T30n1564_中論

大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1564 中論

No. 1564 [cf. Nos. 1565-1567]

中論卷第一

釋僧睿序

中論有五百偈。龍樹菩薩之所造也以中為名者。照其實也。以論為稱者。盡其言也。實非名不悟。故寄中以宣之。言非釋不盡。故假論以明之。其實既宣。其言既明。于菩薩之行道場之照。朗然懸解矣。夫滯惑生於倒見。三界以之而淪溺。偏悟起于厭智。耿介以之而致乖。故知大覺在乎曠照。小智纏乎隘心。照之不曠。則不足以夷有無一道俗。知之不盡。則未可以涉中途泯二際。道俗之不夷。二際之不泯。菩薩之憂也。是以龍樹大士。析之以中道。使惑趣之徒望玄指而一變。括之以即化。令玄悟之賓喪諮詢于朝徹。蕩蕩焉。真可謂坦夷路于沖階。敝玄門于宇內。扇慧風于陳枚。流甘露于枯悴者矣。夫百梁之構興。則鄙茅茨之仄陋。睹斯論之宏曠。則知偏悟之鄙倍。幸哉此區之赤縣。忽得移靈鷲以作鎮。險陂之邊情。乃蒙流光之餘惠。而今而後。談道之賢始可與論實矣。雲天竺諸國。敢預學者之流。無不玩味斯論以為喉衿。其染翰申釋者。甚亦不少。今所出者。是天竺梵志名賓伽羅。秦言青目之所釋也。其人雖信解深法。而辭不雅中。其中乖闕煩重

者。法師皆裁而裨之。于經通之理盡矣。文或左右未盡善也。百論治外以閑邪。斯文袪內以流滯。大智釋論之淵博。十二門觀之精詣。尋斯四者。真若日月入懷無不朗然鑒徹矣。予玩之味之不能釋手。遂復忘其鄙拙。托悟懷於一序。並目品義題之於首。豈期能釋耶。蓋是欣自同之懷耳。

中論觀因緣品第一(十六偈)

龍樹菩薩造梵志青目釋

姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯

不生亦不滅　　不常亦不斷　不一亦不異　　不來亦不出　能說是因緣　　善滅諸戲論　我稽首禮佛　　諸說中第一

問曰。何故造此論。答曰。有人言萬物從大自在天生。有言從韋紐天生。有言從和合生。有言從時生。有言從世性生。有言從變生。有言從自然生。有言從微塵生。有如是等謬故墮于無因邪因斷常等邪見。種種說我我所。不知正法。佛欲斷如是等諸邪見令知佛法故。先於聲聞法中說十二因緣。又為已習行有大心堪受深法者。以大乘法說因緣相。所謂一切法不生不滅不一不異等。畢竟空無所有。如般若波羅蜜中說。佛告須菩提。菩薩坐道場時。觀十二因緣。如虛空不可盡。佛滅度后。后五百歲像法中。人根轉鈍。深著諸法。求十二因緣五陰十二入十八界等決定相。不知佛意但著文字。聞大乘法中說畢竟空。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：法師們都加以整理和補充，對經文的理解透徹詳盡。只是文字方面或許有些地方還不夠完善。百論用於對外破除邪說，而此論則用於對內消除思想的滯礙。大智度論的淵博，十二門論的精妙，如果能深入研究這四部論著，真就像日月進入懷抱一樣，一切都會明亮透徹。我反覆研讀，愛不釋手，於是忘記了自己的淺薄，寫了一篇序言來表達我的理解，並將品義的題目放在最前面。難道期望能解釋經典嗎？只不過是表達自己欣喜贊同的心情罷了。

《中論·觀因緣品第一》（十六偈）

龍樹菩薩造，梵志青目釋

姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯

不生亦不滅，不常亦不斷，不一亦不異，不來亦不出。能說是因緣（pratītyasamutpāda，緣起），善滅諸戲論（prapañca，虛妄分別），我稽首禮佛，諸說中第一。

問：為什麼造這部論？答：有人說萬物從大自在天（Maheśvara，濕婆神）生，有人說從韋紐天（Vishnu，毗濕奴神）生，有人說從和合生，有人說從時生，有人說從世性生，有人說從變生，有人說從自然生，有人說從微塵生。像這樣錯誤的緣故，墮入無因、邪因、斷見、常見等邪見，種種執著於我（ātman，神我）和我所（ātmanīya，我所有的）。不瞭解正法。佛爲了斷除像這樣的各種邪見，使人瞭解佛法，所以先在聲聞法中說十二因緣（dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda，十二緣起）。又爲了已經修行且有大心，堪能接受深奧佛法的人，用大乘法來說明因緣的真相，即一切法不生不滅、不一不異等，畢竟空無所有，就像《般若波羅蜜經》中所說。佛告訴須菩提（Subhūti，解空第一的弟子），菩薩坐在道場時，觀察十二因緣，如同虛空一樣不可窮盡。佛滅度后，后五百歲像法時期，人們的根器變得遲鈍，深深執著于諸法，尋求十二因緣、五陰（pañca-skandha，五蘊）、十二入（dvādaśa-āyatana，十二處）、十八界（aṣṭādaśa-dhātu，十八界）等的決定相，不瞭解佛的真意，只執著于文字。聽到大乘法中說畢竟空，

【English Translation】 English version: The Dharma masters have all refined and supplemented it, and their understanding of the scriptures is thorough and exhaustive. It's just that the writing may not be perfect in some places. The Śataśāstra (Hundred Treatise) is used to externally refute heresies, while this treatise is used to internally eliminate ideological stagnation. The profundity of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (Great Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom), and the subtlety of the Dvādaśanikāyaśāstra (Twelve Gates Treatise), if one can deeply study these four treatises, it will be like the sun and moon entering one's bosom, and everything will be bright and clear. I have repeatedly studied it and can't put it down, so I forgot my own shallowness and wrote a preface to express my understanding, and put the title of the chapter's meaning at the beginning. Do I expect to be able to explain the classics? It's just to express my joy and agreement.

Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Chapter 1: Examination of Conditions (Sixteen Verses)

Composed by Nāgārjuna (龍樹), Commentary by Vimalākṣa (青目)

Translated by Kumārajīva (鳩摩羅什) of the Yao Qin Dynasty

Neither from itself nor from another, nor from both, nor without a cause, Things come into being. Therefore, we say that things are not produced. Not permanent, not impermanent, not identical, not different, Not coming, not going. He who teaches dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda), the pacification of phenomenal play (prapañca), I prostrate to the Buddha, the foremost of teachers.

Question: Why was this treatise written? Answer: Some say that all things are born from Maheśvara (大自在天, the Great Lord, Shiva), some say they are born from Vishnu (韋紐天, Vishnu), some say they are born from a combination, some say they are born from time, some say they are born from primordial nature, some say they are born from transformation, some say they are born from nature, and some say they are born from atoms. Because of such errors, they fall into wrong views such as causelessness, wrong causes, annihilationism, and eternalism, and they cling to 'self' (ātman) and 'what belongs to self' (ātmanīya) in various ways. They do not understand the correct Dharma. The Buddha wanted to cut off such wrong views and enable people to understand the Buddha-dharma, so he first spoke of the twelve links of dependent origination (dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda) in the Śrāvakayāna (聲聞法, the Vehicle of Hearers). Furthermore, for those who have already practiced and have a great mind, capable of receiving profound Dharma, he used the Mahāyāna (大乘法, the Great Vehicle) to explain the true nature of dependent origination, that is, all dharmas are neither produced nor destroyed, neither identical nor different, etc., and are ultimately empty and without substance, as stated in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra (般若波羅蜜經, Perfection of Wisdom Sutra). The Buddha told Subhūti (須菩提, foremost disciple in understanding emptiness), when a Bodhisattva sits in the Bodhimaṇḍa (道場, place of enlightenment), he contemplates the twelve links of dependent origination, which are as inexhaustible as space. After the Buddha's Parinirvana (滅度, passing away), in the Age of Semblance Dharma (像法, the age resembling the true Dharma) five hundred years later, people's faculties become dull, and they cling deeply to all dharmas, seeking the definite characteristics of the twelve links of dependent origination, the five skandhas (pañca-skandha), the twelve āyatanas (dvādaśa-āyatana), the eighteen dhātus (aṣṭādaśa-dhātu), etc. They do not understand the Buddha's true intention, but only cling to the words. When they hear that the ultimate emptiness is taught in the Mahāyāna,

不知何因緣故空。即生疑見。若都畢竟空。云何分別有罪福報應等。如是則無世諦第一義諦。取是空相而起貪著。於畢竟空中生種種過。龍樹菩薩為是等故。造此中論。

不生亦不滅　　不常亦不斷　不一亦不異　　不來亦不出　能說是因緣　　善滅諸戲論　我稽首禮佛　　諸說中第一

以此二偈贊佛。則已略說第一義。問曰。諸法無量。何故但以此八事破。答曰法雖無量。略說八事則為總破一切法。不生者。諸論師種種說生相。或謂因果一。或謂因果異。或謂因中先有果。或謂因中先無果。或謂自體生。或謂從他生。或謂共生。或謂有生。或謂無生。如是等說生相皆不然。此事後當廣說。生相決定不可得故不生。不滅者。若無生何得有滅。以無生無滅故。餘六事亦無問曰。不生不滅已總破一切法。何故復說六事。答曰。為成不生不滅義故。有人不受不生不滅。而信不常不斷。若深求不常不斷。即是不生不滅。何以故。法若實有則不應無。先有今無是即為斷。若先有性是則為常。是故說不常不斷。即入不生不滅義。有人雖聞四種破諸法。猶以四門成諸法。是亦不然。若一則無緣。若異則無相續。后當種種破。是故復說不一不異。有人雖聞六種破諸法。猶以來出成諸法。來者。言諸法從自在天世性微塵

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因為什麼因緣的緣故而認為空，就會產生懷疑和錯誤的見解。如果一切都畢竟是空，那麼如何區分善惡的報應呢？如果這樣，就沒有世俗諦和第一義諦了。執著于這種空相，就會在畢竟空中產生各種過失。龍樹菩薩爲了這些人，才造了這部《中論》。

『不生也不滅，不常也不斷，不一也不異，不來也不去，能夠宣說這因緣法，善於止息各種戲論。我稽首禮敬佛陀，在一切說法中最為第一。』

用這兩首偈頌讚嘆佛陀，就已經簡略地說明了第一義。有人問：諸法無量無邊，為什麼只用這八件事來破斥呢？回答說：法雖然無量，但簡略地說，用這八件事就能總括地破斥一切法。『不生』是指，各種論師以各種方式談論生相，或者認為因果是一，或者認為因果是異，或者認為因中先有果，或者認為因中先無果，或者認為是自體生，或者認為是自他生，或者認為是共生，或者認為是有生，或者認為是無生。像這樣談論生相都是不對的。這件事以後會詳細說明。因為生相決定是不可得的，所以說不生。『不滅』是指，如果沒有生，又怎麼會有滅呢？因為沒有生滅，所以其餘六件事也沒有意義。有人問：不生不滅已經總括地破斥了一切法，為什麼還要再說六件事呢？回答說：爲了成就『不生不滅』的意義。有些人不接受『不生不滅』，卻相信『不常不斷』。如果深入探究『不常不斷』，那就是『不生不滅』。為什麼呢？法如果真實存在，就不應該消失。先前有而現在沒有，這就是斷。如果先前就具有自性，那就是常。所以說『不常不斷』，就是進入了『不生不滅』的意義。有些人即使聽說了四種破斥諸法的方式，仍然用四種方式來成立諸法，這也是不對的。如果是一，就沒有緣。如果是異，就沒有相續。以後會用各種方式來破斥。所以又說『不一不異』。有些人即使聽說了六種破斥諸法的方式，仍然用『來』和『去』來成立諸法。『來』是指，諸法從自在天（Ishvara，印度教主神之一）、世性（Prakriti，數論哲學中的原始物質）、微塵（Paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）而來。

【English Translation】 English version: Due to what causes and conditions does one perceive emptiness, thus giving rise to doubt and wrong views? If everything is ultimately empty, how can one distinguish between the retribution of good and evil? If so, there would be no conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya) or ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). Clinging to this aspect of emptiness gives rise to various faults within ultimate emptiness. Nāgārjuna (龍樹菩薩) composed this Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (中論) for the sake of such individuals.

'Neither from itself nor from another, nor from both, nor without a cause, things come into being. They neither cease nor are they permanent, neither one nor many, neither coming nor going. This is the dependent origination that pacifies all conceptual proliferation. I prostrate to the Buddha (佛), the foremost among those who teach.'

By praising the Buddha (佛) with these two verses, the ultimate truth has already been briefly explained. Someone asks: Phenomena are immeasurable, why only use these eight aspects to refute them? The answer is: Although phenomena are immeasurable, briefly speaking, using these eight aspects can comprehensively refute all phenomena. 'Not arising' means that various theorists discuss the characteristic of arising in various ways, either believing that cause and effect are one, or believing that cause and effect are different, or believing that the effect exists in the cause beforehand, or believing that the effect does not exist in the cause beforehand, or believing that it arises from itself, or believing that it arises from another, or believing that it arises from both, or believing that there is arising, or believing that there is no arising. Such discussions about the characteristic of arising are all incorrect. This matter will be explained in detail later. Because the characteristic of arising is definitely unattainable, it is said to be not arising. 'Not ceasing' means that if there is no arising, how can there be ceasing? Because there is no arising and no ceasing, the remaining six aspects are also meaningless. Someone asks: Not arising and not ceasing have already comprehensively refuted all phenomena, why is it necessary to mention the six aspects again? The answer is: To accomplish the meaning of 'not arising and not ceasing'. Some people do not accept 'not arising and not ceasing' but believe in 'not permanent and not discontinuous'. If one deeply investigates 'not permanent and not discontinuous', that is 'not arising and not ceasing'. Why? If phenomena truly exist, they should not disappear. Having existed before and not existing now, that is discontinuity. If it possessed self-nature beforehand, that is permanence. Therefore, saying 'not permanent and not discontinuous' is entering the meaning of 'not arising and not ceasing'. Some people, even after hearing the four ways of refuting phenomena, still use four ways to establish phenomena, which is also incorrect. If it is one, there is no condition. If it is different, there is no continuity. It will be refuted in various ways later. Therefore, it is said again 'not one and not different'. Some people, even after hearing the six ways of refuting phenomena, still use 'coming' and 'going' to establish phenomena. 'Coming' refers to phenomena coming from Ishvara (自在天, a Hindu deity), Prakriti (世性, primordial matter in Samkhya philosophy), or Paramāṇu (微塵, the smallest unit of matter).

等來。出者。還去至本處。複次萬物無生。何以故。世間現見故。世間眼見劫初谷不生。何以故。離劫初谷。今谷不可得。若離劫初谷有今谷者。則應有生。而實不爾。是故不生。問曰若不生則應滅。答曰不滅。何以故。世間現見故。世間眼見劫初谷不滅。若滅今不應有谷而實有谷。是故不滅。問曰。若不滅則應常。答曰不常。何以故。世間現見故。世間眼見萬物不常。如谷芽時種則變壞。是故不常。問曰若不常則應斷。答曰不斷。何以故。世間現見故。世間眼見萬物不斷。如從谷有芽。是故不斷。若斷不應相續。問曰。若爾者萬物是一。答曰不一。何以故。世間現見故。世間眼見萬物不一。如谷不作芽芽不作谷。若谷作芽芽作谷者。應是一。而實不爾。是故不一。問曰若不一則應異。答曰不異。何以故。世間現見故。世間眼見萬物不異。若異者。何故分別谷芽谷莖谷葉。不說樹芽樹莖樹葉。是故不異。問曰。若不異應有來。答曰無來何以故。世間現見故。世間眼見萬物不來。如穀子中芽無所從來。若來者。芽應從余處來。如鳥來棲樹。而實不爾。是故不來。問曰。若不來應有出。答曰不出。何以故。世間現見故。世間眼見萬物不出。若有出。應見芽從谷出。如蛇從穴出。而實不爾。是故不出。問曰。汝雖釋不生不滅

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：問：『等』從何而來？『出』又指向何處？答：『出』者，最終還是會回到它原本的地方。再者，萬物實際上是『無生』的。為什麼這麼說呢？因為這是世間顯而易見的事實。世間親眼所見，在劫初之時，穀物並非憑空產生。為什麼呢？因為離開了劫初的穀物，現在的穀物就無從談起。如果離開了劫初的穀物，還能有現在的穀物，那就應該有『生』這個過程。但事實並非如此，所以說是『不生』。問：如果不『生』，那就應該『滅』吧？答：不『滅』。為什麼呢？因為這是世間顯而易見的事實。世間親眼所見，劫初的穀物並沒有消失。如果消失了，現在就不應該有穀物存在，但實際上穀物是存在的，所以說不『滅』。問：如果不『滅』，那就應該是『常』（永恒不變）的吧？答：不『常』。為什麼呢？因為這是世間顯而易見的事實。世間親眼所見，萬物都不是永恒不變的。比如穀物發芽時，種子就會變壞，所以說不『常』。問：如果不『常』，那就應該是『斷』（中斷、不再延續）的吧？答：不『斷』。為什麼呢？因為這是世間顯而易見的事實。世間親眼所見，萬物都不是中斷的。比如從穀物中可以長出芽，所以說不『斷』。如果『斷』了，就不應該有相續的現象。問：如果這樣說，那萬物豈不是『一』（同一個）？答：不『一』。為什麼呢？因為這是世間顯而易見的事實。世間親眼所見，萬物不是同一個。比如穀物不會變成芽，芽也不會變成穀物。如果穀物變成了芽，芽又變成了穀物，那才應該說是『一』。但事實並非如此，所以說不『一』。問：如果不『一』，那就應該是『異』（不同的）吧？答：不『異』。為什麼呢？因為這是世間顯而易見的事實。世間親眼所見，萬物不是完全不同的。如果是完全不同的，為什麼我們要區分谷芽、谷莖、谷葉，而不說樹芽、樹莖、樹葉呢？所以說不『異』。問：如果不『異』，那就應該有『來』（從某處而來）吧？答：沒有『來』。為什麼呢？因為這是世間顯而易見的事實。世間親眼所見，萬物沒有從哪裡來。比如穀子中的芽，並沒有從其他地方來。如果說有『來』，那芽就應該從別的地方來，就像鳥飛來棲息在樹上一樣。但事實並非如此，所以說不『來』。問：如果不『來』，那就應該有『出』（從某處出去）吧？答：沒有『出』。為什麼呢？因為這是世間顯而易見的事實。世間親眼所見，萬物沒有從哪裡出去。如果說有『出』，就應該看到芽從谷中出來，就像蛇從洞穴里出來一樣。但事實並非如此，所以說不『出』。問：你雖然解釋了不『生』、不『滅』……

