T30n1568_十二門論

大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1568 十二門論

No. 1568

十二門論品目

觀因緣門第一

(萬法所因似各有性，推而會之實自無性，通達無滯故謂之門)

觀有果無果門第二

(重推無性之法，為先有而生？為先無而生？有無無生，以之為門)

觀緣門第三

(上推因，此推緣，四緣廣略皆無有果，故以為門)

觀相門第四

(上三門推因緣無生，此推三相，三相既無，以之為門)

觀有相無相門第五

(此推三相之實，為有相而相？為無相而相？有無無相，故以為門)

觀一異門第六

(即推有相無相，為在一法？為在異法？不一不異，以之為門)

觀有無門第七

(上推三相非相，此明四相亦非，生住為有變異？為無？同處不有，異處亦無，故以為門)

觀性門第八

(既知有無，又推其性，變易無常從緣而有，則非性也，故以為門)

觀因果門第九

(無性之法既無因果，變異處推求則無得理，故以為門)

觀作門第十

(無因無果則為無作，四處既無，以之為門)

觀三時門第十一

(既推無作必盡其

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1568 《十二門論》

No. 1568

《十二門論》品目

觀因緣門第一

（萬法所由之因，看似各有自性，推究會合起來，實則皆無自性，通達無礙，所以稱之為門）

觀有果無果門第二

（再次推究無自性的法，是先有而生？還是先無而生？無論有還是無都不能生，以此作為門）

觀緣門第三

（上面推究因，這裡推究緣，四緣（四種緣，即因緣、等無間緣、所緣緣、增上緣）無論廣說還是略說，都沒有果，所以以此作為門）

觀相門第四

（前面三個門推究因緣無生，這裡推究三相（生、住、滅），三相既然沒有，以此作為門）

觀有相無相門第五

（這裡推究三相的真實，是有相而相？還是無相而相？無論有相還是無相都不能相，所以以此作為門）

觀一異門第六

（即推究有相無相，是在一法中？還是在異法中？不一不異，以此作為門）

觀有無門第七

（上面推究三相非相，這裡說明四相（生、住、異、滅）也非相，生住是有還是無？相同之處沒有，不同之處也沒有，所以以此作為門）

觀性門第八

（既然知道有無，又推究其自性，變易無常，從緣而有，那就不是自性，所以以此作為門）

觀因果門第九

（無自性的法既然沒有因果，在變異之處推求也得不到道理，所以以此作為門）

觀作門第十

（沒有因就沒有果，那就是沒有作為，四個地方都沒有，以此作為門）

觀三時門第十一

（既然推究沒有作為，必定要窮盡其……）

【English Translation】 English version Taisho Tripitaka Volume 30, No. 1568, The Twelve Gates Treatise

No. 1568

Table of Contents of the Twelve Gates Treatise

First Gate: Contemplation on Conditions (Hetu)

(The causes of all dharmas appear to each have their own nature, but when investigated and brought together, they are actually without inherent nature. Understanding this without obstruction is why it is called a gate.)

Second Gate: Contemplation on the Existence or Non-existence of Results

(Further investigation into dharmas without inherent nature: are they produced from existence or from non-existence? Neither existence nor non-existence can produce them; this is taken as a gate.)

Third Gate: Contemplation on Conditions (Paccaya)

(The above investigates causes; this investigates conditions. The four conditions (hetu-paccaya, samanantara-paccaya, arammana-paccaya, adhipati-paccaya), whether broadly or briefly explained, have no result; therefore, this is taken as a gate.)

Fourth Gate: Contemplation on Characteristics (Laksana)

(The above three gates investigate the non-arising of causes and conditions; this investigates the three characteristics (arising, abiding, ceasing). Since the three characteristics do not exist, this is taken as a gate.)

Fifth Gate: Contemplation on Existence or Non-existence of Characteristics

(This investigates the reality of the three characteristics: do they characterize with characteristics or without characteristics? Neither with nor without characteristics can they characterize; therefore, this is taken as a gate.)

Sixth Gate: Contemplation on Oneness or Difference

(This investigates whether existence and non-existence of characteristics are in one dharma or in different dharmas. Neither one nor different; this is taken as a gate.)

Seventh Gate: Contemplation on Existence or Non-existence

(The above investigates the non-characteristic nature of the three characteristics; this explains that the four characteristics (birth, abiding, change, and extinction) are also non-characteristic. Is arising and abiding existence or non-existence? There is no existence in the same place, nor is there existence in a different place; therefore, this is taken as a gate.)

Eighth Gate: Contemplation on Nature (Svabhava)

(Having known existence and non-existence, we further investigate its nature. Change and impermanence arise from conditions, so it is not nature; therefore, this is taken as a gate.)

Ninth Gate: Contemplation on Cause and Effect

(Since dharmas without inherent nature have no cause and effect, seeking them in the place of change and transformation yields no reason; therefore, this is taken as a gate.)

Tenth Gate: Contemplation on Action (Karman)

(Without cause, there is no effect; that is, there is no action. Since there is none in the four places, this is taken as a gate.)

Eleventh Gate: Contemplation on the Three Times

(Having investigated no action, one must exhaustively...)

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因，故尋三時無作而以為門)

觀生門第十二

(作為有造，生為有起，時中既無，誰為生者？即以為門)

十二門論序

十二門論者，蓋是實相之折中，道場之要軌也。十二門者，總眾枝之大數也；門者，開通無滯之稱也；論之者，欲以窮其源、盡其理也。若一理之不盡，則眾異紛然，有或趣之乖；一源之不窮；則眾涂扶疏；有殊致之跡。殊致之不夷、乖趣之不泯，大士之憂也。是以龍樹菩薩，開出者之由路，作十二門以正之。正之以十二，則有無兼暢，事無不盡。事盡于有無，則忘功于造化。理極于虛位，則喪我於二際。然則喪我在乎落筌，筌忘存乎遺寄。筌我兼忘，始可以幾乎實矣！幾乎實矣，則虛實兩冥、得失無際。冥而無際，則能忘造次於兩玄、泯顛沛於一致，整歸駕于道場、畢趣心於佛地。恢恢焉，真可謂運虛刃于無間、奏希聲于宇內，濟溺喪于玄津、出有無于域外者矣。遇哉后之學者，夷路既坦、幽涂既開，真得振和鸞于北冥、馳白牛以南迴，悟大覺于夢境、即百化以安歸。夫如是者慧，復知曜靈之方盛、玄陸之未希也哉。

睿以鄙倍之淺識，猶敢用誠虛關、希懷宗極，庶日用之有宜、冀歲計之能殖。況才之美者乎！不勝敬仰之至。敢以鈍辭𢭃思序而申之，並目品義

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為這個原因，所以要尋找過去、現在、未來三世中無所作為的狀態，並將其作為入門的途徑。

觀生門第十二

（如果認為事物是有造作的，生命是有起始的，那麼在時間之中既然找不到造作者，誰又是產生生命的主體呢？將這個問題作為入門的途徑。）

十二門論序

《十二門論》，大概是實相的折中體現，是通往菩提道場的關鍵途徑。『十二門』，是總括眾多分支的大數目；『門』，是開通無阻礙的稱謂；『論』，是要窮盡其根源、徹底明白其道理。如果一個道理沒有被完全理解，那麼各種差異就會紛繁出現，導致方向上的偏差；如果一個根源沒有被徹底探究，那麼各種途徑就會繁雜叢生，留下特殊差異的痕跡。特殊差異不能消除、方向偏差不能泯滅，這是大菩薩所擔憂的。因此，龍樹菩薩（Nāgārjuna，佛教中觀學派創始人），爲了開闢修行者的道路，撰寫了《十二門論》來匡正這些問題。用十二門來匡正，那麼有和無就能同時通暢，事理沒有不完備的。事理完備于有和無，那麼就能忘卻造化的功勞。道理達到虛空的極致，那麼就能在二際（過去和未來）中喪失自我。既然如此，喪失自我在於忘掉捕魚的竹笱（比喻達到目的后就應忘掉的工具），忘掉竹笱在於遺忘寄託之物。竹笱和自我都忘卻，才可以接近真實！接近真實，那麼虛和實兩者就能融合，得和失就沒有界限。融合而沒有界限，那麼就能在兩種玄妙的境界中忘卻輕率的舉動，在一致的境界中泯滅顛沛流離，整理好行裝回歸菩提道場，最終將心安住在佛的境界。多麼廣闊啊，真可以說是將虛空的刀刃運用在沒有間隙的地方，在宇宙中演奏稀有的聲音，在玄妙的津渡中拯救沉溺的人，使有和無都超出世俗的範圍。遇到《十二門論》的後世學者，平坦的道路已經開闢，幽深的途徑已經打開，真的可以像大鵬鳥一樣在北冥振翅高飛，駕馭著白牛向南方迴歸，在夢境中領悟大覺悟，憑藉各種變化而安然迴歸。像這樣的人才是有智慧的，又怎麼會知道太陽的光輝正在興盛，玄妙的陸地還沒有被渴望呢？

我慧睿以淺薄的見識，仍然敢於用真誠來探索玄妙的關隘，希望能夠宗奉最高的真理，希望每天都能有所適宜，希望每年都能有所積累。更何況是那些才華出衆的人呢！我非常敬佩。謹用我遲鈍的言辭來構思序言並加以闡述，同時列出章節的名稱和意義。

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, one seeks the state of non-action in the three times (past, present, and future) and takes it as the gateway.

Chapter 12: Gate of Observing Production

(If one considers things to be created and life to have a beginning, then since there is no creator in time, who is the subject that produces life? This question is taken as the gateway.)

Preface to the Twelve Gates Treatise

The 『Twelve Gates Treatise』 is probably a compromise of the true nature of reality and a crucial path to the Bodhi-mandala (bodhi tree). 『Twelve Gates』 is the grand number that encompasses all branches; 『Gate』 is a term for unobstructed access; 『Treatise』 is to exhaust its source and thoroughly understand its principles. If a principle is not fully understood, various differences will arise, leading to deviations in direction; if a source is not thoroughly explored, various paths will grow complex, leaving traces of special differences. The inability to eliminate special differences and the inability to extinguish directional deviations are the concerns of great Bodhisattvas. Therefore, Nāgārjuna (founder of the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism), in order to open up the path for practitioners, wrote the 『Twelve Gates Treatise』 to correct these problems. By correcting with the twelve gates, existence and non-existence can both be unobstructed, and matters will be complete. When matters are complete in existence and non-existence, one can forget the merit of creation. When the principle reaches the extreme of emptiness, one can lose oneself in the two extremes (past and future). In that case, losing oneself lies in forgetting the fish trap (a metaphor for a tool that should be forgotten after achieving the goal), and forgetting the fish trap lies in forgetting the object of reliance. When both the fish trap and the self are forgotten, one can almost approach reality! Approaching reality, then emptiness and existence can merge, and gain and loss have no boundaries. Merging without boundaries, then one can forget rash actions in the two mysterious realms, extinguish wandering in the state of oneness, prepare to return to the Bodhi-mandala, and ultimately settle the mind in the realm of the Buddha. How vast it is! It can truly be said to wield the blade of emptiness in a place without gaps, to play rare sounds in the universe, to save those who are drowning in the mysterious ford, and to make existence and non-existence transcend the mundane realm. Fortunate are the later scholars who encounter the 『Twelve Gates Treatise』; the flat road has been opened, the deep path has been revealed, and one can truly soar like the Peng bird in the Northern Darkness, drive the white ox back to the South, awaken to great enlightenment in a dream, and return safely through various transformations. Such a person is wise, and how would they know that the radiance of the sun is flourishing and the mysterious land is not yet desired?

I, Hui Rui, with my shallow knowledge, still dare to use sincerity to explore the mysterious passes, hoping to follow the highest truth, hoping that each day will be suitable, and hoping that each year will accumulate. How much more so for those who are talented! I am very respectful. I humbly use my dull words to conceive the preface and elaborate on it, and at the same time list the names and meanings of the chapters.

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題之於首，豈其能益也？庶以此心開疾進之路耳。

觀因緣門第一

龍樹菩薩造

姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯

說曰：今當略解摩訶衍義。

問曰：「解摩訶衍者，有何義利？」

答曰：「摩訶衍者，是十方三世諸佛甚深法藏，為大功德利根者說。末世眾生薄福鈍根，雖尋經文不能通達。我愍此等欲令開悟，又欲光闡如來無上大法，是故略解摩訶衍義。」

問曰：「摩訶衍無量無邊不可稱數，直是佛語尚不可盡，況復解釋演散其義？」

答曰：「以是義故，我初言略解。」

問曰：「何故名為摩訶衍？」

答曰：「摩訶衍者，於二乘為上，故名大乘；諸佛最大，是乘能至，故名為大；諸佛大人乘是乘故，故名為大；又能滅除眾生大苦、與大利益事，故名為大；又觀世音、得大勢、文殊師利、彌勒菩薩等，是諸大士之所乘故，故名為大；又以此乘能盡一切諸法邊底，故名為大；又如《般若經》中佛自說摩訶衍義無量無邊，以是因緣，故名為大。」

大分深義，所謂空也。若能通達是義，即通達大乘，具足六波羅蜜，無所障礙，是故我今但解釋空。解釋空者，當以十二門入于空義。

初是因緣門，所謂：

眾緣所生法，　　是即無自性； 　若

【現代漢語翻譯】 題寫在最前面，難道就能有所助益嗎？只不過是想借此心開啟快速進步的道路罷了。

觀因緣門第一

龍樹菩薩造

姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯

說：現在我將簡略地解釋摩訶衍（Mahayana，大乘）的意義。

問：『解釋摩訶衍（Mahayana，大乘）的人，有什麼意義和利益？』

答：『摩訶衍（Mahayana，大乘）是十方三世諸佛甚深法藏，是為具有大功德和敏銳根器的人說的。末法時代的眾生福薄根鈍，即使研讀經文也不能通達。我憐憫這些人，想讓他們開悟，又想光大闡揚如來無上的大法，所以簡略地解釋摩訶衍（Mahayana，大乘）的意義。』

問：『摩訶衍（Mahayana，大乘）無量無邊不可稱數，僅僅是佛說的話尚且不能窮盡，更何況解釋和演散它的意義呢？』

答：『正因為這個緣故，我一開始就說是簡略地解釋。』

問：『為什麼叫做摩訶衍（Mahayana，大乘）？』

答：『摩訶衍（Mahayana，大乘），對於聲聞乘和緣覺乘來說是至上的，所以叫做大乘；諸佛最大，這個乘能夠到達，所以叫做大；諸佛大人乘坐這個乘，所以叫做大；又能滅除眾生的大苦、給予大利益，所以叫做大；又觀世音（Avalokiteshvara）、得大勢（Mahasthamaprapta）、文殊師利（Manjushri）、彌勒菩薩（Maitreya）等，是這些大菩薩所乘坐的，所以叫做大；又用這個乘能夠窮盡一切諸法的邊際和底蘊，所以叫做大；又如《般若經》（Prajna Sutra）中佛自己說摩訶衍（Mahayana，大乘）的意義無量無邊，因為這個因緣，所以叫做大。』

大乘最深奧的意義，就是空性。如果能夠通達這個意義，就通達了大乘，具足六波羅蜜（Six Paramitas），沒有阻礙，所以我現在只解釋空性。解釋空性，應當用十二門進入空性的意義。

首先是因緣門，也就是：

眾緣所生的法，就是沒有自性；

【English Translation】 To inscribe it at the beginning, can it truly be of benefit? It is merely with this intention to open a path for rapid progress.

Chapter One: The Gate of Observing Conditions (Hetu-pratyaya)

Composed by Nagarjuna Bodhisattva

Translated by Kumarajiva of the Yao Qin Dynasty

It is said: Now I shall briefly explain the meaning of Mahayana (Great Vehicle).

Question: 'For those who explain Mahayana (Great Vehicle), what is the meaning and benefit?'

Answer: 'Mahayana (Great Vehicle) is the profound Dharma treasury of all Buddhas of the ten directions and three times, spoken for those with great merit and sharp faculties. Sentient beings of the degenerate age have meager blessings and dull faculties; though they seek through the sutra texts, they cannot penetrate them. I pity these beings and wish to enable them to awaken, and also wish to illuminate and propagate the unsurpassed Great Dharma of the Tathagata. Therefore, I briefly explain the meaning of Mahayana (Great Vehicle).'

Question: 'Mahayana (Great Vehicle) is immeasurable and boundless, beyond calculation. Even the words of the Buddha cannot be exhausted, how much more so to explain and elaborate its meaning?'

Answer: 'It is for this reason that I initially said I would briefly explain it.'

Question: 'Why is it called Mahayana (Great Vehicle)?'

Answer: 'Mahayana (Great Vehicle) is superior to the Two Vehicles (Shravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana), therefore it is called the Great Vehicle; the Buddhas are the greatest, and this vehicle can reach them, therefore it is called Great; the great beings, the Buddhas, ride this vehicle, therefore it is called Great; moreover, it can extinguish the great suffering of sentient beings and bestow great benefits, therefore it is called Great; furthermore, Avalokiteshvara (Guanyin), Mahasthamaprapta (Dashizhi), Manjushri (Wenshushili), Maitreya Bodhisattva (Mile Pusa), and others, are those great beings who ride it, therefore it is called Great; moreover, with this vehicle, one can exhaust the boundaries and depths of all dharmas, therefore it is called Great; also, as in the Prajna Sutra (Wisdom Sutra), the Buddha himself said that the meaning of Mahayana (Great Vehicle) is immeasurable and boundless, and for this reason, it is called Great.'

