T30n1566_般若燈論釋
大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 般若燈論釋
No. 1566 [cf. Nos. 1564, 1565, 1567]
般若燈論釋序
釋慧賾述
般若燈論者。一名中論。本有五百偈。龍樹菩薩之所作也。借燈為名者。無分別智。有寂照之功也。舉中標目者。鑒亡緣觀。等離二邊也。然則燈本無心。智也亡照。法性平等。中義在斯。故寄論以明之也。若夫尋詮滯旨。執俗迷真。顛沛斷常之間。造次有無之內。守名喪實。攀葉亡根者。豈欲爾哉。蓋有由矣。請試陳之。若乃構分別之因。招虛妄之果。惑業熏其內識。惡友結其外緣。致令慢聳崇山。見深滄海。恚火難觸。詞鋒罕當。聞說有而快心。聽談空而起謗。六種偏執。各謂非偏五百論師。爭興異論。或將邪亂正。或以偽齊真。識似悟而翻迷。教雖通而更壅。可謂捐珠玩石。棄寶負薪。觀畫怖龍。尋跡怯象。愛好如此。良可悲夫。龍樹菩薩救世挺生。呵嗜慾而發心。閱深經而自鄙。蒙獨尊之懸記。燃法炬于閻浮。且其地越初依。功超伏位。既窮一實。且究二能。佩兩印而定百家。混三空而齊萬物。點塵劫數。歷試諸難。悼彼群迷。故作斯論。文玄旨妙。破巧申工。被之鈍根。多生怯退。有分別明菩薩者。大乘法將。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本
大正藏第三十冊 No. 1566 《般若燈論釋》
No. 1566 [cf. Nos. 1564, 1565, 1567]
《般若燈論釋序》
釋慧賾 述
《般若燈論》（Prajna Pradipa）者，又名《中論》（Madhyamaka-karika）。原本有五百偈頌，是龍樹菩薩（Nagarjuna）所作。借用『燈』來命名，是因為無分別智（non-discriminating wisdom）具有寂靜照耀的功用。用『燈』來標明主旨，是爲了鑑別去除因緣觀，從而平等地遠離二邊（two extremes）。然而，燈本身沒有心識，智慧也超越了照耀。法性（Dharmata）是平等的，中道（Middle Way）的意義就在於此。所以，借用『論』來闡明它。如果有人尋求解說的文字而滯留在字句上，執著於世俗而迷惑于真理，在斷滅和常恒之間顛沛流離，在有和無的觀念中倉促行事，守著名相而喪失了實際，攀著樹葉而忘記了樹根，難道是他們想要這樣嗎？其中肯定有原因。請讓我嘗試說明一下。如果有人構建分別的因，招來虛妄的果，迷惑的業力薰染著他們的內在意識，惡友結成他們的外在因緣，導致傲慢高聳如山，見解深邃如海，嗔恚的火焰難以觸碰，言辭的鋒芒難以抵擋，聽到說『有』就感到高興，聽到談論『空』就產生誹謗，六種偏頗的執著，各自認為自己不是偏頗的。五百個論師，爭相興起不同的論點，或者用邪說擾亂正法，或者用虛偽冒充真理，認識好像覺悟了卻反而更加迷惑，教義雖然通達卻更加閉塞。這可以說是丟棄珍珠而玩弄石頭，拋棄寶藏而揹負柴薪，看到畫中的龍就感到害怕，尋著足跡卻害怕大象。愛好是這樣，實在令人悲哀啊！龍樹菩薩爲了拯救世人而降生，呵斥嗜慾而發起菩提心，閱讀深奧的經典而感到自己的不足，蒙受獨尊的授記，在閻浮提（Jambudvipa）燃起法炬。他的地位超越了初地菩薩，功德超過了伏位菩薩。他既窮盡了一實之理，又徹底研究了二能之用。佩戴著空有二印而降伏了百家，混合三空之理而齊同萬物。經歷瞭如塵沙劫數般的考驗，經歷了各種磨難。哀悼那些迷惑的眾生，所以撰寫了這部論典。文辭玄妙，旨意精微，破斥巧妙，闡述精工。被鈍根之人聽聞，多生都會怯懦退縮。有一位具有分別智慧的菩薩，是大乘佛法的將領。
【English Translation】 English version
Taiso Tripitaka Volume 30, No. 1566 《Prajna Pradipa Mula-Madhyamaka-vrtti》
No. 1566 [cf. Nos. 1564, 1565, 1567]
Preface to the Commentary on the 《Prajna Pradipa》
Composed by Shì Huìzé
The 《Prajna Pradipa》 (Prajna Pradipa), also known as the 《Madhyamaka-karika》 (Treatise on the Middle Way), originally consisted of five hundred verses and was composed by Nagarjuna (Longshu Pusa). The name 『Lamp』 is borrowed because non-discriminating wisdom (wu fenbie zhi) has the function of stillness and illumination. Using 『Lamp』 to mark the main point is to discern and eliminate the view of conditioned arising, thereby equally distancing oneself from the two extremes (er bian). However, the lamp itself has no consciousness, and wisdom transcends illumination. The Dharma-nature (faxing) is equal, and the meaning of the Middle Way (zhongdao) lies in this. Therefore, the 『Treatise』 is used to clarify it. If someone seeks the words of explanation and lingers on the sentences, clings to the mundane and is deluded by the truth, vacillates between annihilation and permanence, acts hastily within the concepts of existence and non-existence, holds onto names and loses reality, clings to leaves and forgets the roots, is this what they desire? There must be a reason. Please allow me to try to explain it. If someone constructs the cause of discrimination, invites the result of illusion, the karma of delusion薰染s their inner consciousness, evil friends form their external conditions, leading to arrogance towering like a mountain, views as deep as the sea, the flames of anger difficult to touch, the sharpness of words difficult to resist, feeling happy when hearing about 『existence,』 and giving rise to slander when hearing about 『emptiness,』 six kinds of biased attachments, each thinking they are not biased. Five hundred teachers, vying to raise different arguments, either disturbing the Dharma with heresy, or counterfeiting truth with falsehood, knowledge seeming like enlightenment but instead becoming more deluded, the teachings although accessible becoming more obstructed. This can be said to be discarding pearls and playing with stones, abandoning treasures and carrying firewood, being afraid of the dragon in the painting, being timid of the elephant by following its tracks. Such fondness is truly lamentable! Nagarjuna was born to save the world, rebuking desires and generating Bodhicitta (bodhi xin), reading profound scriptures and feeling his own inadequacy, receiving the prediction of the Unique Honored One, and lighting the Dharma-torch in Jambudvipa (Yanfuti). His position surpassed the first Bhumi (chudi) of Bodhisattvas, and his merits exceeded the position of subduing. He both exhausted the principle of One Reality and thoroughly studied the function of the Two Abilities. Wearing the two seals of emptiness and existence, he subdued hundreds of schools, and harmonized the principles of the three emptinesses, making all things equal. He experienced trials like dust-mote kalpas, and underwent various tribulations. Grieving for those deluded beings, he therefore wrote this treatise. The writing is profound and the meaning subtle, refuting skillfully and expounding meticulously. When heard by those of dull faculties, they will be timid and retreat for many lifetimes. There is a Bodhisattva with discriminating wisdom, who is a general of the Great Vehicle.
體道居衷。遐覽真言。為其釋論。開秘密藏。賜如意珠。略廣相成。師資互顯。至若自乘異執。郁起千端。外道殊計。紛然萬緒。驢乘競馳于駕駟。螢火爭耀于龍燭。莫不標其品類。顯厥師宗。玉石既分。玄黃已判。西域染翰。乃有數家。考實析微。此為精詣。若含通本末。有六千偈。梵文如此。翻則減之。我
皇帝神道邁于羲農。陶鑄侔于造化。一六合而貫三才。攝四生而弘十善。崇本息末。無為太平。守母存子。不言而治。偏復留心釋典。遐想至真。以為聖教東流。年淹數百。而億象所負。闕者猶多。希聞未聞勞于寤寐。中天竺國三藏法師波羅頗蜜多羅。唐言明友。學兼半滿。博綜群詮。喪我怡神。搜玄養性。遊方在念。利物為懷。故能附杙傳身。舉煙召伴。冒冰霜而越蔥嶺。犯風熱而渡沙河。時積五年。涂經四萬以大唐貞觀元年歲次娵觜十一月二十日。頂戴梵文。至止京輦。昔秦徴童壽。苦用戎兵。漢請摩騰。遠勞蕃使。詎可方茲感應。道契冥符。家國休祥。德人爰降。有司奏見。殊悅帝心。其年有敕安置大興善寺。仍請譯出寶星經一部。四年六月。移住勝光。乃召義學沙門慧乘。慧朗。法常。曇藏。智首。慧明。道岳。僧辯。僧珍。智解。文順。法琳。靈佳。慧賾。慧凈等傳譯。沙門玄謨。僧伽。及三
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 體悟真理在於內心。廣泛閱讀佛經真言，為其解釋和論述，開啟秘密寶藏，賜予如意寶珠。簡略和廣博相互補充，師父和弟子互相彰顯。至於那些自立門戶，持有不同見解的，像叢生的雜草一樣冒出千頭萬緒；外道的各種奇異想法，也像無數的絲線一樣紛亂。他們如同用驢車和駟馬車賽跑，螢火蟲和龍的蠟燭爭光。無不標榜自己的品類，彰顯自己的師承宗派。玉和石頭既然已經區分開來，黑色和黃色也已經判然不同。西域的佛教學者著書立說，也有好幾家，但要說考證詳實，分析精微，那就要數這部經書最為精妙了。如果包含全部內容，有六千頌（偈）。梵文是這樣，翻譯成漢語就會減少一些。我 皇帝的神聖功德超過了伏羲和神農，他的教化就像天地造物一樣偉大。他統一天下，貫穿天、地、人三才，教化所有眾生，弘揚十善。崇尚根本，抑制末節，實現無為而治的太平盛世。守護根本，愛護百姓，不用多說話就能治理好國家。他還特別關心佛經，嚮往最高的真理。他認為佛教傳入中國已經數百年，但還有很多經典沒有翻譯過來。他渴望聽到未曾聽過的佛法，為此日夜操勞。於是，他請來了中天竺國（古印度）的三藏法師波羅頗蜜多羅（Paramita，意為『度』或『到彼岸』），用漢語來說就是『明友』。這位法師學識淵博，精通大小乘佛教，廣泛研究各種經典。他捨棄自我，怡養精神，探索玄妙的佛理，培養善良的品性。他四處遊歷，心中想著利益眾生。所以他才能像接力一樣傳遞佛法，像用煙火召喚同伴一樣，不畏冰霜，翻越蔥嶺（帕米爾高原），不怕風熱，渡過沙漠。歷時五年，行程四萬里，在大唐貞觀元年，歲在娵觜（十二星次之一），十一月二十日，他帶著梵文佛經，來到了京城。過去秦國徵調童壽，費盡兵力；漢朝邀請摩騰，遠勞外國使者。怎麼能和這次的感應相比呢？這是道義相合，上天保佑，國家吉祥的徵兆，有德之人降臨了。有關部門上奏朝廷，皇帝非常高興。當年就下令將波羅頗蜜多羅安置在大興善寺，並請他翻譯《寶星經》一部。貞觀四年六月，又將他移到勝光寺。於是召集了義學沙門慧乘、慧朗、法常、曇藏、智首、慧明、道岳、僧辯、僧珍、智解、文順、法琳、靈佳、慧賾、慧凈等人來翻譯。還有沙門玄謨、僧伽，以及三
【English Translation】 English version: Realizing the truth resides within the heart. Widely peruse the true words of the scriptures, expounding and elucidating them, unlocking the secret treasury, bestowing the wish-fulfilling jewel. Brevity and extensiveness complement each other, teacher and disciple mutually illuminate. As for those who establish their own schools, holding divergent views, myriad strands arise like rampant weeds; the various peculiar notions of external paths are as chaotic as countless threads. They are like racing a donkey cart against a chariot drawn by four horses, fireflies vying for brilliance with a dragon's candle. All invariably proclaim their own categories, displaying their own lineage and school. Now that jade and stone have been distinguished, black and yellow have been clearly differentiated. Among the scholars of the Western Regions (India) who write and expound, there are several schools, but in terms of thorough examination and subtle analysis, this scripture is the most exquisite. If it contains the complete content, there are six thousand gathas (verses). Such is the Sanskrit text; when translated into Chinese, it will be reduced somewhat. I The Emperor's divine virtue surpasses that of Fuxi and Shennong, his transformative influence is comparable to the creation of the universe. He unifies the world, connecting the three realms of heaven, earth, and humanity, teaching all beings, promoting the ten virtues. He values the fundamental, suppresses the trivial, achieving a state of peaceful governance through non-action. He protects the root and cherishes the people, governing the country well without excessive words. He also pays particular attention to Buddhist scriptures, yearning for the highest truth. He believes that Buddhism has been introduced to China for hundreds of years, but there are still many scriptures that have not been translated. He longs to hear the Dharma he has not yet heard, laboring day and night for this purpose. Therefore, he invited the Tripitaka Master Paramita (meaning 'perfection' or 'gone beyond') from Central India (ancient India), whose Chinese name means 'Bright Friend'. This master is erudite, proficient in both Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhism, and extensively studies various scriptures. He abandons the self, nourishes the spirit, explores the profound Buddhist principles, and cultivates virtuous qualities. He travels everywhere, thinking of benefiting all beings. Therefore, he is able to pass on the Dharma like a relay, summoning companions like using smoke signals, braving frost and snow, crossing the Pamir Mountains (Congling), and enduring wind and heat, crossing the desert. After five years and a journey of forty thousand li, in the first year of the Zhenguan era of the Tang Dynasty, in the year of Zuzi (one of the twelve zodiacal divisions), on the twentieth day of the eleventh month, he arrived in the capital with the Sanskrit Buddhist scriptures. In the past, the Qin Dynasty conscripted Tongshou, expending great military force; the Han Dynasty invited Kasyapa Matanga, greatly troubling foreign envoys. How can this be compared to this response? This is a sign of the alignment of virtue, the blessing of heaven, and the auspiciousness of the country, a virtuous person has descended. The relevant departments reported to the court, and the Emperor was very pleased. In the same year, he ordered Paramita to be placed in the Daxingshan Temple and requested him to translate the 'Bao Xing Jing' (Ratnakuta Sutra). In June of the fourth year of Zhenguan, he was moved to Shengguang Temple. Thereupon, he summoned the erudite monks Huicheng, Huilang, Fachang, Tanzang, Zhishou, Huiming, Daoyue, Sengbian, Sengzhen, Zhijie, Wenshun, Falin, Lingjia, Huize, Huijing, and others to translate. Also, the monks Xuanmo, Sangha, and three
藏同學崛多律師等。同作證明。對翻此論。尚書左僕射邠國公房玄齡。太子詹事杜正倫。禮部尚書趙郡王李孝恭等。並是翊聖賢臣。佐時匡濟。盡忠貞而事主。外形骸以求法。自聖君肇慮。竟此弘宣。利深益厚。寔資開發。監譯。
敕使右光祿大夫太府卿蘭陵簫璟。信根篤始。慧力要終。寂慮尋真。虛心慕道。讚揚影響。勸助無輟。其諸德僧。夙興匪懈。研核幽旨。去華存實。目擊則欣其會理。函丈則究其是非。文雖定而覆詳。義乃明而重審。歲次壽星十月十七日。撿勘畢了。其為論也。觀明中道而存中失觀。空顯第一。而得一乖空。然則司南之車。本示迷者。照膽之鏡。爲鑑邪人。無邪則鏡無所施。不迷則車不為用。斯論破申。其由此矣。雖復斥內遮外。盡妄窮真。而存乎妙存。破如可破。蕩蕩焉。恢恢焉。迎之靡測其源。順之罔知其末。信是瑩心神之砥礪。越溟險之舟輿。駭昏識之雷霆。照幽涂之日月者矣。此土先有中論四卷。本偈大同。賓頭盧伽為其註解。晦其部執。學者昧焉。此論既興。可為明鏡。庶悟玄君子。詳而味之也。
般若燈論釋
觀緣品第一之一(卷一)
偈本龍樹菩薩 釋論分別明菩薩
大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅譯
普斷諸分別 滅一切戲論 能拔
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：藏地的同學崛多律師等人，一同為此翻譯作證明。負責校對翻譯此論的有：尚書左僕射、邠國公房玄齡（Fang Xuanling），太子詹事杜正倫（Du Zhenglun），禮部尚書、趙郡王李孝恭（Li Xiaogong）等人。他們都是輔佐聖上的賢臣，匡扶時政，竭盡忠誠侍奉君主，不拘外表形骸以求佛法。自從聖明的君主開始考慮此事，最終得以弘揚宣講，利益深遠而厚重，實在依賴於他們的開發。監譯者為： 敕使右光祿大夫、太府卿蘭陵蕭璟（Xiao Jing），他信念堅定始終如一，智慧之力貫穿始終，沉寂思慮以尋求真理，虛心向往佛道。讚揚弘揚佛法，勸勉幫助從不懈怠。還有那些有德行的僧人，早起勤奮不懈怠，研究探討深奧的旨意，去除浮華保留真實。親眼見到就欣喜于領會了道理，書信往來就探究其中的是非。文字雖然已經確定，但還要反覆詳細地審查；義理因此更加明瞭，還要重新審視。時間是歲星在壽星位置的十月十七日，檢查勘定完畢。這部論著，觀察光明中道而存在，執著于中道就失去了觀察；宣揚空性是第一要義，而執著于空性就違背了空性。如此說來，指南車本來是用來指示迷路的人的，照膽之鏡是用來鑑別邪惡的人的。沒有邪惡，鏡子就沒有用處；不迷路，指南車就沒有作用。這部論著的破斥申明，大概就是由此而來。雖然它既排斥內在的執著，又遮蔽外在的誘惑，窮盡虛妄而達到真理，但存在於精妙的存在之中，破斥如同可以破斥一樣。浩蕩啊，寬廣啊，迎接它無法測知它的源頭，順應它無法知道它的末尾。相信它是磨礪心神的砥石，是超越大海險境的舟船，是震懾昏昧認識的雷霆，是照亮幽暗道路的日月啊。此土先前有《中論》四卷，偈頌的原本大體相同，賓頭盧伽（Binduluojia）為它做了註解，隱晦了他的部派執著，學者們對此感到迷惑。這部論著既然興起，可以作為一面明鏡，希望領悟玄機的君子，詳細地品味它。
《般若燈論釋》
觀緣品第一之一（卷一）
偈頌的作者是龍樹菩薩（Nagarjuna），解釋論著的是分別明菩薩（Vimalakirti）。
大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅（Prabhakaramitra）翻譯
普遍斷除各種分別，滅除一切戲論，能夠拔除
【English Translation】 English version: The students from Tibet, including the lawyer Ju Duo, and others, jointly testified to this translation. Those responsible for proofreading and translating this treatise were: Fang Xuanling (Fang Xuanling), the Left Vice Director of the Department of State Affairs and Duke of Bin; Du Zhenglun (Du Zhenglun), the Grand Tutor to the Crown Prince; and Li Xiaogong (Li Xiaogong), the Minister of Rites and Prince of Zhao. They were all virtuous ministers who assisted the sage ruler, rectified the government, devoted their loyalty to serving the sovereign, and disregarded their outward appearances in pursuit of the Dharma. Since the wise ruler began to consider this matter, it has finally been promoted and propagated, with profound and substantial benefits, truly relying on their development. The supervisor of the translation was: Xiao Jing (Xiao Jing), the Imperial Envoy, Right Grand Master of the Palace, and Minister of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices from Lanling. He had firm faith from beginning to end, and his wisdom persisted throughout. He sought truth through silent contemplation and yearned for the Tao with a humble heart. He praised and promoted the Dharma, and his encouragement and assistance never ceased. There were also those virtuous monks who were diligent and tireless from morning till night, researching and exploring the profound meanings, removing the superficial and preserving the real. Upon seeing it, they rejoiced in understanding the principles; through correspondence, they investigated the rights and wrongs. Although the text had been finalized, it was still repeatedly and thoroughly examined; the meaning was thus made clearer, and it was re-examined. The time was the seventeenth day of the tenth month when the Jupiter was in the position of Longevity Star, and the examination and determination were completed. This treatise observes the Middle Way in the midst of brightness, and clinging to the Middle Way loses the observation; it proclaims emptiness as the foremost principle, and clinging to emptiness violates emptiness. Thus, the south-pointing chariot was originally intended to guide those who are lost, and the mirror for illuminating the gall was intended to distinguish the wicked. Without wickedness, the mirror would be useless; without being lost, the south-pointing chariot would be unnecessary. The refutation and declaration of this treatise probably arise from this. Although it both rejects internal attachments and shields against external temptations, exhausting falsehood and reaching truth, it exists in the subtle existence, and refutation is like something that can be refuted. Vast and expansive, welcoming it, one cannot fathom its source; following it, one cannot know its end. It is believed to be the whetstone for sharpening the mind and spirit, the boat for crossing the perilous sea, the thunder that startles the darkened consciousness, and the sun and moon that illuminate the dark path. Previously, there were four volumes of the Madhyamaka-karika in this land, with largely the same original verses. Binduluojia (Binduluojia) made annotations to it, obscuring his sectarian attachments, which confused scholars. Now that this treatise has arisen, it can serve as a clear mirror, hoping that gentlemen who understand the mysteries will carefully savor it.
Prajna-pradipa-mulatika
Chapter 1 on Conditions (Part 1 of Volume 1)
The verses were written by Nagarjuna (Nagarjuna), and the commentary was explained by Vimalakirti (Vimalakirti).
Translated by Prabhakaramitra (Prabhakaramitra), Tripitaka Master from Central India of the Great Tang Dynasty
Universally cutting off all discriminations, extinguishing all playful fabrications, able to uproot
除有根 巧說真實法 于非言語境 善安立文字 破惡慧妄心 是故稽首禮
釋曰。如是等偈。其義云何。我師聖者。如自所證。于深般若波羅蜜中。審驗真理。開顯實義。為斷諸惡邪慧網故。彼惡見者。雖修梵行。以迷惑故。皆成不善。今欲令彼悟解正道。依凈阿含。作此中論。宣通佛語。論所為者。其相云何。謂婆伽婆見彼無明眾生。世間起滅斷常一異來去等諸戲論網稠林所壞。起第一悲。發勇猛慧。于無量億百千俱胝那由他劫。為利益他。捐捨身命。無厭倦心。能擔無量福慧聚擔。鉆般若境界海。斷一切戲論網。非他緣無分別。得一切法真實甘露。于彼趣壽分齊。性處時等。攝受利益。不共一切聲聞緣覺。及諸外道唯為進趣第一乘者。依彼世諦。第一義諦。施設不起等諸名字句。此緣起實說中最勝。我阿阇梨亦于不起等文句。開示如來如實道理。得如實解。生極勇猛。如所通達。讚歎婆伽婆。故造此論。又悲水適心。驗已所解。令彼世間同已得解故出此言。如偈曰。
不滅亦不起 不斷亦不常 非一非種種 不來亦不去 緣起戲論息 說者善滅故 禮彼婆伽婆 諸說中最上
釋曰。彼句義次第。解無間故解此論義。是故初說。如是句義。破壞故滅。出生故起。相續死
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『除有根，巧說真實法，于非言語境，善安立文字，破惡慧妄心，是故稽首禮。』
釋曰：如是等偈，其義云何？我師聖者，如自所證，于深般若波羅蜜（Prajna Paramita，智慧到彼岸）中，審驗真理，開顯實義，為斷諸惡邪慧網故。彼惡見者，雖修梵行，以迷惑故，皆成不善。今欲令彼悟解正道，依凈阿含（Agama，佛教經藏），作此中論，宣通佛語。論所為者，其相云何？謂婆伽婆（Bhagavan，世尊）見彼無明眾生，世間起滅斷常一異來去等諸戲論網稠林所壞，起第一悲，發勇猛慧，于無量億百千俱胝那由他劫，為利益他，捐捨身命，無厭倦心，能擔無量福慧聚擔，鉆般若境界海，斷一切戲論網，非他緣無分別，得一切法真實甘露，于彼趣壽分齊，性處時等，攝受利益，不共一切聲聞緣覺，及諸外道唯為進趣第一乘者，依彼世諦，第一義諦，施設不起等諸名字句。此緣起實說中最勝。我阿阇梨亦于不起等文句，開示如來如實道理，得如實解，生極勇猛，如所通達，讚歎婆伽婆，故造此論。又悲水適心，驗已所解，令彼世間同已得解故出此言。如偈曰：
『不滅亦不起，不斷亦不常，非一非種種，不來亦不去，緣起戲論息，說者善滅故，禮彼婆伽婆，諸說中最上。』
釋曰：彼句義次第，解無間故解此論義。是故初說。如是句義。破壞故滅。出生故起。相續死
【English Translation】 English version 'Eliminating the root of existence, skillfully expounding the true Dharma, In the realm beyond words, skillfully establishing language, Destroying the evil wisdom and deluded mind, therefore, I bow in reverence.'
Explanation: What is the meaning of these verses? My teacher, the Holy One, based on his own realization, thoroughly examined the truth in the profound Prajna Paramita (Perfection of Wisdom), revealed the true meaning, and aimed to sever the nets of evil and heretical wisdom. Those with evil views, though practicing pure conduct, are rendered unwholesome due to delusion. Now, desiring to lead them to awaken to the right path, relying on the pure Agama (Buddhist scriptures), he composes this treatise to communicate the Buddha's words. What is the purpose of this treatise? It is that the Bhagavan (Blessed One) saw those ignorant beings ruined by the dense forest of nets of discursive fabrications such as arising and ceasing, permanence and impermanence, oneness and otherness, coming and going, etc., arose with supreme compassion, generated courageous wisdom, and for countless billions of hundreds of thousands of kotis of nayutas of kalpas, for the benefit of others, gave up his body and life without weariness, able to bear the burden of immeasurable accumulations of merit and wisdom, penetrated the ocean of Prajna, severed all nets of discursive fabrications, without dependence on others and without discrimination, attained the true nectar of all dharmas, and in accordance with their life span, nature, place, time, etc., received and benefited, not in common with all Sravakas (Hearers) and Pratyekabuddhas (Solitary Realizers), but only for those advancing towards the One Vehicle, based on conventional truth and ultimate truth, established names and phrases such as non-arising. This teaching of dependent origination is the most supreme. My Acharya (teacher) also, through phrases such as non-arising, revealed the Tathagata's (Thus Come One's) true principle, attained true understanding, generated extreme courage, and as he understood, praised the Bhagavan, therefore, he composed this treatise. Furthermore, with compassion moistening his heart, having verified what he understood, he uttered these words so that the world might attain the same understanding as he had. As the verse says:
'Neither ceasing nor arising, neither 끊 끊 nor permanent, Neither one nor many, neither coming nor going, The discursive fabrications of dependent origination cease, the speaker is well extinguished, I bow to that Bhagavan, the most supreme of all speakers.'
Explanation: The meaning of those phrases in sequence, because understanding is without interruption, therefore, understanding the meaning of this treatise. Therefore, it is first said. Such is the meaning of the phrases. Destroying, therefore ceasing. Giving birth, therefore arising. Continuous death
故斷。一切時住故常。無別不異義故一。差別異義故種種。向此義故來。向彼義故去。無此滅故不滅。乃至無此去故不去。彼起滅一異。第一義遮。彼斷常者。世俗中遮。彼來去者。或言俱遮。或有說言。如是一切第一義遮。以彼為故。彼者佛婆伽婆。緣起者。種種因緣和合得起。故名緣起。語自性執。永不行故。名戲論息。一切災障無故。或時自性空。故名善滅。說者開演義故。正不顛倒。通達人法二種無我。是故名為佛婆伽婆。由如此義故我作禮。諸說中最上者。此言何謂。彼不顛倒緣起。開示天人涅槃信樂道故。教授聲聞獨覺菩薩最勝故。如所演說。正不顛倒。緣起勝故。問曰。汝向自言。說緣起法。若言緣起。云何不起。若言不起。云何緣起此語自相違。又生解退故。語義俱壞。如雲一切言語皆是妄者。答曰。若一切緣起。皆不起者。彼當作解。我得此過。我未曾說一切緣起。皆不起故。無如上過。此義云何。彼世諦中。有緣起故。非第一義亦有緣起。彼說因者。此義不成。猶如檀等。第一義中。不說為善。攝生死故。說之為善。又如說識為我。第一義中。識實非我。如此解知。是故無過。又如化丈夫起。丈夫自性。實無所起。亦如幻焰內入起等。世俗故說。非第一義。是故無咎。問曰。起后遮滅。法相應爾
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此是『斷』。因為一切時都存在，所以是『常』。因為沒有差別和不同，所以是『一』。因為有差別和不同，所以是『種種』。因為趨向這個意義，所以是『來』。因為趨向那個意義，所以是『去』。因為沒有這個『滅』，所以是『不滅』。乃至因為沒有這個『去』，所以是『不去』。那些『起滅』、『一異』，在第一義諦中被遮止。那些『斷常』，在世俗諦中被遮止。那些『來去』，或者說都被遮止。或者有人說，像這樣的一切都在第一義諦中被遮止。因為以『彼』為目標，這個『彼』指的是佛（Buddha）婆伽婆（Bhagavan，世尊）。『緣起』（Pratītyasamutpāda，因緣生法）指的是種種因緣和合而生起，所以叫做『緣起』。因為語言的自性執著永遠不行，所以叫做『戲論息』。因為一切災障都沒有，或者說因為自性是空的，所以叫做『善滅』。『說者』是因為開演意義，所以是正而不顛倒的。通達人法二種無我，所以被稱為佛（Buddha）婆伽婆（Bhagavan，世尊）。因為這樣的意義，所以我作禮。在一切說法中最殊勝的。這句話是什麼意思呢？指的是不顛倒的緣起，開示天人涅槃信樂之道。教授聲聞（Śrāvaka，小乘弟子）、獨覺（Pratyekabuddha，緣覺）、菩薩（Bodhisattva，大乘修行者）最為殊勝。如所演說，正而不顛倒，緣起最為殊勝。問：你剛才自己說，宣說緣起法。如果說是緣起，怎麼會不起呢？如果說是不起，怎麼又是緣起呢？這種說法自相矛盾，又因為產生理解上的退步，所以語言和意義都壞了，就像說『一切言語都是虛妄』一樣。答：如果一切緣起都是不起的，那麼你們就可以這樣理解，我承認這個過失。但我從未說過一切緣起都是不起的，所以沒有上面的過失。這個意義是什麼呢？因為在世俗諦中，有緣起，但在第一義諦中，沒有緣起。他們所說的『因』，這個意義是不成立的，就像佈施（Dāna）等等。在第一義諦中，不說佈施是善，因為佈施是攝取生死的。又比如，說識為我，在第一義諦中，識實際上不是我。這樣理解，所以沒有過失。又比如，化人（幻化出來的人）生起，化人的自性實際上沒有生起。也像幻焰內入等，這是世俗的說法，不是第一義。所以沒有過失。問：生起之後遮滅，這是法相應的。
【English Translation】 English version Therefore, it is 『cessation』. Because it exists at all times, it is 『permanence』. Because there is no difference or dissimilarity, it is 『one』. Because there are differences and dissimilarities, it is 『various』. Because it tends towards this meaning, it is 『coming』. Because it tends towards that meaning, it is 『going』. Because there is no 『cessation』 of this, it is 『non-cessation』. Even to the point that because there is no 『going』 of this, it is 『non-going』. Those 『arising and ceasing』, 『oneness and otherness』 are refuted in the ultimate truth. Those 『permanence and annihilation』 are refuted in the conventional truth. Those 『coming and going』 are either all refuted, or some say that all such things are refuted in the ultimate truth. Because 『that』 is the goal, and 『that』 refers to the Buddha (Buddha) Bhagavan (Bhagavan, World Honored One). 『Dependent Origination』 (Pratītyasamutpāda, the law of dependent arising) refers to arising from the combination of various causes and conditions, hence it is called 『Dependent Origination』. Because the clinging to the inherent nature of language never occurs, it is called 『cessation of conceptual proliferation』. Because all calamities are absent, or because the inherent nature is empty, it is called 『good cessation』. 『The speaker』 is so called because of expounding the meaning, hence it is correct and not inverted. Having thoroughly understood the two kinds of selflessness, of persons and phenomena, therefore he is called the Buddha (Buddha) Bhagavan (Bhagavan, World Honored One). Because of this meaning, I pay homage. This is the most supreme among all teachings. What does this statement mean? It refers to the non-inverted Dependent Origination, which reveals the path of Nirvana, faith, and joy to gods and humans. Teaching the Śrāvakas (Śrāvaka, Hearers), Pratyekabuddhas (Pratyekabuddha, Solitary Buddhas), and Bodhisattvas (Bodhisattva, enlightened beings) is the most supreme. As expounded, it is correct and not inverted, and Dependent Origination is the most supreme. Question: You yourself just said that you proclaim the Dharma of Dependent Origination. If it is said to be Dependent Origination, how can it not arise? If it is said not to arise, how can it be Dependent Origination? This statement contradicts itself, and because it leads to a regression in understanding, both the language and the meaning are ruined, just like saying 『all language is false』. Answer: If all Dependent Origination does not arise, then you can understand it that way, and I will admit this fault. But I have never said that all Dependent Origination does not arise, so there is no fault as you described. What is the meaning of this? Because in the conventional truth, there is Dependent Origination, but in the ultimate truth, there is no Dependent Origination. Their saying about 『cause』, this meaning is not established, just like giving (Dāna). In the ultimate truth, giving is not said to be good, because giving is the grasping of birth and death. Also, for example, saying that consciousness is the self, in the ultimate truth, consciousness is actually not the self. Understanding it this way, there is no fault. Also, for example, a magically created man arises, but the nature of the magically created man does not actually arise. It is also like the internal arising of illusory flames, etc., which are conventional sayings, not ultimate truth. Therefore, there is no fault. Question: After arising, there is cessation, this is in accordance with the Dharma.
。以彼先故。如不斷者。答曰。生死無始故。先滅後起。此亦同遮。非一向因過。觀義次第不觀異。文若先遮。起與滅同過。複次曇無德人言。汝論初言。不起滅等。此無為法。別緣起者。是義不然。何以故。我法中有故。汝論初言。非聲聞等共緣起者。義不相應。論者言。遮自性故。說不起等。別緣起法。令汝得解。若言有彼無為緣起。令他信者。是義不然。驗無體故。若汝意謂。緣起決定。名緣起無為者。此解有過。何以故。由遮起故。彼起無體。不應名共。以無為無起有因故。譬如住。
複次經部師言不起等義。非聲聞不共。此義云何。彼異起無體。名為不起。如不自在。彼外道解滅。此滅無體。名為不滅。譬如無我。藉因果起故不斷。果起因壞故不常。彼摩尼珠。干牛糞末。日光和合。如是起火。不可說彼體故不一。不可說異體故不種種。如是起時壞故。不來不去義正如此。汝論初言。不共聲聞。別緣起者。是義不然。論者言。汝雖有此語。違正道理。此義云何。彼起者不起故。我欲令人解不起等。別緣起義。以是不共別緣起故。在初讚歎佛婆伽婆。方作此論。先令了知起者不起。余不滅等。則易可思。云何令解彼不起等。謂諸分別起者。現前知故。諸如是說。或言自起體。或言他起體。或言共起體。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為那個先存在。如果像不斷滅的情況。回答說：生死沒有開始，所以先滅後起。這個也可以同樣遮止。不是一概而論的因果過失。觀察義理的次第，不觀察異同。如果文句先遮止，生起和滅亡就有同樣的過失。其次，曇無德（Dharmottara）的人說：你的論述一開始說，不起滅等等，這是無為法（asaṃskṛta dharma）。如果另外有緣起（pratītyasamutpāda），這個說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為在我的法中有。你的論述一開始說，不是聲聞（Śrāvaka）等共同緣起的，義理不相應。論者說：因為遮止自性（svabhāva），所以說不起等等，另外有緣起法，讓你能夠理解。如果說有那個無為緣起，讓別人相信，這個說法是不對的。因為驗證沒有實體。如果你認為，緣起是決定的，名為緣起無為，這個理解是有過失的。為什麼呢？因為由於遮止生起，那個生起沒有實體，不應該名為共同。因為無為沒有生起的原因，譬如住（sthiti）。 其次，經部師（Sautrāntika）說：不起等等的意義，不是聲聞不共有的。這個意義是什麼呢？那個不同的生起沒有實體，名為不起，如不自在。那些外道（tīrthika）理解的滅，這個滅沒有實體，名為不滅，譬如無我（anātman）。憑藉因果生起，所以不斷。果生起因壞滅，所以不常。那個摩尼珠（maṇi-ratna），干牛糞末，日光和合，這樣生起火。不可說那個體性，所以不一。不可說異體，所以不種種。這樣生起時壞滅，所以不來不去，意義正是如此。你的論述一開始說，不共聲聞，另外有緣起，這個說法是不對的。論者說：你雖然有這個說法，違背了正確的道理。這個意義是什麼呢？那個生起者不生起，所以我想要讓人理解不起等等，另外的緣起意義。因為是不共的另外緣起，所以在開始讚歎佛婆伽婆（Buddha-bhagavat），才作這個論述。先讓人瞭解生起者不生起，其餘的不滅等等，就容易思考。怎麼樣讓人理解那個不起等等呢？就是各種分別生起者，現前知道的緣故。各種像這樣說，或者說自體生起，或者說他體生起，或者說共體生起。
【English Translation】 English version: Because that exists first. If it is like something that is not ceasing. The answer is: because birth and death have no beginning, so there is cessation first and arising later. This can also be similarly refuted. It is not a universally applicable fault of causality. Observe the order of meaning, not observing differences. If the text first refutes, arising and ceasing have the same fault. Furthermore, the people of Dharmottara (Dharmottara) say: Your argument initially states that there is no arising, no ceasing, etc. This is an unconditioned dharma (asaṃskṛta dharma). If there is another dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), this statement is incorrect. Why? Because it exists in my Dharma. Your argument initially states that it is not jointly originated by Śrāvakas (Śrāvaka) etc., the meaning is not consistent. The debater says: Because of refuting self-nature (svabhāva), it is said that there is no arising, etc., and there is another dharma of dependent origination, so that you can understand. If you say that there is that unconditioned dependent origination, to make others believe, this statement is incorrect. Because there is no substance to verify. If you think that dependent origination is definite, and it is called unconditioned dependent origination, this understanding is flawed. Why? Because by refuting arising, that arising has no substance, and should not be called joint. Because the unconditioned has no cause for arising, like abiding (sthiti). Furthermore, the Sautrāntika (Sautrāntika) says: The meaning of no arising, etc., is not unique to Śrāvakas. What is this meaning? That different arising has no substance, and is called no arising, like non-self-mastery. Those heretics (tīrthika) understand cessation, this cessation has no substance, and is called no ceasing, like no-self (anātman). Relying on cause and effect to arise, so it is not discontinuous. The effect arises and the cause decays, so it is not permanent. That maṇi-jewel (maṇi-ratna), dried cow dung powder, and sunlight combine, thus fire arises. It cannot be said that it has a substance, so it is not one. It cannot be said that it has a different substance, so it is not various. Thus, arising and decaying, so it does not come or go, the meaning is exactly like this. Your argument initially states that it is not shared by Śrāvakas, and there is another dependent origination, this statement is incorrect. The debater says: Although you have this statement, it violates the correct principle. What is this meaning? That which arises does not arise, so I want to make people understand no arising, etc., and the meaning of another dependent origination. Because it is a unique other dependent origination, so at the beginning, the Buddha-bhagavat (Buddha-bhagavat) is praised, and then this argument is made. First let people understand that which arises does not arise, and the rest, such as no ceasing, etc., are easy to think about. How to make people understand that no arising, etc.? That is, various discriminating arisings, because they are known in the present. Various such statements, either saying self-arising, or saying other-arising, or saying joint-arising.
或言無因起體。此諸說皆不然。由依阿含及正道理。如實諦觀。起即無義。故造論者。自在決定。說此偈曰。
無時亦無處 隨有一物體 從自他及共 無因而起者
釋曰。非自者。彼聚安立諸起法者。竟無體故。如一一次第。應知自者我義故。彼一切體。何義故遮。所謂遮者最勝義故。又無餘分別網遮故。無餘分別網者。謂無餘所識境界故。無境界者。欲成立無分別智故。複次遮者遮有餘受故。彼異方便說諸法不起。方便不起。令他解故。此非大乘悉檀。云何知耶。如阿含說。色不起行。不行般若波羅蜜故。複次不自起者。謂不自起如是體故。此正領解。若異此領解。而言不從自體起者。此義有過。有何等過。謂他起過故。複次汝言不從自體起者。非唯有他起過。及有自他共起過故。此非我欲。以違悉檀多故。此方便語。第一義中。諸內入等。無自起義。世所不行以有故。譬如思異部迴轉。不令解故。有故因者。同非因那。以譬喻無體。如是彼因迴轉非一切處。無譬過故。
複次僧佉人言。汝所立者。立何等義。為果名自耶。為因名自耶。此有何過。若立果體為自者。我悉檀成。若立因體為自者。與義相違。以因中體有故。如是一切有起。應名為起。汝言不起者。義豈然耶。論者言。此語無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 或者有人說萬法是無因而生的。這些說法都不對。因為依據阿含經以及正確的道理，如實地觀察，『起』是沒有意義的。所以造論者，自在地、確定地說出這首偈頌：
『無論何時何地，任何事物，從自身、他者、共同、或無因而生，都是不可能的。』
解釋：『非自者』，是指聚集安立諸『起』法的那些事物，最終是沒有實體的。就像一個一個的次第。應該知道，『自』的意思是『我』。因為這個原因，一切的實體都被遮止。因為什麼原因遮止呢？因為這是最殊勝的意義。而且沒有其餘分別網的遮止。沒有其餘分別網，是指沒有其餘所能認識的境界。沒有境界，是爲了成立無分別智。再次，遮止是爲了遮止其餘的感受。他們用不同的方便來說諸法不起，用方便法使他人理解。這不是大乘的究竟教義。如何知道呢？如阿含經所說，色不起行，因為不行般若波羅蜜。再次，『不自起』，是指不是以自身而起的這種實體。這是正確的理解。如果不是這樣理解，而是說不從自體而起，這種說法是有過失的。有什麼過失呢？就是有『他起』的過失。再次，你說不從自體而起，不僅有『他起』的過失，還有『自他共起』的過失。這不是我所希望的，因為這違背了究竟的教義。這是一種方便的說法。在第一義諦中，諸如內入等，沒有自起的意義。世俗所不行，因為有（自性）的緣故。譬如思異部的迴轉，不令人理解。因為有（自性）的緣故，如同非因一樣。以譬喻來說明沒有實體。這樣，他們的因迴轉不是在所有地方都適用，因為有譬喻不成立的過失。
再次，僧佉論者說：你所立的觀點，是立什麼意義呢？是果名為『自』呢？還是因名為『自』呢？這有什麼過失呢？如果立果體為『自』，那麼我的宗義就成立了。如果立因體為『自』，那麼就與意義相違背。因為因中的體是存在的。像這樣，一切有『起』，都應該名為『起』。你說不起，這道理能成立嗎？論者說：這種說法沒有道理。
【English Translation】 English version: Or some say that all phenomena arise without a cause. All these views are incorrect. Because according to the Agamas and correct reasoning, when truly observing, 'arising' has no meaning. Therefore, the author of the treatise, freely and decisively, speaks this verse:
'At no time and in no place, does any object, arise from itself, from others, from both, or without a cause.'
Explanation: 'Not from itself' refers to those things that gather and establish the 'arising' dharmas, which ultimately have no substance. Like one by one in sequence. It should be known that 'self' means 'I'. For this reason, all substances are negated. For what reason is it negated? Because this is the most supreme meaning. And there is no negation by the remaining nets of discrimination. No remaining nets of discrimination means there are no remaining knowable realms. No realms are established in order to establish non-discriminating wisdom. Furthermore, negation is to negate the remaining feelings. They use different expedient means to say that dharmas do not arise, using expedient means to make others understand. This is not the ultimate teaching of Mahayana. How do we know? As the Agamas say, form does not arise into action, because it does not practice Prajnaparamita (Perfection of Wisdom). Again, 'not arising from itself' means that it is not a substance that arises from itself. This is the correct understanding. If it is not understood in this way, but it is said that it does not arise from its own nature, this statement has a fault. What fault is there? That is, there is the fault of 'arising from others'. Again, you say that it does not arise from its own nature, not only is there the fault of 'arising from others', but also the fault of 'arising from both self and others'. This is not what I desire, because it contradicts the ultimate teaching. This is an expedient way of speaking. In the ultimate truth, such as the inner entrances, there is no meaning of arising from oneself. It is not practiced by the world because there is (self-nature). For example, the turning of the Samkhya school does not make people understand. Because there is (self-nature), it is like a non-cause. By analogy, there is no substance. In this way, their turning of the cause is not applicable everywhere, because there is the fault of the analogy not being established.
Again, the Samkhya (a school of Indian philosophy) person says: What meaning are you establishing with your established view? Is the result called 'self'? Or is the cause called 'self'? What fault is there in this? If the substance of the result is established as 'self', then my doctrine is established. If the substance of the cause is established as 'self', then it contradicts the meaning. Because the substance in the cause exists. Like this, everything that has 'arising' should be called 'arising'. You say it does not arise, can this reason be established? The author of the treatise says: This statement is unreasonable.
義。汝不知耶。起分遮故。謂因自性起。及他性起。此等悉遮。汝不正思惟。出此言者惑故。無過有異。釋曰。諸法無有從自體起。彼起無義故。又生無窮故。彼不相應。此義云何。以不說因及譬喻故。又不能避他說過故。此破顯示顛倒成就過。云何顛倒。謂從他起體過。及生有果過。又生有窮過故。違悉檀多故。複次有異僧佉。作如是言諸體不自起者。此不應爾。何以故。自欲作起還自除故。如說三界有兔角起。復欲屏除汝義如此我所成立因果能了無異體故。猶如自我從彼因體果法自起。是故義成。論者言。邪分別說。不應道理。先遮彼義。是故無過。如是諸法。體不自起。從他起者。義亦不然。何以故。無時無處。隨有一體。從他起故。此義云何。他者異義。此方便語。第一義中。內入不從彼諸緣生。何以故。以他故。譬如瓶等。複次第一義中。他緣不能起眼等入。何以故。以他故。譬如經等。問曰。汝言他者。因義不成。何以故。立義一分故。譬如無常聲。聲故。答曰。汝不善說。無常聲者。是韋陀聲。聲故者。如鼓聲故。以見立義一分出因成故。非謂一邊。
複次鞞世師人言。微塵為因。生諸法果。彼二微塵為初。次第如是地水火風聚實起成。汝言他者。為分別我求那因義耶。為分別異義耶。若分別我
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：你不知道嗎？因為要遮止『起』的分別，也就是遮止『因自性起』和『他性起』。你因為不正思維，才說出這樣迷惑的話，這是沒有過失的，因為有差別。解釋：諸法不是從自身產生的，因為如果是自身產生就沒有意義，而且會無窮無盡地產生，這不合理。這是什麼意思呢？因為沒有說明原因和譬喻，而且不能避免別人指出你的過失。這破斥顯示了顛倒成就的過失。什麼是顛倒呢？就是從他體產生的過失，以及產生有果的過失，還有產生有窮盡的過失，所以違背了悉檀多（根本教義）。 再次，有些僧佉派的人這樣說：諸體不是自己產生的，這種說法不對。為什麼呢？因為自己想要產生，又自己排除。比如，說三界有兔角產生，又想要排除你的意思，就像我所成立的因果，能夠了解沒有異體，就像自我從那個因體果法自己產生，所以這個道理成立。論者說：這是邪分別說，不合道理。先遮止他們的意思，所以沒有過失。像這樣，諸法體不是自己產生的，從他體產生的，這個道理也不對。為什麼呢？因為沒有時間，沒有地方，隨便有一個體，是從他體產生的。這是什麼意思呢？他者，是不同的意思。這是一種方便的說法。在第一義諦中，內入（指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六入）不是從那些緣產生的。為什麼呢？因為是他（指非自性）。比如瓶子等。 再次，在第一義諦中，他緣不能產生眼等入（六入）。為什麼呢？因為是他（指非自性）。比如經書等。問：你說『他』，因的意義不能成立。為什麼呢？因為立義只說了一部分。比如『無常聲，因為是聲』。答：你沒有好好說。『無常聲』，是韋陀（Veda）聲。『因為是聲』，就像鼓聲。因為看到立義只說了一部分，才說因不能成立，不是說只有一邊。 再次，鞞世師（Vaisheshika）派的人說：微塵是產生諸法果的因。兩個微塵是最初的，次第是地、水、火、風聚集，真實產生而成。你說『他』，是爲了分別我（Atman）求那（Guna）因的意義嗎？還是爲了分別不同的意義呢？如果分別我（Atman）求那（Guna）因的意義……
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Do you not know? Because of refuting the divisions of 'arising,' namely, refuting 'arising from its own nature' and 'arising from other nature.' You speak such deluded words because of incorrect thinking. This is without fault because there is difference. Explanation: Dharmas do not arise from themselves, because if they arose from themselves, it would be meaningless and would arise endlessly, which is unreasonable. What does this mean? Because there is no explanation of cause and analogy, and one cannot avoid others pointing out one's faults. This refutation shows the fault of inverted accomplishment. What is inverted? It is the fault of arising from another entity, as well as the fault of arising having a result, and also the fault of arising having an end, thus violating the Siddhanta (fundamental doctrine). Furthermore, some Samkhya followers say: Entities do not arise by themselves; this statement is incorrect. Why? Because one wants to arise oneself and then eliminate oneself. For example, saying that rabbit horns arise in the three realms, and then wanting to eliminate your meaning, just like the cause and effect that I have established, which can understand that there is no different entity, just like the self arises from that causal entity and resultant dharma, so this principle is established. The debater says: This is incorrect discrimination and is unreasonable. First, refute their meaning, so there is no fault. Like this, the entity of dharmas does not arise by itself; arising from another entity is also not correct. Why? Because there is no time, no place, where any entity arises from another entity. What does this mean? 'Other' means different. This is a convenient way of speaking. In the ultimate truth, the inner entrances (referring to the six entrances of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind) do not arise from those conditions. Why? Because it is 'other' (referring to non-self-nature). For example, pots and so on. Furthermore, in the ultimate truth, other conditions cannot produce the entrances such as the eye. Why? Because it is 'other' (referring to non-self-nature). For example, scriptures and so on. Question: You say 'other,' but the meaning of cause cannot be established. Why? Because establishing the meaning only states a part. For example, 'impermanent sound, because it is sound.' Answer: You have not spoken well. 'Impermanent sound' is Veda (Veda) sound. 'Because it is sound' is like the sound of a drum. Because seeing that establishing the meaning only states a part, it is said that the cause cannot be established, not that there is only one side. Furthermore, the Vaisheshika (Vaisheshika) followers say: Atoms are the cause of producing the fruits of all dharmas. Two atoms are the beginning, and the order is that earth, water, fire, and wind gather and truly arise and become. You say 'other,' is it to distinguish the meaning of Atman (Atman) Guna (Guna) cause? Or is it to distinguish different meanings? If distinguishing the meaning of Atman (Atman) Guna (Guna) cause...
求那為因者。則因義不成。何以故。若離我體無別求那故。若彼異義分別者。即為世間解所破故。論者言。彼說不善總說因故。以彼法聚集能生他覺。如是覺因。總說為他非彼我及求那。異思惟故。世間所解。亦不破壞。立義別故。第一義中。地微塵初起。不名地實。以微塵故。譬如火塵。如是第一義中。火微塵初起。不名火實。以微塵故。譬如水塵。如是等次第應說。
複次阿毗曇人言。汝言他者。為以果功能空。說為他耶。為當彼能不空說為他耶。二俱有過。何以故。若以果功能空。說為他者。因義不成故。若彼能不空者。彼能成法空。譬喻壞故。論者言。總說聚法故。物邊觀故。生他覺故。汝言因義不成。及能成法空。譬喻壞者。無此過失。似光影耳複次有自部言。若第一義中。彼內外入皆不起者。法體不成。能依止壞。汝得因義不成過故。論者言。世俗言說實故。瓶眼入等內外可得故。汝說過者。此不相應。複次佛護論師釋曰。他作。亦不然。何以故。遍一切處。一切起過故。論者言。彼若如此說過。即所成能成顛倒故。謂自俱因起體過故。或時有處隨一物起故先語相違。又若異此。遍一切處。一切起過。此語能成他起過者。此不相應。如偈曰。
香附子苦蔘 庵摩羅除熱 石女無有兒 竹
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果把『求那』（guna，屬性）作為原因，那麼原因的意義就不能成立。為什麼呢？因為離開了『我體』（atman，自性）就沒有別的『求那』。如果對那個『異義』（不同意義）進行分別，就會被世間的理解所駁倒。論者說，他們的說法沒有很好地概括原因，因為那些聚集的法能夠產生其他的覺知，這樣的覺知的原因，可以概括為『他』（anya，其他），而不是『我』和『求那』。因為有不同的思維，所以世間的理解也不會被破壞，因為所建立的意義不同。在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya，勝義諦）中，最初升起的地微塵，不能稱為『地實』（真實的土地），因為它只是微塵。比如火的微塵。同樣，在第一義諦中，最初升起的火微塵，不能稱為『火實』（真實的火），因為它只是微塵。比如水的微塵。像這樣，應該依次說明。
其次，阿毗曇（Abhidharma，論藏）學者說，你說的『他』，是用果的功能空來說『他』呢？還是用那個能力不空來說『他』呢？這兩種說法都有過失。為什麼呢？如果用果的功能空來說『他』，那麼原因的意義就不能成立。如果那個能力不空，那麼那個能力成就的法就是空的，譬喻就壞了。論者說，因為概括地說了聚集的法，因為從物的角度觀察，因為產生其他的覺知，所以你說原因的意義不能成立，以及能力成就的法是空的，譬喻是壞的，這些都沒有過失，只是像光影一樣。其次，有自部（自己宗派）的人說，如果在第一義諦中，那些內外入（ayatana，處）都不生起，那麼法的體性就不能成立，能依止的就會壞掉，你就會得到原因的意義不能成立的過失。論者說，因為世俗的言說是真實的，瓶子、眼睛等內外入是可以得到的，所以你說有過失，這不相應。其次，佛護論師（Buddhapālita）解釋說，『他作』（由他而作）也是不對的。為什麼呢？因為會遍一切處，一切都生起的過失。論者說，如果他們這樣說過失，那麼所成和能成就會顛倒，也就是說，自俱因（自身和合之因）生起本體有過失，或者有時在某個地方隨一個物體生起，所以先前的說法是矛盾的。而且，如果不是這樣，就會有遍一切處，一切都生起的過失，這種說法能夠成立『他起』（由他而起）的過失，這不相應。如偈語所說：
香附子、苦蔘，庵摩羅（āmalaka，余甘子）能除熱，石女沒有兒子，竹……
【English Translation】 English version: If 'guna' (attribute) is taken as the cause, then the meaning of cause cannot be established. Why? Because there is no other 'guna' apart from 'atman' (self-essence). If one distinguishes that 'different meaning' (different meaning), it will be refuted by worldly understanding. The debater says that their statement does not well summarize the cause, because those assembled dharmas can generate other cognitions, and the cause of such cognition can be summarized as 'anya' (other), not 'atman' and 'guna'. Because of different thinking, worldly understanding will not be destroyed, because the established meaning is different. In paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth), the initial arising of earth dust cannot be called 'earth reality' (real earth), because it is just dust. For example, fire dust. Similarly, in paramārtha-satya, the initial arising of fire dust cannot be called 'fire reality' (real fire), because it is just dust. For example, water dust. In this way, it should be explained in sequence.
Furthermore, the Abhidharma (collection of treatises) scholars say, do you use the emptiness of the function of the result to say 'other', or do you use that non-empty ability to say 'other'? Both statements have faults. Why? If you use the emptiness of the function of the result to say 'other', then the meaning of cause cannot be established. If that ability is not empty, then the dharma accomplished by that ability is empty, and the analogy is broken. The debater says that because the assembled dharmas are summarized, because it is observed from the perspective of things, because it generates other cognitions, so your saying that the meaning of cause cannot be established, and that the dharma accomplished by the ability is empty, and the analogy is broken, these have no faults, they are just like light and shadow. Furthermore, some people from our own school say that if those inner and outer ayatana (sense bases) do not arise in paramārtha-satya, then the nature of dharma cannot be established, and what can be relied on will be broken, and you will get the fault that the meaning of cause cannot be established. The debater says that because worldly speech is real, and inner and outer ayatanas such as bottles and eyes can be obtained, so your saying that there is a fault is not appropriate. Furthermore, Buddhapālita explains that 'parakrta' (done by others) is also not right. Why? Because there will be the fault of pervading all places and everything arising. The debater says that if they say the fault in this way, then what is to be accomplished and what can be accomplished will be reversed, that is to say, the self-co-arising cause (cause of self and combination) has the fault of arising the essence, or sometimes in a certain place, it arises with one object, so the previous statement is contradictory. Moreover, if it is not like this, there will be the fault of pervading all places and everything arising, and this statement can establish the fault of 'parotpada' (arising from others), which is not appropriate. As the verse says:
Cyperus rotundus, Sophora flavescens, āmalaka (Indian gooseberry) can remove heat, a barren woman has no children, bamboo...
筍重有苦 兔印記月光 陽春時作樂
複次異僧佉人言。彼別不別。地等種子。生芽等果。由如此義。說俱起體。彼說不然。何以故。不共者。非自他義。無時無處有一物體。從共起故。彼說有過。此復云何。若謂俱起。令他信者。驗無體故。此義不成。複次此中又遮裸形部義。說不共起。此義云何。彼謂金與非金。人功火等。自他力故。環釧等起。彼如是說。為遮彼故。說不共起。應如此知。複次不無因者。此義云何。無時無處。有一物體。無因起故。何故無因。驗無體故。若說有驗。即為世間。所驗解破。有此過故。世間驗者。其相云何。世俗欲令內入體生。何以故。總別有故。譬如芽等。複次世間所解過者。于彼世間。若有此物。知從因生。如絲成絹。如篾成筐。如泥成瓶等。為彼過故。複次彼惡因者。亦名無因。如無婦等。何等惡因。所謂自性及自在天。丈夫藏時。那羅延等不真實故。是故此等無因。不能起體。若謂從彼自性等起。令人解者。驗不爾故。若說有驗。此亦有過。複次執自性者。說如是言。我立此義。自性有彼。內入等生。何以故。莊嚴我體故。如水生花根鬚莖葉好色形相。如大青珠因陀羅尼羅阿毗尼羅寶等。又如孔雀項邊種種纈目光明可愛。皆自性爾。論者言。彼立此義。自性作者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 筍的重量在於它的苦澀。 就像在月光下追逐兔子的印記，如同在美好的春天裡尋歡作樂。
再次，異教的僧佉（Samkhya，印度哲學流派，認為世界由自性和神我構成）論者說，『彼』（指事物）是分離的還是不分離的？土地等種子，產生芽等果實，根據這樣的道理，說明它們是共同產生的整體。』他們的說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為不共同的事物，不是『自』（自身）也不是『他』（其他）的性質。沒有在任何時間任何地點，有一個物體是從共同中產生的。他們的說法是有過失的。這是什麼過失呢？如果說是共同產生，想要讓別人相信，但實際上沒有實體，所以這個道理是不能成立的。再次，這裡又駁斥了裸形部（Jainism，耆那教）的觀點，說不是共同產生。這個道理是什麼呢？他們認為金和非金，人的功勞和火等，因為自身和他力的緣故，產生了環、釧等。他們是這樣說的。爲了駁斥他們的觀點，所以說不是共同產生，應該這樣理解。
再次，『不是沒有原因的』，這個道理是什麼呢？沒有在任何時間任何地點，有一個物體是沒有原因而產生的。為什麼沒有原因呢？因為實際上沒有實體。如果說有實際的驗證，那麼就會被世間的驗證所破解，有這樣的過失。世間的驗證，它的相狀是什麼呢？世俗希望內在進入物體而產生。為什麼呢？因為有總相和別相的緣故。譬如芽等。
再次，世間所理解的過失，在於那個世間，如果有這個東西，知道是從原因產生的，如絲變成絹，如篾變成筐，如泥變成瓶等。因為有這樣的過失。
再次，那些惡劣的原因，也叫做沒有原因。如沒有妻子等。什麼是惡劣的原因呢？就是所謂的自性（Prakriti，僧佉哲學中的根本實體）以及自在天（Ishvara，印度教中的主神），丈夫藏起來的時候，那羅延（Narayana，印度教中的保護神）等不真實。所以這些沒有原因，不能產生物體。如果說是從那些自性等產生的，想要讓人理解，但實際上不是這樣的。如果說有實際的驗證，這也有過失。
再次，執著于自性的人，這樣說：『我建立這個道理，自性有那些內在進入等產生。為什麼呢？因為莊嚴我的身體的緣故。』如水產生花，根、須、莖、葉有好的顏色和形狀，如大青珠、因陀羅尼羅（Indranila，藍寶石）、阿毗尼羅寶（Abhinila，深藍色寶石）等。又如孔雀脖子旁邊有各種各樣的花紋，目光明亮可愛，都是自性使然。論者說，他們建立這個道理，自性是作者。
【English Translation】 English version The weight of the bamboo shoot lies in its bitterness. Like chasing the rabbit's imprint in the moonlight, it's like making merry in the beautiful spring.
Furthermore, the heretical Samkhya (Samkhya, a school of Indian philosophy that believes the world is composed of Prakriti and Purusha) proponents say, 'Is 'that' (referring to things) separate or not separate? Seeds like earth produce fruits like sprouts, according to such a principle, explaining that they are a collectively arising entity.' Their statement is incorrect. Why? Because things that are not common are neither the nature of 'self' (itself) nor 'other' (others). There is no object at any time or place that arises from the collective. Their statement has a fault. What is this fault? If it is said to arise collectively, wanting to make others believe, but in reality there is no substance, so this principle cannot be established. Furthermore, here it also refutes the view of the Naked Ascetics (Jainism), saying that it does not arise collectively. What is this principle? They believe that gold and non-gold, human effort and fire, etc., produce rings, bracelets, etc., because of their own and other forces. That's what they say. To refute their view, it is said that it does not arise collectively, and it should be understood in this way.
Furthermore, 'not without cause', what is this principle? There is no object at any time or place that arises without cause. Why is there no cause? Because in reality there is no substance. If it is said that there is actual verification, then it will be broken by the verification of the world, and there is such a fault. What is the appearance of worldly verification? The world hopes that the inner enters the object and produces it. Why? Because there are general and specific aspects. For example, sprouts, etc.
Furthermore, the fault understood by the world lies in that world, if there is this thing, knowing that it is produced from a cause, such as silk becoming silk, bamboo strips becoming baskets, clay becoming bottles, etc. Because there is such a fault.
Furthermore, those bad causes are also called no cause. Such as no wife, etc. What are bad causes? These are the so-called Prakriti (Prakriti, the fundamental substance in Samkhya philosophy) and Ishvara (Ishvara, the main god in Hinduism), when the husband hides, Narayana (Narayana, the protector god in Hinduism) and others are not real. Therefore, these without cause cannot produce objects. If it is said that it arises from those Prakriti, etc., wanting to make people understand, but in reality it is not like this. If it is said that there is actual verification, this also has a fault.
Furthermore, those who are attached to Prakriti say this: 'I establish this principle, Prakriti has those inner entry, etc., producing. Why? Because it adorns my body.' Like water produces flowers, roots, beards, stems, and leaves have good colors and shapes, such as Indranila (Indranila, sapphire), Abhinila (Abhinila, dark blue gem), etc. Also, like the peacock's neck has various patterns, the eyes are bright and lovely, all are caused by Prakriti. The debaters say that they establish this principle, Prakriti is the author.
。不觀業因。無有作者。若爾彼內入生因緣決定世智所行等。共言說成。已覆成過。若第一義。譬喻無體。何以故。第一義中。蓮花寶等。本無生故。複次汝欲共。我立無因義。一切法成。我今示汝以無因故。一切不成。又彼立無因。若說因者。先執破故。複次若謂我立無因。不能令彼說因者解故。須出因今解無因。譬如共夷狄人。還行彼語。為此義故。方便說因。亦非先語破者。是義不然。何以故。語邊轉者。亦如所得相。以此相義。令彼得解。如語夷狄。彼處有煙。則知有火。令彼了知相覺起故。此彼語異。是故不成。複次有異僧佉。婆胄羅人言。彼歌羅羅。及以芽等。無緣故起。若瓶衣等。有緣故起。非一切體。自性起故。成我所成。論者言。彼一切時。一切物起。皆悉遮故。汝所說者。此不相應。由如是義。無自性起。複次外人有執自在為因者。說如是言。眾生無智。于苦樂中。不得自在。善道惡道。皆是自在之所使故。論者言。彼立是義。自在令為世間起因。於世俗中。亦不應爾。何以故。或有憂喜因故。如牧牛者。若執自在名一切因作世間者。此義不然。當如是知。由所量故譬如自在。是故當知。于彼世俗。亦非自在。能起諸法。若汝定謂自在為因。生諸法者。是因與果。為自性。為他性。為俱性。此異
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：不觀察業的因緣，認為沒有造作者。如果這樣，那麼關於眾生內在的入胎、生長的因緣，以及世俗智慧所能理解的範圍等等，通過共同的言語表達而成立，這又會陷入過失。如果從第一義諦（Paramārtha， ultimate truth）的角度來看，譬如蓮花、寶物等，本來就沒有實體。為什麼呢？因為在第一義諦中，蓮花、寶物等，本來就沒有生起。再說，你想要和我一起建立『無因』的觀點，認為一切法都能成立。我現在要告訴你，因為『無因』的緣故，一切法都不能成立。而且，他們建立『無因』，如果再說『因』，就違背了先前所堅持的破斥。再說，如果認為我建立『無因』，不能讓那些主張『因』的人理解，所以需要提出『因』來解釋『無因』，就像和邊遠地區的野蠻人交流，仍然使用他們的語言一樣。爲了這個目的，方便地說『因』，並不是先用語言破斥對方。這個說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為語言的轉變，也像所獲得的表相一樣。用這種表相的意義，讓他們能夠理解。就像和野蠻人說，那個地方有煙，就知道有火一樣，讓他們瞭解表相的覺悟生起。這和之前的語言不同，所以不能成立。再說，有不同的僧佉（Sāṃkhya，數論派）和婆胄羅（Vātsīputrīya，犢子部）的人說，歌羅羅（kalala， 羯羅藍，受精卵最初的凝結狀態）以及芽等，是無緣無故產生的；而瓶子、衣服等，是有緣故產生的。不是一切事物都是自性產生的，這樣就成就了我們所要成就的觀點。論者說，他們否定了一切時間、一切事物的產生，所以你所說的，是不相應的。因為這樣的緣故，沒有自性產生。再說，外道有人執著自在天（Īśvara， Lord）為萬物之因，他們這樣說：眾生沒有智慧，在痛苦和快樂中，不能自主。善道和惡道，都是自在天所驅使的。論者說，他們建立這樣的觀點，認為自在天是世間產生的起因，即使在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，conventional truth）中，也不應該是這樣。為什麼呢？因為有時會有憂愁和喜悅的原因，就像牧牛人一樣。如果執著自在天是創造世間一切事物的因，這個觀點是不對的。應當這樣理解，因為所衡量的事物就像自在天一樣。所以應當知道，在世俗諦中，也不是自在天能夠產生諸法。如果你一定要認為自在天是產生諸法的因，那麼這個因和果，是自性（svabhāva， own-being）關係，還是他性（parabhāva， other-being）關係，還是既是自性又是他性的關係？這很奇怪。 再說，外道有人執著自在天（Īśvara， Lord）為萬物之因，他們這樣說：眾生沒有智慧，在痛苦和快樂中，不能自主。善道和惡道，都是自在天所驅使的。論者說，他們建立這樣的觀點，認為自在天是世間產生的起因，即使在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，conventional truth）中，也不應該是這樣。為什麼呢？因為有時會有憂愁和喜悅的原因，就像牧牛人一樣。如果執著自在天是創造世間一切事物的因，這個觀點是不對的。應當這樣理解，因為所衡量的事物就像自在天一樣。所以應當知道，在世俗諦中，也不是自在天能夠產生諸法。如果你一定要認為自在天是產生諸法的因，那麼這個因和果，是自性（svabhāva， own-being）關係，還是他性（parabhāva， other-being）關係，還是既是自性又是他性的關係？這很奇怪。
【English Translation】 English version: Not observing the causes of karma, they believe there is no creator. If so, then the causes and conditions of beings entering the womb and being born, as well as the scope of what worldly wisdom can understand, are established through common verbal expression, which would again lead to error. If from the perspective of the ultimate truth (Paramārtha), things like lotuses and treasures have no inherent existence. Why? Because in the ultimate truth, lotuses, treasures, etc., have no origination. Furthermore, you want to establish the view of 'no cause' with me, believing that all dharmas can be established. I am now telling you that because of 'no cause,' all dharmas cannot be established. Moreover, they establish 'no cause,' but if they then speak of 'cause,' they contradict their previously held refutation. Furthermore, if it is thought that my establishing 'no cause' cannot be understood by those who advocate 'cause,' so it is necessary to present 'cause' to explain 'no cause,' just like communicating with barbarians from remote regions, still using their language. For this purpose, speaking of 'cause' as a convenience is not the same as first refuting the other with language. This statement is incorrect. Why? Because the transformation of language is also like the appearance that is obtained. Using the meaning of this appearance, they can understand. Just like telling barbarians that there is smoke in that place, and they know there is fire, allowing them to understand the arising of the awareness of appearance. This is different from the previous language, so it cannot be established. Furthermore, there are different Sāṃkhyas and Vātsīputrīyas who say that kalala and sprouts arise without cause, while pots, clothes, etc., arise with cause. Not all things arise from their own nature, thus accomplishing the view we want to accomplish. The debater says that they deny the arising of all things at all times, so what you say is not corresponding. Because of this reason, there is no arising from self-nature. Furthermore, some non-Buddhists adhere to Īśvara as the cause of all things, saying: Sentient beings have no wisdom and cannot be autonomous in suffering and happiness. Good and evil paths are all driven by Īśvara. The debater says that they establish such a view, believing that Īśvara is the cause of the world's arising, but even in conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), it should not be so. Why? Because sometimes there are causes for sorrow and joy, just like cowherds. If one adheres to Īśvara as the cause of creating all things in the world, this view is incorrect. It should be understood that because the measured things are like Īśvara. Therefore, it should be known that even in conventional truth, Īśvara cannot produce all dharmas. If you insist that Īśvara is the cause of producing all dharmas, then is this cause and effect a relationship of own-being (svabhāva), other-being (parabhāva), or both own-being and other-being? This is strange. Furthermore, some non-Buddhists adhere to Īśvara as the cause of all things, saying: Sentient beings have no wisdom and cannot be autonomous in suffering and happiness. Good and evil paths are all driven by Īśvara. The debater says that they establish such a view, believing that Īśvara is the cause of the world's arising, but even in conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), it should not be so. Why? Because sometimes there are causes for sorrow and joy, just like cowherds. If one adheres to Īśvara as the cause of creating all things in the world, this view is incorrect. It should be understood that because the measured things are like Īśvara. Therefore, it should be known that even in conventional truth, Īśvara cannot produce all dharmas. If you insist that Īśvara is the cause of producing all dharmas, then is this cause and effect a relationship of own-being (svabhāva), other-being (parabhāva), or both own-being and other-being? This is strange.
分別。先已遮故。有起無起。后當廣破。第一義中。自在不能起諸法故。或有說言。眾生世間。及器世間。種種業因。為自在故。彼住起壞。苦樂增減。通為依止。作是說者。成我所成。世俗言說。非第一義。以第一義中業不起故。
複次彼執丈夫為生因者。說如是言。一切世間丈夫為因故。是義云何。如糸齊織網。如月珠出水。如樹生枝葉等。一切眾生。以彼為因。亦復如是。所謂彼過去未來。動不動等。遠近內外。如是一切。皆丈夫為因。論者言。前執自在為因。中已遮此計。今當復說。如調達我。不作調達身根聚因。何以故。由我故。譬如耶若達多自我。複次耶若達多身根等聚。非耶若達多我之所作。何以故。由彼樂苦智起因故。譬如提婆達多身根等聚。若謂彼繫縛我為三界因非一切者。此義不然。何以故。由我故如解脫我。彼執不成。立義過故。問曰。汝言我故因者。此自立義中。是一分故。汝出因者。是義不成。有過失故。答曰。無過失義。先已說故。何故無過。如上云。無常聲聲故。譬如鼓聲。若有說言。我所立義。唯是一我。如一虛空瓶等分別。皆是其假假故無量。為此義故。譬喻無體。驗破不成。立義無過故。論者言。彼不善說。此義云何。以虛空無生故。如虛空花。體不可得。如是而言。一
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因為先前已經遮破了這種觀點，所以無論是有生起還是無生起，之後都將廣泛地進行破斥。在第一義諦（Paramārtha， ultimate truth）中，自在天（Īśvara， a supreme being）不能生起諸法。或者有人說，眾生世間（sentient world）和器世間（inanimate world）的種種業因，都是因為自在天的緣故，它們的住立、生起、壞滅、苦樂、增減，都普遍地以自在天為依止。如果有人這樣說，那就成就了我所要成就的——這只是世俗的言說，而不是第一義諦。因為在第一義諦中，業是不生起的。
其次，那些執著丈夫（puruṣa， a cosmic being）為生起之因的人，會這樣說：『一切世間都是以丈夫為因的。』這是什麼意思呢？就像絲線交織成網，像月亮中的寶珠涌出水，像樹木生長出枝葉等等，一切眾生也是以丈夫為因的。』所謂過去、未來、動、不動等，遠、近、內外，所有這一切，都是以丈夫為因的。論者說，先前執著自在天為因，中間已經遮破了這個觀點，現在應當再次說明。就像調達（Devadatta， a common name）的『我』，不作為調達身體、根聚的因。為什麼呢？因為『我』的緣故。譬如耶若達多（Yajñadatta， a common name）的『我』。其次，耶若達多的身體、根等聚合，不是耶若達多的『我』所造作的。為什麼呢？因為那是樂、苦、智生起的因。譬如提婆達多（Devadatta， a common name）的身體、根等聚合。如果說，繫縛的『我』是三界（trailokya， three realms）的因，而不是一切的因，這種說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為『我』的緣故，就像解脫的『我』。他們的執著不能成立，因為立義有過失。問：你說『因為我的緣故』是因，這在自己所立的義中，只是一部分。你提出的因，這個義不能成立，有過失。答：沒有過失，因為先前已經說過了。為什麼沒有過失呢？就像上面所說，『無常的聲音，因為是聲音的緣故，譬如鼓聲。』如果有人說，我所立的義，只有一個『我』，就像一個虛空，瓶等分別，都是它的假象，因為是假象的緣故，所以是無量的。爲了這個義，譬喻沒有實體，驗證破斥不能成立，立義沒有過失。論者說，他們沒有好好地說。這是什麼意思呢？因為虛空沒有生起，就像虛空中的花，本體不可得。像這樣說，『一』
【English Translation】 English version Because it has already been refuted, whether there is arising or no arising, it will be widely refuted later. In the Paramārtha (ultimate truth), Īśvara (a supreme being) cannot give rise to all dharmas. Or some say that the various karmic causes of the sentient world and the inanimate world are because of Īśvara; their abiding, arising, decay, suffering, happiness, increase, and decrease all universally rely on Īśvara. If someone says this, then it accomplishes what I want to accomplish—this is merely conventional speech, not the Paramārtha. Because in the Paramārtha, karma does not arise.
Furthermore, those who cling to puruṣa (a cosmic being) as the cause of arising say, 'All the world is caused by puruṣa.' What does this mean? Just as threads are woven into a net, just as jewels emerge from the moon's water, just as trees grow branches and leaves, so too are all sentient beings caused by puruṣa.' So-called past, future, moving, unmoving, etc., near, far, internal, external, all of this is caused by puruṣa. The debater says, 'Previously, clinging to Īśvara as the cause, this view has already been refuted in the middle; now it should be explained again. Just like Devadatta's (a common name) 'self' does not act as the cause of Devadatta's body and aggregates of senses. Why? Because of the 'self'. For example, Yajñadatta's (a common name) 'self'. Secondly, Yajñadatta's body, aggregates of senses, etc., are not created by Yajñadatta's 'self'. Why? Because that is the cause of the arising of pleasure, suffering, and wisdom. For example, Devadatta's body, aggregates of senses, etc. If it is said that the bound 'self' is the cause of the trailokya (three realms), but not the cause of everything, this statement is incorrect. Why? Because of the 'self', just like the liberated 'self'. Their clinging cannot be established because there is a fault in establishing the thesis. Question: You say 'because of the self' is the cause; this, in your own established thesis, is only a part. The cause you put forward, this meaning cannot be established; there is a fault. Answer: There is no fault because it has already been said. Why is there no fault? Just like what was said above, 'Impermanent sound, because it is sound, like the sound of a drum.' If someone says that the thesis I establish is only one 'self', like one space, the distinctions of pot, etc., are all its illusions; because they are illusions, they are immeasurable. For this meaning, the metaphor has no substance, verification and refutation cannot be established, and there is no fault in establishing the thesis. The debater says, 'They have not spoken well.' What does this mean? Because space has no arising, like flowers in space, the substance cannot be obtained. Saying like this, 'one'
虛空者。此義不成。但有言說。世俗法中。總說我者。示假令識故。汝立一我。令他信者。驗無體故。此義不成。問曰。縛我脫我。更無異體。何以故。由我故如解脫我。答曰。無餘涅槃界中。一解脫我。此有不成。如先說過。不能避故。如觀我品。當廣解說。
複次僧佉人言。如我立義。彼自性為因。謂梵摩為初。下至住持際。諸法果生。皆因自性。如彼內入。為苦樂癡因。決定作因。彼具有故。若世間物。彼具有者。我知為因。如栴檀札。如瓦器片。金莊嚴具。如是等總別因故。由彼內入具有樂苦癡等故。說內入為彼樂苦癡因。如是應知。色想行識諸陰。皆是樂苦癡等自性。何以故。由陰故。譬如受陰。是故因及譬喻義皆得成。論者言。為此故。第一義中。栴檀等譬不成。以無體故。於世俗中。癡者行陰攝故。譬喻不成。彼樂苦等二。異外諸法。非樂苦自性。應如是知。何以故。所量故。譬如覺驗不相應。問曰。汝第一義中。無譬喻故。答曰。總說覺故。世間共解。取為譬喻。亦非譬喻無體。以是義故。彼藏不為大等諦因。由不了故。譬如丈夫。汝若欲說自性為因者。自驗破故。外人言。我立丈夫。與思相應。則得明瞭而言由不了故者。此因不成。又能成法。不具故。亦譬喻過故。論者言。彼語無義。此復
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 關於『虛空』的說法，這個觀點是不成立的。這僅僅是一種言語上的表達。在世俗的法則中，總的來說，提到『我』，是爲了方便理解而假設的。如果你設立一個『我』，想要讓別人相信，但實際上它並沒有實體，所以這個觀點是不成立的。有人問：『束縛『我』和解脫『我』，並沒有不同的實體，為什麼呢？因為通過『我』才能獲得解脫。』回答說：『在無餘涅槃的境界中，只有一個解脫的『我』。』這個說法是不成立的，就像之前說過的，無法避免這個矛盾。關於『觀我品』，將會詳細解釋。
其次，僧佉派的人說：『就像我所建立的觀點，那個自性是原因。以梵摩（Brahma，創造神）為開始，直到住持的終結，所有法的果報產生，都是因為自性。就像那個內入（內在的感知），是苦、樂、癡的原因，因為它具有決定性的作用。如果世間的事物，它具有這些（苦、樂、癡），我就認為它是原因。』比如栴檀木，瓦器的碎片，金製的裝飾品，像這些總的、別的因。因為那個內入具有樂、苦、癡等等，所以說內入是樂、苦、癡的原因。應該這樣理解，色、想、行、識這五陰，都是樂、苦、癡的自性。為什麼呢？因為五陰的緣故，比如受陰。所以原因和譬喻的意義都能夠成立。』論者說：『因為這個原因，在第一義諦中，栴檀木等等的譬喻是不成立的，因為它沒有實體。在世俗中，愚癡的人被行陰所攝，所以譬喻是不成立的。』那個樂、苦等等，與外在的諸法不同，不是樂、苦的自性，應該這樣理解。為什麼呢？因為可以被衡量。比如感覺的驗證不相應。』有人問：『你在第一義諦中，沒有譬喻，為什麼呢？』回答說：『總的來說，因為感覺的緣故，世間共同理解，所以取來作為譬喻。也不是說譬喻沒有實體，因為這個意義。』因為這個原因，那個藏識不是大等等真諦的原因，因為不瞭解的緣故，比如丈夫。如果你想要說自性是原因，那麼你自己的驗證就會被打破。』外人說：『我設立丈夫，與思考相應，就能明白，說因為不瞭解的緣故，這個原因是不成立的。』而且能成就法，不具備的緣故，也是譬喻的過失。』論者說：『那個話沒有意義，這個又...
【English Translation】 English version The notion of 'emptiness' is untenable. It is merely a verbal expression. In conventional truth, the general reference to 'self' is a provisional designation for the sake of understanding. If you posit a 'self' to be believed by others, it is untenable because it lacks substance. Someone asks: 'The 'self' that is bound and the 'self' that is liberated are not different entities, why is that? It is because liberation is attained through the 'self'.' The answer is: 'In the realm of Nirvana without remainder, there is only one liberated 'self'.' This statement is untenable, as previously stated, and cannot avoid the contradiction. The 'Chapter on the Observation of Self' will explain this in detail.
Furthermore, the Samkhya school says: 'As I establish the view, that primordial nature (Prakriti) is the cause. Starting with Brahma (the creator god) and extending to the end of existence, the fruits of all dharmas arise because of primordial nature. Like that internal organ (Antahkarana), it is the cause of suffering, pleasure, and delusion, because it possesses a decisive function. If worldly things possess these (suffering, pleasure, and delusion), I consider it to be the cause.' For example, sandalwood, fragments of earthenware, gold ornaments, like these general and specific causes. Because that internal organ possesses pleasure, suffering, delusion, etc., it is said that the internal organ is the cause of pleasure, suffering, and delusion. It should be understood that the five skandhas (aggregates) of form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness are all of the nature of pleasure, suffering, and delusion. Why is that? Because of the skandhas, such as the skandha of feeling. Therefore, the cause and the meaning of the analogy can be established.' The debater says: 'For this reason, in the ultimate truth, the analogy of sandalwood, etc., is untenable because it has no substance. In conventional truth, foolish people are included in the skandha of mental formations, so the analogy is untenable.' That pleasure, suffering, etc., are different from external dharmas and are not the nature of pleasure and suffering, it should be understood in this way. Why is that? Because it can be measured. For example, the verification of feeling is not consistent.' Someone asks: 'In your ultimate truth, there is no analogy, why is that?' The answer is: 'Generally speaking, because of feeling, the world commonly understands, so it is taken as an analogy. It is not that the analogy has no substance, because of this meaning.' For this reason, that Alaya-vijnana (storehouse consciousness) is not the cause of the great truths, etc., because of not understanding, like a man. If you want to say that primordial nature is the cause, then your own verification will be broken.' The outsider says: 'I establish a man, corresponding to thought, then it can be understood, saying that because of not understanding, this cause is untenable.' Moreover, it can accomplish the Dharma, because it is not complete, it is also a fault of analogy.' The debater says: 'That word has no meaning, this again...
云何。總說因故。立別義故。處處不了。總一不成。或有說言。亦不無因。能起諸法。彼性時那羅延等為因故者。如遮自在中說。應知。
複次僧佉人言。汝說不自。不他。不共。不無因。有處有體。能起一物者。誠如所言。彼實不起。雖實無起。以了作故。論者問言。是何等物。云何了作。僧佉人言。如燈瓶等。論者言。燈瓶二物。本自不生。云何以不生燈。欲了作。彼不生瓶等。如無馬角。豈能了耶。以第一義中諸法不生故。依於世諦。作如是問。彼燈于瓶。何所作用。外人言。受作故。論者言。受本先無。於後始有。先無後有。受即是作。若言暗中眼識爾時無受。由有燈明暗障等破者。如前已遮。是作法故。又暗障破者。豈非作耶。若汝執言。受見先有。若先有者。燈復何用。複次云何名瓶。如我法中。四大及所造和合故名瓶。彼燈在時。與明俱起。以是義故。世諦法中。有所作因。一一物體。各從自因相續而起。所以者何。如明與物體俱起。是爲了因。第一義中起法皆無。亦無有了。非大等諸諦。不了之物。能令其了。何以故。由不了故。譬如空花。是故汝言未了者了。此語非也。複次佛護論師釋此句云。亦非無因起彼物體。何以故。若無因者。應於一切處一切物常起。有如是過。此義不然。何以故。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 為什麼呢？因為總括地說明了因的緣故，確立了不同的意義的緣故，處處都不能明瞭。總括為一也不能成立。或者有人說，也不是沒有因，能夠生起諸法。他們認為自性（Prakriti），時間和那羅延（Narayana，毗濕奴的化身）等是諸法的因。正如《遮自在論》中所說，應當知曉。
其次，僧佉（Samkhya）論者說：『你說既不是從自身生，也不是從他物生，也不是從共同生，也不是無因而生，而是存在於某個地方，具有某種實體，能夠生起一個事物。』誠如你所說，那個事物實際上並沒有生起。雖然實際上沒有生起，但因為有了『了作』（使之明了的作用）的緣故（而看似生起）。論者問道：『這是什麼事物？如何進行『了作』？』僧佉論者說：『比如燈和瓶子等。』論者說：『燈和瓶子這兩種事物，本來就沒有產生。怎麼能用不生的燈，去『了作』那不生的瓶子等呢？就像沒有馬角一樣，怎麼能進行『了作』呢？』因為在第一義諦中，諸法是不生的，所以依據世俗諦，才這樣發問。那個燈對於瓶子，有什麼作用呢？外道說：『接受作用的緣故。』論者說：『接受本來是沒有的，在後來才有的。先前沒有，後來才有，接受就是一種作用。』如果說在黑暗中，眼識在那個時候沒有接受，因為有燈光明亮，破除了黑暗的遮蔽等，這在前面已經駁斥過了，因為這是有為法（作法）的緣故。而且，破除黑暗的遮蔽，難道不是一種作用嗎？』如果你堅持說，接受和見是先前就有的，如果先前就有了，那燈又有什麼用呢？其次，什麼叫做瓶子？按照我的法（佛法）中，四大（地、水、火、風）以及四大所造之物和合，所以叫做瓶子。那個燈在的時候，與光明一同生起。因為這個緣故，在世俗諦法中，有所作之因。每一個物體，各自從自己的因相續而生起。為什麼這樣說呢？比如光明與物體一同生起，這是爲了因。在第一義諦中，生起的法都是沒有的，也沒有了。不是大等諸諦，這些不能明瞭的事物，能夠使之明了。為什麼呢？因為不能明瞭的緣故，譬如虛空中的花。所以你說『未明瞭的事物使之明了』，這種說法是不對的。其次，佛護論師解釋這句話說：『也不是沒有因，而生起那個物體。』為什麼呢？如果沒有因的話，應該在一切處，一切事物都經常生起，有這樣的過失。』這個意義是不對的。為什麼呢？
【English Translation】 English version: Why is that? Because it comprehensively explains the cause, establishes different meanings, and is not clear everywhere. Comprehensively unifying it into one cannot be established. Or some say that it is not without a cause that can give rise to all dharmas. They consider Prakriti (nature), time, and Narayana (an incarnation of Vishnu) etc. as the causes of all dharmas. As stated in the 'Nirvana Sutra', it should be known.
Furthermore, the Samkhya philosophers say: 'You say that it is neither born from itself, nor from others, nor from both, nor without a cause, but exists in a certain place, possesses a certain entity, and can give rise to a thing.' As you say, that thing is actually not born. Although it is actually not born, it appears to be born because of the 'making clear' (the function of making it clear). The debater asks: 'What is this thing? How does it 'make clear'?' The Samkhya philosophers say: 'For example, a lamp and a pot, etc.' The debater says: 'The lamp and the pot, these two things, are originally not produced. How can you use an unproduced lamp to 'make clear' the unproduced pot, etc.? Just like the absence of a horse's horn, how can it 'make clear'?' Because in the ultimate truth, all dharmas are not born, so based on conventional truth, this question is asked. What effect does that lamp have on the pot? The outsider says: 'Because of the receiving function.' The debater says: 'Receiving is originally non-existent, and only exists later. Previously non-existent, later existent, receiving is a function.' If it is said that in the darkness, the eye consciousness does not receive at that time, because there is the light of the lamp, which dispels the darkness, this has been refuted before, because it is a conditioned dharma (a made dharma). Moreover, dispelling the darkness, is it not a function?' If you insist that receiving and seeing are pre-existent, if they are pre-existent, then what is the use of the lamp? Secondly, what is called a pot? According to my Dharma (Buddha's teachings), the four great elements (earth, water, fire, wind) and what is made of the four great elements combine, so it is called a pot. When the lamp is present, it arises together with light. For this reason, in conventional truth, there is a cause for action. Each object arises continuously from its own cause. Why is this so? For example, light arises together with an object, this is the cause. In the ultimate truth, the arising dharmas are all non-existent, and there is nothing. It is not the great elements and other truths, these unclear things, that can make it clear. Why? Because they are unclear, like flowers in the sky. Therefore, your statement 'making clear what is unclear' is incorrect. Secondly, the teacher Buddhapalita explains this sentence as: 'It is not without a cause that the object arises.' Why? If there is no cause, it should arise constantly in all places and all things, there is such a fault.' This meaning is not correct. Why?
汝此語義。能成所成。分明顛倒。是義云何。謂彼物體從因起故。或有時有體起。或有處一物起有初起故。與先語相違。如是不相應者。先已說過故。若彼有異不相應義者。亦如先說。複次此中亦不無因起者。一切諸論。無如是說。有時有處。若自宗。若他宗。無有一物。若染若凈。從無因起者。一一應如是說。以是故不共外道等。別緣起不起等義得成。複次阿毗曇人言。有四種緣。能生諸法。云何而言緣起不起如我。偈曰。
因緣及緣緣 次第增上緣 四緣生諸法 更無第五緣
釋曰。因緣者。謂共有自分相應遍報等。五因緣緣者。謂一切法。次第緣者。除阿羅漢最後所起心心數法。增上緣者。謂所作因。無第五者。若自宗他宗。若天上人間。若修多羅。若阿毗曇。及余諸論。佛未曾說有第五緣。複次如大眾部。亦作是言。先生無有等諸緣。皆於四緣中攝。以是義故。此四種緣。能生諸法。汝言物體不從他起者。是義不然。論者偈曰。
所有諸物體 及以外眾緣 言說音聲等 是皆無自性
釋曰。諸物體者。謂彼眼等。外眾緣者。謂歌羅邏等。言說聲者。謂和合時。無自性者遮彼自體。是義云何。彼諸體等。皆無自性。亦非異處。及自在等有也。是故說言。彼他無體。複次何等為
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 你所說的這些意義，關於『能成』（能夠成就的）和『所成』（所成就的），分明是顛倒錯亂的。這是什麼道理呢？因為你認為物體是從因緣生起的，或者有時有自體生起，或者在某個地方，一物生起有最初的開始，這與你先前的說法相違背。像這樣不相應的情況，先前已經說過了。如果你的意思是說有不相應的其他意義，那也和先前所說的一樣。而且，這裡面也沒有無因而起的說法。所有的論著中，沒有這樣說的。無論何時何地，無論是我們自己的宗派還是其他宗派，沒有一樣東西，無論是染污的還是清凈的，是從無因而起的。應該一一這樣說明。因此，不共外道等，關於緣起和不起等的不同意義才能成立。此外，阿毗曇（Abhidhamma，論藏）學者說，有四種緣，能夠產生諸法。你又怎麼能說緣起和不起像我一樣呢？偈頌說： 『因緣及緣緣，次第增上緣，四緣生諸法，更無第五緣。』 解釋說：『因緣』，指的是共有、自分、相應、遍報等五種因緣。『緣緣』，指的是一切法。『次第緣』，指的是除了阿羅漢（Arhat，斷盡煩惱的聖者）最後生起的心和心所法之外。『增上緣』，指的是所作之因。『沒有第五緣』，無論是我們自己的宗派還是其他宗派，無論是天上人間，無論是修多羅（Sutra，經藏）還是阿毗曇，以及其他的論著，佛陀從未說過有第五種緣。此外，如大眾部（Mahasanghika，早期佛教部派之一）也這樣說，先生無有等諸緣，都包含在這四種緣中。因此，這四種緣，能夠產生諸法。你說物體不是從他處生起的，這種說法是不對的。論者有偈頌說： 『所有諸物體，及以外眾緣，言說音聲等，是皆無自性。』 解釋說：『諸物體』，指的是眼等。『外眾緣』，指的是歌羅邏（Kalala，受精卵最初的形態）等。『言說聲』，指的是和合的時候。『無自性』，是遮止它們的自體。這是什麼意思呢？這些物體等，都沒有自性，也不是在其他地方，以及自在天（Ishvara，印度教中的主神）等所擁有的。所以說，它們沒有自體。此外，什麼是...
【English Translation】 English version Your meaning here, regarding 'what can be accomplished' (that which is able to be accomplished) and 'what is accomplished' (that which is accomplished), is clearly inverted and confused. What is the reason for this? Because you believe that objects arise from causes and conditions, or sometimes arise from their own essence, or in some place, the arising of a thing has a beginning. This contradicts your previous statement. Such inconsistencies have already been discussed. If you mean that there are other meanings of inconsistency, then it is the same as what was said before. Moreover, there is no arising without a cause here. In all treatises, there is no such statement. At no time and in no place, whether in our own school or other schools, is there anything, whether defiled or pure, that arises without a cause. It should be explained in this way one by one. Therefore, the different meanings of arising and non-arising, which are distinct from those of the non-Buddhists (外道, Waidào), can be established. Furthermore, the Abhidhamma (阿毗曇, Āpídámó) scholars say that there are four kinds of conditions that can produce all dharmas. How can you say that arising and non-arising are like me? The verse says: 'Causal condition and condition of conditions, sequential condition and dominant condition, these four conditions produce all dharmas, there is no fifth condition.' The explanation says: 'Causal condition' refers to the five causal conditions such as common, self-division, corresponding, pervasive retribution, etc. 'Condition of conditions' refers to all dharmas. 'Sequential condition' refers to the mind and mental factors that arise last in an Arhat (阿羅漢, Āluóhàn, one who has extinguished all afflictions), except for the last arising. 'Dominant condition' refers to the cause of action. 'There is no fifth condition,' whether in our own school or other schools, whether in heaven or on earth, whether in the Sutras (修多羅, Xiūduōluó, discourses of the Buddha) or the Abhidhamma, and other treatises, the Buddha has never said that there is a fifth condition. Furthermore, as the Mahasanghika (大眾部, Dàzhòngbù, one of the early Buddhist schools) also says, the conditions such as the absence of a prior cause are all included in these four conditions. Therefore, these four conditions can produce all dharmas. You say that objects do not arise from others, this statement is not correct. The commentator has a verse that says: 'All objects, and the various external conditions, speech, sounds, etc., all these are without self-nature.' The explanation says: 'All objects' refers to the eye, etc. 'Various external conditions' refers to the Kalala (歌羅邏, Gēluóluó, the initial form of a fertilized egg), etc. 'Speech and sounds' refers to the time of combination. 'Without self-nature' is to negate their own essence. What does this mean? These objects, etc., all have no self-nature, nor are they in other places, and possessed by Ishvara (自在天, Zìzàitiān, a major deity in Hinduism), etc. Therefore, it is said that they have no self. Furthermore, what is...
自體而言眾緣為他體彼有者。如先不起義中已說驗破。以是故汝於此中。不能破我。複次或有自心虛妄分別者。作是說言。若有能起諸法體者。說為他起。非是自體。若無他緣。則不能生。有他緣故。諸法得起。緣決定故。我作是解者。是義不然。何以故。若作是語。遮自起者。助成我義。若諸體未起。他能令起。是語不善。同前遮故。複次若言體不從他起。遮彼體外有異起者。助成我喻。以是義故。赤白緣中。無有眼等。以眾緣中眼法空故。所以者何。眾緣無自體。以無他故。複次是中有二種語。第一義中。彼眼入等。不從赤白眾緣而起。何以故。眼等無故。如瓶。第一義中。赤白眾緣。無其功能。生眼入等。何以故。彼眼空故。譬如織刀。是故佛說。第一義中。因及眾緣不能生眼。如是應知。佛為憐愍世間住于亂慧無因惡因諸諍論者。於世諦中。說有因緣。次第緣。緣緣增上緣。以是緣故。我義不破。應如是知。復有異分別者。言體從他起。論者言。彼共於此。復應思量。是四緣中。云何能生眼等諸體。復有異名差別。如大眾部。及鞞世師等。所分別者。彼亦隨相。於此中攝。是故決定無第五緣如是。第一義中眼等及他。皆不應爾。云何不然。如偈曰。
自我等諸體 內入等眾緣 一一皆不有 以無自
性故
釋曰。諸緣中。若總若別。彼眼等體。皆不可得。此等聲者。別因中無。和合中亦無。異中亦無。若世諦。若第一義諦。未曾有時。有無自性。物體先起。亦未曾有無自性物。諸緣他體。未來欲起。諸他義者。云何得成。一向無他。以他因無體故。
複次若汝自心妄置諸法有體未來當起待此體故。彼緣為他相待力故說緣為他者。但有是語。何以故。彼等眾緣無他性故。是故不應於此生著。於世諦中假說有他。第一義中。彼他不起。先已說故。僧佉人言。如我意謂有微細我體。彼於後時作令明瞭。即以不了果緣而為他義。是故得成。汝何能破。論者言。汝語非也。世間愚人不作此解。瓶等細我。其義難成。汝言了者。先已破故。
般若燈論釋卷第一 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 般若燈論釋
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複次餘僧佉言。若諸果功能緣中空故。緣不生果。如是義者。成我所成。何以故。汝謂果體不起。是則名常。汝先立義。則為自破。論者言。汝語非也。一切時起。悉皆遮故。不生之物。亦不說常。何以故。不生之物。於世諦中。不欲有故。復有僧佉。說如是言。雖
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 性故
釋曰：在各種因緣中，無論是總體還是個別，那些眼等自體（指眼根等構成要素）都是不可得的。這些聲音，在個別的因中沒有，在和合的因中也沒有，在不同的因中也沒有。無論是世俗諦（俗諦，相對真理），還是第一義諦（勝義諦，絕對真理），從來沒有過有自性的物體先產生，也從來沒有過無自性的物體。各種因緣的其他自體，未來想要產生，那些其他的意義，又怎麼能夠成立呢？因為其他的因沒有自體，所以始終沒有他性。
再次，如果你的自心虛妄地認為諸法有自體，未來應當產生，等待這個自體，因為相互對待的力量而說因緣為他性，這僅僅是說說而已。為什麼呢？因為那些眾多的因緣沒有他性。所以，不應該對此產生執著。在世俗諦中，可以假說有他性，但在第一義諦中，那個他性不會產生，因為之前已經說過了。僧佉（數論派）的人說，正如我認為有微細的我體（神我），它在之後會變得明瞭，就用不了果的因緣作為他性，所以能夠成立，你又能如何破斥呢？論者說，你的話不對。世間的愚人不會這樣理解。瓶等微細的我，其意義難以成立。你說『明瞭』，之前已經被破斥過了。
《般若燈論釋》卷第一 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 《般若燈論釋》
《般若燈論釋》卷第二
偈本 龍樹菩薩（Nagarjuna） 釋論分別 明菩薩（Ming菩薩）
大唐中印度三藏 波羅頗蜜多羅（Prabhakaramitra）譯 觀緣品之二
再次，其他的僧佉（數論派）人說，如果各種果的功能在因緣中是空無的，那麼因緣就不會產生果。如果是這樣的意義，就成就了我所要成就的。為什麼呢？你認為果的自體不產生，那就是常。你先立下這樣的義，就是自己破斥自己。論者說，你的話不對。一切時都產生，都已經遮止了。不產生的事物，也不能說是常。為什麼呢？因為不產生的事物，在世俗諦中，也不想要有。又有僧佉（數論派）人，這樣說，雖然
【English Translation】 English version Nature of Causes
Explanation: Among all conditions, whether general or specific, the inherent nature of those eyes and so on (referring to the elements constituting the eye faculty) is unattainable. These sounds are not present in individual causes, nor in combined causes, nor in different causes. Whether in conventional truth (relative truth) or ultimate truth (absolute truth), there has never been a time when an object with self-nature arises first, nor has there ever been an object without self-nature. The other inherent nature of various conditions, desiring to arise in the future, how can those other meanings be established? Because other causes have no inherent nature, they ultimately have no otherness.
Furthermore, if your own mind falsely posits that all dharmas have inherent nature, that they should arise in the future, waiting for this inherent nature, and because of the power of mutual dependence, you say that conditions are otherness, this is merely speaking. Why? Because those numerous conditions have no otherness. Therefore, one should not become attached to this. In conventional truth, it can be falsely said that there is otherness, but in ultimate truth, that otherness does not arise, because it has been said before. The Samkhya (Samkhya school) people say, just as I think there is a subtle self (Atman), which will become clear later, and use the condition of the unmanifested result as otherness, so it can be established, how can you refute it? The debater says, your words are not right. The foolish people in the world would not understand it this way. The subtle self of a pot and so on is difficult to establish. You say 'manifested', it has already been refuted before.
Prajna Pradipa Commentary, Volume 1 Taisho Tripitaka, Volume 30, No. 1566, Prajna Pradipa Commentary
Prajna Pradipa Commentary, Volume 2
Verses by Nagarjuna (Nagarjuna) Bodhisattva, Commentary and Analysis by Ming Bodhisattva (Ming Bodhisattva)
Translated by Prabhakaramitra (Prabhakaramitra), Tripitaka Master from Central India of the Great Tang Dynasty, Chapter 2 on Observing Conditions
Again, other Samkhya (Samkhya school) people say, if the functions of various results are empty in conditions, then conditions will not produce results. If this is the meaning, then it accomplishes what I want to accomplish. Why? You think that the inherent nature of the result does not arise, then that is permanence. You first establish this meaning, then you refute yourself. The debater says, your words are not right. Arising at all times has already been prevented. Things that do not arise cannot be said to be permanent either. Why? Because things that do not arise are not desired to exist in conventional truth. There are also Samkhya (Samkhya school) people who say like this, although
彼眾緣。不能起果。由有眼色空明。及作意等。諸緣有作故識得生。是故欲令有生有作。彼作及生。我今當說。第一義中。有彼生識自果之作。何以故。以有緣故。譬如𩱭𩰿(集心反)水米及薪火等。諸緣具已。作能成飯。以是驗故。我立義成。論者偈曰。
緣中無作者
釋曰。我不欲令第一義中作能熟飯。以無作故。譬喻不成。譬不成故。汝則有過。何以故。能成立法無故。由成立無故。緣中定無生識之作。若有若無。果皆不起如后當遮作者不起故。因義不成。第一義中。應如是說。複次若汝執言。總說作者。則與義相違。彼緣有者。世智境界。生識之作。與彼眾緣。體不相離。佛護問中。復有外人。作是釋言。若自起。若他起者。是言何謂。此義於我無所用為。雖然眼等諸緣。作眼識生。如𩱭𩰿等。作飯熟故。而彼外人。作是成立。言有體起佛護論師為遮彼故。引偈本云。作者緣中無。何以故。已生未生生時。識有作者。是亦不然。論者言。彼不相應。汝等前後二語。唯有立義故。復有異僧佉言。汝將此過。安置與我。遮我緣中。無其作義。作不起故。譬喻不成者。是義不然。今有作在。云何驗知。有作生彼識等自果。由其作故。如作能熟飯。論者偈曰。
離緣亦無作
釋曰。緣無故亦不與
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這些眾緣（hetu-pratyaya），自身不能產生結果。因為有了眼（cakṣus）、色（rūpa）、空（ākāśa）、明（āloka）以及作意（manasikāra）等，這些緣起具有作用，所以識（vijñāna）才能產生。因此，想要使（識）產生和作用，關於這個作用和產生，我現在應當說明。在第一義（paramārtha）中，存在著這些產生識的自身結果的作用。為什麼呢？因為有緣的緣故。譬如𩱭𩰿（kumbhī，鍋）、水、米以及薪柴火焰等，各種條件具備后，作用就能煮成熟飯。根據這個驗證，我確立這個義理成立。論者的偈頌說： 『緣中無作者』 解釋：我不認為在第一義中，（這些緣）能夠煮成熟飯，因為沒有作者的緣故。譬喻不成立。譬喻不成立，你就有過失。為什麼呢？因為能夠成立的法不存在。由於成立不存在，所以在緣中一定沒有產生識的作用。無論有還是沒有（作者），結果都不會產生，如同後面將要遮破作者不起作用一樣。因此，因的義理不成立。在第一義中，應該這樣說。再次，如果你堅持說，總的來說有作者，那就與義理相違背。那些緣起具有（作用），是世俗智慧的境界，產生識的作用，與那些眾緣，本體不相分離。在佛護（Buddhapālita）的問答中，還有外人，這樣解釋說：『若是自己產生，或是他者產生，這些話是什麼意思？』這個義理對我來說沒有什麼用處。雖然眼等各種緣，產生眼識，如同𩱭𩰿等，煮成熟飯一樣。而那些外人，這樣來成立（他們的觀點），說有自體產生。佛護論師爲了遮破他們，引用偈頌的原文說：『作者緣中無。』為什麼呢？無論是已生、未生還是正在生的時候，識有作者，這也是不對的。論者說：『這些不相應。』你們前後兩句話，只有立義。又有不同的僧佉（Sāṃkhya）論者說：『你將這個過失，安置在我這裡，遮破我的緣中，沒有作用的義理。』作用不起，譬喻不成立，這個義理不對。現在有作用存在。如何驗證知道呢？有作用產生那些識等自身的結果。因為有作用的緣故，如同作用能夠煮成熟飯一樣。論者的偈頌說： 『離緣亦無作』 解釋：沒有緣，作用也不會存在。
【English Translation】 English version: These aggregates of conditions (hetu-pratyaya) cannot produce a result by themselves. Because there are eye (cakṣus), form (rūpa), space (ākāśa), light (āloka), and attention (manasikāra), etc., these conditions have an effect, so consciousness (vijñāna) can arise. Therefore, wanting to make (consciousness) arise and act, I shall now explain about this action and arising. In the ultimate sense (paramārtha), there is the action of these arising consciousnesses producing their own results. Why? Because there are conditions. For example, a pot (kumbhī), water, rice, and firewood, etc., when all conditions are complete, the action can cook the rice. Based on this verification, I establish that this principle is established. The commentator's verse says: 'There is no agent in the conditions.' Explanation: I do not think that in the ultimate sense, (these conditions) can cook the rice, because there is no agent. The analogy is not established. If the analogy is not established, you have a fault. Why? Because the dharma that can establish (the argument) does not exist. Since the establishment does not exist, there is definitely no action of arising consciousness in the conditions. Whether there is or is not (an agent), the result will not arise, just as it will be refuted later that the agent does not act. Therefore, the meaning of the cause is not established. In the ultimate sense, it should be said like this. Furthermore, if you insist that, generally speaking, there is an agent, then it contradicts the meaning. Those conditions have (action), which is the realm of worldly wisdom, the action of arising consciousness is not separate from those aggregates of conditions in essence. In the questions and answers of Buddhapālita, there are also outsiders who explain it this way: 'If it arises by itself, or if it arises by another, what do these words mean?' This meaning is of no use to me. Although the various conditions such as the eye produce eye consciousness, just like the pot, etc., cook the rice. And those outsiders establish (their view) in this way, saying that there is self-arising. Buddhapālita, in order to refute them, quoted the original verse saying: 'There is no agent in the conditions.' Why? Whether it is already arisen, not yet arisen, or arising, it is not right that consciousness has an agent. The commentator says: 'These are not consistent.' Your two sentences before and after only establish the meaning. There are also different Sāṃkhya theorists who say: 'You place this fault on me, refuting the meaning that there is no action in my conditions.' The action does not arise, the analogy is not established, this meaning is not right. Now there is action. How to verify and know? There is action that produces those consciousnesses and other self-results. Because there is action, just like the action can cook the rice. The commentator's verse says: 'Without conditions, there is also no action.' Explanation: Without conditions, action will not exist either.
緣合而獨有作者無也。如先緣中有作次第說其過故。復有論師釋此偈言。識自體生。即是作也。論者言。如前偈說緣中無有作離緣亦無作。若言有彼生識作者。是義不然。何以故。如識無故。彼作亦無。若言無其別作。但緣是作者。是亦不然。若言緣無自體作有自體者。佛護論師言。彼亦無緣。有作過故。論者言。若謂無緣得有作者。是義不然。何以故。若無彼緣自然有作。無此義故。佛護言。於世諦中。云何有作自他眾緣相因待故。有作如無間。剎那能起果體。是名為作。如彼未來欲起法體由作。得生於世諦中。非無有作。不同汝執緣中有作。是語無咎。論者言。汝今不說因緣譬喻。但有立義與他過者。此釋不成。複次經部師言。有異法起。如眼識等。何以故。由有作故。譬如種子。地水火風。因緣和合。得有芽出。以此答故。汝先驗破。論者言。如先偈說。緣中無有作。此義云何。第一義中。遮彼起故。彼作無體。種子等緣和合有作者。此不應爾。汝言緣中定有作者。是義不成。譬喻無故。汝先答者。不能破我。複次有外人言。如稻穀等。真實是有。何以故。由作有故。於世諦中。欲令如是隨順世諦。如其所欲。第一義中。亦復如是。譬如兔角。由譬成故。所欲義立。論者言。汝等如是安立作義。如稻穀等。於世
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 緣起和合，並無獨立的作者存在。如果說在因緣中存在『作』（karma, 行為），那麼就犯了先前所說的過失。另有一些論師解釋這句偈頌說：『識』（consciousness）的自體產生，就是『作』。論者反駁說：如前一偈所說，因緣中沒有『作』，離開因緣也沒有『作』。如果說有『生識』的作者，這種說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為『識』不存在，所以『作』也不存在。如果說沒有其他的『作』，只是因緣是作者，這也是不對的。如果說因緣沒有自體，而『作』有自體，佛護論師說，這樣就成了沒有因緣卻有『作』的過失。論者說：如果認為沒有因緣就能有作者，這種說法是不對的。為什麼呢？如果沒有因緣，『作』自然產生，沒有這種道理。佛護說：在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya）中，怎麼會沒有『作』呢？因為自體、他體、眾多因緣相互依賴，所以有『作』，比如無間剎那（anantara-kṣaṇa）能夠產生果體的作用，這叫做『作』。就像未來想要產生的法體，通過『作』才能在世俗諦中產生，並非沒有『作』。這與你們執著因緣中有『作』不同，這種說法沒有過失。論者說：你現在不舉因緣的譬喻，只是立論來指責他人，這種解釋是不成立的。再次，經部師（Sautrāntika）說：有異法生起，比如眼識等。為什麼呢？因為有『作』的緣故。比如種子、土地、水、火、風等因緣和合，才能有芽產生。用這個來回答，你先前所說的就被駁倒了。論者說：如先前偈頌所說，因緣中沒有『作』，這是什麼意思呢？在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya）中，是爲了遮止『作』的生起，因為『作』沒有自體。種子等因緣和合有作者，這種說法是不應該成立的。你說因緣中一定有作者，這種說法是不成立的，因為沒有譬喻。你先前的回答，不能駁倒我。再次，有外人說：比如稻穀等，真實是存在的。為什麼呢？因為有『作』的緣故。在世俗諦中，想要這樣隨順世俗諦，就如你所愿。在第一義諦中，也是如此。比如兔角，因為有譬喻，所以想要表達的意義就成立了。論者說：你們這樣安立『作』的意義，就像稻穀等，在世
【English Translation】 English version When conditions come together, there is no independent agent. If 'action' (karma) is said to exist within conditions, then the previously stated fault is committed. Some teachers explain this verse by saying that the self-arising of 'consciousness' (vijñāna) is 'action'. The debater refutes this, saying: As the previous verse stated, there is no 'action' within conditions, nor is there 'action' apart from conditions. If it is said that there is an agent who 'produces consciousness', this is not correct. Why? Because 'consciousness' does not exist, therefore 'action' does not exist either. If it is said that there is no separate 'action', but that the conditions themselves are the agent, this is also incorrect. If it is said that the conditions have no self-nature, but 'action' has self-nature, the teacher Buddhapālita says that this would be the fault of having 'action' without conditions. The debater says: If it is thought that an agent can exist without conditions, this is not correct. Why? If 'action' arises naturally without conditions, there is no such principle. Buddhapālita says: In conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), how can there be no 'action'? Because self, other, and numerous conditions depend on each other, there is 'action', such as the immediately preceding moment (anantara-kṣaṇa) being able to produce the effect-body, this is called 'action'. Just as the dharma-body that is to arise in the future can only arise in conventional truth through 'action', it is not that there is no 'action'. This is different from your clinging to 'action' existing within conditions; this statement has no fault. The debater says: You are not giving examples of conditions, but are merely establishing a thesis to accuse others; this explanation is not established. Furthermore, the Sautrāntika says: Different dharmas arise, such as eye-consciousness and so on. Why? Because there is 'action'. For example, when the conditions of seed, earth, water, fire, and wind come together, a sprout can arise. With this answer, what you said earlier is refuted. The debater says: As the previous verse stated, there is no 'action' within conditions; what does this mean? In ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), it is to prevent the arising of 'action', because 'action' has no self-nature. The statement that the coming together of conditions such as seeds has an agent should not be established. Your statement that there must be an agent within conditions is not established, because there is no example. Your previous answer cannot refute me. Furthermore, an outsider says: For example, rice grains and so on truly exist. Why? Because there is 'action'. In conventional truth, wanting to accord with conventional truth in this way is as you wish. In ultimate truth, it is also like this. For example, a rabbit's horn; because there is an example, the meaning that one wants to express is established. The debater says: You establish the meaning of 'action' in this way, like rice grains and so on, in the world.
諦中。言有作者。是義不然。何以故。如偈曰。
若有若無作 諸緣作不成
釋曰。於世諦中。兔角無故。第一義中。有亦不成。作亦如是。以無體故。汝言由譬成故。所欲義立者。翻此二過。還在於汝。複次僧佉人言。兔角無體。即是其體。云何知耶。如毗伽羅論第六門中。作如是說。有別異故。譬如青優缽羅華。與色為異。論者言。汝說不善。何以故。華色等二體別異者。第一義中。此皆不成。無譬喻故。若汝意謂如我立色等有體故。不能令汝解。如是汝立色等無體。亦不能令我解。以彼此同過故。今當答汝。無同過義。何以故。起法有體。如是已遮。況不起者。欲令有體而當不遮。有體無體。是汝意欲顯示異相。我今遮汝。作如此解。有體無體。墮在二邊。我不同汝執有無故。不墮二邊。此義云何。汝立有體無體。令他信受。驗無體故。非我所欲。是故汝執無道理故。我立義成。汝言同過者。此復非也。
複次或有諸說起者。應如是問。果先未起。彼諸緣等。為無作耶。為有作耶。若諸緣無作。不能起果者。云何名無作起果。功能緣中空故。說名無作。若功能空者。則非彼緣能起彼果。譬如麥種無稻穀芽。此不應爾。若有作者。驗此作有。緣中無故。由果起故。說彼有作。果未起時。彼無所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 在勝義諦中，如果說有造作者，這種說法是不對的。為什麼呢？就像偈頌所說： 『若有若無作，諸緣作不成。』 解釋：在世俗諦中，兔角是不存在的，所以在第一義諦中，『有』也不能成立，『作』也是一樣，因為它沒有實體。你說因為譬喻成立，所以你想要建立的意義就能成立，但這樣反而會回到你自己的兩個過失上。此外，數論派的人說，兔角沒有實體，這本身就是它的實體。怎麼知道呢？就像《毗伽羅論》第六門中這樣說：因為有差別。比如青蓮花，和顏色是不同的。論者說，你說的不好。為什麼呢？花和顏色等兩個實體不同，這在第一義諦中都不能成立，因為沒有譬喻。如果你認為就像我建立的顏色等有實體一樣，就不能讓你理解。同樣，你建立的顏色等沒有實體，也不能讓我理解。因為彼此都有同樣的過失。現在我來回答你，沒有同樣的過失。為什麼呢？生起的法有實體，這樣已經遮破了。何況是不生起的法呢？想要讓有實體的法而不被遮破。有實體和無實體，是你想顯示不同的相。我現在遮破你，這樣解釋：有實體和無實體，都落在兩邊。我不同於你執著有和無，所以不落在兩邊。這是什麼意思呢？你建立有實體和無實體，讓別人相信接受，但驗證了無實體，這不是我想要的。所以你執著沒有道理，所以我建立的意義才能成立。你說有同樣的過失，這也是不對的。 此外，或者有人提出各種說法，應該這樣問：果在沒有生起之前，那些因緣等，是沒有作用呢？還是有作用呢？如果那些因緣沒有作用，不能生起果，怎麼能叫做沒有作用而生起果呢？因為功能在因緣中是空的，所以叫做沒有作用。如果功能是空的，那麼就不是那些因緣能生起那些果。比如麥種不能生起稻穀芽。這不應該這樣。如果有作用，驗證這個作用是存在的，因為因緣中沒有，由於果生起，所以說它有作用。果還沒有生起的時候，它沒有...
【English Translation】 English version: In the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), to say there is an agent (kartṛ) is not correct. Why? As the verse says: 'If there is or is not an agent, the conditions (hetu) cannot produce.' Explanation: In conventional truth (Saṃvṛti-satya), a rabbit's horn does not exist, so in the ultimate truth, 'existence' cannot be established, and 'action' is the same, because it has no substance. You say that because the analogy is established, the meaning you want to establish can be established, but this will return to your own two faults. Furthermore, the Sāṃkhya school says that the rabbit's horn has no substance, and this itself is its substance. How do we know? As it is said in the sixth chapter of the Vigraha-vyāvartanī: because there is a difference. For example, a blue lotus (utpala) is different from its color. The debater says, 'What you say is not good.' Why? The flower and color, etc., are two different entities, which cannot be established in the ultimate truth, because there is no analogy. If you think that just as I establish that color, etc., have substance, it cannot make you understand. Similarly, if you establish that color, etc., have no substance, it cannot make me understand. Because both have the same fault. Now I will answer you, there is no same fault. Why? A phenomenon that arises has substance, which has already been refuted. How much more so for a phenomenon that does not arise? You want to allow a phenomenon with substance to not be refuted. Having substance and not having substance are what you want to show as different aspects. I now refute you, explaining it this way: having substance and not having substance both fall into two extremes. I am different from you in clinging to existence and non-existence, so I do not fall into two extremes. What does this mean? You establish having substance and not having substance to make others believe and accept, but verifying the non-substance, this is not what I want. Therefore, your clinging is unreasonable, so the meaning I establish can be established. You say there is the same fault, this is also not correct. Furthermore, or if someone raises various arguments, one should ask this: before the result (phala) has arisen, are those conditions (pratyaya), etc., without action or with action? If those conditions have no action and cannot produce the result, how can it be called producing a result without action? Because the function (kāritra) is empty in the conditions, it is called without action. If the function is empty, then it is not those conditions that can produce those results. For example, a wheat seed cannot produce a rice sprout. This should not be so. If there is action, verifying that this action exists, because it is not in the conditions, because the result arises, it is said to have action. When the result has not yet arisen, it has no...
作。由此驗故因義不成。
複次經部師言。彼果起時。諸緣有作。以是緣故。互相隨攝。資益果起。非因不成。答驗亦立。論者言。汝經部師。欲令第一義中。谷等諸緣。和合聚集。果得起耶。若定爾者。是諸因緣。乃至未能起果。自此已前。此稻穀等。云何不名為非緣耶。無有此事。如是緣故。譬如乃至未從他受學。云何不名無智人耶。此義不成。問曰。若如是者。果先未起。則諸緣非緣。我欲如此。是故無過。答曰。汝甚有過。何以故。汝意唯解。果先未起。諸緣非緣。而不知彼。果正起時。緣亦非緣。為此義故。云何芽起時。彼稻穀等。非緣自性。以第一義中。若一若異。不可說故。如彼谷等。先剎那時。若有說言。非自非他非俱起體者。此是成我所成。何以故。因果二法不可說一異故。雖不可說。要待彼緣。方能生果。如是說者。並同前破謂云何芽起乃至先剎那時。複次說有起者言。第一義中。彼入等緣。能起內入。何以故。以緣故。如谷等芽。若不能起。彼則非緣譬如兔角。論者言。如汝所說。第一義中。彼緣有者。此緣于果為有為無。為有無俱。皆不應爾。如偈曰。
非定有定無 諸緣義應爾
釋曰。此緣非有。如其所執。不應爾者。今當顯示此義。偈言緣非有者。是何等耶。此非有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，通過這種驗證，因的定義是不成立的。
其次，經部師說：『當果產生時，各種緣起作用，因此，它們互相隨順攝持，資助果的生起，所以因的定義並非不成立，驗證也是成立的。』論者反駁說：『你們經部師，想要在第一義諦中，讓稻穀等各種緣和合聚集，果才能生起嗎？如果一定是這樣，那麼在這些因緣，乃至未能生起果之前，這些稻穀等，為什麼不被稱為非緣呢？』沒有這樣的道理。就像乃至未從他人處學習，怎麼能不被稱為無知的人呢？這個定義是不成立的。問：『如果像你這樣說，果先前未生起，那麼各種緣就是非緣，我就是想這樣說，所以沒有過失。』答：『你很有過失。為什麼呢？你的意思只理解到，果先前未生起，各種緣就是非緣，卻不知道，果正在生起時，緣也是非緣。爲了這個道理，為什麼芽生起時，那些稻穀等，不是緣的自性呢？因為在第一義諦中，若一若異，是不可說的。』就像那些稻穀等，在先前剎那的時候，如果有人說，非自非他非俱起體，這是在重複我已經成立的觀點。為什麼呢？因為因果二法，不可說是一或異。雖然不可說，但要等待那些緣，才能生果。這樣說的人，和前面所破斥的觀點相同，即為什麼芽生起乃至先前剎那的時候。
其次，說有生起的人說：『在第一義諦中，那些入等緣，能夠生起內入。為什麼呢？因為是緣的緣故，就像稻穀等生芽。如果不能生起，那麼它就不是緣，譬如兔角。』論者說：『如你所說，在第一義諦中，那些緣是存在的，那麼這些緣對於果來說，是有還是無，還是有無俱備呢？都不應該是這樣。』如偈頌所說：
『非定有定無，諸緣義應爾。』
解釋：這些緣不是有，如他們所執著的，不應該是這樣，現在應當顯示這個道理。偈頌說緣非有，是指什麼呢？是指非有。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, by this verification, the definition of cause is not established.
Furthermore, the Sautrāntika (a Buddhist philosophical school) says: 'When the effect arises, all conditions are active. Therefore, they mutually support and assist in the arising of the effect. Thus, the definition of cause is not invalid, and the verification is valid.' The debater refutes: 'You, Sautrāntika, want that in the ultimate truth (paramārtha), the various conditions such as rice grains, etc., come together and gather, and then the effect can arise? If it must be so, then before these conditions, until the effect has not yet arisen, why are these rice grains, etc., not called non-conditions?' There is no such thing. Just like until one has not learned from others, how can one not be called an ignorant person? This definition is not established. Question: 'If it is as you say, the effect has not arisen before, then the various conditions are non-conditions. I want to say it this way, so there is no fault.' Answer: 'You have a great fault. Why? Your meaning only understands that the effect has not arisen before, and the various conditions are non-conditions, but you do not know that when the effect is arising, the conditions are also non-conditions. For this reason, why, when the sprout arises, are those rice grains, etc., not the nature of conditions? Because in the ultimate truth, whether one or different, it is unspeakable.' Just like those rice grains, etc., in the previous moment, if someone says, 'not self, not other, not both arising together,' this is repeating what I have already established. Why? Because the two dharmas of cause and effect cannot be said to be one or different. Although it cannot be said, it must wait for those conditions to produce the effect. Those who say this are the same as the previously refuted view, that is, why when the sprout arises, even until the previous moment.
Furthermore, those who say there is arising say: 'In the ultimate truth, those conditions such as the sense bases (āyatana), etc., can give rise to the internal sense bases. Why? Because it is a condition, like rice grains, etc., producing sprouts. If it cannot give rise, then it is not a condition, like a rabbit's horn.' The debater says: 'As you say, in the ultimate truth, those conditions exist, then are these conditions for the effect existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent? None of these should be the case.' As the verse says:
'Not definitely existent, not definitely non-existent, the meaning of all conditions should be thus.'
Explanation: These conditions are not existent, as they insist, it should not be so. Now we should show this reason. The verse says the condition is non-existent, what does it refer to? It refers to non-existent.
者。如空華等。何等是。彼摩婁多緣故可知。如是彼無一物。為虛空花。為兔角緣耶。此釋非有緣者。是何語義。此驗稻穀等緣。第一義中。非自性有。何以故果非有故。如空花非有。虛空無體。如是芽等非有。以稻穀等諸緣非有故。如虛空花。或有人言。我不欲令彼有法起意。欲令彼可起法起。先無體故。論者言。汝謂緣非有者。是何等耶。如彼瓶等。先未起時。則無體相。既無自體。更有何等為彼瓶衣。稻穀等緣。欲令可起法起。如是則無一緣。應知此義。以第一義中。驗稻穀等。非芽等緣。何以故。由先未起。無其體故。譬如瓶等。複次法若已有。緣亦無用。何以故。有自體故。如是於世諦中。彼稻穀等。亦非芽等緣。何以故。以生作不觀故。如彼已生芽者。及余瓶衣等。以是驗故。因義不成。僧佉人言。實有物體。藉緣了作。或時緣中先有細果。后時待緣。令細為粗。汝言已有。緣何用者。此語不然。論者言。彼了作者。先已遮故。複次先細后粗。若有非有。如前說過。汝語非也。複次經部師言。理實諸緣非有非無。言有無者。義不應爾。此復云何。謂第一義中。果起現前。諸緣和合。互相資攝。能得自體。以有緣故。爾時彼果不得言無。以其起故。不得言有。以未現起故。我欲如此以是因緣。無如前過。論
【現代漢語翻譯】 問：就像虛空中的花朵等，這是什麼意思呢？答：就像『摩婁多』（Maruta，一種傳說中的怪物）一樣，因為有『緣』（hetu，原因、條件）才能被認知。就像這樣，『彼』（tat，指現象）沒有一物，是虛空花，還是兔角的『緣』呢？ 解釋：如果說『此』（idam，指現象）沒有『緣』，這是什麼意思呢？這是爲了驗證稻穀等的『緣』，在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya，勝義諦，真諦）中，不是自性存在的。為什麼呢？因為果不是真實存在的。就像虛空花不是真實存在的一樣，虛空沒有實體。同樣，芽等也不是真實存在的，因為稻穀等諸『緣』不是真實存在的。就像虛空花一樣。 或者有人說：『我不希望讓彼有法（sat-dharma，已存在的法）生起，而是希望讓彼可起法（utpāda-dharma，可以生起的法）生起，因為它們先前沒有實體。』論者說：『你認為「緣」不是真實存在的，這是指什麼呢？』就像瓶子等，在尚未生起時，就沒有實體和形相。既然沒有自體（svabhāva，自性），還有什麼可以作為瓶子的『緣』呢？稻穀等『緣』，想要讓可生起的法生起。這樣一來，就沒有一個『緣』了。應該明白這個道理。在第一義諦中，驗證稻穀等，不是芽等的『緣』。為什麼呢？因為在先前尚未生起時，沒有它的實體。譬如瓶子等。 進一步說，如果法已經存在，『緣』也沒有用處。為什麼呢？因為已經有了自體。這樣在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，俗諦，世諦）中，稻穀等也不是芽等的『緣』。為什麼呢？因為對於已經生起的事物，不會再觀察其生起的過程。就像已經生起的芽，以及其餘的瓶子、衣服等。通過這樣的驗證，『因』（hetu，原因）的意義不能成立。 僧佉論者說：『真實存在物體，藉助「緣」來使其顯現。或者有時「緣」中先有細微的果，之後等待「緣」，使細微的果變得粗大。』你說已經存在，『緣』有什麼用呢？這種說法是不對的。論者說：『彼顯現者，先前已經被遮止了。』進一步說，先細后粗，若是有還是沒有，就像前面說過的。你的話是不對的。 複次，經部師說：『理實上，諸「緣」非有非無。說有說無，意義不應該是這樣。』這是什麼意思呢？在第一義諦中，果生起顯現，諸「緣」和合，互相資助攝持，才能獲得自體。因為有「緣」的緣故，那時彼果不能說是沒有，因為它已經生起了。也不能說是有，因為它尚未完全顯現。我想要這樣，因為這個因緣，沒有像前面那樣的過失。』
【English Translation】 Question: What is meant by things like flowers in the sky? Answer: It is like 'Maruta' (a legendary monster), which can only be recognized because of 'hetu' (cause, condition). Like that, 'tat' (that, referring to phenomena) has nothing, is it a flower in the sky, or the 'hetu' of a rabbit's horn? Explanation: If it is said that 'idam' (this, referring to phenomena) has no 'hetu', what does this mean? This is to verify that the 'hetu' of rice grains, etc., is not self-existent in the paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth). Why? Because the fruit is not truly existent. Just as the flower in the sky is not truly existent, the sky has no substance. Similarly, sprouts, etc., are not truly existent because the 'hetu' of rice grains, etc., is not truly existent. It's like a flower in the sky. Or someone might say: 'I do not want to bring about the sat-dharma (existing dharma), but rather I want to bring about the utpāda-dharma (dharma that can arise), because they previously had no substance.' The debater says: 'What do you mean by saying that 'hetu' is not truly existent?' It's like a pot, etc., which has no substance or form when it has not yet arisen. Since there is no svabhāva (self-nature), what else can be the 'hetu' of the pot? The 'hetu' of rice grains, etc., wants to bring about the dharma that can arise. In this way, there is not a single 'hetu'. This principle should be understood. In the ultimate truth, verifying rice grains, etc., is not the 'hetu' of sprouts, etc. Why? Because when it has not yet arisen, it has no substance. For example, pots, etc. Furthermore, if a dharma already exists, 'hetu' is useless. Why? Because it already has self-nature. Thus, in the saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth), rice grains, etc., are also not the 'hetu' of sprouts, etc. Why? Because for things that have already arisen, the process of their arising is no longer observed. Like the sprouts that have already arisen, and the remaining pots, clothes, etc. Through such verification, the meaning of 'hetu' (cause) cannot be established. The Samkhya philosopher says: 'Objects truly exist, and they are manifested through 'hetu'. Or sometimes there is a subtle fruit in 'hetu' first, and then waiting for 'hetu' to make the subtle fruit become coarse.' You say it already exists, what is the use of 'hetu'? This statement is incorrect. The debater says: 'That which is manifested has already been negated.' Furthermore, whether it is subtle first and then coarse, whether it exists or does not exist, is as previously stated. Your words are incorrect. Moreover, the Sautrāntika says: 'In reality, all 'hetu' are neither existent nor non-existent. Saying existent or non-existent, the meaning should not be like this.' What does this mean? In the ultimate truth, when the fruit arises and manifests, all 'hetu' combine, mutually aid and support each other, and then can obtain self-nature. Because of the 'hetu', at that time the fruit cannot be said to be non-existent, because it has already arisen. Nor can it be said to be existent, because it has not yet fully manifested. I want it to be like this, because of this cause, there is no fault like before.'
者言。此亦自分別耳。非有非無。緣義應爾有及非有。二種無故。皆不可說。譬如余物。若有不有。二俱非緣。論者意爾。複次此中但是有及非有俱不可說。何以故。有非有故。非非有故。如是物者。此是無物。謂眼識或芽彼緣即眼等。諸種子等。不可說實。何以故以彼等果。有及非有。不可說故。譬如余物。修多羅人。不能避過。複次有等自性體空。於世諦中。生義成故。復有俱說尼犍子言。彼果者亦有非有以緣故。我意欲爾。是故無前所說過失。論者言。彼諸尼犍子等。有無二語。方便俱說者。此非安隱處。立義不成。如是已說總破諸緣。今當別破。此中總觀因緣故。若能生異緣。彼名為因。如是和合自在所生法起非一能生故。又遮彼起故。我欲如此。於世諦中。建立因義。第一義中。因非因故。應如是說。若汝意謂。此因有物。若不有物。及有無物。能起果者。此義不然。偈曰。
非有非非有 非有無法起
釋曰。第一義中。法相如是。云何說言。因能起耶。故彼非因。如是。彼不能起。有故無故。猶如自他。先已驗破。若有無俱。則有二過。是故因體不成。若謂所生法起應說因故者。此亦不然。以有等相不起故。於世諦中。由因有果因亦如是果起因成故。複次自部人言。有因能起彼內入等。此緣
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：論者說：『這些也只是分別而已。既非存在，也非不存在。』根據緣起的意義，應該是『有』和『非有』。因為這兩種情況都不存在，所以都無法說清。譬如其他事物，如果既存在又不存在，那麼這兩種情況都不是緣起。這是論者的意思。再者，這裡只是『有』和『非有』都無法說清。為什麼呢？因為既是『有』又『非有』，既不是『非有』又『非非有』。像這樣的事物，就是『無物』。所謂眼識或嫩芽，它們所依賴的緣就是眼等，以及各種種子等，都無法說是真實的。為什麼呢？因為它們的果，既是『有』又是『非有』，無法說清。譬如其他事物，修多羅（sutra，經）的作者也無法避免這種過失。再者，『有』等的自性是空性的，在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）中，生起的意義才能成立。還有，俱說外道尼犍子（Nigaṇṭha，耆那教）說：『它們的果也是既存在又不存在，因為有緣的緣故。』我的意思是這樣，所以沒有前面所說的過失。論者說：『那些尼犍子等，用「有」和「無」兩種說法，只是方便說法而已，這不是安穩之處，立論不能成立。』像這樣已經總的破斥了各種緣起。現在應當分別破斥。這裡總的觀察因緣的緣故，如果能夠生起不同的緣，那麼它就叫做『因』。像這樣和合自在所生的法生起，不是一個能夠生起的緣故，又遮止它的生起緣故，我想要這樣，在世俗諦中，建立『因』的意義。在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya，絕對真理）中，因為既不是因也不是非因的緣故，應當這樣說。如果你的意思是，這個因是『有物』，或者『不有物』，或者『既有又無物』，能夠生起果，那麼這個道理是不成立的。偈頌說：『非有非非有，非有無法起。』解釋說：在第一義諦中，法的相狀就是這樣，怎麼能說因能夠生起呢？所以它不是因。像這樣，它不能生起，因為『有』的緣故，因為『無』的緣故，就像『自』和『他』一樣，先前已經驗證破斥過了。如果既『有』又『無』，那麼就有兩種過失。所以因的體性不能成立。如果說所生法生起，應當說因的緣故，那麼這也是不成立的。因為『有』等的相狀不能生起的緣故。在世俗諦中，由於因的存在，果才存在，因也像這樣，果生起，因才成立。再者，自部人說：『有因能夠生起那些內入等。』這個緣
【English Translation】 English version: The objector says: 'These are merely discriminations. It is neither existent nor non-existent.' According to the meaning of dependent origination, it should be 'existent' and 'non-existent.' Because these two conditions do not exist, both are unspeakable. For example, other things, if they are both existent and non-existent, then these two conditions are not dependent origination. This is the objector's meaning. Furthermore, here it is only that 'existent' and 'non-existent' are both unspeakable. Why? Because it is both 'existent' and 'non-existent,' and it is neither 'non-existent' nor 'non-non-existent.' Such a thing is a 'non-thing.' What is called eye-consciousness or a sprout, their dependent condition is the eye, etc., and various seeds, etc., cannot be said to be real. Why? Because their result is both 'existent' and 'non-existent,' and cannot be spoken of. For example, other things, the author of the sutra (sutra, scripture) cannot avoid this fault. Furthermore, the self-nature of 'existent,' etc., is emptiness. In conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya, relative truth), the meaning of arising can be established. Also, the Nigaṇṭhas (Nigaṇṭha, Jainas), who speak together, say: 'Their result is also both existent and non-existent, because of the condition of the cause.' This is what I mean, so there is no fault as mentioned before. The objector says: 'Those Nigaṇṭhas, etc., use the two terms 'existent' and 'non-existent' as mere expedient speech. This is not a safe place, and the proposition cannot be established.' Thus, all dependent origination has been generally refuted. Now, we should refute them separately. Here, because we generally observe the cause and condition, if it can give rise to a different condition, then it is called 'cause.' Like this, the arising of the dharma produced by the combination of self-existence is not something that can be produced by one cause, and it also prevents its arising. I want to establish the meaning of 'cause' in conventional truth in this way. In ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya, absolute truth), because it is neither cause nor non-cause, it should be said like this. If you mean that this cause is 'something existent,' or 'something non-existent,' or 'something both existent and non-existent,' and can produce a result, then this reasoning is not established. The verse says: 'Neither existent nor non-existent, non-existence cannot arise.' The explanation says: In ultimate truth, the characteristics of dharma are like this. How can it be said that the cause can produce? Therefore, it is not a cause. Like this, it cannot produce, because of 'existence,' because of 'non-existence,' just like 'self' and 'other,' which have already been verified and refuted. If it is both 'existent' and 'non-existent,' then there are two faults. Therefore, the nature of the cause cannot be established. If it is said that the arising of the produced dharma should be spoken of as the cause, then this is also not established. Because the characteristics of 'existence,' etc., cannot arise. In conventional truth, because of the existence of the cause, the result exists, and the cause is like this. When the result arises, the cause is established. Furthermore, people of our own school say: 'There is a cause that can produce those internal entrances, etc.' This condition
起義。是如來說。如如來說。不可變異。譬如寂滅涅槃。此能起因。是因緣義。心心數法所緣。是緣緣義。彼次第滅心心數法除阿羅漢最後心。是次第緣義。若此法有。彼法得起。生增上緣義。由佛說故。有因緣等。為緣自體。汝言無者。此因不成。立義破故。論者言。汝所立義。於世諦中。可得如是。以譬喻過故。所說不然。云何汝等立此因義。為世諦中。佛如是說。為第一義中。佛如是說。若世諦中。如是說者。汝義自壞。若第一義中。如是說者。彼第一義中。非有非不有非有無法起故。彼有非有亦有非有自性果緣不可得故。因不能起。若其如是。云何定言彼因能起。以是義故。汝因不成。以相違故復有人言。受遮方便。此中論中。明法無性法。無性者。二俱遮故。二謂名著。及所名著。所名著者。如前已破。其名著者。今當次遮。若總說義。非有非不有。亦非非有非非不有等世人盡欲因能起果。彼因若有非有。有非有俱。自性果生。皆不應爾。因語轉故。識彼因體。因如是因。故不相應。或有人言。第一義中。有諸體起。何以故。有因故者。如先說破。彼因不成。複次有異。論師言。若有若非有。若有無俱。自體不起故。非是因相。因義不成。如是釋者。是義不然。複次今當觀察彼緣緣義。如其緣緣。亦不如彼
憶想分別。如偈曰。
婆伽婆所說 真實無緣法 此法體如是 何處有緣緣
釋曰。彼眼識等。不名為緣。何以故。無緣緣故。但是自心虛妄分別。第一義中。遮彼法起。彼欲起時。亦非能緣。何以故。由欲起故。譬如色法。以是義故。緣緣無體。但於世諦。建立眼等因相持故。名之為法。如識因光。然後得起。故名緣緣。不如財與主俱。若爾者無能緣法。第一義中。能緣識不成。如所分別。能緣無故。所緣亦無。以所緣無物故。其義如是。譬如造五逆者。終不見諦。是故彼因不成。亦與緣義相違故。復有異人言。若色陰所攝。色不能緣者。是義相應。諸部論師亦作是說。何等無所緣法。謂色及涅槃。若汝意謂。心心數法。無所緣者。汝先所欲。則為自破。何等有所緣法。謂心及心數法。論者言。汝語不善。我所立喻。今更明顯。外人言。心心數法。定有所緣。非如造色者。無譬喻故。複次所取者為所緣。論者言。如彼分別心心數法。有所取者。后當更破。如第一義道理所說。我不欲令識有能緣。如佛說。複次勇猛菩薩摩訶薩應如是行。色非所緣。何以故。一切法無所緣。無有少法可取故。彼若是可取此則是所緣。如是勇猛非色行色。乃至非識行識。勇猛一切法不行故。非色見。亦非識見。乃至非識
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 憶念和分別。如偈頌所說：
『婆伽婆（Bhagavān，世尊）所說，真實無緣之法，此法之本體即是如此，哪裡會有緣和緣的關係呢？』
解釋：那些眼識等等，不能稱作『緣』。為什麼呢？因為沒有緣和緣的關係。這只是自心的虛妄分別。在第一義諦中，遮止這些法的生起。當這些『欲』生起時，也不是能緣。為什麼呢？因為『欲』的生起本身就像色法一樣。因此，緣和緣的關係沒有實體。只是在世俗諦中，建立眼等因相持的關係，稱之為法。比如識因光而生起，所以稱為緣緣。這不像財產和主人同時存在。如果這樣，就沒有能緣之法了。在第一義諦中，能緣的識是不成立的。如同所分別的那樣，因為能緣不存在，所以所緣也不存在。因為所緣沒有實體，道理就是這樣。比如造五逆罪的人，終究不能見諦。所以，那個因是不成立的，也與緣的意義相違背。還有其他人說，如果色陰所攝的色不能作為所緣，這個說法是相應的。各部論師也是這樣說的。什麼法沒有所緣呢？就是色和涅槃。如果你認為，心和心數法沒有所緣，那麼你先前的觀點就自相矛盾了。什麼法有所緣呢？就是心和心數法。論者說，你的話不妥當。我所立的比喻，現在更加明顯。外人說，心和心數法，一定有所緣，不像造色者那樣，沒有譬喻。再次，所取的就是所緣。論者說，像你分別心和心數法有所取那樣，之後會進一步破斥。如第一義的道理所說，我不認為識有能緣。如佛所說。再次，勇猛菩薩摩訶薩應該這樣修行：色不是所緣。為什麼呢？一切法都沒有所緣，沒有絲毫法可以執取。如果色是可以執取的，那麼它就是所緣。這樣，勇猛菩薩不是以色行色，乃至不是以識行識。勇猛菩薩對一切法都不執著，所以不是以色見，也不是以識見，乃至不是以識見。
【English Translation】 English version: Recollection and Discrimination. As the verse says:
'What the Bhagavan (世尊, The Blessed One) has spoken, is the true law without conditions. The essence of this law is such, where would there be a relationship of conditions and conditioned?'
Explanation: Those eye-consciousness and so on, cannot be called 'conditions'. Why? Because there is no relationship of conditions and conditioned. This is merely the mind's own false discrimination. In the ultimate truth, it prevents the arising of these dharmas. When these 'desires' arise, they are also not the conditioning factor. Why? Because the arising of 'desire' itself is like a form. Therefore, the relationship of conditions and conditioned has no substance. It is only in the conventional truth that the relationship of eye and other causes is established, and it is called a dharma. For example, consciousness arises because of light, so it is called conditioned. This is not like property and the owner existing simultaneously. If that were the case, there would be no conditioning dharma. In the ultimate truth, the conditioning consciousness is not established. As discriminated, because the conditioning does not exist, the conditioned also does not exist. Because the conditioned has no substance, the principle is like this. For example, a person who commits the five heinous crimes will never see the truth. Therefore, that cause is not established, and it also contradicts the meaning of condition. There are also others who say that if the form contained in the form aggregate cannot be taken as the conditioned, this statement is consistent. The various schools of teachers also say this. What dharma has no conditioned? It is form and Nirvana (涅槃, cessation of suffering). If you think that mind and mental factors have no conditioned, then your previous view contradicts itself. What dharma has a conditioned? It is mind and mental factors. The debater says, your words are inappropriate. The analogy I have established is now even clearer. The outsider says, mind and mental factors must have a conditioned, unlike the creator of form, who has no analogy. Furthermore, what is grasped is the conditioned. The debater says, like you discriminating that mind and mental factors have something to be grasped, it will be further refuted later. As the principle of the ultimate truth says, I do not think that consciousness has a conditioning factor. As the Buddha (佛, awakened one) said. Again, a courageous Bodhisattva (菩薩, enlightenment being) Mahasattva (摩訶薩, great being) should practice in this way: form is not the conditioned. Why? All dharmas have no conditioned, and there is not the slightest dharma that can be grasped. If form can be grasped, then it is the conditioned. In this way, the courageous Bodhisattva does not practice form with form, and even does not practice consciousness with consciousness. The courageous Bodhisattva does not cling to any dharma, so he does not see with form, nor does he see with consciousness, and even does not see with consciousness.
知。亦非可見。若色至識。非知非見。是名般若波羅蜜。觀所緣竟。複次如汝分別。次第緣者。此應諦觀其相云何。第一義中。彼一切種。及一切法。皆遮無起。以是緣故。如偈曰。
不起諸法滅 是義則不然 滅法則非緣 及何等次第
釋曰。此義云何。以無起故。如第二頭。不可言滅。是故第一義中次第緣者此不相應。如是彼義不成。以相違故。順彼說者。若汝欲得此次第滅心心數法。為次第緣者。是義不然。何以故。彼體滅故。如久滅識。亦如色法。以非緣故。此將欲起心心數法。彼物滅故。何者為緣。以非此緣故。以彼滅者。及欲起法。不能隨攝故。此意如是。非次第緣。亦非總緣故。或有如是心起所有決定因緣。各各自在與欲起體處故。緣欲滅時作饒益故。彼余過去剎那。以無間故。次第緣成。是故無過者。此義不然。以非色法無住處故六識次第滅。此名為意。如是滅意。為次第緣者。不免過故。若汝意謂彼欲滅者。為次第緣。汝立此緣。但有是語。何以故。以其同時非次第緣故。複次滅法則非緣及何等次第者。有異釋云。此及聲者。及未起果。應如是知。其義云何。彼滅未起種子芽等二皆無體俱是無因種子及芽滅起等二墮此過中。論者言。彼立此義。所謂滅者。因滅無體及無住當起作起
【現代漢語翻譯】 知，也非可見。如果色（rupa，物質）至識（vijnana，意識）的法，既非可知，也非可見，這便稱為般若波羅蜜（prajnaparamita，智慧到彼岸）。觀所緣境完畢。再者，如你所分別的，次第緣起，對此應當仔細觀察其相狀如何。在第一義諦（paramartha-satya，勝義諦）中，那一切種類以及一切法，都被遮止而無生起。因為這個緣故，如偈頌所說： 『不起諸法滅，是義則不然；滅法則非緣，及何等次第。』 解釋說，這個意義是什麼呢？因為沒有生起，就像第二顆頭一樣，不可說滅。因此，在第一義諦中，次第緣起是不相應的。這樣，那個意義不能成立，因為互相違背。順著他們的說法，如果你想要得到這次第滅的心（citta，心）和心數法（caittasika，心所法），作為次第緣起，這個意義是不成立的。為什麼呢？因為它們的體性已經滅盡。就像很久以前滅去的識，也像色法一樣，因為不是緣故。這即將生起的心和心數法，因為那個事物已經滅盡，什麼能作為緣呢？因為不是這個緣故。因為那個滅去的，以及想要生起的法，不能隨之攝取。這個意思是這樣，既非次第緣起，也非總緣起。或者有這樣的心生起，所有決定的因緣，各自自在地給予想要生起的體性處所。因為在想要滅去的時候，給予饒益。那些其餘過去剎那（ksana，瞬間），因為沒有間隔，次第緣起成立。因此沒有過失，這個意義是不成立的。因為不是色法沒有住處，六識（sadayatana，六根）次第滅去，這稱為意（manas，意）。這樣滅去的意，作為次第緣起，不能免除過失。如果你認為那想要滅去的，作為次第緣起，你建立這個緣起，但只有這個說法。為什麼呢？因為它們同時存在，不是次第緣起。再者，滅去的法則不是緣，以及什麼次第呢？有不同的解釋說，這個『及』字，以及未生起的果，應當這樣理解。它的意義是什麼呢？那滅去的未生起的種子（bija，種子）、芽（ankura，芽）等等，兩者都沒有體性，都是無因。種子和芽的滅去和生起等等，都落入這個過失中。論者說，他們建立這個意義，所謂滅去的，因為因滅而沒有體性，以及沒有住處，當生起而作生起。
【English Translation】 Knowing, yet also not visible. If the dharmas from rupa (form, matter) to vijnana (consciousness) are neither knowable nor visible, this is called Prajnaparamita (perfection of wisdom). The contemplation of the object of thought is complete. Furthermore, as you distinguish, sequential dependent origination, one should carefully observe its characteristics. In the ultimate truth (paramartha-satya), all those kinds and all dharmas are negated and do not arise. Because of this reason, as the verse says: 'The non-arising and cessation of all dharmas, this meaning is not so; the cessation of dharmas is not a condition, and what kind of sequence is there?' The explanation says, what is this meaning? Because there is no arising, like a second head, one cannot speak of cessation. Therefore, in the ultimate truth, sequential dependent origination is not corresponding. Thus, that meaning cannot be established because it contradicts itself. Following their statement, if you want to obtain this sequential cessation of mind (citta) and mental factors (caittasika) as sequential dependent origination, this meaning is not established. Why? Because their nature has already ceased. Like the consciousness that ceased long ago, also like form, because it is not a condition. This mind and mental factors that are about to arise, because that thing has ceased, what can serve as a condition? Because it is not this condition. Because that which has ceased, and the dharma that wants to arise, cannot be included with it. This meaning is like this, neither sequential dependent origination nor total dependent origination. Or there is such a mind arising, all the determining causes and conditions, each freely giving the place for the nature that wants to arise. Because at the time of wanting to cease, giving benefit. Those remaining past kshanas (moments), because there is no interval, sequential dependent origination is established. Therefore, there is no fault, this meaning is not established. Because it is not that form has no dwelling place, the six consciousnesses (sadayatana) cease sequentially, this is called manas (mind). Thus, the ceased mind, as sequential dependent origination, cannot avoid fault. If you think that which wants to cease, as sequential dependent origination, you establish this dependent origination, but there is only this statement. Why? Because they exist simultaneously, not sequential dependent origination. Furthermore, the ceased dharma is not a condition, and what sequence is there? There is a different explanation saying that the word 'and', and the unarisen fruit, should be understood in this way. What is its meaning? Those ceased unarisen bija (seed), ankura (sprout), etc., both have no nature, both are without cause. The cessation and arising of seed and sprout, etc., all fall into this fault. The debater says, they establish this meaning, the so-called ceased, because the cause ceases and there is no nature, and there is no dwelling place, when it arises it makes arising.
分別以無因故滅起等二得如是過。此說不然。以無過故。所成能成。語義顯了。以顛倒故。得何過失。今當立驗。彼滅非緣。何以故。以因有故。譬如未滅心心數聚。又無因起。以因有故。說此二語。彼不相應。是義云何。先語者。因義不成。后語者。自義相違。以一切法起者遮故。此偈亦遮。次第緣故。彼得二過。謂因義不成過自義相違過。如是分別次第緣已。複次增上緣者。其相云何。若有此法。彼法得起故。名增上緣。汝義如是。今第一義中。緣法不起。令他解了諸法如幻。自體本空不可得故。如偈曰。
諸法無自體 自相非有故
釋曰。以是義故。自大乘中。非獨第一義諦。諸法無起。於世諦中。因有果起。亦不可得。偈曰。
此有彼法起 是義則不然
釋曰。以是義故。彼因過失。汝不得離。複次佛婆伽婆無分別智。善巧安置。教化世間不信深法者。為安慰故。種種稱揚涅槃寂滅等諸勝功德。世諦法故。非第一義。以第一義中彼涅槃等自體空故。譬喻無體。因不成故。或有欲令於世諦中諸法有體。譬如涅槃寂滅故者。此等如先譬喻過失。說無常等諸過患者。毀呰有為法。不令樂著故。誘引彼故。為說涅槃寂滅功德。世諦攝故。說彼有體。第一義中。彼實無體。汝意所欲。義不成故
。如是諸緣遮已。復有外人言。第一義中。有緣能起眼等內入。何以故。彼果得起故。如谷等芽。若是無者。果不得起。譬如龜毛不可為衣。論者言。汝謂有者。為一一緣中有果自體。為和合諸緣有果自體。為一一中無和合亦無。應如是問。外人言。汝何故作此問。論者言。若是有者。如前已遮。果若是有。緣復何用。若是無者。亦先已遮。果若是無。緣復何用。如偈曰。
非一一和合 諸緣中有果 如是則非緣 云何果得起
釋曰。第一義中。如是如是果等不起。諸緣中無故。此義如是。如泥中無酪。不可生酪。以非因故。若稻等中。無其芽體。如是得生。於世諦分中。凡夫智慧同行見故。欲令第一義中。有彼眼等內入生者。此義不然。如偈曰。
若果緣中無 彼果從緣起 非緣中亦無 云何果不起
釋曰。彼如是說。過失起故。如非緣中無果。諸緣中亦無。譬如彼聲。作故無常。有何所以。瓶是作故。而非無常。如先已說。聲是無常。何以故。由作故。譬如瓶。此義應知。若以此方便。第一義中芽等現空而從谷等生。彼芽等義不應爾。何以故。以果故。譬如酪。是故非有。以不免先所說過故。復有人言。第一義中。有彼內入我。如是受緣轉異故。如泥為瓶。論者偈曰。
緣
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：像這樣通過各種論證遮破之後，又有外道之人說：『在第一義諦（Paramārtha， ultimate truth）中，因緣能夠生起眼等內六入（āyatana， sense bases）。為什麼呢？因為它們的結果能夠生起。就像穀物等能生出芽。如果本來沒有，結果就不能生起，就像龜毛不能用來做衣服。』 論者（佛教論師）說：『你所說的『有』，是指每一個個別的因緣中都有果的自體（svabhāva， intrinsic nature），還是指和合的諸緣中才有果的自體？或者是指每一個個別因緣中沒有，和合的諸緣中也沒有？應該這樣問你。』 外道之人說：『你為什麼要這樣問？』 論者說：『如果是有，就像前面已經遮破的那樣，如果果已經存在，那還要因緣做什麼？如果是沒有，也像先前已經遮破的那樣，如果果本來就沒有，那還要因緣做什麼？』就像偈頌所說： 『不是在每一個個別的因緣中，也不是在和合的諸緣中，有果的存在。如果是這樣，那就不是因緣，果又怎麼能生起呢？』 解釋：在第一義諦中，像這樣，像這樣，果等是不能生起的，因為在諸緣中沒有果的自體。這個道理是這樣的，就像泥土中沒有乳酪，就不能從中生出乳酪，因為泥土不是乳酪的因。如果稻穀等中，沒有芽的自體，芽就不能從中生出。但在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya， conventional truth）的層面，凡夫的智慧和通常的見解是相同的，所以芽可以從稻穀中生出。如果想要在第一義諦中，認為眼等內六入能夠生起，這是不合理的。 就像偈頌所說： 『如果果在因緣中不存在，那麼這個果怎麼能從因緣中生起呢？如果非因緣中也沒有果，那果又怎麼能不生起呢？』 解釋：他們這樣說是由於過失產生。例如，如果非因緣中沒有果，諸緣中也沒有果，就像聲音一樣，因為是『作』（kṛta， made）所以是無常（anitya， impermanent）。有什麼理由呢？瓶子是『作』的，但不是無常的。就像先前已經說過的，聲音是無常的，為什麼呢？因為它是『作』的，就像瓶子一樣。這個道理應該知道。如果用這種方便，認為在第一義諦中，芽等顯現為空性（śūnyatā， emptiness），但卻能從穀物等中生起，這種說法是不應該成立的。為什麼呢？因為這就像酪一樣，是果。所以，這種說法是不成立的，因為它無法避免先前所說過的過失。又有人說：『在第一義諦中，有內六入的我（ātman， self）。就像這樣，感受因緣而轉變不同，就像泥土變成瓶子一樣。』 論者用偈頌說：
【English Translation】 English version: After refuting in this way through various arguments, another outsider says: 'In the Paramārtha (第一義諦, ultimate truth), causes and conditions can give rise to the inner āyatana (內入, sense bases) such as the eye. Why? Because their result can arise, just as sprouts arise from grains, etc. If it were not there originally, the result could not arise, just as turtle hair cannot be used to make clothing.' The debater (Buddhist philosopher) says: 'When you say 'exists,' do you mean that each individual cause and condition has the svabhāva (自體, intrinsic nature) of the result, or that the combined causes and conditions have the svabhāva of the result? Or do you mean that it is not in each individual cause and condition, nor in the combined causes and conditions? You should be asked in this way.' The outsider says: 'Why do you ask this question?' The debater says: 'If it exists, as has already been refuted, if the result already exists, then what is the use of causes and conditions? If it does not exist, as has also been refuted previously, if the result does not exist originally, then what is the use of causes and conditions?' As the verse says: 'Not in each individual cause and condition, nor in the combined causes and conditions, is there the existence of the result. If this is the case, then it is not a cause and condition, how can the result arise?' Explanation: In the Paramārtha, in this way, in this way, results, etc., cannot arise because there is no svabhāva of the result in the causes and conditions. This principle is like this: just as there is no butter in the mud, butter cannot be produced from it because mud is not the cause of butter. If, in rice, etc., there is no essence of the sprout, the sprout cannot arise from it. But in the saṃvṛti-satya (世俗諦, conventional truth), the wisdom of ordinary people and common views are the same, so sprouts can arise from rice. If you want to think that in the Paramārtha, the inner āyatana such as the eye can arise, this is unreasonable. As the verse says: 'If the result does not exist in the causes and conditions, then how can this result arise from the causes and conditions? If the result does not exist in non-causes and conditions, then how can the result not arise?' Explanation: They say this because faults arise. For example, if there is no result in non-causes and conditions, there is also no result in causes and conditions, just like sound, because it is 'kṛta' (作, made) it is anitya (無常, impermanent). What is the reason? A pot is 'made' but it is not impermanent. As has been said before, sound is impermanent, why? Because it is 'made,' like a pot. This principle should be known. If, using this method, you think that in the Paramārtha, sprouts, etc., appear as śūnyatā (空性, emptiness), but can arise from grains, etc., this statement should not be established. Why? Because it is like butter, it is a result. Therefore, this statement is not established because it cannot avoid the faults that have been said before. Again, someone says: 'In the Paramārtha, there is the ātman (我, self) of the inner six āyatana. Just like this, feelings are conditioned and transformed differently, just as mud becomes a pot.' The debater says in a verse:
及果自性
釋曰。此謂彼緣轉異故。偈曰。
諸緣無自體
釋曰。此謂緣無自性。偈義如是。譬如生酥。轉為婆羅門心。彼緣自體不可得故。如先已說。偈曰。
若緣無自體 云何轉成果
釋曰。此明第一義中緣不轉變。為彼果體。偈義如是。譬如提婆達多童子梵行。云何耶若達多為彼兒耶。又如幻主化作泥團。彼自體空。能生瓶等。如彼轉變。於世諦中。一切智者。皆不能信。是故非緣轉變為果。如是譬喻無體。所成能成法無故。如先因義不成。亦相違過故。外人言。若緣自體不轉為果者。緣體可無而果者不。失以彼不遮果自體故。如我立義。第一義中。有諸內入。何以故。以果故。譬如芽等。論者偈曰。
非無緣有果
釋曰。無緣轉變而有果者。於世諦中。亦不能信。何況于彼第一義中。而可信耶。此義不成。外人言。若第一義中。緣體空者。然彼非緣。自體不空。而此非緣。是我所欲。是故非緣義成。論者言。但遮緣體。則無非緣。豈以非緣令汝解耶。複次開合偈曰。
何有緣非緣
釋曰。諸緣非緣。自體不有。偈義如是。複次我已先遮有及非有。皆無果起。以是義故果無自體。果既無體。緣則非緣。何處有彼緣體可得。如是語義。本無所有。但彼心聲相因
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 及果自性
釋曰：此謂彼緣轉變的緣故。偈曰：
諸緣無自體
釋曰：此謂諸緣沒有自性。偈的意義是這樣的。譬如生酥，轉變為婆羅門的心。那個緣的自體不可得的緣故，如先前已經說過的。偈曰：
若緣無自體 云何轉成果
釋曰：此說明在第一義諦中，緣不能轉變為那個果的自體。偈的意義是這樣的。譬如提婆達多（Devadatta，人名）童子修梵行，云何耶若達多（Yajnadatta，人名）是他的兒子呢？又如幻術師變化出泥團，那個自體是空的，能生出瓶子等等。像那樣的轉變，在世俗諦中，一切智者，都不能相信。所以不是緣轉變為果。這樣的譬喻沒有實體，所成的法和能成的法都沒有的緣故，如先前的因義不能成立，也是互相違背的過失的緣故。外道人說：如果緣的自體不轉變為果，緣的體可以沒有而果不沒有，是因為它不遮止果的自體的緣故。如我所立的義，在第一義諦中，有諸多的內入。為什麼呢？因為果的緣故。譬如芽等等。論者偈曰：
非無緣有果
釋曰：沒有緣的轉變而有果，在世俗諦中，也不能相信。何況在那第一義諦中，可以相信呢？這個義不能成立。外道人說：如果第一義諦中，緣的體是空的，然而那個非緣，自體不是空的，而這個非緣，是我所希望的。所以非緣的義成立。論者說：只是遮止緣的體，就沒有非緣。難道用非緣來讓你理解嗎？再次，開合偈曰：
何有緣非緣
釋曰：諸緣和非緣，自體沒有。偈的意義是這樣的。再次，我已經先前遮止了有和非有，都沒有果生起。因為這個義的緣故，果沒有自體。果既然沒有體，緣就是非緣。哪裡有那個緣的體可以得到？像這樣的語義，本來就沒有所有。只是那個心聲互相因循。
【English Translation】 English version The Nature of Cause and Effect
Explanation: This refers to the reason for the transformation of those conditions. Verse:
All conditions lack inherent existence.
Explanation: This means that conditions have no self-nature. The meaning of the verse is thus. For example, fresh butter transforms into the mind of a Brahmin. Because the self-nature of that condition is unattainable, as previously stated. Verse:
If conditions lack inherent existence, how can they transform into an effect?
Explanation: This clarifies that in the ultimate truth (paramārtha), conditions do not transform into that effect's self-nature. The meaning of the verse is thus. For example, Devadatta (a proper noun) practices pure conduct (brahmacarya) as a child, how can Yajnadatta (a proper noun) be his son? Also, like a magician conjuring a lump of clay, that self-nature is empty, yet it can produce pots and so on. Such a transformation, in conventional truth (saṃvṛti), cannot be believed by all-knowing ones. Therefore, it is not that conditions transform into an effect. Such analogies have no substance, because the accomplished dharma and the accomplishing dharma are absent. Just as the previous argument of cause is not established, it is also a contradictory fault. An outsider says: If the self-nature of conditions does not transform into an effect, the substance of conditions can be absent while the effect is not absent, because it does not prevent the effect's self-nature. As in my established thesis, in the ultimate truth, there are many internal entrances. Why? Because of the effect. For example, sprouts and so on. The debater's verse:
There is no effect without a cause.
Explanation: That there is an effect without the transformation of a cause cannot be believed even in conventional truth. How much less can it be believed in that ultimate truth? This argument is not established. An outsider says: If in the ultimate truth, the substance of conditions is empty, then that non-condition, its self-nature is not empty, and this non-condition is what I desire. Therefore, the meaning of non-condition is established. The debater says: Merely negating the substance of conditions, there is no non-condition. Are you trying to understand through non-condition? Again, opening and closing verse:
How can there be cause and non-cause?
Explanation: All causes and non-causes, their self-nature does not exist. The meaning of the verse is thus. Again, I have previously negated existence and non-existence, and no effect arises from either. Because of this meaning, the effect has no self-nature. Since the effect has no substance, the cause is a non-cause. Where can that substance of cause be obtained? Such semantics originally have nothing. It is merely that mental sounds follow each other.
起。說果無自性。緣體空故。複次從上已來。外人所說四種緣起。所謂因緣。緣緣。次第。增上等。自體差別。遮彼所立。明無起義。是故此品觀諸緣起。無起義成。如諸大乘經中說。偈曰。
若諸緣起彼無起 彼起自體不可得 若緣自在說彼空 解空名為不放逸 若人知無一物起 亦復知無一物滅 彼非有故亦非無 見彼世間悉空寂 本來寂靜無諸起 自性如是已涅槃 能為依怙轉法輪 說諸法空開示彼 有無不起俱亦非 非有非無無起處 世間因緣悉如是 但彼凡夫妄分別 常無起法是如來 彼一切法如善逝
複次如般若波羅蜜經中說。文殊師利如是應知。彼一切法不起不滅。名為如來。又如梵王問經中說。彼處一切愛滅盡故彼名無起。彼若無起。彼即菩提。世間顛倒。虛妄起著。第一義中。佛不出世。亦不涅槃。從本已來。無起滅故。又如梵王問經。偈曰。
已解彼諸陰 無起亦無滅 雖行彼世間 世法不能染
如是等諸修多羅此中應廣說。
釋觀緣品竟。
般若燈論釋卷第二 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 般若燈論釋
般若燈論釋卷第三
偈本龍樹菩薩 釋論分別明菩薩
大唐中印度三藏波羅
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：起。說果無自性，因為緣起之體是空性的。再者，從前面開始，外道所說的四種緣起，即因緣、緣緣、次第緣、增上緣等，它們各自的自體有差別，遮破他們所建立的，闡明沒有生起的意義。因此，此品觀察諸緣起，無生起的意義成立。如諸大乘經典中所說，偈頌說： 『如果諸緣起沒有生起，那麼它們的自體就不可得。如果說緣起是自在的，那麼就說它是空性的，理解空性就叫做不放逸。如果有人知道沒有一物生起，也知道沒有一物滅去，它既非有也非無，見到那個世間完全是空寂的。本來就是寂靜的，沒有諸多的生起，自性就是這樣已經涅槃。能夠作為依靠，轉動法輪，宣說諸法是空性的，開示他們。有和無都不生起，既非有也非無，沒有生起之處。世間的因緣都是這樣，只不過是凡夫妄加分別。常無生起之法的就是如來（Tathagata），他的一切法都如善逝（Sugata）。』 再如《般若波羅蜜經》中所說。文殊師利（Manjusri）應該這樣知道，一切法不生不滅，名為如來。又如《梵王問經》中所說，那個地方一切愛都滅盡了，所以叫做無生。那個如果無生，那個就是菩提（Bodhi）。世間顛倒，虛妄生起執著。在第一義中，佛（Buddha）不出世，也不涅槃，從本來就沒有生滅的緣故。又如《梵王問經》，偈頌說： 『已經理解了那些陰（Skandha），沒有生起也沒有滅去。雖然行走在那個世間，世間的法卻不能夠染污。』 像這樣等等的諸修多羅（Sutra），這裡應該廣泛地解說。 《釋觀緣品》結束。 《般若燈論釋》卷第二 《般若燈論釋》卷第三 偈頌是龍樹菩薩（Nagarjuna）所作，解釋是分別明菩薩（Vimalakirti）所作。 大唐中印度三藏波羅（Paramartha）
【English Translation】 English version: Beginning. It is said that the result has no self-nature because the substance of dependent origination is empty. Furthermore, from what has been said above, the four kinds of dependent origination asserted by outsiders, namely, cause and condition (hetu-pratyaya), condition for condition (alambana-pratyaya), sequential condition (samanantara-pratyaya), and dominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya), etc., have their own differences in their self-nature. Refuting what they establish clarifies the meaning of no arising. Therefore, this chapter observes all dependent origination, and the meaning of no arising is established. As it is said in the Great Vehicle Sutras, the verse says: 'If these dependent arisings have no arising, then their self-nature is unattainable. If it is said that dependent origination is independent, then it is said to be empty; understanding emptiness is called non-negligence. If a person knows that no thing arises, and also knows that no thing ceases, it is neither existent nor non-existent, seeing that the world is entirely empty and still. Originally it is still, without any arising; its self-nature is thus already in Nirvana (Nirvana). Able to be a refuge, turning the Dharma wheel (Dharmacakra), proclaiming that all dharmas are empty, revealing them. Existence and non-existence do not arise together, neither existent nor non-existent, there is no place of arising. The causes and conditions of the world are all like this, but ordinary people make false distinctions. The Tathagata (Tathagata) is the one who always has no arising Dharma; all his dharmas are like the Sugata (Sugata).' Furthermore, as it is said in the Prajnaparamita Sutra (Prajnaparamita Sutra). Manjusri (Manjusri) should know thus, that all dharmas neither arise nor cease, and are called Tathagata. Also, as it is said in the Brahma King Questioning Sutra, that place where all love is extinguished is called no arising. If that is no arising, that is Bodhi (Bodhi). The world is inverted, falsely arising attachments. In the ultimate meaning, the Buddha (Buddha) does not appear in the world, nor does he enter Nirvana, because from the beginning there is no arising or ceasing. Also, as in the Brahma King Questioning Sutra, the verse says: 'Having understood those Skandhas (Skandha), there is no arising and no ceasing. Although walking in that world, the dharmas of the world cannot defile.' Such and other Sutras (Sutra) should be extensively explained here. The Explanation of the Chapter on Observation of Conditions ends. Prajna-pradipa-tika Volume Two Prajna-pradipa-tika Volume Three The verses are by Nagarjuna Bodhisattva (Nagarjuna), and the explanation is by Vimalakirti Bodhisattva (Vimalakirti). Paramartha (Paramartha), Tripitaka Master from Central India of the Great Tang Dynasty.
頗蜜多羅譯
觀去來品第二
複次初品已說一切法體無起對治。令人信解。今複次明不來不去緣起差別。使物識知。遮彼義故。第二品起。此義云何。世間法中。言說自在。于所作事。深起愛染。今欲拔彼執著箭故。遮一行相。此外施為。即易可破。彼所謂者。外人言。應有如是內入體起。何以故。彼境界差別可言說故。若無此起彼境界差別。則不可言說。如石女兒不可說。彼有來有去。若提婆達多耶若達多則不如是。由此譬喻。自他諸法起義得成。論者言。若施戒禪等。多修習故。自性起成。或行及住。世間所解此成。已覆成過。如在定者。以慧眼觀。彼施戒等。行及不行。第一義中。體不可得。彼境界差別可言說。因義不成故。如遮行起行亦同破。複次若謂我立因種共汝同解分別俱成者。此義不然。何以故。彼俱成因。驗無體故。如是異執有驗。違彼因義故。複次若第一義中。謂有去者。彼已去未去去處三應可得。如偈曰。
已去不應受
釋曰。謂去法已謝故。此義自他俱解。不須成立。偈曰。
未去亦不受
釋曰。由去者故。如已去者。義意如此。複次云何未去。謂彼去者。未有起作。以彼法未去故。能成所成法自在俱得成。以法體法相欲去者。譬喻驗故。此復云何。以未去
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本
頗蜜多羅譯
觀去來品第二
其次，第一品已經說明了一切法的本體沒有生起對立的現象，是爲了使人信服理解。現在進一步說明不來不去的緣起差別，使人們認識瞭解，爲了遮止那種執著，所以才有了第二品。這個道理是什麼呢？在世間法中，言語是自由自在的，對於所做的事情，會產生很深的愛戀執著。現在想要拔除那些執著的箭，所以遮止那唯一的行相。此外的施捨作為，就很容易被攻破。他們所說的，外道說，應該有這樣的內入本體生起。為什麼呢？因為那些境界差別是可以言說的。如果沒有這個生起，那些境界差別就不可言說，就像石女的兒子不可說一樣。他們有來有去，如果提婆達多（Devadatta，六群比丘之一）耶若達多（Yajnadatta，人名）就是這樣。通過這個比喻，自己和他人的諸法生起的道理就成立了。論者說，如果佈施、持戒、禪定等等，因為多次修習的緣故，自性生起成就，或者行走和居住，世間所理解的這個成就，已經重複成就了。就像在禪定中的人，用智慧的眼睛觀察，那些佈施、持戒等等，行走和不行走，在第一義諦中，本體是不可得的。那些境界差別是可以言說的，因的道理不能成立。就像遮止行走的生起，行走的破斥也是一樣的。
其次，如果說我建立的因種和你們共同理解，分別都成立，這個道理是不對的。為什麼呢？因為那些共同成立的因，驗證是沒有本體的。像這樣不同的執著有驗證，違背了那些因的道理。其次，如果在第一義諦中，認為有去，那麼已去、未去、去處這三種應該可以得到。如偈頌所說：
已去不應受
解釋說，所說的去法已經過去了，這個道理自己和他人都能理解，不需要成立。偈頌說：
未去亦不受
解釋說，因為有去的人的緣故，就像已去的人一樣，道理是這樣的。其次，什麼是未去呢？所說的那些去的人，還沒有開始行動。因為那些法還沒有去，能成就和所成就的法，自在地一起成就。因為法體法相想要去的人，用譬喻來驗證。這又是什麼呢？因為未去。
【English Translation】 English version
Translated by Paramitra
Chapter Two: On Observation of Going and Coming
Furthermore, the first chapter has already explained that the essence of all dharmas is without arising or opposition, in order to inspire faith and understanding. Now, this further clarifies the differences in dependent origination of not coming and not going, to enable beings to recognize and understand, and to prevent that attachment, hence the arising of the second chapter. What is this principle? In worldly dharmas, speech is free and unconstrained, and deep love and attachment arise towards what is done. Now, wanting to remove those arrows of attachment, therefore, this single characteristic is prevented. Other acts of giving are easily broken. What they say, the outsiders say, there should be such an internal entering essence arising. Why? Because those differences in realms can be spoken of. If there is no such arising, those differences in realms cannot be spoken of, like the son of a barren woman cannot be spoken of. They have coming and going, if Devadatta (one of the group of six monks) or Yajnadatta (a person's name) is like this. Through this analogy, the principle of the arising of one's own and others' dharmas is established. The debater says, if giving, precepts, meditation, etc., are cultivated many times, the self-nature arises and is accomplished, or walking and dwelling, what the world understands as this accomplishment, has already been accomplished repeatedly. Like those in samadhi, observing with the eye of wisdom, those giving, precepts, etc., walking and not walking, in the ultimate truth, the essence is unattainable. Those differences in realms can be spoken of, the reason of the cause cannot be established. Just like preventing the arising of walking, the refutation of walking is the same.
Furthermore, if you say that the seed of cause that I establish is understood together with you, and the distinctions are both established, this principle is not right. Why? Because those causes that are established together, verification shows that there is no essence. Like this different attachment has verification, violating those reasons of the cause. Furthermore, if in the ultimate truth, it is thought that there is going, then the gone, not yet gone, and place of going, these three should be attainable. As the verse says:
The gone should not be received.
The explanation says, what is said to be the gone dharma has already passed, this principle is understood by both oneself and others, there is no need to establish it. The verse says:
The not yet gone is also not received.
The explanation says, because of the one who is going, like the one who has already gone, the principle is like this. Furthermore, what is not yet gone? What is said to be those who are going, have not yet begun to act. Because those dharmas have not yet gone, the dharma that can accomplish and the dharma that is accomplished, freely accomplish together. Because the essence of the dharma and the characteristic of the dharma want to go, use analogy to verify. What is this again? Because not yet gone.
亦不受。此義成立。何以故。以未去故。譬如余欲去者。複次優樓佉弟子言。何等未去。為如提婆達多未去為去如是不受耶。為如提婆達多去作不去令他解耶。論者言。何因緣故。作如此問。外人言。若汝意欲受先分別則成我義。若汝意欲受後分別則違汝因義。是故非先因義不成。複次我立實外別有去法。汝言非者。是語不然。實外有去。云何成立。謂自體外句義和合調達境界有去。調達我意如是以緣隨轉故如和合調達應如是知。論者言。若世諦中有去和合。提婆達多顯自體外有句義和合。彼境界故生其去覺。令他解者。於世諦中成已覆成過。何以故。但有處邊剎那剎那前後差別。名為和合。調達名者。唯是行聚。自既無體。何有別去。與彼合耶。如是慧者。我意所欲。複次去名句義與調達合。第一義中。無譬喻故。體不可得。如是彼世諦中。亦違道理。何況第一義諦中耶。此等過失。汝不得離。複次經部師言。因欲起動生彼風界及四大造。名為身聚。處邊無間。前後起滅。說名為去。若謂別有外去法者。是義不然。何以故。隨所起處起者即滅故。譬如火焰惑者謂去。其實非也。第一義中。亦無去時。汝于第一義中。遮彼去者。成所成過。論者言。以遮起故。汝說方便。此義不成。何以故。焰等去迷智同迷故彼去者去
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 也不接受。這個道理成立。為什麼呢？因為還沒有離開的緣故。譬如說我想要離開。再次，優樓佉（Ulluka，印度數論派創始人）的弟子說：『什麼叫做沒有離開？是像提婆達多（Devadatta，人名，意為「天授」）沒有離開那樣不接受呢？還是像提婆達多離開后，製造一種沒有離開的假象，以此來迷惑他人呢？』論者說：『你因為什麼緣故，提出這樣的問題？』外人說：『如果你的意思是接受先前的分別，那就成就了我的觀點；如果你的意思是接受後來的分別，那就違背了你自己的因義。所以，先前的因義是不成立的。』再次，我主張在實體之外，另外存在一種『去』的法。你說沒有，這是不對的。實體之外確實存在『去』。如何成立呢？就是說，在自體之外，句義和合，在調達（Devadatta）的境界中有『去』。調達我的意思是，像這樣隨著因緣而轉變，所以應該像和合的調達那樣理解。論者說：『如果在世俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）中，有『去』的和合，提婆達多顯示在自體之外有句義的和合，因為那個境界而產生『去』的覺知，以此來迷惑他人，那麼在世俗諦中就犯了已成覆成的過失。為什麼呢？因為只有處所、邊際、剎那剎那的前後差別，才叫做和合。調達這個名稱，僅僅是行聚。自身既然沒有實體，哪裡會有另外的『去』，與它結合呢？像這樣理解的人，才是我的意思。』再次，『去』這個名稱是句義與調達的結合。在第一義諦（Paramārtha-satya，絕對真理）中，因為沒有譬喻，所以本體不可得。像這樣，即使在世俗諦中，也違背道理，更何況在第一義諦中呢？這些過失，你是無法擺脫的。再次，經部師（Sautrāntika，佛教部派之一）說：『因為想要行動，而生起風界（Vāyu-dhātu，風元素）和四大（Mahābhūta，四大元素）所造的，叫做身聚。處所、邊際沒有間隔，前後生起滅亡，就說這是『去』。如果說另外存在一種外在的『去』法，這是不對的。為什麼呢？因為隨著所生起之處，生起者就立即滅亡了。』譬如火焰，迷惑的人認為它在『去』，其實不是這樣。在第一義諦中，也沒有『去』的時候。你在第一義諦中，遮止那個『去』，就犯了成所成過。論者說：『因為遮止生起，所以你說這是方便。』這個道理不成立。為什麼呢？因為火焰等的『去』，與迷惑的智慧是相同的迷惑，所以那個『去』就是『去』。
【English Translation】 English version And is not accepted. This meaning is established. Why? Because it has not yet departed. For example, if I wish to depart. Furthermore, the disciple of Ulluka (Ulluka, founder of the Vaisheshika school of Indian philosophy) said: 'What is meant by not having departed? Is it not accepted like Devadatta (Devadatta, a proper name, meaning 'God-given') not having departed? Or is it like Devadatta departing and creating the illusion of not having departed, thereby deceiving others?' The debater said: 'For what reason do you ask such a question?' The outsider said: 'If you intend to accept the previous distinction, then you fulfill my argument; if you intend to accept the subsequent distinction, then you contradict your own causal argument. Therefore, the previous causal argument is not established.' Furthermore, I assert that apart from the substance, there exists a separate dharma of 'going'. You say there is not, but that is not correct. Apart from the substance, there truly exists 'going'. How is it established? That is to say, apart from the self, the combination of sentence meaning, in the realm of Devadatta (Devadatta), there is 'going'. Devadatta, my meaning is that it transforms according to conditions, so it should be understood like the combined Devadatta. The debater said: 'If in conventional truth (Saṃvṛti-satya, relative truth), there is a combination of 'going', Devadatta shows that apart from the self, there is a combination of sentence meaning, because of that realm, the perception of 'going' arises, thereby deceiving others, then in conventional truth, you commit the fault of accomplishing what is already accomplished. Why? Because only the location, boundary, and moment-to-moment differences of before and after are called combination. The name Devadatta is merely a collection of aggregates. Since the self has no substance, where would there be a separate 'going' to combine with it?' One who understands in this way is what I mean. Again, the name 'going' is the combination of sentence meaning with Devadatta. In ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya, absolute truth), because there is no analogy, the essence is unattainable. Like this, even in conventional truth, it contradicts reason, let alone in ultimate truth? You cannot escape these faults. Again, the Sautrāntika (Sautrāntika, one of the Buddhist schools) said: 'Because of the desire to move, the wind element (Vāyu-dhātu, air element) and the four great elements (Mahābhūta, four great elements) are produced, which is called the body aggregate. There is no gap in location and boundary, and arising and ceasing occur before and after, which is called 'going'. If you say that there is a separate external dharma of 'going', that is not correct. Why? Because wherever it arises, the one that arises immediately ceases.' For example, flames, those who are deluded think it is 'going', but it is not so. In ultimate truth, there is also no time of 'going'. You, in ultimate truth, deny that 'going', and commit the fault of accomplishing what is already accomplished. The debater said: 'Because you deny arising, you say this is a skillful means.' This reasoning is not established. Why? Because the 'going' of flames and so on, and the deluded wisdom are the same delusion, so that 'going' is 'going'.
異亦欲遮故。又世間智人。于汝所執。不歡喜故。複次僧佉人言。如我法中。動塵偏增。果則轉了。彼未去者說為去故。論者言彼執了等。先已遮故。去義不成。此唯分別。複次諸說去者。聞前過失。心生怖畏。共立義言。去時去故。無前過失。此義決定。論者偈曰。
離已去未去 去時亦不受
釋曰。此義云何。彼去時不可得故。若有去時。為已去耶。為未去耶。若半去半未去。二俱有過。外人言。汝言去時亦不受者。是義不然。何以故。此應受故。云何知耶。彼處舉足下足相貌。名為去時。如偈曰。
非已去未去 彼處去時去
釋曰。我所欲者。去時有故。去義得成。複次有人言。若有去處。彼可說有去。如是言說。音聲有體。以作與依止。不相離故。已去未去者。不說遮去。此不相應。汝說去時不受。義既不成。已去未去。此亦不破。論者偈曰。
若去時去者 云何有是義
釋曰。如汝所欲。去時去者。此義不成。何以故。以去者故。如已去者。先已破故。複次若定分別去時去者。為已去中有去。為未去中有去。為異此二有去處耶。如先說過。複次第一義中。去時去者驗無體故。此義云何。偈曰。
去時去空故 去時去不然
釋曰。如問馬櫪。是誰馬櫪。答
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因為你的異議也想掩蓋這個事實。而且世間的智者，對於你所堅持的觀點，並不贊同。再者，僧佉（Samkhya，印度古代哲學流派，重視二元論）的人說，在我的法中，運動的微塵會增加，結果也會轉變。那些沒有離開的微塵，被說成是離開了。論者說，他們所執著的轉變等等，先前已經被駁斥過了，所以『去』的意義不能成立，這只是分別而已。此外，那些主張『去』的人，聽了前面的過失，心中生起恐懼，共同立下一個定義說，『去』的時候就是『去』，這樣就沒有前面的過失了，這個定義是確定的。論者用偈頌說： 『離開已去和未去，去時也不接受。』 解釋：這個意義是什麼呢？因為那個『去時』是不可得的。如果存在『去時』，那麼是已經去了呢？還是沒有去呢？如果是半去半未去，那麼兩種情況都有過失。外人說，你說『去時也不接受』，這個說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為這個『去時』應該被接受。怎麼知道呢？因為在那個地方，抬腳和落腳的相貌，就叫做『去時』。如偈頌所說： 『不是已去也不是未去，那個地方的去時就是去。』 解釋：我所想要表達的是，『去時』是存在的，所以『去』的意義才能成立。再者，有人說，如果存在『去處』，那麼就可以說存在『去』。這樣的言說，聲音是有實體的，因為它與作用和所依止之處，是不相分離的。對於已去和未去，不說遮止『去』，這並不相應。你說『去時』不被接受，這個意義既然不能成立，那麼已去和未去，也就不能被破斥。論者用偈頌說： 『如果去時就是去，怎麼會有這樣的意義？』 解釋：如你所愿，『去時』就是『去』，這個意義是不能成立的。為什麼呢？因為『去』的緣故。如同已去，先前已經被破斥過了。再者，如果一定要分別『去時』就是『去』，那麼是在已去之中有『去』，還是在未去之中有『去』，還是與這二者不同之處有『去處』呢？如同先前所說過的。再者，在第一義中，『去時』就是『去』，驗證是沒有實體的。這個意義是什麼呢？偈頌說： 『去時去是空，去時去不然。』 解釋：如同問馬槽，是誰的馬槽？回答……
【English Translation】 English version It is also because the dissenters want to conceal this fact. Moreover, worldly wise people do not rejoice in what you hold. Furthermore, the Samkhyas (Samkhya, an ancient Indian philosophical school emphasizing dualism) say that in my Dharma, the moving dust particles increase, and the result also changes. Those who have not left are said to have left. The debater says that their clinging to change, etc., has already been refuted, so the meaning of 'going' cannot be established; this is merely discrimination. Moreover, those who advocate 'going', hearing the previous faults, become fearful and jointly establish a definition, saying that 'going' is when 'going' occurs, so there are no previous faults; this definition is definite. The debater says in a verse: 'Leaving the gone and the not-gone, the time of going is also not accepted.' Explanation: What is the meaning of this? Because that 'time of going' is unattainable. If there is a 'time of going', is it already gone? Or is it not yet gone? If it is half-gone and half-not-gone, then both situations have faults. The outsider says that your saying 'the time of going is also not accepted' is not right. Why? Because this 'time of going' should be accepted. How do we know? Because in that place, the appearance of lifting the foot and putting it down is called 'time of going'. As the verse says: 'It is neither gone nor not-gone; in that place, the time of going is going.' Explanation: What I want to express is that the 'time of going' exists, so the meaning of 'going' can be established. Furthermore, someone says that if there is a 'place of going', then it can be said that there is 'going'. Such speech, sound, has substance, because it is inseparable from action and what it relies on. Not speaking of preventing 'going' for the gone and not-gone is not appropriate. Since your saying that 'time of going' is not accepted cannot be established, then the gone and not-gone cannot be refuted either. The debater says in a verse: 'If the time of going is going, how can there be such a meaning?' Explanation: As you wish, 'the time of going' is 'going'; this meaning cannot be established. Why? Because of 'going'. Like the gone, it has already been refuted. Furthermore, if it is necessary to distinguish that 'time of going' is 'going', then is there 'going' in the gone, or is there 'going' in the not-gone, or is there a 'place of going' different from these two? As previously said. Furthermore, in the first meaning, 'time of going' is 'going'; verification shows that it has no substance. What is the meaning of this? The verse says: 'The time of going is empty; the time of going is not so.' Explanation: Like asking about a manger, whose manger is it? The answer is...