【English Translation】 English version: Question: From where does 'coming' arise? And where does 'going' lead? Answer: 'Going' ultimately returns to its original place. Furthermore, all things are actually 'non-arising'. Why is that? Because it is a fact evident in the world. The world sees with its own eyes that in the beginning of the kalpa (劫初, kalpa: an aeon in Hindu and Buddhist cosmology), grain did not arise from nowhere. Why? Because without the grain of the beginning of the kalpa, there is no way to talk about the grain of the present. If there could be grain of the present without the grain of the beginning of the kalpa, then there should be a process of 'arising'. But that is not the case, so it is said to be 'non-arising'. Question: If it does not 'arise', then it should 'cease' (滅, cease; perish), right? Answer: It does not 'cease'. Why? Because it is a fact evident in the world. The world sees with its own eyes that the grain of the beginning of the kalpa did not disappear. If it disappeared, there should be no grain existing now, but in reality, grain exists, so it is said not to 'cease'. Question: If it does not 'cease', then it should be 'constant' (常, constant; eternal), right? Answer: It is not 'constant'. Why? Because it is a fact evident in the world. The world sees with its own eyes that all things are not eternally unchanging. For example, when grain sprouts, the seed will decay, so it is said not to be 'constant'. Question: If it is not 'constant', then it should be 'discontinuous' (斷, discontinuous; interrupted), right? Answer: It is not 'discontinuous'. Why? Because it is a fact evident in the world. The world sees with its own eyes that all things are not discontinuous. For example, a sprout can grow from grain, so it is said not to be 'discontinuous'. If it were 'discontinuous', there should be no phenomenon of continuity. Question: If that's the case, then are all things 'one' (一, one; the same)? Answer: Not 'one'. Why? Because it is a fact evident in the world. The world sees with its own eyes that all things are not the same. For example, grain does not become a sprout, and a sprout does not become grain. If grain became a sprout and a sprout became grain, then it should be said to be 'one'. But that is not the case, so it is said not to be 'one'. Question: If it is not 'one', then it should be 'different' (異, different), right? Answer: Not 'different'. Why? Because it is a fact evident in the world. The world sees with its own eyes that all things are not completely different. If they were completely different, why would we distinguish between grain sprouts, grain stems, and grain leaves, and not say tree sprouts, tree stems, and tree leaves? So it is said not to be 'different'. Question: If it is not 'different', then there should be 'coming' (來, coming; arriving), right? Answer: There is no 'coming'. Why? Because it is a fact evident in the world. The world sees with its own eyes that all things do not come from anywhere. For example, the sprout in the grain seed does not come from elsewhere. If there were 'coming', then the sprout should come from another place, just like a bird flying to perch on a tree. But that is not the case, so it is said not to 'come'. Question: If it does not 'come', then there should be 'going' (出, going; exiting), right? Answer: There is no 'going'. Why? Because it is a fact evident in the world. The world sees with its own eyes that all things do not go out from anywhere. If there were 'going', one should see the sprout coming out of the grain, just like a snake coming out of a hole. But that is not the case, so it is said not to 'go'. Question: Although you have explained 'non-arising' and 'non-ceasing'...

義。我欲聞造論者所說。答曰。

諸法不自生　　亦不從他生　不共不無因　　是故知無生

不自生者。萬物無有從自體生。必待眾因。複次若從自體生。則一法有二體。一謂生。二謂生者。若離余因從自體生者。則無因無緣。又生更有生生則無窮。自無故他亦無。何以故。有自故有他。若不從自生。亦不從他生。共生則有二過。自生他生故。若無因而有萬物者。是則為常。是事不然。無因則無果。若無因有果者。佈施持戒等應墮地獄。十惡五逆應當生天。以無因故。複次。

如諸法自性　　不在於緣中　以無自性故　　他性亦復無

諸法自性不在眾緣中。但眾緣和合故得名字。自性即是自體。眾緣中無自性。自性無故不自生。自性無故他性亦無。何以故。因自性有他性。他性於他亦是自性。若破自性即破他性。是故不應從他性生。若破自性他性即破共義。無因則有大過。有因尚可破。何況無因。於四句中生不可得。是故不生。問曰。阿毗曇人言。諸法從四緣生。云何言不生。何謂四緣。

因緣次第緣　　緣緣增上緣　四緣生諸法　　更無第五緣

一切所有緣。皆攝在四緣。以是四緣萬物得生。因緣名一切有為法。次第緣除過去現在阿羅漢最後心心數法。余過去現在心心數法。

【現代漢語翻譯】義。我想聽聽造論者對此的解釋。回答說：

『諸法不自生，亦不從他生，不共不無因，是故知無生。』

『不自生』是指萬物沒有從自身產生的。必定依賴眾多因緣。進一步說，如果從自身產生，那麼一個法就有了兩個自體。一個是『生』，另一個是『生者』。如果脫離其他因緣而從自身產生，那就是無因無緣。而且生還會再生，這樣就無窮無盡了。自身不存在，那麼他者也不存在。為什麼呢？因為有自身才會有他者。如果不從自身產生，也不從他者產生。共同產生就會有兩個過失，既是自生又是他生。如果萬物是無因而有，那就是常。這是不可能的。沒有原因就沒有結果。如果沒有原因卻有結果，那麼佈施、持戒等善行應該墮入地獄，十惡五逆的惡行反而應當昇天。因為沒有原因的緣故。進一步說：

『如諸法自性，不在於緣中，以無自性故，他性亦復無。』

諸法的自性不在眾多的因緣之中。只是眾多的因緣和合，才有了名字。自性就是自體。眾多的因緣中沒有自性。自性不存在，所以不自生。自性不存在，所以他性也不存在。為什麼呢？因為因自性才有他性。他性對於他者來說也是自性。如果破除了自性，也就破除了他性。所以不應該從他性產生。如果破除了自性，他性也就破除了共同產生的意義。無因就會有很大的過失。有因尚且可以破除，更何況是無因。在四句中，生是不可得的。所以是不生的。有人問：阿毗曇（Abhidhamma，論藏）學者說，諸法從四緣而生，為什麼你說不生呢？什麼是四緣呢？

『因緣次第緣，緣緣增上緣，四緣生諸法，更無第五緣。』

一切所有的緣，都包含在這四緣之中。因為這四緣，萬物才得以產生。因緣指的是一切有為法。次第緣除了過去現在阿羅漢（Arhat，斷盡煩惱，證得解脫的聖者）的最後心心數法之外，其餘的過去現在心心數法。

【English Translation】 Meaning. I wish to hear what the author of the treatise says. The answer is:

'The dharmas do not arise from themselves, nor do they arise from others, not from both, nor without a cause; therefore, it is known that there is no arising.'

'Not arising from themselves' means that all things do not arise from their own entity. They must depend on many causes and conditions. Furthermore, if they arise from their own entity, then one dharma would have two entities: one is 'arising,' and the other is 'the one that arises.' If it arises from its own entity without other causes and conditions, then it is without cause and without condition. Moreover, arising would give rise to further arising, and thus it would be endless. If the self does not exist, then the other also does not exist. Why? Because there is self, therefore there is other. If it does not arise from itself, nor does it arise from others. Arising together would have two faults: it is both self-arising and other-arising. If all things exist without a cause, then it would be permanent. This is not possible. Without a cause, there is no result. If there is a result without a cause, then acts of giving, upholding precepts, etc., should lead to hell, and the ten evils and five rebellious acts should lead to heaven, because there is no cause. Furthermore:

'As the self-nature of all dharmas is not in the conditions, because there is no self-nature, the other-nature is also non-existent.'

The self-nature of all dharmas is not in the multitude of conditions. It is only through the combination of many conditions that a name is obtained. Self-nature is the same as self-entity. There is no self-nature in the multitude of conditions. Because there is no self-nature, it does not arise from itself. Because there is no self-nature, there is also no other-nature. Why? Because other-nature exists due to self-nature. Other-nature is also self-nature for the other. If self-nature is destroyed, then other-nature is also destroyed. Therefore, it should not arise from other-nature. If self-nature is destroyed, then other-nature also destroys the meaning of arising together. Without a cause, there would be great faults. If there is a cause, it can still be refuted, let alone without a cause. In the four possibilities, arising is unattainable. Therefore, there is no arising. Someone asks: The Abhidhamma (Abhidhamma, the collection of philosophical treatises in Buddhism) scholars say that all dharmas arise from four conditions, why do you say there is no arising? What are the four conditions?

'Causal condition, immediate condition, object condition, dominant condition; the four conditions give rise to all dharmas, there is no fifth condition.'

All conditions are included in these four conditions. Because of these four conditions, all things are able to arise. Causal condition refers to all conditioned dharmas. Immediate condition excludes the last mind and mental factors of past and present Arhats (Arhat, a perfected person who has attained nirvana), the remaining past and present minds and mental factors.

緣緣增上緣一切法。答曰。

果為從緣生　　為從非緣生　是緣為有果　　是緣為無果

若謂有果。是果為從緣生。為從非緣生。若謂有緣。是緣為有果為無果。二俱不然。何以故。

因是法生果　　是法名為緣　若是果未生　　何不名非緣

諸緣無決定。何以故。若果未生。是時不名為緣。但眼見從緣生果。故名之為緣。緣成由於果。以果後緣先故。若未有果何得名為緣。如瓶以水土和合故有瓶生。見瓶緣知水土等是瓶緣。若瓶未生時。何以不名水土等為非緣。是故果不從緣生。緣尚不生。何況非緣。複次。

果先於緣中　　有無俱不可　先無為誰緣　　先有何用緣

緣中先非有果非無果。若先有果不名為緣。果先有故。若先無果亦不名為緣。不生余物故。問曰。已總破一切因緣。今欲聞一一破諸緣。答曰。

若果非有生　　亦復非無生　亦非有無生　　何得言有緣

若緣能生果。應有三種。若有若無若有無。如先偈中說。緣中若先有果不應言生。以先有故。若先無果不應言生。以先無故。亦應與非緣同故。有無亦不生者。有無名為半有半無。二俱有過。又有與無相違。無與有相違。何得一法有二相。如是三種求果生相不可得故。云何言有因緣。次第緣者。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本緣緣增上緣生一切法嗎？回答是：『果是從緣而生？還是從非緣而生？這個緣是有果的？還是無果的？』如果說有果，那麼這個果是從緣而生，還是從非緣而生？如果說有緣，那麼這個緣是有果的還是無果的？這兩種說法都不對。為什麼呢？『因為是法（dharma）生果，這個法才被稱作緣。如果這個果還沒有生，為什麼不稱其為非緣呢？』諸緣沒有決定的性質。為什麼呢？如果果還沒有產生，這個時候不能稱其為緣。只是因為眼睛看到從緣而生果，所以才稱之為緣。緣的成立是由於果，因為果在後而緣在前。如果沒有果，怎麼能稱之為緣呢？比如瓶子因為水和土混合才產生。看到瓶子，才知道水土等是瓶子的緣。如果瓶子沒有產生的時候，為什麼不稱水土等為非緣呢？所以果不是從緣而生。緣尚且不能成立，何況非緣呢？再者：『果在緣中，先有還是先無，這兩種說法都不可靠。如果先前沒有果，那麼緣是為誰而存在的呢？如果先前有果，又何必需要緣呢？』緣中先前既非有果也非無果。如果先前有果，就不能稱之為緣，因為果已經存在了。如果先前沒有果，也不能稱之為緣，因為它不能產生其他事物。問：已經總的破斥了一切因緣，現在想聽聽一一破斥各種緣。回答是：『如果果不是從有而生，也不是從無而生，也不是從亦有亦無而生，怎麼能說有緣呢？』如果緣能生果，應該有三種情況：若有、若無、若有無。如先前的偈頌中所說。緣中如果先前有果，就不應該說是生，因為果已經存在了。如果先前沒有果，就不應該說是生，因為果先前沒有。也應該與非緣相同。有無也不能生果，因為有無意味著一半有，一半無。兩種情況都有過失。而且有與無相互矛盾，無與有相互矛盾。怎麼能一個法具有兩種相互矛盾的性質呢？像這樣三種尋求果的生起的方式都不可得，怎麼能說有因緣呢？次第緣又是什麼呢？

【English Translation】 English version Are all dharmas (phenomena) produced by causal conditions and conditioning factors? The answer is: 『Does the result arise from conditions, or from non-conditions? Is this condition with a result, or without a result?』 If it is said that there is a result, does this result arise from conditions or from non-conditions? If it is said that there is a condition, is this condition with a result or without a result? Neither of these two assertions is correct. Why? 『Because the dharma (law/principle) gives rise to the result, this dharma is called a condition. If this result has not yet arisen, why is it not called a non-condition?』 Conditions are not definitive. Why? If the result has not yet arisen, at that time it cannot be called a condition. It is only because the eye sees the result arising from conditions that it is called a condition. The establishment of a condition is due to the result, because the result is later and the condition is earlier. If there is no result, how can it be called a condition? For example, a pot is produced because water and soil are mixed together. Seeing the pot, one knows that water, soil, etc., are the conditions for the pot. If the pot has not yet been produced, why are water, soil, etc., not called non-conditions? Therefore, the result does not arise from conditions. The condition cannot even be established, let alone a non-condition. Furthermore: 『Whether the result exists or does not exist in the condition beforehand, both are unreliable. If there is no result beforehand, then for whom does the condition exist? If there is a result beforehand, then what is the use of a condition?』 In the condition, there is neither a result beforehand nor no result beforehand. If there is a result beforehand, it cannot be called a condition, because the result already exists. If there is no result beforehand, it cannot be called a condition, because it cannot produce other things. Question: Having generally refuted all causal conditions, now I want to hear a refutation of each individual condition. The answer is: 『If the result does not arise from existence, nor does it arise from non-existence, nor does it arise from both existence and non-existence, how can it be said that there is a condition?』 If a condition can produce a result, there should be three possibilities: existence, non-existence, or both existence and non-existence. As said in the previous verse. If there is a result in the condition beforehand, it should not be said to be produced, because the result already exists. If there is no result beforehand, it should not be said to be produced, because there was nothing beforehand. It should also be the same as a non-condition. Existence and non-existence also cannot produce a result, because existence and non-existence mean half existence and half non-existence. Both situations have faults. Moreover, existence contradicts non-existence, and non-existence contradicts existence. How can one dharma (phenomenon) have two contradictory natures? In this way, the three ways of seeking the arising of a result are unattainable, so how can it be said that there are causal conditions? What then is sequential conditioning?

果若未生時　　則不應有滅　滅法何能緣　　故無次第緣

諸心心數法。於三世中次第生。現在心心數法滅。與未來心作次第緣。未來法未生。與誰作次第緣。若未來法已有即是生。何用次第緣。現在心心數法無有住時。若不住何能為次第緣。若有住則非有為法。何以故。一切有為法常有滅相故。若滅已則不能與作次第緣。若言滅法猶有則是常。若常則無罪福等。若謂滅時能與作次第緣。滅時半滅半未滅。更無第三法。名為滅時。又佛說。一切有為法念念滅。無一念時住。云何言現在法有欲滅未欲滅。汝謂一念中無是欲滅未欲滅。則破自法。汝阿毗曇說。有滅法有不滅法。有欲滅法有不欲滅法。欲滅法者。現在法將欲滅。未欲滅法者。除現在將欲滅法。余現在法及過去未來無為法。是名不欲滅法。是故無次第緣。緣緣者。

如諸佛所說　　真實微妙法　於此無緣法　　云何有緣緣

佛說。大乘諸法。若有色無色有形無形有漏無漏有為無為等諸法相入於法性。一切皆空無相無緣。譬如眾流入海同爲一味。實法可信隨宜所說不可為實。是故無緣緣。增上緣者。

諸法無自性　　故無有有相　說有是事故　　是事有不然

經說十二因緣。是事有故是事有。此則不然。何以故。諸法從眾緣

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：　如果（果）尚未產生時，就不應該有滅（Nirodha，寂滅）。　已經滅去的法如何能作為緣（Hetu，因緣）呢？所以沒有次第緣（Samanantarapaccaya，等無間緣）。

各種心和心所法（Cittacaitta，心和心所），在過去、現在、未來三世中次第產生。現在的心和心所法滅去，與未來的心作為次第緣。未來的法尚未產生，與誰作為次第緣呢？如果未來的法已經存在，那就是已經產生，又何必需要次第緣呢？現在的心和心所法沒有停留的時間。如果不住留，如何能作為次第緣呢？如果有所住留，那就不是有為法（Saṃskṛta，有為法）。為什麼呢？因為一切有為法常有滅去的相狀。如果已經滅去，就不能作為次第緣。如果說滅去的法仍然存在，那就是常（Nitya，常）。如果是常，就沒有罪福等等。如果認為滅去的時候能作為次第緣，那麼滅去的時候是半滅半未滅，沒有第三種法，可以稱作滅去的時候。而且佛說，一切有為法念念滅去，沒有一念的時間停留。怎麼能說現在的法有將要滅去和未將要滅去呢？你認為一念中沒有這種將要滅去和未將要滅去，那就是破壞你自己的法。你們阿毗曇（Abhidhamma，論藏）說，有滅法，有不滅法；有將要滅的法，有不將要滅的法。將要滅的法，就是現在的法將要滅去。未將要滅的法，就是除了現在將要滅去的法之外，其餘的現在的法以及過去、未來、無為法（Asaṃskṛta，無為法），這叫做不將要滅的法。所以沒有次第緣。緣緣（Ālambanapaccaya，所緣緣）是：

如諸佛所說，真實微妙法。　於此無緣法，云何有緣緣？

佛說，大乘（Mahāyāna，大乘）的各種法，如果有色無色、有形無形、有漏無漏、有為無為等等各種法，相入於法性（Dharmatā，法性），一切都是空無相無緣。譬如各種河流流入大海，同爲一種味道。真實法可以相信，隨順適宜所說的，不可以認為是真實。所以沒有緣緣。增上緣（Adhipatipaccaya，增上緣）是：

諸法無自性，故無有有相。　說有是事故，是事有不然。

經中說十二因緣（Dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda，十二因緣），『因為這件事有，所以那件事有』。這就不對了。為什麼呢？因為諸法從各種因緣

【English Translation】 English version: 　If the fruit (Phala) has not yet arisen, then there should be no cessation (Nirodha). 　How can a ceased dharma (phenomenon) be a condition (Hetu)? Therefore, there is no immediate condition (Samanantarapaccaya).

