T30n1567_大乘中觀釋論(第1卷-第9卷)
大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1567 大乘中觀釋論(第1卷-第9卷)
No. 1567 [cf. Nos. 1564-1566]
大乘中觀釋論卷第一
安慧菩薩造
譯經三藏朝散大夫試鴻臚卿光梵大師賜紫沙門臣惟凈等奉 詔譯
觀緣品第一
歸命一切智。所有世俗勝義二諦。本無所行。若無所行。攝化有情事。即當舍離。菩薩為開示故。造此中論。然此不同一切外道所說緣生。佛說緣生法。為令覺悟多慢心者。生極凈信。于諸論中。此論宗重。謂緣生義。即無滅等句。最勝緣生。顯明開示。是故論初讚歎世尊。如本頌言。
不滅亦不生 不斷亦不常等
釋曰。滅者。無常性故名滅。發起名生。斷生死故名斷。擇滅涅槃常時性故名常。如有人言。若佛出世。若不出世。法性常住。此緣生者。亦即是常。一者無差別義。如所說離此即是為緣生之法何所生邪。謂種種義。如其所說。從因所生。生已有果。來者向此名來。若無來義轉時此即無去。無去義轉時即無過去世所行。非今有滅。此即無滅。此法如是說。餘生等亦然。若取著言詮即為戲論。如其言詮。于如是性。執有性者。彼皆息滅此即名為滅諸戲論離諸嬈惱性分。別自性空已乃名寂靜。今
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1567 大乘中觀釋論(第1卷-第9卷)
No. 1567 [cf. Nos. 1564-1566]
大乘中觀釋論卷第一
安慧菩薩造
譯經三藏朝散大夫試鴻臚卿光梵大師賜紫沙門臣惟凈等奉 詔譯
觀緣品第一
歸命一切智。所有世俗勝義二諦。本無所行。若無所行。攝化有情事。即當舍離。菩薩為開示故。造此中論。然此不同一切外道所說緣生。佛說緣生法。為令覺悟多慢心者。生極凈信。于諸論中。此論宗重。謂緣生義。即無滅等句。最勝緣生。顯明開示。是故論初讚歎世尊。如本頌言。
『不滅亦不生 不斷亦不常等』
釋曰。滅者。無常性故名滅。發起名生。斷生死故名斷。擇滅涅槃常時性故名常。如有人言。若佛出世。若不出世。法性常住。此緣生者。亦即是常。一者無差別義。如所說離此即是為緣生之法何所生邪。謂種種義。如其所說。從因所生。生已有果。來者向此名來。若無來義轉時此即無去。無去義轉時即無過去世所行。非今有滅。此即無滅。此法如是說。餘生等亦然。若取著言詮即為戲論。如其言詮。于如是性。執有性者。彼皆息滅此即名為滅諸戲論離諸嬈惱性分。別自性空已乃名寂靜。今
【English Translation】 English version Taisho Tripitaka Volume 30, No. 1567, Mahayana Madhyamaka Commentary (Volumes 1-9)
No. 1567 [cf. Nos. 1564-1566]
Mahayana Madhyamaka Commentary, Volume 1
Composed by Bodhisattva Anhui (Anhui Bodhisattva)
Translated by the Tripitaka Master Chao San Da Fu, Acting Honglu Qing, Guangfan Master, and Purple-Robed Shramana, Chen Weijing (Chen Weijing), et al., under Imperial Decree
Chapter 1: Observation of Conditions
I take refuge in the All-Knowing. All worldly and ultimate two truths are originally without inherent existence. If there is no inherent existence, the work of gathering and transforming sentient beings should be abandoned. Because the Bodhisattva wishes to reveal and explain this, he composed this Madhyamaka treatise. However, this is different from the dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) spoken of by all non-Buddhist paths. The Buddha spoke of the Dharma of dependent origination in order to awaken those with much pride and generate extremely pure faith. Among all treatises, this treatise emphasizes the meaning of dependent origination, which is the phrase 'without cessation,' etc. The most excellent dependent origination is clearly revealed and explained. Therefore, at the beginning of the treatise, the World-Honored One is praised, as the original verse says:
'Neither cessation nor arising, neither discontinuity nor permanence, etc.'
Explanation: 'Cessation' means cessation because of impermanence. 'Arising' means the arising of something. 'Discontinuity' means the discontinuity of birth and death. 'Permanence' means the permanence of the nature of Nirvana, which is selective cessation. As some say, whether a Buddha appears in the world or does not appear, the nature of Dharma is always abiding. This dependent origination is also permanent. One is the meaning of non-difference. As it is said, apart from this, what is the Dharma of dependent origination that arises? It refers to various meanings. As it is said, it arises from a cause, and after arising, there is a result. That which comes towards this is called 'coming.' If there is no meaning of coming, then when it turns, there is no 'going.' When there is no meaning of going, there is no past world that has been traversed. It is not that there is cessation now; therefore, there is no cessation. This Dharma is spoken of in this way. The same is true for the remaining 'arising,' etc. If one clings to verbal expressions, it becomes mere play. As for verbal expressions, those who cling to existence in such a nature, they all cease. This is called the cessation of all playful discriminations, the separation from all disturbing afflictions, and the discrimination of the emptiness of self-nature, which is then called tranquility. Now
此如是無滅等十種句義。如前所說十種對治。此中皆止周儘是論皆說此義此如是義成。餘一切論中皆同此緣法。今此義中。若此因若彼緣。如薪生火。而彼所取如是應知。常不斷義。如前句所說發起之義。此所說成。若因中有故設因壞時後還不離果起無前後時性故。如澡沐已受食。此非緣生。若言無生。自語相違。不和合對治。此即世俗緣生。不和合故。若勝義諦所生。此中止遣。世俗諦識中體性不和合勝義諦體性。此中止遣。何等是世俗。何等是勝義。若勝上所說相續義性。以世俗諦伺察時。此不和合。以彼現證非涅槃所得。此所作性不異勝義諦故。亦不止遣。若智所成。即彼世俗諦。不異勝義諦。如瓶等色等。而此一類色受等法。決定境界智不許可。彼智無性故。譬如瓶等墮世俗有性。雖無所取非世俗無。此中所說。世俗所取之義。是自非他。如理應知。世俗者即是世俗所取故。如樹林等非極微許。而有所取道理可得。若方分分別差別分別等性而彼決定世俗有性。此非道理。以物體遍計有樹林等對礙。而識中有彼樹林等為所表故。然識中物性非無道理。由是樹于彼識而為所緣。如是能表識中得有所表。是故非物體樹于識中有。此如是說故。余說亦然于能表所表中。遍計無體亦無所成。何法可成邪。謂如諸佛境界。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：此『如是無滅』等十種句義，如同前面所說的十種對治（指十種修行方法，用於克服煩惱）。這裡面都包含著止息（煩惱）、周遍、窮盡，這些論述都在闡述這個意義，這個『如是』的意義成立。其他一切論述中，都共同遵循這個緣起法。現在在這個意義中，如果說這個是因，那個是緣，就像柴生火一樣，那麼對於那個所取（指被認知的事物），應當這樣理解：它是常不斷絕的意義，如同前面句子所說的發起之義，這個說法是成立的。如果說因中有（果），所以設立因，那麼因壞滅時，果仍然不離因生起，沒有先後時間性，就像洗澡之後吃飯一樣，這不是緣生。如果說無生，那就是自相矛盾，是不和合的對治。這即是世俗緣生，因為不和合的緣故。如果是勝義諦（究竟真理）所生，這其中止息了（世俗的觀點）。世俗諦的認識中，體性與勝義諦的體性不和合，這其中止息了（世俗的觀點）。什麼是世俗，什麼是勝義？如果是勝上（殊勝）所說的相續義性，用世俗諦來觀察時，這不和合，因為那個現證（直接體驗）不是涅槃所得。這個所作性（指事物由因緣和合而成）不異於勝義諦，所以也不止息（勝義諦）。如果是智慧所成就的，那就是世俗諦，不異於勝義諦，就像瓶子等的顏色等。而這一類色、受等法，決定境界的智慧是不認可的，因為那個智慧沒有自性。譬如瓶子等屬於世俗的有性，雖然沒有所取，但並非世俗中沒有。這裡所說的，世俗所取之義，是自證而非他證，應當如理了知。世俗就是世俗所取，就像樹林等不是極微（最小的物質單位）所組成，但有所取的道理是可以成立的。如果說方分（空間分割）、分別（區分）、差別分別（詳細區分）等性，而那個決定了世俗的有性，這並非道理。因為物體普遍被認為有樹林等對礙（阻礙），而識中存在著那些樹林等作為所表（被表達的對象）。然而識中的物性並非沒有道理，因此樹對於那個識來說是所緣（被緣的對象）。這樣，能表（表達者）的識中才能有所表（被表達的對象）。所以並非物體樹在識中存在，這是如此說的緣故。其他的說法也是這樣，在能表和所表中，遍計（虛妄分別）沒有自體，也沒有所能成就的。什麼法可以成就邪見？就是如同諸佛的境界。 English version: These ten kinds of sentence meanings, such as 'thus, no cessation,' are like the ten kinds of antidotes (referring to the ten practices to overcome afflictions) mentioned earlier. They all contain cessation (of afflictions), pervasiveness, and exhaustion. These discussions all explain this meaning, and this meaning of 'thus' is established. In all other discussions, they commonly follow this law of dependent origination. Now, in this meaning, if we say that this is the cause and that is the condition, just like fire arising from firewood, then for that which is grasped (referring to the object being cognized), it should be understood in this way: it is the meaning of constant non-cessation, just like the meaning of initiation mentioned in the previous sentence, and this statement is established. If we say that there is (the effect) in the cause, so the cause is established, then when the cause is destroyed, the effect still does not arise apart from the cause, without any temporal sequence, just like eating after bathing, this is not dependently originated. If we say there is no arising, then that is self-contradictory, and it is an incompatible antidote. This is worldly dependent origination, because of the incompatibility. If it is originated from the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), then this ceases (worldly views). In worldly truth (Saṃvṛti-satya) cognition, the nature is incompatible with the nature of ultimate truth, and this ceases (worldly views). What is worldly and what is ultimate? If it is the continuous meaning nature spoken of by the supreme, when observed with worldly truth, this is incompatible, because that direct experience is not obtained from Nirvāṇa. This made nature (referring to things made by the combination of causes and conditions) is not different from the ultimate truth, so it does not cease (the ultimate truth) either. If it is accomplished by wisdom, then that is worldly truth, not different from the ultimate truth, like the color of a pot, etc. But these kinds of phenomena such as form, feeling, etc., are not recognized by the wisdom of definite realm, because that wisdom has no self-nature. For example, pots, etc., belong to the worldly existence, although there is nothing to be grasped, it is not that there is nothing in the worldly. What is said here, the meaning of what is grasped by the worldly, is self-evident rather than other-evident, and should be understood as it is. Worldly is what is grasped by the worldly, just like forests, etc., are not composed of atoms (Aṇu), but the reason for what is grasped can be established. If we say that the nature of spatial division, distinction, and detailed distinction, etc., and that determines the worldly existence, this is not reasonable. Because objects are generally considered to have obstacles such as forests, etc., and in consciousness, those forests, etc., exist as what is expressed (the object being expressed). However, the nature of things in consciousness is not without reason, so the tree is the object (Alambana) for that consciousness. In this way, the expressing consciousness can have what is expressed. Therefore, it is not that the object tree exists in consciousness, this is why it is said so. Other statements are also the same, in the expressing and the expressed, the imputation (Parikalpita) has no self-nature, and nothing can be accomplished. What Dharma can accomplish wrong views? It is like the realm of all Buddhas.
【English Translation】 These ten kinds of sentence meanings, such as 'thus, no cessation,' are like the ten kinds of antidotes (指十種修行方法，用於克服煩惱) mentioned earlier. They all contain cessation (of afflictions), pervasiveness, and exhaustion. These discussions all explain this meaning, and this meaning of 'thus' is established. In all other discussions, they commonly follow this law of dependent origination. Now, in this meaning, if we say that this is the cause and that is the condition, just like fire arising from firewood, then for that which is grasped (指被認知的事物), it should be understood in this way: it is the meaning of constant non-cessation, just like the meaning of initiation mentioned in the previous sentence, and this statement is established. If we say that there is (the effect) in the cause, so the cause is established, then when the cause is destroyed, the effect still does not arise apart from the cause, without any temporal sequence, just like eating after bathing, this is not dependently originated. If we say there is no arising, then that is self-contradictory, and it is an incompatible antidote. This is worldly dependent origination, because of the incompatibility. If it is originated from the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), then this ceases (worldly views). In worldly truth (Saṃvṛti-satya) cognition, the nature is incompatible with the nature of ultimate truth, and this ceases (worldly views). What is worldly and what is ultimate? If it is the continuous meaning nature spoken of by the supreme, when observed with worldly truth, this is incompatible, because that direct experience is not obtained from Nirvāṇa. This made nature (指事物由因緣和合而成) is not different from the ultimate truth, so it does not cease (the ultimate truth) either. If it is accomplished by wisdom, then that is worldly truth, not different from the ultimate truth, like the color of a pot, etc. But these kinds of phenomena such as form, feeling, etc., are not recognized by the wisdom of definite realm, because that wisdom has no self-nature. For example, pots, etc., belong to the worldly existence, although there is nothing to be grasped, it is not that there is nothing in the worldly. What is said here, the meaning of what is grasped by the worldly, is self-evident rather than other-evident, and should be understood as it is. Worldly is what is grasped by the worldly, just like forests, etc., are not composed of atoms (Aṇu), but the reason for what is grasped can be established. If we say that the nature of spatial division, distinction, and detailed distinction, etc., and that determines the worldly existence, this is not reasonable. Because objects are generally considered to have obstacles such as forests, etc., and in consciousness, those forests, etc., exist as what is expressed (the object being expressed). However, the nature of things in consciousness is not without reason, so the tree is the object (Alambana) for that consciousness. In this way, the expressing consciousness can have what is expressed. Therefore, it is not that the object tree exists in consciousness, this is why it is said so. Other statements are also the same, in the expressing and the expressed, the imputation (Parikalpita) has no self-nature, and nothing can be accomplished. What Dharma can accomplish wrong views? It is like the realm of all Buddhas.
色等決定。此何不成。如彼諸佛境界。此亦然有。非如識中遍計生等。此中止遣。識中物體若有性者。此非道理。若彼勝上如來之智。如所說義。故名勝義。余皆世俗。不實性故此說最上。謂佛所說善文善義是故頌言。
我稽首禮佛 諸說中第一
釋曰。若文義二。無著智性。唯佛大師而善宣說。何所說邪。謂說無生性。今為證成無生性故。彼無滅等諸差別義。亦如是證成。如是建立無生法故。或有人言。所說生者。我知差別之性如是自生。為遮遣彼說。是故頌言。
諸法不自生
釋曰。所言生者。本無今有之別名。自者。我性義。彼如是說。互相損惱。自語相違。不和合對治。或如瓶等。即不見有自生之法。如前瓶等。自體無性故。諸生法無性。生已復生。亦復無性。如是眼等決定和合。若爾即有對治過失。若有如是因。即有如是果。彼果體有生。以因果二法無別異性故。若言自生。此應思擇。又復泥團離瓶。瓶離於因。此中色等當云何有。若離泥團。果因二種無別異性。若泥團離瓶。而此果體即不和合。泥團若壞。瓶有所得。即非果時有因性故。此僧佉人言。譬如色等非果因二法有別異性。色等自體亦如離瓶先無有性。若彼決定實無所成。所說無異如瓶所作。杖輪水等非此所闕。彼等無別
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 色等決定。此何不成？（顏色等是決定的，為什麼不能成立呢？）如彼諸佛境界，此亦然有。（就像諸佛的境界一樣，這裡也是有的。）非如識中遍計生等。（不像在意識中虛妄分別產生的種種現象。）此中止遣，識中物體若有性者，此非道理。（這裡停止並遣除，如果意識中的物體具有自性，這是不合理的。）若彼勝上如來之智，如所說義，故名勝義，余皆世俗，不實性故。（如果那殊勝的如來智慧，如同所說的意義，所以稱為勝義，其餘都是世俗，因為它們不具有真實性。）此說最上，謂佛所說善文善義，是故頌言： 我稽首禮佛 諸說中第一 釋曰：若文義二，無著智性，唯佛大師而善宣說。（如果文字和意義兩者，具有無礙的智慧，只有佛陀大師才能善於宣說。）何所說邪？謂說無生性。（說了什麼呢？就是說無生性。）今為證成無生性故，彼無滅等諸差別義，亦如是證成。（現在爲了證明無生性，那些沒有滅等種種差別的意義，也同樣可以被證明。）如是建立無生法故。（像這樣建立無生法。）或有人言：所說生者，我知差別之性如是自生。（或者有人說：所說的生，我知道差別之性是這樣自己產生的。）為遮遣彼說，是故頌言： 諸法不自生 釋曰：所言生者，本無今有之別名。（所說的生，是指本來沒有現在有的差別名稱。）自者，我性義。（自，是指我性的意義。）彼如是說，互相損惱，自語相違，不和合對治。（他們這樣說，互相損害，自相矛盾，不能和諧地對治。）或如瓶等，即不見有自生之法。（或者像瓶子等，就看不見有自己產生的法。）如前瓶等，自體無性故，諸生法無性。（像前面的瓶子等，因為自體沒有自性，所以一切生法都沒有自性。）生已復生，亦復無性。（生了之後又生，也同樣沒有自性。）如是眼等決定和合，若爾即有對治過失。（像這樣眼睛等決定和合，如果這樣就有對治的過失。）若有如是因，即有如是果，彼果體有生，以因果二法無別異性故。（如果有了這樣的因，就有了這樣的果，那個果的本體有生，因為因果兩種法沒有差別異性的緣故。）若言自生，此應思擇。（如果說是自己產生，這應該思考。）又復泥團離瓶，瓶離於因，此中色等當云何有？（又如果泥土離開了瓶子，瓶子離開了因，這其中的顏色等應當如何存在呢？）若離泥團，果因二種無別異性。（如果離開了泥土，果和因兩種沒有差別異性。）若泥團離瓶，而此果體即不和合。（如果泥土離開了瓶子，那麼這個果的本體就不和合。）泥團若壞，瓶有所得，即非果時有因性故。（泥土如果壞了，瓶子有所得，就不是果的時候具有因性的緣故。）此僧佉人言：譬如色等非果因二法有別異性，色等自體亦如離瓶先無有性。（這個僧佉（Samkhya）人說：譬如顏色等不是果和因兩種法有差別異性，顏色等的自體也像離開了瓶子一樣，先前沒有自性。）若彼決定實無所成，所說無異如瓶所作。（如果那個決定實際上沒有什麼成就，所說的沒有什麼不同，就像瓶子所做的一樣。）杖輪水等非此所闕，彼等無別。（木杖、輪子、水等不是這裡所缺少的，它們沒有差別。）
【English Translation】 English version Color and so on are definite. Why can't this be established? Like the realms of those Buddhas, this also exists. It is not like the phenomena that arise from conceptual proliferation in consciousness. Here, this is stopped and eliminated. If objects in consciousness have inherent existence, this is not reasonable. If the wisdom of the Supreme Tathagata is in accordance with the meaning as spoken, it is called ultimate truth (Paramartha), and the rest are conventional truths (Samvriti), because they do not have real existence. This speaks of the highest, meaning the good words and good meanings spoken by the Buddha. Therefore, the verse says: I bow my head and pay homage to the Buddha, the foremost among all speakers. Commentary: If both the words and the meaning possess unobstructed wisdom, only the great master, the Buddha, can skillfully proclaim them. What is proclaimed? It is the teaching of non-arising (anutpada). Now, in order to prove non-arising, those meanings without cessation and other distinctions are also proven in the same way. Thus, the Dharma of non-arising is established. Or someone might say: 'What is said to arise, I know that the nature of distinction arises by itself in this way.' To refute that statement, the verse says: Things do not arise from themselves. Commentary: What is called 'arising' is another name for the distinction of 'originally not existing, now existing.' 'Self' means 'the nature of I.' Those who speak in this way harm each other, contradict themselves, and cannot harmoniously counteract. Or like a pot and so on, one does not see a Dharma that arises by itself. Like the previous pot and so on, because the self-nature is without inherent existence, all arising Dharmas are without inherent existence. Having arisen and arising again are also without inherent existence. Thus, the eyes and so on are definitely combined. If so, there is the fault of counteraction. If there is such a cause, there is such a result, and that result has arising, because the two Dharmas of cause and result have no different nature. If it is said to arise from itself, this should be considered. Furthermore, if the lump of clay is separated from the pot, and the pot is separated from the cause, how can color and so on exist in this? If separated from the lump of clay, the two, result and cause, have no different nature. If the lump of clay is separated from the pot, then this result is not combined. If the lump of clay is destroyed, and the pot is obtained, then it is not the case that the cause exists at the time of the result. The Samkhya (Samkhya) people say: 'For example, color and so on are not two Dharmas, result and cause, with different natures, and the self-nature of color and so on is also like being separated from the pot, previously without existence.' If that determination actually accomplishes nothing, what is said is no different from what the pot does. The staff, wheel, water, and so on are not lacking here; they are no different.
異性因果二無性故。何名無別異。謂不見因自體能作。如是果有所作。亦復不得無異性故。若無所作。何名因果。決定自體無別異性。若因無作。彼無作時果不和合。有異人言。我知差別。諸法從他性生。為對遣彼說。是故頌言。
亦不從他生
釋曰。他生者。別異義。如他性瓶等不生眼等。由如是故。自緣既不生。他性亦然。若止遣諸法自相。應知有過。此中或有彼不和合。如是所作非勝義諦中。他緣能生內六處等。以他性故。此如瓶等。此中他性瓶等如內六處緣勝義諦中生無性可得。世俗諦中亦然。生無性可得相違義性無因生性及共生等。若有所得皆他義故。如是所有中論成就。究竟義中離不和合對治等法。若復如是世俗諦中有所得者。決定如前對治相違。世俗緣生有所得故。此亦非所得如是有所成即和合無性成已見邊二不和合。如是即于諸所成中有共過失。若別異所成。當知自有差別過失。此廣文不書。恐繁且止。非中論所說。如前對治。何以故。后對治亦爾。無此中所成和合道理。有異人言。取彼實有泥團。隨有杖等諸作用法共生瓶等。此異意樂。故頌止言。
共生亦無性
釋曰。彼增上所作言非二法共生。若爾有言說對治過失。有異人言。如所意樂諸法如是無因而生。為遣彼義。是故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為異性和因果二者都沒有自性，所以為什麼說沒有差別呢？這是因為不能看到因的自體能夠產生作用。同樣，果的產生作用，也不能脫離沒有異性的狀態。如果沒有產生作用，又怎麼能稱之為因果呢？決定自體沒有差別異性。如果因沒有作用，那麼在它沒有作用的時候，果就不會和合。有些人說，我知道差別，諸法是從他性產生的。爲了駁斥這種觀點，所以頌文說：
『亦不從他生』
解釋：他生，指的是別異的意義。比如他性的瓶子等，不能從眼睛等產生。因為這個原因，自緣既然不能產生，他性也是一樣。如果阻止諸法自身的相狀，應當知道會有過失。這裡或者有彼此不和合的情況。這樣，所作在勝義諦中不是真實的，他緣能夠產生內六處等，因為是他性的緣故。這就像瓶子等一樣。這裡他性的瓶子等，就像內六處一樣，在勝義諦中產生無自性是可得的。在世俗諦中也是一樣。產生無自性是可得的，與相違的意義、無因生性以及共生等相對立。如果有所得，都是他義的緣故。這樣，所有中論的成就，在究竟的意義中，遠離不和合的對治等法。如果又像這樣在世俗諦中有所得，那麼決定像前面一樣對治相違。因為世俗的緣起有所得的緣故。這也不是所得，像這樣有所成就，就是和合無自性，成就了已見邊二者不和合。這樣，就在諸所成中存在共同的過失。如果別異所成，應當知道自有差別的過失。這些廣大的文句不寫了，恐怕繁瑣就此停止。不是中論所說的，像前面的對治一樣。為什麼呢？後面的對治也是一樣。沒有這裡所成就的和合道理。有些人說，取彼實有的泥團，隨著有杖等各種作用法共同產生瓶子等。這是不同的意樂，所以頌文阻止說：
『共生亦無性』
解釋：彼增上所作的言論不是二法共生。如果這樣，會有言說對治的過失。有些人說，像所意樂的諸法一樣，是無因而生的。爲了駁斥這種意義，所以說：
【English Translation】 English version: Because otherness and causality both lack inherent existence (svabhava), why is it said that there is no difference? This is because one cannot see that the self-nature of a cause can produce an effect. Similarly, the production of an effect cannot be separated from the state of having no otherness. If there is no production, how can it be called cause and effect? The determined self-nature has no difference or otherness. If the cause has no action, then when it has no action, the effect will not be in harmony. Some people say, 'I know the difference; all dharmas arise from other-nature (paratantra-svabhava).' To refute this view, the verse says:
'Not from another does it arise.'
Explanation: 'Arising from another' refers to the meaning of difference. For example, a pot, which has other-nature, cannot arise from the eyes, etc. Because of this reason, since self-origination does not arise, other-nature is also the same. If one prevents the self-characteristics of all dharmas, one should know that there will be faults. Here, there may be cases where they do not harmonize with each other. Thus, what is produced is not real in ultimate truth (paramartha-satya); other conditions can produce the six internal sense bases (ayatana), etc., because they are of other-nature. This is like a pot, etc. Here, the pot, etc., which has other-nature, is like the six internal sense bases; in ultimate truth, the arising of no-inherent-existence is attainable. It is the same in conventional truth (samvriti-satya). The arising of no-inherent-existence is attainable, which is opposed to contradictory meanings, the nature of arising without a cause, and arising together, etc. If something is attainable, it is all for the sake of others. Thus, all the accomplishments of the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) are, in the ultimate meaning, free from disharmonious antidotes, etc. If, again, something is attainable in conventional truth, then it is definitely like the previous antidotes and contradictions. Because conventional dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) has something attainable. This is also not attainable; thus, what is accomplished is the harmony of no-inherent-existence, accomplishing the non-harmony of the two extremes of existence and non-existence. Thus, in all that is accomplished, there is a common fault. If what is accomplished is different, one should know that there are inherent faults of difference. These extensive sentences are not written; fearing prolixity, I will stop here. It is not what the Madhyamaka says, like the previous antidotes. Why? The later antidotes are also the same. There is no reason for the harmony accomplished here. Some people say, 'Take the truly existent lump of clay, and along with various actions such as a stick, etc., a pot, etc., arises together.' This is a different intention, so the verse prevents it by saying:
'Arising together also has no inherent existence.'
Explanation: The statement of that which is additionally produced is not the co-arising of two dharmas. If so, there would be the fault of verbal contradiction. Some people say, 'Like the dharmas that are intended, they arise without a cause.' To refute this meaning, it is said:
頌言。
亦不無因生
釋曰。如他所說。無因生性有所得者。即時處等彼相離性。決定有生可得。彼時處效能不相離。此若止遣對治過失。此中或有生性。諸論皆說。是有漏義。如是有性各各系屬。諸性有生。此中皆止。若有所作。即與阿含相違。如佛所說。有四種緣能生諸法。而此四緣諸經論中皆如是說。何等為四。謂因緣。所緣緣。次第緣。增上緣。如是四緣無第五緣。諸異宗中有執我者。執極微者何所以邪。此中若有常因者。彼時處性即能相離。彼一切果乃有同生。現見時處等不相離性次第生法彼同作因。即不相離因性可得。此無過失。是故同作諸因。此中非因。彼說如是生無有性。若有因故決定有果。彼同作諸因決定因性。此本有故。若同作因此相離者。即如前說對治相違。以本和合故。而彼諸因如是建立差別因無性。然彼處等有相離性可同生者。此之分位如士夫等。由如是故非士夫等。因本無和合性。士夫等句義。亦如自體。亦非定有。士夫等本性和合所有因性。如種子等。以士夫等本來分位或離所作性。如種子等因有所得或無所得。此復云何。若本來分位離所作性。或有所得即是無常。若不離所作自相亦即無因。如前已說非諸士夫。如彼種子能生於果。若如是見。此非道理。彼遍計性故。是故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 頌詞： 也不是沒有因緣而生。
解釋：如果像其他人所說，無因而生之自性有所得，那麼在時間、地點等方面，那種彼此分離的自性，決定是可以得到產生的。那些時間、地點的自性不能相互分離。如果這樣阻止、遣除對治的過失，那麼其中或許有自性。各種論典都說，這是有漏的意義。像這樣，各種自性各自系屬於不同的事物，各種自性都有產生。這些都在這裡被阻止。如果有什麼造作，就與阿含經相違背。正如佛所說，有四種緣能夠產生諸法。而這四種緣在各種經論中都是這樣說的。哪四種呢？就是因緣、所緣緣、次第緣、增上緣。像這樣四種緣，沒有第五種緣。那些其他宗派中執著于『我』（ātman）的人，執著于極微（paramāṇu）的人，為什麼是邪見呢？如果這裡有常因，那麼時間、地點的自性就能相互分離，那麼一切果就能同時產生。現在看到的時間、地點等不能相互分離的自性，次第產生諸法，它們共同作為因，就不能得到相互分離的因性。這沒有過失。所以，共同作為諸因。這裡不是因。他們說，像這樣產生是沒有自性的。如果有因的緣故，決定有果。那些共同作為的諸因，決定是因性。這是本來就有的緣故。如果共同作為的因相互分離，就像前面所說，與對治相違背。因為本來是和合的緣故。而那些諸因像這樣建立差別，因沒有自性。然而，那些地點等有相互分離的自性，可以共同產生。這種分位就像士夫（puruṣa）等。因為這樣的緣故，不是士夫等。因本來沒有和合的自性。士夫等語句的意義，也像自體一樣，也不是一定有的。士夫等本性和合所有的因性，就像種子等。因為士夫等本來分位，或者離開所作的自性。就像種子等因，有所得或者沒有所得。這又是什麼呢？如果本來分位離開所作的自性，或者有所得，那就是無常。如果不離開所作的自相，也就是沒有因。像前面已經說過的，不是諸士夫。像那些種子能夠產生果。如果像這樣看待，這不是道理。因為那是遍計所執的自性。所以。
【English Translation】 English version: Verses: Also, it is not born without a cause.
Explanation: As others say, if the nature of causeless birth is something that can be obtained, then in terms of time, place, etc., that mutually separate nature can definitely be obtained as something produced. Those natures of time and place cannot be separated from each other. If this prevents and eliminates the fault of counteracting, then perhaps there is a nature within it. Various treatises say that this is the meaning of being with outflows (sāsrava). Like this, various natures are each connected to different things, and various natures have birth. These are all prevented here. If there is any action, it contradicts the Āgama. As the Buddha said, there are four conditions that can produce all dharmas. And these four conditions are spoken of in various sutras and treatises in this way. What are the four? They are cause condition (hetu-pratyaya), object condition (ālambana-pratyaya), immediate condition (samanantara-pratyaya), and dominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya). Like these four conditions, there is no fifth condition. Why are those of other schools who cling to the 'self' (ātman), who cling to the ultimate particle (paramāṇu), wrong views? If there is a permanent cause here, then the natures of time and place can be separated from each other, then all effects can be produced simultaneously. Now seeing that the natures of time, place, etc., which cannot be separated from each other, produce dharmas in succession, they jointly act as a cause, and the nature of the cause that cannot be separated cannot be obtained. This has no fault. Therefore, jointly acting as all causes. This is not a cause here. They say that birth like this has no nature. If there is a cause, there is definitely an effect. Those jointly acting causes are definitely the nature of the cause. This is because it originally exists. If the jointly acting causes are separated from each other, it contradicts the counteracting as mentioned earlier. Because they are originally in harmony. And those causes establish differences in this way, and the cause has no nature. However, those places, etc., have mutually separate natures and can be produced together. This division is like a person (puruṣa), etc. Because of this, it is not a person, etc. The cause originally has no nature of harmony. The meaning of the phrase 'person, etc.' is also like the self, and it is not necessarily existent. The nature of the cause that the person, etc., originally harmonizes with is like a seed, etc. Because the original division of the person, etc., either departs from the nature of action. Like the cause of a seed, etc., something is obtained or nothing is obtained. What is this again? If the original division departs from the nature of action, or something is obtained, then it is impermanent. If it does not depart from the self-nature of action, then it is also without a cause. As has been said before, it is not all people. Like those seeds that can produce fruit. If viewed in this way, this is not reasonable. Because that is the nature of what is universally conceived. Therefore.
前說無第五緣。亦非斷滅。世間所有諸執無因惡因諍論亂意之者。為攝化彼故。如其分位於世俗諦開示宣說諸因緣等。此即非勝義諦。或有問言。自果於緣中為有邪。為無邪。物體第三分別無性。故頌答言。
如諸法自性 不在於緣中
釋曰。譬如瓶衣。非即有故。亦非異故。如是眼等自性。若自緣若他緣若共有。而彼諸緣非即非異。若離自體即無有果。由自力能即有諸緣。此無異性應當思擇。由如是故。因果二法無別異性。何所以邪。若離是因。果不能成。彼能作因。其義亦然。若定有異性而彼自果於諸緣中即無所生。是故頌言。
以無自性故 他性亦復無
釋曰。若有此二。即互不相離。若見有他性。如此彼二非緣時中有果。非果時中有緣。若他性隨生。即因果二法非俱時有。剎那性故。若生不生二所作性。二俱無性。若不壞因。未來有果。此智所安立。乃說他性然。若取著他性非勝義諦有。或有人言。諸經論中皆說他緣能生諸法。云何此說非他性生。若諸緣中他性不生。豈可無自性諸法于緣中住。若爾緣即是非緣。若自性無所有者。果從他緣生。即非道理。故頌答言。
亦非緣生果
釋曰。然生法所作有果可成。為總止余義。是故頌言。
果不從緣有 有無果生止
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 前面所說的沒有第五種緣。也不是斷滅。世間所有那些執著于無因、惡因，以及爭論擾亂心意的人，爲了攝受教化他們，根據他們在世俗諦中的理解程度，開示宣說各種因緣等等。但這並非勝義諦。或者有人會問：『自果在緣中是有還是沒有呢？』物體第三種分別是沒有自性的。所以頌文回答說： 『如諸法自性，不在於緣中。』 解釋：譬如瓶子和衣服，不是『即有』，也不是『異有』。像這樣，眼等的自性，無論是自緣、他緣還是共緣，這些緣既不是『即』也不是『異』。如果離開自體就沒有果。憑藉自身的力量就能產生各種緣。這種沒有差異的性質應當仔細思考。因為這樣，因和果兩種法沒有不同的性質。為什麼呢？如果離開這個因，果就不能成就。這個能作為因的道理也是這樣。如果一定有異性，那麼這個自果在各種緣中就無法產生。所以頌文說： 『以無自性故，他性亦復無。』 解釋：如果有了這兩種性質（自性和他性），它們就互相不能分離。如果看到有他性，那麼這兩個（因和果）在緣存在時就沒有果，在果存在時就沒有緣。如果他性隨之產生，那麼因和果兩種法就不能同時存在，因為是剎那生滅的性質。如果生和不生這兩種作用的性質，都是沒有自性的。如果不壞滅因，未來就會有果。這種智慧所安立的，才說是他性。然而，如果執著於他性，就不是勝義諦所具有的。或者有人會說：『各種經論中都說他緣能夠產生各種法，為什麼這裡說不是他性所生呢？如果各種緣中他性不能產生，難道沒有自性的各種法就能在緣中存在嗎？如果這樣，緣就不是緣了。』如果自性什麼都沒有，果從他緣產生，就沒有道理。所以頌文回答說： 『亦非緣生果。』 解釋：然而，生法所產生的有果可以成就。爲了總括其餘的意義，所以頌文說： 『果不從緣有，有無果生止。』
【English Translation】 English version The foregoing did not mention a fifth condition. Nor is it annihilation. All those in the world who are attached to causelessness, evil causes, and those who argue and disturb their minds, for the sake of embracing and transforming them, according to their understanding in the conventional truth (世俗諦, Shì Sú Dì), demonstrate and explain various conditions and so on. This is not the ultimate truth (勝義諦, Shèng Yì Dì). Or someone might ask: 'Does the self-effect exist in the conditions or not?' The third distinction of objects is without inherent existence. Therefore, the verse answers: 'As the self-nature of all dharmas, is not in the conditions.' Explanation: For example, a pot and clothes are neither 'identical' nor 'different'. Likewise, the self-nature of the eye, etc., whether it is a self-condition, other-condition, or shared condition, these conditions are neither 'identical' nor 'different'. If there is no effect apart from the self-essence. By its own power, it can produce various conditions. This non-different nature should be carefully considered. Because of this, the two dharmas of cause and effect do not have different natures. Why? If separated from this cause, the effect cannot be achieved. The principle of that which can act as a cause is also the same. If there is definitely a different nature, then this self-effect cannot arise in the various conditions. Therefore, the verse says: 'Because there is no self-nature, other-nature is also absent.' Explanation: If these two (self-nature and other-nature) exist, they cannot be separated from each other. If one sees other-nature, then these two (cause and effect) do not have an effect when the condition exists, and do not have a condition when the effect exists. If other-nature arises accordingly, then the two dharmas of cause and effect cannot exist simultaneously, because of their momentary nature. If the nature of the two actions of arising and not arising are both without self-nature. If the cause is not destroyed, there will be an effect in the future. That which is established by this wisdom is said to be other-nature. However, if one is attached to other-nature, it is not what the ultimate truth (勝義諦, Shèng Yì Dì) possesses. Or someone might say: 'Various sutras and treatises all say that other-conditions can produce various dharmas, why does this say that it is not produced by other-nature? If other-nature cannot arise in the various conditions, can the various dharmas without self-nature exist in the conditions? If so, then the condition is not a condition.' If self-nature is completely non-existent, it is unreasonable for the effect to arise from other-conditions. Therefore, the verse answers: 'Nor does the effect arise from conditions.' Explanation: However, the effect produced by arising dharmas can be achieved. In order to summarize the remaining meanings, the verse says: 'The effect does not come from conditions, the arising and cessation of effects with or without them.'
若說生法時 無依無所生
釋曰。前說果不生無所成者。以能生果者自亦無性。若能生所生及彼生法。定有別異生法可得者。即彼所作說為能生。此中別異生法即無所成。若果離於緣。即所生生法雲何得成。他所繫屬故。或有人言。所作如是從緣所成。非物體自性成故。是故非眼等六處能成緣法有此意樂。故頌答言。
果不從緣生 此果緣中生
釋曰。若彼決定別異生法為可有者。彼無生法中間所作。若生而彼眼等決定生法互相離性。或如是生亦何不成。如是說者。彼無自性法。此中有過失。此異宗說。是故有過。若從緣生果。彼果性無依。緣亦無常。相離性中果云何成。如有頌言。
果若別異解 無道理可依 若一法作成 果體不可立
如本頌言。
非無緣有果 無緣果亦無 如是世俗中 常性不可得
釋曰。若或無緣。果即不成。若有果故。彼諸法體即有所得。彼等諸法亦非先有性故。是義當知從緣所生。若離緣生。虛無有果。譬如芽等。何能和合。若言從種生芽。即能生所生二和合故。亦非種子等緣一向能生。以余法成即能有果。由如是故。果非常有。或有人言。從緣有果。此即非常。亦非無常。如是性中能生得成。釋者言。如汝所說。此有法故。即
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果說生法的時候，是無所依靠也無所產生的。
解釋：前面說果不生，是由於沒有能成就它的東西。因為能產生果的本身也是沒有自性的。如果能生和所生以及那生法，一定有差別和不同，生法是可以得到的，那麼他所做的就可以說是能生。這裡差別和不同的生法是沒有辦法成就的。如果果離開了緣，那麼所生的生法又怎麼能夠成就呢？因為它是被其他事物所繫縛的。或者有人說，所作的事物是依靠因緣而成就的，不是物體本身具有的自性而成就的。因此，不是眼等六處能夠成就緣法，有這樣的想法。所以用頌來回答。
果不是從緣而生，這個果是在緣中產生的。
解釋：如果那決定的、差別不同的生法是可以存在的，那麼那無生的法在中間所作的。如果產生而那眼等決定的生法互相分離。或者像這樣產生又有什麼不能成就的呢？像這樣說的人，那沒有自性的法，這裡面是有過失的。這是其他宗派的說法，所以有過失。如果從緣產生果，那果的自性是沒有依靠的。緣也是無常的。在互相分離的自性中，果又怎麼能夠成就呢？就像頌里所說：
如果把果理解為差別不同的，就沒有道理可以依靠。 如果一個法作成，果的本體就不能成立。
就像本頌所說：
不是沒有緣就有果，沒有緣果也沒有。 像這樣在世俗中，常性是不能得到的。
解釋：如果或者沒有緣，果就不能成就。如果有果的緣故，那麼那些法的本體就可以得到。那些法也不是先前就有的自性，這個道理應當知道是從緣所生。如果離開緣而產生，就是虛無而沒有果。譬如芽等等，怎麼能夠和合呢？如果說從種子產生芽，就是能生和所生二者和合的緣故。也不是種子等緣一定能夠產生，因為有其他法成就才能有果。由於這樣的緣故，果不是非常的。或者有人說，從緣有果，這既不是常，也不是無常。像這樣的自性中能生才能成就。解釋的人說，像你所說的，因為有這個法，就是。
【English Translation】 English version: If it is said that when a dharma (phenomenon, teaching) arises, it is without reliance and without being produced from anything.
Explanation: Earlier, it was said that the result (果, guǒ) does not arise because there is nothing to accomplish it. This is because that which can produce the result itself has no self-nature. If the producer, the produced, and that dharma of arising definitely have differences and distinctions, and the dharma of arising can be obtained, then what it does can be said to be the producer. Here, the different and distinct dharma of arising cannot be accomplished. If the result is separate from conditions (緣, yuán), then how can the dharma of arising that is produced be accomplished? Because it is bound by other things. Or someone might say that what is made is accomplished through conditions, not accomplished by the self-nature of the object itself. Therefore, it is not that the six sense bases (眼等六處, yǎn děng liù chù) can accomplish the dharma of conditions, having this intention. Therefore, the verse answers:
The result does not arise from conditions; this result arises within conditions.
Explanation: If that determined, different, and distinct dharma of arising could exist, then what is made in the middle of that unarisen dharma? If it arises and those determined dharmas of arising, such as the eye, are mutually separate in nature, or if it arises in this way, what cannot be accomplished? For those who say this, that dharma without self-nature has a fault here. This is a statement of another school, so it has a fault. If the result arises from conditions, then the nature of that result has no reliance. The conditions are also impermanent. How can the result be accomplished in a mutually separate nature? As the verse says:
If the result is understood as different and distinct, there is no reason to rely on. If one dharma is made, the substance of the result cannot be established.
As the original verse says:
It is not that there is a result without conditions; without conditions, there is also no result. In this way, in the mundane world (世俗, shìsú), permanence cannot be obtained.
Explanation: If there are no conditions, the result cannot be accomplished. If there is a result, then the substance of those dharmas can be obtained. Those dharmas also do not have a pre-existing nature, so it should be known that this meaning arises from conditions. If it arises apart from conditions, it is empty and without a result. For example, how can sprouts, etc., come together? If it is said that sprouts arise from seeds, it is because the producer and the produced are combined. It is also not that conditions such as seeds can definitely produce, because other dharmas must be accomplished for there to be a result. Because of this reason, the result is not permanent. Or someone might say that there is a result from conditions, so it is neither permanent nor impermanent. In this kind of nature, the producer can be accomplished. The explainer says, 'As you say, because there is this dharma, it is.'
此所成。如是決定勝義諦中。非無緣有果。非無果有緣。俱不見故。眼等諸法此中亦然。于其緣性若止遣者。定知有過。是故當知。從緣有果。諸果體生。謂從因緣次第緣所緣緣增上緣生故。以諸緣分別果體差別如是得成。譬如已成熟果。而諸因體差別分別。是故能作所作此中分別。此如是說。決定有果。決定之言即印持義。此中有果其義顯明。世俗諦中果法增勝。即有所得。然無分位可著。若果性有著。即他宗義。謂于緣中非實有果。若彼如是從緣生果。互相所攝有果隨轉。彼雖分位各別。然有果生此說緣生。是故此等諸緣生已亦各別故。諸未信許言即是不樂說義。若此果不生。即彼無有緣。何等為緣。謂隨所意樂。是故若無有緣。能生於果。此無道理。若或無緣。又復何有緣性可生。◎
大乘中觀釋論卷第一 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1567 大乘中觀釋論(第1卷-第9卷)
大乘中觀釋論卷第二
安慧菩薩造
譯經三藏朝散大夫試鴻臚卿光梵大師賜紫沙門臣惟凈等奉 詔譯觀緣品第一之餘
◎複次此中或有異意。謂以剎那如是緣性可成於果。雖非相續此無過失。是故頌言。
非有亦非無 緣義和合爾
釋曰。所言無者。如兔角等。緣亦何無。此中意者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 此為果的成就。如此在決定的勝義諦（Paramārtha-satya，最終真理）中，並非沒有因緣而有果，也並非沒有果而有因緣，因為兩者都不可見。眼等諸法在此也是如此。如果阻止或否定其因緣性，必定知道有過失。因此應當知道，果是從因緣產生的，諸果的體性產生，即從因緣、次第緣、所緣緣、增上緣而生。由於諸緣分別，果的體性才得以差別成就。譬如已經成熟的果實，而諸因的體性各有差別。因此能作和所作在此有所分別。如此說來，決定有果，『決定』一詞即是印證和保持的意思。此處有果的意義顯明。在世俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）中，果法增勝，即有所得，然而沒有分位可以執著。如果對果的自性有所執著，那就是其他宗派的觀點，即在因緣中並非真實有果。如果它們如此從因緣生果，互相攝持，有果隨之運轉，它們雖然分位各別，然而有果產生，這說明是因緣所生。因此這些因緣產生后也各自不同。那些未信許的言語，即是不樂意說的意思。如果此果不生，那麼彼緣就不存在。什麼是緣呢？即隨順所意樂的。因此，如果沒有緣能夠產生果，這是沒有道理的。如果或者沒有緣，又哪裡會有緣性可以產生呢？
《大乘中觀釋論》卷第一 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1567 《大乘中觀釋論》(第1卷-第9卷)
《大乘中觀釋論》卷第二
安慧菩薩造
譯經三藏朝散大夫試鴻臚卿光梵大師賜紫沙門臣惟凈等奉 詔譯觀緣品第一之餘
複次，此處或許有不同的觀點，認為以剎那（kṣaṇa，瞬間）這樣的緣性可以成就果，即使不是相續的，也沒有過失。因此頌文說：
『非有亦非無，緣義和合爾。』
解釋說：所說的『無』，比如兔角等。緣又怎麼會沒有呢？此中的意思是……
【English Translation】 English version: This is the accomplishment of the result. Thus, in the determined Paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth), it is not that there is a result without causes and conditions, nor is it that there are causes and conditions without a result, because both are not seen. The dharmas such as the eye are also the same in this. If one prevents or denies its causal nature, one will certainly know that there is a fault. Therefore, it should be known that the result arises from causes and conditions, and the nature of all results arises, that is, from causes and conditions, sequential conditions, object-supportive conditions, and dominant conditions. Because of the differentiation of the various conditions, the nature of the result is accomplished differently. For example, a fruit that has already ripened, while the nature of the various causes is different. Therefore, the agent and the action are distinguished here. Thus it is said that there is definitely a result, and the word 'definitely' means to affirm and maintain. The meaning of having a result is clear here. In Saṃvṛti-satya (relative truth), the result dharma is superior, that is, there is something to be obtained, but there is no division to be attached to. If there is attachment to the nature of the result, then that is the view of other schools, that is, there is no real result in the causes and conditions. If they arise from causes and conditions in this way, mutually supporting each other, and the result follows, although their divisions are different, there is a result arising, which indicates that it is born of conditions. Therefore, these conditions are also different after they arise. Those who do not believe in the words are unwilling to speak. If this result does not arise, then that condition does not exist. What is a condition? That is, according to what is desired. Therefore, if there is no condition that can produce a result, this is unreasonable. If there is no condition, then where can the nature of the condition arise?