The deepest meaning of the Great Vehicle is emptiness (shunyata). If one can penetrate this meaning, one penetrates the Great Vehicle, fully possessing the Six Paramitas (Six Perfections), without obstruction. Therefore, I now only explain emptiness. To explain emptiness, one should enter the meaning of emptiness through the twelve gates.

The first is the Gate of Conditions (Hetu-pratyaya), which is:

The dharmas produced by various conditions, are without self-nature;

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無自性者，　　云何有是法？

眾緣所生法有二種：一者內，二者外。眾緣亦有二種：一者內，二者外。外因緣者，如泥團、轉繩、陶師等和合，故有瓶生；又如縷繩、機杼、織師等和合，故有疊生；又如治地、筑基梁、椽、泥、草、人功等和合，故有捨生；又如酪器、鉆搖、人功等和合，故有酥生；又如種子、地、水、火、風、虛空、時節、人功等和合，故有芽生；當知外緣等法皆亦如是。內因緣者，所謂無明、行、識、名色、六入、觸、受、愛、取、有、生、老死，各各先因而後生。如是內外諸法皆從眾緣生，從眾緣生故，即非是無性耶！

若法自性無，他性亦無，自他亦無。何以故？因他性故無自性。若謂以他性故有者，則牛以馬性有，馬以牛性有，梨以柰性有，柰以梨性有，余皆應爾，而實不然。若謂不以他性故有，但因他故有者，是亦不然。何以故？若以蒲故有席者，則蒲、席一體，不名為他；若謂蒲于席為他者，不得言以蒲故有席。又蒲亦無自性。何以故？蒲亦從眾緣出，故無自性。無自性故，不得言以蒲性故有席，是故席不應以蒲為體。余瓶、酥等外因緣生法，皆亦如是不可得。

內因緣生法，皆亦如是不可得，如《七十論》中說：

「緣法實無生；　　若謂為有生， 　為在一

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果事物沒有自性（Sva-bhava，自身固有的性質），又怎麼會有這種法（Dharma，事物）呢？

由眾多因緣和合而生的法有兩種：一是內在的，二是外在的。因緣也有兩種：一是內在的，二是外在的。外在的因緣，比如泥土、轉輪、陶工等和合，所以產生瓶子；又比如絲線、織布機、織工等和合，所以產生布匹；又比如平整的土地、地基、梁、椽、泥、草、人工等和合，所以產生房屋；又比如乳酪器具、攪拌、人工等和合，所以產生酥油；又比如種子、土地、水、火、風、虛空、時節、人工等和合，所以產生芽。應當知道外在的因緣等法都是這樣。

內在的因緣，就是指無明（Avidya，對實相的無知）、行（Samskara，業力行為）、識（Vijnana，意識）、名色（Nama-rupa，名稱和形態）、六入（Sadayatana，六根，即眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）、觸（Sparsa，感覺）、受（Vedana，感受）、愛（Trsna，渴愛）、取（Upadana，執取）、有（Bhava，存在）、生（Jati，出生）、老死（Jara-marana，衰老和死亡），它們各自都是前一個的因，后一個的果。像這樣，內外諸法都是從眾多因緣而生，從眾多因緣而生，就不是沒有自性嗎！

如果一個法沒有自性，那麼他性（Para-bhava，依賴於其他事物的性質）也沒有，自性和他性都沒有。為什麼呢？因為依賴於他性，所以沒有自性。如果說因為他性的緣故而有，那麼牛就應該以馬的性質而有，馬以牛的性質而有，梨以柰（蘋果的一種）的性質而有，柰以梨的性質而有，其餘的都應該這樣，但實際上不是這樣。如果說不是因為他性的緣故而有，只是因為其他的緣故而有，這也是不對的。為什麼呢？如果因為蒲草的緣故而有蓆子，那麼蒲草和蓆子就是一體的，不能稱為『他』；如果說蒲草對於蓆子是『他』，就不能說因為蒲草的緣故而有蓆子。而且蒲草也沒有自性。為什麼呢？蒲草也是從眾多因緣而生，所以沒有自性。沒有自性的緣故，就不能說因為蒲草的性質而有蓆子，所以蓆子不應該以蒲草為本體。其餘的瓶子、酥油等外在因緣所生的法，也都是這樣不可得。

內在因緣所生的法，也都是這樣不可得，就像《七十論》中所說：

『因緣法實際上沒有生；如果說有生，為在一處生……』

【English Translation】 English version: If there is no self-nature (Sva-bhava, inherent existence), how can there be such a Dharma (thing)?

The Dharmas that arise from the aggregation of various causes and conditions are of two kinds: internal and external. Causes and conditions are also of two kinds: internal and external. External causes and conditions are, for example, the combination of clay, a potter's wheel, and a potter, which gives rise to a pot; or the combination of threads, a loom, and a weaver, which gives rise to cloth; or the combination of leveled ground, a foundation, beams, rafters, mud, grass, and human labor, which gives rise to a house; or the combination of a milk container, churning, and human labor, which gives rise to ghee (clarified butter); or the combination of seeds, earth, water, fire, wind, space, seasons, and human labor, which gives rise to a sprout. It should be known that all external causes and conditions are like this.

Internal causes and conditions refer to ignorance (Avidya, unawareness of reality), karmic formations (Samskara, volitional actions), consciousness (Vijnana, awareness), name and form (Nama-rupa, mind and body), the six sense bases (Sadayatana, the six organs: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind), contact (Sparsa, sensory impression), feeling (Vedana, sensation), craving (Trsna, thirst), grasping (Upadana, clinging), becoming (Bhava, existence), birth (Jati, arising), and old age and death (Jara-marana, aging and death), each arising as a result of the preceding one. Thus, all internal and external Dharmas arise from the aggregation of various causes and conditions. Since they arise from the aggregation of various causes and conditions, are they not without self-nature?

If a Dharma has no self-nature, then it also has no other-nature (Para-bhava, nature dependent on other things), and neither self-nature nor other-nature exists. Why? Because due to dependence on other-nature, there is no self-nature. If it is said that it exists because of other-nature, then a cow should exist with the nature of a horse, a horse with the nature of a cow, a pear with the nature of a quince, a quince with the nature of a pear, and so on for everything else, but this is not the case. If it is said that it does not exist because of other-nature, but only because of something else, this is also not correct. Why? If a mat exists because of reeds, then the reeds and the mat are one and the same, and cannot be called 'other'; if it is said that the reeds are 'other' than the mat, then it cannot be said that the mat exists because of the reeds. Moreover, the reeds also have no self-nature. Why? The reeds also arise from the aggregation of various causes and conditions, so they have no self-nature. Because there is no self-nature, it cannot be said that the mat exists because of the nature of the reeds, so the mat should not have reeds as its essence. The same is true for other Dharmas arising from external causes and conditions, such as pots and ghee; they are all unattainable.

The Dharmas arising from internal causes and conditions are also unattainable in the same way, as stated in the Seventy Stanzas:

'The Dharma of conditions truly has no arising; if it is said to have arising, it arises in one place...'

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心中；　　為在多心中？」

是十二因緣法實自無生。若謂有生，為一心中有？為眾心中有？若一心中有者，因果即一時共生。又因果一時有，是事不然。何以故？凡物先因後果故。若眾心中有者，十二因緣法則各各別異，先分共心滅已，後分誰為因緣？滅法無所有，何得為因？十二因緣法若先有者，應若一心、若多心，二俱不然。

是故眾緣皆空。緣空故，從緣生法亦空，是故當知一切有為法皆空。

有為法尚空，何況我耶？因五陰、十二入、十八界有為法故說有我，如因可然故說有然；若陰、入、界空，更無有法可說為我，如無可然不可說然。如經說：「佛告諸比丘：『因我故有我所，若無我則無我所。』」

如是有為法空故，當知無為涅槃法亦空。何以故？此五陰滅更不生餘五陰，是名涅槃。五陰本來自空，何所滅故說名涅槃？又我亦復空，誰得涅槃？複次，無生法名涅槃，若生法成者，無生法亦應成；生法不成，先已說因緣，后當復說，是故生法不成。因生法故名無生，若生法不成，無生法雲何成？

是故有為、無為及我皆空。

觀有果無果門第二

複次，諸法不生。何以故？

先有則不生，　　先無亦不生， 　有無亦不生，　　誰當有生者？

若

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『心中；為在多心中？』

十二因緣法（Twelve Nidānas，佛教關於生命輪迴的十二個環節）實際上是無生的。如果說有生，是在一個心中有？還是在多個心中有？如果在一個心中有，那麼因和果就同時產生。而且因果同時存在，這是不合理的。為什麼呢？因為任何事物都是先有因，後有果。如果在多個心中有，那麼十二因緣法就會各自不同，先分離共同的心滅亡后，誰來作為因緣呢？滅亡的法什麼都沒有，怎麼能作為因呢？如果十二因緣法先存在，那麼無論是在一個心中，還是在多個心中，這兩種情況都不成立。

因此，眾緣（hetu-pratyaya，各種條件和因素）都是空性的。因為緣是空性的，所以從緣而生的法也是空性的，因此應當明白一切有為法（saṃskṛta-dharma，由因緣和合而成的法）都是空性的。

有為法尚且是空性的，更何況我呢？因為五陰（pañca-skandha，構成個體的五種要素）、十二入（dvādaśa-āyatana，感官與對像相互作用的十二個領域）、十八界（aṣṭādaśa-dhātu，六根、六塵、六識）這些有為法，所以才說有我，就像因為有可燃物所以才說有燃燒一樣；如果陰、入、界都是空性的，就沒有什麼法可以用來指代我了，就像沒有可燃物就不能說有燃燒一樣。如經中所說：『佛告訴眾比丘：因為有我，所以有我所；如果沒有我，就沒有我所。』

像這樣，因為有為法是空性的，所以應當明白無為涅槃法（asaṃskṛta-nirvāṇa-dharma，超越因果的涅槃境界）也是空性的。為什麼呢？因為這五陰滅亡后不再產生其他的五陰，這叫做涅槃。五陰本來就是空性的，滅掉什麼才能叫做涅槃呢？而且，我也是空性的，誰能證得涅槃呢？再者，無生法叫做涅槃，如果生法成立，那麼無生法也應該成立；生法不成立，之前已經說了因緣，後面還會再說，所以生法是不成立的。因為生法才有名為無生，如果生法不成立，無生法怎麼能成立呢？

因此，有為、無為以及我都是空性的。

觀有果無果門第二

再者，諸法（dharma，一切事物和現象）是不生的。為什麼呢？

先有則不生， 先無亦不生， 有無亦不生， 誰當有生者？

如果

【English Translation】 English version: 『In the mind; or in many minds?』

The Twelve Nidānas (Twelve Nidānas, the twelve links in the Buddhist chain of dependent origination) are in reality without arising. If it is said that there is arising, is it in one mind? Or is it in many minds? If it is in one mind, then cause and effect arise simultaneously. Moreover, cause and effect existing simultaneously is not reasonable. Why? Because in all things, there is first a cause and then an effect. If it is in many minds, then the Twelve Nidānas will each be different. After the shared mind is first divided and extinguished, who will serve as the condition? Extinguished dharmas (dharma, phenomena) have nothing, how can they be a cause? If the Twelve Nidānas exist first, then whether in one mind or in many minds, both cases are not valid.

Therefore, all conditions (hetu-pratyaya, all conditions and factors) are empty. Because conditions are empty, the dharmas arising from conditions are also empty. Therefore, it should be understood that all conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta-dharma, conditioned phenomena) are empty.

If conditioned dharmas are empty, how much more so is 『I』? Because of the conditioned dharmas of the five skandhas (pañca-skandha, the five aggregates), the twelve āyatanas (dvādaśa-āyatana, the twelve sense bases), and the eighteen dhātus (aṣṭādaśa-dhātu, the eighteen elements), it is said that there is 『I』, just as because there is fuel, it is said that there is burning; if the skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus are empty, then there is no dharma that can be referred to as 『I』, just as without fuel, it cannot be said that there is burning. As the sutra says: 『The Buddha told the bhikshus (bhikṣu, monks): Because of 『I』, there is 『mine』; if there is no 『I』, there is no 『mine』.』

In this way, because conditioned dharmas are empty, it should be understood that unconditioned Nirvāṇa (asaṃskṛta-nirvāṇa-dharma, unconditioned Nirvana) is also empty. Why? Because when these five skandhas are extinguished, they do not give rise to other five skandhas; this is called Nirvāṇa. The five skandhas are originally empty, so what is extinguished to be called Nirvāṇa? Moreover, 『I』 is also empty, so who attains Nirvāṇa? Furthermore, the unarisen dharma is called Nirvāṇa. If the arisen dharma is established, then the unarisen dharma should also be established; the arisen dharma is not established, the conditions have already been discussed before, and will be discussed again later, so the arisen dharma is not established. Because of the arisen dharma, there is the name 『unarisen』; if the arisen dharma is not established, how can the unarisen dharma be established?

Therefore, the conditioned, the unconditioned, and 『I』 are all empty.

Chapter Two: Observing the Existence or Non-Existence of Results

Furthermore, all dharmas (dharma, phenomena) do not arise. Why?

If they exist beforehand, they do not arise; If they do not exist beforehand, they also do not arise; If they both exist and do not exist, they also do not arise; Who then can have arising?

If

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果因中先有則不應生，先無亦不應生，先有無亦不應生。

何以故？若果因中先有而生，是則無窮。如果先未生而生者，今生已復應更生。何以故？因中常有故。從是有邊復應更生，是則無窮。

若謂生已更不生，未生而生者，是中無有生理；是故先有而生，是事不然。

複次，若因中先有果，而謂未生而生、生已不生者，是亦二俱有而一生一不生，無有是處。

複次，若未生定有者，生已則應無。何以故？生、未生共相違故；生未生相違故，是二作相亦相違。

複次，有與無相違，無與有相違，若生已亦有、未生時亦有者，則生、未生不應有異。何以故？若有生，生已亦有、未生亦有，如是生、未生有何差別？生、未生無差別，是事不然，是故有不生。

複次，有已先成，何用更生？如作已不應作，成已不應成，是故有法不應生。

複次若有生，因中未生時果應可見，而實不可見；如泥中瓶、蒲中席，應可見而實不可見，是故有不生。

問曰：「果雖先有，以未變故不見。」

答曰：「若瓶未生時瓶體未變故不見者，以何相知言泥中先有瓶？為以瓶相有瓶？為以牛相、馬相故有瓶耶？若泥中無瓶相者，亦無牛相、馬相，是豈不名無耶？是故汝說因中先有果

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果結果在原因中已經存在，那麼就不應該再產生；如果結果在原因中先前不存在，那麼也不應該產生；如果結果在原因中既存在又不存在，那麼也不應該產生。

為什麼呢？如果結果在原因中已經存在而產生，那麼就會導致無窮無盡。如果先前沒有產生而產生，那麼現在已經產生的就應該再次產生。為什麼呢？因為在原因中始終存在著結果。從這個『有』的邊際出發，就應該再次產生，這樣就會導致無窮無盡。

如果說已經產生的不再產生，沒有產生的卻產生，那麼這其中就沒有產生的道理；因此，說先前存在而產生，這是不正確的。

再者，如果原因中先前存在結果，卻說沒有產生而產生、產生后不再產生，那麼這就是兩者都存在，一個產生一個不產生，沒有這樣的道理。

再者，如果沒有產生就確定存在，那麼產生后就應該不存在。為什麼呢？因為產生和未產生是相互違背的；產生和未產生相互違背，這兩種作用也是相互違背的。

再者，『有』和『無』相互違背，『無』和『有』相互違背，如果產生后也是『有』、未產生時也是『有』，那麼產生和未產生就不應該有區別。為什麼呢？如果有產生，產生后也是『有』、未產生也是『有』，那麼這樣產生和未產生有什麼差別？產生和未產生沒有差別，這是不正確的，所以『有』不會產生。

再者，已經存在的東西已經先完成了，為什麼還要再產生？如同已經做完的事情不應該再做，已經完成的事情不應該再完成，所以已經存在的法不應該產生。

再者，如果『有』會產生，那麼在原因中未產生時，結果就應該可以看見，但實際上是看不見的；如同泥土中的瓶子、燈芯草中的蓆子，應該可以看見但實際上是看不見的，所以『有』不會產生。

有人問：『結果雖然先前存在，因為沒有變化所以看不見。』

回答說：『如果瓶子未產生時，瓶子的本體沒有變化所以看不見，那麼用什麼特徵知道泥土中先前存在瓶子呢？是用瓶子的特徵存在瓶子？還是用牛的特徵、馬的特徵而存在瓶子呢？如果泥土中沒有瓶子的特徵，也沒有牛的特徵、馬的特徵，這難道不叫做『無』嗎？所以你說原因中先前存在結果，是不對的。

【English Translation】 English version: If the result already exists in the cause, then it should not arise; if the result does not exist in the cause beforehand, then it should not arise either; if the result both exists and does not exist in the cause, then it should not arise.