Various mental states and mental factors (Cittacaitta) arise sequentially in the three times: past, present, and future. The cessation of present mental states and mental factors serves as an immediate condition for future mental states. If a future dharma has not yet arisen, with what does it serve as an immediate condition? If the future dharma already exists, then it has already arisen; what need is there for an immediate condition? Present mental states and mental factors have no duration of abiding. If they do not abide, how can they serve as an immediate condition? If they abide, then they are not conditioned phenomena (Saṃskṛta). Why? Because all conditioned phenomena constantly have the characteristic of cessation. If they have already ceased, then they cannot serve as an immediate condition. If it is said that the ceased dharma still exists, then it is permanent (Nitya). If it is permanent, then there are no such things as merit and demerit. If it is argued that the moment of cessation can serve as an immediate condition, then at the moment of cessation, it is half ceased and half not ceased; there is no third dharma that can be called the moment of cessation. Moreover, the Buddha said that all conditioned phenomena cease moment by moment, without abiding for even a single moment. How can it be said that the present dharma has a state of about to cease and not about to cease? If you believe that there is no such thing as about to cease and not about to cease in a single moment, then you are refuting your own dharma. Your Abhidhamma (Abhidhamma) says that there are ceased dharmas and non-ceased dharmas; there are dharmas about to cease and dharmas not about to cease. Dharmas about to cease are present dharmas that are about to cease. Dharmas not about to cease are the remaining present dharmas, excluding those about to cease, as well as past, future, and unconditioned dharmas (Asaṃskṛta). These are called dharmas not about to cease. Therefore, there is no immediate condition. As for object-condition (Ālambanapaccaya):

As the Buddhas have spoken, 　The true and subtle dharma, 　In this causeless dharma, 　How can there be object-condition?

The Buddha said that the various dharmas of the Mahāyāna (Mahāyāna), whether they are with form or without form, with shape or without shape, with outflows or without outflows, conditioned or unconditioned, all enter into the nature of dharma (Dharmatā); everything is empty, without characteristics, and without conditions. It is like various rivers flowing into the ocean, becoming one taste. The true dharma can be believed; what is spoken according to suitability should not be considered as the truth. Therefore, there is no object-condition. As for dominant condition (Adhipatipaccaya):

All dharmas are without self-nature, 　Therefore, there is no having of existence. 　To say that there is because of this, 　That this exists is not so.

The sutra speaks of the twelve links of dependent origination (Dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda): 'Because this exists, that exists.' This is not correct. Why? Because all dharmas arise from various conditions.

生故自無定性。自無定性故無有有相。有相無故。何得言是事有故是事有。是故無增上緣。佛隨凡夫分別有無故說。複次。

略廣因緣中　　求果不可得　因緣中若無　　云何從緣出

略者。于和合因緣中無果。廣者。於一一緣中亦無果。若略廣因緣中無果。云何言果從因緣出。複次。

若謂緣無果　　而從緣中出　是果何不從　　非緣中而出

若因緣中求果不可得。何故不從非緣出。如泥中無瓶。何故不從乳中出。複次。

若果從緣生　　是緣無自性　從無自性生　　何得從緣生　果不從緣生　　不從非緣生　以果無有故　　緣非緣亦無

果從眾緣生。是緣無自性。若無自性則無法。無法何能生。是故果不從緣生。不從非緣生者。破緣故說非緣。實無非緣法。是故不從非緣生。若不從二生。是則無果。無果故緣非緣亦無。

中論觀去來品第二(二十五偈)

問曰。世間眼見三時有作。已去未去去時。以有作故當知有諸法。答曰。

已去無有去　　未去亦無去　離已去未去　　去時亦無去

已去無有去已去故。若離去有去業。是事不然。未去亦無去。未有去法故。去時名半去半未去。不離已去未去故。問曰。

動處則有去　　此中有去時　

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

事物產生本來就沒有固定的自性。因為沒有固定的自性，所以沒有『有』的表相。既然沒有『有』的表相，怎麼能說因為這件事存在，所以那件事也存在呢？因此，沒有增上緣（adhipati-pratyaya，四緣之一，指起主導作用的條件）。佛陀是隨順凡夫分別『有』和『無』的觀念而說的。再者：

在簡略或廣大的因緣中，
都無法找到果。
如果因緣中沒有果，
果又怎麼能從因緣中產生？

『簡略』是指在和合的因緣中沒有果。『廣大』是指在每一個單獨的緣中也沒有果。如果簡略或廣大的因緣中都沒有果，怎麼能說果是從因緣中產生的呢？再者：

如果認為緣中沒有果，
卻說果從緣中產生，
那果為什麼不從
非緣中產生呢？

如果在因緣中尋求果而不可得，那為什麼果不從非緣中產生呢？就像泥土中沒有瓶子，那為什麼瓶子不從牛奶中產生呢？再者：

如果果是從緣產生的，
那麼緣就沒有自性（svabhāva，事物自身存在的性質）。
從沒有自性的事物產生，
怎麼能說是從緣產生的呢？
果不是從緣產生的，
也不是從非緣產生的。
因為果根本不存在，
所以緣和非緣也都不存在。

果是從眾多因緣產生的。這些緣沒有自性。如果沒有自性，那就是沒有法（dharma，此處指事物）。沒有法怎麼能產生事物呢？所以，果不是從緣產生的。『不是從非緣產生的』，這是爲了破斥『緣』的觀點而說的『非緣』。實際上並沒有『非緣』這種法。所以，果不是從非緣產生的。如果不是從這二者產生，那就是沒有果。沒有果，所以緣和非緣也都不存在。

《中論·觀去來品》第二（二十五偈）

問：世間親眼看到有三種時間狀態的運動：已過去的運動、未發生的運動和正在發生的運動。因為有運動，所以應當知道有諸法（dharma，此處指事物）。

答：

已過去的沒有運動，
未發生的也沒有運動，
離開已過去和未發生的，
正在發生的也沒有運動。

已過去的沒有運動，因為已經過去了。如果離開運動而有運動的行為，這是不可能的。未發生的也沒有運動，因為還沒有運動這種法。『正在發生的運動』是指一半過去一半未過去的運動。因為不離開已過去和未過去。

問：

在運動的地方就有運動，
這裡面有運動的時間。

【English Translation】 English version:

Origination inherently lacks fixed self-nature (svabhāva). Because it lacks fixed self-nature, it lacks the appearance of 'existence'. Since there is no appearance of 'existence', how can it be said that because this thing exists, that thing exists? Therefore, there is no adhipati-pratyaya (the dominant condition, one of the four conditions). The Buddha speaks according to the way ordinary people distinguish between 'existence' and 'non-existence'. Furthermore:

In brief or extensive conditions,
the result cannot be found.
If there is no result in the conditions,
how can the result arise from the conditions?

'Brief' means that there is no result in the combined conditions. 'Extensive' means that there is no result in each individual condition. If there is no result in brief or extensive conditions, how can it be said that the result arises from the conditions? Furthermore:

If it is thought that there is no result in the conditions,
yet it is said that the result arises from the conditions,
then why does the result not arise
from non-conditions?

If the result cannot be found in the conditions, then why does the result not arise from non-conditions? Just as there is no pot in the mud, why does the pot not arise from milk? Furthermore:

If the result arises from conditions,
then the conditions lack self-nature (svabhāva).
Arising from something without self-nature,
how can it be said to arise from conditions?
The result does not arise from conditions,
nor does it arise from non-conditions.
Because the result does not exist,
therefore conditions and non-conditions also do not exist.

The result arises from numerous conditions. These conditions lack self-nature. If there is no self-nature, then there is no dharma (here, meaning thing). How can something without dharma produce anything? Therefore, the result does not arise from conditions. 'It does not arise from non-conditions' is said to refute the view of 'conditions' by positing 'non-conditions'. In reality, there is no such dharma as 'non-conditions'. Therefore, the result does not arise from non-conditions. If it does not arise from either of these two, then there is no result. Since there is no result, conditions and non-conditions also do not exist.

《Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Chapter 2: Examination of Going and Coming》 (Twenty-five Verses)

Question: The world sees with its own eyes that there are three temporal states of motion: motion that has already gone, motion that has not yet occurred, and motion that is occurring. Because there is motion, it should be known that there are dharmas (here, meaning things).

Answer:

That which has already gone has no going,
nor does that which has not yet gone have going.
Apart from that which has already gone and that which has not yet gone,
that which is going also has no going.

That which has already gone has no going, because it has already gone. If there is an act of going apart from going, this is not possible. That which has not yet gone also has no going, because there is no such dharma as going yet. 'That which is going' refers to motion that is half gone and half not gone. Because it is not separate from that which has already gone and that which has not yet gone.

Question:

Where there is movement, there is going,
and within this, there is the time of going.

非已去未去　　是故去時去

隨有作業處。是中應有去。眼見去時中有作業。已去中作業已滅。未去中未有作業。是故當知去時有去。答曰。

云何于去時　　而當有去法　若離於去法　　去時不可得

去時有去法。是事不然。何以故。離去法去時不可得。若離去法有去時者。應去時中有去。如器中有果。複次。

若言去時去　　是人則有咎　離去有去時　　去時獨去故

若謂已去未去中無去。去時實有去者。是人則有咎。若離去法有去時。則不相因待。何以故。若說去時有去。是則為二。而實不爾。是故不得言離去有去時。複次。

若去時有去　　則有二種去　一謂為去時　　二謂去時去

若謂去時有去是則有過。所謂有二去。一者因去有去時。二者去時中有去。問曰。若有二去有何咎。答曰。

若有二去法　　則有二去者　以離於去者　　去法不可得

若有二去法。則有二去者。何以故。因去法有去者故。一人有二去二去者。此則不然。是故去時亦無去。問曰。離去者無去法可爾。今三時中定有去者。答曰。

若離於去者　　去法不可得　以無去法故　　何得有去者

若離於去者。則去法不可得。今云何于無去法中。言三時定有去者。複次

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本非已逝、未逝之時，因此才說逝去之時是逝去。

隨著作業（karma）的發生處，其中應有逝去。眼睛看到逝去之時，其中有作業。已逝去中的作業已經滅盡，未逝去中尚未有作業。因此應當知道逝去之時有逝去。回答如下：

『云何于去時，而當有去法？若離於去法，去時不可得。』

逝去之時有逝去之法，此事不然。為何如此說？因為離開逝去之法，逝去之時就不可得。如果離開逝去之法而有逝去之時，那麼應像器皿中有果實一樣，逝去之時中應有逝去。再次：

『若言去時去，是人則有咎。離去有去時，去時獨去故。』

如果認為已逝去、未逝去中沒有逝去，逝去之時確實有逝去，那麼這個人就有過失。如果離開逝去之法而有逝去之時，那麼兩者就不互相依賴。為何如此說？如果說逝去之時有逝去，那就是二者。而實際上並非如此。因此不能說離開逝去而有逝去之時。再次：

『若去時有去，則有二種去。一謂為去時，二謂去時去。』

如果認為逝去之時有逝去，那麼就有過失。所謂有二種逝去，一種是因逝去而有逝去之時，另一種是逝去之時中有逝去。問：如果有二種逝去，有什麼過失？答：

『若有二去法，則有二去者。以離於去者，去法不可得。』

如果有二種逝去之法，那麼就有二個逝去者。為何如此說？因為因逝去之法而有逝去者。一個人有二種逝去和二個逝去者，這就不對了。因此逝去之時也沒有逝去。問：離開逝去者就沒有逝去之法，這可以理解。但現在三時（過去、現在、未來）中一定有逝去者。答：

『若離於去者，去法不可得。以無去法故，何得有去者？』

如果離開逝去者，那麼逝去之法就不可得。現在怎麼能在沒有逝去之法的情況下，說三時中一定有逝去者呢？再次：

【English Translation】 English version It is not in the already-gone nor the not-yet-gone; therefore, it is said that the going is in the going-time.

Wherever there is a place for action (karma), there should be going. The eye sees that in the going-time, there is action. The action in the already-gone is extinguished; in the not-yet-gone, there is no action. Therefore, it should be known that there is going in the going-time. The answer is:

'How can there be a going-dharma in the going-time? If there is separation from the going-dharma, the going-time cannot be obtained.'

That there is a going-dharma in the going-time is not so. Why is that? Because apart from the going-dharma, the going-time cannot be obtained. If there is a going-time apart from the going-dharma, then there should be going in the going-time, just as there is fruit in a vessel. Furthermore:

'If it is said that the going-time goes, then that person has a fault. If there is a going-time apart from going, then the going-time goes alone.'

If it is thought that there is no going in the already-gone or the not-yet-gone, but that there is indeed going in the going-time, then that person has a fault. If there is a going-time apart from the going-dharma, then the two do not depend on each other. Why is that? If it is said that there is going in the going-time, then there are two. But in reality, it is not so. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is a going-time apart from going. Furthermore:

'If there is going in the going-time, then there are two kinds of going. One is called the going-time, and the other is the going in the going-time.'

If it is thought that there is going in the going-time, then there is a fault. That is, there are two goings. One is that there is a going-time because of going, and the other is that there is going in the going-time. Question: If there are two goings, what is the fault? Answer:

'If there are two going-dharmas, then there are two goers. Because apart from the goer, the going-dharma cannot be obtained.'

If there are two going-dharmas, then there are two goers. Why is that? Because there is a goer because of the going-dharma. That one person has two goings and two goers is not right. Therefore, there is also no going in the going-time. Question: It is acceptable that there is no going-dharma apart from the goer. But now, there must be a goer in the three times (past, present, future). Answer:

'If there is separation from the goer, the going-dharma cannot be obtained. Since there is no going-dharma, how can there be a goer?'

If there is separation from the goer, then the going-dharma cannot be obtained. Now, how can it be said that there must be a goer in the three times when there is no going-dharma? Furthermore:

。

去者則不去　　不去者不去　離去不去者　　無第三去者

無有去者。何以故。若有去者則有二種。若去者若不去者。若離是二。無第三去者。問曰。若去者去有何咎。答曰。

若言去者去　　云何有此義　若離於去法　　去者不可得

若謂定有去者用去法。是事不然。何以故。離去法。去者不可得故。若離去者定有去法。則去者能用去法。而實不爾。複次。

若去者有去　　則有二種去　一謂去者去　　二謂去法去

若言去者用去法。則有二過。於一去者中而有二去。一以去法成去者。二以去者成去法。去者成已然後用去法。是事不然。是故先三時中。謂定有去者用去法。是事不然。複次。

若謂去者去　　是人則有咎　離去有去者　　說去者有去

若人說去者能用去法。是人則有咎。離去法有去者。何以故。說去者用去法。是為先有去者後有去法。是事不然。是故三時中無有去者。複次若決定有去有去者。應有初發。而於三時中。求發不可得。何以故。

已去中無發　　未去中無發　去時中無發　　何處當有發

何以故。三時中無發。

未發無去時　　亦無有已去　是二應有發　　未去何有發　無去無未去　　亦復無去時　一切無

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：　　去的人則不是不去的人，不去的人不是不去的人，離開去和不去的人，沒有第三種去的人。

沒有去的人。為什麼呢？如果存在去的人，那麼就有兩種情況：要麼是去的人，要麼是不去的人。如果離開這兩種情況，就沒有第三種去的人。問：如果去的人去，有什麼過失呢？答：

如果說去的人去，怎麼會有這種道理？如果離開去的法則（去法），去的人是不可得的。

如果認為一定存在去的人使用去的法則（去法），這是不對的。為什麼呢？因為離開去的法則（去法），去的人是不可得的。如果離開去的人，一定存在去的法則（去法），那麼去的人就能使用去的法則（去法），但實際上不是這樣。再者：

如果去的人有去，那麼就有兩種去：一種是所謂去的人去，另一種是所謂去的法則（去法）去。

如果說去的人使用去的法則（去法），那麼就有兩種過失。在一個去的人中，卻有兩種去。一種是用去的法則（去法）成就去的人，另一種是用去的人成就去的法則（去法）。去的人成就之後才能使用去的法則（去法），但事實並非如此。因此，在過去、現在、未來這三個時間段中，認為一定存在去的人使用去的法則（去法），這是不對的。再者：

如果認為去的人去，這個人就有過失。離開去的法則（去法）而有去的人。為什麼呢？因為說去的人使用去的法則（去法），這就是先有去的人，後有去的法則（去法），但事實並非如此。因此，在過去、現在、未來這三個時間段中，沒有去的人。再者，如果決定存在去和去的人，應該有最初的出發，但在過去、現在、未來這三個時間段中，尋求出發是不可得的。為什麼呢？

已經去的地方沒有出發，未去的地方沒有出發，去的時候沒有出發，那麼在哪裡會有出發呢？

為什麼呢？因為在過去、現在、未來這三個時間段中沒有出發。

未出發就沒有去的時候，也沒有已經去的地方。這兩種情況應該有出發，未去的地方怎麼會有出發呢？沒有去，沒有未去，也沒有去的時候，一切都沒有。

【English Translation】 English version: The one who goes is not the one who does not go; the one who does not go is not the one who does not go. Apart from the one who goes and does not go, there is no third one who goes.

There is no one who goes. Why? If there is one who goes, then there are two possibilities: either it is the one who goes, or it is the one who does not go. If one departs from these two, there is no third one who goes. Question: If the one who goes goes, what is the fault? Answer:

If you say the one who goes goes, how can this be true? If one is apart from the law of going (going-dharma), the one who goes cannot be obtained.

If one thinks there certainly exists one who goes using the law of going (going-dharma), this is not correct. Why? Because apart from the law of going (going-dharma), the one who goes cannot be obtained. If apart from the one who goes, there certainly exists the law of going (going-dharma), then the one who goes can use the law of going (going-dharma), but in reality, this is not so. Furthermore:

If the one who goes has going, then there are two kinds of going: one is the so-called going of the one who goes, and the other is the so-called going of the law of going (going-dharma).

