T85n2783_大乘稻芉經隨聽疏決
大正藏第 85 冊 No. 2783 大乘稻[〹/干]經隨聽疏決
No. 2783 [cf. No. 2782]
大乘稻芉經隨聽疏決
稽首恭敬正遍知 及以妙法僧伽眾 所有稻芉未決義 今當次第略解釋
十六論中第一言因中有果論者。謂如有一若沙門若婆羅門。起如是見立論。常常時恒恒時。于諸因中具有果性。謂雨眾外道作如是計。何因緣故。起如是計。立如是論。顯示因中具有果性。由教及理故。教者謂彼先師所造教藏。隨門傳授。傳至於今。顯示因中先有果性。理者謂即彼沙門若婆羅門為性。尋□□□□察住即思地住自辯地住異生地住。隨思惟觀察行地。彼作是思。若從彼性此住得生。一切世間共知共立。彼為此因非余。又求果者惟所此因非余。又即于彼加功營構諸所求事非余。又若彼果即從彼生不從餘生。是故彼果因中已有。若不爾者。應立一切是一切因。為求一果應所一切應於一切。加功營構。應從一切一切果生。如是由施設故。求所故。所作決定故。生故。彼見因中常有果性。應審問彼。汝何所欲。何者因相。何者果相。因果兩相為異不異。若無異相。便無因果二種。決定因果二種無差別故。因中有果不應道理。若有異相。汝意云何。因中果相為
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 《大乘稻稈經隨聽疏決》
稽首恭敬于正遍知（正等覺者，即佛陀），以及妙法僧伽眾（僧團）。 對於《稻稈經》中尚未決定的意義，現在應當依次略作解釋。
十六論中，第一種是『因中有果論』。意思是說，如果有一個沙門（出家修道者）或婆羅門（古印度教祭司），生起這樣的見解並立論：在任何時候，任何情況下，各種因中都具有果的性質。這是雨眾外道（指持常見的外道）所作的計較。因為什麼緣故，他們生起這樣的計較，立下這樣的理論，來顯示因中具有果的性質呢？ 這是由於教和理的緣故。教是指他們的先師所造的教藏，按照一定的門徑傳授，一直傳到今天，顯示因中先有果的性質。理是指那些沙門或婆羅門以自性尋思、觀察，安住于思地住、自辯地住、異生地住。隨著思惟觀察的進行，他們這樣思考：如果從那個自性，這個住處得以產生，那麼一切世間都會共同知道、共同承認，那個自性是產生這個住處的因，而不是其他的因。而且，尋求果的人，只會從這個因中尋求，而不是從其他的因中尋求。而且，就在那個因上，人們會加以功力，營造所求的事情，而不是在其他的因上。而且，如果那個果是從那個因產生的，而不是從其他的因產生的，所以那個果在因中已經存在了。如果不是這樣，就應該認為一切都是一切的因，爲了求一個果，就應該在一切事物上，對一切事物，加以功力，應該從一切事物中產生一切果。因為這樣的施設，因為尋求的緣故，因為所作的決定，因為產生的緣故，他們認為因中常有果的性質。應該審問他們：你想要什麼？什麼是因的相狀？什麼是果的相狀？因和果的兩種相狀是相同還是不同？如果沒有不同的相狀，就沒有因果兩種。因為因果兩種沒有差別，所以因中有果是不應道理的。如果有不同的相狀，你認為怎麼樣？因中的果相是
【English Translation】 English version The Commentary and Elucidation on the Mahayana Rice Seedling Sutra
I bow with reverence to the Perfectly Enlightened One (Sammasambuddha), and to the wonderful Dharma and the Sangha (community). Regarding the meanings in the Rice Seedling Sutra that have not yet been resolved, I shall now briefly explain them in order.