Why is that? If the result already exists in the cause and then arises, this would lead to infinite regress. If it arises without having arisen before, then what has already arisen now should arise again. Why is that? Because the result always exists in the cause. Starting from this 'existence' side, it should arise again, which would lead to infinite regress.

If it is said that what has already arisen does not arise again, but what has not arisen arises, then there is no principle of arising in this; therefore, to say that it arises because it already exists is not correct.

Furthermore, if the result already exists in the cause, and yet it is said that it arises without having arisen and does not arise after having arisen, then this means that both exist, one arises and one does not arise, which is not reasonable.

Furthermore, if it is determined to exist without having arisen, then it should not exist after having arisen. Why is that? Because arising and not arising are mutually contradictory; because arising and not arising are mutually contradictory, these two actions are also contradictory.

Furthermore, 'existence' and 'non-existence' are mutually contradictory, 'non-existence' and 'existence' are mutually contradictory. If it exists after arising and also exists before arising, then there should be no difference between arising and not arising. Why is that? If there is arising, and it exists after arising and also exists before arising, then what difference is there between arising and not arising? If there is no difference between arising and not arising, this is not correct, therefore 'existence' does not arise.

Furthermore, what already exists is already complete, why should it arise again? Just as what has already been done should not be done again, what has already been completed should not be completed again, therefore a dharma (law/phenomenon) that already exists should not arise.

Furthermore, if 'existence' arises, then the result should be visible in the cause before it arises, but in reality, it is not visible; just as the pot in the clay, the mat in the reeds, should be visible but in reality are not visible, therefore 'existence' does not arise.

Someone asks: 'Although the result already exists, it is not visible because it has not changed.'

The answer is: 'If the essence of the pot is not visible when the pot has not arisen because it has not changed, then by what characteristic do you know that the pot already exists in the clay? Is it that the pot exists because of the characteristic of the pot? Or does the pot exist because of the characteristic of the cow, the characteristic of the horse? If there is no characteristic of the pot in the clay, and there is also no characteristic of the cow, the characteristic of the horse, is this not called 'non-existence'? Therefore, what you say about the result already existing in the cause is not correct.'

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而生者，是事不然。複次，變法即是果者，即應因中先有變。何以故？汝法因中先有果故。若瓶等先有，變亦先有，應當可見而實不可得，是故汝言未變故不見，是事不然。若謂未變不名為果，則果畢竟不可得。何以故？是變先無，后亦應無，故瓶等果畢竟不可得。若謂變已是果者，則因中先無，如是則不定：或因中先有果，或先無果。」

問曰：「先有變，但不可得見。凡物自有有而不可得者，如物或有近而不可知；或有遠而不可知；或根壞故不可知；或心不住故不可知；障故不可知；同故不可知；勝故不可知；微細故不可知。近而不可知者，如眼中藥。遠而不可知者，如鳥飛虛空高翔遠逝。根壞故不可知者，如盲不見色、聾不聞聲、鼻塞不聞香、口爽不知味、身頑不知觸、心狂不知實。心不住故不可知者，如心在色等則不知聲。障故不可知者，如地障大水、壁障外物。同故不可知者，如黑上墨點。勝故不可知者，如有鐘鼓音，不聞捎拂聲。細微故不可知者，如微塵等不現。如是諸法雖有，以八因緣故不可知。汝說因中變不可得、瓶等不可得者，是事不然。何以故？是事雖有，以八因緣故不可得。」

答曰：「變法及瓶等果，不同八因緣不可得。何以故？若變法及瓶等，果極近不可得者，小遠應可得；

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果說生（產生）就是這樣，那是不對的。進一步說，如果變化（變法）就是果，那麼原因中就應該先有變化。為什麼呢？因為按照你的理論，原因中應該先有結果。如果瓶子等事物是先有的，那麼變化也應該是先有的，應該可以被看到，但實際上卻看不到，所以你說因為沒有變化所以看不到，這是不對的。如果說沒有變化就不能稱為果，那麼果就永遠無法得到。為什麼呢？因為變化先前沒有，之後也應該沒有，所以瓶子等果永遠無法得到。如果說變化之後才是果，那麼原因中先前就沒有果，這樣就不確定了：或者原因中先有果，或者先前沒有果。」

問：『先前有變化，只是無法看到。一般事物本身就有存在但無法被看到的，比如有些事物因為太近而無法知道；有些事物因為太遠而無法知道；有些事物因為根源壞了而無法知道；有些事物因為心不在焉而無法知道；有些事物因為有障礙而無法知道；有些事物因為相同而無法知道；有些事物因為微弱而無法知道。因為太近而無法知道的，比如眼中的藥。因為太遠而無法知道的，比如鳥在空中高飛遠去。因為根源壞了而無法知道的，比如盲人看不到顏色、聾子聽不到聲音、鼻子堵塞聞不到香味、舌頭麻木嘗不出味道、身體麻木感覺不到觸覺、精神錯亂不知道真實。因為心不在焉而無法知道的，比如心在顏色等事物上就不知道聲音。因為有障礙而無法知道的，比如大地阻擋大水、墻壁阻擋外面的東西。因為相同而無法知道的，比如黑色的東西上的墨點。因為微弱而無法知道的，比如鐘鼓的聲音，就聽不到拂塵的聲音。因為細微而無法知道的，比如微塵等無法顯現。像這些法，雖然存在，但因為這八種原因而無法知道。你說原因中的變化無法得到、瓶子等無法得到，這是不對的。為什麼呢？因為這些事物雖然存在，但因為這八種原因而無法得到。』

答：『變化（變法）以及瓶子等果，不同於因為八種原因而無法得到的情況。為什麼呢？如果變化（變法）以及瓶子等果，是因為太近而無法得到，那麼稍微遠一點就應該可以得到；

【English Translation】 English version: 'If existence (birth) is like that, then that is not right. Furthermore, if transformation (change) is the result, then there should be transformation in the cause first. Why? Because according to your theory, the result should exist in the cause first. If the pot and other things exist first, then transformation should also exist first, and it should be visible, but in reality, it is not visible. Therefore, your statement that it is not seen because there is no transformation is not right. If you say that it cannot be called a result without transformation, then the result can never be obtained. Why? Because transformation did not exist before, and it should not exist afterward either, so the pot and other results can never be obtained. If you say that it is a result after transformation, then there was no result in the cause before, so it is uncertain: either there is a result in the cause first, or there is no result before.'

Question: 'There is transformation beforehand, but it cannot be seen. Generally, things themselves exist but cannot be seen, such as some things that cannot be known because they are too close; some things that cannot be known because they are too far; some things that cannot be known because their roots are broken; some things that cannot be known because the mind is not focused; some things that cannot be known because of obstacles; some things that cannot be known because they are the same; some things that cannot be known because they are weak. Those that cannot be known because they are too close are like medicine in the eye. Those that cannot be known because they are too far are like birds flying high and far away in the sky. Those that cannot be known because their roots are broken are like the blind not seeing colors, the deaf not hearing sounds, the nose being blocked and not smelling fragrances, the tongue being numb and not tasting flavors, the body being numb and not feeling touch, and the mind being deranged and not knowing reality. Those that cannot be known because the mind is not focused are like the mind being on colors and not knowing sounds. Those that cannot be known because of obstacles are like the earth blocking great water and walls blocking outside things. Those that cannot be known because they are the same are like ink dots on black things. Those that cannot be known because they are weak are like the sound of bells and drums, and the sound of dusters cannot be heard. Those that cannot be known because they are subtle are like dust and other things that cannot be seen. Like these dharmas, although they exist, they cannot be known because of these eight causes. You say that transformation in the cause cannot be obtained and pots cannot be obtained, but that is not right. Why? Because these things, although they exist, cannot be obtained because of these eight causes.'

Answer: 'Transformation (change) and the pot and other results are different from situations where things cannot be obtained because of eight causes. Why? If transformation (change) and the pot and other results cannot be obtained because they are too close, then they should be obtainable if they are a little further away;'

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極遠不可得者，小近應可得；若根壞不可得者，根凈應可得；若心不住不可得者，心住應可得；若障不可得者，變法及瓶法無障應可得；若同不可得者，異時應可得；若勝不可得者，勝止應可得；若細微不可得者，而瓶等果粗應可得。若瓶細故不可得者，生已亦應不可得。何以故？生已、未生細相一故，生已、未生俱定有故。」

問曰：「未生時細，生已轉粗，是故生已可得，未生不可得。」

答曰：「若爾者，因中則無果。何以故？因中無粗故。又、因中先無粗，若因中先有粗者，則不應言細，故不可得；今果是粗，汝言細故不可得，是粗不名為果。今果畢竟不應可得而果實可得，是故不以細故不可得。如是有法因中先有果，以八因緣故不可得，先因中有果，是事不然。

「複次，若因中先有果生者，是則因、因相壞，果、果相壞。何以故？如疊在縷，如果在器，但是住處，不名為因。何以故？縷、器非疊，果因故。若因壞，果亦壞，是故縷等非疊等因。因無故，果亦無。何以故？因因故有果成，因不成，果云何成？

「複次，若不作不名果，縷等因不能作疊等果。何以故？如縷等不以疊等住故能作疊等果，如是則無因無果。若因果俱無，則不應求因中若先有果、若先無果。

「復

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 極遠的事物不可能得到，稍微近一點的或許可以得到；如果根已經壞了不可能得到，根是乾淨的或許可以得到；如果心不住於一處不可能得到，心安住下來或許可以得到；如果有障礙不可能得到，轉變方法或者瓶子的方法沒有障礙或許可以得到；如果相同不可能得到，不同的時候或許可以得到；如果殊勝不可能得到，殊勝的止境或許可以得到；如果細微的事物不可能得到，像瓶子等粗大的結果或許可以得到。如果因為瓶子細微而不可得，那麼產生之後也應該不可得。為什麼呢？因為產生之後和未產生時的細微狀態是一樣的，產生之後和未產生時都是確定存在的。

問：『未產生時是細微的，產生之後就轉變為粗大的，所以產生之後可以得到，未產生時不可能得到。』

答：『如果這樣說，那麼因中就沒有果。為什麼呢？因為因中沒有粗大的東西。而且，因中先前沒有粗大的東西，如果因中先前有粗大的東西，那麼就不應該說是細微的，所以不可能得到；現在果是粗大的，你說因為細微所以不可能得到，那麼粗大的就不叫做果。現在果畢竟不應該可以得到，而果實卻可以得到，所以不能因為細微就說不可能得到。像這樣，有法認為因中先前有果，因為八種因緣的緣故不可能得到，先前因中有果，這件事是不成立的。

『再者，如果因中先前有果產生，那麼因的因相就會壞滅，果的果相也會壞滅。為什麼呢？就像摺疊的布在絲線里，如果果在器皿里，那只是一個住處，不能叫做因。為什麼呢？因為絲線、器皿不是摺疊的布、果的因。如果因壞滅，果也會壞滅，所以絲線等不是摺疊的布等的因。因沒有了，果也沒有了。為什麼呢？因為因的緣故才有果的成就，因不成就，果怎麼能成就？』

『再者，如果不造作就不能稱為果，絲線等因不能造作摺疊的布等果。為什麼呢？如果絲線等不以摺疊的布等住處就能造作摺疊的布等果，這樣就沒有因也沒有果。如果因果都沒有，那麼就不應該探求因中是先前有果還是先前沒有果。』

【English Translation】 English version: That which is extremely far away is unattainable, but that which is slightly closer may be attainable; if the root is damaged and unattainable, then a pure root may be attainable; if the mind is not dwelling, it is unattainable, but if the mind dwells, it may be attainable; if there is an obstruction, it is unattainable, but transforming the method or the method of the pot without obstruction may be attainable; if it is the same, it is unattainable, but at a different time it may be attainable; if it is superior, it is unattainable, but the cessation of superiority may be attainable; if it is subtle and unattainable, then coarse results such as pots may be attainable. If it is unattainable because the pot is subtle, then it should also be unattainable after it is produced. Why? Because the subtle state after production and before production is the same, and both after production and before production are definitely existent.

Question: 'When not yet produced, it is subtle, but after production, it becomes coarse, therefore it can be attained after production, but it cannot be attained before production.'

Answer: 'If that is the case, then there is no result in the cause. Why? Because there is no coarseness in the cause. Moreover, there was no coarseness in the cause before; if there was coarseness in the cause before, then it should not be said to be subtle, therefore it is unattainable; now the result is coarse, and you say it is unattainable because it is subtle, then the coarse is not called a result. Now the result should ultimately not be attainable, but the fruit is attainable, therefore it cannot be said to be unattainable because it is subtle. Like this, some doctrines hold that the result is present in the cause beforehand, but it is unattainable due to eight conditions; the result is present in the cause beforehand, this is not established.'

'Furthermore, if the result is produced in the cause beforehand, then the cause-aspect of the cause will be destroyed, and the result-aspect of the result will be destroyed. Why? Just like folded cloth in threads, if the result is in a vessel, it is only a dwelling place, and cannot be called a cause. Why? Because threads and vessels are not the cause of folded cloth and results. If the cause is destroyed, the result will also be destroyed, therefore threads etc. are not the cause of folded cloth etc. If there is no cause, there is no result. Why? Because the result is achieved due to the cause, if the cause is not achieved, how can the result be achieved?'

'Furthermore, if it is not made, it cannot be called a result; the cause of threads etc. cannot make the result of folded cloth etc. Why? If threads etc. can make the result of folded cloth etc. without dwelling in folded cloth etc., then there is neither cause nor result. If there is neither cause nor result, then one should not seek whether the result is present in the cause beforehand or not present in the cause beforehand.'

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次，若因中有果而不可得，應有相現，如聞香知有華、聞聲知有鳥、聞笑知有人、見煙知有火、見鵠知有池。如是因中若先有果，應有相現；今果體亦不可得，相亦不可得，如是當知因中先無果。

「複次，若因中先有果生，則不應言因縷有疊、因蒲有席。若因不作，他亦不作。如疊非縷所作，可從蒲作耶？若縷不作，蒲亦不作，可得言無所從作耶？若無所從作，則不名為果。若果無，因亦無，如先說。是故從因中先有果生，是則不然。

「複次，若果無所從作，則為是常，如涅槃性。若果是常，諸有為法則皆是常。何以故？一切有為法皆是果故。若一切法皆常，則無無常；若無無常，亦無有常。何以故？因常有無常、因無常有常，是故常無常二俱無者，是事不然。是故不得言因中先有果生。

「複次，若因中先有果生，則果更與異果作因，如疊與著為因，如席與障為因。如車與載為因，而實不與異果作因，是故不得言因中先有果生。若謂如地先有香，不以水灑，香則不發；果亦如是，若未有緣會，則不能作因。是事不然，何以故？如汝所說，可了時名果，瓶等物非果。何以故？可了是作，瓶等先有非作，是則以作為果。是故因中先有果生，是事不然。

「複次，了因但能顯發，不能生物，

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 其次，如果因中已經有果，但卻無法得到，那麼應該有相應的徵兆顯現，就像聞到香味就知道有花，聽到聲音就知道有鳥，聽到笑聲就知道有人，看到煙就知道有火，看到天鵝就知道有池塘。如果因中已經有果，就應該有徵兆顯現；現在果的本體也無法得到，徵兆也無法得到，由此應當知道因中原本沒有果。

其次，如果因中已經有果產生，那麼就不應該說從線（縷）產生布（疊），從蒲草（蒲）產生蓆子（席）。如果因不產生作用，其他事物也不會產生作用。如果布不是線所做的，難道可以從蒲草做出來嗎？如果線不產生作用，蒲草也不產生作用，難道可以說布沒有從任何事物產生嗎？如果沒有從任何事物產生，那麼就不能稱之為果。如果沒有果，那麼也沒有因，就像先前所說的那樣。因此，從因中已經有果產生，這是不正確的。

其次，如果果沒有從任何事物產生，那麼它就是常，就像涅槃（Nirvana）的性質一樣。如果果是常，那麼所有有為法（Samskrta-dharma，指由因緣和合而生的事物）就都是常。為什麼呢？因為一切有為法都是果。如果一切法都是常，那麼就沒有無常；如果沒有無常，那麼也沒有常。為什麼呢？因為常是因為無常而存在，無常是因為常而存在，因此常和無常兩者都沒有，這是不可能的。因此，不能說因中已經有果產生。

其次，如果因中已經有果產生，那麼果會進一步與其他果作為因，就像布與穿著（著）作為因，就像蓆子與遮蔽（障）作為因，就像車與載運（載）作為因。但實際上果不會與其他果作為因，因此不能說因中已經有果產生。如果認為就像地中原本有香味，如果不灑水，香味就不會散發出來；果也是如此，如果沒有因緣聚合，就不能作為因。這是不正確的，為什麼呢？就像你所說的，可以被認識的時候才叫做果，瓶子等事物不是果。為什麼呢？因為可以被認識是產生作用，瓶子等事物原本就有而不是產生作用，因此是以產生作用作為果。因此，因中已經有果產生，這是不正確的。

其次，了因（hetu-pratyaya，能幫助認識事物的因）只能顯發事物，不能產生事物。

【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, if the effect (fruit, phala) already exists in the cause (hetu), but cannot be obtained, then there should be a corresponding sign appearing, just as knowing there are flowers by smelling the fragrance, knowing there are birds by hearing the sound, knowing there are people by hearing laughter, knowing there is fire by seeing smoke, knowing there is a pond by seeing swans. If the effect already exists in the cause, there should be a sign appearing; now, the substance of the effect cannot be obtained, nor can the sign be obtained, thus it should be known that the effect does not exist in the cause originally.