If one says the one who goes uses the law of going (going-dharma), then there are two faults. In one who goes, there are two goings. One is using the law of going (going-dharma) to accomplish the one who goes, and the other is using the one who goes to accomplish the law of going (going-dharma). The one who goes is accomplished and then can use the law of going (going-dharma), but this is not the case. Therefore, in the three times (past, present, future), thinking there certainly exists one who goes using the law of going (going-dharma) is not correct. Furthermore:

If one thinks the one who goes goes, this person has a fault. Apart from the law of going (going-dharma), there is one who goes. Why? Because saying the one who goes uses the law of going (going-dharma) means there is first the one who goes and then the law of going (going-dharma), but this is not the case. Therefore, in the three times (past, present, future), there is no one who goes. Furthermore, if it is decided there is going and one who goes, there should be an initial departure, but in the three times (past, present, future), seeking the departure is unobtainable. Why?

In the already gone, there is no departure; in the not-yet-gone, there is no departure; in the time of going, there is no departure; then where will there be departure?

Why? Because in the three times (past, present, future), there is no departure.

Without departure, there is no time of going, nor is there the already gone. These two should have departure; how can the not-yet-gone have departure? There is no going, no not-yet-going, and also no time of going; everything is not.

有發　　何故而分別

若人未發則無去時。亦無已去。若有發當在二處。去時已去中。二俱不然。未去時未有發故。未去中何有發。發無故無去。無去故無去者。何得有已去未去去時。問曰。若無去無去者。應有住住者。答曰。

去者則不住　　不去者不住　離去不去者　　何有第三住

若有住有住者。應去者住。若不去者住。若離此二。應有第三住。是事不然。去者不住。去未息故。與去相違名為住。不去者亦不住。何以故。因去法滅故有住。無去則無住。離去者不去者。更無第三住者。若有第三住者。即在去者不去者中。以是故。不得言去者住。複次。

去者若當住　　云何有此義　若當離於去　　去者不可得

汝謂去者住。是事不然。何以故。離去法。去者不可得。若去者在去相。云何當有住。去住相違故。複次。

去未去無住　　去時亦無住　所有行止法　　皆同於去義

若謂去者住。是人應在去時已去未去中住。三處皆無住。是故汝言去者有住。是則不然。如破去法住法。行止亦如是。行者。如從穀子相續至芽莖葉等。止者。穀子滅故芽莖葉滅。相續故名行。斷故名止。又如無明緣諸行乃至老死是名行。無明滅故諸行等滅是名止。問曰。汝雖種種門破去去者住

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：有發（開始行動）：因為什麼原因而要區分呢？如果人還沒有開始行動，就沒有開始的時候，也沒有已經結束的時候。如果已經開始行動，應當在兩種狀態中：開始的時候，已經結束的時候。這兩種情況都不對。因為沒有開始行動的時候，就沒有開始；沒有開始的時候，怎麼會有開始？沒有開始，就沒有行動；沒有行動，就沒有行動者。怎麼會有已經結束、沒有結束、開始的時候呢？問：如果沒有行動，沒有行動者，應該有停留和停留者吧？答：『行動者則不住，不去者不住，離去不去者，何有第三住。』如果存在停留和停留者，應該是行動者停留，或者是不行動者停留。如果脫離這兩種情況，應該有第三種停留。但事實並非如此。行動者不會停留，因為行動還沒有停止。與行動相反的狀態叫做停留。不行動者也不會停留。為什麼呢？因為依靠行動的消滅才會有停留。沒有行動，就沒有停留。脫離行動者和不行動者，就沒有第三種停留者。如果存在第三種停留者，那就在行動者和不行動者之中。因此，不能說行動者會停留。再次：『去者若當住，云何有此義，若當離於去，去者不可得。』你說行動者會停留，這是不對的。為什麼呢？離開行動，行動者就無法存在。如果行動者存在於行動的狀態中，怎麼會有停留呢？因為行動和停留是相互矛盾的。再次：『去未去無住，去時亦無住，所有行止法，皆同於去義。』如果說行動者會停留，那麼這個人應該在開始的時候、已經結束的時候、沒有結束的時候停留。這三種情況都沒有停留。所以你說行動者會停留，這是不對的。就像破斥行動一樣，停留也是如此。行動，比如從穀子的連續狀態到發芽、長莖、長葉等。停留，比如穀子滅亡，所以芽、莖、葉也滅亡。相續叫做行動，斷絕叫做停留。又比如無明緣起諸行，乃至老死，這叫做行動。無明滅亡，所以諸行等滅亡，這叫做停留。問：你雖然用各種方法破斥行動、行動者、停留……

【English Translation】 English version: Having Departure (initiation of action): For what reason is there a distinction? If a person has not yet initiated action, then there is no time of beginning, nor is there a time of having already departed. If there is initiation of action, it should be in two states: the time of beginning, the time of having already departed. Neither of these two is correct. Because when there is no initiation of action, there is no beginning; when there is no beginning, how can there be a beginning? Without a beginning, there is no action; without action, there is no actor. How can there be already departed, not yet departed, or the time of departure? Question: If there is no action, no actor, there should be abiding and an abider, right? Answer: 'The actor does not abide, the non-actor does not abide, apart from the actor and non-actor, how can there be a third abiding?' If there is abiding and an abider, it should be the actor abiding, or the non-actor abiding. If separated from these two, there should be a third abiding. But this is not the case. The actor does not abide, because the action has not ceased. That which is contrary to action is called abiding. The non-actor also does not abide. Why? Because abiding arises from the cessation of the law of action. Without action, there is no abiding. Apart from the actor and the non-actor, there is no third abider. If there were a third abider, it would be among the actor and the non-actor. Therefore, it cannot be said that the actor abides. Furthermore: 'If the actor were to abide, how could this be possible? If separated from action, the actor cannot be found.' You say the actor abides, this is not correct. Why? Separated from action, the actor cannot be found. If the actor exists in the state of action, how can there be abiding? Because action and abiding are contradictory. Furthermore: 'Departure, non-departure, there is no abiding; the time of departure also has no abiding; all laws of movement and cessation are the same as the meaning of departure.' If it is said that the actor abides, then this person should abide in the time of beginning, the time of having already departed, the time of not yet departed. There is no abiding in these three situations. Therefore, your saying that the actor abides is not correct. Just as the law of departure is refuted, so is the law of abiding. Movement, for example, is like the continuous state from a grain of rice to sprouting, growing stems, leaves, etc. Cessation, for example, is like the grain of rice perishing, so the sprouts, stems, and leaves also perish. Continuity is called movement, cessation is called abiding. Also, for example, ignorance conditions actions, up to old age and death, this is called movement. Ignorance ceases, so actions, etc., cease, this is called abiding. Question: Although you refute departure, the actor, and abiding in various ways...

住者。而眼見有去住。答曰。肉眼所見不可信。若實有去去者。為以一法成。為以二法成。二俱有過。何以故。

去法即去者　　是事則不然　去法異去者　　是事亦不然

若去法去者一。是則不然。異亦不然。問曰一異有何過。答曰。

若謂于去法　　即為是去者　作者及作業　　是事則為一　若謂于去法　　有異於去者　離去者有去　　離去有去者

如是二俱有過。何以故。若去法即是去者。是則錯亂破于因緣。因去有去者。因去者有去。又去名為法。去者名為人。人常法無常。若一者則二俱應常二俱無常。一中有如是等過。若異者則相違。未有去法應有去者。未有去者應有去法。不相因待。一法滅應一法在。異中有如是等過。複次。

去去者是二　　若一異法成　二門俱不成　　云何當有成

若去者去法。有若以一法成。若以異法成。二俱不可得。先已說無第三法成。若謂有成。應說因緣無去無去者。今當更說。

因去知去者　　不能用是去　先無有去法　　故無去者去

隨以何去法知去者。是去者不能用是去法。何以故。是去法未有時。無有去者。亦無去時已去未去。如先有人有城邑得有所起。去法去者則不然。去者因去法成。去法因去者成故。複次

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本問：有人說，『住』（sthita，停留）是實有的，而眼睛卻看到有『去』（gati，運動）和『住』。對此如何解釋？答：肉眼所見是不可信的。如果『去』確實存在，那麼它是以一種法（dharma，事物、現象）成立的，還是以兩種法成立的？這兩種情況都有過失。為什麼呢？如果『去法』（gati-dharma，運動的法）就是『去者』（gantṛ，運動的主體），這是不可能的。如果『去法』不同於『去者』，這也是不可能的。問：如果說『一』（ekatva，同一）和『異』（anyatva，相異）都有過失，那麼過失在哪裡呢？答：如果認為『去法』就是『去者』，那麼作者（kartṛ，能動者）和作業（karma，行為）就成了一回事，這是不合理的。如果認為『去法』有別於『去者』，那麼就成了離開『去者』有『去』，離開『去』有『去者』。這樣一來，兩種情況都有過失。為什麼呢？如果『去法』就是『去者』，那麼就會錯亂，破壞因緣（hetu-pratyaya，原因和條件）。因為有『去』才有『去者』，因為有『去者』才有『去』。而且，『去』被稱為法，『去者』被稱為人。人是常（nitya，永恒）的，法是無常（anitya，無常）的。如果『去法』和『去者』是『一』，那麼兩者都應該是常或者都應該是無常。『一』中有這樣的過失。如果『去法』和『去者』是『異』，那麼就互相矛盾。不應該在沒有『去法』的時候有『去者』，也不應該在沒有『去者』的時候有『去法』，兩者不互相依賴。一種法滅了，另一種法應該存在。『異』中有這樣的過失。再說：『去』和『去者』是二，如果通過『一』或『異』的法來成立，那麼這兩種方式都不能成立，又怎麼能成立呢？如果『去者』和『去法』，是通過『一』法或者『異』法來成立的，這兩種情況都是不可能的。之前已經說過，沒有第三種法可以成立。如果認為可以成立，就應該說明因緣。沒有『去』，就沒有『去者』。現在再進一步說明：因為『去』而知道有『去者』，『去者』不能使用這個『去』。因為先前沒有『去法』，所以沒有『去者』的『去』。無論用什麼『去法』來認知『去者』，這個『去者』都不能使用這個『去法』。為什麼呢？因為在『去法』還沒有產生的時候，就沒有『去者』，也沒有『去』的時間，無論是已去還是未去。就像先有人有城邑才能有所作為一樣。『去法』和『去者』不是這樣，『去者』因為『去法』而成立，『去法』因為『去者』而成立。再說：

【English Translation】 English version Question: Someone says, 『Staying』 (sthita, abiding) is real, but the eye sees 『going』 (gati, movement) and 『staying』. How is this explained? Answer: What is seen by the physical eye is not to be trusted. If 『going』 truly exists, is it established by one dharma (thing, phenomenon) or by two dharmas? Both cases have faults. Why? If the 『dharma of going』 (gati-dharma, the dharma of movement) is the same as the 『goer』 (gantṛ, the subject of movement), this is not possible. If the 『dharma of going』 is different from the 『goer』, this is also not possible. Question: If both 『oneness』 (ekatva, identity) and 『otherness』 (anyatva, difference) have faults, where are the faults? Answer: If it is thought that the 『dharma of going』 is the same as the 『goer』, then the agent (kartṛ, the doer) and the action (karma, the deed) become the same thing, which is unreasonable. If it is thought that the 『dharma of going』 is different from the 『goer』, then there is 『going』 apart from the 『goer』, and there is a 『goer』 apart from 『going』. Thus, both cases have faults. Why? If the 『dharma of going』 is the same as the 『goer』, then there will be confusion, destroying the conditions (hetu-pratyaya, cause and conditions). Because there is 『going』, there is a 『goer』; because there is a 『goer』, there is 『going』. Moreover, 『going』 is called a dharma, and the 『goer』 is called a person. A person is permanent (nitya, eternal), and a dharma is impermanent (anitya, impermanent). If the 『dharma of going』 and the 『goer』 are 『one』, then both should be permanent or both should be impermanent. There are such faults in 『oneness』. If the 『dharma of going』 and the 『goer』 are 『different』, then they contradict each other. There should not be a 『goer』 without a 『dharma of going』, nor should there be a 『dharma of going』 without a 『goer』; they do not depend on each other. If one dharma ceases, the other dharma should remain. There are such faults in 『otherness』. Furthermore: 『Going』 and the 『goer』 are two; if they are established through 『one』 or 『different』 dharmas, then both ways cannot be established. How can they be established? If the 『goer』 and the 『dharma of going』 are established through 『one』 dharma or 『different』 dharmas, both cases are impossible. It has already been said that there is no third dharma by which they can be established. If it is thought that they can be established, then the conditions should be explained. Without 『going』, there is no 『goer』. Now, let us explain further: Because of 『going』, it is known that there is a 『goer』; the 『goer』 cannot use this 『going』. Because there was no 『dharma of going』 beforehand, there is no 『going』 of the 『goer』. No matter what 『dharma of going』 is used to recognize the 『goer』, the 『goer』 cannot use this 『dharma of going』. Why? Because when the 『dharma of going』 has not yet arisen, there is no 『goer』, and there is no time of 『going』, whether it is gone or not yet gone. It is like how one can only act if there is first a person and a city. The 『dharma of going』 and the 『goer』 are not like this; the 『goer』 is established because of the 『dharma of going』, and the 『dharma of going』 is established because of the 『goer』. Furthermore:

。

因去知去者　　不能用異去　於一去者中　　不得二去故

隨以何去法知去者。是去者不能用異去法。何以故。一去者中。二去法不可得故。複次。

決定有去者　　不能用三去　不決定去者　　亦不用三去　去法定不定　　去者不用三　是故去去者　　所去處皆無

決定者。名本實有。不因去法生。去法名身動。三種名未去已去去時。若決定有去者。離去法應有去者。不應有住。是故說決定有去者不能用三去。若去者不決定。不決定名本實無。以因去法得名去者。以無去法故不能用三去。因去法故有去者。若先無去法則無去者。云何言不決定去者用三去。如去者去法亦如是。若先離去者。決定有去法。則不因去者有去法。是故去者。不能用三去法。若決定無去法去者何所用。如是思惟觀察。去法去者所去處。是法皆相因待。因去法有去者。因去者有去法。因是二法則有可去處不得言定有。不得言定無。是故決定知。三法虛妄。空無所有。但有假名。如幻如化。

中論觀六情品第三(八偈)

問曰。經中說有六情。所謂。

眼耳及鼻舌　　身意等六情　此眼等六情　　行色等六塵

此中眼為內情色為外塵。眼能見色乃至意為內情。法為外塵。意能知法。答

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：　因為用『去』來認知『去者』（行動者），就不能用不同的『去』（行動）來認知，　因為在一個『去者』中，不可能存在兩種『去』（行動）。

無論用哪種『去』（行動）的方法來認知『去者』（行動者），這個『去者』（行動者）都不能用不同的『去』（行動）方法。為什麼呢？因為在一個『去者』（行動者）中，不可能存在兩種『去』（行動）的方法。再者：

如果確定有『去者』（行動者），就不能用三種『去』（行動）：未去、已去、去時；　如果不確定有『去者』（行動者），也不能用三種『去』（行動）；　『去』（行動）的法則是確定或不確定的，『去者』（行動者）都不能用三種『去』（行動）。　因此，『去』（行動）、『去者』（行動者）、所『去』之處，都是不存在的。

所謂『確定』，是指本來就真實存在，不是因為『去』（行動）的法則而產生。『去』（行動）的法則指的是身體的移動。三種『去』（行動）指的是未去、已去、去時。如果確定有『去者』（行動者），那麼離開『去』（行動）的法則，應該有『去者』（行動者），不應該有停留。所以說，確定有的『去者』（行動者）不能用三種『去』（行動）。如果『去者』（行動者）不確定，不確定指的是本來就真實不存在，因為『去』（行動）的法則才有了『去者』（行動者）的名稱。因為沒有『去』（行動）的法則，所以不能用三種『去』（行動）。因為『去』（行動）的法則才有了『去者』（行動者）。如果先沒有『去』（行動）的法則，就沒有『去者』（行動者），怎麼能說不確定的『去者』（行動者）能用三種『去』（行動）呢？『去者』（行動者）和『去』（行動）的法則也是這樣。如果先離開『去者』（行動者），確定有『去』（行動）的法則，那麼『去』（行動）的法則就不是因為『去者』（行動者）而產生的。因此，『去者』（行動者）不能用三種『去』（行動）的法則。如果確定沒有『去』（行動）的法則，那麼『去者』（行動者）用什麼呢？這樣思維觀察，『去』（行動）的法則、『去者』（行動者）、所『去』之處，這些法都是相互依存的。因為『去』（行動）的法則才有『去者』（行動者），因為『去者』（行動者）才有『去』（行動）的法則。因為這兩種法則才有可『去』之處，不能說一定有，也不能說一定沒有。因此，確定地知道，這三種法是虛妄的，空無所有的，只有假名，如幻如化。

《中論·觀六情品》第三（八偈）

問：經中說有六情，即：

眼、耳、及鼻、舌，身、意等六情，　此眼等六情，行色等六塵。

這裡，眼為內在的感官，色（rupa）為外在的塵境。眼能見色，乃至意為內在的感官，法（dharma）為外在的塵境，意能知法。答：

【English Translation】 English version: Because one uses 'going' to know the 'goer' (agent), one cannot use a different 'going' (action) to know it, Because within one 'goer' (agent), two 'goings' (actions) are not possible.

Whichever method of 'going' (action) is used to know the 'goer' (agent), that 'goer' (agent) cannot use a different method of 'going' (action). Why? Because within one 'goer' (agent), two methods of 'going' (action) are not obtainable. Furthermore:

If it is determined that there is a 'goer' (agent), then three 'goings' (actions) cannot be used: not yet gone, already gone, and the time of going; If it is not determined that there is a 'goer' (agent), then three 'goings' (actions) also cannot be used; Whether the principle of 'going' (action) is determined or undetermined, the 'goer' (agent) cannot use three. Therefore, 'going' (action), 'goer' (agent), and the place gone to are all non-existent.