彼有馬者。又問誰馬。答彼有櫪者。如是問何等為去時。答彼處去。問何處去。答彼去時。俱不明瞭。或謂無始世諦所解去時。于彼第一義中。欲成立去。是義不然。何以故。此一去業屬彼去時此外何處更別有去而言于彼去時去耶。是故汝說第一義中諸內入起及彼境界差別言說。又引提婆達等為喻。立義因譬三皆不成。第一義中以無體故。或謂如是去業。不屬去時。以不屬故。安置去名。彼有體故。非因不成者。如偈曰。
說去時去者
釋曰。去時兼去。此義應爾。而言無去者。此執有過。是故偈曰。
去時中無去
釋曰。于去時中。若無去者。則不可說。以為去時。去時無去者。世間不信受。是故去業攝屬去時。與時和合義必定爾。汝言無去有異去者。是義不然。有過失故。若汝欲避如前過咎。執言去與去時。和合復如是行去者。此義不然。如偈曰。
去和合去時 去者唯分別
釋曰。第一義中。去和合等。皆不可得。但憶想分別故。若定如此。得何等過。偈曰。
若去時中去 復及此行去 則墮二去過 此義則不然
釋曰。此謂於世諦中。義不然故。複次偈曰。
若有二去法 則有二去者
釋曰。何因緣故。作如此遮。若有二法。則有二者。偈曰
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果有人說有馬，又問：『誰有馬？』回答說：『有馬廄的人有馬。』 這樣問：『什麼是去時（Adhvan, 時間，此處指運動的時間）？』回答說：『在那個地方去。』 問：『在哪個地方去？』回答說：『在那個去時去。』 這樣一來，雙方都沒有說清楚。或者有人認為，按照無始以來的世俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya, 俗諦，相對於真諦的世俗認知）所理解的『去時』，想要在第一義諦（Paramārtha-satya, 真諦，佛教所追求的終極真理）中成立『去』（Gamana, 行動，運動）的概念，這是不合理的。為什麼呢？因為這個『去』的業（Karma, 行為，作用）屬於那個『去時』，除此之外，哪裡還有另外的『去』，可以用來描述在那個『去時』中的『去』呢？所以，你們所說的第一義諦中，諸內入（指感官）的生起以及它們境界的差別言說，又引用提婆達多（Devadatta, 印度常見人名）等作為比喻，所立的義（論點）、因（理由）、譬（比喻）三者都不能成立，因為在第一義諦中，它們沒有實體。 或者有人認為，這樣的『去』的業，不屬於『去時』，因為不屬於『去時』，所以才安立了『去』這個名稱，因為『去』有實體，所以不能說因（理由）不成立。正如偈頌所說： 『說去時去者』 解釋：『去時』包含『去』，這個意思應該是這樣，卻說沒有『去』，這種執著是有過失的。所以偈頌說： 『去時中無去』 解釋：如果在『去時』中，沒有『去』，那就不能說那是『去時』。『去時』沒有『去』，世間的人不會相信接受。所以，『去』的業包含在『去時』中，與『去時』和合的意義一定是這樣的。你們說沒有『去』，有另外的『去』，這種說法是不合理的，因為有過失。 如果你們想要避免像前面一樣的過失，堅持說『去』與『去時』和合，又像這樣進行『去』，這種說法也是不合理的。正如偈頌所說： 『去和合去時，去者唯分別』 解釋：在第一義諦中，『去』和合等等，都是不可得的，只是憶想分別而已。如果一定是這樣，會有什麼過失呢？偈頌說： 『若去時中去，復及此行去，則墮二去過，此義則不然』 解釋：這是說在世俗諦中，這個意義是不成立的。再次，偈頌說： 『若有二去法，則有二去者』 解釋：因為什麼緣故，要作這樣的遮止呢？如果存在兩種『去』的法，那麼就存在兩個『去』者。偈頌說：
【English Translation】 English version: If someone says there is a horse, and then asks, 'Who has the horse?' The answer is, 'The one who has the stable has the horse.' If asked, 'What is Adhvan (time, here referring to the time of movement)?' The answer is, 'Going in that place.' If asked, 'Where to go?' The answer is, 'Going in that Adhvan.' In this way, neither side has made it clear. Or someone might think that according to the Saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth, relative to the ultimate truth) understood from beginningless time, wanting to establish the concept of Gamana (action, movement) in Paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth, the ultimate truth pursued by Buddhism) is unreasonable. Why? Because this Karma (action, function) of 'going' belongs to that 'Adhvan,' and apart from that, where else is there another 'going' that can be used to describe the 'going' in that 'Adhvan'? Therefore, your statements about the arising of the senses and the differences in their realms in Paramārtha-satya, and the use of Devadatta (a common Indian name) and others as metaphors, the established thesis, reason, and example are all untenable because they have no substance in Paramārtha-satya. Or someone might think that such an action of 'going' does not belong to 'Adhvan,' and because it does not belong to 'Adhvan,' the name 'going' is established. Because 'going' has substance, it cannot be said that the reason is not established. As the verse says: 'Saying Adhvan goes' Explanation: 'Adhvan' includes 'going,' this meaning should be like this, but saying there is no 'going' is a mistake. Therefore, the verse says: 'In Adhvan, there is no going' Explanation: If in 'Adhvan' there is no 'going,' then it cannot be said to be 'Adhvan.' If 'Adhvan' has no 'going,' the people of the world will not believe or accept it. Therefore, the action of 'going' is included in 'Adhvan,' and the meaning of being in harmony with 'Adhvan' must be like this. Your saying that there is no 'going' and there is another 'going' is unreasonable because it is a mistake. If you want to avoid the same mistake as before, insisting that 'going' is in harmony with 'Adhvan,' and then proceeding with 'going' in this way is also unreasonable. As the verse says: 'Going in harmony with Adhvan, the goer is only a distinction' Explanation: In Paramārtha-satya, 'going' in harmony, etc., are all unattainable, only remembered and distinguished. If it must be like this, what fault will there be? The verse says: 'If going is in Adhvan, and also this going, then there is the fault of two goings, this meaning is not so' Explanation: This means that in Saṃvṛti-satya, this meaning is not established. Again, the verse says: 'If there are two dharmas of going, then there are two goers' Explanation: For what reason is such a prohibition made? If there are two dharmas of 'going,' then there are two 'goers.' The verse says:
。
離去者有去 是義則不然
釋曰。為是義故。此不應爾。如前過咎。應清凈故。此復云何。如是一去。於世諦中。觀彼去者。去時得成。第一義中。與此相違。如是彼境界差別言說。及譬喻等。驗無體故。內入不起。無來無去。緣起得成。複次毗伽羅論者言。我所立義。無前過失。何以故。唯有一行。自體去故。彼處行時。即名為去。彼行作者。名為去者。是故汝言。有二去者。及二去法。此過不然。論者言。第一義中。遮彼去故。時則無體。時無體故。去亦不成。於世諦中。處邊無間。行聚續起。名為去者。觀察去時。實無自體。此不相應。復有人言。決定有去。如是應知。此義云何。彼依止有故。若此依止無。彼則不有。如石女兒。倒行等事。去依去者。相貌云何。謂提婆達多。是故若依止有。彼去則有。以因得成故。如是諸內入起。及去未去等。亦皆得成。論者偈曰。
離去者無去
釋曰。汝言去者。為去依止。以此依止有故。為去因者。是義不然。何以故。若未說因時。去則不成。此之過失。汝不得離。如偈曰。
離去者有去 是義則不然
釋曰。若離去者。去則不成。如此句義。先已分別。是故偈曰。
若其無彼去 何處有去者
釋曰。彼去者因。驗
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『離去者有去，是義則不然』
釋曰：爲了這個意義，不應該是這樣的。如同之前的過失，應該清凈的緣故。這又是什麼呢？像這樣一去，在世俗諦中，觀察那個去者，去的時候得以成就。在第一義中，與此相反。像這樣，那些境界差別言說，以及譬喻等等，驗證了沒有實體，所以內入不起，無來無去，緣起得以成就。再次，毗伽羅論者說：我所立的義，沒有之前的過失。為什麼呢？只有一行，自體去的緣故。那個地方行走時，就叫做去。那個行走的作者，叫做去者。所以你說，有兩個去者，以及兩個去法，這個過失不對。論者說：在第一義中，遮止那個去，那麼就沒有實體。沒有實體，去也不能成立。在世俗諦中，處邊沒有間隔，行走聚集持續生起，叫做去者。觀察去的時候，實在沒有自體。這不相應。又有人說：決定有去，應該這樣知道。這個意義是什麼呢？它依止於有的緣故。如果這個依止沒有，它就沒有。如同石女兒，倒行等事。去依止去者，相貌怎麼樣呢？就是提婆達多（Devadatta，人名）。所以如果依止有，那個去就有，因為因得以成就的緣故。像這樣，各種內入生起，以及去未去等等，也都可以成立。論者偈曰：
『離去者無去』
釋曰：你說去者，作為去的依止，因為這個依止有的緣故，作為去的因，這個意義不對。為什麼呢？如果未說因的時候，去就不能成立。這個過失，你不能擺脫。如偈曰：
『離去者有去，是義則不然』
釋曰：如果離開去者，去就不能成立。如此句義，先前已經分別過了。所以偈曰：
『若其無彼去，何處有去者』
釋曰：那個去者的因，驗證
【English Translation】 English version: 『The one who departs has departing, this meaning is not so.』
Explanation: For the sake of this meaning, it should not be like this. Like the previous fault, it should be pure. What is this again? Like this one departing, in conventional truth (世俗諦), observing that one who departs, the departing is accomplished at the time of departing. In ultimate truth (第一義), it is contrary to this. Like this, those discriminations of realms, speech, and metaphors, etc., verify that there is no substance, therefore internal entry does not arise, there is no coming and no going, dependent origination (緣起) is accomplished. Furthermore, the debater of Vikalpa (毗伽羅) says: The meaning I establish has no previous faults. Why? Because there is only one act of going, the self itself goes. When walking in that place, it is called going. The author of that walking is called the goer. Therefore, you say that there are two goers and two acts of going, this fault is not right. The debater says: In ultimate truth, the going is prevented, then there is no substance. If there is no substance, the going cannot be established. In conventional truth, there is no gap at the edge of the place, the gathering of walking continuously arises, it is called the goer. Observing the time of going, there is really no self-nature. This is not appropriate. Someone else says: It is certain that there is going, it should be known like this. What is this meaning? Because it depends on existence. If this dependence does not exist, then it does not exist. Like the stone woman's (石女兒) upside-down walking, etc. How does the going depend on the goer's appearance? It is Devadatta (提婆達多). Therefore, if the dependence exists, then the going exists, because the cause is accomplished. Like this, all kinds of internal entry arise, and going and not going, etc., can all be established. The debater's verse says:
『The one who departs has no departing.』
Explanation: You say the goer, as the dependence of going, because this dependence exists, as the cause of going, this meaning is not right. Why? If the cause is not spoken, then the going cannot be established. You cannot escape this fault. As the verse says:
『The one who departs has departing, this meaning is not so.』
Explanation: If departing is separated from the goer, then the going cannot be established. This meaning of the sentence has already been distinguished. Therefore, the verse says:
『If there is no departing, where is the goer?』
Explanation: The cause of that goer, verifies
無體故。此意如是。何處聲者。謂不信去者。語義得成。先已廣說。去者無體故。如是依止因不成過。及與彼義相違過故。復有人言。去有驗故。無前執咎。汝應諦聽。我決定立有如是去。此義云何。此若有合。彼則可指示故。此若無合。彼則不可指示。如兔無角。不可指示言有角也。今有去與合可指示言彼調達去以去有故。我立義成。論者言。汝若定謂有調達去可指示者。為欲令于第一義中。有去者耶。無去者耶。如偈曰。
彼去者不去
釋曰。今當安立此義。以方便說。所謂第一義中。彼去者不去。何以故。以作有故。譬如住者。是故應知。去者不去。復有人言。我今成立未去者去。以此方便。不能破我。論者言。如與去合。於世諦中。說去者。去義已不成。今云何言未去者去。如偈曰。
未去者不去
釋曰。彼未去者。以無去故。義意如此。複次若未去者。云何是去。若或時去。云何名未去者。此自相違。複次方便說者。第一義中。彼未去者。不名為去。何以故。以去空故。如彼異者。前來遮句。應為自部諸師。及食糠外道等。作如是說。複次僧佉人言。如汝所說。彼未去者。名為不去。汝立此義。成我所成。論者言。云何名未去者。外人言。去未了故。名未去者。若去已了。名為去者。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為沒有實體。這個意思就是這樣。那麼『聲』在哪裡呢？是指那些不相信『去』的人，語義才能成立。之前已經廣泛地說明了，因為『去』沒有實體。這樣一來，依靠的因就不能成立，並且與那個意義相違背。又有人說，『去』有證據，所以之前的執著沒有過失。你應該仔細聽。我決定設立有這樣的『去』。這個意義是什麼呢？如果『去』與某物結合，那麼就可以指示它；如果『去』沒有與某物結合，那麼就不可指示，就像兔子沒有角，不能指示說它有角一樣。現在有『去』與某物結合，可以指示說『那個調達去』，因為有『去』的緣故，我設立的義理就成立了。論者說，你如果一定認為有『調達去』可以指示，那麼是想讓在第一義（ परमार्थ, paramārtha 究竟真實）中有『去』呢，還是沒有『去』呢？如偈頌所說： 『那個去者不去』 解釋說：現在應當安立這個意義，用方便之說。所謂在第一義中，那個去者不去。為什麼呢？因為『去』是造作的（作有）。譬如住者（ स्थिर, sthira ），所以應當知道，去者不去。又有人說，我現在成立『未去者去』，用這個方便，不能破我。論者說，如果與『去』結合，在世俗諦（ संवृति, saṃvṛti 相對真理）中，說『去者』，『去』的意義已經不能成立，現在怎麼說『未去者去』呢？如偈頌所說： 『未去者不去』 解釋說：那個未去者，因為沒有『去』的緣故，意義就是這樣。再次，如果未去者，怎麼是『去』呢？如果有時『去』，怎麼名叫『未去者』呢？這自相矛盾。再次，方便說者，在第一義中，那個未去者，不名為『去』。為什麼呢？因為『去』是空（ शून्य, śūnya ）的緣故。如那個異者，前來的遮止之句，應當為自己的部派的諸位老師，以及食糠外道等，作這樣的說明。再次，僧佉（ सांख्य, sāṃkhya ）人說，如你所說，那個未去者，名為不去。你設立這個義理，成就了我所成就的。論者說，怎麼名叫『未去者』？外人說，因為『去』還沒有完成，所以名叫『未去者』。如果『去』已經完成，名叫『去者』。
【English Translation】 English version: Because there is no substance. This is the meaning. Where is the 'sound'? It refers to those who do not believe in 'going', so that the meaning can be established. It has already been extensively explained that 'going' has no substance. In this way, the dependent cause cannot be established, and it contradicts that meaning. Again, someone says that 'going' has evidence, so the previous attachment has no fault. You should listen carefully. I am determined to establish that there is such a 'going'. What is the meaning of this? If 'going' is combined with something, then it can be indicated; if 'going' is not combined with something, then it cannot be indicated, just as a rabbit has no horns, and it cannot be indicated that it has horns. Now there is 'going' combined with something, and it can be indicated that 'that Devadatta is going', because there is 'going', the meaning I established is established. The debater says, if you are sure that there is 'Devadatta's going' that can be indicated, then do you want there to be 'going' in the ultimate reality (paramārtha), or is there no 'going'? As the verse says: 'That goer does not go' Explanation: Now we should establish this meaning, using expedient speech. So-called in the ultimate reality, that goer does not go. Why? Because 'going' is fabricated (made). For example, the one who stays (sthira), so it should be known that the goer does not go. Again, someone says, I now establish 'the not-yet-gone goes', using this expedient, you cannot break me. The debater says, if it is combined with 'going', in the conventional truth (saṃvṛti), saying 'the goer', the meaning of 'going' cannot be established, how can you say 'the not-yet-gone goes'? As the verse says: 'The not-yet-gone does not go' Explanation: That not-yet-gone, because there is no 'going', the meaning is like this. Furthermore, if the not-yet-gone, how is it 'going'? If sometimes 'going', how is it called 'not-yet-gone'? This is self-contradictory. Furthermore, the expedient speaker, in the ultimate reality, that not-yet-gone is not called 'going'. Why? Because 'going' is empty (śūnya). Like that different one, the previous prohibitive sentence, should be made for the teachers of one's own school, and the husk-eating heretics, and so on. Again, the Sāṃkhya person says, as you said, that not-yet-gone is called not going. You establish this meaning, and you have accomplished what I have accomplished. The debater says, how is it called 'not-yet-gone'? The outsider says, because 'going' has not yet been completed, it is called 'not-yet-gone'. If 'going' has been completed, it is called 'goer'.
論者言。汝所說了。有過失故。如先已遮。複次若汝言先未作去。名未去者。是義不然。何以故。汝自破故。謂彼去者。先未去時。去有自體。汝義如是。複次汝謂住等。為未去者故。去者無體。如是意欲者。是義不然。何以故。汝自立義。還自破故。謂未作去聲。彼去者。體不可得故。復有人言。有異門故。名為去者。有異門故。名未去者。由此義成。無如上過。論者言。汝謂去者。未去者。外別有異者。與彼去合。是義不然。何以故。如偈曰。
異去及未去 無第三去者
釋曰。此明何義。謂離去者。及未去者。無彼第三。此是去者。未去者故。有如此人難令他解。複次去未去者。先已破故。汝言有異門故。名為去者。有異門故。名未去者。此義不成。若謂去者有作故。此作不遍。汝立因義不成。以彼無作故者。是義不然。何以故。汝言去者。與去作合。如是去作。是我所遮。譬如功用作聲。是其無常。作雖不遍。而作故無常。因義得成。如是去者。與去作合。我遮此故。非因不成。若有成立。未去義者。亦應以此未去因。答若謂有去者。無去者住者。住者立義。譬喻無體。以所成之法一分不具者。是義不然。何以故。所成分者。彼此俱解。我引住者。為譬喻故。竟有何咎。如是一人。說為去者。此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：論者說：『你所說的，有過失的緣故。』如同先前已經遮止的。再次，如果你說『先前沒有進行移動，名為未移動者』，這個說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為你自相矛盾。意思是說，那個移動者，在先前未移動時，移動具有自體。你的意思是這樣。再次，你認為『住』等等，因為未移動者的緣故，移動者沒有實體，如果你的意圖是這樣，這個說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為你建立的義理，又自己破壞了。意思是說，未產生移動的聲音，那個移動者的實體是不可得的。還有人說，因為有不同的方面，所以名為移動者；因為有不同的方面，所以名為未移動者。由此義理成立，沒有像上面那樣的過失。論者說：『你認為移動者、未移動者之外，另外有不同的東西，與那個移動結合』，這個說法是不對的。為什麼呢？如偈頌所說： 『異於移動和未移動，沒有第三種移動者。』 解釋說：這說明什麼意義呢？意思是說，離開移動者和未移動者，沒有那第三者。這是因為有移動者、未移動者的緣故，有這樣的人難以讓他理解。再次，移動、未移動者，先前已經破斥過了。你說『因為有不同的方面，所以名為移動者；因為有不同的方面，所以名為未移動者』，這個說法不成立。如果認為移動者有作為的緣故，這個作為不普遍。你建立的因義不成立，因為那個沒有作為的緣故，這個說法是不對的。為什麼呢？你說移動者，與移動的作為結合。這樣的移動的作為，是我所遮止的。譬如功用產生聲音，是無常的。作為雖然不普遍，但是因為作為的緣故是無常的，因義得以成立。像這樣，移動者，與移動的作為結合，我遮止這個，所以因義並沒有不成立。如果有人成立未移動的義理，也應該用這個未移動的因來回答。如果認為有移動者、沒有移動者、住者，住者建立義理，譬喻沒有實體，因為所成立的法一部分不具備，這個說法是不對的。為什麼呢？所成立的部分，彼此都理解。我引用住者，作為譬喻的緣故，究竟有什麼過失呢？像這樣一個人，說為移動者，這個...
【English Translation】 English version: The debater says, 'What you have said has faults,' as previously refuted. Furthermore, if you say, 'Prior to acting of going, it is called the not-gone,' this is not correct. Why? Because you contradict yourself. Meaning, that which goes, prior to not-going, going has its own self-nature. This is your meaning. Furthermore, you consider 'staying' etc., because of the not-gone, the gone has no substance. If this is your intention, this is not correct. Why? Because you establish a principle and then refute it yourself. Meaning, before the sound of going is made, the substance of that which goes is unattainable. Someone else says, 'Because there is a different aspect, it is called the gone; because there is a different aspect, it is called the not-gone.' By this principle, it is established, and there is no fault as above. The debater says, 'You consider that outside of the gone and the not-gone, there is another different thing that combines with that going,' this is not correct. Why? As the verse says: 'Other than the gone and the not-gone, there is no third that goes.' Explanation: What meaning does this clarify? It means that apart from the gone and the not-gone, there is no third. This is because there is the gone and the not-gone, it is difficult to make such a person understand. Furthermore, the gone and the not-gone have already been refuted previously. You say, 'Because there is a different aspect, it is called the gone; because there is a different aspect, it is called the not-gone,' this statement is not established. If it is considered that the gone has action, this action is not pervasive. The reason you establish is not valid, because that which has no action, this statement is not correct. Why? You say that the gone combines with the action of going. Such action of going is what I refute. For example, the action of effort produces sound, which is impermanent. Although the action is not pervasive, because of the action, it is impermanent, and the reason is established. Like this, the gone combines with the action of going, I refute this, so the reason is not unestablished. If someone establishes the principle of the not-gone, they should also use this reason of the not-gone to answer. If it is considered that there is the gone, the not-gone, the stayer, the stayer establishes a principle, the analogy has no substance, because a portion of the established dharma is incomplete, this statement is not correct. Why? The established portion is understood by both sides. I cite the stayer as an analogy, what fault is there ultimately? Like this person, it is said to be the gone, this...
義不然。如先說因有去合故。彼可指示以此為因者。因義不成。亦譬喻無體。以所成之法具故。違于因義故。外人言。世間眼見彼去者去。見已起說。雖有聞等。不勝眼見。以是義故。非因等不成。
論者言。彼如是見世諦中慧。以此為實。第一義中。如理諦觀。何等名見。若以世諦所見。為第一義者。彼不可信。此云何知。如偈曰。
若謂去者去 此義云何成
釋曰。彼去者去。去義不成。譬如有人自言勇健。將臨戰陣。望風退走。此勇若成。汝義則立。云何不成。如偈曰。
去者無去故 不成義如是
釋曰。如去無體。我先已說。令他解故。何處令解。如上偈言。已去者不去故。及彼去起亦先已遮。已去不去者。此是立義。令他得解。云何令解。如上偈言。若謂去者去。此義云何。成等如先分別。如是第一義中。無去無去者。以去不實故。但彼妄置去者。名去彼諍論者。如是立義得此過失。云何過失。偈曰。
去者去既空 何有去者去
釋曰。若謂去成去者。與彼去合。是義不然。何以故。若汝欲避如前過失。第一義中。成立一去與去者。合彼名為去。此執則墮二去過中。如偈曰。
去者與去合 則墮二去咎
云何如此。偈曰。
一去了去者 二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：對方的理由是不成立的。如果先說因為有『去』（gati，運動）和『去者』（gantṛ，行動者）的結合，所以可以指明『這個』是原因，那麼這個原因的意義是不成立的。這也像一個沒有實體的比喻，因為所要成立的法已經具備了，所以違背了原因的意義。外道說：世間上眼睛看到那個『去者』在『去』，看到之後才開始說。即使有聽聞等等，也比不上眼睛所見。因為這個緣故，原因等等不是不能成立。
論者說：他們這樣以世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）中的智慧，認為這是真實的。在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya，絕對真理）中，如理如實地觀察，什麼叫做『見』（darśana，見解）？如果以世俗諦所見，作為第一義諦，那是不可信的。這怎麼知道呢？如偈頌所說：
『如果說『去者』在『去』，這個道理怎麼成立？』
解釋：那個『去者』在『去』，『去』的意義是不成立的。譬如有人自稱勇敢強健，將要面臨戰鬥，卻望風而逃。如果這種勇敢能夠成立，你的道理才能成立。為什麼不能成立呢？如偈頌所說：
『因為『去者』沒有『去』，所以道理不能成立就是這樣。』
解釋：就像『去』沒有實體，我先前已經說過，爲了讓他人理解。在什麼地方讓他人理解呢？就像上面的偈頌所說，已經『去』的不再『去』，以及那個『去』的生起，先前已經遮破了。已經『去』的不再『去』，這是建立義理，爲了讓他人理解。要如何讓他人理解呢？就像上面的偈頌所說，如果說『去者』在『去』，這個道理怎麼成立？等等，就像先前所分別的。像這樣在第一義諦中，沒有『去』也沒有『去者』，因為『去』是不真實的。只是他們虛妄地安立『去者』，名為『去』。那些爭論者，像這樣立義會得到這種過失。是什麼過失呢？偈頌說：
『『去者』的『去』既然是空無，哪裡會有『去者』的『去』？』
解釋：如果說『去』成就了『去者』，與那個『去』結合，這個道理是不成立的。為什麼呢？如果你們想要避免像前面那樣的過失，在第一義諦中，成立一個『去』與『去者』結合，那個叫做『去』，這種執著就會墮入二『去』的過失中。如偈頌所說：
『『去者』與『去』結合，就會墮入二『去』的過失。』
為什麼會這樣呢？偈頌說：
『一個『去』了『去者』，二……』
【English Translation】 English version: The opponent's reasoning is not valid. If one first says that because there is a combination of 'going' (gati, movement) and 'goer' (gantṛ, agent), therefore one can point out 'this' as the cause, then the meaning of this cause is not established. This is also like a metaphor without substance, because the dharma to be established is already complete, thus violating the meaning of cause. Outsiders say: In the world, the eyes see that 'goer' is 'going', and after seeing this, they begin to speak. Even if there is hearing, etc., it cannot surpass what the eyes see. For this reason, the cause, etc., are not unestablished.
The proponent says: They see with wisdom in conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya, relative truth), taking this as real. In ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya, absolute truth), observing according to reason, what is called 'seeing' (darśana, view)? If what is seen in conventional truth is taken as ultimate truth, that is not credible. How is this known? As the verse says:
'If it is said that the 'goer' is 'going', how is this meaning established?'
Explanation: That the 'goer' is 'going', the meaning of 'going' is not established. For example, someone claims to be brave and strong, but when facing battle, they flee at the sight of the wind. If this bravery can be established, your reasoning can be established. Why can't it be established? As the verse says:
'Because the 'goer' has no 'going', the meaning is not established in this way.'
Explanation: Just as 'going' has no substance, I have said before, in order to make others understand. Where to make others understand? As the verse above says, what has already 'gone' does not 'go' again, and the arising of that 'going' has already been refuted. What has already 'gone' does not 'go' again, this is establishing a meaning, in order to make others understand. How to make others understand? As the verse above says, if it is said that the 'goer' is 'going', how is this meaning established? And so on, as previously distinguished. Like this, in ultimate truth, there is no 'going' and no 'goer', because 'going' is not real. They just falsely establish a 'goer', called 'going'. Those disputants, establishing meaning in this way, will incur this fault. What fault? The verse says:
'Since the 'going' of the 'goer' is empty, where is the 'going' of the 'goer'?'
Explanation: If it is said that 'going' accomplishes the 'goer', combining with that 'going', this reasoning is not valid. Why? If you want to avoid the previous fault, in ultimate truth, establishing a 'going' combining with a 'goer', that is called 'going', this attachment will fall into the fault of two 'goings'. As the verse says:
'The 'goer' combining with 'going' will fall into the fault of two 'goings'.'
Why is this so? The verse says:
'One 'going' has 'gone' the 'goer', two...'
謂去者去
釋曰。以是義故。別有過失。謂墮二去者。此復云何。偈曰。
離去者有去 是義則不然
釋曰。所依若無。能依不有。義意如此。必欲無去。有去者故。及有二去。二去者故。理應有去。名為去者。又欲去與去者一故。世諦成立。非第一義。以第一義中譬喻無體。如彼所說。驗不成故。外人言。定有去。何以故。彼初發足有故。若世間無物。則無初起。如虛空花。由世間有物。彼處轉離。即名初發。說為行相。是故有去。論者言。譬如染雞。后色雖異。雞體是一。汝亦如此。語雖異前。義更無別。如先所問。今還問汝。為已行名初發。為未行名初發。為行時名初發耶。三皆不然。如偈曰。
已去中無發 未去亦無發 去時中無發 何處當有發
釋曰。已去中無發者。謂去作用。于彼已謝故。未去亦無發者。謂未行無去。去則不然。去時中無發者。謂已去未去等。皆無去義。云何可說去時有去。如是三種。俱無初發。是故偈言。何處當有發。以是義故。汝因不成。立義亦壞。如是已去未去去時。初發不成。令人信解。語義如此。云何驗耶。所謂已去無初發。以去者故。譬如去者。去已未去亦無發。以未去故。譬如欲去者。未去去時中無發。以去者故。譬如已去未去者。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 謂『去者去』。
解釋：因為這個緣故，另外有過失，就是說墮入兩種『去』（gati，意為趣、道，指眾生輪迴的去處）的人。這是什麼意思呢？偈頌說：
『離去者有去，是義則不然。』
解釋：所依賴的如果不存在，能依賴的也不會存在，道理就是這樣。如果一定要說沒有『去』，因為有『去者』的緣故，以及有『二去』，因為有『二去者』的緣故，道理上應該有『去』，名為『去者』。又因為想讓『去』和『去者』合一的緣故，世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，指相對的、世俗的真理）才能成立，而不是第一義諦（paramārtha-satya，指絕對的、究竟的真理）。在第一義諦中，譬喻沒有實體，就像他們所說的，驗證不能成立。外道說：一定有『去』，為什麼呢？因為最初邁步的時候有。如果世間沒有事物，就沒有最初的開始，就像虛空中的花朵。由於世間有事物，在那裡轉移離開，就叫做最初邁步，說是行走的相狀，所以有『去』。論者說：譬如染色的雞，後面的顏色雖然不同，雞的本體是一樣的。你也像這樣，話語雖然和之前不同，意思並沒有改變。就像先前問你的，現在還問你，是已經行走叫做最初邁步，還是沒有行走叫做最初邁步，還是行走時叫做最初邁步呢？三種情況都不對。如偈頌說：
『已去中無發，未去亦無發，去時中無發，何處當有發？』
解釋：『已去中無發』，是指『去』的作用，在那個時候已經結束了。『未去亦無發』，是指沒有行走就沒有『去』，這樣說是不對的。『去時中無發』，是指已去、未去等等，都沒有『去』的意義，怎麼能說行走時有『去』呢？像這樣三種情況，都沒有最初的開始。所以偈頌說：『何處當有發？』因為這個緣故，你的因（hetu，指論證的理由）不能成立，立論也壞了。像這樣已去、未去、去時，最初邁步不能成立，讓人信服理解，語義就是這樣。怎麼驗證呢？所謂已去沒有最初邁步，因為是『去者』的緣故，譬如『去者』。去已、未去也沒有最初邁步，因為是未去的緣故，譬如想要去的人。未去、去時中沒有最初邁步，因為是『去者』的緣故，譬如已去、未去的人。
【English Translation】 English version It is said, 'The goer goes'.
Explanation: Because of this reason, there is another fault, namely, those who fall into the two 'gatis' (destinations, paths, referring to the realms of rebirth for sentient beings). What does this mean? The verse says:
'To say there is going apart from the goer, this meaning is not so.'
Explanation: If that which is relied upon does not exist, that which relies upon it will not exist. The meaning is like this. If one insists that there is no 'going', because there is a 'goer', and because there are 'two gatis', because there are those who go to 'two gatis', logically there should be 'going', called 'goer'. Furthermore, because one wants to make 'going' and 'goer' one, the conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya) can be established, but not the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). In the ultimate truth, the analogy has no substance, just as they say, the verification cannot be established. The outsider says: There definitely is 'going', why? Because there is a first step. If there were no things in the world, there would be no first beginning, like flowers in the sky. Because there are things in the world, there is a transfer and departure there, which is called the first step, said to be the appearance of walking, therefore there is 'going'. The debater says: Like a dyed chicken, although the later color is different, the body of the chicken is the same. You are also like this, although the words are different from before, the meaning has not changed. Just like what I asked you before, I will ask you again now, is it that already going is called the first step, or not yet going is called the first step, or is it that the time of going is called the first step? All three are not correct. As the verse says:
'In the gone, there is no beginning; in the not-gone, there is also no beginning; in the going, there is no beginning; where then is there a beginning?'
Explanation: 'In the gone, there is no beginning' means that the function of 'going' has already ended at that time. 'In the not-gone, there is also no beginning' means that without going, there is no 'going', which is not correct. 'In the going, there is no beginning' means that the gone, the not-gone, etc., all have no meaning of 'going', how can it be said that there is 'going' at the time of going? Like these three situations, there is no first beginning. Therefore, the verse says: 'Where then is there a beginning?' Because of this reason, your cause (hetu, reason for argument) cannot be established, and your proposition is also ruined. Like this, the gone, the not-gone, the time of going, the first step cannot be established, making people believe and understand, the meaning is like this. How to verify it? So-called the gone has no first step, because it is the 'goer', like the 'goer'. The gone and the not-gone also have no first step, because it is the not-gone, like the one who wants to go. The not-gone and the time of going have no first step, because it is the 'goer', like the gone and the not-gone.
如是初發無體。因義不成。自謂為因有過失故。外人言。我有異義。所謂有彼去言說故。以此方便。去有自體。自位別故。又和合句義起別語言因故。此若無者。彼自位差別和合句義起別語因則不得有如生盲人。眼識畢竟無和合故。不可說言彼生盲者。已見現見及以當見。今有去法及自位等。和合句義起別語因。故得說言。彼行止息名為已去。行法正起名為去時。行作未發名為未去。是故我說。因有力故。去法不空。所欲義成。無前過失。論者言。若有去法可說去時。已去未去是義應爾。彼去無體先已廣說。汝復執有。今當更破。如偈曰。
未發無去時 亦復無已去 彼初起去空 未去何處發
釋曰。前無去合彼去不起故。偈意如此。先說去空。令他得解。驗破外人所立義故。複次未去何處發者。此明去無故。如是第一義中。分別不起。此義云何。偈曰。
無已去未去 亦無彼去時 于無去法中 何故妄分別
釋曰。妄分別者。如翳目人。于虛空中。或見毛髮蚊蚋蠅等。皆無體故。如偈曰。
如是一切時 未曾見初發 而言有去等 過失則甚多
釋曰。譬如那羅延𥎞逐彼竭株嗢羯遮阿修羅王。彼亦如是。去等過失。常隨逐汝。複次有人言。第一義中。去法是有。何
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果最初的出發沒有實體，那麼作為原因的意義就不能成立，因為自認為是原因本身就存在過失。外人辯駁說：『我持有不同的觀點，因為存在關於『去』的言說。』通過這種方式，『去』具有其自身的實體，因為它的位置是不同的。而且，組合的語句意義產生了不同的語言原因。如果這些不存在，那麼『去』的自身位置的差別以及組合語句意義產生不同語言原因的情況就不會存在，就像天生的盲人一樣，他們的眼識畢竟沒有組合，所以不能說天生的盲人已經看到、正在看到或將要看到。現在存在『去』的法以及自身位置等，組合語句意義產生了不同的語言原因，所以可以說，他的行走停止被稱為『已去』，行走的行為正在發生被稱為『去時』，行走的行為尚未發生被稱為『未去』。因此我說，因為原因具有力量，所以『去』的法不是空無，所希望的意義得以成立，沒有之前的過失。論者說：如果存在『去』的法，那麼可以說『去時』、『已去』、『未去』，應該是這樣的。但是『去』沒有實體，之前已經廣泛地說明了，你又堅持認為有，現在應當再次破斥。如偈頌所說： 『未出發時沒有『去時』，也沒有『已去』，最初的出發是空無的，未去又從何處出發？』 解釋：前面沒有『去』，與『去』的結合就不會發生，所以偈頌的意思是這樣。先說『去』是空無的，讓其他人能夠理解，驗證並破斥外人所建立的意義。再次，『未去從何處出發』，這說明『去』是空無的。像這樣，在第一義中，分別不會產生。這個意義是什麼呢？偈頌說： 『沒有『已去』、『未去』，也沒有那個『去時』，在沒有『去』的法中，為什麼要虛妄地分別？』 解釋：虛妄的分別，就像眼睛有翳病的人，在虛空中，或者看到毛髮、蚊蚋、蒼蠅等，這些都沒有實體。如偈頌所說： 『像這樣，在所有的時間裡，從未見過最初的出發，卻說有『去』等等，過失就非常多。』 解釋：譬如那羅延（Narayana，毗濕奴的化身）追逐竭株嗢羯遮（Khadga-ujjvala，一個阿修羅的名字）阿修羅王，那些『去』等等的過失，也常常跟隨你。再次，有人說，在第一義中，『去』的法是存在的，為什麼呢？
【English Translation】 English version: If the initial departure has no substance, then the meaning as a cause cannot be established, because considering itself as a cause is itself a fault. An outsider argues: 'I hold a different view, because there is speech about 'going'.' Through this means, 'going' has its own substance, because its position is different. Moreover, the meaning of combined sentences generates different linguistic causes. If these do not exist, then the difference in the self-position of 'going' and the generation of different linguistic causes by the meaning of combined sentences would not exist, just like a person born blind, whose eye-consciousness ultimately has no combination, so it cannot be said that a person born blind has already seen, is seeing, or will see. Now there is the dharma of 'going' and its own position, etc., and the meaning of combined sentences generates different linguistic causes, so it can be said that his walking and stopping is called 'gone' (已去), the act of walking is happening is called 'going time' (去時), and the act of walking has not yet happened is called 'not gone' (未去). Therefore, I say that because the cause has power, the dharma of 'going' is not empty, the desired meaning is established, and there is no previous fault. The debater says: If there is the dharma of 'going', then it can be said 'going time', 'gone', 'not gone', it should be like this. But 'going' has no substance, which has been extensively explained before, and you insist on having it, now it should be refuted again. As the verse says: 'When not departed, there is no 'going time', nor is there 'gone', the initial departure is empty, from where does 'not gone' depart?' Explanation: There is no 'going' before, so the combination with 'going' will not happen, so the meaning of the verse is like this. First say that 'going' is empty, so that others can understand, verify and refute the meaning established by outsiders. Again, 'from where does 'not gone' depart', this explains that 'going' is empty. Like this, in the first meaning, distinctions do not arise. What is this meaning? The verse says: 'There is no 'gone', 'not gone', nor is there that 'going time', in the dharma of no 'going', why falsely distinguish?' Explanation: False distinctions, like a person with cataracts in their eyes, in the empty space, either sees hairs, mosquitoes, flies, etc., these have no substance. As the verse says: 'Like this, in all times, the initial departure has never been seen, but it is said that there is 'going' etc., the faults are very many.' Explanation: For example, Narayana (那羅延, an avatar of Vishnu) chases Khadga-ujjvala (竭株嗢羯遮, the name of an Asura) the Asura king, those faults of 'going' etc., also often follow you. Again, someone says that in the first meaning, the dharma of 'going' exists, why?
以故。以相違故。謂處處相違。相待可得。譬如明暗如是與住相違有去可得而言無去者。是義不然。論者言。立此義者。是亦應問。汝意為欲令誰住耶。為是去者。為未去者。若去者住。義不應然。如偈曰。
去者則不住
釋曰。此謂第一義中。立去者住。驗不可得。何以故。以去者動作故。譬如調達。正行未息。若謂未去者住。是亦不然。如偈曰。
未去者不住
釋曰。彼未去者。以無去故。於世諦中。彼去息故。名之為住。此義不成。以去無體故。複次惡見所持。邪執自在。作如是說。欲得異住。如偈曰。
異去未去者 誰為第三住
釋曰。無一住者。說之為住。此義可得。偈意如是。複次偈曰。
去者若當住 此義云何成 去者去空故 去住不可得
釋曰。去住相違。於一時中。不得並故。偈意如此。彼去空者。令人得解。以去者住。無體可示故。外人言。譬如窯師。於三時中。能作不失故。如是去者。雖復不去。亦名去者。此義成故無過。論者言。汝受假法。先所成立。第一義者。今並失壞。由如此義。前所出因。及譬喻者。有過失故。複次有別道理。顯彼過失。汝立此住。其義云何。為當去者已去止息名為住耶。為彼去者未去若去時息名為住耶。三皆不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此，因為（去和住）是相互違背的。這是因為在任何地方，它們都是相互對立的，必須互相依存才能成立。例如，就像光明和黑暗一樣。如果說『住』與『去』是相反的，因此有『去』才能有『住』，然後又說沒有『去』，這種說法是不對的。論者說，提出這種觀點的人，也應該被反問：你希望誰『住』呢？是正在『去』的人，還是尚未『去』的人？如果說正在『去』的人『住』，這在道理上是不成立的。正如偈頌所說： 『去者則不住』 解釋：這指的是在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya）中，認為『去』的人可以『住』，這是無法驗證的。為什麼呢？因為『去』的人正在運動。例如，就像調達（Devadatta）一樣，他的行走並沒有停止。如果說尚未『去』的人『住』，這也是不對的。正如偈頌所說： 『未去者不住』 解釋：那些尚未『去』的人，因為沒有『去』這個動作，所以在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya）中，當他們的『去』停止時，才被稱作『住』。但這個觀點是不成立的，因為『去』本身沒有實體。此外，被錯誤的見解所控制，被邪惡的執念所束縛的人，會這樣說，想要得到一種不同的『住』。正如偈頌所說： 『異去未去者，誰為第三住？』 解釋：沒有一個『住』的狀態，可以被稱作『住』。這句偈頌的意思是這樣的。此外，偈頌說： 『去者若當住，此義云何成？去者去空故，去住不可得。』 解釋：『去』和『住』是相互對立的，在同一時間，它們不能同時存在。這句偈頌的意思是這樣的。那個『去』是空性的，能使人得到解脫，因為『去』的人『住』，沒有實體可以展示。外人說，例如窯師，在三個時間段內，能夠製作陶器而不失誤。因此，正在『去』的人，即使不再『去』，也可以被稱為『去』的人。這個觀點是成立的，所以沒有過失。論者說，你接受了假立的法，先前所建立的第一義諦，現在都被破壞了。因為按照這種觀點，先前所提出的原因和比喻，都有過失。此外，還有其他的道理，可以揭示那些過失。你所建立的這個『住』，它的含義是什麼呢？是當『去』的人已經『去』完停止時，才叫做『住』嗎？還是當『去』的人尚未『去』，或者正在『去』的時候停止，才叫做『住』嗎？這三種情況都不成立。
【English Translation】 English version Therefore, because (going and staying) are contradictory. This is because everywhere they are mutually opposed and must depend on each other to be established. For example, like light and darkness. If it is said that 'staying' is the opposite of 'going', therefore 'going' is needed for 'staying' to exist, and then it is said that there is no 'going', this statement is incorrect. The debater says that the person who proposes this view should also be asked in return: Who do you want to 'stay'? Is it the person who is 'going', or the person who has not yet 'gone'? If it is said that the person who is 'going' 'stays', this is not logically valid. As the verse says: 'The one who is going does not stay.' Explanation: This refers to the fact that in the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), it is impossible to verify that the one who is 'going' can 'stay'. Why? Because the one who is 'going' is in motion. For example, like Devadatta, his walking has not stopped. If it is said that the one who has not yet 'gone' 'stays', this is also incorrect. As the verse says: 'The one who has not gone does not stay.' Explanation: Those who have not yet 'gone', because there is no action of 'going', in conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), when their 'going' stops, they are called 'staying'. But this view is not valid because 'going' itself has no substance. Furthermore, those who are controlled by wrong views and bound by evil attachments would say that they want to obtain a different 'staying'. As the verse says: 'Apart from the one who has gone and the one who has not gone, who is the third stayer?' Explanation: There is no state of 'staying' that can be called 'staying'. This is the meaning of the verse. Furthermore, the verse says: 'If the one who is going were to stay, how could this meaning be established? Because the going is empty, going and staying cannot be obtained.' Explanation: 'Going' and 'staying' are contradictory, and they cannot coexist at the same time. This is the meaning of the verse. That 'going' is emptiness, which can liberate people, because the 'staying' of the one who is 'going' has no substance to show. An outsider says, for example, a potter can make pottery in three time periods without making mistakes. Therefore, the one who is 'going', even if he is no longer 'going', can also be called the one who is 'going'. This view is valid, so there is no fault. The debater says that you have accepted the falsely established dharma, and the ultimate truth that was previously established has now been destroyed. Because according to this view, the reasons and metaphors previously put forward have faults. Furthermore, there are other reasons that can reveal those faults. What is the meaning of this 'staying' that you have established? Is it that when the one who is 'going' has finished 'going' and stopped, it is called 'staying'? Or is it that when the one who is 'going' has not yet 'gone', or is in the process of 'going' and stops, it is called 'staying'? None of these three situations are valid.
然。何以故。偈曰。
去時則無住
釋曰。若去與去者合。名此為住。義則不然。外人言。我先所說。已去名住。此義得成。可信驗故。論者偈曰。
無彼已去故
釋曰。已去住者。是義不然。何以故。彼已去者。去已謝故。言其住者。無所除故。若汝意謂。彼未去時。名之為住。是亦不然。何以故。未去而息。義不然故。以是因緣。彼未去者。亦不名住。如是因義不成。驗亦無體。此義云何。彼明暗等。第一義中。不可成立。以相違故。亦乖汝立義故。復有人言。我立住義。以相違故。有初發故。又彼可除。體有起故。是義不然。彼有過失。如偈曰。
去起作及息 其過同去說
釋曰。如去者去。未去者去。異彼二去。義皆不然。及已去未去去時去初發者。是亦不然。如是已去未去去時。及彼去息。皆不成故。如是住者未住者。及異彼二住皆不然。住不然故。已住未住住時。及住初發。亦不可得。初發無故。已住未住住時住息。義皆不成。如上廣說。以文煩故。今略顯示。此義云何。彼住者不住。何以故。以去空故。如彼已住。住未謝者。久已住者。無住初發。何以故。彼已住故。譬如已久住者。又已住者。無住可除。何以故。去無體故。譬如住未謝者。如已住中。三句顯示。未
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『然。何以故。偈曰。』 『去時則無住』 釋曰：如果『去』和『去者』結合，就稱之為『住』（Dwell）。但這個說法是不對的。外人說：我先前所說的，已經過去的就叫做『住』。這個說法成立，因為可以驗證。論者偈曰： 『無彼已去故』 釋曰：已經過去的叫做『住』，這個說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為那已經過去的東西，已經消逝了。說它是『住』，沒有什麼可以去除的。如果你認為，那還沒過去的時候，可以叫做『住』，這也是不對的。為什麼呢？因為還沒過去就停止，這個說法是不對的。因為這個原因，那還沒過去的東西，也不能叫做『住』。這樣一來，這個說法不成立，也無法驗證。這個道理是什麼呢？像明暗等等，在第一義（Paramārtha，勝義）中，是無法成立的，因為它們是相互矛盾的。也違背了你所建立的義理。又有人說：我建立『住』的義理，因為它是相互矛盾的，有最初的發生，而且可以去除，本體是有生起的。這個說法是不對的，因為它有錯誤。如偈曰： 『去起作及息，其過同去說』 釋曰：就像去者（Goer）的『去』，未去者的『去』，不同於這兩種『去』，這些說法都是不對的。以及已去、未去、去時、去的最初發生，這些也是不對的。像這樣，已去、未去、去時，以及『去』的停止，都是不能成立的。像這樣，已住者、未住者，以及不同於這兩種『住』，都是不對的。『住』不能成立，那麼已住、未住、住時，以及『住』的最初發生，也是不可能存在的。最初的發生不存在，那麼已住、未住、住時、住的停止，這些說法都是不能成立的。如上面廣泛地說明。因為文字繁瑣，現在簡略地顯示。這個道理是什麼呢？那『住者』不是『住』，為什麼呢？因為『去』是空性的。就像那已住、住未消逝者、久已住者，沒有『住』的最初發生。為什麼呢？因為他已經『住』了。譬如已經久住的人。又已住者，沒有『住』可以去除。為什麼呢？因為『去』沒有實體。譬如『住』未消逝者。如已住中，三句顯示。未
【English Translation】 English version: 'So. Why is that? The verse says:' 'When going, there is no dwelling.' Explanation: If 'going' and the 'goer' (Gantṛ, the one who goes) are combined, it is called 'dwelling' (sthiti). But this is not the case. An outsider says: What I said earlier, that which has already gone is called 'dwelling'. This statement is valid because it can be verified. The debater's verse says: 'Because that which has already gone is not.' Explanation: That which has already gone is called 'dwelling', this statement is not correct. Why is that? Because that which has already gone, has already vanished. Saying it is 'dwelling', there is nothing to remove. If you think that when it has not yet gone, it can be called 'dwelling', this is also not correct. Why is that? Because stopping before going is not correct. Because of this reason, that which has not yet gone, cannot be called 'dwelling' either. In this way, this statement is not valid and cannot be verified. What is this principle? Like light and darkness, etc., in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha), it cannot be established because they are contradictory. It also violates the principle you established. Someone else says: I establish the principle of 'dwelling' because it is contradictory, has an initial arising, and can be removed, and its essence has an arising. This statement is not correct because it has faults. As the verse says: 'Going, arising, acting, and ceasing, their faults are the same as going.' Explanation: Just like the 'going' of the goer (Gantṛ), the 'going' of the non-goer, different from these two 'goings', these statements are all incorrect. And the gone, not gone, going time, the initial arising of going, these are also incorrect. Like this, the gone, not gone, going time, and the cessation of 'going', cannot be established. Like this, the dwelled, not dwelled, and different from these two 'dwellings', are all incorrect. 'Dwelling' cannot be established, then the dwelled, not dwelled, dwelling time, and the initial arising of 'dwelling', are also impossible to exist. Because the initial arising does not exist, then the dwelled, not dwelled, dwelling time, the cessation of dwelling, these statements cannot be established. As explained extensively above. Because the text is verbose, it is now briefly shown. What is this principle? That 'dweller' is not 'dwelling', why is that? Because 'going' is emptiness. Like that which has already dwelled, the dwelling has not vanished, the one who has dwelled for a long time, there is no initial arising of 'dwelling'. Why is that? Because he has already 'dwelled'. For example, someone who has dwelled for a long time. Also, the one who has already dwelled, there is no 'dwelling' that can be removed. Why is that? Because 'going' has no substance. For example, the one whose 'dwelling' has not vanished. As in the already dwelled, three sentences are shown. Not
住住時。亦復如是。以前方便。應當驗破。如是住義不成。有過失故。外人言。汝言無去。及無去者。是義不然。何以故。破壞世法故。世人咸謂。彼提婆達多去。或耶若達多去。汝言不爾。與世相違。如世皆知彼月是月。復有人云。是兔非月。汝亦如是。論者言。汝立此因。復有何義。為與世間所解相違。為與自論所解相違。若爾有何過。若世間所解相違者。因義不成。何以故。彼去去者。第一義中。不可得故。如是世間所解有去去者。於世諦中。我不遮故。若言與自論所解相違者。即所解破如是意耶。汝作此說。不解義理。應如是說。汝所受破。得此過失。是義不然。何以故。自論所解。我亦不著。以第一義中。去及去者。此二自體皆不受故。如先已遮。複次若第一義中。去及去者。此二定有。或一或異。求應可得。如是觀察。二俱不然。如偈曰。
去法即去者 如是則不然 去法異去者 是義亦不然
此二種義。云何不然。偈曰。
若謂彼去法 即是于去者 作者及作業 則為一體過
釋曰。如是語義。顛倒過咎。如聲是常。瓶亦是常。以其作故。此義不成。何以故。若瓶是作。則不名常。以是義故。聲是無常。以其作故。譬如彼瓶。此言可信。如是第一義中。去及去者。此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 住于住的時候，也是這樣。用以前的方便法門，應當驗證破斥。這樣，『住』的意義就不能成立，因為有錯誤。外人說：『你說沒有『去』，也沒有『去者』，這個說法不對。為什麼呢？因為破壞了世俗的法則。世人都說，『那個提婆達多（Devadatta，人名）去了』，或者『耶若達多（Yajnadatta，人名）去了』，你說不是這樣，與世俗的認知相違背。就像世人都知道那個月亮是月亮，卻有人說，那是兔子不是月亮，你也是這樣。』論者說：『你立這個因，又有什麼意義呢？是爲了與世間所理解的相違背，還是與你自己的論述所理解的相違背？』如果這樣，有什麼過失呢？如果與世間所理解的相違背，那麼『因』的意義就不能成立。為什麼呢？因為『去』和『去者』，在第一義（paramārtha，勝義，究竟的真理）中，是不可得的。這樣，世間所理解的『有去』和『去者』，在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）中，我是不否認的。如果說與你自己的論述所理解的相違背，那就是你所理解的被破斥了，是這個意思嗎？』你說這話，是不理解義理。應該這樣說：『你所接受的破斥，得到了這個過失。』這個說法不對。為什麼呢？因為對於我自己的論述所理解的，我也不執著。因為在第一義中，『去』和『去者』，這兩個自體我都不接受，就像先前已經遮破的那樣。再次，如果在第一義中，『去』和『去者』，這兩個一定是有的，或者是一，或者是異，尋求應當可以得到。這樣觀察，兩者都不成立。如偈頌所說：
『去法（gati，運動）就是去者（gantṛ，能運動者），這樣說是不對的。 去法異於去者，這個意義也是不對的。』
這兩種意義，為什麼不對呢？偈頌說：
『如果說那個去法，就是于去者， 作者（kartṛ，能作者）和作業（karma，所作事），就有一體的過失。』
解釋說：像這樣的語義，有顛倒的過錯，就像說『聲音是常，瓶子也是常，因為它被製造出來』一樣。這個意義不能成立。為什麼呢？如果瓶子是被製造出來的，就不叫做『常』。因為這個緣故，聲音是無常的，因為它被製造出來，就像那個瓶子一樣，這個說法是可信的。像這樣，在第一義中，『去』和『去者』，這二者...
【English Translation】 English version: It is the same when dwelling in dwelling. One should examine and refute with previous skillful means. Thus, the meaning of 'dwelling' cannot be established because there is a fault. An outsider says: 'Your statement that there is no 'going' and no 'goer' is not right. Why? Because it destroys worldly conventions. Everyone says, 'That Devadatta (Devadatta, a proper noun) went,' or 'Yajnadatta (Yajnadatta, a proper noun) went.' You say it is not so, which contradicts worldly understanding. It is like everyone knowing that the moon is the moon, but someone says, 'It is a rabbit, not the moon.' You are the same.' The debater says: 'What is the meaning of establishing this reason? Is it to contradict what the world understands, or to contradict what your own argument understands?' If so, what is the fault? If it contradicts what the world understands, then the meaning of the 'reason' cannot be established. Why? Because 'going' and 'goer' are not obtainable in the ultimate truth (paramārtha). Thus, I do not deny that the world understands 'there is going' and 'a goer' in conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya). If you say it contradicts what your own argument understands, then what you understand is refuted, is that the meaning?' You speak like this because you do not understand the meaning. You should say: 'The refutation you accept has this fault.' This statement is not right. Why? Because I am not attached to what my own argument understands. Because in the ultimate truth, I do not accept either 'going' or 'goer' as inherent entities, as I have already refuted before. Furthermore, if in the ultimate truth, 'going' and 'goer' are definitely there, either one or different, seeking should make them obtainable. Observing in this way, neither is established. As the verse says:
'Going (gati, motion) is the goer (gantṛ, the one who moves), this is not so. Going is different from the goer, this meaning is also not so.'
Why are these two meanings not so? The verse says:
'If it is said that going is the goer, the agent (kartṛ, the doer) and the action (karma, the deed) would have the fault of being one.'
Explanation: Such a semantic has the fault of being inverted, just like saying 'Sound is permanent, and a pot is also permanent because it is made.' This meaning cannot be established. Why? If a pot is made, it is not called 'permanent.' Because of this reason, sound is impermanent because it is made, just like that pot, this statement is credible. Like this, in the ultimate truth, 'going' and 'goer,' these two...
二不一。何以故。以作者作業故。如能斫所斫。此二顯現。亦不得異。何以故。以去去者。更互俱空故。譬如余物。或有難言。若去及去者。更互俱空。空無異相。體不可得。汝引能斫所斫。為譬喻者。此義不成。論者言。汝不善說。唯遮一故。彼二相差別。世間悉解。如是能斫所斫。更互俱空。此義成立。如能覺所覺。二更互空。於世諦中。二相異故。引為譬喻非喻不成。若謂能斫所斫。第一義中。二體無異。何以故。以其量故。譬如所斫自體。彼立一者。是義不然。何以故。所斫自體不異者不成故。何故不成。以第一義中。一異二邊。不取受故。於世諦中。能所各異。而言一者。破世間解。複次若汝意謂。我遮去者。及去不一故。而受異邊者。是亦不然。如先已說。第一義中。一異二邊。我皆不取故。無受異過。復有人言。如我立義。無前過失。謂無始已來。名言戲論。熏習種子。以為因故。決定因緣。各各果起。虛妄分別。自在力故。此執欲令去及去者。決定有異。為遮彼故。如偈曰。
若謂彼去法 定異於去者
釋曰。世俗分別。無有遮者。如實觀察。義則不然。云何不然。如偈曰。
離去有去者 離去者有去
釋曰。此二云何相離而有。以其異故。如瓶衣等。彼說異者。亦不欲令
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：二者不是一。為什麼呢？因為有作者和作業的緣故。如果能砍和所砍同時顯現，這兩者也不能說是不同的。為什麼呢？因為去者和所去之處，相互都是空無的。比如其他事物，或許難以言說。如果去和去者，相互都是空無的，空無之中沒有差異的相狀，本體不可得。你引用能砍和所砍作為譬喻，這個意義是不成立的。論者說，你沒有好好說明，只是遮蓋了一方面。那兩個相的差別，世間都明白。像這樣能砍和所砍，相互都是空無的，這個意義是成立的。如同能覺和所覺，二者相互為空。在世俗諦中，二者的相是不同的，所以引用作為譬喻，並非譬喻不成立。如果說能砍和所砍，在第一義中，二者的本體沒有差異。為什麼呢？因為它們的量是相同的。比如所砍的自體，他們立為一，這個意義是不對的。為什麼呢？因為所砍的自體沒有差異是不成立的。為什麼不成立呢？因為在第一義中，一和異這兩種邊，我們都不接受。在世俗諦中，能和所各自不同，卻說它們是一，這是破壞世間的理解。再次，如果你認為，我遮蓋去者，以及去處不是一的緣故，而接受異的邊，這也是不對的。如先前所說，在第一義中，一和異這兩種邊，我都不接受，所以沒有接受異的過失。又有人說，如我所立的義，沒有先前的過失。說的是從無始以來，名言戲論（Nāma-rūpa-prapañca，概念性的虛構）熏習的種子，作為原因，決定性的因緣，各自產生結果，虛妄分別（Kalpana，錯誤的認知）的自在力。這種執著想要讓去和去者，決定是有差異的。爲了遮蓋這種觀點，如偈頌所說： 『如果說那去法，決定異於去者』 解釋說：世俗的分別，沒有人遮蓋。如實地觀察，義理就不是這樣。為什麼不是這樣呢？如偈頌所說： 『離開去有去者，離開去者有去』 解釋說：這兩者怎麼能相互分離而存在呢？因為它們是不同的，如同瓶子和衣服等。他們所說的不同，也不想讓它們完全分離。
【English Translation】 English version: They are not one. Why? Because there is an agent and an action. If the 'can chop' and 'what is chopped' appear simultaneously, these two cannot be said to be different. Why? Because the 'goer' and 'the place gone to' are mutually empty. Like other things, perhaps it is difficult to say. If the 'going' and the 'goer' are mutually empty, there is no different appearance in emptiness, and the substance cannot be obtained. You cite 'can chop' and 'what is chopped' as a metaphor, but this meaning is not established. The debater says, 'You have not explained well, but only covered up one aspect. The difference between those two aspects is understood by the world. Thus, 'can chop' and 'what is chopped' are mutually empty, and this meaning is established. Just as 'can perceive' and 'what is perceived' are mutually empty. In conventional truth (Saṃvṛti-satya), the aspects of the two are different, so citing it as a metaphor does not mean the metaphor is not established. If you say that 'can chop' and 'what is chopped', in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), the two entities are not different. Why? Because their measure is the same. For example, the self-nature of what is chopped, they establish as one, but this meaning is not correct. Why? Because it is not established that the self-nature of what is chopped is not different. Why is it not established? Because in the ultimate truth, we do not accept the two extremes of one and different. In conventional truth, the 'can' and 'what' are different, but to say they are one is to destroy the world's understanding. Furthermore, if you think that I am covering up the fact that the 'goer' and the 'place gone to' are not one, and accepting the extreme of difference, this is also not correct. As previously stated, in the ultimate truth, I do not accept the two extremes of one and different, so there is no fault of accepting difference. Someone else says, 'As I establish the meaning, there is no previous fault.' It says that from beginningless time, the seeds of verbal play (Nāma-rūpa-prapañca, conceptual fabrication) have been perfumed, and as a cause, the decisive conditions, each produces a result, and the power of false discrimination (Kalpana, erroneous cognition) is free. This attachment wants to make the 'going' and the 'goer' definitely different. To cover up this view, as the verse says: 『If it is said that the going is definitely different from the goer』 The explanation says: 'No one covers up worldly distinctions. If we observe reality, the meaning is not so. Why is it not so? As the verse says:' 『Apart from the going there is a goer, apart from the goer there is going』 The explanation says: 'How can these two exist separately? Because they are different, like a vase and clothes, etc. What they say is different, they do not want to separate completely.'
離去有去者。離去者有去。以能依所依相觀有故。方便說者。第一義中。不欲令彼去及去者。有差別故。以差別語起有待對故。如去自體。如是第一義中。不欲分別離去者外。別有去法。何以故。以差別語起有待對故。譬如去者自體。外人言。異部迴轉。不令他解。汝得此過。論者言。彼異部無體。迴轉義成。外人言。世間自有能依所依。未必和合。汝言有待對者。此因義不成。何以故。于所驗中。一分不遍故。論者言。彼諸物等。亦有此彼。相觀異故。待對無過。非因不成。汝說驗者。終是立異。異先遮故。不異得成。異部無體。亦非二邊。世間所解。亦不破壞。云何不破。今此論中。真實觀察。能依所依。相應和合者。非無漏慧。所觀境界。如先所說。複次或有人言。我異於去有彼去者。可指示故。譬如提婆達多。及彼馬等。能依所依二相異故。論者言。汝不善說去者。自體義不成故。提婆達多馬等異故。此義不成。以第一義中。譬喻無體故。若有邪慧。分別諸因差別等相。亦以此義答。複次鞞世師言。聰明智人。作如是解。謂去者之聲。此自體外有去。句義相應和合。如提婆達多。為所知境界。轉不轉故。如言青衣。余則非分。若不如是。彼去者聲。應無轉不轉異。譬如大有。論者言。汝立此異。以為驗者。是
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 離去有『去者』（執行離去行為的主體）。『離去者』有『去』（離去的行為）。因為能依（執行者）和所依（行為）相互依存地被觀察到。爲了方便起見，這樣說。但在第一義諦（究竟真理）中，我們不希望『去』和『去者』之間存在差別。因為差別之語會產生相互依賴的對立關係。如同『去』的自體一樣，在第一義諦中，我們不希望區分『離去者』之外，還存在一個獨立的『去』法。為什麼呢？因為差別之語會產生相互依賴的對立關係。譬如『去者』的自體。 外人說：『異部』（指持不同見解的學派）的『迴轉』（指改變立場或觀點），不讓他人理解，你犯了這種過失。論者說：『彼異部』沒有實體，『迴轉』的意義無法成立。外人說：世間自有能依和所依，未必需要和合。你說有待對關係，這個論證的理由不成立。為什麼呢？因為在所驗證的事物中，有一部分不普遍適用。論者說：那些事物等等，也有『此』和『彼』相互觀察的差異，所以待對關係沒有過失，理由並沒有不成立。你說的『驗者』，最終還是在建立差異。因為差異已經被預先遮止，所以不差異才能成立。『異部』沒有實體，也不是二邊（極端），世間所理解的，也沒有被破壞。如何沒有被破壞呢？現在這個論中，真實地觀察，能依和所依，相應和合，不是無漏慧（沒有煩惱的智慧）所觀察的境界，如同先前所說。 再次，或者有人說：我異於『去』，有那個『去者』，可以被指示出來。譬如提婆達多（Devadatta，人名）和他的馬等等，能依和所依兩種相狀是不同的。論者說：你沒有很好地說『去者』，自體義無法成立。因為提婆達多和馬等等是不同的，這個意義無法成立。因為在第一義諦中，譬喻沒有實體。如果有邪慧（錯誤的智慧），分別諸因的差別等等相狀，也可以用這個道理來回答。 再次，鞞世師（Vaisheshika，印度哲學流派）說：聰明智人，作這樣的理解，認為『去者』的聲音，在這個自體之外有『去』，句義相應和合，如同提婆達多，作為所知境界，可以轉移或不轉移。如同說『青衣』（穿著藍色衣服的人），其餘則不是這個部分。如果不是這樣，那個『去者』的聲音，應該沒有轉移或不轉移的差異，譬如『大有』（普遍存在）。論者說：你建立這個差異，作為『驗者』，這是...
【English Translation】 English version Departure involves a 'goer' (the subject performing the act of departing). The 'goer' involves 'going' (the act of departing). Because the dependent (the performer) and the depended-upon (the action) are observed in mutual relation. This is said for the sake of convenience. However, in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), we do not want there to be a difference between 'going' and the 'goer'. Because differentiated language gives rise to mutually dependent oppositions. Just like the self-nature of 'going', in the ultimate truth, we do not want to distinguish that apart from the 'goer', there is a separate 'going' dharma (phenomenon). Why? Because differentiated language gives rise to mutually dependent oppositions. For example, the self-nature of the 'goer'. An outsider says: 'Turning around' (changing position or view) of a 'different school' (referring to a school holding different views) does not allow others to understand, you commit this fault. The debater says: 'That different school' has no substance, the meaning of 'turning around' cannot be established. The outsider says: The world has its own dependent and depended-upon, which do not necessarily need to be combined. You say there is a relationship of dependence, this argument's reason is not established. Why? Because in the things being verified, a portion is not universally applicable. The debater says: Those things, etc., also have differences of 'this' and 'that' being observed mutually, so the relationship of dependence has no fault, the reason is not unestablished. What you call 'verifier' is ultimately establishing a difference. Because difference has been pre-emptively blocked, so non-difference can be established. 'Different school' has no substance, nor is it two extremes, what the world understands is also not destroyed. How is it not destroyed? Now in this treatise, truly observing, the dependent and depended-upon, corresponding and combined, is not the realm observed by non-outflow wisdom (wisdom without afflictions), as previously said. Again, or someone says: I am different from 'going', there is that 'goer', which can be pointed out. For example, Devadatta (person's name) and his horse, etc., the two aspects of dependent and depended-upon are different. The debater says: You have not well said 'goer', the meaning of self-nature cannot be established. Because Devadatta and the horse, etc., are different, this meaning cannot be established. Because in the ultimate truth, the metaphor has no substance. If there is wrong wisdom (incorrect wisdom), distinguishing the differences of various causes, etc., this principle can also be used to answer. Again, Vaisheshika (a school of Indian philosophy) says: Intelligent people make this understanding, thinking that the sound of 'goer', outside this self-nature there is 'going', the meaning of the sentence corresponds and combines, like Devadatta, as a knowable realm, can be transferred or not transferred. Like saying 'blue clothes' (a person wearing blue clothes), the rest is not this part. If it is not like this, that sound of 'goer' should have no difference of transferring or not transferring, like 'great being' (universally existing). The debater says: You establish this difference, as 'verifier', this is...
義不然。何以故。所依能依。相應無體。去與去者。此二和合。先已遮故。驗亦不成。云何知耶。謂多同名人。彼自體外。句義不合。謂若二若三。乃至無量調達等也。以此驗知轉不轉聲。因非一向故。外人言。有簡別故。雖同一名。而彼黑長調達者。去聲於此轉。余則不轉。以是義故。我因得成。非非一向。論者言。如汝所言。黑長調達。第一義中。以無體故。因義不成。如青衣喻。及境界者。第一義中。皆不可得。若有說言。去異去者。覺差別故。如此立驗者。同前因喻破。複次若汝謂。我立一遮異。立異遮一。終不離異故。遮異不成者。是義不然。何以故。一異俱遮。先已說故。以此驗力。破著二邊。彼境界覺。何因得起。智人已解。故我無過。是故汝言我遮去者。與去不異。立義分別。受不異者。我無此過。複次汝若細心觀察。取我上言。譬如去者。自體不異故。立義不成。以譬喻無體。與我過失者。是說不然。何以故。去者體外。更無異法。無異法故。去者體成。以體成故。譬喻無過。如是鞞世師人。諸食糠等。覆藏己過。欲壞正理。如先所說。驗皆不成。復有人云。汝先遮去。今則棄捨。乃更論余。若一若異。去及去者。二皆不成。此非善說者不然。如偈曰。
去者及去二 為一異故成
釋
曰。去者去二。為一為異。有彼二故。可領受耶。若方便說。或一或異者。如偈曰。
彼二無有成 云何當有去
釋曰。彼去已遮。非欲舍故。由如此義。一等分別。亦如是遮。於世諦中。彼二有故。應知如汝意謂。第一義中。若一若異。去者去成。無如此義。一異體無。而執為有。令人解者。是義不然。或有聰明慢人。作如是說。汝言第一義中。無去者去。以作動故。如彼余物。如是住者無住。以作動故。如彼調達。去未謝者。此前二驗。為何所顯。作動作者。為當外動作者。此作不作耶。為當身動作者。此作不作耶。若言外作不作者。則譬喻不成。以彼異作作故。若言身作不作者。則與義相違。以語者語故。斫者斫故。彼去亦然。身既動作。何名不作。如是先所說驗。此義不成。有過失故。論者言。彼異作者不作去作。以是義故。彼作者等。譬喻得成。如所說過。今還在汝。譬喻既成。亦不違義。云何不違。如偈曰。
因去了去者 彼去則不去
釋曰。彼去不去者。謂第一義中。不作彼去。何以故。以無異故。如去自體。此謂說無異者。自驗破故。亦破世間所共解故。何以故。如偈曰。
如見有是人 往村等去故
釋曰。彼人體外。別有村等。世間悉解。複次因去了去者。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：『去者』（going）的『去』（going）是二者合一還是二者相異？因為有彼二者，可以領會嗎？如果方便說，或者是一，或者是異，如偈頌所說： 『彼二無有成，云何當有去』 解釋：彼『去』已經被遮止，不是想要捨棄它。由於這樣的意義，一和異的分別，也同樣被遮止。在世俗諦中，彼二者是存在的。應該知道如你所想，在第一義諦中，如果是一或者是異，『去者』的『去』成立，沒有這樣的意義。一異的自體不存在，卻執著為存在，令人理解的人，這個意義是不對的。或者有聰明傲慢的人，作這樣的說法：你說在第一義中，沒有『去者』的『去』，因為有動作的緣故，如彼其餘事物。像這樣，『住者』（staying）沒有『住』（staying），因為有動作的緣故，如彼提婆達多（Devadatta）。『去』還沒有完結，此前二者的驗證，是爲了顯示什麼？動作的作者，是外在的動作作者，這個『作』（doing）還是不『作』（not doing）呢？還是身體的動作作者，這個『作』（doing）還是不『作』（not doing）呢？如果說外在的『作』是不『作』，那麼譬喻就不成立，因為彼『異作』（different doing）是『作』的緣故。如果說是身體的『作』是不『作』，那麼就與意義相違背，因為說話者在說話的緣故，砍伐者在砍伐的緣故，彼『去』也是這樣。身體既然動作，為什麼名叫不『作』？像這樣先前所說的驗證，這個意義不成立，因為有過失的緣故。論者說：彼『異作者』（different doer）不作『去作』（going doing），因為是這個意義的緣故，彼作者等，譬喻得以成立。如所說過的，現在還在你這裡。譬喻既然成立，也不違背意義。為什麼不違背？如偈頌所說： 『因去了去者，彼去則不去』 解釋：彼『去』不『去』，是指在第一義中，不作彼『去』。為什麼呢？因為沒有差異的緣故，如『去』的自體。這指的是說沒有差異的人，因為自己的驗證被破除的緣故，也破除了世間所共同理解的緣故。為什麼呢？如偈頌所說： 『如見有是人，往村等去故』 解釋：彼人體外，另有村莊等，世間都理解。再次，因為『去』了『去者』。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Is the 'going' (去) of the 'goer' (去者) one and the same, or are they different? Because there are these two, can it be understood? If it is convenient to say, either one or different, as the verse says: 'Those two have no becoming, how can there be going?' Explanation: That 'going' has already been stopped, not wanting to abandon it. Due to this meaning, the distinction between one and different is also stopped. In conventional truth (世諦), those two exist. It should be known that as you think, in ultimate truth (第一義), if it is one or different, the 'going' of the 'goer' is established, there is no such meaning. The self-nature of one and different does not exist, but clinging to it as existing, for those who understand, this meaning is not right. Or there are clever and arrogant people who say this: You say that in ultimate truth, there is no 'going' of the 'goer', because there is action, like those other things. Like this, the 'stayer' (住者) has no 'staying' (住), because there is action, like that Devadatta (提婆達多). 'Going' has not ended, what do these two verifications show? Is the doer of action an external doer of action, does this 'doing' (作) or 'not doing' (不作)? Or is it the body's doer of action, does this 'doing' or 'not doing'? If you say that the external 'doing' is 'not doing', then the analogy is not established, because that 'different doing' (異作) is 'doing'. If you say that the body's 'doing' is 'not doing', then it contradicts the meaning, because the speaker is speaking, the cutter is cutting, the 'going' is also like this. Since the body is acting, why is it called 'not doing'? Like this, the previously said verification, this meaning is not established, because there is fault. The debater says: That 'different doer' (異作者) does not do 'going doing' (去作), because of this meaning, those doers, etc., the analogy can be established. As said before, it is still with you now. Since the analogy is established, it does not contradict the meaning. Why does it not contradict? As the verse says: 'Because of going, the goer goes, that going then does not go.' Explanation: That 'going' does not 'go', refers to not doing that 'going' in ultimate truth. Why? Because there is no difference, like the self-nature of 'going'. This refers to those who say there is no difference, because their own verification is broken, and also breaks the common understanding of the world. Why? As the verse says: 'Like seeing that there is a person, going to a village, etc.' Explanation: Outside that person's body, there are other villages, etc., the world all understands. Again, because 'going' has 'gone' the 'goer'.
彼去則不去。此義云何為此故。如偈曰。
先無有去法 故無去者去
釋曰。如住者自體得為去因而作于去。無此去者故。雖無去者。而世諦中。意欲為因。次生功用。風界自在。處邊無間。諸行聚起。時節差別。剎那剎那。前後相異。此等起故。名為去者。於世諦中。實不欲令如是作者。為作者因。是故偈言。如見有是人往村等去故。非以自體為自體因。如是諸自部輩因去了去者。彼去則不去。此義應知。複次僧佉人言。由地等聚集別名身種。彼塵增長故稱為去。如是去果依止聚因。去和合人。名為去者。此執不然。何以故。彼未去時無去者故。若未去時。名為去者。如是住者。亦應名去。而實不然。若謂彼已去者。為彼去因。是亦不然。何以故。如先偈言。如見有是人往彼村等故。此義云何。如是彼去不能作去應如此知有。外人言。有生作故。說為芽生。猶如智人自生智慧。此執不然。但妄分別。以芽未生時。生無所作。而言生作。此義不然。如是去者自體去。說者自言說。斫者自斫作。此皆不然。何以故。自體自作。義不然故。由彼意欲為因。次起功用處作等因。生彼字句音聲行聚。名為語者。而執有別語。言自體者。此則不然。如是語先名為語者。無如此義。複次。鞞世師言。如先所說。因去知
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『彼去則不去。此義云何為此故。』意思是說，如果認為『去』（gati，移動）的本身不存在，那麼『去者』（gantṛ，移動者）也就無從談起。這是什麼原因呢？ 如偈頌所說： 『先無有去法，故無去者去』 解釋：如果說『住者』（sthita，靜止者）的自體可以作為『去』的起因，從而產生『去』，但實際上並沒有這樣的『去』。雖然沒有真實的『去者』，但在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya）的層面，由於意願作為起因，隨後產生功用，風界（vāyu-dhātu）自在執行，處所之間沒有間隔，諸行（saṃskāra）聚集生起，時間有差別，剎那剎那前後相異。這些因素共同作用，才被稱為『去者』。在世俗諦中，實際上並不存在像這樣以『作者』（kartṛ）作為『作者』的起因的情況。因此，偈頌說，就像看到有人前往村莊等處，並不是以自體作為自體的起因。同樣，諸如自部（svabhāva）等作為『去』和『去者』的起因，『彼去則不去』，應該理解這個道理。 此外，僧佉派（Sāṃkhya）認為，由地等元素聚集而成的不同部分被稱為『身種』（kāya-bīja），這些塵埃增長，因此稱為『去』。這樣，『去』的結果依賴於聚集的起因，『去』與和合的人，被稱為『去者』。這種觀點是不正確的。為什麼呢？因為在未『去』的時候，並沒有『去者』。如果未『去』的時候，被稱為『去者』，那麼『住者』也應該被稱為『去』，但事實並非如此。如果認為已經『去』的人，是『去』的起因，這也是不正確的。為什麼呢？就像之前的偈頌所說，就像看到有人前往村莊等處。這是什麼意思呢？像這樣，『彼去』不能作為『去』，應該這樣理解。外道（tīrthika）說，因為有生起的作用，所以說為『芽生』（aṅkura-utpāda），就像有智慧的人自然生起智慧。這種觀點是不正確的，只是妄加分別。因為在芽未生起的時候，生起並沒有作用，卻說生起在作用，這不合道理。像這樣，『去者』自體『去』，說話者自己說，斫者自己斫，這些都是不正確的。為什麼呢？因為自體自己作用，在道理上講不通。由於意願作為起因，隨後產生功用、處所作用等起因，生起那些字句、音聲、行聚，被稱為『語者』（vādin）。如果認為有另外的『語』，說自體是『語者』，這是不正確的。像這樣，『語』先被稱為『語者』，沒有這樣的道理。此外，勝論派（Vaiśeṣika）說，就像先前所說，因為『去』知道。
【English Translation】 English version: 'If that which goes does not go, what does this meaning intend?' This means if 'going' (gati) itself is considered non-existent, then the 'goer' (gantṛ) is also non-existent. What is the reason for this? As the verse says: 'Since there is no act of going initially, there is no goer who goes.' Explanation: If the self of the 'stayer' (sthita) could be the cause of 'going,' thus producing 'going,' but in reality, there is no such 'going.' Although there is no real 'goer,' in the realm of conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), due to intention as the cause, followed by the arising of function, the wind element (vāyu-dhātu) operates freely, there is no gap between places, aggregates of actions (saṃskāra) arise, time has differences, moment by moment, before and after are different. These factors together are called 'goer.' In conventional truth, there is actually no such thing as the 'actor' (kartṛ) being the cause of the 'actor.' Therefore, the verse says, just as seeing someone going to a village, etc., it is not the self as the cause of itself. Similarly, such as self-nature (svabhāva) being the cause of 'going' and 'goer,' 'that which goes does not go,' this principle should be understood. Furthermore, the Sāṃkhya school believes that the different parts formed by the aggregation of elements such as earth are called 'body-seed' (kāya-bīja), and these dusts increase, hence it is called 'going.' Thus, the result of 'going' depends on the aggregated cause, and the 'going' and the combined person are called 'goer.' This view is incorrect. Why? Because when not 'going,' there is no 'goer.' If when not 'going,' it is called 'goer,' then the 'stayer' should also be called 'going,' but this is not the case. If it is thought that the one who has already 'gone' is the cause of 'going,' this is also incorrect. Why? Just as the previous verse said, just as seeing someone going to a village, etc. What does this mean? Like this, 'that which goes' cannot be 'going,' this should be understood. Outsiders (tīrthika) say that because there is the action of arising, it is said to be 'sprout-arising' (aṅkura-utpāda), just as a wise person naturally arises wisdom. This view is incorrect, it is just false discrimination. Because when the sprout has not arisen, arising has no action, but it is said that arising is acting, which is unreasonable. Like this, the 'goer' self 'goes,' the speaker speaks himself, the chopper chops himself, these are all incorrect. Why? Because the self acting on itself is not logically sound. Because intention is the cause, followed by the arising of function, place action, etc., giving rise to those words, sounds, aggregates of actions, which are called 'speaker' (vādin). If it is thought that there is another 'speech,' saying that the self is the 'speaker,' this is incorrect. Like this, 'speech' is first called 'speaker,' there is no such principle. Furthermore, the Vaiśeṣika school says, as mentioned earlier, because 'going' knows.
去者。彼去則不去。汝雖已破。義又不然。何以故。彼去者外。別有去法。以是義故無前過失。別義云何。謂實覺業覺。此二不同。境界別故。譬如牛與水牛。二覺相異。若不異者。彼二境界。則無差別。譬如牛覺自體。論者言。因去了去者。彼去則不去。此過如前說。今遮彼異。如偈曰。
因去了去者 異去亦不去
釋曰。彼立異者。令他得解。驗無體故。如偈曰。
此物與彼物 有異者不成
釋曰。第一義中。法性如是故。我譬喻得成。複次因去了去者。異去亦不去。此義云何。偈曰。
去者是一故 去有二不然
釋曰。何故不然。立驗知故。以第一義中去者。體外無異去去。何以故。以不合二去故。譬如住者。複次食糠者言。如我立義。唯有一去。去與者合。名為去者。由此異故。能為去因。以作彼去故。如有人言。彼調達去。又如彼燈與明為因。名曰燈明。如汝先說。去者一故。去二不然。義不應爾。論者言。汝非善說。如前所說。諸因力等。第一義中。去及未起。皆已遮故。複次去者。不為去和合因。以起聲覺別因故。譬如彼業。以此驗知。汝言去與去者和合。虛妄說耳。何以故。若人未與去和合時。則非去者。譬如住者。而言與彼去者和合。是義不然。複次如理諦
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『去者』（正在行走的人）如果離開了，那麼『去』（行走這個動作）也就不存在了。即使你已經駁斥了這個觀點，但你的論證仍然不成立。為什麼呢？因為在『去者』之外，還存在著獨立的『去法』（行走的規律或方式）。正因為如此，之前所說的過失並不存在。這個獨立的意義是什麼呢？就是說，『實覺』（真實的覺知）和『業覺』（行為的覺知）是不同的。因為它們所對應的境界不同。比如牛和水牛，對它們的覺知是不同的。如果覺知沒有差別，那麼它們所對應的境界也就沒有差別了。就像對牛的覺知一樣，它本身就是一種覺知。論者說，因為『去』導致了『去者』，如果『去』不存在，那麼『去者』也就不存在了。這個過失就像之前說的那樣。現在要駁斥這種差異。就像偈頌所說：
『因去了去者，異去亦不去』
解釋：那些主張『去』和『去者』是不同的人，是爲了讓其他人理解，但實際上並沒有實體。就像偈頌所說：
『此物與彼物，有異者不成』
解釋：在第一義諦（勝義諦， ultimate truth）中，法的本性就是如此，所以我的比喻是成立的。進一步說，因為『去』導致了『去者』，如果『去』不同，那麼『去者』也就不存在了。這個意義是什麼呢？偈頌說：
『去者是一故，去有二不然』
解釋：為什麼不行呢？因為通過論證可以知道。在第一義諦中，『去者』的本體之外，沒有不同的『去』和『去』。為什麼呢？因為『去者』不能同時包含兩種『去』。就像『住者』（正在停留的人）一樣。進一步說，那些吃糠的人說，就像我所主張的，只有一種『去』，『去』和『者』結合在一起，就叫做『去者』。因為這種差異，才能成為『去』的原因。因為產生了『去』這個行為。就像有人說，那個調達（Devadatta，人名）走了。又比如燈和光明互為因果，叫做燈明。就像你之前說的，『去者』是一個，所以有兩種『去』是不成立的。這個道理不應該是這樣的。論者說，你說的並不正確。就像之前所說的，各種因的力量是相等的。在第一義諦中，『去』和『未起』（尚未發生）都被否定了。進一步說，『去者』不是『去』的和合之因，因為產生聲音和覺知的因是不同的。比如那個『業』（karma，行為）。通過這個論證可以知道，你說『去』和『去者』和合是虛妄的說法。為什麼呢？如果一個人沒有和『去』結合，那麼他就不是『去者』。就像『住者』一樣。所以說和『去者』結合是不成立的。進一步說，按照真理的諦（真實不虛的道理）來看。
【English Translation】 English version: If the 'goer' (the one who is going) ceases, then 'going' (the act of going) also ceases. Even though you have refuted this, your argument is still not valid. Why? Because apart from the 'goer,' there exists an independent 'going-ness' (the principle or manner of going). It is for this reason that the previous fault does not exist. What is this independent meaning? It means that 'realized awareness' (true perception) and 'action awareness' (perception of action) are different. Because the realms they correspond to are different. For example, a cow and a water buffalo, the awareness of them is different. If the awareness is not different, then the realms they correspond to would also have no difference. Just like the awareness of a cow, it itself is a kind of awareness. The debater says, because 'going' causes the 'goer,' if 'going' does not exist, then the 'goer' also does not exist. This fault is like what was said before. Now, this difference is to be refuted. Just like the verse says:
'Because of going, the goer; different going also does not go.'
Explanation: Those who assert that 'going' and 'goer' are different are trying to make others understand, but in reality, there is no substance. Just like the verse says:
'This thing and that thing, if there is a difference, it does not hold.'
Explanation: In the first truth (paramārtha-satya, ultimate truth), the nature of dharma is like this, so my analogy is valid. Furthermore, because 'going' causes the 'goer,' if 'going' is different, then the 'goer' also does not exist. What is the meaning of this? The verse says:
'The goer is one, so two goings are not possible.'
Explanation: Why is it not possible? Because it can be known through reasoning. In the first truth, outside the entity of the 'goer,' there is no different 'going' and 'going.' Why? Because the 'goer' cannot simultaneously contain two 'goings.' Just like the 'stayer' (the one who is staying). Furthermore, those who eat chaff say, just like I assert, there is only one 'going,' 'going' and 'er' combine together, and it is called 'goer.' Because of this difference, it can become the cause of 'going.' Because the action of 'going' is produced. Just like someone says, that Devadatta (Devadatta, a proper name) has gone. Also, like the lamp and light are mutually causal, it is called lamplight. Just like you said before, the 'goer' is one, so two 'goings' are not valid. This reasoning should not be like this. The debater says, what you said is not correct. Just like what was said before, the powers of various causes are equal. In the first truth, 'going' and 'not yet arisen' (not yet happened) are both negated. Furthermore, the 'goer' is not the combined cause of 'going,' because the causes of producing sound and awareness are different. For example, that 'karma' (karma, action). Through this reasoning, it can be known that what you said about 'going' and 'goer' combining is a false statement. Why? If a person has not combined with 'going,' then he is not a 'goer.' Just like the 'stayer.' So saying that combining with the 'goer' is not valid. Furthermore, according to the truth of reason (the true and unfailing principle).
觀。去及去者。不可得故。如偈曰。
有實無有實 亦有實無實 如是三去者 各不用三去
釋曰。有實去者。謂與去和合故。名為有去。此義云何。若有實去者。不用三去。謂有實去不去。無實去不去。亦俱去不去。以作動故。譬如余物。若無實去者。亦無三去。以去空故。譬如住者。彼俱去去者。同前驗破。如破去者。去法亦然。立義出因。引譬方便。應如此知。由依道理阿含二種觀察。於一切時。三去不成故。如偈曰。
是故去無性 去者亦復然 去時及諸法 一切無所有
釋曰。如先立驗。破去去者。諸餘作法。亦應例遮。此品中明去無自性者。欲令信解無來無去別緣起義。是故得成。如無盡慧經中說。無去無來者。名為聖去來。又如金剛般若經說。善男子。如來者。無所從來。亦無所去。故名如來。又如無言說經曰。來去無有實。諸法如虛空。又如般若波羅蜜經說。彼微塵等。亦無所從來。亦無所去。以彼去來不可見故。又如佛告極勇猛菩薩言。善男子。色法去來不可見故。受想行識亦復如是。五陰去來不可見者。是名般若波羅蜜。如是等諸修多羅。此中應廣說。
釋觀去來品竟。
般若燈論釋卷第三 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 般若燈論釋
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 觀：『去』（gata，行進）及『去者』（gantṛ，行者）都不可得。如偈頌所說： 『有實』（sat，真實存在）的『無有實』（asat，非真實存在），『亦有實無實』（sadasat，既真實存在又非真實存在），像這樣三種『去者』，各自都不能用三種『去』。 解釋：『有實』的『去者』，是指與『去』和合的緣故，名為『有去』。這個道理是什麼呢？如果『有實』的『去者』，就不能用三種『去』，即『有實去』不能『去』，『無實去』不能『去』，『亦俱去』不能『去』，因為它們在作用。譬如其餘的事物。如果『無實』的『去者』，也沒有三種『去』，因為『去』是空性的。譬如靜止者。那『俱去』的『去者』，用前面的驗證來破斥。像破斥『去者』一樣，『去』的法則也是這樣。確立義理，提出原因，引用譬喻，這些方便，應當這樣理解。由於依靠道理和阿含兩種觀察，在一切時候，三種『去』都不能成立。如偈頌所說： 『是故去無性，去者亦復然，去時及諸法，一切無所有。』 解釋：像先前確立驗證，破斥『去』和『去者』一樣，其餘的『作法』（saṃskṛta-dharma，有為法）也應該依此類推。這一品中說明『去』沒有自性，是爲了讓人們相信和理解沒有『來』（āgata，來處）沒有『去』的別緣起義。所以能夠成就。如《無盡慧經》中所說，『無去無來』，名為『聖去來』。又如《金剛般若經》所說：『善男子，如來者，無所從來，亦無所去，故名如來。』又如《無言說經》說：『來去無有實，諸法如虛空。』又如《般若波羅蜜經》說：『彼微塵等，亦無所從來，亦無所去，因為它們的『去』和『來』不可見。』又如佛告訴極勇猛菩薩說：『善男子，色法『去來』不可見，受、想、行、識也是這樣。五陰『去來』不可見，這叫做般若波羅蜜。』像這些修多羅，這裡應該廣泛地解說。 《釋觀去來品》結束。 《般若燈論釋卷第三》
【English Translation】 English version: Contemplation: 'Going' (gata, the act of going) and 'the goer' (gantṛ, the one who goes) are both unattainable. As the verse says: 'The real' (sat, truly existent) 'non-real' (asat, non-truly existent), 'also real and non-real' (sadasat, both truly and non-truly existent), these three types of 'goers', each cannot use the three types of 'going'. Explanation: 'The real' goer refers to being combined with 'going', hence it is called 'having going'. What is the meaning of this? If there is a 'real' goer, it cannot use the three types of 'going', meaning 'real going' cannot 'go', 'non-real going' cannot 'go', and 'both going' cannot 'go', because they are acting. It is like other things. If there is a 'non-real' goer, there are also no three types of 'going', because 'going' is empty. It is like the one who stays. Those 'both going' goers are refuted by the previous verification. Just like refuting the 'goer', the law of 'going' is also like this. Establishing the meaning, presenting the cause, citing metaphors, these expedient means should be understood in this way. Because relying on reason and the two types of Agama observation, at all times, the three types of 'going' cannot be established. As the verse says: 'Therefore, going has no nature, the goer is also the same, the time of going and all dharmas, everything is without substance.' Explanation: Just like previously establishing verification and refuting 'going' and 'the goer', the other 'conditioned dharmas' (saṃskṛta-dharma, conditioned phenomena) should also be inferred in the same way. This chapter explains that 'going' has no self-nature, in order to make people believe and understand the meaning of dependent origination without 'coming' (āgata, arrival) and without 'going'. Therefore, it can be accomplished. As it is said in the Infinite Wisdom Sutra, 'No going, no coming' is called 'holy going and coming'. Also, as it is said in the Diamond Sutra: 'Good man, the Tathagata, has nowhere to come from, and nowhere to go, therefore he is called Tathagata.' Also, as it is said in the Sutra of No Words: 'Coming and going have no reality, all dharmas are like empty space.' Also, as it is said in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutra: 'Those dust motes, etc., also have nowhere to come from, and nowhere to go, because their 'going' and 'coming' are invisible.' Also, as the Buddha told the Extremely Courageous Bodhisattva: 'Good man, the 'going and coming' of form is invisible, and so are sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness. The 'going and coming' of the five skandhas is invisible, this is called the Perfection of Wisdom.' Like these sutras, they should be extensively explained here. The end of the chapter on Contemplating Going and Coming. Prajnapradipa-tika (般若燈論釋) Volume 3
般若燈論釋卷第四
偈本龍樹菩薩 釋論分別明菩薩
大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅譯
觀六根品第三
複次。成立此品。其相云何。為遮起故。令人識知內六入等無自性義。故說此品。又遮去執。欲令通達入等空義。此品次生。初分別者。外人言。有內入起。第一義中。如是應受。何以故。境界定故。此起若無。彼定境界。則不得有。如石女兒。以是故知。有內入起。彼境定故。如偈曰。
眼耳及鼻舌 身意等六根 彼色等六塵 如其數境界
釋曰。以是義故。所說因成。入起義立。次分別者。外人定說。有如是去。何以故。以作果故。如見色等。論者言。此二分別。今次第遮。彼眼等根。各各增上。聚集有作。能取色等。是故名根。於世諦中。根外亦有色等可得。以作者自體可顯示故。謂見故名眼。乃至知故名意。複次此諸根等。顯示可見可聞嗅嘗觸知諸境界故。境界義云何。謂根于塵。有能取力。故名境界。有境及境。世諦中有。第一義中根塵定有者。此執不然。以違義故。云何開示。令彼解耶。如觀眼根。偈曰。
如是彼眼根 不能見自體 自體既不見 云何得見他
釋曰。何故不見。如是眼根。第一義中。能取不成。何以故。偈言不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本
般若燈論釋卷第四 偈本龍樹菩薩 釋論分別明菩薩 大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅譯 觀六根品第三 其次，成立此品的目的是什麼呢？是爲了遮止錯誤的見解，使人認識到內六入（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）等沒有自性的意義，所以宣說此品。又爲了遮止執著，希望人們通達六入等是空性的道理。此品緊隨前品而生。最初的分別：外道認為，內六入是生起的，在第一義諦（勝義諦）中，應當接受這種觀點。為什麼呢？因為境界是確定的。如果這種生起不存在，那麼確定的境界也就不會存在，就像石女的兒子一樣。因此可知，內六入是生起的，因為它們所對的境界是確定的。如偈頌所說： 『眼耳及鼻舌，身意等六根，彼色等六塵，如其數境界。』 解釋：因為這個道理，所以所說的因成立，六入生起的意義成立。其次的分別：外道肯定地說，六入是有作用的。為什麼呢？因為它們能產生結果，比如能看見顏色等。論者說：這兩種分別，現在依次遮破。那些眼等六根，各自增上，聚集在一起產生作用，能夠取色等，所以叫做根。在世俗諦中，根外也有色等可以獲得，因為作者的自體可以顯示的緣故，所謂見故名眼，乃至知故名意。再次，這些根等，顯示可見、可聞、可嗅、可嘗、可觸、可知的各種境界，所以叫做境界。境界的意義是什麼呢？是指根對於塵，有能取的力量，所以叫做境界。有境和境界，在世俗諦中是存在的。認為在第一義諦中根和塵是確定的，這種執著是不對的，因為這與正義相違背。如何開示，使他們理解呢？比如觀察眼根，偈頌說： 『如是彼眼根，不能見自體，自體既不見，云何得見他？』 解釋：為什麼眼根不能見自體呢？像這樣的眼根，在第一義諦中，能取的作用不能成立。為什麼呢？偈頌說不能見自體。
【English Translation】 English version
Brahmajala Sutra Commentary - Volume 4 Verses by Nagarjuna Bodhisattva, Commentary by Vibhajyavadin Bodhisattva Translated by Tripitaka Master Paramartha of the Great Tang Dynasty from Central India Chapter 3: Examination of the Six Sense Organs Furthermore, what is the purpose of establishing this chapter? It is to refute incorrect views and to make people realize that the six internal sense bases (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind) and so on, have no inherent nature, therefore this chapter is expounded. Also, it is to refute attachment, hoping that people will understand that the sense bases and so on are empty. This chapter arises sequentially from the previous one. The initial distinction: externalists argue that the six internal sense bases arise, and in the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), this view should be accepted. Why? Because the objects are definite. If this arising did not exist, then the definite objects would not exist, just like the son of a barren woman. Therefore, it is known that the six internal sense bases arise, because their corresponding objects are definite. As the verse says: 'Eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind, these six sense organs; their corresponding six objects, such as form, are their respective realms.' Explanation: Because of this reason, the stated cause is established, and the meaning of the arising of the sense bases is established. The subsequent distinction: externalists assert definitively that the six sense bases have a function. Why? Because they produce results, such as seeing forms. The commentator says: These two distinctions, I will now refute in order. Those six sense organs, such as the eye, each being supreme, gather together and produce a function, being able to grasp forms and so on, therefore they are called sense organs (indriya). In conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), forms and so on can also be obtained outside of the sense organs, because the self of the agent can be shown, namely, seeing is called eye, and so on, knowing is called mind. Furthermore, these sense organs and so on, manifest the various objects that can be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, touched, and known, therefore they are called objects (viṣaya). What is the meaning of object? It refers to the power of the sense organ to grasp the object, therefore it is called object. The subject and object exist in conventional truth. The assertion that the sense organs and objects are definite in ultimate truth is incorrect, because it contradicts the correct meaning. How to reveal it, so that they understand? For example, examining the eye sense organ, the verse says: 'Thus, that eye sense organ, cannot see its own self; since it cannot see its own self, how can it see others?' Explanation: Why can't the eye sense organ see its own self? Such an eye sense organ, in ultimate truth, the function of grasping cannot be established. Why? The verse says it cannot see its own self.
見自體故。又有礙故。亦造色故。譬如耳等。又第一義中眼不見色。何以故。以彼色法從因起故。譬如鼻等。又色陰所攝故。譬如舌等。如是第一義中。色非眼境。何以故。以積聚故。如眼自體。又第一義中色非眼境。何以故。以有礙故。亦造色故。譬如耳等。又第一義中色非眼境。何以故。從因起故。譬如鼻等。又色陰所攝故。譬如舌等。復有人言。眼不見者。謂不見自體。以色可見。是故眼能見色。論者言。如汝所說。眼不見者。助我出因。及譬喻力。豈能破我所立義耶。複次阿毗曇人言。若無簡別。如是說言眼不見色者。此成我義。何以故。得一門故。我立義中。彼無分眼不見色故。若有分眼不見色者。汝之所受阿含義破。如我俱舍論。偈曰。
有分眼見色 非彼能依識
阿毗曇中。作如此說。豈非所受阿含義破耶。論者言。如汝立義。此有分眼欲令見色者。是義不然。何以故。無二過故。謂非成已。覆成及非所欲義破。云何不破。如經偈曰。
眼不見色塵 意不知諸法 此名最上實 世人不能度
釋曰。第一義中不欲令彼眼見色故。如先廣破。此義得成。又第一義中彼有分眼不能見色。何以故。以眼根故。如無分眼。又第一義中彼有分眼不能見色。何以故。以色根故。譬如耳等
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為見到自身之故，又因為有障礙之故，也因為是造色之故，譬如耳朵等。又在第一義諦（Paramārtha，最高真理）中，眼睛不能看見顏色。為什麼呢？因為那些色法是從因緣生起的緣故，譬如鼻子等。又因為被色蘊（Rūpa-skandha，構成個體經驗的五種聚合之一，此處指顏色）所包含的緣故，譬如舌頭等。像這樣，在第一義諦中，顏色不是眼睛的境界。為什麼呢？因為是積聚之故，如眼睛自身。又在第一義諦中，顏色不是眼睛的境界。為什麼呢？因為有障礙之故，也因為是造色之故，譬如耳朵等。又在第一義諦中，顏色不是眼睛的境界。為什麼呢？因為是從因緣生起的緣故，譬如鼻子等。又因為被色蘊所包含的緣故，譬如舌頭等。又有人說，眼睛不能見，是指不能見自身。因為顏色是可見的，所以眼睛能見顏色。論者說，如你所說，眼睛不能見自身，這反而幫助我提出論證，並增強譬喻的力量，豈能破斥我所建立的義理呢？ 其次，阿毗曇（Abhidharma，佛教論藏）學者說，如果沒有簡別，像這樣說『眼睛不能見顏色』，這反而成就我的義理。為什麼呢？因為得到一個門徑的緣故。在我所立的義理中，那無分（Avibhajya，不可分割的）的眼睛不能見顏色。如果有分的眼睛不能見顏色，那麼你所接受的阿含義（Āgama-artha，經文的含義）就被破斥了。如我的《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa）中的偈頌說： 『有分的眼睛能見顏色，但不是它所依賴的識（Vijñāna，意識）。』 阿毗曇中，作如此說，豈不是你所接受的阿含義被破斥了嗎？論者說，如你所立的義理，這有分的眼睛想要見顏色，這個義理是不成立的。為什麼呢？因為沒有二種過失的緣故，即不是『已成覆成』（Siddha-sādhyatā，已經證明的又再證明）以及『非所欲義破』（Aniṣṭārtha-prasanga，導致不希望的結果）的過失。如何不破呢？如經中的偈頌說： 『眼睛不見色塵（Rūpa-dhātu，色法的微細粒子），意識不知諸法（Dharma，事物、現象）。』 『這名為最上真實（Paramārtha-satya，最高的真理），世人不能理解。』 解釋說，在第一義諦中，不希望那有分的眼睛能見顏色，如先前廣泛破斥的那樣，這個義理得以成立。又在第一義諦中，那有分的眼睛不能見顏色。為什麼呢？因為是眼根（Cakṣur-indriya，視覺器官）的緣故，如無分的眼睛。又在第一義諦中，那有分的眼睛不能見顏色。為什麼呢？因為是色根（Rūpa-indriya，色法的根源）的緣故，譬如耳朵等。
【English Translation】 English version: Because of seeing itself, and because of being obstructive, and also because of being produced matter, like the ears, etc. Furthermore, in the ultimate sense (Paramārtha), the eye does not see color. Why is that? Because those color-dharmas (Rūpa-dharma, phenomena related to form) arise from causes, like the nose, etc. Also, because it is included in the aggregate of form (Rūpa-skandha), like the tongue, etc. Thus, in the ultimate sense, color is not the object of the eye. Why is that? Because it is an accumulation, like the eye itself. Also, in the ultimate sense, color is not the object of the eye. Why is that? Because it is obstructive, and also because it is produced matter, like the ears, etc. Also, in the ultimate sense, color is not the object of the eye. Why is that? Because it arises from causes, like the nose, etc. Also, because it is included in the aggregate of form, like the tongue, etc. Furthermore, some say that the eye does not see, meaning it does not see itself. Because color is visible, therefore the eye can see color. The debater says, as you say, the eye does not see itself, this instead helps me to present arguments and strengthens the power of analogies, how can it refute the meaning I have established? Secondly, the Abhidharma (Buddhist philosophical texts) scholars say, if there is no distinction, saying 'the eye does not see color' like this, this instead accomplishes my meaning. Why is that? Because one gains an entry point. In the meaning I have established, that indivisible (Avibhajya) eye does not see color. If the divisible eye does not see color, then the Āgama-artha (meaning of the scriptures) you accept is refuted. As my verse in the Abhidharmakośa (Treasury of Abhidharma) says: 'The divisible eye sees color, but it is not the consciousness (Vijñāna) that depends on it.' In the Abhidharma, it is said like this, isn't the Āgama-artha you accept refuted? The debater says, as you establish the meaning, this divisible eye wanting to see color, this meaning is not established. Why is that? Because there are no two faults, namely, not the fault of 'proving what is already proven' (Siddha-sādhyatā) and 'leading to an undesired consequence' (Aniṣṭārtha-prasanga). How is it not refuted? As the verse in the sutra says: 'The eye does not see color-dust (Rūpa-dhātu), the mind does not know all dharmas (Dharma, phenomena).' 'This is called the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), which worldly people cannot comprehend.' Explanation: In the ultimate sense, it is not desired that the divisible eye can see color, as previously refuted extensively, this meaning is established. Also, in the ultimate sense, that divisible eye cannot see color. Why is that? Because it is the eye-organ (Cakṣur-indriya), like the indivisible eye. Also, in the ultimate sense, that divisible eye cannot see color. Why is that? Because it is the color-organ (Rūpa-indriya), like the ears, etc.
。又亦不破世間所解。何以故。立義別故。謂第一義中無與過者。複次迦葉彌羅毗婆沙中如是立義。謂彼眼見諸色。以能作見業故。論者言。汝出因者。立義一分故。驗無體故。已說遮故。此義不成。複次若有作者。則與立剎那者。義相違故。又與無剎那者異故。此皆不然。是故迦葉彌所執義不相應。複次經部師言。諸行無作故。眼不能見。異亦不見。而彼眼色為緣。眼識得起。修多羅中。作如此說。汝言眼不見者是為成已覆成過。論者言。先已遮起故。眼識不可得無成已覆成過。又所受義亦不破故。謂如是領受修多羅義。隨順世諦故。第一義中驗則無體。已遮眼色二見可見等。彼差別者。義皆不然。如是欲令學人生諸覺意。作少分說。如先偈言。如是彼眼根。不能見自體。若不見自體。云何得見他。以第一義中眼不見色。何以故。不見自體故。譬如耳等。或有人言。眼不到境。而能取色。何以故。以彼眼根可得義故。譬如使人見事。名為王見。論者言。第一義中眼不到境。能取色塵。無如此義。何以故。以眼不能取自體故。譬如耳等。如是第一義中。所取色塵。非彼不到眼根境界。何以故。以所造色故。譬如香等。如是有礙故。從因起故。色陰所攝故。又積聚故。此等諸因。並遮眼。不到境。色非所取。立義舉喻。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 此外，也不破壞世俗的理解。為什麼呢？因為建立的意義不同。所謂第一義中沒有能勝過它的。再次，在迦葉彌羅毗婆沙中是這樣建立意義的：所謂眼能看見諸色，是因為它能執行看見的作用。論者說，你提出這個原因，是因為只取了所立意義的一部分，因為在勝義諦中沒有實體，並且已經說了遮止。所以這個意義不成立。再次，如果有作者，就與主張剎那生滅的人的意義相違背，又與不主張剎那生滅的人的觀點相異，這些都不對。因此，迦葉彌羅所執持的意義是不相應的。再次，經部師說，諸行沒有作者，所以眼不能見。異物也不能見。而是眼和色為緣，眼識才能生起。修多羅（Sutra，經）中，是這樣說的。你說眼不見，這是已成立又重複成立的過失。論者說，因為先前已經遮止了生起，所以眼識不可得，沒有已成立又重複成立的過失。又因為所接受的意義也沒有被破壞。所謂這樣領受修多羅的意義，是隨順世俗諦的。在第一義中，如果進行驗證，就沒有實體。已經遮止了眼和色，以及二者所見的可見性等等。那些差別，意義都不對。像這樣，想要讓學人生起諸覺意，只作少部分的說明。如先前的偈頌所說：像這樣，那個眼根，不能見它自身。如果不見它自身，怎麼能見其他事物呢？以第一義來說，眼不見色。為什麼呢？因為不見它自身。譬如耳等。或者有人說，眼不到達境界，而能取色。為什麼呢？因為那個眼根是可以得到的意義。譬如使者見事，名為國王見。論者說，在第一義中，眼不到達境界，能取色塵，沒有這樣的道理。為什麼呢？因為眼不能取它自身。譬如耳等。像這樣，在第一義中，所取的色塵，不是它沒有到達眼根的境界。為什麼呢？因為是所造的色。譬如香等。像這樣，因為有障礙，因為從因生起，因為是色陰所攝，又因為是積聚。這些原因，都遮止了眼不到達境界，色不是所取。建立意義，舉出譬喻。
【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, it does not undermine worldly understanding. Why? Because the established meaning is different. In the ultimate sense (Paramārtha, 第一義), there is nothing that can surpass it. Moreover, in the Kāśmīra-Vibhāṣā (迦葉彌羅毗婆沙), the meaning is established as follows: the eye sees forms because it performs the act of seeing. The debater says, 'Your reason is flawed because it only takes a part of the established meaning, because there is no substance in the ultimate truth, and because it has already been refuted.' Therefore, this meaning is not established. Furthermore, if there is an agent (kartṛ, 作者), it contradicts the meaning of those who assert momentary existence (kṣaṇika, 剎那), and it differs from those who do not assert momentary existence. All of these are incorrect. Therefore, the meaning held by the Kāśmīra school is not appropriate. Moreover, the Sautrāntika (經部師) says, 'Actions have no agent, therefore the eye cannot see. Nor can something different see. Rather, eye and form are conditions for the arising of eye-consciousness.' In the Sutras (修多羅), it is said in this way. You say that the eye does not see, which is the fault of proving what is already proven. The debater says, 'Because the arising has already been refuted, eye-consciousness is not obtainable, so there is no fault of proving what is already proven.' Also, because the accepted meaning is not undermined. That is, understanding the meaning of the Sutras in this way accords with conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya, 世俗諦). In the ultimate sense, if examined, there is no substance. The eye and form, and the visibility of what is seen by the two, have already been refuted. Those distinctions are all incorrect. In this way, wanting to generate the factors of enlightenment (bodhyaṅga, 覺意) in the students, only a small part is explained. As the previous verse said: 'In this way, that eye-sense, cannot see itself. If it does not see itself, how can it see others?' In the ultimate sense, the eye does not see form. Why? Because it does not see itself. For example, like the ear, etc. Or someone says, 'The eye does not reach the object, but can grasp form.' Why? Because that eye-sense is an obtainable meaning. For example, when a messenger sees something, it is called the king's seeing.' The debater says, 'In the ultimate sense, the eye does not reach the object, but can grasp form-dust, there is no such meaning.' Why? Because the eye cannot grasp itself. For example, like the ear, etc. In this way, in the ultimate sense, the grasped form-dust, is not that it has not reached the realm of the eye-sense. Why? Because it is a created form. For example, like smell, etc. In this way, because it is obstructed, because it arises from a cause, because it is included in the form aggregate (rūpa-skandha, 色陰), and because it is an accumulation. These reasons all refute that the eye does not reach the object, and that form is not grasped. Establishing meaning, giving examples.
如前廣說。二門僻執應當驗知。複次第一義中。眼非不到境界。何以故。現在境界故。譬如鼻等。或有人言。眼不到境。何以故。有間取色故。譬如意也。又無功用。時節差別。能取色故。又過量取故。立義譬喻。如前應知。論者言。此說不爾。汝言不到境者。即是有間取色。有間取色者。即是立義一分。更無別義故。此說不然。又時無差別。取者義壞。縱實因成。驗無體故。彼第一義中意亦不到。而能取者。此執不成。以違義故。複次僧佉人言。汝言眼非不到境取者。此成我所成。何以故。我欲令眼到境取故。論者言。不到取者。欲令信知眼法空故。眼法既空。豈覆成立到境取耶。汝于非處。妄生歡喜。複次眼到境取。云何不然。以根故。譬如意。亦不取鼻等諸根。非一向過。何故不非一向過耶。彼鼻根等。亦如是故。如后當說。複次眼到境者。此有何義。為當依止所取境界如是意耶。是義不然。何以故。彼眼識依止實不外去。何以故。以識故。如鼻等識。第一義中眼識不能取彼境界。何以故。以因有故。譬如聲等。外人言。汝依二門。更互相破。依此遮彼。二俱不成。論者言。二俱無體故。我不取。以不取故。所欲義成。複次僧佉人言。眼光到境。故能取色。如是意者。此亦不然。彼眼根光。於世諦中。亦不得有
。何以故。色識因故。譬如彼色。複次僧佉人言。眼根有光。以眼根故。譬如伏翼貓貍等眼。論者言。眼根色者。不可見故。縱彼依止。實有光者。則譬喻不成。復有人言。如前所說。如是彼眼根。不能見自體者。此有何義。諸法若有自體可見。彼和合時。他亦可見。譬如花香。由如此義。眼不自見。亦不見他。如提婆菩薩百論偈曰。
彼一切諸法 若先有自體 如是有眼根 云何不自見
論者言。見者何義。謂色可得。彼色可得。若如眼不有色亦無者成已覆成過。如偈曰。
識不在眼色 不住二中間 非有亦非無 彼識住何處
複次若言彼眼根中。無見種子。是故不見者。須曼那花譬喻不然。何故不然。彼花因緣和合自在。故有香起。如俱蘇摩和合麻故。油則有香。無人立色。有見作義。彼遮不成。複次若謂自不見故。亦不見他者。火花譬喻二皆無力。以火花等自他不取故。此不相應。如是眼見義不成故。彼起及去亦皆不成。以譬喻無體故。亦違因義故。外人言。汝言眼不見色者。由不見自體故。此義所明。若於自體無力。於他亦然。如是義者非一向故。如火自體。無其燒力。於他則能。眼亦如是。論者偈曰。
火喻則不能 成彼眼見義
釋曰。第一義中。燒者不成
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 為什麼呢？因為色（Rupa，物質）和識（Vijnana，意識）是相互依存的。比如那個色。此外，僧佉（Samkhya）學派的人說，眼根有光，因為有眼根的緣故。就像蝙蝠、貓、貍等動物的眼睛一樣。論者說，眼根是色法，因為不可見。即使它依賴於某種東西，確實有光，那麼這個比喻也是不成立的。又有人說，就像前面所說的，這樣那個眼根就不能看見它自身，這有什麼意義呢？如果諸法有自體可以被看見，那麼它們和合的時候，其他的也應該可以被看見，比如花香。因為這個道理，眼不能自見，也不能見他物。正如提婆（Aryadeva）菩薩《百論》中的偈頌所說： 『彼一切諸法，若先有自體，如是有眼根，云何不自見？』 論者說，『見』是什麼意思？就是色是可以被獲得的。那個色是可以被獲得的。如果像眼睛一樣沒有色也沒有，那就成了已成之過。如偈頌所說： 『識不在眼色，不住二中間，非有亦非無，彼識住何處？』 再者，如果說那個眼根中沒有見的種子，所以看不見，那麼用須曼那（Sumanas）花來做比喻是不對的。為什麼不對呢？因為那花是因緣和合而自在的，所以有香味產生。就像俱蘇摩（kusuma）和麻和合在一起，油就會有香味一樣。沒有人設立色，有見的作用，所以那個遮止是不成立的。再者，如果認為因為自己看不見，所以也看不見其他的，那麼用火花來做比喻，兩者都沒有力量。因為火花等自己和他物都不取，所以這不相應。像這樣，眼見的意義不成立，所以它的生起和消失也都不成立。因為比喻沒有實體，也違背了因的意義。外人說，你說眼睛看不見色，是因為看不見自身。這個意思表明，如果對於自身沒有力量，對於其他的也是一樣。這樣的意義不是絕對的，比如火自身沒有燃燒的力量，但是對於其他的卻能燃燒。眼睛也是這樣。論者的偈頌說： 『火喻則不能，成彼眼見義。』 解釋說，在第一義（Paramartha，勝義）中，燃燒是不成立的。
【English Translation】 English version: Why is that? Because Rupa (form, matter) and Vijnana (consciousness) are interdependent. Like that Rupa. Furthermore, the Samkhya school says that the eye-organ has light, because of the eye-organ. Like the eyes of bats, cats, civets, and other animals. The debater says that the eye-organ is a form, because it is invisible. Even if it relies on something and truly has light, then this analogy is not valid. Someone else says, just as mentioned before, that the eye-organ cannot see itself, what is the meaning of this? If all dharmas have a self-nature that can be seen, then when they combine, others should also be able to be seen, like the fragrance of a flower. Because of this reason, the eye cannot see itself, nor can it see others. Just as Aryadeva's verse in the 'Hundred Treatises' says: 'If all those dharmas, previously had a self-nature, then like the eye-organ, why does it not see itself?' The debater says, what is the meaning of 'seeing'? It means that the form can be obtained. That form can be obtained. If, like the eye, there is no form and nothing, then it becomes a case of 'already accomplished'. As the verse says: 'Consciousness is not in the eye or form, nor does it dwell in between the two, neither existent nor non-existent, where does that consciousness dwell?' Furthermore, if it is said that there is no seed of seeing in the eye-organ, therefore it cannot see, then the analogy of the Sumanas flower is incorrect. Why is it incorrect? Because that flower is free due to the combination of causes and conditions, so fragrance arises. Just like kusuma combined with flax, oil will have fragrance. No one establishes form, having the function of seeing, so that negation is not established. Furthermore, if it is thought that because it cannot see itself, it also cannot see others, then the analogy of fire and flower is powerless in both cases. Because fire and flower, etc., do not take themselves or others, so this is not corresponding. Like this, the meaning of eye-seeing is not established, so its arising and ceasing are also not established. Because the analogy has no substance, and it also violates the meaning of cause. The outsider says, you say that the eye cannot see form because it cannot see itself. This meaning shows that if there is no power over oneself, it is the same for others. Such a meaning is not absolute, for example, fire itself does not have the power to burn, but it can burn others. The eye is also like this. The debater's verse says: 'The analogy of fire cannot, establish the meaning of eye-seeing.' Explanation: In the ultimate meaning (Paramartha), burning is not established.
。於世諦中。火非見性。又彼火自體。於世諦中。燒義不成。云何名燒。謂薪火變異。是故知火自體非燒。複次火喻不成。眼見義者。彼眼見火喻。如前已說。云何已說。偈曰。
去未去去時 已總說遮故
釋曰。第一義中。已去未去。去時無去。如先已說。如是第一義中。已燒未燒燒時無燒。何以故。燒時故。已燒故。未燒故。譬如燒時。已燒未燒彼燒時者。有二過故。彼已燒者。如久已燒訖。彼未燒者。本無燒故。如是已見未見見時不見。何以故。已見故。未見故。見時故。譬如已見未見見時。隨其次第。應當驗破。有人言。眼有見作。何以故。諸部論中。皆作此說故。譬如眼見諸色。論者言。此眼見者。於世諦中。以方便說。非第一義。云何知耶。今此論中遮眼見故。亦遮起故。彼眼則空。如偈曰。
眼若未見時 不得說為見 而言眼能見 是義則不然
釋曰。見義不然。偈意如此。以是義故。如偈曰。
見則無彼見 非見亦無見
釋曰。能見空故。如土石等。偈意如此。如是二種。有見作者。此義不然是故偈言。見則無彼見。非見亦無見。二種俱遮。譬如若有非有。緣皆無用。如是若有非有。因亦類遮。複次僧佉鞞世師等言。以此眼見所作具故。彼所有眼彼名見者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：在世俗諦（Samvriti-satya）中，火併非具有能見的自性。而且，火的自體，在世俗諦中，燃燒的意義也無法成立。為什麼說無法成立燃燒的意義呢？因為薪柴被火改變了形態，所以可知火的自體並非燃燒。再者，用火來比喻眼見的道理也無法成立。眼見火的比喻，如同之前已經說過的。之前是怎麼說的呢？偈頌說： 『去、未去、去時，都已經總括地遮止了。』 解釋：在第一義諦（Paramartha-satya）中，已去、未去、去時，都沒有『去』這個行為，如同先前已經說過的。同樣，在第一義諦中，已燒、未燒、燒時，都沒有『燒』這個行為。為什麼呢？因為有燒時的緣故，有已燒的緣故，有未燒的緣故。譬如在燃燒的時候，已燒和未燒，對於這個燃燒的時刻來說，存在兩種過失。那個已燒的部分，就像已經燃燒完畢很久了；那個未燒的部分，本來就沒有燃燒。同樣，已見、未見、見時，都沒有『見』這個行為。為什麼呢？因為有已見的緣故，有未見的緣故，有見時的緣故。譬如已見、未見、見時，應該按照次第來驗證和破斥。 有人說，眼具有能見的作用。為什麼呢？因為各個部派的論典中，都這樣說。譬如眼能見諸色，論者說，這個眼能見，是在世俗諦中，用方便之說來表達的，並非第一義諦。怎麼知道呢？因為現在的這部論中，遮止了眼能見，也遮止了眼能生起見的作用。那麼眼就是空性的。如偈頌說： 『眼如果未見的時候，就不能說它具有見的功能，如果說眼能夠見，這個道理是不成立的。』 解釋：『見』的意義是不成立的，偈頌的意思是這樣。因為這個緣故，如偈頌說： 『見的時候就沒有那個見，非見的時候也沒有見。』 解釋：能見是空性的，如同土石等。偈頌的意思是這樣。像這樣兩種，認為眼具有能見作用的說法，這個道理是不成立的。所以偈頌說：『見的時候就沒有那個見，非見的時候也沒有見。』兩種都遮止了。譬如若有和非有，因緣都沒有作用。像這樣若有和非有，因也同樣被遮止。再者，數論派（Samkhya）、勝論派（Vaisheshika）等說，因為眼具有能見的作用工具，所以他們所說的眼，就叫做『見』。
【English Translation】 English version: In conventional truth (Samvriti-satya), fire does not possess the inherent nature of seeing. Moreover, the self-nature of fire, in conventional truth, cannot establish the meaning of burning. Why is it said that the meaning of burning cannot be established? Because firewood is transformed by fire, it can be known that the self-nature of fire is not burning. Furthermore, the analogy of fire for the principle of eye-seeing is untenable. The analogy of the eye seeing fire is as previously stated. How was it stated before? The verse says: 'Going, not-going, and the time of going, have all been comprehensively negated.' Explanation: In ultimate truth (Paramartha-satya), there is no 'going' in gone, not-gone, or the time of going, as previously stated. Similarly, in ultimate truth, there is no 'burning' in burned, not-burned, or the time of burning. Why? Because of the time of burning, because of the burned, because of the not-burned. For example, during the time of burning, the burned and the not-burned have two faults in relation to that moment of burning. The burned part is like something that has been burned long ago; the not-burned part originally had no burning. Similarly, there is no 'seeing' in seen, not-seen, or the time of seeing. Why? Because of the seen, because of the not-seen, because of the time of seeing. For example, seen, not-seen, and the time of seeing should be examined and refuted in sequence. Some say that the eye has the function of seeing. Why? Because all schools of treatises say so. For example, the eye can see various forms, and the commentators say that this eye's ability to see is expressed in conventional truth as a provisional explanation, not in ultimate truth. How do we know? Because this treatise now negates the eye's ability to see and also negates the arising of seeing by the eye. Then the eye is empty. As the verse says: 'If the eye has not seen, it cannot be said to have the function of seeing. If it is said that the eye can see, this principle is not established.' Explanation: The meaning of 'seeing' is not established; this is the meaning of the verse. Because of this reason, as the verse says: 'When there is seeing, there is no that seeing; when there is non-seeing, there is also no seeing.' Explanation: The ability to see is empty, like earth and stone. This is the meaning of the verse. Thus, these two kinds of views, which hold that the eye has the function of seeing, are not established. Therefore, the verse says: 'When there is seeing, there is no that seeing; when there is non-seeing, there is also no seeing.' Both are negated. For example, if there is existence and non-existence, causes are useless. Similarly, if there is existence and non-existence, the cause is also negated in the same way. Furthermore, the Samkhya and Vaisheshika schools say that because the eye has the instrument of seeing, the eye they speak of is called 'seeing'.
。以彼見者。自眼見故。如所斫木。斫者能斫。非斧能斫。是故非眼見者。此則成我所成。謂彼作者。有諸作具。以作具故。譬如斧等。必有斫者。論者言。彼邪分別。謂有見者。此執不然。如偈曰。
若已遮于見 應知遮見者
釋曰。如眼不自見。彼亦復爾。丈夫自體。見丈夫者。此義不然。以與世間所作相違故。如刀不自割等。云何驗知。謂第一義中。彼丈夫者。無能見義。何以故。不見自體故。譬如耳等。亦非因義不成。彼經中說。我還見我者。但於心上。施設我名世諦故說。非第一義。如是物故。所識境故。量故。如聲及耳。是等諸因。及彼譬喻。應當廣說。複次第一義中。色非我見。何以故。以物故。如我自體。不能自見。如是所識境等。應當廣說。
外人言。佛法無我。汝言。如我自體。不能見者。與教相違。論者言。於世諦中。假說我喻。不違于教。第一義中。斧等及譬。皆無體故。非成已覆成。有人言。汝說見者不見。語自相違。何以故。若言見者。云何言不見。若言不見。云何名見者。此是立義過。論者言。緣起法不起。如先已答。不復更說。複次汝言見者。為是見自體耶。為不見耶。若見自體者。如僧佉言。思是丈夫自體。若彼見者。是見自體。自體非作離。彼眼根亦應得見
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：以他們所持的觀點來看，是由於自己的眼睛在看。就像砍伐樹木，是砍伐者在砍，而不是斧頭在砍。所以不是眼睛在看。這就能成立我所要成立的觀點，即存在作者，並且有各種工具。因為有工具的緣故，就像斧頭等，必定有砍伐者。論者說，那是錯誤的分別，認為有能見者。這種執著是不對的。如偈頌所說：
『如果已經遮止了見，應當知道也遮止了見者。』
解釋：就像眼睛不能自己看見自己一樣，那個能見者也是如此。丈夫自己看見丈夫，這種說法是不對的，因為它與世間常理相違背。就像刀不能自己割自己一樣。如何驗證呢？在第一義諦中，那個丈夫沒有能見的性質。為什麼呢？因為他不能看見自己的自體。就像耳朵等一樣。而且因的道理也沒有不成立。經中說『我還看見我』，但這只是在心上假立我的名稱，是世俗諦的說法，不是第一義諦。因為它是事物，是所認識的境界，是量。就像聲音和耳朵一樣。這些原因和比喻，應當廣泛地說明。再次，在第一義諦中，色不是我所見。為什麼呢？因為它是一個事物，就像我的自體不能自己看見自己一樣。像這樣所認識的境界等，應當廣泛地說明。
外道說：佛法說無我，你說『就像我的自體不能見』，這與佛教的教義相違背。論者說：在世俗諦中，假借『我』來作比喻，不違背教義。在第一義諦中，斧頭等比喻都沒有實體，所以不是重複論證已經成立的觀點。有人說：你說見者不見，這是自相矛盾。為什麼呢？如果說是見者，為什麼又說不見？如果說不見，為什麼又稱為見者？這是立義的過失。論者說：緣起法是不生起的，就像先前已經回答過的一樣，不再重複說明。再次，你說見者，是見自己的自體呢？還是不見呢？如果見自己的自體，就像僧佉派所說，思是丈夫的自體。如果他能見，是見自己的自體，自體不是被製造出來的，那麼眼睛也應該能看見。
【English Translation】 English version: According to their view, it is because their own eyes are seeing. Just like chopping wood, it is the chopper who chops, not the axe. Therefore, it is not the eyes that see. This establishes what I want to establish, that there is an agent and various tools. Because there are tools, like axes, there must be a chopper. The debater says that it is a false distinction to think there is a seer. This attachment is incorrect. As the verse says:
'If seeing has been stopped, one should know that the seer has also been stopped.'
Explanation: Just as the eye cannot see itself, neither can the seer. The husband seeing the husband himself is not correct, because it contradicts worldly conventions, just as a knife cannot cut itself. How can it be verified? In the ultimate truth (Paramārtha, 第一義), that husband has no ability to see. Why? Because he cannot see his own self (ātman, 自體). Like the ear and so on. Also, the reason is not unestablished. The sutra says 'I see myself', but this is only a provisional designation of 'I' on the mind, spoken in conventional truth (Saṃvṛti, 世俗諦), not in the ultimate truth. Because it is a thing, it is an object of cognition, it is a measure. Like sound and the ear. These reasons and metaphors should be explained extensively. Furthermore, in the ultimate truth, form (rūpa, 色) is not seen by me. Why? Because it is a thing, just as my own self cannot see itself. Like this, the object of cognition and so on should be explained extensively.
An outsider says: Buddhism teaches no-self (anātman, 無我), and you say 'just as my own self cannot see', which contradicts Buddhist teachings. The debater says: In conventional truth, the metaphor of 'I' is used provisionally, which does not contradict the teachings. In the ultimate truth, the axe and other metaphors have no substance, so it is not re-establishing what has already been established. Someone says: You say the seer does not see, which is self-contradictory. Why? If it is said to be a seer, why say it does not see? If it is said not to see, why is it called a seer? This is a fault in establishing the meaning. The debater says: Dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda, 緣起法) does not arise, as has already been answered, and will not be repeated. Furthermore, you say the seer, does it see its own self, or does it not see? If it sees its own self, as the Sāṃkhya (僧佉) says, thought is the self of the husband. If it can see, it sees its own self, and the self is not created, then the eye should also be able to see.
。複次斫者離斧。則不能斫。丈夫離眼。豈能見耶。我為見者。及彼斫者。世諦中說。非第一義。為此分別故。偈曰。
離眼不離眼 見者不可得
釋曰。眼等諸具。先未有時。及彼舍時。即是無眼。若無眼者。則能所見空。離能所見。執有見者。此則不然。見無自體。見者亦無。義意如此。複次若言如火自性。見者亦爾。此義不然。何以故。若無薪時。火無體故。複次僧佉人言。若不離眼此色可得驗知有彼見者能見。此執不然。何以故。無見者故彼色可得者。謂眼色空明及以作意此等有故有色可得。又此等諸緣具足聚集說彼調達名為見者無。如僧佉所計。丈夫名為見者。何以故。無有盲人能見色故。彼眼能見說為見者。如燈無思。亦為明因。眼見亦爾。以是義故。於世諦中。亦無見者。複次鞞世師言。見者無體。由四種和合色識起故。名見者見。論者言。彼同前過四種和合別有見者世皆不知而言有者。此義不然。是故偈言。離眼無見者。無彼自體故。以離眼見則無見能總名見者。此是隨汝意說。複次鞞世師所立。第一義中。見者見色。是義不然。何以故。異眼故。如瓶等。以前二門。見者不成故。複次分別丈夫以為見者。無自體故。如偈言。離眼不離眼見者。不可得彼見者。自體有眼無眼不可見故。若
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 再說，如果斫者離開了斧頭，就不能砍東西。丈夫離開了眼睛，怎麼能看見東西呢？我說有『見者』（darśaka，能看見東西的人）和『斫者』（kartṛ，能砍東西的人），這是在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）中說的，不是第一義諦（paramārtha-satya，絕對真理）。爲了說明這個道理，所以用偈頌說： 『離開眼睛或不離開眼睛，見者都是不可得的。』 解釋：眼睛等各種感官，在沒有產生的時候，以及它們壞滅的時候，就是沒有眼睛。如果沒有眼睛，那麼能見和所見都是空無。如果離開了能見和所見，卻執著于有一個『見者』，這是不對的。見沒有自性（svabhāva，自身本性），見者也沒有。道理就是這樣。再說，如果有人說，就像火有自性一樣，見者也是如此，這個說法不對。為什麼呢？因為如果沒有柴薪，火就沒有本體。 再說，數論派（Sāṃkhya）的人說，如果不離開眼睛，這個顏色就可以被觀察到，從而可以驗證有能見的『見者』。這種執著是不對的。為什麼呢？因為沒有見者。這個顏色之所以可以被觀察到，是因為眼睛、顏色、空間、光明以及作意（manaskāra，心理活動）這些條件存在。又因為這些條件具足聚集，所以才說那個『調達』（Devadatta，人名）是見者，而不是像數論派所認為的，丈夫是見者。為什麼呢？因為沒有盲人能看見顏色。那個能看見東西的眼睛被稱為見者，就像燈沒有思想，也能成為光明的因緣一樣，眼睛看見東西也是如此。因為這個道理，即使在世俗諦中，也沒有見者。 再說，勝論派（Vaiśeṣika）的人說，見者沒有本體，是因為四大（四大種，四大元素）和合，以及識（vijñāna，意識）生起，才被稱為見者。論者說，他們的說法和前面的過失一樣，四大和合之外，另有一個見者，世人都不知道，卻說有，這個說法是不對的。所以偈頌說：『離開眼睛就沒有見者，因為沒有那個自體。』因為離開了眼睛，就沒有能見，所以總的來說就沒有見者。這只是隨順你的意思說說而已。 再說，勝論派所建立的，在第一義諦中，見者能看見顏色，這個說法不對。為什麼呢？因為和眼睛不同，就像瓶子等物體一樣。因為用前面兩種方式，見者都不能成立。再說，分別丈夫是見者，因為沒有自體。就像偈頌所說：『離開眼睛或不離開眼睛，見者都是不可得的』。那個見者的自體，有眼睛或沒有眼睛，都是不能看見的。
【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, if a woodcutter is separated from his axe, he cannot chop. If a man is separated from his eyes, how can he see? My saying that there is a 'seer' (darśaka, one who sees) and a 'cutter' (kartṛ, one who cuts) is spoken in conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya, relative truth), not in ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya, absolute truth). For the sake of explaining this distinction, the verse says: 'Whether apart from the eye or not apart from the eye, the seer is unobtainable.' Explanation: The various sense faculties, such as the eye, when they have not yet arisen, and when they are abandoned, are without eyes. If there are no eyes, then the seen and the seer are empty. If, apart from the seen and the seer, one clings to the existence of a 'seer', this is not correct. Seeing has no self-nature (svabhāva, own-being), and the seer also does not exist. The meaning is thus. Furthermore, if someone says that just as fire has self-nature, so too does the seer, this is not correct. Why? Because if there is no fuel, fire has no substance. Furthermore, the Sāṃkhya (Samkhya) school says that if not separated from the eye, this color can be observed, and thus it can be verified that there is a 'seer' who can see. This clinging is not correct. Why? Because there is no seer. The reason this color can be observed is because the eye, color, space, light, and attention (manaskāra, mental activity) are present. Moreover, because these conditions are fully assembled, it is said that 'Devadatta' (Devadatta, a person's name) is the seer, not that the man is the seer, as the Sāṃkhya school believes. Why? Because no blind person can see color. That eye which can see is called the seer, just as a lamp, without thought, can also be a cause of light, so too is seeing with the eye. Because of this reason, even in conventional truth, there is no seer. Furthermore, the Vaiśeṣika (Vaisheshika) school says that the seer has no substance, because the four great elements (mahābhūta, the four great elements) combine, and consciousness (vijñāna, awareness) arises, and is then called the seer. The commentator says that their statement has the same fault as before, that apart from the combination of the four great elements, there is another seer, which the world does not know, but they say exists, this statement is not correct. Therefore, the verse says: 'Apart from the eye, there is no seer, because there is no such self-nature.' Because apart from the eye, there is no seeing, so in general there is no seer. This is just speaking according to your intention. Furthermore, the Vaiśeṣika school establishes that in ultimate truth, the seer can see color, this statement is not correct. Why? Because it is different from the eye, just like a pot and other objects. Because with the previous two methods, the seer cannot be established. Furthermore, distinguishing the man as the seer, because there is no self-nature. Just as the verse says: 'Whether apart from the eye or not apart from the eye, the seer is unobtainable.' That self-nature of the seer, with eyes or without eyes, cannot see.
謂見者有眼能見。此亦不然。何以故。由眼有體。見色得成。如火能燒。眼見亦爾。世諦中說。如此應知。若離彼眼。別有見者。盲人無眼。亦應能見。此義不然。複次鞞世師云。見者合作。能見於色。如是應知。彼具業有故。此若無作。彼業具則無。譬如虛空。由有眼具見色為業。知有見者。及彼見作。論者言。第一義中。於一切時。眼無有故。而立見者。是則不然。如偈曰。
見者無有故 能所二皆空
釋曰。見者無體。則無所取。而言眼為彼具。以此眼見者。是義不然。是故汝言具業有故者。彼因不成。亦違義故。過失如是。複次自乘人言。諸行因緣。依他故空。眼及彼我。俱不能見。是義應爾。而言所見能見都無體者。此義不然。何以故。彼識等果。四種有故。此若無者。彼識觸受愛。不名為果。如生盲人。論者言。所見及見。此義不成。如先已破。今所謂者。如偈曰。
見所見無故 識等四種無
釋曰。何故無。緣無故。以是義故。識等不成。能所既不成。譬喻亦無體。有人言。第一義中。有是識等。以彼取等果有體故。論者言。此應如是答。偈曰。
彼取緣等果 何處當可得
釋曰。識等無故。取亦不成。偈義如此。攝受是取義。彼有幾種。謂欲取戒取我語取見取
彼取緣有及生老死。如是過失。常隨逐汝。外人品初。舉譬喻等。成立眼見。如先已遮。彼耳聲等。例同前破。如偈曰。
耳鼻舌身意 聞者所聞等 應知如是義 皆同眼見遮
複次外人品初。說有是去。以作果者。是亦不然。如先偈說。是故去無性。去者亦復然。去時及諸法。一切無所有。以是義故。外人分別。有彼入起及去義者。此皆不成。如先說過。以入等體空令生信解。品義如此。是故得成。如無言說經。偈曰。
內外地界無二義 如來智慧能覺了 彼無二相及不二 一相無相如是知
又如金光女經言。文殊師利語彼童女。應觀諸界。童女答言。文殊師利。譬如劫燒時。三界等亦爾。又說偈曰。
眼不能見色 意不知諸法 此是無上諦 世間不能了
又如般若波羅蜜經說。彼一切法。無知者。無見者。彼說法師。亦不可得。不可以心分別。不可以意能知。又如佛母經說。阿姊。眼不見色。乃至意不知法。如是菩提離故。眼色離。乃至菩提離故。意法離等。又如佛告極勇猛菩薩言。善男子。色不為色境界。受想行識不為識等境。以境界無故。極勇猛。色不知色。色不見色。若色不知不見。是為般若波羅蜜。乃至受想行識不知不見亦復如是。
釋觀根品
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：他們執著于緣起、有、以及生老死，這樣的過失，常常伴隨著你們。在《外人品》的開頭，通過舉例和比喻等方式，來確立眼見為實，這就像之前已經駁斥過的那樣。耳朵聽聲音等等，也可以用同樣的方法來駁斥。正如偈頌所說：
『耳朵、鼻子、舌頭、身體、意識， 聽到者所聽到的等等， 應該知道這樣的道理， 都和眼見一樣應該被否定。』
此外，《外人品》的開頭，說『有』是『去』的原因，以『作者』作為結果，這也是不對的。正如之前的偈頌所說，所以『去』沒有自性，『去者』也是如此。『去時』以及一切諸法，都是空無所有的。因為這個緣故，外人的分別，認為有『入』、『起』和『去』的意義，這些都不能成立，就像之前說過的。以『入』等等的體性是空性的，來使人產生信心和理解。這一品的意義就是這樣，所以能夠成立。正如《無言說經》的偈頌所說：
『內部和外部的地界沒有兩種意義， 如來的智慧能夠覺察了知。 它們沒有二相和不二， 一相就是無相，應該這樣理解。』
又如《金光明女經》所說，文殊師利（Manjusri，菩薩名）對童女說，應該觀察諸界。童女回答說，文殊師利，譬如劫火燃燒的時候，三界（Trailokya，欲界、色界、無色界）也是這樣。又說偈頌：
『眼睛不能看見色（Rupa，物質、顏色）， 意識不能知道諸法（Dharma，事物、規律）， 這是無上的真諦（Paramartha-satya，最高真理）， 世間的人不能理解。』
又如《般若波羅蜜經》（Prajnaparamita Sutra，大乘佛教經典）所說，一切法，沒有知者，沒有見者，說法師也不可得。不可以用心分別，不可以用意識來了解。又如《佛母經》所說，阿姊，眼睛不能看見色，乃至意識不能知道法，這樣菩提（Bodhi，覺悟）是遠離的，所以眼睛和色是分離的，乃至菩提是遠離的，所以意識和法是分離的等等。又如佛告訴極勇猛菩薩說，善男子，色不是色的境界，受（Vedana，感受）、想（Samjna，概念）、行（Samskara，行為）、識（Vijnana，意識）不是識等等的境界。因為沒有境界的緣故，極勇猛，色不知道色，也看不見色。如果色不知道也看不見，這就是般若波羅蜜（Prajnaparamita，智慧的完成），乃至受想行識不知道也看不見也是這樣。
《釋觀根品》
【English Translation】 English version: They cling to dependent origination, existence, and birth, old age, and death. Such faults constantly follow you. At the beginning of the 'Outsider' chapter, establishing 'seeing is believing' through examples and metaphors is like what has already been refuted. Hearing sounds, etc., with the ear can be refuted in the same way. As the verse says:
'Ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, What is heard by the hearer, etc., Should know such a principle, All should be negated like seeing with the eye.'
Furthermore, at the beginning of the 'Outsider' chapter, saying that 'existence' is the cause of 'going,' with the 'maker' as the result, is also incorrect. As the previous verse said, therefore 'going' has no self-nature, and the 'goer' is also the same. The 'time of going' and all dharmas (Dharma, phenomena, laws) are all empty and non-existent. Because of this reason, the outsider's distinctions, thinking that there is the meaning of 'entering,' 'arising,' and 'going,' these cannot be established, just as previously said. Using the emptiness of the nature of 'entering,' etc., to generate faith and understanding. The meaning of this chapter is like this, so it can be established. As the verse in the 'Inexpressible Sutra' says:
'The internal and external earth element have no two meanings, The Tathagata's (Tathagata, 'Thus Gone One', an epithet of the Buddha) wisdom can perceive and know. They have no duality and non-duality, One aspect is no aspect, should understand like this.'
Moreover, as the 'Golden Light Queen Sutra' says, Manjusri (Manjusri, a Bodhisattva) said to the maiden, one should observe the realms. The maiden replied, Manjusri, just like when the kalpa (Kalpa, an aeon) is burned, the three realms (Trailokya, the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm) are also like that. It also says in the verse:
'The eye cannot see form (Rupa, matter, color), The mind cannot know dharmas (Dharma, phenomena, laws), This is the supreme truth (Paramartha-satya, ultimate truth), The people of the world cannot understand.'
Moreover, as the 'Prajnaparamita Sutra' (Prajnaparamita Sutra, Perfection of Wisdom Sutra) says, all dharmas, there is no knower, no seer, and the Dharma teacher is also unattainable. Cannot be distinguished by the mind, cannot be understood by the consciousness. Moreover, as the 'Buddha Mother Sutra' says, sister, the eye cannot see form, and even the mind cannot know dharma, thus Bodhi (Bodhi, enlightenment) is separate, so the eye and form are separate, and even Bodhi is separate, so the mind and dharma are separate, etc. Moreover, as the Buddha told the Extremely Courageous Bodhisattva, good man, form is not the realm of form, sensation (Vedana, feeling), conception (Samjna, perception), volition (Samskara, mental formations), and consciousness (Vijnana, consciousness) are not the realm of consciousness, etc. Because there is no realm, Extremely Courageous One, form does not know form, nor does it see form. If form does not know and does not see, this is Prajnaparamita (Prajnaparamita, perfection of wisdom), and even sensation, conception, volition, and consciousness do not know and do not see, it is also like this.
Explanation of the 'Contemplation of the Roots' chapter
竟。
般若燈論釋觀五陰品第四
複次欲令識知陰無性義。故有此品。有人言。第一義中。有諸入等。何以故。以陰攝故。若其無者。彼色入等。則非陰攝。如處空花。由有諸入彼陰攝故。如十種色入。一色陰攝。法入三陰。謂受想行。及彼一分色陰所攝。彼意入識陰攝。以是因故。第一義中。有諸入等。論者言謂色陰者。略說二種。四大及所造。若三世等一切差別總說色陰。彼眼等陰攝。外人慾為因者。色粗易解。先分別說。如偈曰。
若離於色因 色則不可得
釋曰。何等是彼色因。謂地等四種大。第一義中。若離此等。色不可得。而於世諦。依四大因。假施設色。第一義中。驗色無實。自因不受故。彼覺無體故。若自因不受。覺無體者。彼實非有。如軍眾等。色因不可取。色覺無自體。亦復如是。複次第一義中。色覺境界。體非實有。何以故。以覺故。譬如林等覺。複次第一義中。色聲句義。境界無實。何以故。以聞故。譬如軍等聲。若言受等諸陰非一向者。此義不然。何以故。識等心數。亦同遮故。非非一向。或謂第一義中。有彼實色。何以故。彼色變異。覺無別故。若物變異。覺亦別者。此世俗有。譬如瓶等。如青色別時。彼覺無異。以是義故。知有實色。論者言。第一義中。驗
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
竟。
《般若燈論釋·觀五陰品》第四
其次，爲了使人瞭解五陰（panchaskandha）無自性的意義，所以有這一品。有人說，在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya）中，有諸如十二入（dvādaśa āyatana）等。為什麼呢？因為五陰包含了它們。如果五陰不存在，那麼色入（rūpa-āyatana）等就不被五陰所包含，就像虛空中的花朵一樣。由於有諸入，所以它們被五陰所包含，例如十種色入被色陰（rūpa-skandha）所包含，法入（dharma-āyatana）被三種陰所包含，即受（vedanā）、想（saṃjñā）、行（saṃskāra），以及一部分色陰所包含。意入（mana-āyatana）被識陰（vijñāna-skandha）所包含。因為這個原因，在第一義諦中，有諸入等。論者說，所謂的色陰，簡略地說有兩種：四大（mahābhūta）及所造色（upādāyarūpa）。如果將三世等一切差別總括起來說，就是色陰。那些眼等被陰所包含。外道想要作為原因，因為色粗顯易懂，所以先分別解說。如偈頌所說：
『若離於色因，色則不可得。』
解釋：什麼是色的原因呢？就是地、水、火、風四種大種（catvāri mahābhūtāni）。在第一義諦中，如果離開了這些，色是不可得的。但在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya）中，依靠四大作為因，假立施設為色。在第一義諦中，驗證色沒有實體，因為它不接受自己的因，所以它的覺知沒有自體。如果它不接受自己的因，覺知沒有自體，那麼它實際上是不存在的，就像軍隊等一樣。色的因不可取，色的覺知沒有自體，也是如此。其次，在第一義諦中，色覺的境界，其體性並非真實存在。為什麼呢？因為它是覺知。譬如對森林等的覺知。再次，在第一義諦中，色、聲、句、義的境界沒有實體。為什麼呢？因為它是聽聞。譬如對軍隊等聲音的聽聞。如果說受等諸陰不是一概如此，這種說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為識等心數（citta-samprayukta）也同樣被遮破，所以不是非一概如此。或者認為在第一義諦中，有真實的色。為什麼呢？因為色變異時，覺知沒有差別。如果事物變異時，覺知也有差別，那麼這在世俗中是存在的，譬如瓶子等。如青色變化時，它的覺知沒有不同。因為這個原因，知道有真實的色。論者說，在第一義諦中，驗證
【English Translation】 English version:
End.
Prajñāpradīpa-ṭīkā, Chapter Four: Examination of the Five Skandhas
Furthermore, in order to make known the meaning of the non-inherent existence of the five skandhas (pañcaskandha), this chapter exists. Someone says that in the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), there are the twelve āyatanas (dvādaśa āyatana), etc. Why? Because the skandhas encompass them. If they did not exist, then the rūpa-āyatana (form āyatana), etc., would not be encompassed by the skandhas, like flowers in the sky. Because there are the āyatanas, they are encompassed by the skandhas, such as the ten rūpa-āyatanas being encompassed by the rūpa-skandha (form skandha), the dharma-āyatana being encompassed by three skandhas, namely vedanā (feeling), saṃjñā (perception), and saṃskāra (mental formations), as well as a portion of the rūpa-skandha. The mana-āyatana (mind āyatana) is encompassed by the vijñāna-skandha (consciousness skandha). For this reason, in the ultimate truth, there are the āyatanas, etc. The commentator says that the so-called rūpa-skandha is briefly of two types: the four great elements (mahābhūta) and the derived form (upādāyarūpa). If all distinctions such as the three times are generally spoken of, it is the rūpa-skandha. Those such as the eye are encompassed by the skandhas. The outsider wants to use it as a cause, because form is coarse and easy to understand, so it is explained separately first. As the verse says:
'If apart from the cause of form, form cannot be obtained.'
Explanation: What is the cause of form? It is the four great elements (catvāri mahābhūtāni), namely earth, water, fire, and wind. In the ultimate truth, if these are absent, form cannot be obtained. But in the conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), relying on the four great elements as the cause, form is falsely posited. In the ultimate truth, it is verified that form has no reality, because it does not accept its own cause, so its awareness has no self-nature. If it does not accept its own cause and awareness has no self-nature, then it is actually non-existent, like an army, etc. The cause of form cannot be grasped, and the awareness of form has no self-nature, and so it is. Secondly, in the ultimate truth, the object of form awareness is not truly existent in its nature. Why? Because it is awareness. For example, the awareness of a forest, etc. Again, in the ultimate truth, the objects of form, sound, sentence, and meaning have no reality. Why? Because it is hearing. For example, the sound of an army, etc. If it is said that the skandhas such as feeling are not uniformly so, this statement is incorrect. Why? Because mental factors (citta-samprayukta) such as consciousness are also similarly refuted, so it is not non-uniformly so. Or it is thought that in the ultimate truth, there is real form. Why? Because when form changes, the awareness has no difference. If when things change, the awareness also has a difference, then this exists in the conventional world, like a vase, etc. For example, when blue changes, its awareness is no different. For this reason, it is known that there is real form. The commentator says that in the ultimate truth, it is verified
無體故。已觀因色。次遮四大。如偈曰。
若當離於色 色因亦不見
釋曰。色聲香味觸等。此諸因色皆相離故。彼色因地等。不可見取。為此義故。今造論者。初遮彼地。遮彼地等。有何所以。有大義故。云何大義。如世諦中。從因起者。第一義中。體實無生。此無自體。如楞伽經偈曰。
離積聚無體 彼覺無可取 故知緣起空 我說無自性 無物從緣起 無物從緣滅 起唯諸緣起 滅唯諸緣滅
釋曰。以此方便。第一義中。地非實有。如是決定。彼因不可見。不見彼故。若不可見故。不見彼者。第一義中。彼不實有。如軍眾等。複次第一義中。地覺境界。體非實有。何以故。以覺故。如林等覺。複次第一義中。地聲句義境界無實。何以故。以聞故。譬如軍眾等聲。複次第一義中。自和合分。無彼異色。何以故。彼不可取。彼覺無體故。譬如地等自體。複次僧佉人言。汝言色等不異地等者。此成我所成。論者言。遮異故。非以不異令汝得解。汝邪分別言不異者我不受故。複次鞞世師言。汝出因者。非一向過。何以故。如不取燈。則無瓶覺。彼亦異故。論者言。汝不善說。我但遮彼。自和合支。不可取故。彼覺無體。不論餘事。燈雖無體。而有寶珠藥草日月等光。彼瓶覺起。自
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 無自體之故。既然已經觀察了作為原因的『色』（Rupa, 物質），接下來遮破『四大』（四大元素）。如偈頌所說： 『如果離開了『色』（Rupa, 物質），『色』（Rupa, 物質）的因也不可見。』 解釋：『色』（Rupa, 物質）、聲、香、味、觸等等，這些作為原因的『色』（Rupa, 物質）都是相互分離的，因此，作為『色』（Rupa, 物質）之因的地等元素，是不可見、不可取的。爲了這個意義，現在造論者首先遮破地，遮破地等元素。遮破地等元素有什麼意義呢？有很大的意義。什麼樣的大意義呢？如在世俗諦中，從因產生的法，在第一義諦中，其體性實際上是沒有生起的。這是沒有自體的。如《楞伽經》的偈頌所說： 『離開了積聚就沒有自體，那個覺知是不可取的，因此可知緣起性空，我說沒有自性。沒有事物從緣而起，沒有事物從緣而滅，生起只是諸緣的生起，滅只是諸緣的滅。』 解釋：用這種方便，在第一義諦中，地不是真實存在的。這樣決定之後，地的因是不可見的。因為不可見，所以不見地。如果因為不可見就不見地，那麼在第一義諦中，地不是真實存在的，就像軍隊等一樣。其次，在第一義諦中，對地的覺知境界，其體性不是真實存在的。為什麼呢？因為是覺知。如對森林等的覺知。再次，在第一義諦中，地的聲音、語句、意義境界都不是真實的。為什麼呢？因為是聽聞。譬如軍隊等的聲音。再次，在第一義諦中，自身和合的部分，沒有與地不同的顏色。為什麼呢？因為那是不可取的，那個覺知沒有自體。譬如地等的自體。再次，『僧佉』（Samkhya）論者說：『你說『色』（Rupa, 物質）等不異於地等，這正成就了我所要成就的。』論者說：『遮破不同，不是用不異來讓你得到理解。你邪分別說不異，我是不接受的。』再次，『鞞世師』（Vaisheshika）論者說：『你指出因，不是一概而論的過失。為什麼呢？如不取燈，就沒有對瓶子的覺知，那也是不同的緣故。』論者說：『你沒有好好說。我只是遮破自身和合的支分，因為不可取，那個覺知沒有自體，不討論其他事情。燈雖然沒有自體，但有寶珠、藥草、日月等的光，那個對瓶子的覺知才生起。』
【English Translation】 English version Because of having no inherent existence. Having already observed 'Rupa' (form, matter) as the cause, next we refute the 'Four Great Elements' (四大). As the verse says: 'If one is apart from 'Rupa' (form, matter), the cause of 'Rupa' (form, matter) is also not seen.' Explanation: 'Rupa' (form, matter), sound, smell, taste, touch, etc. These 'Rupa' (form, matter) as causes are all mutually separate. Therefore, the earth element, etc., as the cause of 'Rupa' (form, matter), cannot be seen or grasped. For this meaning, the author of the treatise now first refutes earth, refuting earth and other elements. What is the significance of refuting earth and other elements? It has great significance. What kind of great significance? As in conventional truth, phenomena arising from causes, in ultimate truth, their nature is actually unarisen. This has no inherent existence. As the verse in the 'Lankavatara Sutra' says: 'Apart from aggregation, there is no entity; that perception is unobtainable. Therefore, know that dependent origination is emptiness; I say there is no self-nature. No thing arises from conditions; no thing ceases from conditions. Arising is only the arising of conditions; ceasing is only the ceasing of conditions.' Explanation: Using this method, in ultimate truth, earth is not truly existent. Having determined this, the cause of earth is invisible. Because it is invisible, earth is not seen. If because it is invisible, earth is not seen, then in ultimate truth, earth is not truly existent, like an army, etc. Furthermore, in ultimate truth, the object of perception of earth is not truly existent in its nature. Why? Because it is perception. Like the perception of a forest, etc. Again, in ultimate truth, the sound, words, and meaning of earth are not real. Why? Because it is hearing. For example, the sound of an army, etc. Again, in ultimate truth, the self-combined parts have no different color from earth. Why? Because it is unobtainable, and that perception has no inherent existence. For example, the self-nature of earth, etc. Again, the 'Samkhya' (僧佉) philosopher says: 'You say that 'Rupa' (form, matter), etc., are not different from earth, etc., which accomplishes what I want to accomplish.' The author of the treatise says: 'Refuting difference, not using non-difference to make you understand. I do not accept your wrong view that they are not different.' Again, the 'Vaisheshika' (鞞世師) philosopher says: 'Your pointing out the cause is not a universal fault. Why? For example, if one does not grasp the lamp, there is no perception of the pot, which is also different.' The author of the treatise says: 'You have not spoken well. I only refute the self-combined parts, because they are unobtainable, and that perception has no inherent existence, not discussing other things. Although the lamp has no inherent existence, it has the light of jewels, herbs, the sun, and the moon, and then the perception of the pot arises.'
和合支已外。更無異色可得。以是義故。汝喻非也。燈非彼瓶自和合支故。異門無體。非非一向過。如偈曰。
此物與彼物 異者則不然
釋曰。此義如后當說。複次第一義中。燈與瓶異。此亦不成。以是義故。非非一向過。複次鞞世師言。彼軍眾等總實。以初起有故。汝言地等無實。立驗令解者。譬喻不成。論者言。軍眾諸枝。非彼軍眾總實初起之因。何以故。以總故。如樹根莖枝葉等諸分。彼軍眾象等諸分。非彼軍眾初起之因。何以故。彼非分故。譬如經等。亦非譬喻無體。如偈言。若當離於色。色因亦不見。如前立義出因譬喻。驗彼色等。無異地等。及彼地等。無異色等。異如前遮。不異后破。若不異者。乳即是酪。酪亦為乳。以不異故。以是義故。此證得成。如楞伽經偈曰。
不異無有體 束蘆及別處 若一若異等 凡夫妄分別
釋曰。如色入等。彼欲成立。說因有故。以為因者。此因不成。亦違義故。複次若汝分別離彼色因而有色者。此亦不然。何以故。有過失故。如偈曰。
離色因有色 色則墮無因
釋曰。諸說無因者。言欲令無因有色彼應如是問縱令汝說與理相應。隨何等物。是汝所說無因種耶。不欲令爾。如偈曰。
無因而有物 終無有是處
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 和合支（samagga-hetu，結合的因素）之外，沒有其他的特性可以獲得。因為這個原因，你的比喻是不恰當的。燈不是瓶子自身結合的因素，因此，從不同的角度來看，它沒有實體。這並非總是錯誤的，如偈頌所說： 『此物與彼物，異者則不然』 解釋：這個意義將在後面詳細說明。其次，在第一義諦（paramattha-sacca，究竟真理）中，燈和瓶子是不同的，這種說法也不成立。因為這個原因，這並非總是錯誤的。再次，勝論師（Vaisheshika，古印度哲學流派）說，軍隊等整體是真實的，因為它們最初產生。你說地等沒有實體，設立論證來讓理解者明白，這個譬喻是不成立的。論者說，軍隊的各個部分，不是軍隊整體最初產生的原因。為什麼呢？因為它們是整體。例如樹的根、莖、枝葉等各個部分。軍隊的大象等各個部分，不是軍隊最初產生的原因。為什麼呢？因為它們不是部分。例如經書等。這也不是一個沒有實體的譬喻，如偈頌所說： 『若當離於，因亦不見。』 如前面設立的定義、原因和譬喻，驗證顏色等，與地等沒有不同，以及地等，與顏色等沒有不同。不同之處如前面所遮止的，不相同之處在後面破斥。如果不相同，牛奶就是奶酪，奶酪也就是牛奶。因為它們不相同。因為這個原因，這個論證是成立的。如《楞伽經》（Lankavatara Sutra）的偈頌所說： 『不異無有體，束蘆及別處，若一若異等，凡夫妄分別。』 解釋：例如色入（rupa-ayatana，色處）等。他們想要成立，說原因存在，以此作為原因，這個原因是不成立的，也違背了意義。再次，如果你分別認為離開顏色（rupa，形態）的原因而有顏色，這也是不對的。為什麼呢？因為有錯誤。如偈頌所說： 『離色因有色，色則墮無因。』 解釋：那些說沒有原因的人，想要讓沒有原因而有顏色，他們應該這樣問：即使你說的與道理相符，那麼什麼東西是你所說的沒有原因的種類呢？不應該這樣。如偈頌所說： 『無因而有物，終無有是處。』
【English Translation】 English version: Apart from the samagga-hetu (factors of combination), no other distinct characteristic can be obtained. For this reason, your analogy is inappropriate. The lamp is not a factor of combination for the jar itself; therefore, from a different perspective, it has no substance. This is not always wrong, as the verse says: 'This thing and that thing, if different, then it is not so.' Explanation: This meaning will be explained in detail later. Secondly, in the ultimate truth (paramattha-sacca), the statement that the lamp and the jar are different is also untenable. For this reason, this is not always wrong. Furthermore, the Vaisheshika (an ancient school of Indian philosophy) says that the totality of the army, etc., is real because they initially arise. You say that earth, etc., have no substance, setting up an argument to make the understander realize that this analogy is not valid. The debater says that the various parts of the army are not the cause of the initial arising of the army as a whole. Why? Because they are the whole. For example, the various parts of a tree, such as roots, stems, branches, and leaves. The various parts of the army, such as elephants, etc., are not the cause of the initial arising of the army. Why? Because they are not parts. For example, scriptures, etc. This is also not an analogy without substance, as the verse says: 'If one separates from *, the cause of * is also not seen.' As in the previously established definition, cause, and analogy, verify that colors, etc., are not different from earth, etc., and that earth, etc., are not different from colors, etc. The differences are as previously negated, and the non-differences are refuted later. If they are not different, milk is cheese, and cheese is also milk. Because they are not different. For this reason, this argument is established. As the verse in the Lankavatara Sutra says: 'Not different, without substance, like a bundle of reeds and separate places; whether one or different, ordinary people falsely discriminate.' Explanation: For example, the rupa-ayatana (sense-sphere of form), etc. They want to establish that the cause exists, using this as the cause. This cause is not established and also contradicts the meaning. Furthermore, if you separately think that color exists apart from the cause of color, this is also incorrect. Why? Because there is a fault. As the verse says: 'If color exists apart from the cause of color, then color falls into having no cause.' Explanation: Those who say there is no cause want color to exist without a cause. They should ask: Even if what you say is consistent with reason, then what is the kind of thing you are talking about that has no cause? It should not be like this. As the verse says: 'A thing existing without a cause, there is ultimately no such place.'
釋曰。此義云何。以無譬喻。顯彼體故。若撥無因。有大過失。此執不成。如觀緣品中已破。僧佉言。第一義中。實有地等。色等無異故。如色自體。論者言。汝因不成。喻亦無體。色等無異。及色自體。前已遮故。復有人言。第一義中。有彼地等。何以故。彼果有故。此若無者。彼果不有。如虛空花。今有果色故。地等不無。此執不然。如偈曰。
若離色有因 此因則無果 無果而有因 云何有是義
釋曰。若離色等果。有色因者。即是無果有因。何以故。以其異故。如竹篾等。又彼因者。亦色等聚故。由如此義。因果不成。如汝所說果有故。為因違于義故。此執不成。複次分別此色。若有若無。二俱不然。因無用故。如偈曰。
色若已有者 則不待色因 色若先無者 亦不待色因
釋曰。色若先有。則不須因。何以故。以其有故。如彼瓶衣。色若先無。即是未有。如彼余物。義意如是。複次執無因者。謂因無體。是義不然。如偈曰。
無因而有色 是義則不然
釋曰。於世諦中。色無因者。義亦不爾。複次毗婆沙師言。未來色有者。同前偈答。複次於世諦中因未取果。色則無體。而言有者。是義不然。以是因故。於一切時。執有四大及造色者。與義相違。如偈曰
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
釋曰：此義何解？因為沒有譬喻可以顯示它的本體。如果否定因的存在，就會有很大的過失，這種執著是不能成立的，如同在《觀緣品》中已經破斥的那樣。僧佉派說：在第一義諦中，地等（Dì děng，指地、水、火、風四大元素）是真實存在的，因為色等（Sè děng，指色、聲、香、味、觸五種感官對像）與它們沒有差別，就像色（Sè，物質、顏色）的自體一樣。論者說：你的因不成立，比喻也沒有本體，因為色等沒有差別以及色的自體，這些在前面已經被駁斥過了。又有人說：在第一義諦中，有那些地等存在，為什麼呢？因為它們有果（Guǒ，結果）的緣故。如果它們不存在，那麼它們的結果就不會存在，就像虛空中的花一樣。現在有果色（Guǒ sè，結果的顏色）存在，所以地等不是不存在的。這種執著是不對的，如偈頌所說：
『若離色有因，此因則無果；無果而有因，云何有是義？』
釋曰：如果離開色等果，有色因（Sè yīn，產生顏色的原因）存在，那就是無果有因。為什麼呢？因為它們是不同的，就像竹篾等。而且那個因，也是色等的聚集。由於這樣的道理，因果關係不能成立。如你所說，因為有果的存在，所以作為因，這與義理相違背，這種執著是不能成立的。再次，分別這個色，無論它是有還是無，兩種情況都不對，因為因沒有作用。如偈頌所說：
『色若已有者，則不待色因；色若先無者，亦不待色因。』
釋曰：色如果已經存在，就不需要因。為什麼呢？因為它已經存在了，就像瓶子和衣服。色如果先前沒有，那就是未曾存在，就像其他的物體。道理就是這樣。再次，執著于沒有因的人，認為因沒有本體，這種說法是不對的，如偈頌所說：
『無因而有色，是義則不然。』
釋曰：在世俗諦中，色沒有因，這種說法也是不對的。再次，毗婆沙師說：未來的色是存在的，可以用前面的偈頌來回答。再次，在世俗諦中，因還沒有產生結果，色就沒有本體，卻說它存在，這種說法是不對的。因為這個原因，在一切時候，執著于有四大（Sì dà，地、水、火、風四大元素）以及造色（Zào sè，由四大產生的顏色）的人，與義理是相違背的，如偈頌所說：
【English Translation】 English version:
Explanation: What does this meaning signify? It is because there is no analogy to reveal its essence. If one denies the existence of a cause, there would be a great fault. This adherence cannot be established, as it has already been refuted in the 'Chapter on Examining Conditions'. The Samkhya school says: In the ultimate truth, the earth element and so on (Dì děng, referring to the four great elements: earth, water, fire, and wind) truly exist, because color and so on (Sè děng, referring to the five sense objects: form, sound, smell, taste, and touch) are not different from them, just like the self-nature of color (Sè, matter, color). The debater says: Your cause is not established, and the analogy has no substance either, because the non-difference of color and so on, and the self-nature of color, have already been refuted before. Furthermore, someone says: In the ultimate truth, those earth elements and so on exist. Why? Because they have a result (Guǒ, consequence). If they did not exist, then their result would not exist, like a flower in the sky. Now there is a result-color (Guǒ sè, the color of the result) existing, so the earth elements and so on are not non-existent. This adherence is incorrect, as the verse says:
'If there is a cause apart from color, then this cause has no result; if there is no result but there is a cause, how can this meaning be?'
Explanation: If there is a color-cause (Sè yīn, the cause that produces color) apart from the result of color and so on, then it is a cause without a result. Why? Because they are different, like bamboo strips and so on. Moreover, that cause is also an aggregation of color and so on. Due to this reason, the cause-and-effect relationship cannot be established. As you say, because there is a result, therefore, as a cause, this contradicts the meaning. This adherence cannot be established. Furthermore, distinguishing this color, whether it exists or does not exist, both cases are incorrect, because the cause is useless. As the verse says:
'If color already exists, then it does not depend on a color-cause; if color does not exist beforehand, it also does not depend on a color-cause.'
Explanation: If color already exists, then it does not need a cause. Why? Because it already exists, like a pot and clothes. If color did not exist beforehand, then it is non-existent, like other objects. The meaning is like this. Furthermore, those who adhere to no cause, thinking that the cause has no substance, this statement is incorrect, as the verse says:
'If color exists without a cause, then this meaning is not so.'
Explanation: In conventional truth, the statement that color has no cause is also incorrect. Furthermore, the Vaibhashika master says: Future color exists, which can be answered with the previous verse. Furthermore, in conventional truth, before the cause produces a result, color has no substance, but it is said to exist, this statement is incorrect. Because of this reason, at all times, those who adhere to the existence of the four great elements (Sì dà, the four great elements: earth, water, fire, and wind) and derived color (Zào sè, color derived from the four elements) contradict the meaning, as the verse says:
。
是故於色境 不應生分別
釋曰。云何分別。謂有實色。或因不異。及果不異地等色因如是色等形相差別。於此境界。不應分別。以不免前所說過故。欲得真實無分別智。聰慧眼者應善諦觀。如夢所見覺則不然。彼智亦爾。復有人言。先因功能次第相續後果起時。彼因功力相亦可見。如紫礦汁染白疊子。以熏習故次第相續。至後果時彼色可得。為遮此執。故如偈曰。
若果似因者 此義則不然
釋曰。此驗彼非果因。語義如是。何以故。第一義中。不欲令彼青等色經為青等疊因以相似故。如余青疊等。僧佉人言。汝說彼余青疊因亦無者不然。何以故。汝立譬喻以無體故。論者言。汝不善說。彼疊起時。此因非分。以不成彼疊故。如是譬喻得成。複次自部人言。有相似因果。不相似因果。彼前後剎那。世雖有異。於物類中。如風燈焰。剎那起滅。此名相似因果。如燒木成灰。變乳為酪等。此名不相似因果。論者言。彼相似因果。如先已遮。不相似者。此如今破。偈曰。
若果不似因 義亦不應爾
釋曰。第一義中。驗此穀子。不為芽因。何以故。不相似故。譬如碎瓦。或謂稻穀。是彼芽因。以谷有體。彼芽得有。可指示故。如大鼓聲。及麥芽等。論者言。汝不善說。諸有起者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
因此，對於色境（rūpa-dhātu，指物質存在的領域），不應該產生分別。
解釋：什麼是分別？就是認為色是真實的，或者認為原因是和結果沒有差異的，以及地等色因（指構成物質的基本元素）和色等形相的差別。對於這些境界，不應該產生分別。因為無法避免前面所說過的錯誤。想要獲得真實的無分別智（nirvikalpa-jñāna，指超越概念和區分的智慧），聰慧的人應該仔細觀察，就像夢中所見，醒來后就不是那樣了。那種智慧也是如此。又有人說，先前的因的功能次第相續，然後產生結果時，那個因的功力相也可以看見，就像用紫礦汁染白布，因為熏習的緣故，次第相續，到產生結果時，那個顏色可以得到。爲了遮止這種執著，所以有偈頌說：
『如果結果和原因相似，這個道理就不成立。』
解釋：這個比喻說明結果不是原因。語義是這樣的。為什麼呢？在第一義（paramārtha，指究竟的真理）中，不希望青等色（指各種顏色）經過後成為青等布的原因，因為它們相似，就像其餘的青布等。僧佉（Sāṃkhya，印度古代哲學流派）的人說，你說其餘的青布也沒有原因是錯誤的。為什麼呢？你所立的比喻因為沒有實體。論者說，你說的不好。那個布產生時，這個因不是一部分，因為它沒有構成那個布。這樣的比喻才能成立。再次，自部人說，有相似的因果，也有不相似的因果。那個前後的剎那（kṣaṇa，指極短的時間單位），世間雖然有差異，在物類中，就像風燈的火焰，剎那生滅，這叫做相似的因果。就像燒木頭成灰，變牛奶為酪等，這叫做不相似的因果。論者說，那種相似的因果，就像先前已經遮破的。不相似的，現在就來破斥。偈頌說：
『如果結果和原因不相似，這個道理也不應該成立。』
解釋：在第一義中，驗證這個穀子，不是芽的原因。為什麼呢？因為不相似。譬如碎瓦。或者說稻穀，是那個芽的原因，因為谷有實體，那個芽才能有，可以指示的緣故，就像大鼓的聲音，以及麥芽等。論者說，你說的不好。凡是有生起的，
【English Translation】 English version:
Therefore, with regard to the realm of form (rūpa-dhātu), one should not generate discriminations.
Explanation: What are discriminations? They are the notions that form is real, or that the cause and effect are not different, as well as the differences in the causes of form, such as the elements of earth, and the various appearances of form. With regard to these realms, one should not generate discriminations, because one cannot avoid the errors mentioned earlier. If one wishes to attain true non-discriminating wisdom (nirvikalpa-jñāna), a wise person should carefully observe, just as what is seen in a dream is not the same upon awakening. That wisdom is also like that. Furthermore, some say that the functions of the prior causes continue in sequence, and when the result arises, the power of that cause can also be seen, just as white cloth is dyed with purple mineral juice, and because of the impregnation, it continues in sequence, so that when the result arises, that color can be obtained. In order to refute this attachment, there is the verse:
'If the result is similar to the cause, then this reasoning is not valid.'
Explanation: This analogy illustrates that the result is not the cause. The meaning is like this. Why? In the ultimate truth (paramārtha), it is not desirable for colors such as blue to become the cause of cloth such as blue cloth, because they are similar, like other blue cloths. The Sāṃkhya (an ancient Indian philosophical school) person says, 'It is wrong for you to say that the other blue cloth also has no cause. Why? The analogy you have established has no substance.' The debater says, 'You do not speak well. When that cloth arises, this cause is not a part of it, because it does not constitute that cloth. Such an analogy can be established.' Furthermore, a member of our own school says that there are similar causes and effects, and there are dissimilar causes and effects. Although there are differences in the successive moments, in the category of things, like the flame of a wind lamp, arising and ceasing in an instant, this is called similar cause and effect. Like burning wood into ashes, or transforming milk into cheese, this is called dissimilar cause and effect. The debater says, 'That similar cause and effect is like what was refuted earlier. As for the dissimilar, we will now refute it.' The verse says:
'If the result is not similar to the cause, then this reasoning should also not be valid.'
Explanation: In the ultimate truth, verify that this grain seed is not the cause of the sprout. Why? Because they are not similar. For example, broken tiles. Or it is said that rice grain is the cause of that sprout, because the grain has substance, and that sprout can exist, and can be pointed out, like the sound of a large drum, and wheat sprouts, etc. The debater says, 'You do not speak well. All that arises,'
。一切遮故。以譬喻無體能成不足。有此過故。若謂彼眼等根生識等果。此不相似。非一向故者。是亦不然。何以故。如破諸法。彼眼識等亦如是遮。更無異門故。非非一向過。如前所說有實地等彼果有故者。二皆不成。以違義故。複次毗婆沙者言。所作因有故。謂有為法起時。一切相似不相似法。為彼因故。譬喻無體。論者言。汝不善說。有簡別故。彼自分生不共等所作因能起者已遮故。品初已來此諸文句已遮四大及彼因色。令他解知色陰無體。余受陰等者。如偈曰。
受陰及心陰 想行一切種 如是等諸法 皆同色陰遮
釋曰。如遮色陰。受等亦爾。已說第一義中色非實有。自因不取故。彼覺無體故。如軍眾等。如是第一義中受心想觸。及作意等皆非實有。自因不取故。彼亦不取。如軍眾等。一切亦應如此類知。複次受等諸因所謂觸也及色明虛空作意等如其所應。當如是遮。複次如色等諸因不別。已令他解如是第一義中受等諸因亦無別異。自和合支不可取故。彼不應取如自因自體此亦與過應如先說。若外人與過者。應如先避。複次如是等諸法者。謂彼陰外有為諸法所有分別如瓶衣等。實有故異故者。如其所應同彼色遮如色等陰攝故為因者。此因不成。譬亦無體。陰義壞故。彼陰攝者。世諦中攝非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：一切都被遮止了。如果用譬喻來說明沒有實體就不能成立，這是不充分的。因為存在這個過失。如果說眼等根產生識等果，這並不相似，因為不是一概而論。這也是不對的。為什麼呢？就像破斥諸法一樣，眼識等也同樣被遮止，沒有其他的不同之處。所以不存在非一概而論的過失。就像之前所說的，有實地等，所以有那些果，這兩種說法都不成立，因為違背了意義。此外，毗婆沙者說，因為存在所作之因，也就是說，有為法生起時，一切相似和不相似的法，都是它的因。譬喻沒有實體。論者說，你說的不好，因為有簡別。那些由自身所生、不共等的所作之因能夠生起的，已經被遮止了。從本品開始，這些文句已經遮止了四大以及它們的因——色，讓其他人理解色陰沒有實體。至於其餘的受陰等，就像偈頌所說： 受陰及心陰，想行一切種，如是等諸法，皆同色陰遮。 解釋說，就像遮止色陰一樣，受等也是如此。已經說了在第一義中，色不是真實存在的，因為不取自身的因。因為那個覺沒有實體，就像軍隊等。像這樣，在第一義中，受、心、想、觸以及作意等都不是真實存在的，因為不取自身的因。它們也不應該被取，就像軍隊等。一切都應該如此類推得知。此外，受等諸陰的因，也就是觸，以及色、明、虛空、作意等，應該如其所應地被遮止。此外，就像色等諸因沒有差別一樣，已經讓其他人理解在第一義中，受等諸因也沒有差別，因為自身和合的支分不可取。它們不應該被取，就像自身的因和自體一樣，這也會有過失，應該像先前所說的那樣。如果外人給予過失，應該像先前那樣避免。此外，像這些法，也就是陰之外的有為諸法的所有分別，比如瓶子、衣服等，因為是真實存在的，所以是不同的，應該如其所應地像遮止色一樣遮止它們。如果以色等陰所攝為因，這個因不成立，譬喻也沒有實體，陰的意義被破壞了。那些陰所攝的，是在世俗諦中攝取的，不是...
【English Translation】 English version: Everything is negated. If using a metaphor to say that without substance it cannot be established, this is insufficient because this fault exists. If it is said that the eye and other roots produce consciousness and other results, this is not similar because it is not always the case. This is also not right. Why? Just like refuting all dharmas, eye-consciousness and the like are also negated in the same way, with no other difference. Therefore, there is no fault of not being always the case. As previously stated, there are real grounds and the like, so there are those results. Both of these statements are not established because they contradict the meaning. Furthermore, the Vibhasha masters say that because there is a causal factor of action, that is, when conditioned dharmas arise, all similar and dissimilar dharmas are their cause. The metaphor has no substance. The debater says, 'You do not speak well, because there is differentiation. Those that can be caused by the causal factor of action, such as those born from oneself and the non-common, have already been negated.' From the beginning of this chapter, these sentences have negated the four great elements (Mahabhuta) and their cause—rupa (form), letting others understand that the rupa-skandha (form aggregate) has no substance. As for the remaining vedana-skandha (feeling aggregate) and the like, it is as the verse says: 'Vedana (feeling) and citta (mind) aggregates, samjna (perception) and samskara (volition) of all kinds, such dharmas are all negated like the rupa-skandha (form aggregate).' The explanation says that just as the rupa-skandha (form aggregate) is negated, so are vedana (feeling) and the like. It has already been said that in the ultimate sense, rupa (form) is not truly existent because it does not take its own cause. Because that awareness has no substance, like an army and the like. In this way, in the ultimate sense, vedana (feeling), citta (mind), samjna (perception), sparsa (contact), and manaskara (attention) are not truly existent because they do not take their own cause. They should also not be taken, like an army and the like. Everything should be understood by analogy. Furthermore, the causes of the vedana (feeling) and other aggregates, namely sparsa (contact), as well as rupa (form), light, space, manaskara (attention), etc., should be negated as appropriate. Furthermore, just as the causes of rupa (form) and the like have no difference, it has already been made clear to others that in the ultimate sense, the causes of vedana (feeling) and the like also have no difference because the self-aggregating parts cannot be taken. They should not be taken, just like one's own cause and self. This will also have faults, which should be avoided as previously stated. If outsiders give faults, they should be avoided as before. Furthermore, like these dharmas, that is, all distinctions of conditioned dharmas outside the aggregates, such as bottles, clothes, etc., because they are truly existent, they are different and should be negated as appropriate, just like negating rupa (form). If taking being included in the rupa (form) and other aggregates as a cause, this cause is not established, the metaphor has no substance, and the meaning of the aggregates is destroyed. Those included in the aggregates are taken in the conventional truth (Samvriti-satya), not...
第一義。以違因義故。此諸道理應如是知。或復有人妄想分別第一義中隨何等物自體不空及起滅等。此諸諍論義皆不然。何以故。如實諦觀彼相空故。以第一義中諸入不起體非實有如是觀察令人識知。若執不空與空作過者。此亦不然。何以故。同前遮故。一切不能與空作過。如偈曰。
若觀一物體 則見一切體 如是一物空 一切皆空故
釋曰。自前文句遮諸入起。以陰無自性。曉示行人。品義如此。是故得成。如佛告極勇猛菩薩言。善男子。色無起滅故。受想行識亦無起滅。若彼五陰無起無滅。此是般若波羅蜜。善男子。色離色自性。如是受想行識離識自性。若色至識諸性離者。此是般若波羅蜜。善男子。色無自性故。受想行識亦無自性。若色至識無自性者。是為般若波羅蜜。又如勝思惟梵天所問經偈曰。
我為世間說諸陰 彼陰為彼世間依 能于彼陰不作依 世間諸法得解脫 世間如彼虛空相 彼虛空相亦自無 由如是解無所依 世間八法不能染
又如金剛般若經中說。須菩提。菩薩不住色佈施。不住聲香味觸法而行佈施。又如楞伽經偈曰。
三有假施設 物無自體故 但于假設中 妄想作分別 以覺分別時 自體不可得 以無自體故 彼言說亦無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 第一義（Paramārtha，究竟真實）。以違背因果的意義而言。這些道理應該這樣理解。或者，如果有人錯誤地想像和分別第一義中任何事物的自性不是空性，以及生起和滅亡等等。所有這些爭論的意義都是不正確的。為什麼呢？因為如實地觀察，那些相狀是空性的。在第一義中，諸入（āyatana，感覺器官和感覺對像）不起作用，其體性不是真實存在的，這樣的觀察能使人認識和了解。如果有人執著于非空性，並認為它能對空性造成損害，這也是不正確的。為什麼呢？因為與前面的遮止相同。一切都不能對空性造成損害。正如偈頌所說： 『如果觀察一個物體，就能看到一切物體；同樣，如果一個事物是空性的，一切事物都是空性的。』 解釋：前面的文句遮止了諸入的生起，因為五陰（skandha，構成個體經驗的五種要素）沒有自性，以此來曉示修行者。這一品的意義就是這樣，所以能夠成就。正如佛陀告訴極勇猛菩薩（Ugraparipṛcchā Bodhisattva）說：『善男子，色（rūpa，物質形態）沒有生起和滅亡，受（vedanā，感受）、想（saṃjñā，知覺）、行（saṃskāra，意志）、識（vijñāna，意識）也沒有生起和滅亡。如果這五陰沒有生起和滅亡，這就是般若波羅蜜（Prajñāpāramitā，智慧的完成）。善男子，色離開了色的自性，同樣，受、想、行、識離開了識的自性。如果色到識的諸種自性都離開了，這就是般若波羅蜜。善男子，色沒有自性，同樣，受、想、行、識也沒有自性。如果色到識沒有自性，這就是般若波羅蜜。』又如《勝思惟梵天所問經》（Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra）中的偈頌所說： 『我為世間宣說諸陰，這些陰是世間的所依；如果能對這些陰不作依賴，世間諸法就能得到解脫。世間如虛空的相狀，虛空的相狀也是沒有自性的；由於這樣理解而無所依賴，世間的八法（世間的八種境界，即利、衰、毀、譽、稱、譏、苦、樂）不能染污。』 又如《金剛般若經》（Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra）中說：『須菩提（Subhūti），菩薩不住於色佈施，不住于聲、香、味、觸、法而行佈施。』又如《楞伽經》（Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra）的偈頌所說： 『三有（tribhava，欲界、色界、無色界）是虛假的施設，事物沒有自體（svabhāva，自性）的緣故；只是在假設中，妄想地作出分別。當覺知分別時，自體是不可得的；因為沒有自體，所以言說也是沒有的。』
【English Translation】 English version: The highest meaning (Paramārtha, ultimate truth). In the sense of contradicting causality. These principles should be understood in this way. Or, if someone falsely imagines and distinguishes that in the highest meaning, the self-nature of anything is not empty, and that there is arising and ceasing, etc. All these arguments are incorrect. Why? Because when truly observed, those characteristics are empty. In the highest meaning, the sense bases (āyatana, sense organs and sense objects) do not arise, and their essence is not truly existent; such observation enables one to know and understand. If someone clings to non-emptiness and thinks it can harm emptiness, this is also incorrect. Why? Because it is the same as the previous negation. Nothing can harm emptiness. As the verse says: 『If one observes one object, one sees all objects; similarly, if one thing is empty, all things are empty.』 Explanation: The preceding sentences negate the arising of the sense bases, because the five aggregates (skandha, the five components of individual experience) have no self-nature, thereby enlightening practitioners. The meaning of this chapter is thus, so it can be accomplished. Just as the Buddha told the Bodhisattva Ugraparipṛcchā (Extremely Courageous Bodhisattva): 『Good man, form (rūpa, material form) has no arising and ceasing, and feeling (vedanā, sensation), perception (saṃjñā, perception), volition (saṃskāra, volition), and consciousness (vijñāna, consciousness) also have no arising and ceasing. If these five aggregates have no arising and ceasing, this is Prajñāpāramitā (Perfection of Wisdom). Good man, form is apart from the self-nature of form, similarly, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness are apart from the self-nature of consciousness. If the natures from form to consciousness are all apart, this is Prajñāpāramitā. Good man, form has no self-nature, similarly, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness also have no self-nature. If from form to consciousness there is no self-nature, this is Prajñāpāramitā.』 Furthermore, as the verse in the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra (Sūtra Spoken by Vimalakīrti) says: 『I speak of the aggregates for the world, these aggregates are the reliance of the world; if one can not rely on these aggregates, the dharmas of the world can be liberated. The world is like the aspect of space, and the aspect of space also has no self-nature; because of understanding thus and having no reliance, the eight worldly conditions (the eight worldly conditions, namely gain, loss, defamation, fame, praise, ridicule, suffering, and happiness) cannot defile.』 Furthermore, as it is said in the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra (Diamond Sutra): 『Subhūti, a Bodhisattva should not give with attachment to form, nor should he give with attachment to sound, smell, taste, touch, or dharma.』 Furthermore, as the verse in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (Descent into Lanka Sutra) says: 『The three realms (tribhava, desire realm, form realm, formless realm) are falsely established, because things have no self-nature (svabhāva, own-being); only in assumptions, do deluded thoughts make distinctions. When awareness distinguishes, self-nature is unattainable; because there is no self-nature, speech is also nonexistent.』
如是等諸修多羅。此中應廣說。
釋觀五陰品竟。
般若燈論釋觀六界品第五
複次諸法無體。由空所對治故。今復欲明地等諸界無自性義。有此品起。此義云何。觀陰中說。若離於色則無色因。此中自部復引佛語為證。如經言。佛告大王。界有六種。地水火風及空識等彼各有相。謂堅濕暖動容受了別。此六種界說名丈夫。如無空花施設為有取名丈夫者。此義不然。是故論者先所立義地等色因體非有者。彼所立義則為破壞。亦與阿含相違故。論者言。為世諦故。如來說此地等六界以為丈夫。非第一義。複次毗婆沙師言。第一義中有地等界。何以故。彼相有故。此地等界若實無者。如來不應說有彼相。如虛空花。今有堅等為地等相。以相有故。地等非無。論者言。虛空無自體少功用生他解彼無物故。解空界已。自余諸界即易可遮。如偈曰。
先虛空無有 毫末虛空相
釋曰。虛空與彼無障礙相此二無別偈意如是。複次毗婆沙師言。我立此義。無障礙者。是虛空相。彼相有故。論者言。此無障礙立為有者。他不能解。此義云何。如無常聲是其立義。以無常故將為出因。如是有此虛空。以虛空有故。此則唯有立義。無因及喻義則不成。若汝意謂無障礙相為虛空者。於世諦中隨人悉解
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 如是等等的這些修多羅（Sutra，經），應當在此中廣泛解說。
《般若燈論釋·觀五陰品》結束。
《般若燈論釋·觀六界品》第五
進一步說，諸法沒有實體，因為空效能對治它們。現在進一步闡明地等諸界沒有自性的意義，因此有了此品的設立。這個意義是什麼呢？在觀陰中說，如果離開了色，就沒有色的因。這裡，論者的自部又引用佛語作為證據。如經中所說：佛告訴大王，界有六種，即地、水、火、風以及空、識等，它們各有各的相，即堅、濕、暖、動、容受、了別。這六種界被稱為丈夫（Purusha，補特伽羅，人）。如同虛空花（空中的花朵）被假設為存在，並取名為丈夫一樣，這種說法是不對的。因此，論者先前所立的義——地等色因的體性不是真實存在的——他所立的義就被破壞了，也與阿含（Agama，聖典）相違背。論者說：爲了世俗諦（Samvriti-satya，相對真理）的緣故，如來說此地等六界是丈夫，並非第一義諦（Paramartha-satya，勝義諦，絕對真理）。進一步說，毗婆沙師（Vaibhashika，分別說者，論師）說：在第一義諦中存在地等界。為什麼呢？因為它們的相存在。如果這地等界實際上不存在，如來不應該說它們有這些相，如同虛空花一樣。現在有堅等作為地等的相，因為相存在，所以地等不是不存在的。論者說：虛空沒有自體，少有功用，產生他人的理解，因為它沒有實物。理解了空界之後，其餘諸界就容易遮破了。如偈頌所說：
先說虛空沒有，絲毫虛空的相。
解釋：虛空與彼無障礙相，這兩者沒有區別，偈頌的意思是這樣。進一步說，毗婆沙師說：我立此義，無障礙就是虛空的相，因為這個相存在。論者說：將此無障礙立為存在，他人不能理解。這個意義是什麼呢？如同無常的聲音是其所立的義，因為無常，所以將它作為提出的原因。如同有此虛空，因為虛空存在，這則只有所立的義，沒有因和比喻，義則不能成立。如果你的意思是無障礙相就是虛空，那麼在世俗諦中，人們都理解。
【English Translation】 English version Thus are these Sutras (Sutra), which should be extensively explained herein.