Furthermore, if the effect already arises from the cause, then it should not be said that cloth (dīkā) arises from threads (tantu), or that a mat (āsana) arises from reeds (nalī) . If the cause does not act, then other things will not act either. If cloth is not made by threads, can it be made from reeds? If threads do not act, nor do reeds, can it be said that cloth is made from nothing? If it is made from nothing, then it cannot be called an effect. If there is no effect, then there is no cause, as said before. Therefore, it is not correct to say that the effect already exists in the cause.

Furthermore, if the effect does not arise from anything, then it is permanent (nitya), like the nature of Nirvana (Nirvana). If the effect is permanent, then all conditioned phenomena (Samskrta-dharma) are permanent. Why? Because all conditioned phenomena are effects. If all phenomena are permanent, then there is no impermanence (anitya); if there is no impermanence, then there is no permanence either. Why? Because permanence exists because of impermanence, and impermanence exists because of permanence, therefore it is impossible for both permanence and impermanence to not exist. Therefore, it cannot be said that the effect already exists in the cause.

Furthermore, if the effect already exists in the cause, then the effect would further act as a cause for other effects, just as cloth acts as a cause for wearing (ācchādana), just as a mat acts as a cause for covering (praticchādana), just as a cart acts as a cause for carrying (vahana). But in reality, the effect does not act as a cause for other effects, therefore it cannot be said that the effect already exists in the cause. If it is thought that just as fragrance originally exists in the earth, but the fragrance will not be released unless water is sprinkled; the effect is also like this, if there is no convergence of conditions (pratyaya), then it cannot act as a cause. This is not correct, why? Just as you said, it is called an effect when it can be cognized, objects like bottles are not effects. Why? Because being cognized is an action, objects like bottles already exist and are not actions, therefore it is taking action as the effect. Therefore, it is not correct to say that the effect already exists in the cause.

Furthermore, the condition of cognition (hetu-pratyaya) can only manifest things, but cannot produce things.

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如為照闇中瓶故然燈，亦能照余臥具等物；為作瓶故和合眾緣，不能生余臥具等物，是故當知非先因中有果生。

「複次，若因中先有果生，則不應有今作、當作差別。而汝受今作、當作，是故非先因中有果生。

「若謂因中先無果而果生者，是亦不然。何以故？若無而生者，應有第二頭、第三手生。何以故？無而生故。」

問曰：「瓶等物有因緣，第二頭、第三手無因緣，云何得生？是故汝說不然。」

答曰：「第二頭、第三手及瓶等果，因中俱無。如泥團中無瓶，石中亦無瓶，何故名泥團為瓶因，不名石為瓶因？何故名乳為酪因、縷為疊因，不名蒲為因？

「複次，若因中先無果而果生者，則一一物應生一切物，如指端應生車、馬、飲食等；如是縷不應但出疊，亦應出車、馬、飲食等物。何以故？若無而能生者，何故縷但能生疊，而不生車、馬、飲食等物？以俱無故。若因中先無果而果生者，則諸因不應各各有力能生果。如須油者要從麻取，不笮于沙；若俱無者，何故麻中求，而不笮沙？若謂曾見麻出油、不見從沙出，是故麻中求而不笮沙。是事不然。何以故？若生相成者，應言余時見麻出油、不見沙出，是故於麻中求，不取沙；而一切法生相不成，故不得言余時見麻出油，故麻

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『譬如爲了照亮黑暗中的瓶子而點燈，燈也能照亮其他的臥具等物品；爲了製作瓶子而聚合各種因緣，卻不能產生其他的臥具等物品。因此應當知道，並非是先前的因中已經存在果。』

『再者，如果因中先前已經存在果，那麼就不應該有『現在做』、『將來做』的差別。而你接受『現在做』、『將來做』的說法，因此並非是先前的因中已經存在果。』

『如果認為因中先前沒有果而果卻能產生，這也是不合理的。為什麼呢？如果無中生有，就應該能長出第二個頭、第三隻手。為什麼呢？因為是無中生有啊。』

有人問：『瓶子等物有因緣，而第二個頭、第三隻手沒有因緣，怎麼能產生呢？所以你說的不對。』

回答說：『第二個頭、第三隻手以及瓶子等果，在因中都是沒有的。如同泥團中沒有瓶子，石頭中也沒有瓶子，為什麼稱泥團為瓶子的因，而不稱石頭為瓶子的因呢？為什麼稱乳為酪的因、縷為布的因，而不稱蒲草為因呢？』

『再者，如果因中先前沒有果而果卻能產生，那麼任何一樣東西都應該能產生任何其他東西，比如指尖應該能產生車、馬、飲食等；這樣一來，線不應該只能織成布，也應該能產生車、馬、飲食等物。為什麼呢？如果無中能生有，為什麼線只能織成布，而不能產生車、馬、飲食等物呢？因為都是沒有的緣故。如果因中先前沒有果而果卻能產生，那麼各種因就不應該各自具有產生果的能力。比如需要油的人要從芝麻中榨取，而不是從沙子中榨取；如果都是沒有的，為什麼要在芝麻中求取，而不從沙子中榨取呢？如果說曾經見過芝麻出油、沒見過沙子出油，所以從芝麻中求取而不從沙子中榨取。這種說法是不對的。為什麼呢？如果生是相互成就的，就應該說過去曾經見過芝麻出油、沒見過沙子出油，所以從芝麻中求取，不從沙子中榨取；而一切法的產生不是相互成就的，所以不能說過去曾經見過芝麻出油，所以芝麻』

【English Translation】 English version: 'For example, if a lamp is lit to illuminate a jar in the darkness, it can also illuminate other bedding and objects; but if various causes and conditions are brought together to make a jar, they cannot produce other bedding and objects. Therefore, it should be known that the effect does not pre-exist in the cause.'

'Furthermore, if the effect already pre-exists in the cause, then there should be no difference between 'doing now' and 'doing later'. But you accept the distinction between 'doing now' and 'doing later', therefore the effect does not pre-exist in the cause.'

'If it is argued that the effect arises from a cause in which it did not pre-exist, that is also unreasonable. Why? If something can arise from nothing, then a second head or a third hand should be able to arise. Why? Because it arises from nothing.'

Someone asks: 'Jars and other things have causes and conditions, but a second head and a third hand do not have causes and conditions, so how can they arise? Therefore, what you say is not correct.'

The answer is: 'A second head, a third hand, and effects such as jars, are all non-existent in the cause. Just as there is no jar in a lump of clay, and there is no jar in a stone, why is the lump of clay called the cause of the jar, and not the stone? Why is milk called the cause of cheese, and thread the cause of cloth, and not reeds?'

'Furthermore, if the effect arises from a cause in which it did not pre-exist, then any one thing should be able to produce any other thing, such as a fingertip should be able to produce carts, horses, food, and drink; in that case, thread should not only be able to produce cloth, but should also be able to produce carts, horses, food, and drink. Why? If something can arise from nothing, why can thread only produce cloth, and not carts, horses, food, and drink? Because they are all non-existent. If the effect arises from a cause in which it did not pre-exist, then the various causes should not each have the power to produce an effect. For example, someone who needs oil must extract it from sesame seeds, and not squeeze it from sand; if they are both non-existent, why seek it in sesame seeds, and not squeeze it from sand? If it is said that one has seen oil come from sesame seeds, and not seen it come from sand, therefore one seeks it from sesame seeds and does not squeeze it from sand. This is not correct. Why? If arising is mutually accomplished, one should say that in the past one has seen oil come from sesame seeds, and not seen it come from sand, therefore one seeks it from sesame seeds and does not squeeze it from sand; but the arising of all dharmas is not mutually accomplished, so one cannot say that in the past one has seen oil come from sesame seeds, so sesame'

---

中求，不取于沙。

「複次，我今不但破一事，皆總破一切因果。若因中先有果生、先無果生、先有果無果生，是三生皆不成；是故汝言余時見麻出油，則墮同疑因。

「複次，若先因中無果而果生者，諸因相則不成。何以故？諸因若無，法何能作？何能成？若無作、無成，云何名為因？如是作者不得有所作，使作者亦不得有所作。

「若謂因中先有果，則不應有作、作者、作法別異。何以故？若先有果，何須復作？是故汝說作、作者、作法諸因皆不可得。因中先無果者，是亦不然。何以故？若人受作、作者分別有因果，應作是難：『我說作、作者及因果皆空，若汝破作、作者及因果，則成我法，不名為難。』是故因中先無果而果生，是事不然。

「複次，若人受因中先有果，應作是難：『我不說因中先有果，故不受此難，亦不受因中先無果。』

「若謂因中先亦有果亦無果而果生，是亦不然。何以故？有、無性相違故；性相違者，云何一處？如明闇、苦樂、去住、縛解不得同處，是故因中先有果先無果二俱不生。

「複次、因中先有果先無果，上有無中已破。是故先因中有果亦不生，無果亦不生，有無亦不生，理極於此。一切處推求不可得，是故果畢竟不生。果畢竟不生故，

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：從中尋求，而不是從沙子中獲取。

『再者，我現在不僅破斥一件事，而是總共破斥一切因果。如果因中先有果產生、先無果產生、或者先有果又無果產生，這三種產生方式都不能成立；因此，你說你曾經見過從麻中榨出油，就落入了同疑因的謬誤。』

『再者，如果先在因中沒有果，而果卻能產生，那麼諸因的相狀就不能成立。為什麼呢？如果諸因不存在，法又如何能作用？如何能成就？如果沒有作用、沒有成就，又怎麼能稱為因呢？這樣，作者就不能有所作為，使作者也不能有所作為。』

『如果認為因中先有果，就不應該有作（行為）、作者（能動者）、作法（行為的方式）的差別。為什麼呢？如果先有果，又何須再作？因此，你說作、作者、作法等諸因都是不可得的。認為因中先無果，也是不對的。為什麼呢？如果有人接受作、作者分別有因果，就應該這樣反駁：『我說作、作者以及因果都是空性的，如果你破斥作、作者以及因果，那就成就了我的法，不能算作是反駁。』因此，因中先無果而果生，這件事是不成立的。』

『再者，如果有人認為因中先有果，就應該這樣反駁：『我不認為因中先有果，所以不接受這種反駁，也不接受因中先無果。』

『如果認為因中先有果也有無果，然後果才產生，這也是不對的。為什麼呢？有和無的性質是相互違背的；性質相互違背的，怎麼能存在於同一處呢？就像光明和黑暗、痛苦和快樂、去和住、束縛和解脫不能在同一處一樣，因此因中先有果先無果這兩種情況都不會產生。』

『再者，因中先有果先無果，在上面的有無中已經破斥過了。因此，先因中有果也不會產生，無果也不會產生，有無同時存在也不會產生，道理已經窮盡於此。在一切處推求都不可得，因此果畢竟不會產生。果畢竟不會產生，』

【English Translation】 English version: To seek from within, not to take from the sand.

'Furthermore, I am now not only refuting one thing, but I am totally refuting all cause and effect. If in the cause, there is first a result produced, first no result produced, or first a result and no result produced, these three kinds of production are all untenable; therefore, when you say that you have seen oil extracted from sesame, you fall into the fallacy of a doubtful cause.'

'Furthermore, if the result arises when there is no result in the cause, then the characteristics of all causes cannot be established. Why? If all causes do not exist, how can the Dharma act? How can it be accomplished? If there is no action, no accomplishment, how can it be called a cause? Thus, the agent cannot act, and the agent cannot be made to act.'

'If it is asserted that the result already exists in the cause, then there should be no distinction between the act (karma), the agent (doer), and the mode of action (the way of acting). Why? If the result already exists, what need is there for further action? Therefore, your assertion that the act, the agent, and the mode of action, all causes, are unattainable. The view that there is no result in the cause is also incorrect. Why? If someone accepts that the act and the agent are distinct and have cause and effect, one should retort: 『I say that the act, the agent, and cause and effect are all empty; if you refute the act, the agent, and cause and effect, then you are establishing my Dharma, and it cannot be called a refutation.』 Therefore, the arising of a result from a cause in which there is no result is not established.'

'Furthermore, if someone accepts that the result already exists in the cause, one should retort: 『I do not say that the result already exists in the cause, so I do not accept this refutation, nor do I accept that there is no result in the cause.』'

'If it is asserted that the result arises when there is both a result and no result in the cause, this is also incorrect. Why? Because the natures of existence and non-existence are contradictory; if their natures are contradictory, how can they exist in the same place? Just as light and darkness, suffering and happiness, going and staying, bondage and liberation cannot exist in the same place, therefore, the arising of a result from a cause in which there is first a result and first no result is not possible.'

'Furthermore, the assertion that there is first a result and first no result in the cause has already been refuted in the above discussion of existence and non-existence. Therefore, the arising of a result from a cause in which there is first a result, no result, or both existence and non-existence is not possible; the reasoning is exhausted here. Seeking in all places is unattainable, therefore, the result ultimately does not arise. Because the result ultimately does not arise,'

---

則一切有為法皆空。何以故？一切有為法，皆是因是果。

「有為空故，無為亦空。有為、無為尚空，何況我耶？」

觀緣門第三

複次，諸法緣不成。何以故？

廣略眾緣法，　　是中無有果； 　緣中若無果，　　云何從緣生？

瓶等果，一一緣中無，和合中亦無，若二門中無，云何言從緣生？

問曰：「云何名為諸緣？」

答曰：

「四緣生諸法，　　更無第五緣， 　因緣次第緣，　　緣緣增上緣。」

四緣者：因緣、次第緣、緣緣、增上緣。因緣者，隨所從生法，若已從生、今從生、當從生，是法名因緣。次第緣者，前法已滅次第生，是名次第緣。緣緣者，隨所念法，若起身業、若起口業、若起心心數法，是名緣緣。增上緣者，以有此法故彼法得生，此法于彼法為增上緣。如是四緣，皆因中無果。若因中有果者，應離諸緣而有果，而實離緣無果。若緣中有果者，應離因而有果，而實離因無果。若於緣及因有果者，應可得，以理推求而不可得，是故二處俱無。如是一一中無、和合中亦無，云何得言果從緣生？

複次：

若果緣中無，　　而從緣中出， 　是果何不從，　　非緣中而出？

若謂果，緣中無而從緣生者，何故不從非緣生？二

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 那麼一切有為法（Samskrta dharma，指由因緣和合而成的、會生滅變化的法）都是空性的。為什麼呢？因為一切有為法，都是因也是果。

『因為有為法是空性的，所以無為法（Asamskrta dharma，指不生不滅、不依賴因緣的法）也是空性的。有為法、無為法尚且是空性的，更何況『我』呢？』

觀緣門 第三

再者，諸法（Dharma，指一切事物和現象）由因緣和合不能成立。為什麼呢？

廣略眾緣法， 是中無有果； 緣中若無果， 云何從緣生？

瓶子等果，在每一個個別的緣中沒有，在眾緣和合中也沒有，如果在這兩種情況下都沒有，怎麼能說果是從因緣產生的呢？

問：『什麼叫做諸緣呢？』

答：

『四緣生諸法， 更無第五緣， 因緣次第緣， 緣緣增上緣。』

四緣是：因緣（Hetu-pratyaya）、次第緣（Samanantara-pratyaya）、緣緣（Alambana-pratyaya）、增上緣（Adhipati-pratyaya）。因緣是指，隨其所從生之法，無論是已生、今生、當生，此法名為因緣。次第緣是指，前法已滅，后法次第生起，這名為次第緣。緣緣是指，隨其所念之法，無論是起身業、起口業、起心心數法，這名為緣緣。增上緣是指，因為有此法，所以彼法得以生起，此法對於彼法來說是增上緣。像這樣的四緣，都是在因中沒有果。如果因中本來就有果，那麼就應該離開諸緣而有果，但實際上離開因緣就沒有果。如果緣中本來就有果，那麼就應該離開因而有果，但實際上離開因就沒有果。如果在緣和因中都有果，那麼這個果應該是可以得到的，但用道理推求卻不可得，所以這兩個地方都沒有果。像這樣，在每一個個別的緣中沒有，在眾緣和合中也沒有，怎麼能說果是從因緣產生的呢？

再者：

若果緣中無， 而從緣中出， 是果何不從， 非緣中而出？

如果說果在緣中沒有，卻能從緣中產生，那麼這個果為什麼不從非緣中產生呢？這兩種情況...

【English Translation】 English version: Then all conditioned dharmas (Samskrta dharma, referring to phenomena that arise from the combination of causes and conditions and are subject to birth and death) are empty. Why? Because all conditioned dharmas are both causes and effects.

'Because conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas (Asamskrta dharma, referring to phenomena that are not subject to birth and death and do not depend on causes and conditions) are also empty. If conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, what about 'I'?'

Chapter 3: Observation on Conditions

Furthermore, the arising of dharmas (Dharma, referring to all things and phenomena) from conditions is untenable. Why?

The many conditions, whether broad or concise, Do not contain the result within them; If the conditions do not contain the result, How can it arise from conditions?

The result, such as a pot, is not found in each individual condition, nor is it found in the combination of conditions. If it is not found in either of these two cases, how can it be said that the result arises from conditions?

Question: 'What are called the various conditions?'