Among the sixteen theses, the first is the 'theory of the effect existing in the cause'. It means that if there is a Shramana (wandering ascetic) or a Brahmin (ancient Indian priest), who arises with such a view and establishes a theory: at all times and in all circumstances, various causes possess the nature of the effect. This is the calculation made by the Rain Sect heretics (referring to externalists who hold the view of permanence). For what reason do they arise with such a calculation, establish such a theory, to show that the cause possesses the nature of the effect? This is due to the reason of teaching and principle. Teaching refers to the teachings created by their former teachers, transmitted through certain paths, and passed down to this day, showing that the nature of the effect exists in the cause first. Principle refers to those Shramanas or Brahmins who contemplate and observe with their own nature, dwelling in the dwelling of thought, the dwelling of self-argument, and the dwelling of the different birth. As the contemplation and observation proceed, they think like this: if from that nature, this dwelling can be produced, then all the world will commonly know and commonly acknowledge that that nature is the cause of producing this dwelling, and not other causes. Moreover, those who seek the effect will only seek it from this cause, and not from other causes. Moreover, on that cause, people will apply effort and construct the things they seek, and not on other causes. Moreover, if that effect is produced from that cause, and not from other causes, then that effect already exists in the cause. If it is not like this, it should be considered that everything is the cause of everything, and in order to seek one effect, effort should be applied to everything, to everything, and all effects should be produced from everything. Because of such establishment, because of the reason of seeking, because of the determination of what is done, because of the reason of production, they believe that the nature of the effect always exists in the cause. They should be questioned: what do you want? What is the characteristic of the cause? What is the characteristic of the effect? Are the two characteristics of cause and effect the same or different? If there are no different characteristics, there are no two kinds of cause and effect. Because the two kinds of cause and effect have no difference, it is unreasonable to say that the effect exists in the cause. If there are different characteristics, what do you think? Is the characteristic of the effect in the cause
未生相。為已生相。若未生相。便於因中果猶未生而說。是有不應道理。若已生相即果。已生復從因生。不應道理。是故因中非先有果。然要有因待緣果生。又有相法。于有相法中。由五種相故。方可了知。於一處所可得。如瓶中水。二于所依可得。如眼中眼識。三即自相可得。如因自體不由比度。四即由自作業可得。五由因變異故成變異。或由緣變異故果成變異。是故彼說常常時恒恒時因中有果。不應道理。由此因緣故。所立論非如理說。如是不異相故。異相故。未生相故。已生相故。不應道理 二言從緣顯了。論者。即如有一若沙門若婆羅門。起如是見。立如是論。一切諸法本性是有。從眾緣顯。不從緣生。謂即因中有果論者。及聲相論者。作如是計。何因緣故。因中有果。論者。見諸因中。先有果性。從緣顯耶。由教及理故。教如前說。理者謂如有一為性。即思為性觀察廣說如前。彼如是思。果先是有。復從因生。不應道理。然非不用功為成於果。彼復何緣而作功用。豈非唯為顯了果耶彼作如是妄分別已。立顯了論。應審問彼。汝何所欲為無障緣而為障礙為有障緣耶。若無障緣者。無障礙緣而為障礙。不應道理。若有障緣者。屬果之因。何故不障。同是有故。不應道理。譬如黑闇障盆中水。亦能障盆。若言障因
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 未生之相，是已生之相嗎？如果說是未生之相，那麼在因中，果實尚未產生就被談論，這是不應有的道理。如果說是已生之相，那麼果實已經產生，又從因中產生，這也不合道理。因此，因中並非預先存在果實。然而，必須要有因，等待緣分的聚合，果實才能產生。又有相之法，在有相之法中，通過五種相，才能被瞭解。一是在一處所可以獲得，比如瓶中的水。二是在所依賴之處可以獲得，比如眼中的眼識。三是直接從自身之相可以獲得，比如因的自體，不需要通過比較推度。四是直接通過自身的作業可以獲得。五是由於因的變化而產生變化，或者由於緣的變化而果實產生變化。因此，那些說果實常常時、恒恒時存在於因中的說法，是不合道理的。由於這些因緣，所建立的論點並非如理如實。像這樣，因為不異之相，因為異相，因為未生之相，因為已生之相，這些說法都是不合道理的。 二、關於『從緣顯了』的論者。就像有些沙門（Śrāmaṇa，指佛教出家修行者）或婆羅門（Brāhmaṇa，指古印度教的祭司），產生這樣的見解，立下這樣的論點：一切諸法的本性是存在的，只是從眾緣顯現出來，而不是從緣而生。這就是所謂的『因中有果』論者，以及『聲相』論者，他們這樣認為。因為什麼緣故，『因中有果』論者認為在諸因中，果的性質預先存在，只是從緣顯現出來呢？是因為教義和道理的緣故。教義如前面所說。道理是指，比如有一個『為性』，即以思考為性質，觀察並廣泛論述，如前所述。他們這樣認為，果實預先存在，又從因中產生，這不合道理。然而，並非不用功就能成就果實。他們又因為什麼緣故而作功用呢？難道不是僅僅爲了顯現果實嗎？他們作出這樣的虛妄分別之後，立下『顯了』論。應該審問他們，你們想要做什麼？是爲了消除障礙的緣，還是爲了製造障礙？如果說是爲了消除障礙的緣，那麼沒有障礙的緣卻要消除障礙，這不合道理。如果說是有障礙的緣，那麼屬於果的因，為什麼不阻礙它呢？因為它們同樣是存在的，這不合道理。譬如黑暗能夠阻礙盆中的水，也能阻礙盆。如果說阻礙因...