The chapter on Contemplating the Five Skandhas in the Prajna-pradipa (Wisdom Lamp) is completed.
Prajna-pradipa: Chapter Five, Contemplating the Six Dhatus (Elements)
Furthermore, all dharmas (phenomena) are without substance because they are counteracted by emptiness. Now, intending to further clarify the meaning that the elements such as earth are without self-nature, this chapter is established. What is this meaning? It is said in the contemplation of the skandhas (aggregates) that if one is separated from form (rupa), there is no cause of form. Here, the proponent's own school again cites the Buddha's words as evidence. As it is said in the Sutra: The Buddha told the Great King that there are six kinds of elements (dhatu), namely earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness, each having its own characteristic, namely solidity, moisture, heat, motion, receptivity, and discernment. These six elements are called a 'Purusha' (person). Just as a 'flower in the sky' (an imaginary flower) is hypothetically considered to exist and is named a 'Purusha,' this is not correct. Therefore, the proponent's previously established thesis—that the nature of the causes of elements such as earth is not real—is undermined, and it also contradicts the Agamas (scriptures). The proponent says: For the sake of conventional truth (Samvriti-satya), the Tathagata (Buddha) speaks of these six elements, such as earth, as a 'Purusha,' not in the ultimate sense (Paramartha-satya). Furthermore, the Vaibhashikas (a school of Buddhism) say: In the ultimate sense, there exist elements such as earth. Why? Because their characteristics exist. If these elements such as earth did not actually exist, the Tathagata should not have said that they have these characteristics, like a 'flower in the sky.' Now there are characteristics such as solidity as the characteristics of earth, and because the characteristics exist, the elements such as earth are not non-existent. The proponent says: Space has no self-nature, has little function, and generates understanding in others because it has no real object. Once the element of space is understood, the remaining elements are easily refuted. As the verse says:
First, space does not exist, not even the slightest characteristic of space.
Explanation: Space and its characteristic of non-obstruction are not different; the meaning of the verse is like this. Furthermore, the Vaibhashika says: I establish this meaning: non-obstruction is the characteristic of space, because this characteristic exists. The proponent says: To establish this non-obstruction as existent, others cannot understand. What is this meaning? Just as impermanent sound is the established thesis, and because it is impermanent, it is taken as the reason for the proposition. Similarly, if there is this space, because space exists, there is only the established thesis, without a reason or example, and the meaning cannot be established. If you mean that the characteristic of non-obstruction is space, then in conventional truth, everyone understands.
不須說彼令他解因者。以于第一義中此不成故。決須說彼令他解因。彼若說者。則有因及譬喻過失。以唯有立義故。複次毗婆沙師言。實有虛空。是無為法。為答彼故。如偈曰。
此中驗虛空 無毫釐實體
釋曰。第一義中虛空無實。何以故。以無生故。譬如兔角。如是因無體故。無果故。無有故等諸因。應如是廣說。複次鞞世師言。所相能相二法異故。論者言。若爾彼等則有先後。如瓶衣等。為答彼故。如偈曰。
若先有虛空 空則是無相
釋曰。虛空無相。偈意如是。此中說驗。虛空非彼相之所相。何以故。先已有故。如隨一物。複次無障礙者。非虛空相。何以故。以彼異故。如隨一物。複次若謂所相能相無相者。是亦不然。何以故。異分別者。我亦舍故。複次若汝言世諦說因非因不成者違義過失汝不能避。是故別不別相二皆不成故。知虛空定是無相。若言無相有體者。人不能知。為是故如偈曰。
無處有一物 無相而有體
釋曰。第一義中若自分若他分此體成者。義則不然。或有人言。所相虛空如是有體。于彼有能相轉者。此亦不然。如偈曰。
無相體既無 相於何處轉
釋曰。所依無體故。能依亦無體。義不成故。復是因過。複次所相能相若不異者。豈以
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：不須要說那個使他人理解原因的人，因為在第一義（paramārtha，究竟真實）中，這（種說法）是不成立的。必須說那個使他人理解原因的人。如果那個人說了，那麼就會有因和譬喻的過失，因為只有立義（自己的主張）。 再次，毗婆沙師（Vaibhāṣika，有部宗論師）說，虛空（ākāśa，沒有阻礙的空間）確實存在，是無為法（asaṃskṛta-dharma，不依賴條件產生的法）。爲了回答他們，就像偈頌所說： 『這裡驗證虛空，沒有絲毫實體。』 解釋說，在第一義中，虛空沒有實體。為什麼呢？因為它沒有生起。譬如兔角。像這樣，因為因沒有自體，沒有果，沒有有等等諸因，應該像這樣廣泛地說。再次，鞞世師（Vaiśeṣika，勝論師）說，所相（lakṣya，被標示者）和能相（lakṣaṇa，標示者）是兩種不同的法。論者說，如果這樣，那麼它們就會有先後，如瓶子和衣服等。爲了回答他們，就像偈頌所說： 『如果先有虛空，空則是無相。』 解釋說，虛空沒有相。偈頌的意思是這樣。這裡說驗證，虛空不是那個相所標示的。為什麼呢？因為它先已存在。如隨一物。再次，沒有障礙者，不是虛空的相。為什麼呢？因為它不同。如隨一物。再次，如果說所相、能相沒有相，這也是不對的。為什麼呢？因為對於不同的分別者，我也捨棄。再次，如果你們說世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）說因非因不成，違背意義的過失你們不能避免。因此，別相和不別相兩種都不成立，所以知道虛空一定是無相的。如果說無相有體，人不能知道。因此，就像偈頌所說： 『沒有一處有一物，無相而有體。』 解釋說，在第一義中，無論是自分還是他分，這個體成立，這個意義是不對的。或者有人說，所相虛空像這樣有體，對於它有能相轉，這也是不對的。如偈頌所說： 『無相體既然沒有，相在何處轉？』 解釋說，所依沒有體，所以能依也沒有體。意義不成立，這是因的過失。再次，所相能相如果不異，難道以...
【English Translation】 English version: It is not necessary to speak of that which causes others to understand the cause, because this is not established in the ultimate meaning (paramārtha). It is necessary to speak of that which causes others to understand the cause. If that person speaks, then there will be the faults of cause and example, because there is only the establishment of one's own thesis. Furthermore, the Vaibhāṣikas (Vaibhāṣika, a school of Buddhist philosophy) say that space (ākāśa, unobstructed space) truly exists and is an unconditioned dharma (asaṃskṛta-dharma, a dharma not produced by conditions). To answer them, as the verse says: 'Here, it is verified that space has no substantial entity, not even a hair's breadth.' The explanation is that in the ultimate meaning, space has no reality. Why? Because it has no arising. Like a rabbit's horn. Thus, because the cause has no self-nature, no result, no existence, etc., these causes should be extensively explained in this way. Furthermore, the Vaiśeṣikas (Vaiśeṣika, a school of Indian philosophy) say that the characterized (lakṣya, the object being characterized) and the characterizer (lakṣaṇa, the characteristic) are two different dharmas. The debater says, 'If so, then they would have a sequence, like a pot and clothes, etc.' To answer them, as the verse says: 'If space exists first, then space is without characteristic.' The explanation is that space has no characteristic. The meaning of the verse is like this. Here it says to verify, space is not characterized by that characteristic. Why? Because it already exists first. Like any one thing. Furthermore, that which is without obstruction is not a characteristic of space. Why? Because it is different. Like any one thing. Furthermore, if you say that the characterized and the characterizer have no characteristic, that is also not right. Why? Because for different differentiators, I also abandon it. Furthermore, if you say that in conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya, relative truth), saying cause and non-cause is not established, you cannot avoid the fault of contradicting the meaning. Therefore, both different and non-different characteristics are not established, so know that space is definitely without characteristic. If you say that without characteristic there is substance, people cannot know it. Therefore, as the verse says: 'There is no place where there is a thing, without characteristic and with substance.' The explanation is that in the ultimate meaning, whether it is its own part or another's part, if this substance is established, the meaning is not right. Or someone says that the characterized space has substance like this, and for it there is a characterizer turning, this is also not right. As the verse says: 'Since the substance without characteristic does not exist, where does the characteristic turn?' The explanation is that because the basis does not have substance, the dependent also does not have substance. The meaning is not established, this is a fault of the cause. Furthermore, if the characterized and the characterizer are not different, how can...
所相還相所相彼異相無體故。以是義故。無異門中虛空無相。若異門說相者。彼亦非相。所相異故。譬如隨一物等。如是相既無體。空亦無相故。偈言無有無相體者。謂虛空也。相於何處轉者。以不于彼轉故。此義應知。複次偈曰。
無相相不轉 有相相不轉
釋曰。如汝所說。能相所相義皆不然。何以故。無彼物體而有相者。此則不成。有體亦爾。偈曰。
離有相無相 異處亦不轉
釋曰。第一義中有一物體相於中轉。此皆不然。何以故。以譬喻無體。外人所欲義不成故。複次如虛空花等。以無相故。彼相亦爾。以無體故。不可說轉世間悉解。是故偈言有相相不轉。以第一義中如實驗。彼無障礙者。非虛空相。何以故。以相故如堅等相。複次有人言。有相無相物相於中轉。此無過咎。為遮彼故。如偈言離有相無相。異處亦不轉。此二俱不然。彼定觀者然可然品后當廣遮先令他解二分過者。今還屬汝此不相應。以有二過故。複次有人言。第一義中虛空是有。以彼相故。此若無者。不說彼相。如虛空花。如經言。佛告大王。此六種界名為丈夫。是故彼有及為相故。論者言。所相不成。我先已破。如偈曰。
所相不成故 能相亦不成
釋曰。能相亦墮所相中故。相亦不成。譬喻無體
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『所相』（被相的事物）還相於『所相』，是因為『彼異相』（那不同的相）沒有自體的緣故。因此，從『無異門』（沒有差別的角度）來說，虛空沒有相。如果從『異門』（有差別的角度）來說相，那也不是真正的相，因為『所相』不同。譬如，就像隨順一個物體等等。這樣，既然相沒有自體，虛空也就沒有相。所以偈頌說『無有無相體者』，指的就是虛空。 相在何處運轉呢？因為它不在任何地方運轉，所以應該明白這個道理。進一步，偈頌說： 『無相相不轉，有相相不轉。』 解釋：如你所說，能相和所相的意義都不成立。為什麼呢？因為沒有那個物體卻有相，這是不可能的。有物體也是一樣。偈頌說： 『離有相無相，異處亦不轉。』 解釋：在第一義諦中，有一個物體的相在其中運轉，這完全不成立。為什麼呢？因為譬如沒有自體，外道所希望的意義不能成立。進一步，就像虛空中的花等等，因為沒有相，所以那個相也是一樣。因為它沒有自體，所以不可說運轉，世間都明白這個道理。所以偈頌說『有相相不轉』。在第一義諦中，如實驗一樣，它沒有障礙，不是虛空的相。為什麼呢？因為有相，就像堅硬等等的相。 進一步，有人說，有相和無相的物體的相在其中運轉，這沒有過失。爲了遮止這種說法，就像偈頌所說『離有相無相，異處亦不轉』。這兩種說法都不成立。那些修習禪定的人，在『然可然品』（可以被燃燒的品）之後會廣泛地遮止，先讓他人理解二分的過失。現在還歸於你，這不相應，因為有兩個過失的緣故。 進一步，有人說，在第一義諦中，虛空是存在的，因為它有相。如果虛空不存在，就不會說它的相，就像虛空中的花。就像經文所說：『佛告訴大王，這六種界名為丈夫。』因此，它存在並且有相。論者說，『所相』不成立，我先前已經破斥過了。就像偈頌所說： 『所相不成故，能相亦不成。』 解釋：『能相』（能取相的事物）也落在『所相』之中，所以相也不成立。譬如沒有自體。
【English Translation】 English version The 『lakṣaṇa』 (所相, object characterized) still characterizes the 『lakṣaṇa』, because the 『bhinnākāra』 (彼異相, different characteristic) has no own-being. Therefore, from the perspective of 『anānātva』 (無異門, non-difference), space has no characteristic. If one speaks of characteristics from the perspective of 『nānātva』 (異門, difference), that is also not a true characteristic, because the 『lakṣaṇīya』 (所相, object to be characterized) is different. For example, like following a single object, and so on. Thus, since the characteristic has no own-being, space also has no characteristic. Therefore, the verse says, 『There is no entity without a characteristic,』 referring to space. Where does the characteristic operate? Because it does not operate anywhere, this principle should be understood. Furthermore, the verse says: 『The characteristic of the uncharacterized does not operate; the characteristic of the characterized does not operate.』 Explanation: As you say, the meanings of the characterizer and the characterized are both untenable. Why? Because it is impossible for there to be a characteristic without that object. It is the same with an object. The verse says: 『Apart from the characterized and the uncharacterized, it does not operate in a different place either.』 Explanation: In the ultimate truth, it is completely untenable that there is a characteristic of an object operating within it. Why? Because, for example, without own-being, the meaning desired by the outsiders cannot be established. Furthermore, like flowers in space, and so on, because there is no characteristic, that characteristic is also the same. Because it has no own-being, it cannot be said to operate; the world understands this principle. Therefore, the verse says, 『The characteristic of the characterized does not operate.』 In the ultimate truth, as in experience, it has no obstruction; it is not a characteristic of space. Why? Because it has a characteristic, like the characteristic of hardness, and so on. Furthermore, someone says that the characteristic of objects with and without characteristics operates within them; this has no fault. To refute this statement, as the verse says, 『Apart from the characterized and the uncharacterized, it does not operate in a different place either.』 Both of these statements are untenable. Those who practice meditation will extensively refute this after the 『consumable』 (然可然品) section, first letting others understand the fault of duality. Now it is returned to you; this is not appropriate, because there are two faults. Furthermore, someone says that in the ultimate truth, space exists, because it has a characteristic. If space did not exist, its characteristic would not be spoken of, like flowers in space. As the sutra says, 『The Buddha told the Great King, these six elements are called a man.』 Therefore, it exists and has a characteristic. The debater says, 『The characterized』 is not established; I have already refuted it previously. As the verse says: 『Because the characterized is not established, the characterizer is also not established.』 Explanation: The 『characterizer』 (能相, that which characterizes) also falls within the 『characterized』, so the characteristic is also not established. For example, without own-being.
。為是義故。以慧諦觀所相能相二皆不立。如偈曰。
是故無所相 亦無有能相
釋曰。彼令他解。無體可驗故。以是驗知。彼實無體。此義得成。複次毗婆沙師言。如我立義。虛空有體。何以故。彼為境界欲染斷故。譬如色。又三摩缽提所緣故。譬如識。亦無為故。譬如涅槃。論者言。汝若欲令第一義中有此虛空者。為是所相。為是能相。二皆不然。如先已說。令人得解。是故偈曰。
離所相能相 是體亦不有
釋曰。自部義如是。余涅槃等隨一物體能成。譬喻皆不成故。複次別部人言。虛空是有。領受自體故。亦有為故。此義及因二皆不成。如前驗過。應如是說。複次經部人言。如我立義。實礙無處說為虛空。虛空無體。唯是假名。我義如此。論者言。如毗婆沙師所說。三摩缽提所緣故。彼為境界欲染斷故。立空有體。欲令人解。今經部執言。實礙無處說為虛空。唯是假名。遮前有體。如是計者。令我譬喻轉更明顯。今說此義。如偈曰。
離色因有色 是義則不然 色本無體故 無體云何成
釋曰。如先觀陰品說。第一義中有礙名色者。無此道理。如經部分別虛空無體驗令解者。此義不成。有人言。虛空有體。不令人解。無譬喻者。我今立義。令人易解。應如是說。色
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，爲了這個意義，用智慧仔細觀察，所相（所觀察的對象）和能相（能觀察的主體）二者都不能成立。如偈頌所說： 『是故無所相，亦無有能相。』 解釋：他們爲了使他人理解，認為虛空沒有實體可以驗證，因此可以驗證得知，虛空實際上沒有實體，這個意義才能成立。再次，毗婆沙師（Vaibhashika，佛教部派之一）說：『正如我所立的義理，虛空是有實體的。』為什麼呢？因為虛空是境界，可以斷除對慾望的染著，譬如色（rupa，物質）。又因為虛空是三摩缽提（samapatti，等至，禪定的一種境界）所緣的對象，譬如識（vijnana，意識）。也因為虛空是無為法（asamskrta-dharma，不依賴因緣而存在的法），譬如涅槃（nirvana，解脫）。論者說：『如果你們想讓第一義諦（paramartha-satya，最高的真理）中存在這個虛空，那麼它是所相還是能相呢？』二者都不成立，如先前已經說過的那樣，不能使人理解。所以偈頌說： 『離所相能相，是體亦不有。』 解釋：自部的義理是這樣的。其餘的涅槃等任何一個物體都不能成立，譬喻都不成立。再次，別部的人說：『虛空是存在的，因為它能領受自體，也是有為法。』這個義理和原因二者都不成立，如前面驗證過的那樣，應該這樣說。再次，經部（Sautrantika，佛教部派之一）的人說：『正如我所立的義理，實際阻礙沒有之處才稱為虛空，虛空沒有實體，只是假名安立。』我的義理是這樣的。論者說：『正如毗婆沙師所說，因為虛空是三摩缽提所緣的對象，因為它能斷除對慾望的染著，所以立虛空為有實體，想要使人理解。現在經部卻執著地說，實際阻礙沒有之處才稱為虛空，只是假名安立，以此來遮破先前認為虛空有實體的觀點。』像這樣計較的人，使我的譬喻更加明顯。現在說這個意義，如偈頌所說： 『離色因有色，是義則不然，色本無體故，無體云何成？』 解釋：如先前在觀陰品中所說，第一義諦中有阻礙之物名為色，沒有這個道理。如經部爲了分別虛空沒有實體而使人理解，這個意義不能成立。有人說：『虛空有實體，但不能使人理解，也沒有譬喻。』我現在立義，使人容易理解，應該這樣說：色（rupa，物質）。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, for this reason, with wisdom, carefully observing, both the object of observation (所相, suo xiang) and the subject of observation (能相, neng xiang) cannot be established. As the verse says: 'Therefore, there is no object of observation, nor is there a subject of observation.' Explanation: They, in order to make others understand, believe that emptiness has no substance that can be verified. Therefore, it can be verified that emptiness actually has no substance, and this meaning can be established. Furthermore, the Vaibhashika (毗婆沙師, a school of Buddhism) says: 'Just as I establish the principle, emptiness has substance.' Why? Because emptiness is a realm that can cut off attachment to desires, like form (色, rupa). Also, because emptiness is the object of Samapatti (三摩缽提, a state of meditative absorption), like consciousness (識, vijnana). Also, because emptiness is unconditioned dharma (無為法, asamskrta-dharma), like Nirvana (涅槃, liberation). The commentator says: 'If you want this emptiness to exist in the ultimate truth (第一義諦, paramartha-satya), then is it the object of observation or the subject of observation?' Neither can be established, as has been said before, and it cannot make people understand. Therefore, the verse says: 'Apart from the object of observation and the subject of observation, the substance does not exist either.' Explanation: The meaning of our school is like this. The remaining objects, such as Nirvana, cannot be established, and the metaphors are not established. Furthermore, people from other schools say: 'Emptiness exists because it can receive its own substance and is also conditioned.' Both this meaning and the reason cannot be established, as has been verified before. It should be said like this. Furthermore, people from the Sautrantika (經部, a school of Buddhism) say: 'Just as I establish the principle, the place where there is actually no obstruction is called emptiness. Emptiness has no substance and is only a provisional name.' My meaning is like this. The commentator says: 'Just as the Vaibhashika said, because emptiness is the object of Samapatti and because it can cut off attachment to desires, emptiness is established as having substance, wanting to make people understand. Now, the Sautrantika insists that the place where there is actually no obstruction is called emptiness, and it is only a provisional name, thereby refuting the previous view that emptiness has substance.' Those who argue like this make my metaphor even clearer. Now I will explain this meaning, as the verse says: 'That form exists because of the cause of form is not true. Because form originally has no substance, how can no substance be established?' Explanation: As said earlier in the chapter on the aggregates, there is no reason to say that in the ultimate truth, the thing with obstruction is called form. As the Sautrantika tries to distinguish that emptiness has no substance in order to make people understand, this meaning cannot be established. Someone says: 'Emptiness has substance, but it cannot make people understand, and there is no metaphor.' Now I establish the principle to make it easy for people to understand. It should be said like this: form (色, rupa).
等有體。觀彼無體有故。此若是有。觀彼體無。譬如色味二無體故。法若無體。無則不觀。譬如馬角。論者言。色法有體。我先已遮。不欲令汝受彼無體。如偈曰。
無有體
釋曰。色名。偈曰。
何處
釋曰。味故。偈曰。
無體當可得
釋曰。彼色無故。譬喻無體。所欲義壞。應知。外人言。有體無體二皆是有彼解者有故。若解者有彼物則有。論者言。汝謂解者解體無體。此之解者為是有體為是無體。俱亦已遮解者有體此義不成。又與有體無體不相似故。異此之外分別解者。此義不然。如偈曰。
與體無體異 何處有解者
釋曰。解者無體。偈義如是。外人復言。我有異門作此分別如是解者。與彼有體無體不相似故。論者言。彼不相似體是一物有二分者。是義不然。以相違故。觀亦不立。彼無可驗令人信知。如是虛空諦觀察時不應道理。如偈曰。
是故知虛空 非體非無體 非所相能相 餘五同虛空
釋曰。如遮虛空無有毫末令人信受。餘五亦然。如偈曰。
先地等無有 微毫相可得
釋曰。彼地水等亦應如是廣分別說。乃至偈言非體非無體非所相能相應當同作如虛空遮。云何名界。藏義是界義。如彼金界。彼虛空等能為憂苦等藏義故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如果存在『有體』（sat-kaya，實體），那麼觀察它，因為沒有『無體』（asat-kaya，非實體）的存在，『有體』才顯得存在。如果存在『有體』，那麼觀察它，因為沒有『體』的存在。例如，色和味兩者都沒有實體，所以它們的存在依賴於其他條件。如果法沒有實體，那麼就無法觀察到它，就像馬的角一樣，根本不存在。 論者說：你說色法有實體，我先前已經駁斥過了。我不希望你接受那種『無體』的說法。正如偈頌所說： 『無有體』 釋義：指的是色名。偈頌說： 『何處』 釋義：指的是味。偈頌說： 『無體當可得』 釋義：因為色不存在，所以譬喻沒有實體，所要表達的意義就破壞了。應該知道，外道認為，『有體』和『無體』兩者都是存在的，因為有理解它們的人存在。如果理解者存在，那麼這些事物就存在。論者說：你認為理解者理解『有體』和『無體』，那麼這個理解者是有實體還是沒有實體呢？這兩種說法都已經被駁斥了，理解者有實體的說法是不成立的。而且，理解者與『有體』和『無體』並不相似，所以將理解者與它們區分開來是不對的。正如偈頌所說： 『與體無體異，何處有解者』 釋義：理解者沒有實體。偈頌的意義就是這樣。外道又說：我用不同的方式來做這種區分，這樣理解者就與『有體』和『無體』不相似了。論者說：那種不相似的『體』，如果是一個事物有兩個部分，這種說法是不對的，因為它們是相互矛盾的，觀察也無法成立。沒有什麼可以驗證，讓人相信。像這樣對虛空進行仔細觀察是不合道理的。正如偈頌所說： 『是故知虛空，非體非無體，非所相能相，餘五同虛空』 釋義：就像駁斥虛空沒有絲毫實體，讓人信服一樣，其餘五蘊也是如此。正如偈頌所說： 『先地等無有，微毫相可得』 釋義：對於地、水等也應該像這樣廣泛地分別解說，乃至偈頌所說的『非體非無體，非所相能相』，應當像虛空一樣進行遮破。 什麼是『界』（dhatu）？『藏』（holding）是『界』的意義，就像金礦一樣。虛空等能夠作為憂愁痛苦等的儲藏處，所以是『界』的意義。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: If there is 'sat-kaya' (entity, having a body), then observe it, because 'asat-kaya' (non-entity, without a body) does not exist, 'sat-kaya' appears to exist. If there is 'sat-kaya', then observe it, because there is no 'body' (substance). For example, color and taste both have no substance, so their existence depends on other conditions. If a dharma has no substance, then it cannot be observed, like a horse's horn, which simply does not exist. The debater says: You say that color-dharma has substance, I have already refuted it before. I do not want you to accept that 'non-entity' statement. As the verse says: 'No substance' Explanation: Refers to the name of color. The verse says: 'Where' Explanation: Refers to taste. The verse says: 'Non-entity can be obtained' Explanation: Because color does not exist, the metaphor has no substance, and the meaning to be expressed is destroyed. It should be known that outsiders believe that both 'having substance' and 'not having substance' exist, because there are people who understand them. If the understander exists, then these things exist. The debater says: You think the understander understands 'having substance' and 'not having substance', then is this understander having substance or not having substance? Both of these statements have been refuted, and the statement that the understander has substance is not valid. Moreover, the understander is not similar to 'having substance' and 'not having substance', so it is wrong to distinguish the understander from them. As the verse says: 'Different from having substance and not having substance, where is the understander?' Explanation: The understander has no substance. The meaning of the verse is like this. The outsider says again: I use different ways to make this distinction, so the understander is not similar to 'having substance' and 'not having substance'. The debater says: That dissimilar 'substance', if it is one thing with two parts, this statement is not correct, because they are contradictory, and observation cannot be established. There is nothing to verify and make people believe. It is unreasonable to carefully observe space like this. As the verse says: 'Therefore, know that space is neither substance nor non-substance, neither object nor subject, the remaining five are the same as space' Explanation: Just like refuting that space has no slightest substance, making people believe, the remaining five skandhas are also like this. As the verse says: 'First earth etc. have no, slightest appearance can be obtained' Explanation: For earth, water, etc., it should also be widely explained and said like this, even to the verse 'neither substance nor non-substance, neither object nor subject', it should be refuted like space. What is 'dhatu' (界, element)? 'Holding' (藏, holding) is the meaning of 'dhatu', like a gold mine. Space and so on can be the storage place for sorrows and sufferings, so it is the meaning of 'dhatu'.
。複次無功用自相持義是界義。說彼界者。為教化眾生憐愍故。說彼佛語者。世諦所攝。第一義中界無體也。入亦不成。以界有故。所欲不破。復有人言。若第一義中一切句義皆撥無者。此是路伽耶陀法邪見所說。與佛語相似。此應棄捨。以非佛語故。論者言。汝起過增翳不真發毛蚊蚋蠅等妄作遮故。是義云何。我說遮入有者。遮有自體。不說無體。如楞伽經中偈曰。
有無俱是邊 乃至心所行 彼心行滅已 名為正心滅
釋曰。如是不著有體。不著無體。若法無體。則無一可作故。又如偈曰。
遮有言非有 不取非有故 如遮青非青 不欲說為白
釋曰。此二種見名為不善。是故有智慧者。欲息戲論得無餘樂者。應須遮此二種惡見。此復云何。若三界所攝。若出世間。若善不善及無記等。如世諦種諸所營作。彼于第一義中。若有自體者。起勤方便作善不善此諸作業應空無果。何以故。以先有故。譬如先有。若瓶衣等如是樂者常樂。苦者常苦。如壁上彩畫形量威儀相貌不變。一切眾生亦應如是。複次若無自體者。彼三界所攝。若出世間善不善法起勤方便則空無果以無有故。如是世間則墮斷滅。譬如磨瑩兔角。令其铦利終不可得。是故偈曰。
少慧見諸法 若有若無等 彼人
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：再者，無功用而能自然保持自身狀態的意義，就是『界』（Dhatu，要素、界別）的意義。說這些『界』，是爲了教化眾生，出於憐憫的緣故。所說的佛語，屬於世俗諦的範疇。在第一義諦中，『界』是沒有實體的，因此『入』（進入涅槃）也是不可能的。因為『界』的存在，（斷滅見）所想要破除的（輪迴）就不會被破除。又有人說，如果第一義諦中所有的語句和意義都被否定，這就是順世外道（Lokāyata）的邪見，雖然與佛語相似，但應該拋棄，因為它不是真正的佛語。論者說，你產生了過度的增益，虛構了不真實的頭髮、蚊子、蒼蠅等來作為遮蔽。這是什麼意思呢？我說遮蔽『有』的『入』，是遮蔽『有』的自體，而不是說它完全沒有實體。正如《楞伽經》（Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra）中的偈頌所說： 『有』和『無』都是邊見，乃至一切心所的活動。 當這些心的活動止息時，就稱為真正的心的止滅。 解釋：像這樣，不執著于『有』的實體，也不執著于『無』的實體。如果法沒有實體，那麼就沒有什麼可以作為的了。又如偈頌所說： 遮止說『有』，並非說『無』，因為不執取『非有』的緣故。 就像遮止說『青色』，並非說它是『非青色』，不是想要說它是白色。 解釋：這兩種見解被稱為不善。因此，有智慧的人，想要止息戲論，獲得無餘涅槃的快樂，就應該遮止這兩種惡見。這又是什麼呢？無論是三界所包含的，還是出世間的，無論是善、不善還是無記等，就像世俗諦中的各種活動。如果在第一義諦中，這些有自體，那麼發起勤奮和方便，所作的善與不善的這些作業，都應該空無結果。為什麼呢？因為它們先前就存在了。譬如先前就存在的瓶子、衣服等，這樣，快樂的人就永遠快樂，痛苦的人就永遠痛苦，就像墻上的彩畫，形狀、大小、威儀、相貌都不會改變，一切眾生也應該如此。再者，如果沒有自體，那麼三界所包含的，無論是出世間的善與不善法，發起勤奮和方便，就會空無結果，因為它們不存在。這樣，世間就會墮入斷滅。譬如磨礪兔子的角，想要讓它鋒利，最終是不可能得到的。所以偈頌說： 少智慧的人看待諸法，認為它們要麼是『有』，要麼是『無』等等。 這樣的人...
【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, the meaning of self-sustaining without effort is the meaning of 『Dhatu』 (element, realm). The reason for speaking of these 『Dhatus』 is to teach sentient beings, out of compassion. The spoken words of the Buddha are included within the scope of conventional truth (Saṃvṛti-satya). In the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), 『Dhatu』 has no substance, therefore 『entry』 (into Nirvana) is also impossible. Because of the existence of 『Dhatu』, what (the nihilistic view) wants to destroy (samsara) will not be destroyed. Moreover, some say that if all sentences and meanings in the ultimate truth are denied, this is the heresy of Lokāyata (materialism), which is similar to the Buddha's words, but should be discarded because it is not the true Buddha's word. The debater says, you have generated excessive augmentation, fabricating unreal hair, mosquitoes, flies, etc., as obstructions. What does this mean? I say that obstructing the 『entry』 of 『existence』 is obstructing the self-nature of 『existence』, not saying that it has no substance at all. Just as the verse in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra says: 『Existence』 and 『non-existence』 are both extremes, even the activities of the mind. When these activities of the mind cease, it is called the true cessation of the mind. Explanation: Like this, not clinging to the substance of 『existence』, nor clinging to the substance of 『non-existence』. If a dharma has no substance, then there is nothing that can be done. Moreover, as the verse says: Obstructing the saying of 『existence』 is not saying 『non-existence』, because one does not grasp 『non-existence』. Just like obstructing the saying of 『blue』, not saying it is 『non-blue』, not wanting to say it is white. Explanation: These two views are called unwholesome. Therefore, wise people, wanting to cease conceptual proliferation and obtain the bliss of Nirvana without remainder, should obstruct these two evil views. What is this? Whether it is included in the three realms (Trailokya), or supramundane, whether it is good, unwholesome, or neutral, like the various activities in conventional truth. If, in the ultimate truth, these have self-nature, then initiating diligence and skillful means, the good and unwholesome actions performed should be empty and without result. Why? Because they existed previously. For example, things that existed previously, such as bottles, clothes, etc., in this way, happy people will always be happy, and suffering people will always suffer, just like the colored paintings on the wall, the shape, size, majesty, and appearance will not change, and all sentient beings should be like this. Furthermore, if there is no self-nature, then whether it is included in the three realms, or supramundane good and unwholesome dharmas, initiating diligence and skillful means will be empty and without result, because they do not exist. In this way, the world will fall into annihilation. For example, sharpening a rabbit's horn, wanting to make it sharp, will ultimately be impossible. Therefore, the verse says: People with little wisdom view all dharmas, thinking they are either 『existent』 or 『non-existent』, etc. Such people...
則不見 滅見第一義
複次如寶聚經中。佛告迦葉。有者是一邊。無者是一邊。如是等。彼內地界及外地界皆無二義。諸佛如來實慧證知得成正覺無二一相。所謂無相。又如上金光明女經。文殊師利問善女人言。姊云何觀界。女人答言。文殊師利如劫燒時世界空虛無一可見。又如偈曰。
世間如空相 虛空亦無相 若能如是知 於世得解脫
如是等諸修多羅此中應廣說。
釋觀六界品竟。
般若燈論釋卷第四 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 般若燈論釋
般若燈論釋卷第五
偈本龍樹菩薩 釋論分別明菩薩
大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅譯
觀染染者品第六
複次一切法空。何以故。彼染染者。瞋瞋者等。本無自性。欲使了知無自性義。有此品起。有人言。第一義中有陰入界。何以故。婆伽婆說彼為染污過惡因故。若此非有。佛則不說彼為染因。譬如龜毛。云何驗知。經中偈曰。
染者不知法 染者不見法 若人安受此 名為極盲暗
釋曰。如染染者。乃至癡等盲暗亦然。是故當知。有彼陰等。論者言。彼陰等行聚增長染因過惡顯現。如是染者及彼染等。於世諦中如幻焰夢乾闥婆城。非第一義。如是諦觀汝此分別
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 則不見滅見第一義
複次，如《寶聚經》（Ratnarashi Sutra）中，佛告迦葉（Kashyapa）說：『有』是一邊，『無』是一邊，像這樣等等。其中，內地界和外地界都沒有二種意義。諸佛如來以真實的智慧證知，得成正覺，沒有二種或一種的相，所謂的無相。又如《金光明女經》（Suvarnaprabhasa Sutra）中，文殊師利（Manjushri）問善女人說：『姊姊，你如何觀察界？』女人回答說：『文殊師利，如劫火燃燒時，世界空虛，沒有一物可見。』又如偈頌說：
『世間如空相，虛空亦無相，若能如是知，於世得解脫。』
像這樣等等的諸部經，這裡應該廣為解說。
《釋觀六界品》結束。
《般若燈論釋》卷第四 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 《般若燈論釋》
《般若燈論釋》卷第五
偈本：龍樹菩薩（Nagarjuna） 釋論：分別明菩薩
大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅譯
《觀染染者品》第六
複次，一切法皆空。為什麼呢？因為那些染者、染污者，嗔者、嗔怒者等等，本來沒有自性。爲了使人瞭解無自性的意義，才有此品的產生。有人說，在第一義中，有陰、入、界。為什麼呢？因為婆伽婆（Bhagavan，世尊）說它們是染污和過惡的原因。如果這些不存在，佛就不會說它們是染污的原因，譬如龜毛。如何驗證呢？經中的偈頌說：
『染者不知法，染者不見法，若人安受此，名為極盲暗。』
解釋說：如染者、染污者，乃至癡等盲暗也是這樣。所以應當知道，有那些陰等。論者說：那些陰等行聚增長染因過惡顯現。像這樣，染者以及那些染等，在世俗諦中如幻、焰、夢、乾闥婆城（Gandharva city）。不是第一義。像這樣諦觀，你才能明白這種分別。
【English Translation】 English version: Then, one does not see the ultimate meaning of extinguishing views.
Furthermore, as in the Ratnarashi Sutra (Ratnarashi Sutra), the Buddha told Kashyapa (Kashyapa): 'Existence' is one extreme, 'non-existence' is one extreme, and so on. In this, the inner earth element and the outer earth element have no dual meaning. All Buddhas and Tathagatas, with true wisdom, realize and attain perfect enlightenment, without dual or singular characteristics, which is called no-characteristic (無相). Also, as in the Suvarnaprabhasa Sutra (Suvarnaprabhasa Sutra), Manjushri (Manjushri) asked the virtuous woman: 'Sister, how do you observe the realms?' The woman replied: 'Manjushri, like when the world is burned by the kalpa fire, the world is empty and nothing can be seen.' Also, as the verse says:
'The world is like an empty appearance, emptiness also has no appearance, if one can know this, one will attain liberation in the world.'
Such are the sutras, which should be extensively explained here.
End of the Chapter on Explaining the Six Realms.
Prajna-pradipa-mulashastra-tika Volume 4 Taisho Tripitaka Volume 30 No. 1566 Prajna-pradipa-mulashastra-tika
Prajna-pradipa-mulashastra-tika Volume 5
Verses by Nagarjuna (Nagarjuna), Commentary by Vimalakirti (Vimalakirti)
Translated by Tripitaka Paramartha of Central India during the Great Tang Dynasty
Chapter 6: On the Defiled and the Defiler
Furthermore, all dharmas are empty. Why? Because those who defile, those who are defiled, those who are angry, those who are angered, etc., originally have no self-nature. In order to make people understand the meaning of no self-nature, this chapter arises. Some say that in the ultimate meaning, there are skandhas (陰), ayatanas (入), and dhatus (界). Why? Because the Bhagavan (Bhagavan) said that they are the cause of defilement and faults. If these did not exist, the Buddha would not have said that they are the cause of defilement, like a turtle's hair. How to verify this? The verse in the sutra says:
'The defiled do not know the Dharma, the defiled do not see the Dharma, if a person accepts this, he is called extremely blind and dark.'
Explanation: Like the defiled, the defilers, and even ignorance, etc., are also like this. Therefore, it should be known that there are those skandhas, etc. The commentator says: Those skandhas, etc., actions gather and increase, the cause of defilement, faults appear. Like this, the defiled and those defilements, etc., in conventional truth are like illusions, flames, dreams, Gandharva cities (Gandharva city). They are not the ultimate meaning. By observing in this way, you can understand this distinction.
為欲染。先有染者為染者。先有染為染及染者。此二俱時三皆不然。如偈曰。
若先有染者 離染染者成
釋曰。染是愛著異名。若染者離染彼名染者。此則不然。何以故。如熟無果。云何名熟。如偈曰。
因染得染者 染者染不然
釋曰。若各別異此是染法。此是染者。是則離染。亦名染者。又染者起染終無得義。云何驗知。非無染體得名染者。以有觀故如染自體。複次阿毗曇人言。如我偈曰。染污名遍因自地中先起。是故染者得為染因。阿毗達磨相義如是。論者偈曰。
染者先有故 何處復起染
釋曰。如無染人後時起染乃名染者。若彼染者。先已得名說此染者復起于染無如此義驗無體故。義意如是。複次猶如調達相續中染彼調達染者不作證因。何以故。以染者故譬如耶若達多。外人言。別不別相續染非因故染者門作成已覆成過。亦譬喻無體。及違義故。論者言。彼說不善不別相續染非因故。染者門作非成已覆成過。彼別相續染及染者亦應同遮。亦非譬喻無體所成相似及遮異門非違義故。外人言。有所作因。謂他相續染者。亦為染因故。譬喻無體。論者言。此不相應遮不共因故。此過非實。複次若汝定謂染者之先有染法者。是亦不然。如偈曰。
若有若無染 染者亦
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：慾望是染污。是先有染污，然後才有被染污者；還是先有染污，然後才有染污和被染污者？這三種情況都不是同時發生的。正如偈頌所說： 『如果先有被染污者，離開染污，被染污者如何成立？』 解釋：染污是愛著的另一種說法。如果被染污者離開了染污，還能稱之為被染污者嗎？這是不可能的。為什麼呢？就像果實沒有成熟，怎麼能稱之為成熟呢？正如偈頌所說： 『因為染污才有了被染污者，染污和被染污者並非如此。』 解釋：如果將染污和被染污者看作是各自不同的，那麼這就是染污法，這就是被染污者。這樣一來，離開了染污，也能稱之為被染污者。而且，被染污者生起染污，最終也無法獲得意義。如何驗證呢？沒有染污的本體，卻能被稱為被染污者，這是因為有觀待的緣故，就像染污的自體一樣。此外，阿毗曇（Abhidhamma，論藏）學者說，正如我的偈頌所說：染污之名普遍，因為在自身所處的地界中先產生。因此，被染污者可以作為染污的原因。阿毗達磨（Abhidharma，論藏）的相義就是這樣。論者的偈頌說： 『被染污者先已存在，染污又從何處生起？』 解釋：就像沒有染污的人，後來才生起染污，才能被稱為被染污者。如果那個被染污者，先前已經獲得了這個名稱，再說這個被染污者又生起了染污，沒有這樣的道理，因為沒有本體的緣故。義理就是這樣。此外，就像調達（Devadatta，人名）的相續中存在染污，那個調達（Devadatta，人名）作為被染污者，不能作為證因。為什麼呢？因為是被染污者的緣故，譬如耶若達多（Yajnadatta，人名）。外人說，不區分相續，染污不是原因，所以被染污者的門已經成立，又重複成立了過失。也譬喻沒有本體，並且違背義理的緣故。論者說，他們的說法不好，不區分相續，染污不是原因，所以被染污者的門沒有成立，沒有重複成立過失。他們區分相續，染污和被染污者也應該同樣遮止。也不是譬喻沒有本體所成立的相似，以及遮止不同的門，沒有違背義理的緣故。外人說，有所作的原因，就是他人相續的被染污者，也可以作為染污的原因，所以譬喻沒有本體。論者說，這不相應，因為遮止不共的原因的緣故。這個過失不是真實的。此外，如果你們一定認為被染污者之前有染污法，這也是不對的。正如偈頌所說： 『無論是有染污還是沒有染污，被染污者也……』
【English Translation】 English version: Desire is defilement. Is there defilement first, and then the defiled; or is there defilement first, and then both defilement and the defiled? None of these three situations occur simultaneously. As the verse says: 'If there is a defiled one first, how can the defiled one be established apart from defilement?' Explanation: Defilement is another name for attachment. If the defiled one is separated from defilement, can it still be called the defiled one? This is impossible. Why? It's like a fruit that is not ripe, how can it be called ripe? As the verse says: 'Because of defilement, there is the defiled one; defilement and the defiled one are not like that.' Explanation: If defilement and the defiled one are regarded as distinct, then this is the defilement dharma, and this is the defiled one. In this way, even apart from defilement, one can still be called the defiled one. Moreover, when the defiled one arises with defilement, there is ultimately no meaning to be gained. How can this be verified? Without the substance of defilement, one can still be called the defiled one, because there is dependence, just like the self-nature of defilement. Furthermore, the Abhidhamma (Abhidhamma, collection of treatises) scholars say, as my verse says: the name of defilement is universal, because it arises first in its own realm. Therefore, the defiled one can be the cause of defilement. This is the meaning of the characteristics in Abhidharma (Abhidharma, collection of treatises). The commentator's verse says: 'Since the defiled one already exists, where does defilement arise from?' Explanation: It's like a person without defilement, who later arises with defilement, and can then be called the defiled one. If that defiled one has already obtained this name, and then it is said that this defiled one arises with defilement again, there is no such reason, because there is no substance. The meaning is like this. Furthermore, just as there is defilement in the continuum of Devadatta (Devadatta, a person's name), that Devadatta (Devadatta, a person's name) as the defiled one, cannot be taken as proof. Why? Because it is the defiled one, like Yajnadatta (Yajnadatta, a person's name). Outsiders say that without distinguishing the continuum, defilement is not the cause, so the door of the defiled one is already established, and the fault of repeated establishment occurs. It is also like a metaphor without substance, and because it violates the meaning. The commentator says that their statement is not good, without distinguishing the continuum, defilement is not the cause, so the door of the defiled one is not established, and there is no fault of repeated establishment. They distinguish the continuum, and defilement and the defiled one should also be similarly refuted. It is also not a similarity established by a metaphor without substance, and there is no violation of meaning in refuting different doors. Outsiders say that there is a cause of action, which is the defiled one in the continuum of others, which can also be the cause of defilement, so the metaphor has no substance. The commentator says that this is not appropriate, because it prevents the uncommon cause. This fault is not real. Furthermore, if you insist that there is defilement before the defiled one, this is also incorrect. As the verse says: 'Whether there is defilement or no defilement, the defiled one also...'
同過 染者先有染 離染者染成
釋曰。此復云何。若染者先有彼染法。此則有過。謂此是染此是染者。故有所染。故名之為染。非所依。先有。譬如飯熟故。若汝欲得不觀染者。而有染法。此亦不然。如偈曰。
離染者染成 不欲得如是
釋曰。如熟不觀熟物起故此云何驗非染者無體而有染法。何以故。以有觀故。如染者自體。外人言。如父子二體。非一向故。此義得成。論者言。彼亦如是遮故無過。外人言。如先剎那起染已離而為當起染剎那因是故無過。論者偈曰。
有染復染者 何處當可得
釋曰。如是別時起染剎那無間次生染者剎那此不可得。以染者不成故。如彼異熟是異熟。是異熟者。事則不然。如是過去起染剎那。立為現在染者之因。義亦不爾。云何不爾。如調達染不為調達染者之因。何以故。以其染故。譬如別相續染。複次鞞婆沙師言。我所立義無如上過。所以者何。彼染及染者同時起故無咎。論者言。此亦有過。汝今當聽。如偈曰。
染及染者二 同時起不然 如是染染者 則不相觀故
釋曰。何因緣故起此分別。以觀無故而可分別。此是染者。彼為染法此是染法。彼為染者而不欲爾。此復云何。欲有觀故。此中立驗。彼染與染者無同起義。何
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 同過 染者先有染，離染者染成 釋曰：這是什麼意思呢？如果受染色者先有那染法，這就有了過失。因為這是染色，這是受染色者，所以才有所染。因此稱之為染色，而不是所依。先有，比如飯煮熟了。如果你們想要不觀察受染色者，而有染法，這也是不行的。如偈頌所說： 離染者染成，不欲得如是 釋曰：就像煮熟不觀察熟物而生起一樣，這如何驗證沒有受染色者的本體卻有染法呢？因為有觀察的緣故，就像受染色者的自體。外人說：就像父子二人的身體，不是一成不變的，這個道理可以成立。論者說：他們也像這樣遮止，所以沒有過失。外人說：就像先前的剎那生起染色，已經離開，而作為當要生起染色剎那的原因，所以沒有過失。論者偈頌說： 有染復染者，何處當可得 釋曰：像這樣，在不同時間生起染色剎那，沒有間隔地接著生起受染色者的剎那，這是不可能得到的。因為受染色者不能成立的緣故，就像那異熟是異熟，是異熟者，事情就不是這樣。像這樣，過去生起染色剎那，立為現在受染色者的原因，道理也不對。為什麼不對呢？就像調達（Devadatta）的染色，不作為調達受染色者的原因。為什麼呢？因為它已經染色了。比如不同的相續染色。再次，鞞婆沙師（Vaibhashika）說：我所立的義理沒有像上面那樣的過失。為什麼呢？因為那染色和受染色者同時生起，所以沒有過失。論者說：這也有過失。你們現在應當聽。如偈頌說： 染及染者二，同時起不然，如是染染者，則不相觀故 釋曰：因為什麼緣故生起這種分別呢？因為沒有觀察的緣故而可以分別。這是受染色者，那是染法，這是染法，那是受染色者，但不是想要這樣。這是什麼意思呢？想要有觀察的緣故。這裡立下驗證，那染色與受染色者沒有同時生起的道理。何
【English Translation】 English version Contradiction The dyer first has the dye; the one free from dye becomes dyed. Explanation: What does this mean? If the one being dyed already possesses that dye, then there is a fault. Because this is the dyeing and this is the one being dyed, therefore there is something dyed. Hence it is called dyeing, not the basis. It exists beforehand, like cooked rice. If you want to have dye without observing the one being dyed, that is also not possible. As the verse says: The one free from dye becomes dyed; one should not desire it to be so. Explanation: Just as cooking does not observe the cooked object arising, how does this prove that without the entity of the one being dyed, there is dye? Because there is observation. Like the self-nature of the one being dyed. An outsider says: Like the two bodies of father and son, not being uniform, this principle can be established. The debater says: They also prevent it in this way, so there is no fault. An outsider says: Like the previous moment arising dyeing, already departed, and serving as the cause for the moment of dyeing about to arise, therefore there is no fault. The debater's verse says: Where can one obtain the dye and the one being dyed again? Explanation: Like this, at different times, the moment of dyeing arises, and without interval, the moment of the one being dyed arises next. This is impossible to obtain. Because the one being dyed cannot be established. Like that Vipaka (karmic result) is Vipaka, is the one experiencing Vipaka, things are not like this. Like this, the past moment of arising dyeing is established as the cause of the present one being dyed, the principle is also not right. Why is it not right? Like Devadatta's (調達) dyeing, it does not serve as the cause of Devadatta being dyed. Why? Because it is already dyed. For example, different continuums of dyeing. Again, the Vaibhashika (鞞婆沙師) says: The principle I establish does not have faults like the above. Why? Because that dyeing and the one being dyed arise simultaneously, so there is no fault. The debater says: This also has a fault. You should listen now. As the verse says: The dye and the one being dyed, the two, arising simultaneously is not right; thus, the dye and the one being dyed do not observe each other. Explanation: For what reason does this distinction arise? Because there is no observation, one can distinguish. This is the one being dyed, that is the dye; this is the dye, that is the one being dyed, but it is not desired to be so. What does this mean? Because one wants to have observation. Here, a verification is established, that the dye and the one being dyed do not have the principle of arising simultaneously. What
以故。以有觀故。譬如子芽。複次鞞婆沙師言。汝出此因。有何等義。為觀生故。名為有觀。為觀別語名為有觀。若觀生故名有觀者。心心數法此恒相隨。亦同時起。共有因故。又如燈炷光明亦同時起。非一向故。若觀別語名有觀者。如牛二角亦同時起。一左一右。有別語故。現見如此亦非一向。論者言。是心心數及燈光等和合自在同時共起彼二牛角觀別語等。於世諦中欲令如此。第一義中皆不成故。汝所說過。我無此咎。複次染及染者。若一若異。同時分別。二皆不然。如偈曰。
染及染者一 一則無同時
釋曰。若言同時。即有二體。偈意如是。此中立驗。染及染者。不同時起。何以故。以一體故。如染者自體。若汝意欲染及染者。一體同時義則不可。以相違故。我今染與染者。別體同時。無如上過者。此亦不然。如偈曰。
染及染者異 同時亦叵得
釋曰。別體同時。無有此義。以驗破故。複次彼立別體而欲同時令他解者。驗無體故。此中立驗。染染者二不得同時。何以故。以有觀故。如染自體。複次今當更破別體同時。如偈曰。
若別同時者 離伴亦應同
釋曰。若汝意謂染及染者。此二同時而不欲令隨一離伴者。此中立驗。第一義中不欲令彼染及染者別體同時以有觀
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，因為有觀的緣故。譬如種子和嫩芽。再者，鞞婆沙師（Vaibhashika，佛教部派之一）說：『你提出這個因，有什麼意義呢？是爲了觀察生起，所以稱為有觀嗎？還是爲了觀察不同的語言，所以稱為有觀？』如果因為觀察生起而稱為有觀，那麼心和心所法（Citta-caitta，心理活動及其伴隨的精神現象）總是相互伴隨，也同時生起，因為它們有共同的因。又如燈芯和光明也同時生起，不是單方面的緣故。如果因為觀察不同的語言而稱為有觀，就像牛的兩隻角也同時生起，一左一右，因為它們有不同的語言。現在看到的情況也是如此，也不是單方面的。論者說：『這些心和心所，以及燈光等，和合自在，同時共同生起。那兩隻牛角觀察不同的語言等，在世俗諦（Samvriti-satya，相對真理）中想要這樣認為。但在第一義諦（Paramartha-satya，絕對真理）中，都是不能成立的。』你所說過的，我沒有這樣的過失。再者，染（Klesha，煩惱）和染者（Klishta，被煩惱所染者），若是一體還是異體，同時分別，這兩種說法都不對。如偈頌所說： 『染和染者是一體，一體則不能同時。』 解釋說：如果說是同時，就有兩個實體。偈頌的意思是這樣。這裡建立論證：染和染者，不同時生起。為什麼呢？因為是一體的緣故，如同染者自身。如果你認為染和染者是一體同時，這個道理是講不通的，因為它們是相互矛盾的。我現在說染和染者是不同的實體，同時存在，沒有上述的過失。』這種說法也是不對的。如偈頌所說： 『染和染者是異體，同時也是不可能的。』 解釋說：不同的實體同時存在，沒有這樣的道理，因為可以用論證來駁斥。再者，他們建立不同的實體，卻想要同時存在，讓別人理解，這是因為論證沒有實體的緣故。這裡建立論證：染和染者二者不能同時存在。為什麼呢？因為有觀的緣故，如同染自身。再者，現在應當進一步駁斥不同的實體同時存在。如偈頌所說： 『如果是不同的實體同時存在，那麼離開伴侶也應該相同。』 解釋說：如果你認為染和染者，這兩個同時存在，卻不希望其中任何一個離開伴侶，這裡建立論證：在第一義諦中，不希望那個染和染者是不同的實體同時存在，因為有觀的緣故。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, it is because of 'having observation' (有觀). It is like a seed and a sprout. Furthermore, the Vaibhashika master (鞞婆沙師, Vaibhashika, one of the Buddhist schools) says, 'What is the meaning of you putting forward this cause? Is it called 'having observation' because of observing arising? Or is it called 'having observation' because of observing different languages?' If it is called 'having observation' because of observing arising, then the mind and mental factors (心心數法, Citta-caitta, mental activities and their accompanying mental phenomena) always accompany each other and arise simultaneously, because they have a common cause. Also, like the wick of a lamp and the light also arise simultaneously, not unilaterally. If it is called 'having observation' because of observing different languages, like the two horns of a cow also arise simultaneously, one on the left and one on the right, because they have different languages. The situation seen now is also like this, and it is not unilateral. The debater says, 'These minds and mental factors, as well as the light of the lamp, etc., are harmoniously and freely arising together simultaneously. Those two cow horns observing different languages, etc., want to think like this in conventional truth (世諦, Samvriti-satya, relative truth). But in ultimate truth (第一義諦, Paramartha-satya, absolute truth), they cannot be established.' What you have said, I do not have this fault. Furthermore, defilement (染, Klesha, affliction) and the defiled (染者, Klishta, one who is defiled by affliction), whether they are one or different, distinguishing them simultaneously, both of these statements are incorrect. As the verse says: 'Defilement and the defiled are one; if one, then they cannot be simultaneous.' Explanation: If it is said that they are simultaneous, then there are two entities. The meaning of the verse is like this. Here, a proof is established: defilement and the defiled do not arise simultaneously. Why? Because they are one entity, like the defiled one's own self. If you intend that defilement and the defiled are one entity and simultaneous, then this principle is untenable, because they are contradictory. I now say that defilement and the defiled are different entities and exist simultaneously, without the above fault.' This statement is also incorrect. As the verse says: 'Defilement and the defiled are different; being simultaneous is also impossible.' Explanation: Different entities being simultaneous, there is no such principle, because it can be refuted by proof. Furthermore, they establish different entities, but want them to be simultaneous, to make others understand, this is because the proof has no entity. Here, a proof is established: defilement and the defiled cannot exist simultaneously. Why? Because of 'having observation', like defilement itself. Furthermore, now we should further refute different entities existing simultaneously. As the verse says: 'If they are different entities existing simultaneously, then being apart from a companion should also be the same.' Explanation: If you think that defilement and the defiled, these two exist simultaneously, but do not want either of them to be apart from a companion, here a proof is established: in ultimate truth, it is not desirable for that defilement and the defiled to be different entities existing simultaneously, because of 'having observation'.
故。如因果二。複次餘論師言。若汝別體欲得同時今處處別體彼彼同時。如馬邊有牛說為同時。如是獨牛無伴。亦得同時。此如先答。義無少異。複次偈曰。
若別同時起 何用染染者
釋曰。染及染者。若同時起。是義不然。以其別故。譬如染及離染。複次偈曰。
若染染者二 各各自體成 何義強分別 此二同時起
釋曰。若染及染者。我體各別。以體別故。則不相觀。複次若有所用此是染者染。此是染染者。有觀相貌說同時起。汝意爾耶。此說有過。何以故。如偈言。染及染者二。同時起不然。如是等同時起不應爾。有觀故。不即此法說同時起。以不異故若欲別體。同時起者。此亦不然。如偈曰。
如是別不成 求欲同時起 成立同時起 復欲別體耶
釋曰。如是義者。長老應說。如偈曰。
有何等別體 欲同時起耶
釋曰。同時起者。有何等義。為有別體。次第起故說同時起。為無別體同時起耶。若言次第同時起者。是則不然。如染及離染。先已說過。若同時起者。此亦不然。以有觀故。如因果二。亦先已說。是故偈曰。
由染染者二 同不同不成 諸法亦如染 同不同不成
釋曰。彼瞋癡等。若內若外。同以不同亦皆不成。如
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此，就像原因和結果這二者一樣。此外，其他論師說：『如果你們認為不同的實體可以同時存在，那麼在任何地方，不同的實體都可以同時存在。就像馬旁邊有牛，可以說它們同時存在。』 這樣，單獨的牛沒有伴侶，也可以說是同時存在。這就像之前的回答一樣，意義上沒有絲毫差別。此外，偈頌說： 『如果不同的事物同時生起，那又何必需要能染者和所染者呢？』 解釋說：能染和所染，如果同時生起，這個道理是不成立的，因為它們是不同的。譬如染色和離染色。此外，偈頌說： 『如果能染者和所染者是二，各自的自體成立，又有什麼意義要強行分別，說這二者同時生起呢？』 解釋說：如果能染和所染，它們的自體各自不同，因為自體不同，所以互不相干。此外，如果有所作用，這是能染者所染的，這是所染者，有觀察相貌而說同時生起，你們是這個意思嗎？這種說法是有過失的。為什麼呢？如偈頌所說：能染和所染二者，同時生起是不成立的。像這樣，同時生起是不應該的，因為有觀察的緣故。不即是此法而說同時生起，因為沒有差異的緣故。如果想要不同的實體同時生起，這也是不成立的。如偈頌說： 『像這樣，別體不能成立，卻想要同時生起，已經成立了同時生起，又想要是別體嗎？』 解釋說：像這樣的道理，長老應該說。如偈頌說： 『有什麼樣的別體，想要同時生起呢？』 解釋說：同時生起，有什麼樣的意義呢？是爲了有別體，次第生起，所以說同時生起？還是爲了沒有別體而同時生起呢？如果說是次第同時生起，那是不成立的，就像染色和離染色，之前已經說過了。如果說是同時生起，這也是不成立的，因為有觀察的緣故，就像原因和結果這二者，之前也已經說過了。所以偈頌說： 『由於能染者和所染者二者，相同和不同都不能成立，諸法也像染色一樣，相同和不同都不能成立。』 解釋說：那些嗔（chen，嗔怒）癡（chi，愚癡）等，無論是內在的還是外在的，相同和不同都不能成立，就像…
【English Translation】 English version Therefore, like cause and effect, these two. Furthermore, other teachers say: 'If you believe that different entities can exist simultaneously, then in any place, different entities can exist simultaneously. Just as there is an ox next to a horse, it can be said that they exist simultaneously.' Thus, a solitary ox without a companion can also be said to exist simultaneously. This is like the previous answer, with no difference in meaning. Furthermore, the verse says: 'If different things arise simultaneously, then what need is there for the dyer and the dyed?' The explanation says: The dyer and the dyed, if they arise simultaneously, this principle is not established, because they are different. For example, dyeing and undyeing. Furthermore, the verse says: 'If the dyer and the dyed are two, and each of their own entities is established, then what is the meaning of forcibly distinguishing them, saying that these two arise simultaneously?' The explanation says: If the dyer and the dyed, their own entities are different, because the entities are different, so they do not regard each other. Furthermore, if there is something used, this is what the dyer dyes, this is the dyed, there is observation of appearance and it is said to arise simultaneously, is that what you mean? This statement is flawed. Why? As the verse says: The dyer and the dyed, the two, arising simultaneously is not established. Like this, arising simultaneously should not be, because there is observation. Not being identical to this dharma and saying arising simultaneously, because there is no difference. If you want different entities to arise simultaneously, this is also not established. As the verse says: 'Like this, separate entities cannot be established, yet you want them to arise simultaneously, having established simultaneous arising, do you still want them to be separate entities?' The explanation says: Like this principle, the elder should say. As the verse says: 'What kind of separate entities do you want to arise simultaneously?' The explanation says: Simultaneous arising, what kind of meaning is there? Is it because there are separate entities, arising in sequence, so it is said to be simultaneous arising? Or is it because there are no separate entities and they arise simultaneously? If it is said that they arise simultaneously in sequence, then that is not established, like dyeing and undyeing, which has been said before. If it is said that they arise simultaneously, this is also not established, because there is observation, like cause and effect, these two have also been said before. Therefore, the verse says: 'Because the dyer and the dyed, the two, being the same and being different cannot be established, all dharmas are also like dyeing, being the same and being different cannot be established.' The explanation says: Those anger (chen, anger) and ignorance (chi, ignorance), etc., whether internal or external, being the same and being different cannot be established, just like...
是第一義中彼染等不成故。如外人品初作如是。說陰等是有。以染污過患故者。彼因不成。又世諦說因及違義故。如先所說因過失故。品內所明染及染者無其自體。令他得解。此義得成。如般若波羅蜜經。佛告極勇猛菩薩言。善男子。色非染體。非離染體。如是受想行識非染體。非離染體。複次色受想行識非染體空。非離染體空。此是般若波羅蜜如是。色非瞋體。非非瞋體。亦非癡體。非非癡體。受想行識亦復如是。此名般若波羅蜜。極勇猛色非染非凈。受想行識非染非凈。複次色非染法性。非凈法性。受想行識亦復如是。此名般若波羅蜜。如是等諸修多羅。此中應廣說。
釋觀染染者品竟。
般若燈論釋觀有為相品第七
複次成立此品。其相云何。陰等諸法本無自性。惑者未知取相分別。今欲顯示令彼識知無自性義。有此品起。外人言。第一義中有是陰等有為自體。何以故。以彼起等諸有為相共相扶故。此若無者。彼有為相無相扶義。譬如兔角。由起等諸相與陰等相扶因有力故。彼法不無。所謂有為諸陰等也。論者言。汝說起等有為相者。彼起等相為是有為。為是無為。外人言。是有為也。論者言。今當次第分別此義。先驗起者。如偈曰。
若起是有為 亦應有三相
釋曰。第一義
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為在第一義諦中，那些染污等等是不成立的。就像外道在《人品》一開始所做的那樣，說五蘊等是有自性的，因為有染污的過患。但他們的論證是不成立的。而且，在世俗諦中，他們的說法也違背了因果關係，就像先前所說的因的過失一樣。在這一品中，所闡明的染污和染污者都沒有其自身實體，從而使他人能夠理解。這個意義是可以成立的，就像《般若波羅蜜經》中所說的那樣。佛告訴極勇猛菩薩說：『善男子，色不是染污的本體，也不是脫離染污的本體。同樣，受、想、行、識也不是染污的本體，也不是脫離染污的本體。』進一步說，色、受、想、行、識不是染污的本體（空），也不是脫離染污的本體（空）。這就是般若波羅蜜。同樣，色不是嗔恚的本體，也不是非嗔恚的本體；也不是愚癡的本體，也不是非愚癡的本體。受、想、行、識也是如此。這叫做般若波羅蜜。極勇猛，色不是染污的，也不是清凈的；受、想、行、識不是染污的，也不是清凈的。進一步說，色不是染污的法性，也不是清凈的法性；受、想、行、識也是如此。這叫做般若波羅蜜。』像這樣的許多修多羅（sutra，經），在這裡應該廣泛地解說。 《觀染染者品》解釋完畢。 《般若燈論》解釋《觀有為相品》第七 進一步成立這一品，它的『相』是什麼呢？五蘊等諸法本來沒有自性，迷惑的人不知道，執取『相』而加以分別。現在想要顯示，使他們認識到無自性的意義，因此而有這一品的產生。外道說：『在第一義諦中，五蘊等是有為法的自體。為什麼呢？因為那些生起等等的有為相，互相扶持的緣故。如果這些不存在，那麼有為相就沒有互相扶持的意義，譬如兔角。』由於生起等諸相與五蘊等相扶持，因的力量強大，所以那些法不是不存在的，所謂有為的五蘊等就是存在的。論者說：『你說生起等有為相，那麼那些生起等相是有為的，還是無為的呢？』外道說：『是有為的。』論者說：『現在應當依次分別這個意義。先檢驗生起，如偈頌所說： 『如果生起是有為，也應該有三種相。』 解釋：在第一義諦中。
【English Translation】 English version: Because in the ultimate truth (paramārtha satya), those defilements and so on are not established. Just as the non-Buddhist (tīrthika) initially argues in the chapter on 'Persons,' stating that the aggregates (skandha) and so on have inherent existence because of the fault of defilement. However, their reasoning is not valid. Moreover, in conventional truth (saṃvṛti satya), their statement contradicts causality and is subject to the same flaws of reasoning as previously mentioned. In this chapter, the defilement and the defiler, as clarified, lack inherent existence, thereby enabling others to understand. This meaning can be established, as stated in the Prajñāpāramitā Sutra. The Buddha said to the Bodhisattva 'Extremely Courageous': 'Good son, form (rūpa) is not the nature of defilement, nor is it the nature of being apart from defilement. Likewise, feeling (vedanā), perception (saṃjñā), mental formations (saṃskāra), and consciousness (vijñāna) are not the nature of defilement, nor are they the nature of being apart from defilement.' Furthermore, form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness are not the nature of defilement (emptiness), nor are they the nature of being apart from defilement (emptiness). This is Prajñāpāramitā. Similarly, form is not the nature of anger (dveṣa), nor is it the nature of non-anger; it is not the nature of delusion (moha), nor is it the nature of non-delusion. Feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness are also the same. This is called Prajñāpāramitā. Extremely Courageous, form is neither defiled nor pure; feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness are neither defiled nor pure. Furthermore, form is not the nature of defiled phenomena, nor is it the nature of pure phenomena; feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness are also the same. This is called Prajñāpāramitā.' Such are many sutras (sūtra), which should be extensively explained here. Explanation of the Chapter on Examining Defilement and the Defiler is complete. Prajñāpradīpa (Lamp of Wisdom) Commentary on the Seventh Chapter: Examining the Characteristics of Conditioned Phenomena (Saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa) Furthermore, to establish this chapter, what are its 'characteristics'? The aggregates (skandha) and other phenomena originally lack inherent existence (svabhāva). Those who are deluded do not know this, grasping at 'characteristics' and making distinctions. Now, the intention is to reveal this, enabling them to recognize the meaning of non-inherent existence, and thus this chapter arises. The non-Buddhist (tīrthika) says: 'In the ultimate truth (paramārtha satya), the aggregates and so on are the inherent existence of conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta dharma). Why? Because those characteristics of conditioned phenomena, such as arising (utpāda) and so on, mutually support each other. If these do not exist, then the characteristics of conditioned phenomena would have no meaning of mutual support, like rabbit horns.' Because the characteristics such as arising support the aggregates and so on, the power of the cause is strong, so those phenomena are not non-existent; what are called the conditioned aggregates and so on do exist. The commentator says: 'You say that arising and other characteristics are conditioned phenomena, so are those characteristics of arising and so on conditioned or unconditioned (asaṃskṛta)?' The non-Buddhist says: 'They are conditioned.' The commentator says: 'Now we should sequentially analyze this meaning. First, examine arising, as the verse says: 'If arising is conditioned, it should also have three characteristics.' Explanation: In the ultimate truth.
中不欲令彼起等諸相是有為相。何以故。以有為故。譬如法體。外人言。起住滅體各有作用。是故欲令起等諸相是有為相。論者言。此驗無體。唯有立義。故外人言。起住滅等各有功能。汝撥無者。義則不然。論者言。起等作相不可得故。又世諦中起亦非彼有為法相。何以故。以起作故。如父生子。住亦非彼有為法相。何以故。以住作故。如食持身。又有為相非彼住作。何以故。以住作故。譬如女人。置瓶于地。滅亦非彼有為法相。何以故。以破壞故。如棒破物。如是彼立起等有為相者。此義不成。以因不成及與義相違有此過故。起非有為。是故說起有為相者。義則不然。複次若汝欲避先所說過成立起等是無為者義亦不然。如偈曰。
若起是無為 何名有為相
釋曰。若起是無為。而為有為相者。無如此義。以無為自體無所有故。義意如此。複次第一義中起是無為。而作有為諸法相者。是義不然。何以故。以無為故。譬如虛空。住滅亦爾。不復廣遮。複次若汝分別起住滅等是有為相有所作者。為是次第。為復同時。二俱有過。何以故。若次第者。如偈曰。
起等三次第 無力作業相
釋曰。于誰無力。謂于有為。複次欲得起等隨次第者。如法體未起。住滅二種。則無力為相。以法體無故。又
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：外道不希望生起等諸相是有為相。為什麼呢？因為它們是有為的緣故。譬如法的自體。外道說：『生起、安住、滅壞各自有作用。』所以希望生起等諸相是有為相。論者說：『這種驗證沒有自體，只有立義。』所以外道說：『生起、安住、滅壞等各有功能，你否定它們，道理就不對。』論者說：『生起等作為相不可得的緣故。』又在世俗諦中，生起也不是那有為法的相。為什麼呢？因為生起是作為的緣故，如父親生兒子。安住也不是那有為法的相。為什麼呢？因為安住是作為的緣故，如食物維持身體。又有為相不是那安住所作。為什麼呢？因為安住是作為的緣故，譬如女人把瓶子放在地上。滅壞也不是那有為法的相。為什麼呢？因為滅壞是破壞的緣故，如用棍子打破物體。』像這樣，他們建立生起等有為相，這個道理不能成立，因為因不成，以及與義相違背有這些過失的緣故。生起不是有為，所以說生起是有為相，道理就不對。再次，如果你想避免先前所說的過失，而成立生起等是無為的，道理也不對。如偈頌所說： 『如果生起是無為，怎麼能稱為有為相？』 解釋：如果生起是無為，卻作為有為相，沒有這樣的道理。因為無為自體沒有所有的緣故。道理就是這樣。再次，在第一義中，生起是無為，卻作為有為諸法的相，這個道理不對。為什麼呢？因為它是無為的緣故，譬如虛空。安住、滅壞也是這樣，不再廣泛地遮破。再次，如果你分別生起、安住、滅壞等是有為相，有所作為，是次第的呢？還是同時的呢？兩種都有過失。為什麼呢？如果是次第的，如偈頌所說： 『生起等三者次第，沒有力量作為業相。』 解釋：對於誰沒有力量呢？對於有為。再次，想要得到生起等隨次第，如法體未生起，安住、滅壞兩種，就沒有力量作為相。因為法體沒有的緣故。又
【English Translation】 English version: Outsiders do not want the characteristics such as arising to be conditioned (samskrta) characteristics. Why? Because they are conditioned. For example, the essence of a dharma. Outsiders say, 'Arising, abiding, and ceasing each have their own functions.' Therefore, they want the characteristics such as arising to be conditioned characteristics. The debater says, 'This verification has no essence, only the establishment of meaning.' Therefore, outsiders say, 'Arising, abiding, and ceasing each have their own functions. If you deny them, the reasoning is incorrect.' The debater says, 'Because the characteristics such as arising are unobtainable.' Moreover, in conventional truth (samvriti-satya), arising is not a characteristic of conditioned dharmas. Why? Because arising is an action, like a father begetting a son. Abiding is also not a characteristic of conditioned dharmas. Why? Because abiding is an action, like food sustaining the body. Furthermore, the conditioned characteristic is not the action of abiding. Why? Because abiding is an action, like a woman placing a jar on the ground. Ceasing is also not a characteristic of conditioned dharmas. Why? Because ceasing is destruction, like a stick breaking an object.' Thus, their establishment of arising as a conditioned characteristic is untenable because the reason is unestablished and there is a fault of contradicting the meaning. Arising is not conditioned, so saying that arising is a conditioned characteristic is incorrect. Furthermore, if you want to avoid the previously mentioned faults and establish that arising, etc., are unconditioned (asamskrta), that reasoning is also incorrect. As the verse says: 'If arising is unconditioned, how can it be called a conditioned characteristic?' Explanation: If arising is unconditioned but serves as a conditioned characteristic, there is no such reasoning because the essence of the unconditioned is devoid of all. The meaning is thus. Furthermore, in ultimate truth (paramartha-satya), if arising is unconditioned but serves as a characteristic of conditioned dharmas, that reasoning is incorrect. Why? Because it is unconditioned, like space (akasha). Abiding and ceasing are also the same; I will not refute them extensively. Furthermore, if you distinguish arising, abiding, ceasing, etc., as conditioned characteristics that have actions, are they sequential or simultaneous? Both have faults. Why? If they are sequential, as the verse says: 'Arising, etc., are three in sequence, without the power to act as characteristics of action.' Explanation: For whom is there no power? For the conditioned. Furthermore, if you want to obtain arising, etc., in sequence, like the essence of a dharma that has not yet arisen, abiding and ceasing do not have the power to act as characteristics because the essence of the dharma does not exist. Also,
已滅之法滅則無體。起住二種。則于滅無力。又已起之法起則無力。又法體若住滅復無力。若謂住時無常隨逐者。是義不然。如百論偈曰。
離住無法體 無常何有住 若初有住者 后時不應故 若常有無常 一切時無住 若先是常者 復不得無常 若無常與住 共法體同時 有住無無常 有無常無住
複次若謂起等諸有為相同時有者。是亦不然。如偈曰。
云何於一物 同時有三相
釋曰。此相如是不同時有。語義如此。云何不有。謂彼一物於一時中有起住滅。義則不然。以畢竟相違故。複次經部師言。諸法各別有定因緣自在相續。於一時中當可起者。得自體時此名為起。初剎那相續位此名為住。先剎那不相似此名為老。已起者壞此名為滅。如是等決定有觀於一剎那同時有故。汝作方便與我作過者。我無此咎。論者言。是相續者。亦非實有。又有觀故。住分別者。是世諦三相。非第一義。汝言住時違住滅者。此不應然。以不免先所說過故。複次鞞婆沙師言。如先體未起者。於後得自體時。此名為起。起者樹立。此名為住。住者朽故。此名為老。老者滅故。此名為壞。由起等次第得不離有為體。以是義故。彼相體成。如先所說。起等三次第無力作業相者。此為不善。論
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 已滅之法滅去後便沒有實體。『起』（Utpada，生）、『住』（Sthiti，住）、兩種狀態，對於『滅』（Bhanga，滅）沒有作用。又已經生起的法，生起后便沒有作用。又法體如果安住，『滅』也沒有作用。如果說安住的時候有『無常』（Anitya，無常）伴隨，這種說法是不對的。如《百論》中的偈頌所說： 『離開安住就沒有法體，無常又怎麼會有安住？如果最初有安住，後來就不應該壞滅。如果常與無常同時存在，那麼任何時候都沒有安住。如果先前是常，就不能變為無常。如果無常與安住，共同存在於一個法體中，有安住就沒有無常，有無常就沒有安住。』 再者，如果說『起』、『住』等有為相同時存在，這也是不對的。如偈頌所說： 『怎麼可能在一個事物上，同時存在三種相？』 解釋說：這些相不是同時存在的，意思是說，怎麼會沒有呢？意思是說，一個事物在一瞬間同時具有生、住、滅，這是不對的，因為它們畢竟是相互違背的。再者，經部師說，諸法各自有其特定的因緣，自在相續，在一瞬間可以生起。當獲得自體時，這叫做『起』。最初剎那的相續位，這叫做『住』。與前一剎那不相似，這叫做『老』（Jara，老）。已經生起的壞滅，這叫做『滅』。像這樣決定地觀察，在一剎那同時存在。你用這種方便來指責我的過失，我沒有這種過失。論者說，這種相續也不是真實存在的，因為有能觀察的緣故。安住的分別，是世俗諦的三相，不是第一義諦。你說安住的時候違背安住和滅，這是不應該的，因為不能免除先前所說過的過失。再者，鞞婆沙師說，像先前體未生起，在後來得到自體時，這叫做『起』。生起者樹立，這叫做『住』。安住者朽壞，這叫做『老』。衰老者滅亡，這叫做『壞』（Vyaya，壞）。由於『起』等次第獲得，不離開有為的體。因為這個緣故，這些相的體才成立。像先前所說，『起』等三種次第沒有作用的相，這是不善的。論者……'
【English Translation】 English version: When a Dharma (法, law/phenomenon) is extinguished, it has no substance. The two states of 'Utpada' (起, arising) and 'Sthiti' (住, abiding) have no power over 'Bhanga' (滅, ceasing). Furthermore, a Dharma that has already arisen has no power once it has arisen. Moreover, if the Dharma body abides, 'ceasing' has no power. If it is said that 'Anitya' (無常, impermanence) accompanies the abiding state, this is not correct. As the verse in the Śataśāstra (百論, One Hundred Treatises) says: 'Without abiding, there is no Dharma body; how can impermanence have abiding? If there is abiding from the beginning, it should not perish later. If permanence and impermanence exist simultaneously, then there is no abiding at any time. If it was permanent before, it cannot become impermanent. If impermanence and abiding share the same Dharma body simultaneously, with abiding there is no impermanence, and with impermanence there is no abiding.' Furthermore, if it is said that the conditioned characteristics such as 'arising' and 'abiding' exist simultaneously, this is also incorrect. As the verse says: 'How can three characteristics exist simultaneously in one thing?' The explanation is: these characteristics do not exist simultaneously. The meaning is like this: how can they not exist? The meaning is that one thing simultaneously has arising, abiding, and ceasing in one moment, which is not correct because they are ultimately contradictory. Furthermore, the Sautrāntika (經部師, Sutra School) says that all Dharmas each have their specific causes and conditions, freely continue, and can arise in one moment. When they obtain their own substance, this is called 'arising'. The continuous position of the initial moment is called 'abiding'. Being dissimilar to the previous moment is called 'Jara' (老, aging). The destruction of what has already arisen is called 'ceasing'. Observing in this way, they definitely exist simultaneously in one moment. If you use this expedient to accuse me of fault, I have no such fault. The debater says that this continuity is also not truly existent because there is observation. The distinction of abiding is the three characteristics of conventional truth (世俗諦, saṃvṛti-satya), not the ultimate truth (第一義諦, paramārtha-satya). You say that abiding contradicts abiding and ceasing, which should not be so because it cannot avoid the faults previously stated. Furthermore, the Vaibhāṣika (鞞婆沙師, Vaibhāṣika) says that like the previous body that has not arisen, when it obtains its own substance later, this is called 'arising'. The arising establishes, which is called 'abiding'. The abiding decays, which is called 'aging'. The aging perishes, which is called 'Vyaya' (壞, decay). Because 'arising' and so on are obtained in sequence, they do not leave the conditioned body. Because of this meaning, the substance of these characteristics is established. Like what was said before, the three sequences of 'arising' and so on have no power to act, which is not good. The debater...
者言。汝語非也。云何名相。謂與所相未曾相離。譬如堅相不離於地。及大人諸相不離大人。若言起等第一義中是彼有為諸法相者。此義不然。何以故。有次第故。次第云何。如以泥團置於輪上。運手旋已如小塔形。次拍令平。次轉如蓋。后攏如圌。此諸位別。非彼瓶家有為體相。起等諸相亦不離彼。有為法者。假施設耳。真實起者。此中遮故。以云何遮。彼未起者。住滅無體故。若謂當來起時應有住滅。作此分別者。唯世諦言說不免。如先所說。過咎如是。起等諸有為相次第同時彼體不成。因有過故。複次偈曰。
若諸起住壞 有異有為相 有則為無窮
釋曰。若彼有異彼亦有異者。如是則無窮而不欲爾。複次若起等諸相更無相者。復得如先所說過失。如偈曰。
無則非有為
釋曰。此義云何。如汝意欲有為諸法非有為相。以有為故。如是起等。亦非有為相。以是義故。第一義中不應分別起等諸相。若是有為。若是無為。如所說過。今還屬汝。複次犢子部言。起是有為而非無窮。云何知耶。由此自體和合有十五法。總共起故何等十五。一此法體。二謂彼起。三住異。四滅相。五若是白法則有正解脫起。六若是黑法則有邪解脫起。七若是出離法則出離體起。八若非出離法則有非出離體起。此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 那人說：『你的說法不對。』什麼是『名相』（nāma-lakṣaṇa，名稱和相狀）？就是指名稱和所指的相狀從未分離。比如堅硬的相狀不離開大地，以及偉人的各種相狀不離開偉人。如果說『起』（utpāda，生）、『住』（sthiti，住）、『異』（anyathātva，異）、『滅』（vyaya，滅）等在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya，勝義諦）中是那些有為法（saṃskṛta-dharma，有為法）的相狀，這種說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為有次第的緣故。次第是怎樣的呢？比如把泥團放在輪子上，用手旋轉後像小塔的形狀，然後拍打使它平坦，接著轉動像蓋子，最後攏起來像糧倉。這些位置的不同，不是那個制瓶人所造瓶子的有為法的體相。『起』等各種相狀也不離開那些有為法，只是假借安立而已。真實的『起』，在這裡是被遮止的。用什麼來遮止呢？因為那些未生起的法，住和滅都沒有自體。如果認為當未來生起時應該有住和滅，作這樣的分別，只是世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，世俗諦）的言說，不能避免。像先前所說，過失就是這樣。『起』等各種有為相，次第或同時，它們的體性都不能成立，因為有上述的過失。再次，偈頌說： 『如果生、住、壞，有異於有為相，那麼就會無窮無盡。』 解釋說：如果那些相狀與它們所依附的事物不同，並且那些事物也有不同的相狀，那麼就會導致無窮無盡，這是不希望發生的。再次，如果『起』等各種相狀不再有其他的相狀，那麼又會得到先前所說的過失。如偈頌說： 『如果沒有相狀，就不是有為法。』 解釋說：這是什麼意思呢？就像你認為有為法沒有有為相一樣，因為它們是有為的。這樣，『起』等也不是有為相，因為這個緣故，在第一義諦中不應該分別『起』等各種相狀，無論是有為還是無為，就像先前所說的過失，現在仍然屬於你。再次，犢子部（Vātsīputrīya，犢子部）說，『起』是有為法，但不是無窮無盡的。怎麼知道呢？因為由此自體和合有十五種法，總共生起。哪十五種呢？一、此法體；二、就是那個『起』；三、『住』；四、『異』；五、『滅』相；六、如果是白法（śukla-dharma，善法），則有正解脫（samyak-vimokṣa，正解脫）生起；七、如果是黑法（kṛṣṇa-dharma，惡法），則有邪解脫（mithyā-vimokṣa，邪解脫）生起；八、如果是出離法（nairyāṇika-dharma，出離法），則有出離體生起；九、如果不是出離法，則有非出離體生起。此
【English Translation】 English version: That person said: 'Your statement is incorrect.' What are 'name and characteristic' (nāma-lakṣaṇa)? It refers to the fact that the name and the characteristic it refers to are never separate. For example, the characteristic of hardness does not leave the earth, and the various characteristics of a great person do not leave the great person. If you say that 'arising' (utpāda), 'abiding' (sthiti), 'change' (anyathātva), and 'cessation' (vyaya) etc., in the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), are the characteristics of those conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta-dharma), this statement is not correct. Why? Because there is a sequence. What is the sequence? For example, placing a lump of clay on a wheel, turning it by hand to form a small pagoda shape, then patting it flat, then turning it like a lid, and finally gathering it like a granary. These different positions are not the conditioned characteristics of the pot made by the potter. The various characteristics such as 'arising' do not leave those conditioned dharmas either; they are merely provisional designations. The real 'arising' is negated here. What is used to negate it? Because those dharmas that have not yet arisen have no self-nature in their abiding and cessation. If it is argued that when they arise in the future, there should be abiding and cessation, making such distinctions is merely conventional speech (saṃvṛti-satya) and cannot be avoided. As previously stated, the fault is like this. The various conditioned characteristics such as 'arising', whether sequential or simultaneous, cannot establish their nature because of the aforementioned faults. Furthermore, the verse says: 'If arising, abiding, and decay are different from the conditioned characteristics, then it would be endless.' The explanation says: If those characteristics are different from the things they depend on, and those things also have different characteristics, then it would lead to endlessness, which is undesirable. Furthermore, if the various characteristics such as 'arising' no longer have other characteristics, then the previously mentioned faults will be obtained again. As the verse says: 'If there are no characteristics, then it is not a conditioned dharma.' The explanation says: What does this mean? Just as you think that conditioned dharmas have no conditioned characteristics because they are conditioned. Thus, 'arising' etc. are also not conditioned characteristics. For this reason, in the ultimate truth, one should not distinguish the various characteristics such as 'arising', whether they are conditioned or unconditioned. Like the previously mentioned faults, they still belong to you. Furthermore, the Vātsīputrīya school says that 'arising' is a conditioned dharma but is not endless. How do we know this? Because fifteen dharmas are combined in this self-nature, arising together in total. What are the fifteen? First, the nature of this dharma; second, that 'arising'; third, 'abiding'; fourth, 'change'; fifth, the characteristic of 'cessation'; sixth, if it is a white dharma (śukla-dharma), then correct liberation (samyak-vimokṣa) arises; seventh, if it is a black dharma (kṛṣṇa-dharma), then wrong liberation (mithyā-vimokṣa) arises; eighth, if it is a dharma of departure (nairyāṇika-dharma), then the nature of departure arises; ninth, if it is not a dharma of departure, then the nature of non-departure arises. This
前七種是法體眷屬。七眷屬中皆有一隨眷屬。謂有起起乃至非出離。非出離體此是眷屬。眷屬法如是。法體和合總有十五法。起。彼根本起。除其自體能起作十四法。起起。能起。彼根本起。住等亦然。以是義故無無窮過。如我偈曰。
彼起起起時 獨起根本根 根本起起時 還起于起起
阿阇梨言。汝雖種種多語。而於義不然。云何不然。如偈曰。
若謂起起時 能起根本起 汝從本起生 何能起本起
釋曰。不如是生。以未起故。如前都未起時。外人言。根本起者。能起起起。如是起起能起本起。義正如此。論者偈曰。
若謂根本起 能起彼起起 彼從起起生 何能起起起
釋曰。不如是生。以未起故。義意如是。外人言。彼根本起及以起起。此二起時。各自作業。是故無過。論者偈曰。
汝謂此起時 隨所欲作起 若此起未生 未生何能起
釋曰。第一句謂根本起。第二句謂起起。第三句謂起時未起。第四句謂根本起無起功能。何以故。以未生故。亦起時故。譬如前未生時。又如當起法體。外人言。如共有因於法起時。及已起者。共起諸法有起功能故。非謂一向汝言起時故。因及未生故。因者此義不成。論者言。前染染者。中已遮。共起亦
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 前七種是法體眷屬（Dharmakāya retinue）。七眷屬中每一個都帶有一個隨眷屬。這指的是有『起』（arising）、『起起』（arising of arising）乃至『非出離』（non-cessation）。『非出離』的體性就是這些眷屬。眷屬法就是這樣。法體和合總共有十五法。『起』，是彼根本的『起』。除了它自身，能生起十四法。『起起』，是能生起『起』的，是彼根本的『起』。『住』（abiding）等等也是這樣。因為這個道理，所以沒有無窮的過失。正如我的偈頌所說： 『彼起起起時，獨起根本根；根本起起時，還起于起起。』 阿阇梨（Ācārya，導師）說：『你雖然說了這麼多，但你的意思不對。』為什麼不對呢？正如偈頌所說： 『若謂起起時，能起根本起，汝從本起生，何能起本起？』 解釋說：不是這樣產生的，因為它還沒有生起。就像之前根本沒有生起的時候。外人說：根本的『起』，能生起『起起』。這樣，『起起』能生起根本的『起』，道理正是如此。論者的偈頌說： 『若謂根本起，能起彼起起，彼從起起生，何能起起起？』 解釋說：不是這樣產生的，因為它還沒有生起。道理就是這樣。外人說：彼根本的『起』以及『起起』，這二者生起時，各自作業，所以沒有過失。論者的偈頌說： 『汝謂此起時，隨所欲作起，若此起未生，未生何能起？』 解釋說：第一句指的是根本的『起』。第二句指的是『起起』。第三句指的是生起時還沒有生起。第四句指的是根本的『起』沒有生起的功能。為什麼呢？因為它還沒有生起，也是因為生起的時候。譬如之前沒有生起的時候，又如將要生起的法體。外人說：如同共有的因在法生起時，以及已經生起的，共同生起諸法有生起的功能，不是說一概而論你說生起的時候。因為因以及未生起。因的這個道理不成立。論者說：之前染污和被染污，中間已經遮止。共同生起也是。
【English Translation】 English version The first seven are the Dharmakāya (body of the Dharma) retinue. Each of the seven retinues has an accompanying retinue. This refers to 『arising』 (utpāda), 『arising of arising』 (utpādotpāda), and even 『non-cessation』 (aniḥsarana). The nature of 『non-cessation』 is this retinue. Such is the Dharma of the retinue. The Dharmakāya combined consists of fifteen Dharmas. 『Arising』 is the fundamental 『arising』 of that. Except for itself, it can generate fourteen Dharmas. 『Arising of arising』 is what can generate 『arising』; it is the fundamental 『arising』 of that. 『Abiding』 (sthiti) and so on are also the same. Because of this reason, there is no fault of infinite regress. As my verse says: 『When that arising of arising arises, it uniquely arises from the fundamental root; when the fundamental arising arises, it in turn arises from the arising of arising.』 The Ācārya (teacher) said: 『Although you have spoken much, your meaning is not correct.』 Why is it not correct? As the verse says: 『If you say that when arising of arising arises, it can arise from the fundamental arising, how can you, who are born from the fundamental arising, arise from the fundamental arising?』 The explanation says: It does not arise in this way, because it has not yet arisen. It is like when it has not arisen at all before. The outsider says: The fundamental 『arising』 can generate 『arising of arising』. In this way, 『arising of arising』 can generate the fundamental 『arising』; the principle is exactly like this. The debater's verse says: 『If you say that the fundamental arising can generate that arising of arising, how can that, which is born from arising of arising, arise from arising of arising?』 The explanation says: It does not arise in this way, because it has not yet arisen. The principle is like this. The outsider says: That fundamental 『arising』 and 『arising of arising』, when these two arise, each performs its own function, so there is no fault. The debater's verse says: 『You say that when this arises, it arises according to what it desires to do; if this arising has not yet arisen, how can what has not yet arisen arise?』 The explanation says: The first line refers to the fundamental 『arising』. The second line refers to 『arising of arising』. The third line refers to when arising, it has not yet arisen. The fourth line refers to the fundamental 『arising』 having no function of arising. Why? Because it has not yet arisen, and also because it is the time of arising. For example, when it has not arisen before, and also like the Dharmakāya that is about to arise. The outsider says: Like the shared cause when the Dharma arises, and those that have already arisen, jointly arising Dharmas have the function of arising; it is not saying that you generally say it is the time of arising. Because of the cause and not yet arising. This principle of cause is not established. The debater says: Previously, defilement and being defiled, in the middle it has already been prevented. Joint arising is also.
遮。彼因汝言非一向者說我有過。又言。無有無窮過者。此不能避。復有人言。有別道理。避無窮過。道理云何。如偈曰。
如燈照自體 亦能照於他 起法亦復然 自起亦起彼
釋曰。以是義故。無無窮過。論者偈曰。
燈中自無暗 住處亦無暗 彼燈何所照 而言照自他
釋曰。如是燈無毫末照用。因語意爾。複次此中立驗燈體。于彼第一義中不能自照。亦不照他。何以故。以暗無故。譬如猛熾日光。複次第一義中燈不破暗。何以故。以其大故。譬如彼地。以是義故。譬喻無體。外人言。燈初起時即能破暗。如偈言。如燈能破暗。謂自體作明能除外暗。義意如是。如先所說暗無故者。此因不成。亦譬喻無體。以燈及光義可得故。論者偈曰。
云何燈起時 而能破于暗
釋曰。云何破者。謂不能破故。語義如是。偈曰。
此燈初起時 不到彼暗故
釋曰。以起時故。譬如暗燈。外人言。智非智等。非一向故。論者言。汝執此義墮前成立分中攝故。如是亦遮。非非一向也。複次起時未生故。如未生子無所作業。燈亦如是。不能作明。複次如前偈說。云何燈起時而能破于暗。此燈初起時不到彼暗故者此中立驗。第一義中彼燈起時不能破暗。何以故。以不到故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 遮（Zhe）。因為你的話，說我並非一概而論，所以說我有過錯。又說，沒有無窮的過失。這是無法避免的。又有人說，有別的道理，可以避免無窮的過失。道理是什麼呢？如偈頌所說： 『如燈照自體，亦能照於他，起法亦復然，自起亦起彼。』 解釋說：因為這個緣故，沒有無窮的過失。論者用偈頌說： 『燈中自無暗，住處亦無暗，彼燈何所照，而言照自他？』 解釋說：這樣的燈沒有絲毫的照用。這是因為語言的意義是這樣的。再次，這裡建立論證，燈的本體，在第一義（Paramārtha，終極真理）中不能自己照亮，也不能照亮其他。為什麼呢？因為沒有黑暗的緣故。譬如猛烈的日光。再次，在第一義中，燈不能破除黑暗。為什麼呢？因為它太大了。譬如大地。因為這個緣故，譬喻沒有實體。外人說，燈剛開始點亮的時候就能破除黑暗。如偈頌所說：如燈能破暗，意思是自體產生光明，能夠去除外面的黑暗。意義是這樣的。如果像先前所說沒有黑暗的緣故，這個原因就不成立。也譬喻沒有實體。因為燈和光明的意義是可以得到的。論者用偈頌說： 『云何燈起時，而能破于暗？』 解釋說：云何破除呢？意思是不能破除的緣故。語義是這樣的。偈頌說： 『此燈初起時，不到彼暗故。』 解釋說：因為剛開始點亮的時候的緣故。譬如黑暗的燈。外人說，智慧、非智慧等等，不是一概而論的緣故。論者說，你執著這個意義，屬於先前成立的部分中，所以這樣也是遮止。不是非一概而論。再次，剛開始點亮的時候還沒有產生，譬如未出生的孩子沒有所作所為。燈也是這樣，不能產生光明。再次，如先前的偈頌所說：云何燈起時而能破于暗？此燈初起時不到彼暗故，這裡建立論證，在第一義中，那燈剛開始點亮的時候不能破除黑暗。為什麼呢？因為它沒有到達黑暗的緣故。
【English Translation】 English version Zhe. Because of your words, saying that I am not one-sided, you say I have faults. And you say, there are no infinite faults. This cannot be avoided. And some say, there is another reason to avoid infinite faults. What is the reason? As the verse says: 'As a lamp illuminates itself, it can also illuminate others; the arising of phenomena is also like this, arising itself and also arising that.' The explanation says: Because of this reason, there are no infinite faults. The debater says in a verse: 'In the lamp itself there is no darkness, and in the place where it dwells there is no darkness; what does that lamp illuminate, that it is said to illuminate itself and others?' The explanation says: Such a lamp has no slightest illuminating function. This is because the meaning of the language is like this. Again, here we establish the argument that the essence of the lamp, in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha), cannot illuminate itself, nor can it illuminate others. Why? Because there is no darkness. For example, the fierce sunlight. Again, in the ultimate truth, the lamp cannot dispel darkness. Why? Because it is too large. For example, the earth. Because of this reason, the metaphor has no substance. The outsider says that the lamp can dispel darkness when it is first lit. As the verse says: As a lamp can dispel darkness, meaning that the self produces light, which can remove external darkness. The meaning is like this. If, as previously said, there is no darkness, then this reason is not established. Also, the metaphor has no substance. Because the meaning of the lamp and light can be obtained. The debater says in a verse: 'How can the lamp dispel darkness when it is lit?' The explanation says: How to dispel? Meaning that it cannot be dispelled. The semantic meaning is like this. The verse says: 'This lamp does not reach that darkness when it is first lit.' The explanation says: Because of the time when it is first lit. For example, a dark lamp. The outsider says that wisdom, non-wisdom, etc., are not one-sided. The debater says, you are attached to this meaning, which belongs to the previously established part, so this is also a refutation. It is not non-one-sided. Again, because it has not yet arisen when it is first lit, like an unborn child has no actions. The lamp is also like this, unable to produce light. Again, as the previous verse said: How can the lamp dispel darkness when it is lit? This lamp does not reach that darkness when it is first lit, here we establish the argument that in the ultimate truth, that lamp cannot dispel darkness when it is first lit. Why? Because it has not reached the darkness.
。譬如無明世界中間黑暗。複次第一義中燈不破暗。何以故。以不得所對治故。譬如彼暗。外人言。現見燈不到暗而能作明故。論者言。汝立此門增我破力。令我譬喻轉更明顯。故我無過。彼若如是今當觀察。為如所見。為復異耶。我亦不見燈不到暗而能除暗。若燈不到暗而能除暗者。是義不然。如偈曰。
若燈不到暗 而破彼暗者 燈住於此中 應破一切暗
釋曰。燈破遠暗。汝既不許。近亦如是。云何能破。複次如偈曰。
若燈能自照 亦能照他者 暗亦應如是 自障亦障他
釋曰。暗自他二不欲爾者。燈自他二豈欲得耶。複次此中立驗。第一義中燈于自他不壞所治。何以故。有能治故。譬如彼闇。如是燈體。自照照他。先已遮故。譬喻無體。是故外人引彼燈喻。成立起義。能起自他者。是則不然。以不免前無窮過故。複次若謂自起亦起他者。云何能起。為已起起。為未起起。若爾有何過。若未起起者。如偈曰。
此起若未起 云何生自他
釋曰。未起無生。以未生故。如前未生時。如是意者。先已分別。複次偈曰。
此起若已起 起復何所起
釋曰。由已起故。生於彼起。則無功用。如是觀察。汝言起者。能起自他義則不爾。以不免前無窮過故。又
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：譬如無明（avidyā，指對事物真相的迷惑和無知）世界中間的黑暗。進一步說，在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya，指最高的真理）中，燈不能破除黑暗。為什麼呢？因為燈沒有找到它所要對治的對象。就像那黑暗一樣。外人說：『現在明明看到燈不用到達黑暗就能產生光明。』論者說：『你提出這個論點反而增加了我駁斥的力量，使我的譬喻更加明顯，所以我沒有過失。』如果他們這樣說，現在應當觀察，是像所見的那樣，還是有所不同呢？我也沒看到燈不用到達黑暗就能消除黑暗。如果燈不用到達黑暗就能消除黑暗，這個道理是不成立的。』如偈頌所說： 『如果燈不到黑暗，而能破除那黑暗，燈住在這裡，就應該破除一切黑暗。』 解釋：燈破除遠處的黑暗，你既然不允許，近處的黑暗也是一樣，怎麼能破除呢？進一步說，如偈頌所說： 『如果燈能自己照亮，也能照亮其他事物，黑暗也應該這樣，自己遮蔽自己，也遮蔽其他事物。』 解釋：黑暗自己和照亮其他事物這兩者你都不希望，那麼燈自己照亮和照亮其他事物這兩者你難道希望得到嗎？進一步說，這裡設立論證：在第一義諦中，燈對於自己和他人，不破壞所要對治的。為什麼呢？因為有能對治的，譬如那黑暗。像這樣，燈的本體，自己照亮和照亮其他事物，先前已經遮止了，譬喻沒有本體。因此外人引用那燈的譬喻，成立生起義，能生起自己和他人，這是不成立的，因為不能免除前面無窮的過失。進一步說，如果說自己生起也能生起他人，怎樣才能生起呢？是已經生起後生起，還是未生起時生起？如果這樣，有什麼過失呢？如果未生起時生起，如偈頌所說： 『這個生起如果未生起，怎樣生起自己和他人？』 解釋：未生起就沒有生，因為沒有生起。如前面未生起時一樣。這樣的意思是，先前已經分別過了。進一步說，偈頌說： 『這個生起如果已經生起，生起又生起什麼呢？』 解釋：由於已經生起，生於那個生起，就沒有功用了。這樣觀察，你說生起，能生起自己和他人，這個道理是不成立的，因為不能免除前面無窮的過失。又
【English Translation】 English version: For example, the darkness in the middle of the world of ignorance (avidyā, referring to delusion and ignorance of the true nature of things). Furthermore, in the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya, referring to the highest truth), a lamp cannot dispel darkness. Why? Because it does not find what it is supposed to counteract. It is like that darkness. An outsider says: 'Now it is clearly seen that a lamp can produce light without reaching the darkness.' The debater says: 'Your proposition increases my power of refutation, making my analogy even clearer, so I have no fault.' If they say so, now we should observe whether it is like what is seen or whether it is different. I also do not see that a lamp can eliminate darkness without reaching it. If a lamp can eliminate darkness without reaching it, this reasoning is not valid.' As the verse says: 'If a lamp does not reach the darkness, but can dispel that darkness, the lamp staying here should dispel all darkness.' Explanation: You do not allow the lamp to dispel distant darkness, so it is the same with nearby darkness. How can it dispel it? Furthermore, as the verse says: 'If a lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate others, darkness should also be like that, obscuring itself and also obscuring others.' Explanation: You do not want darkness to obscure itself and others, so do you want the lamp to illuminate itself and others? Furthermore, here we establish the argument: In the ultimate truth, the lamp does not destroy what is to be counteracted in itself and others. Why? Because there is something that can counteract it, like that darkness. Like this, the essence of the lamp, illuminating itself and illuminating others, has already been prevented, and the analogy has no substance. Therefore, the outsider uses the analogy of the lamp to establish the meaning of arising, which can cause itself and others to arise. This is not valid because it cannot avoid the previous infinite faults. Furthermore, if it is said that self-arising can also cause others to arise, how can it arise? Does it arise after it has already arisen, or does it arise when it has not yet arisen? If so, what is the fault? If it arises when it has not yet arisen, as the verse says: 'If this arising has not yet arisen, how does it give rise to itself and others?' Explanation: If it has not arisen, there is no arising, because it has not arisen. It is like the time before it arose. This means that it has already been distinguished. Furthermore, the verse says: 'If this arising has already arisen, what does the arising arise from?' Explanation: Because it has already arisen, arising from that arising has no function. Observing in this way, you say arising, which can cause itself and others to arise, this reasoning is not valid because it cannot avoid the previous infinite faults. Also
彼起等成其無為。以無為故。彼諸起等非有為相。汝言相故者。因義不成。又復當問。說有起者。云何起耶。為起時起。為已起起。是皆不然。如偈曰。
起時及已起 未起皆無起 去未去去時 于彼已解釋
釋曰。如彼已驗。此中亦應如是廣說。以第一義中起時不起。何以故。異世向前故。如欲滅時。複次若謂彼法少起少未起說為起時者。是亦不然。何以故。若少起者。彼更不起。起無用故。若未起者。起亦不起。以未起故。譬如未來。外人言決定起者。來向現在。此名起時。論者言。如是義者。亦應觀察。如偈曰。
由起時名起 此義則不然 云何彼起時 而說為緣起
釋曰。彼起時者。為有為無為。亦有亦無。此等過失。如上已遮。外人言。譬如有人善解劍術。起不善心行惡逆行。自害其母以為隨順。汝亦如是。何以故。大仙為彼聲聞獨覺說深緣起。以汝久習妄想行非法行。自破所欲害正道理。此執不然。論者言。汝不知耶。有惡見人撥無因果。破壞白法不肯信受。為欲教化彼惡見人。洗濯不善垢穢義故。佛婆伽婆作如此說此有故彼有。此生故彼生。所謂無明緣行。諸如是等。為世諦故。非第一義。如是意者。是我所欲。汝言自破所欲害正理者。此語不然。如偈曰。
由
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：他們從生起等法中成就了無為法（Asamskrta-dharma，不生不滅的真如）。因為無為的緣故，這些生起等法不具有有為（Samskrta，有生滅變化）的體相。你說有『相』的緣故，這個理由是不成立的。而且我還要反問你，你說有生起，那麼這個生起是如何生起的呢？是在生起的時候生起，還是在已經生起之後再生起？這些都是不合理的。正如偈頌所說： 『生起時和已生起，以及未生起時，都沒有生起。 過去、未過去和過去時，這些都已經解釋過了。』 解釋：就像前面已經驗證過的那樣，這裡也應該像那樣廣泛地解釋。在第一義諦（Paramārtha-satya，勝義諦，最高的真理）中，生起時是不生起的。為什麼呢？因為異世是向前發展的。就像想要滅亡的時候一樣。其次，如果說某種法少部分生起，少部分未生起，就說是生起時，這也是不合理的。為什麼呢？如果少部分已經生起，那麼它就不應該再生起，因為再生起是沒有用的。如果少部分還沒有生起，那麼生起也不會生起，因為它還沒有生起，就像未來一樣。外道說，決定會生起的，從未來走向現在，這叫做生起時。論者說，像這樣的道理，也應該觀察。正如偈頌所說： 『因為生起時而名為生起，這個道理是不成立的。 怎麼能把那個生起時，說成是緣起（Pratītyasamutpāda， dependent origination）呢？』 解釋：那個生起時，是有為還是無為？或者亦有為亦無為？這些過失，就像上面已經駁斥過的那樣。外道說，譬如有人精通劍術，卻生起不善的心，做出邪惡的事情，甚至殺害自己的母親來表示順從。你也像這樣。為什麼呢？大仙（佛陀）為那些聲聞（Śrāvaka，聽聞佛法而修行的弟子）、獨覺（Pratyekabuddha，不依師而自悟的修行者）宣說甚深的緣起法，而你卻長期習慣於虛妄分別，做出不如法的事情，自己破壞自己想要的東西，損害正確的道理。這種執著是不對的。論者說，你不知道嗎？有些持有惡見的人，否定因果，破壞善良的法，不肯相信接受。爲了教化那些持有惡見的人，爲了洗滌不善的污垢，佛陀（Buddha，覺悟者）才這樣說：『因為有了這個，所以有了那個；因為有了這個生，所以有了那個生』，也就是所謂的『無明緣行』等等。這是爲了世俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya，俗諦，相對於勝義諦的世俗真理）的緣故，而不是第一義諦。像這樣的意思，才是我想要的。你說我『自己破壞自己想要的東西，損害正確的道理』，這種說法是不對的。正如偈頌所說：
【English Translation】 English version: They accomplish the unconditioned (Asamskrta-dharma) through the arising, etc. Because of the unconditioned, these arising, etc., do not have the characteristics of the conditioned (Samskrta). Your saying 'because of characteristics' is not a valid reason. Furthermore, I should ask you, you say there is arising, how does this arising arise? Does it arise at the time of arising, or does it arise after it has already arisen? All of these are unreasonable. As the verse says: 'At the time of arising and already arisen, and not yet arisen, there is no arising. Past, not past, and the time of past, these have already been explained.' Explanation: Just as it has been verified before, it should also be explained extensively here. In the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), there is no arising at the time of arising. Why? Because the different world is moving forward. Like when one wants to perish. Furthermore, if one says that a certain dharma that has arisen a little and not yet arisen a little is called the time of arising, that is also unreasonable. Why? If a little has already arisen, then it should not arise again, because arising again is useless. If a little has not yet arisen, then arising will not arise either, because it has not yet arisen, like the future. Outsiders say that what is definitely going to arise, coming from the future to the present, is called the time of arising. The debater says that such a meaning should also be observed. As the verse says: 'Because the time of arising is called arising, this reason is not valid. How can that time of arising be said to be dependent origination (Pratītyasamutpāda)?' Explanation: Is that time of arising conditioned or unconditioned? Or both conditioned and unconditioned? These faults have already been refuted above. Outsiders say, for example, someone is skilled in swordsmanship, but generates an unwholesome mind, does evil deeds, and even kills his own mother to show obedience. You are like this. Why? The Great Sage (Buddha) spoke of the profound dependent origination for those Śrāvakas (hearers) and Pratyekabuddhas (solitary realizers), but you have long been accustomed to false discriminations, doing unlawful things, destroying what you want, and harming the correct principle. This attachment is not right. The debater says, don't you know? Some people with evil views deny cause and effect, destroy good dharmas, and are unwilling to believe and accept. In order to teach those people with evil views, in order to wash away the defilements of unwholesomeness, the Buddha (Buddha) said, 'Because this exists, that exists; because this arises, that arises,' that is, the so-called 'ignorance conditions action,' and so on. This is for the sake of conventional truth (Saṃvṛti-satya), not ultimate truth. Such a meaning is what I want. Your saying that I 'destroy what I want and harm the correct principle' is not right. As the verse says:
諸法無性 自體非有故 此有彼得者 如是則不然
複次如佛說偈。若從緣生則不生。彼緣起者。體非有。若屬因緣此則空。解空者名不放逸。如是等諸經此中應廣說。由如是觀。若生未生。悉皆如幻。是故起時寂滅則無起相。如彼外人所說起時以為緣起者。第一義中驗不成故。彼為不善。復有人言。世間現見種種因緣各各果起。謂瓶衣等。更無異驗。勝現見者。如前偈說。起時及已起未起皆無起者。此不相應。以戒等起故。論者言。彼戒等聚隨順功德。誰能違者。而是世諦非第一義。彼如是等。為舍執著。為實義故。有此論起。是故無過。若汝意謂瓶衣有起者。亦是世諦非第一義。我所欲者。若瓶若衣現起可得。非彼未起。若已起者。有起不然。瓶衣等起。未起起故。如此執者。是義不然。何以故。若瓶未起安立妄覺。緣彼瓶名謂有瓶起。如是意者此但世諦安置妄覺。以瓶未生不可得故。複次鞞婆沙師言。三世有故。彼瓶等起。我義如此。論者言。此亦不然。如偈曰。
隨處若一物 未起而有體
釋曰。一物者。或瓶衣等。若於諸緣。若和合中。及於余處。體先有者。偈曰。
已有何須起
釋曰。彼若已有起。則無用故。為是因緣。偈曰。
體有起無故
釋曰。以此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 諸法沒有自性，因為它們本身並非真實存在。 如果說『因為有了這個，所以有了那個』，那麼情況並非如此。
此外，正如佛陀所說的偈頌：『如果從因緣而生，則實際上沒有生。』 那些因緣生起的事物，其本體並非真實存在。如果依賴於因緣，那麼這就是空性。理解空性的人被稱為不放逸。』 像這樣的許多經文應該在這裡廣泛地解釋。通過這樣的觀察，無論生起還是未生起，一切都如幻象。因此，生起之時即是寂滅，沒有生起的相狀。正如那些外道所說，生起之時即是緣起，這在第一義諦中是無法成立的，因此他們的觀點是不正確的。還有人說，世間現在可以見到種種因緣各自產生結果，比如瓶子、衣服等等，沒有比這更明顯的證據了。比現見更殊勝的證據，正如前面的偈頌所說，生起之時以及已經生起和未生起，都沒有生起者。這與戒律等的生起不符。論者說，那些戒律等的集合順應功德，誰能違背呢？但這是世俗諦，而非第一義諦。他們這樣說，是爲了捨棄執著，爲了真實的意義，才有了這些論述，因此沒有過失。如果你的意思是瓶子、衣服有生起，這也是世俗諦，而非第一義諦。我所要表達的是，瓶子或衣服現在生起是可以得到的，但它們未生起時則不然。如果已經生起，那麼說有生起是不對的。瓶子、衣服等的生起，是因為未生起而生起，如果這樣執著，這個觀點是不正確的。為什麼呢？如果瓶子未生起，就安立虛妄的覺知，緣于那個瓶子的名稱，認為有瓶子的生起。如果是這樣的意思，這只是世俗諦的安置，是虛妄的覺知，因為瓶子未生起是不可得的。此外，鞞婆沙師（Vaibhashika，有部宗論師）說，因為三世（過去、現在、未來）都存在，所以瓶子等才會生起，我的意思是這樣。論者說，這也是不對的。正如偈頌所說：
『如果任何事物，在任何地方，未生起時就已具有實體，』
解釋：『任何事物』，或者指瓶子、衣服等。如果在諸緣（各種因緣），或者在和合之中，或者在其他地方，本體已經存在，那麼偈頌說：
『已經有了，何須生起？』
解釋：如果它已經存在，那麼生起就沒有用處了。因為這個原因，偈頌說：
『本體存在，所以沒有生起。』
解釋：因為這個。
【English Translation】 English version All dharmas are without inherent existence, because their own nature is not truly existent. If it is said, 'Because this exists, that exists,' then it is not so.
Furthermore, as the Buddha said in a verse: 'If it arises from conditions, then it does not truly arise.' Those things that arise from conditions, their essence is not truly existent. If it depends on conditions, then this is emptiness. One who understands emptiness is called non-negligent.' Many such sutras should be extensively explained here. Through such observation, whether arising or not arising, all are like illusions. Therefore, the moment of arising is itself quiescence, and there is no aspect of arising. Just as those non-Buddhists say that the moment of arising is dependent origination, this cannot be established in the ultimate truth, therefore their view is incorrect. Some also say that in the world, one can now see various conditions each producing results, such as bottles, clothes, and so on, and there is no more obvious evidence than this. Evidence that is superior to direct perception, as the previous verse said, at the moment of arising, and whether already arisen or not yet arisen, there is no arising. This is inconsistent with the arising of precepts and so on. The debater says, those collections of precepts and so on accord with merit, who can oppose them? But this is conventional truth, not ultimate truth. They say this in order to abandon attachment, and for the sake of true meaning, these arguments arise, therefore there is no fault. If you mean that bottles and clothes have arising, this is also conventional truth, not ultimate truth. What I want to express is that bottles or clothes can be obtained when they arise now, but not when they have not yet arisen. If they have already arisen, then saying there is arising is incorrect. The arising of bottles, clothes, and so on, is because they arise from not yet arising, if one clings to this, this view is incorrect. Why? If the bottle has not yet arisen, then a false perception is established, based on the name of that bottle, thinking that there is the arising of the bottle. If this is the meaning, this is only the establishment of conventional truth, it is a false perception, because the bottle cannot be obtained when it has not yet arisen. Furthermore, the Vaibhashika (Vaibhashika, a Sarvastivadin master) says that because the three times (past, present, future) exist, therefore bottles and so on arise, this is what I mean. The debater says, this is also incorrect. As the verse says:
'If any thing, in any place, has substance before arising,'
Explanation: 'Any thing' refers to bottles, clothes, and so on. If in various conditions, or in combination, or in other places, the essence already exists, then the verse says:
'Having already existed, what need is there for arising?'
Explanation: If it already exists, then arising is useless. For this reason, the verse says:
'The essence exists, therefore there is no arising.'
Explanation: Because of this.
義故。先起有體者驗起。則無有體起者立義有過。複次執時異者。說如是言。諸法有體。云何驗知。來現世故此執不然。何以故。若來現在則破現在。如是體異相異及位異者。如先過失。皆以此答。複次僧佉人言。諸法體有。可顯了故。我無過失。論者言可顯了者。先已遮故。此不相應。複次未起有體。云何可信。僧佉復言。以世攝故。如現在物。論者言現在物者。第一義中無自體故。汝譬不成。所欲義壞。複次雖無自體亦不壞世諦。以現在時色等諸法。猶如幻等。亦可得故。彼世諦中色等諸法但假施設。應如是知。偈言起時及已起未起皆無起。如是等。先雖已答。今當更說。如偈曰。
若謂起起時 此起有所起
釋曰。彼意若謂起于起時能有所起。此執不然。有過失故。如偈曰。
彼起能起作 何等復起是
釋曰。彼起不然。以起作故。譬如父子起無自體。偈義如是。複次若如是說。更有異起能起。此起是亦有過。得何等過。偈曰。
若起更有起 此起無窮過
外人言。不起起故。無無窮過。我欲如是。論者偈曰。
若起無起起 法皆如是起
釋曰。法既不爾。起亦應然。是故不應強作分別。複次此有起者。若有體若無體。若有無體。起悉有過。如偈曰。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為這個緣故。如果先假定『起』（生起， उत्पत्ति, utpatti）具有實體，那麼在驗證『起』的時候，就會出現問題。因此，認為沒有實體的『起』是正確的，否則就犯了立義上的過失。再者，如果有人認為時間不同，並說：『一切法都有實體，如何證明呢？因為它們會來到現在世。』這種觀點是不成立的。為什麼呢？如果來到現在，那麼現在也會被破壞。像這樣，如果實體不同、相狀不同、位置不同，都可以用之前的過失來回答。此外，Sāṃkhya（僧佉，數論派）的人說：『一切法都有實體，因為它們可以被顯現出來，所以我沒有過失。』論者說：『可以被顯現』這一點，之前已經被駁斥過了，所以這種說法是不成立的。再者，未生起的『起』，如何能夠被相信呢？Sāṃkhya（僧佉）又說：『因為被世俗所攝持，就像現在的物體一樣。』論者說：『現在的物體』，在第一義諦中沒有自性，所以你的比喻是不成立的，你想要表達的意義也被破壞了。再者，即使沒有自性，也不會破壞世俗諦，因為在現在時，色等諸法，就像幻象一樣，也是可以獲得的。在世俗諦中，色等諸法只是假立的施設，應該這樣理解。偈頌說：『生起時、已生起、未生起，都沒有生起。』像這些，之前雖然已經回答過了，現在應當再次說明。如偈頌所說： 『如果認為『起』在生起時生起，那麼這個『起』就有所生起。』 解釋：他們的意思是，如果認為『起』在生起時能夠有所生起，這種觀點是不成立的，因為有過失。如偈頌所說： 『這個『起』能夠生起作用，那麼什麼又是生起呢？』 解釋：他們的『起』是不成立的，因為它能生起作用。譬如父子關係，『起』沒有自性。偈頌的意義就是這樣。再者，如果像這樣說，還有另外的『起』能夠生起，這個『起』也是有過失的。會得到什麼樣的過失呢？偈頌說： 『如果『起』還有『起』，那麼這個『起』就會有無窮的過失。』 外人說：因為『起』不生起『起』，所以沒有無窮的過失。我想要這樣說。論者的偈頌說： 『如果『起』沒有『起』而生起，那麼一切法都像這樣生起。』 解釋：既然法不是這樣生起的，那麼『起』也應該如此。所以不應該強行作出分別。再者，這個有『起』的東西，如果是有實體的，或者是沒有實體的，或者是有無實體的，『起』都會有過失。如偈頌所說：
【English Translation】 English version: Because of this reason. If one first assumes that 'arising' (utpatti) has substance, then when verifying 'arising', a problem will occur. Therefore, it is correct to consider that 'arising' has no substance, otherwise, one commits an error in establishing the thesis. Furthermore, if someone argues that time is different, and says: 'All dharmas have substance, how can it be proven? Because they come to the present world.' This view is not valid. Why? If it comes to the present, then the present will also be destroyed. Like this, if the substance is different, the characteristics are different, the positions are different, all can be answered with the previous faults. Moreover, the Sāṃkhya (enumeration) school says: 'All dharmas have substance because they can be manifested, so I have no fault.' The debater says: 'Can be manifested' has already been refuted before, so this statement is not valid. Furthermore, how can the 'arising' that has not arisen be believed? The Sāṃkhya again says: 'Because it is grasped by the mundane, like present objects.' The debater says: 'Present objects' have no self-nature in the ultimate truth, so your analogy is not valid, and the meaning you want to express is destroyed. Furthermore, even if there is no self-nature, it will not destroy the mundane truth, because in the present time, dharmas such as form, etc., like illusions, can also be obtained. In the mundane truth, dharmas such as form, etc., are only provisional establishments, and should be understood in this way. The verse says: 'Arising time, already arisen, not yet arisen, all have no arising.' Like these, although they have been answered before, they should be explained again now. As the verse says: 'If it is thought that 'arising' arises at the time of arising, then this 'arising' has something that arises.' Explanation: Their meaning is that if it is thought that 'arising' can arise at the time of arising, this view is not valid because there is a fault. As the verse says: 'This 'arising' can produce an effect, then what is arising?' Explanation: Their 'arising' is not valid because it can produce an effect. For example, the relationship between father and son, 'arising' has no self-nature. The meaning of the verse is like this. Furthermore, if it is said like this, there is another 'arising' that can arise, this 'arising' also has a fault. What kind of fault will be obtained? The verse says: 'If 'arising' has another 'arising', then this 'arising' will have an infinite fault.' The outsider says: Because 'arising' does not arise 'arising', there is no infinite fault. I want to say it like this. The debater's verse says: 'If 'arising' arises without 'arising', then all dharmas arise like this.' Explanation: Since dharmas do not arise like this, then 'arising' should also be like this. Therefore, one should not forcibly make distinctions. Furthermore, this thing that has 'arising', if it has substance, or has no substance, or has both substance and no substance, 'arising' will have a fault. As the verse says:
有體起無用 無體起無依 有無體亦然 此義先已說
釋曰。何處先說。如觀緣品中偈說。非有亦非無。諸緣義應爾。又如偈言。非有非不有。非有無法起。如先已遮。不復更釋。複次如偈曰。
若滅時有起 此義則不然
釋曰。以滅時故。譬如死時。外人言。未滅時起。是故無過。論者偈曰。
法若無滅時 彼體不可得
釋曰。以彼體相不相應故。如虛空花。偈意如是。外人言。住非一向故。論者言。彼亦無常隨故。未滅時不成。我無過咎。如前廣說。外人言。有如是起。彼所起法有故。此若無者。彼所起法則不得有。如用龜毛為衣。二皆無體以起成故。住法則有。是故如所說。因起非無體。論者言。起無體故所起不成。雖世諦中說有此起。第一義中則無住相。今問此體。為未住體住。為已住體住。為住時體住。第一義中。三皆不然。如偈曰。
未住體不住 住體亦不住 住時亦不住 無起誰當住
釋曰。第一句者。由非住故。譬如滅。第二句者。以現在世及過去世二世一時不可得故。住義則空。第三句者。離住未住更無住時。有者不然。廣如前破。第四句者。無一物起無一物住。偈意如是。複次第一義中無一物體起相可得。從前已來廣引道理。令人解了起
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『有體起無用，無體起無依，有無體亦然，此義先已說。』 解釋：哪裡先說了這個道理？就像《觀緣品》中的偈頌所說：『非有亦非無，諸緣義應爾。』（萬法的生起既不是憑空產生，也不是完全沒有原因，而是各種因緣和合的結果。）又如偈頌所說：『非有非不有，非有無法起。』（既不能說它是存在，也不能說它是不存在，因為沒有一個獨立存在的法可以生起。）這些之前已經遮破過了，不再重複解釋。接下來還有偈頌說： 『若滅時有起，此義則不然。』 解釋：因為是在滅的時候生起。比如人死的時候。外道說：在沒有滅的時候生起，所以沒有過失。論者用偈頌回答： 『法若無滅時，彼體不可得。』 解釋：因為那個實體的相狀不符合實際，就像虛空中的花朵一樣。偈頌的意思是這樣。外道說：住不是一成不變的。論者說：它也是無常變化的。沒有滅的時候不能成立，我沒有過錯。就像前面廣泛論述的那樣。外道說：有這樣的生起，它所生起的法是存在的，如果這個生起不存在，那麼它所生起的法就不可能存在，就像用烏龜的毛做衣服一樣，兩者都沒有實體，因為生起才成立。住這個法是存在的，所以像你所說的，因為生起不是沒有實體。論者說：生起沒有實體，所以它所生起的法不能成立。雖然在世俗諦中說有這個生起，但在第一義諦中沒有住的相狀。現在問你這個實體，是未住的實體住，還是已住的實體住，還是住的時候的實體住？在第一義諦中，這三種情況都不成立。就像偈頌所說： 『未住體不住，住體亦不住，住時亦不住，無起誰當住？』 解釋：第一句，因為不是住的狀態，就像滅一樣。第二句，因為現在世和過去世不能同時存在，所以住的意義是空洞的。第三句，離開住和未住，沒有住的時候。如果有人說有，那是不對的，前面已經廣泛地破斥過了。第四句，沒有一個東西生起，也沒有一個東西住。偈頌的意思是這樣。進一步說，在第一義諦中，沒有一個實體的生起相可以得到。從前面到現在，廣泛地引用道理，讓人理解生起。
【English Translation】 English version 'If something arises from an existing entity, it's useless; if it arises from a non-existing entity, it's without support; the same applies to entities that both exist and don't exist. This meaning has already been explained.' Explanation: Where was this explained before? It's like the verse in the 'Contemplation on Conditions' chapter: 'Neither existent nor non-existent; the meaning of conditions should be understood thus.' (The arising of all dharmas is neither spontaneously generated nor completely without cause, but rather the result of the combination of various conditions.) And like the verse that says: 'Neither existent nor non-non-existent; no dharma can arise without existence.' (It cannot be said that it exists, nor can it be said that it does not exist, because no independently existing dharma can arise.) These have already been refuted before, so I won't explain them again. Furthermore, as the verse says: 'If arising occurs at the time of cessation, this meaning is not valid.' Explanation: Because it arises at the time of cessation, like the time of death. The outsider says: It arises when it has not yet ceased, so there is no fault. The debater replies with a verse: 'If a dharma has no time of cessation, its entity cannot be obtained.' Explanation: Because the characteristic of that entity does not correspond to reality, like a flower in the sky. That's the meaning of the verse. The outsider says: Abiding is not fixed. The debater says: It is also impermanent and changing. It cannot be established when it has not ceased, I have no fault. As explained extensively before. The outsider says: There is such an arising, and the dharma that arises from it exists. If this arising does not exist, then the dharma that arises from it cannot exist, like using tortoise hair to make clothes, both have no entity because arising is established. The dharma of abiding exists, so as you say, because arising is not without entity. The debater says: Arising has no entity, so the dharma that arises from it cannot be established. Although it is said in conventional truth that there is this arising, in ultimate truth there is no characteristic of abiding. Now I ask you about this entity, does the entity that has not yet abided abide, or does the entity that has already abided abide, or does the entity abide at the time of abiding? In ultimate truth, none of these three situations are valid. As the verse says: 'The entity that has not yet abided does not abide, the entity that is abiding also does not abide, the time of abiding also does not abide, if there is no arising, who will abide?' Explanation: The first line, because it is not the state of abiding, like cessation. The second line, because the present and past cannot exist simultaneously, so the meaning of abiding is empty. The third line, apart from abiding and not abiding, there is no time of abiding. If someone says there is, that is incorrect, and it has been extensively refuted before. The fourth line, no thing arises, and no thing abides. That's the meaning of the verse. Furthermore, in ultimate truth, no characteristic of the arising of an entity can be obtained. From the beginning until now, reasoning has been extensively cited to make people understand arising.
既不成。誰為住者。由此義故。汝先說言所起之法起有因者。此皆不成。複次如偈曰。
滅時有住者 是義則不然
釋曰。以相違故。若相違法。則不同時。如烈日光。不與暗並。偈意如是。外人言。彼未滅時。體可得故。論者偈曰。
若法無滅時 彼體不可得
釋曰。以諸有為法無常隨逐故。複次彼體不可得。何以故。無滅時故。如虛空花。偈意如是。複次若汝意謂已起剎那住相有力。當於爾時法體不滅。亦不是常。以住無間次即有老無常隨逐故。此執不然。何以故。若此色等住相用時無無常者。后時亦無。無常隨逐。如火處無水。火於後時亦不作水。住義亦然。外人言。世間現見法體滅盡。云何言無。論者言此應觀察。汝見滅者。是滅與體。為恒相隨。為各別處。若與相隨即無住義。若在別處。體無滅時。既無滅時。體不可得。二俱不然。複次有聰慢者。或如是言。譬如有人先無佛體后時得佛。住亦如是。先雖無滅后時滅者。竟有何咎。此執不然。何以故。無佛體者。謂無一切智相用。凡夫智后時得佛者。無如此義。於世諦中此方便語。亦不成立。如是斷煩惱障及彼境障。最後剎那智相起時。說名得佛。彼智與佛體無差別。如汝所言。無實道理。如是老住。若一若異者。亦同此過。由此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：既然不成，那麼誰是住者（保持存在狀態的事物）呢？由於這個原因，你先前所說的『所生之法，生起有因』，這些都不能成立。此外，如偈頌所說： 『滅時有住者，是義則不然。』 解釋：因為相互矛盾的緣故。如果相互違法，則不能同時存在。就像強烈的陽光，不能與黑暗並存。偈頌的意思是這樣。外人說：『在它未滅的時候，本體是可以得到的。』論者說： 『若法無滅時，彼體不可得。』 解釋：因為一切有為法都伴隨著無常的緣故。此外，那個本體是不可得的。為什麼呢？因為沒有滅時。就像虛空中的花朵。偈頌的意思是這樣。此外，如果你認為已經生起的剎那住相是有力量的，在那個時候法體不會滅，也不是常住的，因為住的無間隙之後緊接著就是衰老，無常伴隨著它。這種執著是不對的。為什麼呢？如果這個色等等的住相起作用的時候沒有無常，那麼之後也不會有無常伴隨著它。就像火的地方沒有水，火在之後也不會變成水。住的道理也是這樣。外人說：『世間現在看到法體滅盡，怎麼能說沒有呢？』論者說：『這應該觀察。你所看到的滅，是滅與體恒常相隨，還是在不同的地方？』如果與相隨，就沒有住的意義。如果在不同的地方，體就沒有滅的時候。既然沒有滅的時候，體就不可得。兩者都不對。此外，有些自作聰明的人，或者這樣說：『譬如有人先前沒有佛的身體，後來得到了佛。住也是這樣，先前雖然沒有滅，後來滅了，究竟有什麼過失呢？』這種執著是不對的。為什麼呢？沒有佛的身體，是指沒有一切智的相用。凡夫的智慧，後來得到佛，沒有這樣的道理。在世俗諦中，這種方便的說法，也不能成立。就像斷除煩惱障以及它的境界障，最後剎那的智慧相起的時候，說名為得佛。那個智慧與佛的身體沒有差別。就像你所說的，沒有真實的道理。像這樣，衰老和住，如果是一或者異，也同樣有這個過失。因為這個原因。
【English Translation】 English version: Since it does not hold, who is the dweller (the thing that maintains a state of existence)? Because of this reason, your previous statement that 'the arising dharma arises with a cause' is untenable. Furthermore, as the verse says: 'If there is a dweller at the time of cessation, this meaning is not so.' Explanation: Because of mutual contradiction. If they are mutually contradictory, they cannot exist simultaneously. Like the intense sunlight, it cannot coexist with darkness. The meaning of the verse is like this. The outsider says: 'When it has not ceased, the substance can be obtained.' The debater says: 'If a dharma has no time of cessation, its substance cannot be obtained.' Explanation: Because all conditioned dharmas are accompanied by impermanence. Furthermore, that substance is unobtainable. Why? Because there is no time of cessation. Like flowers in the sky (Śūnyatā-空性). The meaning of the verse is like this. Furthermore, if you think that the momentary aspect of dwelling that has already arisen has power, at that time the dharma body will not cease, nor will it be permanent, because immediately after the dwelling there is aging, and impermanence accompanies it. This attachment is incorrect. Why? If this aspect of dwelling of form, etc., has no impermanence when it functions, then there will be no impermanence accompanying it later. Just as there is no water where there is fire, fire will not become water later. The principle of dwelling is also like this. The outsider says: 'The world now sees the dharma body ceasing completely, how can you say there is none?' The debater says: 'This should be observed. The cessation you see, is the cessation and the substance constantly accompanying each other, or are they in different places?' If they accompany each other, there is no meaning of dwelling. If they are in different places, the substance has no time of cessation. Since there is no time of cessation, the substance cannot be obtained. Both are incorrect. Furthermore, some conceited people may say: 'For example, someone previously had no Buddha body (Buddha-佛), and later obtained the Buddha. Dwelling is also like this, although there was no cessation before, it ceased later, what fault is there?' This attachment is incorrect. Why? Not having the Buddha body means not having the aspect of all-knowing wisdom. A common person's wisdom later obtaining the Buddha, there is no such principle. In conventional truth (Saṃvṛti-satya-世俗諦), this expedient saying cannot be established. Just like cutting off the afflictive obscurations and their object obscurations, when the aspect of wisdom arises in the final moment, it is said to be obtaining the Buddha. That wisdom is no different from the Buddha's body. Just as you say, there is no real reason. Like this, aging and dwelling, whether they are one or different, also have this fault. Because of this reason.
不成故。阿阇梨偈曰。
彼一切諸法 恒時有老死 何等是住法 而無老死相
釋曰。若有起者。隨是體處。有住可見。起可得成。今則不爾。是故彼立因義不成。複次汝等欲得彼住住者。為住能自住。為假異住住。二俱不然。如偈曰。
住異住未住 此義則不然 如起不自起 亦不從他起
釋曰。云何起者。自起不然。如前說偈。此起若未起。云何得自生。若已起能生。生復何所起故。云何不從他生。如先偈言。若起更有起。此起無窮過故。住亦如此。偈曰。
此住若未住 自體云何住 此住若已住 住已何須住 住若異住住 此住則無窮 住若無住住 法皆如是住
釋曰。此二偈是釋義偈。非論本偈。前遮自住住。如遮自體起。后遮他住住。如遮從他起。應如此知。是故當知。住無自體。如汝先說。有如是起。彼有體故。法有體者。此因不成。外人言。第一義中有此起住。何以故。共行諸法彼體有故。此若無者。彼共行法體應不有。譬如馬角由起住有故。彼共行滅有。是故第一義中說因力故。起住是有。論者言。滅亦如是。謂此體已滅未滅滅時。欲令有滅者。一切不然。如偈曰。
未滅法不滅 已滅法不滅 滅時亦不滅 無生何等滅
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 不成故（因為這個原因不成立）。阿阇梨（Acharya，導師）說偈語： 『彼一切諸法，恒時有老死，何等是住法，而無老死相？』 釋曰（解釋說）：若有起者（如果事物有生起），隨是體處（無論在哪個狀態），有住可見（就能看到它的存在）。起可得成（生起才能成立）。今則不爾（現在不是這樣）。是故彼立因義不成（所以你所立的因是不成立的）。複次汝等欲得彼住住者（再者，你們想要得到那個住的狀態），為住能自住（是住自己能夠存在），為假異住住（還是依靠不同的住而存在）？二俱不然（兩者都不對）。如偈曰： 『住異住未住，此義則不然，如起不自起，亦不從他起。』 釋曰（解釋說）：云何起者（什麼是生起）？自起不然（自己生起是不成立的）。如前說偈（就像前面說的偈語）。此起若未起（這個生起如果還沒有生起），云何得自生（怎麼能自己產生）？若已起能生（如果已經生起才能產生），生復何所起故（那麼這個生起又從哪裡產生呢）？云何不從他生（為什麼不能從其他事物產生呢）？如先偈言（就像之前的偈語說的）：若起更有起（如果一個生起之後還有另一個生起），此起無窮過故（這樣生起就無窮無盡了）。住亦如此（住也是這樣）。偈曰： 『此住若未住，自體云何住？此住若已住，住已何須住？住若異住住，此住則無窮，住若無住住，法皆如是住。』 釋曰（解釋說）：此二偈是釋義偈（這兩句偈語是解釋意義的偈語），非論本偈（不是論的根本偈語）。前遮自住住（前面否定了自己存在），如遮自體起（就像否定自己產生一樣）。后遮他住住（後面否定了依靠其他事物存在），如遮從他起（就像否定從其他事物產生一樣）。應如此知（應該這樣理解）。是故當知（所以應當知道），住無自體（住沒有自己的本體）。如汝先說（就像你之前說的），有如是起（有這樣的生起），彼有體故（因為它有本體）。法有體者（如果法有本體），此因不成（這個因就不成立）。外人言（外道說）：第一義中有此起住（在第一義諦中，有生起和存在）。何以故（為什麼呢）？共行諸法彼體有故（因為共同作用的諸法有它的本體）。此若無者（如果這個沒有），彼共行法體應不有（那麼共同作用的法的本體就不應該存在）。譬如馬角（比如馬的角），由起住有故（因為生起和存在而存在）。彼共行滅有（共同作用的滅也是存在的）。是故第一義中說因力故（所以在第一義諦中說，因為因的力量），起住是有（生起和存在是存在的）。論者言（論者說）：滅亦如是（滅也是這樣）。謂此體已滅未滅滅時（意思是說，這個本體已經滅、未滅、滅的時候），欲令有滅者（想要讓滅存在），一切不然（一切都不成立）。如偈曰： 『未滅法不滅，已滅法不滅，滅時亦不滅，無生何等滅？』
【English Translation】 English version: It is not established, because of this reason. The Acharya (teacher) says in a verse: 'All these dharmas (phenomena) are constantly subject to aging and death. What kind of abiding dharma (phenomenon) is there that has no characteristics of aging and death?' Explanation: If there is arising, then wherever its substance is, its abiding can be seen. Arising can be established. But now it is not so. Therefore, the meaning of your established cause is not established. Furthermore, you want to obtain that abiding state. Does abiding abide by itself, or does it abide by relying on a different abiding? Neither is correct. As the verse says: 'Abiding by a different abiding, or by a not-yet-abiding, this meaning is not so. Just as arising does not arise by itself, nor does it arise from another.' Explanation: How does arising arise? It is not that it arises by itself, as the previous verse said. If this arising has not yet arisen, how can it arise by itself? If it can arise only after it has already arisen, then from where does this arising arise again? Why can't it arise from another? As the previous verse said, if there is arising after arising, then this arising has the fault of being endless. Abiding is also like this. The verse says: 'If this abiding has not yet abided, how can its own substance abide? If this abiding has already abided, why does it need to abide again after abiding? If abiding abides by a different abiding, then this abiding is endless. If abiding abides without abiding, then all dharmas (phenomena) abide in this way.' Explanation: These two verses are explanatory verses, not the fundamental verses of the treatise. The former negates abiding by itself, just as it negates arising by itself. The latter negates abiding by another, just as it negates arising from another. It should be understood in this way. Therefore, it should be known that abiding has no own-nature. As you said before, there is such an arising because it has a substance. If dharmas (phenomena) have a substance, then this cause is not established. Outsiders say: In the ultimate truth, there is this arising and abiding. Why? Because the dharmas (phenomena) that act together have their substance. If this does not exist, then the substance of the dharmas (phenomena) that act together should not exist. For example, a horse's horn exists because of arising and abiding. The cessation that acts together with them also exists. Therefore, in the ultimate truth, it is said that arising and abiding exist because of the power of the cause. The debater says: Cessation is also like this. That is to say, regarding this substance, whether it has already ceased, has not yet ceased, or is ceasing, it is not at all established that cessation exists. As the verse says: 'A dharma (phenomenon) that has not ceased does not cease, a dharma (phenomenon) that has already ceased does not cease, nor does it cease at the time of ceasing. If there is no arising, what cessation is there?'
釋曰。第一句者。以滅空故。譬如住。第二句者。如人已死。不復更死。第三句者。離彼已滅及未滅。法更無滅時。有俱過故。是故定知滅時不滅。複次第一義中滅時不滅。以世傳流故。如當起法來現在者。第四句者。其義云何。一切諸法皆不生故。言無生者。生相無故。無生有滅。義則不然。如石女兒。如是彼欲起者及不起者。於一切時有滅不然。複次法住無住彼分別滅。二俱不然。如偈曰。
法體若住者 滅相不可得
釋曰。以住故無滅世間悉解。若汝言無住有滅無過失者。是亦不然。如偈曰。
法體若無住 滅亦不可得
釋曰。以無住故如彼滅相。複次此法為當即住此位滅耶。為住異位滅耶。外人言。此言何謂。論者偈曰。
彼於此位時 不即此位滅 彼于異位時 亦非異位滅
釋曰。不即此位滅者。以不捨自體故。譬如乳住乳位亦不于彼異位時滅。何以故。此中說驗。第一義中乳不于彼酪位時滅。以彼異故。如異瓶等。復有人言。有如是滅。依止體故。譬如彼熟。論者偈曰。
若一切諸法 起相不可得 以無起相故 有滅亦不然
釋曰。諸法不起如前已說。未熟已熟此執不成。譬喻無體。複次汝言滅者為有體滅耶。為無體滅耶。二俱不然。如偈
曰。
法若有體者 有則無滅相
釋曰。以相違故。譬如水火。由如是故。偈曰。
一法有有無 于義不應爾
複次偈曰。
法若無體者 有滅亦不然 如無第二頭 不可言其斷
釋曰。偈譬喻者。以其無故。以此無體驗有滅者。是義不然。法體壞故。複次汝等若言第一義中有彼滅相及隨滅者。為是自滅。為是他滅。二俱不然。如偈曰。
法不自體滅 他體亦不滅 如自體不起 他體亦不起
釋曰。自體起者。此不相應。如前已說。此起若未起。云何能自生。此起若已生。生復何所起。他體起者。如偈言。此起若異起。起則無窮過故。起既如此。滅亦類然。滅類偈者。此滅若未滅。云何能自滅。此滅若已壞。滅復何所壞。此滅若異滅。滅則無窮過。滅若無滅。滅法皆如是壞。此釋義偈應知。如自他起前已廣遮。自他滅者。類同起破。有人言。得壞因時壞法方壞者。應如是答汝立壞因。是義不然。何以故。彼法非是。此法壞因。以彼異故。譬如余物。品初已來。廣遮彼說。如是起住。以第一義中起因不成。譬亦無體。若世諦中說因譬喻者。違汝義故。如前立驗。已廣分別道理自在故。如偈曰。
起住壞不成 故無有有為
釋曰。如外人所說。有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問： 如果法有自性，那麼有就不會有滅的現象。 解釋：因為有和滅是相互矛盾的。就像水和火一樣。因此，偈頌說： 一個法如果既有有，又有無，在道理上是不應該的。 進一步說，偈頌說： 如果法沒有自性，那麼有和滅也是不成立的。 就像沒有第二個頭，就不能說它被砍斷了一樣。 解釋：偈頌用比喻來說明，因為法沒有自性。如果認為沒有自性的東西會有生滅，這是不合道理的。因為法的本體已經壞滅了。進一步說，如果你們認為在第一義諦中有滅相以及隨之而來的滅，那麼這種滅是自身滅，還是他體滅？這兩種說法都不對。如偈頌所說： 法不會自己滅亡，也不會被他體滅亡。 就像自體不會生起，他體也不會生起一樣。 解釋：自體生起是不相應的，正如前面已經說過的。如果這個生起還沒有生起，怎麼能自己產生呢？如果這個生起已經生起，那麼生起又從何處生起呢？他體生起，如偈頌所說：如果這個生起是從不同的東西生起的，那麼生起就會有無窮的過失。生起既然如此，滅也是一樣的。滅的類比偈頌是：這個滅如果還沒有滅亡，怎麼能自己滅亡呢？如果這個滅已經壞滅，那麼滅又壞滅了什麼呢？如果這個滅是從不同的東西滅亡的，那麼滅就會有無窮的過失。如果滅沒有滅亡，那麼滅法都會這樣壞滅。這個解釋義理的偈頌應該知道。就像自體和他體生起，前面已經廣泛地遮破了。自體和他體滅亡，與生起的破斥類似。如果有人說，得到壞滅的因緣時，壞滅的法才會壞滅，那麼應該這樣回答：你所立的壞滅的因緣，這個道理是不成立的。為什麼呢？因為那個法不是這個法壞滅的因緣，因為它們是不同的。就像其餘的物體一樣。從一開始，就廣泛地遮破了他們的說法。像這樣生起、住留，因為在第一義諦中生起的因緣是不成立的，所以比喻也沒有本體。如果在世俗諦中說因緣和比喻，就違背了你們的義理。就像前面所立的論證，已經廣泛地分別了道理，所以是自在的。如偈頌所說： 生起、住留、壞滅都不成立，所以沒有有為法。 解釋：就像外道所說的，有……
【English Translation】 English version: Said: If dharma has a substance, then existence would not have the characteristic of cessation. Explanation: Because existence and cessation are contradictory. Like water and fire. Therefore, the verse says: If a single dharma has both existence and non-existence, it should not be so in principle. Furthermore, the verse says: If dharma has no substance, then existence and cessation are also not established. Like not being able to say a second head is severed, because it doesn't exist. Explanation: The verse uses a metaphor because dharma has no substance. If one thinks that something without substance can have existence and cessation, that is unreasonable. Because the essence of dharma is already destroyed. Furthermore, if you say that in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha, 第一義諦) there is the characteristic of cessation and the cessation that follows, is this cessation self-cessation or other-cessation? Neither of these is correct. As the verse says: Dharma does not cease by itself, nor does it cease by another. Just as self does not arise, nor does another arise. Explanation: Self-arising is not corresponding, as has been said before. If this arising has not yet arisen, how can it produce itself? If this arising has already arisen, then from where does arising arise again? Other-arising, as the verse says: If this arising arises from something different, then arising will have infinite faults. Since arising is like this, cessation is the same. The analogy verse for cessation is: If this cessation has not yet ceased, how can it cease itself? If this cessation has already been destroyed, then what does cessation destroy again? If this cessation ceases from something different, then cessation will have infinite faults. If cessation has no cessation, then all dharmas of cessation will be destroyed in this way. This verse explaining the meaning should be understood. Just like self and other arising, it has already been widely refuted before. Self and other cessation are similar to the refutation of arising. If someone says that when the cause of destruction is obtained, the dharma that is to be destroyed will be destroyed, then one should answer like this: The cause of destruction that you establish, this principle is not established. Why? Because that dharma is not the cause of destruction of this dharma, because they are different. Like the rest of the objects. From the beginning, their statement has been widely refuted. Like this arising and abiding, because the cause of arising is not established in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha, 第一義諦), so the metaphor also has no substance. If one speaks of cause and metaphor in conventional truth (Saṃvṛti, 世俗諦), then it violates your principle. Just like the argument established earlier, the principle has been widely distinguished, so it is independent. As the verse says: Arising, abiding, and ceasing are not established, so there is no conditioned dharma (Saṃskṛta, 有為法). Explanation: As the outsiders say, there is...
彼陰等諸有為法。以有為相和合故者。彼為已破。復有人言。第一義中有彼牛等諸有為法。何以故。以角犎垂𩑶等相有故。此亦應遮。汝立此等有為相者。為更有相。為更無相。若更有相。此角犎等則非牛體有為相也。何以故。以有相故。譬如牛實。廣如前破。若更無相者。以無相故。此等諸相自然不成。以能相無力故。所相亦無。又有相者。相無窮過。此等一切如先廣遮。復有人言。第一義中有是有為。何以故。有待對故。此若無者。應無待對。如石女兒。以彼有為無為二法相待由此因故。第一義中有是有為。論者言。若有為法得成立者。除有為故。可說無為。彼有為法。如理諦觀體不可得。是故偈曰。
有為不成故 云何有無為
釋曰。如兔角無生。於世諦中亦不作實解。應知此意。以是義故。因等無體。若爾云何分別有諸相等。為世諦故。如偈曰。
如夢亦如幻 如乾闥婆城 說有起住壞 其相亦如是
釋曰。諸仙知彼有為起等。能生覺因。開實知見。如彼智人所說起等。是我所欲。由無智者覆慧眼故。于無實境起增上慢。如夢中語說彼諸法起住滅等。此由染污熏習。各執異因分別三種。謂有實義。為示彼故。說夢幻等三種譬喻應知。有人言。起等是有。何以故。現前覺取故。譬
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果認為『彼陰等諸有為法，以有為相和合故』成立，那麼這種觀點已經被駁斥了。又有人說，在第一義諦（Paramārtha-satya）中，存在著牛等有為法（saṃskṛta-dharma）。為什麼呢？因為有角、犎（牛背上的隆肉）、垂（下垂的肉）、𩑶（牛頸下的垂皮）等相存在。這也應該被駁斥。你所建立的這些有為相，是更有其他相，還是更無其他相呢？如果更有其他相，那麼這些角、犎等就不是牛的本體的有為相了。為什麼呢？因為它們還有其他的相。譬如牛的實體，如同前面所破斥的那樣。如果更無其他相，那麼因為沒有相，這些相自然不能成立。因為能相（laksana）沒有力量，所以所相（laksya）也沒有。而且，如果有相，就會有相無窮的過失。這些都像先前那樣廣泛地遮破。又有人說，在第一義諦中，『有』是有為法。為什麼呢？因為有待對（apekṣā）的緣故。如果『有』不存在，就應該沒有待對，就像石女兒一樣。因為有為和無為這兩種法相互對待，由於這個原因，在第一義諦中，『有』是有為法。論者說，如果有為法能夠成立，那麼排除有為法，才能說無為法。但是，有為法如果如理如實地觀察，其體性是不可得的。所以偈頌說： 『有為不成故，云何有無為』 解釋說：如同兔角沒有生起一樣，在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya）中也不應作真實的理解。應該明白這個意思。因為這個緣故，因等沒有自體。如果這樣，那麼如何分別有諸相呢？爲了世俗諦的緣故。如偈頌說： 『如夢亦如幻，如乾闥婆城，說有起住壞，其相亦如是』 解釋說：諸仙知道那些有為法的生起等，能夠產生覺悟的原因，開啟真實的知見。如同那些智者所說的生起等，是我所希望的。由於沒有智慧的人覆蓋了智慧之眼，對於沒有實體的境界產生增上慢（adhimāna）。如同夢中的語言，說那些諸法的生起、住、滅等。這是由於染污的熏習，各自執著不同的原因，分別三種，認為有真實的意義。爲了顯示這些，應該知道夢、幻等三種譬喻。有人說，生起等是存在的。為什麼呢？因為現前覺取到的緣故。譬如...
【English Translation】 English version: If it is considered that 'those conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta-dharma) such as the aggregates (skandha), are combined because of conditioned characteristics,' then this view has already been refuted. Again, someone says that in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), there exist conditioned dharmas such as cows. Why? Because there are characteristics such as horns, humps (kūṭa), dewlaps (lambana), and neck folds (valī). This should also be refuted. These conditioned characteristics that you establish, do they have other characteristics, or do they have no other characteristics? If they have other characteristics, then these horns, humps, etc., are not the conditioned characteristics of the cow's essence. Why? Because they have other characteristics. For example, the substance of the cow, as refuted earlier. If they have no other characteristics, then because there are no characteristics, these characteristics naturally cannot be established. Because the characterizing (laksana) has no power, the characterized (laksya) also does not exist. Moreover, if there are characteristics, there will be the fault of infinite characteristics. All of these are refuted extensively as before. Again, someone says that in the ultimate truth, 'existence' is conditioned. Why? Because there is dependence (apekṣā). If 'existence' did not exist, there should be no dependence, like the child of a barren woman. Because conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are mutually dependent, for this reason, in the ultimate truth, 'existence' is conditioned. The debater says, if conditioned dharmas could be established, then by excluding conditioned dharmas, one could speak of unconditioned dharmas. However, if conditioned dharmas are observed truthfully and rationally, their essence is unattainable. Therefore, the verse says: 'Because the conditioned is not established, how can there be the unconditioned?' The explanation says: Just as a rabbit's horn does not arise, one should not understand it as real in conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya) either. One should understand this meaning. For this reason, causes, etc., have no self-nature. If so, how are the various characteristics distinguished? For the sake of conventional truth. As the verse says: 'Like a dream, like an illusion, like a city of Gandharvas (gandharva-nagara), it is said there is arising, abiding, and ceasing; their characteristics are also like that.' The explanation says: The sages know that the arising, etc., of those conditioned dharmas can generate the cause of awakening and open up true knowledge and vision. Like the arising, etc., spoken of by those wise people, is what I desire. Because those without wisdom cover their eyes of wisdom, they develop arrogance (adhimāna) towards unreal realms. Like the words in a dream, saying that those dharmas arise, abide, and cease, etc. This is due to the熏習(vāsanā) of defilements, each clinging to different causes, distinguishing three kinds, thinking there is real meaning. To show these, one should know the three metaphors of dream, illusion, etc. Someone says that arising, etc., exist. Why? Because they are apprehended directly. For example...
如色。又作者有故。亦相續同取故。如是說者。此執不然。何以故。非一向故。為開示彼。如其數量說夢等譬喻應知。複次佛婆伽婆。見真實者為聲聞乘對治惑障故。作如是說。色如聚沫受喻水泡。想同陽焰。行似芭蕉。識譬幻事。此意欲令知我我所本無自性。猶如光影。亦為大乘對治惑障及智障故。說有為法本無自體。如金剛般若經說。一切有為法。如星翳燈幻。露泡夢電云。應作如是觀。欲令他解有為無體。是此品義。是故得成。如般若波羅蜜經中說。佛告極勇猛菩薩言。善男子。色非有為非無為。受想行識亦復如是。若色受想行識非有為非無為者。此是般若波羅蜜。又如楞伽經說。有為無為無自體相。但彼凡夫愚癡妄執分別有異。猶如石女夢見抱兒又如金剛般若經說。須菩提。凡所有相皆是虛妄。若見諸相非相。則見如來。如是等諸修多羅此中應廣說。
釋觀有為相品竟。
般若燈論釋卷第五 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 般若燈論釋
般若燈論釋卷第六
偈本龍樹菩薩 釋論分別明菩薩
大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅譯
觀作者業品第八
複次空所對治。欲令驗知陰無體義。有此品起。有人言。第一義中有陰入界。婆伽婆說。以此為因。起作者作
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果說色法（Rupa）的作者存在，並且相續的眾生共同執取色法，那麼這種說法是不正確的。為什麼呢？因為它不是絕對的。爲了開示這一點，應該按照色法的數量，用夢等譬喻來理解。此外，佛（Buddha）世尊（Bhagavan），作為證悟真實者，爲了聲聞乘（Śrāvakayāna）對治煩惱障，這樣說：色如聚沫，受如水泡，想如陽焰，行如芭蕉，識如幻事。這是爲了讓人們知道『我』和『我所』（Atman and Atman belonging）本來就沒有自性，就像光和影一樣。也爲了大乘（Mahāyāna）對治煩惱障和智障，說有為法（Saṃskṛta）本來就沒有自體。如《金剛般若經》（Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra）所說：『一切有為法，如星翳燈幻，露泡夢電云，應作如是觀。』這是爲了讓人們理解有為法沒有實體，是這一品的意義。因此，這種說法是成立的。如《般若波羅蜜經》（Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra）中說，佛告訴極勇猛菩薩說：『善男子，色非有為非無為，受想行識亦復如是。若色受想行識非有為非無為者，此是般若波羅蜜。』又如《楞伽經》（Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra）說：有為無為沒有自體相，只是凡夫愚癡妄執，分別有差異，猶如石女夢見抱兒。又如《金剛般若經》說：『須菩提，凡所有相皆是虛妄。若見諸相非相，則見如來。』像這樣的修多羅（Sūtra），這裡應該廣泛地引用。 《觀有為相品》結束。 《般若燈論釋》卷第五 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 《般若燈論釋》 《般若燈論釋》卷第六 偈本：龍樹菩薩（Nāgārjuna），釋論：分別明菩薩 大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅譯 《觀作者業品》第八 其次，空性（Śūnyatā）所對治的，是爲了讓人們驗證瞭解五蘊（Skandha）沒有實體的意義，因此有這一品的產生。有人說，在第一義諦（Paramārtha-satya）中有五蘊、十二入（Āyatana）、十八界（Dhātu）。佛世尊說，以此為因，產生作者和作用。
【English Translation】 English version: If it is said that the author of Rupa (form) exists, and that sentient beings in succession commonly grasp Rupa, then this assertion is not correct. Why? Because it is not absolute. To reveal this, one should understand using analogies such as dreams, according to the quantity of Rupa. Furthermore, the Buddha (Buddha) Bhagavan (Bhagavan), as the one who sees reality, said this for the Śrāvakayāna (Hearer Vehicle) to counteract the afflictive obscurations: Rupa is like a mass of foam, Vedanā (feeling) is like a water bubble, Samjñā (perception) is like a mirage, Saṃskāra (formation) is like a banana tree, and Vijñāna (consciousness) is like an illusion. This is to make people know that 'I' and 'mine' (Atman and Atman belonging) originally have no self-nature, just like light and shadow. Also, for the Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle) to counteract afflictive obscurations and cognitive obscurations, it is said that Saṃskṛta (conditioned phenomena) originally have no intrinsic nature. As the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra (Diamond Sutra) says: 'All conditioned phenomena are like a star, an optical illusion, a lamp, a phantom, a bubble, a dream, lightning, and a cloud; one should contemplate them in this way.' This is to make people understand that conditioned phenomena have no substance, which is the meaning of this chapter. Therefore, this assertion is established. As it is said in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra (Perfection of Wisdom Sutra), the Buddha told the extremely courageous Bodhisattva: 'Good man, Rupa is neither conditioned nor unconditioned, and so are Vedanā, Samjñā, Saṃskāra, and Vijñāna. If Rupa, Vedanā, Samjñā, Saṃskāra, and Vijñāna are neither conditioned nor unconditioned, this is Prajñāpāramitā.' Also, as the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (Descent into Lanka Sutra) says: Conditioned and unconditioned phenomena have no self-nature, but ordinary people foolishly cling to them and differentiate them, just like a barren woman dreaming of holding a child. Also, as the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: 'Subhuti, all forms are illusory. If one sees all forms as non-forms, then one sees the Tathagata.' Such Sutras (Sūtra) as these should be widely cited here. End of the Chapter on Observing Conditioned Phenomena. Prajñā-dīpa-ṭīkā, Volume 5 Taisho Tripitaka, Volume 30, No. 1566, Prajñā-dīpa-ṭīkā Prajñā-dīpa-ṭīkā, Volume 6 Verses by: Nāgārjuna (Nāgārjuna), Commentary by: Vibhajyavādin Bodhisattva Translated by Prajñāparamita of the Great Tang Dynasty from Central India Chapter 8: Examination of the Agent and Action Next, what is counteracted by emptiness (Śūnyatā) is to allow people to verify and understand the meaning of the Skandha (aggregates) having no substance, hence the arising of this chapter. Some say that in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya) there are the five Skandhas, twelve Āyatanas (sense fields), and eighteen Dhātus (elements). The Buddha Bhagavan said that based on this, the agent and action arise.
業故。此若無者。佛不應說與彼為因有作者及業。譬如馬角。由有作者及作業故。修多羅中說是偈曰。
應行善法行 惡法不應行 此世及後生 行者得安樂
釋曰。如此經中說有作者及以作業。彼業有三種。善不善無記。彼善業者。分別有四。一自性。二相應。三發起。四第一義。不善亦爾。無記四種。謂報生。威儀。工巧。變化。是故如所說因有勢力故。第一義中陰等是有。論者言。若汝欲得第一義中以彼為因。知有作者及以作業。說此為因者。此義不成。若世諦中欲得爾者。則譬喻無體。如此無體。第一義中婆伽婆說。以彼為因有實作者及有作業。如此解者。于義不然。如其不然。應如是觀。今此作者為有實無實。亦有無實。能作業耶。業亦如是。有實無實。亦有無實。為作者所作耶。此皆不然。如偈曰。
若有實作者 不作有實業
釋曰。若彼作有。則作者有實與作相應。業亦有實。由翻此義二皆無實。彼無實者亦不能作。如偈曰。
若無實作者 不作無實業
釋曰。所作名業。能作名者。此中先觀立有實者。如偈曰。
有實者無作
釋曰。若汝意欲不觀作業有作者體。若定如此則無作業。作既無體。則作者不成。複次有實無作者。此言何謂。立喻驗釋
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為業的緣故。如果不存在這些，佛陀不應該說因為它們作為原因，存在作者和業。就像馬的角一樣（馬並不存在角）。因為存在作者和作業，所以在修多羅（sutra，佛經）中說了這首偈： 『應當奉行善良的法，不應當奉行邪惡的法；今生和來世，奉行善良之法的人都能得到安樂。』 解釋說：就像這部經中說存在作者以及作業。這些業有三種：善業、不善業和無記業（既非善亦非惡的業）。這些善業，分別有四種：一、自性（本質），二、相應（伴隨），三、發起（引發），四、第一義（究竟意義）。不善業也是如此。無記業有四種，即報生（由果報而生）、威儀（行為舉止）、工巧（工藝技巧）、變化（變化能力）。因此，正如所說，因為原因具有力量，所以在第一義中，中陰（bardo，死亡和再生之間的狀態）等是存在的。論者說：如果你們想要在第一義中，以它們為原因，知道存在作者和作業，說這是原因，這個意義是不成立的。如果在世俗諦（conventional truth，相對真理）中想要這樣認為，那麼譬喻就沒有實體。就像這樣沒有實體，婆伽婆（Bhagavan，世尊）在第一義中說，以它們為原因，存在真實的作者和真實的作業。這樣解釋，在意義上是不對的。如果這樣不對，應該這樣觀察：現在這個作者是有實體的還是沒有實體的？或者既有實體又沒有實體？能夠作業嗎？業也是這樣，有實體的還是沒有實體的？或者既有實體又沒有實體？是被作者所作的嗎？這些都不對。就像偈頌所說： 『如果存在有實體的作者，就不會造作有實體的業。』 解釋說：如果他造作存在，那麼作者的有實體就與造作相應，業也是有實體的。由於顛倒了這個意義，兩者都沒有實體。那些沒有實體的也不能造作。就像偈頌所說： 『如果沒有實體的作者，就不會造作沒有實體的業。』 解釋說：所作的叫做業，能作的叫做作者。這裡首先觀察建立有實體的人。就像偈頌所說： 『有實體的人沒有造作。』 解釋說：如果你的意思是，不觀察作業，就沒有作者的實體。如果一定是這樣，就沒有作業。造作既然沒有實體，那麼作者就不能成立。再次，有實體沒有作者，這是什麼意思？用比喻來驗證解釋。
【English Translation】 English version: Because of karma. If these did not exist, the Buddha should not have said that because they are the cause, there exist an agent and an action. Like the horns of a horse (horses do not have horns). Because there is an agent and an action, it is said in the sutra (sutra, Buddhist scripture) in this verse: 『One should practice good dharma, one should not practice evil dharma; in this life and the next, those who practice good dharma will attain happiness.』 The explanation says: Just as this sutra says that there is an agent and an action. These actions are of three types: good karma, bad karma, and neutral karma (neither good nor bad karma). These good karmas are of four types respectively: 1. nature (essence), 2. correspondence (accompaniment), 3. initiation (triggering), 4. ultimate meaning (ultimate significance). Bad karma is also the same. Neutral karma has four types, namely, retribution-born, demeanor, craftsmanship, and transformation. Therefore, as it is said, because the cause has power, in the ultimate meaning, the intermediate state (bardo, the state between death and rebirth) and so on exist. The debater says: If you want in the ultimate meaning, to know that there is an agent and an action because they are the cause, saying that this is the cause, this meaning is not established. If you want to think this way in conventional truth (conventional truth, relative truth), then the metaphor has no substance. Just like this has no substance, the Bhagavan (Bhagavan, the Blessed One) said in the ultimate meaning that because they are the cause, there is a real agent and a real action. This explanation is not correct in meaning. If this is not correct, it should be observed in this way: Is this agent real or unreal? Or both real and unreal? Can it act? The action is also like this, is it real or unreal? Or both real and unreal? Is it done by the agent? None of these are correct. Just as the verse says: 『If there is a real agent, he will not create a real action.』 The explanation says: If he creates existence, then the agent's existence corresponds to the creation, and the action is also real. Because the meaning is reversed, both are unreal. Those who are unreal cannot create either. Just as the verse says: 『If there is no real agent, he will not create no real action.』 The explanation says: What is done is called action, and what can be done is called the agent. Here, first observe the establishment of a real person. Just as the verse says: 『A real person does not create.』 The explanation says: If you mean that without observing the action, there is no entity of the agent. If it must be so, there is no action. Since creation has no entity, then the agent cannot be established. Again, there is a real entity without an agent, what does this mean? Use a metaphor to verify the explanation.
有實作者。彼五取陰但假施設。又如外道所計。提婆達多名若善業。若不善業。複次第一義中調達相續不能作業。何以故。以作者故。譬如耶若達多。複次若有實作者。非假施設。如食糠外道我為作者。如彼意欲。此義不然。為彼執故。此中立驗。第一義中彼調達我不能作業。何以故。以物故。譬如業。複次第一義中彼業亦非提婆達多相續我作。何以故。以業故。譬如余物。複次若彼外人作如是意。汝此立義有何所以。如提婆達多彼相續業為是他作耶。為當無作耶。二俱不然。何以故。若他作者。汝立義破。若無作者。則譬喻無體。論者言。彼執不然。何以故。耶若達多彼相續業。提婆達多我不作故。由如是義。立譬得成。彼如是說。不觀作業有實作者虛妄分別。于義不然。以作者無體故。如偈曰。
業是無作者
釋曰。業亦如是。不觀作者自然而有。由無作者。作是業故。若彼分別業有實者。業即無作。有此過失。又作者及業互不相觀。世無能信。是故彼二必相因待。應如是知。此中立驗。第一義中提婆達多相續作者不作提婆達多定業。何以故。以有觀故。譬如耶若達多。複次第一義中提婆達多相續作者不作調達定受報業。何以故。觀作者故。譬如耶若達多相續作業。複次今更立義。遮前所說。如偈曰。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：存在實際的作者。那五取蘊（panchaskandha，構成個體經驗的五種要素：色、受、想、行、識）只是假名安立。又如外道所計，提婆達多（Devadatta，人名）之名，無論是善業還是不善業。其次，在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya，究竟真理）中，提婆達多（Devadatta）的相續不能造業。為什麼呢？因為有作者的緣故。譬如耶若達多（Yajnadatta，人名）。再次，如果存在真實的作者，而非假名安立，就像食糠外道所認為的『我』是作者一樣，如他們的意願。這個道理是不成立的，因為他們執著於此。這裡建立論證：在第一義諦中，那個提婆達多（Devadatta）的『我』不能造業。為什麼呢？因為是『物』的緣故。譬如業。再次，在第一義諦中，那個業也不是提婆達多（Devadatta）相續的『我』所作。為什麼呢？因為是業的緣故。譬如其他事物。再次，如果那些外道之人作這樣的想法：你這樣立論有什麼意義呢？如提婆達多（Devadatta），他的相續之業是他者所作嗎？還是沒有作者呢？兩者都不對。為什麼呢？如果是他者所作，你的立論就被破斥了；如果沒有作者，那麼譬喻就沒有實體。論者說：他們的執著是不成立的。為什麼呢？因為耶若達多（Yajnadatta）的相續之業，不是提婆達多（Devadatta）的『我』所作。由於這樣的道理，建立譬喻才能成立。他們這樣說：不觀察作業，卻有實際的作者，這是虛妄分別，在義理上是不成立的。因為作者沒有實體的緣故。如偈頌所說： 『業是無作者』 釋曰：業也是如此，不觀察作者，自然而有。由於沒有作者，才會有這樣的業。如果他們分別認為業有實體，那麼業就無法被創造，會有這樣的過失。而且，作者和業互相不觀察，世間沒有人會相信。所以，這兩者必定相互依賴，應該這樣理解。這裡建立論證：在第一義諦中，提婆達多（Devadatta）相續的作者不作提婆達多（Devadatta）的定業。為什麼呢？因為有觀察的緣故。譬如耶若達多（Yajnadatta）。再次，在第一義諦中，提婆達多（Devadatta）相續的作者不作提婆達多（Devadatta）定受報的業。為什麼呢？因為觀察作者的緣故。譬如耶若達多（Yajnadatta）相續的作業。再次，現在重新立義，遮止前面所說。如偈頌所說：
【English Translation】 English version: There is a real agent. Those five skandhas (pañcaskandha, the five aggregates that constitute individual experience: form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness) are merely nominal designations. Furthermore, as conceived by externalists, the name Devadatta (Devadatta, a proper name) refers to either good or bad karma. Moreover, in the ultimate sense (paramārtha-satya, ultimate truth), the continuum of Devadatta (Devadatta) cannot perform actions. Why? Because there is an agent. For example, Yajnadatta (Yajnadatta, a proper name). Again, if there is a real agent, not merely a nominal designation, as the bran-eating heretics believe that 'I' am the agent, according to their intention. This reasoning is not valid because they are attached to it. Here, we establish a proof: in the ultimate sense, that 'I' of Devadatta (Devadatta) cannot perform actions. Why? Because it is an 'object'. For example, karma. Again, in the ultimate sense, that karma is not done by the 'I' of Devadatta's (Devadatta) continuum. Why? Because it is karma. For example, other things. Again, if those externalists think like this: what is the point of your establishing this argument? Is the karma of Devadatta's (Devadatta) continuum done by another, or is there no agent? Neither is correct. Why? If it is done by another, your argument is refuted; if there is no agent, then the analogy has no substance. The debater says: their attachment is not valid. Why? Because the karma of Yajnadatta's (Yajnadatta) continuum is not done by the 'I' of Devadatta (Devadatta). Because of this reason, establishing the analogy is valid. They say this: without observing the action, there is a real agent, which is a false discrimination, and is not valid in meaning. Because the agent has no substance. As the verse says: 'Karma is without an agent.' Explanation: Karma is also like this, without observing the agent, it arises naturally. Because there is no agent, there is such karma. If they distinguish that karma has substance, then karma cannot be created, and there will be this fault. Moreover, the agent and karma do not observe each other, and no one in the world will believe it. Therefore, these two must depend on each other, and it should be understood in this way. Here, we establish a proof: in the ultimate sense, the agent of Devadatta's (Devadatta) continuum does not perform the fixed karma of Devadatta (Devadatta). Why? Because there is observation. For example, Yajnadatta (Yajnadatta). Again, in the ultimate sense, the agent of Devadatta's (Devadatta) continuum does not perform the karma of Devadatta (Devadatta) that is destined to receive retribution. Why? Because of observing the agent. For example, the action of Yajnadatta's (Yajnadatta) continuum. Again, now we re-establish the meaning to prevent what was said before. As the verse says:
業及彼作者 則墮于無因
釋曰。此後半偈欲顯業及作者墮無因過。此義云何。謂業離作者故。作者離業故。互不相待故墮無因。以無因義開示他者。一切世間所不能信。複次第一義中提婆達多相續不作提婆達多業因。何以故。以有觀故。譬如耶若達多。複次第一義中調達相續不作調達定報業因。何以故。觀作者故。譬如耶若達多相續作業。是故偈曰。
無因義不然 無因無果故
釋曰。云何名果。謂為各各決定因緣力起。故名為果。云何名因。謂近遠和合同有所作。由此有故彼法得起。是名為因。如汝分別因則無因。果亦無果。觀無體故。是義不然。應知此意。複次若不相觀則無彼體。此執不然。無何等體。如偈曰。
作及彼作者 作用具皆無
釋曰。於世間中瓶衣等物亦有作者欲作彼業。若謂作者不觀業。業不觀作者。彼瓶衣等則不藉人工。善巧方便自然成就。又彼瓶等種種技因之所成就。彼勝分具。若不觀者具等亦無如是一切斫者斫具及所斫物亦皆無體。又如偈曰。
法非法亦無 作等無體故
釋曰。何故無有法非法二。彼法非法作者作具所成就故。又彼作者作具了故。法與非法二亦無體。複次或有自部生如是心。諸行空故作者無體。彼作者空於我無咎。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 業及彼作者，則墮于無因
釋曰：此後半偈（gatha，偈頌）意在闡明業和作者會陷入無因的過失。此義如何理解？即業離開作者，作者離開業，彼此互不依賴，因此會墮入無因論。以無因的觀點開示他人，一切世間都無法相信。進一步說，在第一義（paramārtha，勝義）中，提婆達多（Devadatta，人名）的相續（saṃtāna，心識流）不會成為提婆達多業的因。為何如此？因為存在觀察。譬如耶若達多（Yajñadatta，人名）。進一步說，在第一義中，調達（Daivata，人名）的相續不會成為調達決定性果報業的因。為何如此？因為觀察作者的緣故。譬如耶若達多的相續作業。因此偈頌說：
無因義不然，無因無果故
釋曰：何謂果？即由各自決定的因緣力量所生起，故名為果。何謂因？即近因、遠因和合，從而有所作為。由此因的存在，彼法得以生起，這便名為因。如你所分別的因，則無因可言；果亦無果可言，因為觀察到沒有實體。此義不成立。應知此意。進一步說，若不互相觀待，則無彼實體。此種執著不成立。沒有何種實體？如偈頌所說：
作及彼作者，作用具皆無
釋曰：在世間中，瓶、衣等物也有作者想要製作它們。如果說作者不觀待業，業不觀待作者，那麼這些瓶、衣等物就不需要人工，不需要巧妙的手段，而是自然成就。而且這些瓶等是由種種技藝之因所成就的，那些殊勝的組成部分，如果不互相觀待，這些組成部分等也將不存在。如同斫者、斫具以及所斫之物，都將沒有實體。又如偈頌所說：
法非法亦無，作等無體故
釋曰：為何沒有法和非法二者？因為法和非法是由作者、作具所成就的。而且因為作者、作具的緣故，法與非法二者也沒有實體。進一步說，或許有自部（宗派）的人產生這樣的想法：諸行（saṃskāra，一切有為法）是空性的，所以作者沒有實體。彼作者是空性的，對我沒有過失。
【English Translation】 English version: The deed and its doer, then fall into causelessness.
Explanation: This latter half of the gatha (verse) intends to clarify that the deed and the doer will fall into the fault of causelessness. How is this meaning understood? That is, because the deed is separate from the doer, and the doer is separate from the deed, they do not depend on each other, thus falling into causelessness. To explain to others with the view of causelessness is something that the entire world cannot believe. Furthermore, in the ultimate truth (paramārtha), the continuum (saṃtāna) of Devadatta (a proper noun) does not become the cause of Devadatta's deed. Why is this so? Because there is observation. For example, Yajñadatta (a proper noun). Furthermore, in the ultimate truth, the continuum of Daivata (a proper noun) does not become the cause of Daivata's karma that determines the result. Why is this so? Because the doer is observed. For example, the continuum of Yajñadatta performs actions. Therefore, the verse says:
The meaning of causelessness is not so, because of causelessness, there is no result.
Explanation: What is called a result? It is what arises from the power of individually determined causes and conditions, hence it is called a result. What is called a cause? It is the combination of near and far causes, thereby something is done. Because of the existence of this cause, that dharma can arise, this is called a cause. As the cause you distinguish, there is no cause to speak of; there is also no result to speak of, because it is observed that there is no substance. This meaning is not established. This intention should be known. Furthermore, if they do not depend on each other, then there is no such substance. This attachment is not established. What kind of substance is not there? As the verse says:
The doing and its doer, the means of action, all are without.
Explanation: In the world, objects such as pots and clothes also have doers who want to make them. If it is said that the doer does not depend on the deed, and the deed does not depend on the doer, then these pots and clothes do not need human labor, do not need skillful means, but are naturally accomplished. Moreover, these pots, etc., are accomplished by various skillful causes, those excellent components, if they do not depend on each other, these components, etc., will also not exist. Just like the chopper, the chopping tool, and the object being chopped, all will have no substance. Also, as the verse says:
Dharma and non-dharma also do not exist, because the doing, etc., have no substance.
Explanation: Why are there no dharma and non-dharma? Because dharma and non-dharma are accomplished by the doer and the means of action. Moreover, because of the doer and the means of action, dharma and non-dharma also have no substance. Furthermore, perhaps someone from our own school (sect) has such a thought: all conditioned things (saṃskāra) are empty, so the doer has no substance. That doer is empty, so there is no fault in me.
何以故。勝身口意自體能作。法與非法由如此義故我無咎。論者言。汝立因者。但有聚集饒益。於世諦中彼名作者。以觀法非法故。若無作者則無所觀業不成故。法等無體。汝不免過。以無相觀道理故。道理云何。如偈曰。
若無法非法 從生果亦無
釋曰。彼二為因。從生為果。人天等善道為可愛。地獄等惡道為不可愛。彼身根受用皆無自體。複次于善道中彼修行者。受戒習禪。三摩缽底。八聖道支正見為首。離諸煩惱此義悉空。如是分別無實作者。無實作業。此諸過聚皆屬於汝。難可療治。知過失已應信作者及彼作業相觀道理。以是義故所說無過。以因有故。無實作者。無實作業。此執不然。此不然義。如先已說。複次或有人言。我立異門如是作者。亦有非有彼所作業。亦有非有。由此異門無如上過。論者偈曰。
有無互相違 一法處無二
釋曰。於一物體一剎那中。有及非有互相違故。二不可得。云何相違法。若是有云何非有法。若非有云何言有。猶如一火冷暖同時。世所不信。若汝意謂有實體故名之為實。無所作故名為不實。一物一時觀自在故。二義俱立無過失者。是義不然。何以故。彼二門者。前已遮故無過。相觀道理如后當遮。外人言。如耶若達多。亦有作者。亦無作者。汝立
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 為什麼呢？因為勝義諦中，身、口、意本身能夠造作。在世俗諦中，善與不善（法與非法）就是這樣產生的，所以我沒有過失。論辯者說：『你所立的因，只是聚集和饒益，在世俗諦中，它們被稱為作者。因為觀察善與不善（法與非法）的緣故。如果沒有作者，那麼就沒有所觀察的業，業就不能成立。善與不善（法等）沒有自體。你不能免除過失，因為沒有相觀的道理。』道理是什麼呢？如偈頌所說： 『如果沒有善與不善（法與非法），那麼從（它們）所生的果報也沒有。』 解釋說：善與不善（彼二）是因，從（因）所生的是果。人天等善道是可愛的，地獄等惡道是不可愛的。這些身根和受用都沒有自體。進一步說，在善道中，那些修行者，受戒、習禪、三摩缽底（Samāpatti，等至），八聖道支以正見為首，遠離各種煩惱，這些意義都將是空洞的。如果這樣分別，沒有真實的作者，沒有真實的作業。這些過失都屬於你，難以治療。知道過失之後，應該相信作者以及作業相觀的道理。因為這個緣故，所說沒有過失。因為因存在，所以沒有真實的作者，沒有真實的作業，這種執著是不對的。這種不對的意義，先前已經說過了。進一步說，或者有人說：我立異門，這樣作者既有也有非有，他所造的業既有也有非有。因為這個異門，所以沒有上面的過失。論辯者用偈頌說： 『有和無互相違背，一個法處不可能同時存在兩種。』 解釋說：在一個物體的一個剎那中，有和非有互相違背，所以二者不可能同時存在。怎樣是互相違背呢？如果是有，怎麼會是非有呢？如果是非有，怎麼說是有的呢？就像一個火同時具有冷和暖，世間不會相信。如果你認為因為有實體所以稱為實有，因為沒有造作所以稱為不實，一個物體在一個時間可以自在地觀察，所以兩種意義都可以成立，沒有過失，這種說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為這兩種門，先前已經被遮破了，所以沒有過失。相觀的道理將在後面遮破。外人說：就像耶若達多（Yajnadatta），既有作者，也沒有作者。你立……
【English Translation】 English version: Why is that? Because, in the ultimate truth (勝義諦, Paramārtha-satya), body, speech, and mind themselves are capable of acting. In conventional truth (世俗諦, Saṃvṛti-satya), good and non-good (法與非法, dharma and adharma) arise in this way, so I have no fault. The debater says: 'Your established cause is merely an accumulation and benefit; in conventional truth, they are called agents. Because of observing good and non-good (法與非法, dharma and adharma). If there is no agent, then there is no observed action, and the action cannot be established. Good and non-good (法等, dharma, etc.) have no intrinsic nature. You cannot avoid fault, because there is no principle of mutual observation.' What is the principle? As the verse says: 'If there is no good and non-good (法與非法, dharma and adharma), then there is also no result arising from (them).' Explanation: Good and non-good (彼二, those two) are the cause, and what arises from (the cause) is the result. Good paths like humans and gods are desirable, and evil paths like hells are undesirable. These sense faculties and enjoyments have no intrinsic nature. Furthermore, in the good paths, those practitioners, taking vows, practicing meditation, Samāpatti (三摩缽底, meditative absorption), the eightfold noble path with right view as the foremost, being free from all afflictions, these meanings will all be empty. If you differentiate in this way, there is no real agent, no real action. These clusters of faults all belong to you, and are difficult to cure. Having known the faults, one should believe in the principle of mutual observation of the agent and the action. For this reason, what is said has no fault. Because the cause exists, therefore there is no real agent, no real action; this clinging is not right. This meaning of not being right has been said before. Furthermore, or someone says: I establish a different door, in this way the agent both exists and does not exist, and the action done by him both exists and does not exist. Because of this different door, there are no faults as above. The debater says in a verse: 'Existence and non-existence contradict each other; two cannot exist in one dharma-place.' Explanation: In one object, in one instant, existence and non-existence contradict each other, so the two cannot be obtained simultaneously. How do they contradict each other? If it exists, how can it be non-existent? If it is non-existent, how can it be said to exist? It is like a fire having both cold and warmth at the same time, which the world does not believe. If you think that because there is substance it is called real, and because there is no action it is called unreal, and one object can be freely observed at one time, so both meanings can be established and there is no fault, this saying is not right. Why is that? Because these two doors have been refuted before, so there is no fault. The principle of mutual observation will be refuted later. An outsider says: Like Yajnadatta (耶若達多, a proper name), there is both an agent and no agent. You establish...
譬喻無體驗不能破。論者言。彼耶若達多自相續中無提婆達作者。作業分故。我意欲爾。非譬不成。是故無過。廣如前說。如是等分別。依止第一義中作者及業建立不成。複次有人言。我有作者無彼作業。是故無過。論者偈曰。
有者不作無 無者不作有
釋曰。此誰不作。謂作者業。何故不作。偈曰。
此由著有過 彼過如先說
釋曰。如上所說實不實門。第一義中無實作者作不實業。亦無實作者能作實業。此二句立義有別因及譬喻。廣如前說。複次偈曰。
作者實不實 亦實亦不實 不作三種業 是過先已說 作業實不實 亦實亦不實 非俱作者作 過亦如先說
釋曰。此諸過失如前廣明。唯有立義為差別耳。由如是觀。偈曰。
緣作者有業 緣業有作者 由此業義成 不見異因故
釋曰。於世諦中。作者作業更互相觀。離此之外。更無異因能成業義。如是外人品。初已來說因立譬。義皆不成。及違義故。不免過失。複次或有人言。第一義中有陰入界。以彼取故。佛婆伽婆作如是說。為遮彼故。偈曰。
如業作者離 應知取亦爾
釋曰。如先已遮。作者緣業。業緣作者。如是取緣取者取者緣取。第一義中不可得故。此義云何。由
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 譬喻如果沒有實際體驗是無法駁倒的。論者說：『耶若達多（Yajnadatta，人名）的自相續中沒有提婆達多（Devadatta，人名）作為作者，因為有作業的區分。』我的意思是這樣，沒有譬喻就不能成立，所以沒有過失，詳細的論述如前所述。像這樣的分別，依賴於第一義諦中作者和業的建立是不能成立的。另外，有人說：『我有作者，但沒有他的作業，所以沒有過失。』論者用偈頌說： 『有者不作無，無者不作有。』 解釋：這裡所說的『誰不作』，是指作者和業。為什麼不作？偈頌說： 『此由著有過，彼過如先說。』 解釋：如上面所說的真實和不真實之門，在第一義諦中，沒有真實的作者去作不真實的業，也沒有真實的作者能作真實的業。這兩句話的立義有不同的原因和譬喻，詳細的論述如前所述。另外，偈頌說： 『作者實不實，亦實亦不實，不作三種業，是過先已說。 作業實不實，亦實亦不實，非俱作者作，過亦如先說。』 解釋：這些過失如前面詳細說明，只有立義有所差別而已。通過這樣的觀察，偈頌說： 『緣作者有業，緣業有作者，由此業義成，不見異因故。』 解釋：在世俗諦中，作者和作業互相觀待，離開這些之外，沒有其他的因能成就業的意義。像這樣，外道品一開始所說的因和立譬，意義都不能成立，並且因為違背意義，所以不能免除過失。另外，或許有人說：『第一義諦中有陰、入、界（skandha, ayatana, dhatu，構成存在的要素），因為它們被取。』佛陀薄伽梵（Bhagavan，世尊）這樣說，是爲了遮止他們的觀點，偈頌說： 『如業作者離，應知取亦爾。』 解釋：如先前已經遮止的，作者緣業，業緣作者，這樣，取緣取者，取者緣取，在第一義諦中是不可得的。這個意義是什麼？由於...
【English Translation】 English version: An analogy cannot be refuted without actual experience. The debater says: 'In Yajnadatta's (Yajnadatta, a proper noun) own continuum, there is no Devadatta (Devadatta, a proper noun) as the agent, because there is a distinction of actions.' My intention is thus; without an analogy, it cannot be established, therefore there is no fault. The detailed discussion is as previously stated. Such distinctions, relying on the establishment of agent and action in the ultimate truth, cannot be established. Furthermore, someone says: 'I have an agent, but not his action, therefore there is no fault.' The debater says in a verse: 'The existent does not do the non-existent, the non-existent does not do the existent.' Explanation: Who does not do this? It refers to the agent and the action. Why does it not do? The verse says: 'This is because attachment has faults, those faults are as previously stated.' Explanation: As mentioned above, regarding the door of real and unreal, in the ultimate truth, there is no real agent doing unreal actions, nor is there a real agent capable of doing real actions. These two sentences establish the meaning with different causes and analogies, as discussed in detail previously. Furthermore, the verse says: 'The agent, real or unreal, also both real and unreal, does not do three kinds of actions; this fault has been previously stated. The action, real or unreal, also both real and unreal, is not done by a co-agent; the fault is also as previously stated.' Explanation: These faults are as explained in detail before, only the establishment of meaning is different. Through such observation, the verse says: 'Dependent on the agent, there is action; dependent on the action, there is an agent; thereby the meaning of action is established; no different cause is seen.' Explanation: In conventional truth, the agent and action are mutually dependent. Apart from these, there is no other cause that can establish the meaning of action. Thus, the heretical school's initial statement of cause and analogy is not established, and because it contradicts the meaning, it cannot avoid faults. Furthermore, someone might say: 'In the ultimate truth, there are skandhas, ayatanas, and dhatus (skandha, ayatana, dhatu, elements of existence), because they are taken.' The Buddha Bhagavan (Bhagavan, the Blessed One) said this to refute their view. The verse says: 'As action and agent are separate, so should taking be understood.' Explanation: As previously refuted, the agent depends on action, and action depends on the agent. Likewise, taking depends on the taker, and the taker depends on taking, which are unobtainable in the ultimate truth. What is the meaning of this? Because...