The Mahāyāna Madhyamaka Commentary, Volume 1 Tripitaka, Volume 30, No. 1567, Mahāyāna Madhyamaka Commentary (Volumes 1-9)
The Mahāyāna Madhyamaka Commentary, Volume 2
Composed by Bodhisattva Anhui
Translated by the Tripitaka Master Chao San Da Fu Shi Honglu Qing Guangfan, the Purple-Robed Sramana Chen Weijing, and others, by Imperial Decree, the remainder of the first chapter on contemplating conditions
Furthermore, there may be different views here, thinking that the nature of conditions such as a kṣaṇa (moment) can accomplish the result, even if it is not continuous, there is no fault. Therefore, the verse says:
'Neither existent nor non-existent, the meaning of conditions is harmonious.'
The explanation says: What is said to be 'non-existent' is like rabbit horns, etc. How can conditions be non-existent? The meaning here is...
。如前說性。此不可說不可伺察。謂以彼因於分位中不能取故。所言有者。諸緣於何性而有所說。是中無有少法而可施作。若有彼因及作用事。如上所說。此即為有如是果緣。其義顯明。如瓶燈等。此應思擇。此中決定。若有所離。即無所有亦非無有緣不和合故。如所說果或果分位彼三種功用能所性極成。彼若緣異即無功用。所施作故。此說顯明。彼有所生此無所離。此說義成。此中無有少法不生及非有性如量增廣體不生故。以無生法而可增故。若諸緣有體性。即不和合生。此中無功用體性止遣。其有如是有性者。有人謂于彼無功用不和合體性中亦有所成。如癡等體性。或量中減少。或生中減少。非壞因而有。非常因而有。如瓶決定離別異性。或彼境界智生。其理應思。若對治法起。即能遣除冥暗。若彼二種決定為有者。于境界智中即不成就。以世俗諦中。譬如燈等及瓶生因有所成故。是故應知。亦無所離。或有人言非有非非有。生時緣成故。謂以生時有作用性所發起故。此中雖有亦復不成決定生性。彼有即是增上所作。是故頌言。
諸法無自性 非有亦非無
釋曰。謂以生時種類所作或有或無。后亦如是。不離有性無性或有所得。如是有諸緣論中說是相。非不有故。如兔角等。亦有說相。此有說相即世
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如前面所說的『性』（svabhāva，自性）。這種『性』是不可說、不可推測的，因為憑藉那個原因，在各個階段中無法把握它。所謂『有』（astitva，存在），是指各種因緣依附於什麼『性』而有所述說？其中沒有任何事物可以被創造出來。如果存在那個原因以及作用之事，就像上面所說的，這就意味著存在這樣的果緣，其意義顯而易見，比如瓶子、燈等。這應該仔細思考。這裡可以確定，如果有什麼東西被分離出去，那就是不存在的，但也不是完全沒有，因為因緣沒有和合。就像所說的果，或者果的各個階段，那三種功用、能、所的『性』（svabhāva，自性）是極其確定的。如果它們依附於不同的因緣，就沒有功用，因為它們是被施加作用的。這個說法很明顯。如果有什麼東西產生，它就不會脫離因緣，這個說法是成立的。這裡沒有任何事物是不生的，或者不是『有』（astitva，存在）的，就像數量增廣的實體不會產生一樣。因為沒有不生的法可以被增加。如果各種因緣具有實體性，就不會和合而生。這裡沒有功用實體性的止息和遣除。那些具有『有』（astitva，存在）的『性』（svabhāva，自性）的事物，有人認為在那些沒有功用、不和合的實體性中，也有所成就，比如愚癡等的實體性，或者在數量上減少，或者在產生中減少，不是因為壞滅的原因而有，不是因為非常的原因而有，就像瓶子決定性的分離和異性。或者彼境界的智慧產生，這個道理應該思考。如果對治法生起，就能遣除黑暗。如果那兩種（有和無）被確定為存在，那麼在境界智中就不能成就，因為在世俗諦中，比如燈等以及瓶子的生因有所成就。所以應該知道，也沒有什麼東西可以被分離出去。或者有人說，既非『有』（astitva，存在）也非『非有』（nastitva，不存在），因為產生時因緣成就。也就是說，因為產生時具有作用性所發起。這裡即使有，也不能成就決定性的生性。那個『有』（astitva，存在）就是增上所作。所以頌說： 『諸法無自性，非有亦非無』 釋曰：也就是說，憑藉產生時的種類所作，或者『有』（astitva，存在）或者『無』（nastitva，不存在），後來也是這樣。不脫離『有』（astitva，存在）的『性』（svabhāva，自性）、『無』（nastitva，不存在）的『性』（svabhāva，自性），或者有所得。就像這樣，在各種因緣的論述中，這是『相』（lakṣaṇa，相），不是不存在的，比如兔角等。也有『說相』（kathālakṣaṇa，言說之相）。這個『有說相』（astikatālakṣaṇa，存在的言說之相）就是世俗。
【English Translation】 English version: As previously stated regarding 『svabhāva』 (性, self-nature). This 『svabhāva』 is inexpressible and unobservable, because by that cause, it cannot be grasped in its various stages. What is meant by 『astitva』 (有, existence) is: upon what 『svabhāva』 (性, self-nature) do various conditions rely to be spoken of? Within it, there is nothing that can be created. If that cause and the event of its function exist, as mentioned above, it signifies the existence of such causal conditions, the meaning of which is evident, like a pot, a lamp, etc. This should be carefully considered. Here, it is certain that if something is separated, it is non-existent, but it is not entirely non-existent either, because the conditions are not in harmony. Like the mentioned result, or the various stages of the result, the three functions, the agent, and the object, their 『svabhāva』 (性, self-nature) is extremely certain. If they rely on different conditions, they have no function, because they are being acted upon. This statement is clear. If something arises, it does not separate from conditions; this statement is established. Here, there is nothing that is unborn, or not 『astitva』 (有, existence), just as the substance of increasing quantity does not arise. Because there is no unborn dharma that can be increased. If various conditions have substantiality, they will not arise in harmony. Here, there is no cessation or removal of the substantiality of function. Those things that have the 『svabhāva』 (性, self-nature) of 『astitva』 (有, existence), some people think that in those non-functional, non-harmonious substantialities, something is also accomplished, like the substantiality of ignorance, etc., or a decrease in quantity, or a decrease in arising, not because of a destructive cause, not because of an extraordinary cause, like the decisive separation and difference of a pot. Or the wisdom of that realm arises; this principle should be considered. If the antidote arises, it can dispel darkness. If those two (existence and non-existence) are determined to exist, then it cannot be accomplished in the wisdom of the realm, because in conventional truth, like lamps, etc., and the causes of the arising of pots are accomplished. Therefore, it should be known that nothing can be separated either. Or some say, it is neither 『astitva』 (有, existence) nor 『nastitva』 (非有, non-existence), because the conditions are accomplished at the time of arising. That is, because it is initiated by the functionality at the time of arising. Even if it exists here, it cannot accomplish a decisive arising nature. That 『astitva』 (有, existence) is the result of an augmenting action. Therefore, the verse says: 『All dharmas have no self-nature, they are neither existent nor non-existent.』 Explanation: That is to say, by the action of the type at the time of arising, either 『astitva』 (有, existence) or 『nastitva』 (非有, non-existence), and it is the same later. It does not separate from the 『svabhāva』 (性, self-nature) of 『astitva』 (有, existence), the 『svabhāva』 (性, self-nature) of 『nastitva』 (非有, non-existence), or something is obtained. Like this, in the discussions of various conditions, this is 『lakṣaṇa』 (相, characteristic), it is not non-existent, like rabbit horns, etc. There is also 『kathālakṣaṇa』 (說相, the characteristic of speech). This 『astikatālakṣaṇa』 (有說相, the characteristic of the speech of existence) is conventional.
俗諦。非勝義諦。能成彼果說名因緣。然彼亦無諸法不有亦非不有。若其不有即無法可成。若爾云何有此能成之因而得和合。有若不成與成相違。無即決定。不成無。彼有性生故。譬如兔角亦有亦無決定不成。於一法中相違自性。本不生故。二俱有過。以如是因成如是果。豈得和合。若或於彼心心所法而有取著。此即說為所緣緣法。如是決定彼不和合。若勝義諦中如是眼識等有法可說。彼法生時無言說性。是故此中非所緣法而得和合。若有所說彼即相違。無亦相違。若有所緣。應知皆是世俗諦故。非勝義諦。勝義諦者。此中止遣。若有法轉時。即諸相隨轉。是即所緣。此說是為所緣緣法。是故頌言。
於此無緣法 云何有緣緣
釋曰。若無緣之法生時。云何復有所緣法生。彼體無成故。又若等無間滅法。彼即容受所作為等無間緣。此中決定如是分別。是故頌言。
若法未生時 即不應有滅 滅法何能緣 故無次第緣
釋曰。若法未生如石女兒死若法已生諸法皆滅。是故無彼次第緣法而得和合。以生滅性不和合故。即滅即生。而彼滅緣當云何有。是故緣滅無說性可轉如是則應生時為緣。若生時為緣者。生時已生又何用緣。生者起義。此不有故彼何有緣。若有所成。即是增上緣法。此若決定
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於俗諦（Samvriti-satya，世俗諦），它不是勝義諦（Paramartha-satya，勝義諦），但能成就某種結果，因此被稱為因緣（hetu-pratyaya，因緣）。然而，這些因緣本身既不能說存在，也不能說不存在。如果它們不存在，就沒有什麼可以被成就。如果是這樣，怎麼會有這種能夠成就的因，並且能夠和合呢？如果存在不能成立，那就與成立相違背；如果不存在，那就是絕對的不成立，因為它們具有存在的自性而生起。例如，就像兔角一樣，既不能說它存在，也不能說它不存在，絕對不能成立。在同一個法中，具有相互矛盾的自性，本來就不會產生。這兩種說法都有過失。以這樣的因成就這樣的果，怎麼可能和合呢？如果對於心和心所法（citta-caitta，心和心所法）有所執著，這就被稱為所緣緣（alambana-pratyaya，所緣緣）。這樣決定了它們不能和合。如果在勝義諦中，像眼識等有法可以被討論，那麼這些法生起時，是沒有言說性的。因此，在這裡，非所緣法不能和合。如果有所說，那就是相互矛盾；如果無所說，也是相互矛盾。如果有所緣，應該知道這都是世俗諦的緣故，而不是勝義諦。勝義諦是指，在這裡停止追究。如果有法在運轉時，各種相也隨之運轉，這就是所緣。這被稱作所緣緣法。所以頌文說： 『於此無緣法，云何有緣緣』 解釋說：如果沒有緣的法生起時，怎麼會有所緣法生起呢？因為它的體性沒有成就的緣故。此外，如果等無間滅法（samanantara-niruddha-dharma，等無間滅法），它就能夠容受所作，成為等無間緣（samanantara-pratyaya，等無間緣）。在這裡，要這樣明確地分別。所以頌文說： 『若法未生時，即不應有滅；滅法何能緣，故無次第緣。』 解釋說：如果法還沒有生起，就像石女的兒子一樣；如果法已經生起，諸法都會滅去。因此，沒有次第緣法（krama-pratyaya，次第緣）能夠和合，因為生滅的自性不能和合。如果即滅即生，那麼滅緣又怎麼會有呢？因此，關於緣滅，沒有言說性可以轉變。如果這樣，那麼應該在生起時作為緣。如果在生起時作為緣，那麼生起時已經生起了，又何必需要緣呢？生起就是起始的意思。因為這不存在，它又怎麼會有緣呢？如果有所成就，那就是增上緣法（adhipati-pratyaya，增上緣）。如果這樣決定了。
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding Samvriti-satya (conventional truth), it is not Paramartha-satya (ultimate truth), but it can accomplish a certain result, and is therefore called hetu-pratyaya (cause and condition). However, these causes and conditions themselves can neither be said to exist nor not to exist. If they do not exist, there is nothing that can be accomplished. If so, how can there be such a cause that can accomplish and be in harmony? If existence cannot be established, it contradicts establishment; if it does not exist, it is absolutely not established, because they arise with the nature of existence. For example, like a rabbit's horn, it cannot be said to exist or not to exist, and it absolutely cannot be established. In the same dharma, having contradictory natures, it originally does not arise. Both of these statements have faults. How can such a cause accomplishing such a result be in harmony? If there is attachment to citta-caitta (mind and mental factors), this is called alambana-pratyaya (object-condition). It is thus determined that they cannot be in harmony. If in Paramartha-satya, dharmas such as eye-consciousness can be discussed, then when these dharmas arise, they have no expressible nature. Therefore, here, non-object-dharmas cannot be in harmony. If something is said, it is contradictory; if nothing is said, it is also contradictory. If there is an object, it should be known that this is all due to Samvriti-satya, not Paramartha-satya. Paramartha-satya refers to stopping the pursuit here. If a dharma is in operation, various characteristics also operate accordingly, and this is the object. This is called alambana-pratyaya-dharma. Therefore, the verse says: 'In this absence of object-dharma, how can there be object-condition?' It is explained that if a dharma without an object arises, how can an object-dharma arise? Because its nature is not accomplished. Furthermore, if samanantara-niruddha-dharma (immediately preceding cessation dharma), it can accommodate what is done and become samanantara-pratyaya (immediately preceding condition). Here, it must be clearly distinguished in this way. Therefore, the verse says: 'If a dharma has not yet arisen, then there should be no cessation; how can a ceased dharma be a condition? Therefore, there is no krama-pratyaya (sequential condition).' It is explained that if a dharma has not yet arisen, it is like the son of a barren woman; if a dharma has already arisen, all dharmas will cease. Therefore, there is no krama-pratyaya that can be in harmony, because the nature of arising and ceasing cannot be in harmony. If it ceases and arises simultaneously, then how can there be a cessation-condition? Therefore, regarding cessation-condition, there is no expressible nature that can be transformed. If so, then it should be taken as a condition at the time of arising. If it is taken as a condition at the time of arising, then it has already arisen at the time of arising, so why is a condition needed? Arising means beginning. Because this does not exist, how can it have a condition? If something is accomplished, it is adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition). If this is determined.
起伺察時。即無所有。故此諸法皆無自性。若起言說及伺察時。實無自性可得成就。是故頌言。
諸法無自性 非有亦非無 此有彼法起 如是無所有
釋曰。彼如是性非有性故。乃有是緣。論中所說緣者說有彼果故。如佛所說諸緣法者。謂有士夫所作果增上果勝報果平等果。非無體性故。如兔角等。或說有果。若如實所說。非勝義諦。何所以邪。果若有若無。緣中皆止遣。若如實觀察不即緣有果。不離緣有果。是故頌言。
若謂緣無果 果從緣中出 是果何不從 非緣中而出
釋曰。非緣中出者。如砂出油。若或止遣緣生。定知有過。複次頌言。
若果從緣生
釋曰。有異意樂。若言有果從緣可生。亦何不從非緣所成。以相似無性故。若正緣有成。非緣亦應成。若止其不生。又定知有過。複次頌言。
是緣無自性
釋曰。意謂若無自性。彼云何能所作差別。此中謂顯果非自成故。複次頌言。
從無自性生 何得從緣生
釋曰。此中意者。如尊者提婆所說頌言。
如衣因所成 能成因別異 成法若自無 別異因何有
今此品中皆為止遣如是義故。或有人言。
果不從緣生 不從非緣生 以果無有故 緣非緣亦無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：當開始審視、觀察時，一切皆空無所有。因此，一切諸法都沒有自性（svabhāva，事物自身存在的本性）。如果開始言說和審視觀察時，實際上沒有自性可以被獲得和成就。所以偈頌說：
『諸法無自性，非有亦非無，此有彼法起，如是無所有。』
解釋：事物如是的本性並非實有，因此才會有因緣（hetu-pratyaya，產生結果的條件）。論中所說的因緣，是指有其結果。如佛所說，諸緣法是指有士夫（puruṣa，人）所作之果、增上果（adhipati-phala，由主要條件產生的果）、勝報果（vipāka-phala，由業力成熟產生的果）、平等果（nisyanda-phala，與因相似的果）。這些果並非沒有體性，不像兔角等虛無之物。或者說有果，如果如實所說，則並非勝義諦（paramārtha-satya，最高的真理）。為什麼呢？如果果是有或無，在因緣中都會被止息。如果如實觀察，果既不即于緣而有，也不離於緣而有。所以偈頌說：
『若謂緣無果，果從緣中出，是果何不從，非緣中而出？』
解釋：如果說果不是從因緣中產生，那麼果又是從哪裡產生的呢？就像不能從沙子中榨出油一樣。如果有人止息因緣生，必定知道這是有過的。再次，偈頌說：
『若果從緣生』
解釋：這裡有不同的意樂（āśaya，意圖）。如果說有果可以從因緣中產生，那麼為什麼不也能從非因緣中產生呢？因為它們在無自性上是相似的。如果正因緣能夠產生果，那麼非因緣也應該能產生果。如果阻止非因緣產生果，那麼必定知道這是有過的。再次，偈頌說：
『是緣無自性』
解釋：意思是說，如果沒有自性，那麼它怎麼能有所作的差別呢？這裡是說，果不是自身成就的。再次，偈頌說：
『從無自性生，何得從緣生？』
解釋：這裡的意思是，如尊者提婆（Āryadeva）所說偈頌：
『如衣因所成，能成因別異，成法若自無，別異因何有？』
現在這一品中，都是爲了止息這樣的意義。或者有人說：
『果不從緣生，不從非緣生，以果無有故，緣非緣亦無。』
【English Translation】 English version: When one begins to scrutinize and examine, there is nothing at all. Therefore, all these dharmas (phenomena) are without svabhāva (intrinsic existence, self-nature). If one begins to speak and scrutinize, in reality, no svabhāva can be obtained or accomplished. Therefore, the verse says:
'All dharmas are without svabhāva, neither existent nor non-existent, when this exists, that arises, thus, there is nothing at all.'
Explanation: That suchness (tathātā, the true nature of reality) is not of an existent nature, therefore there are conditions (hetu-pratyaya, causes and conditions). The conditions spoken of in the treatise refer to having their results. As the Buddha said, the dharmas of conditions refer to the result produced by a puruṣa (person), the adhipati-phala (dominant result, result from a primary condition), the vipāka-phala (result of maturation, result from karma), and the nisyanda-phala (result in accordance, result similar to the cause). These results are not without substance, like the horns of a rabbit and other non-existent things. Or it is said that there are results, but if spoken of as they truly are, it is not the paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth). Why is that? Whether the result is existent or non-existent, it is stopped in the conditions. If one observes as it truly is, the result is neither identical to the conditions nor separate from the conditions. Therefore, the verse says:
'If it is said that conditions have no result, and the result comes from the conditions, why does this result not come from non-conditions?'
Explanation: If the result does not come from the conditions, then where does the result come from? It is like trying to extract oil from sand. If someone stops the arising from conditions, it is certain that there is a fault. Again, the verse says:
'If the result arises from conditions'
Explanation: Here there are different āśaya (intentions). If it is said that a result can arise from conditions, then why can it not also arise from non-conditions? Because they are similar in being without svabhāva. If the proper conditions can produce a result, then non-conditions should also be able to produce a result. If one prevents non-conditions from producing a result, then it is certain that there is a fault. Again, the verse says:
'These conditions are without svabhāva'
Explanation: The meaning is that if there is no svabhāva, then how can it have the distinction of what is made? Here it is said that the result is not self-accomplished. Again, the verse says:
'From what is born without svabhāva, how can it arise from conditions?'
Explanation: The meaning here is as in the verse spoken by Āryadeva (Noble Deva):
'Like a cloth made by causes, the causes that make it are different, if the made dharma is without self, what different causes can there be?'
Now, in this chapter, it is all for stopping such meanings. Or someone says:
'The result does not arise from conditions, nor does it arise from non-conditions, because the result does not exist, therefore conditions and non-conditions also do not exist.'
釋曰。彼生不能無性故。此中有言果由緣成。緣法者是果之種類。果無自成無自種類。彼果決定從他性生而有所得。然為止其定生性故。無有緣成。亦無非緣成。無緣種類。無非緣種類。無非緣種類果可有果生無性。謂因等及緣有果圓成。彼緣所成此果無性。果無性故。緣與非緣復云何有。此中意者。若說生若說緣若說果。應知唯是世俗分別。如是皆非勝義諦境。今此品中皆為證成如。是義故。
觀去來品第二之一
前品已止生義。今當次第。勝義諦中諸有物體。如是總聚差別之義。而悉止遣。余有所觀次應發起。如前品余所分別說。諸有物體皆悉無性。謂先止遣彼生義已。余諸句義亦然止遣。諸有所作雖復如是多種止已。然善巧智中有所生義還復發起。此無過失。有人言去。此中去者。去法勝義諦有彼果。此法有實性故。能作所作作法非不和合。今為止遣彼有能作所作及作法故。有此品起。此中應問。為已去名去。為未去名去。故頌答言。
已去無有去
釋曰。已去名謝滅。若有去法可去。即彼去法為不極成。即不和合。自語相違。複次頌言。
未去亦無去
釋曰。未去未生。若有去法可去。即如前所說。自語相違。不和合對治。復有人言。此言去者。總攝作用。諸差別等如所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
釋曰：因為事物產生不能沒有自性，所以這裡說果實是由因緣和合而成的。因緣法是果實的種類。果實不能自己產生，也沒有自己的種類。果實必定是從其他自性產生而有所得。然而，爲了阻止其固定的自性產生，所以說沒有因緣和合而成，也沒有非因緣和合而成。沒有無因緣的種類，也沒有非無因緣的種類。沒有非因緣種類產生的果實，果實產生沒有自性。所謂因等和因緣使果實圓滿成就，這種因緣所成的果實沒有自性。果實沒有自性，那麼因緣和非因緣又怎麼會有呢？這裡的意思是，如果說產生，如果說因緣，如果說果實，應當知道這只是世俗的分別。這些都不是勝義諦的境界。現在這一品中都是爲了證明如是的意義。
觀去來品第二之一
前一品已經止息了產生的意義，現在應當依次止息勝義諦中諸有物體的總聚和差別的意義。其餘所觀察的應當依次發起。如前一品其餘所分別說的，諸有物體都是沒有自性的。所謂先止息了產生的意義后，其餘的語句意義也同樣止息。諸有所作雖然已經這樣多種止息，然而善巧智慧中有所生起的意義還會再次發起，這沒有過失。有人說去，這裡所說的『去』，『去法』在勝義諦中是有其果的。此法有真實性，能作、所作、作法不是不和合的。現在爲了止息其有能作、所作以及作法，所以有這一品的生起。這裡應當問，是已經去才叫做『去』，還是未去才叫做『去』？所以頌文回答說：
『已去無有去』
釋曰：已去名為謝滅。如果有『去法』可以去，那麼這個『去法』就不極成，也就是不和合，自語相違。再次，頌文說：
『未去亦無去』
釋曰：未去就是未生。如果有『去法』可以去，那就如前面所說，自語相違，不和合對治。又有人說，這裡所說的『去』，總攝了作用，諸差別等如所 English version:
Explanation: Because the arising of things cannot be without inherent nature (svabhava), it is said here that the result (phala) arises from conditions (pratyaya). The law of conditions is the kind of result. The result cannot arise by itself, nor does it have its own kind. The result must arise from other inherent nature and be obtained. However, in order to prevent its fixed inherent nature from arising, it is said that there is no arising from conditions, nor is there arising from non-conditions. There is no kind of non-condition, nor is there a kind of non-non-condition. There is no result that can arise from a non-non-condition kind; the arising of the result has no inherent nature. The so-called causes (hetu) and conditions make the result perfectly accomplished. This result accomplished by conditions has no inherent nature. Since the result has no inherent nature, how can conditions and non-conditions exist? The meaning here is that if one speaks of arising, if one speaks of conditions, if one speaks of result, one should know that these are only worldly distinctions (samvriti). These are not the objects of ultimate truth (paramartha satya). Now, this chapter is all for proving such a meaning.
Chapter Two on Observation of Going and Coming, Part One
The previous chapter has already stopped the meaning of arising. Now, in order, we should stop the meaning of the totality and differences of all material objects in the ultimate truth. The remaining observations should be initiated in order. As the previous chapter said in the remaining distinctions, all material objects have no inherent nature. The so-called stopping of the meaning of arising first, and then the remaining sentence meanings are also stopped. Although all actions have been stopped in such a variety of ways, the meaning of arising in skillful wisdom (upaya-kausalya) will arise again, and this is not a fault. Someone says 'going' (gati). The 'going' mentioned here, the 'law of going' (gati-dharma), has its result in the ultimate truth. This law has real nature, and the agent (kartr), the object (karman), and the action (kriya) are not non-harmonious. Now, in order to stop the existence of the agent, the object, and the action, this chapter arises. Here, one should ask, is it called 'going' after it has already gone, or is it called 'going' before it has gone? Therefore, the verse answers:
'Gone, there is no going.'
Explanation: 'Gone' is called cessation. If there is a 'law of going' that can go, then this 'law of going' is not ultimately established, that is, it is not harmonious, and it contradicts itself. Furthermore, the verse says:
'Not gone, there is also no going.'
Explanation: 'Not gone' is 'not arisen'. If there is a 'law of going' that can go, then, as mentioned before, it contradicts itself, and it is not harmonious. Someone else says that the 'going' mentioned here encompasses all functions, and the various differences are as
【English Translation】 Modern Chinese Translation:
Explanation: Because the arising of things cannot be without inherent nature, it is said here that the result is produced by the combination of causes and conditions. The law of conditions is the kind of result. The result cannot arise by itself, nor does it have its own kind. The result must arise from other inherent nature and be obtained. However, in order to prevent its fixed inherent nature from arising, it is said that there is no arising from the combination of causes and conditions, nor is there arising from non-causes and conditions. There is no kind of non-causes and conditions, nor is there a kind of non-non-causes and conditions. There is no result that can arise from a non-non-causes and conditions kind; the arising of the result has no inherent nature. The so-called causes and so on, and causes and conditions, make the result perfectly accomplished. This result accomplished by causes and conditions has no inherent nature. Since the result has no inherent nature, then how can causes and conditions and non-causes and conditions exist? The meaning here is that if one speaks of arising, if one speaks of causes and conditions, if one speaks of result, one should know that these are only worldly distinctions. These are not the realm of ultimate truth. Now, this chapter is all for proving such a meaning.
Chapter Two on Observation of Going and Coming, Part One
The previous chapter has already stopped the meaning of arising. Now, in order, we should stop the meaning of the totality and differences of all material objects in the ultimate truth. The remaining observations should be initiated in order. As the previous chapter said in the remaining distinctions, all material objects have no inherent nature. The so-called stopping of the meaning of arising first, and then the remaining sentence meanings are also stopped. Although all actions have been stopped in such a variety of ways, the meaning of arising in skillful wisdom will arise again, and this is not a fault. Someone says 'going', the 'going' mentioned here, 'the law of going' in the ultimate truth has its result. This law has real nature, and the agent, the object, and the action are not non-harmonious. Now, in order to stop the existence of the agent, the object, and the action, this chapter arises. Here, one should ask, is it called 'going' after it has already gone, or is it called 'going' before it has gone? Therefore, the verse answers:
'Gone, there is no going.'
Explanation: 'Gone' is called cessation. If there is a 'law of going' that can go, then this 'law of going' is not ultimately established, that is, it is not harmonious, and it contradicts itself. Furthermore, the verse says:
'Not gone, there is also no going.'
Explanation: 'Not gone' is 'not arisen'. If there is a 'law of going' that can go, then, as mentioned before, it contradicts itself, and it is not harmonious. Someone else says that the 'going' mentioned here encompasses all functions, and the various differences are as
意樂。去時有去。為對彼異意故。頌遣言。
離已去未去 去時亦無去
釋曰。而彼去時。或有所去。即不離已去未去二種法中。何以故。於一法中互相違性彼不生故。此中若說諸法無性。是義成就。若以是法于非法中有所成者。即去時去又何不成。是故亦無去時可去。復有人言。現見世間舉足下足有行動相。此往彼方不離所觀。有可去相。彼復謂言。世所作事。先由作者後有所作。作事方成。去相亦爾。複次頌言。
動處則有去 此中有去時
釋曰。若復別異。此云何有。複次頌言。
非已去未去
釋曰。彼異意者。謂以去時有行動相。乃說去時以成去義。複次頌言。
是故去時去
釋曰。異意謂離已去未去去時有去。複次頌言。
云何于去時 而當有去法 以離於去法 去時不可得
釋曰。於一去法中若有去時可和合者。即應二種去法有性。而此去法不可得故。如是決定法止遣相離者。此有過失。若此去法有去可和合者。即非去時。如是決定。若言去時去法彼和合者。云何去時而有去邪。何所以邪。複次頌言。
若去時有去 則有二種去 一謂有去時 二謂去時去
釋曰。若言去時得有去者。此義不然。離已去未去無去時和合可
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：意樂（動機或意圖）。當存在『去』這個動作的時候，就有了『去時』（行動的時間）。爲了反駁那些持有不同觀點的人，用偈頌來闡述：
『已經離去的不是去時，尚未離去的也不是去時，去時本身也沒有去。』
解釋：當『去時』存在的時候，或者說存在『去』這個動作的時候，它既不屬於『已去』的狀態，也不屬於『未去』的狀態。為什麼呢？因為在一個狀態中，相互矛盾的性質不能同時存在。如果在這裡說諸法（一切事物）沒有自性，這個道理就成立了。如果說通過某種方法在非法中有所成就，那麼『去時』的『去』又怎麼不能成立呢？所以說，『去時』本身也沒有『去』這個動作。又有人說，現在可以看到世間舉足、落足的行動狀態，從這裡到那裡，不離開所觀察的對象，存在可以『去』的狀態。他們又說，世間所做的事情，先有作者，後有所作，事情才能完成，『去』這個狀態也是這樣。再次用偈頌來說：
『有動作的地方才會有『去』，而這裡面才有『去時』。』
解釋：如果『去時』是獨立存在的，那麼怎麼會有『去』這個動作呢？再次用偈頌來說：
『不是已去，也不是未去。』
解釋：那些持有不同觀點的人，認為『去時』有行動的狀態，所以說『去時』成就了『去』的意義。再次用偈頌來說：
『因此，去時才會有去。』
解釋：持有不同觀點的人認為，離開『已去』和『未去』，『去時』才會有『去』。
再次用偈頌來說：
『怎麼能在『去時』中，會有『去』的法則呢？因為離開了『去』的法則，『去時』是無法獲得的。』
解釋：在一個『去』的法則中，如果能和『去時』相和合，那麼就應該有兩種『去』的法則存在。但是這種『去』的法則無法獲得。像這樣，如果決定性的法則和止遣的現象相分離，就會有過失。如果這個『去』的法則有『去』可以和它相和合，那麼就不是『去時』了。像這樣來決定。如果說『去時』和『去』的法則相互和合，那麼怎麼能在『去時』中存在『去』呢？為什麼呢？再次用偈頌來說：
『如果『去時』有『去』，那麼就會有兩種『去』：一種是所謂的『有去時』，另一種是『去時』的『去』。』
解釋：如果說『去時』能夠有『去』，這個道理是不成立的。離開『已去』和『未去』，沒有『去時』可以和合。
【English Translation】 English version: Intention. When there is 'going,' there is 'time of going.' To counter those with differing views, a verse is sent forth:
'Having already gone is not the time of going, not yet having gone is not the time of going, and the time of going itself has no going.'
Explanation: When the 'time of going' exists, or when there is the action of 'going,' it belongs neither to the state of 'already gone' nor to the state of 'not yet gone.' Why? Because contradictory properties cannot coexist in one state. If it is said here that all dharmas (all things) have no self-nature, this principle is established. If it is said that something is accomplished in the non-dharma through some method, then how can the 'going' of the 'time of going' not be established? Therefore, the 'time of going' itself has no action of 'going.' Some say that we can see the state of movement of lifting and lowering the foot in the world, and from here to there, without leaving the observed object, there is a state of being able to 'go.' They also say that in the things done in the world, there is first the doer, and then what is done, so that the thing can be completed, and the state of 'going' is also like this. Again, a verse is used to say:
'Where there is movement, there will be 'going,' and within this, there is 'time of going.'
Explanation: If the 'time of going' exists independently, then how can there be the action of 'going'? Again, a verse is used to say:
'Not already gone, not yet gone.'
Explanation: Those who hold different views believe that the 'time of going' has a state of movement, so they say that the 'time of going' accomplishes the meaning of 'going.' Again, a verse is used to say:
'Therefore, the time of going has going.'
Explanation: Those who hold different views believe that apart from 'already gone' and 'not yet gone,' the 'time of going' will have 'going.'
Again, a verse is used to say:
'How can there be a law of 'going' in the 'time of going'? Because apart from the law of 'going,' the 'time of going' cannot be obtained.'
Explanation: In one law of 'going,' if it can be combined with the 'time of going,' then there should be two laws of 'going' existing. But this law of 'going' cannot be obtained. Like this, if the decisive law is separated from the phenomenon of cessation, there will be a fault. If this law of 'going' has 'going' that can be combined with it, then it is not the 'time of going.' This is how to decide. If it is said that the 'time of going' and the law of 'going' are combined with each other, then how can there be 'going' in the 'time of going'? Why? Again, a verse is used to say:
'If the 'time of going' has 'going,' then there will be two kinds of 'going': one is the so-called 'having time of going,' and the other is the 'going' of the 'time of going.'
Explanation: If it is said that the 'time of going' can have 'going,' this principle is not established. Apart from 'already gone' and 'not yet gone,' there is no 'time of going' that can be combined.
去。是故若見有是法。還成過失。如所說過失者。謂去時有去。若此二種決定有去理可成者。即彼去法應于去時去可得邪。若爾即有二法可得。一謂去法去。二謂去時去。若爾此說還成去法可去。若有二去法者。此無道理。何以故。若去法去時有所成者。彼何決定。或有所得。此復云何。若或無所有。彼決定說。云何有此去時可去。諸法亦然。皆如是止若法決定。應有如是去時可去。非已去未去無如是見。是故此中無二去法。若有即成別異過失。複次頌言。
若有二去法 即有二去者
釋曰。此何所以。如頌言。
以離於去者 去法不可得
釋曰。若如此說已。余皆亦然。無二去者可見。亦非所樂。此復云何。此中如是無去者去時去法可去。若有去時可去者。非彼亦無去法可得。是故於其一去。者中無二去法。若有即成過失。或有人言。於一去法中去者相離。即無所得。若有所作即有去者。此中若有所依。即去時去法或有可說。是故無二去法和合。如是若於如前所說過失遣除。即無有少法可作。若有別異還成過失。複次頌言。
若離於去者 去法不可得
釋曰。去法若離。即俱時所起彼去作用即當破散。是中何有去者可得。若無去者。彼去者性所作無性。此中去者若不相離。而
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，如果見到有這樣的『法』（dharma，事物、規律），反而會成為過失。就像前面所說的過失那樣，指的是『去』（gati，運動、行進）的時候有『去』。如果這兩種情況——『去時』和『去』——確實存在，那麼這個『去法』（gati-dharma，運動的性質）應該在『去時』（gati-kala，運動的時間）被觀察到，對嗎？如果這樣，就會有兩種『法』可以被觀察到：一種是『去法』的『去』，另一種是『去時』的『去』。如果是這樣，那就變成了『去法』可以『去』。如果有兩種『去法』，這是沒有道理的。為什麼呢？如果『去法』在『去時』有所成就，那麼它又如何確定呢？或者說，它又如何被獲得呢？這是什麼意思呢？如果它什麼都沒有，那麼怎麼能確定地說有『去時』可以『去』呢？所有的『法』也是一樣，都應該這樣停止。如果『法』是確定的，就應該有這樣的『去時』可以『去』。但無論是已『去』（gata，已完成的運動），還是未『去』（agata，未完成的運動），都沒有這樣的現象。因此，這裡沒有兩種『去法』。如果有，就會造成差別過失。接下來頌文說： 『若有二去法，即有二去者。』 解釋說：這是什麼原因呢？就像頌文所說： 『以離於去者，去法不可得。』 解釋說：如果這樣說，其餘的也都是一樣。沒有兩種『去者』（gantr，運動者）可以被看到，也不是所希望的。這是什麼意思呢？這裡沒有『去者』、『去時』、『去法』可以『去』。如果有『去時』可以『去』，那麼也就沒有『去法』可以獲得。因此，在一個『去者』中，沒有兩種『去法』。如果有，就會造成過失。或者有人說，在一個『去法』中，『去者』是分離的，所以無法獲得。如果有所作為，就會有『去者』。這裡如果有所依靠，就可以說『去時』、『去法』或者存在。因此，沒有兩種『去法』的和合。如果像前面所說的過失那樣被去除，就沒有什麼『法』可以被作為。如果有差別，反而會成為過失。接下來頌文說： 『若離於去者，去法不可得。』 解釋說：『去法』如果分離，那麼同時產生的『去』的作用就會被破壞。這裡怎麼會有『去者』可以獲得呢？如果沒有『去者』，那麼『去者』的性質所產生的就沒有性質。這裡『去者』如果不分離，那麼
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, if one sees such a 『dharma』 (事物、規律, thing, law), it becomes a fault. Like the fault mentioned earlier, it refers to having 『going』 (gati, 運動、行進, movement, going) at the time of 『going』. If these two – 『going-time』 and 『going』 – truly exist, then this 『going-dharma』 (gati-dharma, 運動的性質, nature of movement) should be observable at the 『going-time』 (gati-kala, 運動的時間, time of movement), right? If so, there would be two 『dharmas』 that can be observed: one is the 『going』 of 『going-dharma』, and the other is the 『going』 of 『going-time』. If that's the case, then it becomes 『going-dharma』 can 『go』. If there are two 『going-dharmas』, this is unreasonable. Why? If 『going-dharma』 is accomplished at 『going-time』, then how is it determined? Or how is it obtained? What does this mean? If it has nothing, then how can it be definitively said that there is 『going-time』 that can 『go』? All 『dharmas』 are the same, and should all cease like this. If a 『dharma』 is definite, there should be such a 『going-time』 that can 『go』. But neither in the already 『gone』 (gata, 已完成的運動, completed movement) nor the not yet 『gone』 (agata, 未完成的運動, uncompleted movement) is such a phenomenon seen. Therefore, there are no two 『going-dharmas』 here. If there are, it will cause the fault of difference. Next, the verse says: 『If there are two going-dharmas, then there are two goers.』 The explanation says: What is the reason for this? As the verse says: 『Because apart from the goer, the going-dharma cannot be obtained.』 The explanation says: If it is said like this, the rest are all the same. No two 『goers』 (gantr, 運動者, mover) can be seen, nor is it desirable. What does this mean? Here, there is no 『goer』, 『going-time』, or 『going-dharma』 that can 『go』. If there is 『going-time』 that can 『go』, then there is also no 『going-dharma』 that can be obtained. Therefore, in one 『goer』, there are no two 『going-dharmas』. If there are, it will cause a fault. Or someone might say that in one 『going-dharma』, the 『goer』 is separate, so it cannot be obtained. If there is action, there will be a 『goer』. If there is reliance here, then it can be said that 『going-time』, 『going-dharma』 or existence. Therefore, there is no combination of two 『going-dharmas』. If it is removed like the fault mentioned earlier, there is no 『dharma』 that can be acted upon. If there is a difference, it will become a fault. Next, the verse says: 『If apart from the goer, the going-dharma cannot be obtained.』 The explanation says: If the 『going-dharma』 is separated, then the function of 『going』 that arises simultaneously will be destroyed. How can a 『goer』 be obtained here? If there is no 『goer』, then what is produced by the nature of the 『goer』 has no nature. If the 『goer』 is not separated here, then
彼去法亦云何有。今此去者去法如實伺察。云何可說有去相邪。此去者中雲何實有去者去法而可施作。又或去者若有別異。此復云何。複次頌言。
去者即不去
釋曰。何所以邪。謂法自相止遣。複次頌言。
不去者不去
釋曰。謂如前所有。相違法故。複次頌言。
離去不去者 無第三去者
釋曰。以彼如是第三無性。是故此中無有去義。前言去者不去。如其所說。止法自相。為證成此義。複次頌言。
若言去者去 云何有此義
釋曰。無有是義。此復云何。複次頌言。
若離於去法 去者不可得
釋曰。以離去法。去者不和合。若有如是去法與彼去者。此中和合亦無別異去法可有。若或決定去有所作。即彼去法有去和合。複次頌言。
去法若欲去 非無去者去
釋曰。若言如是異法有著。即離去法。去者可見。去法不離去者體故。彼皆無性。若復止遣法自相者。還成過失。若定有彼去法可成。如是即有二去法可立。乃成。去者。有去何等為二。一者有動。二即去者有異法可去。如是去法即成差別此中無有去法可取道理。若爾即有別異去者別異去法。若無去者去法可立。此無過失。有人謂去有發起可說有去。此中若或去者已去有發起邪。或
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
『彼去法亦云何有。』（「那個『去』的法又是如何存在的呢？」）現在這個『去者』如實地觀察『去』的法，怎麼能說有『去』的相狀呢？在這個『去者』之中，怎麼能真實地存在『去者』和『去』的法，並且可以施加作用呢？又或者，『去者』如果有什麼不同，這又該怎麼說呢？再次用偈頌來說： 『去者即不去』 解釋說：為什麼呢？因為法自身的相狀是止息和遣除的。再次用偈頌來說： 『不去者不去』 解釋說：就像前面所說的那樣，因為相違背的緣故。再次用偈頌來說： 『離去不去者，無第三去者』 解釋說：因為那樣的第三者是沒有自性的，所以這裡沒有『去』的意義。前面說『去者不去』，就像它所說的那樣，止息法的自身相狀，爲了證明這個意義，再次用偈頌來說： 『若言去者去，云何有此義』 解釋說：沒有這樣的意義。這又是為什麼呢？再次用偈頌來說： 『若離於去法，去者不可得』 解釋說：因為離開了『去』的法，『去者』就不能和合。如果有這樣的『去』的法和那個『去者』，這裡和合也沒有別的『去』的法可以存在。如果或者確定『去』有所作為，就是那個『去』的法有『去』的和合。再次用偈頌來說： 『去法若欲去，非無去者去』 解釋說：如果說像這樣不同的法有著作用，就是離開了『去』的法，『去者』就可以看見。『去』的法不離開『去者』的本體，它們都是沒有自性的。如果又止息和遣除法的自身相狀，還是會造成過失。如果確定有那個『去』的法可以成立，這樣就有兩個『去』的法可以成立，才能成為『去者』。有什麼是二呢？一是動，二是『去者』有不同的法可以『去』。這樣『去』的法就成了差別，這裡沒有『去』的法可以取用的道理。如果這樣，就有不同的『去者』和不同的『去』的法。如果沒有『去者』和『去』的法可以成立，這沒有過失。有人認為『去』有發起，可以說有『去』。這裡如果或者『去者』已經『去』，有發起嗎？或者
【English Translation】 English version:
'彼去法亦云何有。' ('How does that 'going' dharma exist?') Now, this 'goer' truly observes the dharma of 'going', how can it be said that there is a characteristic of 'going'? Within this 'goer', how can the 'goer' and the dharma of 'going' truly exist and be able to exert influence? Or, if the 'goer' is different in some way, how should this be explained? Again, the verse says: '去者即不去' ('The goer is not going') Explanation: Why is that? Because the self-nature of dharma is cessation and elimination. Again, the verse says: '不去者不去' ('The non-goer does not go') Explanation: As mentioned before, because they are contradictory. Again, the verse says: '離去不去者，無第三去者' ('Apart from the goer and the non-goer, there is no third goer') Explanation: Because that third one is without self-nature, therefore there is no meaning of 'going' here. Previously it was said 'the goer does not go', just as it says, ceasing the self-nature of dharma. To prove this meaning, again the verse says: '若言去者去，云何有此義' ('If it is said that the goer goes, how can there be this meaning?') Explanation: There is no such meaning. Why is that? Again, the verse says: '若離於去法，去者不可得' ('If separated from the dharma of going, the goer cannot be obtained') Explanation: Because separated from the dharma of 'going', the 'goer' cannot be in harmony. If there is such a dharma of 'going' and that 'goer', there is no other dharma of 'going' that can exist in this harmony. If it is determined that 'going' has an action, then that dharma of 'going' has a harmony of 'going'. Again, the verse says: '去法若欲去，非無去者去' ('If the dharma of going wants to go, it is not without the goer going') Explanation: If it is said that different dharmas have an effect like this, then separated from the dharma of 'going', the 'goer' can be seen. The dharma of 'going' does not leave the essence of the 'goer', they are all without self-nature. If the self-nature of dharma is ceased and eliminated again, it will still cause faults. If it is determined that there is that dharma of 'going' that can be established, then there are two dharmas of 'going' that can be established, and then it can become a 'goer'. What are the two? One is movement, and the second is that the 'goer' has different dharmas that can 'go'. In this way, the dharma of 'going' becomes a difference, and there is no reason to take the dharma of 'going' here. If so, there are different 'goers' and different dharmas of 'going'. If there is no 'goer' and dharma of 'going' that can be established, there is no fault. Some people think that 'going' has an initiation, and it can be said that there is 'going'. Here, if the 'goer' has already 'gone', is there an initiation? Or
別異邪。如是分位有所著故。所以頌言。
已去中無發
釋曰。已去者。去彼去作用而已謝故。此中何有去法發起。複次頌言。
未去中無發
釋曰。未去者。彼去作用未有生故。若離已去。未去性亦無發起。複次頌言。
離已去未去 去時中無發
釋曰。是故今時云何有。去而得發起。所以去法發起無性去者無性其義亦然。由是當知勝義諦中去者去法分別悉無。或有人言。此中應有如是去法。已去未去去時分位因性可成。彼說不然。若或先有去法發起。即有去時。后亦復有去者發起。此中無去法故。即無去作用。去時作用已謝滅故。如前所說。去法發起即無分位。亦無去時可有。若彼去時有所發者。又離去法去時不有。云何當有已去未去。彼皆無性。如是無去故。云何如前去法有所發起。以彼去法發起無故。去中皆止諸有體性。去無性故。即不和合。此中決定說者。若無去故何有去法。以無去無去法故。亦無彼去作用發起。去云何有。複次頌言。
去未去去時 云何有分別
釋曰。若不見有如是去法所發起故。餘一切處其義亦然。已去未去去時分位。因性所成。一切皆無去法可得。以彼如是發無性故。若有如是去法。于勝義諦中如理思擇。分位對治悉無所有。云何當
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
不要執著于其他的邪見。因為像這樣執著于各個階段（已去、未去、去時）的劃分。所以頌詞說：
『已去中無發』
解釋：『已去』是指，已經完成了去的行為和作用，已經結束了。在這種情況下，怎麼會有『去』這個法的生起呢？再次，頌詞說：
『未去中無發』
解釋：『未去』是指，『去』的行為和作用還沒有產生。如果離開了『已去』，『未去』的性質也無法生起。再次，頌詞說：
『離已去未去，去時中無發』
解釋：所以，現在這個時刻，怎麼會有『去』而能夠生起呢？因此，『去』這個法的生起是沒有自性的，『去者』也是沒有自性的，它們的意義也是一樣的。由此應當知道，在勝義諦（究竟真理）中，『去者』和『去法』的分別都是不存在的。或者有人說，這裡應該有這樣的『去』法，『已去』、『未去』、『去時』這些階段的因性是可以成立的。那種說法是不對的。如果先有『去』這個法的生起，就會有『去時』，之後也會有『去者』的生起。這裡沒有『去』這個法，所以就沒有『去』的作用。『去時』的作用已經消失滅亡了，就像前面所說的那樣，『去』這個法的生起就沒有階段的劃分，也沒有『去時』可以存在。如果那個『去時』有所生起，又離開了『去』這個法，『去時』是不存在的。怎麼會有『已去』、『未去』呢？它們都是沒有自性的。像這樣沒有『去』，怎麼會像前面所說的『去』這個法有所生起呢？因為那個『去』這個法的生起是沒有的，在『去』之中，一切有為的體性都停止了。『去』沒有自性，所以就不和合。這裡可以確定地說，如果沒有『去』，怎麼會有『去』這個法呢？因為沒有『去』，沒有『去』這個法，也就沒有那個『去』的作用生起，『去』又怎麼會有呢？再次，頌詞說：
『去未去去時，云何有分別』
解釋：如果沒有見到有像這樣的『去』這個法所生起，那麼其他一切地方的意義也是一樣的。『已去』、『未去』、『去時』這些階段，因性所成就的，一切都無法得到『去』這個法。因為它們像這樣生起是沒有自性的。如果有像這樣的『去』這個法，在勝義諦中如理地思考，階段和對治都是不存在的。怎麼會存在呢？
【English Translation】 English version:
Do not adhere to other wrong views. Because of such attachment to the divisions of phases (gone, not-gone, going-time). Therefore, the verse says:
'In the gone, there is no arising.'