Answer:

'The four conditions give rise to all dharmas, There is no fifth condition; Causal condition, immediate condition, Object-condition, dominant condition.'

The four conditions are: causal condition (Hetu-pratyaya), immediate condition (Samanantara-pratyaya), object-condition (Alambana-pratyaya), and dominant condition (Adhipati-pratyaya). Causal condition refers to the dharma from which something arises, whether it has already arisen, is arising now, or will arise in the future; this dharma is called the causal condition. Immediate condition refers to the preceding dharma that has ceased, followed by the arising of the subsequent dharma in sequence; this is called the immediate condition. Object-condition refers to the dharma that is being contemplated, whether it gives rise to bodily karma, verbal karma, or mental and mental-related dharmas; this is called the object-condition. Dominant condition refers to the fact that because this dharma exists, that dharma is able to arise; this dharma is the dominant condition for that dharma. These four conditions all lack the result within the cause. If the result were already present in the cause, then the result should exist independently of the conditions, but in reality, there is no result without conditions. If the result were already present in the conditions, then the result should exist independently of the cause, but in reality, there is no result without a cause. If the result were present in both the conditions and the cause, then this result should be obtainable, but it is not obtainable through logical reasoning; therefore, the result is absent in both places. Thus, it is absent in each individual condition and also absent in the combination of conditions; how can it be said that the result arises from conditions?

Furthermore:

If the result is not in the conditions, Yet it emerges from the conditions, Why does this result not arise From non-conditions?

If it is said that the result is not in the conditions but arises from the conditions, then why does this result not arise from non-conditions? These two cases...

---

俱無故。是故無有因緣能生果者。

果不生故，緣亦不生。何以故？以先緣後果故。緣果無故，一切有為法空；有為法空故，無為法亦空；有為、無為空故，云何有我耶？

觀相門第四

複次，一切法空。何以故？

有為及無為，　　二法俱無相； 　以無有相故，　　二法則皆空。

有為法不以相成。

問曰：「何等是有為相？」

答曰：「萬物各有有為相，如牛，以角、峰、垂𩑶、尾端有毛，是為牛相。如瓶，以底平、腹大、頸細、唇粗，是為瓶相。如車，以輪、軸、轅、軛，是為車相。如人，以頭、目、腹、脊、肩、臂、手、足，是為人相。如是生、住、滅，若是有為法相者，為是有為？為是無為？」

問曰：「若是有為有何過？」

答曰：

「若生是有為，　　復應有三相； 　若生是無為，　　何名有為相？

「若生是有為者，即應有三相，是三相復應有三相，如是展轉則為無窮。住、滅亦爾。若生是無為者，云何無為與有為作相？離生、住、滅，誰能知是生？複次，分別生、住、滅故有生，無為不可分別，是故無生、住、滅亦爾。生、住、滅空故，有為法空；有為法空故，無為法亦空，因有為故有無為；有為、無為法空故，一切法皆空。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因此，一切都無緣無故。所以，沒有任何因緣能夠產生結果。

因為沒有結果產生，所以因緣也不會產生。為什麼呢？因為先有因緣後有結果。因緣和結果都不存在，所以一切有為法（Samskrta-dharma，指由因緣和合而成的法）都是空性的；有為法是空性的，所以無為法（Asamskrta-dharma，指不依賴因緣而存在的法）也是空性的；有為法和無為法都是空性的，那麼，哪裡會有『我』的存在呢？

觀相門 第四

再者，一切法都是空性的。為什麼呢？

有為法和無為法，這兩種法都沒有自性；因為沒有自性，所以這兩種法都是空性的。

有為法不是依靠『相』而成立的。

問：『什麼是「有為相」呢？』

答：『萬物各有其有為相，例如牛，以角、峰、垂胡、尾端有毛作為牛的相。例如瓶子，以底平、腹大、頸細、唇粗作為瓶子的相。例如車子，以輪、軸、轅、軛作為車子的相。例如人，以頭、目、腹、脊、肩、臂、手、足作為人的相。像這樣，生、住、滅，如果是作為有為法的相，那麼，這些相是有為法呢？還是無為法呢？』

問：『如果「生」是有為法，會有什麼過失呢？』

答：

如果「生」是有為法，就應該還有三個相；如果「生」是無為法，又怎麼能稱作有為相呢？

『如果「生」是有為法，那麼「生」就應該還有三個相，而這三個相又應該有它們自己的三個相，這樣循環下去就無窮無盡了。住和滅也是同樣的道理。如果「生」是無為法，那麼無為法怎麼能作為有為法的相呢？離開了生、住、滅，誰又能知道什麼是生呢？再者，因為分別生、住、滅，所以才有了「生」，而無為法是不可分別的，所以沒有生，住和滅也是同樣的道理。生、住、滅都是空性的，所以有為法是空性的；有為法是空性的，所以無為法也是空性的，因為有了有為法，才會有無為法；有為法和無為法都是空性的，所以一切法都是空性的。』

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, everything is without cause or condition. Hence, there are no causes and conditions that can produce a result.

Because no result arises, conditions also do not arise. Why? Because conditions precede results. Since conditions and results do not exist, all conditioned dharmas (Samskrta-dharma, referring to dharmas arising from the combination of causes and conditions) are empty; because conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas (Asamskrta-dharma, referring to dharmas that exist independently of causes and conditions) are also empty; since both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, where can the 'self' be found?

Chapter Four: Contemplating Characteristics

Furthermore, all dharmas are empty. Why?

Conditioned and unconditioned, both dharmas are without characteristics; because they have no characteristics, both dharmas are empty.

Conditioned dharmas are not established by characteristics.

Question: 'What are the characteristics of conditioned dharmas?'

Answer: 'All things have their own conditioned characteristics. For example, a cow is characterized by its horns, hump, dewlap, and hair at the end of its tail. A pot is characterized by its flat bottom, large belly, narrow neck, and thick lip. A cart is characterized by its wheels, axle, shaft, and yoke. A person is characterized by their head, eyes, belly, spine, shoulders, arms, hands, and feet. Likewise, are birth, abiding, and cessation, if they are characteristics of conditioned dharmas, conditioned or unconditioned?'

Question: 'If birth is conditioned, what fault is there?'

Answer:

If 'birth' is conditioned, it should have three characteristics; if 'birth' is unconditioned, how can it be called a conditioned characteristic?

'If 'birth' is conditioned, then 'birth' should have three characteristics, and those three characteristics should have their own three characteristics, and so on, endlessly. The same applies to abiding and cessation. If 'birth' is unconditioned, how can the unconditioned serve as a characteristic of the conditioned? Apart from birth, abiding, and cessation, who can know what birth is? Furthermore, because we distinguish birth, abiding, and cessation, 'birth' exists, but the unconditioned cannot be distinguished, therefore there is no birth, and the same applies to abiding and cessation. Since birth, abiding, and cessation are empty, conditioned dharmas are empty; since conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are also empty, because unconditioned dharmas exist due to conditioned dharmas; since both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, all dharmas are empty.'

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」

問曰：「汝說三相復有三相，是故無窮，生不應是有為者。今當說：

「生生之所生，　　生於彼本生； 　本生之所生，　　還生於生生。

「法生時，通自體七法共生：一、法，二、生，三、住，四、滅，五、生生，六、住住，七、滅滅。是七法中，本生除自體，能生六法；生生能生本生，本生還生生生，是故三相雖是有為而非無窮。住、滅亦如是。」

答曰：

「若謂是生生，　　還能生本生， 　生生從本生，　　何能生本生？

「若謂生生能生本生，本生不生生生，生生何能生本生？

「若謂是本生，　　能生彼生生， 　本生從彼生，　　何能生生生？

「若謂本生能生生生，生生生已還生本生，是事不然。何以故？生生法應生本生，是故名生生；而本生實自未生，云何能生生生？

「若謂生生生時能生本生者，是事亦不然。何以故？

「是生生生時，　　或能生本生； 　生生尚未生，　　何能生本生？

「是生生生時，或能生本生，而是生生自體未生，不能生本生。

「若謂是生生生時，能自生亦生彼；如燈然時，能自照亦照彼。是事不然。何以故？

「燈中自無闇，　　住處亦無闇， 　破闇乃名照，　　燈為何所照？

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：『你說三相（tri-lakshana）之外還有三相，這樣豈不是無窮無盡，生（jati）不應該是有為法（saṃskṛta）的特性。現在我來解釋：』 『生生（jati-jati）所生之物， 生於彼本生（mula-jati）； 本生所生之物， 還生於生生。』 『當法（dharma）生起時，連同其自體，共有七法共同生起：一、法，二、生，三、住（sthiti），四、滅（bhanga），五、生生，六、住住（sthiti-sthiti），七、滅滅（bhanga-bhanga）。在這七法中，本生除去自體，能生六法；生生能生本生，本生還能生生生，因此三相雖然是有為法，卻不是無窮無盡的。住、滅也是如此。』 答： 『如果說生生， 還能生本生， 生生從本生， 如何能生本生？』 『如果說生生能生本生，而本生不生生生，那麼生生如何能生本生？』 『如果說是本生， 能生彼生生， 本生從彼生， 如何生生生？』 『如果說本生能生生生，生生生起后又反過來生本生，這是不對的。為什麼呢？生生法應該生本生，所以才叫做生生；而本生實際上自己還沒有生起，怎麼能生生生呢？』 『如果說生生生起時能生本生，這也是不對的。為什麼呢？』 『是生生生時， 或許能生本生； 生生尚未生， 如何能生本生？』 『當生生生起時，或許能生本生，但是生生自體尚未生起，不能生本生。』 『如果說生生生起時，能自生也能生彼；就像燈點燃時，能自照也能照彼。這是不對的。為什麼呢？』 『燈中自己沒有黑暗， 住處也沒有黑暗， 破除黑暗才叫做照， 燈要照什麼呢？』

【English Translation】 English version Question: 'You say that besides the three characteristics (tri-lakshana), there are also three characteristics, so it is endless, and birth (jati) should not be a characteristic of conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta). Now I will explain:' 'What is born of birth-birth (jati-jati), is born of that original birth (mula-jati); What is born of original birth, still born of birth-birth.' 'When a dharma (dharma) arises, together with its own nature, seven dharmas arise together: one, dharma; two, birth (jati); three, duration (sthiti); four, cessation (bhanga); five, birth-birth (jati-jati); six, duration-duration (sthiti-sthiti); seven, cessation-cessation (bhanga-bhanga). Among these seven dharmas, the original birth, excluding its own nature, can generate six dharmas; birth-birth can generate the original birth, and the original birth can still generate birth-birth, so although the three characteristics are conditioned phenomena, they are not endless. Duration and cessation are also like this.' Answer: 'If you say that birth-birth, can still generate original birth, birth-birth comes from original birth, how can it generate original birth?' 'If you say that birth-birth can generate original birth, but original birth does not generate birth-birth, then how can birth-birth generate original birth?' 'If you say that it is original birth, that can generate that birth-birth, original birth comes from that birth, how can it generate birth-birth?' 'If you say that original birth can generate birth-birth, and birth-birth, having arisen, in turn generates original birth, this is not correct. Why? The dharma of birth-birth should generate original birth, so it is called birth-birth; but original birth has not actually arisen itself, how can it generate birth-birth?' 'If you say that when birth-birth arises, it can generate original birth, this is also not correct. Why?' 'When birth-birth arises, perhaps it can generate original birth; birth-birth has not yet arisen, how can it generate original birth?' 'When birth-birth arises, perhaps it can generate original birth, but the nature of birth-birth has not yet arisen, it cannot generate original birth.' 'If you say that when birth-birth arises, it can generate itself and also generate that; just as when a lamp is lit, it can illuminate itself and also illuminate that. This is not correct. Why?' 'In the lamp itself there is no darkness, in the place where it dwells there is also no darkness, breaking darkness is called illumination, what does the lamp illuminate?'

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「燈體自無闇，明所住處亦無闇。若燈中無闇，住處亦無闇，云何言燈自照亦能照彼？破闇故名為照，燈不自破闇，亦不破彼闇，是故燈不自照亦不照彼。是故汝先說燈自照亦照彼，生亦如是自生亦生彼者，是事不然。」

問曰：「若燈然時能破闇，是故燈中無闇、住處亦無闇。」

答曰：

「云何燈然時，　　而能破于闇？ 　此燈初然時，　　不能及於闇。

「若燈然時不能到闇，若不到闇不應言破闇。複次：

「燈若不及闇，　　而能破闇者， 　燈在於此間，　　則破一切闇。

「若謂燈雖不到闇而力能破闇者，此處然燈應破一切世間闇，俱不及故。而實此間然燈不能破一切世間闇，是故汝說燈雖不及闇而力能破闇者，是事不然。

「複次，

「若燈能自照，　　亦能照于彼， 　闇亦應如是，　　自蔽亦蔽彼。

「若謂燈能自照亦照彼，闇與燈相違，亦應自蔽亦蔽彼。若闇與燈相違，不能自蔽亦不蔽彼，而言燈能自照亦照彼者，是事不然，是故汝喻非也。

「如生能自生亦生彼者，今當更說：

「此生若未生，　　云何能自生？ 　若生已自生，　　已生何用生？

「此生未生時，應若生已生、若未生生。若未生而生，未生名未有，云何能自生

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『燈的本體自身沒有黑暗，光明所存在的地方也沒有黑暗。如果燈中沒有黑暗，存在的地方也沒有黑暗，為什麼說燈能自己照亮也能照亮其他事物呢？因為破除黑暗才叫做照亮，燈不能自己破除黑暗，也不能破除其他地方的黑暗，所以燈不能自己照亮也不能照亮其他事物。因此，你先前說燈能自己照亮也能照亮其他事物，如同「生」能自己產生也能產生其他事物一樣，這種說法是不對的。』 問：『如果燈點燃時能破除黑暗，所以燈中沒有黑暗，存在的地方也沒有黑暗。』 答： 『燈如何點燃時， 就能破除黑暗呢？ 這燈剛點燃時， 不能到達黑暗之處。』 『如果燈點燃時不能到達黑暗之處，如果不能到達黑暗之處就不應該說破除黑暗。再者：』 『如果燈不能到達黑暗， 卻能破除黑暗的話， 燈如果在這裡， 就能破除一切黑暗。』 『如果說燈雖然不能到達黑暗之處，但力量能破除黑暗，那麼在這裡點燃燈就應該破除一切世間的黑暗，因為都沒有到達黑暗之處。但實際上這裡點燃燈不能破除一切世間的黑暗，所以你說燈雖然不能到達黑暗之處但力量能破除黑暗，這種說法是不對的。』 『再者，』 『如果燈能自己照亮， 也能照亮其他事物， 黑暗也應該如此， 自己遮蔽也遮蔽其他事物。』 『如果說燈能自己照亮也能照亮其他事物，黑暗與燈相反，也應該自己遮蔽也遮蔽其他事物。如果黑暗與燈相反，不能自己遮蔽也不能遮蔽其他事物，卻說燈能自己照亮也能照亮其他事物，這種說法是不對的，所以你的比喻是不恰當的。』 『如同「生」能自己產生也能產生其他事物一樣，現在我將進一步說明：』 『這「生」如果未產生， 如何能自己產生？ 如果「生」已經自己產生， 已經產生還用得著產生嗎？』 『這「生」在未產生時，應該是已經產生、或者已經自己產生、或者未產生而產生。如果未產生而產生，未產生意味著不存在，如何能自己產生？』

【English Translation】 English version 『The lamp's essence itself has no darkness, and the place where light resides also has no darkness. If there is no darkness in the lamp, and no darkness in the place where it resides, how can you say that the lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate other things? It is because it dispels darkness that it is called illumination. The lamp cannot dispel its own darkness, nor can it dispel the darkness of other places, so the lamp cannot illuminate itself nor illuminate other things. Therefore, your previous statement that the lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate other things, just as 'birth' can generate itself and also generate other things, is incorrect.』 Question: 『If the lamp can dispel darkness when it is lit, then there is no darkness in the lamp, and no darkness in the place where it resides.』 Answer: 『How can the lamp, When it is lit, dispel darkness? When this lamp is first lit, It cannot reach the darkness.』 『If the lamp cannot reach the darkness when it is lit, and if it cannot reach the darkness, it should not be said that it dispels darkness. Furthermore:』 『If the lamp cannot reach the darkness, But can dispel darkness, If the lamp is here, It can dispel all darkness.』 『If you say that although the lamp cannot reach the darkness, its power can dispel darkness, then lighting a lamp here should dispel all the darkness in the world, because it does not reach the darkness. But in reality, lighting a lamp here cannot dispel all the darkness in the world, so your statement that although the lamp cannot reach the darkness, its power can dispel darkness, is incorrect.』 『Furthermore,』 『If the lamp can illuminate itself, And also illuminate other things, Darkness should also be like this, Conceal itself and also conceal other things.』 『If you say that the lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate other things, then darkness, being the opposite of light, should also conceal itself and also conceal other things. If darkness is the opposite of light, and cannot conceal itself nor conceal other things, yet you say that the lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate other things, this statement is incorrect, so your analogy is inappropriate.』 『Just as 'birth' can generate itself and also generate other things, now I will explain further:』 『If this 'birth' is not yet born, How can it generate itself? If 'birth' has already generated itself, Why would it need to generate again?』 『When this 'birth' is not yet born, it should be either already born, or already self-generated, or not yet born and then generated. If it is generated without being born, not yet born means non-existent, how can it generate itself?』