What is called 'determined' means originally and truly existing, not arising because of the principle of 'going' (action). The principle of 'going' (action) refers to the movement of the body. The three 'goings' (actions) refer to not yet gone, already gone, and the time of going. If it is determined that there is a 'goer' (agent), then apart from the principle of 'going' (action), there should be a 'goer' (agent), and there should be no staying. Therefore, it is said that a determined 'goer' (agent) cannot use three 'goings' (actions). If the 'goer' (agent) is undetermined, 'undetermined' means originally and truly non-existent, and the name 'goer' (agent) is obtained because of the principle of 'going' (action). Because there is no principle of 'going' (action), three 'goings' (actions) cannot be used. Because of the principle of 'going' (action), there is a 'goer' (agent). If there is no principle of 'going' (action) first, then there is no 'goer' (agent). How can it be said that an undetermined 'goer' (agent) can use three 'goings' (actions)? The 'goer' (agent) and the principle of 'going' (action) are also like this. If one first separates from the 'goer' (agent) and determines that there is a principle of 'going' (action), then the principle of 'going' (action) does not arise because of the 'goer' (agent). Therefore, the 'goer' (agent) cannot use the three principles of 'going' (action). If it is determined that there is no principle of 'going' (action), then what does the 'goer' (agent) use? Thinking and observing in this way, the principle of 'going' (action), the 'goer' (agent), and the place gone to, these dharmas are all mutually dependent. Because of the principle of 'going' (action), there is a 'goer' (agent); because of the 'goer' (agent), there is a principle of 'going' (action). Because of these two principles, there is a place to go to. It cannot be said that it definitely exists, nor can it be said that it definitely does not exist. Therefore, know for certain that these three dharmas are false, empty, and without substance, and only have provisional names, like illusions or transformations.

Chapter Three: Examination of the Six Senses from the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Eight Verses)

Question: The sutras say that there are six senses, namely:

Eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind are the six senses; These six senses, such as the eye, perceive the six sense objects, such as form (rupa).

Here, the eye is the internal sense organ, and form (rupa) is the external sense object. The eye can see form, and so on, up to the mind being the internal sense organ, and dharma (dharma) being the external sense object. The mind can know dharma. Answer:

曰無也。何以故。

是眼則不能　　自見其己體　若不能自見　　云何見余物

是眼不能見自體。何以故。如燈能自照亦能照他。眼若是見相。亦應自見亦應見他。而實不爾。是故偈中說。若眼不自見何能見余物。問曰。眼雖不能自見。而能見他。如火能燒他不能自燒。答曰。

火喻則不能　　成於眼見法　去未去去時　　已總答是事

汝雖作火喻。不能成眼見法。是事去來品中已答。如已去中無去。未去中無去。去時中無去。如已燒未燒燒時俱無有燒。如是已見未見見時俱無見相。複次。

見若未見時　　則不名為見　而言見能見　　是事則不然

眼未對色。則不能見。爾時不名為見。因對色名為見。是故偈中說。未見時無見。云何以見能見。複次二處俱無見法。何以故。

見不能有見　　非見亦不見　若已破于見　　則為破見者

見不能見。先已說過故。非見亦不見。無見相故。若無見相。云何能見。見法無故見者亦無。何以故。若離見有見者。無眼者。亦應以餘情見。若以見見。則見中有見相。見者無見相。是故偈中說。若已破于見則為破見者。複次。

離見不離見　　見者不可得　以無見者故　　何有見可見

若有見見者則不成。若無見見者

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：回答說：『沒有。』為什麼呢？

『這眼睛不能自己看見自己的形體，如果不能自己看見，怎麼能看見其他事物呢？』

眼睛不能看見自身，為什麼呢？比如燈能自己照亮也能照亮其他物體。如果眼睛是能見的相，也應該能看見自己，也能看見其他物體。但實際上不是這樣。所以偈頌中說：『如果眼睛不能自己看見，怎麼能看見其他事物呢？』有人問：眼睛雖然不能自己看見，但能看見其他物體，就像火能燒其他物體但不能燒自己。回答說：

『用火來比喻，不能成立眼睛能見的道理，在「去、未去、去時」的討論中，已經完全回答了這件事。』

你雖然用火來比喻，不能成立眼睛能見的道理。這件事在「去來品」中已經回答過了。就像已去中沒有去，未去中沒有去，去時中沒有去。就像已燒、未燒、燒時都沒有燒。這樣，已見、未見、見時都沒有見的相狀。再次，

『如果見在未見時，就不叫做見，而說見能見，這件事是不成立的。』

眼睛未對色塵（Rupa，指可見的物體），就不能見。那時不叫做見。因為對色塵才叫做見。所以偈頌中說：『未見時沒有見，怎麼能用見來見呢？』再次，兩個地方都沒有見的法，為什麼呢？

『見不能有見，非見也不能見，如果已經破除了見，那麼就破除了見者。』

見不能見，先前已經說過了。非見也不能見，因為沒有見的相狀。如果沒有見的相狀，怎麼能見呢？見法沒有了，見者也就沒有了。為什麼呢？如果離開見有見者，沒有眼睛的人，也應該用其他感覺器官來見。如果用見來見，那麼見中就有見的相狀，見者就沒有見的相狀。所以偈頌中說：『如果已經破除了見，那麼就破除了見者。』再次，

『離開見或不離開見，見者都不可得，因為沒有見者，哪裡有見和可見呢？』

如果有見來見見者，那是不成立的。如果沒有見來見見者

【English Translation】 English version: He said, 'No.' Why is that?

'These eyes cannot see their own form, If they cannot see themselves, how can they see other things?'

The eye cannot see its own self. Why is that? For example, a lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate others. If the eye were a visible phenomenon, it should be able to see itself and also see other objects. But in reality, it is not so. Therefore, the verse says: 'If the eye cannot see itself, how can it see other things?' Someone asks: Although the eye cannot see itself, it can see other objects, just as fire can burn other objects but cannot burn itself. The answer is:

'The analogy of fire, cannot establish the principle of the eye's seeing, In the discussion of 'going, not going, and the time of going', this matter has already been fully answered.'

Although you use fire as an analogy, it cannot establish the principle of the eye's seeing. This matter has already been answered in the 'Going and Coming' chapter. Just as there is no going in what has already gone, no going in what has not yet gone, and no going in the time of going. Just as there is no burning in what has already been burned, what has not yet been burned, and the time of burning. Thus, there is no appearance of seeing in what has already been seen, what has not yet been seen, and the time of seeing. Furthermore,

'If seeing is in the time of not seeing, then it is not called seeing, but to say that seeing can see, this matter is not established.'

The eye cannot see when it is not facing a visible object (Rupa). At that time, it is not called seeing. It is because of facing a visible object that it is called seeing. Therefore, the verse says: 'When there is no seeing in the time of not seeing, how can one see with seeing?' Furthermore, there is no dharma (Dharma, meaning law, teaching, or phenomenon) of seeing in either place. Why is that?

'Seeing cannot have seeing, non-seeing also cannot see, if seeing has already been refuted, then the seer is also refuted.'

Seeing cannot see; this has already been said. Non-seeing also cannot see because there is no appearance of seeing. If there is no appearance of seeing, how can one see? If the dharma of seeing is absent, then the seer is also absent. Why is that? If there is a seer apart from seeing, then someone without eyes should also be able to see with other sense organs. If one sees with seeing, then there is an appearance of seeing in seeing, and the seer has no appearance of seeing. Therefore, the verse says: 'If seeing has already been refuted, then the seer is also refuted.' Furthermore,

'Apart from seeing or not apart from seeing, the seer is unattainable, because there is no seer, where is there seeing and what is seen?'

If there is seeing to see the seer, that is not established. If there is no seeing to see the seer

亦不成。見者無故。云何有見可見。若無見者。誰能用見法分別外色。是故偈中說。以無見者故何有見可見。複次。

見可見無故　　識等四法無　四取等諸緣　　云何當得有

見可見法無故。識觸受愛四法皆無。以無愛等故。四取等十二因緣分亦無。複次。

耳鼻舌身意　　聲及聞者等　當知如是義　　皆同於上說

如見可見法空。屬眾緣故無決定。余耳等五情聲等五塵。當知亦同見可見法。義同故不別說。

中論觀五陰品第四(九偈)

問曰。經說有五陰。是事云何。答曰。

若離於色因　　色則不可得　若當離於色　　色因不可得

色因者。如布因縷。除縷則無布。除布則無縷。布如色縷如因。問曰若離色因有色。有何過。答曰。

離色因有色　　是色則無因　無因而有法　　是事則不然

如離縷有布。布則無因。無因而有法。世間所無有。問曰。佛法外道法世間法中皆有無因法。佛法有三無為。無為常故無因。外道法中虛空時方神微塵涅槃等。世間法虛空時方等。是三法無處不有。故名為常。常故無因。汝何以說無因法世間所無。答曰。此無因法但有言說。思惟分別則皆無。若法從因緣有。不應言無因。若無因緣則如我說。問曰。有二種因。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本也不成立。能見者沒有緣故，怎麼會有能見和所見呢？如果沒有能見者，誰能用見的法來分別外在的色塵呢？所以偈頌中說，因為沒有能見者，哪裡會有能見和所見呢？再者。

能見所見若皆無，識等四法亦皆空，四取等諸緣亦無，云何當得而有之？

能見和所見之法既然沒有，識、觸、受、愛這四法也就都沒有了。因為沒有愛等，四取等十二因緣分也就沒有了。再者。

耳鼻舌身意，聲及聞者等，當知如是義，皆同於上說。

如同能見和所見之法是空，因為依屬眾緣所以沒有決定性。其餘的耳等五根，聲等五塵，應當知道也和能見所見之法一樣。意義相同所以不再分別說明。

《中論·觀五陰品》第四（九偈）

問：經典上說有五陰（skandha，蘊），這件事是怎麼回事？答：

若離於色因，色則不可得，若當離於色，色因不可得。

色因，比如布的因是線。除去線就沒有布，除去布就沒有線。布就像色，線就像因。問：如果離開色因而有色，有什麼過失？答：

離色因有色，是色則無因，無因而有法，是事則不然。

如同離開線而有布，布就沒有原因。沒有原因而有法，這是世間所沒有的。問：佛法、外道法、世間法中都有無因法。佛法中有三種無為法（asaṃskṛta-dharma），無為法是常住的所以沒有原因。外道法中有虛空、時間、方位、神我、微塵、涅槃等。世間法中也有虛空、時間、方位等。這三種法無處不在，所以稱為常住。常住所以沒有原因。你為什麼說無因法是世間所沒有的？答：這些無因法只是言說上的存在，如果進行思惟分別，則都是沒有的。如果法是從因緣而有的，就不應該說是無因。如果沒有因緣，那就如我所說。問：有兩種因。

【English Translation】 English version It is also not established. The seer has no cause, how can there be seeing and what is seen? If there is no seer, who can use the law of seeing to distinguish external sense objects? Therefore, the verse says, 'Because there is no seer, how can there be seeing and what is seen?' Furthermore,

If seeing and what is seen do not exist, the four dharmas of consciousness, etc., do not exist. If there is no love, etc., the twelve links of dependent origination, such as the four attachments, also do not exist. Furthermore,

Ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, sound, and the hearer, etc., should be known that these meanings are all the same as what was said above.

Just as the dharma of seeing and what is seen is empty, because it depends on conditions, it is not definite. The remaining five senses such as ear, etc., and the five sense objects such as sound, etc., should also be known to be the same as the dharma of seeing and what is seen. The meaning is the same, so it is not explained separately.

Chapter Four: Examination of the Five Skandhas (Nine Verses) from the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Treatise on the Middle Way)

Question: The scriptures say that there are five skandhas (pañca-skandha, aggregates). What is this about? Answer:

If apart from the cause of form (rūpa), form cannot be obtained. If there is separation from form, the cause of form cannot be obtained.

The cause of form is like the threads that make up cloth. Without threads, there is no cloth; without cloth, there are no threads. Cloth is like form, and threads are like the cause. Question: If form exists apart from the cause of form, what is the fault? Answer:

If form exists apart from the cause of form, then this form has no cause. If a dharma exists without a cause, this is not so.

It is like cloth existing without threads; the cloth would have no cause. For a dharma to exist without a cause is something that does not exist in the world. Question: In the Buddha-dharma, the non-Buddhist teachings, and worldly dharmas, there are causeless dharmas. In the Buddha-dharma, there are three unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta-dharma). Because the unconditioned is permanent, it has no cause. In non-Buddhist teachings, there are space (ākāśa), time (kāla), direction (dik), self (ātman), atoms (paramāṇu), nirvāṇa, etc. In worldly dharmas, there are also space, time, direction, etc. These three dharmas are everywhere, so they are called permanent. Because they are permanent, they have no cause. Why do you say that causeless dharmas do not exist in the world? Answer: These causeless dharmas only exist in speech. If one thinks and analyzes them, they are all non-existent. If a dharma arises from causes and conditions, it should not be said to be causeless. If there are no causes and conditions, then it is as I have said. Question: There are two kinds of causes.

一者作因。二者言說因。是無因法無作因。但有言說因。令人知故。答曰。雖有言說因。是事不然。虛空如六種中破。餘事后當破。複次現事尚皆可破。何況微塵等不可見法。是故說無因法世間所無。問曰。若離色有色因。有何過。答曰。

若離色有因　　則是無果因　若言無果因　　則無有是處

若除色果。但有色因者。即是無果因。問曰。若無果有因。有何咎。答曰。無果有因世間所無。何以故。以果故名為因。若無果云何名因。複次若因中無果者。物何以不從非因生。是事如破因緣品中說。是故無有無果因。複次。

若已有色者　　則不用色因　若無有色者　　亦不用色因

二處有色因。是則不然。若先因中有色。不名為色因。若先因中無色。亦不名為色因。問曰。若二處俱不然。但有無因色。有何咎。答曰。

無因而有色　　是事終不然　是故有智者　　不應分別色

若因中有果因中無果。此事尚不可得何況無因有色。是故言無因而有色。是事終不然。是故有智者。不應分別色。分別名凡夫。以無明愛染貪著色。然後以邪見生分別戲論說因中有果無果等。今此中求色不可得。是故智者不應分別。複次。

若果似於因　　是事則不然　果若不似因　　是事亦不然

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本一者是『作因』（karma hetu，行為之因）。二者是『言說因』（vacana hetu，言語表達之因）。對於『無因法』（ahetuka dharma，無因之法）來說，沒有『作因』，只有『言說因』，是爲了讓人瞭解它。回答說：即使有『言說因』，這件事也是不成立的。就像在六種破法中破斥虛空一樣，其餘的事情以後再破斥。進一步說，現在的事物尚且都可以破斥，更何況微塵等不可見的法呢？所以說，『無因法』是世間所沒有的。問：如果離開色（rupa，物質）而有色的因，會有什麼過失？答：　若離色有因　　則是無果因　若言無果因　　則無有是處如果去除色果，只有色的因，那就是『無果因』。問：如果沒有果而有因，有什麼過錯？答：沒有果而有因，是世間所沒有的。為什麼呢？因為有了果才能稱為因，如果沒有果，怎麼能稱為因呢？進一步說，如果因中沒有果，那麼事物為什麼不從非因中產生呢？這件事就像在破因緣品中所說的那樣。所以沒有『無果因』。進一步說：　若已有色者　　則不用色因　若無有色者　　亦不用色因在兩種情況下都有色因，這是不成立的。如果先前的因中已經有色，就不能稱為色因。如果先前的因中沒有色，也不能稱為色因。問：如果兩種情況都不成立，只有無因的色，會有什麼過錯？答：　無因而有色　　是事終不然　是故有智者　　不應分別色如果因中有果，因中無果，這件事尚且不可能成立，更何況無因而有色呢？所以說，無因而有色，這件事終究是不成立的。因此，有智慧的人不應該分別色。分別就是凡夫，因為無明、愛染而貪著色，然後以邪見產生分別戲論，說因中有果、無果等等。現在在這裡尋求色是不可得的，所以智者不應該分別。進一步說：　若果似於因　　是事則不然　果若不似因　　是事亦不然

【English Translation】 English version Firstly, there is 『karma hetu』 (作因, the cause of action). Secondly, there is 『vacana hetu』 (言說因, the cause of verbal expression). For 『ahetuka dharma』 (無因法, causeless dharmas), there is no 『karma hetu』, but only 『vacana hetu』, which is for the purpose of making it known to others. The answer is: even if there is 『vacana hetu』, this matter is not established. Just as emptiness is refuted in the six types of refutation, the remaining matters will be refuted later. Furthermore, even present matters can be refuted, let alone invisible dharmas such as atoms? Therefore, it is said that 『ahetuka dharma』 does not exist in the world. Question: If there is a cause of rupa (色, form/matter) apart from rupa, what fault would there be? Answer: 　If there is a cause apart from rupa, then it is a cause without a result. 　If you say there is a cause without a result, then there is no such thing. If you remove the result of rupa, and only have the cause of rupa, then it is a 『cause without a result』. Question: If there is a cause without a result, what is the fault? Answer: A cause without a result does not exist in the world. Why? Because it is called a cause because of the result. If there is no result, how can it be called a cause? Furthermore, if there is no result in the cause, then why do things not arise from non-causes? This matter is as explained in the chapter on refuting conditions. Therefore, there is no cause without a result. Furthermore: 　If there is already rupa, then the cause of rupa is not needed. 　If there is no rupa, then the cause of rupa is also not needed. Having the cause of rupa in both cases is not correct. If there is already rupa in the previous cause, it cannot be called the cause of rupa. If there is no rupa in the previous cause, it also cannot be called the cause of rupa. Question: If neither case is established, and there is only rupa without a cause, what fault would there be? Answer: 　If there is rupa without a cause, this is ultimately not possible. 　Therefore, wise people should not discriminate rupa. If there is a result in the cause, and no result in the cause, this matter is not possible, let alone rupa without a cause? Therefore, to say that there is rupa without a cause is ultimately not possible. Therefore, wise people should not discriminate rupa. Discrimination is the characteristic of ordinary people, because of ignorance and attachment, they are greedy for rupa, and then with wrong views, they generate discriminating conceptual proliferation, saying that there is a result in the cause, no result in the cause, and so on. Now, seeking rupa here is impossible, so wise people should not discriminate. Furthermore: 　If the result is similar to the cause, this is not correct. 　If the result is not similar to the cause, this is also not correct.