作者業二俱離故。彼取取者亦如是離。複次此中分別第一義中無實調達取者實取。何以故。以觀取故。譬如耶若達多。如是第一義中亦無無實取者取無實取。亦實不實取立義應知。複次第一義中無實可取為實提婆達多取觀彼取者故。譬如耶若達多取。如是第一義中亦無不實取。為不實取者取。亦實不實取。為亦實不實取者取。立義差別。因及譬喻如先已說。如是不等分別亦應類遮。複次由業作者及取取者。第一義中以性離故。如偈曰。
及餘一切法 亦應如是觀
釋曰。何等余法。謂自他所解。若果若因。能依所依。能相所相。或總別等。如是諸法亦應觀察。果緣于因。因緣于果。此義得成。是世俗法非第一義。何以故。或有人謂第一義中因果等法皆有自體。今欲拔彼執著箭故。少分開示。非第一義中。乳實作酪。何以故。以觀果故。譬如經等。若言世間。悉見乳作于酪。汝說無者。即為破壞世間所見。此執不然。何以故。我立義言非第一義。故我無過。或有人言。第一義中乳不作酪。而世諦中作。由此義故。汝譬不成。立義亦壞。若言諸法不作自果者。譬亦不成。何以故。彼一切法各有定因果故。論者言。汝語不善。何以故。初分別者非我所受。次分別者譬喻亦成。何以故。以此經等非彼酪因。前立義
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：由於作者和業，以及取者和所取之物，在第一義諦中都是分離的。如同取者，也是如此分離的。此外，在此處分別第一義諦時，沒有真實的調達（Devadatta，人名）作為取者，也沒有真實的取。為什麼呢？因為觀察取的關係時，就像耶若達多（Yajnadatta，人名）一樣，實際上找不到取者。同樣，在第一義諦中，也沒有不真實的取者取不真實的取。對於亦實亦不實的取，也應瞭解其立義。此外，在第一義諦中，沒有真實的可取之物給真實的提婆達多（Devadatta，人名）去取，因為觀察取者時，就像耶若達多（Yajnadatta，人名）的例子一樣，實際上找不到取者。同樣，在第一義諦中，也沒有不真實的取給不真實的取者去取，也沒有亦實亦不實的取給亦實亦不實的取者去取。立義的差別，原因和譬喻，如先前已經說過的那樣。像這樣，對於不等的分別，也應該用類似的方法來遮止。此外，由於業的作者以及取者和所取之物，在第一義諦中，其自性是分離的。正如偈頌所說： 『以及其餘一切法，也應該這樣觀察。』 解釋說：什麼是其餘的法呢？就是自己和他人所理解的，無論是果還是因，能依還是所依，能相還是所相，或者總和別等等。像這樣的諸法也應該觀察。果依賴於因，因依賴於果，這個道理是可以成立的，這是世俗諦的法，而不是第一義諦。為什麼呢？因為或許有人認為在第一義諦中，因果等法都有其自體。現在想要拔除他們這種執著的箭，所以稍微分開來開示。在第一義諦中，牛奶實際上不能變成奶酪。為什麼呢？因為觀察果的時候，就像經典等所說的那樣。如果有人說，世間上都看到牛奶變成奶酪，你說沒有，那就是破壞世間所見。這種執著是不對的。為什麼呢？因為我所立的義是說非第一義諦，所以我沒有過失。或許有人說，在第一義諦中，牛奶不能變成奶酪，但是在世俗諦中可以變成。因為這個道理，你的譬喻不能成立，立義也壞了。如果說諸法不能產生自己的果，那麼譬喻也不能成立。為什麼呢？因為一切法都有其一定的因果關係。論者說：你說的不對。為什麼呢？最初的分別不是我所接受的，其次的分別，譬喻是可以成立的。為什麼呢？因為這些經典等，不是奶酪的因，這是前面所立的義。
【English Translation】 English version: Because the agent and the action, as well as the taker and the taken, are separate in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha). Just like the taker, it is also separate in this way. Furthermore, in distinguishing the ultimate truth here, there is no real Devadatta (a proper noun) as the taker, nor is there real taking. Why? Because when observing the taking, it is like Yajnadatta (a proper noun); in reality, the taker cannot be found. Similarly, in the ultimate truth, there is no unreal taker taking unreal taking. For the taking that is both real and unreal, its established meaning should also be understood. Furthermore, in the ultimate truth, there is no real object to be taken for the real Devadatta to take, because when observing the taker, it is like the example of Yajnadatta; in reality, the taker cannot be found. Similarly, in the ultimate truth, there is no unreal taking for the unreal taker to take, nor is there taking that is both real and unreal for the taker that is both real and unreal to take. The difference in established meanings, the cause, and the analogy are as previously stated. In this way, unequal distinctions should also be refuted in a similar manner. Furthermore, because the agent of action and the taker and the taken are separate in nature in the ultimate truth. As the verse says: 『And all other dharmas (phenomena), should also be observed in this way.』 The explanation says: What are the other dharmas? They are what are understood by oneself and others, whether they are effects or causes, the dependent or the depended upon, the characteristic or the characterized, or the general and the specific, and so on. Such dharmas should also be observed. The effect relies on the cause, and the cause relies on the effect; this principle can be established, and it is a truth of conventional reality (Saṃvṛti), not the ultimate truth. Why? Because perhaps someone thinks that in the ultimate truth, phenomena such as cause and effect all have their own self-nature (Svabhāva). Now, wanting to remove the arrow of their attachment, it is shown separately in a small way. In the ultimate truth, milk does not actually become cheese. Why? Because when observing the effect, it is like what is said in the sutras (scriptures), etc. If someone says that everyone in the world sees milk turning into cheese, and you say it doesn't, then you are destroying what the world sees. This attachment is incorrect. Why? Because the meaning I establish is that it is not the ultimate truth, so I have no fault. Perhaps someone says that in the ultimate truth, milk cannot become cheese, but in conventional truth, it can. Because of this principle, your analogy cannot be established, and the established meaning is also ruined. If it is said that phenomena cannot produce their own effects, then the analogy also cannot be established. Why? Because all phenomena have their definite cause-and-effect relationships. The debater says: What you say is not good. Why? The initial distinction is not accepted by me, and the second distinction, the analogy can be established. Why? Because these sutras, etc., are not the cause of cheese; this is the meaning established earlier.
中已簡別故。非譬喻無體。複次僧佉人言。如我立義因中有果。因能起作無不作故。此若無者彼因則無。如龜毛衣是何等因。謂酪瓶等。是故有果。複次若無果者。是義不然。何以故。如乳中無酪。草中亦無彼求酪者。何故取乳而不取草。由彼取故。知因有果。又如乳中無酪。亦無三界。等是無者。何因緣故從乳因緣而生於酪。不生三界。由彼乳中不生三界。非一切物從一因起。是故定知因中有果。又若無者。何故決定如窯師見土堪作瓶者取以為瓶。非取一切。由此功能。能有起作。知因有果。若無果者。因亦無體。終無一物無果有因。而無此事。是故當知。因有體故。彼果亦有。論者言。如汝立因。無不作者。非立義法。以是果故因義不成。汝言無果有因義則不爾。由有此故彼得成者。此於世諦中成。非第一義。以第一義中因及譬喻二皆無體。若物彼處有者。彼物不于彼處起故。如因自體。由此法體二種差別。彼義不成。有過失故。如破初因。彼取乳等諸因亦應以此道理答遣。複次如毗婆沙師所執因中無果而因能起果者。此因無力。亦不能起作彼無體故。譬如兔角。又如犢子兒。執果有非有。皆不可說。而因能起作如此意者。於世諦中作者因成。第一義中若因若果。有及非有。皆不可得故。我無過。複次異僧佉人言
。因中果體不可得者。由果細故。此執不然。何以故。因中無粗故。粗先無體后時可得者。即是因中無果。汝立義破。若汝意欲細者為粗。是亦不然。何以故。不見細者轉為粗故。后時粗果與細相違。法體顛倒。立義過故。複次異僧佉人言。因作果者。是義不然。由了作故。應如是問。此了作者。其相云何。彼答如燈了作瓶等。此執已如觀緣品破。複次第一義中燈不了作彼瓶衣等。何以故。以眼取故。有礙故。色故。觸故。說故。因等譬如土塊。複次異僧佉言。果若未起及已滅功能自體有不名爲了。是故我說有如是果。而言因能作果者。此云何作。謂因自體轉為果體。語意如此。論者言。若汝過去未來受為因者。依止不成。若謂現在受為因者。則無譬喻。彼果不成。有此等過。又汝因果不異。若不異者。則此非彼因。以不異故。如因自體。以非因故。因義不成。因不成故。法自性壞。立義過故。現在果者。亦無實體。以無起故。彼有不成。譬喻無體。如是諸不異門亦應隨所執破。已說實因不能作果。於世諦中若無因者。亦不作果。以彼無故。如無龜毛不可為衣。如是若無果者因亦不作。此立義有異。因喻同前。彼半有半無執者。二俱過故。亦如先說。複次自部及鞞世師等言。因有果無。此因能作。以未起無果。我不受
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因地（hetu，原因）中果的實體是不可得的，因為果是微細的。這種觀點是不成立的。為什麼呢？因為因中沒有粗大的東西。如果粗大的東西先前沒有實體，之後才可得到，那就是說因中沒有果。你所立的宗義就被破壞了。如果你認為微細的東西可以轉變為粗大的東西，這也是不成立的。為什麼呢？因為沒有見到微細的東西轉變為粗大的東西。之後粗大的果與微細的因是相違背的，法的體性顛倒了，所以你所立的宗義有過失。 再次，其他的僧佉論者說，因能產生果，這種說法是不成立的，因爲了別作用的緣故。應該這樣問：這個了別作用的相狀是怎樣的？他們回答說，就像燈能了別作用於瓶子等。這種觀點已經在《觀緣品》中被破斥了。再次，在第一義諦中，燈不能了別作用於瓶子、衣服等。為什麼呢？因為可以用眼睛看到，因為有障礙，因為是色法，因為可以觸控，因為可以言說，原因等同於土塊。 再次，其他的僧佉論者說，如果果還沒有生起或者已經滅亡，其功能和自體是不被稱爲了別的。因此我說有這樣的果，而說因能產生果，這是如何產生的呢？意思是說，因的自體轉變為果的體性。論者說，如果你以過去和未來的受（vedanā，感受）作為因，那麼所依止的就不能成立。如果認為現在的受作為因，那麼就沒有譬喻。那個果也不能成立，有這些過失。而且，你的因和果不是不同的。如果不是不同的，那麼這個就不是那個的因，因為不是不同的緣故，就像因的自體一樣。因為不是因的緣故，因的意義就不能成立。因不能成立，法的自性就壞滅了，所以你所立的宗義有過失。現在的果，也沒有實體，因為沒有生起的緣故。那個有也不能成立，譬喻沒有實體。像這樣，各種不異的門也應該隨著你所執著的觀點來破斥。已經說了真實的因不能產生果，在世俗諦中，如果沒有因，也不能產生果，因為它不存在的緣故，就像沒有烏龜毛就不能做衣服一樣。像這樣，如果沒有果，因也不能產生。這個所立的宗義是有差異的，因的譬喻與前面相同。那些執著半有半無的人，因為兩種過失的緣故，也像先前所說的那樣。 再次，自部（svabhāva-vādin，自性論者）和鞞世師（vaiśeṣika，勝論派）等人說，因有而果無，這個因能夠產生果，因為還沒有生起果，我不接受。
【English Translation】 English version The entity of the effect in the cause (hetu, reason) is unobtainable because the effect is subtle. This view is not valid. Why? Because there is no coarse thing in the cause. If the coarse thing has no entity before and can be obtained later, it means that there is no effect in the cause. Your established proposition is thus broken. If you think that the subtle thing can be transformed into a coarse thing, this is also not valid. Why? Because no subtle thing is seen to be transformed into a coarse thing. Later, the coarse effect contradicts the subtle cause, and the nature of the dharma is reversed, so your established proposition has a fault. Again, other Sāṃkhya (enumeration) proponents say that the cause can produce the effect. This statement is not valid because of the function of discernment. It should be asked: What is the characteristic of this function of discernment? They answer that it is like a lamp that discerns a pot, etc. This view has already been refuted in the chapter on conditions. Again, in the ultimate truth, the lamp cannot discern a pot, clothes, etc. Why? Because it can be seen with the eyes, because it has obstacles, because it is a form, because it can be touched, because it can be spoken of, and the cause is like a lump of earth. Again, other Sāṃkhya proponents say that if the effect has not yet arisen or has already ceased, its function and self-nature are not called discernment. Therefore, I say that there is such an effect, and how can it be said that the cause can produce the effect? It means that the self-nature of the cause is transformed into the nature of the effect. The debater says that if you take the past and future feeling (vedanā, sensation) as the cause, then the basis of reliance cannot be established. If you think that the present feeling is the cause, then there is no analogy. That effect cannot be established, and there are these faults. Moreover, your cause and effect are not different. If they are not different, then this is not the cause of that, because they are not different, just like the self-nature of the cause. Because it is not the cause, the meaning of the cause cannot be established. If the cause cannot be established, the self-nature of the dharma is destroyed, so your established proposition has a fault. The present effect also has no entity because it has not arisen. That existence cannot be established, and the analogy has no entity. In this way, various non-different aspects should also be refuted according to your adhered views. It has been said that the real cause cannot produce the effect. In the conventional truth, if there is no cause, the effect cannot be produced either, because it does not exist, just as clothes cannot be made without turtle hair. In this way, if there is no effect, the cause cannot produce it either. This established proposition has differences, and the analogy of the cause is the same as before. Those who adhere to half existence and half non-existence are also like what was said before because of the two faults. Again, the Svabhāva-vādin (self-nature proponents) and the Vaiśeṣika (particularist school) and others say that the cause exists but the effect does not. This cause can produce the effect because the effect has not yet arisen, and I do not accept it.
故。如虛空華。已生果者。因無力用。未生果者。因有功能。由如此義。因中無果。論者言。如汝立因未起無果我不受者。此意云何。汝為現見故不受耶。為立驗故不受耶。為一切量不受耶。如是分別因義不成。立因有過。非一向故。彼未起果有故者。此驗不能令他信解。汝言無果起者。此無果起。無譬喻故。云何可知。複次第一義中乳不生酪。何以故。以觀因故。譬如絹起。複次泥實名求那假瓶名求泥。第一義中泥不成瓶。何以故。觀求泥故。譬如余物。複次第一義中垂𩑶等相非牛體相。何以故。以觀體故。譬如馬相。複次別名阿婆也婆。總名阿婆也毗。第一義中無實經等成絹。何以故。以觀阿婆也毗故。譬如余物。如是作者及業無自體性。品義如此。是故得成。如佛告極勇猛菩薩言。善男子。色非作者使作者。如是受想行識亦非作者使作者。若色至識非作者使作者。此是般若波羅蜜。又如摩訶般若波羅蜜經中。舍利弗言。婆伽婆。無作是般若波羅蜜。佛言。作者不可得故。又如佛告極勇猛菩薩言。善男子。色非善。非不善。受想行識亦復如是。若色至識非善非不善。是名般若波羅蜜。如是等諸修多羅。此中應廣說。
釋觀作者業品竟。
般若燈論釋觀取者品第九
複次為令諦觀取者無體。有此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，就像虛空中的花朵一樣。已經產生的果實，原因是失去了作用；尚未產生的果實，原因是具有產生作用的功能。由於這個道理，原因中並不存在果實。論者說：『如果你們認為原因產生之前沒有果實，我是不會接受的。』這是什麼意思呢？你們是因為親眼看見所以不接受呢？還是因為要建立論證所以不接受呢？還是因為一切衡量標準都不接受呢？像這樣分別原因的意義是不能成立的，建立原因存在過失，因為它不是絕對的。他們所說的『果實未產生之前就存在』，這種論證不能使他人信服理解。你們說沒有果實產生，這種『沒有果實產生』，沒有可以比喻的事物，怎麼能知道呢？ 再次，在第一義諦中，牛奶不能產生奶酪。為什麼呢？因為觀察原因的緣故。譬如絲絹的產生。再次，泥土的實體叫做『求那』（guna，屬性），虛假的瓶子叫做『求泥』。在第一義諦中，泥土不能成為瓶子。為什麼呢？因為觀察『求泥』的緣故。譬如其他事物。再次，在第一義諦中，牛的垂胡等表相不是牛的本體表相。為什麼呢？因為觀察本體的緣故。譬如馬的表相。再次，個別的名稱叫做『阿婆也婆』（apaya-apa，離散），總體的名稱叫做『阿婆也毗』（apaya-api，離散-聚合）。在第一義諦中，沒有真實的經線等構成絲絹。為什麼呢？因為觀察『阿婆也毗』的緣故。譬如其他事物。像這樣，作者和業都沒有自體的性質，品義就是這樣，所以能夠成立。如同佛陀告訴極勇猛菩薩說：『善男子，色不是作者，也不是使作者。』像這樣，受、想、行、識也不是作者，也不是使作者。如果色到識不是作者，也不是使作者，這就是般若波羅蜜（prajna-paramita，智慧到彼岸）。又如《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》中，舍利弗（Sariputra，佛陀十大弟子之一，以智慧著稱）說：『婆伽婆（Bhagavan，世尊），無作就是般若波羅蜜。』佛陀說：『因為作者是不可得的。』又如佛陀告訴極勇猛菩薩說：『善男子，色不是善，也不是不善，受、想、行、識也是這樣。如果色到識不是善，也不是不善，這叫做般若波羅蜜。』像這樣等等的修多羅（sutra，經），這裡應該廣泛地解說。 《觀作者業品》解釋完畢。 《般若燈論釋觀取者品》第九 再次，爲了使人如實觀察取者沒有實體，有這個品。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, it is like flowers in the sky. For fruits that have already arisen, it is because the cause has lost its function; for fruits that have not yet arisen, it is because the cause has the function of producing. Because of this principle, there is no fruit in the cause. The debater says, 'If you assert that there is no fruit before the cause arises, I will not accept it.' What does this mean? Do you not accept it because you see it with your own eyes? Or do you not accept it because you want to establish an argument? Or do you not accept it by all measures? Separating the meaning of cause in this way cannot be established, and establishing a cause has faults because it is not absolute. Their saying that 'the fruit exists before it arises' cannot convince others. You say that no fruit arises; this 'no fruit arises' has no analogy, how can it be known? Furthermore, in the ultimate truth (paramartha-satya), milk cannot produce cheese. Why? Because of observing the cause. For example, the arising of silk. Furthermore, the substance of mud is called 'guna' (attribute), and the false pot is called 'guna-mud.' In the ultimate truth, mud cannot become a pot. Why? Because of observing 'guna-mud.' For example, other things. Furthermore, in the ultimate truth, the dewlap and other characteristics of a cow are not the characteristics of the cow's essence. Why? Because of observing the essence. For example, the characteristics of a horse. Furthermore, the individual name is called 'apaya-apa' (separation), and the collective name is called 'apaya-api' (separation-aggregation). In the ultimate truth, there are no real warp threads, etc., that make up silk. Why? Because of observing 'apaya-api.' For example, other things. In this way, neither the agent nor the action has its own nature. The meaning of the chapter is like this, so it can be established. It is like the Buddha telling the Bodhisattva Extremely Courageous, 'Good man, form is not the agent, nor does it cause the agent.' Likewise, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness are not the agent, nor do they cause the agent. If form to consciousness is not the agent, nor does it cause the agent, this is prajna-paramita (perfection of wisdom). Also, in the Maha Prajna Paramita Sutra, Sariputra (one of the Buddha's ten great disciples, known for his wisdom) said, 'Bhagavan (World Honored One), non-action is prajna-paramita.' The Buddha said, 'Because the agent is unattainable.' Also, the Buddha told the Bodhisattva Extremely Courageous, 'Good man, form is not good, nor is it not good; feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness are also like this. If form to consciousness is not good, nor is it not good, this is called prajna-paramita.' Such sutras (discourses) should be explained extensively here. The explanation of the 'Chapter on Observing the Agent and Action' is complete. The Ninth Chapter of the Commentary on the Lamp of Wisdom Sutra: Observing the Taker Furthermore, in order to enable people to truly observe that the taker has no substance, there is this chapter.
品起。如偈曰。
眼耳等諸根 受等諸心法 此先有人住 一部如是說
釋曰。一切自部皆無此執。唯有婆私弗多羅立如是義。眼等諸根。受等心法。此若有者。則有先住。道理如是。若不爾者。偈曰。
若取者無體 眼等不可得 以是故當知 先有此住體
釋曰。我見有是取者先住。何以故。以取者故。由此取者可得故。在諸取先住。譬如織者在經緯前。複次取者之先有眼等取。何以故。以有取故。如竹篾等。如是取及取者二俱得成。以是義故。我先說言第一義中有是陰等取及取者。婆伽婆說不可破壞。論者偈曰。
若眼等諸根 受等諸心法 彼先有取者 因何而施設
釋曰。眼及受等以無體故。異取更無一物可得有。何取者而施設耶。如是彼于爾時不有。以取無體故。此中立驗。眼等取前無彼取者。何以故。以施設故。如經絹等。是故取者不成。由取者不成故。因義則壞。由因壞故。彼經絹等譬喻無體。以第一義中取及取者體不成故。複次有異婆私弗多羅言。如先生天上。生天業盡天上取者得如是住。后取人等諸陰故。彼取者阿含得成。論者言。彼生天者。天上取體天施設故。又汝總說阿含。無別驗故。令生疑惑。不應定信。如偈曰。
若無眼等根 先
有彼住者 亦應無取者 眼等有無疑
釋曰。汝意如是。義則不然。何以故。若不觀取者。眼等諸取體則不成。此意如是。若此二法互不相觀。如此次第義不應爾。所謂此是眼等諸法取。此是調達名取者。此是調達名取者。此是眼等諸法取。由此偈曰。
或有取了人 或有人了取 無取何有人 無人何有取
釋曰。或有取了人者。謂眼等諸法。或有人了取者。謂見者聞者。由取取者。更互相觀。世諦中成非第一義。後半偈者。由彼無體。彼因過失汝不得離。複次婆私弗多羅言。汝今何故自生分別言有先住。在彼眼等諸根之前。后還自破。我等法中亦作此說。如偈曰。
一切眼等根 先無一人住
釋曰。無一人住者。謂彼眼等一一根。先各有人住。何以故。偈曰。
由彼眼等根 異異了彼異
釋曰。眼等者謂耳鼻舌身受等。由眼至受各各有異。故得說言。此是見者。此是觸者。由觀異取故。彼取者得。成汝言因。不成者。無如此義。論者偈曰。
若眼等諸根 先無一住者 眼等一一先 彼別云何有
釋曰。由諸外道一一取先立有取者。謂眼耳等先各有人住。是義不然。何以故。若不觀眼等取者無體故。此意如是。由前立驗。眼等取先一一取者。義
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 若有人住在那裡，也應該沒有人去獲取。那麼對於眼等（indriya）諸根，還有什麼疑問呢？
解釋：你的意思是這樣，但道理並非如此。為什麼呢？如果不觀察獲取者，眼等諸根的自體就不能成立。意思是說，如果這兩種法互相不觀察，那麼這樣的次第就不應該成立。所謂『這是眼等諸法所取』，『這是名叫調達（Devadatta）的獲取者』。應該是『這是名叫調達的獲取者』，『這是眼等諸法所取』。因此偈頌說：
或者有（眼等）諸根去了解人，或者有人去了解（眼等）諸根。如果沒有（眼等）諸根，哪裡有人？如果沒有人，哪裡有（眼等）諸根？
解釋：『或者有（眼等）諸根去了解人』，指的是眼等諸法。『或者有人去了解（眼等）諸根』，指的是見者、聞者。通過（眼等）諸根和獲取者，互相觀察，在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya）中成立，而非在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya）中成立。後半偈的意思是，由於它們沒有自體，你無法擺脫這些因果過失。此外，婆私弗多羅（Vasumitra）說：你現在為何自己生起分別，說有先住者，在眼等諸根之前？之後又自己破斥。我們法中也有這樣的說法，如偈頌說：
一切眼等諸根，先前沒有一個人住在其中。
解釋：『沒有一個人住在其中』，指的是眼等每一個根，先前各自有人住在其中。為什麼呢？偈頌說：
由於眼等諸根，各自不同地瞭解不同的事物。
解釋：眼等指的是耳、鼻、舌、身、受等。由於眼到受各自有差異，所以才能說，『這是見者』，『這是觸者』。由於觀察到不同的獲取，所以獲取者才能成立。你的說法是因，不成者，沒有這樣的道理。論者偈頌說：
如果眼等諸根，先前沒有一個住者，眼等每一個先前，它們之間的差別又怎麼會有呢？
解釋：由於一些外道認為，每一個獲取者先前都存在一個獲取者，即眼耳等先前各自有人住在其中。這個道理是不成立的。為什麼呢？如果不觀察眼等諸根，它們就沒有自體。意思是說，通過前面的立驗，眼等諸根先前，每一個獲取者，這個道理...
【English Translation】 English version If there is one who dwells there, there should also be no one who takes. Then, regarding the indriyas (eye, etc.), is there any doubt?
Explanation: Your intention is thus, but the principle is not so. Why? If the taker is not observed, then the self-nature of the indriyas (eye, etc.) cannot be established. The meaning is this: if these two dharmas do not observe each other, then such an order should not be established. So-called 'this is what is taken by the dharmas of the eye, etc.,' 'this is the taker named Devadatta.' It should be 'this is the taker named Devadatta,' 'this is what is taken by the dharmas of the eye, etc.' Therefore, the verse says:
Either the indriyas (eye, etc.) understand a person, or a person understands the indriyas (eye, etc.). If there are no indriyas (eye, etc.), where is the person? If there is no person, where are the indriyas (eye, etc.)?
Explanation: 'Either the indriyas (eye, etc.) understand a person' refers to the dharmas of the eye, etc. 'Or a person understands the indriyas (eye, etc.)' refers to the seer, the hearer. Through the indriyas (eye, etc.) and the taker, observing each other, it is established in conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), but not in ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). The meaning of the latter half of the verse is that, since they have no self-nature, you cannot escape these causal faults. Furthermore, Vasumitra said: Why do you now generate distinctions yourself, saying that there is a prior dweller, before the indriyas (eye, etc.)? Then you refute yourself. In our Dharma, there is also such a saying, as the verse says:
All the indriyas (eye, etc.), previously, no one dwells within them.
Explanation: 'No one dwells within them' refers to each of the indriyas (eye, etc.), previously, each had a person dwelling within them. Why? The verse says:
Because the indriyas (eye, etc.), each differently understands different things.
Explanation: The indriyas (eye, etc.) refer to ear, nose, tongue, body, sensation, etc. Because there are differences from eye to sensation, it can be said, 'This is the seer,' 'This is the toucher.' Because of observing different takings, the taker can be established. Your statement is the cause, the non-established, there is no such principle. The commentator's verse says:
If the indriyas (eye, etc.), previously, had no dweller, each of the indriyas (eye, etc.) previously, how could there be differences between them?
Explanation: Because some heretics believe that for each taker, there was previously a taker, that is, the eye, ear, etc., each had a person dwelling within them. This principle is not established. Why? If the indriyas (eye, etc.) are not observed, they have no self-nature. The meaning is this: through the previous establishment, the indriyas (eye, etc.) previously, each taker, this principle...
亦不成。複次汝若定執有彼取者。今當問汝。為此見者。即是聞者。乃至受者。為見聞者。乃至受者。各各異耶。若受先說者。是義不然。如偈曰。
見者即聞者 聞者即受者 一一若先有 是義則不然
釋曰。彼如是說則同外道。此義云何。外道所說彼身根處積聚法者。如草土成舍。而有別人于中受用。如是人者。不可識知。謂見者等。此義不然。何以故。彼一體故立義有過。複次非第一義中彼見者體不異聞者。何以故。聞者故如別體聞者由相續異故。見聞不同。汝言體不異者。此立義過。複次見者欲見不觀。于眼色應可得。何以故。不異聞者故。譬如聞者。由與聞者不異驗故。不觀于眼。彼色可得。若其不爾。見者異法。此皆不成。立義過故。復有異僧佉言。我若是一丈夫則墮余根去過如歷諸窗牖。由彼處處眼等為因起色等覺。以我既不遍則有別方所。若不依彼眼等諸根。則見聞者等皆不得成。由我遍故。則不至余根。是故無過。論者言。汝立因者有大過失。由一一根中皆先有我。是義不然。何以故。道理無有如此我故。若人慾得異陰入界。有一丈夫為見者等。論主教彼如先觀入品遮。當如此解不復廣釋。或有欲避如先過失說有取者。其相云何。彼謂見者聞者各各差別。而是一我。如此執者。是
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 也不成立。更進一步說，你如果一定要堅持有能『取』（graha，接受、領受）的人，現在我要問你，這個『見』（darśana，看見）者，就是『聞』（śravaṇa，聽見）者，乃至『受』（vedanā，感受）者嗎？還是『見』者、『聞』者，乃至『受』者，各自不同呢？如果接受先前的說法，這個道理是不對的。正如偈頌所說：
『見者即聞者，聞者即受者，一一若先有，是義則不然。』
解釋：他們這樣說就和外道一樣了。這是什麼道理呢？外道所說的那些身根處積聚的法，就像用草和土建成的房子，而有另外的人在其中享受。像這樣的人，是無法認識的，比如『見』者等等。這個道理是不對的。為什麼呢？因為他們是一體的，所以立論有過失。再進一步說，在第一義諦中，那個『見』者的本體和『聞』者沒有不同。為什麼呢？因為『聞』者就像是另外一個本體，『聞』者因為相續不同，所以『見』和『聞』不同。你說本體沒有不同，這就有立論的過失。再進一步說，『見』者想要看，如果不看，在眼和色之間應該可以得到（見）。為什麼呢？因為和『聞』者沒有不同。比如『聞』者，因為和『聞』者沒有不同，所以不看眼，那個色也可以得到。如果不是這樣，『見』者就是不同的法，這些都不成立，因為有立論的過失。還有一些異於僧佉派（Sāṃkhya）的人說：『我如果是一個丈夫（puruṣa，補盧沙，神我），就會墮入其餘根的過去，就像穿過各個窗戶一樣。因為那些眼等在各個地方作為原因，產生色等的覺知。因為我既然不是普遍的，就有不同的方所。如果不依靠那些眼等諸根，那麼『見』者、『聞』者等都不能成立。因為我是普遍的，所以不會到達其餘的根，因此沒有過失。』論者說：『你所立的因有很大的過失。因為每一個根中都先有我，這個道理是不對的。為什麼呢？因為道理上沒有這樣的我。』如果有人想要得到異陰入界，有一個丈夫作為『見』者等，論主引導他們像先前觀察入品那樣遮止。應當這樣理解，不再詳細解釋。或者有人想要避免像先前的過失，說有『取』者，它的相狀是怎樣的呢？他們認為『見』者、『聞』者各自有差別，而是一個『我』。像這樣執著的，是
【English Translation】 English version: It is also not established. Furthermore, if you are determined to insist that there is a 'taker' (graha, receiver), I will now ask you, is this 'seer' (darśana, one who sees) the same as the 'hearer' (śravaṇa, one who hears), or even the 'feeler' (vedanā, one who feels)? Or are the 'seer', 'hearer', and 'feeler' each different? If you accept the previous statement, this reasoning is incorrect. As the verse says:
'The seer is the hearer, the hearer is the feeler, if each existed prior, then this reasoning is not correct.'
Explanation: Their statement is the same as that of the heretics. What is the reason for this? The heretics speak of the aggregates of body, faculties, and realms as being like a house made of grass and earth, in which another person enjoys. Such a person is unknowable, such as the 'seer' and so on. This reasoning is incorrect. Why? Because they are one entity, so the proposition has a fault. Furthermore, in the ultimate truth, the essence of the 'seer' is not different from the 'hearer'. Why? Because the 'hearer' is like another entity, and the 'hearer' is different from the 'seer' because of the difference in continuity. If you say that the essence is not different, then this proposition has a fault. Furthermore, if the 'seer' wants to see, without looking, it should be possible to obtain (seeing) between the eye and the form. Why? Because it is not different from the 'hearer'. For example, the 'hearer', because it is not different from the 'hearer', can obtain that form without looking at the eye. If this is not the case, then the 'seer' is a different dharma, and none of this is established, because there is a fault in the proposition. There are also some who differ from the Sāṃkhya school who say: 'If I am a single puruṣa (puruṣa, self), I will fall into the past of the other faculties, like passing through various windows. Because those eyes and so on in various places act as causes, producing perceptions of form and so on. Since I am not pervasive, I have different locations. If I do not rely on those faculties such as the eyes, then the 'seer', 'hearer', and so on cannot be established. Because I am pervasive, I will not reach the other faculties, therefore there is no fault.' The debater says: 'Your established cause has a great fault. Because in each faculty there is already a self, this reasoning is incorrect. Why? Because there is no such self in reason.' If someone wants to obtain the different skandhas entering the realm, and there is a puruṣa as the 'seer' and so on, the debater guides them to refute it as in the previous observation of the entry chapter. It should be understood in this way, and no further explanation is given. Or someone wants to avoid the previous fault and says there is a 'taker', what is its appearance like? They believe that the 'seer' and 'hearer' are each different, but are one 'self'. Such an attachment is
亦有過。如偈曰。
若見聞者異 受者亦差別
釋曰。如汝分別得何等過。今當示汝。如偈曰。
見聞者不同 是我則多體
釋曰。若世間物異彼物者。則彼此俱有。以其異故。如瓶缽等。見聞者異亦復如是。由見聞者異故。嗅嘗觸者亦各差別。以是義故。於一相續中有無量我。而不欲爾。是故第一義中見者聞者有別相續。此異不然。此中說驗。見者取者不異聞者。以彼取者因果合有故。如見者自體。複次如前偈言。見者聞者異。此言見者為緣則聞者可得。以如是義我成多體。又過去時等各差別故。複次此中說驗。第一義中取者無體。何以故。以緣起故。如取自體。複次第一義中調達眼等不名調達取者之取。何以故。以眼等故。譬如耶若達多眼等自體。是故取者及取。二皆不成。以不免前過故。婆私弗多羅言。取及取者。若一若異。俱不可說。是故無過。論者言。可說有故。豈非過耶。複次於一身根聚。若果若因諸聚食者。我則無量。而不欲爾。以是故我則不一。此義得成。以識別故。如多相續見者不一多我得成。複次有異人言。有如是取。如佛所說。名色緣六入。彼色是四大為取者取。是故有實取者。由六入具足次生受等。非眼等先有。彼取者因施設故。譬如瓶等。此是如來所說道理。汝
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 也有過失。如偈語所說：
『若見者聞者不同，感受者也會有差別。』
解釋：如果你的分別成立，會有什麼樣的過失呢？現在告訴你。如偈語所說：
『見者和聞者不同，那麼「我」就會變成多個個體。』
解釋：如果世間一個事物與另一個事物不同，那麼彼此都各自存在，因為它們是不同的，比如瓶子和缽等。見者和聞者不同也是如此。由於見者和聞者不同，嗅者、嘗者、觸者也各有差別。因為這個原因，在一個相續流中會有無數個「我」，但這是我們不希望看到的。因此，在第一義諦中，見者和聞者有不同的相續流，這種不同是不成立的。這裡有一個論證：見者和取者與聞者沒有不同，因為取者是因果的結合。就像見者自身一樣。此外，如前面的偈語所說，見者和聞者不同，這句話的意思是，以見者為緣，聞者才能存在。因為這個原因，「我」就變成了多個個體。而且，過去時等各有差別。
此外，這裡有一個論證：在第一義諦中，取者沒有自體。為什麼呢？因為它是緣起的，就像取者自身一樣。此外，在第一義諦中，調達（Devadatta，人名）的眼睛等，不能稱為調達的取者之取。為什麼呢？因為它們只是眼睛等，就像耶若達多（Yajnadatta，人名）的眼睛等自身一樣。因此，取者和取，兩者都不能成立，因為無法避免前面的過失。婆私弗多羅（Vasumitra，論師名）說：取和取者，無論是一還是異，都無法說清。因此沒有過失。論者說：可以說的存在，難道不是過失嗎？此外，在一個身體的根聚中，如果果聚和因聚的食者不同，那麼「我」就會有無數個，但這是我們不希望看到的。因此，「我」就不是單一的。這個觀點成立，因為有識別作用。就像多個相續流一樣，見者不是單一的，多個「我」就成立了。
此外，有其他人說：有這樣的取，就像佛陀所說，名色緣六入。其中的色是四大，被取者所取。因此，有真實的取者。由於六入具足，接下來產生受等，而不是眼睛等先存在。這個取者是因施設而有的，就像瓶子等一樣。這是如來所說的道理，你...
【English Translation】 English version There is also fault. As the verse says:
'If the seer and the hearer are different, the receiver will also be different.'
Explanation: If your distinction holds, what fault would there be? Now I will show you. As the verse says:
'The seer and the hearer are different; then 'I' would be multiple entities.'
Explanation: If one thing in the world is different from another, then both exist separately because they are different, like a bottle and a bowl. The difference between the seer and the hearer is similar. Because the seer and the hearer are different, the smeller, taster, and toucher are also each different. For this reason, there would be countless 'I's in one continuum, which is undesirable. Therefore, in the ultimate sense (paramārtha, 第一義諦), the seer and the hearer have different continuums, and this difference is not valid. Here is an argument: the seer and the taker are not different from the hearer, because the taker is a combination of cause and effect. Just like the seer itself. Furthermore, as the previous verse said, the seer and the hearer are different, which means that the hearer can be obtained by taking the seer as a condition. Because of this, 'I' becomes multiple entities. Moreover, past times, etc., are each different.
Furthermore, here is an argument: in the ultimate sense, the taker has no self-nature (svabhāva, 自體). Why? Because it is dependently originated (pratītyasamutpāda, 緣起), just like the taker itself. Furthermore, in the ultimate sense, Devadatta's (調達, person's name) eyes, etc., cannot be called Devadatta's taker's taking. Why? Because they are just eyes, etc., like Yajnadatta's (耶若達多, person's name) eyes, etc., themselves. Therefore, the taker and the taking both cannot be established, because they cannot avoid the previous fault. Vasumitra (婆私弗多羅, a philosopher's name) said: The taker and the taking, whether they are one or different, cannot be clearly stated. Therefore, there is no fault. The debater said: Can what can be said not be a fault? Furthermore, in a body's aggregate of roots, if the eaters of the fruit aggregates and the cause aggregates are different, then there would be countless 'I's, which is undesirable. Therefore, 'I' is not singular. This view is established because there is discrimination. Just like multiple continuums, the seer is not singular, and multiple 'I's are established.
Furthermore, some others say: There is such a taking, as the Buddha said, name and form (nāmarūpa, 名色) condition the six entrances (ṣaḍāyatana, 六入). The form in it is the four great elements (mahābhūta, 四大), which are taken by the taker. Therefore, there is a real taker. Because the six entrances are complete, next arises feeling (vedanā, 受), etc., rather than the eyes, etc., existing first. This taker is established by conceptual imputation (prajñapti, 施設), just like a bottle, etc. This is the doctrine taught by the Tathagata (如來), you...
違此理。是故汝先所立義破。論者偈曰。
眼耳及受等 所從生諸大 于彼諸大中 取者不可得
釋曰。由彼取者。無實體故。依第一義名色位中取者無體。然世諦中名色為因施設取者。是故不違阿含所說。以彼眼等及大唯是聚故。汝立取者。為因此義。不成有過失故。如理諦觀。彼無實體。如偈曰。
眼先無取者 今後亦復無 以無取者故 無有彼分別
釋曰。眼等諸取取者不然。彼異取故。如別相續四大取者。如是驗知前不可得。以實體不成故。譬如四大實體。由第一義無故。取及取者一異俱壞。一異不成故。彼分別滅。云何滅耶。以無實有故。有分別滅。因施設故。無分別滅。複次汝立有故。欲令我解。我于第一義中驗無體故。有分別滅。有既滅故。無亦隨滅。如婆伽婆楞伽經中偈曰。
以覺觀察時 物體不可得 以無自體故 彼法不可說
如前人言。有取取者。彼皆不成。取為因過。已如上說。取及取者皆無自性。故有此品。以是義故。此證得成。如般若波羅蜜經中說。佛告極勇猛菩薩言。善男子。色無見者使見者。受想行識無見者使見者。若色至識無見者使見者。此是般若波羅蜜。複次色無知者見者。受想行識無知者見者。若色至識無知者見者。此是般
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這違反了道理。因此，你先前所建立的義理被破斥。論者的偈頌說： 『眼、耳以及感受等，所從生起的諸大（四大元素：地、水、火、風），在那些諸大之中，取者（能取者）是不可得的。』 解釋：由於那個取者沒有實體。依據第一義諦，在名色（nama-rupa，精神和物質）的位中，取者沒有實體。然而在世俗諦中，名色作為因緣施設了取者。因此不違背阿含經所說。因為那些眼等以及四大，僅僅是聚合。你建立取者，因為這個義理，不成，有過失。如理如實地觀察，那個沒有實體。如偈頌說： 『眼先前沒有取者，現在和以後也同樣沒有。因為沒有取者，就沒有那些分別。』 解釋：眼等諸取的取者不是真實的。因為它們與取不同。如同其他相續的四大取者。這樣驗證可知，先前是不可得的。因為實體不能成立。譬如四大實體，由於第一義諦中沒有，取和取者，一和異都壞滅。一和異不能成立，那些分別就滅了。如何滅呢？因為沒有真實的存在，所以有分別滅。因為是因緣施設，所以無分別滅。再次，你建立『有』，想要讓我理解。我在第一義諦中驗證沒有實體，所以有分別滅。『有』既然滅了，『無』也隨之滅。如《婆伽婆楞伽經》（Bhagavatam Lankavatara Sutra）中的偈頌說： 『以覺悟觀察時，物體不可得。因為沒有自體（svabhava，自性），那些法不可說。』 如先前人所說，有取者和取，那些都不成立。取作為因的過失，已經在上面說過了。取和取者都沒有自性。所以有此品。因為這個義理，這個論證得以成立。如《般若波羅蜜經》（Prajnaparamita Sutra）中說。佛告訴極勇猛菩薩說：『善男子，色（rupa，物質）沒有見者使之見，受（vedana，感受）、想（samjna，概念）、行（samskara，意志）、識（vijnana，意識）沒有見者使之見。如果色到識沒有見者使之見，這就是般若波羅蜜（prajnaparamita，智慧的完成）。』再次，色沒有知者見者，受想行識沒有知者見者。如果色到識沒有知者見者，這就是般若。'
【English Translation】 English version: This violates the principle. Therefore, the meaning you previously established is refuted. The proponent's verse says: 'The eye, ear, and feelings, etc., the great elements (mahabhuta, the four great elements: earth, water, fire, and wind) from which they arise, among those great elements, the taker (graha, the one who takes) is unattainable.' Explanation: Because that taker has no substance. According to the ultimate truth (paramartha satya), in the position of name and form (nama-rupa, mind and matter), the taker has no substance. However, in conventional truth (samvriti satya), name and form are established as the cause of the taker. Therefore, it does not contradict what the Agamas say. Because those eyes, etc., and the great elements are merely aggregates. You establish the taker because of this meaning, which is not established and has faults. Observe with reason and truth, that there is no substance. As the verse says: 'The eye had no taker before, and it has none now or in the future. Because there is no taker, there are no discriminations.' Explanation: The takers of the eyes, etc., are not real. Because they are different from the taking. Like the takers of the four great elements in other continuums. Thus, it can be verified that the former is unattainable. Because the substance cannot be established. For example, the substance of the four great elements, because it does not exist in the ultimate truth, the taking and the taker, one and different, are all destroyed. Because one and different cannot be established, those discriminations are extinguished. How are they extinguished? Because there is no real existence, so discrimination with existence is extinguished. Because it is established by causes and conditions, discrimination without existence is extinguished. Furthermore, you establish 'existence' to make me understand. I verify in the ultimate truth that there is no substance, so discrimination with existence is extinguished. Since 'existence' is extinguished, 'non-existence' also follows and is extinguished. As the verse in the 'Bhagavatam Lankavatara Sutra' says: 'When observing with awareness, objects are unattainable. Because there is no self-nature (svabhava), those dharmas (phenomena) are unspeakable.' As the previous person said, there are takers and taking, but those are not established. The fault of taking as a cause has already been mentioned above. Taking and the taker have no self-nature. Therefore, there is this category. Because of this meaning, this proof is established. As it is said in the 'Prajnaparamita Sutra': The Buddha told the extremely courageous Bodhisattva: 'Good man, form (rupa, matter) has no seer to make it see, feeling (vedana, sensation), conception (samjna, perception), volition (samskara, mental formations), and consciousness (vijnana, awareness) have no seer to make them see. If form to consciousness has no seer to make them see, this is prajnaparamita (perfection of wisdom).' Again, form has no knower or seer, feeling, conception, volition, and consciousness have no knower or seer. If form to consciousness has no knower or seer, this is prajna.'
若波羅蜜。如是等諸修多羅。此中應廣說。
釋觀取者品竟。
般若燈論釋卷第六 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 般若燈論釋
般若燈論釋卷第七
偈本龍樹菩薩 釋論分別明菩薩
大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅譯
觀薪火品第十
複次前品已遮取及取者。除其執見。今復令解不一不異緣起法故。有此品起。外人言。第一義中有取取者。何以故。由此二法互相觀故。譬如火薪。云何知耶。如佛所說。第一義中有陰等取及以取者。此因成故。我義得立。論者言。總遮起故。薪火亦遮。汝今未悟猶言有實。如觀陰品說。若離色因。色不可得。因亦如此。雖先已破。今當復遮。汝應諦聽。此遮方便火薪二種欲令有者。為是一耶。為是異耶。若爾有何過。薪火一者。是義不然。何以故。如偈曰。
若火即是薪 作者作業一
釋曰。由彼地等譬喻無故。此不相應。有人言。四大是薪。暖界是火。復有人言。彼諸大中暖界增起故名為火。論者此中更方便說。第一義中薪火二事不為一體。何以故。作者作業故。譬如斫者所斫有異。火為作者。燃為作業。以作者業異故。薪火不為一。複次若火即是薪作者作業一。若定爾者。汝不應言是薪是火。薪外有火者。一
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如《若波羅蜜》（Prajnaparamita，般若波羅蜜多）等諸修多羅（Sutra，經）。此中應廣說。
釋觀取者品竟。
《般若燈論釋》卷第六 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 《般若燈論釋》
《般若燈論釋》卷第七
偈本龍樹菩薩（Nagarjuna，佛教中觀派創始人） 釋論分別明菩薩
大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅譯
觀薪火品第十
複次，前品已遮遣取（grasping）及取者（grasper）。除其執見。今復令解不一不異緣起法故。有此品起。外人言：『第一義（ultimate truth）中有取及取者。何以故？由此二法互相觀故。譬如火薪。云何知耶？如佛所說，第一義中有陰（skandhas，五蘊）等取及以取者。此因成故，我義得立。』論者言：『總遮起故，薪火亦遮。汝今未悟猶言有實。如觀陰品說，若離色因，色不可得。因亦如此。雖先已破，今當復遮。汝應諦聽。此遮方便火薪二種欲令有者，為是一耶？為是異耶？若爾有何過？』薪火一者，是義不然。何以故？如偈曰：
『若火即是薪 作者作業一』
釋曰：由彼地等譬喻無故，此不相應。有人言：『四大是薪，暖界是火。』復有人言：『彼諸大中暖界增起故名為火。』論者此中更方便說，第一義中薪火二事不為一體。何以故？作者作業故。譬如斫者所斫有異。火為作者，燃為作業。以作者業異故，薪火不為一。複次，若火即是薪作者作業一。若定爾者，汝不應言是薪是火。薪外有火者，一
【English Translation】 English version: Such as the Prajnaparamita Sutras (Prajnaparamita, Perfection of Wisdom). These should be extensively explained herein.
End of the chapter on Examining the Grasper.
Commentary on the Lamp of Wisdom, Volume Six Taisho Tripitaka, Volume 30, No. 1566, Commentary on the Lamp of Wisdom
Commentary on the Lamp of Wisdom, Volume Seven
Verses by Nagarjuna (Nagarjuna, founder of the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism), Commentary Explained by Bodhisattva Vimalakirti
Translated by Tripitaka Master Prabhamitra from Central India of the Great Tang Dynasty
Chapter Ten: Examining Fuel and Fire
Furthermore, the previous chapter has already refuted the grasping (grasping) and the grasper (grasper), removing their attachment. Now, this chapter arises to further explain the interdependent origination of phenomena that are neither identical nor different. An outsider says: 'In the ultimate truth (ultimate truth), there is grasping and a grasper. Why? Because these two phenomena are mutually observed. For example, fuel and fire. How do we know this? As the Buddha said, in the ultimate truth, there are skandhas (skandhas, five aggregates) and so on as the grasped and the grasper. Because of this cause, my argument is established.' The commentator says: 'Because of the overall refutation, fuel and fire are also refuted. You are still unenlightened and still speak of reality. As said in the chapter on Examining the Skandhas, if separated from the cause of form, form cannot be obtained. The cause is also like this. Although it has been refuted before, now I will refute it again. You should listen carefully. This skillful means of refutation: are these two, fuel and fire, which you want to exist, one or different? If so, what is the fault?' If fuel and fire are one, this is not correct. Why? As the verse says:
'If fire is identical to fuel, the agent and the action are one.'
Commentary: Because there are no analogies such as earth and so on, this is not appropriate. Someone says: 'The four great elements are fuel, and the heat element is fire.' Others say: 'Among those great elements, the increase of the heat element is called fire.' The commentator further explains skillfully here, in the ultimate truth, fuel and fire are not one entity. Why? Because there is an agent and an action. For example, the cutter and what is cut are different. Fire is the agent, and burning is the action. Because the agent and the action are different, fuel and fire are not one. Furthermore, if fire is identical to fuel, the agent and the action are one. If it is definitely so, you should not say it is fuel and it is fire. If there is fire outside of fuel, one
體義壞。以不暖不燒火即無用。法體無別故。立義有過。汝言薪火一者。是義不然。複次薪火異者。是亦不然。何以故。如偈曰。
若火異於薪 離薪應有火
釋曰。以其異故。譬如余物。而不欲爾。此中說驗。第一義中火薪不異。何以故。以有觀故。如薪自體。如是第一義中火薪不異。何以故。以有觀故。如火自體。若言火薪別物。皆有相觀。一切有觀故。因非一向者。是義不然。何以故。彼一切等觀義相似亦同遮故無過。若定欲得火薪異者。有過失故。如偈曰。
如是常應燃 以不因薪故
釋曰。不觀薪故。彼應常燃。縱無薪時。火亦不滅。以其異故。又幹薪投火亦無焰起。義皆不然。如偈曰。
復無燃火功 火亦無燒業
釋曰。無可燒相業無體故而不欲爾。何以故。幼男小女盡知有因。皆欲有業故。此中立驗。第一義中火薪不異。何以故。以有因故。有起作故。有業故。如薪自體廣如前說。薪門亦爾。以薪為燃因。有起有業。皆同火說。是故非因。譬喻不成。若汝意謂火正燃時名為薪者。是亦不然。如偈曰。
若火正燃時 汝謂為薪者 彼時唯有火 誰是可燃薪
釋曰。於世諦中。未燃時名薪。正燃時名火。以薪是火緣。于正燃時唯說火故此起亦唯聚。
唯是獨自故能為燒煮照明果因故說為火。第一義中起不可得。先已遮故。複次若汝意謂四大齊等。火界不增。說名為薪。或說三大名之為薪。彼三或四是其所燒。火亦如是。大聚和合故說為火。如是說者。今當立驗。第一義中火不燒薪。何以故。以其大故。譬如水大。如是色故。有故。粗故。色陰所攝故。外故。有生故有因故。如是因驗此應廣說。如彼意謂第一義中火能燒者。是則不然。複次如前偈說。彼時唯有火。誰是可燃。薪者唯是何義。謂唯大積聚故。起別觀故。於世諦中說為薪火。汝謂于正燃時說為薪等者。是義不然。問曰地等和合中。有火能燒故。汝立喻者。此喻不成。答曰。成立相似者彼亦同破地等自相我引為喻。汝言喻不成者。我無此過。以第一義中遮故。不壞世間所解故。複次鞞世師言火薪微塵我之一分。此一分塵與後塵合。此業作和合依止二塵。彼二微塵和合起作名陀臘脾(毗佉反唐言實)。如是三塵已去漸次起已作光明故。名為火陀臘脾。如是薪塵與薪塵合。彼薪火二更互相觀。以相觀故。得成因果。論者言。彼亦如前偈說。若火異於薪。離薪應有火。如是等執。前已廣遮。此中應說。複次非第一義中火作光明。何以故。以其大故。譬如余大及遮彼起第一義中火大微塵不能起作火陀臘脾。何以故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 唯獨因為是獨立的，所以能夠進行燃燒、照明，因此才說它是火（Agni，火神）。但在第一義諦（Paramārtha，勝義諦，究竟真實）中，火的生起是不可得的，因為之前已經遮遣過了。 再者，如果你認為四大（四大種，即地、水、火、風）是齊等的，火界（Tejo-dhātu，火元素）沒有增加，那麼所謂的『薪』（Indhana，燃料），或者說三大（地、水、風）被稱為薪，這三者或四者是被火所燃燒的。火也是如此，因為是大的聚合和合，所以才被稱為火。如果這樣說，現在應當立一個論證：在第一義諦中，火不能燃燒薪。為什麼呢？因為它（火）是大（Mahābhūta，大種）的緣故，就像水大（Āpa-dhātu，水元素）一樣。像這樣，因為是色（Rūpa，物質）的緣故，因為是存在的緣故，因為是粗大的緣故，因為是被色陰（Rūpa-skandha，色蘊）所攝的緣故，因為是外在的緣故，因為是有生起的緣故，因為是有原因的緣故。像這樣的原因和論證，應該廣泛地說明。 如果對方認為在第一義諦中火能夠燃燒，那是不對的。再者，如前一偈所說：『那時只有火，誰是可燃物？』薪僅僅是什麼意思呢？意思是僅僅是大的積聚。因為生起不同的觀察，所以在世俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya，世俗諦，相對真實）中才說它是薪和火。你認為在正在燃燒的時候才說是薪等等，這種說法是不對的。問：在地等和合中，有火能夠燃燒，你所立的比喻，這個比喻不成立。答：成立相似性的人，他們也會同樣破斥地等自相，我引用它作為比喻。你說比喻不成立，我沒有這個過失。因為在第一義諦中已經遮遣過了，並且沒有破壞世間所理解的。再者，鞞世師（Vaiśeṣika，勝論學派）說，火和薪的微塵是我（Ātman，神我）的一部分。這一部分的微塵與後面的微塵結合。這種業（Karma，行為）所產生的和合，依止於兩個微塵。這兩個微塵和合生起作用，叫做陀臘脾（Dravya，實體）。像這樣，從三個微塵開始，逐漸生起，因為已經產生了光明，所以叫做火陀臘脾。像這樣，薪的微塵與薪的微塵結合。薪和火這兩者互相觀察。因為互相觀察的緣故，才能成就因果。 論者說，他們也像前面的偈頌所說：『如果火異於薪，離開薪應該有火。』像這樣的執著，之前已經廣泛地遮遣過了。這裡應該說明。再者，在第一義諦中，火不能產生光明。為什麼呢？因為它（火）是大（Mahābhūta，大種）的緣故，就像其餘的大種一樣。並且遮遣了它的生起。在第一義諦中，火大的微塵不能產生火陀臘脾。為什麼呢？
【English Translation】 English version It is only because it is independent that it can burn and illuminate, and therefore it is called fire (Agni, the god of fire). However, in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha, the highest truth, ultimate reality), the arising of fire is unattainable because it has already been refuted. Furthermore, if you think that the four great elements (Mahābhūta, the four elements, namely earth, water, fire, and wind) are equal, and the fire element (Tejo-dhātu, the element of fire) has not increased, then the so-called 'fuel' (Indhana, fuel), or the three great elements (earth, water, and wind) are called fuel, and these three or four are burned by the fire. Fire is also like this, because it is a large aggregation and combination, so it is called fire. If you say so, now we should establish an argument: in the ultimate truth, fire cannot burn fuel. Why? Because it (fire) is a great element (Mahābhūta, great element), just like the water element (Āpa-dhātu, water element). Like this, because it is form (Rūpa, matter), because it exists, because it is coarse, because it is included in the form aggregate (Rūpa-skandha, aggregate of form), because it is external, because it has arising, because it has a cause. Such causes and arguments should be explained extensively. If the opponent thinks that fire can burn in the ultimate truth, that is not correct. Furthermore, as the previous verse said: 'At that time, there is only fire, who is the combustible?' What does fuel mean? It means only a large accumulation. Because different observations arise, it is said to be fuel and fire in conventional truth (Saṃvṛti-satya, conventional truth, relative truth). You think that it is called fuel etc. when it is burning, this statement is not correct. Question: In the combination of earth etc., there is fire that can burn, and the metaphor you established, this metaphor is not valid. Answer: Those who establish similarity will also refute the self-characteristics of earth etc., and I cite it as a metaphor. You say that the metaphor is not valid, I do not have this fault. Because it has been refuted in the ultimate truth, and it does not destroy what the world understands. Furthermore, the Vaiśeṣika (Vaiśeṣika, school of special categories) says that the dust of fire and fuel is a part of my self (Ātman, self). This part of the dust combines with the dust behind. This combination produced by karma (Karma, action) depends on two dusts. The combination of these two dusts gives rise to action, called Dravya (Dravya, substance). Like this, starting from three dusts, it gradually arises, and because it has produced light, it is called fire Dravya. Like this, the dust of fuel combines with the dust of fuel. The two, fuel and fire, observe each other. Because they observe each other, they can achieve cause and effect. The debater said that they are also like the previous verse said: 'If fire is different from fuel, there should be fire without fuel.' Such attachments have been widely refuted before. This should be explained here. Furthermore, in the ultimate truth, fire cannot produce light. Why? Because it (fire) is a great element (Mahābhūta, great element), just like the other great elements. And it refutes its arising. In the ultimate truth, the dust of the fire element cannot produce fire Dravya. Why?
。以微塵故。如余微塵。問曰。汝前立義有何所以。為起余塵。為都無起。若起余塵立義則壞若都不起。則譬喻無體。答曰。汝語不善。如先分別。非我所欲。後分別者。譬喻亦成。何以故。如火微塵不能起火。地等諸塵一一皆爾。複次第一義中彼火微塵不能起火。何以故。以異故。譬如水。如是作故。壞故。起故等諸因。此應廣說。複次僧佉人言。如我立義彼薩埵(唐言明相)遏邏阇(唐言塵)諸觸色增時說名為火若多摸(唐言暗)增時說名為薪是故定以薪為火因。以薪為因故。觀薪說火。論者言。彼亦有過。以第一義中暖非火體。何以故。以大故。如前譬遮。複次偈曰。
若異則不到
釋曰。若火異薪者異故則不到。譬如未到火薪。由作者喻火。作業喻薪。此二和合名為作相。義正如是。複次偈曰。
不到故不燒 不燒故不滅 不滅住自相
釋曰。由此火無因離薪得成故。則住自相。住自相故名之為常。既無此義故。知火薪不異。若立異者。如先已遮。此應廣說。如后偈曰。
此物共彼物 異者則不然
外人言。若異不到者得如是過。如前偈言。異則不到。不到不燒等由異有到無如上過。云何驗耶。如女人丈夫異故。相到世間所解無能破者。如偈曰。
然異於可燃
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為微塵的緣故，就像其餘的微塵一樣。有人問：『你先前所立的義理有什麼根據？是爲了生起其餘的微塵，還是根本沒有生起？』如果生起其餘的微塵，那麼你所立的義理就被破壞了；如果根本沒有生起，那麼你的譬喻就沒有實體。 回答說：『你這樣說是不恰當的。像先前那樣分別，不是我所希望的。後來的分別，譬喻也是可以成立的。』為什麼這樣說呢？因為火的微塵不能生起火，地等諸塵也是一樣。再者，在第一義諦中，那火的微塵不能生起火。為什麼呢？因為它們是不同的。譬如水。像這樣，因為『作故』、『壞故』、『起故』等諸種原因，這些應該詳細說明。再者，僧佉（Samkhya，印度數論派）人說：『就像我所立的義理，當薩埵（Sattva，明相）和遏邏阇（Rajas，塵）這些觸色增加時，就說它是火；如果多摸（Tamas，暗）增加時，就說它是薪柴。』所以，一定是以薪柴作為火的原因。因為以薪柴為原因的緣故，觀察薪柴來說火。 論者說：『他們也有過失。因為在第一義諦中，暖不是火的本體。』為什麼呢？因為它廣大。就像前面的譬喻所遮破的那樣。再者，偈頌說： 『若異則不到』 解釋說：如果火和薪柴是不同的，因為它們是不同的，所以火就不能到達薪柴。譬如沒有到達火的薪柴。由作者比喻火，作業比喻薪柴，這二者和合稱為作相，義理正是這樣。再者，偈頌說： 『不到故不燒，不燒故不滅，不滅住自相』 解釋說：由此火沒有原因，離開薪柴而能夠成立，所以它就安住于自身的相狀。安住于自身的相狀，所以稱之為常。既然沒有這樣的道理，所以知道火和薪柴不是不同的。如果立為不同，就像先前已經遮破的那樣。這些應該詳細說明。就像後面的偈頌所說： 『此物共彼物，異者則不然』 外人說：如果不同就不能到達，那麼就會有像前面偈頌所說的過失，『不同則不能到達，不能到達就不能燃燒』等等，因為不同而有到達，沒有像上面所說的過失。用什麼來驗證呢？就像女人和丈夫是不同的，所以能夠相互到達，這是世間所理解的，沒有人能夠破斥。就像偈頌所說： 『然異於可燃』
【English Translation】 English version: Because of the minute particles, just like the remaining minute particles. Someone asks: 'What is the basis for the doctrine you previously established? Is it to generate the remaining minute particles, or is there no generation at all?' If it generates the remaining minute particles, then the doctrine you established is destroyed; if there is no generation at all, then your analogy has no substance. The answer is: 'Your statement is inappropriate. Such distinctions as before are not what I desire. The later distinctions, the analogy can also be established.' Why is this so? Because a minute particle of fire cannot generate fire, and the same is true for particles of earth and so on. Furthermore, in the ultimate truth, that minute particle of fire cannot generate fire. Why? Because they are different. For example, water. In this way, because of reasons such as 'making,' 'destroying,' and 'arising,' these should be explained in detail. Furthermore, the Samkhya (Indian school of enumeration) people say: 'Just as the doctrine I established, when Sattva (clarity) and Rajas (dust) these tangible qualities increase, it is called fire; if Tamas (darkness) increases, it is called fuel.' Therefore, fuel is definitely the cause of fire. Because fuel is the cause, fire is spoken of by observing the fuel. The debater says: 'They also have faults. Because in the ultimate truth, warmth is not the essence of fire.' Why? Because it is vast. Just like the previous analogy refuted it. Furthermore, the verse says: 'If different, then cannot reach' Explanation: If fire and fuel are different, because they are different, then fire cannot reach fuel. For example, fuel that has not reached fire. The maker is likened to fire, the action is likened to fuel, the combination of these two is called the aspect of making, the meaning is exactly like this. Furthermore, the verse says: 'Cannot reach, therefore cannot burn, cannot burn, therefore cannot extinguish, cannot extinguish, abiding in its own form' Explanation: Because this fire has no cause, it can be established apart from fuel, so it abides in its own form. Abiding in its own form, it is called permanent. Since there is no such principle, it is known that fire and fuel are not different. If it is established as different, as previously refuted. These should be explained in detail. Just like the later verse says: 'This thing with that thing, if different, then it is not so' The outsider says: If different, then cannot reach, then there will be faults like the previous verse said, 'Different, then cannot reach, cannot reach, then cannot burn,' etc., because of difference there is reaching, there is no fault as mentioned above. How to verify it? Just like women and men are different, so they can reach each other, this is understood by the world, no one can refute it. Just like the verse says: 'But different from the combustible'
此二能相至 如女至丈夫 如丈夫至女
論者偈曰。
若然異可然 此二相到者
釋曰。汝意立異譬。彼男女縱如是者。則互不相觀。以薪火處同而起。到相復是異故。不相觀者可言我得因非一向。如偈曰。
火薪既有異 則不互相觀
釋曰。互不相觀者。此義云何。謂作者作業和合則空。如薪火異。意不欲爾。何以故。彼二無到故。汝說作者作業和合相異者。是義不然。執法別故。立義有過。何等過耶。汝說異故。而能相到。如男女者。二不可得。以異門不成故。非非一向因過。但彼外人自迷於義。智慧輕薄。作如是說。品初成立薪火一異。譬喻無故。二皆不成。外人言。第一義中有薪有火。何以故。互相觀故。此若無者。彼二相觀則不得有。譬如兔角。由有薪火更互相觀故。得說言此是火薪。此是薪火。以是義故譬喻得成。論者偈曰。
若火觀于薪 若薪觀於火 何等體先成 而說相觀有
釋曰。若相觀者。為薪先成。為火先成。汝應分別。如是此二。無一先成。別相觀者。以第一義中觀不成故。因義不成。亦譬喻過。若汝言於世諦中立此因者。與義相違。又無譬喻。成立有過。若汝意謂彼薪先成故無過者。是義不然。如偈曰。
若火觀薪者 火成已
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 此二者（薪和火）能夠互相到達的狀態，就像女子到達丈夫處，或者丈夫到達女子處一樣。
論者（對方）用偈頌說： 如果說薪和火是不同的，那麼這二者是如何互相到達的呢？
解釋：你用不同的比喻。即使男女之間是這樣，他們也是互相不觀待的。因為薪和火在同一個地方生起，到達的狀態又是不同的，所以不互相觀待，可以說我得到的因不是一成不變的。如偈頌所說：
火和薪既然是不同的，那麼它們就不互相觀待。
解釋：互相不觀待是什麼意思呢？意思是說，作者（能作者）和作業（所作業）和合則為空。就像薪和火是不同的。你的意思不是這樣。為什麼呢？因為它們二者沒有到達。你說作者和作業和合是相異的，這個說法是不對的。因為你執著於法是別異的。立義有過失。是什麼過失呢？你說因為是異體，所以能夠互相到達，就像男女一樣，這是不可能的。因為從異體的角度來說是不成立的，所以不是非一向因的過失。但是那些外道自己迷惑于義理，智慧淺薄，才這樣說。在品初成立薪和火的一異，譬喻沒有道理，二者都不成立。外道說，在第一義諦中，有薪有火。為什麼呢？因為互相觀待的緣故。如果沒有這個，那麼二者互相觀待就不可能存在，就像兔角一樣。由於有薪和火，才能互相觀待，所以才能說這是火薪，這是薪火。因為這個緣故，譬喻才能成立。論者用偈頌說：
如果火觀待于薪，如果薪觀待於火，那麼哪個本體先成立，才能說有互相觀待呢？
解釋：如果互相觀待，那麼是薪先成立，還是火先成立？你應該分別說明。像這樣，這二者沒有一個先成立。別相觀待，因為在第一義諦中觀待是不成立的，所以因義不成立。這也是譬喻的過失。如果你說在世俗諦中立這個因，那麼就與義理相違背，又沒有譬喻，成立有過失。如果你認為薪先成立，所以沒有過失，這個說法是不對的。如偈頌所說：
如果火觀待薪，那麼火已經成立了。
【English Translation】 English version: These two (fuel and fire) can reach each other, like a woman reaching her husband, or a husband reaching his wife.
The debater (opponent) says in a verse: If fuel and fire are different, how can these two reach each other?
Explanation: You use different metaphors. Even if it is like the relationship between a man and a woman, they do not depend on each other. Because fuel and fire arise in the same place, and the state of reaching is different, they do not depend on each other. It can be said that the cause I obtained is not fixed. As the verse says:
Since fire and fuel are different, they do not depend on each other.
Explanation: What does it mean to not depend on each other? It means that the agent (the one who acts) and the action (what is acted upon) combining together is empty. Just like fuel and fire are different. That is not what you mean. Why? Because these two do not reach each other. You say that the combination of the agent and the action is different, but this statement is incorrect. Because you are attached to the idea that the dharma is separate. Establishing the meaning has a fault. What is the fault? You say that because they are different entities, they can reach each other, like a man and a woman, but this is impossible. Because it cannot be established from the perspective of different entities, it is not the fault of a non-one-sided cause. But those heretics are confused about the meaning, and their wisdom is shallow, so they say this. Establishing the oneness or difference of fuel and fire at the beginning of the chapter, the metaphor is unreasonable, and neither can be established. The heretic says that in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), there is fuel and there is fire. Why? Because they depend on each other. If this does not exist, then the two cannot depend on each other, just like a rabbit's horn. Because there is fuel and fire, they can depend on each other, so it can be said that this is fire-fuel, and this is fuel-fire. Because of this, the metaphor can be established. The debater says in a verse:
If fire depends on fuel, if fuel depends on fire, then which entity is established first, so that it can be said that there is mutual dependence?
Explanation: If they depend on each other, then is fuel established first, or is fire established first? You should explain separately. Like this, neither of these two is established first. Separate mutual dependence, because dependence is not established in the ultimate truth, so the meaning of the cause is not established. This is also a fault of the metaphor. If you say that this cause is established in conventional truth (Saṃvṛti-satya), then it contradicts the meaning, and there is no metaphor, and establishing it has a fault. If you think that fuel is established first, so there is no fault, this statement is incorrect. As the verse says:
If fire depends on fuel, then fire is already established.
覆成 薪亦當如是 無火可得故
釋曰。汝若定作如此分別者。火已先成。后觀薪故。此義云何。由薪不觀火薪先成故。語意如是。而不欲然。此中說驗。第一義中薪在火先。無如此義。何以故。以有觀故。如火自體前已廣說。外人言。若薪與火無一先成者。今薪火相觀一時而有。如牛左右角同時起故。此義得成。論者偈曰。
若此待得成 彼亦如是待 今無一物待 云何二體成
釋曰。此謂火體相。彼謂薪體相。外人意欲薪火俱成。一一有故。此義不然。何以故。由彼自因更互相觀生不成故。語義如此。複次牛角喻者。亦如是問。彼二角中何等是左何等是右。世人所解由相觀故。第二得成。無如此義。複次如偈曰。
若體待得成 不成云何待 不成而有待 此待則不然
釋曰。謂彼物。不成此無所待。語義如是。此中說驗。第一義中薪不觀火。何以故。火體不成故。如地水等。複次偈言不成而有待者。外人若作如此說者有過失故。云何過失。偈言此待則不然。以無待故。如虛空華。複次此待不然。何以故。薪體無故。譬如余物火門。亦應作如是說。複次觀察彼者。如偈曰。
無火可觀薪 薪非不觀火
釋曰。薪不觀火薪體不成。如此道理如先已說。亦遮異
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 覆成 『薪亦當如是，無火可得故。』 釋曰：『你若一定作如此分別，火已先成，后觀薪故。此義云何？由薪不觀火，薪先成故。』語意如是，而不欲然。此中說驗，第一義中薪在火先，無如此義。何以故？以有觀故。如火自體前已廣說。外人言：『若薪與火無一先成者，今薪火相觀，一時而有，如牛左右角同時起故。』此義得成。論者偈曰： 『若此待得成，彼亦如是待，今無一物待，云何二體成？』 釋曰：『此謂火體相，彼謂薪體相。外人意欲薪火俱成，一一有故。』此義不然。何以故？由彼自因更互相觀生不成故。語義如此。複次，牛角喻者，亦如是問：『彼二角中何等是左，何等是右？』世人所解由相觀故，第二得成，無如此義。複次，如偈曰： 『若體待得成，不成云何待？不成而有待，此待則不然。』 釋曰：『謂彼物不成，此無所待。』語義如是。此中說驗，第一義中薪不觀火。何以故？火體不成故，如地水等。複次，偈言『不成而有待』者，外人若作如此說者，有過失故。云何過失？偈言『此待則不然』，以無待故，如虛空華。複次，此待不然。何以故？薪體無故。譬如余物火門，亦應作如是說。複次，觀察彼者，如偈曰： 『無火可觀薪，薪非不觀火。』 釋曰：『薪不觀火，薪體不成。』如此道理如先已說，亦遮異。
【English Translation】 English version Re-establishment 'The firewood should also be like this; because without fire, it cannot be obtained.' Explanation: 'If you insist on making such distinctions, the fire is already formed before observing the firewood. What does this mean? It is because the firewood does not observe the fire, and the firewood is formed first.' The meaning is thus, and it does not intend to burn. This is verified here. In the ultimate truth, the firewood precedes the fire, but there is no such meaning. Why? Because there is observation. The nature of fire has been extensively discussed before. Outsiders say: 'If neither the firewood nor the fire is formed first, then the firewood and fire observe each other and exist simultaneously, just like the left and right horns of a cow rising at the same time.' This meaning is established. The debater's verse says: 'If this depends on being formed, the other also depends in the same way. Now, nothing depends; how can the two entities be formed?' Explanation: 'This refers to the characteristic of the fire entity, and that refers to the characteristic of the firewood entity.' Outsiders intend for the firewood and fire to be formed together, each existing. This meaning is not correct. Why? Because they cannot be formed by their own causes observing each other. The meaning is thus. Furthermore, the analogy of the cow's horns can also be questioned in the same way: 'Among those two horns, which is the left and which is the right?' The worldly understanding is that they are determined by observing each other, so the second is established, but there is no such meaning. Furthermore, as the verse says: 'If the entity depends on being formed, how can it depend if it is not formed? If it is not formed but there is dependence, then this dependence is not valid.' Explanation: 'It means that if that thing is not formed, then this has nothing to depend on.' The meaning is thus. This is verified here. In the ultimate truth, the firewood does not observe the fire. Why? Because the fire entity is not formed, like earth and water. Furthermore, regarding the verse 'If it is not formed but there is dependence,' if outsiders make such a statement, there is a fault. What is the fault? The verse says 'Then this dependence is not valid,' because there is no dependence, like flowers in the sky. Furthermore, this dependence is not valid. Why? Because the firewood entity does not exist. Just like other things related to fire, it should also be said in this way. Furthermore, observing that, as the verse says: 'Without fire, firewood cannot be observed; firewood does not not observe fire.' Explanation: 'Firewood does not observe fire; the firewood entity is not formed.' Such a principle has been explained before, and it also refutes differences.
體。彼別相續。異不成故偈曰。
無薪可觀火 火非不觀薪
釋曰。遮相待故及遮異體應知。複次偈曰。
火不餘處來 薪中亦無火
釋曰。遮異體故。及遮去實並薪火故。或有人言。無薪有火。或言有待。或言無待。二俱不成。何以故。若無薪體火無所依。依止無故。去則不成。薪中亦無火者。是義云何。由有起故。譬如識。複次已破薪火。余亦同遮。偈曰。
如薪余亦遮 去來中已說
釋曰。如第一義中已去未去。去時無去。已燒未燒。燒時無燒。義亦如是。何以故。以燒故。如火自體。諸如是等此中應說。複次如去者不去。未去者不去。離亦無去。今亦第一義中燒者不燒。未燒者不燒。離亦無燒。如是等驗。先已廣說。何以故。二作空故。無燒者故。二俱過故。譬如土塊。應如是說。複次如偈曰。
即薪非是火 異薪亦無火
釋曰。遮一體故。遮異體故。如其次第。先已解說。偈曰。
火亦不有薪 火中亦無薪 薪中亦無火
釋曰。如有牛者。如水中華。如器中果。彼如是故火薪不成。譬喻無體。如品初立義。有取取者互相觀故。如火薪者。此譬無故。不免過失。薪火一異。遮無體故。由如此義根本不成。如偈曰。
已遮火及薪 自取
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 體。彼別相續。異不成故。偈曰：
『無薪可觀火，火非不觀薪。』
釋曰：遮相待故及遮異體應知。複次偈曰：
『火不餘處來，薪中亦無火。』
釋曰：遮異體故，及遮去實並薪火故。或有人言：無薪有火，或言有待，或言無待，二俱不成。何以故？若無薪體，火無所依，依止無故，去則不成。薪中亦無火者，是義云何？由有起故，譬如識。複次已破薪火，余亦同遮。偈曰：
『如薪余亦遮，去來中已說。』
釋曰：如第一義中已去未去，去時無去；已燒未燒，燒時無燒。義亦如是。何以故？以燒故，如火自體。諸如是等此中應說。複次如去者不去，未去者不去，離亦無去。今亦第一義中燒者不燒，未燒者不燒，離亦無燒。如是等驗，先已廣說。何以故？二作空故，無燒者故，二俱過故，譬如土塊，應如是說。複次如偈曰：
『即薪非是火，異薪亦無火。』
釋曰：遮一體故，遮異體故，如其次第，先已解說。偈曰：
『火亦不有薪，火中亦無薪，薪中亦無火。』
釋曰：如有牛者，如水中華，如器中果。彼如是故，火薪不成，譬喻無體。如品初立義，有取取者互相觀故。如火薪者，此譬無故，不免過失。薪火一異，遮無體故。由如此義，根本不成。如偈曰：
『已遮火及薪，自取。』
【English Translation】 English version: Substance. They are distinct continuities, and difference is not established. As the verse says:
'Without fuel, fire cannot be observed; fire does not not observe fuel.'
Explanation: It should be understood that this refutes dependence and difference in substance. Furthermore, the verse says:
'Fire does not come from elsewhere; there is also no fire in the fuel.'
Explanation: This refutes difference in substance and also refutes the reality of going, along with fuel and fire. Some say that there is fire without fuel, or that there is dependence, or that there is no dependence; neither is established. Why? If there is no fuel substance, fire has nothing to rely on. Because there is no basis for reliance, going is not established. 'There is also no fire in the fuel'—what does this mean? Because it arises from existence, like consciousness (vijnana). Furthermore, having refuted fuel and fire, the rest are similarly refuted. The verse says:
'Like fuel, the rest are also refuted; going and coming have already been discussed.'
Explanation: Just as in the ultimate sense, there is no going in what has gone or what has not gone; there is no going in the moment of going; there is no burning in what has been burned or what has not been burned; there is no burning in the moment of burning. The meaning is also like this. Why? Because of burning, like the self-nature of fire. All such things should be discussed here. Furthermore, like the goer does not go, the non-goer does not go, and there is no going apart from them. Now, also in the ultimate sense, the burner does not burn, the non-burner does not burn, and there is no burning apart from them. Such proofs have already been extensively discussed. Why? Because both actions are empty, because there is no burner, because both are flawed, like a clod of earth. It should be said like this. Furthermore, as the verse says:
'Fuel is not fire; there is also no fire in different fuel.'
Explanation: This refutes oneness in substance and refutes difference in substance, in that order, as has already been explained. The verse says:
'Fire also does not possess fuel; there is also no fuel in fire; there is also no fire in fuel.'
Explanation: Like someone who has a cow, like a flower in water, like a fruit in a container. Because they are like this, fuel and fire are not established; the analogy has no substance. Like the initial establishment of meaning in the chapter, there is mutual observation between the taker and the taken. Like fuel and fire, this analogy is without basis and cannot avoid fault. The oneness or difference of fuel and fire refutes non-existence. Because of such meaning, the foundation is not established. As the verse says:
'Having refuted fire and fuel, self-grasping.'
如次第 一切凈無餘 瓶衣等亦爾
釋曰。云何方便遮自取耶。此中立驗。第一義中彼自取二。不得一體。何以故。作者作業故。如斫者所斫。彼自及取亦不異體。何以故。以有觀故。亦余物故。如取自體。取門亦應如是廣說。此復云何。第一義中取與自我不得異體。何以故。以有觀故。亦余物故。譬如自我。如是第一義中調達之取。若成不成。不為調達我之所取。何以故。以有觀故。亦以我故。譬如余調達我。複次第一義中調達之我。不取調達之取。何以故。以取故。如耶若取。如是調達之取。若成不成。不觀調達我。何以故。以取故。如耶若取。如是火薪我取次第已說。一切無餘者。法喻不成故。瓶衣等者。彼瓶等物。若果若因。總實別實。應如是知。云何驗耶。如瓶土二。第一義中不得一體。何以故。作者及業故。如斫者所斫。亦不異體。何以故。有觀故亦果故。如土自體。如遮薪火。色非色法。亦應類遮。此復云何。如佉陀羅樹。根莖枝葉與佉陀羅樹不得一體。何以故。斫一枝時。非斫一切故。譬如棗樹。複次第一義中佉陀羅樹與佉陀羅根莖枝葉不得異體。何以故。根等壞時。樹亦壞故。如根等自體。複次第一義中彼經緯等與絹體不異。何以故。以有觀故。此等壞時。彼亦壞故。如經自體。如一體
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如次第： 一切清凈無餘，瓶衣等亦是如此。
解釋說：用什麼方法遮止自取呢？這裡建立論證。在第一義諦（Paramārtha，最高真理）中，『彼』（指取）和『自』（指自我）二者，不能是一體。為什麼呢？因為有作者和作業的關係。就像斫者和所斫之物。『彼』（指取）和『自』（指自我）也不是異體。為什麼呢？因為有觀待（apekṣā，依賴關係）的緣故，也是因為是不同的事物。就像取自身的自體。取門也應該像這樣廣泛地說明。這又是什麼意思呢？在第一義諦中，取與自我不能是異體。為什麼呢？因為有觀待的緣故，也是因為是不同的事物。譬如自我。像這樣，在第一義諦中，調達（Devadatta，人名）的取，無論成就與否，都不是調達我的所取。為什麼呢？因為有觀待的緣故，也是因為有我的緣故。譬如其他的調達我。再次，在第一義諦中，調達的我，不取調達的取。為什麼呢？因為是取的緣故。就像耶若（yajña，祭祀）的取。像這樣，調達的取，無論成就與否，都不觀待調達我。為什麼呢？因為是取的緣故。就像耶若的取。像這樣，火、薪、我、取的次第已經說完了。一切無餘，是因為法和比喻都不成立的緣故。瓶衣等，那些瓶子等物，無論是果還是因，總的實有還是個別的實有，都應該這樣理解。什麼是論證呢？比如瓶子和土，在第一義諦中不能是一體。為什麼呢？因為有作者和作業的關係。就像斫者和所斫之物。也不是異體。為什麼呢？因為有觀待的緣故，也是因為是果的緣故。就像土的自體。就像遮止薪和火一樣，色法和非色法，也應該類似地遮止。這又是什麼意思呢？比如佉陀羅樹（khadira，一種樹），根、莖、枝、葉與佉陀羅樹不能是一體。為什麼呢？因為砍一根樹枝的時候，不是砍了所有的樹。譬如棗樹。再次，在第一義諦中，佉陀羅樹與佉陀羅的根、莖、枝、葉不能是異體。為什麼呢？因為根等壞的時候，樹也壞了。就像根等的自體。再次，在第一義諦中，那些經緯等與絹的本體不是異體。為什麼呢？因為有觀待的緣故，這些壞的時候，那個也壞了。就像經的自體。就像一體一樣。
【English Translation】 English version: As in sequence: Everything is pure and without remainder; so are the pot and clothes.
Explanation: What means are there to prevent self-grasping? Here, we establish proof. In the ultimate sense (Paramārtha), 'it' (the grasping) and 'self' are not one entity. Why? Because there is an agent and an action, like the chopper and what is chopped. 'It' (the grasping) and 'self' are also not different entities. Why? Because there is dependence (apekṣā), and also because they are different things, like grasping one's own self. The gateway of grasping should also be explained extensively in this way. What does this mean? In the ultimate sense, grasping and the self cannot be different entities. Why? Because there is dependence, and also because they are different things, like the self. Thus, in the ultimate sense, Devadatta's (person's name) grasping, whether accomplished or not, is not grasped by Devadatta's self. Why? Because there is dependence, and also because there is the self. Like other Devadatta selves. Furthermore, in the ultimate sense, Devadatta's self does not grasp Devadatta's grasping. Why? Because it is grasping, like the grasping of a yajña (sacrifice). Thus, Devadatta's grasping, whether accomplished or not, does not depend on Devadatta's self. Why? Because it is grasping, like the grasping of a yajña. Thus, the sequence of fire, fuel, self, and grasping has been explained. 'Everything without remainder' is because the dharma and the analogy are not established. 'Pot and clothes,' those pots and other things, whether they are effects or causes, general realities or individual realities, should be understood in this way. What is the proof? For example, the pot and the earth, in the ultimate sense, cannot be one entity. Why? Because there is an agent and an action, like the chopper and what is chopped. Nor are they different entities. Why? Because there is dependence, and also because it is an effect, like the self of the earth. Just as fuel and fire are refuted, so too should form and non-form be similarly refuted. What does this mean? For example, the khadira tree (a type of tree), its roots, stems, branches, and leaves are not one entity with the khadira tree. Why? Because when one branch is cut, not everything is cut, like a jujube tree. Furthermore, in the ultimate sense, the khadira tree and the roots, stems, branches, and leaves of the khadira are not different entities. Why? Because when the roots, etc., are destroyed, the tree is also destroyed, like the self of the roots, etc. Furthermore, in the ultimate sense, those warp and weft threads are not different from the body of the silk. Why? Because there is dependence, and when these are destroyed, that is also destroyed, like the self of the warp threads. Like one entity.
異體及一異。俱如前過失。此應廣說。由如是故。第一義中如理諦觀。若一若異。此體不成。於世諦中自在說者。不違世所解。隨順戒定慧世諦中說。世人執為第一義諦。為遮此故。如偈曰。
若計我真實 諸法各各異 應知彼說人 不解聖教義
釋曰。云何不解聖教義耶。現見及驗義皆不成。而執為實故名不解。此意如是。以是義故。此品中明不一不異。別緣起義。開示行者。是故得成。如梵天王問經中偈曰。
離身不見法 離法不見身 不一亦不異 應當如是見
釋曰。如是見者。謂不見彼見。如是等諸修多羅。此中應廣說。
釋觀薪火品竟。
般若燈論釋觀生死品第十一
複次前品已遮諸法無性空所對治。自性無故。今欲令他解悟生死無自體性。有此品起。外人言。第一義中有是五陰。何以故。由婆伽婆作別名說。及為盡彼故。勤方便說。此若無者。如來不應作別名說。亦不為盡彼故。作如是說。如無第二頭。不可言眼病。由此有故。作別名說。及為盡彼故。說如是言。諸比丘生死長遠。有來無際。諸凡夫人不解正法。不知出要。是故汝等為盡生死故。應隨順行。應如是學。由如是義說因有力。是故當知有彼陰等。論者言。汝雖引聖言而未詳聖旨。是義云
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：異體及一異（既可以是異體，也可以是一體或異體），都和前面的過失一樣。這裡應該廣泛說明。因為這個緣故，在第一義（paramārtha，最高真理）中如理諦觀（yathābhūtaṃ darśanaṃ，如實觀察），無論是一還是異，這個自體都不能成立。在世諦（saṃvṛti-satya，世俗諦）中自在宣說的人，不違背世俗所理解的，隨順戒定慧（śīla-samādhi-prajñā，戒律、禪定和智慧）在世諦中宣說。世人執著為第一義諦，爲了遮止這種執著，如偈頌所說： 『如果認為『我』是真實的，諸法各自是不同的，應當知道說這種話的人，不瞭解聖教的意義。』 解釋：為什麼說不了解聖教的意義呢？因為現量（pratyakṣa，現量）和比量（anumāna，比量）的意義都不能成立，卻執著認為是真實的，所以說不了解。意思是這樣。因為這個緣故，這一品中闡明不一不異，分別闡述緣起（pratītyasamutpāda，緣起）的意義，開示修行者，所以能夠成就。如《梵天王問經》中的偈頌所說： 『離開身不見法，離開法不見身，不一也不異，應當這樣去看待。』 解釋：所謂『這樣去看待』，就是不見那些錯誤的見解。像這樣等等的修多羅（sūtra，經），這裡應該廣泛說明。 《釋觀薪火品》結束。 《般若燈論釋觀生死品》第十一 其次，前一品已經遮破了諸法無自性空（svabhāva-śūnyatā，自性空）所對治的，因為自性不存在。現在想要讓別人理解領悟生死沒有自體自性，所以有這一品的產生。外人說：在第一義中存在五陰（pañca-skandha，色、受、想、行、識），為什麼呢？因為婆伽婆（Bhagavān，世尊）作了不同的名稱來說明，並且爲了斷盡它們而勤加方便宣說。如果這些不存在，如來（Tathāgata，如來）不應該作不同的名稱來說明，也不應該爲了斷盡它們而這樣說。就像沒有第二個頭，不能說眼睛有病一樣。因為有這些五陰的存在，所以作不同的名稱來說明，並且爲了斷盡它們而說這樣的話：『諸比丘（bhikṣu，比丘），生死長遠，有來無際。諸凡夫人不瞭解正法，不知道出離的要道。所以你們爲了斷盡生死，應當隨順修行，應當這樣學習。』因為這樣的意義，說明了因果的力量，所以應當知道有那些陰等存在。論者說：你雖然引用了聖言，但是沒有詳細瞭解聖旨，這個意義是錯誤的。
【English Translation】 English version: Heterogeneous entities and one-and-different entities, all have the same faults as before. This should be explained extensively. Because of this, in the ultimate truth (paramārtha), through proper contemplation (yathābhūtaṃ darśanaṃ), whether it is one or different, this entity cannot be established. In conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), those who freely speak do not contradict what the world understands, and they speak in accordance with morality, concentration, and wisdom (śīla-samādhi-prajñā) within conventional truth. Worldly people cling to it as the ultimate truth. To prevent this clinging, as the verse says: 『If one considers 『I』 to be real, and all dharmas to be individually different, one should know that the person who speaks this does not understand the meaning of the holy teachings.』 Explanation: Why is it said that they do not understand the meaning of the holy teachings? Because the meanings of direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) cannot be established, yet they cling to them as real, so it is said that they do not understand. The meaning is like this. Because of this meaning, this chapter clarifies neither one nor different, and separately elucidates the meaning of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), enlightening practitioners, so it can be accomplished. As the verse in the Brahma King's Question Sutra says: 『Apart from the body, one does not see the Dharma; apart from the Dharma, one does not see the body; neither one nor different; one should see it in this way.』 Explanation: 『Seeing it in this way』 means not seeing those wrong views. Like these and other sutras (sūtra), this should be explained extensively here. The chapter on Examining Fuel and Fire is complete. Prajñā-dīpa-ṭīkā, Chapter Eleven on Examining Birth and Death Furthermore, the previous chapter has already refuted what is countered by the emptiness of inherent existence (svabhāva-śūnyatā), because inherent existence does not exist. Now, we want to make others understand and realize that birth and death have no self-nature. Therefore, this chapter arises. Outsiders say: In the ultimate truth, there are the five aggregates (pañca-skandha), why? Because the Blessed One (Bhagavān) spoke of them with different names, and diligently and skillfully taught to exhaust them. If these did not exist, the Tathāgata (Tathāgata) should not have spoken of them with different names, nor should he have said so to exhaust them. Just as there is no second head, one cannot say that the eye is sick. Because these five aggregates exist, they are spoken of with different names, and to exhaust them, it is said: 『Monks (bhikṣu), birth and death are long and have no end. Ordinary people do not understand the true Dharma and do not know the essential path to liberation. Therefore, in order to exhaust birth and death, you should practice accordingly, you should learn in this way.』 Because of this meaning, it explains the power of cause and effect, so you should know that those aggregates exist. The commentator says: Although you have quoted the holy words, you have not understood the holy intention in detail; this meaning is wrong.
何。由佛世尊見諸凡夫。無始已來。于生死中未起對治。無對治故流轉不息。從煩惱生業。從業生生。由生相續盛受諸苦。如世庫藏。佛見此已故說是言。生死長遠猶如幻焰。又生死苦種種無量。如來為欲盡生死故。建立眾生於勤精進。若諦觀察生死涅槃于第一義中無毫釐差別。若汝欲令第一義中生死涅槃有差別者。因義不成。若世諦中分別因者。譬喻無體。如佛先說生死無際者。為對破彼說無因輩明。有因為初。能生諸法。言有起者。如來為彼一分眾生作如是說。有諸外道。欲求過失。問佛世尊。如偈曰。
生死有際不 佛言畢竟無 此生死無際 前後不可得
釋曰。未起聖道對治已來。由生老死相續不息。展轉為因。初起無定。是故無際無邊成立世諦中說。非第一義。有信心人。信婆伽婆不顛倒語。非不信者。何以故。顛倒心人說相似驗。為對彼故。作如是說。彼劫初眾生。身根覺聚皆由前世善不善業集因所成。何以故。能為苦樂法等起因故。如今現在身根聚等如是不共取境因故。可饒益長養故。能為他作饒益故。作他嗔喜因故。可散壞法故。為共取境界因故。如此等因立義譬喻如前廣說。應如此知。外人言。生死有初。何以故。以有邊故。法若有邊非謂無始。譬如瓶等。由正智起時見生死邊。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：什麼原因呢？因為佛世尊看到所有凡夫，從無始以來，在生死輪迴中沒有生起對治（duìzhì，antidote）。因為沒有對治，所以流轉不息。從煩惱產生業，從業產生生。由於生相續不斷，盛大地承受各種痛苦，就像世間的庫藏一樣。佛看到這些，所以說了這樣的話：『生死長遠，猶如幻焰。』而且生死的痛苦種種無量。如來爲了斷盡生死，建立眾生於勤奮精進。如果仔細觀察，生死和涅槃在第一義（dì yī yì，ultimate truth）中沒有絲毫差別。如果你們想要在第一義中區分生死和涅槃，那麼因的意義就不能成立。如果在世俗諦（shì sú dì，conventional truth）中分別因，那麼譬喻就沒有實體。例如佛先前說生死沒有邊際，是爲了對破那些說沒有因的人，闡明有因是最初的，能夠產生諸法。說到『有起』，如來是爲了一部分眾生這樣說的。有些外道，想要尋找過失，問佛世尊，如偈頌所說： 『生死有邊際嗎？佛說，畢竟沒有。這生死沒有邊際，前後都不可得。』 解釋：在沒有生起聖道對治之前，由於生老死相續不斷，輾轉為因，最初的生起沒有定準，所以沒有邊際，沒有邊。這是在世俗諦中說的，不是第一義。有信心的人，相信婆伽婆（Póqié pó，Bhagavan，世尊）不顛倒的語言，而不是不相信的人。為什麼呢？因為顛倒心的人說相似的驗證。爲了對治他們，才這樣說。那些劫初的眾生，他們的身根覺聚，都是由前世善不善業的聚集因所成就的。為什麼呢？因為能夠成為苦樂等法的生起之因。就像現在現在的身根聚等，這樣不共同取境的因，可以饒益長養，能夠為他人作饒益，能夠作為他人嗔怒喜悅的因，是可以散壞的法，作為共同取境界的因。像這樣的因，建立意義和譬喻，如前面廣泛所說，應當這樣理解。外人說：『生死有最初，為什麼呢？因為有邊際的緣故。法如果有邊際，就不能說是沒有開始。譬如瓶子等。』由於正智生起時，看見了生死的邊際。
【English Translation】 English version: What is the reason? Because the Buddha, the World Honored One, sees that all ordinary beings, from beginningless time, have not generated an antidote (duìzhì) in the cycle of birth and death. Because there is no antidote, they continue to transmigrate without ceasing. From afflictions arise karma, and from karma arises birth. Due to the continuous succession of births, they greatly endure all kinds of suffering, like a worldly treasury. Seeing this, the Buddha spoke these words: 'Birth and death are long and far-reaching, like illusory flames.' Moreover, the sufferings of birth and death are various and immeasurable. The Tathagata, in order to exhaust birth and death, establishes beings in diligent effort. If one observes carefully, birth and death and Nirvana are not different by a hair's breadth in the ultimate truth (dì yī yì). If you want to differentiate between birth and death and Nirvana in the ultimate truth, then the meaning of cause cannot be established. If one distinguishes causes in conventional truth (shì sú dì), then the analogy has no substance. For example, the Buddha previously said that birth and death have no boundary, in order to refute those who say there is no cause, clarifying that there is a cause that is the beginning, capable of producing all dharmas. Speaking of 'having a beginning,' the Tathagata said this for the sake of a portion of beings. There are some non-Buddhists who want to find fault and ask the Buddha, the World Honored One, as the verse says: 'Does birth and death have a boundary? The Buddha said, ultimately no. This birth and death has no boundary, the beginning and end cannot be obtained.' Explanation: Before the antidote of the holy path arises, due to the continuous succession of birth, old age, and death, turning into causes, the initial arising has no fixed standard, so it has no boundary, no edge. This is spoken of in conventional truth, not ultimate truth. People with faith believe in the Bhagavan's (Póqié pó, World Honored One) non-inverted words, not those who do not believe. Why? Because people with inverted minds speak of similar verifications. In order to counter them, it is said in this way. Those beings at the beginning of the kalpa, their aggregates of body, faculties, and consciousness are all accomplished by the accumulated causes of good and bad karma from previous lives. Why? Because they can become the cause of the arising of suffering, happiness, and other dharmas. Just like the present aggregates of body and faculties, etc., such a cause of not jointly taking objects, can benefit and nourish, can benefit others, can be the cause of others' anger and joy, is a dharma that can be scattered and destroyed, as a cause of jointly taking realms. Establishing meaning and analogies with such causes, as widely explained earlier, should be understood in this way. Non-Buddhists say: 'Birth and death has a beginning, why? Because it has a boundary. If a dharma has a boundary, it cannot be said to have no beginning. For example, a vase, etc.' Due to the arising of correct wisdom, one sees the boundary of birth and death.
如我所說因有力故。是故定知生死有初。論者偈曰。
非獨于生死 初際不可得 一切法亦然 悉無有初際
釋曰。瓶等無初。何以故。展轉因起故。初既不成。譬喻則壞。立義過故。汝言有邊為因者。義亦不然。何以故。虛妄分別生死有因佛不記故。此義如后當說。外人言。若汝欲得生死無始者。如是生死亦應無終。何以故。以無始故。譬如丈夫。及彼虛空。論者言。汝言丈夫及余法無起者。於世諦中亦不應爾。何以故。法體不成。譬喻無故。彼稻穀等。世諦門中雖復無始。而見滅壞。汝立難者與義相違。複次有異聰慢者言。汝婆伽婆無一切智。何以故。彼說生死無初際。自欲顯己無智故。譬如死屍無所覺了。論者言。遣執著故。作如是說。此義云何。諸外道等分別生死謂有初際。是故佛言無有初際。無初際者。即說生死無始。云何無始。以其無故。如是生死無始故。初際不可見。非婆伽婆于彼無智。複次生死無際者。此中立驗。第一義中諸陰似先不如是有。何以故。無前際故。譬如幻主作幻丈夫。外人言。由無分別識取彼幻主所作幻人色等為境。彼諸色等於后時中亦如是有故。譬喻無體。論者言。幻主所作幻丈夫者。自無實體。見亦如是。由無分別識色境界中幻作丈夫自體空故。譬喻得成。無無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 正如我所說，因為有力的緣故，所以可以確定生死是有開端的。論者以偈頌說： 『不只是生死，最初的邊際不可得，一切法也是這樣，都沒有最初的邊際。』 解釋：瓶子等事物沒有最初的開端。為什麼呢？因為是輾轉相因而生起的。最初的開端既然不能成立，那麼比喻也就破壞了，這是立義的過失。你說有邊際作為原因，這個道理也是不成立的。為什麼呢？因為虛妄分別生死有因，佛陀是不認可的。這個道理在後面會詳細說明。外人說：如果你想要生死沒有開端，那麼生死也應該沒有終結。為什麼呢？因為沒有開端。譬如丈夫和虛空。論者說：你說丈夫和其餘的法沒有生起，在世俗諦中也不應該是這樣。為什麼呢？因為法的體性不能成立，比喻沒有根據。那些稻穀等，在世俗諦的層面中即使沒有開端，也能看到滅壞。你提出詰難，與道理相違背。 再者，有自以為聰明的傲慢者說：你的婆伽婆（Bhagavan，世尊）沒有一切智。為什麼呢？因為他說生死沒有最初的邊際，自己想要顯示自己沒有智慧的緣故。譬如死屍沒有知覺。論者說：爲了遣除執著，才這樣說。這是什麼意思呢？那些外道等分別生死，認為有最初的邊際，所以佛陀說沒有最初的邊際。沒有最初的邊際，就是說生死沒有開始。為什麼沒有開始呢？因為它是空無自性的緣故。這樣，生死沒有開始，所以最初的邊際是不可見的。不是婆伽婆對這個沒有智慧。 再者，生死沒有邊際，這裡建立論證。在第一義諦中，諸陰（skandha，五蘊）似乎先前存在，但實際上並非如此。為什麼呢？因為沒有前際的緣故。譬如幻術師變出的幻化丈夫。外人說：由於沒有分別識，所以取幻術師所作的幻化人的色等作為境界。那些色等在後來的時間中也是這樣存在的，所以比喻沒有實體。論者說：幻術師所作的幻化丈夫，自身沒有實體，見到的景象也是這樣。由於沒有分別識，在色境界中，幻化丈夫的自體是空性的，所以比喻可以成立，並非沒有。
【English Translation】 English version: As I said, because of the force, it is certain that birth and death have a beginning. The debater says in a verse: 'Not only birth and death, the initial boundary is unattainable, all dharmas are like this, all have no initial boundary.' Explanation: Jars and other things have no beginning. Why? Because they arise from interdependent causes. Since the initial beginning cannot be established, the analogy is destroyed, which is a fault of establishing the thesis. You say that having an end is the cause, but this reason is also not valid. Why? Because the Buddha does not acknowledge that delusional discrimination is the cause of birth and death. This meaning will be explained in detail later. An outsider says: If you want birth and death to have no beginning, then birth and death should also have no end. Why? Because there is no beginning. For example, a man and space. The debater says: You say that a man and other dharmas do not arise, but this should not be the case even in conventional truth. Why? Because the nature of the dharma cannot be established, and the analogy has no basis. Those rice grains, etc., even if they have no beginning in the realm of conventional truth, can be seen to perish. Your challenge contradicts the principle. Furthermore, some arrogant people who think they are clever say: Your Bhagavan (Bhagavan, the Blessed One) does not have omniscience. Why? Because he says that birth and death have no initial boundary, wanting to show that he has no wisdom. For example, a corpse has no awareness. The debater says: To dispel attachment, he says this. What does this mean? Those non-Buddhists discriminate birth and death, thinking that there is an initial boundary, so the Buddha says that there is no initial boundary. Having no initial boundary means saying that birth and death have no beginning. Why is there no beginning? Because it is empty of inherent existence. Thus, birth and death have no beginning, so the initial boundary is invisible. It is not that the Bhagavan has no wisdom about this. Furthermore, birth and death have no boundary, and here an argument is established. In the ultimate truth, the skandhas (skandha, the five aggregates) seem to exist before, but in reality they are not like that. Why? Because there is no prior boundary. For example, a magician conjures up an illusory man. An outsider says: Because there is no discriminating consciousness, the colors, etc., of the illusory man made by the magician are taken as objects. Those colors, etc., also exist like this in later times, so the analogy has no substance. The debater says: The illusory man made by the magician has no substance of his own, and the seen appearance is also like this. Because there is no discriminating consciousness, in the realm of color, the self-nature of the illusory man is empty, so the analogy can be established, and it is not without.
體過。是故汝言生死是有及為盡彼故。引佛說為因者。此皆不成。外人言。第一義中有陰相續。是名生死。何以故。彼中有故。此若無者。彼中亦無。譬如兔角。由生死中有染有凈故。生死是有。我所欲義既成立故。汝言為因不成及違義者。是則不然。論者偈曰。
此既無前後 彼中何可得
釋曰。如彼中體不可得故。語義如是。譬如幻師幻作丈夫。于彼相續求中體者。無如此義。何以故。以前後不成中無體故。汝喻非也。如所說過。今還在汝如是諦觀生死無體。偈曰。
是故前後中 次第此不然
釋曰。前中後者。謂生老死。外人若言生死有自體。何以故。生老死有故。如石女無兒。不可說有生老死者。此執不然何以故。彼石女兒生老死初中后不成故。因義不成。譬喻無體。以第一義中一物生等自體不成故。複次云何生等初中后次第不成。應審觀察。如偈曰。
若謂生是先 老死是其後 生則無老死 不死而有生
釋曰。若汝意謂生為先者。應離老死獨自而生。若定有物離彼生者。如此物體。終不可得。譬如火馬。自體無起。何以故馬非火故。語意如此。先無今起名生。新新變異名老。命根斷壞名死。複次不死而有生者。謂前世不死如是而生故。然非所欲。複次此中立驗
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，你說生死是存在的，並且爲了斷盡生死而引用佛陀的說法作為理由，這些都不能成立。外道說，在第一義諦（Paramārtha，最高真理）中有陰（skandha，五蘊）的相續，這叫做生死。為什麼呢？因為有中有（antarābhava，中陰身）的緣故。如果這個沒有，那麼那個中有也沒有，譬如兔角一樣。由於生死中有染污和清凈，所以生死是存在的。我所想要表達的意義已經成立，所以你說以佛陀的說法作為理由不能成立以及違背意義，這是不對的。論者用偈頌說： 『此既無前後，彼中何可得』 解釋說：如果那個中有自體不可得，那麼語義就是這樣。譬如幻術師幻化出一個丈夫，在那相續中尋找自體，是沒有這種道理的。為什麼呢？因為前後不成，所以中無自體。你的比喻是不恰當的，就像之前所說的那樣。現在還是回到你那裡，像這樣仔細觀察，生死是沒有自體的。偈頌說： 『是故前後中，次第此不然』 解釋說：前、中、后，指的是生、老、死。外道如果說生死有自體，是因為生、老、死存在。就像石女沒有兒子，不能說有生、老、死一樣。這種執著是不對的。為什麼呢？因為石女的兒子，生、老、死，初、中、后都不成立。所以理由不成立，比喻沒有自體。因為在第一義諦中，一物的生等等自體不能成立。再次，生等等的初、中、后次第為什麼不能成立呢？應該仔細觀察。如偈頌說： 『若謂生是先，老死是其後，生則無老死，不死而有生』 解釋說：如果你的意思是說生是先，那麼應該離開老死獨自而生。如果一定有事物離開那個生而存在，那麼這樣的物體，終究是不可得的。譬如火馬，自體沒有生起。為什麼呢？因為馬不是火。語意是這樣的：先前沒有現在生起叫做生，新新變異叫做老，命根斷壞叫做死。再次，不死而有生，指的是前世不死，像這樣而生，然而這不是我們所希望的。再次，這裡建立論證。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, your statement that 'birth and death exist' and that you cite the Buddha's teachings as a reason to end them are both untenable. The outsider says that in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha), there is a continuity of the skandhas (aggregates), which is called birth and death. Why? Because there is an intermediate existence (antarābhava). If this does not exist, then that intermediate existence does not exist either, like a rabbit's horn. Because there is defilement and purity in birth and death, birth and death exist. The meaning I want to express has been established, so your statement that citing the Buddha's teachings as a reason is untenable and contradicts the meaning is incorrect. The debater says in a verse: 'If this has no before and after, how can the middle be obtained?' The explanation is: If that intermediate entity is unobtainable, then the meaning is like this. For example, if a magician conjures up a man and seeks an entity in that continuity, there is no such meaning. Why? Because the before and after are not established, so there is no entity in the middle. Your analogy is inappropriate, as mentioned before. Now it still returns to you, observe carefully like this, birth and death have no entity. The verse says: 'Therefore, the sequence of before, after, and middle is not so.' The explanation is: Before, middle, and after refer to birth, old age, and death. If the outsider says that birth and death have an entity because birth, old age, and death exist, just as a barren woman has no child, it cannot be said that there is birth, old age, and death. This attachment is incorrect. Why? Because the barren woman's child, birth, old age, and death, the beginning, middle, and end are not established. Therefore, the reason is not established, and the analogy has no entity. Because in the ultimate truth, the entity of one thing's birth, etc., cannot be established. Furthermore, why is the sequence of birth, etc., not established in the beginning, middle, and end? It should be carefully observed. As the verse says: 'If you say birth is first, and old age and death are after, then birth has no old age and death, and there is birth without death.' The explanation is: If you mean that birth is first, then it should arise independently of old age and death. If there must be something that exists apart from that birth, then such an object is ultimately unobtainable. For example, a fire horse, its entity does not arise. Why? Because a horse is not fire. The meaning is like this: previously non-existent, now arising is called birth, new and new changes are called old age, and the destruction of the life force is called death. Furthermore, there is birth without death, referring to the previous life not dying, and thus being born, but this is not what we desire. Furthermore, here we establish an argument.
。老死之先不得有生。何以故。彼自體故。譬如火在暖先。複次若汝欲避如此過失。作如是言。先有老死。後有生者。是亦不然。如偈曰。
若先有老死 而後有生者 未生則無因 云何有老死
釋曰。無法未生而有老死。以依止無體故。語意如是。複次此中立驗。先生老死。是則不然。何以故。以彼為體故。譬如住外人言。老死隨著生故。無如是過。論者偈曰。
生及於老死 俱時則不然 生時即死故 二俱得無因
釋曰。何故不然。生時即死無如此義。何以故。生無體故。此義世間所無。生無體者。得何過失。二俱得無因過二謂老死同時故。以共生故。如老死非生因今生亦非老死因。是故老死同時起者。此義不然。由此觀察故。偈曰。
若彼先後共 次第皆不然 何故生戲論 謂有生老死
釋曰。以是義故。第一義中不應起戲論。如品初所說。以生老死為因。成立生死者。此義不成。以不免前所說過失。如生老等。約前後中觀察不成。自余諸法皆亦類破。此復云何。今當顯示。如偈曰。
如是諸因果 及與彼體相 受及受者等 所有一切法 不但于生死 前際不可得 如是一切法 悉亦無前際
釋曰。一切法者。謂能量所量知及所知
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：老死不可能先於生而存在。為什麼呢？因為老死本身需要依賴於生。這就好比火在有暖之前不可能存在一樣。進一步說，如果你爲了避免這個過失，說先有老死，後有生，這也是不對的。正如偈頌所說：
『如果先有老死，而後才有生，那麼在未生之前就沒有產生老死的因，又怎麼會有老死呢？』
解釋：沒有未生就有的老死，因為老死依賴於有自體。偈頌的意思是這樣的。進一步說，這裡可以立一個論證：生先於老死，這是不對的。為什麼呢？因為老死以生為自體。這就好比住在外面的人說，老死是隨著生而來的，這樣就沒有上述的過失。論者用偈頌說：
『生和老死，同時發生也是不對的，因為生的時候就是死，這樣生和老死都將沒有原因。』
解釋：為什麼說同時發生不對呢？因為生的時候就是死，沒有這樣的道理。為什麼呢？因為生沒有自體。這種說法在世間是不存在的。生沒有自體，會有什麼過失呢？會產生生和老死都沒有原因的過失，因為老死是同時發生的。因為是共同產生的，如果老死不是生的原因，那麼生也不是老死的原因。所以老死同時發生是不對的。通過這樣的觀察，所以偈頌說：
『如果說生、老死是先後或同時發生的，這些說法都不對。為什麼還要虛妄地爭論，說有生老死呢？』
解釋：因為這個原因，在第一義（Paramārtha）中不應該產生虛妄的爭論。就像在品的第一部分所說的那樣，以生老死為因，來成立生死（Saṃsāra）的說法是不成立的，因為不能避免前面所說的過失。就像生老等，從前後關係中觀察也是不成立的。其餘的諸法（Dharma）都可以用類似的方法來破斥。這是什麼意思呢？現在來顯示，就像偈頌所說：
『像這樣，諸因果（Hetu-phala），以及它們的體相（Lakṣaṇa），受（Vedanā）以及受者（Upādātṛ）等，所有一切法（Sarva Dharma），不但在生死的前際（Pūrvakoṭi）不可得，像這樣一切法，都沒有前際。』
解釋：一切法，指的是能量（Māna）、所量（Meya）、知（Jñāna）以及所知（Jñeya）。
【English Translation】 English version: Old age and death cannot exist prior to birth. Why? Because they themselves depend on birth. It's like fire cannot exist before warmth. Furthermore, if you want to avoid this fault and say that old age and death exist first, and then birth exists later, that is also incorrect. As the verse says:
'If old age and death exist first, and then birth exists later, then before birth there would be no cause for old age and death, so how could there be old age and death?'
Explanation: There is no old age and death that exists before birth, because old age and death depend on having a self-nature. The meaning of the verse is like this. Furthermore, here we can establish an argument: birth precedes old age and death, which is incorrect. Why? Because old age and death have birth as their self-nature. It's like someone living outside says that old age and death come with birth, so there is no such fault. The debater says in a verse:
'Birth and old age and death, occurring simultaneously is also incorrect, because at the time of birth there is death, so both birth and old age and death will have no cause.'
Explanation: Why is it incorrect to say that they occur simultaneously? Because at the time of birth there is death, there is no such principle. Why? Because birth has no self-nature. This kind of statement does not exist in the world. If birth has no self-nature, what fault will there be? There will be the fault that birth and old age and death have no cause, because old age and death occur simultaneously. Because they are produced together, if old age and death are not the cause of birth, then birth is not the cause of old age and death. Therefore, old age and death occurring simultaneously is incorrect. Through this kind of observation, the verse says:
'If birth, old age, and death are said to occur sequentially or simultaneously, these statements are all incorrect. Why engage in vain arguments, saying that there is birth, old age, and death?'
Explanation: Because of this reason, in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha) one should not engage in vain arguments. Just like what was said in the first part of the chapter, establishing the existence of birth and death (Saṃsāra) based on birth, old age, and death is not established, because it cannot avoid the faults mentioned earlier. Just like birth, old age, etc., observing from the perspective of sequential relationships is also not established. All other phenomena (Dharma) can be refuted using similar methods. What does this mean? Now I will show it, just like the verse says:
'Like this, all causes and effects (Hetu-phala), as well as their characteristics (Lakṣaṇa), sensation (Vedanā) and the experiencer (Upādātṛ), etc., all phenomena (Sarva Dharma), not only are the prior limits (Pūrvakoṭi) of birth and death unattainable, but like this all phenomena have no prior limits.'
Explanation: All phenomena refer to the measure (Māna), the measurable (Meya), knowledge (Jñāna), and the knowable (Jñeya).
。得解脫者。解脫行等。如彼所立因果體相。是皆不然。其義云何。今說少分。謂第一義中彼稻穀等芽先不有。何以故。以其果故。如芽自體。若汝欲得因先果者。是亦不然。何以故。第一義中因先無果。以無因故。僧佉人言。有如是因。能了彼果。論者言。汝謂有因能了果者。是亦不然。何以故。彼因種種果亦別故。譬如泥團作彼瓶等。複次能了之物。及所了物。彼有別異。此無別異。如日寶珠燈及藥草光有差別。瓶等無別故。若謂因果同時者。是亦不然。以第一義中稻芽二種不得同時。何以故。一時起故。如牛二角。複次垂𩑶等相在牛體先。無如此義。何以故。依止無體故。如壁與畫。如是相先有體。是亦不然。何以故。以其體故。譬如大丈夫體不在丈夫相先。又如地不先堅。複次體相二法同時起者。是亦不然。何以故。同時起故。譬如香味。如前廣破。如品初成立。及與彼過所說苦空。令人了達。是品所明。以是義故。此證得成。如般若波羅蜜經中說。佛告極勇猛菩薩言。善男子。色不生不死。如是受想行識不生不死。若色受想行識無生無死。是名般若波羅蜜。複次極勇猛。如涅槃無際。一切法亦無際。如是等諸修多羅。此中應廣說。
釋觀生死品竟。
般若燈論釋卷第七 大正藏第 30 冊
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：『那些獲得解脫的人，以及解脫的修行等等，就像他們所建立的因果關係和本體現象，這些都不是真實的。』這是什麼意思呢？現在略說一部分。在第一義諦中，稻穀等的芽最初並不存在。為什麼呢？因為它們是果。就像芽的自體一樣。如果你們想要因在果之前存在，這也是不對的。為什麼呢？在第一義諦中，因在果之前並不存在，因為沒有因。僧佉論者說：『有這樣的因，能夠顯現那個果。』論者說：『你們認為有因能夠顯現果，這也是不對的。』為什麼呢？因為因有種種，果也有差別。譬如泥團可以做成瓶子等等。再者，能顯現的事物和所顯現的事物，它們之間有差別。而這裡沒有差別。就像太陽、寶珠、燈和藥草的光有差別，而瓶子等等沒有差別。如果認為因果是同時存在的，這也是不對的。因為在第一義諦中，稻芽這兩種東西不能同時存在。為什麼呢？因為它們是同時生起的。就像牛的兩隻角。再者，垂下來的皮等相，在牛的身體上先存在，沒有這樣的道理。為什麼呢？因為依止的事物沒有自體。就像墻壁和畫。像這樣，相先於體存在，這也是不對的。為什麼呢？因為有體。譬如大丈夫的身體不在大丈夫的相之前。又如土地不先於堅硬。再者，體和相這兩種法同時生起，這也是不對的。為什麼呢？因為它們是同時生起的。譬如香味。就像前面廣泛破斥的那樣。就像本品最初成立的，以及和那些過失所說的苦和空，令人了達。是本品所闡明的。因為這個緣故，這個論證得以成立。就像《般若波羅蜜經》中說：佛告訴極勇猛菩薩說：『善男子，色不生不死，如是受、想、行、識也不生不死。若色、受、想、行、識無生無死，這叫做般若波羅蜜。』再者，極勇猛，就像涅槃沒有邊際，一切法也沒有邊際。』像這樣的各種修多羅，這裡應該廣泛地解說。 《釋觀生死品》結束。 《般若燈論釋》卷第七 《大正藏》第30冊
【English Translation】 English version: 'Those who attain liberation, and the practices of liberation, etc., like the cause-and-effect relationships and the nature of entities they establish, are all not true.' What does this mean? Now, I will explain a small part. In the ultimate truth (第一義諦), the sprouts of rice and other grains do not exist initially. Why? Because they are the result. Just like the self-nature of the sprout. If you want the cause to exist before the result, that is also not correct. Why? In the ultimate truth, the cause does not exist before the result, because there is no cause. The Samkhya (僧佉) philosophers say: 'There is such a cause that can manifest that result.' The commentator says: 'You think there is a cause that can manifest the result, that is also not correct.' Why? Because the causes are various, and the results are also different. For example, a lump of clay can be made into a bottle, etc. Furthermore, the thing that can manifest and the thing that is manifested, there is a difference between them. But here there is no difference. Just like the light of the sun, jewels, lamps, and medicinal herbs are different, but bottles, etc., are not different. If you think that cause and effect exist simultaneously, that is also not correct. Because in the ultimate truth, these two things, rice and sprout, cannot exist simultaneously. Why? Because they arise simultaneously. Like the two horns of a cow. Furthermore, the appearance of hanging skin, etc., existing on the body of a cow beforehand, there is no such reason. Why? Because the thing relied upon has no self-nature. Like a wall and a painting. Like this, the appearance existing before the entity, that is also not correct. Why? Because there is an entity. For example, the body of a great man does not exist before the appearance of a great man. Also, like the earth is not prior to hardness. Furthermore, the two dharmas (法), entity and appearance, arising simultaneously, that is also not correct. Why? Because they arise simultaneously. For example, fragrance and taste. Just like the extensive refutations mentioned earlier. Just like what was initially established in this chapter, and the suffering and emptiness mentioned in those faults, causing people to understand. This is what this chapter clarifies. Because of this reason, this argument is established. Just like it is said in the Prajnaparamita Sutra (般若波羅蜜經): The Buddha (佛) told the Bodhisattva (菩薩) Extremely Courageous (極勇猛): 'Good man, form (色) does not arise and does not die, likewise, feeling (受), perception (想), volition (行), and consciousness (識) do not arise and do not die. If form, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness do not arise and do not die, this is called Prajnaparamita (般若波羅蜜).' Furthermore, Extremely Courageous, just like Nirvana (涅槃) is without limit, all dharmas are also without limit.' Such sutras (修多羅) as these should be extensively explained here. End of the Chapter on Explaining the Observation of Birth and Death. Commentary on the Lamp of Wisdom (般若燈論釋), Volume 7 Taisho Tripitaka (大正藏), Volume 30
No. 1566 般若燈論釋
般若燈論釋卷第八
偈本龍樹菩薩 釋論分別明菩薩
大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅譯
觀苦品第十二
複次苦無自性。所對治空。遮定執故。有此品起。外人言。第一義中有是諸陰。何以故。由苦故。此若無者。則無彼苦。如第二頭。陰是苦者。如經偈曰。
苦集亦世間 見處及彼有
以是義故。第一義中有是諸陰。論者言。虛妄分別于苦不然。如偈曰。
有人慾得苦 自作及他作 共作無因作 彼果皆不然
釋曰。第一義中種種無量如理觀察。彼皆不然。云何觀察。苦非自作。如偈曰。
苦若自作者 則不從緣生
釋曰。由自作故。則不藉因緣。是故苦從緣起。即無此義。而彼不然。復欲得故。此義云何。謂從緣起。如偈曰。
由現陰為因 未來陰得起
釋曰。第一義中諸陰相續名調達者非調達作。何以故。藉緣起故。譬如一有由現陰為因牽后陰起義正如此。複次鞞世師言。身等諸根覺聚雖別而我無異。彼一遍住亦是作者彼作此苦故。是自作。若言諸行剎那剎那生滅。無常者。此說有過。得何等過。此心剎那俱生之苦。不即此苦剎那心作故。非自作亦非他作。何以故。他所作業自受果者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 第1566號 般若燈論釋
般若燈論釋卷第八
偈本 龍樹菩薩（Nāgārjuna） 釋論分別明菩薩
大唐中印度三藏 波羅頗蜜多羅（Prajñāmitra）譯
觀苦品第十二
複次，苦無自性，所對治空，遮止對苦的定執，因此有此品生起。外道之人說，在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya）中，存在著諸陰（skandha，五蘊）。為什麼呢？因為有苦的緣故。如果沒有苦，那麼就沒有彼苦，就像第二顆頭一樣不存在。陰是苦，如經中的偈頌所說：
『苦、集亦世間，見處及彼有。』
因為這個緣故，在第一義諦中存在著諸陰。論者說，虛妄分別認為苦是存在的，這是不對的。如偈頌所說：
『有人慾得苦，自作及他作，共作無因作，彼果皆不然。』
解釋：在第一義諦中，種種無量的如理觀察，那些觀點都是不對的。如何觀察呢？苦不是自己造成的。如偈頌所說：
『苦若自作者，則不從緣生。』
解釋：因為是自己造成的，就不依賴因緣。所以，苦從因緣生起，就沒有自己造作的意義。而那種觀點是不對的。又因為想要得到苦的緣故。這又是什麼意義呢？就是說從因緣生起。如偈頌所說：
『由現陰為因，未來陰得起。』
解釋：在第一義諦中，諸陰相續，名為調達（Devadatta）者，不是調達自己造作的。為什麼呢？因為是依賴因緣而生起的。譬如一個有情，由現在的陰為因，牽引後來的陰生起，道理正是如此。再次，鞞世師（Vaiśeṣika）說，身等諸根覺聚雖然有差別，但我（ātman）沒有差別。那個普遍存在並且常住的『我』也是作者，他造作了這個苦，所以是自作。如果說諸行（saṃskāra）剎那剎那生滅，是無常的，這種說法是有過失的。有什麼過失呢？這一剎那俱生之苦，不是這一剎那的心所造作的，所以不是自作，也不是他作。為什麼呢？因為他人所造的業，自己承受果報。
【English Translation】 English version: No. 1566 Commentary on the Lamp of Wisdom
Commentary on the Lamp of Wisdom, Volume 8
Verses by Nāgārjuna (龍樹菩薩), Commentary by Bhāviveka (分別明菩薩)
Translated by Prajñāmitra (波羅頗蜜多羅) of the Great Tang Dynasty, from Central India
Chapter 12: Examination of Suffering
Furthermore, suffering has no inherent existence (svabhāva), its object of negation is emptiness, and this chapter arises to prevent fixed clinging to suffering. An outsider says, 'In the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), these aggregates (skandha, 五蘊) exist. Why? Because of suffering. If this [suffering] did not exist, then that suffering would not exist, like a second head [which does not exist]. The aggregates are suffering,' as the verse in the scripture says:
'Suffering and its origin are also the world, the place of seeing and that which exists.'
Because of this meaning, in the ultimate truth, these aggregates exist. The commentator says, 'Deluded conceptualization about suffering is not so,' as the verse says:
'Someone desires to obtain suffering, self-made, other-made, jointly made, or without a cause; those results are all not so.'
Explanation: In the ultimate truth, various immeasurable reasoned observations [show] that those views are all not so. How to observe? Suffering is not self-made, as the verse says:
'If suffering were self-made, then it would not arise from conditions.'
Explanation: Because it is self-made, it does not rely on causes and conditions. Therefore, suffering arises from conditions, which means there is no such thing as self-made. And that view is not so. Also, because of the desire to obtain suffering. What does this mean? It means arising from conditions, as the verse says:
'Due to the present aggregate as a cause, the future aggregate arises.'
Explanation: In the ultimate truth, the continuity of aggregates, named Devadatta (調達), is not made by Devadatta himself. Why? Because it arises relying on conditions. For example, a sentient being, due to the present aggregate as a cause, draws forth the arising of the later aggregate; the principle is exactly like this. Furthermore, the Vaiśeṣika (鞞世師) says, 'Although the aggregates of sense faculties such as the body are different, the self (ātman) is not different. That all-pervading and permanent 'self' is also the agent; he creates this suffering, therefore it is self-made.' If it is said that all conditioned phenomena (saṃskāra) arise and cease moment by moment, are impermanent, this statement has a fault. What fault is there? The suffering that arises simultaneously with this moment of mind is not created by this moment of mind, therefore it is not self-made, nor is it other-made. Why? Because one's own receives the result of the karma created by others.
。此義不然。汝意若欲令他作者則違自悉檀。論者言。此中立驗。汝言丈夫即是作者。是義不然。何以故。以其常故。譬如虛空。以常驗故。知非作者。丈夫作者法自體破立義過故。複次若汝定謂我作此苦即不從緣起有如是過。此義云何。以我法中名苦為我。義意如是。複次若言丈夫作業即是自作非不藉余因緣共作后得起者。是義不然。何以故。由無量因共我作苦應如是知。如彼乾草及牛糞等為火作緣。義意正爾。複次調達之苦非調達我作。何以故。由苦故如耶若苦。汝前說言。若剎那諸行等無別作者。彼業所作即是自作者。今當答汝。第一義中苦不可說故我無過。彼世諦中相以相續因果不別。世間咸見作如是說。如言彼處燈來此庵羅樹是我所種。此亦如是。后時有相與彼前思相續。因果不別前有相思。此剎那作名為自作。由前剎那思所積集善不善業。彼業滅時與后為因。如彼燈焰前為后因。如是展轉相續乃至得果。故非不作而得。亦非作已失滅。若汝意謂諸行剎那先所集業不受後果。何以故。以其異故。如別相續者。是義不然。如偈曰。
處處緣起法 不即是彼緣 亦不異彼緣 不常亦不斷
釋曰。我悉檀如是。汝立異故為因者。此義不成。何以故。由先心剎那所傳來業。對治未生。相續與果。以
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：此種說法是不對的。如果你的意思是想讓他者來作為作者，那就違背了你自己的宗義（自悉檀）。論者說，這裡可以立一個論證：你說丈夫（puruṣa）就是作者，這種說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為他是常的，就像虛空一樣。因為是常的緣故，就知道他不是作者。丈夫（puruṣa）作為作者的法則，會因為自體破立義而有過失。再者，如果你一定認為『我』造作了此苦，那就不是從因緣生起的，會有這樣的過失。此義是什麼呢？因為在我的法中，稱『苦』為『我』，意思是這樣的。再者，如果說丈夫（puruṣa）作業就是自己作，不是不憑藉其他因緣共同作用后才生起的，這種說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為無量因共同作用才使『我』產生苦，應當這樣理解。就像那些乾草和牛糞等作為火的助緣一樣，意思正是如此。再者，調達（Devadatta）的苦不是調達（Devadatta）的『我』所作。為什麼呢？因為是苦的緣故，就像耶若（yajña）的苦一樣。你前面說，如果剎那諸行等沒有別的作者，那麼彼業所作就是自作者。現在我來回答你，在第一義諦中，苦是不可說的，所以我沒有過失。在世俗諦中，相以相續，因果不別，世間人都見到並這樣說。例如說『彼處的燈是從這裡來的，這庵羅樹是我所種的』，這也是如此。后時有相與彼前思相續，因果不別，前有相思，此剎那作名為自作。由前剎那思所積集的善不善業，彼業滅時與后為因，就像燈焰前為后因一樣。這樣輾轉相續乃至得到果報，所以不是不作而得，也不是作了之後就消失了。如果你認為諸行剎那先前所積集的業不會受到後果，為什麼呢？因為它們是異體的，就像別的相續者一樣，這種說法是不對的。如偈頌所說： 『處處緣起法，不即是彼緣，亦不異彼緣，不常亦不斷。』 解釋說，我的宗義就是這樣。你因為立異而作為因，這種說法是不成立的。為什麼呢？因為由先前心剎那所傳來的業，對治還沒有生起，相續而給予果報。
【English Translation】 English version: This view is not correct. If you intend to have another as the author, then you violate your own tenet (svasiddhānta). The debater says, here we can establish a proof: You say that puruṣa (the self) is the author, but this view is not correct. Why? Because it is permanent, like space. Because it is proven to be permanent, we know it is not an author. The principle of puruṣa as the author will have faults due to the self-contradictory nature of establishing and refuting. Furthermore, if you definitely assert that 'I' create this suffering, then it does not arise from conditions, and there will be such a fault. What does this mean? Because in my Dharma, 'suffering' is called 'I,' that is the meaning. Furthermore, if you say that puruṣa's action is self-made and not arising from other causes and conditions acting together, this view is not correct. Why? Because countless causes act together to produce suffering for 'me,' it should be understood in this way. Just like dry grass and cow dung serve as conditions for fire, the meaning is exactly like that. Furthermore, Devadatta's suffering is not made by Devadatta's 'self.' Why? Because it is suffering, like the suffering of a yajña (sacrifice). You said earlier that if the momentary dharmas and so on have no other author, then the action done by that karma is self-made. Now I will answer you, in the ultimate truth, suffering is inexpressible, so I have no fault. In the conventional truth, the characteristics are continuous, and the cause and effect are not different. People in the world see and say it like this. For example, they say, 'The lamp there came from here, and this mango tree was planted by me.' This is also like that. Later, there is a characteristic that continues with the previous thought, the cause and effect are not different, and there is previous thought. This momentary action is called self-made. The good and bad karma accumulated by the previous moment's thought, when that karma ceases, it becomes the cause for the later, just like the flame of a lamp is the cause for the later. In this way, it continues until the result is obtained, so it is not obtained without action, nor does it disappear after being done. If you think that the karma accumulated by the momentary dharmas earlier will not receive the consequences, why? Because they are different entities, like other continuums, this view is not correct. As the verse says: 『The dharmas arising from conditions everywhere are neither identical to those conditions, nor different from those conditions, neither permanent nor discontinuous.』 The explanation is that my tenet is like this. You establish a difference as a cause, this view is not established. Why? Because the karma transmitted by the previous moment of mind, the antidote has not yet arisen, continues and gives the result.
功能勝異故。譬如以紫礦汁浸摩多弄伽子種之。后時花中有紫礦色不違世諦。複次說有丈夫者言。一邊作業。一邊受果。無如上過。論者言。彼一邊者不作而得。此一邊者已作失壞。以作業邊永不得果。有此過失。外人言。我是一故無過。云何知一。與一數相應故。論者言。我與一數相應無如此義。何以故。由有故。譬如一數。以是義故。苦非自作。亦不他作。此義云何。如偈曰。
若前陰異后 后陰異前者 此陰從彼生 可言他作苦
釋曰。若人慾得他作苦者。法體不成。立義有過。而實不然。云何不然。此中立驗。第一義中調達后陰于先陰非他。何以故。調達陰故。譬如后自陰體。又彼苦體。相續不別故。立義譬喻如前應知。複次執有人者說如是言。他所造業自受果者。是義不然。何以故。諸位差別皆人作故。名自作苦。亦名他作。二家所立者。我無此過。論者言。汝但有此語。是亦不然。如偈曰。
若人自作苦 離苦無別人 何等是彼人 言人自作苦
釋曰。何等是苦。謂五陰相。離彼苦陰無別有人。云何而言。人作于苦。複次若汝執。言人與五陰不一不異者。是義不然。何以故。但於五陰施調達名。無人可得。以緣起故。譬如瓶等。如是第一義中彼人不成。人既不成。無作
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：功能上的殊勝差異是這樣的：譬如用紫礦的汁液浸泡摩多弄伽（一種植物）的種子，之後開出的花朵會帶有紫礦的顏色，這並不違背世俗諦。進一步說，如果有人主張，『一邊作業，一邊受果』，那就會有上述的過失。論者反駁說，『彼一邊』是不勞而獲，而『此一邊』是已經做了卻又失去了，因為作業的一方永遠無法得到結果，這就是其中的過失。外道辯解說，『我是一體的，所以沒有過失。』 憑什麼說是一體的呢？因為與『一』這個數字相應。論者反駁說，『我與『一』這個數字相應』並不能成立這種說法。為什麼呢？因為『有』的緣故。譬如『一』這個數字。因此，苦不是自己造成的，也不是他人造成的。這是什麼道理呢？就像偈頌所說： 『如果前陰和后陰是不同的，后陰和前陰也是不同的，此陰是從彼陰產生的，那麼就可以說是他人造作了苦。』 解釋：如果有人想要主張苦是由他人造作的，那麼法的體性就無法成立，立論就會有過失。但事實並非如此。為什麼不是這樣呢？這裡可以立一個論證：在第一義諦中，調達（人名）的后陰對於先陰來說不是『他』。為什麼呢？因為是調達的陰。譬如後來的自身陰體。並且，苦的本體，相續沒有差別。立論的譬喻應該像前面所說的那樣理解。進一步，如果有人執著于『人』的存在，並說：『他人所造的業，由自己來承受果報』，這種說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為各位的差別都是人造成的，所以名為自作苦，也名為他作苦。兩家所立的觀點，我都不會有這種過失。論者反駁說：你只是說說而已，這種說法也是不對的。就像偈頌所說： 『如果人自己造作了苦，離開苦就沒有別的人，那麼誰是那個人呢？說人自己造作了苦。』 解釋：什麼是苦呢？就是五陰（色、受、想、行、識）的相。離開了那苦陰，就沒有別的人。怎麼能說人造作了苦呢？進一步，如果你執著于說人與五陰不一也不異，這種說法是不對的。為什麼呢？只是在五陰上施設了調達（人名）的名字，沒有人是可以得到的，因為是緣起法。譬如瓶子等等。因此，在第一義諦中，那個人是不能成立的。人既然不能成立，就沒有造作。
【English Translation】 English version: The functional difference is like this: For example, if you soak the seeds of Modanongjia (a plant) in the juice of purple ore, the flowers that bloom later will have the color of purple ore, which does not violate the mundane truth (conventional truth). Furthermore, if someone claims, 'One side performs actions, and the other side receives the results,' then there will be the aforementioned faults. The debater refutes, 'The 'one side' is getting something without working, while the 'other side' has already worked but lost it, because the side that performs the actions can never get the results, and that is the fault.' The outsider argues, 'I am one, so there is no fault.' How do you know it is one? Because it corresponds to the number 'one.' The debater refutes, 'My corresponding to the number 'one' does not establish this statement.' Why? Because of 'existence.' For example, the number 'one.' Therefore, suffering is neither self-created nor other-created. What is the reason for this? It's like the verse says: 'If the previous skandha (aggregate) is different from the later skandha, and the later skandha is different from the previous one, and this skandha arises from that skandha, then it can be said that suffering is created by others.' Explanation: If someone wants to argue that suffering is created by others, then the nature of the Dharma cannot be established, and the argument will have faults. But that is not the case. Why is it not like that? Here, an argument can be established: In the ultimate truth (first truth), the later skandha of Tiao Da (a person's name) is not 'other' to the previous skandha. Why? Because it is Tiao Da's skandha. For example, the later self-skandha. Moreover, the essence of suffering, the continuity is not different. The analogy for establishing the argument should be understood as mentioned earlier. Furthermore, if someone clings to the existence of 'person' and says: 'The karma created by others is borne by oneself,' this statement is incorrect. Why? Because the differences in positions are all created by people, so it is called self-created suffering, and it is also called other-created suffering. I will not have this fault in the views established by the two families. The debater refutes: You are just saying it, this statement is also incorrect. It's like the verse says: 'If a person creates suffering himself, and there is no other person apart from suffering, then who is that person? Saying that a person creates suffering himself.' Explanation: What is suffering? It is the appearance of the five skandhas (form, feeling, perception, volition, consciousness). Apart from that suffering skandha, there is no other person. How can it be said that a person creates suffering? Furthermore, if you cling to saying that a person and the five skandhas are neither one nor different, this statement is incorrect. Why? Only the name of Tiao Da (a person's name) is applied to the five skandhas, and no person can be obtained, because it is dependent origination. For example, a bottle, etc. Therefore, in the ultimate truth, that person cannot be established. Since the person cannot be established, there is no creation.
苦者。複次他人作苦。是義不然。如偈曰。
若他人作苦 持與此人者 離苦何有他 而言他作苦
釋曰。離苦無人。前已遮故。人有別體令證知者。以無驗故。如是自作苦不可得。先已立驗曉諸未解。是故偈曰。
自作若不成 何處有他作 若他人作苦 彼還是自作
釋曰。無自作苦而指示言他作苦者。此語不然。如別相續決定報業。言他作者。無如此義。是故偈言。何處有他作。語意如是。汝言位有差別人無異者。此為妄語。以是義故。若自作苦。若他作者。此皆不然。複次異尼犍子作如是言。人自作苦故苦是自作。而苦不即人名為他作。是故自作他作二門得成。論者偈曰。
自作苦不然
釋曰。無人作苦。此義如是。由苦無自體人無體故。若謂苦體是人者。義亦不然。何以故。偈曰。
苦不還作苦
釋曰。如先偈言。苦若自作者。則不從緣起。此之二句。如彼已遮語意如是。複次若苦還作苦者。即是果還作果。又苦自起不待因緣。此之二種世所不見。汝前說言。苦不即人此人作苦名他作者。此說不善。如偈曰。
若他作苦者
釋曰。外人意欲以人為他。此人無體不能作苦。何故不作。以其空故。空則無物。云何起作。無起有體者。智人所不欲
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於苦，如果說是他人制造了苦，這個說法是不成立的。正如偈頌所說： 『如果他人制造了苦，然後把苦給予這個人，離開了苦，哪裡還有『他』呢？又怎麼能說是『他』製造了苦呢？』 解釋：離開了苦，就沒有人。這在前面已經駁斥過了。如果人有獨立的實體，可以被認知，但這是沒有證據的。因此，自己製造苦也是不可能的，之前已經通過論證讓那些不理解的人明白了。所以偈頌說： 『如果自己製造苦不能成立，哪裡還會有他人制造苦呢？如果他人制造苦，那（對於他人來說），那還是自己製造的苦。』 解釋：沒有自己製造的苦，卻指著說是他人制造的苦，這種說法是不對的。就像不同的相續（saṃtāna）決定了報應的業力，說是由『他』製造的，沒有這樣的道理。所以偈頌說：『哪裡還會有他人制造苦呢？』意思就是這樣。你說位置有差別，但人沒有不同，這是妄語。因為這個原因，無論是自己製造苦，還是他人制造苦，這些都是不成立的。此外，異見者尼犍子（Nigaṇṭha）這樣說：人自己製造苦，所以苦是自己製造的；但苦不等於人，所以稱為他人制造的。因此，自己製造和他製造這兩個方面都可以成立。論者用偈頌說： 『自己製造苦是不成立的。』 解釋：沒有人制造苦，道理就是這樣。因為苦沒有自體，人也沒有自體。如果說苦的自體就是人，這個說法也是不成立的。為什麼呢？偈頌說： 『苦不會反過來製造苦。』 解釋：就像之前的偈頌所說，如果苦是自己製造的，那麼它就不會從因緣生起。這兩句話，就像之前駁斥的那樣，意思就是這樣。此外，如果苦反過來製造苦，那就是果反過來製造果。而且苦自己產生，不需要依賴因緣。這兩種情況在世間都是看不到的。你之前說，苦不等於人，這個人制造苦，所以稱為他人制造的，這種說法是不正確的。正如偈頌所說： 『如果是他製造苦，』 解釋：外道想要把人當作『他』，但這個人沒有實體，不能製造苦。為什麼不能製造苦呢？因為他是空性的。空性就沒有事物，怎麼能產生作用呢？沒有產生作用卻有實體的，這是智者所不認可的。
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding suffering, the idea that suffering is created by others is not valid. As the verse says: 'If others create suffering and then give that suffering to this person, apart from suffering, where is the 'other'? How can it be said that 'he' created the suffering?' Explanation: Apart from suffering, there is no person. This has already been refuted earlier. If a person has an independent entity that can be recognized, there is no evidence for this. Therefore, creating suffering oneself is also impossible, as has been demonstrated earlier to those who do not understand. Therefore, the verse says: 'If creating suffering oneself cannot be established, where can creating suffering by others exist? If others create suffering, then (for the others), it is still suffering created by themselves.' Explanation: To point to something and say it is suffering created by others when there is no suffering created by oneself is incorrect. Just like different continuities (saṃtāna) determine the karmic force of retribution, saying it is created by 'others' is not reasonable. Therefore, the verse says: 'Where can creating suffering by others exist?' That is the meaning. You say that positions are different, but people are not different; this is false speech. For this reason, whether it is suffering created by oneself or suffering created by others, these are not valid. Furthermore, the non-Buddhist Nigaṇṭha says this: People create suffering themselves, so suffering is created by oneself; but suffering is not the same as the person, so it is called created by others. Therefore, the two aspects of creating by oneself and creating by others can be established. The commentator says in a verse: 'Creating suffering by oneself is not valid.' Explanation: No one creates suffering; that is the principle. Because suffering has no self-nature and people have no self-nature. If it is said that the self-nature of suffering is the person, that statement is also not valid. Why? The verse says: 'Suffering does not in turn create suffering.' Explanation: As the previous verse said, if suffering is created by itself, then it does not arise from conditions. These two sentences, like the previous refutation, mean just that. Furthermore, if suffering in turn creates suffering, then the result in turn creates the result. Moreover, suffering arises by itself, not relying on conditions. These two situations are not seen in the world. You said earlier that suffering is not the same as the person, and this person creates suffering, so it is called created by others; this statement is incorrect. As the verse says: 'If it is he who creates suffering,' Explanation: The outsider wants to regard the person as 'other', but this person has no entity and cannot create suffering. Why can't he create suffering? Because he is emptiness. Emptiness has no things, how can it produce action? Having no production but having an entity is not desired by the wise.
。是故偈曰。
無他誰作苦
釋曰。無此他義。語意如是。以是義故。自作他作此皆不然。俱作者言二作苦故無過。為遮此故。阿阇梨偈曰。
若一一作成 可言二作苦
釋曰。一一不作如先已遮。苦非自作亦非他作。是故汝言二作苦者。此義不然。亦不無因。何以故。此無因執。如無起品已遮。此中偈曰。
自他二不作 無因何有苦
釋曰。此品前來所說遮苦若無因者。則亦無苦。無因有苦。無如是義。由第一義中苦不可得。語意如此。如是種種觀察彼苦無體。外人品初言。有諸陰以苦故為因者。第一義中此執不成。如偈曰。
不獨觀于苦 四種義不成 外所有諸法 四種亦皆無
釋曰。如前所說道理。彼外色等觀察亦無此義。云何色不自作。何以故。若有若無。因不然故。如前已說。又從緣起故。如芽自體不名自作。若言從諸大作名他作者。是義不然。云何不然。諸大於色不名為他。何以故。以其外故。如色自體。又遮實有故。色無自體。他義不成。亦非共作。以一一不成故。亦不無因。何以故。此無因執前已遮故。如是聲等亦應類破。是故品初說因由苦故者。有過失故。此義不成。今此品中為欲顯示苦是空義。是故得成。如般若波羅蜜經中說。佛告極勇猛
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因此，用偈頌說：
『沒有其他誰來製造痛苦』
解釋：沒有『此他』的意義。語句的含義是這樣。因為這個意義，自己製造，他人制造，這些都不成立。如果說共同製造，就是兩個製造痛苦，沒有過失。爲了遮止這個說法，阿阇梨用偈頌說：
『如果一一各自製造完成，就可以說兩個製造痛苦』
解釋：一一各自不製造，如先前已經遮止。痛苦不是自己製造，也不是他人制造。所以你說兩個製造痛苦，這個意義不成立。也不是沒有原因。為什麼呢？因為這種無因的執著，如『無起品』已經遮止。這裡用偈頌說：
『自己和他人都不能製造，沒有原因怎麼會有痛苦？』
解釋：這一品前面所說的，遮止痛苦如果是沒有原因的，那麼也就沒有痛苦。沒有原因卻有痛苦，沒有這樣的道理。由於第一義中，痛苦是不可得的。語句的含義是這樣。像這樣種種觀察，那痛苦沒有實體。『外人品』開始說，有各種陰以痛苦作為原因，在第一義中，這種執著不成立。如偈頌說：
『不只是觀察痛苦，四種意義不能成立。 外在所有的法，四種也都沒有。』
解釋：如前面所說的道理，那外在的色等等觀察也沒有這個意義。為什麼色不是自己製造的呢？因為無論是有還是沒有，原因都不成立。如前面已經說過。又因為是從因緣生起的，如芽的自體不稱為自己製造。如果說從諸大製造，稱為他人制造，這個意義不成立。為什麼不成立呢？諸大對於色不稱為他。為什麼呢？因為它是外在的，如色的自體。又遮止實有，所以色沒有自體，『他』的意義不成立。也不是共同製造，因為一一都不成立。也不是沒有原因。為什麼呢？因為這種無因的執著前面已經遮止了。像這樣，聲音等等也應該類推破斥。所以『品』開始說因為痛苦的緣故，有過失的緣故，這個意義不成立。現在這一品中，爲了顯示痛苦是空性的意義，所以才能成立。如《般若波羅蜜經》中說，佛告訴極勇猛（菩薩名）
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, it is said in a verse:
'No other who makes suffering'
Explanation: There is no meaning of 'this other'. The meaning of the statement is like this. Because of this meaning, self-made, other-made, all these are not established. If it is said that jointly made, that is, two make suffering, there is no fault. To prevent this statement, Ācārya (teacher) said in a verse:
'If each individually makes it complete, then it can be said that two make suffering'
Explanation: Each individually does not make, as previously prevented. Suffering is neither self-made nor other-made. Therefore, you say that two make suffering, this meaning is not established. Nor is it without a cause. Why? Because this clinging to no cause, as the 'No Arising Chapter' has already prevented. Here it is said in a verse:
'Neither self nor other makes it, without a cause, how can there be suffering?'
Explanation: What was said in the previous chapter, preventing suffering if it is without a cause, then there is no suffering. There is no such principle as having suffering without a cause. Because in the ultimate truth, suffering is unattainable. The meaning of the statement is like this. Observing in various ways like this, that suffering has no substance. The 'Outsider Chapter' begins by saying that there are various skandhas (aggregates) that take suffering as the cause, in the ultimate truth, this clinging is not established. As the verse says:
'Not only observing suffering, the four meanings cannot be established. All external dharmas (phenomena), the four are also all without.'
Explanation: As the principle said earlier, observing those external forms, etc., there is also no this meaning. Why is form not self-made? Because whether it exists or not, the cause is not established. As previously said. Also, because it arises from conditions, such as the sprout's own nature is not called self-made. If it is said that it is made from the great elements, called other-made, this meaning is not established. Why is it not established? The great elements are not called 'other' to form. Why? Because it is external, like the own nature of form. Also preventing real existence, so form has no own nature, the meaning of 'other' is not established. Nor is it jointly made, because each is not established. Nor is it without a cause. Why? Because this clinging to no cause has already been prevented. Like this, sound, etc., should also be refuted by analogy. Therefore, the 'Chapter' begins by saying that because of suffering, because of having faults, this meaning is not established. Now in this chapter, in order to show that the meaning of suffering is emptiness, it can be established. As said in the Prajnaparamita Sutra, the Buddha told Extremely Courageous (a Bodhisattva's name)
菩薩言。善男子。色非苦非樂。如是受想行識非苦非樂。若色受想行識非苦非樂。是名般若波羅蜜。又如梵王問經中說。云何名聖諦。若苦若集。若滅若道。不名聖諦。彼苦等不起。乃名聖諦。如是等。複次聲聞乘中婆伽婆說。有比丘問佛言。瞿曇。苦自作耶。佛言不。他作耶。佛言不。俱作耶。佛言不。無因作耶。佛言不。如是等諸修多羅。此中應廣說。
釋觀苦品竟。
般若燈論釋觀行品第十三
複次為令他解一切諸行種種差別皆無自性。有此品起。此中外人引經立義。如偈曰。
婆伽婆說彼 虛妄劫奪法
釋曰。云何知彼諸行等法是虛妄耶。彼諸行等自體無故。誑凡夫故。邪智分別。謂為可得。故是虛妄。又能為彼第一義諦境界念等。妄失因故是虛妄法。婆伽婆說者。謂于諸經中。告諸比丘作如是說。彼虛妄劫奪法者。謂一切有為法最上實者。謂涅槃真法。如是諸行是劫奪法。是滅壞法。聲聞法中作如是說。大乘經中亦作是說。諸有為法皆是虛妄。諸無為法皆非虛妄。此二阿含皆明諸行是虛妄法。此義得成。論者言。此中立驗。第一義中內諸法空。何以故。劫奪法故。如幻化人。外人言。立義出因無差別故。汝言第一義中諸法空者。是無所有劫奪法者。亦無所有。出因闕故。立
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：菩薩說：『善男子，色（物質現象）既非苦，也非樂。同樣，受（感受）、想（思維）、行（意志）、識（意識）也既非苦，也非樂。如果色、受、想、行、識既非苦，也非樂，這就叫做般若波羅蜜（智慧到彼岸）。』又如《梵王問經》中所說：『什麼叫做聖諦（真理）？如果是苦、集（苦的根源）、滅（苦的止息）、道（通往滅苦的道路），那就不叫做聖諦。當苦等不再生起時，才叫做聖諦。』等等。此外，在聲聞乘（小乘）中，婆伽婆（世尊）說：『有比丘問佛說：瞿曇（佛陀），苦是自己造作的嗎？』佛說：『不是。』『是他人造作的嗎？』佛說：『不是。』『是共同造作的嗎？』佛說：『不是。』『是無因而生的嗎？』佛說：『不是。』等等，像這樣的修多羅（經文）有很多，這裡應該廣泛地解說。 釋觀苦品結束。 《般若燈論釋觀行品》第十三 其次，爲了讓別人理解一切諸行的種種差別都沒有自性，所以才有了這一品。這裡外道之人引用經文來建立他們的觀點，就像偈頌所說： 『婆伽婆說彼，虛妄劫奪法。』 解釋說：『怎麼知道那些諸行等法是虛妄的呢？因為那些諸行等自體不存在，欺騙凡夫，邪智分別，認為是可以得到的，所以是虛妄的。』又因為能使第一義諦（最高真理）境界的念等妄失，所以是虛妄法。『婆伽婆說』，是指在各種經文中，告訴各位比丘這樣說。『彼虛妄劫奪法』，是指一切有為法（因緣和合而生的法）中最真實的是涅槃（寂滅）真法，像這樣的諸行是劫奪法，是滅壞法。在聲聞法中是這樣說的，在大乘經中也是這樣說的：『諸有為法都是虛妄的，諸無為法（不依賴因緣而生的法）都不是虛妄的。』這兩部阿含經都說明諸行是虛妄法，這個意義就成立了。論者說：『這裡建立論證，在第一義中，內在的諸法是空的。為什麼呢？因為是劫奪法。就像幻化的人一樣。』外道之人說：『立義（所要證明的命題）和出因（證明命題的理由）沒有差別，你說第一義中諸法是空的，是無所有的，劫奪法也是無所有的。』因為出因有缺失，所以立義不成立。
【English Translation】 English version: The Bodhisattva said: 'Good man, form (rupa) is neither suffering nor pleasure. Likewise, feeling (vedana), perception (samjna), volition (samskara), and consciousness (vijnana) are neither suffering nor pleasure. If form, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness are neither suffering nor pleasure, this is called Prajna Paramita (Perfection of Wisdom).』 Furthermore, as it is said in the Brahma King Questioning Sutra: 『What is called the Noble Truth (Arya Satya)? If it is suffering (duhkha), accumulation (samudaya - the origin of suffering), cessation (nirodha - the cessation of suffering), and the path (marga - the path to the cessation of suffering), it is not called the Noble Truth. Only when suffering and so on do not arise is it called the Noble Truth.』 And so on. Moreover, in the Sravaka Vehicle (Hinayana), the Bhagavan (World-Honored One) said: 『A Bhikshu asked the Buddha: 『Gautama (Buddha), is suffering self-made?』 The Buddha said: 『No.』 『Is it made by others?』 The Buddha said: 『No.』 『Is it made by both?』 The Buddha said: 『No.』 『Is it made without a cause?』 The Buddha said: 『No.』』 And so on. There are many such Sutras (discourses), which should be extensively explained here. End of the Explanation of the Chapter on Observing Suffering. Prajna-pradipa-tika, Chapter Thirteen on Observing Actions Furthermore, in order to make others understand that all the various differences of all actions are without self-nature (svabhava), this chapter arises. Here, outsiders cite scriptures to establish their views, as the verse says: 『The Bhagavan said that, the false plundering dharma.』 The explanation says: 『How do we know that those actions and other dharmas are false? Because those actions and others do not have their own self-nature, they deceive ordinary people, and with wrong knowledge they discriminate and think they can be obtained, so they are false.』 Also, because they can cause the loss of mindfulness and so on in the realm of the First Noble Truth (paramartha satya - ultimate truth), they are false dharmas. 『The Bhagavan said』 refers to telling the Bhikshus in various sutras to say this. 『That false plundering dharma』 refers to the most real of all conditioned dharmas (samskrta dharma) being Nirvana (extinction) true dharma, and such actions are plundering dharmas, they are destroying dharmas. This is how it is said in the Sravaka Dharma, and it is also said in the Mahayana Sutras: 『All conditioned dharmas are false, and all unconditioned dharmas (asamskrta dharma) are not false.』 These two Agamas (collections of scriptures) both explain that actions are false dharmas, and this meaning is established. The commentator says: 『Here we establish the proof, in the First Noble Truth, the inner dharmas are empty. Why? Because they are plundering dharmas. Like an illusionary person.』 The outsider says: 『The proposition (what is to be proven) and the reason (the reason for proving the proposition) are not different. You say that in the First Noble Truth the dharmas are empty, they are non-existent, and the plundering dharmas are also non-existent.』 Because the reason is lacking, the proposition is not established.
義不成。有過失故。論者偈曰。
若妄奪法無 有何名劫奪
釋曰。汝謂立義出因皆無所有。若爾此既是無。竟有何物可名劫奪。以無體故。譬如兔角。是故虛妄劫奪。此之二語。非是無義。復有何義分別境界。彼自體空是虛妄義。不如實有。喻若光影。是劫奪義。因與立義此二不同。是故我無立義闕因過失。無二過故。所欲義成。複次劫奪語者。佛婆伽婆拔煩惱障。及智障根。永盡無餘。故作此說。如偈曰。
婆伽婆說此 為顯示空義
釋曰。劫奪語者。與空無別體。如言彼處有煙此說彼處有火。外人言。虛妄語者非是無義。此有何義。謂如來不說諸法無我。若爾云何。說虛妄語。如偈曰。
見法變異故 諸法無自體
釋曰。此偈說何義。謂見諸法變異故知諸法無體。云何無體。以非常住故。婆伽婆說虛妄語者。道理如是。又如偈曰。
有體非無體
釋曰。云何名有。自體有故。如汝道理者。諸法則無體。而此不然。偈曰。
由諸法空故
釋曰。諸法無我我所故。汝義如是。是故應信諸法有體。若不如此者。偈曰。
自體若非有 何法為變異
釋曰。現見此體有變異故。是故定知有變異法。此中立驗。第一義中諸法有體。何以故。體變異故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 義不成：因為有過失的緣故。論者用偈頌說： 『如果虛妄地奪取法，那有什麼能稱作劫奪呢？』 解釋：你認為立義和提出理由都是空無所有的。如果這樣，既然一切都是空無，究竟有什麼東西可以被稱作劫奪呢？因為沒有實體，就像兔角一樣。所以，『虛妄』和『劫奪』這兩個詞，並非沒有意義。又有什麼意義呢？分別境界。那境界的自性是空的，這是『虛妄』的意義，不如實存在，就像光影一樣。『劫奪』的意義是，因和立義這兩者是不同的。因此，我沒有立義缺失原因的過失，因為沒有這兩種過失，所以想要表達的意義成立。再次，『劫奪』這個詞，是佛陀（婆伽婆）拔除煩惱障和智慧障的根本，永遠斷盡無餘，所以這樣說。如偈頌說： 『婆伽婆說這個，是爲了顯示空性的意義。』 解釋：『劫奪』這個詞，與空性沒有區別。就像說『那個地方有煙』，就說明『那個地方有火』。外人說：『虛妄』這個詞並非沒有意義。這有什麼意義呢？就是如來不說諸法無我。如果這樣，為什麼說虛妄語呢？如偈頌說： 『因為見到法的變異，所以諸法沒有自體。』 解釋：這首偈頌說明什麼意義呢？就是因為見到諸法的變異，所以知道諸法沒有自體。為什麼沒有自體呢？因為不是恒常住留的。婆伽婆說虛妄語，道理就是這樣。又如偈頌說： 『有體，不是無體。』 解釋：什麼叫做『有』呢？因為自體存在。如果按照你的道理，諸法就沒有自體了，但事實並非如此。偈頌說： 『由於諸法是空性的。』 解釋：諸法沒有我，也沒有我所，你的意思是這樣。所以，應該相信諸法是有自體的。如果不這樣認為，偈頌說： 『如果自體不存在，什麼法會發生變異呢？』 解釋：現在看到這個自體有變異，所以一定知道有變異的法。這裡可以立一個論證：在第一義諦中，諸法是有自體的。為什麼呢？因為自體會變異。
【English Translation】 English version: 『Yi bu cheng』 (Meaning not established): Because there is a fault. The debater says in a verse: 『If one falsely seizes the Dharma, what can be called robbery?』 Explanation: You say that establishing a thesis and presenting a reason are both empty and without substance. If that is the case, since everything is empty, what can be called robbery? Because there is no substance, like a rabbit's horn. Therefore, the two terms 『false』 and 『robbery』 are not without meaning. What is the meaning then? To distinguish the realm of experience. The self-nature of that realm is empty, which is the meaning of 『false,』 not truly existing, like light and shadow. The meaning of 『robbery』 is that the cause and the established thesis are different. Therefore, I do not have the fault of lacking a cause for the established thesis, because there are not these two faults, so the meaning I want to express is established. Furthermore, the term 『robbery』 is used because the Buddha (Bhagavan) uproots the root of afflictive obscurations and cognitive obscurations, completely and without remainder, so he says this. As the verse says: 『Bhagavan speaks of this to reveal the meaning of emptiness.』 Explanation: The term 『robbery』 is not different in substance from emptiness. Just as saying 『there is smoke in that place』 indicates 『there is fire in that place.』 The outsider says: The term 『false』 is not without meaning. What is the meaning of this? It means that the Tathagata does not say that all dharmas are without self. If so, why speak falsely? As the verse says: 『Because seeing the change of dharmas, all dharmas have no self-nature.』 Explanation: What meaning does this verse explain? It means that because seeing the change of dharmas, one knows that all dharmas have no self-nature. Why no self-nature? Because they are not permanent. The reason why Bhagavan speaks falsely is like this. Also, as the verse says: 『There is substance, not no substance.』 Explanation: What is called 『existence』? Because the self-nature exists. If according to your reasoning, all dharmas would have no substance, but this is not the case. The verse says: 『Because all dharmas are empty.』 Explanation: All dharmas have no self and no belonging to self, that is your meaning. Therefore, one should believe that all dharmas have substance. If one does not think so, the verse says: 『If the self-nature does not exist, what dharma would change?』 Explanation: Now seeing that this self-nature has change, therefore one certainly knows that there is a dharma that changes. Here, one can establish a proof: In the ultimate truth, all dharmas have substance. Why? Because the substance changes.
。此若無體。則無變異。如石女兒。由有體變異。謂內入等。是故第一義中法有自體。論者偈曰。
若法有自體 云何有變異
釋曰。法有自體而變異者。是義不然。何以故。以自體者不可壞故。而今現見彼體變異。是故當知。彼變異體與無自體不得相離。汝所立因則自相違。有人言虛妄法義者。謂不如實見法無自體者。此謂說無我義。何以故。言自體者。即是我名。見法變異者。此謂諸法轉變滅壞。是故虛妄語者。與其無我不得相離。此虛妄語即說無我。非謂說空。是故聖道未起。我見山未崩。內外諸法我及我所光影顯現聖道起時。於此諸法不復分別我及我所。若言諸法無自體者。如外道所執我。此我無體成立此義者。則成我所成。如是因者。成立無我。不成立空及無自體。論者言。汝等分別法無體者。謂如兔角。無體如是。故生怖畏。譬如小兒夜見自影。謂是非人失聲驚怖。汝亦如是。如汝所言外道執我立此無我則成我所成者。汝今諦聽。若以虛妄之言。為成立無我及外道執。我亦無自體。作此解者。如是如是。我今成立法空為因開示汝者。此亦成立人無我義。何以故。此人無我。與彼法空不相離故。如是此因令人信解。如立義者。聲是無常。云何出因。謂彼作故。言作故者。苦空無我亦得成立。如
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果這個法沒有自性（svabhāva），就不會有變異。就像石女兒（śila-putra，比喻不存在的事物）一樣。由於有自性才會有變異，比如內入（adhyātma-praveśa，指禪定中的一種境界）等等。因此，在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya，最高的真理）中，法是有自性的。論者（指持此觀點的論師）用偈頌說： 『如果法有自性，怎麼會有變異？』 解釋：法有自性卻又變異，這種說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為有自性的東西是不可毀壞的。而現在我們明明看到它在變異。所以應當知道，這個變異的體與沒有自性是不可分離的。你所立的因（hetu，理由）就自相矛盾了。有人說虛妄法義的人，是指不如實地看到法沒有自性的人。這叫做說無我（anātman）的意義。為什麼呢？因為說『自性』，就是『我』（ātman）的另一種說法。看到法在變異，這叫做諸法轉變滅壞。所以，虛妄語（mṛṣā-vāda，虛妄的言論）與無我是不可分離的。這個虛妄語就是說無我，而不是說空（śūnyatā）。所以，聖道（ārya-mārga，通往解脫的道路）還沒有生起，我見（ātma-dṛṣṭi，認為有『我』的錯誤見解）這座山還沒有崩塌，內外諸法，『我』及『我所』（mama，屬於我的事物）的光影仍然顯現。聖道生起時，對於這些法，不再分別『我』及『我所』。 如果說諸法沒有自性，就像外道（tīrthika，指佛教以外的宗教）所執著的『我』一樣。如果成立這個『我』沒有實體，那就成了『我所成』（ātmasiddha，已經成立的）。這樣的因，成立了無我，但不能成立空及無自性。論者說：你們分別法沒有實體，就像兔角（śaśa-viṣāṇa，比喻不存在的事物）一樣，沒有實體，所以產生怖畏。譬如小孩子晚上看到自己的影子，以為是非人（amanuṣya，鬼怪），失聲驚叫。你們也是這樣。如果像你們所說，外道執著『我』，而立這個無我，那就成了『我所成』了。你們現在仔細聽著。如果用虛妄的言論，來成立無我以及外道執著的『我』也沒有自性，這樣解釋，才是正確的。我現在成立法空（dharma-śūnyatā，諸法皆空）作為因，來開示你們，這也成立了人無我（pudgala-śūnyatā，人無我）的意義。為什麼呢？因為這個人無我，與那個法空是不可分離的。這樣，這個因才能令人信解。比如立義者說：『聲是無常（anitya，變化無常）。』怎麼出因呢？說：『因為它是被造作的（kṛtaka，由因緣和合而成）。』說『被造作』，苦（duḥkha，痛苦）、空、無我，也都可以成立。比如……
【English Translation】 English version: If this dharma (phenomenon) had no svabhāva (own-being, intrinsic nature), then there would be no change. Like a śila-putra (stone-daughter, a metaphor for something non-existent). It is because there is svabhāva that there is change, such as adhyātma-praveśa (inner absorption, a state in meditation), etc. Therefore, in paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth), dharma has its own-being. The debater (referring to the proponent of this view) says in a verse: 'If dharma has its own-being, how can there be change?' Explanation: That dharma has its own-being and yet changes is not correct. Why? Because that which has its own-being is indestructible. But now we clearly see that this entity changes. Therefore, it should be known that this changing entity is inseparable from the absence of own-being. Your established reason (hetu, cause) contradicts itself. Someone who speaks of the meaning of false dharma refers to someone who does not see the absence of own-being in dharma as it truly is. This is called speaking of the meaning of anātman (no-self). Why? Because saying 'own-being' is another way of saying 'ātman' (self). Seeing dharma changing is called the transformation and destruction of all dharmas. Therefore, mṛṣā-vāda (false speech) is inseparable from no-self. This false speech is speaking of no-self, not speaking of śūnyatā (emptiness). Therefore, the ārya-mārga (noble path, path to liberation) has not yet arisen, the mountain of ātma-dṛṣṭi (self-view, the mistaken view of a 'self') has not yet collapsed, and the light and shadows of internal and external dharmas, 'I' and 'mine' (mama, belonging to me), still appear. When the ārya-mārga arises, there is no longer any distinction between 'I' and 'mine' regarding these dharmas. If it is said that dharmas have no own-being, like the 'self' held by the tīrthikas (non-Buddhists, adherents of other religions). If establishing this 'self' as having no substance, then it becomes 'ātmasiddha' (self-established, already established). Such a reason establishes no-self, but does not establish emptiness or the absence of own-being. The debater says: You distinguish dharma as having no substance, like a śaśa-viṣāṇa (rabbit's horn, a metaphor for something non-existent), having no substance, thus causing fear. For example, a child sees his own shadow at night and thinks it is an amanuṣya (non-human being, ghost), and cries out in fright. You are also like that. If, as you say, the tīrthikas hold onto a 'self', and establish this no-self, then it becomes 'self-established'. Now listen carefully. If using false speech to establish no-self and that the 'self' held by the tīrthikas also has no own-being, this interpretation is correct. I now establish dharma-śūnyatā (emptiness of phenomena) as the reason to enlighten you, and this also establishes the meaning of pudgala-śūnyatā (emptiness of person, no-self of person). Why? Because this no-self of person is inseparable from that dharma-śūnyatā. Thus, this reason can lead to understanding and faith. For example, the proponent says: 'Sound is anitya (impermanent, changing).' How to give the reason? Say: 'Because it is kṛtaka (made, produced by causes and conditions).' Saying 'made', duḥkha (suffering), emptiness, and no-self can also be established. For example...
是成立虛妄法者。無其自體。即亦成立。人無我義。以不相離故。如外人言。虛妄義者。此明諸法自體不住。今答此義。若法可取者。偈曰。
彼體不變異 余亦不變異 如少不作老 老亦不作少
釋曰。此二譬喻如數次第相似相對。此中立驗。法住自體變異者不然。何以故。不捨自體故。譬如少老。若言彼前剎那異相老住名變異者。此亦不然。何以故。異相已去故。譬如老若。外人言。如乳不捨自體而轉成酪。以是義故。因非一向者。是義不然。今當問汝。何者是酪。彼言乳是。若乳是酪。不捨自體。云何分別。此名為酪。若定分者。偈曰。
若此體即異 乳應即是酪
釋曰。由乳不捨色。味力用利益等故。乳不為酪。異亦不然。何以故。如偈曰。
異乳有何物 能生於彼酪
釋曰。無酪可起故。余體亦無變異。汝言因非一向者。是義不然。有異人言。我亦不說乳不生酪。酪相異乳。然以和合自在力故乳生於酪。論者言。汝言和合自在力者。此乳為舍自體能生於酪。為不捨自體而生酪耶。若爾有何過。若舍自體則不得言乳生於酪。若不捨自體此則相違。云何相違。若是乳者。云何名酪。若是酪者。云何是乳。于彼世間悉如是解。若有人言。乳不生酪但變為酪。如此義者亦
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：是成立虛妄法的人，因為法沒有它自身的實體。即使這樣，也仍然可以成立人無我的道理，因為它們不是相互分離的。就像外道所說的，虛妄的意義在於說明諸法自身沒有恒常不變的自性。現在回答這個意義：如果法是可以被把握的，那麼，偈頌說： 『它的本體不變異，其他的也不變異，就像年少不會變成年老，年老也不會變成年少。』 解釋：這兩個譬喻，就像數字的順序一樣，相似且相對。這裡建立論證：法安住于自身而發生變異是不成立的。為什麼呢？因為它沒有捨棄自身的本體。譬如年少和年老。如果說，前一剎那不同的相貌，年老安住，這叫做變異，這也是不成立的。為什麼呢？因為不同的相貌已經過去了。譬如年老。外道說，就像牛奶沒有捨棄自身的本體而轉化成酪（一種乳製品），因為這個緣故，因不是單方面的。這個說法是不成立的。現在我要問你，什麼是酪？他們說是牛奶。如果牛奶是酪，沒有捨棄自身的本體，那麼如何區分，這叫做酪？如果一定要區分，那麼，偈頌說： 『如果這個本體就是不同的，那麼牛奶就應該直接是酪。』 解釋：由於牛奶沒有捨棄顏色、味道、力量、作用、利益等等，所以牛奶不是酪。不同也是不成立的。為什麼呢？就像偈頌說： 『離開了牛奶，還有什麼東西能夠產生那個酪呢？』 解釋：因為沒有酪可以產生，所以其他的本體也沒有變異。你說因不是單方面的，這個說法是不成立的。有其他人說，我也沒有說牛奶不生酪，酪的相貌不同於牛奶，然而憑藉和合的自在力量，牛奶產生了酪。論者說，你說和合的自在力量，那麼，這個牛奶是捨棄了自身的本體而能夠產生酪，還是沒有捨棄自身的本體而產生酪呢？如果這樣，有什麼過失呢？如果捨棄了自身的本體，那麼就不能說牛奶產生了酪。如果沒有捨棄自身的本體，那麼這就互相矛盾。如何互相矛盾呢？如果是牛奶，怎麼能叫做酪？如果是酪，怎麼能是牛奶？在那個世間，大家都這樣理解。如果有人說，牛奶不是生出酪，而是變成了酪，如果這樣說也是……
【English Translation】 English version: These are those who establish false dharmas (phenomena), because the dharmas do not have their own inherent nature. Even so, the meaning of 'no-self' in persons can still be established, because they are not separate from each other. Just as the heretics say, the meaning of falsity lies in explaining that all dharmas do not have a constant and unchanging self-nature. Now, in response to this meaning: if a dharma can be grasped, then the verse says: 'Its essence does not change, nor do others change; just as youth does not become old age, nor does old age become youth.' Explanation: These two metaphors are similar and relative, like the order of numbers. Here, an argument is established: it is not valid to say that a dharma abides in itself and undergoes change. Why? Because it has not abandoned its own essence. For example, youth and old age. If it is said that the different appearance of the previous moment, with old age abiding, is called change, this is also not valid. Why? Because the different appearance has already passed. For example, old age. The heretics say, just as milk does not abandon its own essence but transforms into cheese (a type of dairy product), for this reason, the cause is not one-sided. This statement is not valid. Now I will ask you, what is cheese? They say it is milk. If milk is cheese, without abandoning its own essence, then how can it be distinguished, and called cheese? If a distinction must be made, then the verse says: 'If this essence is indeed different, then milk should directly be cheese.' Explanation: Because milk has not abandoned its color, taste, strength, function, benefits, etc., milk is not cheese. Difference is also not valid. Why? As the verse says: 'Apart from milk, what else can produce that cheese?' Explanation: Because there is no cheese that can arise, therefore other essences have not changed either. You say the cause is not one-sided, this statement is not valid. Someone else says, I also did not say that milk does not produce cheese, the appearance of cheese is different from milk, however, by the power of harmonious combination, milk produces cheese. The debater says, you say the power of harmonious combination, then, does this milk abandon its own essence and is able to produce cheese, or does it not abandon its own essence and produce cheese? If so, what fault is there? If it abandons its own essence, then it cannot be said that milk produces cheese. If it does not abandon its own essence, then this is contradictory. How is it contradictory? If it is milk, how can it be called cheese? If it is cheese, how can it be milk? In that world, everyone understands it this way. If someone says, milk does not produce cheese, but transforms into cheese, if this is said, it is also...
同前遮。如是觀察。第一義中諸法異者此皆不成。汝言諸法有體以此為因者。此因不成。外人言。第一義中諸法不空。何以故。此相違法有故。如顛倒智及不顛倒智。此若無者則無違法。如虛空花由違不空故有空法。以是義故。如所說因諸法不空。論者言。若第一義中有陰等者。除此有物立於空法。而第一義中實無一法是不空者。如偈曰。
若一法不空 觀此故有空 無一法不空 何處空可得
釋曰。空不空者。於世諦中依止法體。如是分別。此義云何。如有舍宅。有人住故名舍不空。人不住故則名舍空。今第一義中無一法不空。何處得有空法可得。如汝向言有相違法分別為因者。此因不成。但為遮執著故假言空耳。複次十七。地論者言。如所分別。自體無故。分別體空。此諸法空。真實是有。云何真實。不觀作者故。論者言。汝此見者名著空見。外人言。何故名我以爲著空。論者言。由一切法無體故空。空非實法。不應執著。為遮此故。如前偈中。若有一法是不空者。此是有分別智境界。此是無分別智境界。若有一物是空此名。空智境界而無此物。以無一物是不空者。此謂一切法皆空。是故偈言。何處空可得。複次無一法不空者。此言何謂。不空見者。空火所燒。分別空者。此亦燒故。是故偈言。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 與前文相同，進行遮破。像這樣觀察，在第一義諦中，如果諸法存在差異，這些說法都不能成立。你說諸法有自體，並以此作為原因，這個原因是不成立的。外道說，在第一義諦中，諸法不是空性的。為什麼呢？因為存在相互違背的現象。比如顛倒的智慧和不顛倒的智慧。如果這些不存在，就不會有相互違背的現象。就像虛空中的花朵，因為與『不空』相違背，所以才顯現出『空』的法。因為這個緣故，如你所說的原因，諸法不是空性的。論者說，如果在第一義諦中存在五蘊等，那麼就應該有某種事物可以用來建立『空』的法。然而，在第一義諦中，實際上沒有一個法不是空性的。正如偈頌所說： 『如果有一個法不是空性的，觀察這個法才能顯現空性。 如果沒有一個法不是空性的，那麼在哪裡可以找到空性呢？』 解釋：『空』和『不空』，在世俗諦中，是依賴於法的自體而進行分別的。這個道理是什麼呢？比如有一間房屋，有人居住，所以稱之為『房屋不空』。沒有人居住，就稱之為『房屋空』。現在在第一義諦中，沒有一個法不是空性的，那麼在哪裡可以找到空性的法呢？就像你之前所說，以存在相互違背的現象作為原因，這個原因是不成立的。這只是爲了遮止執著而假立『空』的概念而已。 其次，第十七地論者說，就像所分別的那樣，因為自體不存在，所以分別的自體也是空性的。這些法是空性的，但真實是存在的。如何真實呢？因為不觀察作者的緣故。論者說，你這種見解叫做『著空見』。外道說，為什麼說我執著于空呢？論者說，因為一切法沒有自體，所以是空性的。空性不是真實存在的法，不應該執著。爲了遮止這種執著，就像前面的偈頌所說，如果有一個法不是空性的，這就是有分別智的境界。這是無分別智的境界。如果有一件事物是空性的，這叫做空智的境界，但實際上沒有這樣的事物。因為沒有一件事物不是空性的，所以說一切法都是空性的。因此偈頌說：『在哪裡可以找到空性呢？』 其次，『沒有一個法不是空性的』，這句話是什麼意思呢？對於執著于『不空』的見解的人，會被空性的火焰所焚燒。對於分別空性的人，也會被空性所焚燒。所以偈頌說：
【English Translation】 English version Similar to the previous refutation, we refute again. Observing in this way, if phenomena are different in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha, 第一義), all these claims are untenable. Your statement that phenomena have inherent existence (svabhāva, 體) and use this as a reason, this reason is not valid. The outsider says, in the ultimate truth, phenomena are not empty (śūnya, 空). Why? Because there are contradictory phenomena. Such as inverted wisdom (viparyāsa-jñāna, 顛倒智) and non-inverted wisdom (aviparyāsa-jñāna, 不顛倒智). If these did not exist, there would be no contradiction. Like flowers in the sky (ākāśa-puṣpa, 虛空花), because they contradict 'non-emptiness,' empty phenomena appear. For this reason, as you say, phenomena are not empty. The proponent says, if there are aggregates (skandha, 陰) etc. in the ultimate truth, then there should be something that can be used to establish the 'empty' phenomena. However, in the ultimate truth, there is actually not a single phenomenon that is not empty. As the verse says: 'If there is one phenomenon that is not empty, Observing this, emptiness can be seen. If there is not one phenomenon that is not empty, Where can emptiness be found?' Explanation: 'Empty' and 'non-empty,' in conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya, 世諦), are distinguished based on the inherent existence of phenomena. What is the meaning of this? For example, there is a house. If someone lives there, it is called 'the house is not empty.' If no one lives there, it is called 'the house is empty.' Now, in the ultimate truth, there is not a single phenomenon that is not empty, so where can empty phenomena be found? Like you said before, using the existence of contradictory phenomena as a reason, this reason is not valid. This is just a provisional statement of 'emptiness' to prevent attachment. Secondly, the seventeenth Bhūmi (stage of Bodhisattva, 地) theorist says, as distinguished, because the self-nature (ātman, 自體) does not exist, the self-nature of distinction is also empty. These phenomena are empty, but they truly exist. How is it true? Because the creator is not observed. The proponent says, your view is called 'attachment to emptiness' (śūnyatā-dṛṣṭi, 著空見). The outsider says, why do you say I am attached to emptiness? The proponent says, because all phenomena have no self-nature, they are empty. Emptiness is not a real phenomenon, and should not be attached to. To prevent this attachment, as the previous verse said, if there is one phenomenon that is not empty, this is the realm of discriminating wisdom (vikalpa-jñāna, 有分別智). This is the realm of non-discriminating wisdom (nirvikalpa-jñāna, 無分別智). If there is one thing that is empty, this is called the realm of empty wisdom, but there is actually no such thing. Because there is not one thing that is not empty, it is said that all phenomena are empty. Therefore, the verse says: 'Where can emptiness be found?' Secondly, 'There is not one phenomenon that is not empty,' what does this mean? For those who are attached to the view of 'non-emptiness,' they will be burned by the fire of emptiness. For those who distinguish emptiness, they will also be burned by emptiness. Therefore, the verse says:
何處空可得。複次行二行者。作此分別。如幻馬等無體故空。如實馬等有體不空。此覺差別無二行者。以無分別行般若波羅蜜時。第一義諦境界。真實觀一切法。猶如虛空。一相無相。見無所見。偈言。無一法不空。何處空可得。以是義故。彼因不成。外人言。縱令不成及與相違。汝一切時恒遮于空。我意亦爾。以是義故。所欲得成。論者言。非空智起。諸法乃空。法體自空。智了空故。如燈照知。無瓶非作。何以故。彼瓶無體。不可令有故。是故汝說不善思量。復有人言。汝說空者。與他作過。而依止空。見空無力。復言無空。是故汝等所欲義破。亦違自悉檀。云何自違。如梵天王問經偈曰。
若有解空者 皆是見法性
又如楞伽經偈曰。
若離於和合 無有如是體 是故空無起 我說無自性
如是違汝阿含。論者言。汝不聞耶。如金剛般若波羅蜜經中說。解我法門如筏喻者。是法尚應舍。何況于非法。又如摩訶般若波羅蜜經中說。不觀色空。不觀色不空。此謂空見亦是執著故須遮止。若復有作不空分別者。此亦應舍。以此二執大過失故。非舍空者有過如是種種諸見過患壞亂於心。如來為彼未離苦眾生。斷苦種子故。起第一大悲。如偈曰。
如來說空法 為出離諸見
釋
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 何處可以找到空性？進一步說，修行二行（兩種修行方式）的人，會作這樣的區分：如幻化的馬等，因為沒有實體所以是空；如真實的馬等，因為有實體所以不是空。覺知這種差別、沒有二元對立的修行者，以無分別的智慧行般若波羅蜜（Prajnaparamita，智慧到彼岸），處於第一義諦（Paramartha-satya，勝義諦）的境界，真實地觀察一切法，猶如虛空，一相無相，見而無所見。偈語說：『沒有一個法不是空的，何處可以找到空性？』因為這個緣故，他們的因（論證的理由）不能成立。 外人說：『縱然你們的因不能成立，或者與你們的觀點相違背，你們總是遮止空性。我的意思也是這樣，因此我所想要達成的目的就能夠實現。』論者說：『不是因為空性的智慧生起，諸法才變為空性；而是法體本身就是空的，智慧只是了知了空性，就像燈照亮物體，並不是燈創造了瓶子。』為什麼呢？因為瓶子沒有自性，無法被創造出來。所以你說的不善於思考。還有人說：『你們說空性，是給他人制造過失，卻又依賴空性，認為空性沒有力量，又說沒有空性。所以你們想要表達的意義被破壞了，也違背了你們自己的宗義。』如何違背自己的宗義呢？如《梵天王問經》的偈語說： 『若有解空者，皆是見法性。』 又如《楞伽經》（Lankavatara Sutra）的偈語說： 『若離於和合，無有如是體，是故空無起，我說無自性。』 這樣就違背了你們的阿含經。論者說：『你沒有聽過嗎？如《金剛般若波羅蜜經》（Vajracchedika Prajnaparamita Sutra）中所說，理解我的法門如同筏（竹筏）的比喻，法尚且應該捨棄，何況不是法？』又如《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》（Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra）中所說，不觀察色是空，不觀察色不是空。這是說，空見也是一種執著，所以需要遮止。如果有人作不空的分別，這也應該捨棄。因為這兩種執著有很大的過失。不是捨棄空性的人有過失，像這樣種種的邪見和過患會擾亂內心。如來爲了那些還沒有脫離痛苦的眾生，爲了斷除痛苦的種子，生起第一大悲心。如偈語說： 『如來說空法，為出離諸見。』 釋
【English Translation】 English version: Where can emptiness be found? Furthermore, those who practice the two practices make this distinction: things like illusory horses are empty because they have no substance; things like real horses are not empty because they have substance. Those who perceive this difference, practitioners without duality, when practicing Prajnaparamita (Perfection of Wisdom) with non-discriminating wisdom, abide in the realm of Paramartha-satya (Ultimate Truth), truly observing all dharmas as being like empty space, of one form and no form, seeing without seeing. A verse says: 'There is not a single dharma that is not empty; where can emptiness be found?' For this reason, their cause (reasoning) cannot be established. An outsider says: 'Even if your cause cannot be established, or contradicts your views, you always obstruct emptiness. That is also my intention, so what I want to achieve can be accomplished.' The debater says: 'It is not that dharmas become empty because the wisdom of emptiness arises; rather, the nature of dharmas is inherently empty, and wisdom merely realizes this emptiness, just as a lamp illuminates an object, it does not create the bottle.' Why? Because the bottle has no self-nature and cannot be created. Therefore, what you say is not well-considered. Someone else says: 'You speak of emptiness, creating faults for others, yet you rely on emptiness, seeing emptiness as powerless, and then say there is no emptiness. Therefore, the meaning you want to express is destroyed, and you also contradict your own tenets.' How do you contradict your own tenets? As the verse in the Brahma King's Question Sutra says: 'Those who understand emptiness all see the nature of dharma.' And as the verse in the Lankavatara Sutra says: 'If separated from combination, there is no such entity; therefore, emptiness has no arising; I say there is no self-nature.' Thus, you contradict your Agamas. The debater says: 'Have you not heard? As it is said in the Vajracchedika Prajnaparamita Sutra (Diamond Sutra), understanding my Dharma is like the parable of the raft; even the Dharma should be abandoned, let alone what is not Dharma.' And as it is said in the Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra, one does not observe form as empty, nor does one observe form as not empty. This means that the view of emptiness is also an attachment, so it needs to be stopped. If someone makes distinctions of non-emptiness, this should also be abandoned. Because these two attachments have great faults. It is not that those who abandon emptiness have faults; such various wrong views and faults disturb the mind. The Tathagata, for the sake of those sentient beings who have not yet escaped suffering, in order to cut off the seeds of suffering, arises with great compassion. As the verse says: 'The Tathagata speaks of the Dharma of emptiness to liberate from all views.' Explanation
曰。見謂身見等。空謂對治內入空等。若有眾生善根未熟。未得無生深法忍者。不解正道。如偈曰。
諸有見空者
釋曰。云何名見空者。謂執著于空言有此空。此執著空有何過失。如偈曰。
說彼不可治
釋曰。如來說彼空見眾生不可療治。此義云何。如服下藥。動作諸病。而復不泄。反成重病。如是說空法。為舍諸惡見。若還執空者。說彼不可治。以是義故。舍空無過。又如有人車沒泥中。為出車故語異人言。與無所有為我出車。而彼異人為出車已。從其車主索無所有。由彼不解此語意故。為諸智人之所輕笑。是故汝等不應執空以之為有。以是義故。彼因不成。過不離汝。由汝所說因義不成。我立自因無前過失。及有力故。云何有力。說諸行空令人信解。品義如此。是故得成。如般若波羅蜜經中。佛告極勇猛菩薩言。善男子。彼一切法從顛倒起。不實無所有。虛妄不如實極勇猛。若有人行一法者。此顛倒行不如實行。又如梵王所問經說。世間愚人執著諸諦。此法非實亦非虛妄。如是等諸修多羅此中應廣說。
釋觀行品竟。
般若燈論釋觀合品第十四
複次。為令信解空所對治諸有合法。皆無自性。有此品起。外人言。汝說一切法自性皆空。如是說者。違正道理。何等道理
【現代漢語翻譯】 說：『見』指的是身見等（認為身體是真實存在的錯誤觀念）。『空』指的是對治內入空等（通過修習空性來對治對內在感官的執著）。如果有些眾生的善根尚未成熟，沒有獲得對無生之法的深刻忍耐，就不能理解真正的佛法正道。正如偈頌所說： 『諸有見空者』 解釋：什麼叫做『見空者』呢？就是指那些執著于空，認為存在一個『空』的人。這種執著于空有什麼過失呢？正如偈頌所說： 『說彼不可治』 解釋：如來說那些執著于空見的眾生是不可救治的。這是什麼意思呢？就像服用瀉藥，雖然能使各種疾病發作，但如果不能順利排泄，反而會變成重病。同樣，宣說空性的法門，是爲了捨棄各種錯誤的見解。如果反而執著于空，那麼就說這種人是不可救治的。因為這個原因，捨棄空性並沒有過錯。又比如有人車子陷在泥里，爲了把車子弄出來，告訴另一個人說：『給我一個不存在的東西，幫我把車子弄出來。』那個人幫他把車子弄出來之後，卻向車主要求那個『不存在的東西』。由於他不理解這句話的真正意思，所以會被有智慧的人所輕視嘲笑。所以，你們不應該執著于空，認為它真實存在。因為這個原因，你所提出的理由是不成立的，過失並沒有離開你。由於你所說的理由不成立，我所提出的理由沒有之前的過失，而且有力。怎麼說有力呢？因為宣說諸行皆空，能使人信服和理解。這個品的內容就是這樣，所以能夠成立。正如《般若波羅蜜經》中，佛告訴極勇猛菩薩說：『善男子，一切法都是從顛倒妄想中產生的，不是真實的，沒有實在的自性，虛妄而不符合實際。極勇猛，如果有人只修行一種法，這就是顛倒的修行，不是真正的修行。』又如《梵王所問經》所說：『世間的愚人執著于各種諦理，這些法既不是真實的，也不是虛妄的。』像這樣的修多羅，這裡應該廣泛地宣說。 《釋觀行品》結束。 《般若燈論釋觀合品》第十四 其次，爲了使人相信和理解空性所要對治的各種有法，都沒有自性，所以才有了這一品的開始。外人說：『你說一切法的自性都是空，這樣說就違背了正當的道理。』是什麼道理呢？
【English Translation】 It says: 'Views' refer to views of self (the mistaken notion that the body is real), etc. 'Emptiness' refers to counteracting internal entry into emptiness (counteracting attachment to internal senses through the practice of emptiness), etc. If some sentient beings' roots of virtue are not yet mature, and they have not attained deep forbearance of the unoriginated dharma, they cannot understand the true path of the Dharma. As the verse says: 'Those who have views of emptiness' Explanation: What is meant by 'those who have views of emptiness'? It refers to those who are attached to emptiness, believing that there is such a thing as 'emptiness'. What fault is there in this attachment to emptiness? As the verse says: 'It is said that they are incurable' Explanation: The Tathagata says that those sentient beings who are attached to the view of emptiness are incurable. What does this mean? It is like taking a purgative medicine, which causes various diseases to manifest, but if it cannot be properly eliminated, it will turn into a serious illness. Similarly, the Dharma of emptiness is taught to abandon all evil views. If one becomes attached to emptiness instead, it is said that such a person is incurable. For this reason, abandoning emptiness is not a fault. It is also like someone whose cart is stuck in the mud. In order to get the cart out, he tells another person, 'Give me something that does not exist and help me get the cart out.' After that person helps him get the cart out, he asks the owner of the cart for that 'non-existent thing'. Because he does not understand the true meaning of this statement, he will be ridiculed by wise people. Therefore, you should not be attached to emptiness, thinking that it is real. For this reason, the reason you put forward is not valid, and the fault has not left you. Because the reason you put forward is not valid, the reason I put forward does not have the previous fault and is powerful. How is it powerful? Because proclaiming that all phenomena are empty can make people believe and understand. This is what this chapter is about, so it can be established. Just as in the Prajnaparamita Sutra, the Buddha told the Extremely Courageous Bodhisattva, 'Good man, all dharmas arise from inverted thoughts, are not real, have no real self-nature, are false, and do not conform to reality. Extremely Courageous, if someone only practices one dharma, this is inverted practice, not true practice.' Also, as the Brahma's Question Sutra says, 'The foolish people of the world are attached to various truths. These dharmas are neither real nor false.' Such sutras should be widely explained here. End of Explanation of the Chapter on Observation of Conduct. Chapter Fourteen of Prajna Lamp Treatise Explanation of the Combined Chapter on Observation Furthermore, in order to make people believe and understand that all conditioned dharmas, which are to be counteracted by emptiness, have no self-nature, this chapter begins. An outsider says, 'You say that the self-nature of all dharmas is empty. To say this violates proper reason.' What reason is that?