Explanation: 'Gone' means that the act and function of going have been completed and have ended. In this case, how can the 'going' dharma arise? Again, the verse says:
'In the not-gone, there is no arising.'
Explanation: 'Not-gone' means that the act and function of 'going' have not yet arisen. If separated from 'gone,' the nature of 'not-gone' cannot arise either. Again, the verse says:
'Apart from gone and not-gone, in the going-time, there is no arising.'
Explanation: Therefore, at this present moment, how can there be 'going' that can arise? Therefore, the arising of the 'going' dharma is without inherent existence (svabhava), and the 'goer' is also without inherent existence; their meanings are the same. From this, it should be known that in the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), the distinctions of 'goer' and 'going' dharma do not exist.
Or someone might say that there should be such a 'going' dharma here, and the causal nature of the phases of 'gone,' 'not-gone,' and 'going-time' can be established. That statement is not correct. If there is first the arising of the 'going' dharma, there will be 'going-time,' and later there will also be the arising of the 'goer.' Here, there is no 'going' dharma, so there is no function of 'going.' The function of 'going-time' has already ceased and perished, as mentioned earlier. The arising of the 'going' dharma has no division of phases, and there is no 'going-time' that can exist. If that 'going-time' arises, and is separated from the 'going' dharma, 'going-time' does not exist. How can there be 'gone' and 'not-gone'? They are all without inherent existence. Since there is no 'going' like this, how can the 'going' dharma arise as mentioned earlier? Because the arising of that 'going' dharma is non-existent, in 'going,' all conditioned entities cease. 'Going' has no inherent existence, so it does not cohere. Here, it can be definitively said that if there is no 'going,' how can there be a 'going' dharma? Because there is no 'going' and no 'going' dharma, there is also no arising of that 'going' function; how can 'going' exist? Again, the verse says:
'Going, not-gone, going-time, how can there be distinctions?'
Explanation: If one does not see the arising of such a 'going' dharma, then the meaning in all other places is the same. The phases of 'gone,' 'not-gone,' and 'going-time,' which are accomplished by causal nature, all cannot obtain the 'going' dharma. Because their arising is without inherent existence. If there is such a 'going' dharma, and one rationally contemplates it in the ultimate truth, the phases and antidotes are all non-existent. How can they exist?
有已去未去去時分位。◎
大乘中觀釋論卷第二 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1567 大乘中觀釋論(第1卷-第9卷)
大乘中觀釋論卷第三
安慧菩薩造
譯經三藏朝散大夫試鴻臚卿光梵大師賜紫沙門臣惟凈等奉 詔譯觀去來品第二之餘
◎複次頌言。
去者即不住
釋曰。於一同生法中。相違所作叢雜無性。
不去者不住
釋曰。去法止息名之為住。今不去者。去法無性不應止息。若或本有住法可得者。然亦住法無二和合。若有二和合。今應如實觀。是故頌言。
離去不去者 何有第三住
釋曰。去不去者。是二不住。此如是義即如前說。複次頌言。
去者若當住 云何有此義 以離於去法 去者不可得
釋曰。總止住法。複次頌言。
去未去去時 止息諸分別
釋曰。若彼去時不住可爾。彼已去者應可住邪。此亦不然。已去者無別去法。去法已壞。是故無住。此中無有已去者住。今此住法如是止已。余諸過失所說亦然。複次頌言。
所有行止法 皆同去義說
釋曰。此所說已。余法皆同。已去未去去時去法不生。已去未去去時去法初發。已去未去去時去法止息。住法亦然已住未住住時住
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：有已去、未去、去時的分位。（◎）
《大乘中觀釋論》卷第二 大正藏第30冊 No. 1567 《大乘中觀釋論》(第1卷-第9卷)
《大乘中觀釋論》卷第三
安慧菩薩 造
譯經三藏朝散大夫試鴻臚卿光梵大師賜紫沙門臣惟凈等 奉 詔譯《觀去來品》第二之餘
◎複次頌言：
『去者即不住。』
釋曰：于同一生法中，相違所作叢雜無自性。
『不去者不住。』
釋曰：去法止息名為住。今不去者，去法無自性，不應止息。若或本有住法可得者，然亦住法無二和合。若有二和合，今應如實觀。是故頌言：
『離去不去者，何有第三住？』
釋曰：去與不去，是二者皆不住。此如是義，即如前說。複次頌言：
『去者若當住，云何有此義？以離於去法，去者不可得。』
釋曰：總止住法。複次頌言：
『去未去去時，止息諸分別。』
釋曰：若彼去時不住，可容許。彼已去者應可住嗎？此亦不然。已去者無別去法，去法已壞，是故無住。此中無有已去者住。今此住法如是止息已，其餘諸過失所說亦然。複次頌言：
『所有行止法，皆同去義說。』
釋曰：此所說已，其餘諸法皆同。已去、未去、去時，去法不生；已去、未去、去時，去法初發；已去、未去、去時，去法止息。住法亦然，已住、未住、住時住。
【English Translation】 English version: There are divisions of gone, not-gone, and going time. (◎)
Mahayana Madhyamaka Shastra Commentary, Volume 2 Taisho Tripitaka, Volume 30, No. 1567, Mahayana Madhyamaka Shastra Commentary (Volumes 1-9)
Mahayana Madhyamaka Shastra Commentary, Volume 3
Composed by Bodhisattva Anhui (Anhui: Name of the Bodhisattva)
Translated by Tripitaka Master Chao San Da Fu Shi Honglu Qing Guang Fan, the Purple-Robed Shramana Chen Weijing (Weijing: Name of the translator), etc., under Imperial Order, remaining section of Chapter 2, 'Contemplating Going and Coming'
◎ Furthermore, the verse says:
'The goer does not abide.'
Explanation: In the same arising dharma (dharma: Teachings or laws), contradictory actions are mixed and without inherent nature.
'The not-goer does not abide.'
Explanation: The cessation of the going dharma is called abiding. Now, the not-goer, the going dharma has no inherent nature, so it should not cease. If there were an originally existing abiding dharma that could be obtained, then that abiding dharma would also not have two combinations. If there are two combinations, then one should now observe them as they truly are. Therefore, the verse says:
'Apart from the goer and the not-goer, what third abiding is there?'
Explanation: Going and not-going, these two do not abide. This meaning is as previously stated. Furthermore, the verse says:
'If the goer were to abide, how could this meaning exist? Because apart from the going dharma, the goer cannot be obtained.'
Explanation: Generally stopping the abiding dharma. Furthermore, the verse says:
'Gone, not-gone, going time, cease all discriminations.'
Explanation: If it is acceptable that the going time does not abide, should the gone one be able to abide? This is also not so. The gone one has no separate going dharma; the going dharma has already been destroyed, therefore there is no abiding. There is no gone one abiding here. Now that this abiding dharma has thus ceased, the other faults that have been spoken of are also the same. Furthermore, the verse says:
'All actions of going and stopping are spoken of in the same way as going.'
Explanation: Having said this, all other dharmas are the same. Gone, not-gone, going time, the going dharma does not arise; gone, not-gone, going time, the going dharma initially arises; gone, not-gone, going time, the going dharma ceases. The abiding dharma is also thus: abided, not-abided, abiding time, abiding.
法不生。已住未住住時住法初發。已住未住住時住法止息。此中法自相等。若止遣者則生過失此中所有去者去法二種。于勝義諦中欲求實性者。如理應知。一性異性諸有物體皆法性故。是中若有所生皆客塵事。世俗所行世俗所成。然無異性。是故去者去法二無異性。此應思擇。此中應知。風界動轉即有去者。身等動發往方處相。此乃名去。非去者去法二性別異。于自類中有異說者。皆止是義。◎
◎複次頌言。
去法即去者 是事則不然
此復云何。頌言。
若謂于去法 即為是去者 作者及作業 即一性可立
釋曰。雖有作者作業二相。然彼作者作業互無異性。以彼作者作業自相息故。或可一性和合。即體用有相。世俗所成。世俗有性。以彼實無所成。於世俗所作決定可得。是故非無性非一性。此中若有所止。還成過失。生法顯明。若止遣者。即無果體。亦無往去方處動發等相。
複次毗婆沙人。及吠夜迦啰拏人言。去者去法有別異故。彼謂去者。能去非物體。去物體由去者故說有所得。所作如是。能作亦然。
複次勝論者言。如是能於物中有性故有去者。用彼去法動發行往方處等相。此如是說。余皆亦然。
釋者言。不然。去法若爾。作者功能於物體中為
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 法不生。（法：指事物或現象）已安住、未安住、安住時，安住之法的最初生起。已安住、未安住、安住時，安住之法的止息。此中，法自身相等。若阻止或否定，則會產生過失。此中所有去者（去者：行動的主體）和去法（去法：行動本身）兩種，對於在勝義諦（勝義諦：佛教中的最高真理）中欲求真實本性的人，應如理了知。一性（一性：同一本質）或異性（異性：不同本質），所有物體皆具法性（法性：事物的本性）。其中若有所生，皆為客塵之事（客塵之事：外來的、不真實的現象），是世俗所行、世俗所成，然無異性。是故，去者和去法二者沒有異性，對此應仔細思擇。此中應知，風界（風界：佛教中的四大元素之一，指風的性質）的動轉即有去者，身體等的動發，前往方向處所之相，這稱為『去』，並非去者和去法二者有性別差異。于自類中有異議者，皆應停止，此乃正義。
◎複次頌言。
去法即去者，是事則不然
此復云何。頌言。
若謂于去法，即為是去者 作者及作業，即一性可立
釋曰。雖有作者（作者：行動的發起者）和作業（作業：行動的結果）二相，然彼作者和作業互無異性，以彼作者和作業自相止息故。或可一性和合，即體用有相（體用有相：本體和作用相互關聯），世俗所成，世俗有性。以彼實無所成，於世俗所作決定可得。是故非無性（無性：沒有自性），非一性。此中若有所止，還成過失，生法顯明。若阻止或否定，即無果體（果體：結果的實體），亦無往去方向處所動發等相。
複次，毗婆沙人（毗婆沙人：佛教論師，以《大毗婆沙論》為主要依據）及吠夜迦啰拏人（吠夜迦啰拏人：聲明論師，研究語言和語法的人）言，去者和去法有別異故。彼謂去者，能去非物體，去物體由去者故說有所得。所作如是，能作亦然。
複次，勝論者（勝論者：印度正理論派的信徒）言，如是能於物中有性故有去者，用彼去法動發行往方向處所等相。此如是說，余皆亦然。
釋者言，不然。去法若爾，作者功能於物體中為
【English Translation】 English version Law does not arise. (Law: referring to things or phenomena) The initial arising of the law of abiding when already abiding, not yet abiding, or in the process of abiding. The cessation of the law of abiding when already abiding, not yet abiding, or in the process of abiding. Herein, the laws are equal in their own nature. If one were to stop or deny this, it would lead to error. Within this, regarding the two aspects of the 'goer' (goer: the subject of the action) and the 'going' (going: the action itself), those who seek true nature in the ultimate truth (ultimate truth: the highest truth in Buddhism) should understand it as it is. Whether of one nature (one nature: same essence) or different nature (different nature: different essence), all objects possess the nature of law (nature of law: the inherent nature of things). If anything arises within them, it is merely a matter of external dust (external dust: external, unreal phenomena), something done and accomplished in the mundane world, yet without a different nature. Therefore, the goer and the going are not different in nature, and this should be carefully considered. It should be understood that the movement of the wind element (wind element: one of the four great elements in Buddhism, referring to the nature of wind) constitutes the goer. The movement of the body, etc., the appearance of going towards a direction and place, this is called 'going,' but it does not mean that the goer and the going are different in gender. Those who have different opinions within their own category should stop, for this is the correct meaning.
◎Furthermore, the verse says:
'The going is the goer, this is not so.'
What does this mean? The verse says:
'If it is said that the going is the goer, then the agent and the action can be established as one nature.'
Explanation: Although there are two aspects, the agent (agent: the initiator of the action) and the action (action: the result of the action), the agent and the action are not different in nature, because the agent and the action cease in their own nature. Or they can be of one nature and in harmony, that is, the substance and function are related (substance and function are related: the essence and function are interconnected), accomplished in the mundane world, and have a mundane nature. Because in reality nothing is accomplished, what is done in the mundane world can be definitely obtained. Therefore, it is neither without nature (without nature: without inherent existence) nor of one nature. If one were to stop here, it would lead to error, and the arising of the law would be clear. If one were to stop or deny this, there would be no fruit body (fruit body: the entity of the result), nor would there be the appearance of going, direction, place, movement, etc.
Furthermore, the Vaibhashikas (Vaibhashikas: Buddhist scholars who mainly rely on the Mahavibhasa) and the Vyakarana people (Vyakarana people: grammarians, those who study language and grammar) say that the goer and the going are different. They say that the goer is able to go and is not an object, and that the object goes because of the goer, so it is said that something is obtained. The action is like this, and so is the agent.
Furthermore, the Vaisheshikas (Vaisheshikas: followers of the Vaisheshika school of Indian philosophy) say that because there is nature in things, there is a goer, who uses the going to move, go, and go towards directions and places. This is what they say, and the rest is the same.
Explanation: That is not so. If the going is like that, then the function of the agent in the object is
有差別邪。無差別邪。此復云何。若有差別者。諸異力能或復別有齊等力能。於一能作中若成體性。此即是為作者力能。非所作等功能。此若所作等力能。即非作者功能。是中雲何如實決定。或言自相差別。此即還成不定。若或自相無差別者。即一切處應無差別性。今以物體如是增上所依。火不能作地等事業。亦非無其事用作者和合力能相應。故知物體如是非作者功能。此說義成。由如是故。所有物體如是能作如是所作及此如是增上作用。是中作者即得和合。是故非彼功能差別。亦非自體差別所成。若或物體無有差別。即功能可成。如是亦然。諸力能者互無差別一無異性。故知物體若一性。是中亦無多法所成。若異性是中亦無多法所成。云何二種功能而可成邪。或離所得。即彼如是此之所作是善功能緣法差別。作者物體緣差別有。此名勝上差別長養。是故非作者力能和合。若或分位差別。如是作者分別。是故此說名為作者。若因果轉時。彼能作所作性分位差別。即不可得。彼非物體差別性故。若或施設彼有性等。此不和合。故名去者。複次頌言。
去法異去者 是事亦不然
釋曰。若離去法而彼去者。即不決定。若離去法不決定時。無復別異去者可去。此所分別。若有去者去法二種可得。即去者去法有二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有差別嗎？沒有差別嗎？這又是什麼意思呢？如果存在差別，那麼各種不同的力量，或者另外存在齊等的力量，在一種作用的形成過程中，如果形成了實體性質，這便是作者的力量，而不是所作等同的功能。如果這是所作等同的力量，那就不是作者的功能。在這其中，如何如實地做出決定呢？如果說各自的體相存在差別，這反而會變得不確定。如果各自的體相沒有差別，那麼在所有地方都應該沒有差別性。現在憑藉物體這樣增上的所依，火不能完成地等的事業，也不是沒有其作用的作者和合力量相應。所以知道物體這樣不是作者的功能。這個說法義理成立。由於這個原因，所有物體這樣能作、這樣所作以及這樣增上的作用，在這其中作者就能夠和合。因此，不是那些功能差別，也不是自體差別所造成的。如果物體沒有差別，那麼功能就可以成立。這樣也是一樣，各種力量之間沒有差別，沒有異性。所以知道物體如果是一性，其中也沒有多種法所形成。如果是異性，其中也沒有多種法所形成。怎麼能有兩種功能可以成立呢？或者離開所得，就是那樣，這個所作是善的功能，緣法存在差別。作者物體緣的差別存在，這叫做勝上差別長養。因此，不是作者力量的和合。如果存在分位的差別，就像作者分別一樣。因此，這個說法叫做作者。如果因果轉變時，那個能作和所作的性質分位存在差別，那就不可得。那不是物體差別性的緣故。如果設施它有性質等等，這不和合，所以叫做去者（going one）。再次用頌文說： 『去法異去者，是事亦不然』 解釋說：如果離開去法而存在去者，那就不確定。如果離開去法不確定時，沒有另外的去者可以去。這是所分別的。如果有去者和去法兩種可以得到，那麼去者和去法就有兩種。
【English Translation】 English version Is there difference? Is there no difference? What does this mean? If there is difference, then various different powers, or else there are equal powers, in the process of forming an action, if a substantial nature is formed, this is the power of the agent (kartr, doer), and not the function equivalent to the object (karman, what is done). If this is the power equivalent to the object, then it is not the function of the agent. Among these, how to make a real determination? If it is said that there are differences in their own characteristics, this will become uncertain. If there is no difference in their own characteristics, then there should be no difference in all places. Now, relying on the object as such an increasing support, fire cannot accomplish the work of earth, etc., nor is it without the corresponding combined force of the agent of its function. Therefore, it is known that the object is not the function of the agent. This statement is valid. Because of this reason, all objects can act in this way, be acted upon in this way, and have such increasing functions, in which the agent can be combined. Therefore, it is not caused by those functional differences, nor by the differences in their own nature. If the object has no difference, then the function can be established. It is the same in this way, there is no difference between the various powers, and there is no otherness. Therefore, it is known that if the object is of one nature, then it is not formed by many dharmas (phenomena). If it is of different nature, then it is not formed by many dharmas. How can two functions be established? Or apart from what is obtained, that is, in that way, this action is a good function, and there are differences in the causal dharmas. The differences in the causal conditions of the agent object exist, which is called superior difference and growth. Therefore, it is not the combination of the agent's power. If there are differences in aspects, like the agent's distinctions. Therefore, this statement is called the agent. If the cause and effect change, then the nature and aspect of the agent and the object are different, then it is not available. That is not because of the difference in the object. If it is established that it has nature, etc., this is not in harmony, so it is called the 'goer' (gantr). Again, the verse says: 『The going dharma (gati) is different from the goer, this is also not the case.』 It is explained: If there is a goer apart from the going dharma, then it is uncertain. If it is uncertain when separated from the going dharma, there is no other goer to go. This is what is distinguished. If two kinds of goer and going dharma can be obtained, then there are two kinds of goer and going dharma.
可成。所以有去法故即有去者。有去者故即有去法。如因果二不相離性。此說義成。若因果同生即無性可得。如種生芽。是故有去法故即有去者。有去者故即有去法。若一性所成。若異性所成。然去者去法二俱無有。勝義諦中此說成就。云何無所有。此義文廣。恐繁且止。此中遮遣非復引證。為遮遣故如是表示。此所說已。余處應知。此後復當止遣何義。若因去法即知去者。彼如是去。云何二種有其別異。若然云何和合。複次頌言。
因去知去者 不能用是去
釋曰。不作是義。此中應問。無數義門從義界中出。皆轉是義。今云何言不作是義。故頌答言。
先無有去法 故無去者去
釋曰。為彼如是去者所作。何有少法而可去邪。由如是故。世間所見。何等法是先來已生有所去邪。何等法是後來生時有所去邪。複次頌言。
因去知去者 不能用異去 於一去者中 不有二去故
釋曰。云何二去。一謂因去。知去者故。二謂若有去者複用去法。此中止遣。複次頌言。
若實有去法 去者不用三 不實有去法 去者不用三
此中雲何。複次頌言。
去法有不有 去者不用三
釋曰。若或實有若不實有。此中去者去法不用三去。若實有者。即去者去
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：可以成立。所以因為有『去法』（going, the act of going）的緣故，就有了『去者』（goer, the one who goes）。因為有了『去者』的緣故，就有了『去法』。如同原因和結果二者不相分離的性質一樣，這個說法是成立的。如果原因和結果同時產生，那就沒有自性可以獲得，就像種子生出芽一樣。因此，因為有『去法』的緣故，就有了『去者』；因為有了『去者』的緣故，就有了『去法』。無論是單一自性所成就，還是不同自性所成就，『去者』和『去法』二者都是沒有的。在勝義諦（paramārtha-satya, ultimate truth）中，這個說法是成立的。什麼是『無所有』（nothingness）呢？這個意義的文字很廣，恐怕繁瑣就先停止。這裡遮遣，不再引用證據，爲了遮遣的緣故這樣表示。這裡所說的已經足夠，其餘的地方應該知道。此後又應當停止遮遣什麼意義呢？如果因為『去法』就知道『去者』，那麼他就是這樣去的，為什麼這兩種有區別呢？如果這樣，又如何和合呢？再次，頌文說： 『因為去法知道去者，不能用這個去。』 解釋說：不是這樣理解這個意義。這裡應該問，無數的意義之門從意義的界限中產生，都轉變了這個意義，現在為什麼說不是這樣理解這個意義呢？所以頌文回答說： 『先前沒有去法，所以沒有去者的去。』 解釋說：為那個像這樣去的『去者』所作，有什麼少許的法是可以去的呢？因為這樣，世間所見，什麼法是先前已經產生而有所去的呢？什麼法是後來產生時有所去的呢？再次，頌文說： 『因為去法知道去者，不能用不同的去，在一個去者中，沒有兩種去的緣故。』 解釋說：什麼是兩種去呢？一種是『因為去法知道去者』，另一種是『如果有去者又使用去法』。這裡停止遮遣。再次，頌文說： 『如果真實有去法，去者不用三種；如果不真實有去法，去者不用三種。』 這裡是什麼意思呢？再次，頌文說： 『去法有或者沒有，去者不用三種。』 解釋說：如果或者真實有，或者不真實有，這裡『去者』『去法』不用三種『去』。如果真實有，就是『去者』『去』。
【English Translation】 English version: It can be established. Therefore, because there is 'going' (gati, the act of going), there is a 'goer' (gantṛ, the one who goes). Because there is a 'goer', there is 'going'. Just like the nature of cause and effect being inseparable, this statement is established. If cause and effect arise simultaneously, then no self-nature (svabhāva) can be obtained, just like a seed producing a sprout. Therefore, because there is 'going', there is a 'goer'; because there is a 'goer', there is 'going'. Whether accomplished by a single self-nature or by different self-natures, both 'goer' and 'going' do not exist. In the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), this statement is established. What is 'nothingness' (śūnyatā)? The text of this meaning is extensive, fearing prolixity, I will stop here. Here, there is refutation, no longer citing evidence, for the sake of refutation, it is expressed in this way. What is said here is sufficient, the rest should be known elsewhere. What meaning should be stopped and refuted hereafter? If the 'goer' is known because of 'going', then he goes like this, why are these two different? If so, how do they harmonize? Again, the verse says: 'Because of going, knowing the goer, one cannot use this going.' The explanation says: This meaning is not made. Here it should be asked, countless doors of meaning emerge from the realm of meaning, all transforming this meaning, now why say that this meaning is not made? Therefore, the verse answers: 'Previously there was no going, therefore there is no going of the goer.' The explanation says: For the 'goer' who goes like this, what little dharma (phenomena) is there that can be gone? Because of this, what dharma is seen in the world that has already arisen and has something to go? What dharma is there that arises later and has something to go? Again, the verse says: 'Because of going, knowing the goer, one cannot use different going, in one goer, there is no reason for two goings.' The explanation says: What are the two goings? One is 'because of going, knowing the goer', the other is 'if there is a goer, he uses going again'. Here, stopping and refuting. Again, the verse says: 'If there is truly going, the goer does not use three; if there is not truly going, the goer does not use three.' What is the meaning here? Again, the verse says: 'Going exists or does not exist, the goer does not use three.' The explanation says: If it truly exists or does not truly exist, here the 'goer' and 'going' do not use three 'goings'. If it truly exists, it is the 'goer' 'going'.
法和合。若不實有者。即去者離去法。若亦有亦不有者。二俱無性。或可實有者。去者有故。不實有者。去者不有故。亦有亦不有者。二無去法故。是故去者不用三去。所以不作是義。若彼實有去者實有去法。即所作不有。能作不和合。以不實有故。即無所作不有者為去不生故。亦有亦不有者。亦無所作。彼無性故以不有故。是故去者不用三去。何以故。如是去者自無性故。若有不有悉無所作。彼皆無性。若說去法。此中皆是隨順所說。複次頌言。
是故去去者 所去處皆無
釋曰。此說勝義諦中成就。如是別異說有能作所作作法。此中止遣。此中或說去之作用。如理應思。是故當知。此中所說作者作業作法。諸有分別皆無實體。為證成是義故此品生。
觀六根品第三
前品止遣一切作者作業作法諸所造作相違行相已。複次頌言。
見聞及嗅嘗 觸知等六根 此見等六根 說能取諸境
釋曰。此論所說。如是見等六根行諸境界。謂眼見色乃至意知法。此有所說。當知皆是世俗道理。增上所作此無相違。若於勝義諦中。色等眼等所取能取性不可得。此復云何。複次頌言。
是眼即不能 自見於己體
釋曰。若眼能見自性者。彼眼即應如是同前。自見己體。以諸法
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 法和合。若不實有者，即去者離去法。若亦有亦不有者，二者都無自性。或者說，如果去者是真實存在的，那麼去者就具有去的行為；如果去者不是真實存在的，那麼去者就沒有去的行為；如果去者既存在又不存在，那麼這兩種情況都沒有去的行為。因此，去者不能用三種方式去理解『去』這個概念。所以，不應該這樣理解『去』的意義。如果去者真實存在，去的行為也真實存在，那麼所作的行為就不存在，能作的行為也不和合。因為不是真實存在，所以沒有所作的行為，因為去而不生。如果既存在又不存在，那麼也沒有所作的行為，因為它們沒有自性，因為它們不存在。因此，去者不能用三種方式去理解『去』這個概念。為什麼呢？因為這樣的去者本身就沒有自性。如果存在與不存在都沒有所作，那麼它們都沒有自性。如果說『去』的行為，這裡都是隨順世俗的說法。再次用頌文說： 『是故去去者，所去處皆無。』 解釋：這是說在勝義諦（Paramārtha-satya）中成就。像這樣分別地說有能作者、所作業、作法，這裡是爲了止息這些分別。這裡或者說『去』的作用，應該如理思維。因此應當知道，這裡所說的作者、作業、作法，所有這些分別都沒有實體。爲了證實這個意義，所以產生了這一品。 觀六根品第三 在前一品中，已經止息了一切作者、作業、作法以及所有造作的相反的行相。再次用頌文說： 『見聞及嗅嘗，觸知等六根，此見等六根，說能取諸境。』 解釋：這裡所說的是，像這樣眼等六根（ṣaḍ indriyāṇi）行於各種境界。所謂眼見色，乃至意知法。這裡所說的，應當知道都是世俗道理（saṃvṛti-satya），增上所作，這沒有相違。如果在勝義諦中，色等、眼等，所取能取的自性是不可得的。這是怎麼回事呢？再次用頌文說： 『是眼即不能，自見於己體。』 解釋：如果眼能見自己的自性，那麼這個眼就應該像前面所說的那樣，自己見到自己的身體。因為諸法...
【English Translation】 English version Law and combination. If it is not truly existent, then the goer departs from the act of going. If it is both existent and non-existent, then both lack inherent existence. Or, if the goer is truly existent, then the goer possesses the act of going; if the goer is not truly existent, then the goer does not possess the act of going; if the goer is both existent and non-existent, then neither condition possesses the act of going. Therefore, the goer cannot be understood using the three ways of 'going'. Thus, the meaning of 'going' should not be understood in this way. If the goer is truly existent and the act of going is truly existent, then the action performed does not exist, and the ability to act does not harmonize. Because it is not truly existent, there is no action performed, because going does not arise. If it is both existent and non-existent, then there is also no action performed, because they lack inherent existence, because they do not exist. Therefore, the goer cannot be understood using the three ways of 'going'. Why? Because such a goer inherently lacks existence. If existence and non-existence both lack action, then they both lack inherent existence. If we speak of the act of going, here it is all in accordance with conventional speech. Again, the verse says: 'Therefore, the goer, the going, and the place gone to are all non-existent.' Explanation: This speaks of accomplishment in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya). Like this, speaking separately of the agent, the action, and the act, here is to cease these distinctions. Here, or speaking of the function of 'going', one should contemplate it reasonably. Therefore, one should know that the agent, action, and act spoken of here, all these distinctions lack substance. To prove this meaning, this chapter arises. Chapter Three: Examination of the Six Sense Organs In the previous chapter, all agents, actions, acts, and all fabricated contradictory aspects have been ceased. Again, the verse says: 'Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, and knowing, these are the six sense organs (ṣaḍ indriyāṇi). These seeing, etc., six sense organs are said to apprehend objects.' Explanation: What is spoken of here is that the six sense organs, such as the eye, act upon various objects. So-called the eye sees form, and even the mind knows phenomena. What is spoken of here, one should know, is all conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), an increased action, and this is not contradictory. If in the ultimate truth, form, etc., and the eye, etc., the nature of the apprehended and the apprehender is unobtainable. What is this about? Again, the verse says: 'The eye itself cannot see its own body.' Explanation: If the eye could see its own nature, then that eye should, as said before, see its own body. Because all phenomena...
自性不能自見無異性故。如火熱性。亦復不能自見己體。是中亦無能見自性。複次頌言。
若不能自見 云何能見他
釋曰。無能見自性故。譬如耳等。亦無能見自性可得。彼眼若以能取自性於色境中有所見者。此說還成。眼為能見。譬如薪火變異。即說名燒。非火自體能燒。複次頌言。
火喻即不能 成於眼見法
釋曰。何所以邪。若彼熱效能然火者。彼不熱之性何不能然。是故若無彼薪。此火不有。熱性不應能自燒故。複次頌言。
去未去去時 前已答是事
釋曰。如前已去未去去時不去中。已說是事。今此亦然。已燒未燒燒時無燒。已見未見見時無見。是故無已燒無未燒。不離所燒。無已見無未見。不離所見。如前所說。如其次第。隨應止遣。複次頌言。
見若未見時 即不名為見
釋曰。若或為常。如瓶衣等。複次頌言。
若言能所見 此云何和合
釋曰。以不和合而彼見法亦復止遣。或可能見所見二法和合。彼即可說有能所見。然彼二法不和合故。何所以邪。於一見法中而彼所見不得和合。無別異故。若有能見即非無所見。若有所見。即能見應成。又若決定有彼見法。即彼能見亦復應成。能見若成。所見亦然。複次頌言。
能見亦不見
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 自性（Sva-lakṣaṇa，自有的性質）不能自己看見自己，因為它沒有不同的性質。就像火的熱性一樣，也不能自己看見自己的本體。這裡面也沒有能見自性的東西。再次用偈頌說： 『如果不能自己看見， 怎麼能看見其他的？』 解釋說：因為沒有能見自性的東西，就像耳朵等，也沒有能見自性可以得到。如果眼睛能夠憑藉能取自性的能力在色境中有所見，這種說法仍然成立，眼睛是能見的。譬如柴火變異，就說成是燃燒。不是火的自體能夠燃燒。再次用偈頌說： 『用火的比喻不能， 成就眼睛的見法。』 解釋說：為什麼呢？如果熱效能夠燃燒火，那麼不熱的性質為什麼不能燃燒呢？所以，如果沒有柴，就沒有火。熱性不應該能夠自己燃燒自己。再次用偈頌說： 『去、未去、去時， 前面已經回答了這件事。』 解釋說：就像前面已去、未去、去時、不去中，已經說了這件事。現在這裡也是這樣。已燒、未燒、燒時沒有燒。已見、未見、見時沒有見。所以，沒有已燒，沒有未燒，不離開所燒。沒有已見，沒有未見，不離開所見。就像前面所說，按照次第，隨應止遣。再次用偈頌說： 『見如果在未見時， 就不叫做見。』 解釋說：如果見是常恒不變的，就像瓶子、衣服等。再次用偈頌說： 『如果說能見和所見， 這怎麼能和合？』 解釋說：因為不和合，所以那種見法也被止遣。或許能見和所見兩種法可以和合，那樣就可以說有能見和所見。然而，這兩種法不和合。為什麼呢？在一個見法中，所見不能和合，因為沒有差別。如果有能見，就不是沒有所見。如果有所見，那麼能見就應該成立。又如果決定有那種見法，那麼那種能見也應該成立。能見如果成立，所見也是這樣。再次用偈頌說： 『能見也不能見』
【English Translation】 English version The self-nature (Sva-lakṣaṇa, own-nature) cannot see itself because it does not have a different nature. Just like the hot nature of fire, it also cannot see its own essence. Within this, there is nothing that can see self-nature. Again, a verse says: 『If it cannot see itself, how can it see others?』 Explanation: Because there is nothing that can see self-nature, just like the ears, etc., there is no seeing of self-nature to be obtained. If the eye is able to see something in the realm of form by means of the ability to grasp self-nature, this statement still holds true, that the eye is capable of seeing. For example, when firewood changes, it is called burning. It is not the self-essence of the fire that is able to burn. Again, a verse says: 『The analogy of fire cannot, accomplish the seeing-dharma of the eye.』 Explanation: Why is that? If the hot nature is able to burn fire, then why is the non-hot nature not able to burn? Therefore, if there is no firewood, there is no fire. The hot nature should not be able to burn itself. Again, a verse says: 『Gone, not-gone, the time of going, this matter has already been answered before.』 Explanation: Just like in the previous gone, not-gone, the time of going, and not-going, this matter has already been discussed. Now it is the same here. There is no burning in already-burned, not-yet-burned, and the time of burning. There is no seeing in already-seen, not-yet-seen, and the time of seeing. Therefore, there is no already-burned, no not-yet-burned, not apart from what is burned. There is no already-seen, no not-yet-seen, not apart from what is seen. Just as said before, in sequence, accordingly stop and dismiss. Again, a verse says: 『If seeing is in the time of not-seeing, it is not called seeing.』 Explanation: If seeing were constant, like a bottle or clothing, etc. Again, a verse says: 『If you say the seer and the seen, how can this be harmonized?』 Explanation: Because they are not harmonized, that seeing-dharma is also dismissed. Perhaps the two dharmas of the seer and the seen can be harmonized, then it could be said that there is a seer and the seen. However, these two dharmas are not harmonized. Why is that? Within one seeing-dharma, the seen cannot be harmonized because there is no difference. If there is a seer, then it is not without the seen. If there is the seen, then the seer should be established. Furthermore, if it is determined that there is that seeing-dharma, then that seer should also be established. If the seer is established, so is the seen. Again, a verse says: 『The seer also cannot see』
見法無性故
釋曰。若或離眼別有見相。可說所見。或說能見。以無能見及所見故。複次頌言。
所見亦不見 見法離性故
釋曰。此中若或諸緣止息。亦無能見所見可說。何以故。此所見中非能見故。若有造作彼即有見。說名所見。此中亦然。同上所說。于能見中無見可得。何以故。此中若有諸差別法體性可見。而悉止遣。若有如是能見所見見法發起即非無作者作業作法和合。見及見法亦有所起。此復云何。複次頌言。
離見不離見 見者不可得
釋曰。以無見法發起和合。第二見法本無性故。亦無決定而可發起。以彼見法離所見性不和合故。或可所見能見二俱無故。複次頌言。
以無見者故 云何有所見
釋曰。能所見性作用相違。若離和合性即無見者。若無見者即所見性。不得和合。此中能見所見決定無見。云何可說能所見邪。以見離性故。見無性故。或有人言。若謂諸行是空諸法無我。有此理故。如眼所見。即無別異能所見者。彼即無其實果可得。云何乃有識等四法而發起邪。故頌遣言。
見可見無故 識等四法無
釋曰。如所說理。此能見所見皆不成就。彼果生起識觸受愛。如是四法雲何和合。若決定有識等四法。即有彼果取法可生。以實無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 見法無自性，所以無法真正地『見』。
解釋：如果離開眼睛另外存在一個『見』的相狀，那還可以說『所見』，或者說『能見』。但因為沒有『能見』和『所見』，所以無法成立。進一步解釋如下：
『所見』實際上也『不見』，因為『見』的法本身就遠離了自性。
解釋：這裡，如果各種因緣停止，也就沒有『能見』和『所見』可以說了。為什麼呢？因為『所見』之中沒有『能見』。如果有造作，那就會有『見』，並稱之為『所見』。但在這裡，情況也是一樣，如同上面所說，在『能見』之中也無法找到『見』。為什麼呢？因為這裡如果有什麼差別法的體性可以被看見，那也都被止息了。如果像這樣，『能見』、『所見』、『見』的法發起，那就不是沒有作者、作業、作法和合。『見』以及『見』的法也會有所生起。這又是什麼意思呢？進一步解釋如下：
遠離『見』，也並非不『見』，因為『見者』是不可得的。
解釋：因為沒有『見』的法發起和合，第二種『見』的法本來就沒有自性，所以也沒有什麼可以決定地發起。因為那個『見』的法遠離了『所見』的自性，不和合。或者說，『所見』和『能見』兩者都沒有。
進一步解釋如下：
因為沒有『見者』，怎麼會有『所見』呢？
解釋：『能見』和『所見』的性質作用是相反的。如果離開了和合的性質，就沒有『見者』。如果沒有『見者』，那麼『所見』的性質就無法和合。這裡，『能見』和『所見』都決定沒有『見』，怎麼能說『能所見』是真實存在的呢？因為『見』遠離了自性，『見』沒有自性。或者有人說，如果說諸行是空，諸法無我，有這個道理，就像眼睛所見，就沒有『能所見』的差別。那樣就沒有真實的結果可以得到，怎麼會有識等四法而發起呢？所以用下面的偈頌來破斥：
『見』和『可見』都不存在，所以識等四法也不存在。
解釋：如上面所說的道理，『能見』和『所見』都不成立，那麼由它們產生的識、觸、受、愛，這四法又怎麼能和合呢？如果決定有識等四法，那就會有取法的果可以產生。但實際上沒有。
【English Translation】 English version Because the nature of 'seeing' (法) is without inherent existence, there is no true 'seeing'.
Explanation: If there were a separate aspect of 'seeing' apart from the eye, then one could speak of 'what is seen' or 'the one who sees'. But because there is neither 'the one who sees' nor 'what is seen', it cannot be established. Further explanation follows:
'What is seen' is actually 'not seen', because the dharma of 'seeing' itself is far from inherent existence.
Explanation: Here, if all conditions cease, then there is nothing to be said about 'the one who sees' or 'what is seen'. Why? Because within 'what is seen', there is no 'one who sees'. If there were fabrication, then there would be 'seeing', and it would be called 'what is seen'. But here, the situation is the same, as mentioned above, within 'the one who sees', 'seeing' cannot be found. Why? Because if there were any characteristics of different dharmas that could be seen, they would all be ceased. If it were like this, 'the one who sees', 'what is seen', and the dharma of 'seeing' arise, then it would not be without an agent, action, and the combination of dharmas. 'Seeing' and the dharma of 'seeing' would also arise. What does this mean? Further explanation follows:
Apart from 'seeing', and also not apart from 'seeing', because 'the seer' is unattainable.
Explanation: Because there is no arising and combination of the dharma of 'seeing', the second dharma of 'seeing' originally has no inherent existence, so there is nothing that can be definitively arisen. Because that dharma of 'seeing' is far from the nature of 'what is seen', it does not combine. Or, both 'what is seen' and 'the one who sees' do not exist.
Further explanation follows:
Because there is no 'seer', how can there be 'what is seen'?
Explanation: The nature and function of 'the one who sees' and 'what is seen' are contradictory. If separated from the nature of combination, there is no 'seer'. If there is no 'seer', then the nature of 'what is seen' cannot combine. Here, 'the one who sees' and 'what is seen' are definitely without 'seeing', how can it be said that 'the one who sees' and 'what is seen' are real? Because 'seeing' is far from inherent existence, 'seeing' has no inherent existence. Or someone might say, if it is said that all phenomena (行) are empty and all dharmas (法) are without self, there is this reason, just like what is seen by the eye, there is no difference between 'the one who sees' and 'what is seen'. Then there would be no real result to be obtained, how could the four aggregates (識等四法) such as consciousness arise? Therefore, the following verse is used to refute:
'Seeing' and 'what is seen' do not exist, so the four aggregates such as consciousness do not exist.
Explanation: As the reason stated above, 'the one who sees' and 'what is seen' are not established, then how can the four aggregates of consciousness, contact, feeling, and craving, which arise from them, combine? If there were definitely the four aggregates such as consciousness, then there would be a result of grasping dharmas that could arise. But in reality, there is not.