若果與因相似。是事不然。因細果粗故。因果色力等各異。如布似縷則不名布。縷多布一故。不得言因果相似。若因果不相似。是亦不然。如麻縷不成絹。粗縷無出細布。是故不得言因果不相似。二義不然。故無色無色因。

受陰及想陰　　行陰識陰等　其餘一切法　　皆同於色陰

四陰及一切法。亦應如是思惟破。又今造論者。欲讚美空義故。而說偈。

若人有問者　　離空而欲答　是則不成答　　俱同於彼疑　若人有難問　　離空說其過　是不成難問　　俱同於彼疑

若人論議時。各有所執。離於空義而有問答者。皆不成問答。俱亦同疑。如人言瓶是無常。問者言。何以故無常。答言。從無常因生故。此不名答。何以故。因緣中亦疑不知為常為無常。是為同彼所疑。問者若欲說其過。不依于空而說諸法無常。則不名問難。何以故。汝因無常破我常。我亦因常破汝無常。若實無常則無業報。眼耳等諸法念念滅。亦無有分別。有如是等過。皆不成問難。同彼所疑。若依空破常者。則無有過。何以故。此人不取空相故。是故若欲問答。尚應依于空法。何況欲求離苦寂滅相者。◎

◎中論觀六種品第五(八偈)

問曰。六種各有定相。有定相故則有六種。答曰。

空

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本如果（果）與因相似，這是不對的。因為因細小而果粗大，因和果在顏色、力量等方面都各不相同。例如，如果布像線一樣，那就不能稱為布了，因為線多而布只有一塊。所以不能說因果相似。如果因果不相似，這也是不對的。例如，麻線不能變成絹，粗線也無法織出細布。因此，不能說因果不相似。因果相似和不相似這兩種觀點都不成立，所以無色（Rupa，物質）和無色（Arupa，非物質）都沒有因。

受陰（Vedana-skandha，感受蘊）以及想陰（Samjna-skandha，知覺蘊）、行陰（Samskara-skandha，意志蘊）、識陰（Vijnana-skandha，意識蘊）等，其餘一切法（Dharma，事物、現象），都與色陰（Rupa-skandha，色蘊）相同。

四陰（四大蘊，即受、想、行、識）以及一切法，也應該這樣思維來破斥。現在造論者，爲了讚美空（Sunyata，空性）的意義，所以說了以下偈頌：

如果有人提問，離開空性而想要回答，那就不成其為回答，（提問者和回答者）都同樣處於疑惑之中。如果有人提出詰難，離開空性而說出過失，那就不成其為詰難，（提問者和回答者）都同樣處於疑惑之中。

如果人們在辯論時，各自有所執著，離開空性的意義而進行問答，那都不成其為問答，雙方都同樣處於疑惑之中。例如，有人說瓶子是無常的，提問者說：『為什麼是無常的？』回答說：『因為是從無常的因產生的。』這不能稱為回答。為什麼呢？因為在因緣（Hetu-pratyaya，原因和條件）中，也疑惑不知道是常還是無常。這就是與提問者同樣處於疑惑之中。如果提問者想要說出過失，不依據空性而說諸法是無常的，那就不成其為問難。為什麼呢？你因為無常來破斥我的常，我也能因為常來破斥你的無常。如果確實是無常，那就沒有業報（Karma-phala，行為的果報），眼耳等諸法念念生滅，也就沒有分別。有像這樣的過失，都不成其為問難，與提問者同樣處於疑惑之中。如果依據空性來破斥常，那就沒有過失。為什麼呢？因為這個人不執取空相（Sunyata-lakshana，空性的表相）。所以，如果想要問答，尚且應該依據空法（Sunyata-dharma，空性的法），更何況是想要尋求離苦寂滅（Nirvana，涅槃）之相的人呢！

《中論·觀六種品》第五（八偈）

問：六種（六根，即眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）各有其固定的體相，因為有固定的體相，所以有六種。答：

空（Sunyata，空性）

【English Translation】 English version If the effect is similar to the cause, that is not the case. Because the cause is subtle and the effect is coarse, the cause and effect are different in color, strength, and so on. For example, if cloth is like thread, it is not called cloth, because there are many threads but only one piece of cloth. Therefore, it cannot be said that cause and effect are similar. If cause and effect are not similar, that is also not the case. For example, hemp thread cannot become silk, and coarse thread cannot produce fine cloth. Therefore, it cannot be said that cause and effect are not similar. Since both views of similarity and dissimilarity are not valid, there is no cause for either Rupa (form, matter) or Arupa (formless, non-matter).

The Vedana-skandha (aggregate of feeling), as well as the Samjna-skandha (aggregate of perception), Samskara-skandha (aggregate of mental formations), Vijnana-skandha (aggregate of consciousness), and all other Dharmas (things, phenomena), are the same as the Rupa-skandha (aggregate of form).

The four Skandhas (four aggregates, namely feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness) and all Dharmas should also be refuted by thinking in this way. Now, the author of this treatise, in order to praise the meaning of Sunyata (emptiness), speaks the following verses:

If someone asks a question, wanting to answer apart from emptiness, then it is not an answer, and (the questioner and the answerer) are both in the same doubt. If someone raises a challenge, speaking of faults apart from emptiness, then it is not a challenge, and (the questioner and the answerer) are both in the same doubt.

If people are debating, each clinging to their own views, and engage in questions and answers apart from the meaning of emptiness, then it is not a question and answer, and both sides are in the same doubt. For example, someone says that a bottle is impermanent, and the questioner says: 'Why is it impermanent?' The answer is: 'Because it is produced from an impermanent cause.' This cannot be called an answer. Why? Because in Hetu-pratyaya (cause and condition), there is also doubt whether it is permanent or impermanent. This is being in the same doubt as the questioner. If the questioner wants to point out faults, speaking of Dharmas as impermanent without relying on emptiness, then it is not a challenge. Why? You use impermanence to refute my permanence, and I can also use permanence to refute your impermanence. If it is truly impermanent, then there is no Karma-phala (result of actions), and the eyes, ears, and other Dharmas arise and cease in every moment, and there is no distinction. Having such faults, it is not a challenge, and is in the same doubt as the questioner. If one relies on emptiness to refute permanence, then there is no fault. Why? Because this person does not grasp the Sunyata-lakshana (characteristic of emptiness). Therefore, if one wants to ask and answer, one should rely on the Sunyata-dharma (teaching of emptiness), let alone those who want to seek the aspect of Nirvana (liberation) from suffering and tranquility!

Chapter Five of the Madhyamakakarika, 'Examination of the Six', (Eight Verses)

Question: The six (six sense organs, namely eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind) each have their fixed characteristics, and because they have fixed characteristics, there are six. Answer:

Sunyata (emptiness)

相未有時　　則無虛空法　若先有虛空　　即為是無相

若未有虛空相。先有虛空法者。虛空則無相。何以故無色處名虛空相。色是作法無常。若色未生。未生則無滅。爾時無虛空相。因色故有無色處。無色處名虛空相。問曰。若無相有虛空。有何咎。答曰。

是無相之法　　一切處無有　于無相法中　　相則無所相

若於常無常法中。求無相法不可得。如論者言。是有是無雲何知各有相。故生住滅是有為相。無生住滅是無為相。虛空若無相。則無虛空。若謂先無相后相來相者。是亦不然。若先無相。則無法可相。何以故。

有相無相中　　相則無所住　離有相無相　　余處亦不住

如有峰有角尾端有毛頸下垂𩑶。是名牛相。若離是相則無牛。若無牛是諸相無所住。是故說于無相法中相則無所相。有相中相亦不住。先有相故。如水相中火相不住。先有自相故。複次若無相中相住者。則為無因。無因名為無法。而有相．相．可相。常相因待故。離有相無相法。更無第三處可相。是故偈中說離有相無相余處亦不住。複次。

相法無有故　　可相法亦無　可相法無故　　相法亦復無

相無所住故。則無可相法。可相法無故。相法亦無。何以故。因相有可相。因可相有相。共相

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『相未有時，則無虛空法；若先有虛空，即為是無相。』如果『相』（Lakshana，事物所具有的特徵或屬性）還沒有出現的時候，那麼就沒有『虛空法』（Akasa-dharma，虛空的性質或法則）。如果先有虛空，那麼它就是沒有『相』的。如果還沒有虛空的『相』，卻先有虛空的『法』，那麼虛空就沒有『相』。為什麼呢？因為沒有色之處才叫做虛空的『相』。色是『作法』（ কৃতক，有為法），是無常的。如果色還沒有產生，沒有產生就不會有滅。那時就沒有虛空的『相』。因為色的緣故，才有了沒有色的地方，沒有色的地方才叫做虛空的『相』。問：如果沒有『相』卻有虛空，有什麼過失？答：『是無相之法，一切處無有；于無相法中，相則無所相。』如果在常與無常的法中，尋求沒有『相』的法是不可得的。正如論者所說：『是有是無，怎麼知道各有相？』所以生、住、滅是有為的『相』，無生、住、滅是無為的『相』。虛空如果沒有『相』，那麼就沒有虛空。如果說先沒有『相』，後來『相』才來，這也是不對的。如果先沒有『相』，就沒有法可以去『相』（觀察、認識）。為什麼呢？『有相無相中，相則無所住；離有相無相，余處亦不住。』比如有峰、有角、尾端有毛、頸下垂皮，這叫做牛的『相』。如果離開了這些『相』，就沒有牛。如果沒有牛，這些『相』就沒有所依之處。所以說在沒有『相』的法中，『相』就沒有所『相』（依附的對象）。在有『相』中，『相』也不能住，因為先有『相』的緣故。比如在水的『相』中，火的『相』不能住，因為水先有自己的『相』的緣故。再次，如果沒有『相』，『相』卻能住，那就是沒有原因。沒有原因就叫做沒有法，卻有『相』、『相』、可以『相』，這是常相依賴的緣故。離開了有『相』和無『相』的法，就沒有第三個地方可以『相』。所以偈中說，離開了有『相』和無『相』，其他地方也不能住。再次：『相法無有故，可相法亦無；可相法無故，相法亦復無。』因為『相』沒有所住之處，所以就沒有可以『相』的法。可以『相』的法沒有了，『相』法也就沒有了。為什麼呢？因為有『相』才有可以『相』的，因為有可以『相』的才有『相』，是互相依賴的。 English version 'When 'lakshana' (characteristics or attributes of things) does not yet exist, then there is no 'akasa-dharma' (the nature or law of space). If space exists first, then it is without 'lakshana'.' If there is no 'lakshana' of space, but the 'dharma' of space exists first, then space has no 'lakshana'. Why? Because the place without 'rupa' (form) is called the 'lakshana' of space. 'Rupa' is 'kritaka' (conditioned), and is impermanent. If 'rupa' has not yet arisen, then there will be no cessation. At that time, there is no 'lakshana' of space. Because of 'rupa', there is a place without 'rupa', and the place without 'rupa' is called the 'lakshana' of space. Question: If there is space without 'lakshana', what is the fault? Answer: 'This dharma without 'lakshana' does not exist anywhere; in the dharma without 'lakshana', 'lakshana' has nothing to be attached to.' If one seeks a dharma without 'lakshana' in the dharma of permanence and impermanence, it is unattainable. As the debater says: 'There is existence and non-existence, how do we know that each has its own 'lakshana'?' Therefore, arising, abiding, and ceasing are the 'lakshana' of the conditioned; non-arising, non-abiding, and non-ceasing are the 'lakshana' of the unconditioned. If space has no 'lakshana', then there is no space. If it is said that there was no 'lakshana' first, and then 'lakshana' came later, that is also incorrect. If there is no 'lakshana' first, then there is no dharma to 'lakshana' (observe, recognize). Why? 'In the presence of 'lakshana' and absence of 'lakshana', 'lakshana' has no place to dwell; apart from the presence of 'lakshana' and absence of 'lakshana', it does not dwell anywhere else.' For example, having a hump, having horns, having hair at the end of the tail, and having drooping skin under the neck, this is called the 'lakshana' of a cow. If these 'lakshanas' are absent, there is no cow. If there is no cow, these 'lakshanas' have nowhere to rely. Therefore, it is said that in the dharma without 'lakshana', 'lakshana' has nothing to 'lakshana' (attach to). In the presence of 'lakshana', 'lakshana' cannot dwell either, because 'lakshana' exists first. For example, in the 'lakshana' of water, the 'lakshana' of fire cannot dwell, because water has its own 'lakshana' first. Furthermore, if 'lakshana' can dwell without 'lakshana', then there is no cause. Having no cause is called having no dharma, but there is 'lakshana', 'lakshana', and can be 'lakshana', which is a constant mutual dependence. Apart from the dharma of presence of 'lakshana' and absence of 'lakshana', there is no third place to 'lakshana'. Therefore, the verse says that apart from the presence of 'lakshana' and absence of 'lakshana', it cannot dwell anywhere else. Again: 'Because the dharma of 'lakshana' does not exist, the dharma that can be 'lakshana' also does not exist; because the dharma that can be 'lakshana' does not exist, the dharma of 'lakshana' also does not exist.' Because 'lakshana' has no place to dwell, there is no dharma that can be 'lakshana'. If the dharma that can be 'lakshana' does not exist, then the dharma of 'lakshana' also does not exist. Why? Because there is 'lakshana' only when there is something that can be 'lakshana', and there is 'lakshana' only when there is something that can be 'lakshana', which is mutually dependent.

【English Translation】 English version 'When 'lakshana' (characteristics or attributes of things) does not yet exist, then there is no 'akasa-dharma' (the nature or law of space). If space exists first, then it is without 'lakshana'.' If there is no 'lakshana' of space, but the 'dharma' of space exists first, then space has no 'lakshana'. Why? Because the place without 'rupa' (form) is called the 'lakshana' of space. 'Rupa' is 'kritaka' (conditioned), and is impermanent. If 'rupa' has not yet arisen, then there will be no cessation. At that time, there is no 'lakshana' of space. Because of 'rupa', there is a place without 'rupa', and the place without 'rupa' is called the 'lakshana' of space. Question: If there is space without 'lakshana', what is the fault? Answer: 'This dharma without 'lakshana' does not exist anywhere; in the dharma without 'lakshana', 'lakshana' has nothing to be attached to.' If one seeks a dharma without 'lakshana' in the dharma of permanence and impermanence, it is unattainable. As the debater says: 'There is existence and non-existence, how do we know that each has its own 'lakshana'?' Therefore, arising, abiding, and ceasing are the 'lakshana' of the conditioned; non-arising, non-abiding, and non-ceasing are the 'lakshana' of the unconditioned. If space has no 'lakshana', then there is no space. If it is said that there was no 'lakshana' first, and then 'lakshana' came later, that is also incorrect. If there is no 'lakshana' first, then there is no dharma to 'lakshana' (observe, recognize). Why? 'In the presence of 'lakshana' and absence of 'lakshana', 'lakshana' has no place to dwell; apart from the presence of 'lakshana' and absence of 'lakshana', it does not dwell anywhere else.' For example, having a hump, having horns, having hair at the end of the tail, and having drooping skin under the neck, this is called the 'lakshana' of a cow. If these 'lakshanas' are absent, there is no cow. If there is no cow, these 'lakshanas' have nowhere to rely. Therefore, it is said that in the dharma without 'lakshana', 'lakshana' has nothing to 'lakshana' (attach to). In the presence of 'lakshana', 'lakshana' cannot dwell either, because 'lakshana' exists first. For example, in the 'lakshana' of water, the 'lakshana' of fire cannot dwell, because water has its own 'lakshana' first. Furthermore, if 'lakshana' can dwell without 'lakshana', then there is no cause. Having no cause is called having no dharma, but there is 'lakshana', 'lakshana', and can be 'lakshana', which is a constant mutual dependence. Apart from the dharma of presence of 'lakshana' and absence of 'lakshana', there is no third place to 'lakshana'. Therefore, the verse says that apart from the presence of 'lakshana' and absence of 'lakshana', it cannot dwell anywhere else. Again: 'Because the dharma of 'lakshana' does not exist, the dharma that can be 'lakshana' also does not exist; because the dharma that can be 'lakshana' does not exist, the dharma of 'lakshana' also does not exist.' Because 'lakshana' has no place to dwell, there is no dharma that can be 'lakshana'. If the dharma that can be 'lakshana' does not exist, then the dharma of 'lakshana' also does not exist. Why? Because there is 'lakshana' only when there is something that can be 'lakshana', and there is 'lakshana' only when there is something that can be 'lakshana', which is mutually dependent.

因待故。

是故今無相　　亦無有可相　離相可相已　　更亦無有物

于因緣中。本末推求。相可相決定不可得。是二不可得故。一切法皆無。一切法皆攝在相可相二法中。或相為可相。或可相為相。如火以煙為相。煙亦復以火為相。問曰。若無有有。應當有無。答曰。

若使無有有　　云何當有無　有無既已無　　知有無者誰

凡物若自壞。若為他壞。名為無。無不自有。從有而有。是故言若使無有有云何當有無。眼見耳聞尚不可得。何況無物。問曰。以無有有故無亦無。應當有知有無者。答曰。若有知者。應在有中應在無中。有無既破。知者亦同破。

是故知虛空　　非有亦非無　非相非可相　　餘五同虛空

如虛空種種求相不可得。餘五種亦如是。問曰。虛空不在初不在後。何以先破。答曰。地水火風眾緣和合故易破。識以苦樂因故知無常變異故易破。虛空無如是相。但凡夫悕望為有。是故先破。複次虛空能持四大。四大因緣有識。是故先破根本。餘者自破。問曰。世間人盡見諸法是有是無。汝何以獨與世間相違。言無所見。答曰。

淺智見諸法　　若有若無相　是則不能見　　滅見安隱法

若人未得道。不見諸法實相。愛見因緣故種種戲論。見法生時謂之

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本因緣和合而生。

因此現在沒有『相』（Lakshana，特徵），也沒有可以被視為『相』的事物。當『相』和可以被視為『相』的事物都消失後，就不再有任何東西存在。

在因緣關係中，從本到末推究，『相』和可以被視為『相』的事物，最終都是無法確定的。因為這二者都不可得，所以一切法皆為空無。一切法都包含在『相』和可以被視為『相』的這兩種法中。或者『相』成為可以被視為『相』的事物，或者可以被視為『相』的事物成為『相』。例如，火以煙為『相』，煙也以火為『相』。有人問：如果『有』不存在，那麼應該存在『無』。回答是：

如果『有』都不存在，怎麼會有『無』呢？當『有』和『無』都不存在時，誰又能知道『有』和『無』呢？

凡物若是自身壞滅，或是被他物破壞，就稱為『無』。『無』不是自身就有的，而是從『有』而來的。所以說，如果『有』都不存在，怎麼會有『無』呢？眼睛所見、耳朵所聞尚且不可得，更何況是『無』呢？有人問：因為『有』不存在，所以『無』也不存在，那麼應該有知道『有』和『無』的人存在。回答是：如果存在知道『有』和『無』的人，那麼這個人應該存在於『有』之中，或者存在於『無』之中。既然『有』和『無』都被破除了，那麼知道『有』和『無』的人也同樣被破除了。

因此要知道虛空（Akasha，空間）既非『有』也非『無』，既非『相』也非可以被視為『相』的事物，其餘五蘊（Skandha，色、受、想、行、識）也與虛空相同。

如同虛空，種種尋求其『相』都不可得，其餘五蘊也是如此。有人問：虛空不在最初，也不在最後，為什麼先破除虛空？回答是：地、水、火、風（四大元素）眾緣和合，所以容易被破除。識（Vijnana，意識）因為苦樂的原因，知道無常變異，所以容易被破除。虛空沒有這樣的『相』，只是凡夫希望它存在，所以先破除虛空。其次，虛空能夠承載四大，四大因緣和合產生識，所以先破除根本，其餘的自然就被破除了。有人問：世間人全都看到諸法是『有』是『無』，你為什麼唯獨與世間人相違背，說沒有所見？回答是：

淺薄的智慧看到諸法，要麼是『有』，要麼是『無』的『相』。這樣就不能見到寂滅之見，安穩之法。

如果人沒有得道，就不能見到諸法的實相。因為愛見（愛著和錯誤的見解）的因緣，所以產生種種戲論，見到法生起時，就認為...