。如佛所說。有根塵識三種和合。名之為觸。以是義故。汝先所說則為相違。如我所立第一義中諸法有體。何以故。以此為因。說名為合故。此若無者。如來不說此因名合。譬如不因龜毛說為衣服。由佛說有貪瞋癡等。如是三結。名之為合。由我說因符正道理。是故諸法非無自體論者言。汝雖有此說。義則不然。如偈曰。
見可見見者 此三各異方 二二互相望 一切皆不合
釋曰。見與可見及彼見者。二二相望更互不合。又一切不合。由如是故。偈曰。
應知染染者 及彼所染法 余煩惱余入 三種皆無合
釋曰。染謂欲相。煩惱者。謂能染污眾生相續故。說染等為煩惱。余謂瞋等。此亦三種。謂瞋瞋者及所瞋等。余入者。眼前已說。此中餘者。謂耳鼻舌身意。云何名入。謂心心數法所起處門。故名為入。此亦三種。謂聞可聞聞者。乃至知可知知者。彼染煩惱等及以余入。二二相望更互不合。又一切不合。如可見等無合應知。今為令他解無疑故。偈曰。
異共異有合 此異不可得 及諸可見等 異相皆不合
釋曰。可見等者。謂見可見見者。如是染染者可染。皆不相合。此中說驗。第一義中見者不與可見及見相合。何以故。彼不異故。若物不異者。終不相合。譬
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：正如佛陀所說，根、塵、識三種和合，名為『觸』（Sparsha，感官印象）。因此，你先前所說的就與此相違背。正如我所建立的第一義諦中，諸法皆有自體（Svalakshana，自性）。為什麼呢？因為以此為因，才說名為『合』（Samgati，結合）。如果此因不存在，如來就不會說此因名為『合』。譬如不會因為龜毛而說成衣服。由於佛陀說有貪（Raga，貪慾）、瞋（Dvesha，嗔恨）、癡（Moha，愚癡）等，這樣的三種結縛，名之為『合』。由於我說因符合正當的道理，所以諸法並非沒有自體。論者說：你雖然這樣說，但義理並非如此。如偈頌所說： 『見（Darshana，見）可見（Drshya，所見）見者（Drashtr，能見），此三各在異方，二二互相望，一切皆不合。』 解釋說：見與可見及彼見者，二二相望，更互相不合，又一切都不合。由於這樣的緣故，偈頌說： 『應知染（Raga，染色）染者（Ranjaka，能染色）及彼所染法（Ranjaniya，所染色），余煩惱（Klesha，煩惱）余入（Ayatana，處），三種皆無合。』 解釋說：染，指的是欲的相狀。煩惱，指的是能夠染污眾生相續的緣故，所以說染等為煩惱。其餘的，指的是瞋等。這也分為三種，即瞋、瞋者及所瞋等。其餘的入，眼前已經說過。此中其餘的，指的是耳、鼻、舌、身、意。什麼叫做『入』呢？指的是心、心數法所生起之處的門，所以名為『入』。這也分為三種，即聞、可聞、聞者，乃至知、可知、知者。彼染、煩惱等以及其餘的入，二二相望，更互相不合，又一切都不合。如可見等沒有結合，應當知道。現在爲了使他人理解沒有疑惑，偈頌說： 『異（Bhinna，不同）共（Sahita，共同）異有合（Bhinna-samgati，不同而合），此異不可得，及諸可見等，異相皆不合。』 解釋說：可見等，指的是見、可見、見者，像這樣染、染者、可染，都不相合。這裡說的是驗證。在第一義諦中，見者不與可見及見相合。為什麼呢？因為它們不相異。如果事物不相異，終究不會相合。譬如...
【English Translation】 English version: As the Buddha said, the three elements of root (Indriya, sense faculty), object (Vishaya, sense object), and consciousness (Vijnana, consciousness) coming together are called 『Sparsha』 (contact, sensory impression). Therefore, what you said earlier contradicts this. Just as in the ultimate truth (Paramartha, ultimate reality) that I established, all dharmas (phenomena) have their own essence (Svalakshana, own-characteristic). Why? Because it is based on this cause that it is called 『Samgati』 (combination, coming together). If this cause did not exist, the Tathagata (Buddha) would not say that this cause is called 『Samgati』. For example, one would not speak of clothing based on turtle hair. Because the Buddha spoke of greed (Raga, attachment), hatred (Dvesha, aversion), delusion (Moha, ignorance), etc., these three fetters are called 『Samgati』. Because my explanation accords with right reason, therefore dharmas are not without their own essence. The debater says: Although you say this, the meaning is not so. As the verse says: 『The seer (Darshana, seeing), the seen (Drshya, seen), and the one who sees (Drashtr, the seer), these three are in different directions; the two by two look at each other, but all do not combine.』 Explanation: The seer, the seen, and the one who sees, the two by two look at each other, but do not combine with each other, and all do not combine. Because of this reason, the verse says: 『One should know the staining (Raga, staining), the stainer (Ranjaka, that which stains), and that which is stained (Ranjaniya, that which is stained); the remaining afflictions (Klesha, defilements), the remaining sense bases (Ayatana, sense spheres), all three do not combine.』 Explanation: 『Staining』 refers to the aspect of desire. 『Afflictions』 refers to that which can defile the continuum of beings; therefore, staining, etc., are called afflictions. The remaining ones refer to hatred, etc. These are also of three types: hatred, the hater, and that which is hated, etc. The remaining sense bases have already been mentioned before. The remaining ones here refer to ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. What is called 『Ayatana』 (sense base)? It refers to the gate where mind and mental factors arise; therefore, it is called 『Ayatana』. These are also of three types: hearing, the hearable, and the hearer, up to knowing, the knowable, and the knower. These staining, afflictions, etc., and the remaining sense bases, the two by two look at each other, but do not combine with each other, and all do not combine. Just as the seen, etc., do not combine, one should know. Now, in order to make others understand without doubt, the verse says: 『Different (Bhinna, distinct), together (Sahita, together), different having combination (Bhinna-samgati, distinct combination), this difference is not attainable, and all the seen, etc., different aspects do not combine.』 Explanation: The seen, etc., refers to the seer, the seen, and the one who sees; like this, the staining, the stainer, and that which is stained, do not combine with each other. Here it speaks of verification. In the ultimate truth, the seer does not combine with the seen and seeing. Why? Because they are not different. If things are not different, they will ultimately not combine. For example...
如自體。有人言異。共異合者。此中染等相續。若在別處則不相合。由彼別處及別相續無間隨轉故。名為和合。此因得成。論者言。若可見等。先在別處。后在一處。名為合者。此因不成。亦無驗故。汝語不善。彼如是故。偈曰。
非獨可見等 異相不可得 及餘一切法 異亦不可得
釋曰。如前所說道理。彼聞可聞聞者。瞋可瞋瞋者等。皆無合義。外人言。汝言我及可見眼等無異者。此義不成。因不成故。論者言。非因不成。何以故。如偈曰。
異與異為緣
釋曰。待異故名為異。偈曰。
離異無有異
釋曰。以種為緣起者。待此種子故。名芽為異。偈曰。
若從緣起者 此不異彼緣
釋曰。非第一義中可見異眼。何以故。差別語有觀故。譬如可見自體。若法從緣起者。不異彼緣。若言異者。應離此種芽從余出。如火不觀異體自性是暖。如是見者不觀可見。聞者不觀可聞。染者不觀染等。如火不待于冷而自體是暖者。此異不成。何以故。於世諦中無此義故。外人言。見者與眼等異不須相觀。何以故。以相別故。譬如牛馬。此中境界顯現者。名為識相此是見者。此見者所有行聚眼識所依清凈色以為境。此名為眼。形色及顯色此名可見。如我所說因有力故。見者眼等
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如自體（自身）。有人說它們是不同的。共同的不同結合在一起。在這種結合中，染污等相互連續。如果在不同的地方，它們就不會結合在一起。由於那個不同的地方和不同的相續無間斷地隨之轉變，所以稱為和合。這個原因成立。論者說，如果可見等，先在不同的地方，后在一個地方，稱為結合，這個原因不成立，也沒有證據。你說的不對。因為它們就是這樣的。偈語說：
不僅僅是可見等，不同的相狀是無法獲得的。 以及其餘一切法，不同也是無法獲得的。
解釋說：如前面所說的道理。那些聽、可聽、聽者，嗔、可嗔、嗔者等，都沒有結合的意義。外人說：你說我和可見、眼等沒有不同，這個意思不成立，因為原因不成立。論者說：原因不是不成立。為什麼呢？如偈語說：
不同與不同作為緣。
解釋說：依賴於不同，所以稱為不同。偈語說：
離開不同就沒有不同。
解釋說：以種子為緣而生起者，依賴於這個種子，所以稱芽為不同。偈語說：
如果從緣而生起，這不異於那個緣。
解釋說：在第一義中，可見與眼沒有不同。為什麼呢？因為差別語有觀察。譬如可見的自體。如果法從緣而生起，就不異於那個緣。如果說不同，那麼應該離開這個種子，芽從其他地方生出。如火不觀察異體的自性是暖。這樣，見者不觀察可見，聞者不觀察可聞，染者不觀察染等。如火不依賴於冷而自體是暖，這種不同不成立。為什麼呢？因為在世俗諦中沒有這個道理。外人說：見者與眼等不同，不需要互相觀察。為什麼呢？因為相不同。譬如牛馬。這裡境界顯現者，名為識相，這是見者。這個見者所有行聚，眼識所依清凈色以為境。這名為眼。形色及顯色，這名可見。如我所說，因為原因有力，見者眼等。
【English Translation】 English version: Like the self (Atma). Some say they are different. Different things combined together. In this combination, defilements etc. continue successively. If they are in different places, they will not combine together. Because that different place and different continuum transform without interruption, it is called combination. This reason is established. The debater says, if the visible etc., are first in different places, and then in one place, called combination, this reason is not established, and there is no evidence. What you say is not right. Because they are like that. The verse says:
Not only the visible etc., different characteristics cannot be obtained.
And all other dharmas, difference also cannot be obtained.
Explanation: As the principle said before. Those hearing, hearable, hearer, anger, angerable, angry etc., all have no meaning of combination. Outsiders say: You say that I and the visible, eye etc. are not different, this meaning is not established, because the reason is not established. The debater says: The reason is not unestablished. Why? As the verse says:
Different and different as conditions.
Explanation: Depending on difference, it is called difference. The verse says:
Without difference, there is no difference.
Explanation: Those arising from seeds as conditions, depending on this seed, the sprout is called different. The verse says:
If arising from conditions, this is not different from that condition.
Explanation: In the ultimate truth, the visible is not different from the eye. Why? Because differential language has observation. For example, the self of the visible. If a dharma arises from conditions, it is not different from that condition. If it is said to be different, then it should leave this seed, and the sprout should come out from another place. Like fire does not observe the nature of a different body being warm. Thus, the seer does not observe the visible, the hearer does not observe the hearable, the defiler does not observe the defilement etc. Like fire does not depend on cold and its own nature is warm, this difference is not established. Why? Because there is no such principle in conventional truth. Outsiders say: The seer is different from the eye etc., and does not need to observe each other. Why? Because the characteristics are different. For example, cattle and horses. Here, the manifestation of the realm is called the characteristic of consciousness, this is the seer. All the aggregates of this seer, the pure color on which the eye consciousness depends, is taken as the object. This is called the eye. Form and color, this is called the visible. As I said, because the reason is powerful, the seer, eye etc.
異義得成。論者言。此語不然。第一義中牛馬二體不可得故。復有人言。想差別故。果因別故。見者眼等異義成者。還同前答。複次鞞世師人言。有異法體。與物和合故。論者言。若汝欲令有異法體與物合者。亦應無第二物。自然有異。以彼立異有別體故。此中作驗。無有異法與物和合。何以故。物體故。譬如未有言說已前物體。複次第一義中異無自體。何以故。由總別故。譬如色體。複次第一義中異非起說及覺智因。何以故。由是差別覺智言說因故。譬如色體。複次此異。為在異中。為在不異中。此有何過。若在異中者。如偈曰。
異中無有異
釋曰。若彼異法先已是異。而言此異。向彼異中是則無義。異法空故。鞞世師所立異義不成。若於不異中有者。此亦不然。如偈曰。
不異中亦無
釋曰。此謂自體而有異過。如彼所說。因義破故。異法不成。外人言。一異者是二邊。汝今遮異。異法則無。此異若無。應受不異。是故汝得違悉檀過。論者言。如異法無。已令他解。不異無者。如偈曰。
由無異法故 不異法亦無
釋曰。觀異故有不異。已遮異故。不異亦無。云何遮。今說驗。第一義中見者可見不得為異。何以故。差別言語觀故。譬如可見自體。如是有故。果故。因故。疑智
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『異義得成』（認為通過差異可以形成事物）。論者說：『這種說法不對。在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya，究竟真理）中，牛和馬的兩種實體是不可得的。』又有人說：『因為想（saṃjñā，概念）有差別，所以果（phala，結果）和因（hetu，原因）不同。』見者（draṣṭṛ，觀察者）的眼等（眼睛等感官）的『異義成』，還是和前面的回答一樣（不成立）。 其次，勝論派（Vaiśeṣika）的人說：『存在異法體（dharma，性質），它與事物和合。』論者說：『如果你們想要讓異法體與事物結合，也應該沒有第二種事物，自然就有差異。因為他們建立的差異有不同的實體。』這裡可以做一個驗證：沒有異法與事物和合。為什麼呢？因為是物體。比如在沒有言說之前的物體。 其次，在第一義諦中，『異』沒有自體（svabhāva，自性）。為什麼呢？因為有總（sāmānya，共相）和別（viśeṣa，殊相）。比如色（rūpa，顏色）的實體。 其次，在第一義諦中，『異』不是產生言說和覺智（jñāna，智慧）的原因。為什麼呢？因為是差別覺智言說的原因。比如色體。 其次，這個『異』，是在『異』之中，還是在『不異』之中？這有什麼過失呢？如果在『異』之中，就像偈頌所說： 『異中無有異』 解釋說：如果那個異法（性質的差異）先前已經是『異』，而說這個『異』，向那個『異』中，那就沒有意義了。因為異法是空（śūnya，空性）的，所以勝論派所建立的『異』的意義不成立。如果在『不異』之中，這也不對。就像偈頌所說： 『不異中亦無』 解釋說：這是指自體（自身）而有『異』的過失。就像他們所說，因為因的意義被破壞，所以異法不成立。外人說：『一（ekatva，同一）和異（anyatva，差異）是兩個極端。你們現在遮止了『異』，『異』的法則就沒有了。如果這個『異』沒有了，就應該接受『不異』。所以你們就犯了違背悉檀（siddhānta，宗義）的過失。』論者說：『就像『異法』沒有一樣，已經讓他理解了。』『不異』沒有，就像偈頌所說： 『由無異法故，不異法亦無』 解釋說：觀察『異』，所以有『不異』。已經遮止了『異』，所以『不異』也沒有了。如何遮止呢？現在說一個驗證：在第一義諦中，見者（觀察者）和可見（所觀察的對象）不能認為是『異』。為什麼呢？因為差別言語觀（通過區分的語言和觀察）。比如可見的自體。像這樣，因為有，因為果，因為因，因為疑智（懷疑的智慧）。
【English Translation】 English version: 'Different meanings are achieved' (meaning that things can be formed through differences). The debater says: 'This statement is incorrect. In the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), the two entities of a cow and a horse are unattainable.' Someone else says: 'Because there are differences in perception (saṃjñā), the result (phala) and the cause (hetu) are different.' The 'achievement of different meanings' of the seer's (draṣṭṛ) eyes, etc. (sense organs), is still the same as the previous answer (untenable). Secondly, the Vaiśeṣika school says: 'There is a different dharma (quality), which combines with things.' The debater says: 'If you want the different dharma to combine with things, there should also be no second thing, and there will naturally be differences. Because the differences they establish have different entities.' Here, a verification can be made: no different dharma combines with things. Why? Because it is an object. For example, an object before there is speech. Secondly, in the ultimate truth, 'difference' has no self-nature (svabhāva). Why? Because there are generalities (sāmānya) and particularities (viśeṣa). For example, the entity of color (rūpa). Secondly, in the ultimate truth, 'difference' is not the cause of generating speech and wisdom (jñāna). Why? Because it is the cause of differentiated wisdom and speech. For example, the entity of color. Thirdly, is this 'difference' in 'difference' or in 'non-difference'? What is the fault in this? If it is in 'difference', as the verse says: 'There is no difference in difference' Explanation: If that different dharma (difference in quality) was already 'different' before, and it is said that this 'difference' is in that 'difference', then it is meaningless. Because the different dharma is empty (śūnya), the meaning of 'difference' established by the Vaiśeṣika school is untenable. If it is in 'non-difference', then this is also incorrect. As the verse says: 'There is also nothing in non-difference' Explanation: This refers to the fault of having 'difference' in the self-nature (oneself). As they said, because the meaning of the cause is destroyed, the different dharma is untenable. An outsider says: 'Oneness (ekatva) and difference (anyatva) are two extremes. You are now preventing 'difference', and the law of 'difference' is gone. If this 'difference' is gone, you should accept 'non-difference'. Therefore, you have committed the fault of violating the siddhānta (doctrine).' The debater says: 'Just like the 'different dharma' is gone, he has already understood it.' 'Non-difference' is gone, as the verse says: 'Because there is no different dharma, there is also no non-different dharma' Explanation: Observing 'difference', there is 'non-difference'. Having prevented 'difference', 'non-difference' is also gone. How to prevent it? Now, let's say a verification: In the ultimate truth, the seer (observer) and the seen (the object being observed) cannot be considered 'different'. Why? Because of differentiated speech and observation (through distinguishing language and observation). For example, the self-nature of the seen. Like this, because of existence, because of result, because of cause, because of doubtful wisdom (wisdom of doubt).
境界故。是等諸因。此應廣說。彼如是一異俱遮。由一等不成故。此如偈曰。
一法則不合 異法亦不合
若有人言。有如是染與染者合。何以故。由合時故。如水乳二。複次第一義中有染者合。何以故。差別言說觀故。譬如食者與食相合。論者偈曰。
合時及已合 合者亦皆無
釋曰。如前所說方便異法相合無如是義。由彼外人品初說因。已與其過。為令他解。合無自體。是品中義。是故得成。如般若波羅蜜經中說。佛告極勇猛菩薩言。善男子。色不合不散。如是受想行識不合不散。若色至識不合不散。此是般若波羅蜜。如是等諸修多羅此中應廣說。
釋觀合品竟。
般若燈論釋卷第八 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 般若燈論釋
般若燈論釋卷第九
偈本龍樹菩薩 釋論分別明菩薩
大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅譯
觀有無品第十五
複次空所對治若有若無。為令他解緣起諸法不斷不常故。有此品起。外人言。汝說諸法無自體者。是義不然。何以故。違汝自言。亦立義過故。云何違言。如有人說我母是石女。我父修梵行。他人難曰。若汝父母審如是者。云何有汝。汝若從生則石女梵行義皆不立。汝亦如是。若無自體。云何名諸
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為境界的緣故。這些都是原因。這裡應該廣泛地說明。它們像這樣既不是一，也不是異，兩者都被否定。因為一等等都不能成立。就像偈頌所說： 『一個法則不相合，不同的法則也不相合。』 如果有人說：『有像這樣的染污和被染污者相合。』為什麼呢？因為在相合的時候。就像水和乳兩種東西一樣。其次，在第一義諦中，有被染污者相合。為什麼呢？因為觀察到差別的言說。譬如食用者和食物相結合。』論者的偈頌說： 『相合的時候以及已經相合，相合者也都是沒有的。』 解釋說：就像前面所說的方便，不同的法則相合沒有這樣的意義。因為那些外道在品的最開始就說了原因，已經有了過失。爲了讓其他人理解，相合沒有自體。這是品中的意義。所以能夠成立。就像《般若波羅蜜經》中所說：佛告訴極勇猛菩薩說：『善男子，色（Rūpa，物質）不相合也不離散。像這樣，受（Vedanā，感受）、想（Saṃjñā，認知）、行（Saṃskāra，意志）、識（Vijñāna，意識）不相合也不離散。如果色到識不相合也不離散，這就是般若波羅蜜。』像這樣等等的修多羅（Sūtra，經），這裡應該廣泛地說明。 《觀合品》結束。 《般若燈論釋》卷第八 《般若燈論釋》卷第九 偈頌的作者是龍樹菩薩（Nāgārjuna），解釋論的作者是分別明菩薩。 大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅（Prajñāmitra）翻譯。 《觀有無論品》第十五 其次，空性（Śūnyatā）所要對治的是有和無。爲了讓其他人理解緣起（Pratītyasamutpāda）的諸法不是斷滅的也不是常恒的，所以有了這一品的開始。外道說：『你說諸法沒有自體，這個說法是不對的。』為什麼呢？因為違背了你自己的話，也成立了立義的過失。怎麼樣違背了你自己的話呢？就像有人說：『我的母親是石女，我的父親修行梵行。』其他人反駁說：『如果你的父母真的是這樣的話，怎麼會有你呢？如果你是從他們所生，那麼石女和梵行的意義都不能成立。』你也像這樣。如果沒有自體，怎麼能稱之為諸法呢？
【English Translation】 English version: Because of the realm. These are all causes. This should be explained extensively here. They are like this, neither one nor different, both are negated. Because one, etc., cannot be established. It's like the verse says: 'One law does not combine, different laws also do not combine.' If someone says: 'There is such defilement and the defiled combine.' Why? Because at the time of combination. Like water and milk, two things. Secondly, in the ultimate truth, there is the defiled combining. Why? Because of observing the differentiated speech. For example, the eater and the food combine.' The commentator's verse says: 'The time of combination and already combined, the combiner is also non-existent.' The explanation says: Just like the previously mentioned expedient, different laws combining does not have such meaning. Because those outsiders spoke of the cause at the beginning of the chapter, there was already a fault. In order to let others understand, combination has no self-nature. This is the meaning in the chapter. Therefore, it can be established. Just like what is said in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra: The Buddha told the Extremely Courageous Bodhisattva: 'Good man, Rūpa (form) does not combine nor disperse. Like this, Vedanā (feeling), Saṃjñā (perception), Saṃskāra (volition), Vijñāna (consciousness) do not combine nor disperse. If Rūpa to Vijñāna do not combine nor disperse, this is Prajñāpāramitā.' Like this and other Sūtras, this should be explained extensively here. End of the Chapter on Examining Combination. Prajñāpradīpa-ṭīkā Volume 8 Prajñāpradīpa-ṭīkā Volume 9 The author of the verses is Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, the author of the commentary is Vimalamati Bodhisattva. Translated by Prajñāmitra, Tripiṭaka Master from Central India of the Great Tang Dynasty. Chapter Fifteen on Examining Existence and Non-existence Furthermore, what emptiness (Śūnyatā) aims to counteract is existence and non-existence. In order to let others understand that the dharmas of dependent origination (Pratītyasamutpāda) are neither annihilated nor permanent, therefore this chapter begins. The outsider says: 'You say that dharmas have no self-nature, this statement is incorrect.' Why? Because it contradicts your own words, and also establishes the fault of establishing a thesis. How does it contradict your own words? It's like someone saying: 'My mother is a barren woman, my father practices celibacy.' Others retort: 'If your parents are really like this, how can you exist? If you are born from them, then the meaning of barren woman and celibacy cannot be established.' You are also like this. If there is no self-nature, how can it be called dharmas?
法。既云諸法。云何無自體。故是違言。亦立義過。論者言。汝謂諸法有自體者。第一義中如何等物。以無譬故。汝語非也。複次若我先於第一義中忍有諸法后立無者可違自言。而實不爾故不相違。又世諦中安立諸法如幻等者我所不遮。無立義過。或有聰明邪慢者言。何等諸法是無自體。若如虛妄分別諸法有體。汝言此法無自體者。此則成我所成。若此諸法從因緣起。而汝意欲此無體者。則違現見。及與世間所解相違。論者言。于真實中無分別識緣。色起者不可得故。此物有故者。如前已遮。世諦所說者。我不遮故。不違現見及世間所解。是故汝所說者。義則不然。複次第一義中若有一法有自體者。則無起義。如偈曰。
法若有自性 從緣起不然
釋曰。若謂諸法有自性者。得如是過。若汝定謂見法有起不能破我者。此中應問。汝言見法有起者。是依他因緣耶。如偈曰。
若從因緣起 自性是作法
釋曰。若是作法者。此則無自體因緣相。云何若法不共無間自分生唯一能起自果者。此是因相翻此名緣云何名作。若法有自體者。則不須作。然今有作故知無體。此中立驗。第一義中內入無體。何以故。因緣起故。譬如幻師幻作牛等法。若有自體則不從因緣起。複次有人不解此中譬喻。作如是言。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 法。既然說諸法，為何又說沒有自體（svabhāva，自性）？這是自相矛盾，也犯了立義的過失。論者說：『你認為諸法有自體，那麼在第一義（paramārtha，勝義諦）中，什麼是與它相同的東西呢？』因為沒有可以比喻的，所以你的話是不對的。再者，如果我先在第一義中承認有諸法，然後又說沒有，那才算是自相矛盾。但實際上並非如此，所以並不矛盾。而且，世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，世俗諦）中安立諸法如幻象等，我並沒有否定，所以沒有立義的過失。或者有些聰明卻又傲慢的人會說：『什麼樣的諸法是沒有自體的呢？如果像虛妄分別（vikalpa，分別）那樣，諸法是有實體的，你說此法沒有自體，這反而成就了我的觀點。如果這些諸法是從因緣（hetu-pratyaya，因和緣）而生起的，而你卻認為它沒有自體，那就違背了親眼所見，也與世間的理解相違背。』論者說：『在真實（tattva，真如）中，沒有分別識（vikalpa-jñāna，分別識）緣於色（rūpa，色法）而生起的情況，這是不可得的。』至於『此物有』的說法，前面已經駁斥過了。世俗諦所說的，我並沒有否定，所以不違背親眼所見和世間的理解。因此，你所說的，道理是不成立的。再者，在第一義中，如果有一法有自體，那就沒有生起的道理。正如偈頌所說：
『法若有自性，從緣起不然。』
解釋說：如果認為諸法有自性，就會有這樣的過失。如果你一定要說見到法有生起，不能駁倒我，那麼這裡應該問：你說見到法有生起，是依他因緣（paratantra-hetu-pratyaya，依他起因緣）嗎？正如偈頌所說：
『若從因緣起，自性是作法。』
解釋說：如果是作法（kṛta，造作），那麼就沒有自體，因為因緣的相狀是，什麼法不共同、無間斷、從自身產生，唯一能夠生起自己的果，這才是因的相狀。反過來就叫做緣，怎麼能叫做作呢？如果法有自體，就不需要造作。然而現在有造作，所以知道沒有自體。這裡可以立一個論證：在第一義中，內入（adhyātma，內在）是無自體的。為什麼呢？因為它是因緣生起的。比如幻術師幻化出牛等法。如果有自體，就不會從因緣生起。再者，有人不理解這個譬喻，這樣說： English version: Law. Since it is said that all dharmas (dharma, phenomena), why is it said that there is no svabhāva (svabhāva, self-nature)? This is contradictory and also commits the fault of establishing a proposition. The debater says: 'If you think that all dharmas have svabhāva, then in paramārtha (paramārtha, ultimate truth), what is the same as it?' Because there is nothing to compare it to, your words are not correct. Furthermore, if I first acknowledge the existence of all dharmas in paramārtha and then say that they do not exist, then that would be self-contradictory. But in reality, this is not the case, so there is no contradiction. Moreover, I do not deny the establishment of dharmas as illusions, etc., in saṃvṛti-satya (saṃvṛti-satya, conventional truth), so there is no fault of establishing a proposition. Or some clever but arrogant people might say: 'What kind of dharmas are without svabhāva? If, like vikalpa (vikalpa, conceptualization), dharmas have substance, then your saying that this dharma has no svabhāva actually accomplishes my view. If these dharmas arise from hetu-pratyaya (hetu-pratyaya, causes and conditions), and you think that it has no svabhāva, then it contradicts what is seen with one's own eyes and is contrary to the understanding of the world.' The debater says: 'In tattva (tattva, reality), there is no situation where vikalpa-jñāna (vikalpa-jñāna, discriminating consciousness) arises in relation to rūpa (rūpa, form), which is unattainable.' As for the statement 'this thing exists,' it has already been refuted earlier. I do not deny what is said in saṃvṛti-satya, so it does not contradict what is seen with one's own eyes and the understanding of the world. Therefore, what you say is not reasonable. Furthermore, in paramārtha, if there is a dharma that has svabhāva, then there is no reason for it to arise. As the verse says:
'If a dharma has self-nature, it cannot arise from conditions.'
Explanation: If it is thought that dharmas have self-nature, there will be such a fault. If you insist on saying that seeing dharmas arise cannot refute me, then it should be asked here: Do you say that seeing dharmas arise is dependent on paratantra-hetu-pratyaya (paratantra-hetu-pratyaya, dependently originated causes and conditions)? As the verse says:
'If it arises from causes and conditions, self-nature is kṛta (kṛta, made).'
Explanation: If it is kṛta, then there is no svabhāva, because the characteristic of causes and conditions is that whatever dharma is not common, uninterrupted, arises from itself, and is the only one that can produce its own result, this is the characteristic of a cause. The reverse is called a condition, how can it be called made? If a dharma has svabhāva, it does not need to be made. However, now there is making, so we know that there is no svabhāva. Here, an argument can be established: In paramārtha, adhyātma (adhyātma, internal) is without svabhāva. Why? Because it arises from causes and conditions. For example, a magician conjures up cows and other dharmas. If it had svabhāva, it would not arise from causes and conditions. Furthermore, someone does not understand this metaphor and says:
【English Translation】 Law. Since it is said that all dharmas (phenomena), why is it said that there is no self-nature? This is contradictory and also commits the fault of establishing a proposition. The debater says: 'If you think that all dharmas have self-nature, then in ultimate truth, what is the same as it?' Because there is nothing to compare it to, your words are not correct. Furthermore, if I first acknowledge the existence of all dharmas in ultimate truth and then say that they do not exist, then that would be self-contradictory. But in reality, this is not the case, so there is no contradiction. Moreover, I do not deny the establishment of dharmas as illusions, etc., in conventional truth, so there is no fault of establishing a proposition. Or some clever but arrogant people might say: 'What kind of dharmas are without self-nature? If, like conceptualization, dharmas have substance, then your saying that this dharma has no self-nature actually accomplishes my view. If these dharmas arise from causes and conditions, and you think that it has no self-nature, then it contradicts what is seen with one's own eyes and is contrary to the understanding of the world.' The debater says: 'In reality, there is no situation where discriminating consciousness arises in relation to form, which is unattainable.' As for the statement 'this thing exists,' it has already been refuted earlier. I do not deny what is said in conventional truth, so it does not contradict what is seen with one's own eyes and the understanding of the world. Therefore, what you say is not reasonable. Furthermore, in ultimate truth, if there is a dharma that has self-nature, then there is no reason for it to arise. As the verse says:
'If a dharma has self-nature, it cannot arise from conditions.'
Explanation: If it is thought that dharmas have self-nature, there will be such a fault. If you insist on saying that seeing dharmas arise cannot refute me, then it should be asked here: Do you say that seeing dharmas arise is dependent on dependently originated causes and conditions? As the verse says:
'If it arises from causes and conditions, self-nature is made.'
Explanation: If it is made, then there is no self-nature, because the characteristic of causes and conditions is that whatever dharma is not common, uninterrupted, arises from itself, and is the only one that can produce its own result, this is the characteristic of a cause. The reverse is called a condition, how can it be called made? If a dharma has self-nature, it does not need to be made. However, now there is making, so we know that there is no self-nature. Here, an argument can be established: In ultimate truth, internal is without self-nature. Why? Because it arises from causes and conditions. For example, a magician conjures up cows and other dharmas. If it had self-nature, it would not arise from causes and conditions. Furthermore, someone does not understand this metaphor and says:
幻咒藥力泥草木等是有非無。由此有故。彼象馬等形像顯現。以是義故。汝譬喻中無成立法。論者言。汝不善說。我引喻者以象馬等無體為喻。不取草木有體為喻。複次若謂草木地等有起有實者。前已遮故。有人言。所有諸法從緣生者。皆有自體。如虛空等不從緣起而是有法。汝所出因此非一向。論者言。汝不善說。因緣生法如幻夢焰。世諦中有。非第一義。此義云何。如偈曰。
若有自性者 云何當可作
釋曰。若是作法者。不離無自性。由所對治自體無故。是故出因非非一向。於世諦中虛空等者。亦是無生。猶如兔角。豈是有耶。諸有為法皆無自性。前已觀察令他信解。今復立驗。第一義中諸法無體。何以故。由作故。又是差別言說觀故。如幻人等。若是一物有自性者。則與上相違。複次此中外人立驗。第一義中彼內入等皆有自體。何以故。由起自他差別言說因故。譬如因長有短。長為短因。今言自者。與他差別言說為因論者言。諸法無體。先已立驗。由汝執故。今當復說。如偈曰。
法既無自性 云何有他性
釋曰。若法有自性者。觀自性故。得說他性。自性既無觀何說他。汝言自性與他為因者。此因不成。及違義故。又第一義中短長無故。譬喻不成。外人言。第一義中眼等有體。何
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：幻術、咒語、藥物、泥土、草木等事物，它們是真實存在還是不存在？ 答：因為這些事物存在，所以大象、馬等形象才會顯現。因此，你所舉的譬喻無法成立。 論者說：你說的並不正確。我所引用的譬喻是以大象、馬等沒有實體為喻，而不是以草木有實體為喻。 進一步說，如果認為草木、土地等事物有生起有實體，那麼之前我已經駁斥過了。 有人說：所有從因緣而生的法，都有其自體。例如虛空等不是從因緣生起，但也是一種法。你所提出的因，並非普遍適用。 論者說：你說的並不正確。因緣生法如同幻象、夢境、火焰，只在世俗諦中存在，而非在第一義諦中存在。這是什麼意思呢？如偈頌所說： 『若有自性者，云何當可作』 解釋：如果是可以被造作的法，就離不開無自性。因為所要對治的自體不存在。所以，你提出的因並非普遍適用。在世俗諦中，虛空等也是無生的，猶如兔角，怎麼能說是存在呢？ 所有有為法都是無自性的，之前已經觀察過，使他人信服理解。現在再次立論驗證：在第一義諦中，諸法沒有實體。為什麼呢？因為它們是被造作的，又是差別言說的對象，如同幻化的人等。如果一物有自性，就與上述相違背。 進一步說，這裡外道立論驗證：在第一義諦中，彼內入（Pītarupa，指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六根）等都有自體。為什麼呢？因為生起自體和他體的差別言說。譬如因為有長，所以有短，長是短的原因。現在說自，是以和他的差別言說為原因。 論者說：諸法無體，之前已經立論驗證。因為你的執著，現在我再來說明。如偈頌所說： 『法既無自性，云何有他性』 解釋：如果法有自性，觀察自性，才能說他性。自性既然沒有，觀察什麼來說他性呢？你說自性和他性互為因果，這個因不成立，而且違背了意義。而且，在第一義諦中，短和長都不存在，所以譬喻不成立。 外道說：在第一義諦中，眼等有實體。為什麼呢？
【English Translation】 English version Question: Are illusions, spells, medicines, mud, grass, trees, etc., real or unreal? Answer: Because these things exist, the images of elephants, horses, etc., appear. Therefore, your analogy cannot be established. The debater says: You are not speaking correctly. The analogy I am using is based on the fact that elephants, horses, etc., have no substance, not that grass and trees have substance. Furthermore, if you say that grass, trees, earth, etc., have arising and reality, then I have already refuted that before. Someone says: All dharmas that arise from conditions have their own self-nature (svabhāva). For example, space (ākāśa) does not arise from conditions, but it is still a dharma. The reason you put forward is not universally applicable. The debater says: You are not speaking correctly. Dharmas that arise from conditions are like illusions, dreams, and flames; they exist only in conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), not in ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). What does this mean? As the verse says: 'If there is self-nature, how can it be made?' Explanation: If it is a dharma that can be made, it cannot be separated from no self-nature (anātman). Because the self-nature to be overcome does not exist. Therefore, the reason you put forward is not universally applicable. In conventional truth, space, etc., are also unarisen, like rabbit horns. How can they be said to exist? All conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta-dharma) are without self-nature. This has been observed before to make others believe and understand. Now, I will establish a proof again: In ultimate truth, dharmas have no substance. Why? Because they are made and are objects of differentiated speech, like illusory people, etc. If something has self-nature, it contradicts the above. Furthermore, here an outsider establishes a proof: In ultimate truth, the internal sense bases (adhyātmikāyatana) such as the eye, etc., all have self-nature. Why? Because of the arising of differentiated speech of self and other. For example, because there is long, there is short; long is the cause of short. Now, saying 'self' is based on the differentiated speech of self and other. The debater says: Dharmas are without substance; this has already been established. Because of your attachment, I will explain it again. As the verse says: 'Since dharmas have no self-nature, how can they have other-nature?' Explanation: If a dharma has self-nature, by observing self-nature, one can speak of other-nature. Since self-nature does not exist, what can be observed to speak of other-nature? You say that self-nature and other-nature are mutually causal; this cause is not established and contradicts the meaning. Moreover, in ultimate truth, short and long do not exist, so the analogy is not established. The outsider says: In ultimate truth, the eye, etc., have substance. Why?
以故。由體故。譬如火暖。論者言。火無自體。如觀陰品已破有及起滅。第一義中亦前已遮。火不成故。譬喻無體。又如偈曰。
自他性已遣 何處復有法
釋曰。體義已遮故諸法無性。由法無故因義不成。語意如是。外人偈曰。
若人見自他 及有體無體 彼則不能見 如來真實法
如汝所言自他性已遣。何處復有法。如偈所說。此語則違。複次有如是體。由相違故。如烏角鴟。論者言。第一義中已遮起故。如偈曰。
有體既不立 無法雲何成
釋曰。為遮有執。是故言無。無更無體。雖不言無。無非我欲。何以故。以無別法可執取故。是故亦非。因義不成。複次偈曰。
此法體異故 世人名無體
釋曰。法無體故名之為無。更無一法名為無體。是故汝立因義不成。及違義故。云何違義。汝立相違法為因。由相違破故。所立有法此亦不成故是相違。又第一義中烏鴟無體故。譬喻不成。由此觀察自他無體三皆不成。菩薩摩訶薩以無著慧不見諸法若自若他及有無等。云何不見。以升無分別智車故。複次諸淺智人前世未起深大法忍。于彼自他有無等法。言說熏習故。覆障實慧。如前偈言。若人見自他。及有體無體。彼則不能見如來真實法。此義云何。見自他等違正
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，因為『體』的緣故。譬如火的溫暖。論者說，火沒有自體。如《觀陰品》已經破斥了『有』和『起滅』。在第一義諦中也已經遮止。火不能成立，所以譬喻沒有『體』。又如偈頌所說： 『自他性已遣，何處復有法？』 解釋說，『體』的意義已經被遮止，所以諸法沒有自性。由於法不存在，所以因的意義不能成立。語意就是這樣。外人偈頌說： 『若人見自他，及有體無體，彼則不能見，如來真實法。』 如你所說，『自他性已遣，何處復有法？』如偈頌所說，這話就相違背了。再次，有這樣的『體』，因為相違的緣故，就像烏角鴟（一種傳說中的鳥）。論者說，在第一義諦中已經遮止了『起』，如偈頌所說： 『有體既不立，無法雲何成？』 解釋說，爲了遮止對『有』的執著，所以說『無』。『無』更沒有『體』。雖然不說『無』，『無』不是我所想要的。為什麼呢？因為沒有別的法可以執取。所以也不是。因的意義不能成立。再次，偈頌說： 『此法體異故，世人名無體。』 解釋說，法沒有『體』，所以稱之為『無』。更沒有一種法叫做『無體』。所以你所立的因的意義不能成立，並且違背了意義。怎麼違背了意義呢？你立相違的法作為『因』，因為相違的緣故被破斥，所以所立的『有』法也不能成立，這就是相違。又在第一義諦中，烏鴟沒有『體』，所以譬喻不能成立。由此觀察，自、他、無『體』這三者都不能成立。菩薩摩訶薩以無著的智慧，不見諸法，無論是自、他，還是『有』、『無』等等。怎麼不見呢？因為乘坐著無分別智的車。再次，那些淺薄智慧的人，前世沒有生起深大的法忍，對於那些自、他、『有』、『無』等法，因為言語的熏習，所以覆蓋、障蔽了真實的智慧。如前面的偈頌所說：『若人見自他，及有體無體，彼則不能見如來真實法。』這意義是什麼呢？見自、他等，違背了正法。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, it is because of 'substance' (體). For example, like the warmth of fire. The debater says that fire has no self-substance. As the 'Chapter on Observation of the Skandhas' has already refuted 'existence' and 'arising and ceasing' (起滅). In the ultimate truth (第一義), it has also been previously negated. Fire cannot be established, so the analogy has no 'substance'. Furthermore, as the verse says: 'Self and other natures have been discarded, where else can there be dharma?' The explanation says that the meaning of 'substance' has been negated, so all dharmas have no self-nature. Because dharmas do not exist, the meaning of the cause cannot be established. That is the meaning of the words. An outsider's verse says: 'If a person sees self and other, and existence and non-existence (有體無體), they cannot see the true dharma of the Tathagata (如來真實法).' As you said, 'Self and other natures have been discarded, where else can there be dharma?' As the verse says, this statement contradicts itself. Furthermore, there is such a 'substance', because of contradiction, like the horned owl (烏角鴟). The debater says that in the ultimate truth, 'arising' has already been negated, as the verse says: 'If substance cannot be established, how can non-existence be formed?' The explanation says that in order to negate the attachment to 'existence', therefore it is said 'non-existence'. 'Non-existence' has no 'substance' either. Although 'non-existence' is not spoken of, 'non-existence' is not what I desire. Why? Because there is no other dharma that can be grasped. Therefore, it is also not. The meaning of the cause cannot be established. Furthermore, the verse says: 'Because the substance of this dharma is different, worldly people call it non-substantial (無體).' The explanation says that dharma has no 'substance', so it is called 'non-existence'. There is no such thing as 'non-substantial'. Therefore, the meaning of the cause you established cannot be established, and it contradicts the meaning. How does it contradict the meaning? You establish contradictory dharmas as the 'cause', because of the contradiction it is refuted, so the 'existence' dharma you established cannot be established, this is contradiction. Also, in the ultimate truth, the horned owl has no 'substance', so the analogy cannot be established. From this observation, self, other, and non-'substance' cannot be established. Bodhisattva Mahasattvas (菩薩摩訶薩), with unattached wisdom, do not see dharmas, whether self, other, or 'existence', 'non-existence', etc. How do they not see? Because they are riding in the chariot of non-discriminating wisdom (無分別智). Furthermore, those with shallow wisdom, who have not cultivated deep Dharma-patience (法忍) in previous lives, for those dharmas of self, other, 'existence', 'non-existence', etc., because of the habit of speech, they cover and obscure true wisdom. As the previous verse said: 'If a person sees self and other, and existence and non-existence, they cannot see the true dharma of the Tathagata.' What is the meaning of this? Seeing self, other, etc., contradicts the true Dharma (正法).
道理。及阿含故。偈意如是。違道理者。如先已說。違阿含者。汝今當聽。如偈曰。
佛能如實觀 不著有無法 教授迦旃延 令離有無二
釋曰。云何教授。如佛告迦旃延。世間多有依止二邊。謂若有若無。有深智者不著有無。如是等。又如佛告阿難。若言有者。是執常邊。若言無者。是執斷邊。複次或有人言。若第一義中諸法悉無有者。云何得有見諦法。由世諦中法從緣起故。以智觀察從緣起法。無自無他無有無無。遮如是見名為見諦。云何見諦。此緣起法是見實因故。何人見實。謂諸佛子得緣起智日光所照。以此為因故。論者言。怖畏空者作如是說。猶如世人怖畏虛空。執著有對實物依止故。生心欲得遠離虛空。遠離空者。由彼依止自他等見。如偈言。若人見自他。及有體無體。彼則不能見。如來真實法。此義云何。如是見者。名為邪見。是故佛教迦旃延中。若有若無。二邊俱遮是正道理。由此道理不應見彼自他等法。此復云何。如偈曰。
法若有自體 則不得言無
釋曰。先未起時及后壞時。皆無體故。又若諸法有自性者。偈曰。
法有自性者 后異則不然
釋曰。如火以暖為相。后時冷者不然。為此故說不相似喻。如法是常而是起作者。義則不然。此中立驗。如
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：道理。以及阿含的緣故。偈頌的意義是這樣。違背道理的，就像先前已經說過的。違背阿含的，你現在應當聽。如偈頌所說： 『佛能如實觀，不著有無法，教授迦旃延（Katyayana，佛陀弟子），令離有無二。』 解釋說：如何教授呢？如佛告訴迦旃延說：世間多數人依止兩種邊見，就是『有』或者『無』。有深刻智慧的人不執著于『有』和『無』。像這樣等等。又如佛告訴阿難（Ananda，佛陀的十大弟子之一）說：如果說『有』，這是執著于常邊；如果說『無』，這是執著于斷邊。 進一步說，或者有人說：如果從第一義諦（Paramārtha-satya，佛教的最高真理）來說，諸法全部都沒有，那麼怎麼會有見諦法（dṛṣṭi-satya，證悟真理的法）呢？由於世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）中法從因緣生起，用智慧觀察從因緣生起的法，無自、無他、無有、無無。遮止這樣的見解，名為見諦。 怎麼是見諦呢？這緣起法是見真實的因緣的緣故。什麼人見到真實呢？就是那些得到緣起智（pratītyasamutpāda-jñāna，對緣起法的智慧）的佛子，被緣起智的日光所照耀。以此為因緣的緣故，論者說：怖畏空性的人這樣說，猶如世人怖畏虛空，執著于有對的實物而依止，因此生起想要遠離虛空的心。遠離空性的人，由於他們依止自、他等見解。如偈頌所說： 『若人見自他，及有體無體，彼則不能見，如來真實法。』 這意義是什麼呢？像這樣的見解，名為邪見。因此，佛教導迦旃延，『有』和『無』，兩邊都遮止，才是正道理。由於這個道理，不應該見到那些自、他等法。這又是什麼意思呢？如偈頌所說： 『法若有自體，則不得言無。』 解釋說：在尚未生起時以及後來壞滅時，都沒有實體的緣故。又如果諸法有自性（svabhāva，事物自身存在的性質）的話，偈頌說： 『法有自性者，后異則不然。』 解釋說：如火以溫暖為相，後來變冷就不對了。為此緣故說不相似的比喻。如法是常而是起作者，道理上是不對的。這裡成立論證，如...
【English Translation】 English version: Reasoning. And because of the Agamas. The meaning of the verses is thus. Those who violate reasoning, as has been said before. Those who violate the Agamas, you should listen now. As the verse says: 'The Buddha can truly observe, not clinging to existence or non-existence, instructing Katyayana (Katyayana, a disciple of the Buddha), to be free from the two extremes of existence and non-existence.' The explanation says: How does he instruct? As the Buddha told Katyayana: Most people in the world rely on two extremes, namely 'existence' or 'non-existence'. Those with deep wisdom do not cling to 'existence' and 'non-existence'. Like this and so on. Also, as the Buddha told Ananda (Ananda, one of the Buddha's ten great disciples): If one says 'existence', this is clinging to the extreme of permanence; if one says 'non-existence', this is clinging to the extreme of annihilation. Furthermore, some may say: If, according to the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya, the highest truth in Buddhism), all dharmas are non-existent, then how can there be the dharma of seeing the truth (dṛṣṭi-satya, the dharma of realizing the truth)? Because in conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya, relative truth), dharmas arise from conditions, and with wisdom, one observes the dharmas that arise from conditions, without self, without other, without existence, without non-existence. Obstructing such views is called seeing the truth. How is it seeing the truth? This dependent arising is the cause of seeing reality. Who sees reality? It is those Buddha-sons who have attained the wisdom of dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda-jñāna, wisdom of dependent arising), illuminated by the sunlight of the wisdom of dependent arising. Because of this cause, the debater says: Those who fear emptiness say this, just as people in the world fear empty space, clinging to concrete objects and relying on them, thus giving rise to the desire to be far away from empty space. Those who are far away from emptiness, because they rely on views of self, other, and so on. As the verse says: 'If a person sees self and other, and existence and non-existence, they cannot see the true dharma of the Tathagata.' What is the meaning of this? Such views are called wrong views. Therefore, the Buddha taught Katyayana, 'existence' and 'non-existence', both extremes are obstructed, and this is the right reasoning. Because of this reasoning, one should not see those dharmas of self, other, and so on. What does this mean? As the verse says: 'If a dharma has its own essence, then it cannot be said to be non-existent.' The explanation says: Because it has no substance before it arises and after it is destroyed. Also, if all dharmas have self-nature (svabhāva, the inherent nature of things), the verse says: 'If a dharma has self-nature, then it cannot be different later.' The explanation says: For example, fire has warmth as its characteristic, but it would be wrong if it became cold later. For this reason, a dissimilar analogy is given. For example, if a dharma is permanent and yet a creator, it is not reasonable. Here, a proof is established, such as...
證得實法。內入等體則不顯現。何以故。由內入等后時異故。如水得火故暖。非暖為水自性。複次經部師言。如我阿含木中有種種界。由如是義水亦有暖。汝云暖非水自性者。此譬不成。論者言。彼阿含中作此說者。謂有比丘獲得神通及心自在。隨其所緣草木等物慾變為金。若水火等如意則成。故言木中有種種界。種種界者。此謂木中有多界功能。若彼物中有功能者。此物功能非彼物體。若諸功能是彼體者。如地大中有四功能。亦應具以濕暖動等為地大體。不唯取堅。複次毗婆沙師言。世位雖別而體有不異。應如是知。何以故。由是識境界故。如現在者。以是義故。汝先出因言體異者。非我所受。若汝欲不異者。則自義不成。論者言。第一義中現在物者。有亦不成。汝喻非也。若謂有法經歷於世及諸位中者。是義不然。何以故。已遮起故。複次于去來中無現在法。非現在故。如虛空花。又世諦中過去未來體亦不成。若僧佉人作如是言。汝先出因言異體者。此義不然。何以故。我立諸法有二種義。一為覆蔽。二入自性藏中。為成此義更須立驗。定有如是不滅諸法。何以故。由覆蔽故。譬如日焰翳彼星光。又是識境界故。時節說故。如現在世。是故汝立因義不成。應如是答。現在物者。第一義中有亦不成。何以故。無譬喻
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 證得真實之法。當內心融入等同的本體時，便不再顯現。這是什麼緣故呢？因為內心融入等同本體之後，時間已經不同了。好比水遇到火就變暖，但暖並非水本身的性質。再者，經部師說，如同我們的《阿含經》中說木頭裡有種種界（dhatu，元素、界），根據這個道理，水也可能有暖。你如果說暖不是水的自性，這個比喻就不成立。論者說，在《阿含經》中這樣說，是指有比丘（bhikkhu，佛教僧侶）獲得了神通和心的自在，隨著他所緣的草木等物，想要變成金子，或者水火等，如他的意願就能成功。所以說木頭裡有種種界。所謂種種界，是指木頭裡有多種界的功能。如果某物中有某種功能，這個功能並非該物體的本體。如果各種功能就是該物體的本體，比如地大（prthivi-dhatu，地元素）中有四種功能，也應該具備濕、暖、動等作為地大的本體，而不只是堅硬。再者，毗婆沙師（Vaibhashika，佛教論師）說，世間的位置雖然不同，但本體有不不同的，應該這樣理解。這是什麼緣故呢？因為這是意識的境界。如同現在的事物。因為這個緣故，你先前提出的『本體不同』這個原因，我並不接受。如果你想要說本體沒有不同，那麼你自己的主張就不能成立。論者說，在第一義（paramartha-satya，勝義諦）中，現在的事物，存在也是不能成立的。你的比喻不對。如果說有法（dharma，佛法）經歷於世間和各種位置之中，這個說法是不對的。這是什麼緣故呢？因為已經被遮止了。再者，在過去和未來中沒有現在的事物，因為它不是現在的，如同虛空中的花。而且在世俗諦（samvriti-satya，世俗諦）中，過去和未來的本體也不能成立。如果僧佉（Samkhya，數論派）人這樣說，你先前提出的『本體不同』這個原因，這個說法是不對的。這是什麼緣故呢？因為我所立的諸法有兩種含義，一是被覆蓋，二是進入自性藏中。爲了成立這個含義，還需要建立論證，一定有這樣不滅的諸法。這是什麼緣故呢？因為被覆蓋的緣故。譬如太陽的光芒遮蔽了星光。而且這是意識的境界，因為有時間節令的說法，如同現在的世間。因此你所立的原因不成立。應該這樣回答，現在的事物，在第一義中，存在也是不能成立的。這是什麼緣故呢？因為沒有比喻。
【English Translation】 English version Having attained the real Dharma (truth). When the inner mind merges into the equal essence, it no longer manifests. What is the reason for this? It is because after the inner mind merges into the equal essence, the time is different. It is like water getting warm when it encounters fire, but warmth is not the inherent nature of water. Furthermore, the Sautrantika (a Buddhist school) says, just as our Agama (Buddhist scriptures) says that there are various Dhatus (elements) in wood, according to this principle, water may also have warmth. If you say that warmth is not the nature of water, this analogy does not hold. The debater says, in the Agama it is said that there are Bhikkhus (Buddhist monks) who have attained supernatural powers and freedom of mind, and according to the objects they focus on, such as grass and trees, they can transform them into gold, or water and fire, as they wish. Therefore, it is said that there are various Dhatus in wood. The so-called various Dhatus refer to the functions of various Dhatus in wood. If there is a certain function in an object, this function is not the essence of that object. If various functions are the essence of that object, such as the earth element (Prthivi-dhatu) having four functions, it should also possess wetness, warmth, movement, etc., as the essence of the earth element, and not just hardness. Furthermore, the Vaibhashika (a Buddhist scholar) says that although the positions in the world are different, the essence is not different, and it should be understood in this way. What is the reason for this? Because it is the realm of consciousness. It is like the present things. For this reason, I do not accept the reason you previously put forward that 'the essence is different'. If you want to say that the essence is not different, then your own argument cannot be established. The debater says that in the ultimate truth (Paramartha-satya), the existence of present things cannot be established either. Your analogy is not correct. If it is said that a Dharma (Buddhist teachings) experiences the world and various positions, this statement is not correct. What is the reason for this? Because it has already been refuted. Furthermore, there is no present thing in the past and future, because it is not present, like a flower in the sky. Moreover, in the conventional truth (Samvriti-satya), the essence of the past and future cannot be established either. If the Samkhya (a school of Indian philosophy) says that the reason you previously put forward that 'the essence is different' is not correct. What is the reason for this? Because the Dharmas I have established have two meanings: one is being covered, and the other is entering the treasury of self-nature. In order to establish this meaning, it is also necessary to establish proof that there must be such indestructible Dharmas. What is the reason for this? Because they are covered. For example, the light of the sun obscures the light of the stars. Moreover, this is the realm of consciousness, because there is the saying of time and seasons, like the present world. Therefore, the reason you have established is not valid. It should be answered in this way that the existence of present things cannot be established in the ultimate truth. What is the reason for this? Because there is no analogy.
故。汝立覆蔽以為因者。義亦不成。此中應說云何驗耶。彼未了者終是不了。何以故。以不了故。如虛空花。複次不入自性藏者。終無入義。何以故。以不入故。譬如思。又如自性藏。由此執法。有過失故。如偈曰。
若有是自性 則不得言無 自性有異者 畢竟不應然
釋曰。由是自性不變異故。譬喻則無。若是無法則無變異。如石女兒。從小至大。以此變異。令人信者。終不可得。如偈曰。
若無自性者 云何而可異
釋曰。二邊有過智者。不受外人言。汝說自性有體無體皆無變異。意欲爾耶。是故汝先所立義破。因亦不成。云何不成。若有自性而變異者。此不然故。論者言。此說不然。何以故。我言無者。明自性空。非欲說有。彼自性法。如偈曰。
實無有一法 自性可得者
釋曰。有自性者不然。而汝為彼煩惱習氣。自在力故。作此分別。如先偈說。若無自性者。云何而可異。此變異過。如先已說。遮止二邊。及成立者。皆是世諦。非第一義。是故我先立義不破。於世諦中有變異故。亦非所出因義不成。複次鞞世師言。第一義中眼等諸入定有自體。何以故。此等能為有覺因故。譬如涅槃。論者言。汝說有覺因者。此因不成。何以故。如焰中水亦為覺因。是故因非一
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，你所設立的『覆蔽』（指遮蔽真理的無明）作為原因，在道理上也無法成立。這裡應該如何驗證呢？那些沒有領悟的人終究是無法領悟的。為什麼呢？因為他們沒有領悟，就像虛空中的花朵一樣。再者，不進入自性藏（指如來藏）的人，終究沒有進入的道理。為什麼呢？因為他們沒有進入。譬如思考。又如自性藏。由於執著於法，所以有過失。正如偈頌所說： 『如果存在自性， 那麼就不能說沒有。 如果自性有差異， 那麼終究不應該是這樣。』 解釋：由於自性不變異的緣故，譬喻就無法成立。如果沒有任何法，那麼就沒有變異，就像石女的兒子一樣。從小到大，以此變異來令人相信，終究是不可能的。正如偈頌所說： 『如果沒有自性， 怎麼可能產生差異？』 解釋：有智慧的人不會接受外人的言論，因為二邊都有過失。你說自性有體或無體都沒有變異，是這個意思嗎？因此，你先前所設立的道理被破斥，原因也無法成立。為什麼無法成立呢？如果有自性而發生變異，這是不成立的。論者說：這種說法是不對的。為什麼呢？我說『無』，是表明自性是空的，不是想要說『有』彼自性法。正如偈頌所說： 『實際上沒有一種法， 其自性是可以獲得的。』 解釋：有自性是不成立的。而你因為煩惱習氣的自在力量，才做出這樣的分別。正如先前的偈頌所說：如果沒有自性，怎麼可能產生差異？這種變異的過失，先前已經說過了。遮止二邊以及成立，都是世俗諦（指相對真理），不是第一義諦（指絕對真理）。因此，我先前設立的道理沒有被破斥，因為在世俗諦中有變異的緣故，也不是所提出的原因不成立。再者，鞞世師（Vaisheshika，印度哲學流派）說：在第一義諦中，眼等諸入（指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六根）一定有自體（指獨立的、不變的實體）。為什麼呢？因為這些能夠成為有覺（指產生感覺）的原因。譬如涅槃（Nirvana，佛教術語，指解脫）。論者說：你說『有覺因』，這個原因是不成立的。為什麼呢？就像火焰中的水，也可以成為感覺的原因。因此，原因並非唯一。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, your establishment of '覆蔽' (fù bì) [covering, referring to ignorance that obscures the truth] as a cause is also logically untenable. How should this be verified here? Those who have not understood will ultimately not understand. Why? Because they have not understood, like flowers in empty space. Furthermore, those who do not enter the 自性藏 (zì xìng zàng) [Self-nature Treasury, referring to the Tathagatagarbha] will ultimately have no possibility of entering. Why? Because they have not entered. For example, thinking. Also, like the Self-nature Treasury. Because of attachment to the Dharma, there is fault. As the verse says: 'If there is a self-nature, Then it cannot be said to be non-existent. If the self-nature has differences, Then ultimately it should not be so.' Explanation: Because the self-nature does not change, the analogy cannot be established. If there is no Dharma, then there is no change, like the son of a barren woman. From small to large, using this change to make people believe is ultimately impossible. As the verse says: 'If there is no self-nature, How can there be differences?' Explanation: Those with wisdom do not accept the words of outsiders, because there are faults on both sides. Are you saying that the self-nature, whether it has substance or not, has no change? Therefore, the principle you established earlier is refuted, and the cause is also untenable. Why is it untenable? If there is a self-nature and it changes, this is not established. The debater says: This statement is incorrect. Why? When I say 'non-existent,' I am clarifying that the self-nature is empty, not wanting to say that there is that self-nature Dharma. As the verse says: 'In reality, there is not a single Dharma, Whose self-nature can be obtained.' Explanation: Having a self-nature is not established. And you, because of the power of the habitual energies of afflictions, make this distinction. As the previous verse said: If there is no self-nature, how can there be differences? This fault of change has been mentioned before. Obstructing the two extremes and establishing are both 世諦 (shì dì) [conventional truth, relative truth], not 第一義 (dì yī yì) [ultimate truth, absolute truth]. Therefore, the principle I established earlier has not been refuted, because there is change in conventional truth, and it is also not that the cause presented is untenable. Furthermore, the 鞞世師 (Pí shì shī) [Vaisheshika, an Indian philosophical school] says: In ultimate truth, the 眼等諸入 (yǎn děng zhū rù) [sense bases, referring to the six sense organs: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind] definitely have 自體 (zì tǐ) [own-being, independent and unchanging entity]. Why? Because these can be the cause of having awareness. For example, 涅槃 (Niè pán) [Nirvana, Buddhist term, referring to liberation]. The debater says: Your saying 'cause of having awareness' is an untenable cause. Why? Like water in flames, it can also be a cause of sensation. Therefore, the cause is not unique.
向。今當更說。如偈曰。
有者是常執 無者是斷見 是故有智者 不應依有無
釋曰。彼斷常執有何過失。法若常者。樂應常樂。苦應常苦。亦無厭苦求樂起于聖道。先已有者不須因故。法若斷者。則無染凈及苦樂等。雖復受持禁戒空無果故。是皆不然。有無俱者。名為惡見。由此惡見能閉天人趣涅槃門。是故欲出生死曠野者。欲共諸天婇女遊戲受樂者。欲斷一切受樂。欲受一切戲論。息樂者不應依止有無二見。何以故。依止彼者得斷常過故。云何二見是斷常過。如偈曰。
若法有自性 非無即是常 先有而今無 此即是斷過
釋曰。由如是等斷常過故。說中道者。應正思惟。依世諦故色等法起。是有覺因。色若未起及已滅者。是無覺因。第一義中覺自體空。以無起故非是有見。如幻所作故。不著無見。由如是故不墮二邊。此中為遮諸法自性。令人信解。從緣起法不斷不常。品義如此。是故得成。如般若波羅蜜經中。佛告極勇猛菩薩言。善男子。色不斷不常。如是受想行識不斷不常。若色至識不斷不常。此是般若波羅蜜又如月燈三昧經偈曰。
有無是二邊 凈不凈亦爾 是故有智者 離邊不住中
如是等諸修多羅此中應廣說。
釋觀有無品竟。
般
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：現在應當繼續講述。如偈頌所說： 『執著于『有』，是常見；執著于『無』，是斷見。因此，有智慧的人，不應該依賴『有』或『無』。』 解釋：如果執著于斷見和常見，會有什麼過失呢？如果法是常，那麼快樂應該永遠是快樂，痛苦應該永遠是痛苦。也不會有厭惡痛苦而追求快樂，從而修習聖道的情況。因為已經存在的東西，不需要原因。 如果法是斷滅的，那麼就沒有染污和清凈，以及苦和樂等等。即使受持禁戒，也是空無果報。這些都是不對的。認為『有』和『無』同時存在，這被稱為惡見。由於這種惡見，能夠關閉天道、人道以及通往涅槃的大門。因此，想要脫離生死曠野的人，想要與諸天婇女一起遊戲享受快樂的人，想要斷絕一切享受快樂的人，想要接受一切戲論、止息快樂的人，都不應該依賴『有』和『無』這兩種見解。為什麼呢？因為依賴它們會得到斷見和常見的過失。 什麼是斷見和常見的過失呢？如偈頌所說： 『如果法有自性（svabhāva），不是沒有，那就是常；先前有而現在沒有，這就是斷滅的過失。』 解釋：由於像這樣的斷見和常見的過失，所以宣說中道的人，應該正確地思維。依靠世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya），色（rūpa）等法生起，這是有覺知的因。如果色還沒有生起或者已經滅去，這就是沒有覺知的因。在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya）中，覺知的自體是空性的。因為沒有生起，所以不是有見。如同幻化所作，所以不執著于無見。因此，不會墮入兩邊。 這裡是爲了遮止諸法的自性，使人信解，從因緣生起的法，不是斷滅的，也不是常有的。這一品的意義就是這樣，所以能夠成就。如同《般若波羅蜜經》（Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra）中，佛（Buddha）告訴極勇猛菩薩（atyanta-śūra bodhisattva）說：『善男子，色不是斷滅的，也不是常有的。受（vedanā）、想（saṃjñā）、行（saṃskāra）、識（vijñāna）也不是斷滅的，也不是常有的。如果色到識不是斷滅的，也不是常有的，這就是般若波羅蜜。』又如《月燈三昧經》的偈頌說： 『有和無是兩種邊見，清凈和不清凈也是如此。因此，有智慧的人，遠離邊見，不住于中道。』 像這樣的各種修多羅（sūtra），這裡應該廣泛地解說。 《釋觀有無品》結束。 般若（prajña）
【English Translation】 English version: Now, I shall explain further. As the verse says: 'Those who hold to 'existence' are attached to permanence; those who hold to 'non-existence' are attached to annihilation. Therefore, wise individuals should not rely on either existence or non-existence.' Explanation: What are the faults of clinging to permanence and annihilation? If the dharma (law, teaching) were permanent, then pleasure should be eternally pleasurable, and suffering should be eternally painful. There would be no aversion to suffering and seeking of pleasure, thus no arising of the holy path. Because what already exists does not need a cause. If the dharma were annihilated, then there would be no defilement and purity, nor suffering and pleasure, etc. Even if one upholds precepts, it would be fruitless. All of this is not the case. To say that 'existence' and 'non-existence' exist simultaneously is called a wrong view. Because of this wrong view, the gates to the realms of gods and humans, and to nirvāṇa (liberation), are closed. Therefore, those who wish to escape the wilderness of saṃsāra (cyclic existence), those who wish to play and enjoy pleasure with the celestial maidens, those who wish to cut off all enjoyment of pleasure, and those who wish to accept all speculation and cease pleasure, should not rely on the two views of 'existence' and 'non-existence'. Why? Because relying on them leads to the faults of permanence and annihilation. What are the faults of permanence and annihilation? As the verse says: 'If a dharma has inherent existence (svabhāva), and is not non-existent, then it is permanent; if it existed before and now does not exist, this is the fault of annihilation.' Explanation: Because of such faults of permanence and annihilation, those who teach the Middle Way (madhyamāpratipad) should contemplate correctly. Relying on conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), phenomena such as form (rūpa) arise, which is a cause for awareness. If form has not yet arisen or has already ceased, it is a cause for non-awareness. In ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), the self-nature of awareness is emptiness. Because there is no arising, it is not a view of existence. Like something created by illusion, one does not cling to a view of non-existence. Therefore, one does not fall into either extreme. Here, it is to prevent the inherent existence of all dharmas, to make people believe and understand that phenomena arising from conditions are neither permanent nor annihilated. The meaning of this chapter is thus, and therefore it is accomplished. As in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra (Perfection of Wisdom Sutra), the Buddha (Buddha) said to the extremely courageous bodhisattva (atyanta-śūra bodhisattva): 'Good man, form is neither permanent nor annihilated. Feeling (vedanā), perception (saṃjñā), mental formations (saṃskāra), and consciousness (vijñāna) are also neither permanent nor annihilated. If form to consciousness is neither permanent nor annihilated, this is prajñāpāramitā (perfection of wisdom).' Furthermore, as the verse in the Candrapradīpa Samādhi Sūtra (Moon Lamp Samādhi Sutra) says: 'Existence and non-existence are two extremes, purity and impurity are also the same. Therefore, wise individuals, abandoning extremes, do not abide in the middle.' Such sūtras (discourses) as these should be extensively explained here. End of the chapter on 'Analysis of Existence and Non-existence'. Prajñā (wisdom)
若燈論釋觀縛解品第十六
複次已遮有無離斷常過。此中為明空所對治繫縛解脫無自性義。此品次生。有人言。第一義中諸內入等定有自體。何以故。由彼入等有縛解故。此若無者則無縛解。如石女兒不可言說。是故定知。第一義中諸入有體。論者言。諸行相縛如幻焰夢。而彼無智極盲暗者。無始已來為我我所執之所吞食。貪等煩惱杻械所拘。是故如來為令出離生死囹圄愛見關鑰故。於世諦中假名相說。正智起時于彼極重貪等結使得遠離故。名為解脫。非第一義作此施設。何以故。第一義中有縛解者。義不然故。如來所說有生死者。但假施設。而無于中實流轉者。涅槃亦爾。但假施設。而無于中般涅槃者。見是經故。阿阇梨言。若定分別有縛解者。今此係縛。為是諸行。為是眾生。若是諸行者。為是常耶。是無常乎。二皆不然。何以故。若是常者。如偈曰。
若諸行是常 彼則無流轉
釋曰。諸行是常令人信者。驗則無體。若立常者。則無縛無解。縛解無故法體顛倒。立義有咎。複次諸行是常無流轉者。是義云何。諸趣往來先後相續。名為生死。若是常者。諸行則無先後差別。而言流轉者。義則不然。複次鞞世師。及自部人言。若諸行常則無起滅先後差別無流轉者。今諸行無常應有流轉。此亦不然
。何以故。如偈曰。
無常無流轉
釋曰。若無常者滅不復起。是故。諸行五種往來者。是則不然。複次無常不流轉者。如外諸行。此中立驗。第一義中內諸行等流轉者不然。何以故。由無常故。如外瓶等。如諸行二種若常若無常流轉者俱不然。若汝分別有眾生流轉者。亦如前答。為此眾生常而流轉。為無常流轉。若俱立者。亦如先說過。是義云何。眾生常者則無流轉。何以故。不變異故。亦無先後差別故。眾生無常亦無流轉。何以故。彼已滅者。無起法故。如偈曰。
眾生亦同過
釋曰。是故眾生若常無常有流轉者。亦如前所立諸行驗過。複次佛法中人慾令諸行及人是無常者。作如是言。未起對治道者。前滅諸行以此為因。後起諸行相續為果。眾生亦然。如是諸行流轉義成。故我無過。論者言。彼語不善。已滅諸行及與眾生。為后剎那作其緣者。如先次第緣中已遮。立義及譬有過失故。此亦如是故我無咎。複次路伽耶陀者言。汝說諸行若常無常皆無流轉者。此成我義。云何知耶。如我論中偈曰。
舍摩唯眼見 一種名丈夫 多聞說後世 如人言獸跡 汝今極端正 恣食任所之 過去業皆無 此身唯行聚 死者竟不還 此事汝應信
是故當知無一法從此世至後世。
亦無人從後世來入胎。若有人言。此胎已前更有前世。云何驗知。謂此入胎初覺次前滅心為次第緣。何以故。由覺故。如後起覺。此譬不然。何以故。唯有一覺故。由此一覺乃至未終。常如是住。故無先世。複次亦無後世。以何道理作是說耶。如調達命終心不作後世初入胎心。何以故。命終心故。如阿羅漢命終之心。論者言。諸行流轉者。世諦中不遮。諸行是常計流轉者。此亦俱遮。故非成汝所成。複次調達色覺與調達聲覺。此非不異。何以故。境界別故。譬如他人身相續覺。由如是驗有譬喻故。非世諦中先世不成。複次非無後世。云何驗耶。謂彼有漏命終之心。能續後世初受胎心。何以故。由有漏故。與彼命終因心別故。於世諦中義不相違。複次路伽耶陀者言。第一義中彼調達覺與一切人覺亦不異。何以故。由是覺故。如調達覺。論者言。汝語非也。彼調達覺。第一義中前已遮故。又汝言。第一義中與一切人覺不異者。此執不成。於世諦中立不異者。則與世相違。複次彼阿羅漢命終之心有續念無續念者。第一義中此皆不成。譬喻無故。成立有過。若立無漏心不續後世者。於世諦中成我所成。複次犢子部言。如我立義陰入界等。若一若異。若常無常。皆不可說。人亦如此。汝先所說二種過失不能破我。何以故。如是人
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 也沒有人從後世來投胎。如果有人說：『這個胎兒在入胎之前還有前世。』要如何驗證呢？就是說這個入胎時的最初意識，以其之前的滅心作為次第緣。為什麼呢？因為有『覺』的緣故，就像後來生起的『覺』一樣。這個比喻是不成立的。為什麼呢？因為只有一次『覺』的緣故。因為這一個『覺』乃至未終結，常常這樣存在，所以沒有前世。其次，也沒有後世。以什麼道理這樣說呢？就像提婆達多（Devadatta）命終時的心，不會成為後世最初入胎的心。為什麼呢？因為是命終的心。就像阿羅漢（Arhat）命終的心一樣。論者說：『諸行的流轉』，在世俗諦（世俗諦）中並不否認。如果認為諸行是常恒的，並計度為流轉，這兩種觀點都被否定。所以不能成立你想要成立的觀點。其次，提婆達多（Devadatta）的色覺和提婆達多（Devadatta）的聲覺，這不是不一樣的。為什麼呢？因為境界不同。譬如他人身相續的覺。因為有這樣的驗證和譬喻，所以在世俗諦（世俗諦）中，前世不是不能成立的。其次，不是沒有後世。要如何驗證呢？就是說那個有漏（有漏）的命終之心，能夠延續到後世最初的受胎之心。為什麼呢？因為是有漏（有漏）的緣故，與那個命終的因心不同。在世俗諦（世俗諦）中，義理上沒有相違背。其次，順世外道（Lokāyata）說：『在第一義諦（第一義諦）中，那個提婆達多（Devadatta）的覺與一切人的覺也沒有差別。』為什麼呢？因為都是『覺』的緣故，就像提婆達多（Devadatta）的覺一樣。論者說：『你的話不對。』那個提婆達多（Devadatta）的覺，在第一義諦（第一義諦）中已經被否定了。而且你說：『在第一義諦（第一義諦）中與一切人的覺沒有差別』，這個執著是不成立的。如果在世俗諦（世俗諦）中建立沒有差別，那就與世俗的現象相違背。其次，那個阿羅漢（Arhat）命終的心，是有續念還是沒有續念呢？在第一義諦（第一義諦）中，這些都不成立。因為沒有譬喻的緣故，成立是有過失的。如果立論說無漏（無漏）的心不延續到後世，那麼在世俗諦（世俗諦）中就成立了我所要成立的觀點。其次，犢子部（Vātsīputrīya）說：『就像我所立的義理，陰（Skandha）、入（Āyatana）、界（Dhātu）等，若是一，若是異，若是常，若是無常，都是不可說的。人也是如此。你先前所說的兩種過失不能駁倒我。』為什麼呢？像這樣的人
【English Translation】 English version Nor does anyone come from the future life to enter the womb. If someone says, 'This fetus had a previous life before entering the womb,' how can it be verified? It means that the initial consciousness at the moment of entering the womb takes the preceding extinguished mind as its sequential cause. Why? Because of 'awareness' (覺, jiao), just like the subsequent arising of 'awareness.' This analogy is not valid. Why? Because there is only one 'awareness.' Because this one 'awareness' remains constantly in this way until it ends, therefore there is no previous life. Secondly, there is also no future life. By what reasoning is this said? It is like the mind of Devadatta (調達, Diàodá) at the moment of death, which does not become the initial mind entering the womb in the future life. Why? Because it is the mind at the moment of death, just like the mind of an Arhat (阿羅漢, Āluóhàn) at the moment of death. The debater says, 'The flow of phenomena,' is not denied in conventional truth (世俗諦, Shìsúdì). If one considers phenomena to be permanent and calculates them as flowing, both of these views are negated. Therefore, it does not establish what you want to establish. Secondly, the visual perception of Devadatta (調達, Diàodá) and the auditory perception of Devadatta (調達, Diàodá), these are not undifferentiated. Why? Because the objects are different, like the continuous perception of another person's body. Because there is such verification and analogy, in conventional truth (世俗諦, Shìsúdì), the previous life is not unestablished. Secondly, it is not that there is no future life. How can it be verified? It means that the defiled (有漏, Yǒulòu) mind at the moment of death can continue to the initial mind of conception in the future life. Why? Because it is defiled (有漏, Yǒulòu), and it is different from the causal mind at the moment of death. In conventional truth (世俗諦, Shìsúdì), there is no contradiction in meaning. Secondly, the Lokāyata (路伽耶陀, Lùjiāyétuó) says, 'In ultimate truth (第一義諦, Dìyīyìdì), that awareness of Devadatta (調達, Diàodá) is not different from the awareness of all people.' Why? Because it is all 'awareness,' just like the awareness of Devadatta (調達, Diàodá). The debater says, 'Your words are incorrect.' That awareness of Devadatta (調達, Diàodá) has already been negated in ultimate truth (第一義諦, Dìyīyìdì). Moreover, you say, 'In ultimate truth (第一義諦, Dìyīyìdì), it is not different from the awareness of all people,' this assertion is not established. If one establishes no difference in conventional truth (世俗諦, Shìsúdì), then it contradicts conventional phenomena. Secondly, does the mind of an Arhat (阿羅漢, Āluóhàn) at the moment of death have continuous thought or non-continuous thought? In ultimate truth (第一義諦, Dìyīyìdì), these are not established. Because there is no analogy, the establishment has faults. If one posits that the undefiled (無漏, Wúlòu) mind does not continue to the future life, then in conventional truth (世俗諦, Shìsúdì), what I want to establish is established. Secondly, the Vātsīputrīya (犢子部, Dúzǐbù) says, 'Just like the principles I establish, the aggregates (陰, Skandha), sense bases (入, Āyatana), realms (界, Dhātu), etc., whether they are one, whether they are different, whether they are permanent, whether they are impermanent, are all unspeakable. People are also like this. The two kinds of faults you mentioned earlier cannot refute me.' Why? Such a person
者有流轉故。論者偈曰。
若人流轉者 諸陰入界中 五種求盡無 誰為受流轉
釋曰。無流轉故。云何驗知。第一義中無人可得。何以故。離五陰外無別體故。猶如兔角。雖實無人而汝謂有。此人我執覆障實慧。如翳眼人見毛輪等。複次偈曰。
若從取至取 則招無有過 無取復無有 其誰當往來
釋曰。若從此取向后取者。取體則空。本由取故施設於有取體既空有無所寄無取無有則無質礙。無質礙故無可流轉。而汝定謂有往來者。是則不然。外人言。我中有中有取陰故取義得成。無前過失。異部破言。汝舍中有趣生有時。此二中間無取無有。如前過失。汝不得離。複次經部等人言。汝此言者不解我義。何以故。此舍及取。先後剎那同一時故。而言無取無有者。是義不然。如汝前言五求盡無誰流轉者。今當答汝有如是人。何以故。向後取住故。此若無者。不可說向後取中住。如石女兒。由有此人從於前取向后取住。云何驗知。如佛言曰。我于往昔作頂生王。及善見王。故知有人從此至彼。論者言。如先偈說。若從取至取。則招無有過。此義云何。初有之取不作。後有依止之因。何以故。離有自性有無體故。譬如調達從此一房到彼一房。如汝所言。有彼諸取能成人者。是義不然。何
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為有流轉的緣故。論者用偈語說： 『如果有人流轉，就在諸陰（skandha，五蘊）、入（ayatana，十二處）、界（dhatu，十八界）之中。 五種求盡（指五蘊皆空），無處可得，那麼是誰在承受流轉呢？』 解釋：因為沒有流轉的緣故。如何驗證得知呢？在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya）中，沒有人可以得到。為什麼呢？因為離開五陰（pañca-skandha）之外，沒有別的實體。猶如兔角一樣，雖然實際上沒有人，但你卻認為有。這種人我執（ātma-graha）遮蔽了真實的智慧，就像眼睛有翳病的人看到毛髮輪轉一樣。再次用偈語說： 『如果從取（upadana，執取）到取，就不會招致任何過失。 如果沒有取，也沒有有（bhava，存在），那麼是誰在往來呢？』 解釋：如果從這個取向后一個取，取的本體就是空的。本來因為取才施設為有，取體既然是空的，有就沒有寄託之處。沒有取也沒有有，就沒有質礙。沒有質礙，就沒有流轉。而你卻一定要說有往來，這是不對的。外人說：我的中有（antarabhava，中陰）中有取陰（upadana-skandha），所以取的意義能夠成立，沒有之前的過失。異部（不同派別的佛教徒）反駁說：你捨棄中有趣向出生的時候，這二者中間沒有取也沒有有，和之前的過失一樣，你無法擺脫。再次，經部（Sautrāntika，佛教部派之一）等人說：你這樣說是不理解我的意思。為什麼呢？因為這個舍和取，先後剎那是在同一時間發生的，所以說沒有取也沒有有，這種說法是不對的。就像你之前說五求盡無，誰在流轉一樣，現在我來回答你，有這樣的人。為什麼呢？因為向後取住的緣故。如果沒有這個人，就不能說向後取中住，就像石女兒一樣。因為有這個人，才從前取向后取住。如何驗證得知呢？就像佛所說：我于往昔作頂生王（Mandhatri，轉輪聖王名號），以及善見王（Sudarsana，轉輪聖王名號）。所以知道有人從此至彼。論者說：就像之前的偈語所說，如果從取到取，就不會招致任何過失。這是什麼意思呢？最初的有之取不造作，後有的依止之因。為什麼呢？因為離開有自性，有就沒有本體。譬如調達（Devadatta，人名）從此一房到彼一房。像你所說的，有那些取能夠成就人，這種說法是不對的。為什麼呢？ English version: Because there is transmigration. The debater says in a verse: 'If there is someone transmigrating, it is within the skandhas (aggregates), ayatanas (sense bases), and dhatus (elements). The five kinds of seeking are exhausted (referring to the emptiness of the five skandhas), and there is nowhere to be found, then who is undergoing transmigration?' Explanation: Because there is no transmigration. How can this be verified? In the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), no one can be found. Why? Because apart from the five skandhas (pañca-skandha), there is no other entity. Like a rabbit's horn, although there is actually no person, you think there is. This attachment to self (ātma-graha) obscures true wisdom, like a person with cataracts seeing whirling hairs. Again, in a verse: 'If from grasping (upadana) to grasping, then no fault is incurred. If there is no grasping and no existence (bhava), then who is going back and forth?' Explanation: If from this grasping to the next grasping, the substance of grasping is empty. Originally, it is because of grasping that existence is established. Since the substance of grasping is empty, existence has nothing to rely on. Without grasping and existence, there is no obstruction. Without obstruction, there is no transmigration. But you insist that there is going back and forth, which is not correct. An outsider says: In my intermediate existence (antarabhava), there are grasping aggregates (upadana-skandha), so the meaning of grasping can be established, and there is no previous fault. A different school (of Buddhism) refutes: When you abandon the intermediate existence and go towards birth, there is no grasping or existence in between, and you cannot escape the previous fault. Again, the Sautrāntikas (a Buddhist school) and others say: You do not understand my meaning. Why? Because this abandonment and grasping, the prior and subsequent moments, occur at the same time, so saying there is no grasping or existence is incorrect. Just as you said before, the five kinds of seeking are exhausted, who is transmigrating? Now I will answer you, there is such a person. Why? Because of dwelling in the subsequent grasping. If there is no such person, it cannot be said that one dwells in the subsequent grasping, like a barren woman's child. Because there is this person, one goes from the prior grasping to the subsequent grasping. How can this be verified? Just as the Buddha said: In the past, I was King Mandhatri (a Chakravartin king), and King Sudarsana (a Chakravartin king). Therefore, it is known that someone goes from here to there. The debater says: As the previous verse said, if from grasping to grasping, then no fault is incurred. What does this mean? The initial grasping of existence does not create the cause for the subsequent existence to rely on. Why? Because apart from the self-nature of existence, existence has no substance. For example, Devadatta (a person's name) goes from this room to that room. As you said, there are those grasping that can accomplish a person, this statement is incorrect. Why?
【English Translation】 Because there is transmigration. The debater says in a verse: 'If there is someone transmigrating, it is within the skandhas (aggregates), ayatanas (sense bases), and dhatus (elements). The five kinds of seeking are exhausted (referring to the emptiness of the five skandhas), and there is nowhere to be found, then who is undergoing transmigration?' Explanation: Because there is no transmigration. How can this be verified? In the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), no one can be found. Why? Because apart from the five skandhas (pañca-skandha), there is no other entity. Like a rabbit's horn, although there is actually no person, you think there is. This attachment to self (ātma-graha) obscures true wisdom, like a person with cataracts seeing whirling hairs. Again, in a verse: 'If from grasping (upadana) to grasping, then no fault is incurred. If there is no grasping and no existence (bhava), then who is going back and forth?' Explanation: If from this grasping to the next grasping, the substance of grasping is empty. Originally, it is because of grasping that existence is established. Since the substance of grasping is empty, existence has nothing to rely on. Without grasping and existence, there is no obstruction. Without obstruction, there is no transmigration. But you insist that there is going back and forth, which is not correct. An outsider says: In my intermediate existence (antarabhava), there are grasping aggregates (upadana-skandha), so the meaning of grasping can be established, and there is no previous fault. A different school (of Buddhism) refutes: When you abandon the intermediate existence and go towards birth, there is no grasping or existence in between, and you cannot escape the previous fault. Again, the Sautrāntikas (a Buddhist school) and others say: You do not understand my meaning. Why? Because this abandonment and grasping, the prior and subsequent moments, occur at the same time, so saying there is no grasping or existence is incorrect. Just as you said before, the five kinds of seeking are exhausted, who is transmigrating? Now I will answer you, there is such a person. Why? Because of dwelling in the subsequent grasping. If there is no such person, it cannot be said that one dwells in the subsequent grasping, like a barren woman's child. Because there is this person, one goes from the prior grasping to the subsequent grasping. How can this be verified? Just as the Buddha said: In the past, I was King Mandhatri (a Chakravartin king), and King Sudarsana (a Chakravartin king). Therefore, it is known that someone goes from here to there. The debater says: As the previous verse said, if from grasping to grasping, then no fault is incurred. What does this mean? The initial grasping of existence does not create the cause for the subsequent existence to rely on. Why? Because apart from the self-nature of existence, existence has no substance. For example, Devadatta (a person's name) goes from this room to that room. As you said, there are those grasping that can accomplish a person, this statement is incorrect. Why?
以故。由取故。如餘人取。是故偈言。無取復無有。其誰當往來。如是諸行及以眾生。第一義中有流轉者。是皆不然。複次執有解脫者。亦應觀察。此解脫者。為是諸行。為是眾生。為當是人。若言諸行得解脫者。今此諸行。為是常耶。是無常乎。若汝欲令第一義中諸行常者。是則不然。如偈曰。
諸行涅槃者 是事終不然
釋曰。第一義中以無起故諸行常者。於世諦中亦不成故。若第一義中諸行無常得涅槃者。是亦不然。何以故。由無常故。如外地等。若謂眾生得解脫者。是亦不然。如偈曰。
眾生涅槃者 是事亦不然
釋曰。若常無常若有分別。若無分別得涅槃者。是皆不然。云何眾生是常不得涅槃。無視聽等諸根具故。譬如虛空。若非質礙。又無視聽。而是有者。世所不信。如石女兒。若謂無常得涅槃者。是亦不然。何以故。若無常者無解脫義。如外地等。已驗無常不得解脫。外人所立法體差別得解脫者。是皆不成。立義過故。複次婆私弗多羅言。如我立義。言有人者。不可說常亦非無常。由如是故解脫義成。無如上過。論者言。汝謂第一義中人是實有不可說常及以無常得解脫者。是亦不然。何以故。藉因施設故。譬如瓶等。如是則破。若實法者亦是無常。譬如色等。由此驗故。汝立
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，由於執取（取，Upadana）的緣故。如同其他人執取一樣。所以偈語說：『沒有執取也沒有存在，誰會往來於生死之中？』像這樣，諸行（Samkhara）以及眾生（Sattva），在第一義（Paramartha）中說有流轉，這些都是不正確的。再次，如果執著于有解脫者，也應該觀察。這個解脫者，是諸行呢？還是眾生呢？還是這個人呢？如果說諸行得到解脫，那麼現在的這些諸行，是常（Nitya）呢？還是無常（Anitya）呢？如果你想讓第一義中的諸行是常，那是不對的。如偈語所說： 『諸行涅槃者，此事終不然。』 解釋說：在第一義中，因為沒有生起，所以說諸行是常，這在世俗諦（Samvriti-satya）中也是不成立的。如果在第一義中，諸行是無常而得到涅槃，這也是不對的。為什麼呢？因為是無常的緣故，就像外道所說的地等。如果說眾生得到解脫，這也是不對的。如偈語所說： 『眾生涅槃者，此事亦不然。』 解釋說：如果是常、無常，或者是有分別、沒有分別的眾生得到涅槃，這些都是不對的。為什麼說眾生是常就不能得到涅槃呢？因為沒有視聽等諸根具的緣故，譬如虛空。如果沒有質礙，又沒有視聽，而說是存在的，世人不會相信，就像石女兒一樣。如果說是無常的眾生得到涅槃，這也是不對的。為什麼呢？如果說是無常，就沒有解脫的意義，就像外道所說的地等。已經驗證了無常不能得到解脫。外道所立的法體差別得到解脫，這些都是不成立的，因為有立義的過失。再次，婆私弗多羅（Vatsiputra）說：『如我所立的義，說有人（Pudgala）是不可說是常也不是無常的，因為這樣，所以解脫的意義才能成立，沒有像上面所說的過失。』論者說：『你認為在第一義中，人是真實存在的，不可說是常也不是無常而得到解脫，這也是不對的。』為什麼呢？因為是藉由因緣施設的緣故，譬如瓶子等。這樣就破斥了你的觀點。如果是實法，也就是無常的，譬如色等。由此驗證，你所立的...
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, it is due to grasping (Upadana). Just like others grasp. Hence, the verse says: 'Without grasping and without existence, who would go back and forth?' Like this, the aggregates (Samkhara) and beings (Sattva), to say there is transmigration in the ultimate truth (Paramartha), all these are incorrect. Furthermore, if one clings to the existence of liberation, it should also be examined. Is this liberated one the aggregates? Or the beings? Or this person? If it is said that the aggregates attain liberation, then are these aggregates permanent (Nitya)? Or impermanent (Anitya)? If you want the aggregates in the ultimate truth to be permanent, that is not right. As the verse says: 'The aggregates attaining Nirvana, this is ultimately not so.' Explanation: In the ultimate truth, because there is no arising, to say the aggregates are permanent, this is also not established in conventional truth (Samvriti-satya). If in the ultimate truth, the aggregates are impermanent and attain Nirvana, that is also not right. Why? Because they are impermanent, like the earth and so on spoken of by externalists. If it is said that beings attain liberation, that is also not right. As the verse says: 'Beings attaining Nirvana, this is also not so.' Explanation: Whether it is permanent, impermanent, or beings with or without distinctions that attain Nirvana, all these are incorrect. Why is it said that a permanent being cannot attain Nirvana? Because they lack faculties such as sight and hearing, like space. If there is no obstruction and no sight or hearing, and yet it is said to exist, the world will not believe it, like a barren woman's child. If it is said that impermanent beings attain Nirvana, that is also not right. Why? If it is impermanent, there is no meaning of liberation, like the earth and so on spoken of by externalists. It has already been verified that impermanence cannot attain liberation. The different entities of dharma established by externalists attaining liberation, all these are not established, because there is a fault in establishing the meaning. Furthermore, Vatsiputra said: 'As I establish the meaning, to say that a person (Pudgala) is neither permanent nor impermanent, because of this, the meaning of liberation can be established, and there are no faults as mentioned above.' The debater says: 'You think that in the ultimate truth, a person is truly existent, neither permanent nor impermanent, and attains liberation, that is also not right.' Why? Because it is established by conditions, like a pot and so on. Thus, your view is refuted. If it is a real dharma, it is also impermanent, like form and so on. From this verification, your...
實人者。則為可說。體是無常。汝言法體差別不可說者。此言則壞。立義過故。複次無餘涅槃一剎那時。人若有體即是常過。人若無體即是斷過。若言無餘涅槃彼剎那時不可說人有體無體者。此則與我中論義同。如經偈說。
解脫若有我 有我即是常 解脫若無我 無我即無常
複次此中立驗。第一義中緣人之覺無實境界。何以故。由覺故。譬如緣瓶等覺。由驗彼人無一物故。第一義中則無解脫。若汝定言人是實法。何以故。由可識故。譬如色等者。此義不然。無常等物。同是可識。無別體故。如兔角等因非一向。複次自部人言。由因緣故。展轉相續。諸行增長。若與貪等。煩惱共起。障礙善趣。貪等有故。縛義得成。若被縛者。聽聞正法。正念思惟。發生明慧。除無智暗。得離貪等。名為解脫。以是義故。縛脫得成。汝云何言。無縛無解。論者偈曰。
諸行生滅相 不縛亦不解 眾生如前說 不縛亦不解
釋曰。如先已說。諸行是常。諸行無常。皆無流轉。如外地等。今亦如是。諸行眾生若常無常有縛解者。此皆不然。如外地等。是故諸部如所分別。第一義中一切諸行流轉涅槃者。此皆不然。其執云何。彼謂諸行新新滅壞。或初如是住。乃至后時方有壞者。或謂不可說常及無常者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於『實人』（Sat-purusha，真實的人）的討論，如果『實人』是可以討論的，並且其本體是無常的，那麼你所說的『法體』（Dharma-kaya，法身）的差別不可說的觀點就站不住腳了，因為這會造成自相矛盾。這是因為你所設立的論點存在缺陷。 進一步說，在無餘涅槃（nirvana without remainder，沒有剩餘的涅槃）的那一剎那，如果『人』有本體，就會陷入『常』（eternalism，永恒論）的過失；如果『人』沒有本體，就會陷入『斷』（annihilationism，斷滅論）的過失。如果你說在無餘涅槃的那一剎那，不能說『人』有本體或沒有本體，那麼這與我的《中論》（Madhyamaka-karika，中觀論頌）的觀點相同，正如經文偈頌所說： 『解脫若有我（atman，自我），有我即是常；解脫若無我，無我即無常。』 進一步說，這裡可以設立一個論證：在第一義諦（paramartha-satya，勝義諦）中，緣于『人』的覺知並沒有真實的境界。為什麼呢？因為它是『覺』（cognition，認知）。例如，緣于瓶子的覺知。因為通過驗證，那個人並沒有任何實在之物。因此，在第一義諦中，就沒有解脫。如果你堅持說『人』是真實存在的法，理由是因為它是可以被認識的，就像色（rupa，色法）等一樣，那麼這個觀點是不成立的。因為無常等事物同樣是可以被認識的，但它們並沒有獨立的本體。就像兔角一樣，這個『因』（hetu，理由）不是必然成立的。 進一步說，自部（Sautrantika，經量部）的人認為，由於因緣（hetu-pratyaya，因和緣）的作用，諸行（samskara，行）展轉相續，不斷增長。如果與貪（raga，貪慾）等煩惱（klesha，煩惱）共同生起，就會障礙善趣（sugati，善道）。因為貪等煩惱的存在，束縛的意義才能成立。如果被束縛的人，聽聞正法（sad-dharma，正法），以正念（samyak-smriti，正念）進行思維，就能生起明慧（prajna，智慧），去除無智的黑暗，從而脫離貪等煩惱，這就被稱為解脫。因此，束縛和解脫才能成立。你為什麼說沒有束縛也沒有解脫呢？論者的偈頌說： 『諸行生滅相，不縛亦不解；眾生如前說，不縛亦不解。』 解釋：正如先前已經說過，諸行是常還是無常，都不會有流轉。就像外在的地等事物一樣。現在也是如此，諸行和眾生，無論是常還是無常，如果有束縛和解脫，這都是不成立的，就像外在的地等事物一樣。因此，各個部派所分別的，在第一義諦中一切諸行的流轉和涅槃，這些都是不成立的。他們的執著是什麼呢？他們認為諸行是新新滅壞的，或者最初是這樣住留，直到後來才壞滅，或者認為是不可說常與無常的。
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the discussion of 'Sat-purusha' (real person), if the 'Sat-purusha' is discussable and its essence is impermanent, then your statement that the differences in 'Dharma-kaya' (body of the Dharma) are inexpressible is untenable, because it would create a contradiction. This is because the argument you have established has flaws. Furthermore, at the moment of nirvana without remainder, if the 'person' has a substance, it would fall into the fault of 'eternalism'; if the 'person' has no substance, it would fall into the fault of 'annihilationism'. If you say that at the moment of nirvana without remainder, it cannot be said that the 'person' has or does not have a substance, then this is the same as my view in the 'Madhyamaka-karika' (Verses on the Middle Way), as the verse in the scripture says: 'If liberation has an 'atman' (self), having a self is eternal; if liberation has no self, having no self is impermanent.' Furthermore, an argument can be established here: In the ultimate truth (paramartha-satya), the perception of 'person' does not have a real object. Why? Because it is 'cognition'. For example, the perception of a pot. Because through verification, that person has nothing real. Therefore, in the ultimate truth, there is no liberation. If you insist that 'person' is a real dharma (phenomenon), because it is knowable, like 'rupa' (form) and so on, then this view is not valid. Because impermanent things are also knowable, but they do not have an independent substance. Like a rabbit's horn, this 'hetu' (reason) is not necessarily valid. Furthermore, people of the Sautrantika school say that due to the action of 'hetu-pratyaya' (causes and conditions), 'samskaras' (formations) continue to arise and grow. If they arise together with 'raga' (greed) and other 'kleshas' (afflictions), they will obstruct 'sugati' (good destinies). Because of the existence of greed and other afflictions, the meaning of bondage can be established. If the bound person hears the 'sad-dharma' (true Dharma), contemplates with 'samyak-smriti' (right mindfulness), then 'prajna' (wisdom) can arise, removing the darkness of ignorance, thereby escaping from greed and other afflictions, which is called liberation. Therefore, bondage and liberation can be established. Why do you say that there is no bondage and no liberation? The verse of the debater says: 'The characteristics of the arising and ceasing of formations neither bind nor liberate; sentient beings, as previously stated, neither bind nor liberate.' Explanation: As previously stated, whether formations are permanent or impermanent, there will be no transmigration. Like external earth and other things. It is the same now, whether formations and sentient beings are permanent or impermanent, if there is bondage and liberation, this is not valid, like external earth and other things. Therefore, the transmigration and nirvana of all formations in the ultimate truth, as distinguished by the various schools, are not valid. What are their attachments? They believe that formations are newly arising and ceasing, or initially abiding in this way, until they are destroyed later, or that they are inexpressible as permanent or impermanent.
。此諸行等皆無流轉及般涅槃。何以故。是起滅故。譬如瓶等。如先偈言。諸行起滅者。不縛亦不解。眾生如前說。不縛亦不解。諸行無住。何以故。剎那剎那別時而起。此相位中有縛解者。此義不然。如前已說。汝言諸行與貪俱起者。此已滅故。已滅之法得解脫者。是則不然。未來當起諸行剎那得解脫者。此亦不然。以相違故。偈言諸行起滅者。無縛解故。複次阿毗曇人言。如我俱舍論偈曰。無學心生時。諸障得解脫。汝云何言都無縛解。論者言。彼生時者。若有染污。若無染污。俱無解脫。有過失故。不可說者。彼染污時亦如上生時。若有染污若無染污。俱無解脫。不可說故。複次經部人言。相續道中有縛解故無過。論者言。彼相續者。無實體故。相續道中若有染污若無染污。亦無解脫。如前已破。於世諦中縛解成故。無斷滅過。若執眾生有縛解者。今答此義。如前偈說。眾生無體故。縛解法亦無。又如偈說。諸行常無常。皆無縛無解。眾生常無常。亦無縛無解。此意正爾。復有人言。有彼眾生沒在諸取。故名為縛。此縛息故名得解脫。然此眾生常以無常皆不可說。先言諸行若常無常皆有過者。我無此咎。論者偈曰。
若為諸取縛 縛者無解脫
釋曰。因諸取故說為取者。此人正為諸取縛故。名解脫
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這些諸行等等都沒有流轉和般涅槃（Parinirvana，完全的涅槃）。為什麼呢？因為它們是生起和滅去的。譬如瓶子等等。正如先前的偈頌所說：『諸行生起和滅去，不被束縛也不被解脫。眾生如前面所說，不被束縛也不被解脫。』諸行沒有住留。為什麼呢？因為剎那剎那之間，在不同的時間生起。在這種相位中存在束縛和解脫，這種說法是不對的。正如前面已經說過的。你說諸行與貪慾一同生起，但這些已經滅去了。已經滅去的法如果能夠得到解脫，那是不可能的。未來將要生起的諸行剎那得到解脫，這也是不可能的。因為這是相互矛盾的。偈頌說：『諸行生起和滅去，沒有束縛和解脫。』 再次，阿毗曇（Abhidhamma，論藏）學者說，正如我的《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa，論藏的根本論書）中的偈頌所說：『無學心生起時，各種障礙得到解脫。』你為什麼說根本沒有束縛和解脫呢？論者說，在這些生起的時候，無論是有染污還是沒有染污，都沒有解脫，因為有各種過失，是不可說的。那些染污的時候也像上面生起的時候一樣，無論是有染污還是沒有染污，都沒有解脫，因為是不可說的。 再次，經部（Sautrāntika，佛教部派之一）學者說，在相續的道中有束縛和解脫，所以沒有過失。論者說，這些相續沒有實體。在相續的道中，無論是有染污還是沒有染污，也沒有解脫，正如前面已經破斥過的。在世俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）中，束縛和解脫是成立的，所以沒有斷滅的過失。如果執著眾生有束縛和解脫，現在回答這個意思。正如前面的偈頌所說：『眾生沒有實體，所以束縛和解脫的法也沒有。』又如偈頌所說：『諸行是常還是無常，都沒有束縛和解脫。眾生是常還是無常，也沒有束縛和解脫。』這個意思正是如此。又有人說，有那些眾生沉沒在各種執取中，所以叫做束縛。這種束縛止息了，叫做得到解脫。然而這些眾生是常還是無常，都是不可說的。先前說諸行如果是常還是無常都有過失，我沒有這種過失。論者的偈頌說： 『如果被各種執取束縛，束縛者沒有解脫。』 解釋說：因為各種執取的原因，說為執取者，這個人正是因為被各種執取束縛，所以叫做解脫。
【English Translation】 English version: These aggregates and so on, all have no transmigration and Parinirvana (complete Nirvana). Why? Because they arise and cease. For example, like bottles and so on. As the previous verse said: 'Aggregates arise and cease, are neither bound nor liberated. Sentient beings, as previously stated, are neither bound nor liberated.' Aggregates have no abiding. Why? Because they arise at different times in each moment. It is not right to say that there is bondage and liberation in this phase. As has been said before. You say that aggregates arise together with greed, but these have already ceased. It is impossible for a dharma that has ceased to be liberated. It is also impossible for the aggregates that will arise in the future to be liberated in an instant. Because this is contradictory. The verse says: 'Aggregates arise and cease, there is no bondage and liberation.' Again, the Abhidhamma (collection of philosophical texts) scholars say, as my verse in the Abhidharmakośa (fundamental text of the Abhidhamma) says: 'When the mind of a non-learner arises, all obstacles are liberated.' Why do you say that there is no bondage and liberation at all? The debater says that at the time of these arising, whether there is defilement or no defilement, there is no liberation, because there are various faults, which are unspeakable. Those times of defilement are also like the times of arising above, whether there is defilement or no defilement, there is no liberation, because it is unspeakable. Again, the Sautrāntika (a Buddhist school) scholars say that there is no fault because there is bondage and liberation in the continuous path. The debater says that these continuations have no substance. In the continuous path, whether there is defilement or no defilement, there is no liberation, as has been refuted before. In Saṃvṛti-satya (relative truth), bondage and liberation are established, so there is no fault of annihilation. If one clings to the idea that sentient beings have bondage and liberation, now I will answer this meaning. As the previous verse said: 'Sentient beings have no substance, so there is no dharma of bondage and liberation.' Also, as the verse says: 'Whether aggregates are permanent or impermanent, there is no bondage and no liberation. Whether sentient beings are permanent or impermanent, there is no bondage and no liberation.' This is exactly what it means. Again, some people say that there are those sentient beings who are submerged in various attachments, so it is called bondage. When this bondage ceases, it is called liberation. However, whether these sentient beings are permanent or impermanent is unspeakable. Previously, it was said that if aggregates are permanent or impermanent, there are faults. I have no such fault. The debater's verse says: 'If bound by various attachments, the bound are not liberated.' The explanation says: Because of the various attachments, it is said to be the one who attaches. This person is precisely because he is bound by various attachments, so it is called liberation.
者。義則不然。縛解二法性相違故。複次第一義中調達之取。此取不作彼調達者。何以故。由取故如耶。若取若定如此先無其取而有彼者。義則不然。如偈曰。
無取故無縛 何位人可縛
釋曰。若離取位無別人位。以是義故。無人可縛。偈意如此。復有人言。定有眾生是其可縛。何以故。由有縛故。如有杻械枷鎖等具幽禁彼人。由此諸取為能縛故。知有眾生是其可縛。論者偈曰。
若縛者先縛 可言縛能縛 而先實無縛 去來中已遮
釋曰。汝謂先有縛具故有可縛眾生。而縛者之先實無縛具。云何驗耶。由調達無縛何以故。以同時故。如調達體。複次已縛者不縛。何以故。已被縛故。已被縛者不復更縛。如不解脫未縛者亦不縛。何以故。以無縛故。如解脫者。縛時亦不縛。何以故。彼縛時者。一分已縛。一分未縛。有二過故。複次不可說者。亦無縛義。何以故。不可說故。如解脫時是已脫者。此則不然。複次去來品中。已廣分別已去未去及以去時有初發者。三皆不然。此亦如是。已縛未。縛及以縛時有縛初起者。三皆不然。云何不然。彼已縛者有更縛初起。義則不然。何以故。由已縛故。譬如久已縛者。彼未縛者有縛初起。是亦不然。何以故。由未縛故。譬如久解脫者。若謂縛時有縛
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 不然，如果從意義上來說，束縛和解脫是兩種性質相反的法。再者，在第一義諦中，調達（Devadatta，人名）的『取』（upādāna，執取）並不能使他成為調達。為什麼呢？因為如果是『取』導致了調達，那麼就像耶（ya，疑問詞）。如果『取』能夠決定某人，那麼應該先有『取』，然後才有那個人，但事實並非如此。正如偈頌所說： 『沒有『取』就沒有束縛，什麼樣的人會被束縛呢？』 解釋：如果離開了『取』的位置，就沒有其他的人的位置。因此，沒有人可以被束縛。偈頌的意思是這樣。又有人說，一定有眾生是可以被束縛的。為什麼呢？因為有束縛存在。比如有枷鎖等工具來囚禁那個人。由此可知，『取』是能夠束縛的，所以一定有眾生是可以被束縛的。論者說： 『如果束縛者先被束縛，才能說束縛能夠束縛；但實際上並沒有先被束縛，過去、未來、現在都已經否定了這種說法。』 解釋：你說先有束縛的工具，所以有可以被束縛的眾生。但是，束縛者之前實際上並沒有束縛的工具。怎麼證明呢？因為調達沒有被束縛。為什麼呢？因為是同時的，就像調達的身體一樣。再者，已經被束縛的人不會再被束縛。為什麼呢？因為已經被束縛了。已經被束縛的人不會再被束縛，就像不解脫的人一樣。未被束縛的人也不會被束縛。為什麼呢？因為沒有束縛，就像解脫的人一樣。束縛的時候也不會被束縛。為什麼呢？因為束縛的時候，一部分已經被束縛，一部分還沒有被束縛，這樣就有了兩種過失。再者，不可說的人，也沒有束縛的意義。為什麼呢？因為不可說，就像解脫的時候是已經解脫的人一樣，這是不對的。再者，在過去、未來品中，已經廣泛地分別了已去、未去以及去的時候有最初出發的人，這三種情況都是不對的。這裡也是一樣，已縛、未縛以及縛的時候有束縛最初開始的情況，這三種情況都是不對的。為什麼不對呢？對於已經被束縛的人來說，有再次開始束縛的情況，這是不對的。為什麼呢？因為已經被束縛了，就像很久以前就被束縛的人一樣。對於未被束縛的人來說，有束縛最初開始的情況，這也是不對的。為什麼呢？因為沒有被束縛，就像很久以前就解脫的人一樣。如果說束縛的時候有束縛...
【English Translation】 English version: It is not so in terms of meaning. Because bondage and liberation are two dharmas (laws, principles) with opposite natures. Furthermore, in the ultimate truth, Devadatta's (a person's name) 'upādāna' (grasping, clinging) does not make him that Devadatta. Why? Because if 'upādāna' caused Devadatta, then it would be like 'ya' (an interrogative particle). If 'upādāna' could determine someone, then there should be 'upādāna' first, and then that person, but that is not the case. As the verse says: 'Without 'upādāna' there is no bondage, what kind of person can be bound?' Explanation: If one is separated from the position of 'upādāna', there is no other position of a person. Therefore, no one can be bound. This is the meaning of the verse. Again, some say that there must be sentient beings who can be bound. Why? Because there is bondage. For example, there are tools such as shackles and locks to imprison that person. From this, it is known that 'upādāna' is capable of binding, so there must be sentient beings who can be bound. The debater says: 'If the binder is bound first, then it can be said that the binding is capable of binding; but in reality, there is no prior binding, the past, future, and present have already negated this statement.' Explanation: You say that there are binding tools first, so there are sentient beings who can be bound. However, before the binder, there are actually no binding tools. How to prove it? Because Devadatta is not bound. Why? Because it is simultaneous, just like Devadatta's body. Furthermore, those who have already been bound will not be bound again. Why? Because they have already been bound. Those who have already been bound will not be bound again, just like those who are not liberated. Those who have not been bound will not be bound either. Why? Because there is no bondage, just like those who are liberated. There is also no binding at the time of binding. Why? Because at the time of binding, part has already been bound, and part has not been bound, so there are two faults. Furthermore, those who are unspeakable also have no meaning of bondage. Why? Because they are unspeakable, just like those who are liberated at the time of liberation, which is not correct. Furthermore, in the past and future chapters, it has been widely distinguished that the three situations of those who have gone, have not gone, and those who have just started at the time of going are all incorrect. It is the same here, the three situations of those who have been bound, have not been bound, and those who have just started binding at the time of binding are all incorrect. Why are they incorrect? For those who have already been bound, there is a situation of starting to bind again, which is incorrect. Why? Because they have already been bound, just like those who have been bound for a long time. For those who have not been bound, there is a situation of starting to bind, which is also incorrect. Why? Because they have not been bound, just like those who have been liberated for a long time. If it is said that there is binding at the time of binding...
初起者。是亦不然。何以故。二俱過故。及不可說故。如解脫時。問曰。我意定謂有如是縛。何以故。有相違故。譬如智慧對治無知縛。對治者。所謂解脫。由解脫故縛則非無。答曰。若汝定謂。有解脫者。為已縛者。為未縛者。為正縛時有解脫耶。三皆不然。如偈曰。
縛者則無脫
釋曰。縛對治道未起之時。此名為縛。不得名脫。何以故。無對治故。如具縛者。偈曰。
未縛者無脫
釋曰。由縛空故。縛空者。於世諦中縛無體故。如久解脫者。若謂脫時名解脫者。誰是脫時。汝應定說。若已縛者名為脫時。是亦不然。偈曰。
縛時有脫者 縛脫則一時
釋曰。縛脫同時不欲如此。是故彼人。復欲取縛。復欲取解。若如此者。有縛解過。不能避故。由如是故。第一義中有解脫者。此義不然。如汝上言。有相違故。及對治者。此因譬喻二皆不成。立義有過。外人言。第一義中解脫是有。何以故。求解脫者有希望故。果若無者。終不為彼起希望心。譬如屯度婆蛇頂珠。由定有故。求解脫者起希望心。如偈曰。
我滅無諸取 我當得涅槃
釋曰。云何當知有涅槃耶。譬如薪上火滅。是故定有涅槃可得。論者言。汝謂我滅無諸取我當得涅槃者。此執不然。如偈曰。
受如
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 初學者會說：『並非如此。』為什麼呢？因為這兩種說法都有過失，而且是不可言說的。比如解脫的時候。』 有人問：『我確信有這樣的束縛。』為什麼呢？『因為有相反的情況。』比如智慧可以對治無知的束縛。所謂對治，就是解脫。因為有解脫，所以束縛並非不存在。 回答說：『如果你確信有解脫，那麼是已經束縛的人解脫，還是未曾束縛的人解脫，還是正在束縛的時候解脫呢？』這三種情況都不對。如偈頌所說： 『被束縛的人則沒有解脫。』 解釋：束縛的對治之道尚未生起的時候，這叫做束縛，不能叫做解脫。為什麼呢？因為沒有對治的緣故。就像被完全束縛的人一樣。偈頌說： 『未被束縛的人沒有解脫。』 解釋：因為束縛是空性的緣故。所謂束縛是空性，是指在世俗諦中，束縛沒有實體。就像已經獲得解脫的人一樣。如果說解脫的時候才叫做解脫，那麼誰是解脫的時候呢？你應該明確地說出來。如果說已經被束縛的人才叫做解脫的時候，這也是不對的。偈頌說： 『束縛的時候有解脫，那麼束縛和解脫就是同一時間了。』 解釋：束縛和解脫同時發生是不合理的。因此，那個人既想要抓住束縛，又想要抓住解脫。如果這樣的話，就會有束縛和解脫的過失，無法避免。因為這個緣故，在第一義諦中說有解脫是不成立的。就像你上面所說，『因為有相反的情況』，以及『對治』，這些原因和比喻都不能成立，立論有過失。 外人說：『在第一義諦中，解脫是存在的。』為什麼呢？『因為尋求解脫的人有希望的緣故。』如果結果不存在，就不會對它產生希望。就像屯度婆蛇頂上的寶珠一樣，因為確實存在，所以尋求解脫的人才會產生希望。如偈頌所說： 『我滅盡了諸取，我將獲得涅槃。』 解釋：怎麼知道有涅槃呢？就像柴火上的火焰熄滅一樣，所以一定有涅槃可以獲得。 論者說：『你說我滅盡了諸取，我將獲得涅槃，這種執著是不對的。』如偈頌所說： 『受如……』
【English Translation】 English version: An initial practitioner might say: 'It is not so.' Why is that? Because both views have faults, and are inexpressible. For example, at the time of liberation.' Someone asks: 'I am certain that there is such a bondage.' Why is that? 'Because there is opposition.' For example, wisdom can counteract the bondage of ignorance. What is meant by counteracting is liberation. Because of liberation, bondage is not non-existent. The reply is: 'If you are certain that there is liberation, is it the one who is already bound who is liberated, or the one who has not been bound, or is there liberation at the time of being bound?' None of these three is correct. As the verse says: 'The one who is bound has no liberation.' Explanation: When the path of counteracting bondage has not yet arisen, this is called bondage, and cannot be called liberation. Why is that? Because there is no counteraction. Like one who is completely bound. The verse says: 'The one who is not bound has no liberation.' Explanation: Because bondage is empty. What is meant by bondage being empty is that in conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), bondage has no substance. Like one who has long been liberated. If it is said that liberation is called liberation at the time of liberation, then who is at the time of liberation? You should state it clearly. If it is said that the one who has already been bound is called the time of liberation, that is also not correct. The verse says: 'If there is liberation at the time of bondage, then bondage and liberation are at the same time.' Explanation: Bondage and liberation occurring simultaneously is not desirable. Therefore, that person wants to grasp both bondage and liberation. If this is the case, there will be the fault of both bondage and liberation, which cannot be avoided. For this reason, in ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), the statement that there is liberation is not established. As you said above, 'because there is opposition,' and 'counteraction,' these reasons and metaphors are not established, and the proposition has faults. An outsider says: 'In ultimate truth, liberation exists.' Why is that? 'Because those who seek liberation have hope.' If the result does not exist, they would never have hope for it. Like the jewel on the head of a Tundubha snake, because it certainly exists, those who seek liberation have hope. As the verse says: 'I will extinguish all grasping, I will attain Nirvana (Nirvāṇa).' (Nirvāṇa: the ultimate goal of Buddhism, the cessation of suffering and rebirth) Explanation: How do we know that there is Nirvana? Like the fire on firewood being extinguished, so there is certainly Nirvana to be attained. The debater says: 'Your assertion that I will extinguish all grasping and I will attain Nirvana is not correct.' As the verse says: 'Suffering as...'
是執者 此執為不善
釋曰。若起如是緣取我當得涅槃者。此非善執。何以故。此不善執障解脫故。偈意正爾。複次取無自體。而計取為境緣。此所起邪分別智名不善執。是故汝言。求解脫者有希望故。以此為因者。此因不成。如是諦觀諸行眾生。及彼人等有縛脫者。此皆不然。如阿阇梨教諸學者。說此偈曰。
不應捨生死 不應立涅槃 生死及涅槃 無二無分別
釋曰。第一義中生死涅槃一相無差別。如虛空相故。無分別智境故。不集不散。非實法故。是故不應作是分別。舍離生死安置涅槃。若立若謗者。皆分別智。自在可得物境界故。若是可得物境界者。此等皆是集散法故。複次或有眾生堪以涅槃而教化者。誘引彼故說有涅槃。云何安立。但于未來不善諸行分別不起煩惱息相。是則名為寂滅涅槃。故名安立。又為令彼厭離生死。作如是言。生死苦多。汝應舍離。何以故。諸行展轉從緣起者。自體無實。如幻夢焰。即說此等名為生死。舍離此故名為涅槃。世諦門中作如是說。非第一義。何以故。第一義中諸行空故。煩惱息相名涅槃者。此等亦無。不應置立別有涅槃。由彼諸行自體無起。本來寂滅如涅槃故。而欲安立為涅槃者。此義不然。捨生死者。亦不應爾。如前偈言。不應捨生死。不應
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『是執者，此執為不善』
解釋：如果生起這樣的想法，認為通過執取『我』就能獲得涅槃（Nirvana，佛教術語，指解脫生死輪迴的境界），那麼這種執取是不好的。為什麼呢？因為這種不好的執取會障礙解脫。這句偈頌的意思正是如此。進一步說，執取沒有自性的事物，並將其視為境界緣起，由此產生的邪分別智就叫做不善執。所以你說，求解脫的人因為有希望，才以這種執取為因，這個因是不成立的。像這樣如實觀察諸行（Samskara，佛教術語，指一切有為法），眾生，以及那些人等，認為他們有被束縛和解脫的，這些都是不對的。就像阿阇梨（Acharya，佛教術語，指導師）教導學生時，說這首偈頌：
『不應捨生死，不應立涅槃，生死及涅槃，無二無分別』
解釋：在第一義諦（Paramārtha-satya，佛教術語，指最高的真理）中，生死（Samsara，佛教術語，指生死輪迴）和涅槃的體相是一樣的，沒有差別，就像虛空的體相一樣。因為是無分別智的境界，所以不聚集也不消散，不是真實存在的法。因此，不應該這樣分別，捨棄生死，安置涅槃。無論是建立還是誹謗，都是分別智的作用，因為是自在可得之物的境界。如果是可得之物的境界，那麼這些都是聚集和消散的法。進一步說，或許有些眾生適合用涅槃來教化，爲了引導他們，所以說有涅槃。如何安立呢？只是對於未來不善的諸行，分別不起煩惱，息滅煩惱的相狀，這就叫做寂滅涅槃，所以叫做安立。又爲了讓他們厭離生死，這樣說：生死有很多痛苦，你應該捨棄。為什麼呢？因為諸行輾轉從因緣而生起，自體沒有真實，就像幻象、夢境、火焰一樣。就說這些叫做生死，捨棄這些就叫做涅槃。在世俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya，佛教術語，指相對的真理）的層面這樣說，不是在第一義諦的層面。為什麼呢？因為在第一義諦中，諸行是空的，息滅煩惱的相狀叫做涅槃，這些也是沒有的，不應該另外設立一個涅槃。因為那些諸行自體沒有生起，本來就是寂滅的，就像涅槃一樣。而想要安立它為涅槃，這個道理是不對的。捨棄生死，也不應該是這樣。就像前面的偈頌所說：不應該捨棄生死，不應該。
【English Translation】 English version: 'He who grasps, this grasping is not good.'
Explanation: If one arises with the thought that by grasping 'I' one can attain Nirvana (the state of liberation from the cycle of birth and death), then this grasping is not good. Why? Because this bad grasping obstructs liberation. The meaning of this verse is precisely this. Furthermore, grasping things that have no self-nature and considering them as the object of conditions, the wrong discriminating wisdom that arises from this is called bad grasping. Therefore, when you say that those who seek liberation take this grasping as a cause because they have hope, this cause is not established. Observing beings, all phenomena (Samskara), and those people in this way, thinking that they are bound and liberated, is incorrect. It is like when an Acharya (teacher) teaches students, saying this verse:
'One should not abandon Samsara, one should not establish Nirvana, Samsara and Nirvana are non-dual and without distinction.'
Explanation: In the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), Samsara (the cycle of birth and death) and Nirvana are of the same nature, without difference, just like the nature of space. Because it is the realm of non-discriminating wisdom, it neither gathers nor disperses, and is not a real dharma (phenomenon). Therefore, one should not discriminate in this way, abandoning Samsara and establishing Nirvana. Whether establishing or slandering, it is the function of discriminating wisdom, because it is the realm of things that can be freely obtained. If it is the realm of things that can be obtained, then these are all dharmas of gathering and dispersing. Furthermore, perhaps some beings are suitable to be taught with Nirvana, and in order to guide them, it is said that there is Nirvana. How is it established? It is simply that with regard to future unwholesome actions, one does not give rise to discrimination, afflictions, and the cessation of afflictions, which is called quiescent Nirvana, and therefore it is called establishment. Also, in order to make them厭離(yearn to leave) Samsara, it is said: Samsara has much suffering, you should abandon it. Why? Because all phenomena arise from conditions in turn, and their self-nature is not real, like illusions, dreams, and flames. These are called Samsara, and abandoning these is called Nirvana. This is said in the realm of conventional truth (Saṃvṛti-satya), not in the realm of ultimate truth. Why? Because in the ultimate truth, all phenomena are empty, and the cessation of afflictions is called Nirvana, but these are also non-existent, and one should not separately establish a Nirvana. Because those phenomena themselves do not arise, and are originally quiescent like Nirvana. And to want to establish it as Nirvana, this reasoning is incorrect. Abandoning Samsara should also not be like this. Just like the previous verse said: One should not abandon Samsara, one should not.
立涅槃。生死及涅槃。無二無分別。應如是解生死涅槃。第一義中無差別故。若謂此二境界差別。由境別故慧亦別者。二俱不然。如彼外人品初所說。第一義中有是生死有縛解故以為因者。此義不成。由彼說驗成立法者。論者前來已與彼過。令他解悟生死涅槃空無所有。是此品義。是故得成。如般若波羅蜜經中。佛告極勇猛菩薩言。善男子。色無縛無脫。受想行識無縛無脫。若色至識無縛無脫。是名般若波羅蜜。又如梵王所問經說。佛言。梵王。我不得生死。不得涅槃。何以故。言生死者。但是如來假施設故。而無一人于中流轉。說涅槃者。亦假施設。而無一人般涅槃者。如是等諸修多羅此中應廣說。
釋觀縛解品竟。
般若燈論釋卷第九 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 般若燈論釋
般若燈論釋卷第十
偈本龍樹菩薩 釋論分別明菩薩
大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅譯
觀業品第十七
釋曰。今此品者。亦為遮空所對治。令解業果無自體義故說。
阿毗曇人言。彼於前品中說諸行流轉。眾生及人等亦皆流轉者不然。而彼驗中立義言。諸行若常若無常者。是斷常過故。有流轉者不然。而說諸行畢竟無有流轉。彼先作此說故。我今此中說常無常。無如是
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：立涅槃（Nirvana，寂滅）。生死及涅槃。無二無分別。應如是理解生死涅槃，在第一義諦（Paramārtha，最高真理）中沒有差別。如果認為這二者境界有差別，因為所對之境不同，所以智慧也有差別，這兩種說法都不對。如同《外人品》最初所說。在第一義諦中，如果因為有生死、有束縛和解脫，就認為有因，這種說法不成立。因為他們用經驗來建立法則，論者之前已經指出他們的過失，讓他們理解生死涅槃都是空無所有的。這是此品的意義，所以能夠成立。如同《般若波羅蜜經》（Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra）中，佛（Buddha）告訴極勇猛菩薩（Bodhisattva）說：『善男子，色（Rūpa，物質）沒有束縛也沒有解脫，受（Vedanā，感受）、想（Saṃjñā，概念）、行（Saṃskāra，意志）、識（Vijñāna，意識）沒有束縛也沒有解脫。如果色乃至識沒有束縛也沒有解脫，這就叫做般若波羅蜜。』又如《梵王所問經》所說，佛說：『梵王（Brahmā），我不得生死，也不得涅槃。為什麼呢？說生死，只不過是如來（Tathāgata）假施設，而沒有一個人在其中流轉。說涅槃，也是假施設，而沒有一個人般涅槃。』像這樣的修多羅（Sūtra，經）在這裡應該廣泛地解說。 《釋觀縛解品》結束。 《般若燈論釋》卷第九 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 《般若燈論釋》 《般若燈論釋》卷第十 偈本：龍樹菩薩（Nāgārjuna），釋論：分別明菩薩 大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅譯 《觀業品》第十七 解釋：現在這一品，也是爲了遮止空見（Śūnyatā），所要對治的，爲了讓人理解業果（Karma-phala）沒有自體的意義而說的。 阿毗曇（Abhidharma）人說，他們在前品中說諸行流轉，眾生及人等也都在流轉，這種說法不對。而且他們在經驗中立義說，諸行如果常或者無常，就是斷常的過失，所以有流轉，這種說法不對。而是說諸行畢竟沒有流轉。他們先前這樣說，所以我現在在這裡說常無常，沒有這樣的...
【English Translation】 English version: Establishing Nirvāṇa (extinction). Saṃsāra (birth and death) and Nirvāṇa are not two, without distinction. Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa should be understood in this way, as there is no difference in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha). If it is argued that these two states differ, and because the objects they relate to are different, wisdom also differs, both of these views are incorrect, as stated at the beginning of the 'Outsider' chapter. In the ultimate truth, if one considers there to be a cause because there is Saṃsāra, bondage, and liberation, this argument is not valid. Because they establish the Dharma (law, teaching) based on experience, the commentator has already pointed out their error, leading them to understand that Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa are empty and without substance. This is the meaning of this chapter, and therefore it is established. As in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra (Perfection of Wisdom Sutra), the Buddha (enlightened one) said to the extremely courageous Bodhisattva (enlightenment being): 'Good man, Rūpa (form, matter) has no bondage and no liberation; Vedanā (feeling), Saṃjñā (perception), Saṃskāra (mental formations), and Vijñāna (consciousness) have no bondage and no liberation. If Rūpa to Vijñāna have no bondage and no liberation, this is called Prajñāpāramitā.' Furthermore, as stated in the Brahma's Question Sutra, the Buddha said: 'Brahmā (creator god), I do not attain Saṃsāra, nor do I attain Nirvāṇa. Why? Because the term Saṃsāra is merely a provisional designation by the Tathāgata (one who has thus come), and no one actually transmigrates within it. The term Nirvāṇa is also a provisional designation, and no one actually attains Parinirvāṇa (complete extinction).' Such Sūtras (discourses) should be extensively explained here. End of the chapter on 'Examining Bondage and Liberation'. Prajñāpradīpa-ṭīkā, Volume 9 Taishō Tripitaka, Volume 30, No. 1566, Prajñāpradīpa-ṭīkā Prajñāpradīpa-ṭīkā, Volume 10 Verses by Nāgārjuna (Buddhist philosopher), Commentary by Vimalamati (Bodhisattva) Translated by Tripitaka Master Paramārtha from Central India of the Great Tang Dynasty Chapter 17: Examination of Karma Explanation: This chapter is also presented to counter the attachment to emptiness (Śūnyatā), which needs to be addressed, in order to make people understand that the fruits of karma (Karma-phala) have no intrinsic existence. The Abhidharma (Buddhist philosophy) proponents say that their statement in the previous chapter that all phenomena are in flux, and that beings and people are also in flux, is incorrect. Moreover, they establish their argument based on experience, saying that if phenomena are either permanent or impermanent, it would be a fault of eternalism or annihilationism, so there is flux, but this is incorrect. Rather, they say that phenomena ultimately have no flux. They said this previously, so I am now saying here that there is neither permanence nor impermanence, there is no such...
過。而有諸行流轉。作是說者。欲令物解。第一義中定有如是內諸入諸行生死與業果合故。此若無者。不見諸行與業果有合。譬如石女兒。今有諸行與業果合故。而有生死。是故我今觀察業果。其義如阿毗曇中廣說。故彼偈言。自護身口思。及彼攝他者。慈法為種子。能得現未果。所言思者。謂能自調伏遠離非法。與此心相應思故名為思攝他者。謂佈施愛語救護怖畏者。以如是等能攝他故。名為攝他。慈者謂心心即名法。亦是種子。種子者亦名因。為誰因耶。謂果之因。是何等果。謂是現在未來之果。云何名心為種子耶。謂能起身口業故。名為種子。云何名非法。違法故名為非法。非法者謂惡及不善等。云何名無記。謂違法非法名為無記。無記者有四種業。一者報生。二者威儀。三者工巧。四者變化。又無記者。不記善不善故。名為無記。又無記者。不起善不善果。亦名無記。有如是等差別。俱舍論中亦有二種。其義云何。故論偈曰。
大仙所說業 思及思所起 於是二業中 無量差別說
釋曰。云何名大仙。聲聞辟支佛諸菩薩等亦名為仙。佛于其中最尊上故。名為大仙。已到一切諸波羅蜜功德善根彼岸故。名為大仙。複次前偈列名。今當別釋。其義云何。故論偈言。
如前所說思 但名為意
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：有人認為，諸行（Samskara，所有有為法的總稱）是流轉變化的。他們這樣說，是爲了讓人們理解，在第一義諦（Paramārtha-satya，究竟真理）中，內六入（Āyatana，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六種感覺器官）和諸行、生死與業果（Karma-phala，行為的果報）一定是結合在一起的。如果不是這樣，就無法看到諸行與業果之間的聯繫。就像石女兒（Śila-putraka，比喻虛無的事物）一樣，是不存在的。現在因為諸行與業果結合，所以才有生死。因此，我現在觀察業果，其意義就像《阿毗達磨》（Abhidharma，佛教論藏）中廣泛闡述的那樣。所以那首偈頌說：『守護自己的身、口、意，以及那些攝受他人的人，以慈法為種子，能得到現在和未來的果報。』 所說的『思』，是指能夠自我調伏，遠離非法（adharma，不符合佛法的行為）。與這種心相應的思，所以稱為『思』。『攝他者』，是指佈施、愛語、救護那些恐懼的人等等。因為像這樣能夠攝受他人，所以稱為『攝他』。『慈』是指心，心即是法，也是種子。『種子』也稱為『因』。是作為什麼的因呢？是果的因。是什麼樣的果呢？是現在和未來的果。為什麼說心是種子呢？因為能夠引發身口業，所以稱為種子。什麼叫做『非法』呢？違背法就叫做非法。非法是指惡和不善等等。什麼叫做『無記』（avyākrta，非善非惡）呢？違背法和非法就叫做無記。無記有四種業：一是報生（vipāka，果報所生），二是威儀（iryāpatha，行住坐臥的儀態），三是工巧（nairmānika，工藝技巧），四是變化（pratibhānika，神通變化）。又，無記是不記善不善，所以稱為無記。又，無記是不產生善不善的果報，也稱為無記。有像這樣的差別。《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa，佛教論書）中也有兩種，其意義是什麼呢？所以論中的偈頌說： 『大仙（Maharsi，偉大的聖人）所說的業，是思（cetanā，意志）及思所起（cetanā-kṛta，由意志所產生的行為）。在這兩種業中，有無量的差別。』 解釋說：什麼叫做『大仙』呢？聲聞（Śrāvaka，聽聞佛法而證悟者）、辟支佛（Pratyekabuddha，緣覺）和諸菩薩（Bodhisattva，追求覺悟的修行者）等也稱為仙。佛在其中最尊貴，所以稱為大仙。已經到達一切諸波羅蜜（Pāramitā，到達彼岸的方法，如佈施、持戒等）功德善根的彼岸，所以稱為大仙。再次，前面的偈頌只是列出名稱，現在應當分別解釋，其意義是什麼呢？所以論中的偈頌說： 『如前所說的思，僅僅稱為意（manas，意識）。』
【English Translation】 English version: Some argue that the Samskaras (all conditioned phenomena) are in constant flux. They say this to make people understand that, in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), the six internal sense bases (Āyatana: the six sense organs of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind) and the Samskaras, birth and death, and the fruits of karma (Karma-phala) must be interconnected. If this were not the case, one could not see the connection between the Samskaras and the fruits of karma. It would be like the son of a barren woman (Śila-putraka), which does not exist. Now, because the Samskaras are combined with the fruits of karma, there is birth and death. Therefore, I now observe the fruits of karma, the meaning of which is extensively explained in the Abhidharma (Buddhist philosophical treatises). Therefore, the verse says: 'Protecting one's own body, speech, and mind, and those who embrace others, with the Dharma of loving-kindness as the seed, one can obtain the fruits in the present and future.' The 'thought' (cetanā) that is spoken of refers to the ability to subdue oneself and stay away from unlawful actions (adharma). Thought that corresponds to this mind is called 'thought'. 'Those who embrace others' refers to giving, loving speech, protecting those who are afraid, and so on. Because they can embrace others in this way, they are called 'those who embrace others'. 'Loving-kindness' refers to the mind, and the mind is the Dharma, and it is also the seed. 'Seed' is also called 'cause'. What is it the cause of? It is the cause of the fruit. What kind of fruit is it? It is the fruit of the present and the future. Why is the mind called a seed? Because it can initiate actions of body, speech, and mind, it is called a seed. What is called 'unlawful'? That which violates the Dharma is called unlawful. Unlawful refers to evil and unwholesome things, and so on. What is called 'indeterminate' (avyākrta)? That which violates the Dharma and is unlawful is called indeterminate. There are four kinds of indeterminate actions: first, resultant (vipāka), second, deportment (iryāpatha), third, skillful (nairmānika), and fourth, transformative (pratibhānika). Also, indeterminate means that it does not record good or bad, so it is called indeterminate. Also, indeterminate means that it does not produce good or bad results, so it is also called indeterminate. There are such differences. There are also two kinds in the Abhidharmakośa (Buddhist philosophical text), what is their meaning? Therefore, the verse in the treatise says: 'The karma spoken of by the Great Sage (Maharsi), is thought (cetanā) and that which arises from thought (cetanā-kṛta). Among these two kinds of karma, there are countless differences.' The explanation says: What is called 'Great Sage'? Śrāvakas (those who attain enlightenment by hearing the Dharma), Pratyekabuddhas (Solitary Buddhas), and Bodhisattvas (those who seek enlightenment) are also called sages. The Buddha is the most honored among them, so he is called the Great Sage. Having reached the other shore of all the perfections (Pāramitā, such as giving, morality, etc.), merits, and roots of goodness, he is called the Great Sage. Again, the previous verse only listed the names, now we should explain them separately, what is their meaning? Therefore, the verse in the treatise says: 'As the thought mentioned before, it is merely called mind (manas).'
業 從思所起者 即是身口業
釋曰。云何說思但是意業。謂思與意相應名為意業。複次此思于意門中得究竟故。名為意業。非身口業。云何名從思所起。謂知已知已作作者名思所起業。此業有二種。謂身及口。若於身門究竟。口門究竟者。名身業口業。說二業已。次說無量種差別。云何名無量種差別耶。故論偈言。
身業及口業 作與無作四 語起遠離等 皆有善不善
釋曰。語起者。謂以文字了了出言。名為語起。云何名遠離。謂運動身手等。運動者。謂起念言。我當作此善業。從初受善業思。后受善業思。所起之人。若作善業。若不作業。遠離無作色體恒生。不遠離者。亦如是念言。我當作此不善業。若身若口若意從初不善業剎那所起之人。若作惡業。若不作從不善因。名不遠離。無作色體恒生。云何名作無作色。以身口色令他解者名為作色。不以身口色令他解者名無作色。故論偈言。
受用自體福 罪生亦如是 及思為七業 能了諸業相
釋曰。云何名受用自體。謂檀越所舍房舍園林衣服飲食臥具湯藥資身具等。云何名福。謂撈漉義。見諸眾生沒溺煩惱河中。起大悲心。漉出衆生。置涅槃岸故名為福。非福者。謂作種種不善之事。能令眾生入諸惡道。云何亦是受
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 業 從思慮所產生的，就是身業和口業。
解釋：為什麼說思慮只是意業呢？因為思慮與意念相應，所以稱為意業。而且，這種思慮在意識的活動中達到最終完成，因此稱為意業，而不是身業或口業。什麼叫做『從思所起』呢？就是指已經知道、已經瞭解，並且已經行動的作者所產生的業。這種業有兩種，即身業和口業。如果在身體的活動中完成，或者在語言的表達中完成，就稱為身業或口業。在說明了這兩種業之後，接下來要說明無量種類的差別。什麼叫做無量種類的差別呢？所以論中用偈語說：
身業以及口業，作與無作有四種； 語的生起、遠離等等，都有善與不善。
解釋：『語起』是指用文字清晰地表達出來，稱為語起。什麼叫做『遠離』呢？是指運動身體、手等等。『運動』是指產生念頭說：『我應當做這個善業。』從最初接受善業的思慮，到後來接受善業的思慮，由此所產生的人，如果做了善業，或者沒有做善業，遠離（惡業）的無作色體（Avijahati-rupa）就會恒常產生。不遠離（善業）也是這樣，念頭說：『我應當做這個不善業。』無論是身、口、意，從最初不善業的剎那所產生的人，如果做了惡業，或者沒有做惡業，從不善的因緣，就叫做不遠離。無作色體恒常產生。什麼叫做作色（kata-rupa）和無作色（akata-rupa）呢？用身體和語言的表達使他人理解的，叫做作色；不用身體和語言的表達使他人理解的，叫做無作色。所以論中用偈語說：
受用自身所擁有的，福德和罪惡的產生也是這樣； 以及思慮這七種業，能夠了解各種業的相狀。
解釋：什麼叫做『受用自體』呢？是指施主所佈施的房舍、園林、衣服、飲食、臥具、湯藥以及其他生活用品等等。什麼叫做『福』呢？是指撈取、救助的意思。看到各種眾生沉溺在煩惱的河流中，生起大悲心，把眾生撈出來，安置在涅槃（Nirvana）的彼岸，所以叫做福。什麼叫做『非福』呢？是指做各種不善的事情，能夠使眾生進入各種惡道。什麼也叫做受用
【English Translation】 English version Karma That which arises from thought is bodily and verbal karma.
Explanation: Why is it said that thought is only mental karma? Because thought is associated with mind, it is called mental karma. Furthermore, this thought attains completion in the realm of the mind, hence it is called mental karma, not bodily or verbal karma. What is meant by 'arising from thought'? It refers to the karma produced by an agent who has known, understood, and acted. This karma is of two kinds: bodily and verbal. If it is completed in bodily action or in verbal expression, it is called bodily or verbal karma. Having explained these two karmas, next, we will explain the immeasurable kinds of differences. What are these immeasurable kinds of differences? Therefore, the treatise says in verse:
Bodily karma and verbal karma, Acting and non-acting are fourfold; The arising of speech, abstaining, and so on, All have good and non-good.
Explanation: 'Arising of speech' refers to clearly expressing oneself with words, which is called the arising of speech. What is meant by 'abstaining'? It refers to moving the body, hands, and so on. 'Moving' refers to generating the thought: 'I should perform this good karma.' From the initial thought of accepting good karma to the subsequent thought of accepting good karma, the person who arises from this, whether they perform the good karma or not, the non-acting form (Avijahati-rupa) of abstaining (from evil) constantly arises. Non-abstaining (from good) is also like this, with the thought: 'I should perform this non-good karma.' Whether it is body, speech, or mind, from the initial moment of non-good karma, the person who arises from this, whether they perform the evil karma or not, from the non-good cause, it is called non-abstaining. The non-acting form constantly arises. What are called acting form (kata-rupa) and non-acting form (akata-rupa)? That which causes others to understand through bodily and verbal expression is called acting form; that which does not cause others to understand through bodily and verbal expression is called non-acting form. Therefore, the treatise says in verse:
Enjoying what one possesses, The arising of merit and demerit is also like this; And thought, these seven karmas, Are able to understand the characteristics of all karmas.
Explanation: What is meant by 'enjoying what one possesses'? It refers to the houses, gardens, clothing, food, bedding, medicine, and other necessities donated by benefactors. What is meant by 'merit'? It refers to the meaning of rescuing and helping. Seeing various beings drowning in the river of afflictions, generating great compassion, pulling the beings out, and placing them on the shore of Nirvana, therefore it is called merit. What is meant by 'non-merit'? It refers to doing various non-good deeds that can cause beings to enter various evil paths. What is also called enjoying
用自體。謂違背福故。名為非福。解福非福已。次解思義。以何法故。名之為思。謂功德與過惡。及非功德與過惡。起心所作意業者名思。彼論如是以七種業說為業相。乃至坐禪誦經聽聞記念等。亦名為業。皆攝在七種中故。而不別說。有此業故。見業與果合。與果合者。謂於五趣中有五陰起相。是故品初說業與果合為出因者。第一義中有生死義得成。以有縛有解故。有生死體。論者言。今此業者。為一起已乃至受果已來恒住耶。為一剎那起已即滅耶。是皆不然。其過如論偈說。
若住至受果 此業即為常 業若滅去者 滅已誰生果
釋曰。若業自體起已無間不壞。後方有壞者不然。墮常過故。阿毗曇人言。如芭蕉竹葦等。於後與果已即壞。是故無過。論者言。竹葦等一一剎那隨壞不住。后時相似相續斷者。於世諦中說壞耳。若第一義中說業如竹葦等相續至受果者不然。若言有業法自體先後俱不壞者。難令物解汝非無過。阿毗曇人言。初未得壞因故不壞。后時得壞因來方壞。有何過耶。論者言。此義不然。汝立有壞因者。而彼物不是壞因。與此物異故。是因故。譬如余物。如阿含中說。身及諸根等一剎那起已不住。汝義與經相違。若汝欲避此過。而受起已無間即壞者。是亦有過。業若滅者。即無自體
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：用『自體』（svabhāva）來解釋。因為違背了福德，所以稱為『非福』（apuṇya）。解釋了福與非福之後，接下來解釋『思』（cetanā）的含義。憑藉什麼法，稱之為『思』呢？就是指功德與過惡，以及非功德與非過惡，由心所產生的意業，稱為『思』。論中像這樣以七種業來說明業的相狀，乃至坐禪、誦經、聽聞、記念等等，也稱為業，都包含在這七種業之中，所以不再另外說明。因為有這些業，所以能見到業與果報結合。所謂與果報結合，是指在五趣（pañca-gati）之中有五陰（pañca-skandha）生起的相狀。因此，本品一開始說業與果報結合是產生的根本原因，在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya）中，生死的意義才能成立，因為有束縛和解脫的緣故，才有生死的本體。論者說，那麼這個業，是一旦產生就一直存在，直到承受果報之後才消失呢？還是在一個剎那（kṣaṇa）產生之後就立即消滅呢？這兩種說法都不對。其中的過失就像論偈所說： 『如果（業）持續到承受果報，那麼這個業就成了常（nitya）了；如果業已經滅去了，那麼滅去之後誰來產生果報呢？』 解釋說，如果業的自體產生之後，沒有間斷，沒有壞滅，之後才壞滅，這是不對的，因為會墮入常的過失。阿毗曇（Abhidharma）學者說，就像芭蕉、竹葦等，在之後給予果報之後就壞滅了，所以沒有過失。論者說，竹葦等每一剎那都在隨著壞滅而不住留，之後相似的相續斷絕，這只是在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya）中說壞滅罷了。如果在第一義諦中說業像竹葦等一樣相續到承受果報，那是不對的。如果說有業法自體，先後都不壞滅，很難讓人理解你沒有過失。阿毗曇學者說，最初沒有得到壞滅的因緣，所以不壞滅，之後得到壞滅的因緣才壞滅，有什麼過失呢？論者說，這個說法不對。你設立有壞滅的因緣，而那個事物不是壞滅的因緣，因為它與這個事物不同。因為是因緣的緣故，譬如其餘的事物。就像阿含經（Āgama）中所說，身體以及諸根等，在一個剎那產生之後就不能停留。你的說法與經文相違背。如果你想避免這個過失，而認為業產生之後沒有間斷就立即壞滅，這也是有過失的。業如果滅去，就沒有自體了。
【English Translation】 English version: It is explained by 'own nature' (svabhāva). Because it goes against merit, it is called 'non-merit' (apuṇya). Having explained merit and non-merit, next is to explain the meaning of 'thought' (cetanā). By what dharma is it called 'thought'? It refers to merit and demerit, as well as non-merit and non-demerit, the mental karma arising from the mind, which is called 'thought'. The treatise explains the characteristics of karma with seven types of karma, even including meditation, reciting scriptures, listening, remembering, etc., which are also called karma, all included in these seven types, so they are not explained separately. Because there is this karma, one can see the combination of karma and its result. The so-called combination with result refers to the arising of the five aggregates (pañca-skandha) in the five realms (pañca-gati). Therefore, at the beginning of this chapter, it is said that the combination of karma and its result is the fundamental cause of arising, and in the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), the meaning of birth and death can be established, because there is bondage and liberation, there is the substance of birth and death. The debater says, is this karma, once it arises, constantly present until it receives its result, or does it immediately perish after arising in a moment (kṣaṇa)? Neither of these statements is correct. The faults are as stated in the verse: 'If (karma) lasts until receiving the result, then this karma becomes permanent (nitya); if karma has perished, then who will produce the result after it has perished?' The explanation says, if the own nature of karma arises without interruption and without destruction, and only later is destroyed, that is not correct, because it would fall into the fault of permanence. The Abhidharma scholars say, like banana trees, bamboo reeds, etc., they are destroyed after giving their results, so there is no fault. The debater says, bamboo reeds, etc., are constantly perishing in every moment, and the similar continuity is cut off later, this is only said to be destroyed in conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya). If it is said in ultimate truth that karma continues like bamboo reeds until receiving the result, that is not correct. If it is said that there is a karma dharma whose own nature is not destroyed before or after, it is difficult to make people understand that you have no fault. The Abhidharma scholars say, initially there is no cause for destruction, so it is not destroyed, and later it is destroyed when the cause for destruction comes, what fault is there? The debater says, this statement is not correct. You establish that there is a cause for destruction, but that thing is not the cause for destruction, because it is different from this thing. Because it is a cause, like other things. As it is said in the Āgama, the body and the senses, etc., cannot remain after arising in a moment. Your statement contradicts the scriptures. If you want to avoid this fault, and think that karma perishes immediately after arising without interruption, that is also a fault. If karma perishes, it has no own nature.
。若汝意謂。業正滅時能與果者。而此滅時名半滅。半未滅能與果者不然。同前所答過。若汝言不可說滅已與果不滅與果者。此名不可說業。若不可說業于第一義中能與果者不然。不可說故。譬如欲生時。汝所見者不能堅固。出因不成。亦違汝義。
阿毗曇人言。有相續故。我義無違。云何知耶。故論偈言。
如芽等相續 而從種子生 由是而生果 離種無相續
釋曰。此謂從芽生莖。乃至枝葉花果等各有其相。種子雖滅由起相續展轉至果。若離種子芽等相續則無流轉。以是故其義云何。故論偈言。
種子有相續 從相續有果 先種而後果 不斷亦不常
釋曰。云何不斷。謂有種子相續住故。云何不常。謂芽起已種子壞故。內法亦爾。如論偈說。
如是從初心 心法相續起 從是而起果 離心無相續
釋曰。此謂慈心不慈心名為業。此心雖滅而相續起。此相續果起者。謂愛非愛有受想故。若離心者果則不起。今當說相續法。其義云何。故論偈言。
從心有相續 從相續有果 故業在果先 不斷亦不常
釋曰。云何不斷。謂相續能起果故。云何不常。不至第二剎那住故。此中作驗。第一義中有如是業果與眾生名字諸行合諸有欲得勝果眾生。如
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果你的意思是，業力真正消滅的時候能夠產生果報，那麼這種消滅的時候被稱為半滅，一半消滅一半未消滅就能產生果報，這是不對的。這和之前回答的過失一樣。如果你說不可說業已經產生果報，未消滅的業也能產生果報，這就被稱為不可說業。如果不可說業在第一義諦中能夠產生果報，那也是不對的，因為它不可說。比如想要產生的時候，你所見到的不能堅固，出因不能成立，也違背了你的意思。
阿毗曇人說：因為有相續的緣故，我的意思沒有違背。怎麼知道呢？所以論偈說：
『如芽等相續，而從種子生，由是而生果，離種無相續。』
解釋：這是說從芽產生莖，乃至枝葉花果等各有其相。種子雖然滅了，但由於相續的生起，輾轉到果。如果離開種子，芽等相續就沒有流轉。因為這個緣故，它的意義是什麼呢？所以論偈說：
『種子有相續，從相續有果，先種而後果，不斷亦不常。』
解釋：什麼是不斷？就是因為有種子相續存在。什麼是不常？就是因為芽生起后種子就壞滅了。內法也是這樣，如論偈所說：
『如是從初心，心法相續起，從是而起果，離心無相續。』
解釋：這是說慈心、不慈心名為業(karma)。這個心雖然滅了，但相續生起。這個相續果生起，就是說愛與非愛有受想的緣故。如果離開心，果就不會生起。現在應當說相續法，它的意義是什麼呢？所以論偈說：
『從心有相續，從相續有果，故業在果先，不斷亦不常。』
解釋：什麼是不斷？就是因為相續能夠產生果。什麼是不常？就是不能到第二剎那住留。這裡面可以做驗證，在第一義諦中有這樣的業果與眾生的名字、諸行結合，諸有想要得到殊勝果報的眾生。
【English Translation】 English version: If you mean that karma (業) truly ceases and is able to produce a result, then this cessation is called 'half-cessation,' where half has ceased and half has not, and it can produce a result, that is not right. It has the same fault as the previous answer. If you say that the inexpressible karma has already produced a result, and the un-ceased karma can also produce a result, this is called 'inexpressible karma.' If inexpressible karma can produce a result in the ultimate truth (第一義諦), that is not right, because it is inexpressible. For example, when you want to produce something, what you see cannot be firm, the cause of production cannot be established, and it also violates your meaning.
The Abhidharma (阿毗曇) followers say: Because there is continuity (相續), my meaning is not violated. How do I know this? Therefore, the verse in the treatise says:
'Like sprouts and other continuities, they arise from seeds; because of this, fruits are produced; without seeds, there is no continuity.'
Explanation: This means that from the sprout arises the stem, and even the branches, leaves, flowers, and fruits each have their own characteristics. Although the seed has ceased, due to the arising of continuity, it transforms and reaches the fruit. If separated from the seed, the continuity of sprouts and others would not flow. Because of this reason, what is its meaning? Therefore, the verse in the treatise says:
'Seeds have continuity; from continuity comes fruit; first the seed, then the fruit; neither continuous nor permanent.'
Explanation: What is 'not continuous'? It is because there is a continuous existence of the seed. What is 'not permanent'? It is because the seed is destroyed after the sprout arises. The inner dharma (內法) is also like this, as the verse in the treatise says:
'Like this, from the initial thought, the mental dharma arises continuously; from this arises the fruit; without the mind, there is no continuity.'
Explanation: This means that loving-kindness (慈心) and non-loving-kindness are called karma. Although this mind ceases, it arises continuously. The arising of this continuous fruit means that love and non-love have sensation and perception. If separated from the mind, the fruit would not arise. Now we should speak of the dharma of continuity; what is its meaning? Therefore, the verse in the treatise says:
'From the mind comes continuity; from continuity comes fruit; therefore, karma precedes the fruit; neither continuous nor permanent.'
Explanation: What is 'not continuous'? It is because continuity can produce the fruit. What is 'not permanent'? It is because it cannot stay until the second moment. Here, we can verify that in the ultimate truth, there is such karma and fruit combined with the names and actions of sentient beings, all those sentient beings who desire to obtain superior results.
來為說得果方便故。此若無如來不說得樂果方便。譬如虛空花鬘。今說有方便者。其義云何。故論偈言。
求法方便者 謂十白業道 勝欲樂五種 現未二世得
釋曰。法者謂果法。方便者謂得果法。因因者謂白業。果者謂現在未來得五欲樂。得何等果。謂得報果依果。白謂善凈。能成就福德因緣者。從是十白業道生。十者謂不殺不盜。不邪行。不妄語。不兩舌。不惡口。不無益語。不嫉。不恚。不邪見等。名十白業。亦名十善業道。皆從身口意生。云何名勝果。謂於人天趣中得最勝人天。其義云何。故論偈言。
人能降伏心 利益於眾生 是名為慈善 得二世果報
釋曰。以是故佛說有此得果方便。如所說者其義得成。論者言。汝說業果有相續故。而以種子為喻者。則有大過。如論偈說。
作此分別者 得大及多過 是如汝所說 于義則不然
釋曰。云何不然。此謂如汝向分別有種子相續相似法體者不然。何以故。種子有形有色有對。是可見法得有相續。今思惟是事尚不可得。何況心之與業無形無色無對不可見。剎那剎那生滅不住。欲與為驗者。是驗不成。又從種至芽者。為滅已相續至芽。為不滅相續至芽。若滅已至芽者。芽則無因。若不滅而至芽者。應從初種
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：爲了說明獲得果報的方便之法。如果不存在，如來就不會說獲得快樂果報的方便之法，就像虛空中的花鬘一樣。現在說存在方便之法，它的意義是什麼呢？所以論偈說：
『尋求正法之方便，即是十種白業道，勝妙欲樂有五種，現世來世皆可得。』
解釋：法，指的是果法。方便，指的是獲得果法的方法。因，指的是白業（善業）。果，指的是現在和未來獲得的五種欲樂。獲得什麼樣的果報呢？指的是獲得報果和依果。白，指的是善良清凈，能夠成就福德因緣的。從這十種白業道產生。十種指的是不殺生、不偷盜、不邪淫、不妄語、不兩舌、不惡口、不無益語、不嫉妒、不嗔恚、不邪見等等，稱為十白業，也稱為十善業道，都從身、口、意產生。怎樣稱為殊勝的果報呢？指的是在人天道中獲得最殊勝的人天果報。它的意義是什麼呢？所以論偈說：
『人若能降伏內心，利益一切眾生，這稱為慈善，能得現世來世的果報。』
解釋：因此佛說有這種獲得果報的方便之法。如所說的那樣，它的意義才能成立。論者說：你說業果有相續，而用種子作為比喻，那就犯了很大的過失。如論偈說：
『作此分別之人，會得到巨大且眾多的過失，像你所說的那樣，在義理上是不成立的。』
解釋：為什麼不成立呢？這是說像你先前分別有種子相續相似的法體是不成立的。為什麼呢？種子有形狀、有顏色、有對礙，是可見的法，可以有相續。現在思惟這件事尚且不可得，何況心和業無形無色無對礙，不可見，剎那剎那生滅不住。想要用種子來驗證，是驗證不成功的。而且從種子到芽，是滅了之後相續到芽，還是不滅相續到芽？如果滅了之後到芽，那麼芽就沒有原因。如果不滅而到芽，那麼應該從最初的種子...
【English Translation】 English version: For the sake of explaining the expedient means to attain the fruit. If this were not the case, the Tathagata (如來，one of the titles of a Buddha) would not speak of the expedient means to attain the fruit of happiness, just like a flower garland in empty space. Now, it is said that there are expedient means; what is its meaning? Therefore, the verse in the treatise says:
'The expedient means for seeking the Dharma (法，teachings/truth) are the ten white paths of action; the five kinds of superior sensual pleasures can be obtained in both the present and future lives.'
Explanation: 'Dharma' refers to the fruit of Dharma. 'Expedient means' refers to the method of obtaining the fruit of Dharma. 'Cause' refers to white karma (白業，wholesome actions). 'Fruit' refers to the five sensual pleasures obtained in the present and future. What kind of fruit is obtained? It refers to obtaining the resultant fruit and the dependent fruit. 'White' refers to goodness and purity, which can accomplish the causes and conditions for blessings and virtues. It arises from these ten white paths of action. The ten refer to not killing, not stealing, not engaging in sexual misconduct, not lying, not engaging in divisive speech, not using harsh language, not engaging in idle chatter, not being jealous, not being angry, and not holding wrong views, etc. These are called the ten white karmas, also known as the ten wholesome paths of action, all arising from body, speech, and mind. How is it called a superior fruit? It refers to obtaining the most superior human and heavenly rewards in the realms of humans and gods. What is its meaning? Therefore, the verse in the treatise says:
'If a person can subdue their mind and benefit all sentient beings, this is called charity and kindness, and they can obtain the fruit of reward in both the present and future lives.'
Explanation: Therefore, the Buddha (佛) said that there are these expedient means to obtain the fruit. As it is said, its meaning can be established. The debater says: You say that the fruit of karma has continuity and use the seed as a metaphor, which is a great mistake. As the verse in the treatise says:
'One who makes this distinction will incur great and numerous faults; as you say, it is not established in principle.'
Explanation: Why is it not established? This means that it is not established as you previously distinguished that there is a seed-like continuity of similar Dharma-nature. Why? Seeds have shape, color, and resistance; they are visible Dharmas and can have continuity. Now, even contemplating this matter is unattainable, let alone the mind and karma, which are formless, colorless, without resistance, and invisible, arising and ceasing moment by moment without abiding. If you want to use seeds to verify this, the verification will not succeed. Moreover, from seed to sprout, is it that it ceases and then continues to the sprout, or does it not cease and continue to the sprout? If it ceases and then goes to the sprout, then the sprout has no cause. If it does not cease and goes to the sprout, then it should be from the initial seed...
子常生於芽。若爾者。一種子中則生一切眾芽。是事不然。有大過故。正量部人謂阿毗曇人言。如汝所說。有人相續能起天等相續業者。是義不然。何以故。種性別故。譬如荏婆子不生庵羅果等。若善心次第能起善不善無記心。無記心次第能起善不善心。不善心次第能起善無記心者。義皆不然。乃至欲界繫心次第能起色界無色界繫心。及起無漏心。無漏心復展轉起欲界色界無色界繫心。亦如上說芽起者。今悉不然。如前所立驗中已總破故。有作善者。是亦不然。我今當說順業果報正分別義。是何分別。如前分別種子相續相似者。如我所說。無彼過故。過垢不能染。說何等耶。謂說正分別義。是誰說耶。如阿含經中偈言。諸佛及緣覺。聲聞等所說。一切諸聖眾。所共分別者。分別何等。故論偈言。
不失法如券 業如負財物 而是無記性 約界有四種
釋曰。此謂不失法在。如債主有券主。雖與財而不散失。至於后時子本俱得。業亦如是。能得後果。業雖已壞由有不失法在。能令行人得勝果報。亦如債主既得財已。于負債人前毀其本券。如是如是。不失法能與造業者果已。其體亦壞不失法者有幾種耶。約界有四。云何為四。謂欲界色界無色界及無漏界。不失法者是何性耶。是無覆無記性。無覆者亦名不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果種子總是從嫩芽中產生，那麼一個種子就會產生所有的嫩芽。但事實並非如此，因為這存在很大的謬誤。正量部的人對阿毗曇論師說：『正如你所說，一個人的相續能夠引發天人等相續的業，這種說法是不對的。』為什麼呢？因為種子的類別不同。例如，苦楝樹的種子不會長出芒果等果實。如果善心能夠依次產生善、不善和無記心，無記心能夠依次產生善和不善心，不善心能夠依次產生善和無記心，這些說法都是不對的。乃至欲界系的心能夠依次產生非繫心（指色界、無色界的心）和無漏心（指聖道之心），無漏心又反過來產生欲界和非繫心，這些都像上面所說的嫩芽產生一樣，現在看來都是不對的，因為之前所建立的論證中已經全部駁斥過了。有人認為這是行善的結果，這也是不對的。我現在要說的是順應業果報的正分別義。什麼是正分別呢？就像之前所分別的種子相續相似一樣，正如我所說，沒有那些過失。過失和污垢不能沾染。說的是什麼呢？說的是正分別義。是誰說的呢？如阿含經中的偈頌所說：『諸佛和緣覺（Pratyekabuddha），聲聞（Śrāvaka）等所說，一切諸聖眾所共同分別的。』分別的是什麼呢？所以論中的偈頌說： 『不失法如券，業如負財物，而是無記性，約界有四種。』 解釋：這說的是不失法（Avipraṇāśa）的存在，就像債主有借據一樣，即使借出了錢財也不會丟失，到了時候本金和利息都能得到。業也是如此，能夠得到後果。業雖然已經消失，但由於有不失法存在，能夠讓修行人得到殊勝的果報。也像債主得到錢財后，在欠債人面前毀掉借據一樣。像這樣，不失法在給予造業者果報后，其本體也會消失。不失法有幾種呢？按照界來分有四種。是哪四種呢？就是欲界、非想非非想處界（這裡原文有誤，應為色界、無色界）、無漏界。不失法是什麼性質呢？是無覆無記性。無覆也叫做不...
【English Translation】 English version: If a sprout always arises from a seed, then one seed would produce all sprouts. But this is not the case, because there is a great fallacy in this. The Sautrāntikas say to the Abhidharma masters: 'As you say, one person's continuum can give rise to the continuum of devas (gods) and others, this statement is incorrect.' Why? Because the types of seeds are different. For example, a neem seed does not produce mangoes and other fruits. If a wholesome mind can successively produce wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral minds, a neutral mind can successively produce wholesome and unwholesome minds, and an unwholesome mind can successively produce wholesome and neutral minds, these statements are all incorrect. Even a mind associated with the desire realm can successively produce a non-associated mind (referring to the form and formless realms) and an unconditioned mind (referring to the mind of the noble path), and an unconditioned mind can in turn produce minds associated with the desire realm and non-associated minds. These are all like the arising of sprouts mentioned above, and now they are all incorrect, because they have all been refuted in the previously established arguments. Some believe that this is the result of doing good, but this is also incorrect. I will now speak of the correct analysis of the results of karma. What is the correct analysis? Just like the previously analyzed similarity of the seed continuum, as I said, there are no such faults. Faults and defilements cannot taint. What is being said? It is the correct analysis. Who said it? As the verse in the Āgama Sutra says: 'What is spoken by the Buddhas and Pratyekabuddhas (Solitary Buddhas), Śrāvakas (Hearers), and all the noble assemblies, is what is jointly analyzed.' What is being analyzed? Therefore, the verse in the treatise says: 'The non-loss of dharma is like a bond, karma is like owing property, and it is of a neutral nature, with four types according to the realms.' Explanation: This speaks of the existence of Avipraṇāśa (non-loss), just like a creditor has a bond, even if the money is lent out, it will not be lost, and both the principal and interest can be obtained in due time. Karma is also like this, it can obtain consequences. Although the karma has disappeared, due to the existence of Avipraṇāśa, it can allow practitioners to obtain excellent results. It is also like a creditor destroying the bond in front of the debtor after receiving the money. In this way, after Avipraṇāśa gives the result to the creator of karma, its substance will also disappear. How many types of Avipraṇāśa are there? According to the realms, there are four types. What are the four types? They are the desire realm, the realm of neither perception nor non-perception (the original text is incorrect here, it should be the form realm and the formless realm), and the unconditioned realm. What is the nature of Avipraṇāśa? It is of a neutral nature without obstruction. Without obstruction is also called not...
隱沒。無記此謂不說善不善故名為無記。此不失法。何道所斷。故論偈言。
不為見道斷 而是修道斷 以是不失法 諸業有果報
釋曰。此謂見苦集滅道所不斷。何時斷耶。謂修道進向後果時斷。複次見苦所斷不善業。雖斷由此不失法在。見苦時不斷者。是不失法。能與果故。如目犍連被外道辱。離波多比丘被梵摩達王十二年禁。目犍連等雖獲聖果。由不失法在故。受宿不善業報。故論偈言。
若見道所斷 彼業至相似 則得壞業等 如是之過咎
釋曰。此不失法。若為見道所斷。若共業俱至後世者。是則有過。有何過耶。若不失法同見道所斷。隨眠煩惱業亦俱斷者。即壞業果。壞何等果。謂壞見道所斷不善業果。是義應知。修道若不斷者。聖人應具足有凡夫業。以是故煩惱業為見道斷。不失法不為見道斷。是故言如業見道斷不失法修道進向後果時斷。彼度欲界向色界時。度色界向無色界時斷者亦如是。故論偈言。
一切諸行業 相似不相似 現在未終時 一業一法起
釋曰。相似者。謂同類業。于現在命終時。有一不失法。起總持諸業。不相似者。謂業種差別。如欲界業色界業無色界業。有無量種。複次有幾種業為不失法持耶。故論偈言。
如是二種業
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：隱沒。『無記』（既非善也非惡的狀態）是指既非善也非不善，因此被稱為『無記』。這種『不失法』（不會消失的法則或力量）是被哪一道所斷除的呢？因此論中偈頌說： 『不是被見道所斷，而是被修道所斷。因為是不失法，所以諸業有果報。』 解釋：這指的是見苦、集、滅、道（四聖諦）所不能斷除的。那麼何時斷除呢？是指修道並進向後果的時候斷除。進一步說，見苦所斷的不善業，雖然斷除了，但由此『不失法』仍然存在。見苦時不斷除的原因，是因為『不失法』能夠產生果報。例如，目犍連（釋迦摩尼佛的大弟子，以神通著稱）被外道侮辱，離波多比丘（一位比丘的名字）被梵摩達王（一位國王的名字）囚禁十二年。目犍連等人雖然獲得了聖果，但由於『不失法』仍然存在，所以承受了過去不善業的果報。因此論中偈頌說： 『如果見道所斷，那個業到了相似的時候，就會得到壞業等等這樣的過失。』 解釋：這種『不失法』，如果是被見道所斷，如果和共業一起到了後世，那麼就會有過失。有什麼過失呢？如果『不失法』和見道所斷的隨眠煩惱業一起斷除，那麼就會破壞業果。破壞什麼果呢？就是破壞見道所斷的不善業果。這個道理應該明白。如果修道不斷除，那麼聖人就應該仍然具有凡夫的業。因此，煩惱業是被見道所斷，『不失法』不是被見道所斷。所以說，如果業是被見道所斷，『不失法』是在修道並進向後果的時候斷除。當他度過欲界（六道輪迴中的最低一層）並趨向色界（六道輪迴中的中間一層）的時候，當他度過色界並趨向無色界（六道輪迴中的最高一層）的時候，斷除的情況也是如此。因此論中偈頌說： 『一切諸行業，相似不相似，現在未終時，一業一法起。』 解釋：『相似』是指同類的業。在現在命終的時候，有一個『不失法』，總持著各種業。『不相似』是指業的種類不同，例如欲界業、色界業、無色界業，有無量種。進一步說，有幾種業是被『不失法』所持有的呢？因此論中偈頌說： 『如是二種業，』
【English Translation】 English version: Hidden. 'Avyākrta' (neither good nor bad state) means neither good nor not good, therefore it is called 'avyākrta'. Which path severs this 'non-loss dharma' (a law or power that does not disappear)? Therefore, the verse in the treatise says: 'It is not severed by the path of seeing, but by the path of cultivation. Because it is non-loss dharma, all karmas have their consequences.' Explanation: This refers to what cannot be severed by seeing suffering, origination, cessation, and the path (the Four Noble Truths). When is it severed? It is severed when cultivating the path and progressing towards the subsequent result. Furthermore, although the unwholesome karma severed by seeing suffering is severed, the 'non-loss dharma' still exists because of it. The reason it is not severed when seeing suffering is because the 'non-loss dharma' can produce consequences. For example, Maudgalyāyana (one of the Buddha's chief disciples, known for his supernatural powers) was insulted by non-Buddhists, and the monk Revata was imprisoned by King Brahmadata for twelve years. Although Maudgalyāyana and others attained the holy fruit, they still endured the consequences of past unwholesome karma because the 'non-loss dharma' still existed. Therefore, the verse in the treatise says: 'If it is severed by the path of seeing, when that karma reaches a similar state, one will incur faults such as destroying karma.' Explanation: If this 'non-loss dharma' is severed by the path of seeing, and if it goes to the next life together with shared karma, then there will be faults. What faults? If the 'non-loss dharma' is severed together with the defilements of latent tendencies severed by the path of seeing, then it will destroy the karmic result. What result does it destroy? It destroys the result of the unwholesome karma severed by the path of seeing. This principle should be understood. If cultivation does not sever it, then a saint should still possess the karma of an ordinary person. Therefore, defilement karma is severed by the path of seeing, and 'non-loss dharma' is not severed by the path of seeing. Therefore, it is said that if karma is severed by the path of seeing, 'non-loss dharma' is severed when cultivating the path and progressing towards the subsequent result. When he crosses the desire realm (the lowest level of the six realms of reincarnation) and moves towards the form realm (the middle level of the six realms of reincarnation), when he crosses the form realm and moves towards the formless realm (the highest level of the six realms of reincarnation), the severance is the same. Therefore, the verse in the treatise says: 'All kinds of karma, similar and dissimilar, when the present life has not ended, one karma and one dharma arise.' Explanation: 'Similar' refers to karma of the same kind. At the time of death in the present life, there is one 'non-loss dharma' that holds all kinds of karma. 'Dissimilar' refers to the different kinds of karma, such as karma of the desire realm, karma of the form realm, and karma of the formless realm, which are countless. Furthermore, how many kinds of karma are held by 'non-loss dharma'? Therefore, the verse in the treatise says: 'Thus, two kinds of karma,'
現在受果報 或言受報已 此業猶故在
釋曰。二業者。謂思及從思生。或有人言。業受報已而業猶在者。以不念念滅故。又如前說無量種差別者。亦一一有一不失法起持故。何故不失法與果已猶在而不更數數與果耶。謂已與果故。如已了之券。已還財訖縱有券在更不復得。不失法亦如是。已與果故更不數數得果。此不失法於何時滅耶。故論偈言。
度果及命終 至此時而滅 有漏無漏等 差別者應知
釋曰。此謂修道時斷者。如前命終時。相似不相似業。共有一不失法持者是也。如須陀洹等度果已滅阿羅漢及凡夫人死已而滅。此不失法復有差別。云何差別。由漏無漏業別故。不失法亦有漏無漏。彼如是故。不失法亦從種種業起。能令眾生受方土受趣受色受形受信受戒等差別果。與果已然後方滅。以是故。其義云何。故論偈言。
雖空而不斷 雖有而不常 諸業不失法 此法佛所說
釋曰。空者誰空。謂諸行空。如外道所分別。有自性法者無也。而業不斷者。有不失法在故。云何為有。有謂生死。生死者。謂諸行於種種趣流轉故。名為生死。云何不常。業有壞故。云何名不失法。謂佛于處處經中說。作此分別者應爾。以是故。如我先說業與果合為出因者。義非不成。論
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 現在承受果報，或者說已經承受了果報，這個業仍然存在。
解釋：兩種業，指的是思以及從思所生的（行為）。或者有人說，業已經承受了果報，但業仍然存在，這是因為（業）不是念念滅去的緣故。又如前面所說的無量種差別，也是因為每一個（業）都有一種不失法（Aparanāśyati dharma，指一種確保業力不消失的法則）生起並保持著。為什麼不失法在給予果報后仍然存在，而不重複給予果報呢？因為已經給予了果報。就像已經了結的契約，已經歸還了財物，即使契約還在，也不能再次索取。不失法也是如此，已經給予了果報，就不會重複得到果報。這個不失法在什麼時候滅亡呢？所以論偈說：
度過果位以及命終時，到這個時候才會滅亡，有漏（Sāsrava，指有煩惱的）無漏（Anāsrava，指沒有煩惱的）等等差別，應該知曉。
解釋：這裡指的是修道時斷除（煩惱）的情況，如前面所說的命終時，相似或不相似的業，共同有一種不失法保持著。比如須陀洹（Srotāpanna，指預流果）等度過果位后滅亡，阿羅漢（Arhat，指阿羅漢果）以及凡夫人在死亡后滅亡。這個不失法還有差別，有什麼差別呢？由於有漏業和無漏業的差別，不失法也有有漏和無漏之分。它們是這樣的，所以不失法也從種種業中生起，能夠使眾生承受方土（出生的地域），承受趣（Gati，指輪迴的道途），承受色（Rūpa，指外貌），承受形（Saṃsthāna，指形體），承受信（Śraddhā，指信仰），承受戒（Śīla，指戒律）等差別果報，給予果報后才滅亡。因此，它的意義是什麼呢？所以論偈說：
雖然是空性的，但不會斷滅，雖然存在，但不是常恒的，諸業的不失法，這個法是佛所說的。
解釋：空的是什麼？指的是諸行（Saṃskāra，指一切有為法）是空性的。就像外道所分別的，有自性法（Svabhāva，指事物自身不變的性質）是不存在的。而業不會斷滅，是因為有不失法存在。什麼是存在？存在指的是生死（Saṃsāra，指輪迴）。生死指的是諸行在種種趣中流轉，所以名為生死。什麼是不常恒？業有壞滅的時候。什麼是不失法？指的是佛在各處經典中所說的。作此分別的人應該這樣理解。因此，如我先前所說，業與果結合作為出因，這個意義並非不能成立。論（曰）。
【English Translation】 English version: Now receiving the result of karma, Or saying the result has been received, this karma still exists.
Explanation: 'Two karmas' refers to thought (思, cetanā) and what arises from thought. Or some say that karma has already received its result, but the karma still exists because it does not cease moment by moment. Also, as mentioned before, the countless kinds of differences are because each karma has a non-loss dharma (Aparanāśyati dharma) arising and maintaining it. Why does the non-loss dharma still exist after giving the result, and not repeatedly give the result? Because the result has already been given. It is like a settled contract; if the property has been returned, even if the contract still exists, it cannot be claimed again. The non-loss dharma is also like this; having given the result, it will not repeatedly give the result. When does this non-loss dharma cease? Therefore, the verse in the treatise says:
Passing the fruit and at the end of life, It is at this time that it ceases. Leaky (Sāsrava) and non-leaky (Anāsrava), etc., The differences should be known.
Explanation: This refers to the case of cutting off (afflictions) during the practice of the path, such as at the end of life as mentioned before. Similar or dissimilar karmas share one non-loss dharma that maintains them. For example, a Stream-enterer (Srotāpanna) ceases after passing the fruit, and an Arhat (Arhat) and an ordinary person cease after death. This non-loss dharma also has differences. What are the differences? Due to the difference between leaky and non-leaky karmas, the non-loss dharma is also leaky and non-leaky. Because they are like this, the non-loss dharma also arises from various karmas, enabling sentient beings to receive different results such as the land (of birth), the realm (Gati), appearance (Rūpa), form (Saṃsthāna), faith (Śraddhā), precepts (Śīla), etc., and ceases after giving the result. Therefore, what is its meaning? Therefore, the verse in the treatise says:
Although empty, it is not cut off, Although existent, it is not permanent. The non-loss dharma of all karmas, This dharma is what the Buddha taught.
Explanation: What is empty? It refers to the emptiness of all conditioned things (Saṃskāra). Like what is distinguished by the non-Buddhists, there is no self-nature (Svabhāva). And karma is not cut off because there is a non-loss dharma existing. What is existence? Existence refers to Saṃsāra (生死, the cycle of birth and death). Saṃsāra refers to the wandering of all conditioned things in various realms, hence it is called Saṃsāra. What is impermanent? Karma has a time of destruction. What is the non-loss dharma? It refers to what the Buddha taught in various scriptures. Those who make this distinction should understand it this way. Therefore, as I said before, the combination of karma and result as the cause of emergence, this meaning is not untenable. (The) treatise (says).
者言。汝所說者。是皆不然。今為汝說正業因緣。其義云何。如論偈說。
業從本不生 以無自性故 業從本不滅 以其不生故
釋曰。我宗中業無有生。如是種子相續者。第一義中亦無有生。是故汝所立譬喻無體。而有闕譬喻過。諸業云何不生。以無自性是故不生。今且答正量部人說種子有相續過。汝謂有業與果合而無斷常過者。云何無過。謂由有不失法在。我今推求畢竟無故。如上偈說。業從本不生。是不失法第一義中亦不成。若有業生者。為業故可有不失法。業既無體。不失法亦無體。因不成故。違汝義宗。云何違耶。謂業與果合者。翻成世諦。令物解故。如汝前謂阿毗曇人有種子相續過者。此義不然。如阿毗曇人先作種子相續譬喻者。有何意耶。今為汝說。此阿毗曇人有如是意。謂種子相續。展轉因果隨起不壞故。而以種子相續不斷不常為喻者。如是欲得汝先說種性別故為因者。因義不成。由有心及心數法相續起無別故。又汝出因非一向有別過云何非一向。今現見有別相續能起別果。云何知耶。如牛毛生莞角生設蘿(似荻而堅中生於陸地突厥西胡用為箭笴爾雅云𥳞堅中蓋竹之類也)。正量部人言。阿含經中佛如是說。有不失法。以此法故。不斷不常。諸體得成。彼言以業不起。不失法亦不起
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 他說：『你所說的這些都不對。我現在為你講解正業的因緣，它的含義是什麼呢？』正如論偈所說： 『業從根本上不生，因為沒有自性；業從根本上不滅，因為它不生。』 解釋：在我宗看來，業是沒有生起的。像種子相續這樣的說法，在第一義諦中也是沒有生起的。所以你所立的比喻沒有實體，存在著比喻不恰當的過失。諸業為什麼不生起呢？因為沒有自性，所以不生起。現在先回答正量部人所說的種子有相續的過失。你說有業與果結合而沒有斷滅和常恒的過失，這是怎麼沒有過失的呢？因為有不失法存在。我現在推求，發現畢竟是沒有的。如上面的偈頌所說，業從根本上不生，這個不失法在第一義諦中也是不能成立的。如果有業生起，因為業的緣故才可能有不失法。業既然沒有實體，不失法也沒有實體，因為因不能成立。這違背了你的義宗。怎麼違背呢？所謂業與果結合，反而成了世俗諦，是爲了讓人們理解。就像你之前說阿毗曇人有種子相續的過失，這種說法是不對的。阿毗曇人先前作種子相續的比喻，有什麼用意呢？現在為你說明。這個阿毗曇人有這樣的用意，就是說種子相續，輾轉因果隨著生起而不壞滅，所以用種子相續不斷滅也不常恒來作比喻。像這樣想要你先前所說的種性別異作為原因，原因的意義不能成立。因為有心及心數法相續生起而沒有差別。而且你提出的原因並非一向有差別，怎麼不是一向有差別呢？現在現量見到有別異的相續能夠生起別異的果。怎麼知道呢？就像牛毛和莞角，以及設蘿（似荻而堅硬，中間空，生長在陸地上，突厥西胡用作箭桿，爾雅說𥳞堅中，大概是竹子之類的）。正量部人說：『阿含經中佛是這樣說的，有不失法。因為有這種法，所以不斷滅也不常恒，諸體才能成立。』他們說因為業不生起，不失法也不生起。
【English Translation】 English version: He said, 'What you have said is all incorrect. Now I will explain to you the causes and conditions of right action; what is its meaning?' As the verse in the treatise says: 'Action does not arise from its origin, because it has no self-nature; action does not cease from its origin, because it does not arise.' Explanation: In our school, action does not arise. Such a thing as the continuity of seeds also does not arise in the ultimate sense. Therefore, the analogy you have established has no substance and has the fault of being an inappropriate analogy. Why do actions not arise? Because they have no self-nature, therefore they do not arise. Now, let us first answer the fault of the continuity of seeds as stated by the Sautrantikas. You say that there is a combination of action and result without the faults of annihilation or permanence; how is there no fault? Because there is a non-loss Dharma present. Now, I investigate and find that ultimately there is none. As the verse above says, action does not arise from its origin, and this non-loss Dharma also cannot be established in the ultimate sense. If there is action arising, then there may be a non-loss Dharma because of the action. Since action has no substance, the non-loss Dharma also has no substance, because the cause cannot be established. This contradicts your doctrinal position. How does it contradict? The so-called combination of action and result, on the contrary, becomes conventional truth, in order to make things understandable. Just as you previously said that the Abhidharma masters have the fault of the continuity of seeds, this statement is incorrect. What is the intention of the Abhidharma masters in previously making the analogy of the continuity of seeds? Now I will explain it to you. These Abhidharma masters have this intention, that is, the continuity of seeds, the revolving cause and effect arise and do not perish, so they use the analogy of the continuity of seeds being neither annihilated nor permanent. Like this, wanting the difference in the species of seeds that you previously spoke of to be the cause, the meaning of the cause cannot be established. Because there is a continuity of mind and mental factors arising without difference. Moreover, the cause you put forth is not always different; how is it not always different? Now we directly see that there is a different continuity that can give rise to a different result. How do we know this? Like cow hair and 'wan jiao' (莞角), and 'she luo' (設蘿) (similar to 'di' (荻) but hard, hollow in the middle, grows on land, used by the Turks and Western barbarians as arrow shafts; the Erya says '𥳞 jian zhong' (𥳞堅中), probably like bamboo). The Sautrantikas say, 'In the Agamas, the Buddha said this, there is a non-loss Dharma. Because of this Dharma, there is neither annihilation nor permanence, and the entities can be established.' They say that because action does not arise, the non-loss Dharma also does not arise.