【English Translation】 English version Is the unarisen characteristic the same as the arisen characteristic? If it is said to be the unarisen characteristic, then to speak of the fruit as not yet arisen within the cause is unreasonable. If it is said to be the arisen characteristic, then the fruit, having already arisen, arises again from the cause, which is also unreasonable. Therefore, the fruit does not pre-exist within the cause. However, there must be a cause, awaiting the convergence of conditions (緣, pratyaya), for the fruit to arise. Furthermore, there are characteristics of phenomena (相法, lakṣaṇa-dharma). Within the characteristics of phenomena, it is only through five kinds of characteristics that it can be understood. First, it can be obtained in one place, like water in a bottle. Second, it can be obtained in what it relies on, like eye-consciousness in the eye. Third, it can be obtained directly from its own characteristic, like the self-nature of a cause, without relying on comparison or inference. Fourth, it can be obtained directly through its own activity. Fifth, it changes because of the change in the cause, or the fruit changes because of the change in the conditions. Therefore, those who say that the fruit always exists in the cause at all times are speaking unreasonably. Because of these causes and conditions, the established argument is not in accordance with reason. Thus, because of the non-different characteristic, because of the different characteristic, because of the unarisen characteristic, because of the arisen characteristic, these statements are unreasonable. Second, regarding the proponents of 'manifestation from conditions'. It is like some Śrāmaṇas (沙門, Śrāmaṇa, Buddhist renunciates) or Brāhmaṇas (婆羅門, Brāhmaṇa, priests in ancient India) who give rise to such views and establish such arguments: the inherent nature of all phenomena exists, but it is manifested from the aggregation of conditions, not born from conditions. This is what the proponents of 'fruit exists in the cause' and the proponents of 'sound-characteristic' believe. For what reason do the proponents of 'fruit exists in the cause' believe that the nature of the fruit pre-exists in all causes, and is merely manifested from conditions? It is because of doctrine and reason. The doctrine is as previously stated. The reason is that, for example, there is a 'nature' (為性), which is characterized by thinking, observing, and extensively discussing, as mentioned before. They think that the fruit pre-exists and then arises from the cause, which is unreasonable. However, it is not that no effort is needed to achieve the fruit. For what reason do they make effort? Is it not solely to manifest the fruit? After making such false distinctions, they establish the 'manifestation' argument. They should be questioned: what do you want to do? Is it to remove obstructing conditions or to create obstacles? If it is to remove obstructing conditions, then removing obstacles when there are no obstacles is unreasonable. If there are obstructing conditions, then why doesn't the cause belonging to the fruit obstruct it? Because they both exist, which is unreasonable. For example, darkness can obstruct the water in a pot, and it can also obstruct the pot. If it is said that it obstructs the cause...