故。次頌遣言。
四取等諸緣 云何當得有
釋曰。謂以識等及取緣有生緣老死。此等諸法無所成故。無所有故。今此品初他所建立。聞等聲等諸說皆止。此中見者悉無所作。是故頌言。
聞嗅味觸知 如是等諸根 而悉同於上 眼見法中說
釋曰。此中應知。如眼見說能聞所聞等。譬如能見所有聞等。如應廣說。此中且止。已遣一切不和合對治故。此說成就。此中能見所見見法。諸有分別物體無性。今此品中悉為證成。如是義故。
大乘中觀釋論卷第三◎ 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1567 大乘中觀釋論(第1卷-第9卷)
大乘中觀釋論卷第四
安慧菩薩造
西天譯經三藏朝散大夫試鴻臚卿傳梵大師賜紫沙門臣法護等奉 詔譯
◎觀五蘊品第四
次第此品今當止遣。彼十二處諸有所作。或有異宗現所安立。謂于勝義諦中實有內外十二處法。以蘊攝故。論者言然此非無所攝道理。但以世俗諦中有其所攝。非勝義諦。以彼諸蘊無實性故。
又有異宗。計所造色有性可得欲謂大種積集所成。
今對遣彼等。是故頌言。
若離於色因 色即不可得
釋曰。色因者。謂地水火風。彼四大種。由其因故有色處等諸色可
【現代漢語翻譯】 故。接下來用偈頌來遣除（對實有的）執著。
『四取等諸緣，云何當得有？』
解釋：所謂的『以識等及取緣有生緣老死』，這些法因為沒有實在的自性，所以是不存在的。現在這一品一開始，其他宗派所建立的，關於『聞』、『聲』等的各種說法都停止了。在這裡，能『見』者沒有任何作用。所以偈頌說：
『聞嗅味觸知，如是等諸根，而悉同於上，眼見法中說。』
解釋：這裡應該知道，就像『眼見』的說法一樣，能『聞』、所『聞』等，譬如能『見』所有『聞』等，應該廣泛地說明。這裡暫且停止，因為已經遣除了一切不和合的對治。這種說法是成立的。這裡能『見』、所『見』、『見』法，各種分別物體都是無自性的。現在這一品中全部都證明了這一點。就是這樣的意義。
《大乘中觀釋論》卷第三 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1567 《大乘中觀釋論》(第1卷-第9卷)
《大乘中觀釋論》卷第四
安慧菩薩造
西天譯經三藏朝散大夫試鴻臚卿傳梵大師賜紫沙門臣法護等奉 詔譯
◎觀五蘊品第四
接下來這一品，現在應當停止和遣除。那些十二處（dvādaśa āyatana，指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六根和色、聲、香、味、觸、法六塵）所作的各種作用。或者有些其他宗派現在所安立的，認為在勝義諦（paramārtha-satya， ultimate truth）中，真實存在內外十二處法。因為被五蘊（pañca-skandha，the five aggregates）所攝。論者說，然而這並非沒有被攝的道理。只是在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，conventional truth）中，有其所攝。不是在勝義諦中，因為那些五蘊沒有實在的自性。
又有其他宗派，認為所造色（rūpa，form）具有自性可以獲得，想要說是由四大種（mahābhūta，the four great elements）積聚所成。
現在爲了對治和遣除他們，所以偈頌說：
『若離於色因，色即不可得。』
解釋：『色因』，指的是地、水、火、風。那四大種，由於它們的原因，才有色處（rūpāyatana，the sphere of forms）等各種色法可以存在。
【English Translation】 Therefore, the following verses are used to dispel attachments.
'How can the conditions such as the four graspings exist?'
Explanation: The so-called 'dependent on consciousness and grasping, there is birth, old age, and death.' These dharmas do not exist because they have no real self-nature. Now, at the beginning of this chapter, all the statements established by other schools, regarding 'hearing,' 'sound,' etc., are stopped. Here, the 'seer' has no function. Therefore, the verse says:
'Hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, knowing, such sense faculties, are all the same as described above in the Dharma of seeing with the eye.'
Explanation: Here it should be known that, just like the statement of 'seeing with the eye,' the 'hearer,' the 'heard,' etc., for example, being able to 'see' all 'hearing,' etc., should be explained extensively. Here we stop for now, because all incompatible antidotes have been dispelled. This statement is established. Here, the 'seer,' the 'seen,' and the 'Dharma of seeing,' all kinds of discriminating objects are without self-nature. Now, this chapter proves all of this. That is the meaning.
《Mahayana Madhyamaka Shastra Commentary》Volume 3 Taisho Tripitaka Volume 30 No. 1567 《Mahayana Madhyamaka Shastra Commentary》 (Volumes 1-9)
《Mahayana Madhyamaka Shastra Commentary》Volume 4
Composed by Bodhisattva Anhui
Translated by Tripiṭaka Dharma Master Fa Hu, Grand Master of the Imperial Secretariat, Tester of the Honglu Temple, bestowed with the Purple Robe, and others, by Imperial Order
◎Chapter 4: Observation of the Five Aggregates
Next, this chapter should now stop and dispel. Those various functions performed by the twelve āyatanas (dvādaśa āyatana, the twelve sense bases: the six sense organs and their six corresponding objects). Or some other schools now establish that in the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), there truly exist the twelve internal and external āyatanas. Because they are included in the five aggregates (pañca-skandha). The commentator says, however, this is not without the reason for being included. It is only in the conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya) that they are included. Not in the ultimate truth, because those five aggregates have no real self-nature.
Also, there are other schools that believe that the created form (rūpa) has a nature that can be obtained, wanting to say that it is formed by the accumulation of the four great elements (mahābhūta).
Now, in order to counter and dispel them, the verse says:
'If apart from the cause of form, form is unobtainable.'
Explanation: 'Cause of form' refers to earth, water, fire, and wind. Those four great elements, because of them, various forms such as the sphere of forms (rūpāyatana) can exist.
得。若離自性即不可得。是故世俗假施設有。若或別異物體有性。此不能說。何所以邪。複次頌言。
離色因有色 色則墮無因 無因無有義 何法無因立
釋曰。若因色中物體有性。即當對說。果色物體而有所成。若無因有果。即無所成義。是故無有無因可見。是中亦無少法可說。複次頌言。
若復離於色 有其色因者 即是無果因 無果因何立
釋曰。若果色中物體有性。即當對說因色物體而有所成。若有因有果彼所作性。如是乃說因法可轉。此若如是離色因有色離色有色因者。即彼如是無堅濕暖動諸相離性。眼等青等云何可得。以色聲等相離性故。同彼身中堅濕暖動諸有所得。今為對遣彼說。複次頌言。
若已有色者 色因無所起 若無有色者 亦不用色因
釋曰。若言有色。分別色因。或謂無色。或亦有亦無。此如是說。俱非道理。是故應知。非有亦非無。緣義和合爾。
有異人言若爾無因當可得邪。
故頌遣言。
無因而有色 是事亦不然
釋曰。極成法中無如是說。
勝論者言。我欲謂彼地等極微諸色是無因色。
論者言。彼無相似自類諸色無有體相。如是分別是果非果。俱非道理。譬如瓶等。地等所成。彼非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『得。若離自性即不可得。』意思是說，如果離開了自性，就什麼也得不到。『是故世俗假施設有。』所以說，世俗的種種存在都是假立的。『若或別異物體有性。此不能說。何所以邪。』如果說有一種與衆不同的物體具有自性，這是不能成立的。為什麼呢？ 『複次頌言：離色因有色，色則墮無因，無因無有義，何法無因立。』 解釋：如果說在色（rupa，物質）的因中物體具有自性，那麼就應該相對地說，果色的物體是由什麼構成的。如果無因而有果，那就沒有構成的意義。因此，沒有無因而能看見的事物。這裡面也沒有任何法可以這樣說。 『複次頌言：若復離於色，有其色因者，即是無果因，無果因何立。』 解釋：如果說在果色中物體具有自性，那麼就應該相對地說，因色的物體是由什麼構成的。如果有了因，就有了果，它們所產生的性質，這樣才能說因法是可以轉變的。如果像這樣，離開了色而有色的存在，離開了色而有色的因，那麼就像這樣，沒有堅、濕、暖、動這些相，離開了自性，眼等（cakṣus，眼根）、青等（nila，藍色）又怎麼能得到呢？因為色、聲等相離開了自性，就像身體中的堅、濕、暖、動這些所得到的東西一樣。現在爲了駁斥他們的說法。 『複次頌言：若已有色者，色因無所起，若無有色者，亦不用色因。』 解釋：如果說已經有了色，那麼分別色的因，或者說是沒有色，或者說是有也有沒有，這樣說都是不合道理的。所以應該知道，非有也非無，是因緣和合而成的。 『有異人言若爾無因當可得邪。』有人問，如果這樣，那麼無因可以得到嗎？ 『故頌遣言：無因而有色，是事亦不然。』所以用偈頌來駁斥：沒有原因而有色，這是不可能的。 解釋：在普遍認可的法則中，沒有這樣的說法。 『勝論者言。我欲謂彼地等極微諸色是無因色。』勝論派的人說，我想說，地等極微的各種色是無因的色。 『論者言。彼無相似自類諸色無有體相。如是分別是果非果。俱非道理。譬如瓶等。地等所成。彼非』論者說，那些沒有相似的同類別的各種色，沒有實體和表相。像這樣分別什麼是果，什麼不是果，都是沒有道理的。譬如瓶子等，是地等構成的，它們不是……
【English Translation】 English version: 'It cannot be obtained if it is apart from its own nature.' This means that if you are separated from self-nature, nothing can be obtained. 'Therefore, worldly things are provisionally established.' So, all worldly existences are provisionally established. 'If a different object has its own nature, this cannot be said. Why?' If it is said that a different object has its own nature, this cannot be established. Why? 'Furthermore, the verse says: If color exists because of a cause of color, then color falls into causelessness; if there is no cause, there is no meaning; what dharma can be established without a cause?' Explanation: If it is said that the object in the cause of color (rupa, matter) has its own nature, then it should be said relatively, what the object of the resulting color is made of. If there is a result without a cause, then there is no meaning of being made. Therefore, there is nothing that can be seen without a cause. There is also no dharma that can be said in this way. 'Furthermore, the verse says: If there is a cause of color apart from color, then it is a cause without a result; how can a cause without a result be established?' Explanation: If it is said that the object in the resulting color has its own nature, then it should be said relatively, what the object of the cause of color is made of. If there is a cause and there is a result, their produced nature, then it can be said that the causal dharma can be transformed. If it is like this, if there is color apart from color, and there is a cause of color apart from color, then like this, without the characteristics of solidity, wetness, warmth, and movement, separated from self-nature, how can the eye (cakṣus, eye faculty), blue (nila, blue), etc., be obtained? Because the characteristics of color, sound, etc., are separated from self-nature, just like the solidity, wetness, warmth, and movement obtained in the body. Now, in order to refute their statement. 'Furthermore, the verse says: If there is already color, the cause of color does not arise; if there is no color, then there is no need for a cause of color.' Explanation: If it is said that there is already color, then distinguishing the cause of color, or saying that there is no color, or saying that there is and there is not, all these statements are unreasonable. Therefore, it should be known that it is neither existent nor non-existent, but it is the combination of causes and conditions. 'Someone asked, if so, can causelessness be obtained?' Someone asked, if this is the case, then can causelessness be obtained? 'Therefore, the verse refutes: If there is color without a cause, this is also not so.' So, the verse is used to refute: It is impossible to have color without a cause. Explanation: In the universally accepted laws, there is no such statement. 'The Vaiseṣika (勝論者) says: I want to say that the various colors of the ultimate particles of earth, etc., are causeless colors.' The Vaiseṣika school says, I want to say that the various colors of the ultimate particles of earth, etc., are causeless colors. 'The proponent says: Those various colors of similar kinds without similarity have no substance or appearance. It is unreasonable to distinguish what is a result and what is not a result in this way. For example, pots, etc., are made of earth, etc., they are not...' The proponent says, those various colors of similar kinds without similarity have no substance or appearance. It is unreasonable to distinguish what is a result and what is not a result in this way. For example, pots, etc., are made of earth, etc., they are not...
無因。然極微因。無實因性。以無因故。如虛空等非一邊故。此說非彼因性可得本性無體故。雖瓶等有因。而非意中謂彼一向有體可成。亦非同生性。以極微因而無果故。既非同生性。彼即非道理。又若分別虛空等。常非一切所向。以虛空等方分分別。若或別異有性可立者。故頌遣言。
是故於色中 離有無分別
釋曰。如其分別于諸色中能造所造若果若因計有體者。皆是諍論。安立處所。于自所成中而有相違。如佛所言。色處者。謂四大所造。彼能造義。即因義成。應知所說非勝義諦。複次頌言。
果若似於因 此說即不然
釋曰。彼諸大種堅濕暖動自性而不可見。非彼自性色有所得。是故非諸大種與果和合。
有異人言。若爾即果不似因邪。
為遮遣此義。故頌答言。
果若不似因 是事亦不然
釋曰。若不相似性即無果可成。止其果性故。受等多義亦同此說。複次頌言。
所有受心想 諸行一切種 及餘一切法 皆同色法說
釋曰。彼受心想行皆同色法。止遣諸相。如所遮遣。是義應知。云何受心想行如彼色邪。謂離諸因即不可得。以眼色等因諸有分位彼彼無實因性所成。若或離彼無實因性。是中亦無少法可得。亦非離受等果見有眼色等因
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 無因。然而極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）是因。沒有真實的因的自性，因為沒有因。如同虛空等，不是單方面的。這種說法並非是它們的因的自性可以獲得的，因為本性沒有實體。雖然瓶子等有因，但並非意念中認為它們一向有實體可以成立。也不是同生性，因為極微作為因沒有果。既然不是同生性，那麼它就不是道理。又如果分別虛空等，通常不是一切所指向的。因為虛空等可以方分分別。如果或者有別異的自性可以成立，所以用頌文來遣除這種說法。
『是故於色中，離有無分別。』
解釋：如果分別在各種色法中，能造作的、所造作的，無論是果還是因，認為有實體，這都是爭論，是安立處所。在自身所成立的法中，卻有相互違背。如佛所說，色處，是指四大（四大元素）所造。它們能造作的意義，就是因的意義成立。應當知道所說的並非勝義諦（paramārtha-satya，究竟真理）。再次，頌文說：
『果若似於因，此說即不然。』
解釋：那些大種（mahābhūta，四大元素）具有堅硬、潮濕、溫暖、運動的自性，但不可見。並非從它們的自性中可以獲得色法。因此，並非諸大種與果和合。
有異人說：如果這樣，那麼果就不像因了嗎？
爲了遮遣這種意義，所以用頌文回答：
『果若不似因，是事亦不然。』
解釋：如果不相似，就沒有果可以成立，因為止息了它的果性。受等多種意義也與此相同。再次，頌文說：
『所有受心想，諸行一切種，及餘一切法，皆同色法說。』
解釋：那些受、心、想、行都與色法相同，止息各種相狀，如所遮遣的那樣。這個意義應當知道。如何受、心、想、行如彼色法呢？就是說，離開諸因就不可得。以眼、色等作為因，諸有分位，它們沒有真實的因的自性所成。如果離開它們沒有真實的因的自性，其中也沒有少許法可以獲得。也不是離開受等果，就能見到眼、色等因。
【English Translation】 English version: Without a cause. However, the ultimate particle (paramāṇu, the smallest unit of matter) is a cause. There is no real nature of a cause, because there is no cause. Like space, etc., it is not one-sided. This statement is not that their causal nature can be obtained, because the inherent nature has no substance. Although things like jars have causes, it is not that they are inherently substantial in the way we think. Nor is it co-arising, because the ultimate particle as a cause has no effect. Since it is not co-arising, then it is not reasonable. Furthermore, if we distinguish space, etc., it is usually not what everything is directed towards, because space, etc., can be distinguished by direction. If there is a distinct nature that can be established, then the verse is used to eliminate this view.
'Therefore, in form, separate from the distinction of existence and non-existence.'
Explanation: If, in distinguishing various forms, whether they are the maker or the made, whether they are effects or causes, one considers them to have substance, this is all contention, a place of establishment. Within what is established by itself, there is contradiction. As the Buddha said, the realm of form refers to what is made of the four great elements (mahābhūta, the four great elements). Their meaning of being able to make is the meaning of cause being established. It should be known that what is said is not the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya, ultimate truth). Again, the verse says:
'If the effect is similar to the cause, this statement is not so.'
Explanation: Those great elements (mahābhūta, the four great elements) have the nature of hardness, moisture, warmth, and motion, but are invisible. Form cannot be obtained from their nature. Therefore, the great elements do not combine with the effect.
Some different people say: If that is the case, then is the effect not similar to the cause?
In order to eliminate this meaning, the verse answers:
'If the effect is not similar to the cause, this matter is also not so.'
Explanation: If there is no similarity, then no effect can be established, because its effect nature is ceased. The many meanings of sensation, etc., are also the same as this. Again, the verse says:
'All sensations, mind, conceptions, all kinds of formations, and all other dharmas, are all spoken of in the same way as form.'
Explanation: Those sensations, mind, conceptions, and formations are all the same as form, ceasing various characteristics, as what is eliminated. This meaning should be known. How are sensation, mind, conception, and formations like that form? That is to say, they cannot be obtained apart from causes. Taking eye, form, etc., as causes, the various divisions of existence are formed by them without a real causal nature. If apart from them there is no real causal nature, then there is not the slightest dharma that can be obtained. Nor is it that apart from effects such as sensation, one can see causes such as eye and form.
。以無果故因亦無體。若離自因有受等果而可成者。即離受等果。彼因亦有心。若離心因心可立者。是法無因。無有此義。何法無因而可立邪。若復離於心有其心因者。即是無果因。無果因何有此如是等。諸有所說。應知有為之法若離諸蘊而有性者。他所計執。譬如瓶等。若一性異性。皆止其義。餘一切法亦如是說。複次頌言。
彼一切諸法 皆同色法說 若諍論安立 隨所起即空
複次若有樂說空者。應以空義答。是故頌言。
一切不離空 一切得成就
又復顯示彼一切法無自性義。是故頌言。
若見一物性 一切法亦然 若解一法空 一切皆空故 言說有所得 諸所作皆空 一切無所得 一切皆成就
釋曰。雖勝義諦中彼一切法說無自性。然所作所得而亦不空。彼如前說。皆得成就。於一切法無所得義而有所成。此中品初說蘊攝等。應知如是諸蘊無性無有所成。
觀六界品第五
複次異宗所計。謂勝義諦中有地水火風識等諸界所成士夫。譬如虛空。彼引證云。如佛所言。諸苾芻當知。士夫六界成身。譬如虛空。此說見邊。
論者言。此說無相。謂世俗諦。如是諸相有所說者。非勝義諦。是故頌言。
空相未有時 先無彼虛空
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為沒有結果，所以原因也沒有實體。如果離開自身的原因，受（Vedana，感受）、等等結果就能成立，那麼離開受等等結果，那個原因也有心。如果離開心因，心就能成立，那麼這個法就沒有原因。沒有這種道理。什麼法沒有原因就能成立呢？如果又離開了心，有它的心因，那就是沒有結果的原因。沒有結果的原因怎麼會有這些呢？所有這些說法，應該知道有為法如果離開了諸蘊（Skandha，五蘊），而有自性，那是其他人所執著的，譬如瓶子等等。如果是一性還是異性，都停止這種說法。其他一切法也像這樣說。再次，頌詞說： 『彼一切諸法，皆同色法說，若諍論安立，隨所起即空。』 再次，如果有喜歡說空的人，應該用空的道理來回答。所以頌詞說： 『一切不離空，一切得成就。』 又進一步顯示那一切法沒有自性的道理。所以頌詞說： 『若見一物性，一切法亦然，若解一法空，一切皆空故，言說有所得，諸所作皆空，一切無所得，一切皆成就。』 解釋說：雖然在勝義諦（Paramārtha-satya，勝義諦）中，那一切法說是沒有自性的。然而所作所得到底也不是空。那些如前面所說，都能成就。在一切法無所得的意義上而有所成就。這其中，品一開始說蘊攝等等，應該知道像這樣，諸蘊沒有自性，沒有所成就。 觀六界品第五 再次，其他宗派所認為的，在勝義諦中，有地、水、火、風、識等等諸界所成就的士夫（Pudgala，補特伽羅），譬如虛空。他們引用證據說，如佛所說：『諸位比丘，應當知道，士夫由六界構成身體，譬如虛空。』這種說法是隻見片面。 論者說：這種說法是沒有相的，指的是世俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya，世俗諦）。像這樣，諸相有所說的，不是勝義諦。所以頌詞說： 『空相未有時，先無彼虛空。』
【English Translation】 English version: Because there is no result, the cause also has no substance. If, apart from its own cause, effects such as feeling (Vedana) could arise, then apart from effects such as feeling, that cause would also have a mind. If, apart from a mental cause, the mind could be established, then that dharma would have no cause. There is no such meaning. What dharma can be established without a cause? If, moreover, apart from the mind, there were a cause of the mind, that would be a cause without a result. How could there be such a cause without a result? All these statements should be understood to mean that if conditioned dharmas had inherent existence apart from the Skandhas (aggregates), that would be the assertion of others, like a pot, etc. Whether it is one or different, stop that discussion. All other dharmas are also spoken of in the same way. Furthermore, the verse says: 'All those dharmas are said to be like form; if disputes are established, whatever arises is empty.' Furthermore, if there are those who delight in speaking of emptiness, they should answer with the meaning of emptiness. Therefore, the verse says: 'Everything is not apart from emptiness; everything is accomplished.' And further, it shows that all those dharmas have no self-nature. Therefore, the verse says: 'If one sees the nature of one thing, all dharmas are also like that; if one understands that one dharma is empty, everything is empty. Speech has something to be attained, all actions are empty; everything is unattainable, everything is accomplished.' Explanation: Although in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), all those dharmas are said to have no self-nature, nevertheless, what is done and what is attained are not empty. Those, as previously stated, can all be accomplished. In the sense that all dharmas are unattainable, something is accomplished. In this, the beginning of the chapter speaks of the aggregates, etc. It should be known that these aggregates are without inherent existence and nothing is accomplished. Chapter Five: Examination of the Six Elements Furthermore, according to the assertions of other schools, in the ultimate truth, there is a person (Pudgala) constituted by the elements of earth, water, fire, wind, and consciousness, like space. They cite as evidence the words of the Buddha: 'Monks, you should know that a person's body is composed of the six elements, like space.' This statement is a one-sided view. The commentator says: This statement is without characteristics, referring to the conventional truth (Saṃvṛti-satya). Thus, those characteristics that are spoken of are not the ultimate truth. Therefore, the verse says: 'When the characteristic of emptiness has not yet arisen, there is no space before that.'
釋曰。無障礙相即虛空相。此說義成。若或先有虛空而可成者。如是亦然。有相可立說為先有。若有是相此中即無成就因義。然此如是相非無成就義。此中但為止遣諸法自相。是故頌言。
云何無相中 彼有相可得
釋曰。如是分位無成就義。複次頌言。
無實相無體 云何相可轉
釋曰。次當止遣。云何無相中而有能相。所相可轉云何二俱。說為有相。此復云何。故頌遣言。
于無相法中 相則無所相
釋曰。于無相中無有物體。無分位可立。與相相違故。複次頌言。
離有相無相 無異處可轉
釋曰。此遍遮遣。是中亦復無所成義。複次頌言。
所相既無體 能相亦不立
釋曰。所相不相離性故。複次頌言。
能相無有故 亦無有所相
釋曰。能相不相離性故。若二俱決定。即成對治過失。亦非能所二相有異性可成。若此如是有過失生。所說亦然。云何二法能成於一。亦復云何一法成二。故頌遣言。
是故無能相 亦無有所相
釋曰。若一若二有所成性。此中皆遣。故前頌言。能相無有故。亦無有所相。若所相可成。即能相無體。若所相能相二俱無體。別異亦無體。是故決定此皆無體。
有異人言。無障礙處
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
釋曰：『無障礙相』即是『虛空相』。這樣說，意義才能成立。如果先有虛空，然後才能成就，那麼也可以這樣說：有相可以被設立，說它是先有的。如果有了這個相，那麼其中就沒有成就的原因的意義。然而，這個『如是相』並非沒有成就的意義。這裡只是爲了止息諸法各自的自相。所以頌文說： 『云何無相中，彼有相可得？』 釋曰：像這樣，在分位上就沒有成就的意義。再次，頌文說： 『無實相無體，云何相可轉？』 釋曰：接下來應當止息。怎麼能在無相之中，有能相和所相可以轉變？怎麼能說二者都有相？這又是什麼道理？所以頌文遣除說： 『于無相法中，相則無所相。』 釋曰：在無相之中，沒有物體，沒有分位可以設立，因為它與相是相違背的。再次，頌文說： 『離有相無相，無異處可轉。』 釋曰：這是普遍的遮遣。其中也沒有任何可以成就的意義。再次，頌文說： 『所相既無體，能相亦不立。』 釋曰：因為所相不離於自性。再次，頌文說： 『能相無有故，亦無有所相。』 釋曰：因為能相不離於自性。如果二者都確定，就會造成對治的過失。而且，能相和所相這二者也沒有不同的自性可以成就。如果像這樣有過失產生，那麼所說的也是一樣。怎麼能說兩種法成就一種法？又怎麼能說一種法成就兩種法？所以頌文遣除說： 『是故無能相，亦無有所相。』 釋曰：無論是一還是二，有所成就的自性，這裡都予以遣除。所以前面的頌文說：『能相無有故，亦無有所相。』如果所相可以成就，那麼能相就沒有自體。如果所相和能相二者都沒有自體，那麼差別也沒有自體。所以可以確定，這些都沒有自體。 有其他人說：『在無障礙之處……』
【English Translation】 English version:
Explanation: 『The characteristic of non-obstruction』 is the same as 『the characteristic of emptiness (虛空相, xūkōng xiàng)』. Saying it this way makes the meaning complete. If emptiness existed first and then could be accomplished, then it could also be said that a characteristic exists first and can be established as pre-existing. If there is such a characteristic, then there is no meaning of a cause for accomplishment within it. However, this 『suchness characteristic』 is not without the meaning of accomplishment. Here, it is only to stop the self-characteristics of all dharmas. Therefore, the verse says: 『How can a characteristic be obtained in non-characteristicness?』 Explanation: Like this, there is no meaning of accomplishment in division. Furthermore, the verse says: 『Without a real characteristic, without substance, how can a characteristic be transformed?』 Explanation: Next, it should be stopped. How can there be a capable characteristic (能相, néng xiàng) and an object characteristic (所相, suǒ xiàng) that can be transformed in non-characteristicness? How can it be said that both have characteristics? What is the reason for this? Therefore, the verse eliminates it, saying: 『In the dharma of non-characteristicness, a characteristic has nothing to be characterized.』 Explanation: In non-characteristicness, there is no object, no division that can be established, because it is contrary to characteristics. Furthermore, the verse says: 『Apart from having characteristics and non-characteristicness, there is no different place to be transformed.』 Explanation: This is a universal negation. There is also no meaning of accomplishment within it. Furthermore, the verse says: 『Since the object characteristic has no substance, the capable characteristic is also not established.』 Explanation: Because the object characteristic is not separate from its nature. Furthermore, the verse says: 『Since the capable characteristic does not exist, there is also no object characteristic.』 Explanation: Because the capable characteristic is not separate from its nature. If both are determined, it will result in the fault of counteracting. Moreover, the capable characteristic and the object characteristic do not have different natures that can be accomplished. If such a fault arises, then what is said is also the same. How can two dharmas accomplish one dharma? And how can one dharma accomplish two dharmas? Therefore, the verse eliminates it, saying: 『Therefore, there is no capable characteristic, and there is also no object characteristic.』 Explanation: Whether it is one or two, the nature of accomplishment is eliminated here. Therefore, the previous verse said: 『Since the capable characteristic does not exist, there is also no object characteristic.』 If the object characteristic can be accomplished, then the capable characteristic has no substance. If both the object characteristic and the capable characteristic have no substance, then difference also has no substance. Therefore, it can be determined that these all have no substance. Some others say: 『In the place of non-obstruction…』
是虛空相。如是能相。相彼所相。
論者言。當知此說即一分因。云何是彼無障礙處說為能相。此中如是亦無能相。此非道理。
異人言。若彼虛空能相所相非道理者。何故虛空與三摩缽底為所緣相。又復欲貪斷處為境界故。如是豈非虛空有彼能所相邪。彼相有故。此亦何無。故頌遣言。
離所相能相 亦無有別相
釋曰。如譬喻者言。有礙無體無物礙處是為虛空。此亦不然。若此無其有體。云何當有其無。亦非勝義諦中有質礙體。彼無性故。云何無體虛空。或計其有。如是對治有體此說總遣諸性。是故頌言。
若使無有有 云何當有無
釋曰。勝義諦中如是所有。若性無性悉離有體。如佛所言。諸苾芻。我此聲聞乃至若有知解若無知解。如是所說皆世俗諦。非勝義諦。勝義諦者。此中頌言。
有無既已無 誰為知解者
釋曰。無性可成。彼即離相。此復云何。有性無性止遣相違。即彼有性於一切處悉不可得。是故頌言。
非有體無體 無能相所相
釋曰。如其所說同虛空法。此中地水火風識等五界所說。皆同彼虛空界。是等皆無所相能相。亦非有體亦非無體。皆如虛空遮遣一切所有言說。于諸句義中。若有諍論及邪見安立法中妄計路伽耶陀等。如是
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：是虛空之相。像這樣能夠作為能相（能夠作為表徵的事物）的事物，表徵著它所表徵的事物（所相）。
論者說：『應當知道這種說法只是一種片面的原因。』為什麼說在沒有障礙的地方，虛空可以作為能相呢？這裡同樣沒有能相，這種說法是不合理的。
其他人說：『如果虛空作為能相和所相是不合理的，那麼為什麼虛空可以作為三摩缽底（Samapatti，禪定）的所緣相（所觀照的對象）？又因為它是斷除欲貪的境界。』這樣說來，難道不是虛空具有能相和所相嗎？因為這些相的存在，為什麼這裡就沒有呢？
因此，用偈頌來否定這種觀點：
『遠離所相和能相，也沒有任何差別相。』
解釋：正如譬喻者所說：『沒有阻礙、沒有實體、沒有物質阻礙的地方就是虛空。』這種說法也是不對的。如果虛空沒有實體，怎麼會有『沒有』呢？而且在勝義諦（Paramārtha-satya，究竟真理）中，也沒有物質阻礙的實體，因為它沒有自性。那麼，怎麼能說虛空沒有實體，或者認為它有實體呢？像這樣，總的否定有實體的說法，是用來對治一切執著于自性的觀點。所以偈頌說：
『如果不存在「有」，怎麼會有「無」呢？』
解釋：在勝義諦中，所有事物，無論是有自性還是無自性，都遠離實體。正如佛陀所說：『諸位比丘，我這些聲聞弟子，乃至無論是有知解還是無知解，這些說法都是世俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理），而不是勝義諦。』關於勝義諦，這裡用偈頌說：
『「有」和「無」既然都已經不存在，誰又是知解者呢？』
解釋：沒有自性可以成立，那就是遠離一切相。這是什麼意思呢？止息和遣除有自性和無自性的對立，就是說，有自性在任何地方都無法找到。所以偈頌說：
『既不是有實體，也不是無實體，沒有能相，也沒有所相。』
解釋：就像前面所說的虛空一樣，這裡所說的地、水、火、風、識等五界，都和虛空一樣。這些都沒有所相和能相，既不是有實體，也不是無實體，都像虛空一樣，遮遣一切所有的言說。在各種句義中，如果有爭論和邪見，或者在安立法中妄加計度，比如路伽耶陀（Lokāyata，順世論）等，都是如此。
【English Translation】 English version: It is the characteristic of emptiness. In this way, that which is capable of being a 'signifier' (nimitta, that which can serve as a representation) signifies that which is 'signified' (nimitta-lakṣaṇa, the object being represented).
The debater says: 'It should be known that this statement is only a partial cause.' Why is it said that in a place without obstruction, emptiness can serve as a signifier? Here too, there is no signifier; this statement is unreasonable.
Another person says: 'If emptiness as a signifier and signified is unreasonable, then why can emptiness be the object of contemplation (ālambana) for Samapatti (state of meditative absorption)? Also, because it is the realm where desire and greed are cut off.' In this way, doesn't emptiness have both signifier and signified? Because these characteristics exist, why is it absent here?'
Therefore, a verse is used to negate this view:
'Apart from the signified and the signifier, there is also no distinct characteristic.'
Explanation: As the example-givers say: 'A place without obstruction, without substance, without material hindrance is emptiness.' This statement is also incorrect. If emptiness has no substance, how can there be 'non-existence'? Moreover, in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), there is no substance of material hindrance, because it has no inherent nature (svabhāva). Then, how can it be said that emptiness has no substance, or assume that it has substance? In this way, the general negation of having substance is used to counter all views clinging to inherent existence. Therefore, the verse says:
'If there is no 'existence', how can there be 'non-existence'?'
Explanation: In the ultimate truth, all things, whether with or without inherent nature, are apart from substance. As the Buddha said: 'Monks, these disciples of mine, even if they have understanding or no understanding, these statements are conventional truths (Saṃvṛti-satya), not ultimate truths.' Regarding the ultimate truth, here the verse says:
'Since 'existence' and 'non-existence' no longer exist, who is the knower?'
Explanation: No inherent nature can be established; that is being apart from all characteristics. What does this mean? Stopping and eliminating the opposition between having inherent nature and not having inherent nature means that inherent nature cannot be found anywhere. Therefore, the verse says:
'Neither with substance nor without substance, there is no signifier, and no signified.'
Explanation: Just like the emptiness described earlier, the five elements of earth, water, fire, wind, and consciousness described here are all like emptiness. These have neither signified nor signifier, neither with substance nor without substance, all like emptiness, negating all possible expressions. In various meanings of sentences, if there are disputes and wrong views, or reckless speculations in the establishment of laws, such as Lokāyata (materialism), it is all like this.
諸說皆非佛語。應當舍離。如其所說。此悉非有。謂以勝義諦中諸界處等自性不可說然此亦無無性可立但為止遣所作物性此中非彼無性可得。如是所說遍遣諸性。
如異部師所說頌言。
遣有言無性 亦不取無性 如說青非青 不欲成其白
此中應知。於二種見悉當遮遣。都無所得。諸界處等。若有所成。皆是世俗諦攝。彼彼所有別別自體。善不善法已生未生彼法常在。雖復勤作虛無果利。設使先有所生后即無性。若如是知。如是所成。此無過失。以是因故。性無性二有所詮表無所詮表互有相違。計有性可生。即非道理。是故亦非有性亦非無性。二法可成。何以故。從緣有故。先有性可生。所生即無性。性無所生故。有性非道理。如是無實所生。此說有者即是相違。若或一切有所生者。一切有生非一切故。若一切生有力能者。何名力能。因差別生。何能差別果有所生。彼等力能。此復云何。為有異耶。為無異耶。何以故。若有異者。即無分位可立能令果起。此即分別相違。若無異者。即彼如是一切皆有。是中一切生法可立。若離相者。即一切處應無差別。云何有性可生。彼決定因豈得和合。是故若一性若異性。此不可說。如是亦然。物體差別力能和合無能生因表了有性。若於無實自性法中。諸
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 所有這些說法都不是佛陀的教誨，應當拋棄。正如他們所說，這些都不存在。他們認為，在勝義諦（paramārtha-satya，最高真理）中，諸界（dhātu，構成要素）、處（āyatana，感官領域）等的自性是不可言說的。然而，這也並非意味著可以建立一個無自性（niḥsvabhāva）的觀點，而只是爲了遣除人們所執著的自性。在此之中，並不能找到所謂的『非彼無性』。如此說來，這是普遍地遣除了各種自性。 正如其他部派的老師所說的偈頌： 『遣除有，說無自性，也不取無自性，如同說青色非青色，並非想要變成白色。』 在此應當明白，對於兩種見解都應當遮止，沒有任何可以獲得的。諸界、處等，如果有所成就，都屬於世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）的範疇。它們各自具有不同的自體（svabhāva，自性）。善與不善之法，無論是已生還是未生，這些法都是常在的。即使勤奮努力，也只是徒勞無功。假設先前有所生，之後卻變為無自性，如果能這樣理解，那麼這樣的成就就沒有過失。因此，自性與無自性，無論是詮表還是不詮表，都是相互矛盾的。如果認為有自性可以生起，那是不合道理的。所以，既非有自性，也非無自性，這兩種法都不能成立。為什麼呢？因為它們是從因緣而生的。如果先有自性可以生起，那麼所生之物就是無自性的，因為自性是無所生的。因此，有自性是不合道理的。如此說來，沒有真實的所生。如果說有，那就是自相矛盾。如果一切都有所生，那麼一切有生就不是一切，因為並非一切都是生。如果一切生都有力量和能力，那又何謂力量和能力呢？因的差別產生，什麼能力能夠使果產生差別呢？這些力量和能力又是什麼呢？是有差異呢，還是沒有差異呢？為什麼呢？如果有差異，那就無法建立分位（avasthā，階段），從而使果生起。這在分別上是矛盾的。如果沒有差異，那麼它們就都是一樣的，一切生法都可以成立。如果離開了相（lakṣaṇa，特徵），那麼一切處都應該沒有差別。又怎麼會有自性可以生起呢？它們決定的因又怎麼能夠和合呢？所以，無論是同一自性還是不同自性，都是不可說的。同樣，物體差別、力量和能力的和合，如果沒有能生的因，就表明了有自性。如果在無實自性的法中，諸...
【English Translation】 English version: All these statements are not the words of the Buddha and should be abandoned. As they say, none of this exists. They believe that in the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), the self-nature of the elements (dhātu), sense fields (āyatana), etc., is inexpressible. However, this does not mean that a view of no self-nature (niḥsvabhāva) can be established, but only to dispel the self-nature that people are attached to. Within this, the so-called 'non-other no-self-nature' cannot be found. Thus, this is a universal rejection of all self-natures. As the verse spoken by teachers of other schools says: 'Rejecting existence, speaking of no self-nature, also not taking no self-nature, like saying blue is not blue, not wanting to become white.' Here it should be understood that both views should be rejected, and nothing can be obtained. The elements, sense fields, etc., if anything is accomplished, all belong to the category of conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya). They each have different own-natures (svabhāva). Good and unwholesome dharmas, whether they have arisen or not, these dharmas are always present. Even if one works diligently, it is only in vain. Suppose something is born first, but then becomes without self-nature, if one can understand this, then there is no fault in such an accomplishment. Therefore, self-nature and no self-nature, whether expressing or not expressing, are mutually contradictory. If one thinks that self-nature can arise, it is unreasonable. Therefore, neither self-nature nor no self-nature, these two dharmas cannot be established. Why? Because they arise from conditions. If there is self-nature that can arise first, then what is born is without self-nature, because self-nature is unborn. Therefore, self-nature is unreasonable. Thus, there is no real arising. If one says there is, it is self-contradictory. If everything has arisen, then everything that has arisen is not everything, because not everything is arising. If all arising has power and ability, then what is power and ability? The difference of causes arises, what ability can cause the difference of effects to arise? What are these powers and abilities? Are they different, or are they not different? Why? If there is a difference, then there is no way to establish stages (avasthā) to cause the effect to arise. This is contradictory in distinction. If there is no difference, then they are all the same, and all arising dharmas can be established. If one leaves the characteristics (lakṣaṇa), then there should be no difference in all places. How can there be self-nature that can arise? How can their determining causes come together? Therefore, whether it is the same self-nature or different self-nature, it is unspeakable. Similarly, the difference of objects, the combination of power and ability, if there is no cause that can produce, it indicates that there is self-nature. If in the dharma of unreal self-nature, all...
界處等如是決定。有所見者。此即相違。所有世出世間善不善法已生未生諸有所作。若欲不虛果利。應當斷除世俗諦法。此所斷者。謂即二種決定所見。此中頌言。
見有性無性 彼即少智慧 無真實微妙 聖慧眼開生 雖觀于諸性 當寂止諸見 此即勝義諦 遠離一切見
釋曰。若於諸見能止息者。即當遠離諸嬈惱性。於一切法而得寂靜。◎
大乘中觀釋論卷第四 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1567 大乘中觀釋論(第1卷-第9卷)
大乘中觀釋論卷第五
安慧菩薩造
西天譯經三藏朝散大夫試鴻臚卿傳梵大師賜紫沙門臣法護等奉 詔譯
◎觀染法染者品第六
複次有異宗言。于勝義諦中諸界處等性與無性有所知解。由彼雜染成其有性。如佛所言。染者著染法故。行自損害行他損害行俱損害。如是乃至癡者著于癡法。其義亦然。
論者言。此中非無雜染道理。雖有如幻。謂以無實染等體故。但以行聚所成。世俗言說。非勝義諦。何所以邪。此言染法。染者為先有邪。為後有邪。為染者染法俱時起邪。三皆不然。是故頌言。
若先有染者 後有其染法 云何離染法 而有染者生
釋曰。此說畢竟應知此義遮其所離。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 對於界處（dhātu-āyatana，構成經驗世界的元素和領域）的決定是這樣的。如果有人對此有所見解，那就是自相矛盾的。所有世間和出世間的善與不善之法，無論是已經產生還是尚未產生，以及所有行為，如果想要獲得真實不虛的果報利益，就應當斷除世俗諦法（saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）。這裡所要斷除的，就是兩種決定的見解。對此，頌文說：
『見有性無性，彼即少智慧， 無真實微妙，聖慧眼開生。 雖觀于諸性，當寂止諸見， 此即勝義諦（paramārtha-satya，絕對真理），遠離一切見。』
解釋說：如果能夠止息各種見解，就能遠離各種煩惱的性質，對於一切法而獲得寂靜。
《大乘中觀釋論》卷第四
《大乘中觀釋論》卷第五
安慧菩薩造
西天譯經三藏朝散大夫試鴻臚卿傳梵大師賜紫沙門臣法護等奉 詔譯
觀染法染者品第六
再次，有其他宗派認為，在勝義諦中，對於界處等的有性和無性有所知解，由於這些雜染而形成其有性。正如佛所說，染者執著于染法，因此行自損害、行他損害、行俱損害。像這樣，乃至愚癡者執著于愚癡之法，其意義也是一樣的。
論者說：這裡並非沒有雜染的道理，雖然有如幻的雜染，因為沒有真實的染等自體。但只是由行聚所成，是世俗的言說，並非勝義諦。為什麼這樣說呢？這裡所說的染法和染者，是先有染法呢？還是後有染法呢？還是染者和染法同時產生呢？這三種情況都不成立。所以頌文說：
『若先有染者，後有其染法， 云何離染法，而有染者生？』
解釋說：這裡說明了畢竟應當知道這個道理，遮止其所離之物。
【English Translation】 English version: The determination regarding the dhātu-āyatana (elements and spheres constituting the world of experience) is such. If someone has a view about this, it is contradictory. All mundane and supramundane good and bad dharmas, whether they have arisen or have not yet arisen, and all actions, if one wants to obtain true and unfailing beneficial results, one should eliminate the saṃvṛti-satya (relative truth). What is to be eliminated here are the two kinds of determined views. Regarding this, the verse says:
'Seeing existence or non-existence, That is of little wisdom, Without true subtlety, The eye of holy wisdom opens and arises. Although observing all natures, One should pacify all views, This is the paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth), Far from all views.'
The commentary says: If one can pacify all views, one can be far from all afflictive natures, and attain tranquility regarding all dharmas.
《Mahayana Madhyamaka Commentary》 Volume 4
《Mahayana Madhyamaka Commentary》 Volume 5
By Bodhisattva Anhui
Translated by the Tripitaka Master Fa Hu, Grand Master who transmits Sanskrit scriptures, Minister of the Honglu Temple, and Purple-robed Śrāmaṇa, etc., by Imperial Order.
Chapter 6: On the Defiled and the Defiler
Furthermore, another school says that in the paramārtha-satya, there is knowledge and understanding of the existence or non-existence of the dhātu-āyatana, etc., and due to these defilements, their existence is formed. As the Buddha said, the defiled one is attached to the defiled dharma, therefore performing self-harm, performing harm to others, and performing harm to both. Likewise, even the deluded one is attached to the dharma of delusion, and the meaning is the same.
The commentator says: Here, it is not that there is no principle of defilement, although there is defilement like an illusion, because there is no real self-nature of defilement, etc. But it is only formed by the accumulation of actions, and it is a mundane expression, not the paramārtha-satya. Why is this so? Regarding the defiled dharma and the defiler mentioned here, does the defiled dharma exist first? Or does the defiled dharma exist later? Or do the defiler and the defiled dharma arise simultaneously? None of these three cases are established. Therefore, the verse says:
'If the defiler exists first, And the defiled dharma exists later, How can the defiler arise Apart from the defiled dharma?'
The commentary says: Here it is explained that one should definitely know this principle, and prevent what is to be separated.
若染法無體。染者亦然。止其所作非熟無果有果成熟。其義可見。若離染法有染者成。如是乃應別有染法。此即染者因染法得。若爾云何染者有故染法即成。染法有故染者即成。然後起染。此義顯明。如果成熟。若有愛境即染法成。若無愛境云何有染。應當止遣安立過失。此中亦非先有染者後起染法。
故頌遣言。
有染者復染 云何當可得
釋曰。所依染法無體性故。如已成熟。複次頌言。
若有若無染 染者亦復然
釋曰。若先有染者後有染法。即一切處。如染法體。是故先無染者道理。
令為證成此義。是故頌言。
染者先有染 離染者染成
釋曰。染法若無愛體可作。是中其或見有所成。此非道理。
有異宗言。離彼染者別有染法。離彼染法染者可立。
論者言。若離染法得有染者。此中非有。何所以邪。若先有染法後有染者即離染者乃有染法。此中染法不有。即無愛境能成染法道理。以愛境後有故。由如是故。若離自性別因染者。得有染法。即彼染法因染者得。若爾即非愛境能成染法。以愛境居后故。所成不可得。若如此者豈非過邪。亦非先有染法后成染者。
複次頌言。
有染復染者 亦云何當得
問曰。或離染法有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果染法本身沒有實體，那麼能被染污的『染者』也是如此。停止其作用，如果不是因緣成熟，就不會有結果；如果因緣成熟，就會有結果，這個道理是顯而易見的。如果離開染法而存在『染者』，那麼就應該有獨立的染法存在。這樣就成了『染者』因為染法而產生。如果是這樣，怎麼能說因為有『染者』，染法就成立呢？或者說因為有染法，『染者』就成立呢？然後才產生染污。這個道理很明顯，就像果實成熟一樣。如果存在貪愛的對象，染法就成立；如果沒有貪愛的對象，怎麼會有染污呢？應當停止並去除這種安立的過失。這裡也不是先有『染者』，然後才產生染法。
所以用偈頌來去除這種說法：
『有染者復染，云何當可得』
解釋：所依賴的染法沒有自性，就像已經成熟的果實一樣。再次用偈頌來說：
『若有若無染，染者亦復然』
解釋：如果先有『染者』，後有染法，那麼在任何情況下，都和染法的本體一樣。所以說，先沒有『染者』才是道理。
爲了證明這個道理，所以用偈頌來說：
『染者先有染，離染者染成』
解釋：染法如果沒有貪愛的本體可以作為依靠，那麼其中或許會看到有所成就，但這沒有道理。
有其他宗派說：離開那個『染者』，另外有染法；離開那個染法，『染者』可以成立。
論者說：如果離開染法就能有『染者』，這是不可能的。為什麼呢？如果先有染法，後有『染者』，那麼就是離開『染者』才會有染法。這裡染法不存在，就沒有貪愛的對象能夠成立染法，因為貪愛的對象在後面才出現。因為這個原因，如果離開自身的因緣，『染者』就能有染法，那麼那個染法就是因為『染者』而產生。如果是這樣，就不是貪愛的對象能夠成立染法，因為貪愛的對象在後面才出現。所成就的就不可得。如果這樣，難道不是過失嗎？也不是先有染法，然後才成就『染者』。
再次用偈頌來說：
『有染復染者，亦云何當得』
問：或者離開染法會有...