。為出因而道。我因義不成者。此語不然。論者言。如佛所說。若無起者彼即無壞。汝今欲得受此義者。成就我所欲。然汝宗中不受此法故。若汝立自宗義。謂無起無壞者。其義不成。複次汝立諸法有自體者。決定應受。業無自體。若諸法有自體者。即為有過。其過云何。如論偈說。
業若有自體 是即名為常 而業是無作 常法無作故
釋曰。此謂有自體者。即為是常。若常即是不可作業。何以故。常法不可作故。亦無變壞相。複次若業是無作。有何過耶。其過如論偈說。
若業是無作 無作應自來 住非梵行罪 今應得涅槃
釋曰。梵者謂涅槃。若行涅槃行者。名為梵行。住此行者名住梵行。翻此者名不住梵行。何等是住梵行。謂作善業已而得涅槃名住梵行。何等是住非梵行。謂不作善業者名住非梵行。若此業不作自得涅槃者。一切行非梵行人皆應得涅槃。非獨行梵行者得涅槃。有如是過咎。然於世諦作瓶作絹等。亦有是過。其過如論偈說。
破一切世俗 所有言語法 作善及作惡 亦無有差別
釋曰。此謂如世間言。彼是造罪眾生。彼是造福眾生者不然。以汝言不作罪福自然得故。其過云何。如論偈說。
以有業住故 而名不失者 亦應與果已
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：爲了闡明這個道理，我指出，如果因為這個原因你的論點不成立，那麼這種說法是不對的。論辯者說：『正如佛陀所說，如果沒有生起，那麼就不會有壞滅。』你現在如果想要接受這個觀點，就應該贊同我的觀點。然而，在你的宗派中並不接受這種法則。如果你堅持自己的宗派觀點，認為沒有生起也沒有壞滅，那麼你的論點就不能成立。 再者，如果你認為諸法具有自性，那麼就必須承認業沒有自性。如果諸法具有自性，就會產生過失。這個過失是什麼呢？正如論偈所說： 『業如果具有自性，那麼它就是常恒不變的。而業是無作的，因為常恒不變的事物是無作的。』 解釋：這裡說的是，具有自性的事物就是常恒不變的。如果是常恒不變的，那麼就不能被造作。為什麼呢？因為常恒不變的法是不可造作的，也沒有變壞的相狀。再者，如果業是無作的，會有什麼過失呢？這個過失正如論偈所說： 『如果業是無作的，那麼無作的業應該自己產生。如果這樣，那麼即使是安住于非梵行（abrahmacarya，不凈行）的罪人，現在也應該得到涅槃。』 解釋：梵（brahma）指的是涅槃。修行涅槃之道的人，被稱為梵行。安住于這種修行的人，被稱為安住梵行。與此相反的人，被稱為不住梵行。什麼是安住梵行呢？指的是造作善業后而得到涅槃，這叫做安住梵行。什麼是不住梵行呢？指的是不造作善業的人，這叫做不住梵行。如果業不需造作就能自己得到涅槃，那麼一切行非梵行的人都應該得到涅槃，而不僅僅是修行梵行的人才能得到涅槃。這樣就會有這樣的過失。然而，在世俗諦中，製作瓶子、製作絹帛等，也會有這樣的過失。這個過失正如論偈所說： 『這會破壞一切世俗的言語和法則，作善和作惡也就沒有差別了。』 解釋：這裡說的是，如果像世間人所說，『他是造罪的眾生，他是造福的眾生』，這種說法就不對了。因為按照你的說法，不造作罪福也能自然得到果報。這個過失是什麼呢？正如論偈所說： 『因為有業存在，所以名稱不會消失，也應該在給予果報后…』
【English Translation】 English version: To explain this principle, I point out that if your argument is invalid for this reason, then this statement is incorrect. The debater says: 'As the Buddha said, if there is no arising, then there will be no destruction.' If you now want to accept this view, you should agree with my view. However, your school does not accept this principle. If you insist on your own school's view that there is neither arising nor destruction, then your argument cannot stand. Furthermore, if you believe that all dharmas have self-nature (svabhava), then you must admit that karma has no self-nature. If all dharmas have self-nature, then there will be faults. What are these faults? As the verse in the treatise says: 'If karma has self-nature, then it is permanent. And karma is uncreated, because permanent things are uncreated.' Explanation: This means that things with self-nature are permanent. If it is permanent, then it cannot be created. Why? Because permanent dharmas cannot be created and have no aspect of decay. Furthermore, if karma is uncreated, what faults will there be? The fault is as the verse in the treatise says: 'If karma is uncreated, then uncreated karma should arise by itself. If so, then even sinners who abide in non-celibacy (abrahmacarya) should now attain Nirvana.' Explanation: Brahma (*brahma) refers to Nirvana. Those who practice the path of Nirvana are called Brahmacarya. Those who abide in this practice are called abiding in Brahmacarya. Those who are the opposite are called not abiding in Brahmacarya. What is abiding in Brahmacarya? It refers to attaining Nirvana after creating good karma, which is called abiding in Brahmacarya. What is not abiding in Brahmacarya? It refers to those who do not create good karma, which is called not abiding in Brahmacarya. If karma can attain Nirvana by itself without being created, then all those who practice non-celibacy should attain Nirvana, not just those who practice Brahmacarya. There will be such faults. However, in conventional truth, making bottles, making silk, etc., will also have such faults. The fault is as the verse in the treatise says: 'This will destroy all worldly language and laws, and there will be no difference between doing good and doing evil.' Explanation: This means that if, as worldly people say, 'He is a being who creates sins, he is a being who creates blessings,' this statement is incorrect. Because according to your statement, one can naturally obtain rewards without creating sins and blessings. What is the fault? As the verse in the treatise says: 'Because there is karma existing, the name will not disappear, and it should also be after giving the reward...'
今復更與果
釋曰。住者云何。謂自體在故。更與果者。由業住故。雖與作者果已如有券在已償之債重須償故。業亦如是。由有體在還得與果。阿毗曇人復言。第一義中有如是諸業。彼因有故。此業若無而有因者不然。譬如龜毛衣。今有業因。謂諸煩惱。是故如所說因。第一義中定有諸業。論者言。此語不善。如論偈說。
煩惱若業性 彼即無自體 若煩惱非實 何有業是實
釋曰。性者謂因。此說煩惱是業因。譬如泥為瓶體。如是煩惱為業體。云何非實。謂煩惱無自體故。云何無自體。謂先所觀察已遮起法。亦遮諸體有自體。此謂煩惱非是業因。以是故因義不成。及違汝義。云何違耶。謂於世諦中以煩惱為業因。非第一義。是故言違。複次如先觀煩惱品中偈說。愛非愛顛倒。而為所起緣。彼既無自體。故煩惱非實。先已廣遮故。阿毗曇人言。第一義中有如是煩惱。以有果故非無而受果。譬如聾者耳根果及耳識。今有此煩惱果。云何名果。果謂業也。如是第一義中有煩惱故。非因義不成。亦非違義。如我所欲之義得成。複次有業。以有果故非無。如虛空花。由有業果是身非無業而有果。以是義故。當知有業。論者言。是義非也。汝不正思惟邪見所惱。虛妄分別作是說耳。其過如論偈說。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 現在再來進一步討論果報的問題。
註釋：什麼是『住』（Dwell）呢？意思是說，業的自性仍然存在。『更與果』（Again gives result）的意思是，由於業仍然存在，即使作者已經承受了果報，就像持有已償還債務的憑證，仍然需要再次償還一樣。業也是如此，因為其自性存在，所以還能再次產生果報。阿毗曇（Abhidhamma，論藏）學者又說，在勝義諦（Paramattha-sacca，究竟真實）中，存在這樣的業，因為有其因，如果此業不存在但有其因，那是不可能的，就像龜毛衣一樣。現在有業的因，也就是各種煩惱（Kilesa，指貪、嗔、癡等）。因此，根據所說的因，在勝義諦中必定存在各種業。論者說，這種說法是不正確的，正如論偈所說：
『煩惱若業性，彼即無自體；若煩惱非實，何有業是實？』
註釋：『性』（Nature）指的是因。這裡說煩惱是業的因，就像泥土是瓶子的本體一樣，煩惱是業的本體。為什麼說『非實』（Unreal）呢？因為煩惱沒有自性。為什麼沒有自性呢？因為先前所觀察到的，已經遮止了生起之法，也遮止了諸法的自體存在。這說明煩惱不是業的因，因此因的意義不成立，並且違背了你的觀點。如何違背呢？因為在世俗諦（Samutti-sacca，相對真實）中，以煩惱為業的因，而不是在勝義諦中。所以說是違背。再次，正如先前觀察煩惱品中的偈頌所說：愛（Raga，貪愛）、非愛（Dosa，嗔恨）、顛倒（Moha，愚癡）是所生起的緣。它們既然沒有自性，所以煩惱不是真實的。先前已經廣泛地遮止過了。阿毗曇學者說，在勝義諦中存在這樣的煩惱，因為有果報，所以不是沒有而承受果報。比如聾子的耳根果以及耳識。現在有這種煩惱的果報。什麼是果報呢？果報就是業。因此，在勝義諦中存在煩惱，所以因的意義不成立，也沒有違背的意義。正如我所希望的意義得以成立。再次，有業，因為有果報，所以不是沒有。就像虛空花一樣。由於有業的果報是身體，所以不是沒有業而有果報。因此，應當知道有業。論者說，這種說法是不對的。你被不正思惟的邪見所困擾，虛妄分別，才這樣說。其中的過失正如論偈所說：
【English Translation】 English version: Now, let's further discuss the issue of consequences.
Commentary: What is meant by 'Dwell'? It means that the self-nature of karma still exists. 'Again gives result' means that because the karma still exists, even if the author has already endured the consequences, just like holding a voucher for a debt that has been repaid, it still needs to be repaid again. Karma is also like this, because its self-nature exists, it can still produce consequences again. The Abhidhamma (論藏) scholars further say that in Paramattha-sacca (勝義諦, ultimate truth), there is such karma, because there is its cause. If this karma does not exist but has its cause, that is impossible, just like a tortoise-hair coat. Now there is the cause of karma, which is various Kilesa (煩惱, defilements, such as greed, hatred, and delusion). Therefore, according to the cause mentioned, in Paramattha-sacca, there must be various karmas. The debater says that this statement is incorrect, as the verse in the treatise says:
'If defilements are the nature of karma, then they have no self-nature; if defilements are unreal, how can karma be real?'
Commentary: 'Nature' refers to the cause. Here it says that defilements are the cause of karma, just like clay is the body of a pot, defilements are the body of karma. Why is it said to be 'Unreal'? Because defilements have no self-nature. Why is there no self-nature? Because what was previously observed has already prevented the arising of phenomena, and also prevented the existence of the self-nature of all phenomena. This shows that defilements are not the cause of karma, therefore the meaning of cause is not established, and it contradicts your view. How does it contradict? Because in Samutti-sacca (世俗諦, conventional truth), defilements are taken as the cause of karma, not in Paramattha-sacca. So it is said to be contradictory. Again, as the verse in the previous chapter on observing defilements says: Raga (愛, greed), Dosa (非愛, hatred), and Moha (顛倒, delusion) are the conditions for what arises. Since they have no self-nature, defilements are not real. It has been widely prevented before. The Abhidhamma scholars say that in Paramattha-sacca, there are such defilements, because there are consequences, so it is not without enduring consequences. For example, the ear-root result and ear-consciousness of a deaf person. Now there is this result of defilements. What is the result? The result is karma. Therefore, in Paramattha-sacca, defilements exist, so the meaning of cause is not established, and there is no meaning of contradiction. Just as the meaning I desire is established. Again, there is karma, because there are consequences, so it is not without. Just like a flower in the sky. Because the result of karma is the body, so it is not without karma that there are consequences. Therefore, it should be known that there is karma. The debater says that this statement is incorrect. You are troubled by incorrect thinking and wrong views, and make such statements with false distinctions. The fault in it is as the verse in the treatise says:
說業及煩惱 而為諸身因 業煩惱自空 身從何所有
釋曰。何處說耶。謂諸論中諸賢聖等約世諦說。若於第一義中觀察者。是皆不然。如我宗中先已說方便故。此謂諸法上中下貴賤好醜等種種果報無有自體。如說業及煩惱無自體。身亦無自體。以是故。煩惱為業因業為身因者。是皆不然。所說之過。今還在汝。所立譬喻。皆亦不成。複次阿毗曇人言。第一義中有如是業有受果者故。此若無則無彼受者。譬如虛空花鬘。今有業故有受果者。其義云何。故論偈言。
為無明所覆 為愛結所繫 而於本作者 不一亦不異
釋曰。明所治者。名為無明。覆者謂翳障慧眼。云何為名。名謂眾生。何故名眾生。謂有情者數數生故。云何名愛。愛謂貪著。著即是結。與誰為結。謂系眾生。云何名系。謂與貪等相應故。如無始經中所說。眾生為無明所覆。愛結所繫。于無始生死中往來受種種苦樂。如是諸眾生等。自作惡不善業。還自受不善果報。此受業果者。即是我所欲得作者。然此作者。不可說一異故。是有受果者。由第一義中有彼業故。論者言。汝所說者。義皆不然。此論初已來一切諸法皆已觀察。無有從緣起果。亦無不從緣起果。以是故。其義如論偈說。
業不從緣生 不從非緣生 以
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 說業及煩惱，而為諸身因，業煩惱自空，身從何所有？
釋曰：何處說耶？謂諸論中諸賢聖等約世諦（conventional truth）說。若於第一義（ultimate truth）中觀察者，是皆不然。如我宗中先已說方便故。此謂諸法上中下貴賤好醜等種種果報無有自體。如說業及煩惱無自體，身亦無自體。以是故，煩惱為業因，業為身因者，是皆不然。所說之過，今還在汝。所立譬喻，皆亦不成。複次，阿毗曇（Abhidharma）人言，第一義中有如是業有受果者故，此若無則無彼受者，譬如虛空花鬘。今有業故有受果者，其義云何？故論偈言：
為無明所覆，為愛結所繫，而於本作者，不一亦不異。
釋曰：明所治者，名為無明（ignorance）。覆者謂翳障慧眼。云何為名？名謂眾生。何故名眾生？謂有情者數數生故。云何名愛？愛謂貪著。著即是結。與誰為結？謂系眾生。云何名系？謂與貪等相應故。如無始經中所說，眾生為無明所覆，愛結所繫，于無始生死中往來受種種苦樂。如是諸眾生等，自作惡不善業，還自受不善果報。此受業果者，即是我所欲得作者。然此作者，不可說一異故，是有受果者。由第一義中有彼業故。論者言：汝所說者，義皆不然。此論初已來一切諸法皆已觀察，無有從緣起果，亦無不從緣起果。以是故，其義如論偈說：
業不從緣生，不從非緣生，以
【English Translation】 English version: 'Karma and afflictions are said to be the cause of all bodies. If karma and afflictions are empty in themselves, from where do bodies arise?'
Explanation: Where is this said? It is said in various treatises by sages and saints according to conventional truth (世諦). If one observes according to ultimate truth (第一義), it is not so. As I have already explained the means in my school. This means that the various retributions of all dharmas, such as high, middle, low, noble, base, good, and bad, have no self-nature. Just as it is said that karma and afflictions have no self-nature, so too does the body have no self-nature. Therefore, it is not the case that afflictions are the cause of karma and karma is the cause of the body. The fault you speak of still lies with you. The analogies you establish are also not valid. Furthermore, the Abhidharma (阿毗曇) proponents say that in ultimate truth, there is such karma that receives its result. If this were not the case, there would be no receiver of the result, like a garland of flowers in the sky. Now, because there is karma, there is a receiver of the result. What is the meaning of this? Therefore, the verse in the treatise says:
'Covered by ignorance (無明), bound by the knot of love, Regarding the original doer, neither one nor different.'
Explanation: What is subdued by wisdom is called ignorance (無明). 'Covered' means obscured, blocking the eye of wisdom. What is called 'name'? 'Name' refers to sentient beings. Why are they called sentient beings? Because those with sentience are born again and again. What is called 'love'? 'Love' refers to attachment. Attachment is a knot. With whom is it a knot? It binds sentient beings. What is called 'binding'? It means corresponding with greed and so on. As it is said in the scripture without beginning, sentient beings are covered by ignorance and bound by the knot of love, wandering in beginningless birth and death, experiencing various sufferings and joys. Thus, these sentient beings create evil and unwholesome karma and receive unwholesome retributions themselves. This receiver of the result of karma is the doer I desire to obtain. However, this doer cannot be said to be either one or different, so there is a receiver of the result. Because there is that karma in ultimate truth. The debater says: What you say is not true. From the beginning of this treatise, all dharmas have been observed, and there is no result arising from conditions, nor is there a result not arising from conditions. Therefore, the meaning is as the verse in the treatise says:
'Karma does not arise from conditions, Nor does it arise from non-conditions, because'
業無自體 亦無起業者
釋曰。此謂業等無起業有三種。一謂業。二謂果報。三謂受果者。今推求業無起故。作者亦無起。作及作者先皆已遮。無有實體。如我所說無業及無作者方便。其義云何。如論說偈。
無業無作者 何有業生果 既無有此果 何有受果者
釋曰。以是故。汝言第一義中有業有受果者其義不成。亦違汝義。云何違耶。謂翻以世諦令物解故。阿毗曇人言。撥無業無果者。是邪見過。能障慧眼。彼說中論是真實見者不然論者言。汝語非也。其義云何。如論偈說。
如佛神通力 現作化佛身 於是須臾間 化身復起化 此初化身佛 而名為作者 化佛之所作 是即名為業
釋曰。此謂作者與化相似。展轉從緣起。無有我體故。而此所作業者。亦如化人無有自體。譬如化佛復起于化。如是身口業等所作之事。雖無有實而可眼見。應如是知。煩惱者名為三毒。九結。十纏。九十八使等。能起身業口業意業。分別今世後世善不善無記苦報樂報不苦不樂報。及起現報生報后報等。如是諸業一一皆空。設有所作。亦無自體。其義云何。如論偈說。
業煩惱亦爾 作者及果報 如乾闥婆城 如幻亦如焰
釋曰。此謂業等從因緣和合生。如幻化無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 業本身沒有自性，也沒有發起業的人。
解釋：這裡說的是業等沒有發起業的原因有三種：一是業，二是果報，三是接受果報的人。現在推究業沒有生起的原因，所以作者也沒有生起。作和作者先前都已經遮止了，沒有實體。就像我所說的沒有業和沒有作者的方便法門，它的意義是什麼呢？就像論中所說的偈頌：
『沒有業也沒有作者，哪裡會有業產生的果報？既然沒有這個果報，哪裡會有接受果報的人？』
解釋：因此，你說在第一義中存在業和接受果報的人，這個說法是不成立的，也違背了你自己的觀點。怎麼違背了呢？就是你反而用世俗諦來使人理解。阿毗曇人說，否定業和果報的人，是邪見，能夠障礙智慧之眼。他們說中觀論是真實見，論者說，你的話不對。它的意義是什麼呢？就像論中的偈頌所說：
『就像佛的神通力，顯現化作佛身，於是在須臾之間，化身又生起化身。這最初的化身佛，就被稱為作者，化佛所作的，就叫做業。』
解釋：這裡說的是作者與化現相似，輾轉從因緣生起，沒有我體。因此，這所作業的人，也像化人一樣沒有自體。譬如化佛又生起化身。像這樣身口意等所作的事情，雖然沒有實體，但是可以眼見，應該這樣理解。煩惱指的是三毒（貪嗔癡），九結，十纏，九十八使等。能夠發起身業、口業、意業，分別今世後世的善、不善、無記的苦報、樂報、不苦不樂報，以及發起現報、生報、后報等。像這樣的諸業，一一皆空，即使有所作，也沒有自體。它的意義是什麼呢？就像論中的偈頌所說：
『業和煩惱也是這樣，作者和果報也是這樣，就像乾闥婆城（海市蜃樓），像幻術，也像火焰。』
解釋：這裡說的是業等從因緣和合而生，就像幻化一樣虛無。
【English Translation】 English version Karma has no inherent existence, nor is there an agent who initiates karma.
Explanation: This refers to the fact that karma and so on have no initiator for three reasons: first, karma; second, karmic retribution; and third, the recipient of karmic retribution. Now, investigating the fact that karma has no origin, the agent also has no origin. The act and the agent have already been negated, having no substance. Just as I have spoken of the expedient means of no karma and no agent, what is its meaning? As the verse in the treatise says:
'Without karma and without an agent, how can there be karmic results? Since there are no such results, how can there be a recipient of results?'
Explanation: Therefore, your statement that there is karma and a recipient of results in the ultimate sense is untenable and contradicts your own view. How does it contradict? It is because you are using conventional truth to make people understand. The Abhidharma practitioners say that those who deny karma and its results have wrong views that can obstruct the eye of wisdom. They say that the Madhyamaka-karika is the true view, but the author of the treatise says that your words are not correct. What is its meaning? As the verse in the treatise says:
'Like the Buddha's supernatural power, manifesting a transformation body, and in an instant, the transformation body again creates a transformation. This initial transformation Buddha is called the agent, and what the transformation Buddha does is called karma.'
Explanation: This means that the agent is similar to a transformation, arising from conditions in succession, without an inherent self. Therefore, the agent who performs this karma, like a transformation person, has no inherent existence. For example, a transformation Buddha again creates a transformation. In this way, the actions of body, speech, and mind, although without substance, can be seen with the eyes. This should be understood in this way. Afflictions refer to the three poisons (greed, hatred, and delusion), the nine bonds, the ten fetters, the ninety-eight latent tendencies, and so on. They can initiate actions of body, speech, and mind, distinguishing between good, unwholesome, and neutral karmic results of suffering, pleasure, and neither suffering nor pleasure in this life and future lives, as well as initiating immediate, subsequent, and later retributions. Such karmas are all empty, and even if something is done, it has no inherent existence. What is its meaning? As the verse in the treatise says:
'Karma and afflictions are also like this, as are the agent and the karmic results, like a Gandharva city (mirage), like an illusion, and like a flame.'
Explanation: This means that karma and so on arise from the combination of causes and conditions, like an illusion.
實但可眼見。是世諦中有非第一義。複次欲得善趣。及欲得涅槃者。亦是世諦所說。如汝謂我撥無業果是邪見過者。過亦無體。阿毗曇人言。彼雖欲得於世諦中有一切法。而於第一義中誹謗無一切法者。還不免過。論者言。如經中偈說。有體既不成。無體亦不成。又如經偈說。有者是常見。無者是斷見。是故有及無。智者不應依。汝言撥無業果者。我不欲爾。以是故汝先謂。我不免過者。我無此過。複次汝聞第一義中諸體無自體。業果及業果合作者及受者。皆空無體。而謂虛住梵行空無所獲者。是愚癡心。為欲開發愚癡障故。以業等有而令物解。云何解。謂解如佛以神通力現作化佛等事故。此品初與外人所說過。而以業果無自體義令眾生解。是品義意以是故。如梵王所問經說。佛告梵王。若無業無果者。即是菩提。如是菩提無業無果。得菩提者亦無業無果。彼得授記及聖種性亦復如是。若無業無業報者。彼聖種性亦不能起身口等業。複次如觀緣品中說。所有諸物體皆無有自性。已遮眼等非是異處及自在等有。何以故。眼等不從赤白眾緣起。眾緣亦不能生眼入等。亦如觀本際品。已遮生死本際無自體故。如無第二頭。不可說第二頭眼有病。如觀行品偈說。大聖說空義。令離諸見故。若復執有空。諸佛所不化。此已遮諸見
及無明等煩惱故說空。若復執空。云何可化。亦如以水救火。若水中有火起者。則不可救。如觀苦中已遮苦四義不成。亦遮外萬物等四義不成。何以故。苦不名自作法不自作法。以無自體故。何有人作苦。若說有我法各異相。當知是人不得法味。若言諸法是善是不善是無記是有漏無漏有為無為等別異者。是人于甚深寂滅法中。為無義利。如本住中已遮。本住不可得故。亦遮三世無有戲論分別。以是故諸法則空。如作作者中說。決定有作者。不作決定業。決定無作者。不作無定業。何以故。決定業無作。是業無作者。如刀不自割。指不自觸。以是故定作者無作。作者亦無業。如是先後俱等不可得故。複次若無作等法。則無有罪福。罪福等無故。罪福果報亦無。若無罪福果報。亦無涅槃。以是義故。於世諦中說有諸業。非第一義。如夢所見不應于中妄生憂喜。如幻所作。而無實體。如乾闥婆城日出時現。但誑人眼而無所有。如佛告諸比丘。生死無際。諸凡夫人不解正法故。為說生死長遠。又如佛言。諸比丘為欲盡生死故。應隨順行。亦如無上依經說。佛為憐愍世間住于亂慧無因惡因諍論者故。於世諦中說有諸法。有我。有人。有眾生。有命者。複次佛婆伽婆見彼眾生生死相續未起對治故。說生死長遠。所以者何。為欲盡彼
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因為有無明（avidyā，對事物真相的無知）等煩惱，所以說一切皆空。如果又執著于空，如何教化？這就像用水救火，如果水中生火，就無法撲滅。如同在觀察『苦』（duhkha，痛苦）時，已經否定了『苦』的四種定義（自作、他作、共作、無因作），也否定了外在萬物等的四種定義。為什麼呢？『苦』不能被稱為『自作』，也不能被稱為『非自作』，因為它沒有自性。誰會製造『苦』呢？如果說『我』（ātman，自我）和『法』（dharma，事物）各有不同的相狀，應當知道這個人沒有領悟佛法的真味。如果說諸法是善、不善、無記（既非善亦非惡）、有漏（受煩惱影響）、無漏（不受煩惱影響）、有為（因緣和合而生）、無為（不依賴因緣）等等差別，這個人對於甚深寂滅的佛法來說，是沒有意義和利益的。如同在『本住』（原始狀態）中已經否定了，『本住』是不可得的，也否定了過去、現在、未來三世沒有戲論分別。因此，諸法皆空。如同在『作者』（karta，行動者）和『作為』（karman，行為）中說的那樣，決定有作者，不作決定的業；決定沒有作者，不作不決定的業。為什麼呢？決定的業沒有作者，這個業沒有作者，就像刀不能自己割自己，手指不能自己觸碰自己。因此，決定的作者沒有作為，作者也沒有業。像這樣，先後俱等都不可得。再者，如果沒有『作』等法，就沒有罪福。罪福等沒有，罪福的果報也沒有。如果沒有罪福果報，就沒有涅槃（nirvana，解脫）。因為這個緣故，在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）中說有諸業，並非第一義諦（paramārtha-satya，絕對真理）。如同夢中所見，不應在其中妄生憂喜。如同幻術所作，沒有實體。如同乾闥婆城（gandharva-pura，海市蜃樓），日出時出現，只是迷惑人的眼睛，而一無所有。如同佛告訴諸比丘，生死（saṃsāra，輪迴）沒有邊際，諸凡夫人不理解正法，所以才說生死長遠。又如佛說，諸比丘爲了想要窮盡生死，應當隨順修行。也如《無上依經》所說，佛爲了憐憫世間那些住在混亂智慧中、有無因惡因諍論的人，所以在世俗諦中說有諸法，有我，有人，有眾生（sattva，有情），有命者（jīva，生命）。再者，佛婆伽婆（Bhagavān，世尊）看到那些眾生死生相續，還沒有生起對治，所以說生死長遠。為什麼呢？爲了想要窮盡他們。
【English Translation】 English version: Because of afflictions such as ignorance (avidyā, ignorance of the true nature of things), emptiness is taught. If one then clings to emptiness, how can one be transformed? It is like using water to put out a fire; if fire arises within the water, it cannot be extinguished. Just as when observing 'suffering' (duhkha, suffering), the four definitions of 'suffering' (self-made, other-made, both-made, causeless-made) are negated, so too are the four definitions of external things negated. Why? 'Suffering' cannot be called 'self-made' or 'not self-made,' because it has no inherent existence. Who would create 'suffering'? If it is said that 'self' (ātman, self) and 'dharma' (dharma, phenomena) each have different characteristics, know that such a person has not tasted the flavor of the Dharma. If it is said that phenomena are good, not good, neutral (neither good nor bad), defiled (affected by afflictions), undefiled (unaffected by afflictions), conditioned (arising from causes and conditions), unconditioned (not dependent on causes and conditions), and so on, with distinctions, such a person is without meaning or benefit in the profound and tranquil Dharma. As negated in 'original abiding,' 'original abiding' is unattainable, and the frivolous distinctions of the three times (past, present, future) are also negated. Therefore, all phenomena are empty. As said in 'agent' (karta, actor) and 'action' (karman, action), a definite agent does not perform a definite action; a definite non-agent does not perform an indefinite action. Why? A definite action has no agent; this action has no agent, just as a knife cannot cut itself, and a finger cannot touch itself. Therefore, a definite agent does not act, and the agent also has no action. Thus, because prior, subsequent, and simultaneous are all unattainable. Furthermore, if there are no such things as 'action' and so on, then there is no merit or demerit. If there is no merit or demerit, then there are no consequences of merit or demerit. If there are no consequences of merit or demerit, then there is no nirvana (nirvana, liberation). For this reason, it is said in conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya, relative truth) that there are actions, but not in ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya, absolute truth). Like what is seen in a dream, one should not foolishly generate sorrow or joy in it. Like what is created by illusion, it has no substance. Like a mirage (gandharva-pura, mirage) appearing at sunrise, it only deceives the eyes and has nothing at all. As the Buddha told the monks, samsara (saṃsāra, cycle of rebirth) has no beginning; because ordinary people do not understand the true Dharma, it is said that samsara is long. Also, as the Buddha said, monks, in order to exhaust samsara, you should practice accordingly. Also, as stated in the Anuttarāśraya Sūtra, the Buddha, out of compassion for those in the world who dwell in confused wisdom and engage in causeless and evil-caused disputes, speaks in conventional truth of phenomena, self, person, sentient beings (sattva, sentient being), and life (jīva, life). Furthermore, the Buddha Bhagavān (Bhagavān, the Blessed One), seeing that those beings' cycle of birth and death continues without arising the antidote, says that birth and death are long. Why? In order to exhaust them.
生死際故。建立眾生。於勤精進善觀察者。了彼生死及與涅槃無少差別可得。以是故無有生死。亦無涅槃。又如觀緣中說。是作緣中無。非緣中亦無。彼中遮作不可得故。亦不與緣合而言有作不然。如觀三相中。已遮生故。若生等不成。則無彼有為。有為法無故。何得有無為。又如遮去與去者。若謂去法即是去者。作者作業是即為一。若言去法異於去者。則離去者而有去法。亦離去法而有去者。二俱有過。如觀聖諦亦說。第一義中空無體義。如彼偈說。諸佛以是故迴心不說法。佛所解深法眾生不能入。何以故。第一義中無有空執。若言空者。是執著相。如遮見中已遮邊等四見。若說有邊。則無後世。若說無邊。亦無後世。何以故。第一義中諸法空故。如偈說。何處。何因緣。何人起諸見。若言有見起者不然。如遮閤中言。物果不從緣合不合生。以果無故。合法亦無。如遮成壞。有體不生體。亦不生無體。無體不生體。亦不生無體。亦破三時無有相續。以是等義應知如遮縛解無有自體。以無眾生往來陰界諸入五種推求無往來者。以是故第一義中不說離生死外別有涅槃。如寶勝經偈言。涅槃即生死。生死即涅槃。實相義如是。云何有分別。如遮有無中。已遮諸法若有若無。若有人言。見有見無見自他性。是則不見真實道理
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 生死之際，眾生由此而生。對於勤奮精進、善於觀察的人來說，他們了悟生死與涅槃之間沒有絲毫差別。因此，既沒有生死，也沒有涅槃。正如在《觀緣品》中所說：『作用在因緣中不存在，在非因緣中也不存在。』因為在因緣中，作用是不可得的。也不能說與因緣結合就有了作用，這是不成立的。正如在《觀三相品》中，已經遮破了生。如果生等不成立，那麼有為法就不存在。既然有為法不存在，又怎麼會有無為法呢？ 又如遮破『去』與『去者』。如果認為『去』這個法就是『去者』，那麼作者和作業就成了一體。如果說『去』這個法不同於『去者』，那麼就成了離開『去者』而有『去』這個法，也成了離開『去』這個法而有『去者』，這兩種說法都有過失。正如在《觀聖諦品》中也說：在第一義諦中，空是無自性的。如偈頌所說：『諸佛因此而不說法，佛所理解的甚深之法，眾生無法領悟。』為什麼呢？因為在第一義諦中，沒有對空的執著。如果說有空，那就是一種執著相。 正如在遮破『見』中，已經遮破了邊等四種見解。如果說有邊，就沒有後世；如果說沒有邊，也沒有後世。為什麼呢？因為在第一義諦中，諸法皆空。如偈頌所說：『在何處？因何緣？何人產生這些見解？』如果說有見解產生，那是不成立的。正如在遮破『和合』中說：事物的結果不是從因緣和合而生，也不是從不和合而生。因為結果不存在，和合也就不存在。 正如在遮破『成壞』中說：有自性的事物不會產生有自性的事物，也不會產生無自性的事物；無自性的事物不會產生有自性的事物，也不會產生無自性的事物。這也破斥了過去、現在、未來三時中沒有相續。根據這些道理，應該知道，就像遮破束縛和解脫一樣，它們都沒有自體。因為沒有眾生往來，也沒有陰、界、諸入，用五種方法推求，也找不到往來者。因此，在第一義諦中，不說在生死之外另有涅槃。如《寶勝經》的偈頌所說：『涅槃即是生死，生死即是涅槃，實相的意義就是這樣，怎麼會有分別呢？』 正如在遮破『有無』中，已經遮破了諸法若有若無。如果有人說，見到有、見到無、見到自性、見到他性，那就是沒有見到真實的道理。
【English Translation】 English version The boundary of birth and death is the origin of sentient beings. For those who are diligent,精進 (jing jin, diligent progress), and善觀察 (shan guan cha, good at observing), they realize that there is no difference between 生死 (sheng si, birth and death) and 涅槃 (nie pan, nirvana). Therefore, there is neither birth and death nor nirvana. As stated in the chapter on 'Observing Conditions': 'Action does not exist in conditions, nor does it exist in non-conditions.' Because action is unattainable in conditions. It cannot be said that action arises from the combination of conditions; this is not established. Just as in the chapter on 'Observing the Three Characteristics', birth has already been refuted. If birth and so on are not established, then conditioned phenomena do not exist. Since conditioned phenomena do not exist, how can unconditioned phenomena exist? Furthermore, consider the refutation of 'going' and 'the goer'. If it is thought that 'going' as a dharma is the same as 'the goer', then the agent and the action become one. If it is said that 'going' as a dharma is different from 'the goer', then 'going' as a dharma exists apart from 'the goer', and 'the goer' exists apart from 'going' as a dharma. Both of these views have faults. As stated in the chapter on 'Observing the Noble Truths': In the ultimate truth, emptiness is without inherent existence. As the verse says: 'Therefore, the Buddhas refrain from teaching the Dharma, the profound Dharma understood by the Buddhas cannot be comprehended by sentient beings.' Why? Because in the ultimate truth, there is no attachment to emptiness. If one speaks of emptiness, that is a form of attachment. Just as in the refutation of 'views', the four views such as 'edge' have already been refuted. If it is said that there is an edge, there is no afterlife; if it is said that there is no edge, there is also no afterlife. Why? Because in the ultimate truth, all dharmas are empty. As the verse says: 'Where? By what cause? Who gives rise to these views?' If it is said that views arise, that is not established. Just as in the refutation of 'combination', it is said: The result of things does not arise from the combination of conditions, nor does it arise from non-combination. Because the result does not exist, combination also does not exist. Just as in the refutation of 'formation and destruction', a thing with inherent existence does not produce a thing with inherent existence, nor does it produce a thing without inherent existence; a thing without inherent existence does not produce a thing with inherent existence, nor does it produce a thing without inherent existence. This also refutes the continuity in the three times of past, present, and future. According to these principles, it should be known that, just as the refutation of bondage and liberation, they have no self-nature. Because there are no sentient beings coming and going, and there are no aggregates, realms, and entrances; using five methods of investigation, no one who comes and goes can be found. Therefore, in the ultimate truth, it is not said that there is nirvana separate from birth and death. As the verse in the 《寶勝經》(Bao Sheng Jing, Ratnakarashri Sutra) says: 'Nirvana is birth and death, birth and death is nirvana, the meaning of reality is thus, how can there be discrimination?' Just as in the refutation of 'existence and non-existence', it has already been refuted that all dharmas are either existent or non-existent. If someone says that they see existence, see non-existence, see self-nature, see other-nature, then they have not seen the true principle.
。如金光明女經中說。無明體相本自不有妄想因緣和合而生。善女當觀諸法如是。何處有人及以眾生。本性空寂無所有故。
般若燈論釋卷第十 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 般若燈論釋
般若燈論釋卷第十一
偈本龍樹菩薩 釋論分別明菩薩
大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅譯
觀法品第十八
釋曰。今此品者。亦為遮空所對治令解諸行我我所空故說。
諸外道等雖說我見有無量種。亦以五受陰為所緣。是故今當次觀諸陰。如佛所說。若有沙門婆羅門等言見我者。但見五陰。實無有我。有異僧佉人作是說言。身相形色及四大聚諸根。諸根聚諸識等為我。論者言。汝於四大諸根陰相。若總若別。起我分別者。是事不然。如論偈說。
若我是陰相 即是起盡法 我若異諸陰 是則非陰相
釋曰。我者是世諦義。起于言說稱云我者以陰為境。僧佉人復言。隨有陰處我義得成。即是我所立義得成。論者言。如汝意者。我是諸陰。若我是陰。即起盡法。此中說驗。第一義中四大及造色聚諸根。諸根聚諸識。及識身等。非我是起盡法故。譬如外四大等。果故因故。可識境界故。亦果報故。以是等因廣為作驗。有自部論師言。我若是陰。一一身中有多陰
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 正如《金光明女經》中所說：『無明的體性和表象，本來就不存在，只是由於虛妄的念頭和因緣聚合而產生。』善女子，應當這樣觀察諸法。哪裡有什麼人或者眾生呢？它們的本性是空寂的，什麼也沒有。
《般若燈論釋》卷第十 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 《般若燈論釋》
《般若燈論釋》卷第十一
偈頌作者：龍樹菩薩（Nagarjuna），釋論作者：分別明菩薩
大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅（Paramartha）譯
觀法品第十八
解釋：這一品是爲了破除對『空』的執著，使人理解諸行（samskara）和『我』（atman）、『我所』（atmiya）皆是空性的緣故而說的。
那些外道等，雖然說『我』的見解有無數種，但都是以五受陰（panca-skandha）為所緣。因此，現在應當依次觀察諸陰。正如佛所說：『如果有沙門（sramana）、婆羅門（brahmana）等說見到『我』，那他們所見的只是五陰，實際上並沒有『我』。』有不同的僧佉（Samkhya）論者這樣說：『身體的相貌形色以及四大（mahabhuta）聚合、諸根（indriya）、諸根聚合、諸識（vijnana）等就是『我』。』論者說：『你對於四大、諸根、陰的相，無論是總體還是分別，如果產生『我』的分別，這是不對的。』正如論偈所說：
『如果『我』是陰的相， 那就是生起和消滅的法。 如果『我』與諸陰不同， 那就不是陰的相。』
解釋：『我』是世俗諦（samvriti-satya）的意義。產生於言說，稱之為『我』，是以陰為境。僧佉論者又說：『隨著有陰的地方，『我』的意義就能成立，也就是我所建立的意義能夠成立。』論者說：『如果按照你的意思，『我』就是諸陰。如果『我』是陰，那就是生起和消滅的法。』這裡用推理來證明。在第一義諦（paramartha-satya）中，四大以及造色（rupa）聚合、諸根、諸根聚合、諸識以及識身等，不是『我』，因為它們是生起和消滅的法。譬如外面的四大等，因為是果，因為是因，因為是可以認識的境界，也因為是果報。用這些原因廣泛地進行推理。有自部論師說：『如果『我』是陰，那麼每一個身體中就有多個陰。
【English Translation】 English version: As stated in the Golden Light Sutra for Women: 'The nature and appearance of ignorance are fundamentally non-existent, arising only from the aggregation of deluded thoughts and conditions.' O virtuous woman, you should contemplate all dharmas in this way. Where is there any person or sentient being? Their inherent nature is empty and devoid of anything.
Prajna-pradipa-tika (Commentary on the Lamp of Wisdom) Volume 10 Taisho Tripitaka Volume 30, No. 1566, Prajna-pradipa-tika
Prajna-pradipa-tika (Commentary on the Lamp of Wisdom) Volume 11
Verses by Nagarjuna (Longshu Pusa), Commentary Explained by Vimalakirti (Fenbie Ming Pusa)
Translated by Paramartha (Boluo頗蜜多羅), Tripitaka Master from Central India of the Great Tang Dynasty
Chapter 18: On Contemplating Dharmas
Explanation: This chapter is also spoken to counteract the attachment to 'emptiness,' enabling the understanding that all samskaras (conditioned phenomena), 'self' (atman), and 'what belongs to self' (atmiya) are empty.
Those non-Buddhist schools, although they speak of countless kinds of views of 'self,' all take the five skandhas (panca-skandha) as their object. Therefore, we should now contemplate the skandhas in sequence. As the Buddha said: 'If there are sramanas (monks), brahmanas (priests), etc., who say they see the 'self,' they only see the five skandhas; in reality, there is no 'self'.' Some different Samkhya (Sengqie) proponents say: 'The appearance and form of the body, as well as the aggregation of the four great elements (mahabhuta), the senses (indriya), the aggregation of the senses, the consciousnesses (vijnana), etc., are the 'self'.' The commentator says: 'If you generate the discrimination of 'self' regarding the appearance of the four great elements, the senses, and the skandhas, whether in totality or individually, that is not correct.' As the verse in the treatise says:
'If the 'self' is the appearance of the skandhas, Then it is a dharma of arising and ceasing. If the 'self' is different from the skandhas, Then it is not the appearance of the skandhas.'
Explanation: 'Self' is the meaning of conventional truth (samvriti-satya). It arises from speech, called 'self,' taking the skandhas as its object. The Samkhya proponents further say: 'Wherever there are skandhas, the meaning of 'self' can be established, which means the meaning I establish can be established.' The commentator says: 'If according to your meaning, the 'self' is the skandhas. If the 'self' is the skandhas, then it is a dharma of arising and ceasing.' Here, reasoning is used to prove it. In ultimate truth (paramartha-satya), the four great elements, as well as the aggregation of form (rupa), the senses, the aggregation of the senses, the consciousnesses, and the body of consciousness, etc., are not 'self,' because they are dharmas of arising and ceasing. For example, the external four great elements, etc., because they are effects, because they are causes, because they are knowable realms, and also because they are karmic retributions. These reasons are used to make extensive inferences. Some teachers from our own school say: 'If the 'self' is a skandha, then there are multiple skandhas in each body.
故。亦有多我。複次我若是陰。即起盡法。以彼諸陰起盡法故。即自破汝無起無盡差別我也。差別法體破故。汝立義有過。複次我若是陰。即起盡法。然外人不欲令我是起盡故。其所計我無起無盡者。亦復不能令我信解。以是故我今說驗。第一義中畢竟無我。何以故。無起無盡法故。譬如兔角。複次我者若是陰。即起盡法。以是故我今說驗。第一義中色等五陰決定非我。何以故。起盡法故。譬如瓶。如是陰者果故因故。暫有故。憂喜因故。邪智正智疑智因故。非我是諸因。義廣如前驗。釋即陰已。我異陰者。鞞世師人言。身及諸根覺等之外。而別有我。能與苦樂等作依止。是作者。是無心。是常是遍。作如是說。復有僧佉人言。有如是我。云何有耶。因果之外別有於我。然非作者。是受食者。是凈是遍。無聽聞等具。僧佉鞞世師等謂論者言。如彼所說。立驗方便。我無此過。復有以丈夫為因者。亦言無如上過。以是義故。鞞世師等言。諸陰外別有我者。亦復不能令物信解。論者知故說偈答云。我異諸陰則非陰相。非者言無。非陰相者。陰無我故。言無陰相。今當說驗。第一義中色陰等外無別有我。無陰相故。譬如石女兒。鞞世師人言。如彼涅槃。非陰相而是有我體。如是雖非陰相而亦是有。論者言。如經偈言。亦無有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此，也存在多種關於『我』的觀點。更進一步說，如果『我』是五蘊（陰，skandha）之一，那麼它就具有生起和滅盡的性質。因為這些五蘊具有生起和滅盡的性質，這就直接否定了你們所說的那個沒有生起和滅盡的、有差別的『我』。由於這種差別法的本體已經被破斥，所以你們所提出的理論是有過失的。 更進一步說，如果『我』是五蘊之一，那麼它就具有生起和滅盡的性質。然而，外道（外人）不希望『我』具有生起和滅盡的性質，所以他們所設想的那個沒有生起和滅盡的『我』，也不能使我信服和理解。因此，我現在要說明一個真實驗證：在勝義諦（第一義）中，畢竟沒有『我』。為什麼呢？因為沒有生起和滅盡的法，就像兔角一樣。 更進一步說，如果『我』是五蘊之一，那麼它就具有生起和滅盡的性質。因此，我現在要說明一個真實驗證：在勝義諦中，色蘊（rūpa-skandha）等五蘊絕對不是『我』。為什麼呢？因為它們具有生起和滅盡的性質，就像瓶子一樣。像這樣，五蘊是果，是因，是暫時的存在，是憂愁和喜悅的原因，是邪智、正智和疑智的原因，它們不是『我』的諸種原因。這些道理的廣泛解釋如前面的驗證。 在解釋了『我即是五蘊』之後，現在討論『我異於五蘊』的觀點。勝論派（鞞世師，Vaiśeṣika）的人說：在身體和諸根、感覺等之外，另外存在一個『我』，它能夠作為苦樂等的所依，是作者，是沒有心識的，是常恒的，是普遍存在的。他們這樣主張。 還有數論派（僧佉，Sāṃkhya）的人說：存在這樣一個『我』。它是如何存在的呢？在因果之外，另外存在一個『我』，但它不是作者，而是享受者，是清凈的，是普遍存在的，沒有聽聞等功能。數論派和勝論派等對論者說：就像他們所說的那樣，建立驗證的方法，我沒有這樣的過失。還有以丈夫（補特伽羅，Pudgala）為因的人，也說沒有像上面那樣的過失。因為這個原因，勝論派等人說，在五蘊之外另外存在一個『我』，也不能使人信服和理解。論者知道這個原因，所以用偈頌回答說：『我異於諸蘊，則非五蘊相。』『非』的意思是沒有。『非五蘊相』的意思是，五蘊中沒有『我』，所以說沒有五蘊的相。現在我將說明一個真實驗證：在勝義諦中，色蘊等之外沒有另外的『我』，因為它沒有五蘊的相，就像石女的兒子一樣。 勝論派的人說：就像涅槃（nirvāṇa）一樣，它不是五蘊的相，但卻是存在的『我』的本體。像這樣，雖然不是五蘊的相，但也是存在的。論者說：就像經中的偈頌所說：『也沒有有』
【English Translation】 English version Therefore, there are also multiple views about the 'self' (ātman). Furthermore, if the 'self' is one of the five aggregates (skandha), then it has the nature of arising and ceasing. Because these aggregates have the nature of arising and ceasing, this directly negates your claim of a differentiated 'self' that does not arise or cease. Since the essence of this differentiated dharma has been refuted, your proposed theory is flawed. Furthermore, if the 'self' is one of the five aggregates, then it has the nature of arising and ceasing. However, outsiders (外人, heretics) do not want the 'self' to have the nature of arising and ceasing, so their conceived 'self' that does not arise or cease cannot convince or be understood by me. Therefore, I will now explain a true verification: in the ultimate truth (第一義, paramārtha), there is ultimately no 'self'. Why? Because there is no dharma that does not arise or cease, just like a rabbit's horn. Furthermore, if the 'self' is one of the five aggregates, then it has the nature of arising and ceasing. Therefore, I will now explain a true verification: in the ultimate truth, the form aggregate (色蘊, rūpa-skandha) and the other four aggregates are definitely not the 'self'. Why? Because they have the nature of arising and ceasing, just like a pot. In this way, the five aggregates are the result, the cause, a temporary existence, the cause of sorrow and joy, and the cause of wrong knowledge, right knowledge, and doubtful knowledge; they are not the various causes of the 'self'. The extensive explanation of these principles is as in the previous verification. After explaining 'the self is the five aggregates', now we discuss the view of 'the self is different from the five aggregates'. The Vaiśeṣika (鞞世師) school says: outside the body and the senses, feelings, etc., there exists another 'self' that can serve as the basis for suffering and happiness, is the agent, is without consciousness, is permanent, and is universally present. They assert this. There are also those of the Sāṃkhya (僧佉) school who say: there is such a 'self'. How does it exist? Outside of cause and effect, there exists another 'self', but it is not the agent, but the enjoyer, is pure, is universally present, and does not have functions such as hearing. The Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika schools, etc., say to the debaters: just as they say, establish a method of verification, I do not have such a fault. There are also those who take the person (補特伽羅, Pudgala) as the cause, who also say that there is no fault like the above. Because of this reason, the Vaiśeṣika school and others say that another 'self' exists outside the five aggregates, which cannot convince or be understood by people. The debater knows this reason, so he answers with a verse: 'The self is different from the aggregates, then it is not the characteristic of the aggregates.' 'Not' means there is no. 'Not the characteristic of the aggregates' means that there is no 'self' in the five aggregates, so it is said that there is no characteristic of the aggregates. Now I will explain a true verification: in the ultimate truth, there is no other 'self' outside the form aggregate, etc., because it does not have the characteristic of the aggregates, just like the son of a barren woman. The Vaiśeṣika school says: just like nirvāṇa (涅槃), it is not the characteristic of the aggregates, but it is the essence of the existing 'self'. In this way, although it is not the characteristic of the aggregates, it also exists. The debater says: just as the verse in the sutra says: 'There is also no existence.'
一處一法是無為。此言無為涅槃等。並已遮故。一向是無。然常遍我非苦樂等依止。有起故。譬如色等。汝所立我亦非是遍。何以故。是實故。譬如瓶。應如前驗。鞞世師人言。如虛空是實是遍。我亦如是。如彼所立驗者不然。非一向是實者皆不遍。論者言。汝立虛空是實者。前已遮故。如遮我是遍故亦遮虛空是遍不非一向是實者皆遍。複次我亦如是非是作者。何以故。非質礙故。譬如思業。我亦非常。是實法故。譬如瓶。我者是可知故非常。是一物故非常。是等諸因。須廣出驗。複次我者亦非無因。以有體故。譬如瓶。第一義中思不是我。是一物故。譬如柱。我者非常非遍。亦不無因。是一物故。或為正智邪智疑智因故。有時為喜為怒因故。譬如柱。有是等驗。次破僧佉人別執。有我是受食者。于第一義中無我受食。所言疑智因者。如夜見杌。我是一物故。如瓶。應如是說。複次有外人作如是意。謂論者言。彼既不令我是一物。復還簡別言我。是物是體是無常是不遍。是疑智等。作是說者其義不然。亦如有人自生分別。譬如石女實自無兒。何得示他青黃色耶。汝今所說令物解者。是則虛妄。論者言。汝語非也。取後有識者。謂施設我。是故說識為我。如般若經中偈言。調心為善哉。調心招樂果。又如阿含經偈言。我
【現代漢語翻譯】 一處一法是無為，意思是說，任何單一的法都不能單獨達到無為的境界（Nirvana）。這種說法已經涵蓋了對無為和涅槃等的討論，因此無需贅述。如果說存在一個常存且遍在的『我』（Atman），它不依賴於苦樂等感受，並且是萬物生起的根源，這就像顏色等事物一樣是不成立的。你所主張的『我』也不是遍在的，原因在於它是實體。這就像瓶子一樣，可以用之前的論證方法來驗證。鞞世師（Vaisheshika）派的人說，就像虛空是真實且遍在的一樣，『我』也是如此。但根據我們所建立的論證，這種說法是不成立的。並非所有真實存在的事物都是遍在的。論者說，你認為虛空是真實存在的，但這一點已經被之前的論證所否定。正如我們否定『我』是遍在的一樣，我們也否定虛空是遍在的。並非所有真實存在的事物都是遍在的。此外，『我』也不是創造者，因為它沒有物質上的阻礙，就像思考和行為一樣。『我』也不是永恒的，因為它是一種實體法，就像瓶子一樣。『我』之所以不是永恒的，是因為它是可以被認知的，並且是一個獨立的個體。這些論證都需要進一步詳細地驗證。此外，『我』也不是沒有原因的，因為它具有實體，就像瓶子一樣。在第一義諦（Paramartha Satya）中，思考不是『我』，因為它是一個獨立的個體，就像柱子一樣。『我』既不是永恒的，也不是遍在的，也不是沒有原因的，因為它是一個獨立的個體，並且是正智、邪智和疑智的原因，有時也是喜悅和憤怒的原因，就像柱子一樣。這些都是可以用來驗證的論證。接下來，我們駁斥僧佉（Samkhya）派人對『我』的特殊執著，他們認為『我』是受食者。在第一義諦中，沒有『我』是受食者。至於你所說的疑智的原因，就像在夜晚看到樹樁一樣。『我』是一個獨立的個體，就像瓶子一樣，應該這樣說。此外，有外道（Tirthika）這樣認為，論者既然不承認『我』是一個獨立的個體，又進一步區分說『我』是事物、是實體、是無常的、是不遍在的、是疑智等，這種說法是不合理的。這就像一個石女，實際上沒有孩子，卻向別人展示孩子的青黃色一樣。你現在所說的，是爲了讓人們理解事物，但這卻是虛妄的。論者說，你的話是不對的。我們是爲了那些接受後有識（Vijnana）的人，才假立『我』的概念。因此，我們說識就是『我』。正如《般若經》（Prajna Sutra）中的偈頌所說：『調伏內心是善事，調伏內心能招來快樂的果報。』又如《阿含經》（Agama Sutra）中的偈頌所說：『我』 現代漢語譯本
【English Translation】 'One place, one dharma is non-action (Wuwei)'. This statement refers to non-action, Nirvana (Nirvana), etc., and has already covered them, so there is no need to elaborate. If there is a permanent and pervasive 'self' (Atman) that does not depend on feelings such as suffering and happiness and is the origin of all things, this is not valid, just like colors and other things. The 'self' you advocate is also not pervasive because it is a real entity. This is like a pot, which can be verified by the previous argumentation method. The Vaisheshika people say that just as space is real and pervasive, so is the 'self'. However, according to the arguments we have established, this statement is not valid. Not all real things are pervasive. The debater says that you think space is real, but this has been denied by the previous arguments. Just as we deny that the 'self' is pervasive, we also deny that space is pervasive. Not all real things are pervasive. Furthermore, the 'self' is not a creator because it has no material obstacles, just like thinking and behavior. The 'self' is also not eternal because it is a real dharma, just like a pot. The reason why the 'self' is not eternal is that it can be cognized and is an independent individual. These arguments need to be further verified in detail. Furthermore, the 'self' is not without cause because it has substance, just like a pot. In the ultimate truth (Paramartha Satya), thinking is not the 'self' because it is an independent individual, just like a pillar. The 'self' is neither eternal nor pervasive, nor without cause, because it is an independent individual and is the cause of right knowledge, wrong knowledge, and doubtful knowledge, and sometimes the cause of joy and anger, just like a pillar. These are all arguments that can be used for verification. Next, we refute the Samkhya people's special attachment to the 'self', who believe that the 'self' is the enjoyer of food. In the ultimate truth, there is no 'self' that is the enjoyer of food. As for what you said about the cause of doubtful knowledge, it is like seeing a tree stump at night. The 'self' is an independent individual, just like a pot, and that's how it should be said. Furthermore, some Tirthikas think that since the debater does not admit that the 'self' is an independent individual, but further distinguishes that the 'self' is a thing, a substance, impermanent, non-pervasive, doubtful knowledge, etc., this statement is unreasonable. This is like a barren woman who actually has no children but shows others the blue and yellow colors of the child. What you are saying now is to make people understand things, but this is false. The debater says that your words are wrong. We are establishing the concept of 'self' for those who accept subsequent consciousness (Vijnana). Therefore, we say that consciousness is the 'self'. As the verse in the Prajna Sutra says: 'Taming the mind is a good thing, taming the mind can bring about happy results.' Also, as the verse in the Agama Sutra says: 'I' English version
與己為親。不以他為親。智者善調我。則得生善趣。此謂世諦中假說有我。是諸外道分別所執悉皆遮故。我無過咎。複次身及諸根非常遍我不共取境因可取故譬如柱。如是諸根是可量故。應廣說驗。僧佉人言。以何義故陰中無我。若彼陰中定無我者。汝喻無體。何以故。柱等諸物亦有我故。論者言。我亦不論有我。但遮諸陰及身根等非常遍我不共取境因。此是我立義意。如汝妄說不能依我所立驗解。複次諸修行者自於此陰當善觀察。如此我者。為是陰相。為非陰相。如上偈說。若我是陰即起盡法。以是故言彼陰非我。以起滅故。譬如諸陰。複次非陰相者。如上偈說我若異諸陰。是則非陰相。以是義故。無有我也。無陰相故。譬如空華。其義如是。複次若我非陰相。我則無生。如空華。如石女等。若言是陰相者是亦無我。何以故。是起是因是果是物故。譬如瓶。行者如是觀察已。即得通達無我。複次鞞世師人言。有如是我。見境界故。我若是無。眾生身中則無有我。根等無心。猶如窗牖而得見物者。是事不然。由我與根相異故和合乃見。彼見是我故知有我。論者言。以見境界言是我者。義亦不然。何以故。我見境界者。此驗無體。如是若無我者先所見物后見還識是先所見知有我者。無如是因及譬喻。若立身中得有我者。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 要與自己親近，不要以他人為親近。智者能夠好好調伏自我，就能往生善趣（s善趣：好的去處，指天界或人道）。這在世俗諦（世俗諦：相對於勝義諦，指世俗認知的真實）中，只是假說有『我』（我：恒常不變的實體）。這是爲了遮止那些外道（外道：佛教以外的宗教或哲學）所執著的種種『我』的觀念，所以說『我』並沒有過失。 再者，身體以及諸根（諸根：眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六根）都是無常的，普遍存在的『我』不會共同去取境界，因為可以找到原因，就像柱子一樣。像這樣，諸根是可以被度量的，應該廣泛地說明驗證。僧佉（僧佉：古印度數論派哲學）的人說：『因為什麼緣故，五陰（五陰：色、受、想、行、識）中沒有『我』呢？如果五陰中確實沒有『我』，那麼你的比喻就沒有實體。為什麼呢？因為柱子等事物也有『我』的緣故。』 論者說：『我也沒有說有『我』，只是遮止諸陰以及身根等無常、不普遍、不共同取境的原因。這是我立論的意義。』就像你妄加評論，不能依據我所立的驗證來理解。 再者，各位修行者應當好好觀察自己這個五陰。像這樣的『我』，是五陰的相狀，還是不是五陰的相狀？就像上面的偈頌所說，如果『我』是五陰，就會有生起和滅盡的法則。因為這個緣故說，那個五陰不是『我』，因為它有生起和滅滅，就像諸陰一樣。 再者，如果不是五陰的相狀，就像上面的偈頌所說，『我』如果異於諸陰，那就不是五陰的相狀。因為這個緣故，沒有『我』啊。因為沒有五陰的相狀，就像空中的花朵一樣。道理就是這樣。 再者，如果『我』不是五陰的相狀，那麼『我』就沒有生起，就像空中的花朵，就像石女（石女：不能生育的女子）的兒子一樣。如果說是五陰的相狀，那也沒有『我』。為什麼呢？因為它是生起的原因，是結果，是事物。就像瓶子一樣。修行者像這樣觀察之後，就能通達無我。 再者，鞞世師（鞞世師：古印度勝論派哲學）的人說：『有像這樣的『我』，因為能看見境界的緣故。如果『我』是沒有的，眾生的身體中就沒有『我』。根等沒有心，就像窗戶一樣卻能看見東西，這是不可能的。因為『我』與根相互不同，所以和合才能看見。他們所見的，就是『我』，所以知道有『我』。』 論者說：『用看見境界來說是『我』，這個道理也是不成立的。為什麼呢？因為『我』看見境界，這個驗證沒有實體。像這樣，如果沒有『我』，先前所見的事物，後來再見還能認識，是因為先前所見知道有『我』，沒有這樣的原因和譬喻。如果說身體中可以有『我』，』
【English Translation】 English version: Be close to yourself, do not take others as close. The wise can well tame themselves, then they will be reborn in good realms (s善趣: good destinations, referring to the heavens or the human realm). This, in conventional truth (世俗諦: relative to ultimate truth, referring to the truth perceived by the mundane world), is merely a provisional saying that there is a 'self' (我: a constant and unchanging entity). This is to prevent those non-Buddhist (外道: religions or philosophies other than Buddhism) from clinging to various concepts of 'self', so it is said that 'self' has no fault. Furthermore, the body and the sense organs (諸根: the six sense organs of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind) are impermanent, and the pervasive 'self' will not jointly grasp objects, because a cause can be found, just like a pillar. In this way, the sense organs are measurable and should be extensively explained and verified. The Samkhya (僧佉: an ancient Indian school of philosophy) people say: 'For what reason is there no 'self' in the five skandhas (五陰: form, feeling, perception, volition, consciousness)? If there is indeed no 'self' in the five skandhas, then your metaphor has no substance. Why? Because things like pillars also have a 'self'.' The debater says: 'I have not said that there is a 'self', but only deny the causes of the impermanence, non-pervasiveness, and non-joint grasping of objects by the skandhas and sense organs. This is the meaning of my argument.' It is like you making wild comments and not being able to understand based on the verification I have established. Furthermore, all practitioners should carefully observe their own five skandhas. Is such a 'self' the characteristic of the five skandhas, or is it not the characteristic of the five skandhas? Just like the verse above says, if the 'self' is the five skandhas, then there will be the law of arising and ceasing. For this reason, it is said that the five skandhas are not the 'self', because they arise and cease, just like the skandhas. Furthermore, if it is not the characteristic of the five skandhas, just like the verse above says, if the 'self' is different from the skandhas, then it is not the characteristic of the five skandhas. For this reason, there is no 'self'. Because there is no characteristic of the five skandhas, just like flowers in the sky. The principle is like this. Furthermore, if the 'self' is not the characteristic of the five skandhas, then the 'self' has no arising, like flowers in the sky, like the son of a barren woman (石女: a woman who cannot bear children). If it is said to be the characteristic of the five skandhas, then there is also no 'self'. Why? Because it is the cause of arising, it is the result, it is the thing. Just like a bottle. After observing in this way, the practitioner can understand no-self. Furthermore, the Vaisheshika (鞞世師: an ancient Indian school of philosophy) people say: 'There is such a 'self', because it can see objects. If the 'self' is non-existent, there would be no 'self' in the bodies of sentient beings. The sense organs, etc., have no mind, just like windows that can see things, which is impossible. Because the 'self' and the sense organs are different from each other, they can see only when they are combined. What they see is the 'self', so they know there is a 'self'.' The debater says: 'Using seeing objects to say it is the 'self' is also not valid. Why? Because the 'self' sees objects, this verification has no substance. In this way, if there is no 'self', the things seen before can still be recognized when seen again later, because the previous seeing knows there is a 'self', there is no such cause and metaphor. If it is said that there can be a 'self' in the body,'
無如是因及譬喻。若以能憶先所更事知有我者。無如是因及譬喻。若以有業有果報可得故知有我者。無如是因及譬喻。如是等因悉當廣遮。鞞世師中有聰慢者。謂論者言。說我之聲由其身中有實我境界。聲于彼轉有處假設故。譬如喚人為師子。複次緣我境界名為正智。緣異境界名顛倒智。譬如丈夫丈夫智。云何為異境界。謂身及諸根因果聚等名異境界。云何為顛倒智。謂緣陰為我名顛倒智故言異境界。顛倒智隨實境界。如其義智彼即是我。是故有我。論者言。汝所計我。如我法中不遮世諦泛說有我。汝若作是立義者反成我義。云何成我義。我佛法中名識為我。聲如其義。名為實我。若於色等諸陰名為我者。是則為假。如阿含經中所說。依眾分故得名為車。我亦如是。以陰為因假說為我。有如此經。又復識能取後有故說識為我。若外人意謂聲召實我境界不召于識是作故。譬如身。智緣實我境界不緣于識是作故。譬如身。如是證有我者。論者言。若第一義中召我之聲及緣我智。皆以心為境界。汝意謂不如實義者。反成我義。云何成我義。於一切時一切處。我見等先已遮故。若世諦中遮。是事不然。有假設聲。有召實體聲。智亦如是。有緣假境界。有緣實境界。我佛法義得成。我所欲者亦成。若於第一義中無召實我之聲亦無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 沒有像這樣的原因和比喻。如果因為能夠回憶先前經歷的事情就知道有『我』（Ātmā，靈魂）存在，那麼沒有像這樣的原因和比喻。如果因為有業（karma，行為）和果報（vipāka，結果），可以得到，就知道有『我』存在，那麼沒有像這樣的原因和比喻。像這樣的原因都應當廣泛地駁斥。 在鞞世師（Vaiśeṣika，勝論派）中，有一些自作聰明且傲慢的人，他們對論者說：『說『我』的聲音，是因為身體中有真實的『我』的境界。聲音在那裡轉變，因為有處所的假設，譬如呼喚人為獅子。』 其次，緣『我』的境界名為正智（samyag-jñāna，正確的智慧），緣不同境界名為顛倒智（viparyasta-jñāna，錯誤的智慧），譬如丈夫和丈夫的智慧。什麼叫做不同的境界呢？就是身體以及諸根（indriya，感官）、因果的聚合等，名為不同的境界。什麼叫做顛倒智呢？就是緣五陰（skandha，構成個體的要素）為『我』，名為顛倒智，所以說是不同的境界。顛倒智隨順真實的境界，如其義的智慧，那就是『我』。所以有『我』存在。 論者說：『你所認為的『我』，在我佛法中，不遮止世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）中泛泛地說有『我』。你如果這樣立論，反而成就了我的義理。』 『怎樣成就我的義理呢？在我佛法中，稱識（vijñāna，意識）為『我』，聲音如其義，名為真實的『我』。如果對於色（rūpa，物質）、受（vedanā，感受）、想（saṃjñā，知覺）、行（saṃskāra，意志）、識（vijñāna，意識）等五陰稱為『我』，那就是虛假的。』如同阿含經中所說，『依據眾多的部分，才能稱為車。『我』也是這樣，以五陰為因，假說為『我』。』有這樣的經典。 又，識能夠取得後有（punarbhava，來世），所以說識為『我』。如果外道認為聲音呼召的是真實的『我』的境界，而不是呼召識，這是造作的緣故，譬如身體。智慧緣的是真實的『我』的境界，而不是緣識，這是造作的緣故，譬如身體。』像這樣來證明有『我』存在。 論者說：『如果在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya，絕對真理）中，呼召『我』的聲音以及緣『我』的智慧，都是以心（citta，心識）為境界。你認為不如實義，反而成就了我的義理。』 『怎樣成就我的義理呢？在一切時、一切處，我已經遮止了『我見』（ātma-dṛṣṭi，認為有我的邪見）等。如果在世俗諦中遮止，這件事是不成立的。有假設的聲音，有呼召實體的聲音。智慧也是這樣，有緣假境界的，有緣實境界的。我佛法的義理得以成立，我所想要表達的也得以成立。如果在第一義諦中，沒有呼召真實『我』的聲音，也沒有緣真實『我』的智慧。』
【English Translation】 English version There are no such causes and similes. If, because one can recall past experiences, one knows that there is an 'I' (Ātmā, soul), there are no such causes and similes. If, because there is karma (action) and vipāka (result), which can be obtained, one knows that there is an 'I', there are no such causes and similes. Such causes should all be widely refuted. Among the Vaiśeṣikas (the followers of the Vaiśeṣika school), there are some who are clever and arrogant. They say to the debaters: 'The sound of saying 'I' is because there is a real 'I' realm in the body. The sound transforms there because there is a hypothetical place, like calling a person a lion.' Furthermore, perceiving the realm of 'I' is called samyag-jñāna (correct wisdom), and perceiving different realms is called viparyasta-jñāna (inverted wisdom), like a husband and a husband's wisdom. What is called a different realm? It is the body and the aggregation of the indriyas (senses), causes, and results, which are called different realms. What is called inverted wisdom? It is perceiving the skandhas (the elements that make up an individual) as 'I', which is called inverted wisdom, so it is said to be a different realm. Inverted wisdom follows the real realm, and the wisdom of its meaning is the 'I'. Therefore, there is an 'I'.' The debater says: 'The 'I' that you believe in, in my Buddha-dharma, does not prohibit the general saying of 'I' in saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth). If you establish this meaning, you will instead accomplish my meaning.' 'How does it accomplish my meaning? In my Buddha-dharma, vijñāna (consciousness) is called 'I', and the sound is according to its meaning, which is called the real 'I'. If the skandhas such as rūpa (form), vedanā (feeling), saṃjñā (perception), saṃskāra (volition), and vijñāna (consciousness) are called 'I', then that is false.' As it is said in the Agamas, 'Based on many parts, it can be called a chariot. The 'I' is also like this, using the skandhas as the cause, falsely saying 'I'.' There are such sutras. Also, consciousness can obtain punarbhava (rebirth), so it is said that consciousness is 'I'. If the outsiders think that the sound calls the real 'I' realm, not consciousness, it is because it is fabricated, like the body. Wisdom perceives the real 'I' realm, not consciousness, it is because it is fabricated, like the body.' Like this to prove that there is an 'I'. The debater says: 'If, in paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth), the sound of calling 'I' and the wisdom of perceiving 'I' both take the citta (mind) as the realm. If you think it is not the real meaning, you will instead accomplish my meaning.' 'How does it accomplish my meaning? At all times and in all places, I have already prohibited ātma-dṛṣṭi (the false view of believing in an 'I'). If it is prohibited in saṃvṛti-satya, this matter is not established. There is a hypothetical sound, and there is a sound that calls the real entity. Wisdom is also like this, there are those who perceive the false realm, and there are those who perceive the real realm. The meaning of my Buddha-dharma can be established, and what I want to express can also be established. If, in paramārtha-satya, there is no sound of calling the real 'I', and there is no wisdom of perceiving the real 'I'.'
我為境界。如汝所說師子聲義是假設故。彼師子境界不如其義。複次聲于假施設處起彼處。但見眾緣聚集境界。如師子等聲。若外人意謂我聲及智非眾緣聚集境界。作是執者此即自壞。以是故汝差別法壞。是立義有過。複次若外人有未深解道理者。謂我言如彼所說五陰及諸根等非是不共取境因。但欲遮差別法不遮我體。彼嫌我者自違本宗。論者言。我者是世諦中假名字耳。如汝所分別者是常是遍是受食者我法於世諦中遮故。汝今欲令他信解者。是我無體。若第一義中一切時有我。悉皆遮故。不但獨遮差別法也。以是故汝之所說如嚼虛空。僧佉人言。有處有如是我故。于彼可遮。猶如遮此井無水。即知余井有水。如是遮身及諸根中無我。定知余處有我。複次由身根中有我故遮。不以身諸根中無我故遮。以是故知有我。論者言。先已遮故。內諸入等非自在天作。非自性藏作。非時作。非那邏延作。如是亦遮有處我不作內入等無起故。譬如兔角。第一義中水等不成。譬喻無體。是故此說不然。僧佉人復言。有如是我。有我所故。譬如自體有則有我所物謂我舍宅臥具衣服及眼耳諸根等故知有我。論者言。我若是有。我所之物得成。然我是無。先已令汝解故。其義如論偈說。
我既無所有 何處有我所 無我無我所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 我說的是境界。正如你所說的『師子聲』（獅子的吼聲）的意義是假設的，那麼『師子』（獅子）的境界就不如它的意義。再者，聲音在假施設處產生，在那裡，只能看到眾緣聚集的境界，比如『師子』等聲音。如果外道認為我的聲音和智慧不是眾緣聚集的境界，持有這種執著，那就是自我毀滅。因此，你的差別法就被破壞了，這是立義的過失。此外，如果外道有人沒有深入理解道理，認為我說的五陰（色、受、想、行、識）和諸根等不是不共同取境的原因，只是想遮止差別法，而不是遮止我的本體，那麼，他們就是在違背自己的宗義。論者說，『我』只是世俗諦中的假名而已。就像你所分別的『我』是常、是遍、是受食者，這些『我』的法在世俗諦中都被遮止了。你現在想讓別人相信理解的是，『我』是沒有本體的。如果第一義諦中一切時都有『我』，那麼就全部都被遮止了，不僅僅是單獨遮止差別法。因此，你所說的話就像嚼虛空一樣沒有意義。僧佉論者說，在某個地方有像我這樣的『我』，所以可以遮止，就像遮止這口井裡沒有水，就知道其他的井裡有水一樣。像這樣遮止身體和諸根中沒有『我』，就能確定在其他地方有『我』。再者，因為身體和諸根中有『我』，所以才能遮止，而不是因為身體和諸根中沒有『我』才遮止。因此，就知道有『我』。論者說，之前已經遮止過了。內在的諸入（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）不是自在天（印度教主神之一）所造，不是自性藏所造，不是時間所造，不是那邏延（毗濕奴的別名）所造。像這樣也遮止了在某個地方『我』不造內在的諸入等，因為沒有生起的原因，就像兔角一樣。第一義諦中水等不能成立，譬喻沒有本體。所以這種說法是不對的。僧佉論者又說，因為有像我這樣的『我』，所以有『我所』（屬於我的東西），就像自體存在，就有屬於我的東西，比如我的舍宅、臥具、衣服以及眼耳諸根等，所以就知道有『我』。論者說，如果『我』是存在的，『我所』之物才能成立。然而『我』是不存在的，之前已經讓你理解了。其意義就像論偈所說： 『我』既然沒有，哪裡會有『我所』？沒有『我』，就沒有『我所』。
【English Translation】 English version: I speak of the realm. As you say, the meaning of 'Simha-svara' (lion's roar) is hypothetical, so the realm of 'Simha' (lion) is not as its meaning. Furthermore, sound arises in a place of hypothetical designation, where one only sees the realm of the gathering of various causes and conditions, such as the sound of 'Simha' and so on. If an outsider thinks that my sound and wisdom are not the realm of the gathering of various causes and conditions, holding such an attachment is self-destructive. Therefore, your differential dharma is destroyed, and this is a fault in establishing meaning. Moreover, if there are outsiders who have not deeply understood the principle, thinking that what I said about the five skandhas (form, feeling, perception, mental formations, consciousness) and the senses, etc., are not the cause of taking objects non-communally, but only want to prevent differential dharma, not preventing my substance, then they are violating their own tenets. The debater says, 'I' is merely a provisional name in conventional truth. Like the 'I' that you distinguish as being permanent, pervasive, and a consumer, these dharmas of 'I' are all prevented in conventional truth. Now you want others to believe and understand that 'I' has no substance. If in ultimate truth there is 'I' at all times, then all are prevented, not just preventing differential dharma alone. Therefore, what you say is like chewing empty space, meaningless. The Samkhya philosopher says, there is an 'I' like me in some place, so it can be prevented, just like preventing that there is no water in this well, and then knowing that there is water in other wells. Like this, preventing that there is no 'I' in the body and the senses, one can be sure that there is 'I' in other places. Furthermore, because there is 'I' in the body and the senses, it can be prevented, not because there is no 'I' in the body and the senses. Therefore, one knows that there is 'I'. The debater says, it has already been prevented before. The inner entrances (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind) are not made by Ishvara (one of the main gods in Hinduism), not made by Prakriti (primordial substance), not made by time, not made by Narayana (another name for Vishnu). Like this, it is also prevented that in some place 'I' does not make the inner entrances, etc., because there is no cause for arising, like a rabbit's horn. In ultimate truth, water, etc., cannot be established, the metaphor has no substance. Therefore, this statement is not correct. The Samkhya philosopher further says, because there is an 'I' like me, there is 'mine' (belonging to me), just like the self exists, then there are things belonging to me, such as my house, bedding, clothes, and the senses of eyes and ears, etc., so one knows that there is 'I'. The debater says, if 'I' exists, then things of 'mine' can be established. However, 'I' does not exist, I have already made you understand before. Its meaning is like the verse in the treatise says: Since 'I' does not exist, where can 'mine' be? Without 'I', there is no 'mine'.
我執得永息
釋曰。此中言無我。以是故因不成。譬喻無體。第一義中有我自體不成。複次若有人言。有如是我。果有故。能依有故。作如是因者。亦以前過答。諸行者應如是觀察實義。所說道理者。即是已說修行果也。複次僧佉人言。有如是我。在彼無我我所身根識中。何以故。彼法中修行者。真實智起時。言我得無我無我所者。由見實我故。如石女無兒。不可得說住于解脫言。我得無我無我所智。由有住解脫者言。我得無我無我所智故。故知有我。論者言。雖諸行聚等剎那剎那壞相續法起得見無我無我所而無實我。二乘之人得無我故。唯見有此法生此法滅。起如是見。然我境界無故。緣我之心亦不起。我無體故。無有我所內外等法。以緣我之心不復起故。乃至得無我之念亦不起。唯除世俗名字菩薩摩訶薩住無分別智。能見諸行本來無生。其義如論偈說。
得無我我所 不見法起滅 無我我所故 彼見亦非見
釋曰。此謂唯有假施設我。其義如是。第一義中無有我與法。如翳眼人以眼病故不見實法。無實毛輪妄見毛輪。汝亦如是。實無有我妄見有我。以邪見故起取著意。以是故。我為因義不成。若謂我得無我我所。由見實我為因者。無我我所自體不成。體不成故。即是因義不成。汝得如是過
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 我執得永息
解釋：這裡說『無我』，因此因（ हेतु , hetu）不能成立。譬如說，譬喻沒有實體。在第一義諦（ परमार्थसत्य , paramārthasatya）中，『我』的自體不能成立。再者，如果有人說：『有這樣的我，因為有果，因為能依存在。』如果這樣立因，也用前面的過失來回答。修行者應該這樣觀察真實的意義。所說的道理，就是已經說過的修行的果。
再者，數論派（Sāṃkhya）的人說：『有這樣的我，存在於無我、我所（ममकार, mamakāra）、身、根、識之中。』為什麼呢？因為在他們的法中，修行者在真實的智慧生起時，說『我得到無我、無我所』，是因為見到真實的我。如同石女沒有兒子，不能說她安住在解脫中。因為有安住在解脫中的人說『我得到無我、無我所的智慧』，所以知道有我。』
論者說：『即使諸行（saṃskāra）聚集等剎那剎那壞滅，相續法生起，能夠見到無我、無我所，但沒有真實的我。二乘（Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna）之人得到無我，只見到此法生、此法滅，生起這樣的見解。然而，因為我的境界不存在，緣我的心也不生起。我沒有實體，所以沒有我所、內外等法。因為緣我的心不再生起，乃至得到無我的念頭也不生起。只有世俗名字菩薩摩訶薩（bodhisattvamahāsattva）安住在無分別智（ निर्विकल्पज्ञान , nirvikalpajñāna）中，能見到諸行本來無生。』其意義如論偈所說：
『得無我我所，不見法起滅；無我我所故，彼見亦非見。』
解釋：這說的是隻有假施設的我，意義是這樣的。在第一義諦中，沒有我和法。如同眼睛有翳病的人，因為眼病而看不見真實的法，沒有真實的毛輪而妄見毛輪。你也像這樣，實際上沒有我而妄見有我。因為邪見而生起取著的意念。因此，以我為因的意義不能成立。如果說『我得到無我、我所，因為見到真實的我為因』，那麼無我、我所的自體不能成立。自體不能成立，就是因的意義不能成立。你得到這樣的過失。
【English Translation】 English version Cessation of Attachment to Self
Explanation: Here, 'no-self' is spoken of, therefore the cause (hetu) cannot be established. For example, a metaphor has no substance. In the ultimate truth (paramārthasatya), the self-nature of 'self' cannot be established. Furthermore, if someone says, 'There is such a self, because there is a result, because it can depend on something.' If such a cause is established, it is also answered with the previous faults. Practitioners should observe the true meaning in this way. The principle spoken of is the fruit of practice that has already been spoken of.
Furthermore, the Sāṃkhya people say, 'There is such a self, existing in no-self, what belongs to self (mamakāra), body, faculties, and consciousness.' Why? Because in their Dharma, when true wisdom arises in the practitioner, they say, 'I have attained no-self, what belongs to no-self,' because they see the true self. Just as a barren woman has no son, it cannot be said that she abides in liberation. Because there are those who abide in liberation who say, 'I have attained the wisdom of no-self, what belongs to no-self,' therefore it is known that there is a self.'
The commentator says, 'Even though the aggregates (saṃskāra) gather and perish moment by moment, and the continuous Dharma arises, one can see no-self, what belongs to no-self, but there is no real self. People of the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) attain no-self and only see this Dharma arising and this Dharma ceasing, giving rise to such a view. However, because the realm of self does not exist, the mind that clings to self does not arise. Because the self has no substance, there is no what belongs to self, internal and external dharmas, etc. Because the mind that clings to self no longer arises, even the thought of attaining no-self does not arise. Only the nominally named Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva (bodhisattvamahāsattva) abides in non-discriminating wisdom (nirvikalpajñāna) and can see that all phenomena are originally unborn.' Its meaning is as stated in the verse:
'Having attained no-self and what belongs to no-self, one does not see the arising and ceasing of phenomena; because of no-self and what belongs to no-self, that view is also not a view.'
Explanation: This speaks of only a provisional self, the meaning is like this. In the ultimate truth, there is no self and no Dharma. Just as a person with cataracts cannot see the true Dharma because of the eye disease, and falsely sees hair-like circles when there are no real hair-like circles. You are also like this, actually there is no self, but you falsely see that there is a self. Because of wrong views, the intention of grasping arises. Therefore, the meaning of self as a cause cannot be established. If it is said, 'I attain no-self, what belongs to no-self, because seeing the true self is the cause,' then the self-nature of no-self, what belongs to no-self, cannot be established. If the self-nature cannot be established, then the meaning of cause cannot be established. You incur such a fault.
。故修行者欲得見內外入真實者。當勤觀察內外法空。問曰。得空者有何義利。答曰。如論偈說。
得盡我我所 亦盡內外入 及盡彼諸取 取盡則生盡
釋曰。取謂欲取見取戒取我語取。行者見無我故得我語取盡。我語取根本盡故余取自盡。諸取盡故則生盡。生盡故得解脫。二乘之人見無我故煩惱障盡。乘彼乘去。是名說斷煩惱障。說斷煩惱障方便已。次說斷智障方便。其義如論偈說。
解脫盡業惑 彼苦盡解脫 分別起業惑 見空滅分別
釋曰。此謂生因諸有煩惱。未離欲眾生不緣境界而起煩惱。是諸煩惱從何而起。謂從可意不可意諸分別起。有分別故則有煩惱。是故分別為煩惱因。如有種子則有芽生。如是非聖者。有不正思惟分別故。起業煩惱。若無分別則無諸業煩惱。譬如聖相續體。彼染污心起作意故名為煩惱。由染污心起身口所作故名業。云何名煩惱。謂貪瞋等。能令眾生垢污相續。是名煩惱。當知起業煩惱皆因戲論分別。彼應斷者是世諦相。云何滅分別。謂見空則滅。云何見空則滅。謂空智起時則無分別。是故說滅。複次有聲聞人言。見人無我故則無可意不可意分別煩惱及纏。是等俱斷煩惱纏斷已成就聲聞果。果得成已何用法無我耶。論者言。汝不善說。為拔煩惱根蔓
熏習令無餘故。若離法無我終不能得煩惱根蔓熏習盡無餘。以此事故用法無我。複次不染污無知者。諸佛世尊於一切法境界。
得不顛倒。覺了此覺所治障。是不染污無知。若不見法無我則不能斷。是故法無我非是無用。以如是故戲論寂滅無餘相者。所謂空也。如實見空故即是解脫。解脫者。謂脫分別。如經偈言。佛為殺生者略說不害法。小說空涅槃。為大二俱說。此謂如來為殺生者略說不害物命為最上法。為諸聲聞說人空及涅槃為最上法。為大乘者說二無我為最上法。說斷智障方便已。有外人言。彼上引佛經中偈說我與己為親。不以他為親。智者善調我。則得生善趣。以是故汝言無我者。自違汝先所立之義。是故遮我者不成。論者言。復有眾生起如是見。撥無因果。覆障正智。作如是言。畢定無我。無此世無後世故。亦無作善惡業果報。亦無眾生。受彼化生一切時中。作不善事必墮惡道。如臨險岸。以是故諸婆伽婆為欲攝取諸眾生故。勤行大悲。依世諦中施設有我。其義如論偈說。
為彼說有我 亦說于無我 諸佛所證法 不說我無我
釋曰。諸佛世尊見諸眾生心心數法相續不斷至未來世。以是因緣。為說假我。復有眾生計言有我。為常為遍。自作善不善業自作受食者。有如是執。然彼眾生
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：通過熏習才能完全去除煩惱。如果離開法無我（dharma-nairātmya，諸法無自性），最終無法完全去除煩惱的根源。因此，需要運用法無我。此外，『不染污無知』是指諸佛世尊對於一切法的境界，能夠獲得不顛倒的覺悟。這種覺悟所對治的障礙，就是不染污無知。如果不能領悟法無我，就無法斷除這種無知。所以，法無我並非沒有用處。因此，戲論寂滅無餘相，指的就是空（śūnyatā，空性）。如實地證悟空性，就是解脫。解脫，指的是脫離分別。如經中的偈頌所說：『佛為殺生者略說不害法，小說空涅槃，為大二俱說。』 這句話的意思是，如來為殺生的人簡略地講述不傷害生命是最上的法；為聲聞（śrāvaka，聽聞佛法者）講述人空（pudgala-śūnyatā，人無自性）和涅槃（nirvāṇa，寂滅）是最上的法；為大乘（mahāyāna，大乘佛教）行者講述二無我（人無我和法無我）是最上的法。在講述了斷除智障的方便之後，有外道之人說：『之前引用的佛經中的偈頌說，我與自己為親，不以他人為親，智者善於調伏自己，就能生於善趣。』 因此，你們說無我，是自相矛盾的。所以，否定我的說法是不成立的。論者說，還有一些眾生持有這樣的見解，否定因果，遮蔽正確的智慧，說：『必定沒有我，沒有今生也沒有來世，所以也沒有行善作惡的果報，也沒有眾生，接受彼化生，任何時候作惡事必定墮入惡道，如同面臨危險的岸邊。』 因此，諸婆伽婆（bhagavat，世尊）爲了攝取這些眾生，勤奮地行持大悲，依據世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，世俗諦）施設『我』。其含義如論中的偈頌所說： 『為彼說有我，亦說于無我，諸佛所證法，不說我無我。』 解釋：諸佛世尊見到眾生的心、心所法相續不斷，直至未來世。因為這個原因，才說假我。還有一些眾生認為有我，是常恒的、普遍存在的，自己造作善與不善的業，自己承受果報。有這樣的執著，然而這些眾生...
【English Translation】 English version: Because of the complete elimination through cultivation. If one departs from dharma-nairātmya (absence of self of phenomena), one will ultimately not be able to completely eradicate the root and tendrils of afflictions. Therefore, one must employ dharma-nairātmya. Furthermore, 『non-afflicted ignorance』 refers to the fact that the Buddhas, the World Honored Ones, in the realm of all dharmas (phenomena), attain non-inverted realization. The obstacle that this realization overcomes is non-afflicted ignorance. If one does not see dharma-nairātmya, one cannot sever this ignorance. Therefore, dharma-nairātmya is not useless. Thus, the complete cessation of discursive thought refers to śūnyatā (emptiness). Seeing emptiness as it truly is constitutes liberation. Liberation means freedom from conceptualization. As the verse in the sutra says: 『The Buddha briefly teaches non-harming to those who kill, briefly speaks of emptiness and nirvāṇa (cessation), and speaks of both for the great.』 This means that the Tathāgata (the Thus-Gone One) briefly teaches non-harming of life as the supreme dharma for those who kill; for the śrāvakas (hearers), he speaks of pudgala-śūnyatā (the emptiness of the person) and nirvāṇa as the supreme dharma; and for the Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle) practitioners, he speaks of the two nairātmyas (absence of self of person and phenomena) as the supreme dharma. After explaining the means of severing the intellectual obscurations, an outsider says: 『The verse in the previously cited sutra says that I am close to myself, not close to others; the wise person who skillfully tames himself will be born in a good realm.』 Therefore, your statement of no-self contradicts your previously established meaning. Thus, negating the self is not established. The commentator says that there are also beings who hold such views, denying cause and effect, obscuring correct wisdom, saying: 『There is definitely no self, no this life and no next life, so there is no karmic retribution for good and evil deeds, and there are no beings who receive rebirth; at all times, doing evil deeds will certainly lead to evil destinies, like facing a dangerous shore.』 Therefore, the Bhagavats (World Honored Ones), in order to gather these beings, diligently practice great compassion, and based on saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth), provisionally establish 『self.』 Its meaning is as the verse in the treatise says: 『For them, it is said there is self, and also said there is no-self; the dharma realized by the Buddhas, does not say self or no-self.』 Explanation: The Buddhas, the World Honored Ones, see that the minds and mental factors of beings continue uninterruptedly into future lives. For this reason, they speak of a provisional self. There are also beings who believe that there is a self, that it is permanent and pervasive, that they themselves create good and bad karma and experience the results themselves. They have such attachments, but those beings...
為邪我繩縛其心故。于身根識等無我境界。迷而起我。雖有禪定三昧三摩跋提之力。將其遠去。乃至有頂。如繩系鳥牽已復墮。于生死苦猶不生厭。諸佛世尊知眾生已。為息彼苦斷我執繩。於五陰中為說無我。復有眾生善根淳厚諸根已熟。能信甚深大法。堪得一切種智。為彼眾生宣說諸佛所證第一甘露妙法。令知有為如夢如幻如水中月。自性空故。不說我不說無我。問曰。何故不說我無我耶。答曰。我無我分別境界無故。以是故。世諦之中假說有我。如汝所言。謂我違于先所立義。然我亦不違先所立。汝若言第一義中欲令有我。違宗之過今還在汝。論者引經偈言。眾生墮生死。不脫如是苦。無我無眾生。唯有法與因。此經明第一義中畢竟無我。令有我者。我無是驗。已說遮我力故。複次今當解異分別者。有二種外道。各執不同。一者言。諸行聚剎那剎那壞。乃至后時命終分諸行壞。是故無我。若無我者。業果所為。是則無體。此諸外道見是事故即生怖畏。生怖畏故亦有施設我。施設我者。謂執說有我。二者復有盧迦耶蜜迦(唐言無後世外道即路伽耶)言。唯有身及諸根無我自體。于諸行中假名眾生。而實無我受持諸行。言有生死流轉者。是事不然。何故作此言耶。彼諸外道愚于因果所為。但眼見身相諸根等。即是丈夫
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因為錯誤的『我』的觀念束縛了他們的心，所以他們對於身、根、識等無我的境界，迷惑而產生了『我』的執著。即使有禪定、三昧、三摩跋提（正定）的力量，也會被這種執著帶離正道，甚至到達有頂天（色界最高的禪定境界）。就像用繩子拴住的鳥，即使被牽引上去，最終還是會墜落下來。對於生死的痛苦，仍然不會產生厭離之心。諸佛世尊瞭解眾生的這種情況后，爲了止息他們的痛苦，斬斷『我』執的繩索，在五陰（色、受、想、行、識）中為他們宣說無我的道理。 還有一些眾生，善根深厚，諸根已經成熟，能夠相信甚深的大法，堪能獲得一切種智（佛的智慧）。爲了這些眾生，宣說諸佛所證悟的第一甘露妙法，讓他們知道有為法（因緣和合而生的事物）如夢如幻，如水中月，自性本空。因此，既不說『我』，也不說『無我』。 問：為什麼既不說『我』，也不說『無我』呢？ 答：因為『我』和『無我』都是分別的境界，沒有實在的體性。因此，在世俗諦（相對真理）中，假說有『我』。就像你所說的，認為我說『無我』就違背了先前所建立的義理。然而，我並沒有違背先前所立的義理。如果你說在第一義諦（絕對真理）中想要有『我』，那麼違背宗義的過失現在還是在你身上。 論者引用經中的偈頌說：『眾生墮入生死，不能脫離這樣的痛苦，因為沒有我，沒有眾生，只有法（事物）和因（原因）。』這部經說明在第一義諦中，畢竟沒有『我』。想要有『我』的人，『無我』就是對他們的驗證。已經說了遮止『我』的力量。 其次，現在應當解釋不同的分別。有兩種外道，各自執著不同的觀點。一種外道說：『諸行（一切事物）的聚合，剎那剎那壞滅，乃至最後命終時，分解諸行而壞滅，所以沒有我。』如果無我，那麼業果（行為的結果）的施為，就沒有主體。這些外道見到這種情況，就產生怖畏。因為產生怖畏，所以也施設『我』。施設『我』，就是執著說有『我』。 另一種外道是盧迦耶蜜迦（Lokayata）（唐言無後世外道，即路伽耶），他們說：『只有身體和諸根，沒有我的自體。在諸行中，假名叫做眾生，而實際上沒有我來受持諸行。說有生死流轉這件事，是不對的。』為什麼他們這樣說呢？因為這些外道愚昧於因果的施為，只用眼睛看到身體的相貌和諸根等，就認為是丈夫（真實的人）。
【English Translation】 English version Because the erroneous notion of 'self' binds their minds, they are deluded and generate attachment to 'self' regarding the realms of body, roots, consciousness, etc., which are without self. Even if they possess the power of dhyana (禪定), samadhi (三昧), and samapatti (三摩跋提, correct concentration), this attachment will lead them astray, even to the peak of existence (Bhavagra, 有頂). Like a bird tied with a rope, even if pulled upwards, it will eventually fall back down. They still do not develop aversion to the suffering of birth and death. The Buddhas and World Honored Ones, knowing the condition of sentient beings, in order to cease their suffering and sever the rope of 'self' attachment, explain non-self (Anatta, 無我) within the five skandhas (五陰, aggregates of existence: form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness). Furthermore, there are sentient beings with profound good roots and mature faculties, capable of believing in the profound Dharma and worthy of attaining omniscience (Sarvajnatva, 一切種智, the wisdom of a Buddha). For these beings, they proclaim the supreme nectar-like Dharma realized by the Buddhas, enabling them to know that conditioned phenomena (有為法) are like dreams, illusions, and the moon in water, empty in nature. Therefore, they neither speak of 'self' nor 'non-self'. Question: Why do they neither speak of 'self' nor 'non-self'? Answer: Because 'self' and 'non-self' are both realms of discrimination, lacking substantial essence. Therefore, in conventional truth (Samvriti-satya, 世俗諦, relative truth), 'self' is provisionally spoken of. As you say, claiming that my speaking of 'non-self' contradicts the previously established meaning. However, I have not contradicted the previously established meaning. If you claim that you want there to be a 'self' in ultimate truth (Paramartha-satya, 第一義諦, absolute truth), then the fault of contradicting the doctrine still lies with you. The debater quotes a verse from the sutra, saying: 'Sentient beings fall into birth and death, unable to escape such suffering, because there is no self, no sentient beings, only phenomena (Dharma, 法) and causes (Hetu, 因).' This sutra clarifies that in ultimate truth, there is ultimately no 'self'. For those who want there to be a 'self', 'non-self' is the verification for them. The power of negating 'self' has already been spoken of. Furthermore, now we should explain the different discriminations. There are two types of non-Buddhist (外道, those who do not follow the Buddha's teachings), each holding different views. One type of non-Buddhist says: 'The aggregation of phenomena (諸行, all things) disintegrates moment by moment, until finally at the time of death, the disintegration of phenomena occurs, therefore there is no self.' If there is no self, then the actions of karma (業果, the results of actions) have no subject. These non-Buddhists, seeing this situation, generate fear. Because they generate fear, they also posit a 'self'. Positing a 'self' means clinging to the assertion that there is a 'self'. Another type of non-Buddhist is the Lokayata (盧迦耶蜜迦) (in Tang language, 'non-Buddhist who denies the afterlife,' i.e., Lokayata), they say: 'There is only the body and the faculties, without a self-essence. Within phenomena, the provisional name is sentient being, but in reality, there is no self to uphold phenomena. The statement that there is transmigration of birth and death is incorrect.' Why do they say this? Because these non-Buddhists are ignorant of the actions of cause and effect, only seeing with their eyes the appearance of the body and the faculties, etc., and considering it to be a man (a real person).
。更無別我。如前偈中亦說無我。云何無我。謂于身根聚中無我。諸佛於一切法得了了智。如前偈中佛不說我。不說無我。何故不說我無我耶。由證解一切法真實無戲論故。無戲論已斷我無我執。我無我執斷已。起我無我境界亦無。何以故。妄置色等為我無我種。是執不起故。如般若經中說。極勇猛。色非是我非是無我。受想行識非我非無我。若色受想行識非我非無我。是名般若波羅蜜。如上說見空戲論滅者。今還重釋。云何得戲論滅。謂一切體自相不可得。如虛空相。如是不見。是名見空。若見一切諸法空不可說者。其義云何。如論偈說。
為說息言語 斷彼心境界 亦無起滅相 如涅槃法性
釋曰。此中明言語起不可得。云何起不可得。謂心境界斷故。云何為心境界。謂色等是心境界。第一義中色等不成就故。云何色不成就。謂無起滅相故。云何如涅槃法性。謂如涅槃法性無所有相。如是觀者名為見空。複次云何見空。謂體無體不見二故。是名真見。或有人如是疑。云何名真見耶。我今為說。如無盡慧經偈言。于第一義中。云何有二相。彼智亦不行。何況諸文字。此經謂心意識等。于第一義中。畢竟無體。何以故。一切諸法寂靜相故。心及諸法一切皆如。無人能作。如寶積經中說非空令諸法空。
如是等法各各自空。等真如同涅槃故。是義應知。如經說。佛坐道場。知諸煩惱無體無起。從分別起。自性不起。佛如是知。以是故此義得成。如經偈言。識是諸有種彼識行境界。見境無我已有種子是滅。此中明有種寂滅。是故言如涅槃。云何如涅槃。謂見一切法無生平等。見平等已心境界斷。心境斷已言說亦斷。言說斷已。世諦相所執戲論得寂滅。是故言見空戲論滅。有人言。寂滅相者。即是涅槃真如法中性。云何言如涅槃法性耶。論者言。戲論分別者。謂是世間。是涅槃。或說涅槃無為是寂滅法。執說世間是生死法。此中論者說。一切諸法若世間。若出世間。無生性空。皆寂滅相。爲著法眾生不知生死即涅槃相。以是故今阿阇梨以涅槃等為喻者。令知諸法從本以來空無相無作寂滅無戲論故。自部及外人等謂我言。彼中道說無一切句義與路伽耶說無則無差別。應如是答我言。一切句義無者亦有差別。汝不解故出是言耳。有人言。如以智慧知而舍。不以智慧知而舍。豈無差別。若言說無同者。是則凡夫與羅漢不異。生盲與有目不異。平地與丘陵不異。若如是說。中道路伽則無差別。作此說者。不解差別。是為無智。若路伽說無與中道說無是同者。於何時同耶。為世俗言說時同。為見真實時同。且論世諦時同。撥無因果
執者則拔白法善根。行一切不善道。壞世諦法故。複次中道說無者。則不如是。所謂說因果相續如幻如焰行善業道以有漏陰相續故。其義云何。過去有陰相續滅。現在有陰相續起。現在有陰相續滅。未來有陰相續起。譬如夢是名中道說無與路伽說無。非世諦時同。亦非見真實時同。汝說無者。此說無之識緣無境。起一切時。以執無為相。然是邪智。以破戒垢自涂其身。非是息苦因而是起苦因說中道者。未見真實已前。有此色等境界。覺此色等境界。覺見真實時。得空解已。色等境界執覺不起。由見道理故。直言無者。是事不然。無有彼色。境界覺者。非第一義中如實義覺故。譬如有覺。以此驗與彼路伽說無者過。複次中道說無與路伽耶說無者。所釋不同。云何不同。佛法遮有不執無。而令物解。譬如須彌芥子。鉅細殊遠。汝言說無同者。亦復如是。第一義中一切法遮。如涅槃相。為隨順福德聚。所說諸行於世諦中。是實如佛言。所有內外諸物世間說實說不實。我亦如是。順世間法說實說不實。其義云何。如論偈說。
一切實不實 亦實亦不實 非實非不實 是名諸佛法
釋曰。如佛所說。世間欲得及不欲得。我亦如是。於世諦中說欲得說不欲得。複次內外諸入色等境界。依世諦法說不顛倒。一切皆實
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 執著于斷滅見的人，就會拔除一切善法的根基，行一切不善之道，因為他們破壞了世俗諦的法則。反之中道所說的『無』，則不是這樣。中道說的是因果相續，如幻如焰，行善業道是因為有漏的五陰相續不斷。這其中的道理是什麼呢？過去的五陰相續滅去，現在的五陰相續生起；現在的五陰相續滅去，未來的五陰相續生起。這就像夢一樣。這就是中道所說的『無』，與路伽（Lokāyata，順世外道）所說的『無』，在世俗諦的層面並不相同，在證見真諦的時候也不相同。你所說的『無』，這種說『無』的意識緣于『無』的境界，在任何時候都會生起，因為它執著于『無』的表相。然而，這是邪惡的智慧，用破戒的污垢塗抹自身，不是止息痛苦的原因，而是生起痛苦的原因。說中道的人，在未證見真諦之前，有這色等境界，覺知這色等境界。當覺見真諦時，得到空性的解脫后，對於色等境界的執著和覺知就不會再生起，因為見到了真理的緣故。直接說『無』，是不對的。沒有那色等境界的覺知，因為不是在第一義諦中如實地覺知。譬如說有覺知，用這個來驗證，就超過了路伽（Lokāyata，順世外道）所說的『無』。再者，中道所說的『無』與路伽耶（Lokāyata，順世外道）所說的『無』，所解釋的含義不同。有什麼不同呢？佛法遮止對『有』的執著，但不執著于『無』，而是爲了讓眾生理解。譬如須彌山和芥子，大小相差極其遙遠。你所說的『無』是相同的，也是如此。在第一義諦中，一切法都被遮止，就像涅槃的相狀。爲了隨順福德的積聚，所說的諸行在世俗諦中是真實的，如佛所說，所有內外諸物，世間說真實，說不真實，我也是這樣，順應世間法說真實，說不真實。這其中的道理是什麼呢？如論偈所說： 一切實不實，亦實亦不實，非實非不實，是名諸佛法。 解釋說：如佛所說，世間想要得到以及不想要得到，我也是這樣，在世俗諦中說想要得到，說不想要得到。再者，內外諸入，色等境界，依據世俗諦的法則來說，是不顛倒的，一切都是真實的。
【English Translation】 English version: Those who cling to nihilism sever the roots of all virtuous dharmas, and engage in all unwholesome paths, because they destroy the laws of conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya). Conversely, the 'emptiness' (śūnyatā) spoken of in the Middle Way (Madhyamaka) is not like that. It speaks of the continuity of cause and effect, like an illusion or a mirage, and engaging in virtuous paths is due to the continuous succession of defiled aggregates (āsrava-skandha). What is the meaning of this? The past aggregates cease, and the present aggregates arise; the present aggregates cease, and the future aggregates arise, just like a dream. This is the 'emptiness' spoken of in the Middle Way, which is not the same as the 'emptiness' spoken of by the Lokāyata (materialists) in terms of conventional truth, nor is it the same when seeing reality (tattva). The 'emptiness' you speak of, this consciousness that speaks of 'emptiness' arises from the object of 'emptiness' at all times, because it clings to the appearance of 'emptiness'. However, this is perverse wisdom, smearing oneself with the filth of broken precepts, not a cause for ceasing suffering, but a cause for arising suffering. Those who speak of the Middle Way, before seeing reality, have these realms of form (rūpa) and so on, and are aware of these realms of form and so on. When they perceive reality and attain liberation through emptiness, the clinging to and awareness of the realms of form and so on will no longer arise, because they have seen the truth. To directly say 'nothing exists' is not correct. There is no awareness of those realms of form, because it is not a true awareness in the ultimate sense (paramārtha-satya). For example, there is awareness; using this to verify, it surpasses the 'emptiness' spoken of by the Lokāyata (materialists). Furthermore, the 'emptiness' spoken of in the Middle Way and the 'emptiness' spoken of by the Lokāyata (materialists) have different interpretations. What is the difference? The Buddha's Dharma prevents clinging to 'existence' but does not cling to 'non-existence', but rather allows beings to understand. For example, Mount Sumeru and a mustard seed are vastly different in size. Your saying that 'emptiness' is the same is also like that. In the ultimate sense, all dharmas are negated, like the state of Nirvāṇa. In order to accord with the accumulation of merit, the actions spoken of are real in conventional truth, as the Buddha said, 'All internal and external things, the world says are real or unreal, and I also say so, according with worldly laws, I say real or unreal.' What is the meaning of this? As the verse in the treatise says: All is real and unreal, also real and also unreal, neither real nor unreal, this is called the Dharma of all Buddhas. The explanation says: As the Buddha said, what the world wants to obtain and does not want to obtain, I also do so, in conventional truth I say wanting to obtain, and say not wanting to obtain. Furthermore, the internal and external sense bases (āyatana), the realms of form and so on, according to the laws of conventional truth, are not inverted, all are real.
。第一義中內外入等。從緣而起。如幻所作體不可得。不如其所見故。一切不實。二諦相待故。亦實亦不實。修行者證果時。於一切法得真實無分別故。不見實與不實。是故說非實非不實。複次實不實者。如佛所說。為斷煩惱障故。說內外入我我所空。是名一切皆實。不實者。謂佛法中說識為我。世不解者。妄執有我有我所。指示他云。我是作者。是聞者。是坐禪者。是修道者。是名不實。摩訶衍中一切不起。無一切物。是有可為分別無分別。二智境界故非實非不實。複次云何名佛。於一切法不顛倒真實覺了。故名為佛。云何名法。若欲得人天善趣及解脫樂。佛知眾生諸根性慾不顛倒故。為說人天道及涅槃道。故名為法。複次自他相續所有熏習及無熏習煩惱怨賊。悉能破壞故。是名為法。真實道理不與外道等共。為拔一切執著箭故。應勤修習。複次自部及外人同謂我言。汝若分別自體盡舍無餘得真實者。此真實相云何。若不說其相不立自宗。云何但與他過。是汝之失。論者言。實如所言。若實相可說我能分別。而彼實相非是文字。不可言說。為欲安慰初修行者。以分別智而為解釋。其義云何。如論偈說。
寂滅無他緣 戲論不能說 無異無種種 是名真實相
釋曰。無他緣者。是真實法。不以他為緣
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：在第一義諦（Paramārtha-satya）中，內外諸入（āyatana）等，都是從因緣和合而生起，如同幻術所變現的事物一樣，其本體是不可得的。因為它們並不如人們所見的那樣真實，所以說一切都是不真實的。但從二諦（兩條真理，即世俗諦和勝義諦）相互依存的角度來看，也可以說既是真實的，又是不真實的。修行者在證得果位時，對於一切法都能獲得真實而無分別的智慧，因此不會執著于真實與不真實的分別，所以說非實非不實。 進一步說，關於實與不實，正如佛陀所說，爲了斷除煩惱障，佛陀宣說內外諸入以及我（ātman）和我所（ātmanīya）皆是空性的，這可以稱為一切皆實。所謂不實，是指在佛法中，如果有人說識（vijñāna）是『我』，而世人不理解這一點，就會錯誤地執著于有『我』和『我所』，並且指著他人說：『我是作者，我是聽者，我是禪修者，我是修道者』，這就被稱為不實。在摩訶衍（Mahāyāna，大乘）中，一切法不起，沒有任何事物存在，這是因為有可分別和無分別的兩種智慧境界，所以說非實非不實。 再進一步說，什麼叫做佛（Buddha）？對於一切法，能夠不顛倒地真實覺悟，因此稱為佛。什麼叫做達磨（Dharma，法）？如果想要獲得人天善趣的果報以及解脫的快樂，佛陀因爲了解眾生的諸根不顛倒，所以為他們宣說人天之道以及涅槃之道，因此稱為法。再進一步說，能夠徹底摧毀自身和他人的相續中所有熏習和沒有熏習的煩惱怨賊，因此稱為法。真實的道理不與外道等相同，爲了拔除一切執著的毒箭，應當勤奮修習。 再進一步說，我們自宗和外道都認為，如果你能完全捨棄自體，沒有絲毫剩餘，就能獲得真實。那麼，這個真實相是什麼樣的呢？如果不能說出它的相狀，就無法確立自己的宗義，又怎麼能只指出別人的過失呢？這是你自己的過失。論者回答說：『確實如你所說，如果實相是可以言說的，我就可以分別它。然而，那個實相併非文字，是不可言說的。爲了安慰初學者，才用分別智來解釋它。』其含義是什麼呢？正如論偈所說： 『寂滅無他緣，戲論不能說，無異無種種，是名真實相。』 解釋說：『無他緣』，是指真實的法，不依賴於其他因緣。
【English Translation】 English version: In the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), the internal and external āyatanas (sense bases) and so on, arise from conditions, like illusions, their substance is unattainable. Because they are not as they appear, everything is unreal. However, from the perspective of the two truths (conventional and ultimate) being interdependent, it can be said to be both real and unreal. When practitioners attain fruition, they gain true and non-discriminating wisdom regarding all dharmas, thus they do not see reality and unreality. Therefore, it is said to be neither real nor unreal. Furthermore, regarding reality and unreality, as the Buddha said, to sever the afflictive obscurations, the Buddha taught that the internal and external āyatanas, as well as the ātman (self) and ātmanīya (belonging to self) are empty. This can be called everything is real. What is unreal refers to when it is said in the Buddhadharma that consciousness (vijñāna) is the 'self,' and those who do not understand this falsely cling to the existence of a 'self' and 'belonging to self,' and point to others saying, 'I am the doer, I am the listener, I am the meditator, I am the cultivator.' This is called unreal. In the Mahāyāna, all dharmas do not arise, and nothing exists, because there are two realms of wisdom, that of discrimination and non-discrimination, therefore it is said to be neither real nor unreal. Furthermore, what is called a Buddha (Buddha)? One who has truly awakened to all dharmas without delusion is called a Buddha. What is called Dharma (Dharma)? If one desires to attain the happiness of good destinies in the human and deva realms, as well as the bliss of liberation, the Buddha, knowing that the faculties of beings are not deluded, teaches them the paths to the human and deva realms, as well as the path to Nirvana, therefore it is called Dharma. Furthermore, it is called Dharma because it can completely destroy all the afflictive enemies, both those that are habitual and non-habitual, in one's own and others' continua. The true principle is not shared with external paths, and to remove all the arrows of attachment, one should diligently practice. Furthermore, both our own school and external schools say, 'If you can completely abandon the self, without any remainder, you will attain reality.' So, what is the nature of this reality? If its nature cannot be described, one cannot establish one's own doctrine, and how can one only point out the faults of others? This is your own fault. The debater replies, 'It is indeed as you say, if reality were describable, I could distinguish it. However, that reality is not words, it is indescribable. To comfort beginners, it is explained with discriminating wisdom.' What is its meaning? As the verse in the treatise says: 『Quiescence is without other causes, it cannot be spoken of by conceptual proliferation, it is without difference and without variety, this is called the nature of reality.』 The explanation says, 'Without other causes' refers to the true Dharma, which does not depend on other causes.
。故名無他緣。所謂不從他聞亦無保證。自體覺故。寂滅者。自體空故。非差別分別物境界故。名為寂滅。戲論不能說者。戲論謂言說。見真實時不可說故。而不能說。無異者謂無分別。無分別者。謂無一境界可見分別。以分別無境界故名無分別。無種種義者。謂一味故。無體義故。無差別故。是名無種種義。此謂真實相也。複次由無分別故。戲論所不能說。由寂滅故。是無分別智境界。複名無他緣。由無他緣。是故過言語道。真實自體我不能說。複次此遮一切體。自體言說能得真實。自體能起無分別智。能令行者解自覺真實方便。如是語言是得第一義方便。如汝所言。云何為真實相。若不說其相不立自宗。獨與他過。是汝之失者。我無此失。以此偈答。即是說真實相。如是且約第一義說真實相。令復約世諦說之。其義云何。如論偈說。
從緣所起物 此物非緣體 亦不離彼緣 非斷亦非常
釋曰。此明從緣起果。此果不即因。是中說驗因果不一起。異覺境界故。譬如覺及境界。從緣所起果者亦不離彼緣。若離者果起則墮無因過。複次此中立驗因與果不別。藉緣方起故。譬如因自體。以如是因果不一亦不異故。不斷亦不常。複次雖因壞已果起之時。由有因類相續住。然非因壞故果亦壞。以不異故。而
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此名為『無他緣』（anuttara，無上）。所謂『不從他聞亦無保證』，是因為它是『自體覺』（svayambuddha，自證覺悟）的緣故。『寂滅』（nirvana，涅槃）者，是因為『自體空』（svabhava-sunya，自性空）的緣故，不是差別分別之物的境界，所以名為『寂滅』。『戲論不能說』（prapanca-niruddha，戲論止息）者，『戲論』指言說，見真實時不可說，所以不能說。『無異』（advaya，不二）是指沒有分別。『無分別』（nirvikalpa，無分別）是指沒有一個境界可見分別，因為分別沒有境界，所以名為『無分別』。『無種種義』（nanartha-aneka-artha-rahita，無種種義）是指一味，沒有體義，沒有差別，這名為『無種種義』。這說的是真實相（tattva-laksana，真實相）。 再次，因為沒有分別，所以戲論不能說。因為寂滅，所以是無分別智（nirvikalpa-jnana，無分別智）的境界。又名『無他緣』。因為『無他緣』，所以超過言語道。真實自體我不能說。再次，這遮止一切體。自體言說能得到真實。自體能生起無分別智，能令行者理解自覺真實的方便。這樣的語言是得到第一義（paramartha，勝義）的方便。如你所說，『什麼是真實相？若不說其相，不立自宗，獨與他過，是你的過失』，我沒有這個過失。用這個偈頌回答，就是說真實相。這樣且約第一義說真實相，再約世諦（samvriti-satya，世俗諦）說它，其義如何？如論偈所說： 『從緣所起物，此物非緣體，亦不離彼緣，非斷亦非常。』 解釋：這說明從緣起果。此果不即是因。這裡說驗證因果不一起，因為是異覺境界的緣故，譬如覺和境界。從緣所起的果也不離彼緣，如果離開，果的生起就墮入無因的過失。再次，這裡立驗證因與果不別，憑藉緣才能生起，譬如因自體。因為這樣因果不一也不異，所以不斷也不常。再次，雖然因壞滅后，果生起之時，由於有因類相續住，然而不是因為因壞滅，果也壞滅，因為不異的緣故。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, it is named 'Anuttara' (supreme). The so-called 'not hearing from others and having no guarantee' is because it is 'Svayambuddha' (self-awakened). 'Nirvana' (extinction) is because of 'Svabhava-sunya' (self-nature emptiness), not the realm of differentiated and discriminating things, so it is called 'Nirvana'. 'Prapanca-niruddha' (cessation of conceptual proliferation) means that 'prapanca' refers to speech, which cannot be spoken when seeing the truth, so it cannot be spoken. 'Advaya' (non-duality) means without discrimination. 'Nirvikalpa' (non-conceptual) means that there is no realm where discrimination can be seen, because discrimination has no realm, so it is called 'Nirvikalpa'. 'Nanartha-aneka-artha-rahita' (without various meanings) means one taste, without substantial meaning, without difference, this is called 'without various meanings'. This speaks of the Tattva-laksana (true characteristic). Again, because there is no discrimination, prapanca cannot be spoken. Because of nirvana, it is the realm of Nirvikalpa-jnana (non-discriminating wisdom). It is also called 'Anuttara'. Because of 'Anuttara', it transcends the path of language. The true self cannot be spoken. Again, this negates all entities. Self-speech can attain the truth. The self can generate non-discriminating wisdom, enabling practitioners to understand the means of self-awakening to the truth. Such language is a means to attain Paramartha (ultimate truth). As you said, 'What is the true characteristic? If you do not speak of its characteristic, do not establish your own doctrine, and only give faults to others, it is your fault', I do not have this fault. Answering with this verse is speaking of the true characteristic. Thus, for now, speaking of the true characteristic in terms of the ultimate truth, and then speaking of it in terms of Samvriti-satya (conventional truth), what is its meaning? As the verse in the treatise says: 'Things arising from conditions, this thing is not the body of the conditions, nor is it apart from those conditions, neither permanent nor impermanent.' Explanation: This explains the arising of the result from conditions. This result is not the same as the cause. Here it is said that verifying cause and effect do not occur together, because they are different realms of perception, like perception and the object. The result arising from conditions is also not apart from those conditions, if it were apart, the arising of the result would fall into the fault of having no cause. Again, here it is verified that the cause and effect are not different, arising only by relying on conditions, like the self of the cause. Because in this way cause and effect are neither the same nor different, so it is neither permanent nor impermanent. Again, although the cause is destroyed and the result arises, because there is a continuous dwelling of the cause-type, it is not because the cause is destroyed that the result is also destroyed, because of non-difference.
體不斷。由果時因已壞故而不是常。如經偈言。以有體起故。彼斷不可得。以有體滅故。彼常不可得。云何不斷不常。謂緣起法爾剎那剎那相續起。是故不斷。有為法體念念滅故不常。今當爲汝開演其義。如論偈說。
不一亦不異 不斷亦不常 是名諸世尊 最上甘露法
釋曰。甘露者。謂得無分別智因故。如諸佛以已所得智。於一切眾生界。以佛日言說光。隨眾生機令開慧花。複次諸聲聞人。以習聞思修慧得真實甘露法。現證涅槃息一切苦。或為福智聚未滿足故。雖不證解脫。後世決得。其義云何。如論偈說。
諸修真實者 今雖未得果 將來決定得 如業不假勤
釋曰。諸修真實行者。若此世。若後世。而不得果者。因熏習諸行。未來世中自然得真實智。亦無他為緣。如論偈說。
諸佛未出世 聲聞已滅盡 然有辟支佛 依寂靜起智
釋曰。如三密經說。辟支佛依寂靜故起實。智慧者由身心寂靜為因故。智慧得起。是名甘露法。若今世。若後世。有能修真實者。必定得甘露法。是故欲得解脫。應當修行是真實法。此品中破外人立驗。亦說自驗無過。而令信解諸陰我我所空。是此品義意。以是故我義得成。如般若經中說。極勇猛。色非是我非是無我。乃至受想行
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 體性是不斷的。從結果來看，因為因已經壞滅，所以不是常。如經中的偈頌所說：『因為有體性的生起，所以斷滅是不可得的；因為有體性的滅去，所以常住也是不可得的。』 怎樣才是不常不斷呢？就是緣起法則是剎那剎那相續生起的，所以不是斷滅。有為法的體性唸唸滅去，所以不是常住。現在我將為你開演其中的意義，如論中的偈頌所說：
『不一亦不異， 不斷亦不常， 是名諸世尊（諸佛）， 最上甘露法。』
解釋：甘露，是指獲得無分別智的因。如同諸佛以他們已經獲得的智慧，在一切眾生界，用佛日般的言說之光，隨著眾生的根機，令其開啟智慧之花。再次，諸聲聞人，通過修習聞、思、修的智慧，獲得真實的甘露法，現證涅槃，止息一切痛苦。或者因為福德和智慧的積聚尚未滿足，雖然沒有證得解脫，但後世必定能夠獲得。其中的意義是什麼呢？如論中的偈頌所說：
『諸修真實者， 今雖未得果， 將來決定得， 如業不假勤。』
解釋：諸位修習真實行的人，無論是今世還是後世，如果還沒有得到果報，是因為熏習諸行的緣故，未來世中自然能夠得到真實智慧，也不需要其他的因緣。如論中的偈頌所說：
『諸佛未出世， 聲聞已滅盡， 然有辟支佛（Pratyekabuddha，緣覺佛）， 依寂靜起智。』
解釋：如《三密經》所說，辟支佛依靠寂靜而生起真實的智慧，是因為身心寂靜作為因，智慧才得以生起。這就是甘露法。如果今世或者後世，有人能夠修習真實之法，必定能夠得到甘露法。因此，想要得到解脫，應當修行這真實之法。此品中破斥外道所立的驗證，也說明自身的驗證沒有過失，從而令人信解諸陰（Skandha，五蘊）我（Atman，靈魂）我所（belongings of Atman，靈魂的所有物）皆空。這是此品的意義所在。因此，我（Atman，靈魂）的意義得以成立。如《般若經》中所說，極其勇猛，色（Rupa，色蘊）不是我，也不是無我，乃至受（Vedana，受蘊）、想（Samjna，想蘊）、行（Samskara，行蘊）。
【English Translation】 English version: The nature of the body is continuous. From the perspective of the result, it is not permanent because the cause has already perished. As the verse in the sutra says: 'Because there is the arising of a body, cessation is unattainable; because there is the ceasing of a body, permanence is unattainable.' How is it that it is neither permanent nor discontinuous? It is that the law of dependent origination arises continuously from moment to moment, therefore it is not discontinuous. The nature of conditioned dharmas perishes from moment to moment, therefore it is not permanent. Now I will expound its meaning for you, as the verse in the treatise says:
'Not one, not different, Not discontinuous, not permanent, This is named the most supreme nectar dharma Of all the World Honored Ones (Buddhas).'
Explanation: Nectar refers to the cause of attaining non-discriminating wisdom. It is like the Buddhas using the light of speech like the sun, with the wisdom they have already attained, in all realms of sentient beings, causing the flowers of wisdom to bloom according to the capacities of sentient beings. Furthermore, the Shravakas (hearers), through practicing the wisdom of hearing, thinking, and cultivating, attain the true nectar dharma, directly realizing Nirvana and ceasing all suffering. Or because the accumulation of merit and wisdom is not yet complete, although they have not attained liberation, they will surely attain it in future lives. What is its meaning? As the verse in the treatise says:
'Those who cultivate the truth, Although they have not attained the fruit now, They will surely attain it in the future, Like karma that requires no effort.'
Explanation: Those who cultivate true practice, whether in this life or in future lives, if they have not yet attained the fruit, it is because of the influence of cultivating various practices. In future lives, they will naturally attain true wisdom, without needing other conditions. As the verse in the treatise says:
'When Buddhas have not appeared in the world, And Shravakas (hearers) have already passed away, There are still Pratyekabuddhas (Solitary Buddhas), Who rely on stillness to arise wisdom.'
Explanation: As the Samdhinirmochana Sutra says, Pratyekabuddhas (Solitary Buddhas) rely on stillness to arise true wisdom, because the stillness of body and mind is the cause for wisdom to arise. This is the nectar dharma. If in this life or in future lives, there are those who can cultivate the true dharma, they will surely attain the nectar dharma. Therefore, if you want to attain liberation, you should cultivate this true dharma. In this chapter, the validation established by outsiders is refuted, and it is also explained that one's own validation has no fault, thereby causing people to believe and understand that the Skandhas (aggregates), Atman (self), and belongings of Atman (self's belongings) are all empty. This is the meaning of this chapter. Therefore, the meaning of Atman (self) is established. As the Prajnaparamita Sutra says, with utmost courage, Rupa (form) is not self, nor is it non-self, and so on, up to Vedana (feeling), Samjna (perception), and Samskara (mental formations).
識非是我非是無我。若色受想行識非我體非無我體。是名般若波羅蜜。如經偈言。無我無眾生無人無受者。但眾緣名身。佛得如是解。此中明我人眾生及諸行聚是等皆空無有因起。又如空寂所問經說。一切眾生。豎我見幢。張無明帆。處煩惱風。入生死海。諸佛大悲。張大教網。撈漉天人。置涅槃岸如上偈說。不二安隱門。能破諸邪見。諸佛所行處。是名無我法。
釋觀法品竟。
般若燈論釋觀時品第十九
釋曰。今此品者。亦為遮空所對治。解諸體無自體故說。
鞞世師人言。第一義中有時。法自體爲了因故。譬如燈。若無時云何得有了因。譬如龜毛衣。由有物體故。以時爲了因。是故有時。論者言。世諦之中諸行若起。即名為作。此起但是諸物體起。更無別起。此諸行因果已起名過去時。因滅果起名現在時。因果俱未起名未來時。作有分齊故。約物為時。無有別時。世諦中亦假說有時。如言構乳時來。然外人分別執言有時。第一義中應作如是觀察。鞞世師人言。有為法外別說有時。而是常論者言。今遮此時故。第一義中有為法外不別。有時有體故。譬如有為自體。第一義中無有。常時可識故。譬如瓶。鞞世師人言。如虛空等。非是一向無常。論者言。彼虛空異分無體。亦如是遮故。鞞世
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『識』（Vijnana，了別作用）不是『我』(Atman，神我) 也不是『無我』。如果『色』(Rupa，物質) 、『受』(Vedana，感受) 、『想』(Samjna，表象) 、『行』(Samskara，意志) 、『識』(Vijnana，了別作用) 不是『我』的自體，也不是『無我』的自體，這就叫做『般若波羅蜜』(Prajnaparamita，智慧到彼岸)。如經文偈頌所說：『無我』、『無眾生』、『無人』、『無受者』，只是眾多因緣和合而名為『身』，佛陀如此理解。這裡闡明了『我』、『人』、『眾生』以及各種『行』的聚合，這些都是空性的，沒有實在的起因。又如《空寂所問經》所說：一切眾生，豎立『我見』的旗幟，張開『無明』的風帆，處於煩惱的風中，進入生死之海。諸佛以大慈悲，張開廣大的教法之網，撈取天人和世人，安置在涅槃的彼岸。如上面的偈頌所說，不二的安穩之門，能夠破除各種邪見，是諸佛所行之處，這叫做『無我』之法。
（《釋觀法品》結束）
《般若燈論釋觀時品》第十九
解釋：這一品是爲了遮破那些執著『空』的人，解釋一切法沒有自體的緣故而說的。
鞞世師（Vaisheshika，勝論派）的人說：在第一義諦（Paramartha-satya，勝義諦）中，有時（Kala，時間），法（Dharma，事物）的自體是爲了因的緣故，譬如燈。如果沒有時，怎麼能有了因？譬如龜毛衣。由於有物體，所以以時爲了因。所以有時。論者說：在世俗諦（Samvriti-satya，世俗諦）中，諸行如果生起，就叫做『作』。這個生起只是諸物體的生起，更沒有別的生起。這些行的因果已經生起，叫做過去時；因滅果生起，叫做現在時；因果都沒有生起，叫做未來時。『作』有分界，所以依附於物體而建立『時』，沒有別的『時』。在世俗諦中也假說有時，如說『構乳時來』。然而外道分別執著說有時，在第一義諦中應當這樣觀察。鞞世師的人說：在有為法（Samskrta-dharma，有為法）之外別立有時，而且是常。論者說：現在遮破這個『時』，所以在第一義諦中，有為法之外沒有別的『時』，因為有為法有自體。第一義諦中沒有常時可以認識，譬如瓶子。鞞世師的人說：如虛空等，不是一向無常。論者說：那個虛空異分沒有自體，也這樣遮破。鞞世
【English Translation】 English version: 'Consciousness' (Vijnana) is neither 'Self' (Atman) nor 'No-Self'. If 'Form' (Rupa), 'Feeling' (Vedana), 'Perception' (Samjna), 'Volition' (Samskara), and 'Consciousness' (Vijnana) are neither the self-nature of 'Self' nor the self-nature of 'No-Self', this is called 'Prajnaparamita' (Perfection of Wisdom). As the verse in the scripture says: 'No Self', 'No sentient being', 'No person', 'No receiver', but merely a combination of many causes and conditions is named 'body'. The Buddha understands it this way. Here it clarifies that 'Self', 'person', 'sentient being', and the aggregation of various 'volitions' are all empty and have no real cause. Furthermore, as the 'Vimalakirti Sutra' says: All sentient beings erect the banner of 'Self-view', unfurl the sail of 'Ignorance', dwell in the wind of afflictions, and enter the sea of birth and death. The Buddhas, with great compassion, spread the vast net of teachings, catch gods and humans, and place them on the shore of Nirvana. As the verse above says, the non-dual gate of peace and security can break all wrong views, and it is the place where all Buddhas walk. This is called the Dharma of 'No-Self'.
(End of the Chapter on Explaining Observation of Dharmas)
Treatise on the Lamp of Wisdom, Chapter Nineteen on Explaining Observation of Time
Explanation: This chapter is spoken to refute those who cling to 'emptiness', explaining that all dharmas have no self-nature.
The Vaisheshika (Vaisheshika school) person says: In the ultimate truth (Paramartha-satya), there is time (Kala), and the self-nature of dharma (Dharma) is for the sake of cause, like a lamp. If there is no time, how can there be a cause? For example, a garment made of tortoise hair. Because there is an object, time is taken as the cause. Therefore, there is time. The commentator says: In the conventional truth (Samvriti-satya), if actions arise, they are called 'doing'. This arising is merely the arising of objects, and there is no other arising. The cause and effect of these actions that have already arisen are called past time; the cause ceasing and the effect arising is called present time; the cause and effect that have not yet arisen are called future time. 'Doing' has boundaries, so 'time' is established based on objects, and there is no other 'time'. In conventional truth, it is also conventionally said that there is time, such as saying 'the time for milking has come'. However, externalists separately cling to the idea that there is time. In the ultimate truth, one should observe in this way. The Vaisheshika person says: Apart from conditioned dharmas (Samskrta-dharma), time is established separately, and it is permanent. The commentator says: Now we refute this 'time', so in the ultimate truth, there is no separate 'time' apart from conditioned dharmas, because conditioned dharmas have self-nature. In the ultimate truth, there is no permanent time that can be recognized, like a pot. The Vaisheshika person says: Like space, it is not always impermanent. The commentator says: That different aspect of space has no self-nature, and it is also refuted in this way. The Vaiśeṣika
師人言。色體外有時與色。和合緣現在時。有識起故。譬如人與杖合。如識見提婆達多境界與杖合者亦如是。於色上起現在現在識。此色之外有別體者名為時。是故別有時論者言。汝言有識起為因者緣杖之識。于非時相境界起故。時相則壞。執杖者非常故。常義則壞。自體法差別法。如是等皆破故。是汝立義出因等過。與杖和合者譬喻無體。第一義中執杖者不成故為喻不然。緣色之覺與時和合。此覺不能顯了。是故無時。複次三時別成者。為有相待。為無相待。若立時有待成者。其過如論偈說。
現在及未來 若待過去時 現在及未來 過去時已有
釋曰。此謂時有待。時有待故。譬如過去時。複次若待過去時有現在未來時者。應過去時中有現在未來時。何以故。因過去時成現在未來時故。亦應現在未來時住過去時中。如是現在未來盡名過去時。若一切時盡名過去時者。則無現在未來時。盡過去故。若無現在未來時。亦應無過去時。何以故。現在未來時已在過去時中故。複次若時有待者。或彼同時有。不與待相違故。譬如父子異。若不立時有待者。現在未來有別起過。其義如論偈說。
現在與未來 過去時中無 現在與未來 待何而得有
釋曰。此謂過去時中無現在未來時。若謂過
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：論師（指論述佛法的人）說：『色（Rūpa，物質現象）的自體之外，有時（時間）與色和合，因緣和合于現在時（當下時刻），所以有識（Vijñāna，意識）生起。』譬如人與杖（手杖）結合。如同意識見到提婆達多（Devadatta，人名）的境界與杖結合也是如此。於色之上生起現在的、現在的識。此色之外有別個體名為時。是故別有時論者說：『你所說的有識生起作為原因，是緣于杖的識，于非時相（不合時宜的現象）境界生起，所以時相則壞。』執杖者非常（無常）的緣故，常義（永恒的意義）則壞。自體法（自身性質）、差別法（差異性質），像這些都破滅的緣故，這是你立義（建立理論）、出因（提出理由）等的過失。與杖和合的比喻沒有實體。第一義（究竟真理）中執杖者不能成立，所以作為比喻是不對的。緣於色的覺知與時間和合，這種覺知不能顯現明白，所以沒有時間。再次，三時（過去、現在、未來）分別成立，是有相待（相互依賴）的，還是無相待（不相互依賴）的？如果立時為有待而成立，其中的過失如論偈所說： 『現在及未來，若待過去時，現在及未來，過去時已有。』 解釋說：這說明時間是有待的。時間是有待的緣故，譬如過去時。再次，如果等待過去時才有現在未來時，那麼應該過去時中就有現在未來時。為什麼呢？因為過去時成就現在未來時。也應該現在未來時住在過去時中。這樣現在未來都可稱為過去時。如果一切時都稱為過去時，那麼就沒有現在未來時了，因為都過去了。如果沒有現在未來時，也應該沒有過去時。為什麼呢？因為現在未來時已經在過去時中了。再次，如果時間是有待的，或者彼同時有，不與待相違背。譬如父子是不同的。如果不立時為有待，現在未來有別起（分別產生）的過失。其中的意義如論偈所說： 『現在與未來，過去時中無，現在與未來，待何而得有？』 解釋說：這說明過去時中沒有現在未來時。如果說過去
【English Translation】 English version: The master (referring to someone who discusses the Dharma) said: 'Outside the substance of Rūpa (form, material phenomena), there is time (Kāla) that combines with Rūpa, and the conditions combine in the present moment (present time), therefore Vijñāna (consciousness) arises.' For example, a person combines with a staff (walking stick). It is like consciousness seeing Devadatta's (a person's name) realm combined with a staff. Upon Rūpa, present, present consciousness arises. Outside of this Rūpa, there is a separate entity called time. Therefore, those who separately posit time say: 'Your saying that the arising of consciousness is the cause is due to the consciousness related to the staff, arising in a realm of untimely phenomena (inappropriate phenomena), so the aspect of time is destroyed.' Because the one holding the staff is impermanent (anicca), the meaning of permanence (nitya) is destroyed. The self-nature (svabhāva), the differentiating nature (viśeṣa-dharma), and so on, are all destroyed, so this is your fault of establishing a theory, presenting a reason, etc. The analogy of combining with a staff has no substance. In the ultimate truth (paramārtha), the one holding the staff cannot be established, so it is not a valid analogy. The perception related to form combines with time, but this perception cannot be clearly manifested, so there is no time. Furthermore, are the three times (past, present, future) established separately with mutual dependence (apekṣā), or without mutual dependence (anapekṣā)? If time is established as being dependent, the fault is as stated in the verse: 'The present and the future, if they depend on the past, the present and the future are already in the past.' The explanation says: This explains that time is dependent. Because time is dependent, it is like the past. Furthermore, if the present and future exist by depending on the past, then the present and future should exist in the past. Why? Because the past accomplishes the present and future. Also, the present and future should reside in the past. In this way, the present and future can all be called the past. If all times are called the past, then there is no present or future, because they have all passed. If there is no present or future, then there should also be no past. Why? Because the present and future are already in the past. Furthermore, if time is dependent, then perhaps they exist simultaneously, not contradicting dependence. For example, a father and son are different. If time is not established as being dependent, there is the fault of the present and future arising separately. The meaning is as stated in the verse: 'The present and the future, are not in the past, the present and the future, depend on what to exist?' The explanation says: This explains that the present and future are not in the past. If it is said that the past
去時中無現在未來時。而因過去時成現在未來時。此二云何得成。若無現在未來時。有何等過。此下說驗。第一義中無現在未來時。自體時有待故。譬如過去時。複次鞞婆沙人言。現在未來於過去中。得同時故。而有相待。論者言。亦有別時相待。如兄弟。非是一向汝語非也。如是有時相待不成。複次若無時相待得成者。其過如論偈說。
不待過去時 彼二則不成 現在及未來 是則無有時
釋曰。彼二者謂現在未來為二。不待過去時則不成現在未來時。何以故。若不待過去時有現在未來時者。於何處有現在未來時。以無相待故。現在未來時亦不成。其義云何。如論偈說。
與過去無別 餘二次第轉 及上中下品 一體等應觀
釋曰。以此方便應展轉說。其義云何。如論偈說。
未來又過去 若待現在時 未來及過去 現在時中有 未來及過去 現在時中無 未來及過去 待何而得有 不待現在時 彼二則不成 未來及過去 是則無有時 現在及過去 若待未來時 現在及過去 未來時中有 現在及過去 未來時中無 現在及過去 待何而得有 不待未來時 彼二則不成 現在及過去 是則無有時
釋曰。此是釋論偈。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：過去的時間中沒有現在和未來的時間。但是因為過去的時間才成就了現在和未來的時間。這兩種說法如何能夠成立？如果沒有現在和未來的時間，會有什麼過失？下面就來說明驗證。在第一義諦（Paramārtha-satya）中沒有現在和未來的時間，因為自體時間是相互依賴的。比如過去的時間。其次，鞞婆沙人（Vaibhāṣika）說，現在和未來在過去中，可以同時存在，所以是相互依賴的。論者說，也有不同時間相互依賴的情況，比如兄弟。不能一概而論你說的不對。像這樣，有時相互依賴不能成立。再次，如果沒有時間相互依賴能夠成立，那麼過失就像論偈所說：
『不依賴過去時，現在未來則不成，現在和未來，這樣就沒有時間。』
解釋：『彼二』指的是現在和未來兩種時間。不依賴過去的時間，就不能成立現在和未來的時間。為什麼呢？如果不依賴過去的時間而有現在和未來的時間，那麼現在和未來的時間在哪裡存在呢？因為沒有相互依賴，現在和未來的時間也不能成立。』它的意義是什麼呢？就像論偈所說：
『與過去無差別，其餘二次第轉變，以及上中下品，一體等應觀。』
解釋：用這種方便應該輾轉相說。它的意義是什麼呢？就像論偈所說：
『未來和過去，如果依賴現在時，未來和過去，在現在時間中存在；未來和過去，在現在時間中不存在；未來和過去，依賴什麼而存在？不依賴現在時，這二者則不能成立，未來和過去，這樣就沒有時間。現在和過去，如果依賴未來時，現在和過去，在未來時間中存在；現在和過去，在未來時間中不存在；現在和過去，依賴什麼而存在？不依賴未來時，這二者則不能成立，現在和過去，這樣就沒有時間。』
解釋：這是解釋論偈。
【English Translation】 English version Question: In the past, there are no present and future times. But because of the past, the present and future are formed. How can these two statements be established? If there are no present and future times, what faults would there be? The following explains and verifies this. In the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), there are no present and future times, because time itself is interdependent. For example, the past. Furthermore, the Vaibhāṣikas say that the present and future can exist simultaneously in the past, so they are interdependent. The debater says that there are also cases where different times are interdependent, such as brothers. It is not always the case that what you say is wrong. Like this, sometimes interdependence cannot be established. Furthermore, if there is no interdependence of time that can be established, then the fault is as the verse in the treatise says:
'Without dependence on the past, the present and future cannot be formed; the present and future, thus there is no time.'
Explanation: 'The two' refers to the present and future times. Without dependence on the past, the present and future times cannot be established. Why? If there are present and future times without dependence on the past, then where do the present and future times exist? Because there is no interdependence, the present and future times cannot be established either.' What is its meaning? As the verse in the treatise says:
'Without difference from the past, the remaining two change in sequence, and the superior, middle, and inferior grades, should be viewed as one entity, etc.'
Explanation: Using this method, one should explain it in turn. What is its meaning? As the verse in the treatise says:
'If the future and the past depend on the present, the future and the past exist in the present; the future and the past do not exist in the present; on what do the future and the past depend to exist? Without dependence on the present, these two cannot be established; the future and the past, thus there is no time. If the present and the past depend on the future, the present and the past exist in the future; the present and the past do not exist in the future; on what do the present and the past depend to exist? Without dependence on the future, these two cannot be established; the present and the past, thus there is no time.'
Explanation: This is an explanation of the verses in the treatise.
如前自成立。與外人過。云何為上中下品次第乃至一體等。譬如人類。同名為人。于中而有差別。功德具足名上品人。稍減者名中品人。全無者名下品人。如是等為待故成。為不待故成。且有上者。非上自體有相待故。譬如中自體。如是中亦非中。自體有相待故。譬如下自體。下亦非下。自體有相待故譬如上自體。複次以有相待為因。欲令汝解上中下等無自體故。汝不欲得無自體耶。若欲得有自體者。待中故喚為上。是亦不然。如是一數體及一二等亦如前遮。一數者今當說。第一義中一非一數體。何以故。是數有待故。譬如二數等。如是二非二數體。多非多數體。應如一數說。第一義中。不欲於法體外而有彼數。云何欲得謂一者。無二及無異故。名為一。無一及無異故名為二。無二及無異故名為三。自三已后總名為多。亦如前遮。而令開解今當更說。第一義中一亦非一。是可數故。譬如異。如是二亦非二。多亦非多。亦如一數說。應作是驗。等者云何。謂一塵非一塵。是可數故。譬如異如是二塵非二塵。多塵非多塵。亦如上說。及長短遠近前後因果。非長短遠近前後因果。乃至有為無為。非有為非無為亦如是說。鞞世師人言。第一義中有如是時。何以故。有份量故。若無時則無份量。如馬無角。不可說有份量。由有時
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 如前所說，這些概念是相互依存而成立的。與外道辯論時，他們會問：『什麼是上品、中品、下品的次第，乃至一體等等？』 譬如人類，都稱為人，但其中有差別。功德圓滿的稱為上品人，稍有欠缺的稱為中品人，完全沒有功德的稱為下品人。像這些都是因為相互依存才成立的。是依賴於其他事物而成立，還是不依賴於其他事物而成立呢？暫且說有『上』這個概念，但『上』本身並沒有自性，是因為相互比較才產生的。譬如『中』這個概念本身，也是因為相互比較才產生的。『中』也不是自身就具有『中』的性質，是因為相互比較才產生的。譬如『下』這個概念本身。『下』也不是自身就具有『下』的性質，是因為相互比較才產生的，譬如『上』這個概念本身。 進一步說，因為有相互依存的因素，才想讓你們理解上品、中品、下品等等都沒有自性。你們難道不想要理解沒有自性嗎？如果想要得到有自性的東西，因為依賴於『中』才稱為『上』，這也是不成立的。像這樣，一個數、一體以及一和二等等，都可以像前面那樣破斥。一個數，現在應當說明。在第一義諦中，『一』不是一個獨立的數。為什麼呢？因為這個數是依賴於其他事物才成立的，譬如二這個數等等。像這樣，二也不是一個獨立的數，多也不是一個獨立的數，應當像說明『一』這個數那樣說明。 在第一義諦中，不應該在法體之外去尋找那個數。怎麼能想要說『一』呢？因為沒有『二』以及沒有差異，所以稱為『一』。因為沒有『一』以及沒有差異，所以稱為『二』。因為沒有『二』以及沒有差異，所以稱為『三』。從三之後，總稱為『多』，也可以像前面那樣破斥。爲了讓你們開悟理解，現在再進一步說明。在第一義諦中，『一』也不是獨立的『一』，因為它是可以被計數的，譬如『異』（不同）。像這樣，『二』也不是獨立的『二』，『多』也不是獨立的『多』，也可以像說明『一』這個數那樣說明。應當這樣驗證。『等』是什麼呢？所謂一微塵不是獨立的『一微塵』，因為它是可以被計數的，譬如『異』（不同）。像這樣，二微塵不是獨立的『二微塵』，多微塵不是獨立的『多微塵』，也可以像上面那樣說明。以及長短、遠近、前後、因果，都不是獨立的長短、遠近、前後、因果。乃至有為、無為，不是獨立有為、不是獨立無為，也可以像這樣說明。 鞞世師（Vaisheshika，印度哲學流派，主張實在論和原子論）的人說，在第一義諦中，有時間這樣的東西。為什麼呢？因為有份量。如果沒有時間，就沒有份量。就像馬沒有角一樣，不能說有份量。因為有時間。
【English Translation】 English version As previously established, these concepts are established through mutual dependence. When debating with outsiders, they ask: 'What is the order of superior, middling, and inferior grades, and even oneness, etc.?' For example, humans are all called humans, but there are differences among them. Those with complete merit are called superior people, those with slightly less are called middling people, and those with no merit at all are called inferior people. These are all established because of mutual dependence. Are they established by relying on other things, or are they established without relying on other things? Let's say there is the concept of 'superior,' but 'superior' itself does not have self-nature; it is produced because of mutual comparison. For example, the concept of 'middle' itself is also produced because of mutual comparison. 'Middle' does not inherently possess the nature of 'middle'; it is produced because of mutual comparison. For example, the concept of 'inferior' itself. 'Inferior' does not inherently possess the nature of 'inferior'; it is produced because of mutual comparison, like the concept of 'superior' itself. Furthermore, because there are factors of mutual dependence, I want you to understand that superior, middling, inferior, etc., all lack self-nature. Don't you want to understand the lack of self-nature? If you want to obtain something with self-nature, calling something 'superior' because it depends on 'middle' is also not established. In this way, a number, oneness, and one and two, etc., can all be refuted as before. One number, now we should explain. In the ultimate truth (Paramārtha), 'one' is not an independent number. Why? Because this number is established by relying on other things, like the number two, etc. In this way, two is not an independent number, and many is not an independent number; it should be explained as explaining the number 'one'. In the ultimate truth, one should not seek that number outside the substance of the dharma. How can one want to say 'one'? Because there is no 'two' and no difference, it is called 'one'. Because there is no 'one' and no difference, it is called 'two'. Because there is no 'two' and no difference, it is called 'three'. From three onwards, it is generally called 'many,' which can also be refuted as before. To enlighten you to understand, let me explain further now. In the ultimate truth, 'one' is also not an independent 'one' because it can be counted, like 'different' (anya). In this way, 'two' is not an independent 'two', and 'many' is not an independent 'many'; it can also be explained as explaining the number 'one'. It should be verified in this way. What is 'equal'? So-called one dust particle is not an independent 'one dust particle' because it can be counted, like 'different' (anya). In this way, two dust particles are not independent 'two dust particles', and many dust particles are not independent 'many dust particles'; it can also be explained as above. And long, short, far, near, before, after, cause and effect are not independent long, short, far, near, before, after, cause and effect. Even conditioned (saṃskṛta) and unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) are not independent conditioned, not independent unconditioned; it can also be explained in this way. The Vaisheshika (Vaisheshika, an Indian philosophical school advocating realism and atomism) people say that in the ultimate truth, there is such a thing as time. Why? Because there is measurement. If there is no time, there is no measurement. Just like a horse has no horns, it cannot be said to have measurement. Because there is time.
故則有剎那羅婆摸呼多晝夜半月一月時行年雙等份量。若有份量。是則有時。譬如稻穀等。有故則有份量故知有時。論者言。汝之所說義不相應。何以故。如論偈說。
不取不住時 住時亦不有 可取不可取 云何可施設
釋曰。不住者。謂諸行聚是起滅法。名為不住。世諦中行聚等名時。是時名不可取。住時者亦不於法體外有非色時可取。是名住時。云何可取不可取。云何施設。時若可取即能施設。時不可取不能施設。以是故。諸行如是。曰行等作有分齊。諸行生住滅。摸呼㗚多等法。有份量故名為時。如汝所說。因者其義不成何以故。無所依故譬如無體。鞞世師人言。有常時。以有剎那羅婆摸呼㗚多過去未來等種種差別。譬如凈摩尼珠。因彼眾色而有種種相現。論者言。此體待彼體得有剎那等名。我義如是。如論偈說。
此彼體相待 世諦法如是 第一義無體 離體何有時
釋曰。相待者。謂外人於世諦中立有相待。我義亦爾。第一義中無有常時。如我所說過者。汝不能免。鞞世師人言。第一義中有實時體。如非他及他一時及非一時遲疾等。即是時相。非無體而有相。論者言。第一義中無少許體。世諦之中有諸行差別相待相續。非他及他等識起一時者。謂諸行無差別剎那相待非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，才有剎那（ksana，極短的時間單位）、羅婆（lava，時間單位）、摸呼多（muhurta，時間單位）、晝夜、半月、一月、時行年、雙等份量。如果存在份量，那麼就存在時間。譬如稻穀等，因為存在所以有份量，因此可知存在時間。論者說：『你所說的義理不相應。』為什麼呢？如論偈所說： 『不取不住時，住時亦不有，可取不可取，云何可施設？』 解釋：不住，是指諸行（samskara，一切事物）的聚合是生起和滅亡的法則，稱為不住。在世俗諦（samvrti-satya，相對真理）中，行聚等稱為時間。這個時間是不可取的。住時，也不是在法體之外存在非色（arupa，無形）的時間可以取。這稱為住時。『云何可取不可取，云何施設？』時間如果可以取，就能施設；時間不可取，就不能施設。因此，諸行是這樣，說行等具有分齊。諸行的生、住、滅，摸呼㗚多等法，因為有份量，所以稱為時間。如你所說，因的意義不能成立。為什麼呢？因為沒有所依，譬如沒有實體。鞞世師（Vaisesika，勝論學派）人說：『存在常時，因為存在剎那、羅婆、摸呼㗚多、過去、未來等種種差別，譬如清凈的摩尼珠（mani，寶珠），因為那些眾色的緣故而有種種相顯現。』論者說：『這個體依賴那個體才能有剎那等名稱，我的義理是這樣。』如論偈所說： 『此彼體相待，世諦法如是，第一義無體，離體何有時？』 解釋：相待，是指外人在世俗諦中立有相待。我的義理也是這樣。在第一義（paramartha-satya，絕對真理）中沒有常時。如我所說，你不能免除。鞞世師人說：『第一義中存在真實的體，如非他及他、一時及非一時、遲疾等，就是時間的相。沒有體而有相是不可能的。』論者說：『第一義中沒有少許的體，世俗諦之中存在諸行差別相待相續，非他及他等識生起一時，是指諸行沒有差別，剎那相待非……』
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, there are ksana (an extremely short unit of time), lava (a unit of time), muhurta (a unit of time), day and night, half-month, one month, time-year, double equal measure. If there is a measure, then there is time. For example, rice grains, etc., because they exist, they have a measure, therefore it is known that time exists. The debater says: 'What you say is not consistent with the meaning.' Why? As the verse says: 'Not grasping the non-abiding time, the abiding time is also not existent, what can be grasped and what cannot be grasped, how can it be established?' Explanation: 'Non-abiding' refers to the aggregation of all samskaras (all phenomena) which are the law of arising and ceasing, called non-abiding. In samvrti-satya (conventional truth), the aggregation of samskaras, etc., is called time. This time is ungraspable. 'Abiding time' also does not exist outside the dharma-body as a formless (arupa) time that can be grasped. This is called abiding time. 'What can be grasped and what cannot be grasped, how can it be established?' If time can be grasped, it can be established; if time cannot be grasped, it cannot be established. Therefore, all samskaras are like this, saying that samskaras, etc., have a limit. The arising, abiding, and ceasing of all samskaras, the dharmas such as muhurta, etc., are called time because they have a measure. As you say, the meaning of the cause cannot be established. Why? Because there is no basis, like having no substance. The Vaisesika (Vaisesika school) person says: 'There is constant time, because there are various differences such as ksana, lava, muhurta, past, future, etc., like a pure mani (jewel), which manifests various appearances because of those many colors.' The debater says: 'This entity depends on that entity to have names such as ksana, etc., my meaning is like this.' As the verse says: 'This and that entity depend on each other, the conventional truth is like this, the ultimate truth has no entity, without an entity, how can there be time?' Explanation: 'Dependence' refers to outsiders establishing mutual dependence in conventional truth. My meaning is also like this. In paramartha-satya (ultimate truth), there is no constant time. As I have said, you cannot avoid it. The Vaisesika person says: 'In ultimate truth, there is a real entity, such as non-other and other, one time and non-one time, slow and fast, etc., which are the characteristics of time. It is impossible to have characteristics without an entity.' The debater says: 'In ultimate truth, there is not the slightest entity. In conventional truth, there are differences in the continuity of all samskaras depending on each other. The arising of consciousness such as non-other and other at one time refers to the fact that all samskaras have no difference, and the ksana depends on each other, not...'
一時者。有遲有疾。遲者謂后時相續隨轉。疾者謂下相續隨轉。非他識起者。但是諸行無別有時。汝所立因無體。何處有時體可得。若外人意謂。他等識起緣諸行法非是時者。何處可得時耶。論者言。汝以時是常是一令他解者。此驗無有。我今說驗。於世諦中常一之時。非是起他等識因識故。譬如色等識。鞞世師人復言。定有實時。有假設體故。論者問言。似何等物。鞞世師答言。如色等。論者言。第一義中色等體不成。如先已說。能令物解。色相無體。色相無體故。譬喻無體。譬喻無體故時亦不成。我亦無而說有。譬如車軍林等。雖無實體而有施設。故非是一向。有人意謂。依諸行法施設有時。如說晝日住摸呼㗚多住。作此說者。應如是答。如論偈說。
因物故有時 離物無有時 亦無少物體 何處時可得
釋曰。此謂因物生故則名為時。離此行法無別時體。執有時者。言定有時。有起差別。言說因故。不見無法。能起言說。因見有已作今作當作瓶故。即知有時。論者言。汝語不善已作瓶等能起言說因者。是諸行法亦非是時。汝因不成。有相違過。能起言說因者。是世諦法。汝種種說時皆不成故。如先說了因者。義亦不成。此品初已來與外人成立過。自說成立無過。遮空所對治時無有自體。為令信
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 一時：有遲緩和快速之分。遲緩是指時間相續隨之流轉，快速是指下一瞬間相續隨之流轉。如果不是其他意識生起，而只是諸行（saṃskāra，一切有為法）沒有差別，那麼你所立的因就沒有實體。哪裡可以找到時間的實體呢？如果外道認為，其他意識生起所緣的諸行法不是時間，那麼又在哪裡可以找到時間呢？論者說：你認為時間是常一不變的，以此來使他人理解，這種論證是沒有效力的。我現在說一種論證：在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）中，常一的時間不是生起其他意識的原因，就像色等意識一樣。勝論師（Vaiśeṣika）又說：一定有真實的時間，因為有假設的實體。論者問：像什麼東西呢？勝論師回答：像色等。論者說：在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya，絕對真理）中，色等實體是不成立的，正如先前已經說過的。能夠使人理解的色相沒有實體，因為色相沒有實體，所以譬喻沒有實體。因為譬喻沒有實體，所以時間也不成立。我也可以在沒有實體的情況下說有，譬如車、軍隊、森林等，雖然沒有實體，但可以進行施設，所以並非完全沒有。有人認為，依據諸行法可以施設時間，比如可以說『白天住』、『摸呼㗚多（muhūrta，瞬間）住』。對於這種說法，應該這樣回答，如論偈所說： 『因為事物才有時間，離開事物就沒有時間， 也沒有少許物體，哪裡可以找到時間？』 解釋：這是說因為事物生起，所以才稱為時間。離開這些行法，沒有其他的時間實體。執著于有時間的人說：一定有時間，有生起差別，這是言說的原因。因為沒有看到沒有法，能夠生起言說。因為看到有已作、今作、當作瓶子，就知道有時間。論者說：你說的不對，已作瓶等能夠生起言說的原因，是諸行法，而不是時間。你的因不成立，有相違的過失。能夠生起言說的原因是世俗諦法。你種種關於時間的說法都不成立，正如先前所說，因也不成立。此品從一開始就與外道成立過失，自己說成立沒有過失，遮止空性所對治的時間沒有自體，是爲了讓人相信。
【English Translation】 English version: At one time: There are slow and fast aspects. 'Slow' refers to the continuous flow of time, while 'fast' refers to the immediate succession of moments. If it is not the arising of other consciousnesses, but merely the absence of distinction among the 'saṃskāras' (all conditioned phenomena), then the basis you establish has no substance. Where can the substance of time be found? If externalists think that the 'dharmas' (phenomena) of 'saṃskāras' that arise from other consciousnesses are not time, then where can time be found? The debater says: Your attempt to make others understand that time is constant and singular is invalid. I will now present a valid argument: In 'saṃvṛti-satya' (conventional truth), constant and singular time is not the cause of the arising of other consciousnesses, just like visual consciousness and so on. The 'Vaiśeṣika' (a school of Indian philosophy) further states: There is definitely real time because there is a hypothetical entity. The debater asks: Like what? The 'Vaiśeṣika' replies: Like visual objects and so on. The debater says: In 'paramārtha-satya' (ultimate truth), the substance of visual objects and so on is not established, as has been said before. The appearance of visual objects, which can enable understanding, has no substance. Because the appearance of visual objects has no substance, the analogy has no substance. Because the analogy has no substance, time is also not established. I can also speak of existence even without substance, like a chariot, an army, a forest, etc. Although they have no substance, they can be designated, so it is not entirely non-existent. Some think that time can be designated based on 'saṃskāras', such as saying 'dwelling during the day' or 'dwelling for a 'muhūrta' (moment)'. To this, one should reply as the verse in the treatise says: 『Because of things, there is time; Without things, there is no time. Nor is there any small object; Where can time be found?』 Explanation: This means that because things arise, it is called time. Apart from these 'saṃskāras', there is no separate substance of time. Those who cling to the existence of time say: There is definitely time, there is the arising of differences, and this is the cause of speech. Because one does not see the absence of phenomena that can give rise to speech. Because one sees that a pot has been made, is being made, and will be made, one knows that there is time. The debater says: What you say is incorrect. The cause of the arising of speech, such as 'a pot has been made', is 'saṃskāras', not time. Your basis is not established, and there is the fault of contradiction. The cause of the arising of speech is 'saṃvṛti-satya'. Your various statements about time are not established. As said before, the basis is also not established. From the beginning of this chapter, faults have been established with externalists. Saying that one's own establishment has no faults, and refuting the self-nature of time, which is the object to be refuted by emptiness, is to make people believe.
解。此品義意如是。以是故。此下引經顯成。如放光經佛說。佛告須菩提。時非色法非無色法。非受想行識法。非無受想行識法。非生法。非無生法。非住法。非無住法。非異法。非無異法。非壞法。非無壞法。非受法。非住法。非出法。非無受無住無出法。乃至非老相。非病相。非死相。非青相。非啖相。非壞相。非散相。非無老無病無死無青無啖無壞無散相。須菩提。若非色非生非住非異非壞相者。是名般若波羅蜜。複次須菩提。若非色非非色。乃至非受想行識非非受想行識者。時即非時亦非非時。若時非時非非時不可言說者。是名般若波羅蜜。又如妙臂經中所說。菩薩摩訶薩了知三世所有諸行。已起故。說名過去世。未起故。說名未來世。起時故說名現在世。此現在世陰界入等住者。了知不住。何以故。一剎那時不住故。此一剎那即有起時。住時差別。以剎那不住速滅故。定無有時。
釋觀時品竟。
般若燈論釋卷第十一 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 般若燈論釋
般若燈論釋卷第十二
偈本龍樹菩薩 釋論分別明菩薩
大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅譯
觀因果和合品第二十
釋曰。今此品者。亦為遮空所對治。以鞞世師等於前品中立時不成故說。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：解釋：這一品的意義就是這樣。因此，下面引用經文來顯明成就。如《放光經》中佛所說：佛告訴須菩提（Subhuti，佛陀的十大弟子之一，以解空第一著稱）：『那時既不是色法（Rupa，物質現象），也不是無色法（Arupa，非物質現象）；不是受（Vedana，感受）、想（Samjna，概念）、行（Samskara，意志）、識（Vijnana，意識）法，也不是無受想行識法；不是生法（ উৎপাদ，產生），也不是無生法；不是住法（ স্থিতি，持續），也不是無住法；不是異法（ অন্যথা，變化），也不是無異法；不是壞法（ বিনাশ，壞滅），也不是無壞法；不是受法，不是住法，不是出法（ নির্যাস，脫離），也不是無受無住無出法；乃至不是老相（ জরা，衰老），不是病相（ ব্যাধি，疾病），不是死相（ মরণ，死亡），不是青相（ নীল，青色），不是啖相（ ভক্ষণ，被吞噬），不是壞相，不是散相（ বিক্ষেপ，消散），也不是無老無病無死無青無啖無壞無散相。須菩提，如果不是色、不是生、不是住、不是異、不是壞相，這就叫做般若波羅蜜（Prajnaparamita，智慧的完成）。』 再次，須菩提，如果不是色也不是非色，乃至不是受想行識也不是非受想行識，那麼時（Kala，時間）即不是時也不是非時。如果時不是時也不是非時，不可言說，這就叫做般若波羅蜜。又如《妙臂經》中所說：菩薩摩訶薩（Bodhisattva-Mahasattva，偉大的菩薩）了知三世（過去、現在、未來）所有諸行（Samskara，一切有為法），已經生起，所以叫做過去世（ অতীত কাল，過去的時間）。尚未生起，所以叫做未來世（ ভবিষ্যৎ কাল，未來的時間）。生起之時，所以叫做現在世（ বর্তমান কাল，現在的時間）。這現在世的陰（Skandha，五蘊）、界（Dhatu，十八界）、入（Ayatana，十二入）等住者，了知不住。為什麼呢？因為一剎那（Ksana，極短的時間單位）時不住的緣故。這一剎那即有起時、住時差別。因為剎那不住，迅速壞滅的緣故，決定沒有有時。 《釋觀時品》結束。 《般若燈論釋》卷第十一 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 《般若燈論釋》 《般若燈論釋》卷第十二 偈本：龍樹菩薩（Nagarjuna，佛教中觀學派創始人） 釋論：分別明菩薩 大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅譯 《觀因果和合品》第二十 解釋：現在這一品，也是爲了遮遣空（Sunyata，空性）的對治。因為鞞世師（Vaisesika，勝論學派）等在前品中立時不成，所以說。
【English Translation】 English version: Explanation: The meaning of this chapter is thus. Therefore, the following is quoted from the scriptures to manifest accomplishment. As the Buddha said in the Fangguang Jing (放光經, Larger Prajnaparamita Sutra): The Buddha told Subhuti (須菩提, one of the Buddha's ten great disciples, known for his understanding of emptiness): 'That time is neither Rupa (色法, form) nor Arupa (無色法, formless); neither Vedana (受, feeling), Samjna (想, perception), Samskara (行, mental formations), Vijnana (識, consciousness), nor non-Vedana, non-Samjna, non-Samskara, non-Vijnana; neither Utpada (生, arising) nor non-arising; neither Sthiti (住, abiding) nor non-abiding; neither Anyatha (異, change) nor non-change; neither Vinasa (壞, decay) nor non-decay; neither reception, nor abiding, nor Niryssa (出, departure), nor non-reception, non-abiding, non-departure; even not old age (老相, Jara), not sickness (病相, Vyadhi), not death (死相, Marana), not blue (青相, Nila), not being devoured (啖相, Bhaksana), not decay, not scattering (散相, Viksepa), nor non-old age, non-sickness, non-death, non-blue, non-devoured, non-decay, non-scattering. Subhuti, if it is not form, not arising, not abiding, not change, not decay, it is called Prajnaparamita (般若波羅蜜, the perfection of wisdom).' Furthermore, Subhuti, if it is neither form nor non-form, even not feeling, perception, mental formations, consciousness, nor non-feeling, non-perception, non-mental formations, non-consciousness, then Kala (時, time) is neither time nor non-time. If time is neither time nor non-time, and cannot be spoken of, it is called Prajnaparamita. Moreover, as it is said in the Wonderful Arm Sutra (妙臂經): The Bodhisattva-Mahasattva (菩薩摩訶薩, great Bodhisattva) understands all Samskara (諸行, conditioned phenomena) of the three times (past, present, future). Because it has already arisen, it is called the past (過去世, past time). Because it has not yet arisen, it is called the future (未來世, future time). Because it is the time of arising, it is called the present (現在世, present time). Those who abide in the Skandhas (陰, aggregates), Dhatus (界, elements), Ayatanas (入, sense bases) etc. of this present time, understand that they do not abide. Why? Because they do not abide for even a Ksana (剎那, instant). This instant has the difference of arising and abiding. Because the instant does not abide and quickly decays, there is definitely no time. The end of the chapter on Observing Time. Prajnadipa-sastra-vrtti Volume XI Taisho Tripitaka Volume 30 No. 1566 Prajnadipa-sastra-vrtti Prajnadipa-sastra-vrtti Volume XII Verses by: Nagarjuna Bodhisattva (龍樹菩薩, founder of the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism) Commentary by: Vimalamitra Bodhisattva Translated by Tripitaka Master Prajnakaramitra from Central India of the Great Tang Dynasty Chapter 20: Observing the Union of Cause and Effect Explanation: This chapter is also for refuting the counter-argument of Sunyata (空, emptiness). Because the Vaisesika (鞞世師, Vaisesika school) and others established time unsuccessfully in the previous chapter, it is said.
鞞婆沙人及僧佉人等言。第一義中有如是時。果有生滅故。如種子與水土和合。以時節有體故而芽得生。若無因者。果則不生。以是故如前所說。因有力故。當知有時。論者言。若有說言因緣和合有果生者。今當答之。如論偈說。
若謂眾因緣 和合而果生 是果先已有 何須和合生
釋曰。和合中若有果者。得如是過。何以故。有不生故。若有而從和合中生者。有云何生。若言生者。和合中則無。何以故。有之與生二法相違。複次若有果則不生。已有故。果若已有不須更生。何以故。生與不生此二相違。若有言因緣和合中無果而能生果者。今當答之。如論偈說。
若謂眾因緣 和合而果生 和合中無果 何須和合生
釋曰。此謂果不生。無有生故。譬如兔角。若無生者。生法體壞。是汝立義等過。若立因緣和合中有果者。今當重破。如論偈說。
若謂眾因緣 和合而有果 是果應可取 而實不可取
釋曰。此謂果不可取。何以故。一心欲取而不能取。以果無故。此下作驗和合中有芽名果亦不可取。何以故。和合中無果故不可取。若不可取者。是中則無。譬如種中無有瓶絹。如是于和合中無芽名果故不可取。僧佉人言。彼說和合中不可取者。亦有是義。所謂極遠極
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 鞞婆沙人（Vaibhashika，佛教的一個學派）以及僧佉人（Samkhya，印度的一個哲學學派）等說，在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya，佛教的最高真理）中，存在這樣的『時』（kāla，時間），果（phala，結果）有生滅的現象。例如，種子與水土和合，因為時節的緣故而產生芽。如果沒有因（hetu，原因），果就不會產生。因此，如前所說，因為因具有力量，應當知道有時（時間的作用）。 論者（論師，佛教的辯論者）說，如果有人說因緣（hetu-pratyaya，原因和條件）和合而產生果，現在應當回答他。如論偈（偈頌，詩歌形式的經文）所說： 『如果說眾多的因緣，和合而產生果，那麼這個果先前就已經存在，何須因緣和合而生？』 解釋：在因緣和合之中，如果已經有果，就會有這樣的過失。為什麼呢？因為已經存在的東西不會再生。如果果已經存在，又從因緣和合中產生，那麼『有』（存在）又如何『生』（產生）呢？如果說是『生』，那麼在因緣和合中就沒有果。為什麼呢？因為『有』和『生』這兩種法是相互矛盾的。再次，如果已經有果，就不會再生，因為已經存在了。果如果已經存在，就不需要再生。為什麼呢？因為『生』和『不生』這兩種狀態是相互矛盾的。 如果有人說因緣和合中沒有果，卻能產生果，現在應當回答他。如論偈所說： 『如果說眾多的因緣，和合而產生果，和合之中沒有果，何須因緣和合而生？』 解釋：這說明果不會產生，因為沒有『生』的性質。譬如兔角（śaśa-viṣāṇa，兔子頭上沒有角，比喻不存在的事物）。如果沒有『生』，那麼『生』的性質就被破壞了。這是你所立論的過失。如果立論說因緣和合之中有果，現在應當再次破斥。如論偈所說： 『如果說眾多的因緣，和合而有果，那麼這個果應當可以被取得，但實際上卻無法取得。』 解釋：這說明果無法被取得。為什麼呢？因為一心想要取得，卻無法取得，因為果不存在。下面舉例驗證，因緣和合之中，芽（aṅkura，植物的幼芽）這個名為『果』的東西也是無法取得的。為什麼呢？因為因緣和合之中沒有果，所以無法取得。如果無法取得，那麼其中就沒有果。譬如種子中沒有瓶子和絹布。同樣，在因緣和合之中沒有芽這個名為『果』的東西，所以無法取得。僧佉人說，他們所說的因緣和合之中無法取得，也有道理。所謂極遠極（過於遙遠）
【English Translation】 English version: The Vaibhashikas (a school of Buddhism) and the Samkhyas (a school of Indian philosophy), among others, say that in the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya, the highest truth in Buddhism), there exists such a 'time' (kāla, time) where the result (phala, fruit or consequence) has arising and ceasing. For example, when a seed combines with water and soil, a sprout arises due to the season. If there is no cause (hetu, cause), the result will not arise. Therefore, as mentioned before, because the cause has power, it should be known that there is time (the effect of time). The debaters (logicians, Buddhist debaters) say that if someone says that causes and conditions (hetu-pratyaya, causes and conditions) combine to produce a result, we should now answer them. As the verse (gāthā, a verse or stanza in scripture) says: 'If you say that numerous causes and conditions combine to produce a result, then this result already exists. Why would it need to be produced by the combination of causes and conditions?' Explanation: If there is already a result in the combination of causes and conditions, there will be such a fault. Why? Because something that already exists will not arise again. If the result already exists and arises from the combination of causes and conditions, then how does 'existence' (bhava, being) 'arise' (utpāda, arising)? If you say it 'arises', then there is no result in the combination of causes and conditions. Why? Because the two dharmas (dhamma, phenomena) of 'existence' and 'arising' are contradictory. Furthermore, if there is already a result, it will not arise again because it already exists. If the result already exists, it does not need to arise again. Why? Because the two states of 'arising' and 'not arising' are contradictory. If someone says that there is no result in the combination of causes and conditions, but it can produce a result, we should now answer them. As the verse says: 'If you say that numerous causes and conditions combine to produce a result, and there is no result in the combination, why would it need to be produced by the combination of causes and conditions?' Explanation: This explains that the result will not arise because there is no nature of 'arising'. For example, a rabbit's horn (śaśa-viṣāṇa, a rabbit has no horns, a metaphor for something that does not exist). If there is no 'arising', then the nature of 'arising' is destroyed. This is a fault in your established thesis. If you establish that there is a result in the combination of causes and conditions, we should now refute it again. As the verse says: 'If you say that numerous causes and conditions combine and there is a result, then this result should be obtainable, but in reality, it cannot be obtained.' Explanation: This explains that the result cannot be obtained. Why? Because one wholeheartedly wants to obtain it, but cannot, because the result does not exist. Below is an example to verify that in the combination of causes and conditions, the sprout (aṅkura, a young shoot of a plant), which is called 'result', also cannot be obtained. Why? Because there is no result in the combination of causes and conditions, so it cannot be obtained. If it cannot be obtained, then there is nothing in it. For example, there is no bottle or silk in the seed. Similarly, in the combination of causes and conditions, there is no sprout called 'result', so it cannot be obtained. The Samkhyas say that what they say about not being able to obtain in the combination of causes and conditions also makes sense. The so-called extremely distant (too far away)
近及諸根損患。心迷悶時。有隔障等。能障于取。雖有物體而不可取。非一向無故不可取。若言無者。是彼出因立義之過。複次更有異僧佉人言。如前所說過者。今當更說。彼上出因言不可取者。此因有何等義。為是現量不可取耶。如諸根識而實是有。亦不為現量所取故。彼立因者。非是一向。若以驗量不可取者。因義不成。猶如驗因中果。有取可量故。若可量者。因則不空。譬如有果體。如是苦樂二種能為貪瞋諸見三煩惱因。色聲五種亦能為貪瞋等三煩惱因。以是因等有驗量故。因中果有取。汝雖言現量不可取。然今驗量。有可取故。彼出因義不成。若現量及驗量俱不可取者。此違我義。及因不成。論者言。我道不可取者。謂于因緣和合中畢竟無果故不可取。汝言極遠等亦不可取。非一向無者。世諦之中亦無此理。何況第一義耶。于第一義中亦無極遠等物。如上苦樂色聲等於第一義中亦無。是則因義不成。所言果者。果亦自體空故。若因中無果者。世諦中果亦不生。譬如拒不能生拒因亦不能生因。汝言因能生果者。於世諦中亦已被破。復有異僧佉人言。若因未生時先無因體。果亦先無。而後方生。論者言。今當說驗。若先無因后亦不生無有故。譬如空華石女等。廣如前說驗。今更總答修多羅人及鞞世師等計因中無果
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 臨近諸根（indriya，感覺器官）受損或發生病患，心識迷亂昏沉時，會有隔閡障礙等，阻礙對外境的認知。雖然存在物體，卻無法認知。這並非完全不存在而無法認知，如果說完全不存在，那就是你們僧佉（Samkhya）派所立『出因』的過失。其次，還有其他僧佉派人士說，如同前面所說，現在我再進一步說明。你們所說的『上出因』不可認知，這個『因』是什麼意思呢？是指現量（pratyaksa，直接感知）無法認知嗎？如同諸根的識（vijnana，意識）實際上存在，但也不能被現量所認知。因此，你們所立的『因』並非絕對。如果用比量（anumana，推理）無法認知，那麼『因』的意義就不能成立，如同比量中的『果』，是可以被認知和衡量的。如果可以衡量，那麼『因』就不會是空無。譬如有『果』的實體，如同苦樂兩種感受，能成為貪、嗔、諸見三種煩惱的『因』，色、聲等五種也能成為貪、嗔等三種煩惱的『因』。因為這些『因』等可以通過比量來驗證，所以在『因』中存在可以認知的『果』。你們雖然說現量無法認知，但現在通過比量，是可以認知的，所以你們『出因』的意義不能成立。如果現量和比量都無法認知，這就違背了我的觀點，並且『因』也不能成立。論者說，我說不可認知，是指在因緣和合中，畢竟沒有『果』，所以無法認知。你們所說的極遠等也無法認知，但並非完全不存在，在世俗諦（samvrti-satya，世俗真理）中，也不能這樣說，更何況是第一義諦（paramartha-satya，勝義真理）呢？在第一義諦中，也沒有極遠等事物，如同上面的苦、樂、色、聲等，在第一義諦中也是不存在的。這樣，『因』的意義就不能成立。所說的『果』，『果』的自性也是空性的。如果『因』中沒有『果』，那麼在世俗諦中，『果』也不會產生，譬如『拒』不能生出『拒』，『因』也不能生出『因』。你們說『因』能生『果』，這在世俗諦中也已經被駁斥了。又有其他僧佉派人士說，如果『因』在未產生時，先沒有『因』的自體，『果』也先不存在，然後才產生。論者說，現在我來說明驗證。如果先沒有『因』，那麼後來也不會產生，因為沒有存在的基礎，譬如虛空中的花朵、石女等。詳細的論述如同前面所說。現在我總的回答修多羅（sutra，經）派和鞞世師（Vaisesika）派等認為『因』中沒有『果』的觀點。
【English Translation】 English version When the senses (indriya) are impaired or afflicted, and the mind is confused and dull, there are obstructions that hinder perception. Although objects exist, they cannot be perceived. This is not because they are completely non-existent; if you claim they are, that is the fault of your Samkhya school's 'productive cause' (utpatti-hetu). Furthermore, other Samkhya adherents say, as mentioned before, I will now elaborate further. What do you mean by saying that the 'superior productive cause' is imperceptible? Does it mean that it is imperceptible by direct perception (pratyaksa)? Just as the consciousness (vijnana) of the senses actually exists but cannot be perceived by direct perception. Therefore, your established 'cause' is not absolute. If it is imperceptible by inference (anumana), then the meaning of 'cause' cannot be established, just as the 'effect' in inference can be perceived and measured. If it can be measured, then the 'cause' is not empty. For example, there is the entity of 'effect,' just as the two feelings of suffering and pleasure can be the 'cause' of the three afflictions of greed, hatred, and views, and the five objects of sense, such as form and sound, can also be the 'cause' of the three afflictions of greed, hatred, and so on. Because these 'causes' and so on can be verified by inference, there is a perceptible 'effect' in the 'cause.' Although you say that it is imperceptible by direct perception, it is now perceptible by inference, so the meaning of your 'productive cause' cannot be established. If it is imperceptible by both direct perception and inference, this contradicts my view, and the 'cause' cannot be established. The debater says, I say it is imperceptible because there is ultimately no 'effect' in the combination of causes and conditions, so it is imperceptible. What you say about things extremely far away being imperceptible is not because they are completely non-existent; in conventional truth (samvrti-satya), it cannot be said like that, let alone in ultimate truth (paramartha-satya)? In ultimate truth, there are no things extremely far away, just as the suffering, pleasure, form, sound, and so on mentioned above do not exist in ultimate truth. In this way, the meaning of 'cause' cannot be established. As for the so-called 'effect,' the nature of the 'effect' is also empty. If there is no 'effect' in the 'cause,' then in conventional truth, the 'effect' will not arise either, just as a 'rejection' cannot produce a 'rejection,' and a 'cause' cannot produce a 'cause.' Your claim that 'cause' can produce 'effect' has already been refuted in conventional truth. Furthermore, other Samkhya adherents say, if the 'cause' does not have its own entity before it arises, and the 'effect' also does not exist first, and then arises later. The debater says, now I will explain the verification. If there is no 'cause' first, then it will not arise later either, because there is no basis for existence, like flowers in the sky, barren women, and so on. The detailed discussion is as mentioned before. Now I will generally answer the views of the Sutra school (sutra) and the Vaisesika school (Vaisesika) and others who believe that there is no 'effect' in the 'cause.'
者。如論偈說。
若謂眾因緣 和合無果者 是則眾因緣 與非因緣同
釋曰。此言無果者謂果空故。因之與果云何差別。因相者謂自果生無間生自分生等差別。是為因相。緣相者。謂通生種種果能長養他令他相續。乃至遠處通生諸果。非自分生能廣饒益。如是等名為因緣差別相。與非因緣同者。謂非因緣不生於果。何以故。果空故。以是故因緣與非因緣同。複次今為執因中無果者。出驗第一義中種子等諸因緣不能生果。何以故。果空故。譬如非因緣。複次修多羅人言。緣能生果。何以故。有決定緣能生果故。若果空者。義不相應。論者言。第一義中無如是驗。還同上非因緣過。欲令他信解者。汝驗無力。修多羅人復言。見麥種子能生麥芽以是故。彼出因者無有義理。論者言。世諦之中實見麥種能生麥芽。非第一義。若於第一義中麥生芽者。是義不然。如是觀察有果生者。不然。如先答。汝立果生滅。以為因者。果有生義。不然。複次今問。執因中無果者。因為生果已而滅。為未生果而先滅耶。執者答言。我有何過為此二問。論者言。義不相應。如論偈說。
與果作能已 而因方滅者 與因及滅因 則便有二體
釋曰。此謂於世諦中亦不欲令與者滅者一法有二體過。複次若未與果作
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：論中這樣說：
『如果說眾多因緣聚合也無法產生結果， 那麼眾多因緣就和非因緣沒有區別了。』
解釋：這裡說的『無果』是指果是空性的。因和果有什麼區別呢？因的特徵是能產生自己的果，無間斷地產生，產生同類的果等等。這些是因的特徵。緣的特徵是能普遍地產生各種果，能滋養其他的法，使之相續，甚至在遠處也能普遍地產生各種果，不是自己直接產生，但能廣泛地饒益。這些是因緣的差別相。『和非因緣沒有區別』，是因為非因緣不能產生果。為什麼呢？因為果是空性的。因此，因緣和非因緣就沒有區別了。再者，現在爲了駁斥認為因中無果的人，提出第一義諦中種子等各種因緣不能產生果。為什麼呢？因為果是空性的，就像非因緣一樣。再者，《修多羅》的人說，緣能產生果。為什麼呢？因為有決定的緣能產生果。如果果是空性的，這個道理就不成立。論者說，在第一義諦中沒有這樣的驗證，還是和上面的非因緣的過失一樣。想要讓別人相信理解，你的驗證沒有力量。《修多羅》的人又說，看到麥子的種子能產生麥芽，因此，他們提出因是有道理的。論者說，在世俗諦中確實看到麥種能產生麥芽，但在第一義諦中不是這樣。如果在第一義諦中麥子能產生麥芽，這個道理是不成立的。這樣觀察有果產生是不成立的，和之前的回答一樣。你建立果的生滅，作為因，認為果有產生的意義，是不成立的。再者，現在問認為因中無果的人，因是在產生果之後才滅，還是在未產生果之前就滅了呢？執著的人回答說，我有什麼過失要回答這兩個問題？論者說，這個道理不成立。就像論中這樣說：
『如果因在給予果實能力之後才滅亡， 那麼因和滅因就有了兩個自體。』
解釋：這是說在世俗諦中也不應該讓給予者和滅亡者一個法有兩個自體的過失。再者，如果未給予果實能力就滅亡
【English Translation】 English version: As stated in the treatise:
'If it is said that numerous causes and conditions, when combined, produce no result, Then numerous causes and conditions are the same as non-causes and non-conditions.'
Explanation: 'No result' here means that the result is empty. What is the difference between cause and result? The characteristic of a cause is that it produces its own result, produces it without interruption, produces results of the same kind, and so on. These are the characteristics of a cause. The characteristic of a condition is that it can universally produce various results, nourish other dharmas, and cause them to continue, even at a distance it can universally produce various results, it does not directly produce itself, but it can widely benefit. These are the different characteristics of causes and conditions. 'The same as non-causes and non-conditions' is because non-causes and non-conditions cannot produce results. Why? Because the result is empty. Therefore, causes and conditions are no different from non-causes and non-conditions. Furthermore, now, in order to refute those who believe that there is no result in the cause, it is proposed that in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), seeds and other various causes and conditions cannot produce results. Why? Because the result is empty, just like non-causes and non-conditions. Furthermore, the people of the Sutras (Sūtra) say that conditions can produce results. Why? Because there are definite conditions that can produce results. If the result is empty, this reasoning is not valid. The treatise writer says that in the ultimate truth there is no such verification, and it is still the same fault as the non-causes and non-conditions mentioned above. If you want others to believe and understand, your verification has no power. The people of the Sutras also say that seeing wheat seeds can produce wheat sprouts, therefore, their proposition of cause is reasonable. The treatise writer says that in the conventional truth (Saṃvṛti-satya), it is indeed seen that wheat seeds can produce wheat sprouts, but this is not the case in the ultimate truth. If in the ultimate truth wheat can produce wheat sprouts, this reasoning is not valid. Observing in this way that there is a result being produced is not valid, just like the previous answer. You establish the arising and ceasing of the result as a cause, thinking that the result has the meaning of arising, but this is not valid. Furthermore, now I ask those who believe that there is no result in the cause, does the cause cease after producing the result, or does it cease before producing the result? The adherent replies, what fault do I have that I must answer these two questions? The treatise writer says that this reasoning is not valid. As stated in the treatise:
'If the cause ceases only after giving the ability to the result, Then the cause and the cause of cessation would have two selves.'
Explanation: This means that even in the conventional truth, it should not be allowed that the giver and the ceaser, one dharma, has the fault of having two selves. Furthermore, if it ceases without giving the ability to the result
能而先滅者。今當欲答。如論偈說。
若因未與能 而因先滅者 因滅而果起 此果則無因
釋曰。此謂不欲無因而有果。以是故非因滅已而果方生。何以故。已滅故。譬如久已滅者。此義一切世間之所共解。亦復不須更令物解。修多羅人復言。和合法起有同時能生果。如燈與光同時而起。是義應爾。論者言。若謂同時而生果者。是亦不然。如論偈說。
若同時和合 而能生果者 能生及所生 墮在一時中
釋曰。此謂有同時過而不欲令能生所生二法。如父子二同時而起。有如上過。複次云何別時起。謂所生及能生因果為二。今次作驗。非果與因和合同時俱起。何以故。所生及能生二故。譬如父子二。如先所說有器炷油等和合有力故。世諦中燈共光同時起。非燈與光相望為因果。是故汝說不善。復更有異僧佉人言。未和合前果已先起。后和合時方乃顯了。論者答言。無有是義。如論偈說。
若未和合前 已有果起者 離彼因緣已 果起則無因
釋曰。此謂離和合因緣而先有果者。世諦之中實亦不見有如此事。以是故。我佛法中無果先起。汝言后顯了者。先已答訖。更有異僧佉人言。因法雖已滅至果起時猶有因體住。論者言。若因滅已而體不捨。即住為果體者。無如
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如果因緣已經具備產生結果的能力，但在結果產生之前就已消滅，該如何解釋？現在我來回答。正如論偈所說： 『如果因緣尚未給予結果的能力，而因緣就已先消滅，因緣消滅后結果才產生，那麼這個結果就沒有因緣。』 解釋：這是爲了說明我們不希望沒有因緣而有結果。因此，因緣不應該在消滅之後，結果才產生。為什麼呢？因為因緣已經消滅了。這就像已經滅亡很久的事物一樣。這個道理是世間普遍理解的，不需要再多做解釋。修多羅（Sutra，經）的作者又說，因緣和合而生起的事物，能夠同時產生結果，就像燈和光同時產生一樣。這個說法應該是正確的。論者說，如果認為因緣和合能同時產生結果，這也是不對的。正如論偈所說： 『如果同時和合就能產生結果，那麼能產生者和所產生者，就都處在同一時間中。』 解釋：這是爲了說明同時產生的過失，我們不希望出現能生和所生兩種事物同時產生的情況，就像父子同時產生一樣，會有上述的過失。再次，如何區分不同時產生的情況呢？就是將所生和能生的因果關係視為兩種不同的事物。現在我們來驗證，結果和因緣不是和合同時產生的。為什麼呢？因為所生和能生是兩種不同的事物。就像父子是兩種不同的事物一樣。就像先前所說，因為有器皿、燈芯、油等和合的力量，所以在世俗諦（Samvriti-satya，相對真理）中，燈和光是同時產生的，但燈和光相互之間並不是因果關係。所以你的說法是不正確的。還有其他的僧佉（Samkhya）論者說，在未和合之前，結果就已經先產生了，之後和合的時候才顯現出來。論者回答說，沒有這樣的道理。正如論偈所說： 『如果在未和合之前，就已經有結果產生，離開了那些因緣，結果的產生就沒有原因。』 解釋：這是爲了說明如果離開了和合的因緣，而先有結果，在世俗諦中實際上也看不到這樣的事情。因此，在我的佛法中，沒有結果先產生的情況。你所說的後來才顯現，之前已經回答過了。還有其他的僧佉論者說，因的法雖然已經滅了，但直到結果產生的時候，仍然有因的本體存在。論者說，如果因滅了之後，本體沒有捨棄，就以這個本體作為結果的本體，這是不可能的。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: If the conditions are already capable of producing a result, but they perish before the result is produced, how should this be explained? Now I will answer. As the verse in the treatise says: 'If the cause has not yet given the ability to produce a result, and the cause perishes first, and the result arises after the cause has perished, then this result has no cause.' Explanation: This is to explain that we do not want a result to exist without a cause. Therefore, the cause should not perish and then the result arise. Why? Because the cause has already perished. It's like something that has been extinct for a long time. This principle is universally understood in the world and does not need further explanation. The author of the Sutra (Sutra) also says that things that arise from the combination of conditions can produce results simultaneously, just like a lamp and light arise simultaneously. This statement should be correct. The commentator says that if you think that the combination of conditions can produce results simultaneously, this is also incorrect. As the verse in the treatise says: 'If simultaneous combination can produce results, then the producer and the produced are both in the same time.' Explanation: This is to explain the fault of simultaneous occurrence. We do not want the producer and the produced to occur simultaneously, just like a father and son occur simultaneously, there will be the above-mentioned fault. Furthermore, how to distinguish between situations that do not occur at the same time? That is, to regard the cause-and-effect relationship of the produced and the producer as two different things. Now let's verify that the result and the cause are not combined and produced simultaneously. Why? Because the produced and the producer are two different things. Just like a father and son are two different things. As previously said, because of the combined power of the vessel, wick, oil, etc., in Samvriti-satya (conventional truth), the lamp and light are produced simultaneously, but the lamp and light are not causally related to each other. So your statement is incorrect. There are also other Samkhya (Samkhya) philosophers who say that the result has already been produced before the combination, and it only becomes apparent when the combination occurs later. The commentator replies that there is no such principle. As the verse in the treatise says: 'If the result has already been produced before the combination, and the result is produced without those conditions, then the production of the result has no cause.' Explanation: This is to explain that if there is a result before the combination of conditions, in conventional truth, such a thing is not actually seen. Therefore, in my Buddha-dharma, there is no situation where the result is produced first. What you said about it becoming apparent later has already been answered before. There are also other Samkhya philosophers who say that although the dharma of the cause has perished, the essence of the cause still exists until the result is produced. The commentator says that if the essence of the cause is not abandoned after the cause has perished, and this essence is used as the essence of the result, this is impossible.