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？若謂生已而生，生已即是生，何須更生？生已更無生，作已更無作，是故生不自生。若生不自生，云何生彼？汝說自生亦生彼，是事不然。住、滅亦如是。

「是故生、住、滅是有為相，是事不然；生、住、滅有為相不成故，有為法空。

「有為法空故，無為法亦空。何以故？滅有為名無為涅槃，是故涅槃亦空。

「複次，無生、無住、無滅，名無為相；無生、住、滅則無法，無法不應作相。

「若謂無相是涅槃相。是事不然。若無相是涅槃相，以何相故知是無相？若以有相知是無相，云何名無相？若以無相知是無相，無相是無，無則不可知。

「若謂如眾衣皆有相，唯一衣無相，正以無相為相故，人言取無相衣，如是可知無相衣可取；如是生、住、滅是有為相，無生住滅處當知是無為相。是故無相是涅槃者，是事不然。何以故？生、住、滅種種因緣皆空，不得有有為相，云何因此知無為？汝得何有為決定相，知無相處是無為？是故汝說眾相衣中無相衣喻涅槃無相者，是事不然。又衣喻，后第五門中廣說。」

是故有為法皆空；有為法空故，無為法亦空；有為、無為法空故，我亦空。三事空故，一切法皆空。

觀有相無相門第五

複次，一切法空。何以故？

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如果說事物已經產生而再次產生，既然已經產生就是產生了，為什麼還需要再次產生？如果已經產生之後不再產生，完成之後不再完成，所以產生不是自己產生自己。如果產生不是自己產生自己，又如何產生其他事物？你說自己產生也產生其他事物，這是不對的。存在、滅亡也是如此。

因此，說產生、存在、滅亡是有為法的特徵，這是不對的；因為產生、存在、滅亡的有為法特徵不能成立，所以有為法是空性的。

因為有為法是空性的，所以無為法也是空性的。為什麼呢？因為滅除有為法被稱為無為涅槃（Nirvana，解脫），所以涅槃也是空性的。

進一步說，沒有產生、沒有存在、沒有滅亡，被稱為無為法的特徵；沒有產生、存在、滅亡就沒有法，沒有法就不應該作為特徵。

如果說沒有相狀就是涅槃的相狀，這是不對的。如果無相是涅槃的相狀，用什麼相狀來知道這是無相呢？如果用有相來知道這是無相，怎麼能稱為無相呢？如果用無相來知道這是無相，無相就是沒有，沒有就不可知。

如果說就像各種衣服都有相狀，只有一件衣服沒有相狀，正是因為以沒有相狀作為相狀，所以人們說要拿沒有相狀的衣服，這樣就可以知道沒有相狀的衣服是可以拿取的；就像這樣，產生、存在、滅亡是有為法的相狀，沒有產生、存在、滅亡的地方應當知道是無為法的相狀。所以說沒有相狀就是涅槃，這是不對的。為什麼呢？因為產生、存在、滅亡的種種因緣都是空性的，不可能有有為法的相狀，怎麼能因此知道無為法呢？你得到什麼有為法的確定相狀，從而知道沒有相狀的地方是無為法呢？所以你說眾多有相狀的衣服中用沒有相狀的衣服來比喻涅槃的無相，這是不對的。而且衣服的比喻，在後面的第五門中會詳細說明。

因此，有為法都是空性的；因為有為法是空性的，所以無為法也是空性的；因為有為法、無為法都是空性的，所以我也（Atman，真我）是空性的。這三件事物都是空性的，所以一切法都是空性的。

觀察有相無相門第五

進一步說，一切法都是空性的。為什麼呢？

【English Translation】 English version: Question: If you say that something is produced after it has already been produced, and that being produced is simply being produced, then why is there a need for further production? If there is no further production after something has been produced, and no further action after something has been done, then production does not produce itself. If production does not produce itself, how does it produce other things? Your claim that self-production also produces other things is not correct. The same applies to abiding and ceasing.

Therefore, to say that production, abiding, and ceasing are characteristics of conditioned phenomena (Samskrta, 有為), is incorrect. Because the characteristics of conditioned phenomena such as production, abiding, and ceasing cannot be established, conditioned phenomena are empty.

Because conditioned phenomena are empty, unconditioned phenomena (Asamskrta, 無為) are also empty. Why? Because the cessation of conditioned phenomena is called unconditioned Nirvana (涅槃, liberation), therefore Nirvana is also empty.

Furthermore, no production, no abiding, and no ceasing are called the characteristics of unconditioned phenomena. Where there is no production, abiding, or ceasing, there is no dharma (法, law/phenomenon); and where there is no dharma, there should be no characteristic.

If you say that the absence of characteristics is the characteristic of Nirvana, that is not correct. If the absence of characteristics is the characteristic of Nirvana, by what characteristic do you know that it is the absence of characteristics? If you know it is the absence of characteristics by the presence of characteristics, how can it be called the absence of characteristics? If you know it is the absence of characteristics by the absence of characteristics, the absence of characteristics is nothingness, and nothingness is unknowable.

If you say that just as all clothes have characteristics, but one piece of clothing has no characteristic, and precisely because the absence of characteristics is taken as a characteristic, people say to take the clothing without characteristics, and thus it can be known that clothing without characteristics can be taken; in the same way, production, abiding, and ceasing are characteristics of conditioned phenomena, and the place where there is no production, abiding, or ceasing should be known as the characteristic of unconditioned phenomena. Therefore, to say that the absence of characteristics is Nirvana is not correct. Why? Because the various causes and conditions of production, abiding, and ceasing are all empty, and there cannot be characteristics of conditioned phenomena. How can you know unconditioned phenomena from this? What definite characteristic of conditioned phenomena do you obtain that allows you to know that the place without characteristics is unconditioned phenomena? Therefore, your analogy of using clothing without characteristics among many clothes with characteristics to represent the absence of characteristics in Nirvana is not correct. Moreover, the analogy of clothing will be discussed in detail in the fifth gate later.

Therefore, all conditioned phenomena are empty; because conditioned phenomena are empty, unconditioned phenomena are also empty; because both conditioned and unconditioned phenomena are empty, the self (Atman, 我) is also empty. Because these three things are empty, all dharmas are empty.

The Fifth Gate: Observing Characteristics and Absence of Characteristics

Furthermore, all dharmas are empty. Why?

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有相相不相，　　無相亦不相； 　離彼相不相，　　相為何所相？

有相事中相不相。何以故？若法先有相，更何用相為？複次，若有相事中相得相者，則有二相過：一者先有相，二者相來相是相。是故有相事中相無所相。無相事中相亦無所相。何法名無相而以有相相？如像有雙牙，垂一鼻，頭有三隆，耳如箕，脊如彎弓，腹大而垂，尾端有毛，四腳粗圓，是為象相。若離是相，更無有象可以相相。如馬豎耳、垂𩭤，四腳同蹄，尾通有毛，若離是相，更無有馬可以相相。如是有相中相無所相，無相中相亦無所相；離有相、無相，更無第三法可以相相，是故相無所相。相無所相故，可相法亦不成。何以故？以相故知是事名可相。以是因緣故，相、可相俱空。相、可相空故，萬物亦空。何以故？離相、可相，更無有物。物無故，非物亦無；以物滅故名無物，若無物者，何所滅故名為無物？物、無物空故，一切有為法皆空；有為法空故，無為法亦空；有為、無為空故，我亦空。

觀一異門第六

複次，一切法空。何以故？

相及與可相，　　一、異不可得； 　若無有一、異，　　是二云何成？

是相、可相，若一不可得，異亦不可得；若一、異不可得，是二則不成，是故相、可相皆空。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有相之相與無相之相，都不能執著于『相』； 離開有相和無相，那麼『相』又以什麼為『相』呢？

在有相的事物中，『相』實際上是無法成立的。為什麼呢？如果一個法一開始就具有『相』，又何必再用『相』去識別它呢？進一步說，如果在有相的事物中，『相』能夠成立，那麼就會出現兩種『相』的過失：一是事物本身先已存在『相』，二是『相』的出現又給事物增加了一個『相』。因此，在有相的事物中，『相』是無所『相』的。在無相的事物中，『相』也是無所『相』的。什麼樣的法可以被稱為無相，卻又用有相的『相』去識別它呢？比如，大象有雙牙，垂著長長的鼻子，頭上有三個隆起，耳朵像簸箕，脊背像彎弓，肚子大而下垂，尾巴末端有毛，四條腿粗壯而圓，這就是大象的『相』。如果離開了這些『相』，就沒有其他可以用來識別大象的『相』了。比如，馬豎著耳朵，垂著鬃毛，四條腿都是蹄子，尾巴通體有毛，如果離開了這些『相』，就沒有其他可以用來識別馬的『相』了。就像這樣，在有相的事物中，『相』是無所『相』的，在無相的事物中，『相』也是無所『相』的；離開了有相和無相，就沒有第三種法可以用來『相』，所以『相』是無所『相』的。因為『相』無所『相』，所以可以被『相』的法也不能成立。為什麼呢？因為有了『相』，才能知道這個事物是可以被『相』的。因為這個緣故，『相』和『可相』都是空性的。因為『相』和『可相』是空性的，所以萬物也是空性的。為什麼呢？離開了『相』和『可相』，就沒有其他事物存在。事物不存在，非事物也不存在；因為事物滅盡了，所以稱為無物，如果沒有事物，又是什麼滅盡了才稱為無物呢？事物和無物都是空性的，所以一切有為法（Samskrta，指由因緣和合而成的法）都是空性的；有為法是空性的，所以無為法（Asamskrta，指不生不滅、無造作的法）也是空性的；有為法和無為法都是空性的，所以『我』也是空性的。

觀一異門第六

進一步說，一切法都是空性的。為什麼呢？

『相』和『可相』，既不能說是一，也不能說是異； 如果沒有一和異，那麼『相』和『可相』這二者又如何成立呢？

『相』和『可相』，如果不能說是一，也不能說是異；如果不能說是一和異，那麼這二者就不能成立，所以『相』和『可相』都是空性的。

【English Translation】 English version The characteristic of 'having characteristics' and the characteristic of 'not having characteristics' should not be clung to; Apart from 'having characteristics' and 'not having characteristics', what does 'characteristic' characterize?

In things that have characteristics, 'characteristic' cannot actually be established. Why? If a dharma (法, law/phenomenon) initially possesses a characteristic, why would one need to use a characteristic to identify it? Furthermore, if 'characteristic' can be established in things that have characteristics, then there would be two faults of 'characteristic': first, the thing itself already has a characteristic; second, the appearance of 'characteristic' adds another characteristic to the thing. Therefore, in things that have characteristics, 'characteristic' has nothing to characterize. In things that do not have characteristics, 'characteristic' also has nothing to characterize. What kind of dharma can be called 'without characteristics', yet be identified using a 'characteristic' that has characteristics? For example, an elephant has tusks, a long trunk, three humps on its head, ears like winnowing fans, a back like a drawn bow, a large and drooping belly, hair at the end of its tail, and thick, round legs; these are the characteristics of an elephant. If these characteristics are absent, there are no other characteristics to identify an elephant. For example, a horse has erect ears, a flowing mane, hooves on all four legs, and hair all along its tail; if these characteristics are absent, there are no other characteristics to identify a horse. Just like this, in things that have characteristics, 'characteristic' has nothing to characterize; in things that do not have characteristics, 'characteristic' also has nothing to characterize; apart from 'having characteristics' and 'not having characteristics', there is no third dharma that can be used to characterize, so 'characteristic' has nothing to characterize. Because 'characteristic' has nothing to characterize, the dharma that can be characterized cannot be established either. Why? Because with 'characteristic', one can know that this thing can be characterized. Because of this reason, both 'characteristic' and 'that which can be characterized' are empty. Because 'characteristic' and 'that which can be characterized' are empty, all things are also empty. Why? Apart from 'characteristic' and 'that which can be characterized', there are no other things that exist. If things do not exist, non-things also do not exist; because things are extinguished, it is called 'no-thing'. If there are no things, what is extinguished that is called 'no-thing'? Things and non-things are empty, so all conditioned dharmas (Samskrta, conditioned phenomena) are empty; conditioned dharmas are empty, so unconditioned dharmas (Asamskrta, unconditioned phenomena) are also empty; conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, so 'I' is also empty.

Contemplation on the Gate of One and Different, Chapter Six

Furthermore, all dharmas are empty. Why?

'Characteristic' and 'that which can be characterized' cannot be said to be one, nor can they be said to be different; If there is no one and no different, then how can these two be established?

'Characteristic' and 'that which can be characterized', if they cannot be said to be one, nor can they be said to be different; if they cannot be said to be one and different, then these two cannot be established, so both 'characteristic' and 'that which can be characterized' are empty.

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相、可相空故，一切法皆空。

問曰：「相、可相常成，何故不成？汝說相、可相，一、異不可得，今當說：凡物，或相即是可相，或相異可相，或少分是相余是可相。如識相是識，離所用識更無識；如受相是受，離所用受更無受，如是等相即是可相。如佛說滅愛名涅槃，愛是有為有漏法，滅是無為無漏法；如信者有三相，樂親近善人、樂欲聽法、樂行佈施，是三事身、口業故色陰所攝，信是心數法故行陰所攝，是名相與可相異。如正見是道相，于道是少分；又生、住、滅是有為相，于有為法是少分，如是于可相中少分名相。是故，或相即可相，或相異可相，或可相少分為相；汝言一、異不成，故相、可相不成者，是事不然。」

答曰：「汝說或相是可相，如識等。是事不然。何以故？以相故可知，名可相，所用者名為相。凡物不能自知，如指不能自觸，如眼不能自見，是故汝說識即是相、可相，是事不然。

「複次，若相即是可相者，不應分別是相、是可相；若分別是相、是可相者，不應言相即是可相。

「複次，若相即是可相者，因果則一。何以故？相是因，可相是果，是二則一；而實不一，是故相即是可相，是事不然。

「汝說相異可相者，是亦不然。汝說滅愛是涅槃相，不說

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 相（lakṣaṇa，事物所具有的性質或特徵），因為可相（lakṣaṇīya，可以被認識或觀察的性質或特徵）是空性的緣故，所以一切法（dharma，宇宙間的一切事物和現象）都是空性的。

問：『相和可相應該是恒常成立的，為什麼說它們不成立呢？你說相和可相，既不能說它們是『一』（同一），也不能說它們是『異』（不同）。現在我來說明：任何事物，或者相就是可相，或者相異於可相，或者少部分是相，剩餘部分是可相。比如，識相（vijñāna-lakṣaṇa，識別的性質）就是識（vijñāna，識別作用），離開了所作用的識，就沒有其他的識；比如，受相（vedanā-lakṣaṇa，感受的性質）就是受（vedanā，感受作用），離開了所作用的受，就沒有其他的受，像這些情況，相就是可相。比如，佛（Buddha）說滅除愛慾（tṛṣṇā）叫做涅槃（nirvāṇa），愛慾是有為（saṃskṛta，由因緣和合而成的）有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱的）法，滅除是無為（asaṃskṛta，不依賴因緣的）無漏（anāsrava，沒有煩惱的）法；比如，有信心的人有三種表現，喜歡親近善人、喜歡聽聞佛法、喜歡施行佈施，這三件事是身、口的行為，所以屬於色陰（rūpa-skandha，物質的集合），信心是心所法（caitasika，心理活動），所以屬於行陰（saṃskāra-skandha，意志行為的集合），這叫做相與可相不同。比如，正見（samyag-dṛṣṭi，正確的見解）是道（mārga，通往解脫的道路）的相，對於道來說只是少部分；又比如，生、住、滅是有為的相，對於有為法來說只是少部分，像這樣，在可相中少部分叫做相。所以，或者相就是可相，或者相異於可相，或者可相的少部分是相；你說一和異都不能成立，所以相和可相不成立，這種說法是不對的。』

答：『你說或者相就是可相，比如識等等。這種說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為通過相才能被認知，所以叫做可相，被作用的叫做相。任何事物都不能自己認知自己，比如手指不能自己觸控自己，比如眼睛不能自己看見自己，所以你說識就是相和可相，這種說法是不對的。

『再者，如果相就是可相，就不應該分別什麼是相，什麼是可相；如果能分別什麼是相，什麼是可相，就不應該說相就是可相。

『再者，如果相就是可相，那麼因和果就是同一個。為什麼呢？相是因，可相是果，這二者就是同一個；但實際上它們不是同一個，所以相就是可相，這種說法是不對的。

『你說相異於可相，這種說法也是不對的。你說滅除愛慾是涅槃的相，但並沒有說。

【English Translation】 English version Because the lakṣaṇa (characteristic, attribute) and the lakṣaṇīya (that which can be characterized, observable attribute) are empty, all dharmas (phenomena, things) are empty.