【English Translation】 English version: If the '染法' (ranfa, defilement) itself has no substance, then the '染者' (ranzhe, defiled one) who is defiled is also the same. Stop its function; if the conditions are not ripe, there will be no result; if the conditions are ripe, there will be a result. This principle is obvious. If the '染者' (ranzhe, defiled one) exists apart from the '染法' (ranfa, defilement), then there should be an independent '染法' (ranfa, defilement) existing. In this way, the '染者' (ranzhe, defiled one) arises because of the '染法' (ranfa, defilement). If this is the case, how can it be said that because there is a '染者' (ranzhe, defiled one), the '染法' (ranfa, defilement) is established? Or that because there is '染法' (ranfa, defilement), the '染者' (ranzhe, defiled one) is established? And then defilement arises. This principle is very clear, just like the ripening of a fruit. If there is an object of attachment, the '染法' (ranfa, defilement) is established; if there is no object of attachment, how can there be defilement? One should stop and remove the fault of establishing it in this way. Here, it is not that there is a '染者' (ranzhe, defiled one) first, and then the '染法' (ranfa, defilement) arises.
Therefore, a verse is used to eliminate this view:
'If the defiled one is defiled again, how can it be obtained?'
Explanation: Because the '染法' (ranfa, defilement) on which it depends has no self-nature, just like a fruit that has already ripened. Again, a verse is used to say:
'Whether there is or is not defilement, the defiled one is also the same.'
Explanation: If there is a '染者' (ranzhe, defiled one) first, and then '染法' (ranfa, defilement) later, then in any case, it is the same as the substance of '染法' (ranfa, defilement). Therefore, it is reasonable to say that there is no '染者' (ranzhe, defiled one) first.
In order to prove this principle, a verse is used to say:
'The defiled one has defilement first, defilement is established apart from the defiled one.'
Explanation: If the '染法' (ranfa, defilement) has no object of attachment to rely on, then perhaps something can be seen to be accomplished, but this is not reasonable.
Other schools say: Apart from that '染者' (ranzhe, defiled one), there is another '染法' (ranfa, defilement); apart from that '染法' (ranfa, defilement), the '染者' (ranzhe, defiled one) can be established.
The commentator says: If the '染者' (ranzhe, defiled one) can exist apart from the '染法' (ranfa, defilement), this is impossible. Why? If there is '染法' (ranfa, defilement) first, and then '染者' (ranzhe, defiled one) later, then '染法' (ranfa, defilement) will exist apart from '染者' (ranzhe, defiled one). Here, '染法' (ranfa, defilement) does not exist, so there is no object of attachment that can establish '染法' (ranfa, defilement), because the object of attachment appears later. For this reason, if the '染者' (ranzhe, defiled one) can have '染法' (ranfa, defilement) apart from its own cause, then that '染法' (ranfa, defilement) is produced because of the '染者' (ranzhe, defiled one). If this is the case, then it is not the object of attachment that can establish '染法' (ranfa, defilement), because the object of attachment appears later. What is accomplished cannot be obtained. If this is the case, isn't it a fault? It is also not that there is '染法' (ranfa, defilement) first, and then the '染者' (ranzhe, defiled one) is accomplished.
Again, a verse is used to say:
'If there is defilement and a defiled one again, how can it be obtained?'
Question: Or apart from '染法' (ranfa, defilement) there will be...
其染者。既有對待過失。此中染法染者二法同起而可成邪。
故頌答言。
如是若同生 亦復非道理 染法染者二 此當云何用
釋曰。謂以染法染者二相離性互有所違。若法未生二俱無性。若法已生所作無體。但由愛境所成染法故有染者。而彼愛境及所起染法悉亦止遣。問曰。彼染法染者為一性可合邪。為異性合邪。
故頌答言。
彼染法染者 非一性有合
釋曰。此何所以。非彼一性而可合故。若有二法合即極成。此中應知。是提婆達多起染。不復為彼提婆達多染者之因。彼若說合。此非道理。
複次異性亦不可合。故頌遣言。
異性若有合 云何當可得
釋曰。異法異性若有合者。彼即相違而非一處。有二法生道理可得。后當止遣。
複次頌言。
若一性可合 離伴亦應合
釋曰。此言合者。同體為義。凡一性者即是因義。若此一性定有合者。如前所說提婆達多。合義應見。是故無一性因。可合道理。雖於一性因無合可成。然若止其合義。應知有過。
複次頌言。
異性若有合 離伴亦應合
釋曰。此中所說。譬如瓶衣。彼等異性而不能合。若立合者。非有異性相合因故。如前即有對待過失。異性若合有所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果被染污者已經有了對待（duidai，相對、比較）的過失，那麼這其中的染法（ranfa，染污之法）和染者（ranzhe，被染污者）兩種法同時生起，這樣可以成立嗎？
因此用偈頌回答：
『如果是這樣同時生起，也是不合道理的，染法和染者二者，這應當如何運用？』
解釋說：染法和染者二者，其相離的性質互相違背。如果法還沒有生起，二者都沒有自性；如果法已經生起，所作的就沒有實體。只是由於對愛境（aijing，貪愛的對象）所產生的染法，所以才有染者。而那愛境以及所生起的染法，都應當止息遣除。問：那染法和染者，是一體性可以結合呢？還是異體性結合呢？
因此用偈頌回答：
『那染法和染者，不是一體性可以結合的。』
解釋說：這是什麼緣故呢？因為不是一體性而可以結合的。如果有二法結合，那就非常明顯了。這裡應當知道，是提婆達多（T婆達多，Devadatta）生起染污，不再成為提婆達多被染污的原因。如果他們說結合，這是沒有道理的。
再次，異體性也是不可以結合的。所以用偈頌遣除：
『異體性如果有結合，又怎麼能夠得到呢？』
解釋說：不同的法，不同的體性，如果有結合，那它們就是互相違背，而不是在同一個地方。有二法生起，道理是可以得到的，後面應當止息遣除。
再次，用偈頌說：
『如果一體性可以結合，離開伴侶也應該結合。』
解釋說：這裡所說的結合，是同體的意思。凡是一體性，就是因的意思。如果這一體性一定有結合，如前面所說的提婆達多，結合的意義應該可以見到。所以沒有一體性的因，可以結合的道理。雖然在一體性的因上沒有結合可以成立，然而如果止息其結合的意義，應當知道有過失。
再次，用偈頌說：
『異體性如果有結合，離開伴侶也應該結合。』
解釋說：這裡所說的，譬如瓶子和衣服。它們是異體性，而不能結合。如果立結合，因為沒有異體性相結合的因。如前面就有對待的過失，異體性如果結合有所...
【English Translation】 English version: If the one being defiled already has the fault of 'duidai' (duidai, relativity, comparison), can it be established that the defiling dharma (ranfa, defiling dharma) and the defiled one (ranzhe, the one being defiled) arise simultaneously?
Therefore, the verse answers:
'If they arise simultaneously like this, it is also unreasonable. The two, defiling dharma and the defiled one, how should this be used?'
Explanation: The defiling dharma and the defiled one have mutually contradictory natures of separation. If the dharma has not yet arisen, both are without self-nature; if the dharma has already arisen, what is done has no substance. It is only because of the defiling dharma produced by attachment to the object of love (aijing, object of craving) that there is a defiled one. And that object of love and the defiling dharma that arises should all be stopped and eliminated. Question: Can the defiling dharma and the defiled one be combined as one nature, or are they combined as different natures?
Therefore, the verse answers:
'That defiling dharma and the defiled one cannot be combined as one nature.'
Explanation: What is the reason for this? Because they cannot be combined as one nature. If two dharmas are combined, then it is very obvious. Here it should be known that it is Devadatta (提婆達多, Devadatta) who generates defilement, and he no longer becomes the cause of Devadatta being defiled. If they say they are combined, this is unreasonable.
Furthermore, different natures cannot be combined either. Therefore, the verse eliminates:
'If different natures are combined, how can it be obtained?'
Explanation: Different dharmas, different natures, if they are combined, then they are mutually contradictory and not in the same place. It is reasonable to obtain the arising of two dharmas, which should be stopped and eliminated later.
Again, the verse says:
'If one nature can be combined, it should also be combined without a companion.'
Explanation: The combination mentioned here means the same substance. All that is of one nature is the meaning of cause. If this one nature must have a combination, as mentioned earlier about Devadatta, the meaning of combination should be seen. Therefore, there is no cause of one nature, and the principle of combination cannot be established. Although no combination can be established on the cause of one nature, if the meaning of combination is stopped, it should be known that there is a fault.
Again, the verse says:
'If different natures are combined, they should also be combined without a companion.'
Explanation: What is said here is like a bottle and clothes. They are of different natures and cannot be combined. If combination is established, it is because there is no cause for different natures to combine. As before, there is the fault of 'duidai' (duidai, relativity, comparison). If different natures are combined, there is...
得者。彼非異性亦應得合。此豈無過。
複次頌言。
若異性有合 染染者何用
釋曰。此中說合。無合道理。何所以邪。如是二法各各已成別別自體。即無別法為所成義。是中亦無所成可得。故知異性無有詮表。若計異性得有合者。
故頌遣言。
若染染者二 各各自體成 是二若有合 前亦應得合
釋曰。而彼二法汝今云何。此說得成各各體故。若或染法染者。是二汝以何義分別二法各各自體令成其合論中言或者。此說合義。若起分別時虛無果利。彼等自體無所成性。若言合者。是中染者。無有少分染法可作染法。亦非染者可有。
複次頌言。
異相不成合 汝欲求成合 合相若已成 復欲成其異
釋曰。合性不成。彼義極成。一法異性合不可得。異性極成不成合義。故無染法染者二法同時。或複次第異性可生。亦復更互相離性故。由是此中無合道理。今此觀察如汝意欲。何等異性次第可起。或復同時。
今為證成此義。故頌遣言。
如是染染者 非合不合成 諸法亦如染 非合不合成
釋曰。此中雲何。所謂非唯染法染者。非合不合。諸法亦然。◎
◎觀有為品第七之一
複次或有人言。勝義諦中有彼貪
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果（染者）已經獲得了（染法），那麼不同的自性也應該能夠結合。這難道沒有過失嗎？
進一步，頌文說：
『如果不同的自效能夠結合，那麼染和染者又有什麼用呢？』
解釋：這裡所說的結合，是沒有結合的道理的。為什麼呢？因為這兩個法各自已經成就了不同的自體，就沒有其他的法作為所成就的意義。其中也沒有所成就的可以獲得。所以知道不同的自性沒有詮表的作用。如果認為不同的自性可以結合的話，
所以頌文否定說：
『如果染和染者二者，各自的自體已經成就，這二者如果能夠結合，那麼之前也應該能夠結合。』
解釋：而這兩個法，你現在要怎麼樣呢？這裡說的是已經成就了各自的體性。如果染法和染者，這二者你用什麼意義來分別二法各自的體性，使之成就結合呢？論中說『或者』，這裡說的是結合的意義。如果生起分別時，就沒有果實利益。它們的自體沒有所成就的性質。如果說結合，那麼其中染者，沒有少分的染法可以作為染法，也不是染者可以有的。
進一步，頌文說：
『不同的相不能成就結合，你想要成就結合，結合的相如果已經成就，又想要成就它的不同。』
解釋：結合的性質不能成就，這個道理非常明顯。一個法的不同自性是不能結合的。不同的自性已經成就，就不能成就結合的意義。所以沒有染法和染者二法同時，或者次第地產生不同的自性，也因為互相分離的性質。因此這裡沒有結合的道理。現在這個觀察就像你所希望的那樣，什麼樣的不同自性可以次第產生，或者同時產生。
現在爲了證明這個意義，所以頌文否定說：
『像這樣染和染者，不是結合也不是不結合。諸法也像染一樣，不是結合也不是不結合。』
解釋：這裡說的是什麼呢？所謂不僅僅是染法和染者，不是結合也不是不結合，諸法也是這樣。
◎觀有為品第七之一
進一步，或者有人說，勝義諦（Paramārtha-satya）中有那個貪（rāga）。
【English Translation】 English version: If the (stained) has already obtained (the stain), then different natures should also be able to combine. Is there no fault in this?
Furthermore, the verse says:
'If different natures can combine, then what is the use of the stain and the stainer?'
Explanation: The combination spoken of here has no reason for combination. Why? Because these two dharmas (phenomena) have each already achieved their own distinct self-nature, there is no other dharma as the meaning of what is accomplished. There is also nothing that can be achieved to be obtained within it. Therefore, it is known that different natures have no expressive function. If it is thought that different natures can combine,
Therefore, the verse negates, saying:
'If the stain and the stainer are two, and each has achieved its own self-nature, if these two can combine, then the previous should also be able to combine.'
Explanation: And these two dharmas, what do you want now? Here it says that they have already achieved their respective natures. If the stain and the stainer, what meaning do you use to distinguish the respective natures of the two dharmas, so that they achieve combination? The treatise says 'or', which refers to the meaning of combination. If discrimination arises, there is no fruitful benefit. Their self-natures have no nature of being accomplished. If it is said to be a combination, then in it, the stainer has no small part of the stain that can be made into a stain, nor can it be possessed by the stainer.
Furthermore, the verse says:
'Different characteristics cannot achieve combination, you want to achieve combination, if the characteristic of combination has already been achieved, you want to achieve its difference again.'
Explanation: The nature of combination cannot be achieved, this principle is very clear. The different self-natures of one dharma cannot be combined. Different self-natures have already been achieved, so the meaning of combination cannot be achieved. Therefore, there are no two dharmas of stain and stainer simultaneously, or successively, producing different self-natures, also because of the nature of mutual separation. Therefore, there is no reason for combination here. Now this observation is just as you wish, what kind of different self-natures can arise successively, or simultaneously.
Now, in order to prove this meaning, the verse negates, saying:
'Like this, the stain and the stainer are neither combined nor uncombined. All dharmas are also like the stain, neither combined nor uncombined.'
Explanation: What is said here? What is meant is that not only the stain and the stainer are neither combined nor uncombined, but all dharmas are also like this.
◎ Chapter Seven, Part One: Observation of Conditioned Phenomena (Saṃskṛta)
Furthermore, someone might say that in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya) there is that greed (rāga).
等諸雜染法。以有為故。譬如眼等。
論者言。若如是說。遍所成故立喻不正。何以故。勝義諦中若有眼等。應有生等有為諸相。若其無者。如兔角等。亦應有彼有為諸相。是故有為諸相。于勝義諦中決定不成。云何生等有為諸相而可成立。
此中應問。彼生等法增上所作。是有為耶。是無為耶。二俱不然。
故頌答言。
若生是有為 即應有三相
釋曰。譬如能相。此中有為能相如是。不然云何有為諸相。此中所說二法和合三相遍行故。此中三相亦悉止遣彼法自相。
複次頌言。
若生是無為 不作有為相
釋曰。如是所成應當遮遣安立過失。何以故。無為自體亦無性故。譬如滅法。此如是決定。有如是過失。如是住與無常。余法亦然。皆同生法。
論者言。相者即是理法執持為性。如是所說。云何生等為復相離。有彼業用而可轉耶。或不離耶。
複次頌言。
生等三法離 即無相業用
釋曰。云何生等有為諸法次第可轉。若法體未生。即住滅二法不能為彼作有為相。以未生故。是即能相無所詮表。若法自體畢竟已滅。即能相無體故無生住二法。以彼滅法自無性故。已生即無住。無住即無生滅亦無性。若言無常隨逐住法。即不能作有為
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 以及諸如雜染法（klesha-dharma，煩惱和染污的法）。因為它們是有為法（saṃskṛta，由因緣和合而成的法），就像眼睛等器官一樣。
論者說：如果這樣說，那麼以『遍所成』（普遍成立）為理由而設立的比喻就不正確。為什麼呢？如果在勝義諦（paramārtha-satya，究竟真理）中存在眼睛等事物，那麼就應該具有生等有為諸相（saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa，有為法的特徵，如生、住、異、滅）。如果勝義諦中沒有眼睛等事物，那麼就像兔角一樣，也應該具有那些有為諸相。因此，有為諸相在勝義諦中是絕對不能成立的。怎麼能成立生等有為諸相呢？
對此，應該反問：那些生等法（jāti，生起）的增上所作（adhipati-kāraka，增上緣所產生的），是有為法呢？還是無為法（asaṃskṛta，不依賴因緣和合而存在的法）呢？兩者都不是。
所以用偈頌回答：
『若生是有為，即應有三相。』
解釋：譬如能相（lakṣaṇa，相），此處的有為能相就是這樣。不然的話，怎麼會有有為諸相呢？這裡所說的二法和合，三相遍行，因此這三相也完全止息了彼法的自相（svalakṣaṇa，自性）。
再次用偈頌說：
『若生是無為，不作有為相。』
解釋：像這樣所成立的，應當遮遣安立的過失。為什麼呢？因為無為自體也沒有自性。譬如滅法（nirodha，寂滅）。這就像這樣是決定的，有這樣的過失。像這樣，住（sthiti，安住）和無常（anitya，無常）等其餘的法也是一樣，都和生法（jāti，生法）相同。
論者說：相（lakṣaṇa，相）就是以理法執持為自性。像這樣所說的，生等（jāti，生等）到底是和相分離，有那些作用可以運轉呢？還是不分離呢？
再次用偈頌說：
『生等三法離，即無相業用。』
解釋：生等有為諸法怎麼能次第運轉呢？如果法體還沒有生起，那麼住和滅二法就不能為它作為有為相，因為還沒有生起。這就是說，能相沒有所詮表。如果法體畢竟已經滅盡，那麼能相就沒有自體，所以沒有生和住二法。因為那個滅法自身沒有自性。已經生起就沒有住，沒有住就沒有生滅，也沒有自性。如果說無常隨逐住法，就不能作為有為相。
【English Translation】 English version And all such defiled dharmas (klesha-dharma, defiled phenomena). Because they are conditioned (saṃskṛta, compounded phenomena), like the eye and other sense organs.
The objector says: If it is said in this way, then establishing the analogy is incorrect because of 'universal establishment'. Why? If there are eyes and other things in the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya, ultimate reality), then there should be the characteristics of conditioned phenomena such as arising. If there are no eyes and other things in the ultimate truth, then like a rabbit's horn, there should also be those characteristics of conditioned phenomena. Therefore, the characteristics of conditioned phenomena are definitely not established in the ultimate truth. How can the characteristics of conditioned phenomena such as arising be established?
To this, one should ask in return: Are those arising and other phenomena, which are produced by the dominant condition (adhipati-kāraka, the causal condition), conditioned or unconditioned (asaṃskṛta, unconditioned phenomena)? Neither is the case.
Therefore, the verse answers:
'If arising is conditioned, then it should have three characteristics.'
Explanation: For example, a characteristic (lakṣaṇa, characteristic). The conditioned characteristic here is like this. Otherwise, how can there be conditioned characteristics? The two dharmas mentioned here combine, and the three characteristics pervade, so these three characteristics completely cease the self-nature (svalakṣaṇa, own-nature) of that dharma.
Again, the verse says:
'If arising is unconditioned, it does not produce conditioned characteristics.'
Explanation: What is established in this way should refute the fault of establishment. Why? Because the unconditioned itself also has no self-nature. For example, cessation (nirodha, cessation). This is definitely like this, and there is such a fault. Like this, abiding (sthiti, duration) and impermanence (anitya, impermanence) and other dharmas are also the same, all like the dharma of arising (jāti, birth).
The objector says: A characteristic (lakṣaṇa, characteristic) is by nature the holding of principle and dharma. As it is said in this way, are arising and other things separate from the characteristic, having those functions that can operate? Or are they not separate?
Again, the verse says:
'If the three dharmas of arising and others are separate, then there are no functions of characteristics.'
Explanation: How can the conditioned dharmas of arising and others operate in sequence? If the substance of a dharma has not yet arisen, then the two dharmas of abiding and cessation cannot act as conditioned characteristics for it, because it has not yet arisen. That is to say, the characteristic has nothing to express. If the substance of a dharma has completely ceased, then the characteristic has no substance, so there are no two dharmas of arising and abiding. Because that dharma of cessation itself has no self-nature. Once arisen, there is no abiding; without abiding, there is no arising or cessation, and there is no self-nature. If it is said that impermanence follows the dharma of abiding, then it cannot act as a conditioned characteristic.
之相。
故百論頌言。
住何有滅相 無常何有住 若先有住法 后不復應有 若常有無常 有住不有常 或先有其常 后即不有常 無常與住同 若有其體者 有常即邪妄 或有住亦妄
頌意如是。若有為法不相離者。云何以一物體於一時中而得和合。
故頌遣言。
不於一時中 生住滅和合
釋曰。以互相違故。
或有人言。有彼同種因性一時可生。或複次第所作得成。
論者言。此復云何。或復于彼有體中得耶。或離能相所相有所得耶。若有體得者。非於有體中有實體性同生可得。亦非所作別有其因。若或無體。此即亦無同生可有。是故體中無有如是決定生等。如生自相。亦復云何次第可成。
複次頌言。
生住滅諸相 別有有為相 有即是無窮 無即非有為
釋曰。若離生等別有生法而可成者。彼即定有異法可立。如是乃有無窮之過。有為無為之相故非和合。
複次犢子部師言。生等諸法雖是有為。云何可說為無窮耶。
彼宗頌言。
生生之所生 唯生於本生 本生之所生 復生于生生
此頌意者。諸法生時並法自體。有十五法共成生法。即彼如是有生住異滅諸法具足。此如是
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 之相。
故《百論頌》言：
『住何有滅相，無常何有住？若先有住法，后不復應有。若常有無常，有住不有常。或先有其常，后即不有常。無常與住同，若有其體者，有常即邪妄，或有住亦妄。』
頌的意思是這樣。如果有為法不相離，那麼如何以一個物體在同一時間中得以和合？
故頌遣言：
『不於一時中，生住滅和合。』
釋曰：因為互相違背的緣故。
或者有人說，有彼同種因性一時可以生起，或者通過次第所作得以成就。
論者言：這又如何呢？或者在彼有體中得到嗎？或者離開能相、所相而有所得嗎？若有體得者，非於有體中有實體性同生可得，亦非所作別有其因。若或無體，此即亦無同生可有。是故體中無有如是決定生等。如生自相，亦復云何次第可成。
複次頌言：
『生住滅諸相，別有有為相，有即是無窮，無即非有為。』
釋曰：如果離開生等別有生法而可以成就，那麼這就一定有異法可以成立。這樣乃有無窮的過失。有為無為之相故非和合。
複次，犢子部（Vatsiputriya）師言：生等諸法雖是有為，云何可說為無窮呢？
彼宗頌言：
『生生之所生，唯生於本生，本生之所生，復生于生生。』
此頌意者：諸法生時並法自體，有十五法共成生法，即彼如是有生住異滅諸法具足。此如是
【English Translation】 English version: of characteristics.
Therefore, the Śataka-śāstra (Treatise in One Hundred Verses) says in verse:
'How can there be a characteristic of cessation in what abides? How can there be abiding in what is impermanent? If there were a dharma (teaching, law) of abiding first, then there should be no more afterward. If there is permanence in impermanence, there is abiding but no permanence. Or if there were permanence first, then there would be no permanence afterward. Impermanence is the same as abiding; if there is a substance to them, then permanence is a false notion, or abiding is also false.'
The meaning of the verse is like this: If conditioned dharmas (phenomena) are not separate, how can one object be harmonized at one time?
Therefore, the verse refutes, saying:
'Birth, abiding, and cessation do not combine at one time.'
Explanation: Because they contradict each other.
Or someone might say that entities of the same kind can arise simultaneously, or they can be accomplished through sequential actions.
The commentator says: How is this again? Is it obtained in the entity that exists, or is something obtained apart from the subject and object? If it is obtained in the entity that exists, then in the entity that exists, the simultaneous arising of substantial nature cannot be obtained, nor is there a separate cause for what is made. If there is no entity, then there can be no simultaneous arising. Therefore, there is no such definite arising in the entity. Like the self-nature of arising, how can it be accomplished sequentially?
Furthermore, the verse says:
'The characteristics of birth, abiding, and cessation are separate from the characteristic of the conditioned; existence is infinite, and non-existence is not conditioned.'
Explanation: If a dharma of arising can be accomplished separately from birth, etc., then there must be a different dharma that can be established. Thus, there is the fault of infinity. The characteristics of the conditioned and the unconditioned are therefore not combined.
Furthermore, the teacher of the Vātsīputrīya (犢子部) school says: Although the dharmas of birth, etc., are conditioned, how can they be said to be infinite?
Their school's verse says:
'What is born of birth-birth is only born of original birth; what is born of original birth is again born of birth-birth.'
The meaning of this verse is: When dharmas arise, along with the dharma's own entity, there are fifteen dharmas that together form the dharma of arising, that is, they are complete with dharmas of birth, abiding, change, and cessation. This is like this.
法無有差別。若差別分別者有十五法。所謂一生。二住。三滅。四若是白法。即正解脫生。五若是黑法。即邪解脫生。六若非出離法。即非出離法生。七若是出離法。即出離法生。八生生。九住住。十滅滅。十一正解脫眷屬。十二邪解脫眷屬。十三非出離法眷屬。十四出離法眷屬。除本生自體成十四法。若並本生法總成十五。生生及本生二法為始意。為此中生生所生唯本生生。更無別法本生所生還生生生。如是乃生諸餘法等。此即不墮無窮之過。
論者言。如是所說皆非道理。
故頌破言。
若謂是生生 能生於本生 生生從本生 何能生本生
釋曰。自體如是無有性故。
次頌破言。
若謂是本生 能生於生生 本生從彼生 何能生生生
釋曰。自體如是無有性故。
又復有言。生生生時。即當能生。以無別故。
次頌破言。
若謂生生時 能生本生者 生生若未生 何能生本生
釋曰。生生若未生。生時即無體。無體即不生。有何力能能生本生。若無力能即無詮表。◎
大乘中觀釋論卷第五 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1567 大乘中觀釋論(第1卷-第9卷)
大乘中觀釋論卷第六
安慧菩薩造
西天譯經三藏朝散大夫試鴻臚卿傳梵大師賜紫沙門臣法護等奉 詔譯觀有為品第七之二
◎又復有言。我宗有別道理。令彼生法離無窮過。故彼宗頌言。
如燈能自照 亦能照於他 彼生法亦然 自生復生他
論者言。作如此說。亦非道理。以無照故。若有闇冥即有所照。故頌破言。
燈中自無暗 住處亦無暗 破暗乃名照 無暗即無照
釋曰。今此觀察若無有暗。是故燈不自照。亦不照他。
複次頌言。
無少處可照 是燈何能照 生亦無少分 生法可成就
又復有言。彼燈生時即可照邪。
論者言。若燈生時亦不能照。以先分位無暗可破。若彼有暗即有所破。如是乃說。燈能自照。亦復照他。今此所說云何燈不到暗而能破暗。若不到者。故頌遣言。
云何燈生時 而能破于暗 彼燈初生時 不能及於暗
釋曰。燈初生時。無有性故。若或俱時。又無分位。若燈不到暗能破暗者。
複次頌言。
燈若不到暗 而能破暗者 燈在於此間 應破一切暗
釋曰。同法若不到。差別因無體。譬如磁石。力能差別無決定因。此說亦非有其力能。先有所成故。如彼磁石所成皆遍。是法生時無所詮表。力能
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
西天譯經三藏朝散大夫試鴻臚卿傳梵大師賜紫沙門臣法護（Dharmaraksa）等奉 詔譯觀有為品第七之二
◎又有人說：『我宗有特別的道理，能使彼生法脫離無窮的過失。』所以他們的宗義頌說：
『如燈能自照，亦能照於他，彼生法亦然，自生復生他。』
論者說：作如此說，也是沒有道理的，因為沒有照的作用。如果有黑暗，才能有所照。所以用頌來破斥說：
『燈中自無暗，住處亦無暗，破暗乃名照，無暗即無照。』
解釋說：現在這樣觀察，如果沒有黑暗，所以燈不能自照，也不能照他。
複次，頌說：
『無少處可照，是燈何能照，生亦無少分，生法可成就。』
又有人說：那燈在產生的時候就可以照亮嗎？
論者說：如果燈產生的時候也不能照亮，因為在最初的階段沒有黑暗可以破除。如果那裡有黑暗，才能有所破除。這樣才能說燈能自照，也能照他。現在所說的是，燈如何能在不到達黑暗的情況下就能破除黑暗？如果不到達，所以用頌來否定說：
『云何燈生時，而能破于暗，彼燈初生時，不能及於暗。』
解釋說：燈初生的時候，沒有自性。如果同時，又沒有階段。如果燈不到達黑暗就能破除黑暗。
複次，頌說：
『燈若不到暗，而能破暗者，燈在於此間，應破一切暗。』
解釋說：同樣的道理，如果不到達，差別的原因就沒有實體。譬如磁石，力量能產生差別，但沒有決定的原因。這種說法也沒有力量。因為先有已經成就的事物。如同那磁石所成就的都普遍存在。這種法產生的時候，沒有什麼可以詮釋表達的力量。
【English Translation】 English version:
Translated by the Tripitaka Master of the Western Heaven, Chao San Da Fu, Shi Honglu Qing, Chuan Fan Da Shi, the Purple-Robed Shramana Minister Fa Hu (Dharmaraksa), and others, under Imperial Decree: Chapter 7, Section 2, On the Observation of Conditioned Dharmas.
◎ Furthermore, some say: 'Our school has a special principle that allows conditioned dharmas to be free from infinite faults.' Therefore, their school's verse says:
'As a lamp can illuminate itself, it can also illuminate others; so too are conditioned dharmas, they arise themselves and cause others to arise.'
The debater says: Making such a statement is also unreasonable, because there is no act of illumination. If there is darkness, then there is something to illuminate. Therefore, a verse is used to refute it, saying:
'In the lamp itself there is no darkness, in its dwelling place there is also no darkness; dispelling darkness is called illumination, without darkness there is no illumination.'
Explanation: Now, upon this observation, if there is no darkness, then the lamp cannot illuminate itself, nor can it illuminate others.
Furthermore, the verse says:
'With no place to illuminate, how can the lamp illuminate? Likewise, with no small part of arising, how can conditioned dharmas be accomplished?'
Again, some say: Can the lamp illuminate at the moment of its arising?
The debater says: If the lamp cannot illuminate at the moment of its arising, it is because there is no darkness to dispel in the initial stage. If there is darkness there, then there is something to dispel. Only then can it be said that the lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate others. What is being said now is, how can the lamp dispel darkness without reaching the darkness? If it does not reach it, therefore, a verse is used to negate it, saying:
'How can the lamp, at the moment of its arising, dispel darkness? That lamp, at the moment of its initial arising, cannot reach the darkness.'
Explanation: At the moment of the lamp's initial arising, it has no inherent nature. If it is simultaneous, then there are no stages. If the lamp can dispel darkness without reaching the darkness.
Furthermore, the verse says:
'If the lamp can dispel darkness without reaching the darkness, then the lamp, being here, should dispel all darkness.'
Explanation: According to the same principle, if it does not reach, the cause of differentiation has no substance. For example, a magnet, its power can produce differentiation, but there is no definite cause. This statement also has no power. Because there are already accomplished things beforehand. Like that which the magnet accomplishes is all pervasive. When this dharma arises, there is no power to explain or express.
無體故。此復云何。
複次頌言。
若燈能自照 亦能照他者 暗亦于自他 暗蔽定無疑
釋曰。此非所樂自所作處有相違故。燈亦復然。此非所樂。燈以照明為所成性。若燈與暗相違。燈即可成自照照他。無復別異所作性故。暗以暗蔽所成其性。若暗與明相違。暗即亦應自暗暗他。如是安立非有此義。如瓶等色現可見故。
此中應問。所言生法自生。為未生生。為已生生。
故頌答言。
生法若未生 自體不能生
釋曰。未生無體。故不能生。若其無者。如兔角等。因性不生故。
複次頌言。
生法若已生 生已復何生
釋曰。若法已生還復生者。此義應知。如其作已。不復更作。是故生已何復有生。由此應知必無生法自生道理。若從他生。其義亦然。若生時生者。離已生未生。別無生時可得。
複次頌言。
非已生未生 生時亦不生
或有人言。彼生時者。少分已生少分未生。如是中間無別有體。
論者言。若彼生法相離之性。或有少分而可生者。如是余法亦然可生。是中雲何有所生耶。若一切法有所生者。如是諦觀非今所說。豈有生時而可得耶。以彼生時無分位故。又一切法自體無分位可成。如是應知。若無生時
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『無體故。此復云何。』意思是說，因為沒有實體。這是什麼意思呢？
『複次頌言。』接下來用偈頌來說明：
『若燈能自照，亦能照他者，暗亦于自他，暗蔽定無疑。』
『釋曰。』解釋說：這種說法是不合理的，因為在自身所起的作用上存在矛盾。燈也是如此。這並不是我們所期望的。燈的本質在於照明。如果燈與黑暗相互對立，那麼燈就可以實現自我照明和照亮其他事物，而不會有其他不同的作用。黑暗的本質在於遮蔽。如果黑暗與光明相互對立，那麼黑暗也應該能夠自我遮蔽和遮蔽其他事物。這樣安立是不成立的，就像瓶子等顏色是顯而易見的。』
『此中應問。所言生法自生。為未生生。為已生生。』這裡應該提問，所謂的生法是自己產生，是指未產生時產生，還是已經產生后產生？
『故頌答言。』所以用偈頌回答：
『生法若未生，自體不能生。』
『釋曰。』解釋說：未產生的事物沒有實體，所以不能產生。如果它不存在，就像兔角一樣，因為沒有產生的因性。』
『複次頌言。』接下來用偈頌來說明：
『生法若已生，生已復何生。』
『釋曰。』解釋說：如果事物已經產生還要再次產生，那麼這個道理應該知道，就像已經做完的事情，不會再做一遍。所以，已經產生的事物為什麼還要再次產生呢？由此應該知道，絕對沒有事物自己產生的道理。如果是從他處產生，道理也是一樣。如果在產生的時候產生，那麼離開已產生和未產生，就沒有其他的產生時可以得到。』
『複次頌言。』接下來用偈頌來說明：
『非已生未生，生時亦不生。』
『或有人言。彼生時者。少分已生少分未生。如是中間無別有體。』或者有人說，那個產生的時候，少部分已經產生，少部分尚未產生。像這樣，中間沒有其他的實體。
『論者言。若彼生法相離之性。或有少分而可生者。如是余法亦然可生。是中雲何有所生耶。若一切法有所生者。如是諦觀非今所說。豈有生時而可得耶。以彼生時無分位故。又一切法自體無分位可成。如是應知。若無生時』論者說，如果那個產生的事物具有可以分離的性質，或者有少部分可以產生，那麼其他的法也同樣可以產生。這樣，怎麼會有所產生的事物呢？如果一切法都有所產生，那麼這樣仔細觀察就不是我們現在所說的。怎麼會有產生的時候可以得到呢？因為那個產生的時候沒有分位。而且一切法自身沒有分位可以成立。應該知道，如果沒有產生的時候
【English Translation】 English version: 'Without substance, what is this?' This means, because there is no entity. What does this mean?
'Furthermore, the verse says:' Next, it is explained with a verse:
'If a lamp can illuminate itself, it can also illuminate others; darkness also obscures itself and others, obscuring is undoubtedly certain.'
'Explanation says:' This statement is unreasonable because there is a contradiction in the function it performs on itself. The same applies to a lamp. This is not what we expect. The essence of a lamp lies in illumination. If a lamp is opposed to darkness, then the lamp can achieve self-illumination and illuminate other things, without any other different function. The essence of darkness lies in obscuration. If darkness is opposed to light, then darkness should also be able to obscure itself and obscure other things. Such an establishment is not valid, just as the colors of bottles, etc., are obvious.
'Here, one should ask: The so-called arising dharma arises by itself. Does it arise when it has not yet arisen, or does it arise after it has already arisen?' Here, one should ask, does the so-called arising dharma arise by itself, referring to arising when it has not yet arisen, or arising after it has already arisen?
'Therefore, the verse answers:' So, it is answered with a verse:
'If an arising dharma has not yet arisen, its own substance cannot arise.'
'Explanation says:' A thing that has not yet arisen has no substance, so it cannot arise. If it does not exist, like a rabbit's horn, because there is no cause for arising.'
'Furthermore, the verse says:' Next, it is explained with a verse:
'If an arising dharma has already arisen, what further arising is there after arising?'
'Explanation says:' If a thing that has already arisen must arise again, then this principle should be known, just as something that has already been done will not be done again. So, why should something that has already arisen arise again? From this, it should be known that there is absolutely no principle of a thing arising by itself. If it arises from elsewhere, the principle is the same. If it arises at the time of arising, then apart from already arisen and not yet arisen, there is no other time of arising that can be obtained.'
'Furthermore, the verse says:' Next, it is explained with a verse:
'Not already arisen, not yet arisen, it also does not arise at the time of arising.'
'Or someone says: That time of arising, a small part has already arisen, a small part has not yet arisen. Like this, there is no other entity in between.' Or someone says that at the time of arising, a small part has already arisen, and a small part has not yet arisen. Like this, there is no other entity in between.
'The debater says: If that arising thing has a separable nature, or if there is a small part that can arise, then other dharmas can also arise. In this case, how can there be something that arises? If all dharmas have something that arises, then such careful observation is not what we are talking about now. How can there be a time of arising that can be obtained? Because that time of arising has no divisions. Moreover, all dharmas themselves have no divisions that can be established. It should be known that if there is no time of arising' The debater says, if that arising thing has a separable nature, or if there is a small part that can arise, then other dharmas can also arise. In this case, how can there be something that arises? If all dharmas have something that arises, then such careful observation is not what we are talking about now. How can there be a time of arising that can be obtained? Because that time of arising has no divisions. Moreover, all dharmas themselves have no divisions that can be established. It should be known that if there is no time of arising
。云何有彼生法可得。
複次毗婆沙師言。有未來法體生向現在。故有生時可生。
論者言。云何生時先有法體生向現在。有何異法說生時耶。此中無有少法。云何有其生法自體。以彼生法先無所得自體無性故。云何如是有所成耶。若復現轉之法常不離自相。此說相違。若於過去未來轉者。又非道理。若別異可生者。彼牛生時亦應有馬。無此道理。若無少法以未來體生向現在。所說生時此即相違。由如是故。生時不生。已生法不生。若生已復生。彼即無體可生。以無自性故無。即如兔角無有生故。
複次頌言。
去未去去時 前品此已說
釋曰。此諸所說前已廣明。
複次五頂子人言。若法實無生性。云何因法而得顯明。
論者言。彼等決定所說。此皆止遣。此中應知。不顯明時因亦不離。亦復云何有其不離。此說顯明。是故去未去去時。前品已廣說。若或諸法有所離者。即成粗重前不實因。亦非如是先有所生。亦非離因別有法體。以有所離故。
有異人言。有果可生。由自因和合故。或種子等和合因性物體功能及彼業用此無差別。若不生者。云何自生他生而得成耶。由如是故。彼一切果於一切時及一切處。皆有所生。
論者言。所言和合者。為一性耶。為
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如何才能得到所謂的『生法』（Utpāda-dharma，產生之法）呢？
毗婆沙師（Vaibhāṣika，有部宗論師）又說：『有未來之法的體性，朝向現在而生，所以有產生之時，可以產生。』
論者反駁道：『如何在產生之時，先有法的體性朝向現在而生？又有什麼不同的法，可以稱之為產生之時呢？』這裡面沒有任何實在的法，又如何能有『生法』的自體呢？因為這個『生法』先前沒有得到，自體沒有自性，又如何能成就任何事物呢？如果已經顯現轉變的法，常常不離開它自身的相狀，這與你所說的相矛盾。如果它在過去或未來轉變，那也是不合道理的。如果可以有別的法產生，那麼在牛出生的時候，也應該有馬出生，但這沒有道理。如果沒有任何法，以未來的體性朝向現在而生，那麼你所說的『產生之時』，就自相矛盾。因為這個緣故，產生之時，並不能產生。
已經產生的法，不能再生。如果已經產生之後又再生，那麼它就沒有體性可以再生，因為它沒有自性，就像兔角一樣，本來就沒有，所以不能產生。
再次，頌文說：
『去、未去、去時，前品此已說。』
解釋說：這些所說的道理，前面已經詳細闡明。
再次，五頂子人（Pañcaśīrṣaka，一種外道）說：『如果法實際上沒有生性，那麼如何能通過因法而得以顯明呢？』
論者說：『他們所說的這些，都應該停止辯論。』這裡應該知道，不顯明的時候，因也不會離開。又如何能有不離開呢？這實際上就是顯明。所以，『去、未去、去時』，前面已經詳細闡明。如果諸法有所分離，就會變成粗重而不真實的因，也不是像先前所生的那樣，也不是離開因之外，另有法體，因為有所分離的緣故。
有其他人說：『有果可以產生，因為自身的原因和合的緣故，或者種子等和合的因性、物體功能以及它們的業用，這沒有差別。如果不產生，那麼如何能成就自生或他生呢？因為這個緣故，一切果在一切時間和一切地點，都應該有所產生。』
論者反駁道：『你所說的和合，是指單一的體性呢？還是指...
【English Translation】 English version: How can one obtain the so-called 'Utpāda-dharma' (the law of arising)?
Furthermore, the Vaibhāṣika (a school of Buddhist philosophers) says: 'There is a nature of future dharmas that arises towards the present, therefore there is a time of arising when it can arise.'
The debater refutes: 'How can there be a nature of dharmas arising towards the present at the time of arising? And what different dharma can be called the time of arising?' There is no real dharma in this, so how can there be a self-nature of the 'Utpāda-dharma'? Because this 'Utpāda-dharma' was not obtained before, and the self-nature is without inherent existence, how can it accomplish anything? If the dharma that has already manifested and transformed never departs from its own characteristics, this contradicts what you said. If it transforms in the past or future, that is also unreasonable. If another dharma can arise, then a horse should also be born when a cow is born, but this is not reasonable. If there is no dharma arising from the nature of the future towards the present, then what you said about the 'time of arising' is self-contradictory. For this reason, the time of arising cannot arise.
A dharma that has already arisen cannot arise again. If it arises again after it has already arisen, then it has no nature to arise again, because it has no self-nature, just like a rabbit's horn, which does not exist in the first place, so it cannot arise.
Again, the verse says:
'The gone, not-gone, and time of going, have already been explained in the previous chapter.'
The explanation says: These principles that have been said have already been explained in detail before.
Again, the Pañcaśīrṣaka (a type of heretic) says: 'If dharmas actually have no nature of arising, then how can they be manifested through the cause of dharmas?'
The debater says: 'These things they say should all stop being debated.' It should be known here that when it is not manifest, the cause will not depart either. And how can there be no departure? This is actually manifestation. Therefore, 'the gone, not-gone, and time of going' have already been explained in detail before. If dharmas are separated, they will become a coarse and unreal cause, and it is not like what was born before, nor is there another dharma body apart from the cause, because there is separation.
Some other people say: 'There is a result that can arise, because of the combination of its own causes, or the combined causal nature of seeds, etc., the function of objects, and their karma, there is no difference. If it does not arise, then how can self-arising or other-arising be accomplished? For this reason, all results should arise at all times and in all places.'
The debater refutes: 'What you said about combination, does it refer to a single nature? Or does it refer to...
異性耶。或已生未生或復生時。自因彼果有和合耶。此所計執於一切處皆非道理。謂已生未生各無有性。彼因果二先性不立。無所詮表有性無體。是故汝所說種子等和合。已生未生皆無所有。已生未生各無性故。若有種子等和合。即所立相違。無未生性可詮表故。若其無者。如兔角等。是故無果和合可有。云何生法當有所得。又有人言。生法不相離。此說為生時。故頌遣言。
若生時有生 彼生相已破
釋曰。此非次第。此中雲何若有若無亦有亦無。一切處離皆悉止遣。
又有人言。若此生法從緣生時。云何所生無道理耶。如名瓶生。瓶從緣生。如是生時乃有所成。
論者言。若彼生時決定有瓶。是瓶云何生已復生。彼瓶生時未有發起作用力故。是瓶云何別有生時別有生法而當得耶。且無瓶生之時。生已還有衣相可得。諸有所作若離所依。亦非道理。故頌遣言。
云何生時生 而說為緣起
釋曰。諸外道等。以巧辯才說緣生法。彼自相違。佛說緣生不同一切外道知解故。佛為破彼巧辯才勤求所知。彼所知法于勝義諦中伺察無義。彼外道等誣謗因果起惡見根本。佛以善法方便化度。為令彼斷不正見故。如佛所言。此有故彼有。此生故彼生。如是等說。皆世俗諦。非勝義諦。勝義諦
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：是異性嗎？或者已經產生、尚未產生、或者再次產生的時候，是自身的原因和外在的結果相互結合嗎？這種計較和執著在任何情況下都是不合道理的。因為已經產生的和尚未產生的，各自都沒有自性。原因和結果這二者，先前的自性都不能成立，沒有可以詮釋和表達的自性，沒有實體。因此，你們所說的種子等的結合，無論是已經產生的還是尚未產生的，都是不存在的。因為已經產生的和尚未產生的，各自都沒有自性。如果存在種子等的結合，那就與所建立的相違背，因為沒有尚未產生的自性可以詮釋和表達。如果沒有尚未產生的自性，就像兔角一樣，因此沒有結果的結合是可能存在的。那麼，如何能獲得生法呢？又有人說，生法不會相互分離，這是在說產生的時候。所以用偈頌來否定這種說法： 『如果產生的時候有產生，那麼產生的相狀已經被破除了。』 解釋說：這並非是按順序說的。這裡說，怎麼樣如果有、如果沒有、或者既有又沒有，在任何情況下都應該停止和否定這種說法。 又有人說：如果這個生法是從因緣產生的時候，為什麼所產生的就沒有道理呢？比如瓶子的產生，瓶子是從因緣產生的，這樣在產生的時候才能有所成就。 論者說：如果瓶子在產生的時候是確定存在的，那麼這個瓶子為什麼已經產生還要再次產生呢？這個瓶子在產生的時候，還沒有發起作用的力量。這個瓶子怎麼會有另外的產生的時間，另外的產生之法可以獲得呢？而且沒有瓶子產生的時候，產生之後還有衣服的相狀可以獲得。任何有所作為的事情，如果脫離了所依賴的基礎，也是不合道理的。所以用偈頌來否定這種說法： 『怎麼能在產生的時候產生，而說是緣起呢？』 解釋說：那些外道等，用巧妙的辯才來說緣生法，他們自己是相互矛盾的。佛陀所說的緣生不同於一切外道的理解。佛陀爲了破除他們巧妙的辯才，勤奮地尋求所知。他們所知的法在勝義諦（paramārtha-satya）中考察是沒有意義的。那些外道等誣衊因果，產生惡見的根本。佛陀用善法方便教化他們，爲了讓他們斷除不正的見解。就像佛陀所說：『因為有這個，所以有那個；因為這個產生，所以那個產生。』等等這些說法，都是世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya），不是勝義諦（paramārtha-satya）。勝義諦（paramārtha-satya）...