是義。何以故。如論偈說。
若因變為果 因即有向去 先有而復生 則墮重生過
釋曰。此謂因體為果而體不捨。如提婆達多。不捨此宅而至彼宅。何以故。因體已有。而復更起則為重生。既不生果。全無所作。複次若謂即因變為果者。即是不名變。變不名即是如泥團。不即是瓶。泥團滅已而有瓶生。不得稱變。不變故。譬如泥自體。僧佉人復言。因能生果。我義如是。無如上過。論者言。若不捨因體而名果者。但名字有差別而無果體。如上說過。汝不能免若舍因體果體起時而因還住果體中者。是義不然。汝不思量。作如是說。複次今問。執有異僧佉汝言。因能起者。為因已滅能起果耶。為未滅能起果耶。二俱不然。如論偈說。
為已滅生果 為未滅生果 因滅者已壞 云何能生果
釋曰。此謂已滅者。不復是因。何能生果。若因起已。而體不滅。何能生果。汝之所說。義不相應。復有異僧佉人言。實法恒住。而前物體滅。后物體起。有此變異。以是義故。因體不滅。而能生果論者言是。亦有過。前體滅時。實法亦滅何以故。實法與物體不異故。譬如已滅法體。后法體起時實法亦起。何以故。實法與物體不異故。譬如已起法體。如汝所說。與世諦道理相違。若依第一義道理。有何
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這是正確的道理。為什麼呢？正如論偈所說： 『如果因轉變為果，那麼因就有了趨向和離去的動作。 如果已經存在又再次產生，那就犯了重生的過失。』 解釋：這是說因的本體爲了成為果，卻沒有捨棄自身。就像提婆達多（Devadatta，人名），沒有捨棄這座宅子就到了那座宅子。為什麼呢？因為因的本體已經存在，又再次生起，就成了重生。既然不能產生果，就完全沒有作用。其次，如果說因直接轉變為果，那就不能稱之為『變』。『變』不能稱之為『即是』，就像泥團，不直接就是瓶子。泥團滅掉之後才有瓶子產生，不能稱之為『變』，因為沒有變化。比如泥土的自體。僧佉（Samkhya，印度數論派）論者又說：『因能夠產生果，我的道理是這樣的，沒有像上面所說的過失。』論者說：『如果不捨棄因的本體而稱之為果，那麼只是名字上有差別，而沒有果的本體，就像上面所說的那樣。你不能避免。』如果捨棄因的本體，果的本體生起時，而因還停留在果的本體中，這個道理是不對的。你沒有思考，就說出這樣的話。 其次，現在問你，執著有『異』的僧佉論者，你說『因能夠生起果』，那麼是因已經滅掉之後能夠生起果呢？還是因沒有滅掉能夠生起果呢？這兩種說法都不對。正如論偈所說： 『是已經滅掉的因產生果，還是沒有滅掉的因產生果？ 因滅掉就已經壞滅，怎麼能夠產生果呢？』 解釋：這是說已經滅掉的，不再是因，怎麼能夠產生果呢？如果因生起之後，本體沒有滅掉，怎麼能夠產生果呢？你所說的道理，義理不相應。又有不同的僧佉論者說：『實法（Satya-dharma，真實存在的法）恒常存在，只是前面的物體滅掉，後面的物體生起，有這樣的變異。因為這個道理，因的本體沒有滅掉，而能夠產生果。』論者說：『這也是有過失的。』前面的物體滅掉時，實法也滅掉了。為什麼呢？因為實法與物體沒有差別。比如已經滅掉的法體，後面的法體生起時，實法也生起。為什麼呢？因為實法與物體沒有差別。比如已經生起的法體。』就像你所說的，與世俗諦（Samvriti-satya，世俗諦）的道理相違背。如果依據第一義諦（Paramartha-satya，第一義諦）的道理，有什麼用呢？
【English Translation】 English version: This is the correct principle. Why is that? As the verse in the treatise says: 'If the cause transforms into the effect, then the cause has a movement of tending towards and departing. If something already exists and is born again, then it falls into the fault of rebirth.' Explanation: This means that the substance of the cause, in order to become the effect, does not abandon itself. Like Devadatta (Devadatta, a proper noun), he does not abandon this house to go to that house. Why is that? Because the substance of the cause already exists, and arises again, then it becomes rebirth. Since it cannot produce the effect, it has no function at all. Secondly, if it is said that the cause directly transforms into the effect, then it cannot be called 'transformation'. 'Transformation' cannot be called 'is identical to', like a lump of clay, which is not directly a pot. Only after the lump of clay is destroyed is a pot produced, which cannot be called 'transformation', because there is no change. For example, the self-nature of clay. The Samkhya (Samkhya, an Indian philosophical school) proponent also says: 'The cause can produce the effect, my principle is like this, there is no fault as mentioned above.' The proponent says: 'If the substance of the cause is not abandoned and it is called the effect, then there is only a difference in name, but there is no substance of the effect, as mentioned above. You cannot avoid it.' If the substance of the cause is abandoned, and when the substance of the effect arises, the cause still remains in the substance of the effect, this principle is not correct. You have not thought about it, and you say such things. Secondly, now I ask you, the Samkhya proponent who adheres to 'difference', you say 'the cause can give rise to the effect', then is it that the cause can give rise to the effect after it has been destroyed? Or can the cause give rise to the effect before it has been destroyed? Neither of these two statements is correct. As the verse in the treatise says: 'Is it the cause that has already been destroyed that produces the effect, or is it the cause that has not been destroyed that produces the effect? If the cause is destroyed, it is already ruined, how can it produce the effect?' Explanation: This means that what has already been destroyed is no longer the cause, how can it produce the effect? If the cause arises and its substance is not destroyed, how can it produce the effect? What you say is not consistent with the principle. There is also a different Samkhya proponent who says: 'The real dharma (Satya-dharma, truly existing dharma) is constant, only the previous object is destroyed, and the subsequent object arises, there is such a change. Because of this principle, the substance of the cause is not destroyed, and it can produce the effect.' The proponent says: 'This also has a fault.' When the previous object is destroyed, the real dharma is also destroyed. Why is that? Because the real dharma is not different from the object. For example, when the dharma-substance that has already been destroyed, when the subsequent dharma-substance arises, the real dharma also arises. Why is that? Because the real dharma is not different from the object. For example, the dharma-substance that has already arisen.' Just as you said, it contradicts the principle of conventional truth (Samvriti-satya, conventional truth). If based on the principle of ultimate truth (Paramartha-satya, ultimate truth), what is the use?
法體滅。有何法體生。而言有變異耶。何以故。一切時無有譬喻。汝所說者。是義不然。複次汝言前法體滅者。此體為是因體。為非因體。若是因體者。前法體滅。因體亦滅。偈言因滅者。謂非是已滅因有能起果力。複次若前法滅非因體者。如論偈說。
因果和合住 云何得生果 不與果和合 何物能生果
釋曰。此謂因不生果。何以故。因果體不異故。如因自體不自生因。若因與果和合共住。既不生果。因則無用。法體有顛倒故。是汝立義之過。若有人言。因不與果和合者。亦如上答。物不生果。何以故。果空故。譬如余果且已總遮。因能生果。今當別說。遮彼眼識等果若此眼識以眼為因者。此眼為見已取境。為不見而取境。二俱不然。若眼見而取。然後識起者。識則無用。若眼不見而取者。色之境界則為無用。復有人言。第一義中因能生果。何以故。因與果作因故。若因不生果者。是則乳非酪因。譬如乳與瓶。論者言。汝說不善。何以故。如論偈說。
無有過去果 與過去因合 亦無未來果 與已生因合
釋曰。此謂因果俱無故。譬如兔角。複次過去因。以時別故則不與果和合。複次已生未生果與已生未生因不和合者。如論偈說。
已果及未因 畢竟無和合 未果及已
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『法體滅，有何法體生？』如果像你說的有變異，這是什麼意思呢？任何時候都沒有合適的比喻，你說的道理是不對的。再者，你說的前法體滅，這個『體』是因體，還是非因體？如果是因體，那麼前法體滅，因體也滅了。偈語說『因滅』，指的是已經滅掉的因沒有能力產生結果。再者，如果前法滅不是因體，就像論偈說： 『因果和合住，云何得生果？不與果和合，何物能生果？』 解釋：這是說因不能生果。為什麼呢？因為因果的體性沒有差異。就像因的自體不能自己產生因。如果因與果和合共住，既然不能生果，那麼因就沒有用處，法體有顛倒的緣故。這是你立論的過失。如果有人說，因不與果和合，也可以像上面那樣回答，事物不能生果。為什麼呢？因為果是空性的。譬如其他的果且已經全部遮止，因能生果。現在應當分別說明，遮止眼識等果。如果這個眼識以眼為因，那麼這個眼是見已取境，還是不見而取境？兩者都不對。如果眼見而取，然後識才生起，那麼識就沒有用處。如果眼不見而取，那麼色的境界就沒有用處。又有人說，在第一義中，因能生果。為什麼呢？因為因與果作為因的緣故。如果因不生果，那麼乳就不是酪的因，就像乳與瓶子一樣。論者說，你說的不好。為什麼呢？就像論偈說： 『無有過去果，與過去因合；亦無未來果，與已生因合。』 解釋：這是說因果都沒有的緣故，譬如兔角。再者，過去的因，因為時間不同，所以不與果和合。再者，已生未生的果與已生未生的因不和合，就像論偈說： 『已果及未因，畢竟無和合；未果及已因，畢竟無和合。』
【English Translation】 English version: 'If the Dharma-body is extinguished, what Dharma-body is born? And what does it mean to say there is change?' At no time is there a suitable analogy. What you say is not right. Furthermore, when you say the previous Dharma-body is extinguished, is this 'body' a causal body or a non-causal body? If it is a causal body, then when the previous Dharma-body is extinguished, the causal body is also extinguished. The verse says 'cause extinguished,' referring to the fact that an extinguished cause does not have the power to produce a result. Furthermore, if the previous Dharma-body extinguished is not a causal body, as the treatise verse says: 'When cause and effect dwell together in harmony, how can a result be produced? If not in harmony with the result, what can produce the result?' Explanation: This means that the cause cannot produce the result. Why? Because the nature of cause and effect is not different. Just as the self-nature of a cause cannot produce itself as a cause. If the cause and effect dwell together in harmony, since it cannot produce a result, then the cause is useless, because the Dharma-body is inverted. This is the fault of your proposition. If someone says that the cause is not in harmony with the result, the answer is the same as above: a thing cannot produce a result. Why? Because the result is empty. For example, other results have already been completely negated, that the cause can produce the result. Now we should explain separately, negating the results such as eye-consciousness. If this eye-consciousness takes the eye as its cause, then does this eye grasp the object having already seen, or grasp the object without seeing? Neither is correct. If the eye sees and then grasps, and then consciousness arises, then consciousness is useless. If the eye grasps without seeing, then the realm of form is useless. Furthermore, someone says that in the ultimate sense, the cause can produce the result. Why? Because the cause and the result act as a cause. If the cause does not produce the result, then milk is not the cause of cheese, just like milk and a bottle. The debater says, what you say is not good. Why? As the treatise verse says: 'There is no past result that combines with a past cause; nor is there a future result that combines with a cause that has already arisen.' Explanation: This means that both cause and effect do not exist, like rabbit horns. Furthermore, the past cause, because of the difference in time, does not combine with the result. Furthermore, the result that has already arisen or not yet arisen does not combine with the cause that has already arisen or not yet arisen, as the treatise verse says: 'A result that has already arisen and a cause that has not yet arisen, ultimately do not combine; a result that has not yet arisen and a cause that has already arisen, ultimately do not combine.'
因 亦復無和合
釋曰。此謂時別。因果二故。已生果與已生。未生因已壞。果與已壞。未壞因不和合者。如論偈說。
無有已生果 與已未因合 亦無已壞果 與已未因合
釋曰。此謂因果二得同時者。先已遮故由時有別。汝義不成。作是觀察。因之與果。永無和合。如論偈說。
因若不和合 云何能生果 因若有和合 云何能生果
釋曰。此下作驗。第一義中因不生果。不和合故。譬如種子在地芽不出高山。複次今有道理與彼執稻種中無果及有果者過。如論偈說。
因中果若空 云何能生果 因中果不空 云何能生果
釋曰。此謂種不生果。以果空故。如先所答。譬如余果。因中果不空者。謂果已有故。因不生果。譬如因不生。因先已答故。鞞婆沙人言。果未起前。此果先有。論者言。無如是義。今為遮此過故。如論偈說。
未起果不空 不空則無滅 以無起滅故 果得不空過
釋曰。此謂果不從緣起。以果有自體故。若有而起者。無如是義。已有故不須更起。若謂不起而有果者。是則果體。應常不滅。以是故。果得不空。過而執者。不欲令果有不空過。如論偈說。
果不空不起 果不空不滅 以果不空故 無起亦無滅
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因，也同樣不存在和合（samāgama）。
解釋：這是指時間上的差別。因為有因和果兩種。已產生的果和已產生的、未產生的因已經壞滅；果和已壞滅的、未壞滅的因，不會和合。正如論偈所說：
沒有已產生的果，與已生或未生的因和合； 也沒有已壞滅的果，與已壞滅或未壞滅的因和合。
解釋：這是指因果二者不能同時存在。因為先前已經遮止了，由於時間上有差別，你的觀點不能成立。這樣觀察，因與果永遠不會和合。正如論偈所說：
因如果不和合，如何能夠產生果？ 因如果已經和合，又如何能夠產生果？
解釋：下面進行驗證。在第一義（paramārtha）中，因不生果，因為不和合的緣故，譬如種子在高山上，就不會發出芽。其次，現在有道理可以駁斥那些認為稻種中沒有果，以及認為稻種中有果的人。正如論偈所說：
如果因中果是空的，如何能夠產生果？ 如果因中果不是空的，又如何能夠產生果？
解釋：這是說種子不能產生果，因為果是空的緣故，如先前所回答的，譬如其餘的果。如果因中果不是空的，就是說果已經存在了，所以因不能產生果，譬如因不能產生因，先前已經回答過了。鞞婆沙人（Vaibhāṣika）說，在果未生起之前，這個果就已經存在了。論者說，沒有這樣的道理。現在爲了遮止這種過失，正如論偈所說：
未生起的果不是空的，不是空的就沒有滅； 因為沒有生起和滅，果就得到了不是空的過失。
解釋：這是說果不是從因緣生起的，因為果有它自己的自體（svabhāva）的緣故。如果有自體而生起，就沒有這樣的道理，因為已經有了，就不需要再生起。如果說不生起而有果，那麼果的體性就應該常住不滅。因此，果就得到了不是空的過失。那些執著這種觀點的人，是不想讓果有不是空的過失。正如論偈所說：
果不是空的，所以不生起；果不是空的，所以不滅； 因為果不是空的緣故，就沒有生起，也沒有滅。
【English Translation】 English version Cause, likewise, has no combination.
Explanation: This refers to the difference in time. Because there are two: cause and effect. The effect that has already arisen and the cause that has already arisen or not yet arisen have perished; the effect and the cause that has perished or not yet perished do not combine. As the verse in the treatise says:
There is no effect that has already arisen, that combines with a cause that has already arisen or not yet arisen; Nor is there an effect that has already perished, that combines with a cause that has already perished or not yet perished.
Explanation: This refers to the fact that cause and effect cannot exist simultaneously. Because it has already been refuted, due to the difference in time, your view cannot be established. Observing in this way, cause and effect will never combine. As the verse in the treatise says:
If the cause does not combine, how can it produce the effect? If the cause has already combined, how can it produce the effect?
Explanation: The following is a verification. In the ultimate sense (paramārtha), the cause does not produce the effect, because they do not combine, just as a seed on a high mountain will not sprout. Furthermore, there is now a reason to refute those who believe that there is no effect in the rice seed, and those who believe that there is an effect in the rice seed. As the verse in the treatise says:
If the effect in the cause is empty, how can it produce the effect? If the effect in the cause is not empty, how can it produce the effect?
Explanation: This means that the seed cannot produce the effect, because the effect is empty, as previously answered, like other effects. If the effect in the cause is not empty, it means that the effect already exists, so the cause cannot produce the effect, just as a cause cannot produce a cause, which has already been answered. The Vaibhāṣikas say that before the effect arises, this effect already exists. The commentator says that there is no such reason. Now, in order to prevent this fault, as the verse in the treatise says:
The effect that has not arisen is not empty, and if it is not empty, there is no cessation; Because there is no arising and cessation, the effect obtains the fault of not being empty.
Explanation: This means that the effect does not arise from conditions, because the effect has its own self-nature (svabhāva). If it has self-nature and arises, there is no such reason, because it already exists, so there is no need to arise again. If it is said that the effect exists without arising, then the nature of the effect should be permanent and not perish. Therefore, the effect obtains the fault of not being empty. Those who adhere to this view do not want the effect to have the fault of not being empty. As the verse in the treatise says:
The effect is not empty, so it does not arise; the effect is not empty, so it does not perish; Because the effect is not empty, there is no arising, and there is no cessation.
釋曰。果若空則無起滅。若定有者不須復起。無起故無滅。以是故果若不空。云何起滅。複次云何欲得如此果者。是起滅法故。果若已有。則不見有起滅法。譬如現在相。復有路伽耶言。果未起前。果無自體。何以故。果體空故。果已起者。亦無他法體。論者言。是說虛妄無有義理。我今答汝。何以故。如論偈說。
果空云何起 果空云何滅 以果是空故 無起亦無滅
釋曰。此謂第一義中果空而有起者不然。何以故。果無體故。譬如空華。第一義中於稻芽上有麥芽無體。體滅者是亦不然。無體故。譬如非稻芽滅。複次從緣起者自體皆空。是我法中第一義觀故。若謂有少許物而不空者。此等之物則不從因緣生。世諦之中亦無是事。譬如空華。如上偈說未起果不空果得不空過。此謂果不空者。得無起滅過。今令汝解第一義中果空而有起故。譬如幻等。第一義中果空。以有滅故。亦如幻等。果亦如是。若果以無他體為體者。此果則無起無滅。世諦之中亦無果故。譬如空華。亦如上說。果空云何起。果空云何滅。此謂起滅。俱無體故。此果既空則無起滅。然外人不欲令果無起滅故。此中立驗。內入等果非無自體。而有起故。譬如幻等。以此無起。無滅之驗。即破汝果。有起有滅。汝差別法破故。是汝
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 解釋說：如果結果是空性的，那麼就不會有生起和滅亡。如果結果是真實存在的，那麼就不需要再次生起。沒有生起，所以就沒有滅亡。因此，如果結果不是空性的，怎麼會有生起和滅亡呢？再者，如果想要得到這樣的結果，那它就是生起和滅亡之法。如果結果已經存在，那麼就看不到生起和滅亡之法，就像現在的現象一樣。還有路伽耶（Lokāyata，順世論）說，在結果生起之前，結果沒有自體。為什麼呢？因為結果的體性是空性的。結果已經生起之後，也沒有其他的體性。論者說，這是虛妄的，沒有道理。我現在回答你，為什麼呢？就像論偈所說： 『果空云何起，果空云何滅，以果是空故，無起亦無滅。』 解釋說：這意思是說，在第一義諦（paramārtha-satya，勝義諦）中，結果是空性的，而有生起是不可能的。為什麼呢？因為結果沒有實體，就像空中的花朵一樣。在第一義諦中，在稻芽上出現麥芽是沒有實體的。體性的滅亡也是不可能的，因為沒有實體，就像非稻芽的滅亡一樣。再者，從因緣生起的法，其自體都是空性的，這是我法（佛法）中第一義的觀察。如果認為有少許事物不是空性的，那麼這些事物就不會從因緣生起，在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，世俗諦）中也沒有這樣的事情，就像空中的花朵一樣。就像上面的偈頌所說，未生起的結果不是空性的，結果得到不是空性的過失。這意思是說，如果結果不是空性的，就會有無生無滅的過失。現在讓你理解，在第一義諦中，結果是空性的，但有生起，就像幻術等一樣。在第一義諦中，結果是空性的，因為有滅亡，也像幻術等一樣。如果結果以沒有其他體性作為體性，那麼這個結果就沒有生起，沒有滅亡。在世俗諦中也沒有這樣的結果，就像空中的花朵一樣。也像上面所說，結果是空性的，怎麼會有生起？結果是空性的，怎麼會有滅亡？這意思是說，生起和滅亡都沒有體性。這個結果既然是空性的，就沒有生起和滅亡。然而，外道（tīrthika，佛教以外的修行者）不希望結果沒有生起和滅亡，所以在這裡設立論證。內入等果不是沒有自體，而是有生起，就像幻術等一樣。用這個沒有生起，沒有滅亡的論證，就破斥了你的結果，有生起有滅亡。你的差別法被破斥了，就是你的...
【English Translation】 English version: Explanation: If the result is empty, then there is no arising and ceasing. If the result is definitely existent, then there is no need to arise again. Without arising, there is no ceasing. Therefore, if the result is not empty, how can there be arising and ceasing? Furthermore, how can one desire to obtain such a result, since it is subject to arising and ceasing? If the result already exists, then one does not see the phenomena of arising and ceasing, just like present phenomena. Moreover, the Lokāyata (materialists) say that before the result arises, the result has no self-nature. Why? Because the nature of the result is empty. After the result has arisen, it also has no other nature. The debater says that this is false and without meaning. I now answer you, why? As the verse in the treatise says: 『How can an empty result arise? How can an empty result cease? Because the result is empty, there is neither arising nor ceasing.』 Explanation: This means that in the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), it is not possible for a result to be empty and yet arise. Why? Because the result has no substance, like a flower in the sky. In the ultimate truth, it is impossible for barley sprouts to have substance on rice sprouts. The cessation of substance is also impossible, because there is no substance, like the cessation of non-rice sprouts. Furthermore, things that arise from conditions are all empty of self-nature. This is the ultimate view in my Dharma (Buddha's teachings). If one thinks that there is a small amount of something that is not empty, then these things will not arise from causes and conditions, and there is no such thing in conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), like a flower in the sky. As the above verse says, the unarisen result is not empty, and the result obtained is not free from fault. This means that if the result is not empty, there will be the fault of no arising and no ceasing. Now I will explain to you that in the ultimate truth, the result is empty, but there is arising, like illusions and so on. In the ultimate truth, the result is empty, because there is ceasing, also like illusions and so on. If the result has no other nature as its nature, then this result has no arising and no ceasing. There is also no such result in conventional truth, like a flower in the sky. As mentioned above, how can an empty result arise? How can an empty result cease? This means that both arising and ceasing have no substance. Since this result is empty, there is no arising and no ceasing. However, the non-Buddhists (tīrthika) do not want the result to have no arising and no ceasing, so they establish proof here. The result of internal absorption and so on is not without self-nature, but has arising, like illusions and so on. With this proof of no arising and no ceasing, your result, which has arising and ceasing, is refuted. Your differentiated Dharma is refuted, that is your...
立義之過。複次能生之因。此因與果。為一耶。為異耶。其過如論偈說。
因與果一者 終無有是義 因與果異者 亦無有是義
釋曰。何故因果不得一異耶。是中過咎。如論偈說。
因果若一者 能所則為一 因果若異者 因則同非因
釋曰。此謂汝不欲得能生所生二如父與子。云何為一。亦如火與薪。云何得一。此之二喻。世間共見。以是故我今說驗。因之與果不得為一。何以故。能生所生有異故。譬如父子二。此謂計一者過。複次執異者云何。謂因與果異故。譬如一切非因法。而汝不欲因同非因。汝意欲得因果二法相續不異。複次今問。執因中先有果者。此果為先有已生。為未有而生。是皆不然。其過如論偈說。
果若已有者 何用從因生 果若未有者 因復何能生
釋曰。此謂果若有自體者。何假因生。世諦之中亦復不能令人信解。果若無自體者。如虛空華。於世諦中而亦不能令人解也。如上偈說。果空云何生。以此觀察。第一義中因能生果者不然。若因不生果者則不是因。如前外人所立。能生果者。因應處處為因故。今為破此因義不成。汝亦違先所說。于第一義中成立因生果義。複次今言違者。謂于第一義中因不生果。世諦之中有如幻化等生故。鞞世師
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 立義之過。再者，關於能生之因（能夠產生結果的原因）。這個因和果，是一體的呢？還是不同的呢？其中的過失就像論偈所說：
『因與果若是一體，終究沒有這樣的道理；因與果若是不同的，也沒有這樣的道理。』
解釋說：為什麼因果不能是一體也不能是不同的呢？其中的過錯，就像論偈所說：
『因果若是一體，能生和所生就成了一體；因果若是不同的，因就等同於非因。』
解釋說：這是說你不希望得到能生和所生二者像父與子一樣（不同）。怎麼能說是一體呢？又像火與柴薪，怎麼能說是一體呢？這兩個比喻，世間普遍可見。因此我現在說驗證，因和果不能是一體。為什麼呢？因為能生和所生是有區別的。譬如父親和兒子是不同的。這是說認為一體的過失。再者，執著于不同又是怎麼回事呢？認為因和果是不同的，就像一切非因的法一樣。而你不希望因等同於非因。你希望得到因果二法相續而不異。再者，現在問，執著于因中先有果的人，這個果是先有已經產生，還是未有而生？這些都是不對的。其中的過失就像論偈所說：
『果如果已經存在，何必從因產生？果如果尚未存在，因又怎麼能夠產生？』
解釋說：這是說果如果已經有自體，何必假借因的產生？在世俗諦中也不能令人信服理解。果如果沒有自體，就像虛空中的花，在世俗諦中也不能令人理解。就像上面的偈頌所說，空的果怎麼產生？用這個來觀察，在第一義諦中因能夠生果是不對的。如果因不生果，那就不是因。就像之前外道所立的，能夠生果的因應該處處都是因。現在爲了破除這種因的意義不成立。你也違背了先前所說的，在第一義諦中成立因生果的意義。再者，現在說違背，是指在第一義諦中因不生果。在世俗諦中有如幻化等產生。鞞世師（Vaisheshika，印度哲學流派，主張事物由實體和屬性構成）。
【English Translation】 English version The Fault of Establishing a Thesis. Furthermore, concerning the cause that can produce (the cause capable of generating a result). Are this cause and effect one and the same, or are they different? The fault in this is as stated in the verse:
'If cause and effect are one, ultimately there is no such meaning; if cause and effect are different, there is also no such meaning.'
Explanation: Why can't cause and effect be one or different? The fault in this is as stated in the verse:
'If cause and effect are one, the producer and the produced become one; if cause and effect are different, the cause becomes the same as a non-cause.'
Explanation: This means you do not want the producer and the produced to be like father and son (different). How can they be one? Also, like fire and firewood, how can they be one? These two metaphors are commonly seen in the world. Therefore, I now say to verify, cause and effect cannot be one. Why? Because the producer and the produced are different. For example, father and son are different. This is to say the fault of considering them as one. Furthermore, what about adhering to difference? Considering that cause and effect are different, like all non-causal dharmas. And you do not want the cause to be the same as a non-cause. You want to obtain the two dharmas of cause and effect that are continuous and not different. Furthermore, now I ask, for those who adhere to the idea that the effect exists in the cause beforehand, is this effect pre-existing and already produced, or is it not yet existing and then produced? These are all incorrect. The fault in this is as stated in the verse:
'If the effect already exists, why is it produced from the cause? If the effect does not yet exist, how can the cause produce it?'
Explanation: This means if the effect already has its own self-nature, why borrow the production of the cause? Even in conventional truth, it cannot convince people to understand. If the effect does not have its own self-nature, like a flower in the sky, even in conventional truth, it cannot make people understand. As the verse above says, how can an empty effect be produced? Observing this, in the ultimate truth, it is not correct that the cause can produce the effect. If the cause does not produce the effect, then it is not a cause. Like what the non-Buddhist previously established, the cause that can produce the effect should be a cause everywhere. Now, in order to refute this meaning of cause, it is not established. You also contradict what you said earlier, establishing the meaning of cause producing effect in the ultimate truth. Furthermore, now saying contradiction refers to the fact that in the ultimate truth, the cause does not produce the effect. In conventional truth, there are productions like illusions and transformations. Vaisheshika (an Indian philosophical school that argues that things are made up of substance and attributes).
人復言。第一義中因能生果。何以故。世人咸言。此果之因故。當知因能生果。若因不生果者。終不指示言。此是果之因。譬如駝角弓。無故不說。今以有故說。如說眼是因識是果。稻是因芽是果。以有故說。若說識與芽喻得成者。即是我所立義得成。其驗如是。論者言。若曾有少許果生是第一義者。可得言此是因此是果。可作如是指示。今能生因無故。汝上所引世人咸說是果之因者。所立不成。亦違汝義。復有僧佉人言。得和合法故果生。此和合法由得時節故能生於果。而此品初彼遮我言。果有生滅為因故。因不成者。非是不成。亦非獨因能生果。復由和合及得時節而能生果。如彼所言。因不生果者。正成我義。論者言。因緣和合者。非是實法自體能生。若自體生已可能生果。今則不然。何以故。其過如論偈說。
自體及眾緣 和合不能生 自體既不生 云何能生果
釋曰。此謂和合不生於果。何以故。非實法故。譬如幻等。亦如提婆百論遮和合偈中說。一和合者無。諸和合亦無。若言是一者。應離因緣有。今當爲汝分別正義。如論偈說。
是故果不從 緣合不合生 以果無有故 和合法亦無
釋曰。此謂離諸緣無和合法。複次如先已遮因不生果。今遮和合亦不生果。云何不生。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 有人反駁說：『在第一義（Paramārtha，最高真理）中，因能夠產生果。』為什麼這麼說呢？因為世人都說：『這是果的因。』所以應當知道因能夠產生果。如果因不能產生果，最終就不會指著某個事物說：『這是果的因。』 譬如像駱駝角做的弓，因為沒有，所以不會說。現在因為有，所以才這麼說。比如，說眼是因，識是果；稻是因，芽是果。因為有這樣的關係，所以才這麼說。如果說識和芽的比喻能夠成立，那麼我所建立的義理就成立了，其驗證就是這樣。 論者說：『如果曾經有少許果產生是第一義，那麼就可以說『這是因，這是果』，可以這樣指示。現在能生之因並不存在，所以你上面所引用的世人所說的『這是果的因』，所立的觀點不能成立，也違背了你自己的義理。』 又有僧佉（Sāṃkhya，數論派）人說：『果是因為因緣和合而產生的。這種和合是因為得到時節因緣才能產生果。』而在此品開始的時候，他們反駁我說：『果有生滅是因為因的緣故，因不能成立。』這並非不能成立。也不是隻有因才能產生果，還因為因緣和合以及得到時節因緣才能產生果。』就像他們所說，『因不能產生果』，正好成就了我的義理。 論者說：『因緣和合，並非是真實存在的自體能夠產生果。如果是自體產生，之後才可能產生果。現在不是這樣。』為什麼呢？其中的過失就像論偈所說： 『自體及眾緣，和合不能生；自體既不生，云何能生果？』 解釋說：這說明和合不能產生果。為什麼呢？因為它不是真實存在的法，就像幻術等。也像《提婆百論》中遮破和合的偈頌所說：『一個和合不存在，多個和合也不存在。如果說是一個，那麼應該脫離因緣而存在。』現在我將為你分別說明真正的義理，就像論偈所說： 『是故果不從，緣合不合生；以果無有故，和合法亦無。』 解釋說：這說明離開了諸緣，就沒有和合法。再次，就像先前已經遮破了因不能產生果，現在遮破和合也不能產生果。為什麼不能產生呢？
【English Translation】 English version: Someone retorted: 'In the Paramārtha (first principle, highest truth), the cause can produce the effect.' Why is that? Because people generally say: 'This is the cause of the effect.' Therefore, it should be known that the cause can produce the effect. If the cause cannot produce the effect, then ultimately no one would point to something and say: 'This is the cause of the effect.' For example, like a bow made of camel's horn, because it doesn't exist, no one would say that. Now, because it exists, that's why people say it. For example, saying that the eye is the cause and consciousness is the effect; rice is the cause and sprout is the effect. Because there is such a relationship, that's why people say it. If the analogy of consciousness and sprout can be established, then the principle I have established is established, and the verification is like this.' The debater said: 'If there had ever been a slight effect produced as the first principle, then it could be said 'This is the cause, this is the effect,' and such an indication could be made. Now, the cause that can produce does not exist, so your above-quoted statement of people generally saying 'This is the cause of the effect,' the established viewpoint cannot be established, and it also violates your own principle.' Again, a Sāṃkhya (enumerationist school) person said: 'The effect is produced because of the combination of causes and conditions. This combination can produce the effect because it obtains the right time and conditions.' And at the beginning of this chapter, they refuted me by saying: 'The arising and ceasing of the effect is due to the cause, and the cause cannot be established.' This is not that it cannot be established. It is not only the cause that can produce the effect, but also the combination of causes and conditions and obtaining the right time and conditions.' Just as they said, 'The cause cannot produce the effect,' it precisely accomplishes my principle. The debater said: 'The combination of causes and conditions is not a real, self-existent entity that can produce the effect. If it were the self-existent entity that produces, then it would be possible to produce the effect afterward. Now it is not like this.' Why is that? The fault in it is as the verse in the treatise says: 'The self-existent entity and the various conditions, combination cannot produce; since the self-existent entity does not arise, how can it produce the effect?' The explanation says: This means that combination cannot produce the effect. Why is that? Because it is not a real existing dharma (law, phenomenon), like illusions, etc. It is also like what is said in the verse refuting combination in the Devaśarman's Hundred Treatises : 'One combination does not exist, and multiple combinations also do not exist. If it is said to be one, then it should exist apart from causes and conditions.' Now I will separately explain the true principle for you, just as the verse in the treatise says: 'Therefore, the effect does not arise from, the combination of conditions, whether combined or not; because the effect does not exist, the combination of conditions also does not exist.' The explanation says: This means that apart from the various conditions, there is no combination of conditions. Furthermore, just as it has already been refuted that the cause cannot produce the effect, now it is refuted that combination also cannot produce the effect. Why can't it produce?
謂此和合非是近生亦非遠生。第一義中不生者。如先遮因緣中已令信解。如是和合法不生果非和合法亦不生果。又如百論中說。世間名字由和合有。法體非有。體非有故。亦無和合。以是故。品初外人所說因者。與出因過。遮彼時法。為令信解因果無自性故。是此品義意。以是故我義得成。如般若經中說。極勇猛色非因非果。若色非因非果。乃至受想行識非因非果。何以故。色無和合故。若色無和合。乃至受想行識亦無和合。不見色。不見受想行識。無所行者。是名般若波羅蜜。如佛于識趣後世經中說偈言。若說和合處。是說方便門。為趣第一義。智者如是解。
釋觀因果品竟。
般若燈論釋觀成壞品第二十一
釋曰。今此品者。亦為遮空所對治。如前品。以因果無自性故。已令信解。今為顯示諸法無成壞故說。
僧佉人言。第一義中有時。何以故。時是成壞因故。若無時者。則不是因。譬如蛇足。由有時故。成壞二法隨時而轉。是故說時為因。因得成故。即是我所立義得成。論者言。成壞二法。為離成有壞。為不離成有壞。為與俱有壞。是皆不然。如論偈說。
離成無有壞 與俱亦無壞 離壞無有成 與俱亦無成
釋曰。我佛法義如是如是。如汝所說。時為因者。其義不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
這段話的意思是說，這種和合（samāgama）不是最近才產生的，也不是很久以前產生的。在第一義諦（paramārtha）中，事物是不生的，就像之前在遮破因緣時已經使人相信和理解的那樣。因此，和合法（saṃghāta-dharma）不能產生結果，非和合法（asaṃghāta-dharma）也不能產生結果。又如《百論》（Śataśāstra）中所說，世間的名字是由於和合而有的，但法的本體並非實有。因為本體並非實有，所以也沒有和合。因此，在這一品的開頭，外道所說的『因』，會產生『出因過』（hetu-nirgamana），是爲了遮破他們所執著的『時』法，從而使人相信和理解因果沒有自性（svabhāva）。這就是這一品的意義所在。因此，我的義理才能成立。如《般若經》（Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra）中所說，極勇猛的色（rūpa）既不是因也不是果。如果色不是因也不是果，乃至受（vedanā）、想（saṃjñā）、行（saṃskāra）、識（vijñāna）也不是因也不是果。為什麼呢？因為色沒有和合。如果色沒有和合，乃至受、想、行、識也沒有和合。不見色，不見受、想、行、識，無所執著，這叫做般若波羅蜜（Prajñāpāramitā）。如佛在《識趣後世經》（Vijñānānanta-bhava Sūtra）中所說偈言：『如果說和合之處，那是說方便之門，爲了趨向第一義諦，智者應如此理解。』 《觀因果品》解釋完畢。 《般若燈論釋觀成壞品》第二十一 解釋：現在這一品，也是爲了遮破空性（śūnyatā）的對立面而設立的，就像前一品一樣。因為因果沒有自性，已經使人相信和理解。現在是爲了顯示諸法沒有成（utpāda）和壞（vyaya）而說的。 僧佉派（Sāṃkhya）的人說：在第一義諦中有時（kāla）。為什麼呢？因為時是成壞的原因。如果沒有時，那就不是原因，譬如蛇足。由於有時，成和壞這兩種法隨著時間而流轉。所以說時是原因。原因成立了，那麼我所立的義理也就成立了。論者說：成和壞這兩種法，是離開成而有壞，還是不離開成而有壞，還是與成同時而有壞？這些都是不成立的。如論偈所說： 『離開成沒有壞，與成俱時也沒有壞，離開壞沒有成，與壞俱時也沒有成。』 解釋：我佛法的義理就是這樣。如你所說，時作為原因，這個道理不成立。
【English Translation】 English version:
This means that this combination (samāgama) is neither recently produced nor produced long ago. In the ultimate truth (paramārtha), things are not produced, just as it has been made people believe and understand when refuting causality before. Therefore, compounded dharmas (saṃghāta-dharma) cannot produce results, and non-compounded dharmas (asaṃghāta-dharma) cannot produce results either. Furthermore, as stated in the Śataśāstra (Treatise in One Hundred Verses), worldly names arise from combination, but the essence of dharmas is not real. Because the essence is not real, there is no combination either. Therefore, the 'cause' mentioned by the outsiders at the beginning of this chapter will produce the 'fault of the cause going out' (hetu-nirgamana), in order to refute their attachment to the dharma of 'time', thereby making people believe and understand that cause and effect have no inherent existence (svabhāva). This is the meaning of this chapter. Therefore, my doctrine can be established. As stated in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra (Perfection of Wisdom Sutra), extremely vigorous form (rūpa) is neither a cause nor an effect. If form is neither a cause nor an effect, then neither are feeling (vedanā), perception (saṃjñā), volition (saṃskāra), and consciousness (vijñāna) causes or effects. Why? Because form has no combination. If form has no combination, then neither do feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness have combination. Not seeing form, not seeing feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness, being unattached, this is called Prajñāpāramitā (Perfection of Wisdom). As the Buddha said in the Vijñānānanta-bhava Sūtra (Sutra on the Endless Cycle of Consciousness) in verse: 'If one speaks of the place of combination, that is speaking of the gate of skillful means, in order to approach the ultimate truth, the wise should understand it in this way.' End of the explanation of the Chapter on Observing Cause and Effect. Prajñāpradīpa-ṭīkā: Chapter Twenty-One on Observing Formation and Destruction Explanation: Now, this chapter is also established to refute the opposite of emptiness (śūnyatā), just like the previous chapter. Because cause and effect have no inherent existence, it has already made people believe and understand. Now it is said to show that all dharmas have no formation (utpāda) and destruction (vyaya). The Sāṃkhya (Enumeration) school says: There is time (kāla) in the ultimate truth. Why? Because time is the cause of formation and destruction. If there is no time, then it is not a cause, like a snake's feet. Because there is time, the two dharmas of formation and destruction flow with time. Therefore, it is said that time is the cause. If the cause is established, then the doctrine I have established is also established. The debater says: Are the two dharmas of formation and destruction separate from formation and have destruction, or are they not separate from formation and have destruction, or do they have destruction simultaneously with formation? None of these are established. As the verse in the treatise says: 'Apart from formation there is no destruction, nor is there destruction simultaneously with formation, apart from destruction there is no formation, nor is there formation simultaneously with destruction.' Explanation: The meaning of my Buddha-dharma is like this. As you say, time as a cause, this reasoning is not established.
成。何以故。若離成有壞者。則不因成有壞。壞則無因。又無成法可壞故。云何為成。謂眾緣合。云何為壞。謂眾緣散。複次若離成有壞者無成。誰當壞故。譬如無瓶。是故離成無壞。若謂與俱而有壞者。是亦不然。何以故。法先別成。然後有合。是合法不離於異。若離異者。壞則無因。是故與俱亦無壞。如是若離壞共壞無有成者。何以故。若離壞有成。成則為常。常是不壞相。而實不見有法是常。以是故離壞亦無成。若謂與俱有成者。是亦不然。成壞相違。云何得一時俱。僧佉人言。何有與他立過。自義得成。自若成者。應說道理。論者答言。汝義非也。其過如論偈說。
離成則無壞 云何得有壞 離死則無生 無壞何有成
釋曰。此謂離成無有壞法。世間之人皆共解故。不須廣說。釋離成無壞已。複次與俱亦無壞者。如論偈說。
若成與壞俱 云何當可得 亦如生與死 不可得同時
釋曰。此中說驗壞之與成非同時有。何以故。成是壞緣故。譬如死與生不可得俱。釋不俱已。複次第二分別離壞無成者。如論偈說。
若離壞有成 云何當可得 諸體上無常 一切時中有
釋曰。此謂離壞無成。何以故。如立義中諸體無常者。謂色法等自體無常故。譬如無常。自體
復有。正量部人言。法雖無常得壞因來法體即壞。非一切時皆有無常。論者言。若爾者。譬如有人服瀉藥已便瀉。乃語他言。是天瀉我不言藥瀉。汝亦如是。無常之法。一切時中能壞法體。而言待壞因來者。是事不然。若得壞因無常始能壞法體者。但是壞因能壞法體。何得復言無常能壞。今問外人法體。為是壞性得壞因來壞耶。為非壞性得壞因來壞耶。此法體若是壞性。得壞因來壞者不然。何故不然。法體起時無間即壞。亦起便滅不到第二剎那。云何得待壞因來壞。若法自體非壞者。譬如涅槃。亦不待彼壞因來壞。複次壞無有因壞無因故。法則不壞。譬如無為。以此驗故。破彼壞因。彼因既破。即破法體。是汝立義之過。且成壞二法前後而有者不然。釋離壞無成已。複次同時有成壞者。義亦不然。何以故。如論偈說。
成與壞同時 云何而可得 亦如生與死 同時者不然
釋曰。此謂作是觀時。義同前解。複次互不成者。如論偈說。
成壞互共成 此二無有成 離此二互成 二法雲何成
釋曰。此謂成壞二法不可得成。如外人先說有時而為成壞因者。因則不成。薩婆多鞞婆沙人復言。此自性壞法非起而即滅。由起無間有住故。此住無間而有滅。論者言。是事不然其義如論偈說。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：還有，正量部（Pudgalavada）的人說：『法雖然是無常的，但必須等到壞滅之因到來，法體才會壞滅。並非一切時候都是無常的。』論者反駁說：『如果這樣說，就像有人服用了瀉藥后就腹瀉，卻告訴別人說是天讓他腹瀉，而不是藥的作用。你們也是這樣，無常之法在一切時候都能壞滅法體，卻說要等待壞滅之因到來，這是不對的。如果必須得到壞滅之因，無常才能壞滅法體，那麼只是壞滅之因能壞滅法體，為何又說無常能壞滅呢？』現在問外道，法體是具有壞滅的性質，得到壞滅之因才壞滅呢？還是不具有壞滅的性質，得到壞滅之因才壞滅呢？如果這個法體是具有壞滅的性質，得到壞滅之因才壞滅，這是不成立的。為什麼不成立呢？法體生起的時候，沒有間隔就壞滅了，剛一生起就滅亡，到不了第二個剎那，怎麼能等待壞滅之因到來才壞滅呢？如果法體自身不是壞滅的，譬如涅槃（Nirvana），也不需要等待壞滅之因到來才壞滅。再次，壞滅沒有原因，因為沒有原因的緣故，法則不會壞滅，譬如無為法。用這個來驗證，就能破斥他們的壞滅之因。他們的因既然被破斥，也就破斥了法體。這是你們立論的過失。而且，成立和壞滅這兩種法，有先後順序是不成立的。解釋了離開壞滅就沒有成立之後，再次，同時有成立和壞滅，這個道理也是不成立的。為什麼呢？就像論偈所說： 『成立與壞滅同時，怎麼可能成立呢？就像生與死，同時發生是不可能的。』 解釋說：這是說在作這種觀察的時候，道理和前面的解釋相同。再次，互相不能成立，就像論偈所說： 『成立和壞滅互相共同成立，這兩種法都不能成立。離開這兩種互相成立，這兩種法怎麼能成立呢？』 解釋說：這是說成立和壞滅這兩種法是不能成立的。就像外道先前所說，有時作為成立和壞滅的原因，這個因是不成立的。薩婆多鞞婆沙（Sarvastivada Vaibhashika）的人又說：『這種自性壞滅的法，不是生起后立即滅亡，因為生起之後有住留的階段，這個住留之後才有滅亡。』論者反駁說：『這是不對的。』其中的道理就像論偈所說：
【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, the Pudgalavadins (Personalists) say: 'Although a dharma is impermanent, its substance will only be destroyed when the cause of destruction arrives. It is not the case that everything is impermanent at all times.' The debater responds: 'If that is so, it is like someone who takes a purgative and then has diarrhea, but tells others that it was heaven that caused the diarrhea, not the medicine. You are the same. The dharma of impermanence can destroy the substance of a dharma at all times, but you say that it must wait for the cause of destruction to arrive. This is not correct. If impermanence can only destroy the substance of a dharma when the cause of destruction arrives, then only the cause of destruction can destroy the substance of a dharma. Why do you say that impermanence can destroy it?' Now I ask the outsider, is the substance of a dharma destructive in nature and destroyed when the cause of destruction arrives, or is it not destructive in nature and destroyed when the cause of destruction arrives? If this substance of a dharma is destructive in nature and destroyed when the cause of destruction arrives, that is not correct. Why is it not correct? When the substance of a dharma arises, it is destroyed without interval. It arises and then immediately ceases, not reaching the second kshana (instant). How can it wait for the cause of destruction to arrive and then be destroyed? If the dharma itself is not destructive, like Nirvana (liberation), it does not need to wait for the cause of destruction to arrive and then be destroyed. Furthermore, destruction has no cause, because there is no cause, the dharma will not be destroyed, like the unconditioned. By examining this, we can refute their cause of destruction. Since their cause is refuted, the substance of the dharma is also refuted. This is the fault of your established doctrine. Moreover, it is not correct that the two dharmas of arising and destruction exist sequentially. After explaining that there is no arising without destruction, again, it is also not correct that arising and destruction exist simultaneously. Why is that? As the verse in the treatise says: 'How can arising and destruction be simultaneous? It is like birth and death, it is not possible for them to be simultaneous.' The explanation says: This means that when making this observation, the principle is the same as the previous explanation. Furthermore, they cannot establish each other, as the verse in the treatise says: 'Arising and destruction establish each other mutually, but these two dharmas cannot be established. If these two dharmas are separated from each other, how can they be established?' The explanation says: This means that the two dharmas of arising and destruction cannot be established. Just as the outsider previously said that sometimes it is the cause of arising and destruction, that cause is not established. The Sarvastivada Vaibhashikas (those who expound the Sarvastivada Abhidharma) again say: 'This dharma, which is destructive in nature, does not cease immediately after arising, because there is a stage of abiding after arising, and after this abiding there is cessation.' The debater responds: 'That is not correct.' The principle is as the verse in the treatise says:
盡者無有起 無盡亦無起 有盡者無壞 無盡亦無壞
釋曰。此謂若法有無常者名為盡。有盡者則無起。起盡二法相違故。譬如生與死。若言起已而無間不滅者。此非盡法。以是故。如向所說起盡法者。於世諦中不成故。有盡法者不須思惟分別。無盡者非壞自體故。譬如解脫。鞞世師人言。應有成壞。體法有故。若無成壞。亦無體法。譬如蟾蜍毛而成壞。是物體法故。必有成壞故。論者言。第一義中若有。一物實有成壞者應說成壞法。然無成壞可說故。其義如論偈說。
若離彼成壞 則無有物體 是成壞二法 離物體亦無
釋曰。物體者。以成為體故。成既無體。汝向說體法有故為因者不成。何以故。所依無體故。能依亦不成。複次汝以物體為因者。今說其過。修多羅人言。物體無實。自性是空。然於物上有成壞法。薩婆多人復說言。物有實體。自性不空。於此物上而有成壞。今總答彼二部成壞。如論偈說。
有成壞二法 物體空不然 有成壞二法 體不空不然
釋曰。此中立驗如上。體法有故。若言自體有者。則應不壞。以是故汝等立因不成。複次更有與過道理。此成壞法為一耶為異耶。二俱不然。是義云何。如論偈說。
是成壞二法 一體者不然 是成
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『盡』（Nirodha，滅盡）者，不再生起，沒有『盡』的（A Nirodha，不滅盡）也不會生起。 有『盡』的事物不會毀壞，沒有『盡』的也不會毀壞。
解釋：這裡所說的，如果法是無常的，就稱為『盡』。有『盡』的事物就不會生起，因為生起和滅盡是兩種相反的法，譬如生和死。如果說生起之後沒有間斷就不滅，這不是『盡』的法。因此，像前面所說的生起和滅盡的法，在世俗諦中是不成立的，所以有『盡』的法不需要思惟分別。沒有『盡』的事物不會壞滅自體，譬如解脫（Nirvana）。鞞世師（Vaisheshika）的人說，應該有成就和毀壞，因為有實體法（Dravya）。如果沒有成就和毀壞，也就沒有實體法，譬如蟾蜍的毛。成就和毀壞是物體法，所以必定有成就和毀壞。論者說，在第一義諦（Paramartha-satya）中，如果有一物真實有成就和毀壞，就應該說出成就和毀壞的法，然而沒有成就和毀壞可以述說，所以其意義如論偈所說：
如果離開那成就和毀壞，就沒有物體；這成就和毀壞兩種法，離開物體也沒有。
解釋：物體，是以成就作為體性。成就既然沒有體性，你先前所說的以體法為因就不成立。為什麼呢？因為所依賴的沒有體性，能依賴的也不成立。再次，你以物體為因，現在說出它的過失。修多羅（Sutra）的人說，物體沒有實體，自性是空（Sunyata），然而在物體上有成就和毀壞的法。薩婆多（Sarvastivadin）的人又說，物體有實體，自性不空，在這物體上有成就和毀壞。現在總共回答這兩部的成就和毀壞，如論偈所說：
有成就和毀壞兩種法，物體是空，不然；有成就和毀壞兩種法，體不空，不然。
解釋：這裡建立論證如上，因為體法存在。如果說自體存在，那麼應該不會毀壞。因此，你們所立的因不成立。再次，更有給予過失的道理。這成就和毀壞的法是一體的呢，還是異體的呢？兩者都不對。這意義是什麼呢？如論偈所說：
這成就和毀壞兩種法，是一體，不然；是成
【English Translation】 English version: 'Cessation' (Nirodha), there is no arising; that which is without 'cessation' (A Nirodha) also does not arise. That which has 'cessation' does not decay; that which is without 'cessation' also does not decay.
Explanation: Here it is said that if a dharma is impermanent, it is called 'cessation'. That which has 'cessation' does not arise, because arising and cessation are two opposing dharmas, like birth and death. If it is said that after arising there is no interruption and it does not cease, this is not a dharma of 'cessation'. Therefore, like the dharma of arising and cessation mentioned earlier, it is not established in conventional truth (Samvriti-satya), so there is no need to contemplate and differentiate the dharma that has 'cessation'. That which has no 'cessation' does not destroy its own nature, like liberation (Nirvana). The Vaisheshika people say that there should be accomplishment and destruction, because there is substance (Dravya). If there is no accomplishment and destruction, there is no substance, like the hair of a toad. Accomplishment and destruction are the nature of objects, so there must be accomplishment and destruction. The debater says that in ultimate truth (Paramartha-satya), if there is one thing that truly has accomplishment and destruction, then the dharma of accomplishment and destruction should be spoken of, but there is no accomplishment and destruction that can be spoken of, so its meaning is as the verse says:
If apart from that accomplishment and destruction, there is no object; these two dharmas of accomplishment and destruction, apart from the object, also do not exist.
Explanation: An object takes accomplishment as its nature. Since accomplishment has no nature, your previous statement that substance is the cause is not established. Why? Because what is relied upon has no nature, so what relies on it is also not established. Furthermore, you take the object as the cause, now stating its fault. The Sutra people say that objects have no substance, their nature is emptiness (Sunyata), but on objects there are dharmas of accomplishment and destruction. The Sarvastivadins also say that objects have substance, their nature is not empty, and on these objects there is accomplishment and destruction. Now, in total, answering the accomplishment and destruction of these two schools, as the verse says:
There are two dharmas of accomplishment and destruction, the object is empty, not so; there are two dharmas of accomplishment and destruction, the substance is not empty, not so.
Explanation: Here, establishing the proof is as above, because substance exists. If it is said that self-nature exists, then it should not decay. Therefore, the cause you have established is not established. Furthermore, there is more reason to give fault. Are these dharmas of accomplishment and destruction one or different? Neither is correct. What is the meaning of this? As the verse says:
These two dharmas of accomplishment and destruction, are one, not so; are accom
壞二法 異體者不然
釋曰。此謂相違故。譬如愚與智。然此二法同依一物。譬如余物體。此亦因義有不成過。鞞世師人說偈言。
我常見物體 有成亦有壞 是故知體法 定有而不空
論者言。汝實見者。但是同凡夫智非第一義。今當爲汝分別其意。如論偈說。
起者先已遮 無起法亦遮 見成者愚癡 見壞者亦爾
釋曰。此謂無成壞體。外人若言見成壞者。云何知是愚癡非第一義耶。論者言。此先已答。汝若意由不足。今更為說。于第一義中若見有物體者。此成與壞可依彼體。然此物者。為有體能生體。為無體能生體。是皆不然。何以故。其義如論偈說。
有體不生體 亦不生無體 無體不生體 亦不生無體
釋曰。有體不生體者。第一義中無體故。譬如已生體。若外人言。如種子體。后時能生芽故。謂是體能生體者。是亦有過。何以故。芽未生時亦無芽體。以稻體不生故。芽未生時無有名字。此謂未有言說故。譬如余未生物體。不生無體者。體無故。譬如兔角無體。不生體者。謂無因體。體無生故。亦如兔角無體。不生無體者。先已說驗破故。今問體等。為自生耶。為他生耶。並有過故。其義如論偈說。
法體不自生 亦不從他生 亦無自
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 壞二法，異體則不然。
解釋：這是指相互違背的兩種法。例如愚笨和智慧。然而這兩種法卻可以同時依存於同一個事物。比如其他的物體。這也會因為『因』的含義而產生不成立的過失。鞞世師（Vaisheshika，印度哲學流派之一，主張實在論和原子論）的人說偈語道：
『我常見物體，有成亦有壞，是故知體法，定有而不空。』
論者說：你所見的，實際上只是同凡夫的智慧，並非第一義諦（Paramārtha，佛教用語，指最高的真理）。現在我將為你分別解釋其中的含義。如論偈所說：
『起者先已遮，無起法亦遮，見成者愚癡，見壞者亦爾。』
解釋：這是說沒有成壞的實體。外道如果說見到成壞，如何知道這是愚癡而非第一義諦呢？論者說：這之前已經回答過了。如果你覺得意思還不夠，現在再為你說明。在第一義諦中，如果見到有物體，那麼這個成與壞就可以依存於那個物體。然而這個物體，是有實體能生實體，還是無實體能生實體？這都是不成立的。為什麼呢？其中的道理如論偈所說：
『有體不生體，亦不生無體，無體不生體，亦不生無體。』
解釋：有實體不生實體，因為在第一義諦中沒有實體。比如已經產生的實體。如果外道說，比如種子，後來能夠生出芽，所以說是實體能生實體，這也是有錯誤的。為什麼呢？因為芽未產生時也沒有芽的實體，因為稻的實體不能生出芽。芽未產生時沒有名字，這是說沒有言說。比如其他未產生的物體。不生無實體，因為實體不存在。比如兔角沒有實體。不生實體，是指沒有原因的實體，因為實體沒有產生。也像兔角沒有實體。不生無實體，之前已經用驗證的方法破斥過了。現在問，實體等，是自己產生呢，還是由他產生呢？都有過失。其中的道理如論偈所說：
『法體不自生，亦不從他生，亦無自』
【English Translation】 English version The Two Faulty Dharmas: Difference in Substance is Not So
Explanation: This refers to two dharmas that contradict each other, such as foolishness and wisdom. However, these two dharmas can coexist in the same object, like other physical objects. This also incurs the fault of non-establishment due to the meaning of 'cause'. The Vaisheshika (one of the schools of Indian philosophy, advocating realism and atomism) says in a verse:
'I often see objects, with formation and destruction, therefore I know the nature of substance, is definitely existent and not empty.'
The debater says: What you actually see is just the wisdom of ordinary people, not the ultimate truth (Paramārtha, a Buddhist term referring to the highest truth). Now I will explain the meaning to you separately. As the verse in the treatise says:
'That which arises has already been refuted, the dharma of non-arising is also refuted, seeing formation is foolish, seeing destruction is also so.'
Explanation: This means there is no substance of formation and destruction. If outsiders say they see formation and destruction, how do they know this is foolishness and not the ultimate truth? The debater says: This has already been answered before. If you feel the meaning is not sufficient, I will explain it to you further. In the ultimate truth, if one sees an object, then this formation and destruction can rely on that object. However, does this object, have substance that can produce substance, or does it have no substance that can produce substance? Neither is established. Why? The reason is as the verse in the treatise says:
'Substance does not produce substance, nor does it produce non-substance, non-substance does not produce substance, nor does it produce non-substance.'
Explanation: Substance does not produce substance, because there is no substance in the ultimate truth. For example, an already produced substance. If outsiders say, for example, a seed, can later produce a sprout, so it is said that substance can produce substance, this is also a mistake. Why? Because when the sprout has not yet been produced, there is also no substance of the sprout, because the substance of rice cannot produce a sprout. When the sprout has not yet been produced, there is no name, this means there is no speech. For example, other unproduced objects. Non-substance does not produce non-substance, because substance does not exist. For example, a rabbit's horn has no substance. Non-substance does not produce substance, refers to a substance without a cause, because substance is not produced. Also like a rabbit's horn has no substance. Non-substance does not produce non-substance, has already been refuted by verification before. Now ask, is substance, etc., produced by itself, or is it produced by others? Both have faults. The reason is as the verse in the treatise says:
'The nature of dharma is not self-produced, nor is it produced from others, nor is there self'
他生 今說何處生
釋曰。如是不生前已廣說故。此謂畢竟無生。以成壞無有體故。汝根本因義不成。若第一義中欲得有體者。今當說過。如論偈說。
諸法有體者 即墮斷常見 當知所受法 若常若無常
釋曰。何故爾耶。謂此法若常若無常故。何以故。常者不壞故。是常見過。無常者壞故。是斷見過。有外人言。我無是過。其義云何。引上偈本云。諸法有體者。非常亦非斷。論者問言。何故爾耶。外人復引論偈答曰。
起盡相續者 由果及與因 因滅而果起 不斷亦不常
釋曰。外人意謂。因始滅時有果起故不斷。果始起時有因滅故不常。亦如經說。五陰無常苦空無我。而不斷滅。以是義故。因之與果非斷非常。論者言。若如是者。義不相應。前滅後起。今說其過。如論偈說。
是起盡相續 由因及果者 因滅而果起 若斷及若常
釋曰。此謂因滅更不生故。則墮斷過。已滅者不起故。譬如燋種。鞞世師等謂論者言。如彼論中偈說。若物從緣起。此果不即緣亦不離彼緣。非斷亦非常。此謂論者先所欲得。今復說為過者不然。論者言。此語不善。何以故。此偈於世諦中說不斷不常。非第一義。何以故。第一義中一切法無斷常過。僧佉人言。因變為果。住
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 他生：今生於何處？
解釋：像這樣不生（不出現）的情況，之前已經廣泛地說明過了。這裡指的是畢竟沒有生起，因為成和壞都沒有實體。你的根本因的意義不能成立。如果在第一義中想要得到有實體的東西，現在應當指出你的過失。如論偈所說：
『諸法若有實體，即會墮入斷見和常見；應當知道所接受的法，要麼是常，要麼是無常。』
解釋：為什麼會這樣呢？因為這些法要麼是常，要麼是無常。為什麼呢？常的東西不會壞滅，所以是常見的過失；無常的東西會壞滅，所以是斷見的過失。有外道之人說：『我沒有這些過失。』他的意思是怎樣呢？引用上面的偈頌原文說：『諸法若有實體，就不是常，也不是斷。』論者問道：『為什麼會這樣呢？』外道之人又引用論偈回答說：
『生起和滅盡是相續的，由果和因所導致；因滅而果生起，不是斷滅，也不是常。』
解釋：外道之人的意思是說，因為因開始滅的時候有果生起，所以不是斷滅；果開始生起的時候有因滅，所以不是常。也像經書所說，五陰是無常、苦、空、無我的，但不是斷滅。因為這個緣故，因和果不是斷，也不是常。論者說：『如果像你這樣說，意義就不相應了。前滅後生，現在來說明其中的過失。』如論偈所說：
『這生起和滅盡的相續，是由因和果導致的；因滅而果生起，要麼是斷滅，要麼是常。』
解釋：這裡指的是因滅了之後不再生起，就會墮入斷滅的過失。已經滅了的東西不會再生起，譬如燒焦的種子。勝論派（Vaisheshika）等人對論者說：『就像那部論中的偈頌所說：如果事物從因緣生起，這個果既不即是因緣，也不離開那個因緣，不是斷滅，也不是常。』這指的是論者先前想要得到的，現在又說成是過失，是不對的。論者說：『這種說法不好。』為什麼呢？這首偈頌是在世俗諦中說不斷不常，不是在第一義諦中。為什麼呢？在第一義諦中，一切法沒有斷和常的過失。數論派（Samkhya）的人說：『因轉變為果，保持不變。』（僧佉人：Samkhya，古印度哲學流派，認為「神我」和「自性」是宇宙的本源；鞞世師：Vaisheshika，古印度哲學流派，重視邏輯和認識論；五陰：Skandha，佛教術語，指色、受、想、行、識五種構成要素）
【English Translation】 English version: Other Birth: Where does one come to be born now?
Explanation: As such, the non-arising (non-appearance) has already been extensively explained before. This refers to the ultimate non-arising, because formation and destruction have no substance. Your meaning of the fundamental cause cannot be established. If you want to obtain something with substance in the ultimate truth, now I should point out your fault. As the verse in the treatise says:
'If all dharmas have substance, then one will fall into the views of annihilationism and eternalism; one should know that the dharma that is received is either permanent or impermanent.'
Explanation: Why is this so? Because these dharmas are either permanent or impermanent. Why? Because what is permanent does not decay, so it is the fault of eternalism; what is impermanent decays, so it is the fault of annihilationism. Some non-Buddhist say: 'I do not have these faults.' What is his meaning? Quoting the original verse above, he says: 'If all dharmas have substance, then they are neither permanent nor annihilated.' The debater asks: 'Why is this so?' The non-Buddhist again quotes the verse in the treatise and answers:
'Arising and ceasing are continuous, caused by the result and the cause; when the cause ceases, the result arises, it is neither annihilated nor permanent.'
Explanation: The non-Buddhist means that because when the cause begins to cease, the result arises, so it is not annihilated; when the result begins to arise, the cause ceases, so it is not permanent. It is also like what the sutras say, the five skandhas (Skandha) are impermanent, suffering, empty, and without self, but they are not annihilated. Because of this reason, the cause and the result are neither annihilated nor permanent. The debater says: 'If you say it like this, the meaning is not consistent. The former ceases and the latter arises, now I will explain the faults in it.' As the verse in the treatise says:
'This continuity of arising and ceasing is caused by the cause and the result; when the cause ceases, the result arises, it is either annihilated or permanent.'
Explanation: This refers to the fact that after the cause ceases, it no longer arises, and one will fall into the fault of annihilation. What has already ceased will not arise again, like a charred seed. The Vaisheshika (Vaisheshika) and others say to the debater: 'Like the verse in that treatise says: If things arise from conditions, this result is neither identical to the conditions nor separate from those conditions, it is neither annihilated nor permanent.' This refers to what the debater wanted to obtain earlier, but now says is a fault, which is not right. The debater says: 'This statement is not good.' Why? This verse speaks of non-annihilation and non-permanence in conventional truth, not in ultimate truth. Why? In ultimate truth, all dharmas have no faults of annihilation and permanence. The Samkhya (Samkhya) says: 'The cause transforms into the result, remaining unchanged.'
果故得說有體無斷常過。論者言。是義不然。汝轉變無驗。不令人解。轉變義者。先已遮故。汝今復起轉變分別者。今更說驗。若物不可變者。終無有變。何以故。不可變故。譬如兔角。複次若諸體有自體者。義不應爾。其過如論偈說。
先有自體者 后無則不然 涅槃時便斷 即有斷滅過
釋曰。今現見此體有起有滅。是故諸體無自體。所以者何。起滅法故。此義先已說。複次若諸體先有自體者。阿羅漢心心數法。后時更不生故。即斷滅過。此過汝不能避。若汝意言涅槃時是斷者。亦從是斷未涅槃前諸有相續時。我何有斷滅過。而謂相續無斷過者。汝不善說。我前說涅槃時斷者。正遮汝言。未入涅槃前諸有相續。如前言涅槃時便斷者。此已令解是斷見過故。若后時是斷者。障于解脫。何故爾耶。由此斷見不得解脫故。如是答汝。汝心猶不足者。今當復聽。此現在有末後命終時。是名死有。未來有中初受生心者。是名初有。此中義意。如論偈說。
死有者是滅 取初有不然 死有未滅時 取初有不然
釋曰。此中說驗。第一義中死有是滅者。不取未來有。是滅故是死有故。譬如阿羅漢死有。複次死有名過去有。初有名現在有。若死有滅次起初有者。是則無因。若言此死有未滅時能取
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
因為果和原因的緣故，才說有體（實體，dharma）是無斷無常的過失。論者說：『這個道理不對。』你說的轉變沒有證據，不能讓人理解。轉變的道理，先前已經遮止過了。你現在又重新提出轉變的分別。現在再說證據。如果事物是不可變的，那麼終究不會有變化。為什麼呢？因為它是不可變的。比如兔角。再次，如果諸體（實體，dharma）有自體（自性，svabhava）的話，道理上不應該這樣。其中的過失就像論偈所說：
『先有自體者，后無則不然，涅槃時便斷，即有斷滅過。』
解釋：現在我們親眼看到此體有生起有滅亡。因此，諸體沒有自體。為什麼呢？因為是生滅法。這個道理先前已經說過了。再次，如果諸體先前有自體的話，阿羅漢的心和心所法，後來不再生起，就有了斷滅的過失。這個過失你無法避免。如果你認為涅槃時是斷滅的話，也是從這個斷滅開始的，在未涅槃之前，諸有相續的時候，我怎麼會有斷滅的過失呢？而說相續沒有斷滅的過失，你說的不好。我先前說涅槃時斷滅，正是爲了遮止你說未入涅槃之前諸有相續。像前面說的涅槃時便斷滅，這已經讓人理解是斷滅的過失了。如果後來是斷滅的話，就會障礙解脫。為什麼呢？因為有這種斷滅見，就不能得到解脫。這樣回答你，你心裡還是不滿足的話，現在再聽我說。現在有的末後命終時，這叫做死有（cyuti-bhava）。未來有中最初受生的心，這叫做初有（pratisamdhi-bhava）。其中的意義，就像論偈所說：
『死有者是滅，取初有不然，死有未滅時，取初有不然。』
解釋：這裡說的是證據。第一義中，死有是滅亡的，不能取未來有。因為是滅亡的，因為是死有，比如阿羅漢的死有。再次，死有是過去有，初有是現在有。如果死有滅亡之後，接著生起初有，那就是沒有原因。如果說這個死有未滅亡的時候，能夠取……
【English Translation】 English version:
It is said that the entities (dharma) are without cessation and permanence due to cause and effect. The debater says: 'This meaning is not right.' Your transformation has no proof and does not make people understand. The meaning of transformation has already been refuted. Now you raise the distinction of transformation again. Now I will give more proof. If things are immutable, then there will be no change in the end. Why? Because they are immutable. For example, a rabbit's horn. Furthermore, if the entities (dharma) have self-nature (svabhava), then it should not be so. The fault is as the verse in the treatise says:
'If there is self-nature first, then it is not right if there is none later. At the time of Nirvana, it will be cut off, and there will be the fault of annihilation.'
Explanation: Now we see that this entity has arising and ceasing. Therefore, the entities have no self-nature. Why? Because it is subject to arising and ceasing. This meaning has already been explained. Furthermore, if the entities had self-nature before, then the mind and mental functions of an Arhat would not arise again later, and there would be the fault of annihilation. You cannot avoid this fault. If you mean that it is annihilation at the time of Nirvana, then it is from this annihilation that, before entering Nirvana, when the existences continue, how can I have the fault of annihilation? And to say that the continuation has no fault of annihilation is not well said by you. My previous statement that it is annihilation at the time of Nirvana is precisely to refute your statement that the existences continue before entering Nirvana. As said before, it is cut off at the time of Nirvana, which has already made people understand the fault of annihilation. If it is annihilation later, it will hinder liberation. Why? Because with this view of annihilation, one cannot attain liberation. If you are still not satisfied with this answer, then listen to me again. The last moment of life that exists now is called the dying existence (cyuti-bhava). The first mind that arises in the future existence is called the initial existence (pratisamdhi-bhava). The meaning of this is as the verse in the treatise says:
'The dying existence is cessation, it is not right to take the initial existence. When the dying existence has not ceased, it is not right to take the initial existence.'
Explanation: This speaks of proof. In the ultimate sense, the dying existence is cessation, and it cannot take the future existence. Because it is cessation, because it is the dying existence, like the dying existence of an Arhat. Furthermore, the dying existence is the past existence, and the initial existence is the present existence. If the initial existence arises after the dying existence ceases, then there is no cause. If it is said that this dying existence can take...
初有。是有故。得無過者。此中說驗。死有未滅者不能取。初有未滅故。譬如現在有。外人復言死有欲滅。能取初有。論者言。亦不善說其過如論偈說。
是死有滅時 能生初有者 滅時是一有 生時是異有
釋曰。此謂滅時生時。二有各異故。云何能取耶。外人答言。如彼所說。有相續而體異者。我亦如是。論者言。提婆達多死有不取。提婆達多初有有異故。譬如耶若達多死有。又復汝謂已滅未滅滅時取初有者不然。如上二有過。又復汝謂若滅未現前能取初有者。同前二有過。如是生時及已生取初有者。亦不然。還如前過。以是故。如論偈說。
滅時及生時 取初有不然 而此滅陰者 后復還生耶
釋曰。此謂外人不欲得已滅之陰還復重生。如一人一時有二自體者無也。若謂初有滅時即後有生者。今應隨在何陰中死。即於此陰中生。不應余陰中生。如是死有滅已。能取初有者不成。已令信解死有滅時能取初有者亦不成。以是故。已滅及滅時俱不成如我所說道理。死時諸陰滅已。還用此陰相續生者。亦不然。其過如論偈說。
如是三時中 有相續不然 若無三時者 何有有相續
釋曰。此謂死有續生初有者不然。相續不斷不常。語者是世諦非第一義諦。是故我所立
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 最初的有（bhava，存在），是因為有（hetu，因）的緣故。如果這樣，難道沒有過失嗎？這裡說明了驗證。死有（cuti-bhava，死亡時的存在狀態）未滅時，不能取（grahaṇa，接受、獲得）初有（upapatti-bhava，投生時的存在狀態）。因為初有未滅的緣故，譬如現在的有。外人又說，死有將要滅時，能取初有。論者說，這樣說也不好，它的過失如論偈所說：
『是死有滅時，能生初有者，滅時是一有，生時是異有。』
解釋說，這指的是滅時和生時，二者各有不同，怎麼能取呢？外人回答說，如你們所說，有相續而體性不同的情況，我也是這樣。論者說，提婆達多（Devadatta）的死有不能取提婆達多的初有，因為二者有差異。譬如耶若達多（Yajñadatta）的死有。又，你們說已滅或未滅，在滅時取初有，這是不對的，如上面所說的兩種過失。又，你們說如果滅了但未現前，能取初有，也和前面的兩種過失相同。像這樣，生時以及已生取初有，也是不對的，還是和前面的過失一樣。因此，如論偈所說：
『滅時及生時，取初有不然，而此滅陰者，后復還生耶？』
解釋說，這是說外人不希望已滅的陰（skandha，蘊）還復重生。就像一個人一時有二個自體（ātman，自我）是不可能的。如果說初有滅時，後有立即產生，那麼現在應該隨在哪個陰中死去，就在這個陰中出生，不應該在其他的陰中出生。像這樣，死有滅已，能取初有的說法是不成立的。已經令信解死有滅時能取初有的說法也是不成立的。因此，已滅和滅時都不能成立，如我所說的道理。死時諸陰滅已，還用此陰相續而生，也是不對的，它的過失如論偈所說：
『如是三時中，有相續不然，若無三時者，何有有相續？』
解釋說，這是說死有續生初有是不對的。相續不斷，但也不是常恒不變的。這樣說是世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，世俗諦），不是第一義諦（paramārtha-satya，勝義諦）。所以我的立論是正確的。
【English Translation】 English version Initially, there is 'bhava' (existence) because of 'hetu' (cause). If so, is there no fault? Here, the verification is explained. When 'cuti-bhava' (the existence at the moment of death) has not ceased, it cannot 'grahaṇa' (take, receive, obtain) 'upapatti-bhava' (the existence at the moment of rebirth). Because the initial 'bhava' has not ceased, it is like the present existence. The outsider further says that when 'cuti-bhava' is about to cease, it can take the initial 'bhava'. The debater says that this is not well said either; its fault is as stated in the verse:
'When 'cuti-bhava' ceases, one who can generate 'upapatti-bhava', at the time of cessation it is one 'bhava', at the time of generation it is a different 'bhava'.'
The explanation says that this refers to the time of cessation and the time of generation; the two are different, so how can it be taken? The outsider replies, 'As you say, there is continuity but the nature is different; I am also like that.' The debater says, 'The 'cuti-bhava' of Devadatta (提婆達多) does not take the initial 'bhava' of Devadatta, because the two are different. For example, the 'cuti-bhava' of Yajñadatta (耶若達多).' Furthermore, you say that when it has ceased or has not ceased, at the time of cessation, the initial 'bhava' is taken; this is not correct, as in the two faults mentioned above. Also, you say that if it has ceased but has not appeared, it can take the initial 'bhava'; this is the same as the previous two faults. Like this, at the time of generation and after generation, taking the initial 'bhava' is also not correct; it is still the same as the previous fault. Therefore, as stated in the verse:
'At the time of cessation and at the time of generation, taking the initial 'bhava' is not correct; and will this ceased 'skandha' (陰, aggregate) be reborn again later?'
The explanation says that this means the outsider does not want the ceased 'skandha' to be reborn again. Just as it is impossible for one person to have two 'ātman' (自體, self) at one time. If it is said that when the initial 'bhava' ceases, the subsequent 'bhava' immediately arises, then now, wherever one dies in which 'skandha', one should be born in that 'skandha', and should not be born in other 'skandhas'. Like this, the statement that after 'cuti-bhava' has ceased, it can take the initial 'bhava' is not established. The statement that has already led to the belief that 'cuti-bhava' can take the initial 'bhava' at the time of cessation is also not established. Therefore, neither the ceased nor the time of cessation can be established, as in the principle I have stated. It is also not correct that after the 'skandhas' have ceased at the time of death, they are still used to continue and be born; its fault is as stated in the verse:
'In these three times, there is no continuity; if there are no three times, how can there be continuity?'
The explanation says that this means it is not correct for 'cuti-bhava' to continue and generate the initial 'bhava'. Continuity is unbroken, but it is not constant and unchanging. Saying this is 'saṃvṛti-satya' (世俗諦, conventional truth), not 'paramārtha-satya' (第一義諦, ultimate truth). Therefore, my proposition is correct.
者不破。以是故。如品初外人說有如是時為成壞因者。今廣說此因過故。立時不成。以成壞無自性。令物信解是品義意。是故此下引經顯成。如般若中說。佛告極勇猛。色不死不生。受想行識不死不生。若色受想行識無死無生。是名般若波羅蜜。
釋觀成壞品竟。
般若燈論釋卷第十二 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 般若燈論釋
般若燈論釋卷第十三
偈本龍樹菩薩 釋論分別明菩薩
大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅譯
觀如來品第二十二
釋曰。今此品者亦為遮空所對治。令決定解第一義諦如來身故說。
修多羅人及鞞世師等言。有自體色等諸體是體故譬如如來。何等是如來。謂金剛三昧解脫道同起無間第十六剎那心。彼差別門初起剎那即名為智。此智是第一義諦如來智。所依陰亦名如來。論者言。若依止世諦智諸體及如來有自性。汝欲得取此成我義。今依第一義諦觀如來。若此智是陰自體者。已攝入諸陰中。今遮如來。亦遮彼智。如論偈說。
非陰不離陰 陰如來互無 非如來有陰 何等是如來
釋曰。陰者謂積聚義。陰非如來者。如來自體非是陰故。此中說驗。第一義中陰非如來。陰是起盡法故。譬如凡夫諸陰又如外四大等。
如是以作故為因者。當廣說驗。複次諸陰非如來。已遮此陰起法。亦遮實法。及遮色等陰故。複次今將智為一門別遮第一義中智非如來。是起盡法故。是智故。譬如凡夫智。諸外道等謂陰外有如來以此方便成立於我今答此故。若離陰外有如來者。無驗可令信解。如是離陰有如來者不然。互無者。謂如來中無陰陰中無如來。如來中無陰者。譬如雪山中無藥。不得言有藥。陰中無如來者。譬如林中無師子。不得言有師子。非如來有陰者。如具足財者名為有財。不以不具足者名為有財。如是以五種觀察如來不成。如所說觀察方便時無有如來。譬如收賊多獲眾人謂言是賊。及其撿驗還是好人無有實賊。如是離陰之外何等是丈夫。何等是自在。汝所說如來不成。所說不成故亦闕于譬喻。譬喻闕故。是立義有過。修多羅人復言。因陰故假設名如來。我等所說無過。論者言。是義不然。汝所說者則為有過。如論偈說。
因陰有如來 則無有自體 若無自體者 云何因他有
釋曰。此謂有自體者得如是過應作是知如來無自體。此中說驗。于第一義中如來無自體。以假設故。譬如旋火輪。無實故。譬如瓶。阿毗曇人言。第一義中瓶有實體。可識故。譬如色。論者言。瓶等是實者。亦不成無有。譬喻故。然瓶及水等是世諦
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果像這樣以『作為』為因而提問，應當廣泛地說明驗證。再者，諸陰（skandha，蘊）不是如來，已經遮止了此陰生起之法，也遮止了實法，以及遮止色等陰。再者，現在將智慧作為一個方面，特別遮止第一義諦中智慧不是如來，因為是生起和消滅之法。因為是智慧，譬如凡夫的智慧。諸外道等認為陰之外有如來，用這種方便來成立『我』，現在回答這個。如果離開陰之外有如來，沒有驗證可以令人信服理解。像這樣離開陰有如來是不成立的。互相沒有，是指如來中沒有陰，陰中沒有如來。如來中沒有陰，譬如雪山中沒有藥，不能說有藥。陰中沒有如來，譬如森林中沒有獅子，不能說有獅子。不是如來有陰，如具足財富的人名為有財，不以不具足的人名為有財。像這樣以五種方式觀察如來不能成立。如所說的觀察方便時沒有如來。譬如抓捕盜賊，抓到很多，眾人說這是盜賊，等到檢查驗證，還是好人，沒有真正的盜賊。像這樣離開陰之外，什麼才是丈夫？什麼才是自在？你所說的如來不能成立。所說不能成立，所以也缺少譬喻。譬喻缺少，這是立義的過失。修多羅（sutra，經）的人又說，因為陰的緣故，假設名為如來。我們所說的沒有過失。論者說，這個道理不成立。你所說的就是有過失。如論偈說： 『因陰有如來，則無有自體，若無自體者，云何因他有。』 解釋說：這是說有自體的人才有這樣的過失，應當知道如來沒有自體。這裡說驗證。在第一義諦中，如來沒有自體，因為是假設的緣故。譬如旋轉的火輪。因為沒有實體，譬如瓶子。阿毗曇（Abhidharma，論藏）的人說，第一義諦中瓶子有實體，可以被認識的緣故，譬如色。論者說，瓶子等是真實的，也不成立，因為沒有譬喻。然而瓶子和水等是世俗諦。
【English Translation】 English version: If it is asked with 'doing' as the cause, then a broad explanation and verification should be given. Furthermore, the skandhas (aggregates) are not the Tathagata (the thus-gone one), having already refuted the arising of these skandhas, also refuting real entities, and also refuting the skandhas such as form. Furthermore, now taking wisdom as one aspect, specifically refuting that wisdom in the ultimate sense is not the Tathagata, because it is a dharma (phenomenon) of arising and ceasing. Because it is wisdom, like the wisdom of ordinary people. Those of other paths believe that there is a Tathagata outside the skandhas, using this means to establish 'self'; now answering this. If there is a Tathagata outside the skandhas, there is no verification that can make people believe and understand. Thus, it is not established that there is a Tathagata apart from the skandhas. 'Mutual absence' means that there are no skandhas in the Tathagata, and no Tathagata in the skandhas. That there are no skandhas in the Tathagata is like there being no medicine in the Himalayas; one cannot say there is medicine. That there is no Tathagata in the skandhas is like there being no lion in the forest; one cannot say there is a lion. It is not that the Tathagata possesses skandhas, like one who is fully endowed with wealth is called wealthy, not that one who is not fully endowed is called wealthy. Thus, the Tathagata cannot be established by observing in these five ways. As said, there is no Tathagata when observing with expedient means. It is like capturing thieves, catching many, and everyone saying they are thieves, but upon inspection and verification, they are still good people, with no real thieves. Thus, apart from the skandhas, what is a 'man'? What is 'self-mastery'? What you say about the Tathagata is not established. Because what is said is not established, the analogy is also lacking. Because the analogy is lacking, there is a fault in establishing the meaning. Those of the sutras (discourses) again say that because of the skandhas, the name 'Tathagata' is assumed. What we say has no fault. The debater says, this reasoning is not established. What you say is faulty. As the verse in the treatise says: 『Because of the skandhas, there is a Tathagata, then there is no self-nature; if there is no self-nature, how can it exist because of another?』 The explanation says: This means that only those with self-nature have such a fault; it should be known that the Tathagata has no self-nature. Here it speaks of verification. In the ultimate sense, the Tathagata has no self-nature, because it is assumed. Like a rotating fire wheel. Because it has no substance, like a pot. Those of the Abhidharma (doctrines) say that in the ultimate sense, a pot has substance, because it can be recognized, like form. The debater says, that pots and the like are real is also not established, because there is no analogy. However, pots and water are conventional truths.
中有色者。第一義中無實。何以故。若法分別無者是世諦。乃至最後不無者亦是世諦。阿毗曇人復言。如五陰是假設。如來亦是假設。而言如來自體是作者以如是解成立。如來無自體者。反成我義。何以故。諸陰是作故。若言以他為緣有如來起者。如是成立。亦無譬喻可為譬喻。如是一切以他為緣者。悉有自體。亦如火輪色等是無分別眼識境界故。如是一切以他為緣者皆有自體。我宗立義如是。論者言。火于空中上下遍轉而無輪體。以輪體空而為喻者不然。火等有起。先已遮故。如是實法及眼識等諸識色等境界。先皆已遮。如眼乃至色等。一切法亦如是遮故。若待因緣而起者。有自體義不成。何以故。如論偈說。
法從他緣起 有我者不然 若無有我者 云何有如來
釋曰。此謂以他為緣者。是假設故。譬如幻人。若如來無自體者。何能成立諸體有自體。譬喻以如是意。先所譬喻則為有過。複次汝言如來有自體故。一切諸體得有自體者。是亦不然。外人言。雖無一物可為如來。而如來是有我喻得成。無如上過。論者言。是義不然。何以故。如論偈說。
若無有自體 云何有他體 若離自他體 何等是如來
釋曰。此謂畢竟無有如來。若言自體他體之外別有如來體者。第一義中不成汝
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：在勝義諦（Paramārtha，最高真理）中，有色法（rūpa，物質現象）存在嗎？ 答：在勝義諦中，色法並非真實存在。為什麼呢？因為如果某種法（dharma，事物、現象）是分別假立的，那就是世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理），乃至最後不認為是『無』的法，也仍然是世俗諦。 阿毗曇（Abhidharma，論藏）學者又說，例如五蘊（pañca-skandha，構成個體的五種要素：色、受、想、行、識）是假立的，如來（Tathāgata，佛）也是假立的。他們認為，如來的自性（svabhāva，自身本性）是造作者，並以此來解釋和成立如來沒有自性的觀點。如果說如來沒有自性，反而會落入『我』（ātman，靈魂、自我）的觀念。為什麼呢？因為諸陰（skandha，蘊）是造作的。如果說因為其他因緣（hetu-pratyaya，原因和條件）而有如來的生起，那麼這種說法也無法成立，而且找不到合適的譬喻來作比喻。像這樣，一切以他為緣（paratantra，依賴他者）的事物，都具有自性。又如火輪、顏色等，是無分別眼識（nirvikalpa-cakṣur-vijñāna，沒有分別的眼識）的境界，像這樣，一切以他為緣的事物都具有自性。我宗（svatantra，自立宗）的立義就是這樣。 論者反駁說：火在空中上下旋轉，卻沒有輪子的實體，用輪子的空性來作比喻是不對的。因為火等事物的生起，先前已經被遮破了。像這樣，實法（vastu-dharma，真實存在的法）以及眼識等諸識、顏色等境界，先前都已經遮破了。如眼乃至色等，一切法也都是這樣被遮破的。如果依賴因緣而生起的事物，那麼具有自性的觀點就不能成立。為什麼呢？正如論偈所說： 『法從他緣起，有我者不然，若無有我者，云何有如來？』 解釋：這指的是以他為緣的事物是假立的，譬如幻化的人。如果如來沒有自性，又怎麼能成立諸體（kaya，身體）具有自性呢？用這樣的譬喻，先前所作的譬喻就有了過失。 其次，你說如來有自性，所以一切諸體才能有自性，這也是不對的。 外人說：雖然沒有一物可以等同於如來，但是用『如來是有我』來作比喻是可以成立的，沒有上述的過失。 論者反駁說：這種說法不對。為什麼呢？正如論偈所說： 『若無有自體，云何有他體，若離自他體，何等是如來？』 解釋：這指的是畢竟沒有如來。如果說在自體和他體（paratman，他者之體）之外，另有如來的體存在，那麼在勝義諦中，你的觀點就不能成立。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: In the ultimate sense (Paramārtha), is there form (rūpa)? Answer: In the ultimate sense, form does not truly exist. Why? Because if a dharma (thing, phenomenon) is conceptually constructed, that is conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), and even the last dharma that is not considered 'non-existent' is still conventional truth. The Abhidharma scholars further say that, for example, the five aggregates (pañca-skandha: form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness) are conceptual constructs, and the Tathāgata (Buddha) is also a conceptual construct. They believe that the self-nature (svabhāva) of the Tathāgata is the creator, and they use this to explain and establish the view that the Tathāgata has no self-nature. If it is said that the Tathāgata has no self-nature, it would instead fall into the concept of 'self' (ātman). Why? Because the aggregates (skandha) are created. If it is said that the arising of the Tathāgata is due to other causes and conditions (hetu-pratyaya), then this statement cannot be established, and no suitable analogy can be found. Like this, everything that is dependent on others (paratantra) has self-nature. Furthermore, like fire wheels, colors, etc., which are the objects of non-conceptual eye consciousness (nirvikalpa-cakṣur-vijñāna), like this, everything that is dependent on others has self-nature. This is how my school (svatantra) establishes its doctrine. The debater refutes: Fire rotates up and down in the air, but there is no wheel entity. It is not right to use the emptiness of the wheel entity as an analogy. Because the arising of things like fire has already been refuted. Like this, real dharmas (vastu-dharma), as well as consciousnesses such as eye consciousness, and objects such as colors, have already been refuted. Like the eye and even form, all dharmas are refuted in this way. If things arise dependent on causes and conditions, then the view of having self-nature cannot be established. Why? As the verse in the treatise says: 'If dharmas arise from other causes, it is not right to have a self. If there is no self, how can there be a Tathāgata?' Explanation: This refers to things that are dependent on others being conceptual constructs, like an illusionary person. If the Tathāgata has no self-nature, how can it be established that the aggregates (kaya) have self-nature? Using such an analogy, the previous analogy has a fault. Furthermore, you say that the Tathāgata has self-nature, so all aggregates can have self-nature. This is also not right. The outsider says: Although there is nothing that can be equated to the Tathāgata, it can be established by using 'the Tathāgata has a self' as an analogy, without the above fault. The debater refutes: This statement is not right. Why? As the verse in the treatise says: 'If there is no self-nature, how can there be other-nature? If there is no self-nature or other-nature, what is the Tathāgata?' Explanation: This refers to the fact that there is ultimately no Tathāgata. If it is said that there is a Tathāgata entity separate from self-nature and other-nature (paratman), then in the ultimate sense, your view cannot be established.
非無過。犢子部言。因陰施設有如來。不可言與陰一異。何以故。非陰自體故不一。非無陰自體故不異。若如是說如來者其義得成。論者言。為第一義如來取陰施設耶。為非第一義如來取陰施設耶。彼若取陰為如來者。取則無義。若非如來者。今問其義。如論偈說。
彼未取陰前 已有非如來 而今取陰故 始是如來耶
釋曰。此謂未取陰前已有我者。外人意言如此。論者言。若爾者如論偈說。
彼未取陰時 則無有如來 未取無自體 云何后取陰
釋曰。此謂離取如來不成。何以故。如來無自體故。如外人所執我無陰體我后時取如來陰為如來。論者言。今遮此我不取如來陰我非如來故。譬如余物不取如來陰為如來。若如來取陰已后為如來者。汝等欲得爾耶。如上偈說過。今問如來者。為是陰體。為非陰體。若是陰體。已如前答。若異陰體。則無如來。何以故。非陰自體故。譬如兔角。亦如前說。第一義如來未起已前非如來不取如來陰未起已前無如來故。譬如非如來。如論偈說。
猶如未有取 不得名為取 若離於彼取 無處有如來
釋曰。此謂離取無如來體。今當說驗。五陰中無丈夫。是作故。譬如瓶。如是從緣起法無丈夫。是作故。譬如瓶。無常法無丈夫。是
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 非無過。犢子部（Vatsiputriya，佛教部派之一）說：『因為五陰（Skandha，構成個體存在的五種要素：色、受、想、行、識）的施設而有如來（Tathagata，佛陀的稱號之一），不能說如來與五陰是一或異。』為什麼呢？因為如來不是五陰的自體，所以不是一；因為如來不是沒有五陰的自體，所以不是異。如果這樣說如來，那麼這個道理才能成立。 論者說：『是第一義（Paramartha，勝義諦，最高真理）的如來取五陰施設呢？還是非第一義的如來取五陰施設呢？』如果他們認為取五陰就是如來，那麼『取』就沒有意義。如果認為不是如來，現在要問他們這個道理。就像論偈所說： 『在未取五陰之前，已經有非如來；而現在因為取五陰的緣故，才開始是如來嗎？』 解釋說：這裡是指在未取五陰之前已經有『我』（Atman，一種常恒不變的實體）的說法，外道（Tirthika，指佛教以外的其他宗教或哲學派別）的意思是這樣的。論者說：『如果是這樣，就像論偈所說：』 『在未取五陰時，就沒有如來；未取五陰就沒有自體，怎麼能在之後取五陰呢？』 解釋說：這裡是指離開取五陰，如來就不能成立。為什麼呢？因為如來沒有自體的緣故。就像外道所執著的『我』，沒有五陰的自體，『我』在之後取如來的五陰作為如來。論者說：現在遮止這種說法，『我』不取如來的五陰，因為『我』不是如來。譬如其他事物不取如來的五陰作為如來。如果如來取五陰之後才成為如來，你們想要這樣嗎？就像上面的偈頌所說。現在問如來，是五陰的自體，還是不是五陰的自體？如果是五陰的自體，已經像前面回答的那樣。如果與五陰的自體相異，那麼就沒有如來。為什麼呢？因為如來不是五陰的自體。譬如兔角。也像前面所說，第一義的如來在未生起之前不是如來，不取如來的五陰，在未生起之前沒有如來。譬如非如來。就像論偈所說： 『猶如未有取，不得名為取；若離於彼取，無處有如來。』 解釋說：這裡是指離開取五陰就沒有如來的體性。現在應當說驗證。五陰中沒有丈夫（Purusha，一種精神性的自我或靈魂），因為是造作的，譬如瓶子。像這樣，從因緣生起的法沒有丈夫，因為是造作的，譬如瓶子。無常的法沒有丈夫，是...
【English Translation】 English version: Non-erroneous. The Vatsiputriya (a Buddhist school) says: 'Because of the establishment of the five Skandhas (aggregates of existence: form, feeling, perception, mental formations, consciousness), there is a Tathagata (one of the titles of the Buddha). It cannot be said that the Tathagata and the five Skandhas are the same or different.' Why? Because the Tathagata is not the self-nature of the five Skandhas, so they are not the same; because the Tathagata is not without the self-nature of the five Skandhas, so they are not different. If the Tathagata is spoken of in this way, then this reasoning can be established. The debater says: 'Does the Tathagata of the highest truth (Paramartha, ultimate reality) take the five Skandhas as establishment? Or does the non-highest truth Tathagata take the five Skandhas as establishment?' If they consider taking the five Skandhas to be the Tathagata, then 'taking' has no meaning. If they consider it not to be the Tathagata, now we ask them this reasoning. It is like the verse in the treatise says: 'Before taking the five Skandhas, there was already a non-Tathagata; and now because of taking the five Skandhas, does it only now begin to be the Tathagata?' The explanation says: This refers to the statement that there is already an 'Atman' (a permanent, unchanging entity) before taking the five Skandhas. The Tirthikas (non-Buddhist schools) mean it this way. The debater says: 'If that is the case, it is like the verse in the treatise says:' 'When not taking the five Skandhas, then there is no Tathagata; without taking the five Skandhas, there is no self-nature, how can one take the five Skandhas later?' The explanation says: This refers to the fact that the Tathagata cannot be established without taking the five Skandhas. Why? Because the Tathagata has no self-nature. Like the 'Atman' clung to by the Tirthikas, without the self-nature of the five Skandhas, the 'Atman' later takes the Tathagata's five Skandhas as the Tathagata. The debater says: Now we refute this statement, the 'Atman' does not take the Tathagata's five Skandhas, because the 'Atman' is not the Tathagata. For example, other things do not take the Tathagata's five Skandhas as the Tathagata. If the Tathagata becomes the Tathagata after taking the five Skandhas, do you want this? It is like the verse above says. Now we ask the Tathagata, is it the self-nature of the five Skandhas, or is it not the self-nature of the five Skandhas? If it is the self-nature of the five Skandhas, it has already been answered as before. If it is different from the self-nature of the five Skandhas, then there is no Tathagata. Why? Because the Tathagata is not the self-nature of the five Skandhas. For example, a rabbit's horn. It is also as said before, the Tathagata of the highest truth is not the Tathagata before arising, does not take the Tathagata's five Skandhas, and there is no Tathagata before arising. For example, a non-Tathagata. It is like the verse in the treatise says: 'Just as there is no taking, it cannot be called taking; if apart from that taking, there is nowhere to have a Tathagata.' The explanation says: This refers to the fact that there is no nature of the Tathagata without taking the five Skandhas. Now we should say the verification. There is no Purusha (a spiritual self or soul) in the five Skandhas, because it is made, like a bottle. Like this, the Dharma arising from conditions has no Purusha, because it is made, like a bottle. Impermanent Dharma has no Purusha, is...
作故。譬如瓶。正智邪智疑智中無丈夫。是作故。譬如瓶。憂喜因中諦所攝中無丈夫。是作故。譬如瓶。如是諸因當廣說驗。犢子部復言。第一義中有如來。若言無者。佛所不記。如外道所執丈夫。如來即記言無。然未曾說無。如來若言無者。何緣復記。有人問言。死後無如來耶。佛亦不答。以是故有如來。論者言。如經中說。有一國王來問佛言。世尊。我有所疑。請問世尊。唯愿世尊。為我直答。不須廣說。身中我者為大為小。為長為短。色相方圓各似何等。為在一處。為遍身中。佛言。大王。王得自在。今還問王。大王宮中庵羅樹果作何氣味。形狀色相復似何等。王言。世尊。我所住宮無庵羅樹。云何問言氣味形色。佛言。大王。身中有我。王可問言大小長短。然此身中本無有我。云何令我答王所問。如是答者即是如來記于無我。多摩羅跋外道說言。第一義中有如來。取施設故。此謂若言無者。不于取上。而有施設。云何有取。謂取無上解脫熏修諸陰相續。故名如來。如經所說。佛之名者非父母作。乃至非諸天作。其義如是。複次云何名佛。謂最後得解脫時乃名為佛。以如是等故有如來。論者言。如上偈說。不即不離陰。陰中無如來。如來中無陰。非如來有陰。何等是如來。此謂如來於此第一義中畢竟不可得故。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『作故』（因緣和合而生）。譬如瓶子，『正智』（正確的智慧）、『邪智』（錯誤的智慧）、『疑智』（懷疑的智慧）中沒有『丈夫』（補特伽羅，一種靈魂的假設）。這是『作故』。譬如瓶子，『憂』（憂愁）、『喜』（喜悅）等『因』（原因）中，在『諦』（真理）所包含的範圍內，沒有『丈夫』。這是『作故』。譬如瓶子。像這樣，各種原因應當廣泛地說明和驗證。 『犢子部』（佛教部派之一）又說：在『第一義』（勝義諦，最高的真理）中有『如來』（佛陀）。如果說沒有，佛陀不會不作記錄。就像外道所執著的『丈夫』，如來就明確地說沒有。然而，佛陀從未說過『有』。如果如來說沒有如來，為何又要記錄？有人問：死後沒有如來嗎？佛陀也不回答。因此，可以認為有如來。 論者說：如經中所說，有一位國王來問佛陀：『世尊，我有些疑惑，想請問世尊。唯愿世尊為我直接回答，不需要詳細解釋。身中的「我」是大是小？是長是短？顏色形狀像什麼？是在身體的某一個部位，還是遍佈全身？』佛陀說：『大王，您現在可以自由地問我。現在我反問大王，大王宮中的庵羅樹果是什麼氣味？形狀顏色又像什麼？』國王說：『世尊，我所居住的宮殿中沒有庵羅樹，怎麼能問它的氣味和形狀顏色呢？』佛陀說：『大王，如果身中有「我」，您就可以問它的大小長短。然而，這身體中本來就沒有「我」，怎麼能讓我回答您的問題呢？』這樣的回答就是如來記錄了『無我』。 『多摩羅跋』外道說：在『第一義』中有『如來』，這是因為『取施設』（執取假立）的緣故。也就是說，如果說沒有如來，就不會在『取』（執取）之上進行『施設』（假立）。那麼，什麼是『取』呢？就是執取無上解脫所熏習的諸『陰』（五蘊）的相續，所以稱為『如來』。如經中所說，佛陀的名字不是父母所取，乃至不是諸天所取，其意義就是這樣。 再次，什麼叫做佛？就是在最後獲得解脫的時候才稱為佛。因為這些原因，所以有如來。 論者說：如上面的偈頌所說，不即是『陰』（五蘊），也不離『陰』，『陰』中沒有『如來』，『如來』中也沒有『陰』，不是『如來』擁有『陰』。那麼，什麼是『如來』呢？這就是說，『如來』在這個『第一義』中，畢竟是不可得的。
【English Translation】 English version 『Made』 (hetupratyaya, arising from conditions). For example, a pot. In 『correct wisdom』 (samyagjnana), 『incorrect wisdom』 (mithyajnana), and 『doubtful wisdom』 (vicikitsa-jnana), there is no 『person』 (purusha, a hypothetical soul). This is 『made』. For example, a pot. In 『sorrow』 (duhkha), 『joy』 (sukha), etc., within the scope of 『truth』 (satya), there is no 『person』. This is 『made』. For example, a pot. Thus, these various causes should be extensively explained and verified. The 『Vatsiputriya school』 (a Buddhist school) further says: In the 『ultimate meaning』 (paramartha-satya, the highest truth), there is 『Tathagata』 (Buddha). If it is said that there is none, the Buddha would not have failed to record it. Just like the 『person』 clung to by non-Buddhists, the Tathagata explicitly said there is none. However, the Buddha never said 『there is』. If the Tathagata said there is no Tathagata, why would he record it? Someone asked: Is there no Tathagata after death? The Buddha also did not answer. Therefore, it can be considered that there is a Tathagata. The debater says: As it is said in the sutra, a king came to ask the Buddha: 『Venerable One, I have some doubts and would like to ask the Venerable One. I only wish that the Venerable One would answer me directly, without needing to explain in detail. Is the 「self」 in the body large or small? Long or short? What does its color and shape resemble? Is it in a certain part of the body, or does it pervade the whole body?』 The Buddha said: 『Great King, you are now free to ask me. Now I ask the Great King in return, what is the taste of the Amra tree fruit in the Great King's palace? What does its shape and color resemble?』 The king said: 『Venerable One, there is no Amra tree in the palace where I live, how can I ask about its taste and shape and color?』 The Buddha said: 『Great King, if there is a 「self」 in the body, you can ask about its size and length. However, there is originally no 「self」 in this body, how can I answer your question?』 Such an answer is the Tathagata recording 『no-self』 (anatman). The non-Buddhist 『Tamraparniyas』 say: In the 『ultimate meaning』, there is 『Tathagata』, because of 『taking and establishing』 (grahana-prajnapana). That is to say, if it is said that there is no Tathagata, there would be no 『establishing』 (prajnapana) on 『taking』 (grahana). Then, what is 『taking』? It is taking the continuity of the 『skandhas』 (five aggregates) that are perfumed by unsurpassed liberation, hence it is called 『Tathagata』. As it is said in the sutra, the name of the Buddha is not made by parents, nor even by the gods, the meaning is like this. Again, what is called Buddha? It is only when one finally attains liberation that one is called Buddha. Because of these reasons, there is a Tathagata. The debater says: As the verse above says, it is neither identical to the 『skandhas』, nor separate from the 『skandhas』, there is no 『Tathagata』 in the 『skandhas』, and there are no 『skandhas』 in the 『Tathagata』, it is not that the 『Tathagata』 possesses the 『skandhas』. Then, what is 『Tathagata』? That is to say, the 『Tathagata』 is ultimately unattainable in this 『ultimate meaning』.
如論偈說。
一異無如來 五種求不得 云何當以取 施設有如來
釋曰。此謂第一義中有自體者。云何可施設耶。若可施設則非第一義中有自體者。若言如瓶。是假施設。欲得爾者。汝所立義。便為不成。如汝所言。以施設有如來者。此立因驗第一義中不成。亦與因義相違。云何相違。謂取施設而有瓶等。但是世諦中有故。非第一義。復有自部人謂論者言。彼向說偈。若無有諸取云何有如來者。為不善說。我今說言有取者取若無取者。亦無有取。譬如龜毛聚。云何名取。謂無漏解脫不共法等。以為五陰。有所任持。是故如所說因云何名取者。謂如來身此如來有故。我所立義得成。論者言。是義不然。何以故。如論偈說。
如來所取取 此取不可得 取及取者空 及一切種空
釋曰。此謂取無自體。無自體義先已令解。不復更說。一切種者。謂自體種他體種等見真實者。一切種門觀察之時。于第一義中不可施設。隨順世諦而有施設。云何施設。謂不可思議未曾有十力無畏不共等諸功德海熏修如來。為一切世間之所供養。中論者。因彼五陰作是施設。如經言。一人出世。多人利益多人安樂。以是義故名假施設。如佛言曰。我是眾生真善知識。一切眾生有生苦等令得解脫。又如佛言。應
知者我已知。應識者我已識。應修者我已修。阿含經中作如是說。我所立義不與相違如來。於世諦中作是施設。非第一義。外人復言。第一義中不欲得者。自違彼宗。論者言。若第一義中有如來令人信解者。汝不出驗。而亦不能破我所立。我非先受第一義故然後說遮。諸外道等甚可憐慜何以故。如經偈說。
十力無垢輪 一切三有日 無量眾所歸 普照無明闇
(眾所歸有本作言說光)。
此謂如眼病者不信有日。或有說言。如來無一切智。是人故。譬如餘人。復有說言。如來智者。非一切智。是智故。譬如凡夫智。復有說言。如來身者。非一切智所依止處。是身故。譬如凡夫身。論者言。是等所說非也。若第一義中如來無一切智而令信解。是人故。是凡夫智故。是凡夫身故。而為因者。此等因義咸皆不成。法身者。永離人故。智故。身故。諸有戲論故。三界所不攝故。是出世間無漏法聚故。名為法身。複次若更有人說言。如來無一切智。是作故。廣說如是。諸因者。如前所立與其過咎。若復有人作譬喻言。如來身者。非一切智所依止處。是尸故。譬如凡夫死屍。此喻過失亦同前遮。智門譬喻出因等。若言是能取及有所緣。亦以此過說之。複次汝言如來無一切智者。此有何義。為一切不知少
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 智者說：『我已經知曉。』應知曉的，我已經知曉。應修習的，我已經修習。《阿含經》（Agama Sutra）中這樣說。我所建立的義理不與如來（Tathagata）相違背。如來在世俗諦（conventional truth）中作這樣的施設，並非第一義諦（ultimate truth）。外道（outsiders）又說：『在第一義諦中不欲求得，是自相矛盾。』論者說：『如果第一義諦中有如來，能令人信解，你們就應該拿出證據，而你們也不能破斥我所立的觀點。我並非先接受第一義諦，然後才說遮止。』這些外道等甚是可憐，為什麼呢？如經中的偈頌所說： 『十力（ten powers）無垢輪，一切三有（three realms of existence）日，無量眾所歸，普照無明闇。』 （『眾所歸』有的版本作『言說光』） 這就像眼睛有病的人不相信有太陽。或者有人說：『如來沒有一切智（omniscience），因為他是人，』這就像其他人一樣。又有人說：『如來的智慧，不是一切智，因為是智慧，』這就像凡夫的智慧。又有人說：『如來的身體，不是一切智所依止之處，因為是身體，』這就像凡夫的身體。論者說：『這些說法都不對。』如果在第一義諦中，如來沒有一切智，而令人信解，是因為他是人，是因為他是凡夫的智慧，是因為他是凡夫的身體，而作為原因，這些原因的意義都不能成立。法身（Dharmakaya），永遠脫離了人，脫離了智慧，脫離了身體，脫離了各種戲論，不被三界所攝，是出世間的無漏法（untainted dharma）的聚集，所以名為法身。再次，如果有人說：『如來沒有一切智，因為他是造作的，』像這樣廣說，各種原因，就像前面所立的觀點一樣，有同樣的過失。如果有人作譬喻說：『如來的身體，不是一切智所依止之處，因為是屍體，』這就像凡夫的死屍。這個譬喻的過失也和前面所遮止的一樣。智慧之門的譬喻，出因等。如果說是能取和有所緣，也可以用這個過失來說明。再次，你們說如來沒有一切智，這是什麼意思？是說一切都不知道，還是少知道？
【English Translation】 English version: The wise one says: 'I have already known.' What should be known, I have already known. What should be cultivated, I have already cultivated. The Agama Sutra says this. The meaning I have established does not contradict the Tathagata (Tathagata). The Tathagata makes such provisions in conventional truth (conventional truth), not in ultimate truth (ultimate truth). Outsiders (outsiders) further say: 'Not wanting to attain in ultimate truth is self-contradictory.' The debater says: 'If there is a Tathagata in ultimate truth that can make people believe and understand, then you should produce evidence, but you cannot refute my established view. I did not first accept ultimate truth and then say prohibition.' These outsiders are very pitiful, why? As the verse in the sutra says: 'The ten powers (ten powers) are a flawless wheel, the sun of all three realms of existence (three realms of existence), the refuge of countless beings, illuminating the darkness of ignorance.' (Some versions of 'refuge of countless beings' say 'light of speech') This is like a person with diseased eyes not believing in the sun. Or someone says: 'The Tathagata does not have omniscience (omniscience) because he is a person,' just like other people. Someone else says: 'The wisdom of the Tathagata is not omniscience because it is wisdom,' just like the wisdom of ordinary people. Someone else says: 'The body of the Tathagata is not the place where omniscience resides because it is a body,' just like the body of ordinary people. The debater says: 'These statements are all wrong.' If, in ultimate truth, the Tathagata does not have omniscience, and it makes people believe and understand, because he is a person, because he is the wisdom of ordinary people, because he is the body of ordinary people, and as a reason, the meaning of these reasons cannot be established. The Dharmakaya (Dharmakaya) is forever free from people, free from wisdom, free from body, free from all kinds of playful discussions, not included in the three realms, and is a collection of untainted dharma (untainted dharma) that transcends the world, so it is called Dharmakaya. Again, if someone says: 'The Tathagata does not have omniscience because he is created,' speaking broadly like this, the various reasons are like the previously established view, with the same faults. If someone makes an analogy and says: 'The body of the Tathagata is not the place where omniscience resides because it is a corpse,' just like the corpse of an ordinary person. The fault of this analogy is also the same as the previous prohibition. The analogy of the gate of wisdom, the cause of emergence, etc. If it is said that it is the able taker and has something to rely on, this fault can also be used to explain it. Again, you say that the Tathagata does not have omniscience, what does this mean? Does it mean that he knows nothing, or knows little?
有所知耶。為一不知耶。若外人受初問者。即應問言。何故不知。若外人意謂不能知諸根境界。是故言不知者。論者言。此諸根等亦能有知。何以故。可知境界故。譬如自手等。若受后問者。汝先立義則為自破。何以故。汝先以人故為因者。豈有人一事不知耶。又復世間悉知故云何知耶。謂知如來有真解故。汝以凡夫等為喻者。是皆不然。世間凡夫亦少有所知故。複次如諸天等能知過去未來現在三界所攝及不攝等事。謂如來不知此事耶。若不知者。反成我義。云何成我義。謂汝天等以邪智所知故。與如來不同。又復以此智惡故名為無智耶。如汝所事大師等。為有一切智。為無一切智耶。若是一切智者。如來亦是一切智。若汝師無一切智而說如來無一切智者。如是之言不可信也。何以故。為汝師非一切智故。復有外道號聰慢者說言。如來無一切智。何以故。如來不記十四難故。又復說言。如來無一切智。何以故。如來不記孫陀利死故。又復說言。如來無一切智。何以故。如來不記旃遮女婆羅門作譭謗事故。又復說言。如來無一切智。何以故。如來不定記華氏城壞故。又復說言。如來無一切智。何以故。如來不知生死前際自障其無知故。又復說言。如來無一切智。何以故。如來不知提婆達多壞僧等事度出家故。是等不記不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『你有所知嗎？』或者『你一無所知嗎？』如果外道接受第一個問題，就應該反問：『為什麼一無所知？』如果外道認為不能瞭解諸根（indriya）的境界，所以說『一無所知』，那麼論者會說：『這些諸根等也能有所知。』為什麼呢？因為它們可以瞭解境界。譬如自己的手等。如果接受第二個問題，那麼你先前的立論就自相矛盾了。為什麼呢？你先前以人為原因，難道有人對一件事一無所知嗎？而且世間都知道，為什麼說『知』呢？因為知道如來（Tathagata）有真正的解脫。你用凡夫等來比喻，這完全不對。因為世間的凡夫也至少有所知。 再者，像諸天等能知道過去、未來、現在三界所包含和不包含的事，難道如來不知道這些事嗎？如果不知道，反而成就了我的觀點。如何成就我的觀點呢？因為你們的天等以邪惡的智慧所知，所以與如來不同。又或者因為這種智慧邪惡，所以被稱為無智嗎？像你所侍奉的大師等，是具有一切智，還是沒有一切智呢？如果是一切智，那麼如來也是一切智。如果你的老師沒有一切智，卻說如來沒有一切智，那麼這種說法是不可信的。為什麼呢？因為你的老師並非一切智。 又有外道號稱聰慢的人說，如來沒有一切智。為什麼呢？因為如來不記十四難（fourteen unanswerable questions）。又說，如來沒有一切智。為什麼呢？因為如來不記孫陀利（Sundari）的死。又說，如來沒有一切智。為什麼呢？因為如來不記旃遮女（Cinchi）婆羅門（Brahmin）的譭謗事件。又說，如來沒有一切智。為什麼呢？因為如來不確定地記述華氏城（Pataliputra）的毀滅。又說，如來沒有一切智。為什麼呢？因為如來不知道生死的前際，自己遮蔽了自己的無知。又說，如來沒有一切智。為什麼呢？因為如來不知道提婆達多（Devadatta）破壞僧團等事，就允許他出家。這些不記述不...
【English Translation】 English version 『Do you know something?』 or 『Do you know nothing?』 If the outsider accepts the first question, then one should ask in return: 『Why know nothing?』 If the outsider thinks that one cannot understand the realms of the indriyas (senses), and therefore says 『know nothing,』 then the debater will say: 『These indriyas, etc., can also know something.』 Why? Because they can understand the realms. For example, one's own hands, etc. If one accepts the second question, then your previous argument contradicts itself. Why? You previously used 『person』 as the cause; is there anyone who knows nothing about a single thing? Moreover, the world knows, so why say 『know』? Because they know that the Tathagata (Thus Come One) has true liberation. Your analogy using ordinary people, etc., is completely wrong. Because ordinary people in the world also know at least something. Furthermore, like the devas (gods), etc., who can know things included and not included in the past, future, and present three realms, does the Tathagata not know these things? If he does not know, it instead fulfills my view. How does it fulfill my view? Because your devas, etc., know through evil wisdom, so they are different from the Tathagata. Or is it because this wisdom is evil, so it is called ignorance? Like the masters, etc., whom you serve, do they have all-knowing wisdom, or do they not have all-knowing wisdom? If they have all-knowing wisdom, then the Tathagata also has all-knowing wisdom. If your teacher does not have all-knowing wisdom, but says that the Tathagata does not have all-knowing wisdom, then such a statement is not credible. Why? Because your teacher is not all-knowing. Moreover, there are outsiders called conceited fools who say that the Tathagata does not have all-knowing wisdom. Why? Because the Tathagata does not remember the fourteen unanswerable questions. They also say that the Tathagata does not have all-knowing wisdom. Why? Because the Tathagata does not remember the death of Sundari. They also say that the Tathagata does not have all-knowing wisdom. Why? Because the Tathagata does not remember the slanderous event of Cinchi the Brahmin. They also say that the Tathagata does not have all-knowing wisdom. Why? Because the Tathagata does not definitively remember the destruction of Pataliputra. They also say that the Tathagata does not have all-knowing wisdom. Why? Because the Tathagata does not know the beginning of samsara (cycle of rebirth), obscuring his own ignorance. They also say that the Tathagata does not have all-knowing wisdom. Why? Because the Tathagata did not know that Devadatta was destroying the Sangha (monastic community), and allowed him to leave home. These non-recollections do not...
知者。如來無一切智故。論者言。汝聰慢等虛妄所說立義出因及以譬喻。今與其過。汝何不說。尼干外道計有我人眾生壽命。汝何不說。鞞世師人計有實法。汝何不說。僧佉人計有自性。汝何不說。韋陀中所說丈夫如此等事。不能記不能說故。名為無一切智耶。為是等皆無故不記耶。又復汝言。總不知故名為不知者。此即是知。何等是總為一切諸法皆無自體而已。令物解故。佛涅槃后當來之世。諸弟子等亦以無自體義令眾生解。復有彌息伽外道言。佛家所說十二部經者。非一切智人所說。有作者故。譬如鞞世師等論。論者言。若有作者。汝出因義不成。何以故。見有可化眾生故。如來無功用。自然出言說。猶如天鼓。空中自鳴。如我法中作者受者皆無故。汝立有作者義。是因不成。汝違陀有作者誦習故。譬如鞞世師等論。汝所立因則非一向。若外人如是意韋陀文句無有作者。其義云何。作者時遠。不能憶故。論者言。是說不善。汝但說因。無有譬喻。又汝韋陀中言一力山中造。一力毗陀三摩山中造三摩毗陀。迦逋處(唐言白領地)造阿闥毗陀。云何言無作者耶。是故汝立宗義不成若言是了非作者此了義先已遮。汝立了義不能成就。何以故。文句是作法。如人受學次第。披讀文字章句。譬如僧佉論文句。複次汝文句是作
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 知者問：『如來沒有一切智慧嗎？』論者說：『你們這些自以為聰明而傲慢的人，虛妄地設立宗義，提出理由和譬喻，現在指出你們的過失，你們為什麼不說呢？尼干外道（Nigantha，耆那教）計執有我、人、眾生、壽命，你們為什麼不說？鞞世師（Vaisheshika，勝論派）計執有實法，你們為什麼不說？僧佉人（Samkhya，數論派）計執有自性，你們為什麼不說？《韋陀》（Veda，吠陀經）中所說的丈夫等等事情。』因為不能記憶，不能述說，所以被稱為沒有一切智慧嗎？還是因為這些事情都沒有，所以不記憶呢？而且你們說，因為總的來說不知道，所以被稱為不知道。這其實就是一種知道。什麼是總的來說呢？就是一切諸法都沒有自體而已。爲了讓眾生理解這個道理，佛陀涅槃后，未來的弟子們也會用沒有自體的道理來讓眾生理解。 又有彌息伽外道說：『佛家所說的十二部經，不是一切智慧的人所說的，因為有作者。』譬如鞞世師等的理論。論者說：『如果說有作者，你提出的理由就不成立。』為什麼呢？因為看見有可以被教化的眾生。如來沒有功用，自然而然地說出言語，就像天鼓一樣，在空中自己鳴響。正如我的佛法中，作者和受者都沒有，所以你設立有作者的宗義，這個理由是不成立的。你們違背了《韋陀》有作者誦習的說法，譬如鞞世師等的理論。你們所設立的理由就不是一貫的。如果外道這樣認為，《韋陀》的文句沒有作者，那它的意義是什麼呢？因為作者的時代久遠，不能記憶嗎？論者說：『這種說法不好。你只是說了理由，沒有譬喻。而且你們《韋陀》中說，一力山中造了《一力毗陀》，三摩山中造了《三摩毗陀》，迦逋處（Kapota，白領地）造了《阿闥毗陀》（Atharvaveda，阿闥婆吠陀），怎麼能說沒有作者呢？』所以你們設立的宗義是不成立的。如果說這是瞭解了之後才寫的，那麼這個瞭解的意義已經被否定了。你們設立的瞭解的意義不能成立。為什麼呢？因為文句是人為製作的。就像人學習一樣，按照次第披閱文字章句，譬如僧佉的論文句。而且你們的文句是人為製作的。
【English Translation】 English version The questioner asks: 'Does the Tathagata (如來，Thus Come One) not possess all-knowing wisdom?' The debater says: 'You arrogant and conceited individuals, you falsely establish doctrines, propose reasons, and offer analogies. Now, we point out your faults, why do you not speak of them? The Niganthas (尼干外道，Jainas) adhere to the existence of self, person, sentient beings, and lifespan, why do you not speak of them? The Vaisheshikas (鞞世師，followers of the Vaisheshika school) adhere to the existence of real entities, why do you not speak of them? The Samkhyas (僧佉人，followers of the Samkhya school) adhere to the existence of inherent nature, why do you not speak of them? The 'Vedas' (韋陀，Vedas) speak of the 'husband' and other such matters.' Is it because they cannot remember or speak of these things that they are called lacking all-knowing wisdom? Or is it because these things do not exist that they are not remembered? Furthermore, you say that because they do not know in general, they are called unknowing. This is actually a kind of knowing. What is 'in general'? It is that all dharmas (法，phenomena) lack inherent existence. To help beings understand this principle, after the Buddha's (佛，Buddha) Nirvana (涅槃，cessation of suffering), future disciples will also use the principle of no inherent existence to help beings understand. Moreover, a follower of the Misyaka (彌息伽) heretical path says: 'The twelve divisions of scriptures spoken of in the Buddha's teachings are not spoken by an all-knowing person, because they have an author.' For example, the theories of the Vaisheshikas and others. The debater says: 'If you say there is an author, your proposed reason is not established.' Why? Because we see sentient beings who can be taught. The Tathagata has no effort, and naturally speaks words, like a heavenly drum that sounds in the sky by itself. Just as in my Dharma (法，teachings), there is neither author nor receiver, so your doctrine of an author is not established. You contradict the statement in the 'Vedas' that there are authors who recite, like the theories of the Vaisheshikas and others. Your proposed reason is not consistent. If the outsider thinks in this way, that the sentences of the 'Vedas' have no author, then what is its meaning? Is it because the author's time is distant and cannot be remembered? The debater says: 'This statement is not good. You only state the reason, without an analogy. Moreover, in your 'Vedas' it is said that the 'Eka-rika Veda' was created in Eka-rika Mountain, the 'Sama Veda' was created in Sama Mountain, and the 'Atharvaveda' (阿闥毗陀，Atharvaveda) was created in Kapota (迦逋處，white-necked land), how can you say there is no author?' Therefore, your established doctrine is not established. If you say it was written after understanding, then the meaning of understanding has already been negated. Your established meaning of understanding cannot be established. Why? Because the sentences are artificially made. Just like people learn, reading the sentences and phrases in order, like the sentences of the Samkhya's treatises. Moreover, your sentences are artificially made.
法。有樂欲故。譬如僧佉論文句複次文句是作法。有受持故。譬如僧佉論文句。複次文句是作法。有誦習故。譬如僧佉論文句。以是等因應廣為驗。如彌息伽外道所計韋陀聲是常者。今遮此義。汝所分別聲者。非聲自體。何以故。為根所取故。譬如色。複次聲非了出法。是可依行因故。如言提婆達多將瓶來。即依聲將瓶來。不將余物來。譬如頭語手語等。如是有故。複次聲非了出法。是所召法故。譬如頭語等如是有故。複次聲非了出法是能成立法故。譬如頭語等。如是有故。複次聲非出法。是喜怒因故譬如頭語等。如是有故。以是等因當廣為驗。若有人言。劫初諸天子故者。亦同前遮。又復韋陀是破戒惡人所作說。殺生祀天。親處邪行飲酒等故。譬如波西目伽論外人言。韋陀中說殺生者不是非法。以咒力禳不畏殺罪故。譬如以咒毒不害人。論者言。不與取邪行等。是極惡法。然非一向。是故作此殺生罪。是趣惡道因故。作意殺非以狂亂時殺故。譬如不入祭祀羊。又復若言羊等梵天遣來為祭祀者。此義不然。非為祭祀而來生也。何以故。是受食物故。譬如業報果。如是有故等。諸因廣如上說。彼如是不顛倒一切法無自體者。如來所說一切天人之所供養。如來有一切智十力無畏等諸功德具足故。且置是事。今還說我本宗。
如論偈說。
彼所取五陰 不從自體有 若無自體者 云何有他體
釋曰。此謂若不從自體有。云何從他體有。何以故。無自體故。亦無他體。其義如論偈說。
法體如是故 取及取者空 云何當以空 而說空如來
釋曰。思惟觀察取及取者。是二皆空。云何以空說空。如來無是事故。外人言。彼先所說一切諸法皆無戲論。今復說言一切法空者。還是戲論。違本所說。論者言。實如所問。何以故如論偈說。
空則不應說 非空不應說 俱不俱亦然 世諦故有說
釋曰。若有人言離於聞慧而能於一切境界得第一義空者。則不說一切法空。無如是人故。為欲隨順所化眾生福智聚故說空等語。但以世諦施設故說。為欲洗濯不善分別垢故。為破邪見癡眼膜故。說一切境界不空。何以故。若為說空增長邪見。又為破執我等膜故說一切境界空。第一義中如幻如焰。自體無生故。二俱不說。為遮異人立驗故。為息于境界起二見過故。為得第一義故。說言無二。如是為洗濯不善分別垢故。說空無相無作夢幻等語。是故說空滅一切見。如論偈說。
若法有自體 見空有何益 諸見分別縛 為遮此見故
釋曰。此謂物有自體見空無益。為破彼見故贊于空。外人言。若言
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如《如理論》的偈頌所說： 『彼所執取的五蘊（panchaskandha，構成個體經驗的五種要素：色、受、想、行、識），不是從自身產生的。 如果事物沒有自性（svabhava，自身固有的性質），又怎麼會有他性（parabhava，依賴於其他事物的性質）呢？』 解釋：這說明如果五蘊不是從自身產生的，又怎麼會是從他物產生的呢？為什麼呢？因為沒有自性，所以也沒有他性。其含義如《如理論》的偈頌所說： 『法的本體（dharma-kaya，佛法的真實本質）是這樣的，所以能取（grahaka，能感知的主體）和所取（grahya，被感知的客體）都是空性的（shunyata，空虛、無自性）。 怎麼能用空性來描述空性的如來（tathagata，佛陀的稱號之一，意為『如實而來者』或『如實而去者』）呢？』 解釋：思維觀察能取和所取，這兩者都是空性的。怎麼能用空性來描述空性呢？如來沒有這樣的事情。外道之人說：『你先前所說的一切諸法都是沒有戲論（prapancha，虛妄分別）的，現在又說一切法都是空性的，這還是戲論，違背了你先前所說的話。』論者說：『確實如你所問。』為什麼呢？如《如理論》的偈頌所說： 『空性不應該說，非空性也不應該說，既是空性又非空性，以及既非空性又非非空性，都不應該說。因為世俗諦（samvriti-satya，相對真理）的緣故，才有所說。』 解釋：如果有人說，離開聽聞佛法和智慧，就能在一切境界中獲得第一義空（paramartha-shunyata，絕對的空性），那麼就不應該說一切法空。但沒有這樣的人，所以爲了隨順所教化的眾生的福德和智慧的積聚，才說空性等語言。只是以世俗諦的施設才這樣說。爲了洗滌不善分別的垢染，爲了破除邪見和癡暗的眼膜，才說一切境界不是空性的。為什麼呢？如果爲了說空性而增長邪見，又爲了破除執著於我等的眼膜，才說一切境界是空性的。在第一義中，一切都如幻如焰，自身沒有生起，所以兩者都不應該說。爲了遮止其他人建立論證，爲了止息在境界中產生兩種過失的見解，爲了獲得第一義，才說沒有二元對立。這樣是爲了洗滌不善分別的垢染，才說空性、無相（animitta，沒有特徵）、無作（apranihita，沒有愿求）、如夢如幻等語言。因此，說空性是爲了滅除一切見解。如《如理論》的偈頌所說： 『如果法有自性，那麼見到空性又有什麼用呢？ 各種見解和分別都是束縛，爲了遮止這些見解的緣故。』 解釋：這說明如果事物有自性，那麼見到空性就沒有用處。爲了破除那種見解，所以讚歎空性。外道之人說：『如果說』
【English Translation】 English version: As stated in the verses of the Yukti-shastra (Treatise on Reasoning): 'The five skandhas (aggregates of existence: form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness) that are apprehended by him do not arise from themselves. If there is no self-nature (svabhava), how can there be other-nature (parabhava)?' Explanation: This means that if the five skandhas do not arise from themselves, how can they arise from others? Why? Because there is no self-nature, so there is no other-nature either. The meaning is as stated in the verses of the Yukti-shastra: 'Because the nature of dharma (reality, truth) is such, both the apprehender (grahaka, the subject) and the apprehended (grahya, the object) are empty (shunyata, emptiness, devoid of inherent existence). How can one describe the empty Tathagata (the 'Thus-Gone One', an epithet of the Buddha) with emptiness?' Explanation: Contemplating and observing the apprehender and the apprehended, both are empty. How can one describe emptiness with emptiness? The Tathagata has no such thing. An outsider says: 'You previously said that all dharmas are without prapancha (conceptual proliferation), but now you say that all dharmas are empty. This is still prapancha, contradicting what you said before.' The proponent says: 'Indeed, as you ask.' Why? As stated in the verses of the Yukti-shastra: 'Emptiness should not be spoken of, non-emptiness should not be spoken of, Neither both nor neither should be spoken of. It is only spoken of due to conventional truth (samvriti-satya, relative truth).' Explanation: If someone says that apart from hearing the Dharma and wisdom, one can attain the ultimate emptiness (paramartha-shunyata, absolute emptiness) in all realms, then one should not say that all dharmas are empty. But there is no such person, so in order to accord with the accumulation of merit and wisdom of the beings to be taught, one speaks of emptiness and other such terms. It is only spoken of through the designation of conventional truth. In order to wash away the defilement of unwholesome discrimination, in order to break the membrane of wrong views and the darkness of ignorance, one says that all realms are not empty. Why? If one increases wrong views by speaking of emptiness, and in order to break the membrane of attachment to self and others, one says that all realms are empty. In the ultimate meaning, everything is like an illusion or a mirage, without self-arising, so neither should be spoken of. In order to prevent others from establishing proofs, in order to stop the arising of two kinds of faulty views in realms, in order to attain the ultimate meaning, one says that there is no duality. Thus, in order to wash away the defilement of unwholesome discrimination, one speaks of emptiness, signlessness (animitta, without characteristics), wishlessness (apranihita, without aspirations), like a dream, like an illusion, and other such terms. Therefore, speaking of emptiness is to extinguish all views. As stated in the verses of the Yukti-shastra: 'If dharmas have self-nature, what is the use of seeing emptiness? All views and discriminations are bonds, for the sake of preventing these views.' Explanation: This means that if things have self-nature, then seeing emptiness is useless. In order to break that view, one praises emptiness. An outsider says: 'If one says'
二俱不說者。此語即有戲論過。論者言。汝語非也。為遮異人分別故。而言二俱不可說。不可說故無過。譬如以聲止聲。複次若以第一義令信解者。無如是驗。若住第一義心。以世諦智說。第一義中一切法空。作是說者無過。如后偈說。若不依世諦不解第一義。此謂為遮不空故說空。然不取空。是故無過。如是如來自體亦空。若有人言。如來若常若無常。亦常亦無常。非常非無常。世間有邊。世間無邊。亦有邊亦無邊。非有邊非無邊。若如來義得成。我義亦如是成者。今當答之。答如論偈說。
于寂滅法中 無常等四過 亦于寂滅中 無邊等四過
釋曰。此謂如來。自體空能依無體。所依分別亦無體若外人意欲以如來出因。引喻成立我者。其義不成。以是故。因喻不同。亦違先義。如文殊所問經說。佛告文殊師利。不生不滅名為如來。若有人言。第一義中如來滅后不記有無。是故有如來。不如石女無兒說言無兒。我今答彼。汝以種種分別習氣熏習智慧故。執說如來。是皆不然。如論偈說。
粗重執見者 說如來有無 如來滅度后 云何不分別
釋曰。此謂如來滅后如來有耶如來無耶。亦有亦無耶。非有非無耶。是義不然。正習智眼開者。如論偈說。
如來自體空 不應起思惟
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果說二者都不說，這種說法就有了戲論的過失。論者會說：『你的話不對。』爲了遮止不同人的分別，才說二者都不可說。因為不可說，所以沒有過失。譬如用聲音來停止聲音。再者，如果用第一義（Paramārtha， ultimate truth）來讓人生起信解，就沒有這樣的驗證。如果安住于第一義的心，用世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya， conventional truth）的智慧來說，第一義中一切法皆空，這樣說就沒有過失。如後面的偈頌所說：『如果不依靠世俗諦，就不能理解第一義。』這被稱為爲了遮止不空而說空，然而並不執取空，所以沒有過失。像這樣，如來（Tathāgata， the thus-gone one）的自性也是空。如果有人說，如來若常若無常，亦常亦無常，非常非無常；世間有邊，世間無邊，亦有邊亦無邊，非有邊非無邊；如果如來的意義能夠成立，我的意義也能這樣成立，現在就來回答他。回答如論中的偈頌所說： 『在寂滅法中，沒有無常等四種過失；也在寂滅中，沒有有邊等四種過失。』 解釋說，這是說如來自體是空，能依的無體，所依的分別也沒有體。如果外道想要用如來作為因，用比喻來成立我，這種意義是不能成立的。因此，因和比喻不同，也違背了先前的意義。如《文殊所問經》所說：佛告訴文殊師利（Mañjuśrī， gentle glory）：『不生不滅名為如來。』如果有人說，第一義中如來滅后不記有無，所以有如來，不如石女沒有兒子卻說沒有兒子。我現在回答他，你用種種分別的習氣熏習智慧，所以執著說如來，這都是不對的。如論中的偈頌所說： 『粗重執見者，說如來有無；如來滅度后，云何不分別？』 解釋說，這是說如來滅后，如來是有呢，如來是無呢，亦有亦無呢，非有非無呢？這種說法是不對的。真正習得智慧之眼開啟的人，如論中的偈頌所說： 『如來自體空，不應起思惟。』
【English Translation】 English version: To say that neither is spoken is to incur the fault of frivolous talk. The debater will say, 'Your statement is incorrect.' It is to prevent the discriminations of different people that it is said that neither can be spoken. Because it cannot be spoken, there is no fault. It is like stopping a sound with a sound. Furthermore, if one were to use the ultimate truth (Paramārtha) to generate faith and understanding, there would be no such verification. If one abides in the mind of ultimate truth and speaks with the wisdom of conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), saying that all dharmas are empty in the ultimate truth, there is no fault in saying so. As the following verse says: 'If one does not rely on conventional truth, one cannot understand ultimate truth.' This is said to prevent the notion of non-emptiness by speaking of emptiness, yet without grasping emptiness. Therefore, there is no fault. In this way, the self-nature of the Tathāgata (the thus-gone one) is also empty. If someone says that the Tathāgata is either permanent or impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, neither permanent nor impermanent; the world is finite, the world is infinite, both finite and infinite, neither finite nor infinite; if the meaning of the Tathāgata can be established, then my meaning can also be established in the same way, I will now answer him. The answer is as the verse in the treatise says: 'In the Dharma of quiescence, there are no four faults such as impermanence; also in quiescence, there are no four faults such as finitude.' The explanation is that the Tathāgata's self is empty, the dependent is without substance, and the discriminations of the dependent are also without substance. If an outsider intends to use the Tathāgata as a cause, using analogy to establish the self, this meaning cannot be established. Therefore, the cause and analogy are different, and it also contradicts the previous meaning. As the Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā Sūtra (The Questions of Mañjuśrī) says: The Buddha told Mañjuśrī (gentle glory): 'Non-arising and non-ceasing is called the Tathāgata.' If someone says that in the ultimate truth, after the Tathāgata's extinction, there is no record of existence or non-existence, therefore there is a Tathāgata, like a barren woman saying she has no son when she has no son. I now answer him, you are attached to speaking of the Tathāgata because your wisdom is熏習(xunxi, influenced) by the habitual energies of various discriminations, and all of this is incorrect. As the verse in the treatise says: 'Those with coarse and heavy attachments speak of the existence or non-existence of the Tathāgata; after the Tathāgata's extinction, how can they not discriminate?' The explanation is that after the Tathāgata's extinction, is the Tathāgata existent, is the Tathāgata non-existent, both existent and non-existent, or neither existent nor non-existent? This kind of statement is incorrect. One who has truly cultivated and opened the eye of wisdom, as the verse in the treatise says: 'The Tathāgata's self is empty; one should not give rise to thought.'
滅後有如來 及無有如來
釋曰。此謂境界無體慧無分別。以是故。汝先出因。譬喻有過。何以故。有無常無常色身。言教身法身。能相所相因果。能覺所覺。空無相無作無愿。如幻如夢等。悉是分別。如論偈說。
戲論生分別 如來過分別 為戲論所覆 不能見如來
釋曰。譬如生盲者不見日輪。不見如來亦復如是。何故不見。戲論分別覆慧眼故。是名不見。云何為見。能見法性如來。是名為見。複次如經偈言。能見緣起者。是名為見法。若能見法者。即為見如來。複次色身是如來言教。身及法身。亦是如來者。如前偈說。戲論生分別。如來過分別。又如金剛般若經中偈言。
若以色見我 以音聲求我 是人行邪道 不能見如來
作如是觀察時。外人所立諸體自體言有成立。引如來為譬喻者不然。如論偈說。
以如來自體 同世間自體 如來無體故 世間亦無體
釋曰。此謂觀如來時諸陰界等無有自體。分別一切自體皆無體故。云何分別。謂陰界入能相所相。若因若果。有體無體。一異等法。如上廣分別者。悉皆無體。諸陰入等云何無體。如觀陰品中說。若離彼色因有色者不然。如彼所觀道理陰無體故。如來亦無體。又如觀界品中說無物是虛空。彼
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
『滅度後有如來』以及『滅度后無如來』。
解釋：這是說境界沒有實體，智慧沒有分別。因此，你先提出的原因和譬喻是有過失的。為什麼呢？因為有常與無常的色身（Rupakaya，佛的化身），言教身（佛陀的教誨），法身（Dharmakaya，佛的法性之身），能相和所相（能認知的主體和被認知的客體），因和果，能覺和所覺（能覺悟的主體和被覺悟的客體），空、無相、無作、無愿（佛教的四種解脫之門），如幻如夢等等，都是分別。正如論中的偈頌所說：
『戲論產生分別，如來超越分別， 被戲論所覆蓋，不能見如來。』
解釋：譬如天生的盲人看不見太陽，看不見如來也是這樣。為什麼看不見呢？因為戲論分別覆蓋了智慧之眼。這就是所謂的看不見。那麼，什麼是看見呢？能夠看見法性如來，這才是看見。再次，如經中的偈頌所說：『能夠看見緣起的人，這才是看見法。如果能夠看見法，那就是看見如來。』再次，色身是如來，言教身和法身也是如來，正如前面的偈頌所說：『戲論產生分別，如來超越分別。』又如《金剛般若經》中的偈頌所說：
『若以色見我，以音聲求我， 是人行邪道，不能見如來。』
當這樣觀察時，外道所建立的諸體自體說是有成立的，引用如來作為譬喻是不對的。正如論中的偈頌所說：
『以如來自體，同世間自體， 如來無體故，世間亦無體。』
解釋：這是說觀察如來時，諸陰（Skandha，構成個體的五種要素）、界（Dhatu，構成經驗世界的要素）等沒有自體。因為分別一切自體都是沒有實體的。如何分別呢？就是說陰、界、入（Ayatana，感覺器官與對像），能相和所相，若因若果，有體無體，一異等法，如上面廣泛分別的那些，全部都沒有實體。諸陰、入等為什麼沒有實體呢？如《觀陰品》中所說，如果離開那個色的因還有色，那是不對的。如他們所觀察的道理，陰沒有實體，所以如來也沒有實體。又如《觀界品》中所說，沒有東西是虛空。
【English Translation】 English version:
'After extinction, there is Tathagata' and 'After extinction, there is no Tathagata'.
Explanation: This means that the realm has no substance, and wisdom has no discrimination. Therefore, your initial cause and analogy are flawed. Why? Because the impermanent and permanent Rupakaya (Buddha's manifested body), the teaching body (Buddha's teachings), the Dharmakaya (Buddha's Dharma body), the perceiver and the perceived, cause and effect, the aware and the object of awareness, emptiness, signlessness, wishlessness, actionlessness (the three doors of liberation in Buddhism), like illusion, like a dream, etc., are all discriminations. As the verse in the treatise says:
'Playful thoughts generate discriminations, the Tathagata transcends discriminations, Covered by playful thoughts, one cannot see the Tathagata.'
Explanation: Just as a person born blind cannot see the sun, not seeing the Tathagata is also like that. Why can't they see? Because playful thoughts and discriminations cover the eye of wisdom. This is what is called not seeing. Then, what is seeing? Being able to see the Dharmata (nature of reality) Tathagata, that is seeing. Furthermore, as the verse in the sutra says: 'One who can see dependent origination, that is called seeing the Dharma. If one can see the Dharma, then one sees the Tathagata.' Furthermore, the Rupakaya is the Tathagata, the teaching body and the Dharmakaya are also the Tathagata, as the previous verse said: 'Playful thoughts generate discriminations, the Tathagata transcends discriminations.' Also, as the verse in the Diamond Sutra says:
'If one sees me through form, or seeks me through sound, That person walks a false path, and cannot see the Tathagata.'
When observing in this way, the self-nature of entities established by outsiders is said to be established, but using the Tathagata as an analogy is not correct. As the verse in the treatise says:
'Taking the Tathagata's self-nature, as the same as the world's self-nature, Because the Tathagata has no self-nature, the world also has no self-nature.'
Explanation: This means that when observing the Tathagata, the Skandhas (aggregates constituting an individual), Dhatus (elements constituting the world of experience), etc., have no self-nature. Because discriminating all self-natures as having no substance. How to discriminate? That is to say, the Skandhas, Dhatus, Ayatanas (sense bases), the perceiver and the perceived, whether cause or effect, having substance or not having substance, oneness and otherness, etc., all those extensively discriminated above, all have no substance. Why do the Skandhas, Ayatanas, etc., have no substance? As said in the 'Chapter on Observing the Skandhas', if there is form apart from the cause of that form, that is not correct. As the principle they observe, the Skandhas have no substance, therefore the Tathagata also has no substance. Also, as said in the 'Chapter on Observing the Dhatus', there is no thing that is empty space.
中如虛空等觀察六界時。非自體非他體。非能相非所相。一切諸體悉皆無故。已說色無自體。次觀識界。如是識界等分別為如來者。觀彼識界。非體非無體。非能相非所相。無自體故。亦無如來。又如觀入品說入無自體已令開解。離此諸入無別見者得成。如是以諸入境界為如來者。義皆不成。又如然可然品已明一異俱遮薪之與火皆無自體。如是若以智為如來。及以三十二相八十種好。慈悲喜捨。十力無畏。三十七道品。六波羅蜜。諸功德聚為如來。乃至法性法界法住實際真如涅槃。如是等法與如來身。為一為異。非一非異。此等無自體故。如來亦無自體。又如觀緣品說無起中已遮起故。亦遮如來起無自體。又如觀去來品已遮去來無自體故。如來亦無自體。以是故外人立義皆無自體。亦違先出因義故。如向偈說。如來無體故。世間亦無體。是故品初說外人立義等過而令信解。自說法身有成立義。亦令信解。以是義故。我義得成。如楞伽經中說。佛告大慧菩薩。如來身者。非常非無常。非因非果。非有為非無為。非覺非界。非相非無相。非是陰非離陰。非言說非所說物。非一非異。悉無和合乃至無所得無所緣。出過一切戲論者。名為如來。又如如來三密經說。佛告寂慧菩薩。如來身者。等虛空身。無等身。勝一切世間最勝
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 當像觀察虛空一樣觀察地、水、火、風、空、識這六界時，會發現它們既不是獨立的自體，也不是依賴於其他事物的他體；既沒有能相（能認知的主體），也沒有所相（被認知的客體）。一切諸法之體性，皆是空無所有。前面已經說明了色（物質）沒有自體。接下來觀察識界（精神領域）。如果認為識界等同於如來（Tathagata），那麼觀察這個識界，它既不是有實體，也不是沒有實體；既沒有能相，也沒有所相，因為它沒有自體。因此，也不能說有如來存在。又如《觀入品》所說，認識到六入（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）沒有自體，就能獲得開悟。離開這些六入，沒有其他的見解可以成就。所以，如果以諸入的境界作為如來，在道理上是不能成立的。 又如《然可然品》已經闡明，『一』和『異』這兩種觀點都是錯誤的。薪柴和火焰之間，既不能說是一，也不能說是異，因為薪柴和火焰都沒有自體。同樣，如果認為智慧是如來，或者認為三十二相、八十種好、慈悲喜捨四無量心、十力、四無畏、三十七道品、六波羅蜜等諸功德聚集是如來，乃至認為法性、法界、法住、實際、真如、涅槃等法與如來身是一體還是異體？既不是一體，也不是異體。因為這些法都沒有自體，所以如來也沒有自體。 又如《觀緣品》所說，在『無起』的論證中已經否定了生起，因此也否定了如來的生起，因為如來沒有自體。又如《觀去來品》已經否定了去來（運動）的自體，因此如來也沒有自體。因此，外道所建立的義理都沒有自體，也違背了先前所提出的因義。正如偈頌所說：『如來無體故，世間亦無體。』所以，在品初就說明了外道所立義理的過失，從而使人信解。而佛自說法身具有成立的意義，也使人信解。因為這個緣故，我的義理才能成立。正如《楞伽經》（Lankavatara Sutra）中所說，佛告訴大慧菩薩（Mahamati）：『如來之身，非常非無常，非因非果，非有為非無為，非覺非界，非相非無相，非是陰非離陰，非言說非所說物，非一非異，悉無和合，乃至無所得無所緣，出過一切戲論者，名為如來。』又如《如來三密經》所說，佛告訴寂慧菩薩：『如來之身，等同虛空之身，是無與倫比之身，勝過一切世間，是最殊勝的。』
【English Translation】 English version When observing the six realms (dhatu) – earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness – as being like empty space, one finds that they are neither self-existent (svabhava) nor dependent on others (paratantra); neither having a subject (nimitta) nor an object (alambana). All entities are devoid of inherent existence. It has already been stated that form (rupa) has no self-nature. Next, consider the realm of consciousness (vijnana-dhatu). If one considers the realm of consciousness, etc., to be the Tathagata (Tathagata), then observe that realm of consciousness. It is neither substantial nor insubstantial; neither having a subject nor an object, because it has no self-nature. Therefore, there is also no Tathagata. Furthermore, as stated in the chapter on the 'Observation of Entrances' (Ayatana-pariksa), understanding that the entrances (ayatana) have no self-nature leads to liberation. Apart from these entrances, there is no other view that can be attained. Thus, if the realms of the entrances are considered to be the Tathagata, the meaning is not established. Moreover, as clarified in the chapter on 'What Can Be Burned and What Burns' (Agnindhana-pariksa), the notions of 'one' and 'different' are both refuted. The fuel and the fire are neither the same nor different, as both fuel and fire lack inherent existence. Similarly, if wisdom (jnana) is considered to be the Tathagata, or if the thirty-two major marks (dvātrimśat mahāpuruṣa lakṣaṇa) and eighty minor marks (aśītyanuvyañjana), loving-kindness (maitri), compassion (karuna), joy (mudita), equanimity (upeksha), the ten powers (dasa-bala), the four fearlessnesses (catu-vaiśāradya), the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment (bodhipaksika-dharma), the six perfections (sat-paramita), and the accumulation of all merits are considered to be the Tathagata, even up to considering the suchness (dharmata), the realm of reality (dharmadhatu), the abiding of reality (dharmasthiti), the ultimate reality (bhutakoti), true thusness (tathata), and nirvana (nirvana) as being the same as the Tathagata's body, are they one or different? Neither one nor different. Because these dharmas have no self-nature, the Tathagata also has no self-nature. Furthermore, as stated in the chapter on 'Observation of Conditions' (Pratyaya-pariksa), the arising has already been refuted in the discussion of 'no arising' (anutpada), thus also refuting the arising of the Tathagata, because the Tathagata has no self-nature. Moreover, as the chapter on 'Observation of Going and Coming' (Gatagata-pariksa) has refuted the self-nature of going and coming, the Tathagata also has no self-nature. Therefore, the doctrines established by outsiders all lack self-nature and also contradict the previously stated reasons. As the verse says: 'Because the Tathagata has no essence, the world also has no essence.' Therefore, at the beginning of the chapter, the faults of the doctrines established by outsiders are explained to inspire faith and understanding. And the Dharma-body (Dharmakaya) proclaimed by the Buddha himself has an established meaning, also inspiring faith and understanding. Because of this meaning, my doctrine is established. As stated in the Lankavatara Sutra (Lankavatara Sutra), the Buddha told Mahamati Bodhisattva (Mahamati): 'The body of the Tathagata is neither permanent nor impermanent, neither cause nor effect, neither conditioned nor unconditioned, neither awareness nor a realm, neither having characteristics nor lacking characteristics, neither being the aggregates (skandha) nor separate from the aggregates, neither speech nor the object of speech, neither one nor different, completely without combination, even up to having nothing to attain and nothing to rely on, surpassing all conceptual elaborations, is called the Tathagata.' Moreover, as stated in the Tathagata Three Secrets Sutra, the Buddha told Silent Wisdom Bodhisattva: 'The body of the Tathagata is like the body of space, a body without equal, surpassing all worlds, and is the most supreme.'
身遍一切眾生如身。無譬喻身。無相似身清凈無垢身。無染污身。自性清凈身。自性無生身。自性無起身。不與心意識等和合身。如幻如焰如水中月自體身。空無相無愿所觀察身。遍滿十方身。於一切眾生平等身。無邊無盡身。無動無分別身。于住不住得無壞身。無色體身。無受想行識身。非地界非水界非火界非風界等所合成身。如是身者。非實非生。亦非大等所成。非實非實法。一切世間所不能知。不從眼生。不依耳聞。不為鼻識所知。非舌所成。亦不與身相應。又如舍利弗陀羅尼經所說。唯修一心念佛。不以色見如來。不以無色見如來。不以相不以好。不以戒定慧解脫解脫知見。不以生。不以家。不以姓。不以眷屬。乃至非自作非他作。若能如是名爲念佛。又如佛地經中偈言。無起等法是如來。一切法與如來同。雖凡夫智妄取相。而常行於無法中。無漏根力眾德鏡于。中顯現如來像。而實無有真如體。亦未曾有如來身。世間所見如映象。從本無于往來相。又如楞伽經偈言。佛以陰緣起無處有人見。若言無人見云何可觀察。
釋觀如來品竟。
般若燈論釋卷第十三 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 般若燈論釋
般若燈論釋卷第十四
偈本龍樹菩薩 釋論分別明菩薩
大
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 身遍一切眾生，如同自身一樣。此身無法用譬喻描述，沒有相似之處，清凈無垢，沒有染污，自性清凈，自性無生，自性不起。此身不與心、意識等和合，如幻影、如火焰、如水中月，是其自體。此身空無自性，無相，無所愿求，是所觀察的對象。此身遍滿十方，對一切眾生平等，無邊無盡，不動不分別，于住與不住皆得自在，不會毀壞。此身沒有色體，沒有受、想、行、識。它不是由地界、水界、火界、風界等組成的。這樣的身，非真實存在，並非由因緣所生，也不是由地、水、火、風等元素所成。它既非真實存在，也非非真實存在。一切世間都無法瞭解此身。它不從眼根產生，不依賴耳根聽聞，不為鼻識所知，非由舌根所成，也不與身根相應。又如《舍利弗陀羅尼經》所說，唯有修習一心念佛，不以色相見如來（Tathagata），不以無色相見如來，不以（三十二）相、（八十隨形）好，不以戒、定、慧、解脫、解脫知見，不以生、不以家、不以姓、不以眷屬，乃至不是自己所作，也不是他人所作。若能如此，就叫做唸佛。又如《佛地經》中的偈頌所說：『無起等法是如來，一切法與如來同。雖凡夫智妄取相，而常行於無法中。』無漏的根、力、眾德，如鏡子一般顯現如來像，但實際上沒有真如（Tathata）之體，也未曾有如來身。世間所見，如同映象，從根本上說，沒有往來之相。又如《楞伽經》的偈頌所說：『佛以陰緣起，無處有人見。若言無人見，云何可觀察？』 《釋觀如來品》結束。 《般若燈論釋》卷第十三 大正藏第30冊 No. 1566 《般若燈論釋》 《般若燈論釋》卷第十四 偈本作者為龍樹菩薩（Nagarjuna），釋論作者為分別明菩薩。
【English Translation】 English version The body pervades all sentient beings as if it were one's own. It is a body without comparison, a body without similarity, a pure and immaculate body, a body without defilement, a body pure in its own nature, a body unborn in its own nature, a body unarisen in its own nature. This body does not combine with mind, consciousness, etc. It is like a phantom, like a flame, like the moon in water, it is its own self. This body is empty, without characteristics, without desires, and is the object of observation. This body pervades the ten directions, is equal to all sentient beings, is boundless and endless, is without movement and without discrimination. It is indestructible whether abiding or not abiding. This body has no form, no sensation, conception, volition, or consciousness. It is not composed of earth element, water element, fire element, wind element, etc. Such a body is neither real nor born, nor is it made of great elements. It is neither real nor unreal. All the world cannot know it. It does not arise from the eye, does not depend on the ear for hearing, is not known by the nose, is not formed by the tongue, nor is it associated with the body. Furthermore, as stated in the Sariputra Dharani Sutra, one should only cultivate single-minded mindfulness of the Buddha, not seeing the Tathagata (Tathagata) by form, not seeing the Tathagata by formlessness, not by (the thirty-two) marks, (the eighty minor) perfections, not by precepts, concentration, wisdom, liberation, or the knowledge and vision of liberation, not by birth, not by family, not by surname, not by relatives, and not made by oneself or by others. If one can do this, it is called mindfulness of the Buddha. Moreover, as the verse in the Buddhabhumi Sutra says: 'The Tathagata is without arising and other such dharmas; all dharmas are the same as the Tathagata. Although the wisdom of ordinary beings falsely grasps at appearances, it constantly acts in the absence of dharmas.' The undefiled roots, powers, and multitude of virtues manifest the image of the Tathagata like a mirror, but in reality, there is no such thing as the essence of Suchness (Tathata), nor has there ever been a Tathagata body. What the world sees is like a reflection in a mirror, fundamentally without the aspect of coming or going. Furthermore, as the verse in the Lankavatara Sutra says: 'The Buddha arises from the aggregation of skandhas, but no one sees him anywhere. If it is said that no one sees him, how can he be observed?' End of the chapter on 'Explanation of Observing the Tathagata'. Prajna Lamp Treatise Commentary, Volume 13 Taisho Tripitaka, Volume 30, No. 1566, Prajna Lamp Treatise Commentary Prajna Lamp Treatise Commentary, Volume 14 The verse text is by Nagarjuna Bodhisattva (Nagarjuna), and the commentary is by Vimalamati Bodhisattva.
唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅譯
觀顛倒品第二十三
釋曰。今此品者。亦為遮空所對治。令解顛倒無自性故說。
自部人言。有分別故。起諸煩惱。如是煩惱從顛倒起。以顛倒故則有貪等。彼若無者。義不相應。故論偈言。
分別起煩惱 說有貪瞋等 善不善顛倒 從此緣而起
釋曰。諸論中說貪瞋等。隨次第起善不善者。謂愛非愛從此緣起。非不從緣。應知不正思惟分別。能為起煩惱緣。此中立驗。第一義中諸陰等有自體。是第一義中陰等從因緣起故。譬如貪等。若無自體不從緣起。譬如虛空華。論者言。是義不然。如論偈說。
愛非愛顛倒 皆從此緣起 我無自體故 煩惱亦非實
釋曰。非實者謂貪等煩惱非第一義中起。以是故汝闕譬喻。是立義有過。汝若言我以世諦為喻非第一義者。無有所成立法。若於世諦中有成立者。反成我義。如論偈說。
我若有若無 是二皆不成 因我有煩惱 我無彼不起
釋曰。此謂我者非世諦得成。亦非第一義中得成。以是故。若離於我則煩惱不有。所以者何。能依無體故。所依亦無體。為開此義故如偈說。因我有煩惱者。煩惱是我法。亦是所受用故。然我自體不成。如觀我品中觀煩惱無能依處故。其驗如是
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅（Paramārtha）譯
觀顛倒品第二十三
釋曰：這一品是爲了破除對空的執著，使人理解顛倒的無自性而說的。
自部人言：因為有分別，所以產生各種煩惱。這些煩惱從顛倒產生，因為有顛倒，所以有貪等。如果顛倒不存在，這些說法就不合理。所以論偈說：
『分別起煩惱，說有貪瞋等，善不善顛倒，從此緣而起。』
釋曰：各種論典中說貪瞋等，隨著次第產生善不善，是指愛和非愛從此因緣而起，不是不從因緣而起。應該知道不正思惟分別，能成為產生煩惱的因緣。這裡提出一個論證：在第一義諦中，諸陰等有自體，因為在第一義諦中，陰等是從因緣而生起的，比如貪等。如果沒有自體，就不會從因緣生起，比如虛空中的花。
論者說：這個說法不對。如論偈所說：
『愛非愛顛倒，皆從此緣起，我無自體故，煩惱亦非實。』
釋曰：『非實』是指貪等煩惱不是在第一義諦中產生的。因此，你的比喻不成立，這是立義的過失。如果你說我用世俗諦作為比喻，而不是第一義諦，那麼就沒有任何可以成立的法。如果在世俗諦中有所成立，反而會成就我的觀點。如論偈所說：
『我若有若無，是二皆不成，因我有煩惱，我無彼不起。』
釋曰：這裡所說的『我』，不是在世俗諦中可以成立的，也不是在第一義諦中可以成立的。因此，如果離開了我，煩惱就不會存在。為什麼呢？因為能依靠的沒有自體，所以所依靠的也沒有自體。爲了闡明這個道理，如偈所說：『因我有煩惱』，煩惱是我的法，也是我所受用的。然而我的自體不能成立，如在觀我品中觀察煩惱沒有能依靠之處一樣。這個論證就是這樣。
【English Translation】 English version Translated by Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha (波羅頗蜜多羅) from Central India of the Tang Dynasty
Chapter 23: On Views of Inversion (觀顛倒品)
Explanation: This chapter is presented to counter the attachment to emptiness, enabling the understanding that inversions are without inherent existence.
Followers of our school say: Because of discrimination (分別), various afflictions (煩惱) arise. These afflictions arise from inversions (顛倒); because of inversions, there is greed (貪), etc. If inversions did not exist, these statements would not be reasonable. Therefore, the verse in the treatise says:
'Discrimination gives rise to afflictions, speaking of greed, hatred, etc.; wholesome and unwholesome inversions arise from these conditions.'
Explanation: The treatises state that greed, hatred, etc., arise in sequence, producing wholesome and unwholesome [actions]. This refers to love and non-love arising from these conditions; they do not arise without conditions. It should be understood that incorrect thinking and discrimination can be the conditions for the arising of afflictions. Here, a proof is established: In the ultimate truth (第一義諦), the aggregates (陰) and so on have self-nature (自體), because in the ultimate truth, the aggregates and so on arise from causes and conditions (因緣), like greed, etc. If there were no self-nature, they would not arise from causes and conditions, like flowers in the sky (虛空華).
The debater says: This statement is incorrect. As the verse in the treatise says:
'Love and non-love, inversions, all arise from these conditions; because 'I' has no self-nature, afflictions are also not real.'
Explanation: 'Not real' means that afflictions like greed do not arise in the ultimate truth. Therefore, your analogy is invalid; this is a fault in establishing the proposition. If you say that I use conventional truth (世俗諦) as an analogy, not ultimate truth, then there is no dharma (法) that can be established. If something is established in conventional truth, it would contradict my view. As the verse in the treatise says:
'Whether 'I' exists or does not exist, both are not established; because 'I' exists, afflictions exist; if 'I' does not exist, they do not arise.'
Explanation: Here, the 'I' is not established in conventional truth, nor is it established in ultimate truth. Therefore, if one is apart from 'I', afflictions will not exist. Why? Because what is relied upon has no self-nature, so what relies on it also has no self-nature. To clarify this meaning, as the verse says: 'Because 'I' exists, afflictions exist'; afflictions are my dharma, and they are also what I experience. However, my self-nature cannot be established, just as in the chapter on observing 'I', it is observed that afflictions have no place to rely on. This is the proof.
。第一義中貪等皆無。我依止無體故。譬如石女不生子。何得說言子色白黑耶。自部人言。雖無有我但心與煩惱和合故有煩惱起。而煩惱是心上法。汝立無我義者。其因不成。論者言。汝語非也。其過如論偈說。
誰有彼煩惱 有義則不成 若離眾生者 煩惱則無屬
釋曰。此謂煩惱是眾生者。於一切處推求眾生不可得。若離眾生煩惱無屬心起者。先已遮故。亦除識自體故。亦遮有實故。汝心義不成。非我因義不成。自部人言。彼受無煩惱義者。則以無為體。無體之體成故。諸體更互無體相。論者言汝今欲得諸體若瓶若絹及余物等有者。為是體。為是無體。而言能起有覺因耶。欲令瓶是無體者。則不應說此瓶與青黃黑色等和合。亦不應說青黃等色示人。若有無瓶絹處不可說。青黃等色亦不可指示於人。無依止處故。是諸煩惱畢竟無主無體義者。如石女兒無青黃相可說故。是故以無為體義不成。今當次答自部人等。如論偈說。
身起煩惱見 緣於我我所 煩惱與染心 五求不可得
釋曰。名色聚集因名為身。緣于自身起染污見。是名身見。貪等三種與此義同。如觀如來品中偈說。非陰不離陰。陰中無如來。如來中無陰。非如來有陰。諸煩惱亦如。五種中無煩惱者。能起苦故名為煩惱。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：在第一義諦（Paramārtha，最高真理）中，貪慾等煩惱都是不存在的。我所依止的是無自性的空性，就像石女無法生孩子一樣，又怎麼能說孩子有白色或黑色的膚色呢？自部人說：『即使沒有我（ātman，靈魂），但心與煩惱結合，所以才會有煩惱產生。而且煩惱是心上的法，你主張無我，這個因是不成立的。』論者說：『你說的不是事實。』其中的過失就像論偈所說： 『誰有那些煩惱？如果說有主，那就不成立；如果離開眾生，煩惱就沒有歸屬。』 解釋：這裡說煩惱屬於眾生，但在任何地方都找不到眾生。如果離開眾生，煩惱就沒有歸屬，心也無法生起，因為之前已經遮破了。也排除了識的自體，也遮破了實有的存在，所以你的心義是不成立的，非我之因也是不成立的。自部人說：『那些接受無煩惱義的人，是以無為體。無體的體是成立的，所以諸體之間相互沒有自體。』論者說：『你現在想要得到的諸體，無論是瓶子、絹布還是其他事物，是有體還是無體，才能成為產生有覺知的因呢？如果說瓶子是無體，那就不應該說這個瓶子與青色、黃色、黑色等混合。也不應該把青色、黃色等顏色展示給人看。如果在沒有瓶子和絹布的地方，就不能說青色、黃色等顏色，也不能指示給人看，因為沒有依止之處。』這些煩惱畢竟是無主、無自性的，就像石女的兒子沒有青色或黃色的相貌可以描述一樣。所以，以無為體的說法是不成立的。現在我將依次回答自部人等，就像論偈所說： 『身體產生煩惱見，緣於我（ātman，靈魂）和我所（mamakāra，我所擁有之物），煩惱與染污心，在五蘊（skandha）中都無法找到。』 解釋：名色（nāmarūpa，精神和物質）聚集的因叫做身體。緣于自身產生染污的見解，這叫做身見（satkāyadṛṣṭi，認為五蘊為我的邪見）。貪慾等三種煩惱與此義相同。就像《觀如來品》中的偈頌所說：『不是五蘊，不離五蘊，五蘊中沒有如來（Tathāgata，佛），如來中沒有五蘊，不是如來有五蘊。』諸煩惱也是如此。在五種蘊中沒有煩惱，能產生痛苦的才叫做煩惱。
【English Translation】 English version: In the ultimate truth (Paramārtha), greed and other afflictions are non-existent. I rely on the emptiness of no-self-nature, just as a barren woman cannot give birth to a child, how can one say that the child has white or black skin? The proponents of our own school say: 'Even if there is no self (ātman), afflictions arise because the mind is combined with afflictions. And afflictions are dharmas on the mind. You who assert no-self, this reason is not established.' The debater says: 'What you say is not true.' The fault in it is as the verse in the treatise says: 'Who has those afflictions? If it is said that there is an owner, then it is not established; if it is apart from sentient beings, then afflictions have no belonging.' Explanation: Here it says that afflictions belong to sentient beings, but sentient beings cannot be found anywhere. If afflictions have no belonging apart from sentient beings, and the mind cannot arise, because it has already been refuted before. It also excludes the self-nature of consciousness, and also refutes the existence of substantiality, so your meaning of mind is not established, and the reason for no-self is also not established. The proponents of our own school say: 'Those who accept the meaning of no afflictions, take non-existence as the substance. The substance of non-existence is established, so the substances do not have self-nature mutually.' The debater says: 'What you want to obtain now, whether it is a vase, silk cloth, or other things, is it substance or non-substance, that can become the cause of producing awareness? If it is said that the vase is non-substance, then it should not be said that this vase is mixed with blue, yellow, black, etc. Nor should blue, yellow, etc. colors be shown to people. If there is no place for vases and silk cloths, then blue, yellow, etc. colors cannot be said, nor can they be shown to people, because there is no place to rely on.' These afflictions are ultimately masterless and without self-nature, just as the son of a barren woman has no blue or yellow appearance to describe. Therefore, the statement of taking non-existence as the substance is not established. Now I will answer the proponents of our own school in order, just as the verse in the treatise says: 'The body arises with afflictive views, based on self (ātman) and what belongs to self (mamakāra), afflictions and defiled mind, cannot be found in the five aggregates (skandha).' Explanation: The cause of the gathering of name and form (nāmarūpa) is called the body. Arising from the defiled view of oneself is called the view of self (satkāyadṛṣṭi). The three afflictions of greed, etc. are the same in meaning as this. Just as the verse in the chapter 'Contemplating the Tathāgata' says: 'Not the five aggregates, not apart from the five aggregates, there is no Tathāgata in the five aggregates, there are no five aggregates in the Tathāgata, it is not that the Tathāgata has the five aggregates.' The same is true of all afflictions. There are no afflictions in the five aggregates, that which can produce suffering is called afflictions.
染者非煩惱。今為遮不異義故。若染者即煩惱。能燒所燒同得一過。亦不異煩惱有染者。此義已如先遮。複次若異煩惱得有染者。則離煩惱獨有染者過。是故異體不成。染者中亦無煩惱。煩惱中亦無染者。亦非染者有煩惱。如是五種求煩惱無體。以煩惱無體故。則無能成立法。是汝譬喻有過。如論偈說。
愛非愛顛倒 本無有自體 以何等為緣 而能起煩惱
釋曰。如我法中愛非愛顛倒本來無體。以是故。第一義中煩惱非是從緣起法。無能成立法故。是汝立義之過。複次有自部人言。色等六物能起顛倒。云何無耶。彼謂無者。其義不爾。故論偈言。
色聲香味觸 及法為六種 愛非愛為緣 於物起分別
釋曰。此謂緣六種物能起諸煩惱。此中說驗。第一義中有愛非愛顛倒為緣能起貪瞋癡等。第一義中物有體故。若言無者。非六物體。譬如生盲者眼識。又貪瞋等能起顛倒分別。如我所說。因有力故。有諸顛倒。以是因緣譬喻無過。論者言。汝語非也。皆是虛妄。如論偈說。
色聲香味觸 及法體六種 如乾闥婆城 如焰亦如夢
釋曰。如是等自體皆無自體。勢分亦無。乃至世諦誹謗之過亦無。無何過耶。以無此物故。云何如乾闥婆城。以時處等眾人共見故。是名如乾
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：染污者並非煩惱（Klesha）。現在爲了遮止不異的意義，如果染污者就是煩惱，那麼能燒者和所燒者就變成同一個過失。也不是說不同於煩惱有染污者，這個意義已經像先前那樣遮止了。再次，如果不同於煩惱而能有染污者，那麼就有了離開煩惱而單獨有染污者的過失。因此，異體不能成立。在染污者中也沒有煩惱，在煩惱中也沒有染污者，也不是染污者中有煩惱。像這樣五種方式尋求，煩惱都沒有自體。因為煩惱沒有自體，就沒有能成立的法。所以你的譬喻有過失。如論偈所說： 『愛非愛顛倒，本來無有自體，以何等為緣，而能起煩惱？』 解釋說：如我法中，愛（愛取）非愛（非愛取）顛倒本來沒有自體。因此，在第一義諦中，煩惱不是從緣而起的法。因為沒有能成立的法，所以這是你立義的過失。再次，有自部人說，色（Rupa）等六物能生起顛倒，怎麼會沒有呢？他們認為沒有，那個意義不是這樣的。所以論偈說： 『色聲香味觸，及法為六種，愛非愛為緣，於物起分別。』 解釋說：這是說以六種物為緣，能生起各種煩惱。這裡說的是經驗。在第一義諦中，以愛非愛顛倒為緣，能生起貪（Raga）瞋（Dvesha）癡（Moha）等。在第一義諦中，物是有體的。如果說沒有，就不是六物體。譬如天生的盲人沒有眼識。又貪瞋等能生起顛倒分別，如我所說，因為因有力量，所以有各種顛倒。因為這個因緣，譬喻沒有過失。論者說：你的話不對，都是虛妄的。如論偈所說： 『色聲香味觸，及法體六種，如乾闥婆城，如焰亦如夢。』 解釋說：像這些自體都沒有自體，勢力分也沒有。乃至世俗諦誹謗的過失也沒有。沒有什麼過失呢？因為沒有這些事物。為什麼像乾闥婆城（Gandharva-nagara）呢？因為在一定的時間和地點，眾人共同看到它，所以叫做像乾闥婆城。
【English Translation】 English version: The defiler is not a Klesha (affliction). Now, to prevent the meaning of 'not different,' if the defiler is indeed a Klesha, then the burner and the burned become the same fault. It is also not the case that there is a defiler different from Klesha; this meaning has already been refuted as before. Furthermore, if there could be a defiler different from Klesha, then there would be the fault of a defiler existing independently, apart from Klesha. Therefore, a different entity cannot be established. There is no Klesha within the defiler, nor is there a defiler within Klesha, nor is it that the defiler possesses Klesha. In this way, seeking in five ways, Klesha has no self-nature. Because Klesha has no self-nature, there is no establishing dharma. Therefore, your analogy has a fault. As the verse in the treatise says: 'Love and non-love inversions, originally have no self-nature, with what as a cause, can afflictions arise?' Explanation: As in my Dharma, love (attachment) and non-love (non-attachment) inversions originally have no self-nature. Therefore, in the ultimate truth (Paramartha-satya), afflictions are not dharmas arising from conditions. Because there is no establishing dharma, this is the fault of your establishing a thesis. Furthermore, some people from our own school say that the six objects such as Rupa (form) can give rise to inversions, how can they not exist? They think they do not exist, but that is not the meaning. Therefore, the verse in the treatise says: 'Form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharma are the six kinds, love and non-love are the causes, for objects arise discriminations.' Explanation: This means that the six objects can give rise to various afflictions. This speaks of experience. In the ultimate truth, love and non-love inversions can give rise to Raga (greed), Dvesha (hatred), Moha (delusion), etc. In the ultimate truth, objects have substance. If you say they do not exist, then they are not the six objects. For example, a person born blind has no eye consciousness. Also, greed, hatred, etc., can give rise to inverted discriminations, as I have said, because the cause has power, therefore there are various inversions. Because of this cause, the analogy has no fault. The debater says: Your words are not right, they are all false. As the verse in the treatise says: 'Form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharma are the six entities, like a Gandharva-nagara (mirage city), like a flame, also like a dream.' Explanation: Like these self-natures, they all have no self-nature, and there is no division of power. Even the fault of slandering the conventional truth (Samvriti-satya) does not exist. What fault does not exist? Because these things do not exist. Why is it like a Gandharva-nagara? Because at a certain time and place, many people see it together, therefore it is called like a Gandharva-nagara.
闥婆城。云何如焰。譬如愚者。見熱時焰。謂言是水。逐之不已。徒自疲勞。竟無所得。如是一切諸法自體皆空。著法凡夫亦復如是。故言如焰。云何如夢。有時有所思念因果體及一切法無自體故。是名如夢。若色中有者。如論偈說。
若愛若非愛 何處當可得 猶如幻化人 亦如鏡中像
釋曰。第一義中愛非愛皆不可得。何以故。第一義中色像等自體空故。云何如幻化人。于不實境界顯現相似故。云何如像。不待人工而能起現。與形相似故。以是因緣。汝上出因立義等不成。何以故。第一義中物體不成故。亦違汝義。如論偈說。
若不因彼愛 則無有不愛 因愛有不愛 是故無有愛 無不愛待愛 無愛待不愛 若以愛為緣 施設有不愛
釋曰。愛無自體。其義如是。以是故。不應有不愛。不愛無體故。愛不待不愛而言有愛者。是亦不然。如論偈說。
無有可愛者 何處當起貪 不愛若無體 何處當起瞋
釋曰。彼二無體故癡亦無體。是故如所說過。今還在汝。修多羅人言。第一義中有如是愛非愛顛倒。如佛經所說。若經中說者。當知是有譬如說無我定是無我。今經中現有此語。所謂無常計常。無我計我。無樂計樂。不凈計凈。是名顛倒。以是義故。第一
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 闥婆城（Gandharva city，海市蜃樓）。如何如焰（flame，火焰）？譬如愚者，見熱時焰，謂言是水，逐之不已，徒自疲勞，竟無所得。如是一切諸法自體皆空，著法凡夫亦復如是。故言如焰。如何如夢？有時有所思念因果體及一切法無自體故。是名如夢。若色中有者，如論偈說： 『若愛若非愛，何處當可得？猶如幻化人，亦如鏡中像。』 釋曰：第一義（paramārtha，勝義諦）中愛非愛皆不可得。何以故？第一義中色像等自體空故。如何如幻化人？于不實境界顯現相似故。如何如像？不待人工而能起現，與形相似故。以是因緣，汝上出因立義等不成。何以故？第一義中物體不成故。亦違汝義。如論偈說： 『若不因彼愛，則無有不愛；因愛有不愛，是故無有愛。無不愛待愛，無愛待不愛；若以愛為緣，施設有不愛。』 釋曰：愛無自體，其義如是。以是故，不應有不愛。不愛無體故。愛不待不愛而言有愛者，是亦不然。如論偈說： 『無有可愛者，何處當起貪？不愛若無體，何處當起瞋？』 釋曰：彼二無體故癡亦無體。是故如所說過，今還在汝。修多羅（sūtra，經）人言：第一義中有如是愛非愛顛倒。如佛經所說，若經中說者，當知是有譬如說無我定是無我。今經中現有此語，所謂無常計常，無我計我，無樂計樂，不凈計凈，是名顛倒。以是義故，第一
【English Translation】 English version Gandharva city (闥婆城). How is it like a flame (焰)? It is like a foolish person who sees a heat haze and thinks it is water, chasing after it endlessly, only to tire himself out in vain and gain nothing. Likewise, all dharmas (諸法) are empty of inherent existence. Ordinary people attached to dharmas are also like this. Therefore, it is said to be like a flame. How is it like a dream? Sometimes there are thoughts of cause and effect, but all dharmas have no inherent existence. This is called like a dream. If there is something in form (色), as the verse in the treatise says: 'If love or non-love, where can it be found? Like an illusionary person, also like an image in a mirror.' Explanation: In the ultimate meaning (第一義), love and non-love are both unattainable. Why? Because in the ultimate meaning, form and images are empty of inherent existence. How is it like an illusionary person? Because it appears similar in an unreal realm. How is it like an image? Because it can arise without human effort and resembles the form. Because of these reasons, your previous arguments about establishing definitions based on causes are invalid. Why? Because in the ultimate meaning, objects are not established. It also contradicts your own meaning, as the verse in the treatise says: 'If not because of love, then there would be no non-love; because of love, there is non-love, therefore there is no love. Non-love does not depend on love, love does not depend on non-love; if love is the condition, then non-love is established.' Explanation: Love has no inherent existence; its meaning is like this. Therefore, there should be no non-love, because non-love has no substance. It is also not true that love exists without depending on non-love. As the verse in the treatise says: 'If there is no lovable object, where will greed arise? If non-love has no substance, where will hatred arise?' Explanation: Because those two have no substance, delusion also has no substance. Therefore, as previously stated, the fault still lies with you. The sūtra (修多羅) people say: In the ultimate meaning, there is such a reversal of love and non-love. As the Buddha said in the sūtra, if it is said in the sūtra, know that it exists, for example, saying that the samādhi (定) of no-self is no-self. Now, this statement exists in the sūtra, namely, considering impermanence as permanence, no-self as self, suffering as pleasure, and impurity as purity. This is called reversal. Because of this meaning, the first...
義中有如是愛非愛顛倒。論者言於世諦中有愛非愛顛倒。非第一義中有。是故我說無過。如論偈說。
于第一義中 畢竟無顛倒 如來終不說 是我無我等
釋曰。第一義中亦不說我無我故。汝譬喻及出因無體。複次若修多羅人意言。第一義中不欲得有顛倒。何以故。顛倒者有二種。一者隨順生死。二者隨順涅槃。云何名隨順生死。所謂無常常倒。無我我倒。無樂樂倒。無凈凈倒。云何名隨順涅槃。所謂于空執空。于無常執無常。有如是等故名顛倒。若欲得無分別智者。當斷此二種顛倒。為是智障故。自部人言。若於無常之物起無常見是顛倒者。其義不然。論者言。顛倒者是何義耶。自部人言。實是無常。謂是常者可名顛倒。論者言。是說不善。其過如論偈說。
無常謂常者 名為顛倒執 無常亦是執 空何故非執
釋曰。謂彼智所緣顛倒境界故。此言即是顛倒義。譬如人言。離三界欲已。何故不名解脫。如此之言即是解脫。自部人言。汝今復說無常亦空。云何不是第一義耶論者言。無起故。此無起義。道理如先已遮。譬如涅槃無起亦無無常。複次此無常體能起常分別智。若言是顛倒執常覺。所緣境界則無有體。是故如前偈說。無常亦是執空何故非倒者即是顛倒。何以故。有分別故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果意義中存在這樣的愛與非愛的顛倒，論者認為這隻存在於世俗諦（Samvriti-satya，相對真理）中，而不是在第一義諦（Paramartha-satya，勝義諦）中。因此，我說這沒有過錯。正如論偈所說： 『在第一義中，畢竟沒有顛倒。如來（Tathagata，佛陀）最終沒有說，有『我』或『無我』等等。』 解釋：在第一義中，佛陀也沒有說『我』或『無我』，所以你的譬喻和提出的理由沒有根據。此外，如果修多羅（Sutra，經）的作者意圖說，在第一義中不應該有顛倒，那又是為什麼呢？因為顛倒有兩種：一種是隨順生死的，另一種是隨順涅槃（Nirvana，寂滅）。什麼叫做隨順生死？就是把無常執為常，把無我執為我，把無樂執為樂，把不凈執為凈。什麼叫做隨順涅槃？就是執著于空，執著于無常，有這樣的情況，所以叫做顛倒。如果想要獲得無分別智（Nirvikalpa-jnana，無分別智慧），就應當斷除這兩種顛倒，因為它們是智慧的障礙。自部人說：如果對於無常的事物產生無常的見解，這如果是顛倒，那這個道理是不對的。論者說：顛倒的意義是什麼呢？自部人說：實際上是無常的，卻認為是常的，這可以叫做顛倒。論者說：這種說法是不正確的。其中的過失就像論偈所說： 『把無常認為是常的，這叫做顛倒執著。無常也是一種執著，為什麼空就不是執著呢？』 解釋：這是因為那個智慧所緣的境界是顛倒的。這句話本身就是顛倒的意義。譬如有人說，已經離開了三界（Trailokya，欲界、色界、無色界）的慾望，為什麼不叫做解脫（Moksha，解脫）呢？這樣的話本身就是解脫。自部人說：你現在又說無常也是空，為什麼不是第一義呢？論者說：因為沒有生起。這個沒有生起的意義，道理就像先前已經駁斥過的。譬如涅槃沒有生起，也沒有無常。此外，這個無常的本體能夠生起常的分別智。如果說是顛倒執著常的覺知，那麼所緣的境界就沒有實體。所以就像前面的偈頌所說，無常也是一種執著，空為什麼不是顛倒呢？這就是顛倒。為什麼呢？因為有分別。
【English Translation】 English version: If there is such inversion of love and non-love in meaning, the debaters say that there is inversion of love and non-love in Samvriti-satya (conventional truth), but not in Paramartha-satya (ultimate truth). Therefore, I say there is no fault. As the verse in the treatise says: 'In Paramartha-satya, there is ultimately no inversion. The Tathagata (Buddha) ultimately did not say that there is 'self' or 'no-self,' etc.' Explanation: In Paramartha-satya, the Buddha also did not say 'self' or 'no-self,' so your analogy and the reason you put forward have no basis. Furthermore, if the author of the Sutra (scripture) intends to say that there should be no inversion in Paramartha-satya, then why is that? Because there are two kinds of inversion: one that accords with Samsara (cycle of birth and death), and one that accords with Nirvana (liberation). What is called according with Samsara? It is taking impermanence as permanence, taking no-self as self, taking no-bliss as bliss, and taking impurity as purity. What is called according with Nirvana? It is clinging to emptiness, clinging to impermanence. There are such cases, so it is called inversion. If one wants to obtain Nirvikalpa-jnana (non-conceptual wisdom), one should cut off these two kinds of inversion, because they are obstacles to wisdom. People of our own school say: If one has the view of impermanence towards impermanent things, if this is inversion, then this reasoning is not correct. The debater says: What is the meaning of inversion? People of our own school say: In reality, it is impermanent, but it is considered permanent, this can be called inversion. The debater says: This statement is not correct. The fault in it is as the verse in the treatise says: 'Considering impermanence as permanence, this is called inverted clinging. Impermanence is also a clinging, why is emptiness not a clinging?' Explanation: This is because the object of that wisdom is an inverted realm. This statement itself is the meaning of inversion. For example, if someone says that one has already left the desires of the Trailokya (three realms: desire realm, form realm, formless realm), why is it not called Moksha (liberation)? Such a statement itself is liberation. People of our own school say: You now say that impermanence is also emptiness, why is it not the ultimate truth? The debater says: Because there is no arising. The meaning of this no-arising, the reasoning is like what has already been refuted before. For example, Nirvana has no arising, and also no impermanence. Furthermore, this entity of impermanence can give rise to the discriminating wisdom of permanence. If it is said to be the inverted clinging to the awareness of permanence, then the object of awareness has no substance. Therefore, as the previous verse says, impermanence is also a clinging, why is emptiness not an inversion? This is inversion. Why? Because there is discrimination.
。譬如常執者。此中立驗。第一義中色無常者。即是顛倒。是分別故。譬如執色為常。自部人言。智分別者。言諸行空。其智非一向顛倒。論者言。亦是顛倒。我說無過。自部人言。若如是者。此空智非是得解脫因。是倒故。譬如內入是苦樂等智之境界。論者言。汝立義中是何義耶。自部人言。緣眼空智非是得解脫因耶。論者言。若爾者反成我義。云何成我義。以無分別智得解脫故。若言眼空。眼空之智是有分別故。且置是語。今還為汝說我本宗。如執無常為常。即是顛倒。無我為我。無樂為樂。不凈為凈。亦如是說。有自部人立義分別言。有如是執。以有能執所執故。然其起執凡有三種。而不是無。論者言。汝義不然。如論偈說。
執具起執者 及所執境界 一切寂滅相 是故無有執
釋曰。執有三種。謂具起及境界等。執具者。是能執總緣物體智。起執者。謂所執心。或妄置。或非撥等。又須執者。謂起執人所執境界者。謂所計常樂我凈等境界。此之三法皆自體空。如我所說道理。欲令開解執具等一切皆寂滅相。是故無執。而彼執者。以有有之言令物解者。無有譬喻。以是故。如論偈說。
執性無有故 邪正等亦無 誰今是顛倒 誰是非顛倒
釋曰。第一義中誰是顛倒。誰是非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：譬如有人常執著於事物。在此，我提出一個論證：在第一義諦（Paramārtha，最高真理）中，色（Rūpa，物質現象）是無常的，如果認為色是常，那就是顛倒（Viparyāsa，錯誤的認知），因為這是分別（Vikalpa，概念性的區分）所致。例如，執著於色是常。你方（自部人）說，通過智慧進行分別的人，說諸行（Saṃskāra，一切有為法）是空的，他們的智慧並非完全是顛倒。我方（論者）說，這也是顛倒，我這樣說並沒有過錯。你方說，如果這樣，這種空智就不是獲得解脫的原因，因為它是顛倒的，就像內在的感受是苦樂等智慧的境界。我方說，你所提出的論點是什麼意思呢？你方說，緣于眼（眼睛）的空智不是獲得解脫的原因嗎？我方說，如果是這樣，反而成就了我的觀點。如何成就我的觀點呢？因為通過無分別智（Nirvikalpa-jñāna，沒有概念區分的智慧）才能獲得解脫。如果說眼是空的，那麼眼空的智慧是有分別的。暫且放下這些話，現在我還要為你說明我本宗的觀點：如果執著于無常為常，那就是顛倒；執著于無我（Anātman，沒有永恒不變的自我）為我（Ātman，永恒不變的自我），執著于無樂為樂，執著于不凈為凈，也是同樣的道理。你方有人提出論點進行分別說，有這樣的執著，因為有能執著的主體和所執著的客體。然而，這種執著的產生有三種情況，而不是沒有。我方說，你的觀點不對。正如論偈所說： 『執具起執者，及所執境界，一切寂滅相，是故無有執。』 解釋：執著有三種，即執具、起執和境界等。執具，是能執著的總緣物體之智。起執，是指所執著的心，或者妄加設定，或者並非撥除等等。又需要執著的人，是指起執著的人。所執境界，是指所計度的常、樂、我、凈等境界。這三種法都是自體空的，正如我所說的道理，想要讓你們開解，執具等一切都是寂滅相，所以沒有執著。而那些執著的人，用有和有的言語來使人理解，沒有譬喻可以說明。因此，正如論偈所說： 『執性無有故，邪正等亦無，誰今是顛倒，誰是非顛倒。』 解釋：在第一義諦中，誰是顛倒，誰是非顛倒呢？
【English Translation】 English version: For example, someone constantly clings to things. Here, I present an argument: In the ultimate truth (Paramārtha), form (Rūpa) is impermanent; to perceive form as permanent is a reversal (Viparyāsa), because it arises from discrimination (Vikalpa). For instance, clinging to the idea that form is permanent. Your side (self-school) says that those who discriminate through wisdom, saying that all conditioned things (Saṃskāra) are empty, their wisdom is not entirely reversed. My side (the debater) says that it is also a reversal, and I am not at fault for saying so. Your side says that if that is the case, this wisdom of emptiness is not the cause of liberation, because it is reversed, just as internal sensations are the realm of wisdom regarding pleasure and pain. My side says, what is the meaning of the argument you are presenting? Your side says, is the wisdom of emptiness related to the eye (organ of sight) not the cause of liberation? My side says, if so, it actually supports my view. How does it support my view? Because liberation is attained through non-discriminating wisdom (Nirvikalpa-jñāna). If you say the eye is empty, then the wisdom of the emptiness of the eye is discriminating. Let's put aside these words for now; I will now explain the view of my own school: If one clings to impermanence as permanence, that is a reversal; clinging to non-self (Anātman) as self (Ātman), clinging to suffering as pleasure, clinging to impurity as purity, the same applies. Someone from your side presents an argument, saying that there is such clinging because there is a subject that clings and an object that is clung to. However, there are three ways in which this clinging arises, it is not that there is no clinging. My side says, your view is incorrect. As the verse in the treatise says: 『The clinging implement, the one who initiates clinging, and the object of clinging, all have the nature of quiescence; therefore, there is no clinging.』 Explanation: There are three types of clinging: the clinging implement, the initiation of clinging, and the object, etc. The clinging implement is the wisdom that generally grasps objects. The initiation of clinging refers to the mind that clings, either falsely establishing or not rejecting, etc. Also, the one who needs to cling refers to the person who initiates clinging. The object of clinging refers to the realms of permanence, pleasure, self, purity, etc., that are conceived. These three dharmas are all empty in their own nature, just as the principle I have explained, wishing to enlighten you, that all clinging implements, etc., have the nature of quiescence; therefore, there is no clinging. And those who cling, using words of existence and existence to make others understand, there is no analogy to explain it. Therefore, as the verse in the treatise says: 『Because the nature of clinging does not exist, neither does right or wrong, etc.; who is now reversed, and who is not reversed?』 Explanation: In the ultimate truth, who is reversed, and who is not reversed?