緣。亦能障者。亦應顯因。俱被障故。而言但顯因中光有果生不顯因者。不應道理。復應問彼。為有性是障緣為異耶。若有性是障緣者。是即有性應常不顯了。不應道理。因亦是有。何不為障。若言果性。是障緣者。是則一法亦因亦果。如芽是種子。果是莖等。因是即一法亦顯不顯。不應道理。又今問汝。隨汝意答。本法與顯為異不異。若不異者。法應常顯。一已復顯。不應道理。若言異者。彼顯為無因耶。為有因耶。若言無因。無因而顯。不應道理。若有因者。果性可顯。非是因性。以不顯因能顯于果。不應道理。如是無障緣故。有障緣故。有相故。果相故。顯不異故。顯異故。不應道理 三言去來實有論者。謂如有一若沙門若婆羅門。若在此法者。由不正思惟故。起如是見立如是論。有過去有未來其相成就。猶如見在實有非假。何因緣故起如見立如是論。由教及理。教如前說。又在此法者。于如來經。不如理分別故。謂如經言。一切有者。即十二處。此二十處實相是有。又薄伽梵說。有過去業。又說。有過去色。有未來色。廣說乃至識亦如是。理者謂如有一為性尋思為性觀察。廣說如前。彼如是思。若法自相安住此法。真實是有。此若未來無者。爾時應未受相。此若過去無者。爾時應失自相。若如是者。法法自相
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 緣。如果說緣也能成為障礙，那麼也應該顯現出因。因為因和緣都被障礙了。如果只說在顯現因中，光有果產生，而不顯現因，這是不應道理的。還應該問他們，『有性』是障礙緣，還是『異』是障礙緣？如果『有性』是障礙緣，那麼這個『有性』就應該永遠不顯現，這是不應道理的。因也是『有』，為什麼不能成為障礙？如果說果的『性』是障礙緣，那麼這就變成一個法既是因又是果，比如芽是種子的果，是莖的因等等。一個法既顯現又不顯現，這是不應道理的。再問你，隨便你回答，本法和顯現是『異』還是『不異』？如果不『異』，那麼法應該永遠顯現，已經顯現了又再次顯現，這是不應道理的。如果說是『異』，那麼這個顯現是沒有因的呢？還是有因的呢？如果說沒有因，沒有因而顯現，這是不應道理的。如果有因，那麼是果的『性』可以顯現，而不是因的『性』。因為不顯現的因能夠顯現果，這是不應道理的。像這樣，因為沒有障礙緣的緣故，因為有障礙緣的緣故，因為有相的緣故，因為果相的緣故，因為顯現不『異』的緣故，因為顯現『異』的緣故，這些都是不應道理的。 三言去來實有論者。就是說，如果有一個沙門（Śrāmaṇa，出家修道者）或者婆羅門（Brahmana，古印度僧侶階層），如果在這個法中，由於不正思惟的緣故，產生這樣的見解，立下這樣的論斷：過去和未來是真實存在的，它們的相是成就的，就像現在真實存在一樣，不是虛假的。因為什麼因緣而產生這樣的見解，立下這樣的論斷呢？因為教和理。教就像前面所說的。又在這個法中的人，對於如來的經典，不如理分別的緣故，認為如經文所說：『一切有』，就是十二處（Dvādaśa āyatana，內六處和外六處的總稱）。這十二處實相是有。而且薄伽梵（Bhagavan，世尊）說過，有過去的業，又說，有過去的色（Rūpa，物質、顏色），有未來的色，廣泛地說，乃至識（Vijñāna，意識）也是這樣。理就是說，如果有一個人以尋思為『性』，以觀察為『性』，廣泛地說就像前面所說的。他這樣思惟，如果法自身安住的相，這個法就是真實存在的。如果未來沒有，那麼那時應該沒有接受相。如果過去沒有，那麼那時應該失去自身相。如果像這樣，法法自身相
【English Translation】 English version If a condition can also be an obstruction, then the cause should also be manifested, because both the cause and the condition are obstructed. If it is only said that in the manifestation of the cause, only the effect arises without manifesting the cause, this is unreasonable. It should also be asked whether 'having nature' is an obstructing condition or 'difference' is. If 'having nature' is an obstructing condition, then this 'having nature' should never be manifested, which is unreasonable. The cause is also 'having', why can't it be an obstruction? If it is said that the 'nature' of the effect is an obstructing condition, then this becomes one dharma that is both cause and effect, such as a sprout being the effect of a seed and the cause of a stem, etc. One dharma is both manifested and not manifested, which is unreasonable. Furthermore, I ask you, answer as you please, is the original dharma 'different' or 'not different' from manifestation? If it is 'not different', then the dharma should always be manifested, already manifested and manifested again, which is unreasonable. If it is said to be 'different', then is this manifestation without a cause or with a cause? If it is said to be without a cause, manifestation without a cause is unreasonable. If there is a cause, then it is the 'nature' of the effect that can be manifested, not the 'nature' of the cause, because the unmanifested cause can manifest the effect, which is unreasonable. Like this, because there is no obstructing condition, because there is an obstructing condition, because there is a characteristic, because there is the characteristic of the effect, because manifestation is 'not different', because manifestation is 'different', these are all unreasonable. The third is the theory that the past and future are truly existent. That is, if there is a Śrāmaṇa (ascetic) or a Brahmana (member of the priestly class in ancient India), if in this dharma, due to incorrect thinking, they arise with such a view and establish such a theory: the past and the future are truly existent, their characteristics are accomplished, just like the present is truly existent, not false. What is the cause and condition for arising with such a view and establishing such a theory? It is because of teaching and reason. The teaching is as previously stated. Also, those in this dharma, because they do not