Question: 'Lakṣaṇa and lakṣaṇīya should be constantly established, why are they not established? You say that lakṣaṇa and lakṣaṇīya are neither 'one' (identical) nor 'different' (distinct). Now I will explain: In any object, either the lakṣaṇa is the lakṣaṇīya, or the lakṣaṇa is different from the lakṣaṇīya, or a small part is the lakṣaṇa and the remainder is the lakṣaṇīya. For example, the vijñāna-lakṣaṇa (characteristic of consciousness) is vijñāna (consciousness), and there is no other consciousness apart from the consciousness being used; for example, the vedanā-lakṣaṇa (characteristic of feeling) is vedanā (feeling), and there is no other feeling apart from the feeling being used. In these cases, the lakṣaṇa is the lakṣaṇīya. For example, the Buddha says that the extinction of tṛṣṇā (craving) is called nirvāṇa (liberation), tṛṣṇā is a saṃskṛta (conditioned) and sāsrava (defiled) dharma, and extinction is an asaṃskṛta (unconditioned) and anāsrava (undefiled) dharma; for example, a person with faith has three characteristics: they like to be close to good people, they like to listen to the Dharma, and they like to practice dāna (giving). These three things are actions of body and speech, so they are included in the rūpa-skandha (aggregate of form), and faith is a caitasika (mental factor), so it is included in the saṃskāra-skandha (aggregate of mental formations). This is called the lakṣaṇa being different from the lakṣaṇīya. For example, samyag-dṛṣṭi (right view) is a lakṣaṇa of the mārga (path), and it is only a small part of the path; also, birth, duration, and cessation are lakṣaṇas of the saṃskṛta, and they are only a small part of the saṃskṛta dharma. In this way, a small part of the lakṣaṇīya is called the lakṣaṇa. Therefore, either the lakṣaṇa is the lakṣaṇīya, or the lakṣaṇa is different from the lakṣaṇīya, or a small part of the lakṣaṇīya is the lakṣaṇa; your saying that 'one' and 'different' cannot be established, so the lakṣaṇa and lakṣaṇīya are not established, is not correct.'

Answer: 'Your saying that the lakṣaṇa is the lakṣaṇīya, such as consciousness and so on, is not correct. Why? Because it is through the lakṣaṇa that it can be known, so it is called the lakṣaṇīya, and that which is used is called the lakṣaṇa. No object can know itself, just as a finger cannot touch itself, just as an eye cannot see itself, so your saying that consciousness is both the lakṣaṇa and the lakṣaṇīya is not correct.

'Furthermore, if the lakṣaṇa is the lakṣaṇīya, then one should not distinguish what is the lakṣaṇa and what is the lakṣaṇīya; if one can distinguish what is the lakṣaṇa and what is the lakṣaṇīya, then one should not say that the lakṣaṇa is the lakṣaṇīya.

'Furthermore, if the lakṣaṇa is the lakṣaṇīya, then the cause and effect are the same. Why? The lakṣaṇa is the cause, and the lakṣaṇīya is the effect, and these two are the same; but in reality they are not the same, so the lakṣaṇa is the lakṣaṇīya, this is not correct.

'Your saying that the lakṣaṇa is different from the lakṣaṇīya is also not correct. You say that the extinction of craving is a lakṣaṇa of nirvāṇa, but you do not say.'

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愛是涅槃相；若說愛是涅槃相，應言相、可相異；若言滅愛是涅槃相者，則不得言相可相異。

「又汝說信者有三相，俱不異，信若無信則無此三事，是故不得相、可相異。又相、可相異者，相更復應有相，則為無窮。是事不然，是故相、可相不得異。」

問曰：「如燈能自照亦能照彼，如是相能自相亦能相彼。」

答曰：「汝說燈喻，三有為相中已破。又自違先說，汝上言相、可相異，而今言相自能相亦能相彼。是事不然。又汝說可相中少分是相者。是事不然。何以故？此義或在一中、或在異中，一異義先已破故，當知少分相亦破。如是種種因緣相、可相，一不可得、異不可得，更無第三法成相可相，是故相、可相俱空。是二空故，一切法皆空。」

觀有無門第七

複次一切法空。何以故？有、無一時不可得，非一時亦不可得。如說：

有、無一時無，　　離無有亦無， 　不離無有有，　　有則應常無。

有無性相違，一法中不應共有。如生時無死、死時無生，是事《中論》中已說。若謂離無有有無過者。是事不然。何以故？離無雲何有有？如先說法生時通自體七法共生。如阿毗曇中說，有與無常共生。無常是滅相故名無。是故離無，有則不生。若不離無常有有生者，

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 愛是涅槃（Nirvana）之相；如果說愛是涅槃之相，那麼應該說『相』和『可相』是不同的；如果說滅愛是涅槃之相，那麼就不能說『相』和『可相』是不同的。

『而且你說信者有三種相，都不相異，如果信沒有不信，就不會有這三種事，所以不能說『相』和『可相』是不同的。而且如果『相』和『可相』是不同的，那麼『相』應該再有『相』，這樣就無窮無盡了。這件事是不成立的，所以『相』和『可相』不能說是不同的。』

問：『就像燈能自己照亮也能照亮其他事物，這樣『相』能自己顯現也能顯現其他事物。』

答：『你說的燈的譬喻，在三有為相中已經被破斥了。而且你也違背了你先前的說法，你之前說『相』和『可相』是不同的，而現在又說『相』能自己顯現也能顯現其他事物。這件事是不成立的。而且你說在『可相』中少部分是『相』，這件事是不成立的。為什麼呢？這個道理或者在一中，或者在異中，一和異的道理先前已經被破斥了，應當知道少部分的『相』也被破斥了。像這樣種種因緣，『相』和『可相』，一不可得，異不可得，更沒有第三種法能成立『相』和『可相』，所以『相』和『可相』都是空。因為這二者都是空，所以一切法皆空。』

觀有無門第七

再次說明一切法空。為什麼呢？有和無一時不可得，非一時也不可得。就像所說：

有、無一時無， 離無有亦無， 不離無有有， 有則應常無。

有和無的性質相互違背，不應該在一個法中同時存在。就像出生時沒有死亡，死亡時沒有出生，這件事在《中論》中已經說過了。如果說離開無而有有，沒有過失。這件事是不成立的。為什麼呢？離開無，怎麼會有有呢？就像先前所說，出生時通過自體七法共同出生。就像《阿毗曇》中所說，有和無常共同出生。無常是滅的相，所以叫做無。所以離開無，有就不會產生。如果不離開無常而有產生，

【English Translation】 English version Love is a characteristic of Nirvana (Nirvana); if it is said that love is a characteristic of Nirvana, then it should be said that 『characteristic』 and 『characterized』 are different; if it is said that the cessation of love is a characteristic of Nirvana, then it cannot be said that 『characteristic』 and 『characterized』 are different.

『Moreover, you say that a believer has three characteristics, which are not different from each other. If faith does not have non-faith, then these three things would not exist. Therefore, it cannot be said that 『characteristic』 and 『characterized』 are different. Furthermore, if 『characteristic』 and 『characterized』 are different, then the 『characteristic』 should have another 『characteristic』, which would be endless. This is not the case, so 『characteristic』 and 『characterized』 cannot be said to be different.』

Question: 『Just as a lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate other things, so can a 『characteristic』 manifest itself and also manifest other things.』

Answer: 『Your analogy of the lamp has already been refuted in the three conditioned characteristics. Moreover, you contradict your previous statement. You previously said that 『characteristic』 and 『characterized』 are different, but now you say that 『characteristic』 can manifest itself and also manifest other things. This is not the case. Furthermore, you say that a small part of the 『characterized』 is the 『characteristic』. This is not the case. Why? This principle is either in oneness or in otherness, and the principles of oneness and otherness have already been refuted. It should be known that the small part of the 『characteristic』 is also refuted. Like this, due to various causes and conditions, 『characteristic』 and 『characterized』, oneness is unattainable, otherness is unattainable, and there is no third dharma that can establish 『characteristic』 and 『characterized』. Therefore, 『characteristic』 and 『characterized』 are both empty. Because these two are empty, all dharmas are empty.』

Chapter Seven: Contemplating Existence and Non-existence

Furthermore, all dharmas are empty. Why? Existence and non-existence are unattainable at the same time, and also unattainable not at the same time. As it is said:

Existence and non-existence are non-existent at the same time, existence is also non-existent apart from non-existence, Existence is not apart from non-existence, if there is existence, it should always be non-existent.

The natures of existence and non-existence contradict each other, and they should not exist simultaneously in one dharma. Just as there is no death at the time of birth, and no birth at the time of death, this has already been said in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Treatise on the Middle Way). If it is said that there is existence apart from non-existence, there is no fault. This is not the case. Why? How can there be existence apart from non-existence? Just as it was said earlier, at the time of birth, seven dharmas are born together through their own nature. As it is said in the Abhidhamma, existence and impermanence are born together. Impermanence is the characteristic of cessation, so it is called non-existence. Therefore, apart from non-existence, existence will not arise. If existence arises without being apart from impermanence,

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有則常無。若有常無者，初無有住，常是壞故。而實有住，是故有不常無。若離無常有有生者。是亦不然。何以故？離無常有實不生。

問曰：「有生時，已有無常而未發，滅時乃發壞是有。如是生、住、滅、老、得皆待時而發：有起時生為用，令有生；生滅中間住為用，持是有；滅時無常為用，滅是有；老變生至住，變住至滅；無常則壞；得常令四事成就。是故法雖與無常共生，有非常無。」

答曰：「汝說無常是滅相與有共生，生時有應壞，壞時有應生。

「複次，生滅俱無。何以故？滅時不應有生，生時不應有滅，生滅相違故。

「複次，汝法無常與住共生，有壞時，應無住，若住則無壞。何以故？住、壞相違故。老時無住，住時無老。是故汝說生、住、滅、老、無常、得本來共生，是則錯亂。何以故？是有若與無常共生，無常是壞相，凡物生時無壞相，住時亦無壞相，爾時非是無無常相耶？如能識故名識，不能識則無識相；能受故名受，不能受則無受相；能念故名念，不能念則無念相。起是生相，不起則非生相；攝持是住相，不攝持則非住相；轉變是老相，不轉變則非老相；壽命滅是死相，壽命不滅則非死相。如是壞是無常相，離壞非無常相。若生、住時，雖有無常不能壞有、后能

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有，則常常被認為是沒有。如果存在總是沒有，那麼最初就不會有停留，因為總是處於壞滅的狀態。但實際上存在停留，因此存在不是永遠的沒有。如果離開無常而有生起，這也是不成立的。為什麼呢？因為離開無常，實際上不會有生起。

有人問：『在事物生起的時候，已經有了無常但尚未顯現，在事物滅亡的時候才顯現其壞滅的性質，這就是有。像這樣，生、住、滅、老、得，都等待時機而顯現作用：事物開始時，生起的作用是使事物產生；生滅之間，停留的作用是保持事物存在；滅亡時，無常的作用是使事物滅亡；衰老使事物從生到住發生變化，從住到滅發生變化；無常則使事物壞滅；獲得則使四種要素成就。因此，法雖然與無常共同產生，但有不是永遠的沒有。』

回答說：『你說無常是滅亡的相狀，與有共同產生，那麼事物生起時就應該壞滅，壞滅時就應該生起。』

『再者，生和滅不能同時存在。為什麼呢？滅亡的時候不應該有生起，生起的時候不應該有滅亡，因為生起和滅亡是相互違背的。』

『再者，你的理論認為無常與住共同產生，那麼在事物壞滅的時候，應該沒有住，如果存在住，那麼就沒有壞滅。為什麼呢？因為住和壞是相互違背的。衰老的時候沒有住，住的時候沒有衰老。因此，你說生、住、滅、老、無常、得本來是共同產生的，這是錯亂的。為什麼呢？如果事物與無常共同產生，無常是壞滅的相狀，那麼任何事物在生起的時候都沒有壞滅的相狀，在停留的時候也沒有壞滅的相狀，那麼那時不是沒有無常的相狀嗎？正如能夠識別才叫做識別（識，Vijnana），不能識別就沒有識別的相狀；能夠感受才叫做感受（受，Vedana），不能感受就沒有感受的相狀；能夠憶念才叫做憶念（念，Smrti），不能憶念就沒有憶念的相狀。生起是產生的相狀，不生起就不是產生的相狀；攝持是停留的相狀，不攝持就不是停留的相狀；轉變是衰老的相狀，不轉變就不是衰老的相狀；壽命滅盡是死亡的相狀，壽命不滅盡就不是死亡的相狀。這樣，壞滅是無常的相狀，離開壞滅就不是無常的相狀。如果在生起、停留的時候，即使有無常也不能使事物壞滅，之後才能'

【English Translation】 English version 'There is' is often considered 'there is not'. If 'there is' is always 'there is not', then initially there would be no abiding, because it is always in a state of decay. But in reality, there is abiding, therefore 'there is' is not eternally 'there is not'. If arising exists apart from impermanence, that is also not valid. Why? Because apart from impermanence, arising does not actually occur.

Someone asks: 'When something arises, impermanence is already present but not yet manifested. It is when something ceases that its nature of decay manifests, and that is 'there is'. Like this, arising, abiding, ceasing, aging, and obtaining all await the right time to manifest their function: when something begins, the function of arising is to cause the thing to be born; between arising and ceasing, the function of abiding is to maintain the existence of the thing; at the time of ceasing, the function of impermanence is to cause the thing to cease; aging causes the thing to change from arising to abiding, and from abiding to ceasing; impermanence then causes the thing to decay; obtaining then causes the four elements to be accomplished. Therefore, although a dharma arises together with impermanence, 'there is' is not eternally 'there is not'.'

The answer is: 'You say that impermanence is the aspect of cessation, arising together with 'there is', then when something arises, it should decay, and when something decays, it should arise.'

'Furthermore, arising and ceasing cannot occur simultaneously. Why? Because at the time of ceasing, there should be no arising, and at the time of arising, there should be no ceasing, because arising and ceasing are mutually contradictory.'

'Furthermore, your theory holds that impermanence arises together with abiding, then when something decays, there should be no abiding, and if there is abiding, then there is no decay. Why? Because abiding and decay are mutually contradictory. At the time of aging, there is no abiding, and at the time of abiding, there is no aging. Therefore, your saying that arising, abiding, ceasing, aging, impermanence, and obtaining originally arise together is confused. Why? If something arises together with impermanence, and impermanence is the aspect of decay, then when anything arises, there is no aspect of decay, and when it abides, there is also no aspect of decay, so at that time, is there not the aspect of impermanence? Just as being able to recognize is called recognition (識, Vijnana), and not being able to recognize has no aspect of recognition; being able to feel is called feeling (受, Vedana), and not being able to feel has no aspect of feeling; being able to remember is called remembering (念, Smrti), and not being able to remember has no aspect of remembering. Arising is the aspect of being born, and not arising is not the aspect of being born; sustaining is the aspect of abiding, and not sustaining is not the aspect of abiding; transforming is the aspect of aging, and not transforming is not the aspect of aging; the extinction of lifespan is the aspect of death, and the lifespan not being extinguished is not the aspect of death. Like this, decay is the aspect of impermanence, and apart from decay, there is no aspect of impermanence. If at the time of arising and abiding, even if there is impermanence, it cannot cause the thing to decay, and only later can it'

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壞有者，何用共生為？如是應隨有壞時乃有無常。是故無常雖共生、后乃壞有者，是事不然。

「如是有、無共不成，不共亦不成，是故有、無空。有、無空故，一切有為空；一切有為空故，無為亦空；有為、無為空故，眾生亦空。」

觀性門第八

複次，一切法空。何以故？諸法無性故。如說：

見有變異相，　　諸法無有性； 　無性法亦無，　　諸法皆空故。

諸法若有性，則不應變異；而見一切法皆變異，是故當知諸法無性。複次，若諸法有定性，則不應從眾緣生；若性從眾緣生者，性即是作法；不作法不因待他名為性，是故一切法空。

問曰：「若一切法空，則無生無滅；若無生滅，則無苦諦；若無苦諦，則無集諦；若無苦、集諦，則無滅諦；若無苦滅，則無至苦滅道。若諸法空無性，則無四聖諦；無四聖諦故，亦無四沙門果；無四沙門果故，則無賢聖。是事無故，佛、法、僧亦無，世間法皆亦無。是事不然，是故諸法不應盡空。」

答曰：「有二諦：一、世諦，二、第一義諦。因世諦得說第一義諦，若不因世諦，則不得說第一義諦；若不得第一義諦，則不得涅槃。若人不知二諦，則不知自利、他利、共利。如是若知世諦，則知第一義諦；知第一義諦，則知世諦