顛倒。菩薩摩訶薩住無分別智。不行一切分別。無正無邪。無顛倒無不顛倒。複次若人言定有顛倒。有具足顛倒者故。譬如有蓋則有持蓋者。凡夫有顛倒亦如是。由有顛倒者。是故有顛倒。論者言。是義不然。如上偈說。執性無有故。邪正等亦無。此二道理先已令開解故。有起者亦不成如是如是。顛倒及顛倒者亦不成故。如上偈說。誰是顛倒誰非顛倒。此言謂無顛倒。無顛倒故顛倒者亦無。複次若有顛倒即有非顛倒。以是故。汝因義不成。第一義中譬喻無體。亦違汝義。複次世間人言。與顛倒合者名顛倒人。此之顛倒。為與已起倒者有合耶。為與未起倒者有合耶。為與起倒時有合耶。今答此三種與顛倒合者。是皆不然。如論偈說。
已起者無合 未起亦無合 離已未倒者 有合時不然
釋曰。此謂已有倒者。更與倒合。則為無用。何以故。倒者空故。譬如余不倒者。若言有倒與時合者。此有俱過。離倒不倒與時合者不然。作是觀時悉皆不然。若言有者。汝今當答。此之顛倒與誰合耶。是故無有與倒合者。以是義故。汝得如先所說過。複次如第一義中一切諸體皆無自性。說此道理已令開解。以是故。如論偈說。
無起未起者 云何有顛倒 諸倒悉無生 何處起顛倒
釋曰。此謂偈意顯
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 顛倒。菩薩摩訶薩安住于無分別智中，不行使任何分別。沒有正確也沒有邪惡，沒有顛倒也沒有不顛倒。進一步說，如果有人說一定存在顛倒，因為有具備顛倒的人。這就好比有傘就一定有持傘的人一樣，凡夫有顛倒也是如此，因為有顛倒的人，所以有顛倒。論者說：這種說法不對。正如上面的偈頌所說：執著于自性是虛無的，所以邪正等等也都不存在。這兩種道理之前已經解釋清楚了。有生起者也不能成立，像這樣，顛倒以及顛倒者也不能成立。正如上面的偈頌所說：誰是顛倒，誰不是顛倒？這句話的意思是說沒有顛倒，因為沒有顛倒，所以顛倒者也不存在。進一步說，如果有顛倒，那麼就一定有非顛倒。因此，你的因義不能成立。在第一義中，譬喻沒有實體，也違背了你的意思。進一步說，世間人說，與顛倒結合的人叫做顛倒之人。那麼這種顛倒，是與已經生起顛倒的人結合呢？還是與尚未生起顛倒的人結合呢？還是與生起顛倒的時候結合呢？現在回答，這三種與顛倒結合的情況，都是不對的。正如論中的偈頌所說： 『已起者無合，未起亦無合，離已未倒者，有合時不然。』 解釋說：這指的是已經有顛倒的人，再與顛倒結合，就是沒有用的。為什麼呢？因為顛倒是空性的。好比其餘沒有顛倒的人一樣。如果說有顛倒與（生起顛倒的）時候結合，這就有俱生的過失。離開顛倒和不顛倒，與（生起顛倒的）時候結合是不對的。這樣觀察的時候，全部都是不對的。如果說有（結合），你現在應當回答，這種顛倒與誰結合呢？所以沒有與顛倒結合的人。因為這個緣故，你又像先前所說的那樣有過失了。進一步說，在第一義中，一切諸法的體性都沒有自性，這個道理已經解釋清楚了。因此，正如論中的偈頌所說： 『無起未起者，云何有顛倒？諸倒悉無生，何處起顛倒？』 解釋說：這指的是偈頌所要顯明的意義。
【English Translation】 English version Inversions. The Bodhisattva-Mahasattva dwells in non-discriminating wisdom and does not engage in any discriminations. There is neither right nor wrong, neither inversion nor non-inversion. Furthermore, if someone says that inversions definitely exist because there are those who possess inversions, it is like saying that if there is an umbrella, there must be someone holding it. Ordinary people have inversions in the same way; because there are those who have inversions, therefore inversions exist. The debater says: This argument is not correct. As the verse above states: clinging to inherent existence is non-existent, therefore right and wrong, etc., are also non-existent. These two principles have already been clearly explained. The arising of an agent also cannot be established; in this way, neither inversions nor those who have inversions can be established. As the verse above states: Who is inverted, and who is not inverted? This statement means that there are no inversions, and because there are no inversions, those who have inversions also do not exist. Furthermore, if there are inversions, then there must be non-inversions. Therefore, your causal argument cannot be established. In the ultimate meaning, the analogy has no substance and also contradicts your meaning. Furthermore, worldly people say that those who are combined with inversions are called inverted people. Then, does this inversion combine with those who have already arisen with inversion, or with those who have not yet arisen with inversion, or with the time when inversion arises? Now, the answer is that all three of these combinations with inversion are incorrect. As the verse in the treatise says: 'That which has already arisen has no combination; that which has not yet arisen also has no combination; apart from that which has already and not yet inverted, combination at the time is not possible.' Explanation: This refers to someone who already has inversion combining with inversion again, which is useless. Why? Because inversion is empty. It is like others who do not have inversion. If it is said that inversion combines with the time (of arising inversion), then there is a co-arising fault. Apart from inversion and non-inversion, combining with the time (of arising inversion) is not correct. When observing in this way, everything is incorrect. If it is said that there is (combination), you should now answer, with whom does this inversion combine? Therefore, there is no one who combines with inversion. For this reason, you have the same fault as previously stated. Furthermore, in the ultimate meaning, all phenomena have no inherent existence; this principle has already been clearly explained. Therefore, as the verse in the treatise says: 'That which has not arisen and that which has not yet arisen, how can there be inversion? All inversions are without arising; where does inversion arise?' Explanation: This refers to the meaning that the verse intends to reveal.
無生故無有顛倒。汝出因等。皆是有過。如論偈說。
常樂我凈等 而言實有者 彼常樂我凈 翻則為顛倒
釋曰。此謂第一義中有常我等。應知亦是顛倒。如論偈說。
我及常樂等 若當是無者 無我苦不凈 而應是可得
釋曰。此謂無我等自體能除我等倒。以有相待故。無我等亦不成無。無我故何處有我。是顛倒見故。譬如無人。終不于杌起人想顛倒。如是因等其過難免。以是觀察常無常等顛倒及不顛倒。無有因故。無因者。如論偈說。
以彼無因故 則無明行滅 乃至生老死 是等同皆滅
釋曰。此謂無明行識名色六入觸受愛取有生及老死等。由無顛倒因故證得無自體息諸煩惱。其義得成。諸說有自體者。是諸煩惱。為有實體。為無實體。今何所問。如論偈說。
若人諸煩惱 有一自實體 云何能斷除 誰能斷有體
釋曰。此謂有自體者。不可壞故。若諸煩惱無實如兔角者。亦如此偈說過。云何不能斷。謂無者。不可舍故。如虛空華不可舍。無自體故。如馬體無。不可令舍此無。複次若作是意。謂有實煩惱。聖道起時能斷故。謂此說無過者。此實煩惱似何等相。對治道起而能斷耶。汝之立義難令物解。以是故起有實體無實體煩惱分別。而能
斷此分別者不然。是中立驗。第一義中煩惱無。自體是斷故。譬如幻作女人雖是幻化而諸凡夫起染欲心。後知非實染心自舍。煩惱無實亦復如是。此中已說外人所成立驗有過。顯我自成立驗無過。令解顛倒無自體故。是品義意。以是故。此下引經顯成。如金光明女經中偈說。言語非是色。一切處無有。畢竟無有故。煩惱亦如是。如語無實體。不住于內外。煩惱體無實。亦不住內外。佛告舍利弗。若解染污即如實義。無一染污顛倒可得。眾生起染。若無實者。即是顛倒。若彼顛倒是無實者。于中無真實相故。舍利弗。如是解者說為清凈。以煩惱無實體故。如來成正覺時。所說煩惱。非是色。非是無色。非受想行識。非無受想行識。非非識。非非無識。不可見故。不可取故。解者無所斷除。證時亦無所得。不以證。不以得。無證無得。無相無為。但假名字。猶如幻化。于諸法不動相非取非不取。如影如響。離相離念。無生無滅。
般若燈論釋觀聖諦品第二十四
釋曰。今此品者。亦為遮空所對治。令解四聖諦無自體義故說。
自部人言。若謂聖諦空無自體。是義不爾。故論偈言。
若一切法空 無起亦無滅 說聖諦無體 汝得如是過
釋曰。如彼所說道理。令物信解者。是事不然。空
故如虛空華。以是故。彼招此過。起滅無體故。即無苦諦體。苦諦無體故。能起集諦。亦無體。集諦無體故滅諦亦無體。滅諦無體故向苦滅道。以正見為首。道諦所修即為無體。如上偈說。彼得此過。以是故。諸有怖畏生死眾生。於四諦境界勤行精進。苦應知。集應斷。滅應證。道應修。此等皆無。云何無耶。故論偈言。
若知及若斷 修證作業等 聖諦無體故 是皆不可得
釋曰。四聖諦者。謂能作聖人相續體故。名為聖諦。又復諦者。謂真實義。若說無者。是義不然。故論偈言。
聖諦無體故 四果亦無有 以果無體故 住果者亦無
釋曰。此謂身見疑戒取等眾過為薪。聖諦為火。須陀洹。斯陀含。阿那含。阿羅漢等。見聖諦火能燒煩惱。住果者。謂得須陀洹道。須陀洹果。又名不為他緣和合故。所有天魔不能破壞。又與戒定慧解脫解脫知見等和合故名僧。是僧名為無上福田。彼若無者。其義不爾。故論偈言。
若無有僧寶 則無有八人 聖諦若無體 亦無有法寶
釋曰。若無僧寶不應有四道四果差別。複次無僧寶故。亦無法寶。法寶無故。亦無佛寶。故論偈言。
若無法僧者 云何有佛寶 若三寶皆空 則破一切有
釋曰。佛者謂自覺聖諦
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 所以就像虛空中的花朵一樣。因此，他們招致這樣的過失：生起和滅去都沒有實體，所以就沒有苦諦的實體。苦諦沒有實體，所以能生起集諦（苦的根源）也沒有實體。集諦沒有實體，所以滅諦（苦的止息）也沒有實體。滅諦沒有實體，所以以正見為首的通向苦滅的道路，也就是道諦所修習的，也就沒有實體。如上面的偈頌所說，他們因此得到這樣的過失。因此，那些畏懼生死輪迴的眾生，在四聖諦的境界中勤奮修行精進，認為苦應該被瞭解，集應該被斷除，滅應該被證得，道應該被修習，這些都將不存在。為什麼不存在呢？所以論中的偈頌說： 『如果知和斷，修和證，作業等等，聖諦沒有實體，這些都不可得。』 解釋說：四聖諦，是指能夠作為聖人相續的實體，所以稱為聖諦。而且，諦的意思是真實義。如果說沒有，這個道理是不對的。所以論中的偈頌說： 『聖諦沒有實體，四果（須陀洹、斯陀含、阿那含、阿羅漢）也就沒有。因為果沒有實體，住在果位上的人也沒有。』 解釋說：這是指以身見、疑、戒取等眾多過失為柴薪，聖諦為火。須陀洹（Sotapanna，入流者），斯陀含（Sakadagami，一來者），阿那含（Anagami，不還者），阿羅漢（Arhat，無學）等，見到聖諦之火能夠燒掉煩惱。住在果位上的人，是指得到須陀洹道，須陀洹果。又名不為其他因緣和合所破壞，所有的天魔都不能破壞。又與戒、定、慧、解脫、解脫知見等和合，所以稱為僧。這個僧被稱為無上福田。如果這些都沒有，這個道理是不對的。所以論中的偈頌說： 『如果沒有僧寶，就沒有八人（四向四果）。聖諦如果沒有實體，也就沒有法寶。』 解釋說：如果沒有僧寶，就不應該有四道四果的差別。再次，沒有僧寶，也就沒有法寶。法寶沒有，也就沒有佛寶。所以論中的偈頌說： 『如果沒有法和僧，怎麼會有佛寶？如果三寶都空，那就破滅了一切有。』 解釋說：佛，是指自覺聖諦。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, it is like flowers in the sky. Because of this, they incur this fault: arising and ceasing have no substance, so there is no substance of the Truth of Suffering (Dukkha Satya). Because the Truth of Suffering has no substance, the Truth of the Origin of Suffering (Samudaya Satya), which can give rise to it, also has no substance. Because the Truth of the Origin of Suffering has no substance, the Truth of the Cessation of Suffering (Nirodha Satya) also has no substance. Because the Truth of the Cessation of Suffering has no substance, the path to the cessation of suffering, with right view as its head, which is cultivated by the Truth of the Path (Magga Satya), also has no substance. As the verse above says, they thus obtain this fault. Therefore, those sentient beings who fear the cycle of birth and death, diligently practice and strive in the realm of the Four Noble Truths, thinking that suffering should be understood, origin should be abandoned, cessation should be realized, and the path should be cultivated, all of these will not exist. Why will they not exist? Therefore, the verse in the treatise says: 'If knowing and abandoning, cultivating and realizing, actions and so on, the Noble Truths have no substance, all of these are unattainable.' The explanation says: The Four Noble Truths are said to be the Noble Truths because they can serve as the continuous substance of a noble person. Moreover, 'Truth' means the meaning of reality. If it is said that there is nothing, this reasoning is incorrect. Therefore, the verse in the treatise says: 'If the Noble Truths have no substance, the Four Fruits (Sotapanna, Sakadagami, Anagami, Arhat) also do not exist. Because the fruit has no substance, those who abide in the fruit also do not exist.' The explanation says: This refers to taking views of self (Sakkaya-ditthi), doubt (Vicikiccha), clinging to rules and rituals (Silabbata-paramasa), and other numerous faults as firewood, and the Noble Truths as fire. Sotapanna (stream-enterer), Sakadagami (once-returner), Anagami (non-returner), Arhat (worthy one), etc., see that the fire of the Noble Truths can burn away afflictions. Those who abide in the fruit refer to those who have attained the path of Sotapanna and the fruit of Sotapanna. It is also called not being destroyed by other causes and conditions, and all the heavenly demons cannot destroy it. Moreover, it is combined with morality (Sila), concentration (Samadhi), wisdom (Prajna), liberation (Vimutti), and the knowledge and vision of liberation (Vimuttinanadassana), so it is called Sangha. This Sangha is called the supreme field of merit. If these do not exist, this reasoning is incorrect. Therefore, the verse in the treatise says: 'If there is no Sangha Jewel, there are no eight persons (four paths and four fruits). If the Noble Truths have no substance, there is also no Dharma Jewel.' The explanation says: If there is no Sangha Jewel, there should be no difference between the four paths and four fruits. Furthermore, without the Sangha Jewel, there is also no Dharma Jewel. Without the Dharma Jewel, there is also no Buddha Jewel. Therefore, the verse in the treatise says: 'If there are no Dharma and Sangha, how can there be a Buddha Jewel? If the Three Jewels are all empty, then everything existent is destroyed.' The explanation says: Buddha refers to one who is self-awakened to the Noble Truths.
。復能覺他。故名為佛。云何為寶。謂難得故。如經偈言。應解我已解。應修我已修。應斷我已斷。由是故稱佛。此謂於一切法有自體中得平等覺是故名佛。如修多羅中偈言。于無體法中。覺了盡無餘。諸法平等覺。是故名為佛。此謂諸佛所覺境界。若言無體者不然。如上偈說。若三寶皆空則破一切有。是義有過。故論偈言。
若因果體空 法非法亦空 世間言說等 如是悉皆破
釋曰。此謂作是說者。而不欲得有過。此過云何免耶。若不立空而有起滅諸體有自體者彼得無過。是中作驗。諸體有自體有起滅故。若言諸體無自體者。不應見有起滅譬如空華。論者言。汝所引者義皆不然。如論偈說。
汝今自不解 空及於空義 能滅諸戲論 而欲破空耶
釋曰。空者能滅一切執著戲論。是故名空。空義者謂緣空之智。名為空義。汝今欲得破壞真實相者。如人運拳以打虛空。徒自疲極終無所損。汝若作是言。如上偈說。若一切法空。無起亦無滅。汝作如是說者。亦徒疲勞不解中意。何以故。如論偈說。
諸佛依二諦 為眾生說法 一謂世俗諦 二謂第一義
釋曰。世諦者謂世間言說。如說色等起住滅相。如說提婆達多去來。毗師奴蜜多羅吃食。須摩達多坐禪。梵摩達多解
脫。如是等謂世間言說。名為世諦。是等不說名第一義。第一義者云何。謂是第一而有義故。名第一義。又是最上無分別智真實義故。名第一義。真實者。無他緣等為相。若住真實所緣境界無分別。智者名第一義。為遮彼起等隨順。所說無起等及聞思修慧。皆是第一義。慧者云何。是第一義。能為第一遮作不顛倒方便因緣故。是故複名第一義也。如論偈說。
若人不能解 二諦差別相 即不解真實 甚深佛法義
釋曰。此謂若人不解二諦差別。不錯亂境界相者。不正思惟。多者此人不解甚深佛法。而起有體無體執覺。深者云何。難涉渡。佛者如先已解。法者為令天人證得甘露法故。行者于如是等甚深境界。應知應斷應證應修。複次說不顛倒教者名甘露法。是人于第一甚深無分別智道理不解故。雖行不顛倒住真法境界。而於無起無滅法體說眾生。于非境界起境界見。作如是說者。不解中論道理。而言世諦中起滅等法。一切皆無。作是分別者。其過亦如上偈說。若一切法空無起亦無滅。有如是分別者。不解諸佛如來隨順世諦。說有持戒修定生住滅等諸法體。無智之人謂第一義中亦有是事。作是虛妄分別者。墮在諸有曠野之中。無有出期。
自部人言。若以第一義諦得解脫者。不應宣說二諦。論者言
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 脫。像這些就是世間所說的言語，稱為世俗諦（Satyasamvriti，指被世俗接受的真理）。這些言語不能被稱為第一義諦（Paramarthasatya，指最高的真理）。什麼是第一義諦呢？因為它是第一，並且具有意義，所以稱為第一義諦。而且，它又是最上，沒有分別智的真實意義，所以稱為第一義諦。真實是指沒有其他因緣等作為表相。如果安住于真實所緣的境界，沒有分別的智慧，就稱為第一義諦。爲了遮止那些隨順生起的（煩惱），所說的無生起等，以及聞、思、修所產生的智慧，都是第一義諦。什麼是智慧呢？它是第一義諦，能夠爲了第一義諦遮止顛倒，作為不顛倒的方便因緣，所以又稱為第一義諦。正如論偈所說：
如果有人不能理解 二諦的差別相
那就是不理解真實的 甚深佛法義
釋曰：這說的是如果有人不理解二諦的差別，不弄錯境界的表相，不能正確地思維，那麼這個人就不理解甚深的佛法，而生起有體或無體的執著。什麼是深呢？難以涉足和渡越。佛，如先前已經解釋。法，是爲了讓天人證得甘露法。行者，對於像這些甚深的境界，應該知、應該斷、應該證、應該修。再次，宣說不顛倒的教法，稱為甘露法。這個人對於第一義諦甚深的無分別智的道理不理解，所以即使行於不顛倒，安住于真法的境界，卻對於無生無滅的法體說眾生，對於非境界生起境界見。像這樣說的人，不理解中論的道理，卻說世俗諦中的生滅等法，一切都是沒有的。像這樣分別的人，他的過失也如上面的偈頌所說。如果一切法都是空，沒有生起也沒有滅，有像這樣分別的人，不理解諸佛如來隨順世俗諦，說有持戒、修定、生、住、滅等諸法體。沒有智慧的人認為第一義諦中也有這些事，像這樣虛妄分別的人，墮落在諸有的曠野之中，沒有出離的期限。
自部人說：如果以第一義諦就能得到解脫，就不應該宣說二諦。論者說：
【English Translation】 English version: 'Tuo'. Such are called worldly expressions, known as conventional truth (Satyasamvriti, truth accepted by the world). These are not called the ultimate truth (Paramarthasatya, the highest truth). What is the ultimate truth? Because it is the first and has meaning, it is called the ultimate truth. Moreover, it is the supreme and the real meaning of non-discriminating wisdom, hence it is called the ultimate truth. Reality is characterized by the absence of other conditions. If one abides in the realm of reality without discrimination, that wisdom is called the ultimate truth. To prevent the arising of those (afflictions) that arise accordingly, the spoken of non-arising, etc., and the wisdom arising from hearing, thinking, and meditation, are all ultimate truth. What is wisdom? It is the ultimate truth, capable of preventing inversion for the sake of the ultimate truth, serving as a means of non-inversion, hence it is also called the ultimate truth. As the verse in the treatise says:
If a person cannot understand the difference between the two truths,
then they do not understand the true profound meaning of the Buddha's teachings.
Explanation: This says that if a person does not understand the difference between the two truths, does not confuse the characteristics of realms, and does not think correctly, then this person does not understand the profound Buddha's teachings, and arises with attachments to existence or non-existence. What is profound? Difficult to tread and cross. Buddha, as previously explained. Dharma, is to enable gods and humans to attain the nectar of Dharma. Practitioners, regarding these profound realms, should know, should abandon, should realize, and should cultivate. Furthermore, teaching that does not invert is called the nectar of Dharma. This person does not understand the principle of the profound non-discriminating wisdom of the ultimate truth, so even if they practice without inversion and abide in the realm of true Dharma, they speak of sentient beings in the body of Dharma that neither arises nor ceases, and they arise with the view of realms in non-realms. Those who speak like this do not understand the principles of the Middle Way treatise, but say that all phenomena such as arising and ceasing in conventional truth are all non-existent. Those who discriminate like this, their fault is also as the verse above says. If all dharmas are empty, neither arising nor ceasing, those who discriminate like this do not understand that all Buddhas and Tathagatas follow conventional truth, saying that there are bodies of dharmas such as upholding precepts, practicing meditation, birth, abiding, and cessation. People without wisdom think that these things also exist in the ultimate truth, and those who falsely discriminate like this fall into the wilderness of all existences, with no time of escape.
People of our own school say: If liberation can be attained through the ultimate truth, then the two truths should not be proclaimed. The treatise writer says:
。以是事故。如論偈說。
若不依世諦 不得第一義 不依第一義 終不得涅槃
釋曰。世俗諦者。一切諸法無生性空。而眾生顛倒故妄生執著。於世間為實。諸賢聖了達世間顛倒性故。知一切法皆空無自性。于聖人是第一義諦。亦名為實。佛為眾生依二諦說。云何為第一義諦。謂普過一切言語道故。一切小乘所分別者。令離一切分別因故。複次若無世諦不能證得第一義諦。以是故。煩惱及生等滅者。是涅槃相。若不依第一義諦。涅槃之道終不可得。複次外道中。若有聰慢者。作如是分別。有空不空。云何為空。謂見諸陰空。以彼執見無體故。云何不空。謂見諸陰不空。而言我已見我。今見我當見如是諸陰空。不離諸陰有空。空中見諸陰。諸陰中見空。作是見者。是不正思惟。名增上慢。如論偈說。
少智愚癡者 以惡見壞空 如不善捉蛇 不如法持咒
釋曰。此謂與無分別慧命作障礙故。如是等為惡見所壞。複次于諸無體起有體見。亦名壞空。譬如不善捉蛇之人。自害其命。于空執有體者。亦能害解脫命。如持咒人不依咒法而自損壞。以是故。不善解空者。能作種種不饒益事。如論偈說。
諸佛以是故 迴心不說法 佛所解深法 眾生不能入 汝今若如是 于空生
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，基於這個緣故，正如論偈所說： 『若不依世俗諦（Samvriti-satya，相對真理），不得第一義諦（Paramartha-satya，絕對真理）；不依第一義諦，終不得涅槃（Nirvana，解脫）。』 解釋：世俗諦是指，一切諸法本無生性，其性本空，但眾生因顛倒妄想而生執著，認為在世間是真實的。諸位賢聖了達世間的顛倒性，因此知曉一切法皆空無自性，對於聖人而言，這就是第一義諦，也稱為真實。佛陀爲了眾生，依據二諦說法。什麼是第一義諦呢？就是普遍超越一切言語道，一切小乘行者所分別的，是爲了令眾生遠離一切分別之因。進一步說，如果沒有世俗諦，就不能證得第一義諦。因此，煩惱以及生等等的滅盡，就是涅槃的相狀。如果不依靠第一義諦，涅槃之道終究無法獲得。再者，外道中，如果有人自恃聰明而生驕慢，就會作這樣的分別：有空與不空。什麼是空呢？就是看見諸陰（Skandha，五蘊）是空的，因為他們執著于所見之物沒有實體。什麼是不空呢？就是看見諸陰是不空的，並且說『我已經看見我，現在看見我，將來也會看見我』。像這樣諸陰是空的，卻不離諸陰而有空，在空中看見諸陰，在諸陰中看見空。作出這種見解的人，是不正思惟，名為增上慢。 正如論偈所說： 『少智愚癡者，以惡見壞空，如不善捉蛇，不如法持咒。』 解釋：這是說，這種見解會給無分別慧命造成障礙。像這樣的人會被惡見所破壞。進一步說，對於諸法本無實體卻生起有實體的見解，也叫做壞空。譬如不善於捉蛇的人，會自害其命。對於空性執著于有實體的人，也能損害解脫的慧命。如同持咒的人不依照咒法而自受損害。因此，不善於理解空性的人，會做出種種不利的事情。正如論偈所說： 『諸佛因此故，迴心不說法，佛所解深法，眾生不能入，汝今若如是，于空生…』
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, for this reason, as the verse in the treatise says: 'If one does not rely on conventional truth (Samvriti-satya), one cannot attain ultimate truth (Paramartha-satya); if one does not rely on ultimate truth, one will never attain Nirvana (liberation).' Explanation: Conventional truth refers to the fact that all phenomena are inherently without origination and empty in nature, but sentient beings, due to their inverted perceptions, give rise to attachments, considering them to be real in the world. The wise and noble ones understand the inverted nature of the world, and therefore know that all phenomena are empty and without inherent existence. For the sages, this is the ultimate truth, also known as reality. The Buddha, for the sake of sentient beings, teaches according to the two truths. What is ultimate truth? It is that which universally transcends all paths of language, and that which is discriminated by all Hinayana practitioners, in order to lead sentient beings away from all causes of discrimination. Furthermore, without conventional truth, one cannot attain ultimate truth. Therefore, the cessation of afflictions and birth, etc., is the characteristic of Nirvana. If one does not rely on ultimate truth, the path to Nirvana can never be attained. Moreover, among non-Buddhists, if there are those who are arrogant and conceited, they will make such distinctions: there is emptiness and non-emptiness. What is emptiness? It is seeing that the aggregates (Skandha, five aggregates) are empty, because they are attached to the view that there is no substance. What is non-emptiness? It is seeing that the aggregates are not empty, and saying, 'I have already seen myself, I see myself now, and I will see myself in the future.' Like this, the aggregates are empty, but there is no emptiness apart from the aggregates, seeing the aggregates in emptiness, and seeing emptiness in the aggregates. Those who make this kind of view are engaging in incorrect thinking, called increased pride. As the verse in the treatise says: 'Those of little wisdom and foolishness, destroy emptiness with evil views, like one who grasps a snake improperly, or one who holds a mantra incorrectly.' Explanation: This means that such a view creates obstacles for the wisdom-life of non-discrimination. People like this are destroyed by evil views. Furthermore, to give rise to the view of substance in things that have no substance is also called destroying emptiness. For example, a person who is not good at catching snakes will harm their own life. Those who are attached to the existence of substance in emptiness can also harm the wisdom-life of liberation. Like a person who holds a mantra but harms themselves because they do not follow the correct method. Therefore, those who do not understand emptiness well can do all kinds of unbeneficial things. As the verse in the treatise says: 'For this reason, the Buddhas turned their minds away from teaching, the profound Dharma understood by the Buddha, sentient beings cannot enter, if you are now like this, giving rise to...'
誹謗 謂法無起滅 乃至破三寶
釋曰。誹謗者。謂言一切是空。汝瞋忿故。欲與空作過者。空終不被汝過。何以故。諸體無自體者。于第一義中空故無體。無體義者。我亦不用以有執著相故。複次為遮自部人所分別空者。今遮此空故而言空無自體。亦不執空作是分別。空者今應舍故。如寶積經中說。佛告迦葉。寧起我見如須彌山。亦不作增上慢者起于空見。以是義故。不見色空。不見色不空。如論偈說。
若然于空者 則一切皆然 若不然空者 則一切不然
釋曰。此謂正見空者何等為一切皆然。謂有起等。云何然耶。謂有無等及眼等。皆自體空。如幻丈夫。丈夫自體。空何以故。一切藉眾緣聚集為體故。云何為體。體謂苦也。云何為苦。謂此起者名苦。見苦等行名為苦諦。云何為集。謂起苦因者名集。複次集者。謂從此起苦故名集。若見集等行名為集諦。滅苦因者名之為滅。見滅等行名為滅諦。為得滅苦因方便故。而名為道。若見道等行名為道。諦彼聖諦如是有故其法得成。以自然智覺。於一切行故乃名為。佛隨順聲聞說者。如經言。佛告諸比丘。如是苦者我于往昔不聞諸法中得眼起智起明起覺起是等諸體自體皆如幻故。第一義中見無起等名見聖諦。如文殊道行經說。佛告文殊師利。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 誹謗：指說一切法沒有生起和滅亡，甚至毀壞三寶（佛、法、僧）。
解釋：誹謗，就是說一切都是空。你因為嗔恨憤怒的緣故，想要對空加以指責，但空最終不會被你指責。為什麼呢？因為諸法的體性沒有自體，在第一義諦中是空，所以沒有體性。沒有體性的意思，我也不執著于有，因為執著于相的緣故。再次，爲了遮止自部人所分別的空，現在遮止這種空，所以說空沒有自體，也不執著空而作這樣的分別。空，現在應當捨棄。如《寶積經》中所說，佛告訴迦葉：『寧願生起像須彌山一樣大的我見，也不要讓增上慢的人產生空見。』因為這個緣故，不見色是空，不見色不是空。如論偈所說：
『如果對於空是這樣，那麼一切都是這樣；如果空不是這樣，那麼一切都不是這樣。』
解釋：這指的是正確地見空的人，什麼是『一切都是這樣』呢？是指有生起等等。怎麼樣是『這樣』呢？是指有和無等等以及眼等等，都是自體空的，就像幻化出來的人一樣。人本身是空的，為什麼呢？因為一切都是依靠眾多的因緣聚集而成為體性的緣故。什麼是體性呢？體性就是苦。什麼是苦呢？就是這個生起叫做苦。見到苦等等的行叫做苦諦。什麼是集呢？就是生起苦的原因叫做集。再次，集，就是從此生起苦的緣故叫做集。如果見到集等等的行叫做集諦。滅除苦的原因叫做滅。見到滅等等的行叫做滅諦。爲了得到滅除苦的原因的方便，所以叫做道。如果見到道等等的行叫做道諦。這些聖諦是真實存在的，所以佛法才能成立。因為自然智慧覺悟了一切行，所以才叫做佛。隨順聲聞而說，如經中所說：佛告訴諸比丘：『這樣的苦，我在過去沒有聽聞的諸法中，得到了眼生起、智生起、明生起、覺生起。這些體性自體都如幻化一樣，在第一義中見到沒有生起等等，就叫做見到聖諦。』如《文殊道行經》所說，佛告訴文殊師利（菩薩名）：
【English Translation】 English version Slander: Refers to saying that all dharmas have no arising or ceasing, even to the point of destroying the Three Jewels (Buddha, Dharma, Sangha).
Explanation: Slander is saying that everything is empty. Because of your anger and resentment, you want to find fault with emptiness, but emptiness will ultimately not be affected by your fault-finding. Why? Because the nature of all dharmas has no inherent self-nature; in the ultimate truth, it is empty, so it has no substance. The meaning of having no substance is that I also do not cling to existence, because of clinging to appearances. Furthermore, in order to prevent the emptiness that is distinguished by people within our own school, we now prevent this emptiness, so we say that emptiness has no inherent self-nature, and we do not cling to emptiness and make such distinctions. Emptiness should now be abandoned. As it is said in the Ratnakuta Sutra, the Buddha told Kashyapa: 'It is better to give rise to a self-view as large as Mount Sumeru than to have an arrogant person give rise to a view of emptiness.' For this reason, one does not see that form is empty, and one does not see that form is not empty. As the verse in the treatise says:
'If emptiness is like this, then everything is like this; if emptiness is not like this, then everything is not like this.'
Explanation: This refers to the person who correctly sees emptiness. What is 'everything is like this'? It refers to having arising, etc. How is it 'like this'? It refers to having existence and non-existence, etc., and the eye, etc., are all empty of inherent self-nature, just like a phantom person. The person itself is empty. Why? Because everything relies on the gathering of numerous causes and conditions to become a substance. What is substance? Substance is suffering. What is suffering? It is that this arising is called suffering. Seeing the practice of suffering, etc., is called the Truth of Suffering. What is accumulation? It is that the cause of arising suffering is called accumulation. Furthermore, accumulation is called accumulation because suffering arises from this. If one sees the practice of accumulation, etc., it is called the Truth of Accumulation. Eliminating the cause of suffering is called cessation. Seeing the practice of cessation, etc., is called the Truth of Cessation. In order to obtain the means to eliminate the cause of suffering, it is called the Path. If one sees the practice of the Path, etc., it is called the Truth of the Path. These Noble Truths are truly existent, so the Dharma can be established. Because natural wisdom awakens to all practices, it is called the Buddha. Speaking in accordance with the Shravakas, as it is said in the sutra: The Buddha told the Bhikshus: 'Such suffering, in the past, in the dharmas I had not heard, I obtained the arising of the eye, the arising of wisdom, the arising of light, the arising of awakening. These substances themselves are all like illusions; in the ultimate truth, seeing that there is no arising, etc., is called seeing the Noble Truths.' As it is said in the Manjushri Path Practice Sutra, the Buddha told Manjushri (name of a Bodhisattva):
若見一切諸法無起。即解苦諦。若見一切諸法無住。即能斷集。若見一切諸法畢竟涅槃。即能證滅。文殊師利。若見一切諸法無自體。即是修道。以是義故。摩訶衍中聖諦道理得成。道理成故。智慧得成。智慧成故。一切皆可然若誹謗空者。如上偈說。若不然空者。一切皆不然。如論偈說。
汝今持自過 而欲與我耶 亦如人乘馬 自忘其所乘
釋曰。若汝不欲令空有過失者。今當說之。如論偈說。
汝若見諸法 皆有自體者 諸體無因緣 還成自然見
釋曰。若見諸體有自體者。則無諸體從因緣生。不待因緣而有體故。複次若見諸體有自體者。今當說過。如論偈說。
若因果無待 作者及作業 及至起滅等 一切法皆壞
釋曰。此謂不待因緣者。因果等義皆亦不成。汝云何于空義妄生分別。譬如小兒見畫夜叉而生怖心。發聲大叫。若色等是空無有自體。如虛空華。作是分別者。不應於此而生怖畏。以是故。如論偈說。
從眾緣生法 我說即是空 但為假名字 亦是中道義
釋曰。眼等諸體從緣起者。諸緣中眼等非有非無非。亦有亦無非。非有非非無。非異非一。非自非他。亦非俱非不俱。所有從緣起者。第一義中自體無起。依世諦故有眼等起。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果能見到一切諸法（dharma，宇宙間的一切事物和現象）無生起，那就是理解了苦諦（duhkha-satya，四聖諦之一，關於痛苦的真理）。如果能見到一切諸法無住，就能斷除集諦（samudaya-satya，四聖諦之一，關於痛苦根源的真理）。如果能見到一切諸法畢竟涅槃（nirvana，解脫），就能證得滅諦（nirodha-satya，四聖諦之一，關於滅除痛苦的真理）。文殊師利（Manjusri，智慧的象徵），如果能見到一切諸法無自性（svabhava，事物固有的、不變的性質），那就是在修道諦（marga-satya，四聖諦之一，關於達到解脫的道路）。因為這個緣故，大乘（Mahayana，佛教的一個主要分支）中聖諦（arya-satya，四聖諦）的道理才能成立。道理成立，智慧才能成就。智慧成就，一切皆有可能。如果有人誹謗空性（sunyata，佛教中的一個重要概念，指事物沒有固有的自性），就如上面的偈頌所說。如果否定空性，一切都將不成立，正如論中的偈頌所說： 『你現在拿著自己的過錯，想要給我嗎？就像人騎著馬，卻忘記了自己所乘之物。』 解釋說：如果你們不希望空性有過失，現在我就來說明。正如論中的偈頌所說： 『如果你認為諸法都有自性，那麼這些自性沒有因緣，就會變成自然而有的見解。』 解釋說：如果認為諸法有自性，那麼諸法就不會從因緣而生。因為它們不依賴因緣而有自性。進一步說，如果認為諸法有自性，現在我就要指出其中的過失。正如論中的偈頌所說： 『如果因果之間沒有依賴關係，那麼作者和作業，以及生起和滅亡等等，一切法都將壞滅。』 解釋說：這就是說，如果不依賴因緣，因果等意義都不能成立。你們為什麼要在空性的意義上妄加分別呢？譬如小孩子看到畫中的夜叉（yaksha，一種神祇）而心生恐懼，大聲叫喊。如果色（rupa，物質）等是空性的，沒有自性，就像虛空中的花朵一樣，這樣分別的人，不應該對此產生恐懼。因此，正如論中的偈頌所說： 『從眾多因緣產生的法，我說那就是空性。但這只是假名安立，也是中道（madhyama-pratipada，不落兩邊的道路）的意義。』 解釋說：眼等諸法從因緣生起，在諸緣中，眼等既非有，也非無，也非亦有亦無，也非非有非非無，非異非一，非自非他，也非俱非不俱。所有從因緣生起的事物，在第一義（paramartha-satya，勝義諦，終極真理）中，自性沒有生起。依世俗諦（samvriti-satya，相對真理）的緣故，才有眼等的生起。
【English Translation】 English version: If one sees all dharmas (dharma, all things and phenomena in the universe) as without arising, that is understanding the Truth of Suffering (duhkha-satya, one of the Four Noble Truths, the truth about suffering). If one sees all dharmas as without abiding, one can cut off the Truth of the Origin of Suffering (samudaya-satya, one of the Four Noble Truths, the truth about the origin of suffering). If one sees all dharmas as ultimately nirvana (nirvana, liberation), one can realize the Truth of the Cessation of Suffering (nirodha-satya, one of the Four Noble Truths, the truth about the cessation of suffering). Manjusri (Manjusri, symbol of wisdom), if one sees all dharmas as without inherent existence (svabhava, the inherent, unchanging nature of things), that is cultivating the Truth of the Path (marga-satya, one of the Four Noble Truths, the truth about the path to liberation). Because of this meaning, the doctrine of the Noble Truths (arya-satya, the Four Noble Truths) in the Mahayana (Mahayana, a major branch of Buddhism) can be established. When the doctrine is established, wisdom can be achieved. When wisdom is achieved, everything is possible. If someone slanders emptiness (sunyata, an important concept in Buddhism, referring to the lack of inherent existence of things), it is as the verse above says. If one denies emptiness, everything will be impossible, as the verse in the treatise says: 'Are you now holding your own faults, wanting to give them to me? It is like a person riding a horse, but forgetting what they are riding on.' Explanation: If you do not want emptiness to have faults, I will now explain it. As the verse in the treatise says: 'If you see all dharmas as having inherent existence, then these inherent existences have no causes and conditions, and will become a view of natural existence.' Explanation: If one thinks that all dharmas have inherent existence, then the dharmas will not arise from causes and conditions. Because they have inherent existence without relying on causes and conditions. Furthermore, if one thinks that all dharmas have inherent existence, I will now point out the faults in it. As the verse in the treatise says: 'If there is no dependence between cause and effect, then the agent and the action, as well as arising and ceasing, etc., all dharmas will be destroyed.' Explanation: This means that if one does not rely on causes and conditions, the meanings of cause and effect, etc., cannot be established. Why do you make arbitrary distinctions about the meaning of emptiness? For example, a child sees a yaksha (yaksha, a type of deity) in a painting and becomes frightened, shouting loudly. If form (rupa, matter) and so on are empty, without inherent existence, like flowers in the sky, those who make such distinctions should not be afraid of this. Therefore, as the verse in the treatise says: 'The dharmas that arise from many causes and conditions, I say that is emptiness. But this is only a provisional name, and it is also the meaning of the Middle Way (madhyama-pratipada, the path that does not fall into extremes).' Explanation: The dharmas such as the eye arise from causes and conditions. Among the causes and conditions, the eye and so on are neither existent nor non-existent, neither both existent and non-existent, nor neither existent nor non-non-existent, neither different nor the same, neither self nor other, nor neither both nor not both. All things that arise from causes and conditions, in the ultimate truth (paramartha-satya, the ultimate truth), inherent existence does not arise. Because of conventional truth (samvriti-satya, relative truth), there is the arising of the eye and so on.
我說此起空者。謂自體空故。如經偈言。從緣不名生。生法無自體。若有屬緣者。是即名為空。世間出世間。但是假施設。其有解空者。名為不放逸。如楞伽經說。自體無起。體無起者。如佛告大慧。我說一切法空。若言從緣生者。亦是空之異名。何以故。因施設故。世間出世間法。並是世諦所作。如是施設名字即是中道。如摩訶般若波羅蜜經說。云何名中道。謂離有起無起及有無等邊故。名為中道。所謂諸體無起無不起。非有非無。非常非無常。非空非不空。修中道者。觀察之時。不見眼有體。不見眼無體。乃至色受想行識不見體。不見無體。又如寶積經說。佛告迦葉。有是一邊。無是一邊。離二中間。則無色無受想行識。如是中道名為得證實相方便。以是故。如論偈說。
未曾有一法 不從因緣生 如是一切法 無不是空者
釋曰。此謂從緣所起物。譬如幻等丈夫畢竟無體。僧佉人言。如虛空等不從緣生。從緣生法為出因者。于彼宗中一分之義此義不成。是彼出因之過。論者言。虛空之過已如先說。大過咎者。今聚汝身難可逃避。云何過咎。如論偈說。
若一切不空 無起亦無滅 無四聖諦體 過還在汝身
釋曰。此義云何。若苦非空有自體者。則無作者。無作者故。不從緣生
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 我說『此起空』，是指自體是空性的緣故。如經文偈頌所說：『從因緣和合而生，不能稱之為生，因為生法沒有自體。如果有什麼是依屬於因緣的，那就可以稱之為空。世間和出世間的一切，都只是假立的施設。能夠理解空性的人，就叫做不放逸。』如《楞伽經》（Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra）所說，自體沒有生起。體沒有生起，如佛陀告訴大慧（Mahāmati）菩薩：『我說一切法皆空，如果說是從因緣而生，這也是空的另一種名稱。』為什麼呢？因為是因施設的緣故。世間和出世間法，都是世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya）所作。像這樣施設名字，就是中道（madhyamā-pratipad）。如《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》（Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra）所說：『什麼叫做中道？』就是遠離有生起、無生起以及有無等邊，所以叫做中道。所謂諸法體性無生起也無不生起，非有非無，非常非無常，非空非不空。修習中道的人，在觀察的時候，不見眼有自體，不見眼無自體，乃至色受想行識不見自體，不見無自體。又如《寶積經》（Ratnakūṭa Sūtra）所說，佛陀告訴迦葉（Kāśyapa）：『有是一邊，無是一邊，離開這兩邊中間，就沒有色受想行識。像這樣的中道，名為得到證實相的方便。』因此，如論偈所說： 『未曾有一法，不從因緣生，如是一切法，無不是空者。』 解釋說：這是說從因緣所生之物，譬如幻化等，丈夫畢竟沒有自體。僧佉（Sāṃkhya）派人說，如虛空等不是從因緣而生，從因緣生法為出因者，在他們的宗派中一部分的意義，這個意義不能成立。這是他們出因的過失。論者說，虛空的過失已經像先前所說。大過咎者，現在聚集你的身體難以逃避。什麼是過咎呢？如論偈所說： 『若一切不空，無起亦無滅，無四聖諦體，過還在汝身。』 解釋說：這個意義是什麼呢？如果苦不是空性，有自體的話，就沒有作者。沒有作者的緣故，不是從因緣而生。
【English Translation】 English version: I say that 『this arising is emptiness』 means that the self-nature is empty. As the verse in the scripture says: 『Arising from conditions is not called arising, because arising dharmas have no self-nature. If anything belongs to conditions, that is called emptiness. All of the mundane and supramundane are merely provisional designations. One who understands emptiness is called non-negligent.』 As the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (《楞伽經》) says, self-nature has no arising. That which has no arising, as the Buddha told Mahāmati (大慧), 『I say that all dharmas are empty; if it is said to arise from conditions, that is another name for emptiness.』 Why? Because it is due to designation by causes. Mundane and supramundane dharmas are all made by conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya). Designating names in this way is the Middle Way (madhyamā-pratipad). As the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra (《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》) says, 『What is called the Middle Way?』 It is called the Middle Way because it is apart from the extremes of arising, non-arising, and existence and non-existence. That is, the nature of all entities is neither arising nor non-arising, neither existent nor non-existent, neither permanent nor impermanent, neither empty nor non-empty. One who cultivates the Middle Way, when observing, does not see that the eye has self-nature, nor does one see that the eye has no self-nature, and so on, up to form, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness, one does not see self-nature, nor does one see no self-nature. Furthermore, as the Ratnakūṭa Sūtra (《寶積經》) says, the Buddha told Kāśyapa (迦葉), 『Existence is one extreme, non-existence is one extreme; apart from the middle of these two extremes, there is no form, feeling, perception, volition, or consciousness. Such a Middle Way is called the expedient for attaining the true reality.』 Therefore, as the verse in the treatise says: 『There has never been a single dharma that does not arise from conditions; all such dharmas are not empty.』 The explanation says: This refers to things that arise from conditions, such as illusions, etc.; a man ultimately has no self-nature. The Sāṃkhya (僧佉) school says that things like space do not arise from conditions; for those who consider dharmas arising from conditions as the cause of arising, this meaning is not established in their school's partial view. This is the fault of their cause of arising. The treatise writer says that the fault of space has already been discussed earlier. O great fault-finder, now that your body is gathered together, it is difficult to escape. What is the fault? As the verse in the treatise says: 『If everything is not empty, there is no arising or cessation, there is no nature of the Four Noble Truths; the fault still remains with you.』 The explanation says: What is the meaning of this? If suffering is not empty and has self-nature, then there is no agent. Because there is no agent, it does not arise from conditions.
。執是有者。世諦之中亦所不信。何況第一義耶。以是故。如論偈說。
不從緣生者 何處當有苦 無常即苦義 彼苦無自體
釋曰。此謂若不從因緣生者。即是常。常則非苦。修多羅人言。若無常故苦。苦故無我。若無我者。則無自體。以如是故苦無自體。論者言。汝所說者義不相應。如論偈說。
苦既無自體 何處當有集 以集無有故 是則破于空
釋曰。此謂苦體無起。何以故。若有自體者。不待因緣有。如論偈說。
苦若定有性 先來所不見 於今云何見 其性不異故
釋曰。若先不見苦性。得聖果時亦應不見。何以故。性若定者。云何可見。如論偈說。
苦若有體者 不應有滅義 汝著有體故 即破于滅體 苦若有定性 則無有修道 道若可修者 即無有定性
釋曰。此謂若有滅體即有苦體。修者云何數數起正見等。故名為修。若此道體先已成就而有起者不然。若欲避此等過。而說道可修者。如論偈說。
若道是可修 即無有自體 苦集乃至滅 是等悉皆無
釋曰。此謂道有起義若成亦不離無自體。以是故。如上偈所說道理。無起苦者。以苦無故。滅則無體。若言是滅苦之道者。如論偈說。
為滅苦者道
何有道可得 不解苦自體 亦不解苦因
釋曰。此謂如汝所說道理苦有自體。有自體者則不可解。亦不解苦因之過。斷義不成。不斷因體故。斷即無體。愛體無盡者。有盡義不成。滅名無體。無體故證滅義不成。若無證滅趣滅之道。有自體者。則無有修。若無修道亦無證四果人。若欲得有證果人。而執有自體見不捨者。今問何故不捨。若所證之果有自體者。云何復說有能證人。以是故。如論偈說。
既無果自體 住果向亦無 以無有八人 則無有僧寶
釋曰。八人者。謂四道四果。人有差別故。人者云何。謂人中勝人士夫等。若四聖諦無自體者。非獨無僧。如論偈說。
若無四聖諦 亦無有法寶 無有法僧故 云何當有佛
釋曰。佛者能以法覺弟子故名佛。複次今問執有自體者。佛婆伽婆為有自體。為無自體。問曰。此有何過而作是問耶。答曰。若汝欲得佛有自體者。則不藉覺了真如而名為佛。如論偈說。
不以覺為緣 佛墮無緣過 不以佛為緣 覺墮無緣過 佛有自體者 諸菩薩修行 為佛勤精進 不應得成佛 是法及非法 無人能作者 不空何須作 有體作不然
釋曰。此謂若法有自體而起作者不然。又汝意謂亦不長小令大。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：有什麼道可以獲得解脫？ 答：如果不能理解痛苦的本性，也不能理解痛苦的根源，那麼就無法獲得解脫。
解釋：這裡是說，如果像你所說的那樣，道理和痛苦有其自身存在的實體（自體），那麼這種自體是不可解除的。這樣一來，也就無法理解痛苦的根源，斷除痛苦的意義也無法成立，因為痛苦的根源沒有被斷除。如果斷除痛苦，那麼自體就不存在了。如果愛慾的實體沒有窮盡，那麼說有窮盡的意義也無法成立。涅槃（滅）的名稱也變得沒有實體。因為沒有實體，所以證得涅槃的意義也無法成立。如果沒有證得涅槃，也就沒有趨向涅槃的道路。如果有自體存在，那麼就沒有修行。如果沒有修行之道，也就沒有證得四果的聖人。如果想要有證得果位的聖人，卻又執著于自體見而不捨棄，那麼現在要問你為什麼不捨棄？如果所證得的果位有自體存在，又怎麼能說有能證之人呢？因此，就像論偈所說：
既然沒有果位的自體，那麼安住于果位和趨向果位的人也都不存在。因為沒有八種聖人（四向四果），那麼也就沒有僧寶。
解釋：八人指的是四向四果的聖人。因為人的差別而有不同。人是什麼呢？指的是人中的殊勝人士、丈夫等。如果四聖諦沒有自體，那麼不僅僅是沒有僧寶。就像論偈所說：
如果沒有四聖諦，那麼也就沒有法寶。沒有法寶和僧寶，又怎麼會有佛寶呢？
解釋：佛，是因為能以佛法覺悟弟子，所以稱為佛。再問那些執著于自體的人，佛陀（婆伽婆，Bhagavan）是有自體還是沒有自體？你可能會問，這個問題有什麼不妥嗎？回答是，如果你想要佛陀有自體，那麼就不需要通過覺悟真如才能被稱為佛。就像論偈所說：
如果不以覺悟為因緣，那麼佛陀就會陷入無因緣的過失。如果不以佛陀為因緣，那麼覺悟也會陷入無因緣的過失。如果佛陀有自體，那麼諸位菩薩的修行，爲了成就佛果而勤奮精進，就不應該能夠成佛。如果是法和非法，沒有人能夠創造它們。如果一切皆空，又何須造作？如果有自體存在，那麼造作就是不合理的。
解釋：這裡是說，如果法有自體，那麼發起造作就是不合理的。而且，你的意思是說，也不能使小的變大，令大的變小。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: What path is there to be attained? Answer: If one does not understand the nature of suffering itself, nor understand the cause of suffering, then there is no liberation.
Explanation: This means that, as you say, if the principle and suffering have their own inherent entity (svabhava), then this svabhava is irremovable. In this case, one cannot understand the cause of suffering, and the meaning of cutting off suffering cannot be established, because the root of suffering has not been cut off. If suffering is cut off, then svabhava does not exist. If the entity of desire is not exhausted, then the meaning of saying it is exhausted cannot be established. The name of Nirvana (cessation) also becomes without entity. Because there is no entity, the meaning of attaining Nirvana cannot be established. If there is no attainment of Nirvana, then there is no path to approach Nirvana. If svabhava exists, then there is no practice. If there is no path of practice, then there are no saints who have attained the four fruits (stages of enlightenment). If you want to have saints who have attained the fruits, but you cling to the view of svabhava and do not abandon it, then now I ask you why do you not abandon it? If the fruit that is attained has svabhava, then how can you say that there is someone who can attain it? Therefore, as the verse in the treatise says:
Since there is no svabhava of the fruit, then those who abide in the fruit and those who are approaching the fruit do not exist either. Because there are no eight types of saints (four paths and four fruits), then there is no Sangha Jewel.
Explanation: The eight persons refer to the saints of the four paths and four fruits. They are different because of the differences in people. What are people? They refer to the superior people, heroes, etc. among people. If the Four Noble Truths do not have svabhava, then it is not just that there is no Sangha Jewel. As the verse in the treatise says:
If there are no Four Noble Truths, then there is no Dharma Jewel either. Without the Dharma and Sangha Jewels, how can there be the Buddha Jewel?
Explanation: Buddha (Bhagavan) is called Buddha because he can enlighten disciples with the Dharma. Furthermore, I ask those who cling to svabhava, does the Buddha (Bhagavan) have svabhava or not? You may ask, what is wrong with this question? The answer is, if you want the Buddha to have svabhava, then it is not necessary to be called Buddha through the enlightenment of Suchness (Tathata). As the verse in the treatise says:
If not taking enlightenment as a condition, then the Buddha falls into the fault of being without conditions. If not taking the Buddha as a condition, then enlightenment also falls into the fault of being without conditions. If the Buddha has svabhava, then the practice of all Bodhisattvas, diligently striving to achieve Buddhahood, should not be able to achieve Buddhahood. If it is Dharma and non-Dharma, no one can create them. If everything is empty, then why create? If svabhava exists, then creation is unreasonable.
Explanation: This means that if the Dharma has svabhava, then initiating creation is unreasonable. Moreover, you mean that one cannot make the small become large, or make the large become small.
亦不了闇令明。此過已如前說。自部人言。云何作者皆無自體。論者言。處處作者。皆見無自體故。譬如幻所作事內入等。有作亦如是。而此內入亦無自體。若有一物有自體者。即違先義。此謂無有所作體故。汝執有自體義。體若有者。汝可分明為我說之。若言有作及有體者。似何等物。是故汝所說者。皆是邪見。如論偈說。
無法非法因 果得無因過 若離法非法 汝得無待果
釋曰。若汝意謂不違世論。作如是說。欲得有法非法者。如論偈說。
若汝欲得有 法非法因果 從法非法起 云何不是空
釋曰此謂凡有起者皆空故。譬如幻所作事。非獨違汝自宗。今更有餘過咎。如論偈說。
一切言說事 世間皆被破 若壞緣起法 空義亦不成
釋曰。言說者謂作是言。作瓶作衣提婆達多言將白牛來我欲飲乳。若瓶等有自體須。作者不然若不欲得從緣起者。如上偈說。若壞緣起法。空義則不成。汝壞空義得何等過。如論偈說。
一物不須作 亦無人起業 不作名作者 則壞於空義 無生亦無滅 是則名為常 種種諸物類 皆住于自體
釋曰。云何為物類。譬如畫壁有種種色。種種形。種種性。種種量等差別。云何名住自體。謂無作者名住自
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 也不能因為不瞭解黑暗而瞭解光明。這個過失已經像前面說的那樣了。自部人說：『為什麼作者都沒有自體呢？』論者說：『處處作者，都可見其沒有自體。』譬如幻術所作的事情，如眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意（內入，指六根）等，有作用也是這樣。而這些內入也沒有自體。如果有一物有自體的話，就違背了先前的定義。這是因為沒有所作的實體。你執著于有自體的意義，如果體是真實存在的，你可以明白地為我說明它。如果說有作用和有實體，像什麼東西呢？所以你所說的，都是邪見。』如論偈說： 『無法、非法（指善與不善）的因，會導致沒有原因就產生結果的過失。如果離開法和非法，你就會得到不需要依賴的果。』 解釋說：『如果你認為不違背世俗的理論，而這樣說，想要有法和非法，就像論偈所說：』 『如果你想要有法、非法（指善與不善）的因果，從法、非法產生，怎麼能說不是空呢？』 解釋說：『這是說凡是有產生的都是空性的。』譬如幻術所作的事情。『不僅違揹你自己的宗派，現在還有其他的過失。』如論偈說： 『一切言說的事情，在世間都會被破斥。如果破壞緣起法，空性的意義也不能成立。』 解釋說：『言說，是指說這樣的話：』做瓶子『、』做衣服『、』提婆達多（Devadatta）說將白牛帶來，我想要喝牛奶『。如果瓶子等有自體，就需要作者，不然如果不想要從緣起產生，就像上面的偈頌所說。如果破壞緣起法，空性的意義就不能成立。你破壞空性的意義會得到什麼樣的過失呢？』如論偈說： 『一物不需要被製造，也沒有人發起行業（karma）。不製造被稱為作者，這就破壞了空性的意義。沒有生也沒有滅，這就叫做常。種種的物類，都安住于自體。』 解釋說：『什麼叫做物類呢？』譬如畫在墻壁上的畫，有種種顏色、種種形狀、種種性質、種種大小等差別。『什麼叫做安住自體呢？』就是沒有作者，叫做安住自體。
【English Translation】 English version Nor can one understand light by not understanding darkness. This fault has already been explained as before. The adherents of other schools say: 'Why is it that all agents have no inherent existence (svabhava)?' The proponent says: 'Everywhere agents are seen to have no inherent existence.' For example, things created by illusion, such as the sense faculties (ayatana, referring to the six sense organs: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind), and so on, have function in the same way. And these sense faculties also have no inherent existence. If there were a thing with inherent existence, it would contradict the previous definition. This is because there is no entity of what is made. You are attached to the meaning of inherent existence; if the entity is real, you can clearly explain it to me. If you say there is function and there is entity, what is it like? Therefore, what you say is all wrong views.' As the verse in the treatise says: 'A cause of what is lawful and unlawful (dharma and adharma) leads to the fault of obtaining a result without a cause. If you depart from what is lawful and unlawful, you will obtain a result without dependence.' The explanation says: 'If you think that you are not violating worldly theories, and say this, wanting to have what is lawful and unlawful, as the verse in the treatise says:' 'If you want to have the cause and effect of what is lawful and unlawful (dharma and adharma), arising from what is lawful and unlawful, how can you say it is not empty?' The explanation says: 'This means that everything that arises is empty.' For example, things created by illusion. 'Not only does it violate your own school, but now there are other faults.' As the verse in the treatise says: 'All things spoken of are refuted in the world. If the law of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) is destroyed, the meaning of emptiness (śūnyatā) cannot be established.' The explanation says: 'Speaking refers to saying such things as: 'Making a pot,' 'Making clothes,' 'Devadatta (Devadatta) says to bring the white cow, I want to drink milk.' If pots and so on have inherent existence, then an agent is needed, otherwise, if you do not want to arise from dependent origination, as the verse above says. If the law of dependent origination is destroyed, the meaning of emptiness cannot be established. What fault do you obtain by destroying the meaning of emptiness?' As the verse in the treatise says: 'A thing does not need to be made, nor does anyone initiate action (karma). Not making is called the agent, which destroys the meaning of emptiness. There is neither birth nor death, which is called permanence. All kinds of things abide in their own inherent existence.' The explanation says: 'What are things?' For example, a painting on a wall has various colors, various shapes, various natures, various sizes, and other differences. 'What is called abiding in inherent existence?' It means that there is no agent, which is called abiding in inherent existence.
體。以不壞故。而名為常。若言常者。如論偈說。
未得者應得 及盡苦邊業 一切煩惱斷 以無空義故
釋曰。此謂世間出世間所證勝法者。及盡苦邊者。不須修對治法。所說之相。而不欲得。如是故欲得從緣起法。如幻如焰。自體無起。為有體無體等。有過失故。翳慧眼者妄見諸法不從緣起。此見是世諦見。妄執為第一義。其見何等。如論偈說。
所謂苦與集 乃至於滅道 見有生滅者 是見名不見
釋曰。云何不見。謂不見如實緣起法故。自部人言。若離見苦等諸行無有別見諦法。論者言。見諦者有何義耶。自部人言。謂見內諸入等有自體。不顛倒故。論者言。汝所說起等道理。先來已遮。見苦等無起。是見諦義者。得成汝向說。見內入等有自體不顛倒者。是語顛倒。汝之所欲。其義不成。應細觀察。云何見苦。非如子從母索歡喜丸。指手言。得此品中為自部人所說有過遮空對治明聖諦無體。令物信解是品義意。以是故。此下引經顯成。如梵王所問經說。佛告梵王。以此門應知苦非聖諦。知集滅道亦非聖諦。複次云何是聖諦耶。梵王。若苦無起。是名聖諦。集無能起。是名聖諦。見一切法畢竟如涅槃無起滅者。是名聖諦。若知諸法平等無二修于道者。是名聖諦。是故經說。若
【現代漢語翻譯】 體（kaya，身體）。以不壞故，而名為常（nitya，永恒）。若言常者，如論偈說：
未得者應得 及盡苦邊業 一切煩惱斷 以無空義故
釋曰：此謂世間出世間所證勝法者，及盡苦邊者，不須修對治法。所說之相，而不欲得。如是故欲得從緣起法，如幻如焰，自體無起。為有體無體等，有過失故。翳慧眼者妄見諸法不從緣起。此見是世諦見（samvrti-satya，世俗諦），妄執為第一義（paramartha-satya，勝義諦）。其見何等？如論偈說：
所謂苦與集 乃至於滅道 見有生滅者 是見名不見
釋曰：云何不見？謂不見如實緣起法故。自部人言：若離見苦等諸行無有別見諦法。論者言：見諦者有何義耶？自部人言：謂見內諸入等有自體，不顛倒故。論者言：汝所說起等道理，先來已遮。見苦等無起，是見諦義者，得成汝向說，見內入等有自體不顛倒者，是語顛倒。汝之所欲，其義不成。應細觀察。云何見苦？非如子從母索歡喜丸，指手言：得此品中為自部人所說有過遮空對治明聖諦無體。令物信解是品義意。以是故，此下引經顯成。如梵王所問經說。佛告梵王：以此門應知苦非聖諦（arya-satya，四聖諦）。知集（samudaya，集諦）滅（nirodha，滅諦）道（marga，道諦）亦非聖諦。複次云何是聖諦耶？梵王。若苦無起，是名聖諦。集無能起，是名聖諦。見一切法畢竟如涅槃（nirvana，涅槃）無起滅者，是名聖諦。若知諸法平等無二修于道者，是名聖諦。是故經說。若
【English Translation】 Kaya (body). It is called nitya (eternal) because it is indestructible. If it is said to be eternal, as the verse in the treatise says:
Those who have not attained should attain, and exhaust the karma at the edge of suffering. All afflictions are severed, because there is no emptiness.
Explanation: This refers to those who have attained the supreme Dharma in the world and beyond, and those who have exhausted the edge of suffering, who do not need to cultivate antidotal methods. The appearance described is not desired. Therefore, one desires the Dharma arising from conditions, like a mirage or a flame, without self-nature. Whether it has substance or not, etc., has faults. Those whose eyes of wisdom are obscured falsely see that all Dharmas do not arise from conditions. This view is the samvrti-satya (conventional truth), falsely clinging to it as the paramartha-satya (ultimate truth). What is this view? As the verse in the treatise says:
So-called suffering and accumulation, even to cessation and the path, Seeing that there is arising and ceasing, this view is called non-seeing.
Explanation: Why is it called non-seeing? Because it does not see the Dharma of dependent origination as it truly is. People of our own school say: If one departs from seeing the aggregates such as suffering, there is no separate Dharma of seeing the truth. The debater says: What is the meaning of seeing the truth? People of our own school say: It means seeing that the inner entrances, etc., have self-nature and are not inverted. The debater says: The principle of arising, etc., that you have spoken of has already been refuted. If seeing that suffering, etc., has no arising is the meaning of seeing the truth, then it follows that what you said earlier, that seeing that the inner entrances, etc., have self-nature and are not inverted, is inverted speech. What you desire, its meaning is not established. One should observe carefully. How does one see suffering? It is not like a child asking his mother for a joy-giving pill, pointing his finger and saying: 'Obtain!' In this section, the faults spoken of by people of our own school are to refute emptiness, counteract, and clarify that the noble truths have no substance. To make people believe and understand the meaning of this section. Therefore, the scriptures are cited below to manifest and establish it. As the Brahma King Questioning Sutra says. The Buddha told Brahma King: Through this door, one should know that suffering is not an arya-satya (noble truth). Knowing samudaya (accumulation), nirodha (cessation), and marga (path) are also not noble truths. Furthermore, what are the noble truths? Brahma King, if suffering has no arising, it is called a noble truth. If accumulation has no cause, it is called a noble truth. Seeing that all Dharmas are ultimately like nirvana (nirvana), without arising or ceasing, it is called a noble truth. If one knows that all Dharmas are equal and non-dual and cultivates the path, it is called a noble truth. Therefore, the sutra says, if
見因緣法。是人能見佛。亦見聖諦。能得聖果。滅諸煩惱。
釋觀聖諦品竟。
般若燈論釋卷第十四 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 般若燈論釋
般若燈論釋卷第十五
偈本龍樹菩薩 釋論分別明菩薩
大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅譯
觀涅槃品第二十五
釋曰。今此品者。亦為遮空所對治。令解涅槃無自體義故說。
鞞婆沙人言。彼先言。若一切非空。則無有起滅。此謂無自體義。無自體者。如石女兒。則無起滅。煩惱無自體故。非是起滅。而煩惱及名色因亦非起滅者。如上偈說。無斷苦證滅。復誰得涅槃。彼先已作此說者。我今欲得有所斷故證於涅槃。如經所說。染與染者。共起煩惱。此盡滅故。名為涅槃。如是涅槃心得解脫譬如燈滅。得涅槃者。由煩惱有自體故。如彼上說無自體者。若無煩惱體亦無涅槃。譬如石女兒。複次若以無自體為驗無得涅槃者。亦破得涅槃義。即是破於差別法體。是彼立義出因之過。論者言。汝說不善。諸法無自體者。如幻燈滅。是亦不違世諦智境界故。無自體者。從無始因緣展轉而起。如幻如焰。諸行無起。即是涅槃。證得涅槃亦復如是。無有自體。我亦不立無體體故。非立義過。上引石女為喻者。于第一義中得成
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 見因緣法（Pratītyasamutpāda，指事物由相互依存的條件產生）。能見到因緣法的人，就能見到佛，也能見到聖諦（Arya Satya，佛教四聖諦：苦、集、滅、道），能獲得聖果（指修行證悟的果位），滅除各種煩惱。 《釋觀聖諦品》結束。 《般若燈論釋》卷第十四 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1566 《般若燈論釋》 《般若燈論釋》卷第十五 偈頌作者為龍樹菩薩（Nāgārjuna），解釋者為分別明菩薩 大唐中印度三藏波羅頗蜜多羅（Prabhāmitra）翻譯 《觀涅槃品》第二十五 解釋：現在這一品，也是爲了遮止對空的執著，爲了讓人理解涅槃沒有自體的意義而說的。 鞞婆沙人（Vaibhāṣika，說一切有部）說：他們先前說，如果一切不是空，那麼就沒有生起和滅亡。這是指沒有自體的意義。沒有自體的東西，就像石女的兒子一樣，就沒有生起和滅亡。煩惱沒有自體，所以不是生起和滅亡。而煩惱以及名色（Nāmarūpa，五蘊中的受、想、行、識四蘊的總稱）的因也不是生起和滅亡，就像上面的偈頌所說：沒有斷除痛苦，沒有證得寂滅，那麼誰能得到涅槃呢？他們先前已經這樣說了，我現在想要有所斷除，所以證得涅槃。如經文所說：染污和被染污者，共同生起煩惱。這些煩惱全部滅盡，就叫做涅槃。這樣的涅槃，心得到解脫，就像燈熄滅一樣。得到涅槃，是因為煩惱有自體。如果像他們上面所說沒有自體，如果沒有煩惱的自體，也就沒有涅槃，就像石女的兒子一樣。再次，如果以沒有自體作為驗證，沒有得到涅槃的人，也就是破除了得到涅槃的意義，也就是破除了差別法的自體。這是他們立論的過失。 論者說：你們說得不對。諸法沒有自體，就像幻燈熄滅一樣，這並不違背世俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）的智慧境界。沒有自體的東西，是從無始的因緣輾轉而生起的，就像幻象和火焰一樣。諸行沒有生起，就是涅槃。證得涅槃也是這樣，沒有自體。我也不立無體的體，所以不是立論的過失。上面引用石女作為比喻，在第一義諦（Paramārtha-satya，絕對真理）中是成立的。
【English Translation】 English version: Seeing dependent origination (Pratītyasamutpāda, referring to things arising from interdependent conditions). A person who can see dependent origination can see the Buddha and also see the Noble Truths (Arya Satya, the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism: suffering, the cause of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path to the cessation of suffering), can attain the Holy Fruit (referring to the fruit of practice and enlightenment), and extinguish all afflictions. End of the chapter on 'Explaining the Contemplation of the Noble Truths'. Prajñāpradīpa-ṭīkā, Volume 14 Taishō Tripiṭaka, Volume 30, No. 1566, Prajñāpradīpa-ṭīkā Prajñāpradīpa-ṭīkā, Volume 15 The verses were composed by Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna, and the commentary was explained by Bodhisattva Vimalamati (Distinguished Wisdom). Translated by Tripiṭaka Prabhāmitra from Central India of the Great Tang Dynasty. Chapter 25: Contemplating Nirvāṇa Explanation: This chapter is also spoken to prevent attachment to emptiness, to make people understand that Nirvāṇa has no inherent existence. The Vaibhāṣikas (Sarvāstivāda school) say: They said earlier that if everything is not empty, then there is no arising and ceasing. This refers to the meaning of no inherent existence. Something without inherent existence, like the son of a barren woman, has no arising and ceasing. Afflictions have no inherent existence, so they are not arising and ceasing. And the cause of afflictions and nāmarūpa (name and form, the aggregate of the four skandhas of feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness) is also not arising and ceasing, as the verse above says: Without cutting off suffering and without attaining cessation, who can attain Nirvāṇa? They have already said this before, and now I want to cut off something, so I attain Nirvāṇa. As the sutra says: Defilement and the defiled together arise afflictions. The complete extinction of these is called Nirvāṇa. Such Nirvāṇa, the mind attains liberation, like a lamp extinguished. Attaining Nirvāṇa is because afflictions have inherent existence. If, as they said above, there is no inherent existence, if there is no inherent existence of afflictions, then there is no Nirvāṇa, like the son of a barren woman. Furthermore, if using no inherent existence as verification, those who do not attain Nirvāṇa, then the meaning of attaining Nirvāṇa is refuted, which is the refutation of the inherent existence of differentiated dharmas. This is the fault of their establishing a thesis. The commentator says: You are wrong. Dharmas have no inherent existence, like a phantom lamp extinguished, which does not contradict the wisdom realm of conventional truth (Saṃvṛti-satya). Something without inherent existence arises from beginningless causes and conditions, like illusions and flames. The non-arising of actions is Nirvāṇa. Attaining Nirvāṇa is also like this, without inherent existence. I also do not establish the existence of something without existence, so it is not a fault of establishing a thesis. The above quote of a barren woman as a metaphor is established in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya).
。汝執有自體義者。不可壞故。有所斷者不然。以是故。若不見真實理。而說有自體者。得涅槃義不成。法自體壞故。是事云何。汝向出因立義譬喻。三法皆不成故有過。複次鞞婆沙人言。如彼偈說。若一切非空則無有起滅。無斷苦證滅。復誰得涅槃者。不然。我今立有涅槃。云何為涅槃。謂第一義中諸行有自體。斷諸煩惱及滅名色而得涅槃故。非如駝角。涅槃不爾。有體有斷有滅有得故。論者言。如先偈說。若一切非空。則無有起滅。無斷苦證滅。云何得涅槃者。此謂有自體。不可壞故。自體者。若是自宗出因立喻有相似者。所成能成則為有力。而今無此力故。因與喻義亦不成。又亦違汝先所立義。我今問汝所立涅槃。為是第一義諦。為是世諦。若欲得是第一義諦者。我今答之。如論偈說。
無退亦無得 非斷亦非常 不生亦不滅 說此為涅槃
釋曰。此謂如是涅槃。我所欲得。如汝所說。斷故滅故。為出因等。斷諸煩惱得涅槃者。此等因義。今皆不成。顛倒心故。作如是說。義皆不然。複次諸執有涅槃者。或說涅槃是真實法。或說涅槃是施設法。二俱不然。以是義故。次須觀察。如論偈說。
涅槃有自體 即墮老死相 涅槃是體者 即是有為法
釋曰。此謂涅槃有自體者。無驗
可令信解。若令涅槃有體。即墮老死相。何以故。無有體離老死相。亦無老相死相離體。小乘之人不欲涅槃有老死相。以是故。如我出驗。第一義中涅槃非是體。無老死相故。譬如石女兒。是故汝宗因義不成。因不成故。亦與正義相違故。複次今更與過。若汝不欲涅槃是有為。而欲得涅槃。是無為者不然。無處有一物是體復是無為者。今當立驗。涅槃非是體無為故。譬如空華。複次更說其過。如論偈說。
涅槃若有體 云何是無因 亦無有一法 離因而得有
釋曰。此謂體者。皆藉因得有施設。涅槃是體不得無因。以是故此中出驗。涅槃非是體。無因能施設故。譬如兔角。多摩羅跋。及修多羅人等言(多摩羅跋者唐言赤銅葉)。如鞞婆沙師說。涅槃如燈滅。我今說涅槃者。但是無起。於世諦中施設有故。我所立者其義相應。論者言。今答此者。如論偈說。
汝涅槃非體 云何是無體 若涅槃無體 云何是無因
釋曰。鞞婆沙等分別涅槃是第一義。善以息煩惱為因。今汝義非如是體故。而言涅槃無體者。為無善等耶。義皆不然。譬如空華。若言涅槃無實無自體者。無如是驗。能令開解。涅槃非無體者。汝之所說難令人解。複次鞞婆沙分別涅槃先有體后無體。以燈為喻者。此是顯示世間
所解。以燈未滅時有體。滅已是無體。若汝計無體同彼已滅燈者。如向偈說。若涅槃無體云何是無因。此謂如燈無體。而有因施設作燈。如是諸陰煩惱無體。而有因施設為涅槃。如論偈說。
涅槃非無體 而不藉因者 若無因無緣 是名為涅槃
釋曰。如汝所說。涅槃無體是第一義。以是故。因有來去流轉相而施設有生死涅槃有體無體者。是世諦中所說。非第一義。如論偈說。
大師所說者 斷有斷非有 是故知涅槃 非無亦非有
釋曰。如經說。或有人以有求出有。或有人不以有求出有。是皆不然。若言涅槃是體者不然。犢子部言。我今立涅槃者。與彼不同。有是體義。有非體義。有二義故。無如上過。是義應爾。論者言。汝所立者其義不然。如論偈說。
若汝說涅槃 是體是非體 涅槃是體故 解脫者不然
釋曰。此謂體非體相違故。若是體則非非體。若是非體則不是體。若相待者。則有體非體相。如是說者。義不相應。何以故。有分別執著過故。犢子部言。涅槃者。云何非體。謂身及諸根無體故。名為非體。云何是體。謂有畢竟無上樂故。名為是體。論者言。此語不善。身諸根及覺等已遮故。亦即是遮無起等。畢竟無上樂者。如遮有為起。亦遮彼樂。若欲以
無為樂令物解者。無此驗體。汝之所立義不相應。複次若言涅槃有自體者。如論偈說。
若汝說涅槃 二俱有自體 涅槃是無為 二體是有為
釋曰。此偈顯何義耶。謂顯體非體外別有涅槃相。若彼法與此法有別相而是法體者不然。譬如水與火。如是體非體為涅槃相者不然。複次修多羅人言。涅槃者非體非非體故俱不可說。彼向言有二體過及有為者不然。論者言。亦無是事。今答此語。如論偈說。
汝若說涅槃 非體非非體 體非體若成 二非體亦成
釋曰。此謂如明與闇。有明故可說闇。如是有體非體故。有非體非非體得成。複次如論偈說。
非體非非體 若是涅槃者 如是二非體 以何法能了
釋曰。此謂若言以智慧了者。此智先已遮故。如論偈說。
如來滅度后 不言有與無 亦不言有無 非有及非無 如來現在世 不言有與無 亦不言有無 非有及非無
釋曰。此謂身中有神。神與身一。神與身異。離身有神。即身是神。諸不記中皆不說。是故第一義中涅槃不成。汝出因義亦不成。其過在汝。鞞婆沙人復言。第一義中有涅槃怖畏生死者。為求彼故起勤精進。不見求者為得無法故起勤精進。論者言。如我宗中不見有人得彼涅槃。第
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『無為樂』（Nirvana，指不生不滅的境界）能使事物解脫，但沒有這樣的驗證或實體。你所建立的義理是不相應的。此外，如果說涅槃有其自身實體，正如論偈所說：
『如果你說涅槃，二者都有自體，涅槃是無為的，二體是有為的。』
解釋：這首偈頌顯示了什麼意義呢？它顯示了實體（指現象界的實體）之外沒有別的涅槃相。如果某個法與這個法有區別，並且是法的實體，那是不可能的。比如水與火。像這樣，實體與非實體作為涅槃的相也是不可能的。此外，《修多羅》（Sutra，佛經）中說，涅槃既非實體也非非實體，所以兩者都不可說。他們說有二體之過以及有為之過，這是不對的。論者說，也沒有這樣的事。現在回答這句話，正如論偈所說：
『如果你說涅槃，非實體也非非實體，實體與非實體如果成立，那麼非實體與非非實體也成立。』
解釋：這就像光明與黑暗。因為有光明，所以可以說有黑暗。像這樣，因為有實體與非實體，所以非實體與非非實體才能成立。此外，正如論偈所說：
『非實體與非非實體，如果是涅槃的話，那麼這兩種非實體，用什麼法能夠了知呢？』
解釋：這指的是如果說用智慧來了知，那麼這種智慧已經被先前遮止了。正如論偈所說：
『如來滅度后，不說有與無，也不說有無，非有及非無。如來現在世，不說有與無，也不說有無，非有及非無。』
解釋：這指的是身中有神，神與身是一體的，神與身是不同的，離開身有神，即身是神。在所有不記（不可言說）之中都不說這些。因此，在第一義（勝義諦， ultimate truth）中，涅槃是不成立的。你提出的因義也是不成立的，過失在你。『鞞婆沙人』（Vaibhashika，佛教的一個部派）又說，在第一義中，因為有涅槃，所以才會有怖畏生死的人，爲了尋求涅槃，才會發起勤奮精進。沒有見過尋求者爲了得到無法（不存在的事物）而發起勤奮精進的。論者說，在我的宗派中，沒有見過有人得到那個涅槃的。第一義中涅槃是不成立的。
【English Translation】 English version: Those who advocate that 『Nirvana』 (Nirvana, referring to the state of non-birth and non-death) brings liberation assert that there is no such verifiable entity. The doctrine you establish is inconsistent. Furthermore, if you claim that Nirvana has its own inherent nature, as stated in the verse:
『If you say Nirvana, both have self-nature, Nirvana is unconditioned, the two natures are conditioned.』
Explanation: What meaning does this verse reveal? It reveals that there is no Nirvana-aspect separate from the entity (referring to the entity of the phenomenal world). If a certain dharma is different from this dharma and is the entity of the dharma, that is impossible. For example, water and fire. Likewise, entity and non-entity as the aspect of Nirvana is also impossible. Furthermore, the 『Sutra』 (Sutra, Buddhist scripture) says that Nirvana is neither entity nor non-entity, so both are unspeakable. They say there is the fault of two entities and the fault of being conditioned, which is incorrect. The commentator says that there is no such thing either. Now, in response to this statement, as the verse says:
『If you say Nirvana, neither entity nor non-entity, if entity and non-entity are established, then non-entity and non-non-entity are also established.』
Explanation: This is like light and darkness. Because there is light, one can speak of darkness. Likewise, because there are entity and non-entity, non-entity and non-non-entity can be established. Furthermore, as the verse says:
『Non-entity and non-non-entity, if that is Nirvana, then these two non-entities, by what dharma can they be understood?』
Explanation: This refers to if one says that it is understood by intelligence, then this intelligence has already been negated previously. As the verse says:
『After the 『Tathagata』 (Tathagata, the Buddha) passes away, it is not said to be existent or non-existent, nor is it said to be both existent and non-existent, neither existent nor non-existent. When the 『Tathagata』 (Tathagata, the Buddha) is in the present world, it is not said to be existent or non-existent, nor is it said to be both existent and non-existent, neither existent nor non-existent.』
Explanation: This refers to the spirit within the body, the spirit and the body are one, the spirit and the body are different, there is a spirit apart from the body, the body is the spirit. In all the 『avyākrta』 (avyākrta, the undeclared, the inexpressible) these are not spoken of. Therefore, in the 『paramārtha』 (paramārtha, ultimate truth), Nirvana is not established. The reason you put forward is also not established, the fault lies with you. The 『Vaibhashikas』 (Vaibhashika, a school of Buddhism) further say that in the 『paramārtha』 (paramārtha, ultimate truth), because there is Nirvana, there are those who fear birth and death, and in order to seek Nirvana, they initiate diligent effort. It has not been seen that seekers initiate diligent effort to obtain the unobtainable (something that does not exist). The commentator says that in my school, no one has been seen to obtain that Nirvana. Nirvana is not established in the 『paramārtha』 (paramārtha, ultimate truth).
一義中生死及涅槃俱無差別故。如論偈說。
生死邊涅槃 無有少差別 涅槃邊生死 亦無少差別
釋曰。此謂生死涅槃同無所得。是二俱不可得故。亦如分別性無故。生死涅槃皆不可得。已令信解。是故如汝所說為得涅槃而起精進為因者。其義不成。亦違于義。今以涅槃生死令開解者。如論偈說。
生死際涅槃 涅槃際生死 於此二中間 無有少許法
釋曰。涅槃者真如法界空之異名。真如無別異故。譬如虛空。雖有方之殊別而無異相。鞞婆沙人言。彼說一切惡見皆以空能出離。及欲得涅槃是空者。若謂涅槃是無能對治諸見者不然。是故有涅槃。是對治故。譬如明對治闇。論者言。此中燈光能照及有體者不成故。汝喻無體。是能成立之過。我言空者。謂一切諸法不可得也。即是說有所得對治。然彼有所得境界一切時不可得故。而空非是有體。無生故。譬如空華。亦非是無。先已說遮故。執著空者。亦是邪見。是故智者。應舍此執。若無智者。執空有體。空有體故則無利益。如寶積經說。佛告迦葉。若有人言能見空者。我說彼人不可治也。如是故空義不成。汝言對治為因者。因義不成。複次若第一義中有此見者。彼對治法可然。今觀此諸見無故。如論偈說。
滅後有無等 及
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：從第一義諦的角度來看，生死和涅槃沒有差別。正如論偈所說：
『生死之邊與涅槃，沒有絲毫的差別； 涅槃之邊與生死，也沒有絲毫的差別。』
解釋：這說明生死和涅槃都不可得，因為二者都無法獲得。就像分別自性本空一樣，生死和涅槃都是不可得的，這已經使人信解。因此，如你所說，爲了獲得涅槃而精進努力的說法是不成立的，也違背了真義。現在用涅槃和生死來使你開解，正如論偈所說：
『生死之邊際即涅槃，涅槃之邊際即生死； 在這二者中間，沒有任何少許的法。』
解釋：涅槃是真如（Tathata，事物的真實如是之相）、法界（Dharmadhatu，諸法存在的界域）、空的異名。真如沒有差別，就像虛空一樣，雖然有方位的不同，但沒有不同的體相。鞞婆沙（Vaibhashika，說一切有部）的人說，佛陀說一切惡見都可以通過空性來出離，以及想要獲得涅槃就是空性。如果認為涅槃是沒有能力對治各種見解的，那是不對的，所以有涅槃，是因為它可以對治。就像光明可以對治黑暗一樣。論者說，此中燈光能照以及有實體是不成立的，所以你的比喻沒有實體，這是能成立的過失。我說空，是指一切諸法都不可得。這就是說有所得的對治。然而，那有所得的境界在任何時候都不可得，所以空不是有實體，因為它是無生的，就像空花一樣。也不是沒有，因為之前已經說了遮止。執著于空也是邪見，所以智者應該捨棄這種執著。如果沒有智慧的人，執著空是有實體的，因為空有實體就沒有利益。如《寶積經》（Ratnakuta Sutra）所說，佛告訴迦葉（Kasyapa，佛陀的弟子）：如果有人說能見到空，我說這個人不可救治。因此，空義是不成立的。你說對治是原因，這個原因的意義是不成立的。再次，如果第一義諦中有這種見解，那麼這種對治法或許可以成立。現在觀察這些見解都是沒有的，正如論偈所說：
【English Translation】 English version: From the perspective of the ultimate meaning, there is no difference between Samsara (生死, birth and death) and Nirvana (涅槃, liberation). As the verse in the treatise says:
'The edge of Samsara and Nirvana, there is no slightest difference; The edge of Nirvana and Samsara, there is also no slightest difference.'
Explanation: This means that both Samsara and Nirvana are unattainable, because neither can be obtained. Just like the self-nature being empty, both Samsara and Nirvana are unattainable, which has already made people believe and understand. Therefore, as you said, the statement that one should strive diligently to attain Nirvana is not valid and violates the true meaning. Now, using Nirvana and Samsara to enlighten you, as the verse in the treatise says:
'The boundary of Samsara is Nirvana, the boundary of Nirvana is Samsara; In between these two, there is not the slightest bit of Dharma (法, law/teachings).'
Explanation: Nirvana is another name for Tathata (真如, suchness), Dharmadhatu (法界, the realm of phenomena), and emptiness. Tathata has no difference, just like space, although there are different directions, there is no different substance. The Vaibhashikas (鞞婆沙, a school of early Buddhism) say that the Buddha said that all evil views can be liberated through emptiness, and wanting to attain Nirvana is emptiness. If it is thought that Nirvana has no ability to counteract various views, that is not correct, so there is Nirvana, because it can counteract. Just like light can counteract darkness. The debater says that the light of the lamp in this case being able to illuminate and having substance is not valid, so your metaphor has no substance, which is a fault in establishing the argument. When I say emptiness, I mean that all Dharmas are unattainable. This is to say the counteraction of what is attainable. However, that attainable realm is unattainable at any time, so emptiness is not a substance, because it is unborn, just like a flower in the sky. It is also not non-existent, because it has already been said to negate it. Attachment to emptiness is also a wrong view, so wise people should abandon this attachment. If there are people without wisdom who are attached to emptiness as having substance, because emptiness has substance, there is no benefit. As the Ratnakuta Sutra (寶積經, a collection of Mahayana sutras) says, the Buddha told Kasyapa (迦葉, one of the principal disciples of Buddha): If someone says they can see emptiness, I say that person is incurable. Therefore, the meaning of emptiness is not valid. You say that counteraction is the cause, the meaning of this cause is not valid. Furthermore, if there is such a view in the ultimate truth, then this counteraction method may be valid. Now, observing that these views are all non-existent, as the verse in the treatise says:
常等諸見 涅槃前後際 諸見所依止
釋曰。此謂如來滅后。為有如來。為無如來。為亦有如來亦無如來。為非有如來非無如來。世間有邊。世間無邊。亦有邊亦無邊。非有邊非無邊。乃至世間常。世間無常。亦常亦無常。非常非無常。如是四見有十二種。如來滅后依涅槃起。世間邊等依未來起。世間常等依過去起。如是等見。云何起邪。由有虛妄分別習氣過故。然此分別無有自體。已令開解。以是故。如論偈說。
諸體悉皆空 何有邊無邊 亦邊亦無邊 非邊非無邊 何有此彼物 何有常無常 亦常亦無常 非常非無常
釋曰。如是等分別所依止境界無體。彼依止無體故。分別心亦無體。所以者何。一切法一切時一切種。從眾緣和合生。畢竟空故。無自性故。如是法中何者有邊。誰為有邊亦邊無邊非邊無邊。乃至何者是身。誰為有身。身一神一。身異神異。如是等六十二見。於畢竟空中皆不可得。以是故。如修多羅中偈說。所分別既無。分別何處起。能分別滅故。所分別亦亡。論初已來推求諸法。有亦無。無亦無亦有亦無亦無。非有非無亦無。是名諸法實相平等性空。滅諸戲論得安隱道。若依世諦中出因者。已如前說過。修多羅人言。第一義中有涅槃。佛為令眾生證得故。觀根
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 常等諸見 涅槃前後際 諸見所依止 釋曰。此謂如來（Tathagata，如來）滅后。為有如來。為無如來。為亦有如來亦無如來。為非有如來非無如來。世間有邊。世間無邊。亦有邊亦無邊。非有邊非無邊。乃至世間常。世間無常。亦常亦無常。非常非無常。如是四見有十二種。如來滅后依涅槃（Nirvana，涅槃）起。世間邊等依未來起。世間常等依過去起。如是等見。云何起邪。由有虛妄分別習氣過故。然此分別無有自體。已令開解。以是故。如論偈說。 諸體悉皆空 何有邊無邊 亦邊亦無邊 非邊非無邊 何有此彼物 何有常無常 亦常亦無常 非常非無常 釋曰。如是等分別所依止境界無體。彼依止無體故。分別心亦無體。所以者何。一切法一切時一切種。從眾緣和合生。畢竟空故。無自性故。如是法中何者有邊。誰為有邊亦邊無邊非邊無邊。乃至何者是身。誰為有身。身一神一。身異神異。如是等六十二見。於畢竟空中皆不可得。以是故。如修多羅（Sutra，經）中偈說。所分別既無。分別何處起。能分別滅故。所分別亦亡。論初已來推求諸法。有亦無。無亦無亦有亦無亦無。非有非無亦無。是名諸法實相平等性空。滅諸戲論得安隱道。若依世諦中出因者。已如前說過。修多羅人言。第一義中有涅槃。佛為令眾生證得故。觀根
【English Translation】 English version Views on Permanence and Other Matters The limits before and after Nirvana, are the basis of all views. Explanation: This refers to questions such as: After the Tathagata (如來) passes away, does the Tathagata exist? Does the Tathagata not exist? Does the Tathagata both exist and not exist? Does the Tathagata neither exist nor not exist? Is the world finite? Is the world infinite? Is it both finite and infinite? Is it neither finite nor infinite? Furthermore, is the world permanent? Is the world impermanent? Is it both permanent and impermanent? Is it neither permanent nor impermanent? These four views have twelve variations. The views about the Tathagata's existence after passing away arise based on Nirvana (涅槃). Views about the world's limits arise based on the future. Views about the world's permanence arise based on the past. How do such views arise as wrong views? It is due to the fault of false conceptual habit energies. However, these conceptualizations have no inherent substance. They have already been explained. Therefore, as the verse in the treatise says: All entities are empty; how can there be finitude or infinitude? Both finitude and infinitude, neither finitude nor infinitude. What objects are 'this' or 'that'? What is permanent or impermanent? Both permanent and impermanent, neither permanent nor impermanent. Explanation: The objects upon which such conceptualizations rely have no substance. Because these supports have no substance, the conceptual mind also has no substance. Why is this so? All dharmas (法) at all times and in all ways arise from the aggregation of various conditions. Because they are ultimately empty, they have no self-nature. In such dharmas, which one has limits? Who has limits, both limits and no limits, neither limits nor no limits? Furthermore, what is the body? Who has a body? Is the body one with the soul? Is the body different from the soul? These sixty-two views are all unattainable in ultimate emptiness. Therefore, as the verse in the Sutra (修多羅) says: 'Since what is conceptualized does not exist, where do conceptualizations arise? Because the ability to conceptualize ceases, what is conceptualized also vanishes.' From the beginning of the treatise, we have investigated all dharmas. Existence is also non-existence. Non-existence is also neither existence nor non-existence. Neither existence nor non-existence is also non-existence. This is called the true nature of all dharmas: equality, emptiness. Extinguishing all fabrications leads to the path of peace. If one seeks causes within conventional truth, it has already been discussed before. The Sutra says that there is Nirvana in the ultimate truth. The Buddha observes the faculties of beings in order to enable them to attain it.
觀心觀法觀時觀方而為說法。若無涅槃者。佛不應作此說法。乃至說八萬四千諸行煩惱對治門。為得涅槃而有所說。故有涅槃。論者言。若第一義中以說法為因。汝欲得爾耶。如論偈說。
有所得皆謝 戲論息吉祥 如來無處所 無一法為說
釋曰。有所得皆謝者。謂有所得境界無體故。有所得心亦無體。複次有所得境界無為故。有所得心亦不起。如是一切有所得皆謝。戲論息者。謂有所得境界無體。彼境界言說相亦不起。以是故名戲論息。吉祥者。謂一切災殃悉無體故。名為吉祥。由彼所起分別性。一切法不成。及一切法不可說故。第一義中以說法為因者。如上偈說。如來無處所。無一法為說。複次因自覺所得真實法者。不可言說。然此言說者。同分別境界故。所證真實法者。不可言說。如上偈說。如來無處所。無一法為說。複次如來說法者云何。為攝諸有故。無量千劫積集福智聚。佛身從此福智聚生。譬如如意珠悉能顯現一切色像。以一切眾生心自在願力故。如來無功用有聲出攝於三乘。佛身力故。所有聞者。迷故謂言如來為我說法。為說法者。於世諦中施設而有。複次陰非如來。離陰亦無如來。先已觀故。如來名者。無有一物無能說者。亦無聽者。亦無說處。以無實體故。如上偈說。如來無處
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 觀心、觀法、觀時、觀方而說法。如果沒有涅槃（nirvana，解脫），佛陀不應該作這樣的說法，乃至宣說八萬四千種對治煩惱的法門，都是爲了獲得涅槃而說的，所以涅槃是存在的。論者說：『如果從第一義諦（paramārtha-satya，最高真理）的角度，以說法為因，你想要得到什麼呢？』正如論偈所說： 『有所得皆謝，戲論息吉祥，如來無處所，無一法為說。』 解釋：『有所得皆謝』，是指有所得的境界沒有實體，所以有所得的心也沒有實體。進一步說，有所得的境界是無為的，所以有所得的心也不會生起。這樣，一切有所得都會消逝。『戲論息』，是指有所得的境界沒有實體，那麼關於這個境界的言說相也不會生起，因此稱為戲論止息。『吉祥』，是指一切災殃都沒有實體，所以稱為吉祥。由於這些所產生的分別性，一切法都不能成立，以及一切法都不可說。從第一義諦的角度，以說法為因，正如上面的偈頌所說：『如來無處所，無一法為說。』 進一步說，因為自覺所得到的真實法是不可言說的，然而這些言說，與分別境界相同，所以所證悟的真實法是不可言說的，正如上面的偈頌所說：『如來無處所，無一法為說。』 進一步說，如來說法是怎樣的呢？爲了攝受一切眾生，無量劫來積聚福德和智慧，佛身由此福德和智慧聚集而生。譬如如意寶珠，能夠顯現一切色像，因為一切眾生的心自在願力，如來不用功用，自然發出聲音，攝受三乘（triyāna，聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）。由於佛身的力量，所有聽聞者，因為迷惑，認為如來為我說法。為說法者，在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）中施設而有。進一步說，五蘊（skandha，色、受、想、行、識）不是如來，離開五蘊也沒有如來，先前已經觀察過了。如來這個名稱，沒有一物，沒有能說者，也沒有聽者，也沒有說的地方，因為沒有實體。正如上面的偈頌所說：『如來無處』
【English Translation】 English version He speaks the Dharma by observing the mind, observing the Dharma, observing the time, and observing the direction. If there were no Nirvana (nirvana, liberation), the Buddha should not have given such teachings, even to the extent of expounding the eighty-four thousand Dharma doors for counteracting afflictions, all of which are spoken to attain Nirvana. Therefore, Nirvana exists. The debater says, 'If, in the ultimate sense (paramārtha-satya, highest truth), you take the teaching of the Dharma as a cause, what do you want to obtain?' As the verse in the treatise says: 'All that is obtained vanishes, idle talk ceases, auspiciousness arises, the Tathagata (tathāgata, 'the thus-gone one', Buddha) has no location, and there is no Dharma to be spoken.' Explanation: 'All that is obtained vanishes' means that the realm of what is obtained has no substance, so the mind that obtains also has no substance. Furthermore, the realm of what is obtained is unconditioned, so the mind that obtains does not arise. Thus, all that is obtained vanishes. 'Idle talk ceases' means that the realm of what is obtained has no substance, so the aspect of speech about that realm does not arise, therefore it is called the cessation of idle talk. 'Auspiciousness' means that all calamities have no substance, so it is called auspiciousness. Because of the discriminating nature that arises from them, all Dharmas cannot be established, and all Dharmas cannot be spoken. In the ultimate sense, taking the teaching of the Dharma as a cause, as the verse above says, 'The Tathagata has no location, and there is no Dharma to be spoken.' Furthermore, because the real Dharma obtained through self-realization is unspeakable, yet these words are the same as discriminating realms, so the real Dharma that is realized is unspeakable, as the verse above says, 'The Tathagata has no location, and there is no Dharma to be spoken.' Furthermore, how does the Tathagata teach the Dharma? In order to gather all beings, he accumulates merit and wisdom for countless kalpas, and the Buddha's body is born from this accumulation of merit and wisdom. It is like a wish-fulfilling jewel that can manifest all forms and images. Because of the power of the free will of all beings, the Tathagata effortlessly emits sound, gathering the Three Vehicles (triyāna, Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, Bodhisattvayāna). Because of the power of the Buddha's body, all who hear it, because of delusion, think that the Tathagata is teaching the Dharma for me. The one who teaches the Dharma exists in conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya, relative truth). Furthermore, the five aggregates (skandha, form, feeling, perception, volition, consciousness) are not the Tathagata, and there is no Tathagata apart from the five aggregates, as has been observed before. The name 'Tathagata' refers to nothing, there is no speaker, no listener, and no place to speak, because there is no substance. As the verse above says, 'The Tathagata has no location.'
所。無一法為說。複次諸行無所造作。及諸行聚是無漏。二障俱斷。為不共佛法等作依止。具此四法故名如來。彼諸行聚無所造作故。有說法者不然。乃至聽法者。是有漏行聚。而言聽者受者。皆是言說。無有實體。第一義中如幻如化。誰說誰聽。以是故。如來無處所。無一法為說。複次如來行菩薩道時。種宿願力自在。以四攝法攝諸眾生。是諸眾生以種定報善根因緣力故。由信樂諸根心願自在。為令一切眾生歡喜故。六十種具足。無功用說法。聲依如來起。然如來常定。心無功用力所作無覺觀體而言有聲出者。是皆不然。以如是故。如來無處所。無一法為說。複次于先佛所說法。自解自證故。一切諸法皆先佛已說。今佛隨順而說。不加一字。以是故。如來無處所。無一法為說。複次第一義中一切諸法畢竟空故。無有一法為總相智為別相智可取。以是故。如來無處所。無一法為說。如金剛般若經說。如來為菩薩時。定光佛邊無一法可受。何以故。不可取不可說故。諸外道等甚可憐慜。我今以此無體自體空最上乘所說道理。破其邪辯。然彼外道依止惡見道理。而自覆藏己宗之過。執其所見。說是偈言。
彼第一義中 佛本不說法 佛無分別者 說大乘不然 化佛說法者 是事則不然 佛無心說法 化
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：所以，沒有一個法是如來說的。再者，一切諸行沒有造作，以及一切諸行聚集是無漏的，二障（煩惱障和所知障）都斷除了，作為不共佛法等的依止。具備這四種法，所以名為如來（Tathagata，佛的稱號之一）。那些諸行聚集沒有造作，所以說有說法者是不對的，乃至聽法者也是不對的。這些都是有漏的行聚，說聽者、受者，都是言說，沒有實體。在第一義諦中，一切如幻如化，誰說誰聽呢？因此，如來沒有處所，沒有一個法是如來說的。再者，如來行菩薩道時，憑藉過去所種的宿願之力，自在地以四攝法（佈施、愛語、利行、同事）攝受眾生。這些眾生憑藉過去所種的定報善根因緣之力，由於信樂，諸根和心願都自在。爲了令一切眾生歡喜，具足六十種功德，無功用地說法。聲音依如來而起，然而如來常在禪定中，心沒有功用和力量，所作所為沒有覺觀的體性，說有聲音發出，這些都是不對的。因為這個緣故，如來沒有處所，沒有一個法是如來說的。再者，對於過去佛所說的法，自己理解自己證悟，所以一切諸法都是過去佛已經說過的，現在的佛只是隨順著說，不增加一個字。因為這個緣故，如來沒有處所，沒有一個法是如來說的。再者，在第一義諦中，一切諸法畢竟空，沒有一個法可以作為總相智或別相智來取用。因為這個緣故，如來沒有處所，沒有一個法是如來說的。如《金剛般若經》所說，如來作為菩薩時，在定光佛（Dipamkara Buddha，過去佛之一）那裡沒有一個法可以接受。為什麼呢？因為不可取，不可說。那些外道等非常可憐，我現在用這無體、自體空的、最上乘所說的道理，破斥他們的邪辯。然而那些外道依止惡見的道理，來掩蓋自己宗派的過失，執著自己的所見，說了這首偈頌： 『在第一義諦中，佛本來不說法。 佛沒有分別，說大乘是不對的。 化佛說法，這件事是不對的。 佛沒有心，說法』
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, there is not a single Dharma that the Tathagata (Tathagata, one of the titles of the Buddha) speaks. Furthermore, all phenomena (Skandha) are without creation, and the aggregation of all phenomena is unconditioned (Asrava), with both obscurations (two hindrances: klesha-avarana (defilement obstruction) and jneya-avarana (knowledge obstruction)) severed, serving as the basis for the unique Buddha-dharmas (exclusive qualities of a Buddha). Possessing these four qualities, one is called Tathagata. Since those aggregates of phenomena are without creation, it is incorrect to say there is a speaker of Dharma, or even a listener of Dharma. These are all conditioned aggregates of phenomena, and to say there are speakers and receivers is merely verbal expression, without substance. In the ultimate truth (Paramartha), everything is like illusion and transformation; who speaks and who listens? Therefore, the Tathagata has no location, and there is not a single Dharma that the Tathagata speaks. Furthermore, when the Tathagata practiced the Bodhisattva path, relying on the power of past vows, he freely embraced beings with the four means of attraction (catuh-samgraha-vastu: generosity, kind speech, beneficial action, and cooperation). These beings, relying on the power of past fixed-retribution wholesome roots, are free in their faculties and aspirations due to faith and joy. To make all beings happy, he possesses sixty qualities and teaches the Dharma effortlessly. Sound arises dependent on the Tathagata, yet the Tathagata is always in Samadhi (meditative state), the mind has no effort or power, and actions have no nature of perception or contemplation; to say that sound emanates is incorrect. For this reason, the Tathagata has no location, and there is not a single Dharma that the Tathagata speaks. Furthermore, regarding the Dharma spoken by past Buddhas, one understands and realizes it oneself; therefore, all Dharmas have already been spoken by past Buddhas, and the present Buddha merely follows and speaks accordingly, without adding a single word. For this reason, the Tathagata has no location, and there is not a single Dharma that the Tathagata speaks. Furthermore, in the ultimate truth, all Dharmas are ultimately empty (Sunyata), and there is not a single Dharma that can be grasped as general characteristics or specific characteristics. For this reason, the Tathagata has no location, and there is not a single Dharma that the Tathagata speaks. As the Diamond Sutra says, when the Tathagata was a Bodhisattva, there was not a single Dharma that could be received from Dipamkara Buddha (Dipamkara Buddha, one of the past Buddhas). Why? Because it is ungraspable and unspeakable. Those non-Buddhists (Tirthika) are very pitiable. I now use this principle of the highest vehicle, which is without substance and self-empty, to refute their heretical arguments. However, those non-Buddhists rely on the principles of wrong views to conceal the faults of their own sects, clinging to their own views, and speak this verse: 『In the ultimate truth, the Buddha originally does not speak Dharma. The Buddha has no discrimination; to say the Mahayana is incorrect. The transformation body (Nirmanakaya) Buddha speaks Dharma; this is incorrect. The Buddha has no mind; to speak Dharma』
者非是佛 于第一義中 彼亦不說法 無分別性空 有悲心不然 眾生無體故 亦無有佛體 彼佛無體故 亦無悲慜心
外道等謂論者言。彼佛法中若言世諦中有悲慜者。猶如石女哭兒。論者言。此中明第一義者。一相故。所謂無相。無佛亦無大乘。第一義者。是不二智境界。汝說偈者。正是說我佛法道理。今當爲汝說如來身。如來身者。雖無分別。以先種利他願力為大誓莊嚴熏修故。能攝一切眾生。於一切時起化佛身。因此化身有文字章句次第出聲。不共一切外道聲聞辟支佛故。而為開演二種無我。為欲成就第一義波羅蜜故。為欲成就乘最上乘者故。名為大乘。有第一義佛故。依止彼佛而起化身。從此化身起于說法。由第一義佛為說法因故。不壞我所立義。亦不壞世間所欲。複次薩婆多人言。如來所說法者。皆是有分別故說法。以他眾生心自在願力起說法因故。譬如為聲聞等說法。論者言。是義不然。化佛說法者是無分別。非如汝語一向分別。薩婆多人言。佛無分別而為說法者不然。無分別故。譬如土塊。論者言。化佛與第一義佛不可說異故。世諦中有佛者。不遮世諦中。彼第一義佛為說法因者。亦不遮第一義中。如來無戲論故。分別如來。若有悲若無悲。皆是戲論。如是戲論悉皆無體。所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『如果有人認為這就是佛，那他就錯了』 『在第一義諦（Paramārtha-satya， ultimate truth）中，佛陀也不說法。』 『因為自性是無分別的空性（Śūnyatā， emptiness），所以有悲心是不可能的。』 『因為眾生沒有實體（Svabhāva， own-being），所以也沒有佛的實體。』 『因為佛沒有實體，所以也沒有悲憫心。』
外道（Tīrthika， non-Buddhist）等人對論者說：『如果你們佛法中說世俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya， conventional truth）中有悲憫，那就像石女哭她的孩子一樣。』論者說：『這裡所說的第一義諦，是唯一相，也就是無相。沒有佛，也沒有大乘（Mahāyāna， Great Vehicle）。第一義諦是不可思議的智慧境界。』你說的偈頌，正是在說我們佛法的道理。現在我來為你解釋如來身（Tathāgata-kāya， body of the Thus-gone）。如來身雖然沒有分別，但由於先前的利他願力作為大誓莊嚴的熏修，所以能夠攝受一切眾生，在一切時起化佛身（Nirmāṇa-kāya， emanation body）。因此，化身有文字章句，次第出聲，不與一切外道、聲聞（Śrāvaka， Hearer）、辟支佛（Pratyekabuddha， Solitary Buddha）相同，而是爲了開演二種無我（anātman， no-self）。爲了成就第一義波羅蜜（Pāramitā， perfection），爲了成就乘最上乘（Agrayāna， Supreme Vehicle）的人，所以稱為大乘。因為有第一義佛，所以依止於彼佛而起化身。從此化身開始說法。由於第一義佛是說法的因，所以不破壞我所立的義理，也不破壞世間所希望的。』
複次，薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda， the doctrine that 'everything exists'）的人說：『如來說法都是有分別的，因為他以他眾生的心自在願力而起說法之因，譬如為聲聞等人說法。』論者說：『這種說法不對。化佛說法是無分別的，不像你所說的那樣一向分別。』薩婆多部的人說：『佛無分別而說法是不可能的，因為無分別就像土塊一樣。』論者說：『化佛與第一義佛不可說為不同，所以在世俗諦中說有佛，並不遮止世俗諦。彼第一義佛是說法之因，也不遮止第一義諦。如來沒有戲論（Prapañca， conceptual proliferation），分別如來有悲或無悲，都是戲論。』這樣的戲論都沒有實體。
【English Translation】 English version: 『Those who think this is the Buddha are mistaken.』 『In the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), even the Buddha does not teach.』 『Because the nature is non-discriminating emptiness (Śūnyatā), it is impossible to have compassion.』 『Because sentient beings have no inherent existence (Svabhāva), there is also no inherent existence of the Buddha.』 『Because the Buddha has no inherent existence, there is also no compassion.』
The Tīrthikas (non-Buddhists) and others said to the debater: 『If in your Buddhist teachings you say that there is compassion in conventional truth (Saṃvṛti-satya), it is like a barren woman crying for her child.』 The debater said: 『What is meant here by ultimate truth is the single characteristic, which is no characteristic. There is no Buddha, and there is no Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle). Ultimate truth is the realm of non-dual wisdom.』 The verses you speak are precisely explaining the principles of our Buddhist teachings. Now I will explain to you the Tathāgata-kāya (body of the Thus-gone). Although the Tathāgata-kāya has no discrimination, because of the prior vows of benefiting others as the adornment of great vows, it can gather all sentient beings and manifest a Nirmāṇa-kāya (emanation body) at all times. Therefore, the emanation body has words and sentences, and the sounds emerge in sequence, which are not the same as those of all Tīrthikas, Śrāvakas (Hearers), and Pratyekabuddhas (Solitary Buddhas), but to expound the two kinds of no-self (anātman). In order to accomplish the ultimate Pāramitā (perfection), and to accomplish those who ride the Agrayāna (Supreme Vehicle), it is called Mahāyāna. Because there is the ultimate Buddha, the emanation body arises relying on that Buddha. From this emanation body, the teaching arises. Because the ultimate Buddha is the cause of the teaching, it does not destroy the meaning I have established, nor does it destroy what the world desires.』
Furthermore, the Sarvāstivādins (the doctrine that 'everything exists') said: 『All the teachings of the Tathāgata are with discrimination, because he uses the power of the vows of other sentient beings' minds as the cause of the teaching, such as teaching for the Śrāvakas and others.』 The debater said: 『This statement is not correct. The teaching of the emanation Buddha is without discrimination, not always with discrimination as you say.』 The Sarvāstivādins said: 『It is impossible for the Buddha to teach without discrimination, because without discrimination it is like a lump of earth.』 The debater said: 『The emanation Buddha and the ultimate Buddha cannot be said to be different, so saying that there is a Buddha in conventional truth does not negate conventional truth. That the ultimate Buddha is the cause of the teaching does not negate the ultimate truth. The Tathāgata has no conceptual proliferation (Prapañca), and discriminating whether the Tathāgata has compassion or not is all conceptual proliferation.』 Such conceptual proliferation has no inherent existence.
悲慜眾生及能起悲者。亦皆無體。如汝先說。若世諦中有悲謂如石女哭兒者。是喻不然。悲云何相。謂見他有苦起憂苦心。是名悲相。譬如慈母憐極愛子。諸佛菩薩于諸眾生起憐慜心。亦復如是。縱令石女有悲憐心。於我何妨。而復不爾。譬如龜毛空與太虛空而不相似。是故設有悲者。諸佛悲心與石女悲心亦不相似。諸佛悲者。無量劫來積集熏修究竟具足。遍滿一切諸眾生界。若石女無此悲者。更莫復言世諦有悲者與石女悲相似。此品初鞞婆沙等所立驗者。論主已說其過。顯示涅槃無有自體。以是故。此下引經顯成。如梵天王所問經偈言。實無有涅槃。如來說涅槃。如虛空自結。如虛空自解。梵王白佛言。若有分別眾生欲得一切法有起有滅者。佛于其人亦不出世。若於涅槃起分別相言是有體者。然彼眾生決定不能出於生死。世尊。涅槃者。其義云何。一切相皆寂滅。是為涅槃。一切所作皆已謝。是為涅槃。世尊。愚癡眾生於佛法中雖得出家。而墮外道見中求涅槃體。如於麻中求油。指手言得。何異乳中求覓生酥。若於一切法畢竟寂滅中求涅槃者。乃至邪慢外道中聲聞非佛法中聲聞。若是正見成就行者。不作一法有起有滅。亦不欲得證獲一法。亦不見聖諦理。如摩訶般若中說。佛告須菩提。涅槃者。如幻如夢。如影如焰
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 對於悲憫眾生以及能夠生起悲心的人，實際上都沒有實體。正如你先前所說，如果在世俗諦中存在悲心，比如像石女哭泣她的孩子一樣，這個比喻是不恰當的。悲心的相狀是什麼呢？是見到他人有痛苦而生起憂愁痛苦的心，這被稱為悲心的相狀。譬如慈愛的母親憐憫至愛的孩子，諸佛菩薩對於一切眾生生起憐憫之心，也是如此。縱然石女有悲憫之心，對於我又有什麼妨礙呢？但事實並非如此。譬如龜毛與太虛空完全不相似。所以，即使有悲心，諸佛的悲心與石女的悲心也不相似。諸佛的悲心，是無量劫以來積累熏修，最終圓滿具足，遍滿一切眾生界。如果石女沒有這種悲心，就不要再說世俗諦中的悲心與石女的悲心相似。這一品中最初鞞婆沙（Vinaya-vibhāṣā）等所建立的驗證，論主已經說明了它的過失，顯示涅槃沒有自體。因此，下面引用經文來顯明成就。如梵天王所問經的偈頌所說：『實際上沒有涅槃，如來說涅槃，就像虛空自己結合，就像虛空自己解脫。』梵天王對佛說：『如果有分別的眾生想要得到一切法有生起有滅亡，佛也不會為這樣的人出世。如果對於涅槃生起分別之相，說它是有實體的，那麼這些眾生決定不能脫離生死。』世尊，涅槃的意義是什麼呢？一切相都寂滅，這就是涅槃。一切所作都已經止息，這就是涅槃。世尊，愚癡的眾生在佛法中即使出家，也會墮入外道的見解中，尋求涅槃的實體，就像在麻中求油，指著手說得到了。這與在牛奶中尋找生酥有什麼不同呢？如果在一切法畢竟寂滅中尋求涅槃，那麼乃至邪慢的外道中的聲聞也不是佛法中的聲聞。如果是正見成就的修行者，不會認為一法有生起有滅亡，也不想得到或證得一法，也不見聖諦的道理。』如摩訶般若（Mahā-prajñā）中說：『佛告訴須菩提（Subhūti），涅槃就像幻象，就像夢境，就像影子，就像火焰。』
【English Translation】 English version: Those who are compassionate towards sentient beings, as well as those who are capable of generating compassion, are in reality without substance. As you stated earlier, if compassion exists in conventional truth, such as a barren woman weeping for her child, this analogy is inappropriate. What is the characteristic of compassion? It is the arising of sorrowful and painful thoughts upon seeing the suffering of others, which is called the characteristic of compassion. Just as a loving mother pities her beloved child, the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas generate compassion towards all sentient beings in the same way. Even if a barren woman has compassion, what harm does it do to me? But the fact is not so. For example, turtle hair is completely dissimilar to empty space. Therefore, even if there is compassion, the compassion of the Buddhas is not similar to the compassion of a barren woman. The compassion of the Buddhas has been accumulated and cultivated over countless eons, ultimately complete and perfect, pervading all realms of sentient beings. If a barren woman does not have this compassion, then do not say that compassion in conventional truth is similar to the compassion of a barren woman. The validation established by the initial Vinaya-vibhāṣā and others in this chapter has already been pointed out as flawed by the author, showing that Nirvāṇa has no self-nature. Therefore, the following quotes from scriptures are used to clarify and accomplish this. As the verse in the Brahma King's Questions Sutra says: 'In reality, there is no Nirvāṇa; the Tathāgata speaks of Nirvāṇa, like space binding itself, like space liberating itself.' The Brahma King said to the Buddha: 'If there are sentient beings with discrimination who desire to attain all dharmas with arising and ceasing, the Buddha will not appear in the world for such people. If one generates a discriminating perception of Nirvāṇa, saying that it has substance, then those sentient beings will definitely not be able to escape from birth and death.' World-Honored One, what is the meaning of Nirvāṇa? The cessation of all characteristics is Nirvāṇa. The cessation of all actions is Nirvāṇa. World-Honored One, foolish sentient beings, even if they renounce the world in the Buddha-dharma, will fall into the views of external paths, seeking the substance of Nirvāṇa, like seeking oil in sesame seeds, pointing to the hand and saying they have obtained it. What difference is there between seeking ghee in milk? If one seeks Nirvāṇa in the ultimate cessation of all dharmas, then even the Śrāvakas among the heretics with wrong views are not Śrāvakas in the Buddha-dharma. If one is a practitioner who has attained right view, one will not assert that a single dharma has arising and ceasing, nor will one desire to attain or realize a single dharma, nor will one see the truth of the noble truths.' As it is said in the Mahā-prajñā: 'The Buddha told Subhūti, Nirvāṇa is like an illusion, like a dream, like a shadow, like a flame.'
。如鏡中像。如水中月。如乾闥婆城。
釋觀涅槃品竟。
般若燈論釋觀世諦緣起品第二十六
釋曰。今此品者。亦為遮空所對治。而以世諦緣起故說。
目部人謂我言。彼先言如來無處所無一法為說者。其義不然。論者言。我今當說。如來為欲驚怖一切外道及人天等眾生令息諸惡見過患故。說緣起法。佛由覺了緣起法故。名稱高遠遍一切世間。以是因緣故名為佛。汝今與緣起法作過者。自違所欲。如論偈說。
無明之所覆 造作彼三種 後有諸行業 由此往諸趣
釋曰。明所對治名為無明。而此無明能覆障眾生智慧。造作後有諸行。云何名後有。謂未受生者與不相離和合因果。共趣向後有故。名為後有。云何名諸行。行有三種。一謂無我法。二謂剎那。三謂三種業。云何為三業。謂福非福不動等。復有三種。謂身語意。無明者非獨為諸行緣。亦能與識等后支展轉為緣。體亦非獨無明覆障眾生。更有諸餘煩惱行者。謂造作有為法故。名之為行。如論偈說。
以諸行因緣 識托于諸趣 識相續托已 爾時名色起
釋曰。云何為識。於一一物分別取境界故名識。托者言生。行緣者。謂行與識為緣故名行緣。亦非獨諸行與識為緣。彼識生時亦有諸心數法共生。以
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如同鏡中的影像，如同水中的月亮，如同乾闥婆城（Gandharva-city，海市蜃樓）。
《釋觀涅槃品》結束。
《般若燈論釋觀世諦緣起品》第二十六
釋曰：現在這一品，也是爲了遮止空性所對治的，所以用世俗諦的緣起來說明。
目部人（Mudgala，人名）對我說：『你先前說如來沒有處所，沒有一法可說，這種說法不對。』論者說：『我現在要說，如來是爲了驚醒、震懾一切外道以及人天等眾生，讓他們停止各種惡行和過患，所以才說緣起法。佛因為覺悟了緣起法，所以名稱高遠，遍及一切世間。因為這個因緣，所以稱為佛。你現在對緣起法加以指責，是違揹你自己的意願。』如論偈所說：
『無明之所覆，造作彼三種，後有諸行業，由此往諸趣。』
釋曰：明所對治的叫做無明（Avidya， ignorance）。而這無明能覆蓋、障礙眾生的智慧，造作後有的各種行為。什麼叫做後有？是指未受生者與不相分離的和合因果，共同趨向後有，所以叫做後有。什麼叫做諸行？行有三種：一是無我法，二是剎那，三是三種業。什麼叫做三業？就是福業、非福業、不動業等。又有三種，就是身業、語業、意業。無明不只是諸行的緣，也能與識等后支輾轉為緣。而且不只是無明覆蓋、障礙眾生，還有其他的各種煩惱。行者，是指造作有為法，所以稱之為行。如論偈所說：
『以諸行因緣，識托于諸趣，識相續托已，爾時名色起。』
釋曰：什麼叫做識？對於一一事物分別取境界，所以叫做識（Vijnana，consciousness）。托，就是指生。行緣，是指行與識互為因緣，所以叫做行緣。而且不只是諸行與識互為因緣，當識產生時，也有各種心數法共同產生。以
【English Translation】 English version: Like an image in a mirror. Like the moon in water. Like a Gandharva-city (Gandharva-city, mirage).
The chapter on 'Explanation of Observing Nirvana' is complete.
Prajnapradipa-tika, Chapter Twenty-Six: Explanation of Observing Worldly Truth through Dependent Origination
Explanation: This chapter is also for refuting what is countered by emptiness, and thus it is explained through worldly truth and dependent origination.
Mudgala (Mudgala, a name) said to me: 'You previously said that the Tathagata has no location and that there is no dharma to be spoken, which is not right.' The commentator said: 'I will now explain that the Tathagata speaks of dependent origination in order to awaken and terrify all non-Buddhists and beings in the realms of gods and humans, causing them to cease all evil deeds and faults. Because the Buddha awakened to the dharma of dependent origination, his name is lofty and widespread throughout all worlds. Because of this cause, he is called Buddha. If you now find fault with the dharma of dependent origination, you are going against your own wishes.' As the verse in the treatise says:
'Covered by ignorance, they create those three, future existence and various actions, thereby going to various destinies.'
Explanation: What is countered by clarity is called ignorance (Avidya). And this ignorance can cover and obstruct the wisdom of beings, creating various actions that lead to future existence. What is called future existence? It refers to the inseparable combination of cause and effect of those who have not yet been born, jointly heading towards future existence, hence it is called future existence. What are called the various actions? There are three types of actions: first, the dharma of no-self; second, the momentary; and third, the three types of karma. What are the three karmas? They are meritorious karma, non-meritorious karma, and unwavering karma, etc. There are also three types, namely, physical karma, verbal karma, and mental karma. Ignorance is not only the cause of actions, but it can also be the cause of subsequent branches such as consciousness, turning into causes for each other. Moreover, it is not only ignorance that covers and obstructs beings, but there are also various other afflictions. Practitioners refer to the creation of conditioned dharmas, hence they are called actions. As the verse in the treatise says:
'Because of the causes of actions, consciousness relies on various destinies, once consciousness continuously relies, then name and form arise.'
Explanation: What is called consciousness? It is called consciousness (Vijnana) because it distinguishes and grasps objects in each and every thing. 'Rely' refers to arising. 'Action-cause' refers to actions and consciousness being causes for each other, hence it is called action-cause. Moreover, it is not only actions that are causes for consciousness, but when consciousness arises, various mental functions also arise together. With
是故亦以諸心數法為緣。複次行緣識者。如阿羅漢。亦有諸行。何故不與托後有識為緣。以彼愛繩斷故。不與托後有識為緣。是故愛等諸煩惱。亦與受後世識作緣。何故獨言諸行耶。為諸行有勝力故。譬如王者鬥戰得勝。非獨王勝。一切兵眾亦名為勝。由王為主故言王勝。複次或有人起如是意言。無明為不善諸行因可然。但愚癡者是不善故。云何得與善法諸行為因耶。此謂未斷無明者。為欲受天女眷屬樂故。而造諸福德行。以是故無明亦與福德行為展轉因。複次生死者。是第一義不善所有福德諸行。系屬生死者皆名不善。以是故無明能總與諸行為緣。複次善趣不善趣不動趣三種業者。各有上中下差別。是等諸行名為往諸趣業。往諸趣者。諸師各執不同。如薩婆多人說言。有彼中陰。以有名色相續。往託生處故。正量部人曇無鞠多部人等說言。無彼中陰。但以行為緣。而識得起。爾時名為託生。複次計有中陰者言。有色諸眾生等。於一處滅。是有色眾生。還相續生。無間前後起至彼異趣。名為託生。相續隨生故。譬如燈。以是故名色依止陰而有相續。從死剎那至受生剎那無間生故。名為受生。譬如現在人從此到彼。複次無中陰者言。色界死有生有。二有中間更無中有。有漏故。譬如無色界死有生有而無中有。何以故。死
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此，（無明）也以各種心所法為緣。再者，『行』緣『識』，例如阿羅漢，也有各種『行』，為什麼不與投生後有的『識』為緣呢？因為他們的愛慾之繩已經斷了，所以不與投生後有的『識』為緣。因此，愛等各種煩惱，也與承受後世的『識』作為因緣。為什麼單單說『諸行』呢？因為『諸行』有殊勝的力量。譬如國王戰鬥得勝，並非只有國王勝，一切兵眾也都被稱為勝。因為國王是主導，所以說國王勝。再者，或許有人產生這樣的想法：無明作為不善諸行的因，這是可以理解的。但是愚癡本身是不善的，怎麼能與善法諸行作為因呢？這是因為未斷無明的人，爲了享受天女眷屬的快樂，而造作各種福德之行。因此，無明也與福德之行作為輾轉相生的因。再者，生死，從第一義諦來說，是不善的，所有福德諸行，如果系屬於生死，都可稱為不善。因此，無明能夠總括地與各種『行』作為因緣。再者，善趣、不善趣、不動趣這三種業，各有上中下差別，這些『行』被稱為前往諸趣的業。所謂『前往諸趣』，各派論師的執著不同。如薩婆多部（Sarvastivada）的人說，存在『中陰』（Antarabhava），因為有名色（Namarupa）相續，前往投生之處。正量部（Sautrantika）、曇無鞠多部（Dharmaguptaka）等的人說，沒有『中陰』，只是以『行』為緣，而『識』得以生起，那時就稱為投生。再者，認為有『中陰』的人說，有色（Rupa）的眾生等，在一處滅亡，是有色的眾生，還相續地生起，無間斷地前後生起至彼異趣，稱為投生。相續隨之而生，譬如燈。因此，名色依止於陰而有相續，從死亡的剎那至受生的剎那無間斷地生起，所以稱為受生，譬如現在人從此到彼。再者，沒有『中陰』的人說，死有（ মারাণান্তিক চিত্ত / cuti-citta）和生有（ปฏิসন্ধি চিত্ত / patisandhi-citta），這兩種『有』的中間更沒有『中有』，因為有漏。譬如沒有死有生有而沒有中有。為什麼呢？死
【English Translation】 English version Therefore, ignorance also serves as a condition for all mental factors. Furthermore, regarding 『actions』 conditioning 『consciousness,』 consider the case of an Arhat (one who has attained enlightenment). They also possess various 『actions,』 so why don't these actions condition the consciousness that takes rebirth? Because their rope of craving has been severed, they do not condition the consciousness that takes rebirth. Therefore, cravings and other afflictions also serve as conditions for the consciousness that experiences future lives. Why is it specifically 『actions』 that are mentioned? Because 『actions』 possess superior power. For example, when a king wins a battle, it is not only the king who wins; all the soldiers are also considered to have won. Because the king is the leader, it is said that the king has won. Moreover, some might raise the following objection: It is understandable that ignorance is the cause of unwholesome actions, but since ignorance itself is unwholesome, how can it be the cause of wholesome actions? This is because those who have not severed ignorance may perform meritorious actions in order to enjoy the pleasures of celestial consorts. Therefore, ignorance also serves as a contributing cause for meritorious actions. Furthermore, from the ultimate perspective, samsara (cycle of birth and death) is unwholesome, and all meritorious actions that are bound to samsara can be considered unwholesome. Therefore, ignorance can comprehensively serve as a condition for all types of actions. Moreover, the three types of karma—leading to good realms, unwholesome realms, and the immovable realm—each have superior, intermediate, and inferior distinctions. These actions are called the karma that leads to various realms. Regarding 『leading to various realms,』 different schools of teachers hold different views. For example, the Sarvastivada (Sarvastivada) school says that there is an intermediate state (Antarabhava), because there is a continuity of name and form (Namarupa) that leads to the place of rebirth. The Sautrantika (Sautrantika) and Dharmaguptaka (Dharmaguptaka) schools say that there is no intermediate state, but consciousness arises based on actions as a condition, and that is called rebirth. Furthermore, those who believe in the intermediate state say that sentient beings with form (Rupa), etc., perish in one place, and those sentient beings with form continue to arise, without interruption, before and after, until they reach a different realm, which is called rebirth. Continuity follows and arises, like a lamp. Therefore, name and form rely on the aggregates and have continuity, arising without interruption from the moment of death to the moment of rebirth, so it is called rebirth, like a person going from here to there now. Furthermore, those who do not believe in the intermediate state say that between the dying consciousness ( মারাণান্তিক চিত্ত / cuti-citta) and the rebirth consciousness (ปฏิসন্ধি চিত্ত / patisandhi-citta), there is no intermediate existence, because it is tainted. For example, there is dying consciousness and rebirth consciousness, but no intermediate existence. Why? Death
有中間有身起者。非是中陰。身是報故。譬如現在所受得身。複次有身起者。是苦諦所攝故。譬以意體為身。往至異處。剎那剎那相續隨起故。而無中有。非一向有陰。汝立中陰義者。是義不成。複次有中陰者言。若無中陰。云何得至后受生處耶。複次無中陰者言。從死有相續至生有時。如授經。如傳燈。如行印。如映象現。如空聲響。如水中日月影。如種子生芽。如人見酢口中生涎。如是后陰相續起時。無有中陰往來傳此向彼。是故智者應如是解。如上偈說。識相續托已。爾時名色起。云何為名色耶。名有二種。一謂自往諸趣。二謂為煩惱所使強令入諸趣中。複次名者。謂無色四陰。總名為名。云何為色。色者可變異故名色。謂四大及四塵等。非獨識為名色緣。無明行等亦為彼緣。複次識緣名色者。識及無明等非是定與名色為緣。有處有化生者而亦與彼六入為緣。如無色界生者。此識但與名為緣。如論偈說。
從於名色體 次第起六入 情塵等和合 而起於六觸
釋曰。云何為內六入。謂眼入耳入鼻入舌入身入意入等。眼入者。以色為境界故。彼清凈色是眼識所依止處故。名清凈色。以為眼入。如是以聲等為境界。彼清凈色。是耳等識所依止處故。名清凈色。為耳等入。意入者。以無間次第滅為彼
意入。云何為入。謂識及心心數法等。從清凈色中起故。名之為入。何故名觸。謂與苦受樂受不苦不樂受等。各和合故名觸。如論偈說。
因彼眼與色 及作意三種 與名色為緣 爾乃識得生
釋曰。識得生者。如眼以色為緣。識緣色故而識得生。如是耳以聲為緣。耳識得生。乃至意以法為緣。意識得生。云何名觸。如論偈說。
彼色識眼等 三種共和合 如是名為觸 從觸起于受
釋曰。境界與根意等三種為一體故。而名為觸。觸為緣故起三種受。如論偈說。
受為起愛緣 為受故起愛 愛又為取緣 取者有四種
釋曰。此謂求欲之相而名為愛。無聞凡夫為樂受故起貪求心。如舐刀蜜。不覺后時傷舌過患。若為樂受起貪者可爾。云何于苦受不苦不樂受而起貪耶。謂以苦受不苦不樂受亦為愛緣故。受苦受時亦有求離心生。亦是愛也。是故無過。四取者。謂欲取見取戒取我語取。云何為取。謂積集義。複次愛增長故。亦即是取。為得五欲樂故。起追求心。亦名為取。如論偈說。
由取諸有故 取者起于有 以無取者故 脫苦斷諸有
釋曰。有者是業相。複次有者。是生異名。而生之因法亦名為有。若爾者云何即因是果耶。今現見因受果名故。譬如佛
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 意入。什麼是『入』（Ayatana）呢？指的是『識』（Vijnana）以及與心相關的各種心理活動（心心數法，Citta-cetasika dharmas）等。它們從清凈的色法（Rupa）中產生，因此稱為『入』。為什麼稱為『觸』（Sparsha）呢？因為『觸』與苦受（Dukkha vedana）、樂受（Sukha vedana）、不苦不樂受（Adhukkha-asukha vedana）等各種感受相互結合，所以稱為『觸』。正如論中的偈頌所說： 『因彼眼與色，及作意三種，與名色為緣，爾乃識得生。』 解釋：『識得生』，例如眼以色為條件，因為『識』緣於色，所以『識』得以產生。同樣，耳以聲為條件，耳識得以產生。乃至意以法為條件，意識得以產生。什麼是『觸』呢？正如論中的偈頌所說： 『彼色識眼等，三種共和合，如是名為觸，從觸起于受。』 解釋：境界（對像）、根（感官）和意（心）這三種成為一體，因此稱為『觸』。以『觸』為條件，產生三種感受。正如論中的偈頌所說： 『受為起愛緣，為受故起愛，愛又為取緣，取者有四種。』 解釋：這裡所說的『愛』（Trsna），指的是追求慾望的狀態。沒有聽聞佛法的凡夫因為追求快樂的感受而生起貪求之心，就像舔刀上的蜂蜜一樣，沒有察覺到之後舌頭會被割傷的禍患。如果是因為追求快樂的感受而生起貪愛，這還可以理解。那麼，為什麼對於痛苦的感受和不苦不樂的感受也會生起貪愛呢？因為痛苦的感受和不苦不樂的感受也是『愛』的條件。感受痛苦的時候，也會產生想要脫離痛苦的心，這也是一種『愛』。所以，這樣說並沒有過失。四取（Cattaro Upadana）指的是欲取（Kama Upadana）、見取（Ditthi Upadana）、戒取（Silabbata Upadana）和我語取（Attavada Upadana）。什麼是『取』呢？指的是積聚的意思。而且，『愛』增長了，也就是『取』。爲了獲得五欲的快樂，生起追求的心，也稱為『取』。正如論中的偈頌所說： 『由取諸有故，取者起于有，以無取者故，脫苦斷諸有。』 解釋：『有』（Bhava）指的是業相（Karma）。而且，『有』也是『生』（Jati）的另一種說法。而『生』的原因法也稱為『有』。如果這樣說，那麼為什麼『因』就是『果』呢？現在可以清楚地看到，『因』接受『果』的名稱。譬如佛（Buddha）。
【English Translation】 English version Sense-entry. What is 『entry』 (Ayatana)? It refers to 『consciousness』 (Vijnana) and mental functions (Citta-cetasika dharmas) etc. Because they arise from pure form (Rupa), they are called 『entry』. Why is it called 『contact』 (Sparsha)? Because 『contact』 combines with various feelings such as painful feeling (Dukkha vedana), pleasant feeling (Sukha vedana), and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling (Adhukkha-asukha vedana), it is called 『contact』. As the verse in the treatise says: 『Because of the eye and form, and the three kinds of attention, with name and form as conditions, consciousness is then produced.』 Explanation: 『Consciousness is produced』, for example, the eye takes form as its condition, because 『consciousness』 is conditioned by form, 『consciousness』 is produced. Similarly, the ear takes sound as its condition, and ear-consciousness is produced. And so on, the mind takes dharma as its condition, and mind-consciousness is produced. What is 『contact』? As the verse in the treatise says: 『These form, consciousness, eye, etc., the three combine together, thus it is called contact, from contact arises feeling.』 Explanation: The object, the sense organ, and the mind become one, therefore it is called 『contact』. With 『contact』 as the condition, three kinds of feelings arise. As the verse in the treatise says: 『Feeling is the condition for arising craving, because of feeling, craving arises, craving is the condition for grasping, grasping is of four kinds.』 Explanation: Here, 『craving』 (Trsna) refers to the state of seeking desire. An unenlightened ordinary person develops a craving mind because of seeking pleasant feelings, just like licking honey on a knife, unaware of the danger of cutting the tongue later. If craving arises from seeking pleasant feelings, that is understandable. Then, why does craving also arise for painful feelings and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feelings? Because painful feelings and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feelings are also conditions for 『craving』. When experiencing painful feelings, the desire to escape from pain also arises, which is also a kind of 『craving』. Therefore, there is no fault in saying so. The four graspings (Cattaro Upadana) refer to sense-desire grasping (Kama Upadana), view grasping (Ditthi Upadana), precept and practice grasping (Silabbata Upadana), and self-assertion grasping (Attavada Upadana). What is 『grasping』? It refers to the meaning of accumulation. Moreover, the increase of 『craving』 is also 『grasping』. In order to obtain the pleasure of the five desires, the mind of seeking arises, which is also called 『grasping』. As the verse in the treatise says: 『Because of grasping, existence arises, the grasper arises in existence, because there is no grasping, one escapes suffering and cuts off all existence.』 Explanation: 『Existence』 (Bhava) refers to the aspect of karma (Karma). Moreover, 『existence』 is also another term for 『birth』 (Jati). And the causal dharma of 『birth』 is also called 『existence』. If so, then why is the 『cause』 the 『effect』? Now it can be clearly seen that the 『cause』 receives the name of the 『effect』. For example, the Buddha (Buddha).
出世。樂彼識等五支果分。是現在世所攝故。而言從無明行生。若得值善知識聽聞正法起正思惟。于苦樂等諸行能見無常苦空無我等行。複次諸行無生自體空。彼起真實智者。不復起愛。不起愛故無復追求。如上偈說。若無有取者。脫苦斷諸有。此義云何。謂有取故有有。若無取則無有。有云何相。如論偈說。
五陰是有體 從有次起生 老病死憂悲 哀泣愁苦等
釋曰。此謂亦說五陰因為有支體。複次五陰因名有者。謂非獨五陰因名有。無色界四陰因亦名有。生者謂先無陰體今有陰起。老者謂變壞相。死者謂無陰體。病者謂身為苦所逼。憂悲者。謂從愛別離怨憎會等。內被燒然有相起故。哀泣者。謂喪失所愛及有福德眷屬。因此發聲。稱其德行。而哀泣之。苦謂身受。愁謂心受。勞倦者謂身心疲極。如是廣說生等皆名為苦者云何。如論偈說。
愁及勞倦等 皆以生為因 獨此苦陰起 畢竟無樂相
釋曰。獨苦陰起者。謂不與樂和合故。陰者謂聚。起者謂生陰。相續者是世諦所攝緣起。非第一義。如先品中已說無起令信解故。我所立者不破。若言生死行流轉者。云何是不起耶。我今答之。如論偈說。
是謂為生死 諸行之根本 無智者所作 見實者不為
釋曰。諸
行生死根無智所作者。此謂無智者不見諸行無始已來展轉從緣起如幻如焰過患故。而求於樂。為求樂故造福非福不動等諸行。見實不作者。謂聖道已起見真實故。智障煩惱體無明已斷故。如論偈說。
無明若已斷 諸行不復生 修習智慧故 無明乃得斷
釋曰。此謂諸行不生闕于緣故。如種子無體故芽則不生。今修習何智得斷無明。如此論中所說照緣起智。遮一切諸體有自體。解人法二無我境界。空智修者。謂數數習。如論偈說。
一一支滅者 彼彼支不起 唯獨苦陰聚 名為正永滅
釋曰。此謂行等一一有支對治道起故。則滅此等有支更不起者。由行滅故。行滅則識滅。乃至生老死憂悲等滅。唯獨苦陰正永滅者。是世諦所攝故。若第一義中是無明等無起無滅。云何複名緣起耶。佛依世諦故說第一義。我義如是。如前偈說。不依於世諦。不能說第一。以是故不壞我所立義。此品初自部人謂我言。立義有過者今說無此過故。而以世諦緣起。令物信解是品義意。如佛說無起者名為緣起。此謂不起者說為緣起。若彼無起云何有滅。若能于無滅覺無滅者。名解緣起法等。
釋觀世諦緣起品竟。
般若燈論釋觀邪見品第二十七
釋曰。今此品者亦為遮空所對治令解諸見空故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：行（Karma，行為）生死之根源於無智所為。此處的『無智』指的是，不能看見諸行（Karma）從無始以來，輾轉相依，從因緣而生起，如幻如焰，具有過患。因此，人們追求快樂，爲了追求快樂而造作福業、非福業以及不動業等諸行（Karma）。『見實不作者』，指的是聖道已經生起，能夠見到真實，智慧能夠遮蔽煩惱，無明的本體已經被斷除。正如論偈所說： 『無明若已斷，諸行不復生，修習智慧故，無明乃得斷。』 解釋：這指的是諸行（Karma）不再產生，是因為缺少了因緣。如同種子沒有實體，所以不會發芽。現在修習何種智慧才能斷除無明呢？就像論中所說，是照見緣起的智慧，遮止一切諸法具有自體，理解人法二無我的境界。空智的修習者，需要反覆修習。正如論偈所說： 『一一支滅者，彼彼支不起，唯獨苦陰聚，名為正永滅。』 解釋：這指的是行（Karma）等每一個有支，因為對治道的生起而滅除。這些有支滅除后，就不會再次生起。由於行（Karma）滅除，行（Karma）滅除則識滅除，乃至生老死憂悲等滅除。唯獨苦陰得到真正的、永遠的滅除，這是世俗諦所包含的。如果從第一義諦來看，無明等既無生起也無滅除，那又怎麼能稱為緣起呢？佛陀是依據世俗諦來說明第一義諦。我的理解是這樣的，正如之前的偈頌所說：不依靠世俗諦，就不能說明第一義諦。因此，我所建立的義理不會被破壞。這一品最初，自部人認為我所立的義理有過失，現在說明沒有這個過失，因此用世俗諦的緣起，使人們相信和理解，這就是這一品的意義所在。如同佛陀所說，無起者名為緣起。這指的是不起者被說為緣起。如果它沒有生起，又怎麼會有滅除呢？如果能夠覺悟到無滅的，就稱為理解了緣起法等。 《般若燈論釋觀世諦緣起品》結束。 《般若燈論釋觀邪見品》第二十七 解釋：現在這一品，也是爲了遮止空所對治，使人們理解諸見皆空。
【English Translation】 English version: The root of Karma and Samsara (生死, birth and death) is caused by ignorance. 'Ignorance' here refers to not seeing that all Karmas arise from beginningless time, dependently and in a revolving manner, like illusions and flames, possessing faults. Therefore, people pursue happiness, and in order to pursue happiness, they create meritorious Karma, non-meritorious Karma, and unwavering Karma, etc. 'Seeing reality and not creating' refers to the arising of the Noble Path, being able to see reality, and the wisdom to obscure afflictions, the essence of ignorance having been severed. As the verse in the treatise says: 'If ignorance is severed, Karmas will no longer arise; through cultivating wisdom, ignorance can be severed.' Explanation: This refers to Karmas no longer arising because of the lack of conditions. Like a seed without substance, it will not sprout. Now, what kind of wisdom should be cultivated to sever ignorance? As the treatise says, it is the wisdom that illuminates dependent origination, preventing all dharmas from having self-nature, and understanding the realm of the two selflessnesses of persons and dharmas. The cultivator of emptiness wisdom needs to practice repeatedly. As the verse in the treatise says: 'When each branch is extinguished, the corresponding branch does not arise; only the aggregate of suffering is called true and eternal extinction.' Explanation: This refers to each branch of existence, such as Karma, being extinguished because of the arising of the antidote path. After these branches of existence are extinguished, they will not arise again. Because Karma is extinguished, consciousness is extinguished, and even birth, old age, death, sorrow, and grief are extinguished. Only the aggregate of suffering attains true and eternal extinction, which is included in conventional truth (世俗諦). If, from the perspective of ultimate truth (第一義諦), ignorance and so on have neither arising nor ceasing, then how can it be called dependent origination? The Buddha explains the ultimate truth based on conventional truth. My understanding is like this, as the previous verse said: Without relying on conventional truth, one cannot explain the ultimate truth. Therefore, the meaning I have established will not be destroyed. Initially, people from our own school thought that the meaning I established had faults, but now I explain that there is no such fault, so I use the dependent origination of conventional truth to make people believe and understand, which is the meaning of this chapter. As the Buddha said, that which does not arise is called dependent origination. This refers to that which does not arise being spoken of as dependent origination. If it does not arise, then how can there be cessation? If one can awaken to non-cessation, then one is said to have understood the Dharma of dependent origination, etc. End of the Commentary on the Chapter on Observing Conventional Truth and Dependent Origination in the Prajna-pradipa. The Prajna-pradipa, Commentary on the Chapter on Observing Wrong Views, Twenty-seventh. Explanation: Now, this chapter is also to prevent the antidote of emptiness, so that people can understand that all views are empty.
說。
自部人言。有自體五取陰。是見處故。陰若是無而為見處者不然。五陰是見處者如俱舍論中說。彼五陰者是苦是集是世間是見處。如是等是有故。論者言。不然。今當觀察諸見。此中如論偈說。
往昔過去世 我為有為無 是常等諸見 皆依先世起
釋曰。此謂我於過去。為是有為是無。為亦有亦無。為非有非無。如是諸見依過去世起。世間常世間無常亦常亦無常非常非無常等四見因待現在世陰故說過去世陰常等諸見。皆依此起。依者。謂緣為誰緣謂諸見緣。見有何義。謂執著于取等。如論偈說。
復有異諸見 執未來不起 未來起等邊 皆依未來起
釋曰。此諸見依過去世起。世間有邊世間無邊亦有邊亦無邊非有邊非無邊等四見。因現在陰故。未來當起陰者。名為後邊。今且觀察。依止先世起諸見者。如論偈說。
過去世有我 是事則不然 彼先世眾生 非是今世者
釋曰。云何不然。謂時別故。異業所生故。譬如餘眾生。複次身及諸根亦別故。若言根等雖異而我是一者。此亦不然。如論偈說。
還是昔我者 但是取自體 若離彼諸取 復有何我耶
釋曰。此謂如提婆達多過去世我還是今日我者不然。取別故。譬如耶若達多。我以
{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本：", "自部人說：『有自體五取陰（skandha，蘊），是見（dṛṣṭi，觀點）的處所。』如果陰（skandha，蘊）是無而作為見（dṛṣṭi，觀點）的處所，那是不對的。五陰（skandha，蘊）是見（dṛṣṭi，觀點）的處所，正如《俱舍論》中所說：『這五陰（skandha，蘊）是苦（duḥkha，痛苦），是集（samudāya，苦的根源），是世間，是見（dṛṣṭi，觀點）的處所。』像這樣，因為它們是存在的。論者說：『不對。現在應當觀察諸見（dṛṣṭi，觀點）。』其中如論偈所說：", "『往昔過去世，我為有為無，是常等諸見（dṛṣṭi，觀點），皆依先世起。』", "解釋說：這指的是我於過去，為是有還是無，為是亦有亦無，為是非有非無。像這樣的諸見（dṛṣṭi，觀點）依過去世而起。世間常、世間無常、亦常亦無常、非常非無常等四見（dṛṣṭi，觀點），因為依賴現在世的陰（skandha，蘊），所以說過去世的陰（skandha，蘊）常等諸見（dṛṣṭi，觀點），都依此而起。『依』指的是緣，以什麼為緣呢？指的是諸見（dṛṣṭi，觀點）的緣。見（dṛṣṭi，觀點）有什麼意義呢？指的是執著于取等。如論偈所說：", "『復有異諸見（dṛṣṭi，觀點），執未來不起，未來起等邊，皆依未來起。』", "解釋說：這些見（dṛṣṭi，觀點）依過去世而起。世間有邊、世間無邊、亦有邊亦無邊、非有邊非無邊等四見（dṛṣṭi，觀點），因為現在陰（skandha，蘊）的緣故，未來應當生起的陰（skandha，蘊），名為後邊。現在且觀察，依止先世而生起諸見（dṛṣṭi，觀點）的人，如論偈所說：", "『過去世有我，是事則不然，彼先世眾生，非是今世者。』", "解釋說：為什麼不對呢？因為時間不同。因為是異業所生。譬如其餘眾生。再次，身體及諸根也不同。如果說根等雖然不同而我是一個，這也是不對的。如論偈所說：", "『還是昔我者，但是取自體，若離彼諸取，復有何我耶？』", "解釋說：這指的是如提婆達多（Devadatta）過去世的我還是今日的我，那是不對的。因為取不同。譬如耶若達多（yajñadatta）。我以", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", 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是故。前世生還是今日生者不然。複次若欲得我相異取相者。如上偈說。若離於諸取。復有何我耶。無如是我故。離陰有我先已廣遮。計有我者。若作是意。不欲令我無體。即以取為我體者。作是分別。如似說無我者。亦以取體為我。如論偈說。
若取是我者 何處更有我 由取起滅故 云何是取者
釋曰。第一義中。取不是我。取有起滅法二體先已說無我。令信解故。云何為取。謂取及取者。取是業。取者是作業人。譬如薪火二種。複次如先已遮我故我義不成。云何不成。如先偈說。取非即是我。以有起滅故。我者亦非是有亦非是無。如是我者。世諦中亦不能令物解。今當更答計離陰有我者。如論偈說。
若異於彼取 有我者不然 離陰應可取 而不可取故
釋曰。此謂我若異取者不然。何以故。若離取有我者。云何可說取是我相。若無相可說則離取無我。若謂離取無我。但取是我者。是亦不然。離取無有我異故。譬如余物。此中立驗。不異取有我。取是可取法我不可取故。譬如取自體。何以故。取有起滅。我則不爾。複次云何以取即為取者。若謂離取而有取者。是亦不然。若不取五陰而有取者。應離五陰別有取者。彼義如是。我今說道理者。如論偈說。
我不異於取 亦
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因此，前世所生與今日所生並非相同。再者，如果想要得到與『我相』不同的『取相』（upadana-laksana，執取之相），就像上面的偈頌所說：如果離開了所有的執取，又有什麼『我』存在呢？因為沒有這樣的『我』，所以之前已經廣泛地遮止了離開五陰（panca-skandha，構成個體的五種要素：色、受、想、行、識）而有『我』的說法。如果有人這樣認為，不希望『我』沒有實體，就以執取作為『我』的實體，並作這樣的分別，就像那些說沒有『我』的人，也以執取的實體作為『我』一樣，就像論中的偈頌所說： 『如果執取是我的話，哪裡還有另外的「我」呢？由於執取有生起和滅亡，怎麼能說它是執取者呢？』 解釋說：在第一義諦（paramartha-satya，勝義諦，最高的真理）中，執取不是『我』。執取有生起和滅亡的法則，這兩種實體之前已經說過沒有『我』，爲了使人信解的緣故。什麼是執取呢？就是執取以及執取者。執取是業（karma，行為），執取者是作業的人。譬如薪和火這兩種。再者，就像之前已經遮止了『我』，所以『我』的意義不能成立。為什麼不能成立呢？就像之前的偈頌所說：執取並非就是『我』，因為它有生起和滅亡。『我』也不是有，也不是無。像這樣的『我』，在世俗諦（samvriti-satya，俗諦，世俗的真理）中也不能使人理解。現在應當進一步回答那些認為離開五陰而有『我』的人，就像論中的偈頌所說： 『如果與那些執取不同，而有「我」存在，那是不對的。如果離開五陰應該可以執取到「我」，但實際上是無法執取到的。』 解釋說：這意思是說，如果『我』與執取不同，那是不對的。為什麼呢？如果離開執取而有『我』，怎麼能說執取是『我相』呢？如果沒有『我相』可以說明，那麼離開執取就沒有『我』。如果認為離開執取就沒有『我』，只有執取才是『我』，這也是不對的。因為離開執取就沒有與執取不同的『我』。譬如其餘的事物。這裡建立論證：不與執取不同的地方有『我』，因為執取是可執取的法，而『我』是不可執取的。譬如執取自身。為什麼呢？因為執取有生起和滅亡，而『我』則不是這樣。再者，怎麼能以執取就作為執取者呢？如果認為離開執取而有執取者，這也是不對的。如果不執取五陰而有執取者，那麼應該離開五陰另外有執取者。那個意義就是這樣。我現在說道理，就像論中的偈頌所說： 『我不異於取，亦』
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, what is born in the previous life is not the same as what is born today. Furthermore, if one wants to obtain a 'grasping-characteristic' (upadana-laksana, the characteristic of clinging) that is different from the 'self-characteristic', as the verse above says: If one is free from all grasping, what 'self' is there? Because there is no such 'self', it has already been widely refuted that there is a 'self' apart from the five skandhas (panca-skandha, the five aggregates that constitute an individual: form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness). If someone thinks this way, not wanting the 'self' to have no substance, they take grasping as the substance of the 'self', and make such distinctions, just like those who say there is no 'self' also take the substance of grasping as the 'self', as the verse in the treatise says: 'If grasping is the self, where else is there a "self"? Since grasping arises and ceases, how can it be the grasper?' The explanation says: In the ultimate truth (paramartha-satya, the highest truth), grasping is not the 'self'. Grasping has the law of arising and ceasing, and these two entities have already been said to have no 'self', for the sake of making people believe and understand. What is grasping? It is grasping and the grasper. Grasping is karma (action), and the grasper is the one who performs the action. For example, firewood and fire are two kinds. Furthermore, just as the 'self' has been refuted before, the meaning of 'self' cannot be established. Why can't it be established? As the previous verse says: Grasping is not the 'self', because it arises and ceases. The 'self' is neither existent nor non-existent. Such a 'self' cannot be understood by people even in conventional truth (samvriti-satya, the truth of the world). Now we should further answer those who think that there is a 'self' apart from the five skandhas, as the verse in the treatise says: 'If there is a "self" different from those graspings, that is not right. If there is a "self" apart from the skandhas, it should be graspable, but in reality, it is ungraspable.' The explanation says: This means that if the 'self' is different from grasping, that is not right. Why? If there is a 'self' apart from grasping, how can it be said that grasping is the 'self-characteristic'? If there is no 'self-characteristic' to explain, then there is no 'self' apart from grasping. If one thinks that there is no 'self' apart from grasping, and only grasping is the 'self', that is also not right. Because there is no 'self' different from grasping apart from grasping. For example, other things. Here, an argument is established: There is a 'self' where it is not different from grasping, because grasping is a graspable dharma, and the 'self' is ungraspable. For example, grasping itself. Why? Because grasping arises and ceases, but the 'self' is not like that. Furthermore, how can grasping be taken as the grasper? If one thinks that there is a grasper apart from grasping, that is also not right. If there is a grasper without grasping the five skandhas, then there should be a grasper apart from the five skandhas. That meaning is like this. Now I speak of the truth, as the verse in the treatise says: 'I am not different from grasping, also'
不即是取 而復非無取 亦不定是無
釋曰。此謂我不離取。亦不即取。而非無取。亦不是無。已令物解。若言過去世有我者不然。如論偈說。
今世無過去 是事亦不然 過去前生者 與今世不異 若今與前異 離前應獨立 如是應常住 不為現陰緣
釋曰。此謂問者。不欲得如此。云何欲得。謂欲得前世五陰與今世五陰為緣。我今立驗。如提婆達多。今世五陰與過去五陰。不得有異。相續不異故。過去陰為因故。譬如提婆達多。過去五陰。非但有此離前應獨立過。亦更有餘咎如上偈說。如是應常住。不為現陰緣。云何為緣耶。謂后陰不起故。若爾者則不從死有生。而彼前世所受生陰。仍在過去。今別更有異陰于現在生以是故。則有大過。云何為過。如論偈說。
諸業皆斷壞 此人所造業 彼人當受報 得如是過咎
釋曰。若爾者即有斷過。失於諸業果報故。又彼人作罪。此人受果。複次若言業之與生一時起者不然。如論偈說。
非生共業起 此中有過故 我是作如瓶 先無而後起
釋曰。我者云何是造作耶。謂先無後有。我者先不起煩惱業。應如瓶以外法為生因。不以先世所集業為生因。如是能生后陰因者。則為無體。非有非不有。複次過
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『不即是取』，也不是完全沒有『取』，也不是絕對的『無』。
解釋：這是說『我』不離開『取』（upadana，執取），也不等同於『取』，但也不是沒有『取』，也不是絕對的『無』。這樣已經可以讓人們理解了。如果說過去世有『我』存在，那是不對的。正如論偈所說：
『今世無過去，是事亦不然，過去前生者，與今世不異。 若今與前異，離前應獨立，如是應常住，不為現陰緣。』
解釋：這是說提問者不想要這樣的答案。那麼他想要什麼樣的答案呢？他想要前世的五陰（panca-khandha，五蘊）與今世的五陰成為因緣。我現在立一個論證，就像提婆達多（Devadatta）的例子，今世的五陰與過去世的五陰不能有差異，因為它們是相續不斷的，過去陰是原因。比如提婆達多，過去的五陰，不僅僅有這種離開前世就應該獨立的過失，還有其他的過失，就像上面的偈頌所說：『如是應常住，不為現陰緣。』 怎麼能成為因緣呢？因為后陰不會生起。如果這樣，就不會從死亡中產生新的生命。而且前世所接受的生陰仍然停留在過去，現在又另外產生不同的陰于現在，因此，就會有很大的過失。什麼樣的過失呢？正如論偈所說：
『諸業皆斷壞，此人所造業，彼人當受報，得如是過咎。』
解釋：如果這樣，就會有斷滅的過失，因為失去了諸業的果報。而且是這個人造的罪，那個人受果報。再者，如果說業和生同時產生，那是不對的。正如論偈所說：
『非生共業起，此中有過故，我是作如瓶，先無而後起。』
解釋：『我』怎麼是造作的呢？就是先沒有而後有。『我』先不生起煩惱業，應該像瓶子一樣，以外在的法作為生起的原因，而不是以先世所積累的業作為生起的原因。像這樣能夠生起后陰的原因，就沒有實體，既不是有也不是沒有。再者，還有過失。
【English Translation】 English version 『It is not identical to taking (upadana), nor is it completely without taking, nor is it absolutely 『without』.』
Explanation: This means that 『I』 neither departs from 『taking』 (upadana, clinging), nor is it identical to 『taking,』 but it is not without 『taking,』 nor is it absolutely 『without.』 This should make it understandable. If it is said that there was an 『I』 in the past life, that is not correct. As the verse in the treatise says:
『The present life is not the past, this is also not true, the past previous life is not different from the present life. If the present is different from the past, it should be independent from the past, thus it should be permanent, not conditioned by the present skandhas (khandha, aggregates).』
Explanation: This means that the questioner does not want this kind of answer. So what kind of answer does he want? He wants the five skandhas (panca-khandha, five aggregates) of the past life to become the cause and condition for the five skandhas of the present life. Now I establish an argument, like the example of Devadatta, the five skandhas of the present life cannot be different from the five skandhas of the past life, because they are continuous, and the past skandhas are the cause. For example, Devadatta, the past five skandhas, not only have the fault of being independent from the past, but also have other faults, as the verse above says: 『Thus it should be permanent, not conditioned by the present skandhas.』 How can it be a condition? Because the later skandhas will not arise. If so, then there will be no new life arising from death. And the skandhas of birth received in the previous life still remain in the past, and now different skandhas are produced in the present, therefore, there will be a great fault. What kind of fault? As the verse in the treatise says:
『All karmas are cut off and destroyed, the karma created by this person, that person will receive the retribution, such a fault is obtained.』
Explanation: If so, there will be the fault of annihilation, because the fruits of all karmas are lost. Moreover, this person commits the sin, and that person receives the result. Furthermore, if it is said that karma and birth arise at the same time, that is not correct. As the verse in the treatise says:
『Birth does not arise together with karma, there is a fault in this, the 『I』 is made like a pot, first non-existent and then arising.』
Explanation: How is the 『I』 created? It is first non-existent and then existent. The 『I』 does not first arise with afflictions and karma, it should be like a pot, taking external dharmas as the cause of arising, not taking the karma accumulated in the previous life as the cause of arising. The cause that can give rise to the later skandhas in this way has no substance, it is neither existent nor non-existent. Furthermore, there are other faults.
去世亦同前二種過。非有非不有者。無如是法故。觀察過去世有無等四句已。今當次觀未來四句。如論偈說。
或有如是見 來世有我起 來世無我起 同過去有過
釋曰。此謂來世一異俱不俱等。今亦如是遮故。如論偈說。
若天與人一 我則墮于常 天既是無生 常不可生故
釋曰。如是我者即墮常過。自部人言。一異等義有何過耶。論者言。若未生天即是天者。我則無起。無起者即是常。以是故。我未生天時應能起天所作業。而無是事。若謂我是常未生天時已能起天所作業者。世人所不信故。複次若我無常。此人中我天中生時。昔人中我今即壞故。若汝意謂欲得有異而無如上所說一過者。是事不然。計異者亦有過故。如論偈說。
若天與人異 我則墮無常 天與人異故 相續者不然
釋曰。其過云何。謂有異故。譬如提婆達多與耶若達多。二我相續則為有過。複次若有人言。我相續是一有是天義有是人義。今當答之。如論偈說。
若天在一分 人又在一分 常無常共俱 一處者不然
釋曰。云何不然。謂有天處有天即是常。天處無人故。無人即是無常。若有人處有人即是常。人處無天故。無天即是無常。猶如一物一處。亦白亦黑者。其義不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：去世也和前面兩種情況一樣有過失。認為『非有非不有』，沒有這樣的法。觀察過去世『有』『無』等四句之後，現在接著觀察未來四句。如論偈所說： 『或者有人這樣認為，來世有我產生；來世無我產生，和過去世一樣有過失。』 解釋：這是說來世『一』『異』『俱』『不俱』等。現在也這樣遮止，所以如論偈所說： 『如果天和人是一，我就墮入常；天既然是無生，常是不可能生的。』 解釋：像這樣，『我』就墮入『常』的過失。自部人說：『一』『異』等的意義有什麼過失呢？論者說：如果未生的天就是天，我就沒有產生。沒有產生就是『常』。因此，我未生天時應該能做天所做的事，但沒有這樣的事。如果認為我是『常』，未生天時已經能做天所做的事，世人不會相信。其次，如果我不是『常』，這個人中的我在天中產生時，過去人中的我就壞滅了。如果你的意思是想要有『異』，而沒有上面所說『一』的過失，這是不可能的。認為『異』也有過失，如論偈所說： 『如果天和人是異，我就墮入無常；天和人是異，相續是不可能的。』 解釋：它的過失是什麼呢？就是因為有『異』。譬如提婆達多（Devadatta，人名）和耶若達多（Yajnadatta，人名），兩個我的相續就會有過失。其次，如果有人說：我的相續是『一』，有是天的意義，有是人的意義。現在來回答他，如論偈所說： 『如果天在一部分，人又在一部分，常和無常共同存在於一處，這是不可能的。』 解釋：為什麼不可能呢？因為有天的地方有天，就是『常』。天的地方沒有人，沒有人就是『無常』。如果有人地方有人，就是『常』。人地方沒有天，沒有天就是『無常』。就像一個東西一個地方，既是白色又是黑色一樣，道理不通。
【English Translation】 English version: The passing away is also the same as the previous two kinds of faults. To think of 'neither existent nor non-existent,' there is no such Dharma. After observing the four statements of 'existence,' 'non-existence,' etc., in the past, now we will observe the four statements of the future. As the verse in the treatise says: 'Perhaps someone sees it this way: in the coming life, 'I' arise; in the coming life, 'I' do not arise, which is the same fault as in the past.' Explanation: This refers to 'one,' 'different,' 'both,' 'neither both nor neither,' etc., in the coming life. Now we also refute it in this way, so as the verse in the treatise says: 'If the Deva (celestial being) and the human are one, then 'I' fall into permanence; since the Deva is unproduced, permanence cannot be produced.' Explanation: Like this, 'I' falls into the fault of 'permanence.' People of our own school say: What is the fault of the meaning of 'one,' 'different,' etc.? The treatise writer says: If the unproduced Deva is the Deva, then 'I' has no arising. No arising is 'permanence.' Therefore, when 'I' have not yet become a Deva, 'I' should be able to do what the Deva does, but there is no such thing. If you think that 'I' am 'permanent,' and when 'I' have not yet become a Deva, 'I' can already do what the Deva does, the world will not believe it. Secondly, if 'I' am not 'permanent,' when the 'I' in this human being is born in the Deva realm, the 'I' in the past human being is destroyed. If you mean to have 'different,' without the fault of 'one' mentioned above, this is impossible. Thinking of 'different' also has faults, as the verse in the treatise says: 'If the Deva and the human are different, then 'I' fall into impermanence; since the Deva and the human are different, continuity is impossible.' Explanation: What is its fault? It is because there is 'difference.' For example, Devadatta (Devadatta, a person's name) and Yajnadatta (Yajnadatta, a person's name), the continuity of the two 'I's would have faults. Secondly, if someone says: The continuity of 'I' is 'one,' having the meaning of Deva and having the meaning of human. Now let's answer him, as the verse in the treatise says: 'If the Deva is in one part, and the human is in another part, permanence and impermanence exist together in one place, which is impossible.' Explanation: Why is it impossible? Because where there is a Deva, there is Deva, which is 'permanence.' Where there is a Deva, there is no human, and no human is 'impermanence.' If where there is a human, there is a human, which is 'permanence.' Where there is a human, there is no Deva, and no Deva is 'impermanence.' It's like one thing in one place, being both white and black, the reasoning doesn't make sense.
然。若有人言。我非是常亦非無常者。如論偈說。
若常與無常 二義得成者 非常非無常 汝意亦得成
釋曰。此義難令人解故。複次第一義中者。如論偈說。
有處有人來 從住處有去 生死則無始 而無有是事
釋曰。有處者。若天世處人世處。有人者。謂若天若人。住處者。謂住天等世界處。有去者。謂有人向異趣處去。若爾者此我無始已來恒有。而即是常。而無是事。云何無耶。謂眾生及人先已遮故。以是義故。無有常我。若言雖無常我而有無常我者。是亦不然。如論偈說。
若無有常我 誰復是無常 亦常亦無常 非常非無常
釋曰。此謂待常故說無常。本無有常待。何說無常。複次常無常等。皆已不成。今當觀察邊等四句。如論偈說。
世間若有邊 云何有後世 世間若無邊 云何有後世
釋曰。邊者云何。謂究竟處盡處等名邊。如似阿羅漢涅槃陰。而今有後世在者。謂前世陰為因。後世陰為果。展轉無終。如是依前陰因起后陰果故。然今有此諸陰展轉相續起。如論偈說。
此諸陰相續 猶如然燈焰 以是故世間 非有邊無邊
釋曰。此中立驗。有無明煩惱未盡。諸陰相續不斷。此陰有果故。譬如燈焰相續。以是
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『是這樣。如果有人說：『我』既不是常，也不是無常。』正如論偈所說： 『如果常與無常，兩種意義都能成立，那麼非常非無常，你的意思也能成立。』 解釋：這個意義難以讓人理解。再次，在第一義中，正如論偈所說： 『有的地方有人來，從住處有人去，生死就沒有開始，但沒有這件事。』 解釋：『有的地方』，指天世處、人世處；『有人』，指天人、人；『住處』，指居住的天等世界處；『有去』，指有人向不同的去處去。如果這樣，這個『我』從無始以來就恒常存在，也就是常。但沒有這件事。為什麼沒有呢？因為眾生和人先前已經被遮止了。因為這個緣故，沒有常『我』。如果說雖然沒有常『我』，但有無常『我』，這也是不對的。正如論偈所說： 『如果沒有常『我』，誰又是無常的呢？亦常亦無常，非常非無常。』 解釋：這是說因為有常，所以才說無常。本來沒有常，憑藉什麼說無常呢？再次，常、無常等，都已經不能成立。現在應當觀察邊等四句。正如論偈所說： 『如果世間有邊（究盡處），怎麼會有後世？如果世間沒有邊（究盡處），怎麼會有後世？』 解釋：『邊』是什麼？指究竟處、盡處等名為『邊』。就像阿羅漢涅槃的陰。而現在有後世存在，是因為前世的陰為因，後世的陰為果，輾轉沒有終結。這樣依靠前陰為因，生起后陰為果，所以現在有這些陰輾轉相續生起。正如論偈所說： 『這些陰相續，猶如燃燒的燈焰，因此世間，非有邊也非無邊。』 解釋：這裡建立論證。有無明（avidya）煩惱沒有窮盡，諸陰相續不斷。此陰有果，譬如燈焰相續。因此。
【English Translation】 English version: 『So it is. If someone says: 『The 『self』 is neither permanent nor impermanent,』 as the verse in the treatise says: 『If permanence and impermanence, two meanings can be established, then neither permanent nor impermanent, your meaning can also be established.』 Explanation: This meaning is difficult for people to understand. Furthermore, in the first meaning, as the verse in the treatise says: 『In some places people come, from dwelling places people go, birth and death have no beginning, but this is not the case.』 Explanation: 『In some places』 refers to the realms of gods and the realms of humans; 『people』 refers to gods and humans; 『dwelling places』 refers to the worlds where gods and others reside; 『go』 refers to people going to different destinies. If so, this 『self』 has existed constantly since beginningless time, which is permanence. But this is not the case. Why not? Because sentient beings and people have already been negated previously. For this reason, there is no permanent 『self』. If it is said that although there is no permanent 『self』, there is an impermanent 『self』, that is also not correct. As the verse in the treatise says: 『If there is no permanent 『self』, who then is impermanent? Also permanent and impermanent, neither permanent nor impermanent.』 Explanation: This means that because there is permanence, impermanence is spoken of. Originally there was no permanence, so what is there to rely on to speak of impermanence? Furthermore, permanence, impermanence, etc., cannot be established. Now we should observe the four sentences of 『edge』 (anta) etc. As the verse in the treatise says: 『If the world has an edge (ultimate limit), how can there be a future life? If the world has no edge (ultimate limit), how can there be a future life?』 Explanation: What is 『edge』 (anta)? It refers to the ultimate limit, the end point, etc., which are called 『edge』 (anta). It is like the skandhas (khandha) of an Arhat (Arahan) in Nirvana (Nibbana). And now there is a future life, because the skandhas (khandha) of the previous life are the cause, and the skandhas (khandha) of the future life are the result, revolving without end. In this way, relying on the previous skandhas (khandha) as the cause, the subsequent skandhas (khandha) arise as the result, so now these skandhas (khandha) arise in continuous succession. As the verse in the treatise says: 『These skandhas (khandha) continue, like the flame of a burning lamp, therefore the world is neither with edge (anta) nor without edge (anta).』 Explanation: Here, an argument is established. If ignorance (avidya) and afflictions (kilesa) have not been exhausted, the skandhas (khandha) continue without interruption. These skandhas (khandha) have a result, like the continuous flame of a lamp. Therefore.
故。世間有邊者不然。此相似果起不壞者。非前陰不壞有後果故。譬如燈前焰。以是故。世間無邊者不然。如所說驗義者。應如論偈說。
前世陰已壞 后陰別起者 則不因前陰 是名為有邊
釋曰。此謂前陰起已即滅。不為后陰相續因者。即是有邊。如論偈說。
若前陰不壞 后陰不起者 既不因前陰 而即是無邊
釋曰。云何無邊。謂一切時常住故。是義不然。如論偈說。
一分是有邊 一分是無邊 離彼有無邊 更無俱等邊
釋曰。此謂無世間最後邊等四句。所以者何。如論偈說。
云何一取者 一分是有壞 一分是無壞 如是者不然
釋曰。云何不然。如前二種燈喻驗中已破故。是為不然。如論偈說。
有邊及無邊 是二得成者 非有非無邊 其義亦得成
釋曰。此謂若一人是亦有邊亦無邊成者。以相待故。非有邊非無邊亦成。而無是事。如第一義中。總說一切見皆不然。作如是令物解者。如論偈說。
是第一義中 一切法空故 何處何因緣 何人起諸見
釋曰。此謂若第一義中一切諸體皆空者。有何人緣何境。以何為因起何等見。以彼人空境空因空見空故。有人有境有因有見起者不然。以是義故。品
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此，認為世間有邊際是不對的。這種相似的果報生起而不壞滅的說法，也是不對的，因為前一期的『陰』（khandha，蘊）壞滅后，才會產生后一期的『陰』，並非前一期的『陰』不壞滅而有後來的果報。這就像燈焰一樣，前焰滅后才有后焰。因此，認為世間沒有邊際也是不對的。正如所說的驗證意義，應該像論偈所說：
『前世陰已壞，后陰別起者，則不因前陰，是名為有邊。』
解釋：這是說前一期的『陰』生起后立即滅去，不作為后一期『陰』相續的因，這就是有邊。如論偈所說：
『若前陰不壞，后陰不起者，既不因前陰，而即是無邊。』
解釋：什麼是無邊呢？就是說一切時常住不變，這種說法是不對的。如論偈所說：
『一分是有邊，一分是無邊，離彼有無邊，更無俱等邊。』
解釋：這是說沒有世間的最後邊際等四句。為什麼呢？如論偈所說：
『云何一取者，一分是有壞，一分是無壞，如是者不然。』
解釋：為什麼不對呢？因為前面兩種燈的譬喻驗證中已經破斥過了，所以是不對的。如論偈所說：
『有邊及無邊，是二得成者，非有非無邊，其義亦得成。』
解釋：這是說如果一個人既是有邊又是無邊能夠成立，因為相互待對的緣故，那麼非有邊非無邊也能成立。但是沒有這樣的事。如第一義中，總說一切見解都是不對的。作這樣的解釋，使人理解，如論偈所說：
『是第一義中，一切法空故，何處何因緣，何人起諸見？』
解釋：這是說如果第一義中一切諸法體性皆空，那麼有什麼人，憑藉什麼因緣，在什麼境界中，生起什麼見解呢？因為那個人是空的，境界是空的，因是空的，見解也是空的。有人、有境界、有因、有見解生起的說法是不對的。因為這個緣故，這一品結束。
【English Translation】 English version Therefore, the view that the world has an end is incorrect. The idea that this similar result arises and does not perish is also incorrect, because the previous 『khandha』 (aggregate) perishes, and then the subsequent 『khandha』 arises. It is not that the previous 『khandha』 does not perish and then there is a later result. This is like the flame of a lamp, where the previous flame perishes and then there is a later flame. Therefore, the view that the world has no end is also incorrect. As the meaning of the verification that has been spoken, it should be as the verse in the treatise says:
『If the previous khandha has perished, and a subsequent khandha arises separately, then it is not caused by the previous khandha; this is called having an end.』
Explanation: This means that the previous 『khandha』 arises and immediately ceases, and does not serve as the continuous cause of the subsequent 『khandha』; this is having an end. As the verse in the treatise says:
『If the previous khandha does not perish, and a subsequent khandha does not arise, then since it is not caused by the previous khandha, it is immediately without end.』
Explanation: What is without end? It means that it is constant and unchanging at all times, but this view is incorrect. As the verse in the treatise says:
『One part has an end, one part is without end, apart from that which has and has no end, there is no co-equal end.』
Explanation: This means that there are no four statements such as the world having a final end. Why? As the verse in the treatise says:
『How can one grasp, one part has destruction, one part has no destruction; such a view is incorrect.』
Explanation: Why is it incorrect? Because it has already been refuted in the previous two analogies of the lamp, so it is incorrect. As the verse in the treatise says:
『Having an end and being without end, if these two can be established, then neither having nor not having an end can also be established.』
Explanation: This means that if one person can be both having an end and being without end, because of mutual dependence, then neither having nor not having an end can also be established. But there is no such thing. As in the first principle, it is generally said that all views are incorrect. Making such an explanation, so that people understand, as the verse in the treatise says:
『In this first principle, because all dharmas are empty, where, by what cause, and by whom do views arise?』
Explanation: This means that if in the first principle all dharmas are empty in nature, then what person, relying on what cause, in what realm, gives rise to what views? Because that person is empty, the realm is empty, the cause is empty, and the views are empty. The statement that there is a person, a realm, a cause, and views arising is incorrect. For this reason, this chapter ends.
初自部人言。第一義中。有如是五取陰自體是見處者。此出因義不然。云何不然。第一義中已令物解一切諸見悉皆空故。不然若依世諦中而立因者。自違汝義。佛婆伽婆為世親者。見一切眾生虛妄分別起種種苦種子諸見故而起憐愍。如論偈說。
佛為斷諸苦 演說微妙法 以憐愍為因 我今禮瞿曇
釋曰。斷苦者。謂斷一切眾生生死等一切諸苦。妙法者。謂清凈故。名為妙法。能滅煩惱熏習火故。名為清凈。複次一切功德因增長圓滿故。亦名清凈。妙法者。所謂大乘。如勝鬘經說世尊。攝受妙法者。謂守護大乘。何以故。世尊。一切聲聞辟支佛乘。皆從大乘中出生故。乃至一切世間出世間善法。亦皆從大乘中出生故。世尊譬如阿耨達池出四大河。如是如是。世尊。大乘者。能生聲聞辟支佛乘。如是乘者。以慈悲喜捨為因。不以世間名利為因。今禮瞿曇者。謂能開示無上妙法寶故。名為瞿曇。複次姓瞿曇故。名為瞿曇。禮者云何。有二種禮。一謂口言稱歎。二謂屈身頭面著地。如梵王所問經偈言。深解因緣法。則無諸邪見。法皆屬因緣。無自定根本。因緣法不生。因緣法不滅。若能如是解。諸佛常現前。此品初說自部人立驗有過。又以諸見空故。而令開解是品義意。如般若中說佛告勇猛極勇猛菩薩摩訶
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 初出自部人說：『在第一義諦（Paramārtha，最高真理）中，有這樣的五取蘊（Pañca-skandha，構成個體存在的五種要素：色、受、想、行、識）自體是見處。』這種提出原因的方式是不對的。為什麼不對呢？因為在第一義諦中，已經讓事物理解到一切諸見都是空性的緣故。如果依據世俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）中而建立原因，就自相矛盾了。佛陀（Buddha）薄伽梵（Bhagavat，世尊）因為是世間親人，見到一切眾生虛妄分別而生起種種痛苦的種子和諸見，所以才生起憐憫之心。正如論偈所說： 『佛為斷諸苦，演說微妙法，以憐愍為因，我今禮瞿曇（Gautama，釋迦牟尼佛的姓氏）。』 解釋：『斷苦者』，是指斷除一切眾生的生死等一切諸苦。『妙法者』，是因為清凈的緣故，所以稱為『妙法』。能夠滅除煩惱的熏習之火的緣故，所以名為清凈。再次，一切功德的因增長圓滿的緣故，也名為清凈。『妙法者』，就是所謂的大乘（Mahāyāna）。如《勝鬘經》所說，世尊攝受妙法，就是守護大乘。為什麼呢？因為世尊的一切聲聞乘（Śrāvakayāna）、辟支佛乘（Pratyekabuddhayāna），都是從大乘中出生的緣故。乃至一切世間和出世間的善法，也都是從大乘中出生的緣故。世尊譬如阿耨達池（Anavatapta）流出四大河。像這樣，世尊，大乘能夠產生聲聞乘、辟支佛乘。這樣的乘，是以慈悲喜捨為因，而不是以世間的名利為因。『今禮瞿曇者』，是指能夠開示無上妙法寶的緣故，名為瞿曇。再次，因為姓瞿曇的緣故，名為瞿曇。『禮』是什麼呢？有兩種禮，一是口頭上的稱讚，二是屈身頭面著地。如《梵王所問經》偈言：『深解因緣法，則無諸邪見，法皆屬因緣，無自定根本，因緣法不生，因緣法不滅，若能如是解，諸佛常現前。』這一品最初說自部人立論有錯誤。又因為諸見是空性的緣故，而使人開悟理解，這是這一品的意義。如《般若經》中說，佛告訴勇猛極勇猛菩薩摩訶薩（Bodhisattva-mahāsattva，大菩薩）。
【English Translation】 English version: Initially, someone from our own group said: 'In the ultimate truth (Paramārtha), these five aggregates of clinging (Pañca-skandha) themselves are the basis of views.' This way of presenting a cause is incorrect. Why is it incorrect? Because in the ultimate truth, it has already been made clear that all views are empty. If one establishes a cause based on conventional truth (Saṃvṛti-satya), it contradicts your own doctrine. The Buddha (Buddha) Bhagavan (Bhagavat), being a relative of the world, seeing all sentient beings' false discriminations giving rise to seeds of various sufferings and views, thus arose compassion. As the verse in the treatise says: 'The Buddha, to cut off all suffering, expounded the subtle Dharma, with compassion as the cause, I now pay homage to Gautama (Gautama).' Explanation: 'Cutting off suffering' means cutting off all sufferings of sentient beings, such as birth and death. 'Subtle Dharma' is called 'subtle Dharma' because it is pure. It is called pure because it can extinguish the fire of the habitual tendencies of afflictions. Furthermore, it is also called pure because the cause of all merits increases and becomes complete. 'Subtle Dharma' refers to the Mahayana (Mahāyāna). As the Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra says, the World-Honored One embraces the subtle Dharma, which means protecting the Mahayana. Why? Because all the Śrāvakayāna (Śrāvakayāna) and Pratyekabuddhayāna (Pratyekabuddhayāna) of the World-Honored One are born from the Mahayana. Even all worldly and supramundane virtuous dharmas are born from the Mahayana. The World-Honored One is like Lake Anavatapta (Anavatapta) from which the four great rivers flow. In this way, the World-Honored One, the Mahayana, can generate the Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna. This vehicle is based on loving-kindness, compassion, joy, and equanimity as the cause, not on worldly fame and gain as the cause. 'Now I pay homage to Gautama' refers to the one who can reveal the unsurpassed treasure of the subtle Dharma, hence the name Gautama. Furthermore, because of the Gautama lineage, he is called Gautama. What is 'homage'? There are two kinds of homage: one is verbal praise, and the other is prostration with the body, head, and face touching the ground. As the verse in the Brahma's Questions Sutra says: 'Deeply understanding the law of dependent origination, then there will be no wrong views. All dharmas belong to dependent origination, without a fixed foundation of their own. The law of dependent origination is neither born nor destroyed. If one can understand in this way, all Buddhas will always appear before one.' This chapter initially states that the arguments established by people of our own group have flaws. Furthermore, because all views are empty, it leads to enlightenment and understanding, which is the meaning of this chapter. As it is said in the Prajñā Sūtra, the Buddha told the courageous and extremely courageous Bodhisattva-mahāsattva (Bodhisattva-mahāsattva).
薩。知色非起見處。亦非斷見處。乃至受想行識非起見處。亦非斷見處。若色受想行識非起見處。亦非斷見處者。是名般若波羅蜜。今以無起等差別緣起令開解者。所謂息一切戲論及一異等種種見。悉皆寂滅。是自覺法。是如虛空法。是無分別法。是第一義境界法。以如是等真實甘露。而令開解是。一部論宗意。問曰。諸佛所說初中后皆真實。此論中何須廣立諸驗耶。答曰。或有愚鈍諸眾生等。于佛阿含不能正信為欲攝取彼眾生故。廣立諸驗。我今頂禮龍樹阿阇梨故。而作頌曰。
牟尼法王子 大智阿阇梨 以般若妙理 開演此中論 善解利他行 為照世日月 顯了甚深法 說得佛道因 阇梨所作者 我今悉解釋 息諸惡見故 造般若燈論 此般若燈者 深妙無比法 然我今所作 若有少福德 以此般若燈 愿攝眾生類 見法身如來 遍滿十方剎 得自所覺法 息諸見戲論 寂滅無分別 無比如虛空 復愿般若燈 普照於世界 為闇所覆者 建立於涅槃
般若燈論釋第二十七品竟。
一切論到彼岸者。深大智慧者。乘于大乘者。分別照明大菩薩。造此釋中論長行訖。而發願言。
愿以一念善 隨喜迴向等 與一切眾生 命終見彌
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 薩（梵文音譯，意義不詳）。要知道色（梵：rūpa，物質現象）並非產生見解之處，也非斷滅見解之處。乃至受（梵：vedanā，感受）、想（梵：saṃjñā，認知）、行（梵：saṃskāra，意志）、識（梵：vijñāna，意識）也非產生見解之處，也非斷滅見解之處。如果色、受、想、行、識不是產生見解之處，也不是斷滅見解之處，這就叫做般若波羅蜜（梵：Prajñāpāramitā，通過智慧到達彼岸）。現在用無生起等差別緣起（梵：pratītyasamutpāda，事物相互依存的生起）來使人開悟理解，就是止息一切戲論（無意義的爭論）以及一異（相同與不同）等種種見解，全部都寂靜滅除。這是自覺之法，是如同虛空之法，是無分別之法，是第一義境界之法。用像這樣的真實甘露來使人開悟理解，這是一部論的宗旨要義。有人問：諸佛所說的初、中、后都是真實的，這部論中為什麼需要廣泛建立各種論證呢？回答說：或許有些愚鈍的眾生，對於佛陀的教誨不能真正相信，爲了攝取這些眾生，所以廣泛建立各種論證。我現在頂禮龍樹阿阇梨（梵：Nāgārjuna，論師），因此作頌說： 牟尼（梵：muni，聖人）的法王子，大智慧的阿阇梨，用般若（梵：prajñā，智慧）的微妙道理，開演這部中論。善於理解利益他人的行為，像是照亮世界的日月，顯明瞭甚深的佛法，說出了證得佛道的因緣。阿阇梨所作的論著，我現在全部解釋，爲了止息各種錯誤的見解，造作《般若燈論》。這部《般若燈論》，是深奧微妙無比的佛法。然而我現在所作的，如果有一點點的福德，用這《般若燈》，愿能攝受一切眾生，見到法身如來（佛的真身），遍滿十方世界，證得自己所覺悟的佛法，止息各種見解和戲論，寂靜滅除沒有分別，沒有比擬如同虛空。又愿《般若燈》普遍照耀於世界，為黑暗所覆蓋的人們，建立通往涅槃（梵：nirvāṇa，解脫）的道路。 《般若燈論釋》第二十七品結束。 一切論到達彼岸的人，深邃廣大智慧的人，乘坐于大乘（梵：Mahāyāna，佛教宗派）的人，分別照明的大菩薩，造作這部《釋中論》長行完畢，而發願說： 愿以一念善心，隨喜迴向等等功德，與一切眾生，在臨命終時見到彌勒（梵：Maitreya，未來佛）。
【English Translation】 English version: Sa (Sanskrit transliteration, meaning unknown). Know that rūpa (Sanskrit: rūpa, material phenomena) is neither the place where views arise, nor the place where views are cut off. Likewise, vedanā (Sanskrit: vedanā, feeling), saṃjñā (Sanskrit: saṃjñā, cognition), saṃskāra (Sanskrit: saṃskāra, volition), and vijñāna (Sanskrit: vijñāna, consciousness) are neither the place where views arise, nor the place where views are cut off. If rūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra, and vijñāna are not the place where views arise, nor the place where views are cut off, this is called Prajñāpāramitā (Sanskrit: Prajñāpāramitā, perfection of wisdom). Now, using dependent origination without arising or other distinctions (Sanskrit: pratītyasamutpāda, interdependent arising of phenomena) to enlighten understanding, is to cease all drama (meaningless arguments) and various views such as oneness and otherness (same and different), all of which are completely extinguished. This is the self-aware Dharma, the Dharma like space, the Dharma without discrimination, the Dharma of the ultimate reality. Using such true nectar to enlighten understanding, this is the essence of a treatise. Someone asks: The beginning, middle, and end spoken by all Buddhas are true. Why is it necessary to extensively establish various proofs in this treatise? The answer is: Perhaps some dull beings cannot truly believe in the Buddha's teachings. In order to gather these beings, various proofs are extensively established. I now prostrate to Nāgārjuna Ācārya (Sanskrit: Nāgārjuna, master), therefore I compose this verse: The Dharma prince of Muni (Sanskrit: muni, sage), the Ācārya of great wisdom, uses the subtle principles of prajñā (Sanskrit: prajñā, wisdom) to expound this Middle Treatise. Skillful in understanding actions that benefit others, like the sun and moon illuminating the world, revealing the profound Dharma, speaking of the causes for attaining Buddhahood. The works composed by the Ācārya, I now explain in full, in order to cease various wrong views, creating the Prajñāpradīpa (Lamp of Wisdom) Treatise. This Prajñāpradīpa Treatise is a profound and incomparable Dharma. However, if there is a little merit in what I have done, using this Prajñāpradīpa, may it gather all sentient beings, to see the Dharmakāya Tathāgata (the true body of the Buddha), pervading the ten directions, attain the Dharma of self-awakening, cease all views and drama, be extinguished in silence without discrimination, incomparable like space. May the Prajñāpradīpa universally illuminate the world, for those covered by darkness, establish the path to nirvāṇa (Sanskrit: nirvāṇa, liberation). End of Chapter Twenty-Seven of the Prajñāpradīpa Commentary. The one who has reached the other shore of all treatises, the one with profound and vast wisdom, the one who rides the Mahāyāna (Sanskrit: Mahāyāna, Buddhist school), the great Bodhisattva who illuminates with discernment, has completed the prose of this Commentary on the Middle Treatise, and makes this vow: May this single thought of goodness, rejoicing, dedication, and other merits, be shared with all sentient beings, so that at the end of their lives, they may see Maitreya (Sanskrit: Maitreya, the future Buddha).
勒
般若燈論釋卷第十五
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 《般若燈論釋》第十五卷
【English Translation】 English version Prajnapradipa-tika (Commentary on the Lamp on Wisdom), Volume 15