【English Translation】 English version: Is it something different? Or when it is already produced, not yet produced, or produced again, is it a combination of self-cause and external effect? This kind of calculation and attachment is unreasonable in any situation. Because what is already produced and what is not yet produced, each has no self-nature. The previous self-nature of these two, cause and effect, cannot be established, and there is nothing to interpret and express self-nature, without substance. Therefore, the combination of seeds, etc., that you speak of, whether already produced or not yet produced, does not exist. Because what is already produced and what is not yet produced, each has no self-nature. If there is a combination of seeds, etc., then it contradicts what is established, because there is no not-yet-produced self-nature that can be interpreted and expressed. If there is no not-yet-produced self-nature, like a rabbit's horn, then no combination of results is possible. Then, how can the Dharma of production be obtained? Also, some say that the Dharma of production does not separate from each other, which is said at the time of production. Therefore, a verse is used to negate this statement: 'If there is production at the time of production, then the characteristic of production has already been destroyed.' The explanation says: This is not said in order. Here it says, how if there is, if there is not, or if there is both, in any case, this statement should be stopped and negated. Also, some say: If this Dharma of production arises from conditions, why is what is produced unreasonable? For example, the production of a pot, the pot arises from conditions, so that something can be accomplished at the time of production. The debater says: If the pot is definitely present at the time of production, then why does this pot have to be produced again after it has already been produced? This pot does not have the power to initiate action at the time of production. How can this pot have another time of production, another Dharma of production that can be obtained? Moreover, when there is no production of the pot, there is still the characteristic of clothing that can be obtained after production. Anything that is done, if it is separated from the foundation on which it depends, is also unreasonable. Therefore, a verse is used to negate this statement: 'How can it be produced at the time of production, and be said to be dependent origination?' The explanation says: Those heretics, etc., use clever arguments to speak of the Dharma of dependent origination, but they contradict themselves. The dependent origination spoken of by the Buddha is different from the understanding of all heretics. In order to break their clever arguments, the Buddha diligently seeks what is to be known. What they know has no meaning when examined in the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). Those heretics, etc., slander cause and effect, and generate the root of evil views. The Buddha uses skillful means of good Dharma to transform them, in order to let them cut off incorrect views. Just as the Buddha said: 'Because there is this, there is that; because this arises, that arises.' These statements, etc., are all conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), not ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). Ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya)...
者。
複次頌言。
若法眾緣生 彼自性寂滅
釋曰。此義離自性故。如契經說。佛言。大慧。諸法自性本來不生。然以和合一切性亦非無自性。
複次頌言。
是故生時生 如是皆寂滅
釋曰。此無不和合對治過失。況復如是有所生耶。故前頌言。若法緣生自性寂滅。無復自性故。是故諸法。無實因緣發起所生及作用等。
又有人言。若法從緣生。可名生時耶。
故頌遣言。
若法未生時 如瓶等何有 緣法假和合 生已復何生
釋曰。云何有體可生而無生時道理。謂所生非有故。譬如未生法。彼無自性。此說義成。
複次頌言。
若生時有生 是即有所生 諸生性如幻 此生復誰生
釋曰。若法已生復有別異生者。生即無窮。是故決定無生法可作。亦非別有本生能生於生。
複次頌言。
若生已復生 是生即無窮
釋曰此無未生。亦無本生。能生道理。
複次頌言。
若無生而生 法皆如是生
釋曰。而彼生法亦然。何有意謂此生而為有生。真實理中無生可有。非意馳流謂一切有。
複次頌言。
有法不應生 無亦非道理 有無俱不然 前品此已說
釋
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
再說偈語說：
『若法眾緣生，彼自性寂滅。』
解釋說：此義是因為遠離自性。如契經所說。佛說：『大慧（Mahamati，菩薩名）。諸法的自性本來不生。然而因為和合，一切性也不是沒有自性。』
再說偈語說：
『是故生時生，如是皆寂滅。』
解釋說：這沒有不和合的對治過失。何況像這樣有所生呢？所以前面的偈語說：若法因緣而生，自性寂滅。沒有了自性，所以諸法，沒有真實的因緣發起所生以及作用等等。
又有人說：若法從因緣生，可以叫做生時嗎？
所以用偈語來遣除這種說法：
『若法未生時，如瓶等何有？緣法假和合，生已復何生？』
解釋說：怎麼會有實體可以生，卻沒有生時的道理呢？因為所生不是實有。譬如未生的法，它沒有自性。這說明了義理成立。
再說偈語說：
『若生時有生，是即有所生。諸生性如幻，此生復誰生？』
解釋說：如果法已經生了，又另外有生，那麼生就無窮無盡。所以可以確定沒有生法可以作為。也不是另外有本生能夠生於生。
再說偈語說：
『若生已復生，是生即無窮。』
解釋說：這沒有未生，也沒有本生，能夠生的道理。
再說偈語說：
『若無生而生，法皆如是生。』
解釋說：而那些生法也是這樣。哪裡有什麼意思說這個生就是有生。真實的道理中沒有生可以有。不要隨意認為一切都是有。
再說偈語說：
『有法不應生，無亦非道理。有無俱不然，前品此已說。』
解釋
【English Translation】 English version:
Furthermore, the verse says:
'If a dharma arises from conditions, its self-nature is quiescent.'
Explanation: This meaning is because it is apart from self-nature. As the sutra says. The Buddha said: 'Mahamati (Great Wisdom, name of a Bodhisattva). The self-nature of all dharmas is originally unborn. However, because of combination, all natures are not without self-nature either.'
Furthermore, the verse says:
'Therefore, it is born at the time of birth, and thus all are quiescent.'
Explanation: This has no fault of not harmonizing with the counteracting. Moreover, how could there be something born like this? Therefore, the previous verse said: If a dharma arises from conditions, its self-nature is quiescent. Because there is no self-nature, therefore, dharmas have no real causes and conditions that initiate birth and functions, etc.
Also, some people say: If a dharma arises from conditions, can it be called the time of birth?
Therefore, the verse is used to dispel this saying:
'If a dharma is not yet born, how can it exist like a bottle, etc.? Conditioned dharmas falsely combine; after being born, what more is born?'
Explanation: How can there be a substance that can be born, but there is no principle of the time of birth? Because what is born is not real. For example, a dharma that is not yet born has no self-nature. This explains that the meaning is established.
Furthermore, the verse says:
'If there is birth at the time of birth, then there is something born. The nature of all births is like illusion; who gives birth to this birth?'
Explanation: If a dharma has already been born and there is another birth, then birth is endless. Therefore, it is certain that there is no birth-dharma that can be made. Nor is there a separate original birth that can give birth to birth.
Furthermore, the verse says:
'If it is born again after being born, then this birth is endless.'
Explanation: This has no unborn, nor original birth, nor the principle of being able to give birth.
Furthermore, the verse says:
'If there is birth without birth, then all dharmas are born in this way.'
Explanation: And those birth-dharmas are also like this. Where is the meaning in saying that this birth is a real birth? In the true principle, there is no birth that can exist. Do not arbitrarily think that everything exists.
Furthermore, the verse says:
'A dharma that exists should not be born; non-existence is also not reasonable. Both existence and non-existence are not right; this has already been said in the previous chapter.'
Explanation:
曰。證成前品云何生法而有所得。此中應問。滅時可有生法立耶。謂諸生相生已即壞。諸法壞性而同等故。
故頌答言。
若滅時有生 無體而可得
釋曰。此中不應生滅同時。生時分位亦無有滅。
複次頌言。
若法不滅時 彼體不可得
釋曰。如空花等。此中住法而非一向。有所住者。此說不成。
此中應問。為未住體住。為已住體住。為住時住耶。
故頌答言。
未住體不住 住不住相違 住住時不住 此復何有住
釋曰。住者現在過去二法一處同時不生。是故無住。又離已住未住。住時無體。謂以勝義諦中無生法可得。從前廣說。悉為證成無實生法。生法若無。云何有住。
複次頌言。
若滅時有住 彼無體可得 住滅二相違 住位中無滅
釋曰。若說無滅時。彼體不可得。滅法隨逐有為相故。若住時有滅。無此道理。此中所說。
複次頌言。
諸法于常時 皆有老死相
釋曰。老者衰變前相。死者壞滅為義。謂以自體於一切時而常轉易。若有生時。即無老死法成。后亦不得生法可成。如火無冷性。今所觀察。
複次頌言。
而有何等法 離老死有住
此中應問。諸有住法
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如果說在前面的品中已經證明了生法的成立，那麼如何理解『而有所得』呢？這裡應該問，滅的時候可以有生法成立嗎？因為各種生相產生后立即壞滅，諸法的壞滅性質是相同的。
因此用偈頌回答：
『若滅時有生，無體而可得』
解釋：這裡不應該認為生和滅是同時發生的。生的時候，分位中也沒有滅。
再次用偈頌說：
『若法不滅時，彼體不可得』
解釋：就像空中的花朵等。這裡說住法並非一成不變，有所住者，這種說法是不成立的。
這裡應該問：是未住的體住，還是已住的體住，還是住的時候住呢？
因此用偈頌回答：
『未住體不住，住不住相違，住住時不住，此復何有住』
解釋：住，是指現在和過去兩種法不能同時存在於一處。所以沒有住。而且離開了已住和未住，住的時候也沒有自體。這是說在勝義諦（paramārtha-satya）中沒有生法可以得到。從前面廣泛的論述，都是爲了證明沒有真實的生法。生法如果不存在，怎麼會有住呢？
再次用偈頌說：
『若滅時有住，彼無體可得，住滅二相違，住位中無滅』
解釋：如果說沒有滅的時候，那個自體是不可得的。滅法是隨著有為相而存在的。如果住的時候有滅，沒有這個道理。這裡所說的。
再次用偈頌說：
『諸法于常時，皆有老死相』
解釋：老，是衰變的前兆。死，是壞滅的意思。這是說自體在一切時候都在不斷地變化。如果有生的時候，就沒有老死的法成立。以後也無法得到生法成立。就像火沒有冷性一樣。現在所觀察的。
再次用偈頌說：
『而有何等法，離老死有住』
這裡應該問，各種住法
【English Translation】 English version: Question: If the previous chapter has already proven the establishment of arising (utpāda), how should we understand 'and there is attainment'? Here, it should be asked, can arising be established at the time of cessation (nirodha)? Because various characteristics of arising immediately perish after arising, and the nature of the perishing of all dharmas (phenomena) is the same.
Therefore, the verse answers:
'If there is arising at the time of cessation, it can be attained without substance.'
Explanation: It should not be thought that arising and cessation occur simultaneously. At the time of arising, there is no cessation in the divisions.
Again, the verse says:
'If a dharma (phenomenon) does not cease, its substance cannot be attained.'
Explanation: Like flowers in the sky, etc. Here it is said that abiding (sthiti) is not constant, and the statement that there is something that abides is not established.
Here it should be asked: Does the un-abided substance abide, or does the already-abided substance abide, or does it abide at the time of abiding?
Therefore, the verse answers:
'The un-abided substance does not abide, abiding and non-abiding contradict each other, abiding does not abide at the time of abiding, so how can there be abiding?'
Explanation: Abiding refers to the fact that the present and past two dharmas (phenomena) cannot exist in one place simultaneously. Therefore, there is no abiding. Moreover, apart from the already-abided and the not-yet-abided, there is no substance at the time of abiding. This is to say that in ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), no arising can be attained. From the extensive discussion before, it is all to prove that there is no real arising. If arising does not exist, how can there be abiding?
Again, the verse says:
'If there is abiding at the time of cessation, it can be attained without substance, abiding and cessation contradict each other, there is no cessation in the position of abiding.'
Explanation: If it is said that there is no cessation, then that substance cannot be attained. The dharma (phenomenon) of cessation follows the conditioned characteristics. If there is cessation at the time of abiding, there is no such reason. What is said here.
Again, the verse says:
'All dharmas (phenomena) at all times have the characteristics of aging (jarā) and death (maraṇa).'
Explanation: Aging is the precursor to decay. Death means destruction. This is to say that the substance itself is constantly changing at all times. If there is a time of arising, then the dharma (phenomenon) of aging and death cannot be established. Afterwards, the establishment of arising cannot be attained either. Just like fire has no coldness. What is being observed now.
Again, the verse says:
'And what kind of dharma (phenomenon) is there that has abiding apart from aging and death?'
Here it should be asked, all kinds of abiding dharmas (phenomena)
。為自體住。為別有住法而成住耶。
故頌答言。
住不自相住 異住非道理 如生不自生 亦不從他生
複次如別頌言。
此住若未住 住體云何立 此住若已住 復何住可成 若已住更住 此住即無窮 若或無住住 法皆如是住
論者言。一切生法皆隨順說。若有滅處。即無生住。二法以相離性。彼不有故。如是生住滅法諸說皆然。
此中應問。所言滅者。為已滅滅耶。為滅時滅耶。
故頌答言。
已滅法不滅 未滅法滅空
釋曰。云何是已滅法不滅。謂法滅已滅即無體。此中滅法彼不生故。如是亦然。滅時及未滅二俱有過。何以故。謂一切法。于勝義諦中止遣其生。
複次頌言。
彼滅時亦然 無生何有滅
釋曰。生法既爾。何有住體。滅亦不可得。住滅二法。彼相違故。是故無住亦復無滅。彼無住者。住性離故。若除遣住法。滅法即成。是故無有諸物分位。如是亦無一切物體。◎
大乘中觀釋論卷第六 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1567 大乘中觀釋論(第1卷-第9卷)
大乘中觀釋論卷第七
安慧菩薩造
譯經三藏朝散大夫試鴻臚卿光梵大師賜紫沙門臣惟凈等奉 詔譯觀
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：為自體而住，還是為別有的住法而成就住呢？
所以用偈頌回答：
『住』不是以自身之相而住，以異於自身之相而住也沒有道理，如同『生』不是自身而生，也不是從他處而生。
再次，如另一偈頌所說：
如果『住』還沒有住，『住』的本體如何成立？如果『住』已經住了，又有什麼『住』可以成就？如果已經住還要再住，那麼這個『住』就無窮無盡。如果或者沒有『住』而『住』，那麼一切法都這樣『住』。
論者說：一切生法都隨順於這種說法。如果有滅的地方，就沒有生和住。這兩種法因為其相互分離的性質，所以它們不存在。像這樣，生、住、滅諸法的說法都是如此。
這裡應該問：所說的『滅』，是已滅而滅呢？還是滅時而滅呢？
所以用偈頌回答：
已滅的法不會滅，未滅的法滅也是空。
解釋說：什麼是已滅的法不會滅呢？意思是說，法滅之後就已經沒有本體了，這裡滅法不會再生起。像這樣也是一樣，滅時和未滅兩種情況都有過失。為什麼呢？因為一切法，在勝義諦（Paramārtha-satya）中，都應當止息其生起。
再次，偈頌說：
那個滅時也是這樣，沒有生，哪裡會有滅？
解釋說：生法既然如此，哪裡會有住的本體？滅也是不可得的。住和滅兩種法，它們是相互違背的。所以沒有住，也就沒有滅。沒有住的原因是，住的自性已經離開了。如果去除住法，滅法才能成立。所以沒有諸物的分位，像這樣也沒有一切物體。
【English Translation】 English version: Does 'abiding' abide by itself, or does it achieve abiding through a separate method of abiding?
Therefore, the verse answers:
'Abiding' does not abide by its own characteristic; abiding by a different characteristic is unreasonable, just as 'birth' does not arise from itself, nor does it arise from another.
Furthermore, as another verse says:
If 'abiding' has not yet abided, how can the essence of 'abiding' be established? If 'abiding' has already abided, what 'abiding' can be accomplished again? If one abides again after already abiding, then this 'abiding' is endless. If, perhaps, there is 'abiding' without abiding, then all dharmas abide in this way.
The commentator says: All arising dharmas follow this explanation. If there is a place of cessation (nirodha), then there is no arising or abiding. These two dharmas, due to their mutually separate nature, do not exist. Thus, the explanations of arising, abiding, and ceasing dharmas are all like this.
Here, one should ask: The so-called 'cessation', is it cessation of what has already ceased, or cessation at the time of ceasing?
Therefore, the verse answers:
A dharma that has already ceased does not cease; the cessation of a dharma that has not ceased is empty.
Explanation: What is meant by 'a dharma that has already ceased does not cease'? It means that after a dharma has ceased, it no longer has a substance. Here, the ceasing dharma does not arise again. It is the same in this way. Both the time of ceasing and the time of not yet ceasing have faults. Why? Because all dharmas, in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), should cease their arising.
Again, the verse says:
That time of cessation is also like this; without arising, where would there be cessation?
Explanation: Since arising dharmas are like this, where would there be the essence of abiding? Cessation is also unattainable. Abiding and ceasing dharmas are mutually contradictory. Therefore, without abiding, there is also no cessation. The reason there is no abiding is that the nature of abiding has departed. If the abiding dharma is removed, then the ceasing dharma can be established. Therefore, there are no divisions of things, and in this way, there are no objects either.
有為品第七之三
◎複次自部答異宗言。
此分位定住 先分位顯明
釋曰。如乳位中。乳亦不即。於此位滅。如前所說。有無二法。互相違故。複次頌言。
異分位定住 先分位已滅
釋曰。如是決定住異位中若有所轉如酪分位無別異滅。何以故。酪已成時。乳即不生。此中決定壞失次第。各別分位無異性故。若言物體不滅。此即相違。或計滅有所得。彼非道理。今當止遣。他法既無生住可止。自法亦無。今所說滅。以自法無故。複次頌言。
如彼一切法 生相不可得 即此一切法 滅亦不可得
釋曰。此中雲何。若一切處有滅法者。彼即無實。複次頌言。
若法是有者 滅即不可得 不可於一處 有有無二性
釋曰。互相違故。複次頌言。
無法即無果 滅亦不可得 如無第二頭 不可言其斷
或有人言。依止滅體。是中欲令滅有所得。故頌答言。
法不自體滅 他體亦不滅 如生不自生 他體亦不生 此滅若未滅 自體可能滅 此滅若已滅 滅已復何滅 是滅若有異 滅即是無窮 滅若無所滅 法皆如是滅
或造釋者言。若彼生法止遣法自相者所說。即有對待過失。謂以勝義諦中有有為法
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有為品第七之三
◎複次自部答異宗言。
此分位定住 先分位顯明
釋曰。如乳位中，乳亦不即。於此位滅，如前所說。有無二法，互相違故。複次頌言。
異分位定住 先分位已滅
釋曰。如是決定住異位中若有所轉如酪分位無別異滅。何以故？酪已成時，乳即不生。此中決定壞失次第，各別分位無異性故。若言物體不滅，此即相違。或計滅有所得，彼非道理。今當止遣。他法既無生住可止，自法亦無。今所說滅，以自法無故。複次頌言。
如彼一切法 生相不可得 即此一切法 滅亦不可得
釋曰。此中雲何？若一切處有滅法者，彼即無實。複次頌言。
若法是有者 滅即不可得 不可於一處 有有無二性
釋曰。互相違故。複次頌言。
無法即無果 滅亦不可得 如無第二頭 不可言其斷
或有人言，依止滅體，是中欲令滅有所得。故頌答言。
法不自體滅 他體亦不滅 如生不自生 他體亦不生 此滅若未滅 自體可能滅 此滅若已滅 滅已復何滅 是滅若有異 滅即是無窮 滅若無所滅 法皆如是滅
或造釋者言，若彼生法止遣法自相者所說，即有對待過失。謂以勝義諦中有有為法
【English Translation】 English version Chapter Seven on Conditioned Phenomena, Part Three
◎ Furthermore, the self-school answers the different school.
This state is fixed, the previous state is clearly manifested.
Explanation: Like in the state of milk, the milk is not identical. It ceases in this state, as previously stated. Existence and non-existence, two dharmas (laws/phenomena), contradict each other. Furthermore, the verse says:
A different state is fixed, the previous state has already ceased.
Explanation: Thus, it is determined that if there is any transformation in a different state, like the state of yogurt, there is no different cessation. Why? When yogurt is formed, milk no longer arises. Here, the order of determined destruction and loss, each separate state has no different nature. If it is said that the substance does not cease, this is contradictory. Or if it is considered that cessation can be obtained, that is not reasonable. Now we should stop and dismiss it. Since other dharmas (laws/phenomena) have no arising or abiding to be stopped, self-dharmas (laws/phenomena) also have none. The cessation we are talking about now is because self-dharmas (laws/phenomena) are non-existent. Furthermore, the verse says:
Like all those dharmas (laws/phenomena), the characteristic of arising cannot be obtained. Likewise, all these dharmas (laws/phenomena), cessation also cannot be obtained.
Explanation: What is this about? If there is a dharma (law/phenomenon) of cessation everywhere, then it is unreal. Furthermore, the verse says:
If a dharma (law/phenomenon) exists, then cessation cannot be obtained. It is impossible for existence and non-existence, two natures, to be in one place.
Explanation: Because they contradict each other. Furthermore, the verse says:
If there is no dharma (law/phenomenon), then there is no result, and cessation cannot be obtained. Like having no second head, one cannot speak of its cutting off.
Or some people say, relying on the substance of cessation, they want to make cessation obtainable. Therefore, the verse answers:
A dharma (law/phenomenon) does not cease by itself, nor does it cease by another substance. Like arising does not arise by itself, nor does it arise by another substance. If this cessation has not ceased, it is possible for itself to cease. If this cessation has already ceased, after cessation, what cessation is there again? If this cessation is different, then cessation is endless. If cessation has nothing to cease, then all dharmas (laws/phenomena) cease in this way.
Or those who create explanations say that if the self-nature of those arising dharmas (laws/phenomena) is stopped and dismissed, then there is the fault of opposition. That is to say, in the ultimate truth, there are conditioned dharmas (laws/phenomena).
對待無為。今對彼說。是故頌言。
生住滅不成 即無有為法 有為法不成 何得有無為
釋曰。對待所起。此說畢竟。譬如石女不生於子。世俗決定物體不成。
此中應問。若無有為之法及有為相。云何世尊說有三種有為法相。故頌答言。
如夢亦如幻 如乾闥婆城 所說生住滅 其相亦如是
釋曰。諸法如夢幻及乾闥婆城。皆是分別智境界性。是故顯示象馬車步男子女人國城等相。彼體皆空。是故所有生等諸法皆是智境界性之所發起。于勝義諦中所顯無體自性空故。故佛欲令于諸行中舍離常見。令得調伏。乃作是說。止生老等。所言老者。老亦非老。此即自語有所得相違。是故頌言。
老亦不離老 老時無所有 此性老不成 異性亦如是 是故一法中 老即不可得 老老而無老 非自體他體 此老不自老 一切老亦然 老若有別異 老即是無窮 解脫出離道 自具足亦然 若法離自相 果亦不可得
釋曰。如說解脫。諸有善法此即說為緣因。彼善法性若有所得。云何說彼以為緣因。若爾而彼識等亦可說為緣因而有所得。何以故。以差別性彼無體故。差別識性亦非自體。有善法性以其自體諸善法性為緣因故。于解脫中無有果利。
{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本：\n\n對待無為（Nirvana，涅槃）。現在針對他們說。因此用頌文說：\n\n\t生住滅不成，即無有為法\n\t有為法不成，何得有無為\n\n\t\t解釋：對待所產生的。這裡說的是究竟。譬如石女不能生育子女。世俗認定的物體是不成立的。\n\n\t\t這裡應該提問。如果沒有有為之法以及有為之相，世尊（世尊，Buddha）為什麼說有三種有為法相？所以用頌文回答：\n\n\t如夢亦如幻，如乾闥婆城（Gandharva city，海市蜃樓）\n\t所說生住滅，其相亦如是\n\n\t\t解釋：諸法如夢幻以及乾闥婆城。都是分別智的境界性。因此顯示象馬車步男子女人國城等相。它們的本體都是空的。所以所有的生等諸法都是智境界性所發起的。在勝義諦中，所顯示的無體自性是空性的。所以佛（佛，Buddha）想要讓人們在諸行中捨棄常見的執著，使他們得到調伏，才這樣說。停止生老等。所說的老，老也不是老。這就像自己說的話和自己所得到的相互矛盾。所以用頌文說：\n\n\t老亦不離老，老時無所有\n\t此性老不成，異性亦如是\n\t是故一法中，老即不可得\n\t老老而無老，非自體他體\n\t此老不自老，一切老亦然\n\t老若有別異，老即是無窮\n\t解脫出離道，自具足亦然\n\t若法離自相，果亦不可得\n\n\t\t解釋：如說解脫（Nirvana，涅槃）。諸多的善法，這就可以說是緣因。那些善法的性質如果有所得，怎麼能說它們是緣因呢？如果這樣，那麼識等也可以說是緣因並且有所得。為什麼呢？因為差別性它們沒有本體。差別識性也不是自體。有善法的性質，因為它們的自體是諸善法性的緣因，所以在解脫中沒有果利。" , "english_translations": [ "English version:\n\nRegarding the unconditioned (Nirvana). Now, speaking to them. Therefore, it is said in verse:\n\n\tBirth, abiding, and cessation do not occur,\n\tWhich means there are no conditioned dharmas.\n\tIf conditioned dharmas do not occur,\n\tHow can there be the unconditioned?\n\n\t\tExplanation: Arising from opposition. This speaks of the ultimate. Just as a barren woman does not give birth to a child. The worldly determined objects do not come into being.\n\n\t\tHere, one should ask: If there are no conditioned dharmas and no characteristics of conditioned dharmas, why did the World Honored One (Buddha) say there are three characteristics of conditioned dharmas? Therefore, it is answered in verse:\n\n\tLike a dream, like an illusion,\n\tLike a Gandharva city (mirage).\n\tThe so-called birth, abiding, and cessation,\n\tTheir characteristics are also like this.\n\n\t\tExplanation: All dharmas are like dreams, illusions, and Gandharva cities. All are the nature of the realm of discriminating wisdom. Therefore, they manifest the appearances of elephants, horses, chariots, infantry, men, women, countries, and cities. Their substance is all empty. Therefore, all dharmas such as birth are all originated from the realm of wisdom. In the ultimate truth, the manifested self-nature without substance is empty. Therefore, the Buddha wants people to abandon the common attachment in all actions, so that they can be tamed, and thus speaks in this way. Stop birth, old age, etc. As for old age, old age is also not old age. This is like one's own words contradicting what one has obtained. Therefore, it is said in verse:\n\n\tOld age does not depart from old age,\n\tIn old age, there is nothing.\n\tThis nature of old age does not come into being,\n\tOther natures are also like this.\n\tTherefore, in one dharma,\n\tOld age is unattainable.\n\tAging, yet without old age,\n\tNeither self-nature nor other-nature.\n\tThis old age does not age itself,\n\tAll old age is also like this.\n\tIf old age has a separate difference,\n\tOld age would be endless.\n\tThe path of liberation and deliverance,\n\tIs self-sufficient as well.\n\tIf a dharma is apart from its self-nature,\n\tThe result is also unattainable.\n\n\t\tExplanation: As said about liberation (Nirvana). The many good dharmas, these can be said to be causal conditions. If the nature of those good dharmas is something obtained, how can they be said to be causal conditions? If so, then consciousness and so on can also be said to be causal conditions and something obtained. Why? Because their differential nature has no substance. The differential nature of consciousness is also not self-nature. Having the nature of good dharmas, because their self-nature is the causal condition of the nature of all good dharmas, there is no beneficial result in liberation." ] }
若善法性因有解脫者。如是決定舍離自體。何以故。以所立諸法入自體故。若不爾者。如前所說。云何不以不善解脫而成善法解脫所作。若如前說。善法解脫此亦不離有分別故。是故當知。彼一切法若已生若未生二解脫因。彼即不生。複次頌言。
已脫不可說 未脫不可說 脫未脫無說 脫時亦無說 此解脫若異 解脫即無窮 若無脫而脫 皆如是解脫
釋曰。若如是知。彼出離道亦然。具足如所生說。諸佛世尊。于契經中。有說頌言。
色法如聚沫 受即如浮泡 想同陽焰生 行如芭蕉相 識如彼幻法 顯示所立法 如夢如影像 亦同于響應
復說。于諸行中一切法無我即無自性。當知此中所言我者。即是自性別名。此中所說。彼真如法無有戲論。若說決定皆是虛誑妄取之法。
觀作者作業品第八
或有人言。前品所說。破一切法諸有所作。有為不成故。何得有無為。若作此說。何故與彼阿含相違。如佛世尊。于契經中。有說頌言。
應修善法行 勿修惡法行 修善法行人 二世安樂寂
如此頌意。即有作者作法。亦復有果。所說是實如所觀察。何故但言世俗。非勝義耶。
論者言。諸有作者。于勝義諦中。若實有若不實有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果善法自性因為有解脫，那麼就應該徹底捨棄自體（Atman，靈魂、真我）。為什麼呢？因為所建立的諸法都進入了自體之中。如果不是這樣，就如前面所說，為什麼不以不善的解脫來成就善法的解脫呢？如果像前面所說，善法的解脫也離不開分別。因此應當知道，所有這些法，無論是已生的還是未生的，都不是兩種解脫的原因，它們都不會產生解脫。接下來是頌文：
『已解脫不可說，未解脫不可說，解脫未解脫無說，解脫時亦無說。 此解脫若異，解脫即無窮，若無脫而脫，皆如是解脫。』
解釋說：如果這樣理解，那麼出離之道也是如此。完整地如所生起那樣宣說。諸佛世尊在契經中，有這樣的頌文：
『色法如聚沫（Kalaapa，聚集的泡沫），受即如浮泡（Bubbhula，水泡），想同陽焰生（Marici，海市蜃樓），行如芭蕉相（Kadali，芭蕉樹），識如彼幻法（Maya，幻術），顯示所立法，如夢如影像（Pratibimba，倒影），亦同于響應（Pratisrutka，回聲）。』
又說，在諸行（Samskara，一切有為法）中，一切法無我（Anatta，無自性），也就是沒有自性。應當知道，這裡所說的『我』，就是自性的別名。這裡所說，那真如法（Tathata，如實）沒有戲論（Prapanca，虛妄分別）。如果說有決定，那都是虛假的、妄取的法。
觀作者作業品第八
或者有人說，前面一品所說，破斥了一切法的諸有所作，因為有為法（Samskrta，有生滅變化的法）不能成立，怎麼會有無為法（Asamskrta，無生滅變化的法）呢？如果這樣說，為什麼與阿含（Agama，聖典）相違背呢？如佛世尊在契經中，有這樣的頌文：
『應修善法行，勿修惡法行，修善法行人，二世安樂寂。』
如此頌文的意思，就是有作者、作法，也有果。所說是真實的，如所觀察到的那樣。為什麼只說是世俗諦（Samvriti-satya，相對真理），而不是勝義諦（Paramartha-satya，絕對真理）呢？
論者說：諸有作者，在勝義諦中，無論是真實有還是不真實有。
【English Translation】 English version: If the nature of wholesome dharmas leads to liberation, then the self (Atman) should be definitively abandoned. Why? Because all established dharmas enter into the self. If this were not the case, as previously stated, why wouldn't liberation from unwholesome dharmas accomplish the liberation of wholesome dharmas? If it's as previously stated, then the liberation of wholesome dharmas is also inseparable from discrimination. Therefore, it should be known that all those dharmas, whether already arisen or not yet arisen, are not the cause of two liberations; they do not produce liberation. Furthermore, the verse states:
'The liberated cannot be spoken of, the unliberated cannot be spoken of, Liberation and non-liberation are unspeakable, the time of liberation is also unspeakable. If this liberation is different, liberation would be endless, If there is liberation without liberation, all are liberated in this way.'
Explanation: If it is understood in this way, then the path of renunciation is also the same. Fully explain it as it arises. The Buddhas, the World Honored Ones, in the sutras, have spoken this verse:
'Form is like a mass of foam (Kalaapa), sensation is like a floating bubble (Bubbhula), perception is like a mirage (Marici), formations are like the trunk of a banana tree (Kadali), consciousness is like an illusion (Maya), revealing the established dharmas, like a dream, like a reflection (Pratibimba), also like an echo (Pratisrutka).'
It is also said that in all formations (Samskara), all dharmas are without self (Anatta), which means without inherent existence. It should be known that the 'self' mentioned here is another name for inherent existence. What is said here is that suchness (Tathata) is without elaboration (Prapanca). If something is said to be definite, it is all false and falsely grasped dharmas.
Chapter Eight: Examining the Agent and the Action
Or someone might say, the previous chapter refuted all actions of all dharmas, because conditioned phenomena (Samskrta) cannot be established, how can there be unconditioned phenomena (Asamskrta)? If this is said, why does it contradict the Agamas (Agama)? As the Buddha, the World Honored One, said in the sutras, this verse:
'One should cultivate wholesome conduct, do not cultivate unwholesome conduct, Those who cultivate wholesome conduct, will have peace and happiness in both lives.'
The meaning of this verse is that there is an agent, an action, and also a result. What is said is true, as observed. Why is it only said to be conventional truth (Samvriti-satya) and not ultimate truth (Paramartha-satya)?
The commentator says: All agents, in ultimate truth, whether they truly exist or do not truly exist.
。若亦實亦不實有。作業亦然。若實有若不實有。亦實亦不實有。由如是故。而彼作者于所作中若實有作者。亦應實有作業。如是互推。作者作業皆無有實。若實不實二種俱于勝義諦中。無極微許決定實法。若作者有實。然亦無實作業可得。若作業有實。而彼作者亦不和合。複次頌言。
作者若有實 亦不作實業
釋曰。若如所說。何可信耶。故下頌言。
實所作無故 無所作差別
釋曰。若復止息善不善業。即所作不生。若所作中有二。作者亦復有二。亦非於所作中有能作者。此遣法自相。此復云何。故下頌言。
有業無作者
釋曰。若於作者作業中。執著所作生起。此即還成法自相相違。今當止遣。複次頌言。
無實所作故
釋曰。以無所生作用差別故。若復作用有所和合。即所作有二。業亦有二。亦非離其所作有業。此遣法自相。複次頌言。
有作者無業
釋曰。若所作業與作用法彼相離者。即能作所作二俱叢雜。此遣法自相。
復有人言。若有能作及作用法彼即有業生起。應可說為實有作者。以作者生時業亦無異。由有作用和合故。彼亦無別實有。此無過失。
論者言。何名無過。以作者作業及所用法彼能作所作悉無作故。此中若有能
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果作者既是真實的又是不真實的，那麼作業也是如此。如果作業是真實的或不真實的，那麼它既是真實的又是不真實的。正因為如此，如果那個作者在所作之中是真實的作者，那麼也應該有真實的作業。這樣互相推論，作者和作業都沒有真實的實體。如果真實和不真實這兩種情況都在勝義諦（Paramārtha-satya，最終真理）中，沒有極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）允許有決定性的真實法。如果作者有實體，然而也沒有真實的作業可以得到。如果作業有實體，那麼那個作者也不和合。 再者，偈頌說： 『作者若有實，亦不作實業』 解釋說：如果像所說的那樣，有什麼可以相信的呢？所以下面的偈頌說： 『實所作無故，無所作差別』 解釋說：如果停止善與不善的業，那麼所作就不會產生。如果所作中有兩種，作者也就會有兩種。也不是在所作中存在能作者。這排除了法的自相（svalakṣaṇa，自身獨有的特性）。這是什麼意思呢？所以下面的偈頌說： 『有業無作者』 解釋說：如果在作者和作業中，執著于所作的生起，這就會變成與法的自相相違背。現在應當停止排除。再者，偈頌說： 『無實所作故』 解釋說：因為沒有所生作用的差別。如果作用有所和合，那麼所作就會有兩種，業也會有兩種。也不是離開所作而存在業。這排除了法的自相。再者，偈頌說： 『有作者無業』 解釋說：如果所作業與作用法彼此分離，那麼能作者和所作者就會混雜在一起。這排除了法的自相。 又有人說：如果有能作者和作用法，那麼就會有業的生起，應該可以說作者是真實存在的。因為作者產生時，業也沒有不同。由於有作用的和合，所以它也沒有特別的實體。這沒有過失。 論者說：什麼叫做沒有過失？因為作者、作業和所用法，它們能作和所作都沒有作用的緣故。這裡如果存在能...
【English Translation】 English version: If the agent is both real and unreal, then the action is also the same. If the action is real or unreal, then it is both real and unreal. Because of this, if that agent is a real agent in what is done, then there should also be a real action. Thus, mutually inferring, neither the agent nor the action has any real substance. If both real and unreal exist in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), there is no atom (paramāṇu) that allows for a definitive real dharma. If the agent has substance, yet no real action can be obtained. If the action has substance, then that agent is also not in harmony. Furthermore, the verse says: 'If the agent is real, it also does not perform real action.' The explanation says: If it is as said, what can be believed? Therefore, the following verse says: 'Because there is no real action, there is no difference in what is done.' The explanation says: If one stops good and bad karma, then what is done will not arise. If there are two in what is done, then there will also be two agents. Nor is there an agent capable of acting in what is done. This excludes the self-characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) of dharmas. What does this mean? Therefore, the following verse says: 'There is action without an agent.' The explanation says: If, in the agent and the action, one clings to the arising of what is done, this will become contradictory to the self-characteristic of dharmas. Now one should stop excluding. Furthermore, the verse says: 'Because there is no real action.' The explanation says: Because there is no difference in the function of what is produced. If the function is in harmony, then there will be two in what is done, and there will also be two actions. Nor is there action apart from what is done. This excludes the self-characteristic of dharmas. Furthermore, the verse says: 'There is an agent without action.' The explanation says: If the action and the function of the action are separate from each other, then the agent and what is done will be mixed together. This excludes the self-characteristic of dharmas. Again, someone says: If there is an agent and the function of the action, then there will be the arising of action, and it should be said that the agent is real. Because when the agent arises, the action is also not different. Because there is a harmony of function, it also has no special substance. This has no fault. The debater says: What is called having no fault? Because the agent, the action, and what is used, their ability to act and what is done have no function. If there is an ability to...
作所作。過如先說。若無所作。能作亦無。以離所作故。此即云何。有其能作所作及所作業用。此如是故。余處亦然。隨應遮遣。今此文廣。恐繁且止。復有人言。作者所作之業不實可爾。而彼作者可應實有。今為對遣彼說。是故頌言。
作者亦無實
釋曰。若計作者作業為實。今此言中亦當止遣。複次頌言。
若實有作者 亦實有作業 作者及作業 二俱墮無因
釋曰。此言能作即是作者。此言所作即是其業。若或所作離於作者有業可作。如是亦當但有作者無所作時應有作業。有即無因。若作者作業墮無因性。即有一向過失。此應思擇。複次頌言。
若有果無因 因即非道理
釋曰。此言因者。即說為緣。若法有因轉時緣即隨攝。因若無體現事止息。此即是無。云何有義可攝於緣。此復云何。故下頌言。
作作者無體 作用不和合
釋曰。如斷薪等。若無所斷果體。彼能斷者及斷所用作具斧等皆不和合。斷所作用當何有依。彼無體故。作者作業無體亦然。此復云何。故下頌言。
若無法非法 所作等無體
釋曰。若離所作。能作作用即無有業。故下頌言。
法非法無故 從生果亦無
釋曰。此義云何。由此即無惡趣善趣及解脫道隨應
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『作所作』（已經完成的行為）。如先前所說。如果『無所作』（沒有完成的行為），那麼『能作』（能動者）也就不存在了，因為離開了『所作』的緣故。這是什麼意思呢？如果存在『能作』、『所作』以及『所作業用』（能動者的行為和作用），那麼情況就是這樣。其他地方也是如此，應該根據情況進行否定。現在這段文字內容廣泛，恐怕過於繁瑣，就此停止。又有人說，作者所作的業不真實是可以接受的，但是那個作者應該確實存在。現在爲了反駁那種說法，所以頌文說： 『作者亦無實』（作者也不是真實的）。 解釋說：如果認為作者和作業是真實的，那麼在這裡也應當否定這種觀點。再次，頌文說： 『若實有作者，亦實有作業，作者及作業，二俱墮無因』（如果確實存在作者，也確實存在作業，那麼作者和作業，兩者都將陷入無因的境地）。 解釋說：這裡說的『能作』就是作者，這裡說的『所作』就是其業。如果『所作』離開了作者而有業可以完成，那麼就應該只有作者而沒有『所作』的時候，也應該有作業產生，有作業產生就是無因。如果作者和作業陷入無因的性質，就存在一種片面的過失，這應該仔細思考。再次，頌文說： 『若有果無因，因即非道理』（如果有了結果卻沒有原因，那麼原因就不是合理的）。 解釋說：這裡說的『因』，就是指緣。如果法有因轉變的時候，緣就會隨之攝取。如果因沒有體現，事情就會停止。這就是沒有。怎麼會有意義可以被緣所攝取呢？這又是什麼意思呢？所以下面的頌文說： 『作作者無體，作用不和合』（能動者和作者沒有實體，作用也不會和諧）。 解釋說：比如砍柴等等。如果沒有被砍斷的柴的實體，那麼能砍斷者以及砍斷所用的工具斧頭等等，都不會和諧。砍斷的作用又將依靠什麼呢？因為它沒有實體。作者和作業沒有實體也是這樣。這又是什麼意思呢？所以下面的頌文說： 『若無法非法，所作等無體』（如果沒有法和非法，所作等等就沒有實體）。 解釋說：如果離開了『所作』，『能作』和作用就沒有業。所以下面的頌文說： 『法非法無故，從生果亦無』（因為法和非法都不存在，所以從它們產生的果也沒有）。 解釋說：這個意思是什麼呢？由此就沒有惡趣、善趣以及解脫之道等等。
【English Translation】 English version: 'What is done' (actions that have been completed). As previously stated. If there is 'nothing to be done' (no completed actions), then the 'doer' (agent) also does not exist, because it is separated from 'what is done'. What does this mean? If there exists a 'doer', 'what is done', and the 'function of what is done' (the actions and functions of the agent), then that is how it is. It is the same in other places, and should be negated accordingly. Now this text is extensive, and I fear it will be too cumbersome, so I will stop here. Furthermore, some say that it is acceptable that the actions done by the doer are not real, but that the doer should certainly exist. Now, in order to refute that view, the verse says: 'The doer is also not real'. Explanation: If one considers the doer and the action to be real, then this statement should also negate that view. Furthermore, the verse says: 'If there is truly a doer, and there is truly an action, the doer and the action, both fall into causelessness'. Explanation: Here, 'the doer' refers to the agent, and 'what is done' refers to the action. If 'what is done' is separated from the doer and there is an action that can be completed, then there should also be actions produced when there is only a doer and nothing 'to be done', and the production of actions would be causeless. If the doer and the action fall into the nature of causelessness, then there is a one-sided fault, which should be carefully considered. Furthermore, the verse says: 'If there is a result without a cause, then the cause is not reasonable'. Explanation: Here, 'cause' refers to condition. If a dharma (phenomenon) has a cause that transforms, then the condition will be included accordingly. If the cause is not manifested, the event will cease. This is non-existence. How can there be meaning that can be included by the condition? What does this mean? Therefore, the following verse says: 'The agent and the doer have no substance, and the function is not harmonious'. Explanation: For example, chopping firewood, etc. If there is no substance of the firewood being chopped, then the one who is chopping and the tool used for chopping, such as the axe, etc., will not be harmonious. What will the function of chopping rely on? Because it has no substance. It is the same with the doer and the action having no substance. What does this mean? Therefore, the following verse says: 'If there is no dharma (righteousness) and no non-dharma (unrighteousness), then what is done, etc., has no substance'. Explanation: If separated from 'what is done', the 'doer' and the function have no action. Therefore, the following verse says: 'Because dharma (righteousness) and non-dharma (unrighteousness) do not exist, the results arising from them also do not exist'. Explanation: What does this mean? Therefore, there is no evil path, good path, or path to liberation, etc., accordingly.