【English Translation】 English version Arising from conditions.

Therefore, now there is no 'Lakshana' (characteristic), nor is there anything that can be regarded as a 'Lakshana'. When 'Lakshana' and what can be regarded as 'Lakshana' are gone, there is nothing left.

In the conditions of dependent origination, from beginning to end, examining 'Lakshana' and what can be regarded as 'Lakshana', ultimately they cannot be determined. Because these two are unattainable, all dharmas are empty. All dharmas are contained within these two dharmas of 'Lakshana' and what can be regarded as 'Lakshana'. Either 'Lakshana' becomes what can be regarded as 'Lakshana', or what can be regarded as 'Lakshana' becomes 'Lakshana'. For example, fire uses smoke as its 'Lakshana', and smoke also uses fire as its 'Lakshana'. Someone asks: If 'existence' does not exist, then 'non-existence' should exist. The answer is:

If 'existence' does not exist, how can there be 'non-existence'? When 'existence' and 'non-existence' do not exist, who can know 'existence' and 'non-existence'?

Anything that decays by itself or is destroyed by something else is called 'non-existence'. 'Non-existence' does not exist on its own but comes from 'existence'. Therefore, it is said, if 'existence' does not exist, how can there be 'non-existence'? What the eyes see and the ears hear are unattainable, let alone 'non-existence'. Someone asks: Because 'existence' does not exist, 'non-existence' also does not exist, so there should be someone who knows 'existence' and 'non-existence'. The answer is: If there is someone who knows, that person should exist in 'existence' or in 'non-existence'. Since 'existence' and 'non-existence' are both refuted, the knower is also refuted.

Therefore, know that Akasha (space) is neither 'existence' nor 'non-existence', Neither 'Lakshana' nor what can be regarded as 'Lakshana'; the remaining five Skandhas (form, feeling, perception, mental formations, consciousness) are the same as space.

Like space, seeking its 'Lakshana' in various ways is unattainable; the remaining five Skandhas are also like this. Someone asks: Space is neither at the beginning nor at the end, why refute space first? The answer is: Earth, water, fire, and wind (the four great elements) come together through various conditions, so they are easily refuted. Vijnana (consciousness) knows impermanence and change because of the causes of suffering and joy, so it is easily refuted. Space does not have such 'Lakshana'; it is only that ordinary people hope it exists, so space is refuted first. Secondly, space can hold the four great elements, and the four great elements give rise to consciousness through conditions, so the root is refuted first, and the rest will be refuted by themselves. Someone asks: Everyone in the world sees that all dharmas are 'existence' and 'non-existence', why do you alone contradict the world and say that there is nothing to see? The answer is:

Shallow wisdom sees dharmas as either 'existence' or 'non-existence'. Thus, they cannot see the cessation of views, the peaceful dharma.

If a person has not attained the Way, they cannot see the true nature of all dharmas. Because of the conditions of attachment and wrong views, various dramatic elaborations arise, and when they see a dharma arising, they think...

為有。取相言有。見法滅時謂之為斷。取相言無。智者見諸法生即滅無見。見諸法滅即滅有見。是故於一切法雖有所見。皆如幻如夢。乃至無漏道見尚滅。何況余見。是故若不見滅見安隱法者。則見有見無。

中論觀染染者品第六(十偈)

問曰。經說貪慾瞋恚愚癡。是世間根本。貪慾有種種名。初名愛次名著次名染次名淫慾。次名貪慾。有如是等名字此是結使。依止眾生眾生名染者。貪慾名染法。有染法染者故。則有貪慾。餘二亦如是。有瞋則有瞋者。有癡則有癡者。以此三毒因緣起三業。三業因緣起三界。是故有一切法答曰。經雖說有三毒名字。求實不可得。何以故。

若離於染法　　先自有染者　因是染欲者　　應生於染法　若無有染者　　云何當有染　若有若無染　　染者亦如是

若先定有染者。則不更須染。染者先已染故。若先定無染者。亦復不應起染要當先有染者然後起染。若先無染者。則無受染者。染法亦如是。若先離人定有染法。此則無因。云何得起似如無薪火。若先定無染法。則無有染者。是故偈中說若有若無染。染者亦如是。問曰。若染法染者先後相待生。是事不可得者。若一時生有何咎。答曰。

染者及染法　　俱成則不然　染者染法俱　　則無有相待

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『有』的產生，是由於執著于表象而說『有』。當看到法滅去的時候，就認為是斷滅。這也是由於執著于表象而說『無』。有智慧的人看到諸法生起即滅去，就不會有斷滅的見解。看到諸法滅去，也就滅除了『有』的見解。因此，對於一切法，即使有所見解，都應當視如幻象、如夢境。乃至無漏道（arya-marga，超越煩惱的道路）的見解尚且要滅除，更何況其他的見解呢？所以，如果不能見到滅除見解才能獲得安穩之法，就會落入『有』或『無』的偏見之中。

《中論·觀染染者品》第六（十偈）

問：經中說貪慾（raga，渴望）、瞋恚（dvesha，憎恨）、愚癡（moha，迷惑）是世間的根本。貪慾有種種名稱，最初名為愛（prema，喜愛），其次名爲著（asakti，執著），其次名為染（raga，污染），其次名為淫慾（kama，性慾），其次名為貪慾（lobha，貪婪）。有如此等等的名字，這些都是結使（klesha，煩惱）。依止於眾生的煩惱，眾生被稱為染者（rakta，被污染者），貪慾被稱為染法（ragadharma，污染之法）。因為有染法和染者，所以有貪慾。瞋恚和愚癡也是如此。因為這三種毒（trisa，三種煩惱）的因緣，產生三種業（karma，行為），三種業的因緣，產生三界（trayo dhatavah，欲界、色界、無色界）。所以說有一切法。答：經中雖然說了有三種毒的名字，但如果去尋求它們的真實體性，是不可得的。為什麼呢？

如果離開了染法（ragadharma，污染之法），先就存在染者（rakta，被污染者），因為有這個染欲者（rakta，被污染者），才應該產生染法（ragadharma，污染之法）。如果沒有染者（rakta，被污染者），怎麼會有染法（ragadharma，污染之法）呢？如果是有或沒有染法（ragadharma，污染之法），染者（rakta，被污染者）也是如此。

如果先已確定有染者（rakta，被污染者），就不需要再被污染了，因為染者（rakta，被污染者）先前已經被污染了。如果先前確定沒有染者（rakta，被污染者），也不應該產生污染，一定要先有染者（rakta，被污染者）然後才產生污染。如果先前沒有染者（rakta，被污染者），就沒有接受污染的人。染法（ragadharma，污染之法）也是如此。如果先離開人而確定有染法（ragadharma，污染之法），這就沒有原因，怎麼能夠生起呢？就像沒有柴火就不能生火一樣。如果先前確定沒有染法（ragadharma，污染之法），就沒有染者（rakta，被污染者）。所以偈頌中說，如果是有或沒有染法（ragadharma，污染之法），染者（rakta，被污染者）也是如此。問：如果染法（ragadharma，污染之法）和染者（rakta，被污染者）先後互相依賴而生，這件事是不可得的，如果同時產生有什麼過失呢？答：

染者（rakta，被污染者）和染法（ragadharma，污染之法）同時成立，那是不可能的。染者（rakta，被污染者）和染法（ragadharma，污染之法）同時存在，就沒有互相依賴的關係。

【English Translation】 English version: The arising of 'existence' is due to clinging to appearances and asserting 'existence.' When seeing the cessation of phenomena, it is regarded as annihilation. This is also due to clinging to appearances and asserting 'non-existence.' Wise individuals, seeing phenomena arise and immediately cease, will not have the view of annihilation. Seeing phenomena cease, they also eliminate the view of 'existence.' Therefore, regarding all phenomena, even if there is some understanding, it should be regarded as illusion, as a dream. Even the view of the arya-marga (arya-marga, the path beyond afflictions) should be eliminated, let alone other views. Therefore, if one cannot see that only by eliminating views can one attain the Dharma of peace, one will fall into the bias of 'existence' or 'non-existence.'

Chapter Six: An Examination of the Defiled and the Defiler from the Madhyamaka-karika (Ten Verses)

Question: The sutras say that raga (raga, desire), dvesha (dvesha, hatred), and moha (moha, delusion) are the roots of the world. Raga has various names, initially called prema (prema, love), then asakti (asakti, attachment), then raga (raga, defilement), then kama (kama, lust), then lobha (lobha, greed). There are such names, and these are kleshas (klesha, afflictions). Afflictions rely on sentient beings, and sentient beings are called raktas (rakta, the defiled). Raga is called ragadharma (ragadharma, the Dharma of defilement). Because there are ragadharma and raktas, there is raga. Dvesha and moha are also the same. Because of the causes and conditions of these three poisons (trisa, three poisons), three karmas (karma, actions) arise, and because of the causes and conditions of the three karmas, the three realms (trayo dhatavah, the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm) arise. Therefore, it is said that there are all dharmas. Answer: Although the sutras speak of the names of the three poisons, if one seeks their true nature, it is unattainable. Why?

If, apart from ragadharma (ragadharma, the Dharma of defilement), there already exists a rakta (rakta, the defiled), Because there is this rakta (rakta, the defiled), ragadharma (ragadharma, the Dharma of defilement) should arise. If there is no rakta (rakta, the defiled), how can there be ragadharma (ragadharma, the Dharma of defilement)? Whether there is or is not ragadharma (ragadharma, the Dharma of defilement), the rakta (rakta, the defiled) is also the same.

If it is already determined that there is a rakta (rakta, the defiled), then there is no need to be defiled again, because the rakta (rakta, the defiled) has already been defiled. If it is determined that there is no rakta (rakta, the defiled), then defilement should not arise either; there must first be a rakta (rakta, the defiled) before defilement arises. If there is no rakta (rakta, the defiled) beforehand, there is no one to receive defilement. Ragadharma (ragadharma, the Dharma of defilement) is also the same. If, apart from a person, it is determined that there is ragadharma (ragadharma, the Dharma of defilement), then there is no cause; how can it arise? It is like fire cannot arise without firewood. If it is determined that there is no ragadharma (ragadharma, the Dharma of defilement) beforehand, then there is no rakta (rakta, the defiled). Therefore, the verse says that whether there is or is not ragadharma (ragadharma, the Dharma of defilement), the rakta (rakta, the defiled) is also the same. Question: If ragadharma (ragadharma, the Dharma of defilement) and rakta (rakta, the defiled) arise successively, depending on each other, and this is unattainable, what is the fault if they arise simultaneously? Answer:

If the rakta (rakta, the defiled) and ragadharma (ragadharma, the Dharma of defilement) are established simultaneously, that is impossible. If the rakta (rakta, the defiled) and ragadharma (ragadharma, the Dharma of defilement) exist simultaneously, there is no relationship of mutual dependence.

若染法染者一時成。則不相待。不因染者有染法。不因染法有染者。是二應常。已無因成故。若常則多過。無有解脫法。複次今當以一異法。破染法染者。何以故。

染者染法一　　一法雲何合　染者染法異　　異法雲何合

染法染者。若以一法合。若以異法合。若一則無合。何以故。一法雲何自合。如指端不能自觸。若以異法合。是亦不可。何以故。以異成故。若各成竟不須複合。雖合猶異。複次一異俱不可。何以故。

若一有合者　　離伴應有合　若異有合者　　離伴亦應合

若染染者一。強名為合者。應離余因緣而有染染者。複次若一。亦不應有染染者二名。染是法染者是人。若人法為一。是則大亂。若染染者各異。而言合者。則不須余因緣而有合。若異而合者。雖遠亦應合。問曰。一不合可爾。眼見異法共合。答曰。

若異而有合　　染染者何事　是二相先異　　然後說合相

若染染者。先有決定異相。而後合者是則不合何以故。是二相先已異。而後強說合。複次。

若染及染者　　先各成異相　既已成異相　　云何而言合

若染染者先各成別相。汝今何以強說合相。複次。

異相無有成　　是故汝欲合　合相竟無成　　而復說異相

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果染法和染者同時產生，那麼它們之間就不需要互相依賴。不是因為有染者才會有染法，也不是因為有染法才會有染者。如果是這樣，那麼染者和染法就應該永遠存在，因為它們沒有產生的起因。如果它們是常存的，就會有很多過失，並且沒有解脫的方法。再者，現在我將用一異之法來破斥染法和染者。為什麼呢？

染者和染法是一體的，一體的法怎麼能結合呢？染者和染法是不同的，不同的法又怎麼能結合呢？

染法和染者，如果用一體的法來結合，或者用不同的法來結合。如果是一體，那就無法結合。為什麼呢？一體的法怎麼能自己結合自己呢？就像手指尖不能自己觸碰自己一樣。如果用不同的法來結合，這也是不可能的。為什麼呢？因為它們已經各自成立了。如果各自已經成立，就不需要再結合了。即使結合了，仍然是不同的。再者，一體和不同都不可行。為什麼呢？

如果一體可以結合，那麼離開伴侶也應該可以結合；如果不同可以結合，那麼離開伴侶也應該可以結合。

如果染和染者是一體的，勉強稱之為結合，那麼就應該離開其他的因緣而有染和染者。再者，如果是一體，也不應該有染和染者這兩個名稱。染是法，染者是人，如果人法為一，那就是大亂。如果染和染者各自不同，卻說它們結合，那麼就不需要其他的因緣而有結合。如果不同而能結合，那麼即使相隔遙遠也應該能結合。有人問：一體不能結合是可以理解的，但眼睛明明看到不同的法共同結合。回答說：

如果不同而能結合，那麼染和染者有什麼作用呢？因為這兩者先有不同的相狀，然後才說結合的相狀。

如果染和染者，先有決定的不同相狀，然後才結合，那麼這就不是結合。為什麼呢？因為這兩者的相狀已經不同，然後勉強說它們結合。再者，

如果染和染者，先各自成就了不同的相狀，既然已經成就了不同的相狀，為什麼還要說它們結合呢？

不同的相狀沒有成就，所以你想要結合它們；但結合的相狀最終沒有成就，卻又說它們是不同的相狀。

【English Translation】 English version: If the defiling dharma (R染法, dharma of defilement) and the defiler (染者, the one who is defiled) arise simultaneously, then they do not depend on each other. It is not because there is a defiler that there is a defiling dharma, nor is it because there is a defiling dharma that there is a defiler. If this is the case, then the defiler and the defiling dharma should be eternal, because they have no cause of arising. If they are eternal, there will be many faults, and there will be no method of liberation. Furthermore, now I will use the principle of one and different to refute the defiling dharma and the defiler. Why?

The defiler and the defiling dharma are one; how can one dharma combine? The defiler and the defiling dharma are different; how can different dharmas combine?

The defiling dharma and the defiler, if they combine with one dharma, or combine with different dharmas. If they are one, then there is no combination. Why? How can one dharma combine with itself? Just as the fingertip cannot touch itself. If they combine with different dharmas, this is also impossible. Why? Because they have already been established separately. If they have already been established separately, there is no need to combine them. Even if they are combined, they are still different. Furthermore, neither one nor different is feasible. Why?

If one can combine, then it should be able to combine without a companion; if different can combine, then it should also be able to combine without a companion.

If the defilement and the defiler are one, and it is forced to be called a combination, then there should be defilement and a defiler without other causes and conditions. Furthermore, if they are one, there should not be two names, 'defilement' and 'defiler'. Defilement is a dharma, and the defiler is a person. If person and dharma are one, then there is great chaos. If the defilement and the defiler are different, but it is said that they combine, then there is no need for other causes and conditions for the combination. If different can combine, then even if they are far apart, they should be able to combine. Someone asks: It is understandable that one cannot combine, but the eyes clearly see different dharmas combining together. The answer is:

If different can combine, then what is the use of the defilement and the defiler? Because these two first have different characteristics, and then it is said that they have the characteristic of combination.

If the defilement and the defiler first have definite different characteristics, and then combine, then this is not a combination. Why? Because the characteristics of these two are already different, and then it is forced to say that they combine. Furthermore,

If the defilement and the defiler first each achieve different characteristics, since they have already achieved different characteristics, why do you still say that they combine?

Different characteristics have not been achieved, so you want to combine them; but the characteristic of combination has ultimately not been achieved, yet you say that they are different characteristics.

