutras say that all dharmas have no real meaning.' Commentary: This is the proof. Since evil attachments have been destroyed and faith has slightly arisen, the Buddha's words are cited as proof.
Commentary on the Hundred Verses Treatise, Volume 1
Written by the monk Chonghuang in the third month of the third year of the Shenlong era (707 CE).