果等。複次頌言。
無果無解脫 亦無生天道 非唯生天道 解脫道亦無
釋曰。若爾世間諸有一切作用。皆悉墮于無果利中。世間果者如種子等。作用隨轉即能生果。彼若無體即無果利。
或有人言。如是所說作者無實。其義可爾。彼所作業此乃是實。以能作故。此無過失。
論者言。此何無過。今言作者。即是因之別名。業即是果。且非果法離因自體別有所作。如是若有作者作業。即有因有果。和合建立。今此如是作業不異於作者。作者不異於作業。故所作業而亦不離。以差別因彼無性故。此云何知。若法有緣及所作具。即因果性成。今此所說非不顯明。
或有人言。作者亦實亦不實故。作業亦實亦不實故。下頌答彼增上言。
作者實不實 亦不作二業 有無互相違 一處即無二
釋曰。於一法中有無二法和合作用。彼即無體。非道理故。如是決定和合作者作業亦不可得。以相違故亦非道理。複次頌言。
作作者作用 所作實非實 著即生過失 此因如先說
釋曰。此中應知。若實不實皆對待所說。故下頌言。
所作實不實 亦實亦不實 作者及作業 此因如先說 作者諸所作 非實非不實 應知業亦然 此因如先說
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 果報等。再次用偈頌說： 『沒有果報沒有解脫，也沒有往生天界之道， 不僅僅是沒有往生天界之道，連解脫之道也沒有。』 解釋：如果這樣，世間所有的一切作用，都將墮入沒有果報利益之中。世間的果報，比如種子等，作用隨著運轉就能產生果實。如果種子沒有實體，就沒有果報利益。 或者有人說：像這樣所說的作者沒有實體，這個意思可以成立。但作者所作的業卻是真實的，因為它能產生作用，這沒有過失。 論者說：這怎麼沒有過失？現在所說的作者，就是因的別名，業就是果。而且果法不能離開因的自體而另外有所作為。像這樣，如果有作者和作業，就有因和果，和合建立。現在這樣，作業不異於作者，作者不異於作業，所以所作業也不分離。因為差別的原因，它們沒有自性。這怎麼知道呢？如果法有緣和所作的工具，因果的性質就成立。現在所說的並非不明顯。 或者有人說：作者既是真實的也是不真實的，所以作業既是真實的也是不真實的。下面的偈頌回答他們，更進一步說： 『作者是真實與不真實，也不能作兩種業， 有和無互相違背，一個地方不可能同時存在兩種。』 解釋：在一個法中，有和無兩種法和合作用，它就沒有實體，因為不合道理。像這樣，決定和合的作者和作業也是不可能得到的，因為互相違背也不合道理。再次用偈頌說： 『作、作者、作用，所作是真實與不真實， 執著就會產生過失，這個原因如先前所說。』 解釋：這裡應該知道，真實與不真實都是對待而說的。所以下面的偈頌說： 『所作是真實與不真實，也是既真實又不真實， 作者和作業，這個原因如先前所說。 作者和所作，不是真實也不是不真實， 應該知道業也是這樣，這個原因如先前所說。』
【English Translation】 English version: Fruits and so on. Furthermore, the verse says: 'There is no fruit, no liberation, nor is there a path to be born in the heavens, Not only is there no path to be born in the heavens, but there is also no path to liberation.' Explanation: If that is the case, all actions in the world will fall into having no beneficial results. Worldly fruits, such as seeds, can produce fruits as their function turns. If they have no substance, there will be no beneficial results. Or someone might say: What is said about the agent being unreal is acceptable. But the action done by the agent is real, because it can produce an effect, and this is not a fault. The debater says: How is this not a fault? Now, the agent is just another name for the cause, and the action is the effect. Moreover, the law of effect cannot be separated from the self-nature of the cause to do something else. Thus, if there is an agent and an action, there is a cause and an effect, established in combination. Now, in this way, the action is not different from the agent, and the agent is not different from the action, so the action is also not separate. Because of the cause of difference, they have no self-nature. How is this known? If a dharma has conditions and the tools to be made, the nature of cause and effect is established. What is said now is not unclear. Or someone might say: The agent is both real and unreal, so the action is both real and unreal. The following verse answers them, saying further: 'The agent is real and unreal, and cannot perform two actions, Existence and non-existence contradict each other, and two cannot exist in one place.' Explanation: In one dharma, the two dharmas of existence and non-existence combine to function, and it has no substance, because it is unreasonable. Thus, a determined and combined agent and action are also impossible to obtain, because they contradict each other and are also unreasonable. Again, the verse says: 'Doing, agent, function, what is done is real and unreal, Attachment will cause faults, and the reason for this is as previously stated.' Explanation: It should be known here that real and unreal are both spoken of in relation to each other. Therefore, the following verse says: 'What is done is real and unreal, and also both real and unreal, The agent and the action, the reason for this is as previously stated. The agent and what is done, are neither real nor unreal, It should be known that the action is also like this, the reason for this is as previously stated.'
實所作即無 不實又無因 有無互相違 一處何有二
釋曰。此中所說三種對待。如生法說。是故應知。非佛世尊於一切處而悉止遣作者作業及諸作用。此即不墮諸無因過。
論者言。此實無過。我亦不說無其作者及彼作業。何以故。我欲表示作者作業互所成故。
複次頌言。
因作者有業 因業有作者
釋曰。應知此中隨轉施設皆無自體。作者作業。若成不成。離有離無。證成中義。世俗所得。故下頌言。
世俗遣異性 我見成就相
釋曰。若有人言。此與阿含相違者。彼因義不成。
有外人言。勝義諦中有其作者。何以故。如佛所說有能取所取故。
論者言。今為遮遣彼說故說。于彼諸作用中有其能取。若能取所取二法不壞。即作者隨轉亦不相離。如是應知。能取所取互所攝故。由是建立。因作者有業。因業有作者。是故因其能取而有所取。因所取故即有能取。此即非勝義諦。今復云何。離彼作者作業有遮遣邪。此中所作因義。若或止遣作者作業。彼能取所取。此亦應離。
複次頌言。
若勝義諦中 有作者作業 彼能取所取 此亦應遮遣 作者作業等 此義如是故 余法自及他 相因義應觀
釋曰。若果若因
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『實所作即無，不實又無因，有無互相違，一處何有二』 釋曰：此中所說的三種對待，如生法所說，因此應當知道，佛世尊並非在所有情況下都禁止作者、作業以及各種作用。這樣就不會陷入無因的過失。 論者言：這實際上沒有過失。我也不是說沒有作者和作業。為什麼呢？因為我想表明作者和作業是互相成就的。 複次頌言： 『因作者有業，因業有作者』 釋曰：應當知道，這裡所說的隨順流轉的施設都沒有自體。作者和作業，無論成就與否，都既不離有，也不離無，從而證明了中道的意義，這是世俗所能理解的。所以下面的頌文說： 『世俗遣異性，我見成就相』 釋曰：如果有人說，這與阿含經相違背，那麼他的因義就不能成立。 有外人說：在勝義諦（paramārtha-satya， ultimate truth）中存在作者。為什麼呢？因為佛陀說過有能取（grāhaka，the taker）和所取（grāhya，the taken）。 論者言：現在爲了駁斥他的說法，所以說，在這些作用中存在能取。如果能取和所取這兩種法不被破壞，那麼作者的隨順流轉也不會分離。應當知道，能取和所取是互相攝持的，因此才建立了『因作者有業，因業有作者』的說法。所以因為有能取才有所取，因為有所取才會有能取。這並非勝義諦。現在又怎麼能說，離開作者和作業就能遮遣邪見呢？這裡所說的因義，如果禁止作者和作業，那麼能取和所取也應該分離。 複次頌言： 『若勝義諦中，有作者作業，彼能取所取，此亦應遮遣，作者作業等，此義如是故，余法自及他，相因義應觀』 釋曰：無論是果還是因
【English Translation】 English version 'When something is truly made, it is non-existent; if unreal, there is no cause. Existence and non-existence contradict each other; how can two exist in one place?' Explanation: The three kinds of relationships mentioned here are as described in the law of birth. Therefore, it should be known that the World Honored One Buddha does not, in all circumstances, completely prohibit the maker, the making, and all actions. This avoids falling into the fault of causelessness. The debater says: This is actually not a fault. I am not saying that there is no maker or making. Why? Because I want to show that the maker and the making are mutually accomplished. Furthermore, the verse says: 'Because of the maker, there is making; because of the making, there is a maker.' Explanation: It should be known that all the provisional designations that follow here have no inherent existence. The maker and the making, whether accomplished or not, are neither apart from existence nor apart from non-existence, thus proving the meaning of the Middle Way (madhyamā-pratipadā, the Middle Way), which is understood by the mundane. Therefore, the following verse says: 'The mundane dispels otherness; I see the aspect of accomplishment.' Explanation: If someone says that this contradicts the Āgama (collection of early Buddhist texts), then their causal argument cannot be established. An outsider says: In the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), there is a maker. Why? Because the Buddha said that there is a taker (grāhaka) and a taken (grāhya). The debater says: Now, to refute their statement, it is said that in these actions there is a taker. If the two dharmas (phenomena) of the taker and the taken are not destroyed, then the following flow of the maker will not be separated either. It should be known that the taker and the taken are mutually inclusive, and therefore the statement 'because of the maker, there is making; because of the making, there is a maker' is established. So because there is a taker, there is a taken, and because there is a taken, there is a taker. This is not the ultimate truth. Now, how can it be said that by separating from the maker and the making, one can dispel wrong views? The causal meaning mentioned here, if the maker and the making are prohibited, then the taker and the taken should also be separated. Furthermore, the verse says: 'If in the ultimate truth, there is a maker and making, then the taker and the taken should also be prohibited. The maker, the making, etc., because this meaning is thus, the meaning of mutual dependence of other dharmas, self and others, should be observed.' Explanation: Whether it is the result or the cause
。能相所相。同生不同生等。因果二法物體有得。若言有因。即墮果數。如彼生法。若有義可取。即彼有性。若彼無者。非彼有生。色等諸法若無義可取。即彼無體可觀。何況因果離於自體而有力能。若離自體有力能者。即有所得相違。譬如離於泥團可有瓶邪。物體分位法中所起。此說即是瓶生泥團。譬如瓶水。無彼別異分位性故。亦非瓶如木故。又非泥團分位即說有瓶。猶如別瓶若自力能而有所得。此即相違。若樂等法因有力能。即有樂等果法。樂等有故即樂等差別有所發起。此中所說。有所得者。此說亦無少法相違。若離因果而有力能。說所成者。如是決定彼無力能成其因果。此即或成顛倒計執。或成決定。不共因中相違離因無體故。若不共因非一向成故。若因果和合。即物體有性。如是所說因果二法。此中應知非勝義諦。
大乘中觀釋論卷第七 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1567 大乘中觀釋論(第1卷-第9卷)
大乘中觀釋論卷第八
安慧菩薩造
譯經三藏朝散大夫試鴻臚卿光梵大師賜紫沙門臣惟凈等奉 詔譯
觀先分位品第九
前品中說。如作者作業。彼能取所取二法。亦互不相離施設有性。非勝義諦故。有異宗說此頌言。
眼耳等諸根 受等心所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：能相（能夠認知的主體）和所相（被認知的客體），它們是同時產生還是不同時產生等等問題，以及因和果這兩種事物本體是否存在獲得。如果說存在因，那麼因就落入了果的範疇，就像那生法一樣。如果存在某種意義可以把握，那麼就存在那種有性。如果不存在，那麼就不是那種有生。色等諸法如果不存在可以把握的意義，那麼它們就沒有本體可以觀察。更何況因果脫離了自身而具有力量和功能呢？如果脫離自身而具有力量和功能，那麼就與有所得相違背，譬如脫離了泥團而可能有瓶子嗎？事物本體在分位法中所產生，這種說法就是瓶子產生於泥團。譬如瓶子和水，沒有那種特別不同的分位性，也不是瓶子像木頭一樣。又不是泥團的分位就說是有了瓶子，猶如另外一個瓶子如果依靠自身的力量和功能而有所獲得，這就是相違背的。如果樂等法因具有力量和功能，那麼就存在樂等果法。因為樂等存在，所以樂等的差別就有所發起。這裡所說的有所得，這種說法也沒有絲毫的法相違背。如果脫離因果而具有力量和功能，說有所成就，那麼就可以斷定它們沒有力量和功能成就其因果。這就會造成顛倒的計執，或者造成斷定。在不共因中是相違背的，因為脫離了因就沒有本體。如果不共因不是一概成立的。如果因果和合，那麼事物本體就具有有性。像這樣所說的因果二法，這裡應當知道不是勝義諦（究竟真理）。
《大乘中觀釋論》卷第七 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1567 《大乘中觀釋論》(第1卷-第9卷)
《大乘中觀釋論》卷第八
安慧菩薩造
譯經三藏朝散大夫試鴻臚卿光梵大師賜紫沙門臣惟凈等奉 詔譯
觀先分位品第九
前品中說，如作者和作業，那能取（能認知者）和所取（被認知者）這兩種法，也互相不分離地施設為有自性，但不是勝義諦的緣故。有其他宗派說了這首偈頌：
眼耳等諸根 受等心所
【English Translation】 English version: The cognizer (that which cognizes) and the cognized (that which is cognized), whether they arise simultaneously or not, and whether the two entities of cause and effect have attainment. If it is said that there is a cause, then the cause falls into the category of effect, like that arising phenomenon. If there is some meaning that can be grasped, then there is that existence. If it does not exist, then it is not that arising. If phenomena such as form do not have a meaning that can be grasped, then they have no entity that can be observed. How much more so if cause and effect are separated from themselves and have power and function? If they are separated from themselves and have power and function, then it contradicts attainment, like whether there can be a pot separate from a lump of clay? The entity of a thing arises in the divisions of phenomena, and this saying is that the pot arises from the lump of clay. Like a pot and water, there is no such particularly different divisional nature, nor is the pot like wood. Also, it is not that the divisions of the lump of clay are said to have a pot, like another pot if it relies on its own power and function to have attainment, this is contradictory. If the cause of happiness and so on has power and function, then there are the effects of happiness and so on. Because happiness and so on exist, the differences of happiness and so on are initiated. What is said here to be attainment, this saying also has no phenomena that contradict. If separated from cause and effect and having power and function, saying that something is accomplished, then it can be determined that they have no power and function to accomplish their cause and effect. This will cause inverted clinging or cause determination. In non-common causes, it is contradictory, because separated from the cause there is no entity. If the non-common cause is not always established. If cause and effect are combined, then the entity of a thing has existence. Like this, the two phenomena of cause and effect that are spoken of, here it should be known that they are not the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya).
Mahāyāna Madhyamaka Śāstra, Volume 7 Taisho Tripitaka Volume 30, No. 1567 Mahāyāna Madhyamaka Śāstra (Volumes 1-9)
Mahāyāna Madhyamaka Śāstra, Volume 8
Composed by Bodhisattva Anhui (Sthiramati)
Translated by the Tripiṭaka Master Chao San Da Fu, Test Honglu Qing, Guangfan Master, Purple-Robed Śramaṇa Chen Weijing, etc., under Imperial Decree
Chapter 9: Examining Prior Divisions
In the previous chapter, it was said that like the agent and the action, the grasper (grāhaka, the one who grasps) and the grasped (grāhya, the one that is grasped), these two phenomena are also mutually inseparable and provisionally established as having inherent existence, but not because they are the ultimate truth. Other schools have said this verse:
Eyes, ears, and other sense faculties, feelings and other mental factors.
法 彼所取若成 有取者先住
釋曰有一宗人作如是說。彼說有因。故下頌言。
若無彼先住 何有眼耳等
釋曰。此中意樂先有物體。譬如織者。故下頌言。
以是故當知 先已有法住
釋曰若彼所取見等有法先住。乃有所取。如造器用。
複次頌言。
眼耳等諸根 受等心所法 有法先住者 以何可了知
釋曰。彼宗意者。應知有其他法能取。即有所取可得。
論者言。彼眼等根別異。所取先無其體。此義不成。此遣法差別。若或施設所取不有。即所施設物性無體。如無經緯即㲲等不成。此遣法自相。
複次頌言。
若離眼等根 有法先住者
釋曰見聞及受者。此等諸法若有先住。故下頌言。
應離眼耳根 有見等無疑
釋曰。今此非有。其眼根中無有見法可得和合。非離眼根有見法故。如是所說。余義亦然。離眼等根而有何法。若取若舍若異眼根。何有見聞。若無所取。或見或聞。云何可知。此是所見所聞。此是能見能聞。亦非眼等先有能見及受者可成。此復云何差別。見性不有體故。何以故。若離眼等有法先住能成見聞者。此即無住。若不離眼等有法先住。此乃見即是聞。亦非道理。非見分位滅故。若或如
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 法 『彼所取若成，有取者先住』 釋曰：有一宗人作如是說。彼說有因。故下頌言： 『若無彼先住，何有眼耳等』 釋曰：此中意樂先有物體。譬如織者。故下頌言： 『以是故當知，先已有法住』 釋曰：若彼所取見等有法先住。乃有所取。如造器用。 複次頌言： 『眼耳等諸根，受等心所法，有法先住者，以何可了知』 釋曰：彼宗意者。應知有其他法能取。即有所取可得。 論者言：彼眼等根別異。所取先無其體。此義不成。此遣法差別。若或施設所取不有。即所施設物性無體。如無經緯即㲲等不成。此遣法自相。 複次頌言： 『若離眼等根，有法先住者』 釋曰：見聞及受者。此等諸法若有先住。故下頌言： 『應離眼耳根，有見等無疑』 釋曰：今此非有。其眼根中無有見法可得和合。非離眼根有見法故。如是所說。余義亦然。離眼等根而有何法。若取若舍若異眼根。何有見聞。若無所取。或見或聞。云何可知。此是所見所聞。此是能見能聞。亦非眼等先有能見及受者可成。此復云何差別。見性不有體故。何以故。若離眼等有法先住能成見聞者。此即無住。若不離眼等有法先住。此乃見即是聞。亦非道理。非見分位滅故。若或如
【English Translation】 English version 法 (Dharma) 『If that which is taken is established, then the taker dwells first.』 Explanation: There is a certain school of thought that speaks thus. Their statement has a cause. Therefore, the following verse says: 『If that does not dwell first, how can there be eyes, ears, etc.?』 Explanation: Here, intention and joy have objects first, like a weaver. Therefore, the following verse says: 『Therefore, one should know that the Dharma (law, principle) already dwells first.』 Explanation: If that which is taken, such as seeing, has the Dharma (law, principle) dwelling first, then there is something to be taken, like making utensils. Furthermore, the verse says: 『The roots such as eyes and ears, mental functions such as reception, if the Dharma (law, principle) dwells first, how can it be known?』 Explanation: The intention of that school is that one should know that there are other Dharmas (laws, principles) that can take, and then that which is taken can be obtained. The debater says: Those roots such as eyes are different. That which is taken has no substance first. This meaning is not established. This rejects the difference of Dharmas (laws, principles). If one establishes that which is taken as non-existent, then the nature of the established thing has no substance. Like without warp and weft, the rug etc. cannot be made. This rejects the self-nature of Dharmas (laws, principles). Furthermore, the verse says: 『If apart from the roots such as eyes, the Dharma (law, principle) dwells first,』 Explanation: Seeing, hearing, and receiving. If these Dharmas (laws, principles) dwell first, therefore, the following verse says: 『There should be seeing etc. apart from the eyes and ears, without doubt.』 Explanation: Now this is not the case. In the eye-root, there is no seeing-Dharma (law, principle) that can be obtained and combined. It is not because there is a seeing-Dharma (law, principle) apart from the eye-root. As it is said, the remaining meaning is also thus. Apart from the roots such as eyes, what Dharma (law, principle) is there? If taking, if abandoning, if different from the eye-root, how can there be seeing and hearing? If there is nothing to be taken, or seeing or hearing, how can it be known? This is what is seen and heard. This is what can see and hear. Also, it cannot be established that the eyes etc. have the ability to see and receive first. How is this different? Because the nature of seeing has no substance. Why? If apart from the eyes etc., the Dharma (law, principle) dwells first and can establish seeing and hearing, then this is without dwelling. If the Dharma (law, principle) dwells first not apart from the eyes etc., then this seeing is hearing. This is also not reasonable. It is not because the division of seeing is extinguished. If perhaps like
是能見眼根與所見相不相離者。是故離眼等根亦無所取。何有能取。若見若聞。若離所取。復何能取。或有頌言。
一切眼等根 實無法先住
釋曰。云何一一根有法先住。故下頌言。
眼等根所取 異相復異種
釋曰。此非眼等彼一一根先有法住。複次頌言。
若眼等諸根 無法先住者 彼眼等諸根 當云何先有
釋曰。若一一根決定有法而先住者。此乃先復有先。若爾為即為離邪。今此如是。亦非眼根之前先有彼余耳等諸根。彼等未有成故。此復云何。故下頌言。
若見即聞者 聞者即受者 一一有先住 如是非道理
釋曰。非離見分位中有彼聞者受者而得和合。亦非先有眼等諸根見性可得。眼等相違故。
複次頌言。
若見聞各異 受者亦復異 見時若能聞 即成多我體
釋曰。若眼等一一根。先各有異。即見聞各異。受者亦異。若或見等次第所成。如是若有見即能聞者。此乃因見有聞。此復云何。以各別相續成多我體。若言別有取者。此應觀察。彼宗引云。如佛所言。名色緣六處。而彼色者四大所成。即有能取所取。是故實有取者分位。由眼等根與六處和合次第。乃有受法生起。
複次頌言。
眼耳等諸根
{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本：\n\n問：能見的眼根與所見的景像是不相分離的嗎？因此，離開了眼等根，也就沒有什麼可以獲取的了，又哪裡存在能獲取的主體呢？無論是見，還是聞，如果離開了所要獲取的對象，又憑什麼去獲取呢？或者有頌詞說：\n\n『一切眼等根，實無法先住。』\n\n解釋：為什麼說每一個根都有法先存在呢？所以下面的頌詞說：\n\n『眼等根所取，異相復異種。』\n\n解釋：這並非是眼等每一個根先有法存在。進一步，頌詞說：\n\n『若眼等諸根，無法先住者，\n彼眼等諸根，當云何先有？』\n\n解釋：如果每一個根都決定有法先存在，那麼這就成了先有之先了。如果是這樣，是即還是離呢？現在就像這樣，也不是在眼根之前先有其他的耳等諸根，因為它們還沒有形成。這又是什麼道理呢？所以下面的頌詞說：\n\n『若見即聞者，聞者即受者，\n一一有先住，如是非道理。』\n\n解釋：不是離開了見的分位，就有其他的聞者、受者而能夠和合。也不是先有眼等諸根的見性可以得到，因為眼等是相互違背的。\n\n進一步，頌詞說：\n\n『若見聞各異，受者亦復異，\n見時若能聞，即成多我體。』\n\n解釋：如果眼等每一個根，先各有差異，那麼見和聞就各自不同，受者也不同。如果或者見等是次第所成的，像這樣如果有見就能聞，那麼這就是因為見而有聞。這又是什麼道理呢？因為各自不同的相續成就了多個我的存在。如果說另外有獲取者，這應該觀察。他們的宗派引用說，如佛所說：『名色緣六處』（Namarupe hetu paccaya salayatanam），而其中的色（Rupa）是由四大（Mahabhuta）所組成的，即有能取和所取。因此，確實存在獲取者的分位，通過眼等根與六處（Salayatana）的和合次第，才會有受法生起。\n\n進一步，頌詞說：\n\n眼耳等諸根，", "English version:\n\nQuestion: Is the seeing eye-faculty inseparable from the seen object? Therefore, apart from the eye and other faculties, there is nothing to be grasped, and where is there a grasping subject? Whether it is seeing or hearing, if it is apart from the object to be grasped, how can it be grasped? Or there is a verse that says:\n\n'All eye and other faculties, truly no dharma dwells in them beforehand.'\n\nExplanation: Why is it said that each faculty has a dharma dwelling in it beforehand? Therefore, the following verse says:\n\n'What the eye and other faculties grasp, are different in appearance and different in kind.'\n\nExplanation: It is not that each of the eye and other faculties has a dharma dwelling in it beforehand. Furthermore, the verse says:\n\n'If the eye and other faculties, have no dharma dwelling in them beforehand,\nHow can these eye and other faculties, exist beforehand?'\n\nExplanation: If each faculty definitely has a dharma dwelling in it beforehand, then this becomes a prior to the prior. If that is the case, is it the same or different? Now it is like this, it is not that before the eye-faculty there are other ear and other faculties, because they have not yet formed. What is the reason for this? Therefore, the following verse says:\n\n'If seeing is hearing, and hearing is receiving,\nAnd each exists beforehand, this is not reasonable.'\n\nExplanation: It is not that apart from the aspect of seeing, there are other hearers and receivers who can come together. Nor is it that the seeing nature of the eye and other faculties can be obtained beforehand, because the eye and others are contradictory.\n\nFurthermore, the verse says:\n\n'If seeing and hearing are different, and the receiver is also different,\nIf one can hear while seeing, then it becomes multiple selves.'\n\nExplanation: If each of the eye and other faculties is different beforehand, then seeing and hearing are different, and the receiver is also different. If seeing and others are formed in sequence, like this, if there is seeing then there is hearing, then this is because of seeing that there is hearing. What is the reason for this? Because each different continuum becomes multiple selves. If it is said that there is another grasper, this should be observed. Their school quotes, as the Buddha said: 'Name and form are the condition for the six sense bases (Namarupe hetu paccaya salayatanam),' and the form (Rupa) is composed of the four great elements (Mahabhuta), that is, there is a grasper and a grasped. Therefore, there is indeed a division of the grasper, through the combination of the eye and other faculties with the six sense bases (Salayatana) in sequence, then the reception of dharma arises.\n\nFurthermore, the verse says:\n\nThe eye, ear, and other faculties," "專有名詞解釋：\n名色(Namarupe): 佛教術語，指精神現象和物質現象的結合。\n六處(Salayatana): 佛教術語，指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六種感覺器官。\n色(Rupa): 佛教術語，指物質現象。\n四大(Mahabhuta): 佛教術語，指地、水、火、風四種基本元素。" ] }
受等心所法 彼從諸大生 彼大無先住
釋曰。彼能取性畢竟說者。云何離彼所取先有大種所成。若爾即非所取。以能取非所取成故。若所取如是決定有彼所取性者。如秤低昂。即因果生滅離所取法。彼同時性如是決定。能取差別即有多性可得。非無差別一性同生。以離所取有所成故。若或大種所取隨生。即無法先住。若彼大種無先住者。云何大種所成眼等諸根有其所取。亦非能取所取中間決定有法可得。
複次頌言。
眼耳等諸根 受等心所法 若無先住者 眼等亦應無
釋曰。若眼等諸根無法先住者。即無有法能取所取。即何有眼等能取相待因性。
有人言。應知能取無性可得。此即是為發生正見舍離邪見。如佛所言。若法有性皆如幻化。此即正見。若法無性如幻化者。此即邪見。此中頌言。
彼眼等先無 今後亦復無 以三時無故 有性皆息滅
釋曰。諸有分別于勝義諦中悉不成故。若有分別皆是世俗施設所得。勝義諦中即無分別。遣有性故。世俗諦中有所得法。皆如幻化。如前所言。有法先住者。即是邪見所說。此無相違。
觀薪火品第十
複次所作。如說薪火物體有性。非如作者作業一向對待所成。若薪火二法決定有性無性。如作者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 受等心所法 彼從諸大生 彼大無先住
釋曰。彼能取性畢竟說者。云何離彼所取先有大種（Mahābhūta，組成物質世界的基本元素）所成。若爾即非所取。以能取非所取成故。若所取如是決定有彼所取性者。如秤低昂。即因果生滅離所取法。彼同時性如是決定。能取差別即有多性可得。非無差別一性同生。以離所取有所成故。若或大種所取隨生。即無法先住。若彼大種無先住者。云何大種所成眼等諸根有其所取。亦非能取所取中間決定有法可得。
複次頌言。
眼耳等諸根 受等心所法 若無先住者 眼等亦應無
釋曰。若眼等諸根無法先住者。即無有法能取所取。即何有眼等能取相待因性。
有人言。應知能取無性可得。此即是為發生正見舍離邪見。如佛所言。若法有性皆如幻化。此即正見。若法無性如幻化者。此即邪見。此中頌言。
彼眼等先無 今後亦復無 以三時無故 有性皆息滅
釋曰。諸有分別于勝義諦（Paramārtha-satya，最高真理）中悉不成故。若有分別皆是世俗施設所得。勝義諦中即無分別。遣有性故。世俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）中有所得法。皆如幻化。如前所言。有法先住者。即是邪見所說。此無相違。
觀薪火品第十
複次所作。如說薪火物體有性。非如作者作業一向對待所成。若薪火二法決定有性無性。如作者
【English Translation】 English version The Mental Factors such as Feeling They arise from the great elements; those great elements have no prior existence.
Explanation: If the nature of the 'taker' (grasper) is ultimately asserted, how can it be formed apart from the pre-existing great elements (Mahābhūta) that are the 'taken' (grasped)? If so, then it is not the 'taken,' because the 'taker' is formed by what is not the 'taken.' If the 'taken' is definitively asserted to have the nature of the 'taken,' like the rise and fall of a scale, then the arising and ceasing of cause and effect are separate from the 'taken' phenomena. If their simultaneous nature is thus definitive, then multiple natures can be obtained in the differences of the 'taker,' not a single, undifferentiated nature arising simultaneously, because it is formed apart from the 'taken.' If the 'taken' arises following the great elements, then there is no prior existence of phenomena. If those great elements have no prior existence, how can the sense faculties such as the eyes, formed by the great elements, have their 'taken'? Nor can a definitive phenomenon be obtained between the 'taker' and the 'taken.'
Furthermore, the verse says:
The sense faculties such as eyes and ears, And mental factors such as feeling; If there is no prior existence, Then the eyes, etc., should also not exist.
Explanation: If the sense faculties such as the eyes have no prior existence of phenomena, then there is no phenomenon that can take or be taken. Then how can the eyes, etc., have the causal nature of mutual dependence as 'takers'?
Some say: It should be known that the 'taker' has no obtainable nature. This is to generate right view and abandon wrong view. As the Buddha said: If phenomena have nature, they are all like illusions. This is right view. If phenomena have no nature, like illusions, this is wrong view. Here, the verse says:
Those eyes, etc., did not exist before, Nor do they exist now or later; Because they do not exist in the three times, All inherent existence is extinguished.
Explanation: All conceptualizations are not established in the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya). If there are conceptualizations, they are all obtained through conventional designation. In the ultimate truth, there is no conceptualization, because inherent existence is refuted. In conventional truth (Saṃvṛti-satya), all obtainable phenomena are like illusions. As previously stated, asserting that phenomena have prior existence is what is said by wrong view. There is no contradiction here.
Chapter Ten: Examining Fuel and Fire
Furthermore, what is made, such as saying that fuel and fire have inherent existence, is not formed solely through the mutual dependence of agent and action. If fuel and fire definitively have or do not have inherent existence, like the agent
作業此即不成。
此中應問。若欲令其薪火二法物體有性者。為一性邪。為復多性有所得邪。此義云何。是故頌言。
若火即是薪 作作者一性
釋曰。有所安立。此說畢竟。此言薪者。因薪能作於火燒時此有薪之業用。薪火非一。是故作者作業非一性故。如陶師與瓶。此遣法自相。薪火若一性者。即能燒所燒薪火二法不得和合。此遣法差別。故下頌言。
若薪異於火 離薪應有火
釋曰。此中意者。若異法異性現事止息。即無能燒所燒。若火燒時薪即不有即無所起。此應思擇。若無起時彼即無性。亦非無薪有火可見。若異於薪亦不見有因待之法。是故無異。如無經緯即㲲等不成。
複次頌言。
異即應常然 火不因薪故 薪即復無功 此業用相違
釋曰。雖有他法不相因待。不因彼薪火自燒故。
複次頌言。
火若常然者 然火功相違 此如先所說 離薪別有火
釋曰。若無其薪火常然者。此即無因。若爾離薪常然乃可安立。若火常然能發起者。彼然火具等諸相施作而悉相違。如是即無作業功用。有薪亦無因待起處。即所燒相業用無體。若謂燒時離火有薪。火不滅時異薪無體。若無有異。此豈無過。云何燒時中有其薪。若無所燒之薪
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這（作業）就不能成立。
這裡應該提問。如果想要讓薪（fuel，燃料）和火（fire）這兩種物體具有自性（svabhāva，自身存在的性質），那麼它們是一體的自性呢？還是多種自性可以獲得呢？這個道理是什麼？所以頌文說：
『如果火就是薪，作者和作業就是一體的自性』
解釋說：有所安立，這是最終的說法。這裡說的薪，是因為薪能夠產生火，在燃燒的時候具有薪的作用。薪和火不是一體的。因此，作者（cause，因）和作業（effect，果）不是一體的自性。就像陶師和瓶子一樣。這排除了法的自相。如果薪和火是一體的自性，那麼能燒的和所燒的薪和火這兩種法就不能和合。這排除了法的差別。所以下面的頌文說：
『如果薪異於火，離開薪應該有火』
解釋說：這裡的意思是，如果異法（different dharma，不同的法）和異性（different nature，不同的性質）的現象停止，就沒有能燒的和所燒的。如果火燃燒的時候薪就不存在，那就沒有所產生的。這應該仔細思考。如果沒有產生的時候，它就沒有自性。也沒有不依靠薪而能看到火的情況。如果火異於薪，也看不到有依靠的法。因此，火和薪不是相異的。就像沒有經緯就不能形成㲲（一種毛織物）一樣。
再次，頌文說：
『相異就應該常燃，火不依賴於薪的緣故。 薪也就沒有作用，這作業的作用是相違背的。』
解釋說：即使有其他的法不互相依賴，因為不依賴於薪，火自己就能燃燒。
再次，頌文說：
『如果火是常燃的，那麼燃燒火的作用就相違背。 這就像先前所說的，離開薪另外有火。』
解釋說：如果沒有薪，火是常燃的，那麼這就沒有原因。如果這樣，離開薪而常燃才可以成立。如果火是常燃的，能夠發起燃燒，那麼燃燒火的工具等各種現象的施作就都互相違背。這樣就沒有作業的功用。有薪也沒有依靠產生的處所。也就是所燒的現象和作用沒有實體。如果說燃燒的時候離開火有薪，火不熄滅的時候不同的薪就沒有實體。如果沒有不同，這難道沒有過失嗎？為什麼燃燒的時候中間有薪？如果沒有所燒的薪？
【English Translation】 English version: This (the task) cannot be established.
Here, one should ask: If one wishes to assert that fuel (śālaka, wood) and fire (agni) as two entities possess inherent existence (svabhāva), are they of one single inherent existence, or can multiple inherent existences be obtained? What is the meaning of this? Therefore, the verse says:
'If fire is identical to fuel, the agent and the action are of one single nature.'
Explanation: There is something established; this is the ultimate statement. The term 'fuel' here refers to the fact that fuel can produce fire, and it has the function of fuel during combustion. Fuel and fire are not identical. Therefore, the agent (cause) and the action (effect) are not of the same nature. Just like a potter and a pot. This eliminates the self-characteristic of dharmas. If fuel and fire were of the same nature, then the burning and the burnt, fuel and fire, these two dharmas could not combine. This eliminates the difference of dharmas. Therefore, the following verse says:
'If fuel is different from fire, there should be fire apart from fuel.'
Explanation: The meaning here is that if the phenomena of different dharmas (different dharma) and different natures (different nature) cease, there would be no burning and no burnt. If the fuel does not exist when the fire is burning, then there is nothing produced. This should be carefully considered. If there is no production, then it has no inherent existence. Nor can fire be seen without relying on fuel. If fire is different from fuel, one cannot see a dharma that is dependent. Therefore, fire and fuel are not different. Just as without warp and weft, a rug (a type of woolen fabric) cannot be formed.
Again, the verse says:
'If different, it should burn constantly, because fire does not depend on fuel. Then the fuel would have no function, and this action's function is contradictory.'
Explanation: Even if there are other dharmas that do not depend on each other, because it does not depend on fuel, fire can burn by itself.
Again, the verse says:
'If fire is constantly burning, then the function of burning fire is contradictory. This is like what was said earlier, there is fire separate from fuel.'
Explanation: If there is no fuel and the fire is constantly burning, then there is no cause. If so, it can be established that it burns constantly apart from fuel. If the fire is constantly burning and can initiate burning, then the application of the tools for burning fire and other phenomena would all be contradictory. Thus, there would be no function of action. Having fuel also has no place to rely on for arising. That is, the phenomenon and function of what is being burned have no substance. If it is said that there is fuel apart from fire during burning, and different fuel has no substance when the fire does not go out. If there is no difference, is there no fault in this? Why is there fuel in the middle of burning? If there is no fuel to be burned?
異火有者。當火燒時薪亦遍有。火若遍有。如是當知。薪無異性。此應思擇。若言燒時不有薪者。是故薪火俱無異性。若謂燒時有薪。此非道理。
複次頌言。
異火即不到
釋曰。與到相違故。如別物體。故下頌言。
不到即不燒
釋曰。譬如別薪。故下頌言。
不燒即不滅
釋曰。若薪盡即火滅。其或離薪即然火不成。故下頌言。
不滅即常住
釋曰。若自體常然者。如積土塊。云何離火而有薪邪。以異不到故。若言薪在火中。此亦不然。
複次頌言。
若異薪有火 即薪能到火 如此人至彼 彼人至此人
釋曰。如是決定與到相違。若如是說喻即不成。此乃有所得相違之言。
複次頌言。
若異薪有火 欲令薪到火 彼二互相離 薪火何能到
釋曰。如彼人此人勿以一性異性取其物體。彼若有者。即互相因待若其無體。如石女兒。若法因待而有。如是乃有能取所取。亦不可說一性異性。物體有性此即成就。
複次頌言。
若因薪有火 亦因火有薪
釋曰。能燒所燒二不可得。故下頌言。
二何法先成 薪火相因有
釋曰。此畢竟說。彼二先後俱無體故。此意即。是無相因待。若
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『異火有者』（擁有不同火焰的人）。當火焰燃燒時，木柴也普遍存在。如果火焰普遍存在，就應當知道，木柴沒有不同的性質。這應該仔細思考。如果說燃燒時沒有木柴，那麼木柴和火焰就沒有不同的性質。如果說燃燒時有木柴，這不合道理。
進一步，頌文說：
『異火即不到』（不同的火焰不會到達）。
解釋：因為與到達相反。如同不同的物體。所以下面的頌文說：
『不到即不燒』（不到達就不會燃燒）。
解釋：譬如不同的木柴。所以下面的頌文說：
『不燒即不滅』（不燃燒就不會熄滅）。
解釋：如果木柴燒盡，火焰就會熄滅。如果離開木柴，火焰就無法形成。所以下面的頌文說：
『不滅即常住』（不熄滅就常住）。
解釋：如果自體常然，就像堆積的土塊。怎麼能離開火焰而有木柴呢？因為不同的火焰不會到達。如果說木柴在火焰中，這也是不對的。
進一步，頌文說：
『若異薪有火，即薪能到火，如此人至彼，彼人至此人』（如果不同的木柴有火焰，那麼木柴就能到達火焰，就像這個人到那個人那裡，那個人到這個人這裡）。
解釋：這樣就確定與到達相反。如果這樣說，比喻就不成立。這是有所得的相反之言。
進一步，頌文說：
『若異薪有火，欲令薪到火，彼二互相離，薪火何能到』（如果不同的木柴有火焰，想要讓木柴到達火焰，但它們互相分離，木柴和火焰怎麼能到達呢）。
解釋：就像那個人和這個人，不要用一性或異性來取其物體。如果它們有，就互相依賴。如果它們沒有實體，就像石女兒（虛構的人物）。如果法因依賴而有，這樣才有能取和所取。也不能說是一性或異性。物體有自性，這就成立了。
進一步，頌文說：
『若因薪有火，亦因火有薪』（如果因為木柴有火焰，也因為火焰有木柴）。
解釋：能燒和所燒二者都不可得。所以下面的頌文說：
『二何法先成，薪火相因有』（哪一個先成立呢？木柴和火焰互相依賴而有）。
解釋：這是最終的說法。因為它們二者先後都沒有實體。這個意思是，沒有互相依賴。如果...
【English Translation】 English version 『The one who possesses different fires.』 When the fire burns, the firewood is also universally present. If the fire is universally present, then it should be known that the firewood has no different nature. This should be carefully considered. If it is said that there is no firewood when burning, then the firewood and fire have no different nature. If it is said that there is firewood when burning, this is not reasonable.
Furthermore, the verse says:
『Different fire does not reach.』
Explanation: Because it is contrary to reaching. Like different objects. Therefore, the following verse says:
『Not reaching means not burning.』
Explanation: For example, different firewood. Therefore, the following verse says:
『Not burning means not extinguishing.』
Explanation: If the firewood is exhausted, the fire will be extinguished. If separated from the firewood, the fire cannot be formed. Therefore, the following verse says:
『Not extinguishing means constantly abiding.』
Explanation: If the self-nature is constantly burning, like a pile of earth clods. How can there be firewood apart from fire? Because different fires do not reach. If it is said that the firewood is in the fire, this is also not correct.
Furthermore, the verse says:
『If different firewood has fire, then the firewood can reach the fire, just as this person goes to that person, and that person comes to this person.』
Explanation: Thus, it is determined to be contrary to reaching. If it is said in this way, the analogy is not established. This is a contradictory statement of something obtained.
Furthermore, the verse says:
『If different firewood has fire, wanting the firewood to reach the fire, but the two are separated from each other, how can the firewood and fire reach each other?』
Explanation: Like that person and this person, do not use one nature or different nature to take their objects. If they exist, they depend on each other. If they have no substance, like a barren woman's child. If a dharma exists due to dependence, then there is a taker and a taken. It cannot be said to be one nature or different nature. If objects have self-nature, then this is established.
Furthermore, the verse says:
『If fire exists because of firewood, then firewood also exists because of fire.』
Explanation: The burner and the burned are both unattainable. Therefore, the following verse says:
『Which of the two is established first? Firewood and fire exist due to mutual dependence.』
Explanation: This is the ultimate statement. Because neither of the two has substance before or after. This means that there is no mutual dependence. If...
彼二法有異性先成。即有薪火相因。若其無者。此非道理。
複次頌言。
若因薪有火 火即成覆成
釋曰。此中何因有彼薪火。相因道理。故下頌言。
亦非不有薪 而有火可得
釋曰。火不因薪。彼無體故。火亦如是。若先有所成。復因薪而有。此即云何。二法互相因待先後可得。若此所得同時發起。亦非互相因待道理。此復云何。故下頌言。
若法有因待 是法還成待
釋曰。若彼二相因者。即彼薪火二相還成待法。此應思察故下頌言。
二法無所成 已成云何待
此義云何。
複次頌言。
若未成有待 未成當何待
釋曰。未成即無體。因待亦無體。故下頌言。
若因待有成 自待非道理
釋曰。若自體有成復。何所成彼。薪火相因是。義不成。
複次頌言。
二因成無體 無不因薪火
釋曰。若不因薪。火應常然。故下頌言。
因薪火亦無
釋曰。先後相因而不成故。故下頌言。
因火亦無薪
釋曰。亦非燒時有薪。彼無體故。
複次毗世師言。有不見相極微之火。有業及業用。二法差別。是中先有一分和合。如是乃有薪一分來發起火相。故頌遣言。
火不餘
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 彼二法（薪與火）的異性先已存在，即有薪與火相互依存的關係。如果不是這樣，那就沒有道理了。
進一步用頌文來說明：
『如果因為薪而有火，那麼火就已經存在並且再次存在。』
解釋：這裡是什麼原因導致薪與火之間存在相互依存的道理呢？因此下面的頌文說：
『沒有薪而能得到火，也是不可能的。』
解釋：火不依賴於薪，因為它沒有實體。火也是如此。如果先前已經有所成就，又因為薪而存在，這又該如何解釋呢？兩種法互相依賴，先後才能成立。如果這種成立是同時發生的，那也就沒有互相依賴的道理了。這又該如何解釋呢？因此下面的頌文說：
『如果法有所依賴，那麼這個法反過來也成為依賴。』
解釋：如果那兩種事物相互依賴，那麼薪與火這兩種事物就反過來成為依賴法。對此應該仔細思考，因此下面的頌文說：
『兩種法都沒有成就，已經成就的又如何依賴？』
這是什麼意思呢？
進一步用頌文來說明：
『如果未成就而有依賴，未成就的又依賴什麼呢？』
解釋：未成就即沒有實體，依賴也沒有實體。因此下面的頌文說：
『如果因為依賴而有成就，自身依賴就沒有道理。』
解釋：如果自體有所成就，又成就了什麼呢？薪與火相互依賴的意義不能成立。
進一步用頌文來說明：
『兩種原因成就了無實體，沒有不依賴薪火的。』
解釋：如果不依賴薪，火應該常燃。因此下面的頌文說：
『因為薪，火也不存在。』
解釋：先後相互依賴而不能成立。因此下面的頌文說：
『因為火，薪也不存在。』
解釋：也不是燃燒時才有薪，因為它沒有實體。
進一步，毗世師（Vaisheshika，印度哲學流派）說，有看不見的極微之火，有業（karma，行為）以及業用（function of karma，行為的功能），兩種法的差別。其中先有一部分和合，這樣才有薪的一部分來引發火相。因此用頌文來否定說：
『火不剩餘。』
【English Translation】 English version: Those two dharmas (fuel and fire) have distinct natures that pre-exist, meaning there is a relationship of mutual dependence between fuel and fire. If this were not the case, it would be unreasonable.
Furthermore, the verse states:
'If fire exists because of fuel, then fire already exists and exists again.'
Explanation: What is the reason here that there is a principle of mutual dependence between fuel and fire? Therefore, the following verse says:
'It is also not possible to have fire without fuel.'
Explanation: Fire does not depend on fuel because it has no substance. The same is true for fire. If something has already been accomplished and then exists because of fuel, how can this be explained? Two dharmas mutually depend on each other, and only then can they be established sequentially. If this establishment occurs simultaneously, then there is no principle of mutual dependence. How can this be explained? Therefore, the following verse says:
'If a dharma has dependence, then that dharma in turn becomes dependence.'
Explanation: If those two things are mutually dependent, then fuel and fire become dependent dharmas in return. This should be carefully considered, therefore the following verse says:
'Two dharmas are not accomplished; how can what is already accomplished depend?'
What does this mean?
Furthermore, the verse states:
'If what is not accomplished has dependence, what does what is not accomplished depend on?'
Explanation: What is not accomplished has no substance, and dependence also has no substance. Therefore, the following verse says:
'If accomplishment exists because of dependence, self-dependence is unreasonable.'
Explanation: If the self is accomplished, what is accomplished again? The meaning of fuel and fire depending on each other cannot be established.
Furthermore, the verse states:
'Two causes accomplish no substance; there is nothing that does not depend on fuel and fire.'
Explanation: If it does not depend on fuel, fire should burn constantly. Therefore, the following verse says:
'Because of fuel, fire also does not exist.'