汝已染染者異相不成故。復說合相。合相中有過。染染者不成。汝為成合相故。復說異相。汝自已為定。而所說不定。何以故。

異相不成故　　合相則不成　於何異相中　　而欲說合相

以此中染染者異相不成故。合相亦不成。汝於何異相中而欲說合相。複次。

如是染染者　　非合不合成　諸法亦如是　　非合不合成

如染恚癡亦如是。如三毒一切煩惱一切法亦如是。非先非后非合非散。等因緣所成。◎

中論卷第一大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1564 中論

中論卷第二

龍樹菩薩造梵志青目釋

姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯

◎觀三相品第七(三十五偈)

問曰。經說有為法有三相生住滅。萬物以生法生。以住法住。以滅法滅。是故有諸法。答曰不爾。何以故。三相無決定故。是三相為是有為能作有為相。為是無為能作有為相。二俱不然。何以故。

若生是有為　　則應有三相　若生是無為　　何名有為相

若生是有為。應有三相生住滅。是事不然。何以故。共相違故。相違者。生相應生法。住相應住法。滅相應滅法。若法生時。不應有住滅相違法。一時則不然。如明闇不俱。以是故生不應是有為法。住滅相亦應如是。問曰。若

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：你已經執著于能染者和所染者的不同之處，這種區分是不成立的。你又提出『合相』（samgraha-laksana，結合的相狀）的說法。但在『合相』中存在問題，能染者和所染者仍然不能成立。爲了成立『合相』，你又提出『異相』（bheda-laksana，差異的相狀）。你自認為已經確定了，但你所說的並不確定。為什麼呢？因為『異相』不能成立，所以『合相』也不能成立。在什麼樣的『異相』中，你想要說明『合相』呢？因為在這其中，能染者和所染者的『異相』不能成立，所以『合相』也不能成立。你想要在什麼樣的『異相』中說明『合相』呢？再者：像這樣，能染者和所染者，既不是『合』（samgraha，結合）也不是『不合』（asamgraha，不結合）。諸法也是這樣，既不是『合』也不是『不合』。由各種因緣和合而成。《中論》卷第一大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1564 《中論》《中論》卷第二龍樹菩薩造，梵志青目釋姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯觀三相品第七（三十五偈）問：經書中說，有為法（saṃskṛta-dharma，有生滅變化的法）有三種相狀，即生（jāti，生起）、住（sthiti，持續）、滅（bhaṅga，消滅）。萬物以生法而生，以住法而住，以滅法而滅。因此，諸法是存在的。答：不是這樣的。為什麼呢？因為這三種相狀沒有確定性。這三種相狀，是『有為』（saṃskṛta，有為法）能夠作為『有為相』（saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa，有為法的相狀），還是『無為』（asaṃskṛta，無為法）能夠作為『有為相』？兩者都不對。為什麼呢？如果『生』是『有為』，那麼就應該有三種相狀（生、住、滅）。如果『生』是『無為』，那怎麼能叫做『有為相』呢？如果『生』是『有為』，就應該有生、住、滅三種相狀。但這是不成立的。為什麼呢？因為這與『相』（lakṣaṇa，相狀）是相互違背的。所謂『相違』，就是『生』相應于『生法』，『住』相應于『住法』，『滅』相應于『滅法』。如果一個法在生起的時候，不應該有住和滅的相狀，這是相互違背的。一時俱有是不可能的，就像光明和黑暗不能同時存在一樣。因此，『生』不應該是『有為法』。『住』和『滅』的相狀也應該像這樣來理解。問：如果

【English Translation】 English version: You are already attached to the difference between the dyer and the dyed, but this distinction is not established. You then propose the concept of 'samgraha-laksana' (combined characteristics). However, there is a problem with 'samgraha-laksana'; the dyer and the dyed still cannot be established. To establish 'samgraha-laksana', you then propose 'bheda-laksana' (differentiated characteristics). You think you have already determined it, but what you say is not certain. Why? Because 'bheda-laksana' cannot be established, 'samgraha-laksana' also cannot be established. In what kind of 'bheda-laksana' do you want to explain 'samgraha-laksana'? Because in this, the 'bheda-laksana' of the dyer and the dyed cannot be established, 'samgraha-laksana' also cannot be established. In what kind of 'bheda-laksana' do you want to explain 'samgraha-laksana'? Furthermore: Like this, the dyer and the dyed are neither 'samgraha' (combined) nor 'asamgraha' (uncombined). All dharmas are also like this, neither 'samgraha' nor 'asamgraha'. They are formed by the aggregation of various causes and conditions. 'Mūlamadhyamakakārikā' (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way), Volume 1 Taisho Tripitaka Volume 30, No. 1564, 'Mūlamadhyamakakārikā' 'Mūlamadhyamakakārikā', Volume 2 Composed by Nagarjuna Bodhisattva, Commentary by Vimalākṣa Translated by Kumarajiva of the Yao Qin Dynasty Chapter 7: Examination of the Three Characteristics (Thirty-five Verses) Question: The sutras say that conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta-dharma) have three characteristics: origination (jāti), duration (sthiti), and cessation (bhaṅga). All things originate by the law of origination, abide by the law of duration, and cease by the law of cessation. Therefore, dharmas exist. Answer: It is not like that. Why? Because these three characteristics are not definite. Are these three characteristics conditioned (saṃskṛta) able to produce the characteristics of the conditioned (saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa), or are they unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) able to produce the characteristics of the conditioned? Neither is correct. Why? If origination (jāti) is conditioned (saṃskṛta), then it should have three characteristics (origination, duration, and cessation). If origination is unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), then how can it be called a characteristic of the conditioned (saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa)? If origination is conditioned, it should have three characteristics: origination, duration, and cessation. But this is not established. Why? Because it contradicts the characteristics. The so-called contradiction is that origination corresponds to the law of origination, duration corresponds to the law of duration, and cessation corresponds to the law of cessation. If a dharma is in the process of origination, it should not have the characteristics of duration and cessation, which are contradictory. It is impossible for them to exist simultaneously, just as light and darkness cannot exist at the same time. Therefore, origination should not be a conditioned dharma. The characteristics of duration and cessation should also be understood in the same way. Question: If

生非有為。若是無為有何咎。答曰。若生是無為。云何能為有為法作相。何以故。無為法無性故。因滅有為名無為。是故說不生不滅名無為相。更無自相。是故無法。不能為法作相。如兔角龜毛等不能為法作相。是故生非無為。住滅亦如是。複次。

三相若聚散　　不能有所相　云何於一處　　一時有三相

是生住滅相。若一一能為有為法作相。若和合能與有為法作相。二俱不然。何以故。若謂一一者。於一處中或有有相。或有無相。生時無住滅。住時無生滅。滅時無生住。若和合者。共相違法。云何一時俱。若謂三相更有三相者。是亦不然。何以故。

若謂生住滅　　更有有為相　是即為無窮　　無即非有為

若謂生住滅更有有為相。生更有生有住有滅。如是三相復應更有相。若爾則無窮。若更無相。是三相則不名有為法。亦不能為有為法作相。問曰。汝說三相為無窮。是事不然。生住滅雖是有為。而非無窮。何以故。

生生之所生　　生於彼本生　本生之所生　　還生於生生

法生時通自體七法共生。一法二生三住四滅五生生六住住七滅滅。是七法中。本生除自體。能生六法。生生能生本生。本生能生生生。是故三相雖是有為。而非無窮。答曰。

若謂是生生　　能生

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『生』不是『有為』（Samskrta-dharma，指由因緣和合而生的事物）。如果是『無為』（Asamskrta-dharma，指不生不滅、無造作的事物），那又有什麼過失呢？答：如果『生』是『無為』，怎麼能為『有為法』（Samskrta-dharma）作相（Laksana，指事物的特徵或標誌）呢？為什麼呢？因為『無為法』沒有自性（Svabhava，指事物自身存在的性質）。因為『有為』的滅盡，所以稱之為『無為』。因此說不生不滅名為『無為相』，更沒有自身的相狀。所以『無為法』不能為『有為法』作相，就像兔角、龜毛等不能為法作相一樣。所以『生』不是『無為』。『住』（Sthiti，指事物的持續）和『滅』（Bhanga，指事物的消滅）也是這樣。再說：如果生、住、滅三相是聚合或分散的，都不能作為其他事物的相。怎麼可能在一個地方、一個時間同時存在這三種相呢？這生、住、滅三相，如果每一個相都能為『有為法』作相，或者和合起來能為『有為法』作相，這兩種說法都不對。為什麼呢？如果說每一個相都能作相，那麼在一個地方，有時有相，有時沒有相。生的時候沒有住和滅，住的時候沒有生和滅，滅的時候沒有生和住。如果說是和合起來能作相，那麼這些相之間互相違背，怎麼能同時存在呢？如果說這三個相還有另外的三個相，那也是不對的。為什麼呢？如果說生、住、滅還有其他的『有為相』，那麼就會無窮無盡，如果沒有其他的相，那就不是『有為』。如果說生、住、滅還有其他的『有為相』，生還有生、住、滅，這樣這三個相就應該還有其他的相，如果這樣，就會無窮無盡。如果沒有其他的相，那麼這三個相就不能稱為『有為法』，也不能為『有為法』作相。問：你說這三個相會無窮無盡，這是不對的。生、住、滅雖然是『有為』，但不是無窮無盡的。為什麼呢？生所生的，又生於它本來的生；本來的生所生的，又生於生所生的。法產生的時候，連同自體共有七法同時產生：一法、二生、三住、四滅、五生生、六住住、七滅滅。在這七法中，本生除了自體，能生六法。生生能生本生，本生能生生生。所以這三個相雖然是『有為』，但不是無窮無盡的。答：如果說是『生生』能生...

【English Translation】 English version: 『Birth』 (Utpada) is not 『conditioned』 (Samskrta-dharma, referring to things that arise from the combination of causes and conditions). If it were 『unconditioned』 (Asamskrta-dharma, referring to things that neither arise nor cease, and are uncreated), what fault would there be? Answer: If 『birth』 were 『unconditioned』, how could it serve as a characteristic (Laksana, referring to the features or marks of things) for 『conditioned dharmas』 (Samskrta-dharma)? Why? Because 『unconditioned dharmas』 have no self-nature (Svabhava, referring to the inherent nature of things). Because of the cessation of the 『conditioned』, it is called 『unconditioned』. Therefore, it is said that not arising and not ceasing is called the 『characteristic of the unconditioned』, and there is no self-characteristic. Therefore, 『unconditioned dharmas』 cannot serve as characteristics for 『conditioned dharmas』, just as rabbit horns and turtle hair cannot serve as characteristics for dharmas. Therefore, 『birth』 is not 『unconditioned』. 『Duration』 (Sthiti, referring to the continuation of things) and 『cessation』 (Bhanga, referring to the extinction of things) are also like this. Furthermore: If the three characteristics of birth, duration, and cessation are either aggregated or dispersed, they cannot serve as characteristics for other things. How is it possible for these three characteristics to exist in one place and at one time? These three characteristics of birth, duration, and cessation, whether each individual characteristic can serve as a characteristic for 『conditioned dharmas』, or whether they can serve as a characteristic for 『conditioned dharmas』 when combined, both of these statements are incorrect. Why? If it is said that each individual characteristic can serve as a characteristic, then in one place, sometimes there is a characteristic, and sometimes there is no characteristic. At the time of birth, there is no duration or cessation; at the time of duration, there is no birth or cessation; at the time of cessation, there is no birth or duration. If it is said that they can serve as a characteristic when combined, then these characteristics contradict each other, how can they exist simultaneously? If it is said that these three characteristics have another three characteristics, that is also incorrect. Why? If it is said that birth, duration, and cessation have other 『conditioned characteristics』, then it would be endless; if there are no other characteristics, then it is not 『conditioned』. If it is said that birth, duration, and cessation have other 『conditioned characteristics』, birth would have birth, duration, and cessation; in this way, these three characteristics should have other characteristics. If this is the case, it would be endless. If there are no other characteristics, then these three characteristics cannot be called 『conditioned dharmas』, and they cannot serve as characteristics for 『conditioned dharmas』. Question: You say that these three characteristics would be endless, this is incorrect. Although birth, duration, and cessation are 『conditioned』, they are not endless. Why? What is born of birth, is born of its original birth; what is born of the original birth, is born of what is born of birth. When a dharma arises, along with itself, there are seven dharmas that arise simultaneously: one dharma, two births, three durations, four cessations, five births of birth, six durations of duration, and seven cessations of cessation. Among these seven dharmas, the original birth, excluding itself, can give rise to six dharmas. The birth of birth can give rise to the original birth, and the original birth can give rise to the birth of birth. Therefore, although these three characteristics are 『conditioned』, they are not endless. Answer: If it is said that the 『birth of birth』 can give rise to...

于本生　生生從本生　　何能生本生

若是生生能生本生者。是生生則不名從本生生。何以故。是生生從本生生。云何能生本生。複次。

若謂是本生　　能生於生生　本生從彼生　　何能生生生

若謂本生能生生生者。是本生不名從生生生。何以故。是本生從生生生。云何能生生生。生生法應生本生。而今生生不能生本生。生生未有自體。何能生本生。是故本生不能生生生。問曰。是生生生時非先非后。能生本生。但生生生時能生本生。答曰不然。何以故。

若生生生時　　能生於本生　生生尚未有　　何能生本生

若謂生生生時能生本生可爾。而實未有。是故生生生時。不能生本生。複次。

若本生生時　　能生於生生　本生尚未有　　何能生生生

若謂是本生生時能生生生可爾。而實未有。是故本生生時。不能生生生。問曰。

如燈能自照　　亦能照于彼　生法亦如是　　自生亦生彼

如燈入于闇室照了諸物。亦能自照。生亦如是。能生於彼。亦能自生。答曰不然。何以故。

燈中自無闇　　住處亦無闇　破闇乃名照　　無闇則無照

燈體自無闇。明所及處亦無闇。明闇相違故。破闇故名照。無闇則無照。何得言燈自照亦照彼。問曰。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本關於本生（Prakrti，自性、本源）

生生（Samskara，行）從本生（Prakrti）而來，那麼，生生（Samskara）又如何能產生本生（Prakrti）呢？

如果說生生（Samskara）能夠產生本生（Prakrti），那麼，這個生生（Samskara）就不能說是從本生（Prakrti）所生。為什麼呢？因為這個生生（Samskara）是從本生（Prakrti）所生，它又怎麼能產生本生（Prakrti）呢？再者：

如果說是本生（Prakrti）能產生生生（Samskara），本生（Prakrti）又從何而來？它又如何能產生生生（Samskara）呢？

如果說本生（Prakrti）能夠產生生生（Samskara），那麼，這個本生（Prakrti）就不能說是從生生（Samskara）所生。為什麼呢？因為這個本生（Prakrti）是從生生（Samskara）所生，它又怎麼能產生生生（Samskara）呢？生生（Samskara）的法理應當產生本生（Prakrti），但現在生生（Samskara）不能產生本生（Prakrti）。生生（Samskara）本身還沒有自體，又怎麼能產生本生（Prakrti）呢？因此，本生（Prakrti）不能產生生生（Samskara）。有人問：生生（Samskara）產生的時候，既非先也非后，就能產生本生（Prakrti），只是生生（Samskara）產生的時候才能產生本生（Prakrti）。回答說：不是這樣的。為什麼呢？

如果生生（Samskara）產生的時候，能夠產生本生（Prakrti），生生（Samskara）尚未存在，又怎麼能產生本生（Prakrti）呢？

如果說生生（Samskara）產生的時候能夠產生本生（Prakrti），這或許可以成立。但實際上生生（Samskara）尚未存在。因此，生生（Samskara）產生的時候，不能產生本生（Prakrti）。再者：

如果本生（Prakrti）產生的時候，能夠產生生生（Samskara），本生（Prakrti）尚未存在，又怎麼能產生生生（Samskara）呢？

如果說是本生（Prakrti）產生的時候能夠產生生生（Samskara），這或許可以成立。但實際上本生（Prakrti）尚未存在。因此，本生（Prakrti）產生的時候，不能產生生生（Samskara）。有人問：

如同燈能自己照亮，也能照亮其他事物，生法（Dharma，法）也是這樣，能自己產生，也能產生其他事物。

如同燈進入黑暗的房間，照亮所有的東西，也能自己照亮自己。生（生法）也是這樣，能產生其他事物，也能自己產生。回答說：不是這樣的。為什麼呢？

燈中自身沒有黑暗，所照之處也沒有黑暗，破除黑暗才叫做照亮，沒有黑暗就沒有照亮。

燈的本體自身沒有黑暗，光明所到達的地方也沒有黑暗。光明和黑暗是相互對立的，因為破除了黑暗才叫做照亮。沒有黑暗就沒有照亮，怎麼能說燈既能自己照亮也能照亮其他事物呢？有人問：

English version Concerning Prakrti (Original Nature/Source)

Samskara (Mental formations) arises from Prakrti (Original Nature/Source), then how can Samskara produce Prakrti?

If it is said that Samskara can produce Prakrti, then this Samskara cannot be said to arise from Prakrti. Why? Because this Samskara arises from Prakrti, how can it produce Prakrti? Furthermore:

If it is said that Prakrti can produce Samskara, from where does Prakrti arise? How can it produce Samskara?

If it is said that Prakrti can produce Samskara, then this Prakrti cannot be said to arise from Samskara. Why? Because this Prakrti arises from Samskara, how can it produce Samskara? The principle of Samskara should produce Prakrti, but now Samskara cannot produce Prakrti. Samskara itself does not yet have its own substance, how can it produce Prakrti? Therefore, Prakrti cannot produce Samskara. Someone asks: When Samskara arises, neither before nor after, it can produce Prakrti, only when Samskara arises can it produce Prakrti. The answer is: It is not like that. Why?

If when Samskara arises, it can produce Prakrti, Samskara does not yet exist, how can it produce Prakrti?

If it is said that when Samskara arises it can produce Prakrti, this might be established. But in reality, Samskara does not yet exist. Therefore, when Samskara arises, it cannot produce Prakrti. Furthermore:

If when Prakrti arises, it can produce Samskara, Prakrti does not yet exist, how can it produce Samskara?

If it is said that when Prakrti arises it can produce Samskara, this might be established. But in reality, Prakrti does not yet exist. Therefore, when Prakrti arises, it cannot produce Samskara. Someone asks:

Just as a lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate other things, the Dharma (Law/Principle) is also like this, it can produce itself and also produce other things.

Just as a lamp enters a dark room and illuminates all things, it can also illuminate itself. The Dharma is also like this, it can produce other things and also produce itself. The answer is: It is not like that. Why?

There is no darkness in the lamp itself, and there is no darkness where the light reaches, breaking the darkness is called illumination, without darkness there is no illumination.

The substance of the lamp itself has no darkness, and there is no darkness where the light reaches. Light and darkness are opposed to each other, because breaking the darkness is called illumination. Without darkness there is no illumination, how can it be said that the lamp can both illuminate itself and illuminate other things? Someone asks:

【English Translation】 English version Concerning Prakrti (Original Nature/Source)