properly distinguish the sutras of the Tathagata (Buddha), think that as the sutra says: 'all that exists' is the twelve āyatanas (Dvādaśa āyatana, the totality of the six internal and six external sense bases). These twelve āyatanas are truly existent in their real nature. Moreover, the Bhagavan (Bhagavan, the Blessed One) said that there is past karma, and also said that there is past rūpa (Rūpa, form, matter, color), and there is future rūpa, broadly speaking, even vijñāna (Vijñāna, consciousness) is the same. The reason is that if someone has thinking as their 'nature' and observation as their 'nature', broadly speaking as previously stated. They think like this, if the characteristic of a dharma itself abides, then this dharma is truly existent. If it does not exist in the future, then at that time it should not have received a characteristic. If it does not exist in the past, then at that time it should have lost its own characteristic. If it is like this, the characteristic of each dharma
應不成就。由是道理亦非真實故。不應道理。由是思惟。起如是見。立如是論。過去未來性相實有。應審問彼。汝何所欲。去來二相。與現在相。為一為異。若言相一立三世相。不應道理。若相異者。性相實有。不應道理。又汝應說。自意所欲。隨三世法。為是常耶。為無常耶。若常相者。墮在三世。不應道理。若無常相。於三世中。恒是實有。不應道理。又今問汝。隨汝意答。為計未來法至現在世耶。為彼死已於此生耶。為即住未來。為緣生現在耶。為本無業。今有業耶。為本相不圓滿。今相圓滿耶。為本異相。今非異相耶。為于未來有現在分耶。若即未法來來至現在者。此便有方所。后與現在應無差別。復應是常。不應道理。若言未來死已現在生者。是即未來不生。於今現在世法本無今生。又未來未生而言死歿不應道理。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
如果不是這樣成就，那麼由此道理來說，過去、未來也不是真實的，這是不合道理的。由於這樣的思惟，產生了這樣的見解，立下了這樣的論斷：過去、未來諸法的體性和現象是真實存在的。應該審問他們：『你們想要怎樣？過去、未來二相，與現在相，是一還是異？』如果說相是一，而立三世之相，這是不合道理的。如果說相是異，那麼體性和現象是真實存在的，這也是不合道理的。再者，你們應該說說自己所想的，隨著三世之法，是常還是無常？如果是常相，而墮在三世之中，這是不合道理的。如果是無常相，在三世之中，恒常是真實存在的，這也是不合道理的。現在再問你們，隨著你們的意思回答：是認為未來法來到現在世嗎？還是認為它死後在這裡生嗎？還是認為它就住在未來？還是因緣生出現在？還是本來沒有業，現在有業？還是本來的相不圓滿，現在的相圓滿？還是本來是異相，現在不是異相？還是在未來有現在的分？如果說就是未來法來到現在，那麼這就有方所，後來與現在應該沒有差別，又應該是常，這是不合道理的。如果說未來死後現在生，這就是未來不生，在現在世法本來沒有現在生。而且未來沒有生而言死歿，這是不合道理的。
【English Translation】 English version:
If it is not thus accomplished, then by this reasoning, the past and future are also not real; this is unreasonable. Because of such thinking, such a view arises, and such a thesis is established: the nature and phenomena of past and future dharmas are truly existent. One should question them: 'What do you desire? Are the past and future two aspects the same as or different from the present aspect?' If you say the aspects are the same and establish the three aspects of time, that is unreasonable. If you say the aspects are different, then the nature and phenomena are truly existent, which is also unreasonable. Furthermore, you should state what you think: are the dharmas of the three times permanent or impermanent? If they are permanent aspects, then falling within the three times is unreasonable. If they are impermanent aspects, yet constantly truly existent within the three times, that is also unreasonable. Now I ask you again, answer according to your intention: do you think that future dharmas come to the present world? Or do you think that they die there and are born here? Or do you think that they just reside in the future? Or do they arise in the present due to conditions? Or is it that originally there was no karma, and now there is karma? Or is it that the original aspect was not complete, and now the aspect is complete? Or is it that originally it was a different aspect, and now it is not a different aspect? Or is it that in the future there is a part of the present? If it is said that the future dharma comes to the present, then this would have a location, and later there should be no difference from the present, and it should also be permanent, which is unreasonable. If it is said that the future dies and is born in the present, then the future does not arise, and in the present world, dharmas originally do not have a present birth. Moreover, it is unreasonable to say that the future, which has not yet arisen, dies and ceases.'