Explanation: Mutual dependence sequentially cannot be established. Therefore, the following verse says:
'Because of fire, fuel also does not exist.'
Explanation: It is not that fuel exists only when burning, because it has no substance.
Furthermore, the Vaisheshika (a school of Indian philosophy) says that there is unseen atomic fire, and there is karma (action) and the function of karma (function of action), the difference between the two dharmas. Among them, first there is a combination of one part, and then a part of the fuel comes to initiate the appearance of fire. Therefore, the verse is used to negate, saying:
'Fire does not remain.'
處來
論者言。今此何因業用和合。以差別因性所生故。若有分位業用生起。即彼分位。彼彼方處各各差別。汝先說言一分和合。此非道理。以業無依故。亦非起時。若合若離差別因性業用分位有所生起。亦非離所起時別有對待因性可得。生時如是果體作用。此中亦非先無差別。亦非法差別因。中間一分無體。亦非中間一分而得和合。於差別中若有一分和合。即俱時分位所作相違。亦無壞其業用。所生道理或有害故。若計滅有所得。即彼物體還復墮於差別法中。是故當知。火不從彼余處而來。亦無如是自差別所作一分有體和合。云何于彼差別不差別中。計著多性。又一分中亦有所著。又于無分位中著火有性。如是薪火二法。此應思擇。如前已說。次下頌言。
薪中亦無火
釋曰。離火亦無差別因性。彼火因果無異性火故。此應思擇。又復能取發起所得。彼即不有。是故無別異性薪從余處而來至火。亦非無火。故下頌言。
余法亦復然 如去來品說
釋曰。若或無薪。云何得有能燒所燒。若有所燒時。非無能燒。亦無能燒中有能燒發起。若有能燒時。非無所燒。是故無能燒所燒亦非相離。◎
大乘中觀釋論卷第八 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1567 大乘中觀釋論(第1卷-
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
論者說：『現在這是什麼原因導致業和作用的和合呢？』因為是由差別因性所產生的緣故。如果存在分位業用生起，那麼就在那個分位，在各個不同的地方各有差別。你先前說的是一部分和合，這不合道理，因為業沒有所依。也不是在生起的時候。無論是合還是離，差別因性的業用分位有所生起。也不是離開所生起的時候，另外存在對待因性可以獲得。生起的時候是這樣，果體的作用也是這樣。這裡面也不是先前沒有差別。也不是法差別因。中間一部分沒有自體。也不是中間一部分而得到和合。在差別中如果有一部分和合，就與俱時分位所作的相違背。也沒有破壞它的業用。所產生的道理或者有害處。如果認為滅有所得，那麼那個物體又會落入差別法中。所以應當知道，火不是從其他地方來的。也沒有像這樣由自差別所作的一部分有自體和合。為什麼在那個差別不差別中，執著于多性呢？又在一部分中也有所執著。又在沒有分位中執著火有自性。像這樣薪和火兩種法，應該仔細思考。正如前面已經說過的，接下來頌文說： 『薪中亦無火』 解釋說：離開火也沒有差別因性。因為火的因果沒有異性火的緣故。這應該仔細思考。又能夠取、發起、所得，那些都是不存在的。所以沒有別的異性薪從其他地方來到火這裡。也不是沒有火。所以接下來的頌文說： 『余法亦復然，如去來品說』 解釋說：如果或者沒有薪，怎麼會有能燒和所燒呢？如果有被燒的時候，不是沒有能燒。也沒有能燒中有能燒發起。如果有能燒的時候，不是沒有所燒。所以沒有能燒和所燒也不是相互分離的。
【English Translation】 English version:
The debater says: 'Now, what is the reason for the combination of karma (業) and function (用)?' Because it is produced by the nature of differentiated causes (差別因性). If there is the arising of divisional karma-function (分位業用), then in that division, in each different place, there are differences. You said earlier that it is a partial combination, which is unreasonable, because karma has no basis. Nor is it at the time of arising. Whether combining or separating, the divisional karma-function of differentiated causal nature arises. Nor is there another dependent causal nature obtainable apart from the time of arising. It is like this at the time of arising, and so is the function of the fruit-body (果體). There is no prior absence of differentiation here. Nor is it a cause of dharma-differentiation (法差別因). The middle part has no self-nature. Nor is it through the middle part that combination is achieved. If there is a partial combination in differentiation, it contradicts what is done by simultaneous divisions (俱時分位). Nor does it destroy its karma-function. The principle of what is produced is either harmful. If it is considered that extinction is obtainable, then that object will fall back into the differentiated dharmas. Therefore, it should be known that fire does not come from elsewhere. Nor is there such a partial combination of self-differentiations (自差別) that has self-nature. Why, in that differentiation and non-differentiation, are you attached to multiplicity? And there is also attachment in a part. And in the absence of divisions, you are attached to the existence of fire's self-nature. Like this, the two dharmas of fuel (薪) and fire (火) should be carefully considered. As has been said before, the following verse says: 'There is also no fire in the fuel.' The explanation says: Apart from fire, there is also no differentiated causal nature. Because the cause and effect of fire do not have fire of a different nature. This should be carefully considered. And also, what can be taken, initiated, and obtained, those do not exist. Therefore, there is no fuel of a different nature coming from elsewhere to the fire. Nor is there no fire. Therefore, the following verse says: 'Other dharmas are also like this, as said in the chapter on going and coming.' The explanation says: If there is no fuel, how can there be what can be burned (能燒) and what is burned (所燒)? If there is something being burned, it is not that there is no what can be burned. Nor is there the initiation of what can be burned within what can be burned. If there is what can be burned, it is not that there is nothing being burned. Therefore, there is no what can be burned and what is burned, nor are they separate from each other.
第9卷)
大乘中觀釋論卷第九
安慧菩薩造
譯經三藏朝散大夫試鴻臚卿光梵大師賜紫沙門臣惟凈等奉 詔譯觀薪火品第十之餘
◎複次頌言。
即薪而無火
釋曰。遣一性故。
異薪亦無火
釋曰。薪火二法遣異性故。
火中亦無薪 薪中亦無火
釋曰。總遣異性故。此中薪火二法。一性異性俱不可見。如瓶非木。又如水中蓮花。異性不成故。是故勝義諦中。薪火二法非相因有。而彼二法畢竟空故。
複次頌言。
如說薪火法 能所取亦然
釋曰。一性異性互相因待次第不成。複次頌言。
余諸法皆同
釋曰。彼能取所取。非作者作業一性可著。亦非異性所取。離亦不生。若異性所取。即互不到。不到即不燒。不燒即不滅。不滅即是常。若法常住。彼即互相因待不成。若成不成二法。相因畢竟無體。若人計火從余方來。有其能取及所取者。此義不成。故下頌言。
及彼瓶衣等
釋曰。彼瓶衣等因果二法。同生不同。生能相所相。彼等所成。如非泥團即是其瓶。彼瓶果法有作用故。亦非異瓶別有果法作用所成。非彼二法互相因待。若成不成相因無體。此如是故。余處隨應所說亦然。若勝義諦中無一異性。是故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 第九卷
大乘中觀釋論卷第九
安慧菩薩造
譯經三藏朝散大夫試鴻臚卿光梵大師賜紫沙門臣惟凈等奉 詔譯觀薪火品第十之餘
◎複次頌言。
即薪而無火
釋曰。遣一性故。
異薪亦無火
釋曰。薪火二法遣異性故。
火中亦無薪 薪中亦無火
釋曰。總遣異性故。此中薪火二法。一性異性俱不可見。如瓶非木。又如水中蓮花。異性不成故。是故勝義諦（paramārtha-satya）中。薪火二法非相因有。而彼二法畢竟空故。
複次頌言。
如說薪火法 能所取亦然
釋曰。一性異性互相因待次第不成。複次頌言。
余諸法皆同
釋曰。彼能取所取。非作者作業一性可著。亦非異性所取。離亦不生。若異性所取。即互不到。不到即不燒。不燒即不滅。不滅即是常。若法常住。彼即互相因待不成。若成不成二法。相因畢竟無體。若人計火從余方來。有其能取及所取者。此義不成。故下頌言。
及彼瓶衣等
釋曰。彼瓶衣等因果二法。同生不同。生能相所相。彼等所成。如非泥團即是其瓶。彼瓶果法有作用故。亦非異瓶別有果法作用所成。非彼二法互相因待。若成不成相因無體。此如是故。余處隨應所說亦然。若勝義諦（paramārtha-satya）中無一異性。是故
【English Translation】 English version Volume 9
Commentary on the Madhyamaka Shastra of the Great Vehicle, Volume 9
Composed by Bodhisattva Anhui
Translated by Tripitaka Master Chao San Da Fu, Acting Honglu Qing, Guangfan Master, and Purple-Robed Shramana Minister Wei Jing, etc., under Imperial Decree: Remaining Sections of Chapter 10, 'Examining Fuel and Fire'
◎ Furthermore, the verse says:
'Fuel exists, yet there is no fire'
Explanation: Because oneness is refuted.
'Different fuel also has no fire'
Explanation: Because the two dharmas of fuel and fire refute difference.
'In fire, there is also no fuel; in fuel, there is also no fire'
Explanation: Because difference is refuted in totality. Here, the two dharmas of fuel and fire, neither oneness nor difference can be seen. It is like a pot is not wood, or like a lotus in water. Difference is not established. Therefore, in the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), the two dharmas of fuel and fire do not exist interdependently. And those two dharmas are ultimately empty.
Furthermore, the verse says:
'As explained for fuel and fire, so too are the grasper and the grasped'
Explanation: Oneness and difference, mutually dependent, do not arise sequentially. Furthermore, the verse says:
'All other dharmas are the same'
Explanation: That grasper and grasped, neither the agent nor the action can be attached to as one. Nor is the grasped different. Apart, they do not arise. If the grasped were different, they would not reach each other. If they do not reach, they do not burn. If they do not burn, they do not cease. If they do not cease, they are permanent. If a dharma is permanent, then mutual dependence is not established. If becoming and non-becoming, these two dharmas, are interdependent, they are ultimately without substance. If someone calculates that fire comes from elsewhere, and there is a grasper and a grasped, this meaning is not established. Therefore, the following verse says:
'And those pots, clothes, etc.'
Explanation: Those two dharmas of cause and effect, such as pots and clothes, are similar in arising but not the same. The arising of the agent and the object, those are accomplished. For example, a lump of clay is not immediately a pot. Because the pot, the effect dharma, has a function. Nor is the effect dharma accomplished by a different pot having a function. These two dharmas are not mutually dependent. If becoming and non-becoming are interdependent, they are without substance. Because it is like this, what is said elsewhere should be understood accordingly. If in the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya) there is neither oneness nor difference, therefore
不應取著。
如有頌言。
非受非不受 異復云何有 如能取所取 諸所說亦然
複次頌言。
若人執有我 諸法有實性 各各差別說 彼不解佛法
觀生死品第十一
復有人言。勝義諦中亦有生死。何以故。如佛所言。生死長遠。眾生愚迷不知正法。我欲令彼如理修行得盡生死。乃作是言。汝諸苾芻。應如是學。以此證知。勝義諦中有其生死。
論者言。如佛所說。皆是方便世俗施設。非勝義諦。亦非不有生死而說。長時有法可盡。彼生死者眾生所受。若如理修行。即能盡彼生死有性。此中先說薪火二法能取所取彼等次第。此非道理。
複次頌言。
大牟尼所說 生死無先際
釋曰。此義云何。所言生死者。即是無際。無際即無始。今此義者。無最上無先際。故言無際。又非有彼先際。故名無際。故下頌言。
今此如是說 無先亦無後
釋曰。先後義無體無自性故。如兔角等。應如是見。由如是故。中亦不可得說。非不有故。如兔角等。
複次頌言。
若無有先後 中復云何有
釋曰。生死無自性。彼云何有。故下頌言。
是故此中無 先後共次第
釋曰。此中應問。如所表示。無先後共。即
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 不應該執著於此。
如有頌文說：
『非受也非不受，差別又如何存在？如果能取和所取存在，那麼所有說的一切也是如此。』
再次，頌文說：
『如果有人執著于有我（ātman），認為諸法有真實的自性（svabhāva），並且各自差別地宣說，那麼他們不瞭解佛法。』
觀生死品第十一
又有人說：在勝義諦（paramārtha-satya）中也有生死。為什麼呢？如佛所說：生死漫長而遙遠，眾生愚昧迷惑，不知道正確的佛法。我想要讓他們如理修行，得以斷盡生死，所以才這樣說：『你們這些比丘（bhikṣu），應當這樣學習。』以此可以證明，勝義諦中存在生死。
論者說：如佛所說，都是方便的世俗施設（saṃvṛti）。並非勝義諦。也不是沒有生死而說，長久的時間裡有法可以斷盡。那些生死是眾生所承受的。如果如理修行，就能斷盡那些生死的有性。這裡先前說薪和火兩種法，能取和所取，它們的次第，這不合道理。
再次，頌文說：
『大牟尼（mahāmuni，指佛陀）所說，生死沒有先前的邊際。』
解釋說：這個意義是什麼呢？所說的生死，就是沒有邊際。沒有邊際也就是沒有開始。現在的這個意義是，沒有最上，沒有先前的邊際，所以說沒有邊際。又不是有那個先前的邊際，所以名為沒有邊際。所以下面的頌文說：
『現在這樣說，沒有先前也沒有後后。』
解釋說：先後之義沒有自體，沒有自性，如同兔角等，應當這樣看待。由於這樣，中間也是不可得說的。不是沒有，如同兔角等。
再次，頌文說：
『如果沒有先前和後後，中間又怎麼會有呢？』
解釋說：生死沒有自性，它怎麼會有呢？所以下面的頌文說：
『因此這裡沒有，先前、後後和共同的次第。』
解釋說：這裡應該問，如所表示的，沒有先前、後後和共同的，即
【English Translation】 English version: One should not be attached to this.
As a verse says:
'Neither receiving nor not receiving, how else could there be difference? If the grasper and the grasped exist, then all that is said is also so.'
Furthermore, a verse says:
'If someone clings to the existence of a self (ātman), and that all dharmas have real own-being (svabhāva), and speaks of each as different, then they do not understand the Buddha's teachings.'
Chapter Eleven: Observation of Birth and Death
Again, some say: In the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya) there is also birth and death. Why? As the Buddha said: Birth and death are long and far-reaching, and sentient beings are foolish and deluded, not knowing the correct Dharma. I want them to practice according to the truth and attain the exhaustion of birth and death, so I say: 'You monks (bhikṣu), should learn in this way.' With this, it is known that in the ultimate truth there is birth and death.
The debater says: As the Buddha said, all are expedient conventional designations (saṃvṛti). It is not the ultimate truth. Nor is it that there is no birth and death, but it is said that in a long time there are dharmas that can be exhausted. Those births and deaths are what sentient beings undergo. If one practices according to the truth, one can exhaust those existential natures of birth and death. Here, it was previously said that fuel and fire are two dharmas, the grasper and the grasped, and their sequence, which is not reasonable.
Furthermore, a verse says:
'What the Great Sage (mahāmuni, referring to the Buddha) said, birth and death have no prior limit.'
Explanation: What is the meaning of this? What is said about birth and death is that it is without limit. Without limit is without beginning. The meaning now is that there is no supreme, no prior limit, therefore it is said to be without limit. Also, it is not that there is that prior limit, therefore it is named without limit. Therefore, the following verse says:
'Now it is said like this, there is no prior and no posterior.'
Explanation: The meaning of prior and posterior has no entity, no own-being, like rabbit horns, etc., it should be seen in this way. Because of this, the middle is also not obtainable to be spoken of. It is not that it does not exist, like rabbit horns, etc.
Furthermore, a verse says:
'If there is no prior and posterior, how can there be a middle?'
Explanation: Birth and death have no own-being, how can it exist? Therefore, the following verse says:
'Therefore, in this there is no prior, posterior, or common sequence.'
Explanation: Here it should be asked, as indicated, there is no prior, posterior, or common, that is
次第不生。而何有眾生受生老死。又云何修行。盡生死有性。此即不成。故頌答言。
若使先有生 後有老死者 不老死有生
釋曰。若不離老死而有生者。應不離老而有死邪。故下頌言。
后老死非理
釋曰。若或異法有所成者。譬如牛馬。異體應可同生。云何生不有死。又何不死有生。若生老死先有體者。即彼本來有其生死。
複次頌言。
若使後有生 先有老死者 彼所有老死 無生即無因
釋曰。無因即無所依。無依即無生。無生即無相續有性。
複次頌言。
無此生老死 亦無有先後 老死亦復然 亦應與生共
釋曰。此義云何。若言生時有其死者。以彼生滅二法無同時性。又復無因二俱不生。彼無性故。若或同生。又生老死無相待因性。
複次頌言。
若不生即無 先後共次第 云何戲論言 有生老死合
釋曰。勝義諦中戲論不生故。
複次頌言。
若諸法因果 能相及所相 所受及受者 真實義如是
釋曰。能知所知等一切法。先後共次第皆不和合。若先有果後有其因。果即無因。此即因有相違。若先有因后無果者。即因果不和合。若因果二法同時有者。如是決定彼因果性亦復
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
次第不生，那麼怎麼會有眾生承受生老死呢？又該如何修行，才能斷盡生死之有性呢？這根本不成立。所以用偈頌回答說：
『如果先有生，後有老死者，不老死有生，后老死非理。』
解釋說：如果不離開老死而有生，那麼應該不離開老而有死吧？所以下面的偈頌說：
『后老死非理。』
解釋說：如果不同的法可以有所成就，比如牛和馬，不同的個體應該可以一同出生。為什麼生沒有死？又為什麼不死有生？如果生老死先有自體，那麼它們本來就具有生死。
再次用偈頌說：
『如果後有生，先有老死者，彼所有老死，無生即無因。』
解釋說：無因就是沒有所依，沒有所依就是沒有生，沒有生就是沒有相續之有性。
再次用偈頌說：
『無此生老死，亦無有先後，老死亦復然，亦應與生共。』
解釋說：這個道理是什麼呢？如果說生的時候有死，那麼生滅二法沒有同時性。而且沒有因，二者都不會產生。因為它們沒有自性。如果一同產生，那麼生老死就沒有相互依賴的因性。
再次用偈頌說：
『若不生即無，先後共次第，云何戲論言，有生老死合。』
解釋說：在勝義諦中，戲論不會產生。
再次用偈頌說：
『若諸法因果，能相及所相，所受及受者，真實義如是。』
解釋說：能知和所知等一切法，先後共同次第都不和合。如果先有果後有因，那麼果就沒有因，這就是因果相違。如果先有因后沒有果，那麼因果就不和合。如果因果二法同時存在，那麼就可以確定它們的因果關係。
【English Translation】 English version:
If there is no arising in sequence, how can there be sentient beings undergoing birth, aging, and death? And how can one cultivate to exhaust the inherent nature of existence within birth and death? This is simply untenable. Therefore, the verse responds:
'If birth exists first, Then aging and death follow, Without aging and death, there is birth, Subsequent aging and death are illogical.'
Explanation: If birth exists without being separate from aging and death, then shouldn't death exist without being separate from aging? Therefore, the following verse says:
'Subsequent aging and death are illogical.'
Explanation: If different dharmas (法) can achieve something, like a cow and a horse, different entities should be able to be born together. Why does birth not have death? And why does death not have birth? If birth, aging, and death have their own inherent nature first, then they inherently possess birth and death.
Again, the verse says:
'If birth exists later, And aging and death exist first, Those existing aging and death, Without birth, there is no cause.'
Explanation: Without a cause means without a basis. Without a basis means without birth. Without birth means without the inherent nature of continuous existence.
Again, the verse says:
'Without this birth, aging, and death, There is also no sequence of before and after, Aging and death are also like this, They should also be together with birth.'
Explanation: What is the meaning of this? If it is said that death exists at the time of birth, then the two dharmas (法) of arising and ceasing do not have simultaneous existence. Moreover, without a cause, neither will arise. Because they have no inherent nature. If they arise together, then birth, aging, and death do not have a mutually dependent causal nature.
Again, the verse says:
'If there is no birth, then there is no, Before, after, together, or sequence, Why speak of playful concepts, That birth, aging, and death combine?'
Explanation: In the ultimate truth (勝義諦), playful concepts do not arise.
Again, the verse says:
'If all dharmas (法) are causes and effects, That which can be related and that which is related to, That which is received and the receiver, The true meaning is thus.'
Explanation: All dharmas (法), such as that which can know and that which is known, before, after, together, and in sequence, are not harmonious. If there is an effect first and then a cause later, then the effect has no cause, which is contradictory to the cause. If there is a cause first and then no effect later, then the cause and effect are not harmonious. If the two dharmas (法) of cause and effect exist simultaneously, then their causal relationship can be determined.
無體。若已生若未生。二法相因俱無體故。能相所相所說亦然。
複次頌言。
非但說生死 先際不可得 諸法亦復然 先際不可得
觀苦品第十二
復有人言。勝義諦中有彼諸蘊苦所成性。如佛所言。略說五取蘊。由苦所得故。
論者言。此等所說皆世俗諦。非勝義諦。何以故。此苦果故。此苦果者多種分別。
複次頌言。
自作及他作 共作無因作
釋曰。有一類人。欲令此苦各別系屬。故下頌言。
彼等於諸果 所作非道理
複次頌言。
苦若自作者 即不從緣成
釋曰。若自作者。而彼諸法皆自體所成。非同生性故。若離自體即無對待因性。亦非同生可有。故下頌言。
以有此蘊故 有未來五蘊
釋曰。緣所成故。此中若法緣所成性。即無自作。此遣法自相。又復亦非他作道理。
複次頌言。
若有此五蘊 與未來蘊異 於此彼蘊中 應有他作苦
釋曰。今此五蘊與未來五蘊諸有所作。非此二法互有他性。何以故。滅與未生二無性故。此中亦非苦能作苦。自作他作。云何可成。
複次頌言。
若人自作苦 離苦何有人 云何自作中 離人而有苦
釋曰。若復離蘊
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 無體。無論是已生還是未生，這兩種法相互依存，都沒有自體。能相和所相，以及所說的法也是如此。
再次，頌文說： 『不僅僅是說生死，最初的界限是不可得的，一切諸法也是這樣，最初的界限是不可得的。』
觀苦品第十二
又有人說：在勝義諦（paramārtha-satya，最高的真理）中，存在著由那些蘊（skandha，構成個體存在的要素）所形成的苦的自性。正如佛所說：簡略地說，五取蘊（pañca upādānakkhandha，執取的五蘊）是由苦所產生的。
論者說：這些所說的都是世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，相對的真理），而不是勝義諦。為什麼呢？因為這是苦的果報。這苦的果報有多種分別。
再次，頌文說： 『自作、他作、共作、無因作。』
解釋說：有一類人，想要讓這苦各自有所歸屬，所以下面的頌文說： 『他們對於諸果的所作，是不合道理的。』
再次，頌文說： 『苦如果是自作的，那就不應該從因緣而生。』
解釋說：如果是自作的，那麼這些法都是由自體所成，不是同生性。如果離開自體，就沒有對待的因性，也不是同生所能有的。所以下面的頌文說： 『因為有此蘊，所以有未來的五蘊。』
解釋說：因為是因緣所成。這裡如果法是因緣所成的自性，就沒有自作。這是爲了去除法的自相。而且，也不是他作的道理。
再次，頌文說： 『如果此五蘊與未來蘊不同，那麼在此彼蘊中，應該有他作的苦。』
解釋說：現在這五蘊與未來的五蘊有所作為，不是這兩種法互相具有他性。為什麼呢？因為滅和未生這兩種法沒有自性。這裡也不是苦能製造苦。自作他作，怎麼能夠成立呢？
再次，頌文說： 『如果人自作苦，離開苦哪裡還有人？在自作中，怎麼能離開人而有苦？』
解釋說：如果離開蘊
【English Translation】 English version: Without substance. Whether already arisen or not yet arisen, these two dharmas (dharma, law/phenomena) are mutually dependent and have no inherent existence. The nature of the perceiver and the perceived, as well as what is spoken, are also the same.
Furthermore, the verse says: 'Not only is it said of birth and death that the prior limit is unattainable, but all dharmas are also like this; the prior limit is unattainable.'
Chapter Twelve: Observation of Suffering
Again, some say: In the paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth), there exists the nature of suffering formed by those skandhas (skandha, aggregates of existence). As the Buddha said: Briefly speaking, the five upādānakkhandhas (pañca upādānakkhandha, aggregates of clinging) are produced by suffering.
The commentator says: These statements are all saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth), not paramārtha-satya. Why? Because this is the result of suffering. This result of suffering has many distinctions.
Furthermore, the verse says: 'Self-made, other-made, jointly made, causelessly made.'
Explanation: There is a class of people who want to assign this suffering separately, so the following verse says: 'Their actions regarding the fruits are unreasonable.'
Furthermore, the verse says: 'If suffering is self-made, then it should not arise from conditions.'
Explanation: If it is self-made, then these dharmas are all formed by themselves, not of the same arising nature. If separated from itself, there is no reciprocal causal nature, nor can there be co-arising. Therefore, the following verse says: 'Because there are these skandhas, there are future five skandhas.'
Explanation: Because it is conditioned. Here, if a dharma is of a conditioned nature, then there is no self-making. This is to remove the self-nature of the dharma. Moreover, it is not the principle of other-making.
Furthermore, the verse says: 'If these five skandhas are different from the future skandhas, then in these skandhas, there should be other-made suffering.'
Explanation: Now, these five skandhas and the future five skandhas have actions, but these two dharmas do not mutually possess otherness. Why? Because the extinguished and the unarisen two dharmas have no self-nature. Here, it is not that suffering can create suffering. How can self-making and other-making be established?
Furthermore, the verse says: 'If a person makes suffering himself, where is the person apart from suffering? In self-making, how can there be suffering apart from the person?'
Explanation: If separated from the skandhas
無所施設。彼復云何有苦可作。
複次頌言。
若苦他人成 授與此人者 他亦名自作 離苦何有苦
釋曰。此非離苦而復有苦。苦無異故。
複次頌言。
若他人作苦 離他何有苦 亦非有作已 他能授於此
複次頌言。
自作若不成 復何有他作 若他人作苦 即亦名自作
釋曰。或有人言。若人自作苦。即非他所成。應有他作邪。對此異意。故下頌言。
苦不名自作 亦非他人作 是故所作中 離苦人無體
釋曰。今此如是。非有所作。亦非有苦。若以彼苦自作苦者。即自所作。道理相違。是故此說以無有人何有他作。彼無性故。若復他無自體。是中雲何他能作苦。若人自體不生。即無所有。他體不生。即無他作。是故無有他能作苦。若或自他二法共作苦者。亦非道理。
複次頌言。
若有自他作 即有共作苦 今無自他共 無因亦非理
如有頌言。
他相若自作 他相此無因 此若有自因 何有無因作
釋曰。勝義諦中苦無體故。
複次頌言。
非但說于苦 四種俱不有
釋曰。此復云何。色等亦然。故下頌言。
外諸法皆同 四種俱不有
釋曰。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 無所施設（沒有可以安立的地方）。這樣又怎麼會有苦可以產生呢？
進一步用頌文說：
『如果苦是由他人造成的， 然後傳遞給這個人， 那麼他人也就可以稱為自己造作， 離開了苦，又哪裡會有苦呢？』
解釋：這並非離開了苦而另外有苦。因為苦沒有差別。
進一步用頌文說：
『如果他人造作苦， 離開了他人，又哪裡會有苦呢？ 也不是在造作之後， 他人能夠將苦傳遞給這個人。』
進一步用頌文說：
『如果自己造作不能成立， 又怎麼會有他人造作呢？ 如果他人造作苦， 那也就叫做自己造作了。』
解釋：或許有人說，如果人自己造作苦，就不是由他人造成的，應該有他人造作吧？針對這種不同的觀點，所以下面用頌文說：
『苦不叫做自己造作， 也不是他人造作， 因此在所造作中， 離開了苦，人就沒有實體。』
解釋：現在就像這樣，沒有所造作，也沒有苦。如果把那苦當作自己造作的苦，那麼自己所造作的，道理上是相違背的。因此這樣說，因為沒有人，哪裡會有他人造作？因為它沒有自性。如果他人沒有自體，那麼其中怎麼能由他人造作苦呢？如果人的自體不生，就沒有所有。他人之體不生，就沒有他人造作。因此沒有他人能夠造作苦。如果自己和他人的兩種法共同造作苦，也是沒有道理的。
進一步用頌文說：
『如果有自己和他人造作， 那就是有共同造作苦， 現在沒有自己、他人共同， 沒有原因也是不合道理。』
如有頌文說：
『他相如果是自己造作， 他相就沒有原因， 這如果有了自己的原因， 怎麼會有沒有原因的造作呢？』
解釋：在勝義諦（paramārtha-satya）中，苦沒有實體。
進一步用頌文說：
『不只是說苦， 四種（指自作、他作、共作、無因作）都沒有。』
解釋：這是什麼意思呢？色（rūpa）等也是這樣。所以下面用頌文說：
『外在的諸法都相同， 四種都沒有。』
解釋：
【English Translation】 English version There is nothing to establish (no place to settle). How then can there be suffering to be produced?
Furthermore, the verse says:
'If suffering is caused by others, And given to this person, Then the other can also be called self-made, Apart from suffering, where is suffering?'
Explanation: This is not suffering apart from suffering. Because suffering has no difference.
Furthermore, the verse says:
'If others create suffering, Apart from others, where is suffering? Nor is it after creation, That others can give it to this person.'
Furthermore, the verse says:
'If self-creation cannot be established, Then how can there be other-creation? If others create suffering, Then it is also called self-creation.'
Explanation: Perhaps someone says, if a person creates suffering himself, then it is not caused by others, there should be other-creation, right? In response to this different view, the following verse says:
'Suffering is not called self-creation, Nor is it created by others, Therefore, in what is created, Apart from suffering, a person has no substance.'
Explanation: Now it is like this, there is no creation, and there is no suffering. If that suffering is regarded as self-created suffering, then what is self-created is contradictory in principle. Therefore, it is said that because there is no person, where is other-creation? Because it has no self-nature. If others have no self-entity, then how can others create suffering in it? If a person's self-entity is not born, then there is nothing. If the entity of others is not born, then there is no other-creation. Therefore, there is no other who can create suffering. If the two dharmas of self and other jointly create suffering, it is also unreasonable.
Furthermore, the verse says:
'If there is self and other creation, Then there is joint creation of suffering, Now there is no self, no other jointly, Without a cause is also unreasonable.'
As the verse says:
'If the other's characteristic is self-created, Then the other's characteristic has no cause, If this has its own cause, How can there be creation without a cause?'
Explanation: In the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), suffering has no substance.
Furthermore, the verse says:
'It is not just about suffering, The four kinds (referring to self-creation, other-creation, joint-creation, and causeless-creation) do not exist.'
Explanation: What does this mean? Form (rūpa) and so on are also like this. So the following verse says:
'External dharmas are all the same, The four kinds do not exist.'
Explanation:
色非自體作故。彼能作所作。若有若無。皆非所作。若有能作。即所作無體。無即非能作。云何無中計有我作。此即著于能作。亦非他法。成已覆成色法作用。是中亦非他性可成。今此所說。若從緣生。彼即無有異法可得。亦非自他緣法不生。又一切法非無因故。由是勝義諦中。色等諸法體不可得。
觀行品第十三
前品所說破色等蘊。此即亦有對治相違。何以故。如佛所言。諸苾芻。汝等應當如實了知。色是無常。乃至識法亦是無常。以此文證。有色等蘊。
論者言。此世俗諦增上所說。非勝義諦。故有頌言。
若彼虛妄法 是世俗有為 無妄涅槃法 即是勝義諦
釋曰。此虛妄者。是邪智境界。愚人不實。于虛誑法無分位中。計色有性。
複次頌言。
彼虛妄法者 諸行妄取故
釋曰。此即無所得相違。故下頌言。
即彼虛妄法 是中何所取
釋曰。無所有故。譬如兔角。虛妄之法而不和合。是故虛妄法者。雖有所說皆是虛妄。故佛世尊廣為開示。普盡一切若根若隨煩惱所知二障等法。皆悉是空。使令除斷即彼空性離二邊故。此中所說諸虛妄法。決定皆是世俗諦有。若虛妄法。于勝義諦中。如乾闥婆城。又或虛妄法者。雖復所說是中亦非妄法
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 色並非由自身產生，因此不存在能造作者和被造作者。無論存在還是不存在，都不是被造作的。如果存在能造作者，那麼被造作者就沒有實體。沒有能造作者，又怎麼能說在無中生有，由『我』來造作呢？這實際上是執著于能造作者。也不是其他法，已經成就的色法再次產生作用，其中也不存在其他自性可以成立。現在所說的，如果是從因緣而生，那麼就不存在其他的異法可以獲得，也不是自身、他者或因緣法所不生。而且一切法不是沒有原因的。因此，在勝義諦（paramārtha-satya， ultimate truth）中，色等諸法的實體是不可獲得的。
觀行品第十三
前面一品所說的破斥色等五蘊（skandha，aggregate），這實際上也有對治和相違之處。為什麼這麼說呢？正如佛所說：『諸位比丘（bhikṣu，monk），你們應當如實了知，色是無常，乃至識也是無常。』根據這段經文，可以證明色等五蘊是存在的。
論者說：這是在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，conventional truth）的層面上說的，不是在勝義諦的層面上說的。所以有頌說：
『如果那些虛妄法，是世俗諦中的有為法（saṃskṛta，conditioned phenomena），沒有虛妄的涅槃（nirvāṇa，liberation）法，就是勝義諦。』
解釋說：這裡所說的虛妄，是邪見的境界。愚昧的人不瞭解實情，在虛假的法中，認為色是有自性的。
再次，頌說：
『那些虛妄法，是由於對諸行的錯誤執取。』
解釋說：這實際上是與無所得（absence of attainment）相違背的。所以下面的頌說：
『既然是虛妄法，那從中又能執取什麼呢？』
解釋說：因為一無所有，就像兔角一樣。虛妄的法不會和合。所以虛妄法，即使有所說，也都是虛妄的。所以佛世尊廣泛地開示，完全斷除一切根和隨煩惱（kleśa，affliction）以及所知二障（two obscurations）等法，都全部是空性（śūnyatā，emptiness）。使它們被斷除，也就是那個空性遠離了二邊。這裡所說的各種虛妄法，一定是世俗諦中存在的。如果虛妄法，在勝義諦中，就像乾闥婆城（gandharva city，mirage）一樣。或者說虛妄法，即使有所說，其中也不是妄法。
【English Translation】 English version Form is not self-created; therefore, there is no agent and no object of action. Whether existent or nonexistent, it is not created. If there were an agent, the object of action would have no substance. If there is nothing, then there is no agent. How can one conceive of 'I' creating from nothing? This is clinging to the agent. Nor is it another dharma (phenomenon); the already accomplished form dharma again produces effects. There is no other nature that can be established in this. What is now said, if it arises from conditions, then there is no other different dharma to be obtained. Nor is it not born from self, other, or conditioned dharmas. Moreover, all dharmas are not without cause. Therefore, in the paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth), the substance of form and other dharmas is unobtainable.
Chapter Thirteen: Contemplation
The previous chapter discussed the refutation of the skandhas (aggregates) such as form. This actually also has counteractions and contradictions. Why is this so? As the Buddha said: 'Bhikkhus (monks), you should truly understand that form is impermanent, and even consciousness is impermanent.' According to this passage, it can be proven that the skandhas such as form exist.
The commentator says: This is spoken from the perspective of saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth), not paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth). Therefore, there is a verse that says:
'If those false dharmas are conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta) in conventional truth, the non-false nirvana (liberation) dharma is the ultimate truth.'
Explanation: What is called false here is the realm of wrong knowledge. Ignorant people do not understand the truth and, in the false dharmas, believe that form has inherent existence.
Again, the verse says:
'Those false dharmas are due to the mistaken grasping of the aggregates.'
Explanation: This actually contradicts the absence of attainment. Therefore, the following verse says:
'Since it is a false dharma, what can be grasped from it?'
Explanation: Because there is nothing to be grasped, like a rabbit's horn. False dharmas do not coalesce. Therefore, even if something is said about false dharmas, it is all false. Therefore, the Buddha extensively revealed that all roots and kleśas (afflictions), as well as the two obscurations (two obscurations) of what is to be known, are all śūnyatā (emptiness). Causing them to be eliminated means that emptiness is free from the two extremes. The various false dharmas spoken of here are definitely existent in conventional truth. If false dharmas exist in ultimate truth, they are like a gandharva city (mirage). Or, even if something is said about false dharmas, it is not false within it.
可有。故佛世尊諸有所說。悉無相違。若言諸法不有。即是證成自性空義。遣妄執故。
複次頌言。
諸法無自性 見有異性故
釋曰。若見有法變異之性。彼即無我。無我即無常。無常即不有。如是所說。是為虛妄。此法如是。故下頌言。
無性法亦無 一切法空故
釋曰。雖說諸法皆空。即彼諸法猶如空花。亦非有彼無自性法。又或無所成故。
複次頌言。
若法無自性 法雲何有異
釋曰。若法有異。自性亦異。若彼諸法無自性者。即不和合。是故若見諸法各各自性有別異者。云何不說此為虛妄。故下頌言。
若法有自性 亦復何有異
釋曰。若其無者。即無法可有異性和合。計有性者。即墮過失。此復云何。
複次頌言。
若諸法即異 無異法可有 現住法若異 后變異不成
釋曰。若后異者。譬如老作老相。此即自比量相違。
或有人言。若不離自體有法可異者。乳應即成酪。若爾即有因一向過失。
複次頌言。
若法即有異 乳應即成酪
釋曰。亦非離彼滋味氣勢報體等法。乳即成酪。以緣性故。又復亦非異乳有酪。此即于第二時有一向過失。故下頌言。
若或異於乳 云何得成
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：難道不是這樣嗎？所以佛世尊所說的一切，都沒有互相矛盾的地方。如果說諸法不存在，那就是爲了證明自性本空的道理，遣除虛妄的執著。
其次，頌文說：
『諸法無自性，見有異性故。』
解釋：如果看到有法具有變異的性質，那麼它就是無我的。無我就是無常。無常就是不存在。像這樣所說的，是虛妄的。此法就是這樣。所以下面的頌文說：
『無性法亦無，一切法空故。』
解釋：雖然說諸法都是空性的，但那些諸法就像空中的花朵一樣，也不是存在著沒有自性的法。又或者因為沒有什麼可以成就的緣故。
其次，頌文說：
『若法無自性，法雲何有異？』
解釋：如果法有差異，那麼自性也不同。如果那些諸法沒有自性，那麼它們就不會和合。因此，如果看到諸法各自的自性有差別，為什麼不說這是虛妄的呢？所以下面的頌文說：
『若法有自性，亦復何有異？』
解釋：如果它們沒有自性，就沒有法可以有差異性和合。如果認為有自性，就會陷入過失。這又是什麼呢？
其次，頌文說：
『若諸法即異，無異法可有；現住法若異，后變異不成。』
解釋：如果後來的變異不同，比如衰老呈現衰老的相狀，這就是用自身來比量，是相違背的。
或者有人說，如果不離開自體而有法可以變異，那麼牛奶應該立刻變成酪。如果這樣，就會有因一向的過失。
其次，頌文說：
『若法即有異，乳應即成酪。』
解釋：也不是離開滋味、氣勢、報體等法，牛奶就能立刻變成酪。這是因為緣起性的緣故。而且也不是離開牛奶而有酪。這就在第二個時間點上有一向的過失。所以下面的頌文說：
『若或異於乳，云何得成？』
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Is it not so? Therefore, all that the Buddha, the World Honored One, has spoken is without contradiction. If it is said that all dharmas (phenomena, teachings) do not exist, that is to prove the meaning of emptiness of inherent existence (svabhava-sunyata), eliminating false attachments.
Furthermore, the verse says:
'Since all dharmas (phenomena, teachings) lack inherent existence (svabhava), because difference is seen.'
Explanation: If one sees that a dharma (phenomenon, teaching) has the nature of change, then it is without self (anatman). Without self is impermanent (anitya). Impermanent is non-existent. Such statements are false. This dharma (phenomenon, teaching) is like this. Therefore, the following verse says:
'A dharma (phenomenon, teaching) without inherent existence (svabhava) also does not exist, because all dharmas (phenomena, teachings) are empty (sunya).'
Explanation: Although it is said that all dharmas (phenomena, teachings) are empty (sunya), those dharmas (phenomena, teachings) are like flowers in the sky. There is also no dharma (phenomenon, teaching) that lacks inherent existence (svabhava). Or because there is nothing to be accomplished.
Furthermore, the verse says:
'If a dharma (phenomenon, teaching) lacks inherent existence (svabhava), how can a dharma (phenomenon, teaching) have difference?'
Explanation: If a dharma (phenomenon, teaching) has difference, then its inherent existence (svabhava) is also different. If those dharmas (phenomena, teachings) lack inherent existence (svabhava), then they will not be in harmony. Therefore, if one sees that the inherent existence (svabhava) of each dharma (phenomenon, teaching) is different, why not say that this is false? Therefore, the following verse says:
'If a dharma (phenomenon, teaching) has inherent existence (svabhava), what difference is there?'
Explanation: If they do not have inherent existence (svabhava), then there is no dharma (phenomenon, teaching) that can have difference and harmony. If one thinks there is inherent existence (svabhava), one will fall into error. What is this?
Furthermore, the verse says:
'If all dharmas (phenomena, teachings) are immediately different, there can be no different dharma (phenomenon, teaching); if the presently existing dharma (phenomenon, teaching) is different, later change will not be accomplished.'
Explanation: If the later difference is different, like old age showing the appearance of old age, this is contradictory by self-comparison.
Or someone says, if there is a dharma (phenomenon, teaching) that can be different without leaving its own entity, then milk should immediately become cheese. If so, there will be a one-sided fault of cause.
Furthermore, the verse says:
'If a dharma (phenomenon, teaching) is immediately different, milk should immediately become cheese.'
Explanation: It is also not that milk can immediately become cheese without leaving the dharma (phenomenon, teaching) of taste, energy, retribution body, etc. This is because of the nature of dependent origination (pratityasamutpada). Moreover, cheese does not exist apart from milk. This is a one-sided fault at the second time. Therefore, the following verse says:
'If it is different from milk, how can it be accomplished?'
酪
釋曰。亦非異乳有酪可得。此即不墮一向過失。是故無有異法可見。有即虛妄。何以故。自性空故。勝義諦中。亦無少分不空之法對待空法而有所成。
複次頌言。
若有不空法 即應有空法 無少不空法 何得有其空
釋曰。因不成故。此中非有空法可說。今此如是證成。世尊所說空義。如其所說。此復云何。故下頌言。
遣有故說空 令出離諸見 若或見有空 諸佛所不化
釋曰。此即遣諸空執。諸佛世尊所說無疑。何況有異。若欲有其空者。此乃於法自性有所取著。此中亦非有性可取。應當舍離。若或於空有所取者。此即邊執。彼有執者無異方便。應知此等佛所不化。
大乘中觀釋論卷第九
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 關於『酪』的討論： 解釋：並非存在一種與『乳』不同的『酪』可以獲得。這避免了陷入片面性的錯誤。因此，沒有任何不同的『法』(Dharma，佛法)可以被觀察到。如果認為『有』(existence)是真實的，那就是虛妄的。為什麼呢？因為自性是空的。在勝義諦(Paramārtha-satya， ultimate truth)中，沒有任何微小的不空之法可以與空法相對待而成立。 進一步，頌文說： 『若有不空法，即應有空法；無少不空法，何得有其空？』 解釋：因為『因』(hetu，reason)不成立。這裡沒有什麼『空法』(śūnyatā-dharma，emptiness-dharma)可以談論。現在這樣來證實世尊(Bhagavan，the Blessed One)所說的空義(śūnyatā，emptiness)。正如他所說的那樣。這是什麼意思呢？所以下面的頌文說： 『遣有故說空，令出離諸見；若或見有空，諸佛所不化。』 解釋：這正是爲了遣除對『空』的執著。諸佛世尊(Bhagavan，the Blessed One)所說無疑是真實的。更何況有其他不同的說法呢？如果想要執著于『空』，這就是對『法』的自性有所執取。這裡也沒有什麼『性』(svabhāva，nature)可以執取，應當捨棄。如果有人對『空』有所執取，這就是邊見(anta-grāha，extreme view)。他們與執著于『有』的人沒有什麼不同。應當知道這些人是諸佛(Buddhas)所不能教化的。 《大乘中觀釋論》第九卷
【English Translation】 English version On 『Curd』: Explanation: It is not that there is a 『curd』 different from 『milk』 that can be obtained. This avoids falling into a one-sided error. Therefore, there is no different 『dharma』 (Dharma, the teachings of the Buddha) that can be observed. If 『existence』 is considered real, that is false. Why? Because its self-nature is empty. In the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), there is not even a small amount of non-empty dharma that can be established in contrast to empty dharma. Furthermore, the verse says: 『If there were a non-empty dharma, then there should be an empty dharma; since there is no non-empty dharma, how could there be its emptiness?』 Explanation: Because the 『cause』 (hetu, reason) is not established. Here, there is no 『empty dharma』 (śūnyatā-dharma, emptiness-dharma) that can be discussed. Now, this is how the meaning of emptiness (śūnyatā, emptiness) spoken by the World-Honored One (Bhagavan, the Blessed One) is verified. Just as he said. What does this mean? Therefore, the following verse says: 『Emptiness is taught to abandon existence, to liberate from all views; if one sees emptiness as existent, they are not transformed by the Buddhas.』 Explanation: This is precisely to dispel attachment to 『emptiness』. What the Buddhas, the World-Honored Ones (Bhagavan, the Blessed One), have said is undoubtedly true. How much more so could there be other different statements? If one wants to cling to 『emptiness』, this is clinging to the self-nature of 『dharma』. There is also no 『nature』 (svabhāva, nature) to be grasped here, and it should be abandoned. If someone clings to 『emptiness』, this is an extreme view (anta-grāha, extreme view). They are no different from those who cling to 『existence』. It should be known that these people cannot be transformed by the Buddhas. Mahāyāna Madhyamaka Commentary, Volume 9