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 如果『有』（bhava，存在）的壞滅是『有者』（bhavin，存在者）的壞滅，那麼為什麼要說『共生』（sahajāta，同時生起）呢？如果這樣，就應該在『有』壞滅的時候才有『無常』（anitya，無常性）。因此，雖然『無常』是『共生』的，但後來才壞滅『有者』，這種說法是不成立的。 『有』和『無』（abhāva，不存在）共同不能成立，不共同也不能成立，所以『有』和『無』都是空（śūnya，空性）。因為『有』和『無』是空，所以一切『有為』（saṃskṛta，有為法）都是空；一切『有為』是空，所以『無為』（asaṃskṛta，無為法）也是空；『有為』和『無為』是空，所以眾生（sattva，有情）也是空。 觀性門第八 再者，一切法（dharma，法）都是空。為什麼呢？因為諸法沒有自性（svabhāva，自性）。如經中所說： 『見到有變異相（vikāra-lakṣaṇa，變異之相），諸法沒有自性；沒有自性的法也是沒有的，所以諸法都是空。』 如果諸法有自性，就不應該變異；而我們看到一切法都在變異，所以應當知道諸法沒有自性。再者，如果諸法有固定的自性，就不應該從眾緣（pratyaya，因緣）而生；如果自性是從眾緣而生，那麼自性就是造作之法；不是造作之法，不依賴於他者而存在的，才叫做自性，所以一切法都是空。 問：『如果一切法都是空，那麼就沒有生（utpāda，生）沒有滅（nirodha，滅）；如果沒有生滅，就沒有苦諦（duḥkha-satya，苦諦）；如果沒有苦諦，就沒有集諦（samudaya-satya，集諦）；如果沒有苦、集二諦，就沒有滅諦（nirodha-satya，滅諦）；如果沒有苦滅，就沒有通往苦滅之道（mārga-satya，道諦）。如果諸法是空無自性，那麼就沒有四聖諦（catvāri ārya satyāni，四聖諦）；沒有四聖諦，也就沒有四沙門果（catvāri śrāmaṇya phalāni，四沙門果）；沒有四沙門果，就沒有賢聖（ārya，聖者）。如果這些都沒有，佛（Buddha，佛陀）、法（Dharma，佛法）、僧（Saṃgha，僧伽）也就沒有了，世間法（laukika dharma，世俗之法）也都沒有了。這種說法是不對的，所以諸法不應該完全是空。』 答：『有二諦（satya，諦）：一、世諦（saṃvṛti-satya，世俗諦），二、第一義諦（paramārtha-satya，勝義諦）。依靠世諦才能宣說第一義諦，如果不依靠世諦，就不能宣說第一義諦；如果不能證得第一義諦，就不能得到涅槃（nirvāṇa，涅槃）。如果人不知道二諦，就不知道自利、他利、共利。如果知道世諦，就能知道第一義諦；知道第一義諦，就能知道世諦。』

【English Translation】 English version If the destruction of 'bhava' (existence) is the destruction of 'bhavin' (the existent), then why speak of 'sahajāta' (co-arising)? If so, impermanence (anitya, impermanence) should only occur when 'bhava' is destroyed. Therefore, although impermanence is 'co-arising', it is not the case that it destroys 'the existent' later. 'Being' (bhava, existence) and 'non-being' (abhāva, non-existence) cannot be established together, nor can they be established separately, therefore 'being' and 'non-being' are both empty (śūnya, emptiness). Because 'being' and 'non-being' are empty, all 'saṃskṛta' (conditioned things) are empty; because all 'saṃskṛta' are empty, 'asaṃskṛta' (unconditioned things) are also empty; because 'saṃskṛta' and 'asaṃskṛta' are empty, sentient beings (sattva, sentient beings) are also empty. Chapter Eight: Observation of Nature Furthermore, all dharmas (dharma, phenomena) are empty. Why? Because dharmas have no inherent nature (svabhāva, own-being). As it is said: 'Seeing the characteristic of change (vikāra-lakṣaṇa, characteristic of change), dharmas have no inherent nature; dharmas without inherent nature are also non-existent, therefore all dharmas are empty.' If dharmas had inherent nature, they should not change; but we see that all dharmas change, therefore it should be known that dharmas have no inherent nature. Furthermore, if dharmas had a fixed inherent nature, they should not arise from conditions (pratyaya, conditions); if inherent nature arises from conditions, then inherent nature is a created thing; that which is not created and does not depend on others is called inherent nature, therefore all dharmas are empty. Question: 'If all dharmas are empty, then there is no arising (utpāda, arising) and no ceasing (nirodha, cessation); if there is no arising and ceasing, then there is no suffering truth (duḥkha-satya, truth of suffering); if there is no suffering truth, then there is no origin truth (samudaya-satya, truth of origin); if there are no suffering and origin truths, then there is no cessation truth (nirodha-satya, truth of cessation); if there is no cessation of suffering, then there is no path to the cessation of suffering (mārga-satya, truth of the path). If dharmas are empty and without inherent nature, then there are no Four Noble Truths (catvāri ārya satyāni, Four Noble Truths); if there are no Four Noble Truths, then there are no Four Fruits of the Śrāmaṇa (catvāri śrāmaṇya phalāni, Four Fruits of the Contemplative Life); if there are no Four Fruits of the Śrāmaṇa, then there are no noble ones (ārya, noble ones). If these are not, then there is no Buddha (Buddha, the awakened one), no Dharma (Dharma, the teachings), and no Saṃgha (Saṃgha, the community), and there are no worldly dharmas (laukika dharma, mundane phenomena) either. This is not right, therefore dharmas should not be entirely empty.' Answer: 'There are two truths (satya, truths): one is the conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya, conventional truth), and the other is the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya, ultimate truth). It is by relying on the conventional truth that the ultimate truth can be spoken of; if one does not rely on the conventional truth, then the ultimate truth cannot be spoken of; if one cannot attain the ultimate truth, then one cannot attain nirvāṇa (nirvāṇa, liberation). If a person does not know the two truths, then they do not know what benefits oneself, what benefits others, and what benefits both. If one knows the conventional truth, then one knows the ultimate truth; if one knows the ultimate truth, then one knows the conventional truth.'

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。汝今聞說世諦，謂是第一義諦，是故墮在失處。諸佛因緣法，名為甚深第一義，是因緣法無自性，故我說是空。

「若諸法不從眾緣生，則應各有定性，五陰不應有生滅相；五陰不生不滅，即無無常；若無無常，則無苦聖諦。若無苦聖諦，則無因緣生法集聖諦。諸法若有定性，則無苦滅聖諦。何以故？性無變異故。若無苦滅聖諦，則無至苦滅道。是故若人不受空，則無四聖諦；若無四聖諦，則無得四聖諦；若無得四聖諦，則無知苦、斷集、證滅、修道，是事無故則無四沙門果；無四沙門果故，則無得、曏者。若無得、曏者，則無佛；破因緣法故，則無法；以無果故，則無僧；若無佛、法、僧，則無三寶。若無三寶，則壞世俗法。此則不然，是故一切法空。

「複次，若諸法有定性，則無生無滅、無罪無福；無罪福果報，世間常是一相。是故當知諸法無性。

「若謂諸法無自性、從他性有者，是亦不然。何以故？若無自性，云何從他性有？因自性有他性故。又他性即亦是自性。何以故？他性即是他自性故。若自性不成，他性亦不成；若自性、他性不成，離自性、他性何處更有法？若有不成，無亦不成。是故今推求無自性、無他性，無有、無無故，一切有為法空。有為法空故，無為法亦空；有為、無

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：你現在聽聞的世俗諦（Samvriti-satya，相對真理），卻認為是第一義諦（Paramartha-satya，絕對真理），所以陷入了錯誤的境地。諸佛所說的因緣法，名為甚深的第一義諦，而這因緣法是沒有自性的，所以我才說它是空。

如果諸法不是從眾多的因緣和合而生，那麼就應該各自具有固定的自性，五陰（Panca-skandha，色、受、想、行、識）就不應該有生滅的現象；五陰不生不滅，就沒有無常；如果沒有無常，就沒有苦聖諦（Dukkha-satya，苦諦）。如果沒有苦聖諦，就沒有因緣生法的集聖諦（Samudaya-satya，集諦）。如果諸法有固定的自性，就沒有苦滅聖諦（Nirodha-satya，滅諦）。為什麼呢？因為自性沒有變異的緣故。如果沒有苦滅聖諦，就沒有通往苦滅的道。所以如果有人不接受空，就沒有四聖諦（Catur-arya-satya，苦、集、滅、道）；如果沒有四聖諦，就無法證得四聖諦；如果無法證得四聖諦，就無法知苦、斷集、證滅、修道，這些事情不存在，就沒有四沙門果（Catur-sramanya-phala，須陀洹果、斯陀含果、阿那含果、阿羅漢果）；沒有四沙門果，就沒有證得果位者和趨向果位者。如果沒有證得果位者和趨向果位者，就沒有佛；破壞因緣法，就沒有法；因為沒有果，就沒有僧；如果沒有佛、法、僧，就沒有三寶（Tri-ratna，佛寶、法寶、僧寶）。如果沒有三寶，就破壞了世俗法。事實並非如此，所以一切法都是空。

再次，如果諸法有固定的自性，就沒有生滅、沒有罪福；沒有罪福的果報，世間將永遠是一種狀態。所以應當知道諸法沒有自性。

如果認為諸法沒有自性，而是從他性而有，這也是不對的。為什麼呢？如果沒有自性，怎麼能從他性而有呢？因為有自性才有他性。而且他性也就是自性。為什麼呢？因為他性就是他的自性。如果自性不能成立，他性也不能成立；如果自性、他性都不能成立，離開自性、他性，哪裡還有其他的法呢？如果有不能成立，無也不能成立。所以現在推求沒有自性、沒有他性，沒有有、沒有無，一切有為法（Samskrta，因緣和合而成的法）都是空。有為法空，無為法（Asamskrta，非因緣和合的法）也空；有為、無

【English Translation】 English version: Now you hear about conventional truth (Samvriti-satya), and you consider it to be the ultimate truth (Paramartha-satya), therefore you have fallen into error. The Dharma of Dependent Origination taught by all Buddhas is called the profound ultimate truth, and this Dharma of Dependent Origination has no inherent existence, therefore I say it is emptiness.

If all dharmas did not arise from various conditions, then each should have a fixed nature, and the five skandhas (Panca-skandha, form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness) should not have the characteristics of arising and ceasing; if the five skandhas neither arise nor cease, then there is no impermanence; if there is no impermanence, then there is no Truth of Suffering (Dukkha-satya). If there is no Truth of Suffering, then there is no Truth of the Accumulation of the causes of suffering (Samudaya-satya). If all dharmas had a fixed nature, then there would be no Truth of the Cessation of Suffering (Nirodha-satya). Why? Because nature does not change. If there is no Truth of the Cessation of Suffering, then there is no path to the cessation of suffering. Therefore, if one does not accept emptiness, then there are no Four Noble Truths (Catur-arya-satya, suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the path to its cessation); if there are no Four Noble Truths, then one cannot attain the Four Noble Truths; if one cannot attain the Four Noble Truths, then one cannot know suffering, abandon its causes, realize cessation, and cultivate the path, and if these things do not exist, then there are no Four Fruits of the Ascetic Life (Catur-sramanya-phala, Stream-enterer, Once-returner, Non-returner, Arhat); if there are no Four Fruits of the Ascetic Life, then there are no attainers and those on the path to attainment. If there are no attainers and those on the path to attainment, then there is no Buddha; if the Dharma of Dependent Origination is destroyed, then there is no Dharma; because there is no fruit, then there is no Sangha; if there is no Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha, then there are no Three Jewels (Tri-ratna, Buddha, Dharma, Sangha). If there are no Three Jewels, then conventional truth is destroyed. This is not the case, therefore all dharmas are empty.

Furthermore, if all dharmas had a fixed nature, then there would be no birth and death, no sin and merit; without the karmic consequences of sin and merit, the world would always be in one state. Therefore, you should know that all dharmas have no inherent existence.

If you say that all dharmas have no inherent existence, but exist from other-existence, that is also not correct. Why? If there is no inherent existence, how can there be existence from other-existence? Because other-existence exists due to inherent existence. Moreover, other-existence is also inherent existence. Why? Because other-existence is its own inherent existence. If inherent existence cannot be established, other-existence also cannot be established; if inherent existence and other-existence cannot be established, apart from inherent existence and other-existence, where else is there any dharma? If existence cannot be established, non-existence also cannot be established. Therefore, now we investigate and find that there is no inherent existence, no other-existence, no existence, no non-existence, so all conditioned dharmas (Samskrta, compounded dharmas) are empty. Because conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas (Asamskrta, uncompounded dharmas) are also empty; conditioned and unconditioned

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為尚空，何況我耶？」

觀因果門第九

複次，一切法空。何以故？諸法自無性，亦不從余處來。如說：

果於眾緣中，　　畢竟不可得， 　亦不餘處來，　　云何而有果？

眾緣若一一中、若和合中，俱無果，如先說。又是果不從余處來，若余處來者則不從因緣生，亦無眾緣和合功。若果眾緣中無，亦不從余處來者，是即為空。

果空故，一切有為法空；有為法空故，無為法亦空；有為、無為尚空，何況我耶？

觀作者門第十

複次，一切法空。何以故？自作、他作、共作、無因作，不可得故。如說：

自作及他作，　　共作無因作， 　如是不可得，　　是則無有苦。

苦自作，不然。何以故？若自作即自作其體，不得以是事即作是事，如識不能自識，指不能自觸，是故不得言自作。

他作亦不然，他何能作苦？

問曰：「眾緣名為他，眾緣作苦故名為他作，云何言不從他作？」

答曰：「若眾緣名為他者，苦則是眾緣作；是苦從眾緣生，則是眾緣性；若即是眾緣性，云何名為他？如泥瓶，泥不名為他；又如金釧，金不名為他；苦亦如是，從眾緣生故，眾緣不得名為他。

「複次，是眾緣亦不自性有，故不得自在，是故不得言從

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『連尚且是空，更何況我呢？』

觀因果門第九

再者，一切法皆是空。為什麼呢？因為諸法本身沒有自性，也不是從其他地方來的。正如經文所說：

『果在眾多因緣中， 終究是不可得的， 也不是從其他地方來的， 怎麼會有果呢？』

眾多因緣如果一一單獨存在，或者和合在一起，都沒有果，如先前所說。而且果不是從其他地方來的，如果從其他地方來，那就不是從因緣生，也沒有眾多因緣和合的作用。如果果在眾多因緣中沒有，也不是從其他地方來的，那麼它就是空。

果是空，所以一切有為法都是空；有為法是空，所以無為法也是空；有為法和無為法尚且是空，更何況我呢？

觀作者門第十

再者，一切法皆是空。為什麼呢？因為自作、他作、共作、無因作，都是不可得的。正如經文所說：

『自作以及他作， 共作和無因作， 這些都是不可得的， 那麼就沒有苦了。』

苦是自己造成的，不是這樣的。為什麼呢？如果是自己造成的，那就是自己造自己的本體，不能用這件事來造這件事，就像識不能自己認識自己，手指不能自己觸控自己，所以不能說是自作。

是他作，也不是這樣的，他怎麼能造苦呢？

有人問：『眾多因緣名為他，眾多因緣造苦，所以名為他作，為什麼說不是從他作呢？』

回答說：『如果眾多因緣名為他，那麼苦就是眾多因緣造的；這苦是從眾多因緣生的，那就是眾多因緣的自性；如果就是眾多因緣的自性，怎麼能名為他呢？就像泥瓶，泥不能名為他；又像金釧，金不能名為他；苦也是這樣，從眾多因緣生，所以眾多因緣不能名為他。』

『再者，這些眾多因緣也沒有自性，所以不能自在，因此不能說是從

【English Translation】 English version: 'Even 'shang kong' (emptiness) is empty, what about me?'

Chapter Nine: Observing Cause and Effect (Guan Yinguo Men)

Furthermore, all dharmas are empty. Why? Because all dharmas have no self-nature and do not come from elsewhere. As it is said:

'The result (Guo) in the midst of many conditions (Zhong Yuan), Is ultimately unattainable, Nor does it come from elsewhere, How then can there be a result?'

If the many conditions, whether individually or collectively, do not contain the result, as previously stated. Moreover, the result does not come from elsewhere; if it came from elsewhere, it would not arise from conditions, and there would be no combined effect of the many conditions. If the result is not in the many conditions and does not come from elsewhere, then it is empty.

Because the result is empty, all conditioned dharmas (Youwei Fa) are empty; because conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas (Wuwei Fa) are also empty; if conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, what about me?

Chapter Ten: Observing the Agent (Guan Zuozhe Men)

Furthermore, all dharmas are empty. Why? Because self-made (Zi Zuo), other-made (Ta Zuo), jointly-made (Gong Zuo), and causeless-made (Wu Yin Zuo) are unattainable. As it is said:

'Self-made and other-made, Jointly-made and causeless-made, These are unattainable, Then there is no suffering (Ku).'

Suffering is self-made, that is not so. Why? If it is self-made, then it is making its own essence; one cannot use this thing to make this thing, just as consciousness (Shi) cannot recognize itself, a finger cannot touch itself, therefore it cannot be said to be self-made.

Other-made is also not so; how can another make suffering?

Someone asks: 'The many conditions are called 'other' (Ta); the many conditions make suffering, therefore it is called 'other-made'; why do you say it does not come from other-made?'

The answer is: 'If the many conditions are called 'other,' then suffering is made by the many conditions; this suffering arises from the many conditions, then it is the nature of the many conditions; if it is the nature of the many conditions, how can it be called 'other'? Like a clay bottle (Ni Ping), the clay (Ni) cannot be called 'other'; also like a gold bracelet (Jin Chuan), the gold (Jin) cannot be called 'other'; suffering is also like this, because it arises from the many conditions, the many conditions cannot be called 'other.'

'Furthermore, these many conditions also do not have self-nature, therefore they are not independent; therefore, it cannot be said to come from

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眾緣生果。如《中論》中說：

「『果從眾緣生，　　是緣不自在； 　　若緣不自在，　　云何緣生果？』

「如是，苦不得從他作。自作他作亦不然，有二過故。若說自作苦、他作苦，則有自作、他作過，是故共作苦亦不然。若苦無因生，亦不然，有無量過故。如經說：『裸形迦葉問佛：「苦自作耶？」佛默然不答。「世尊！若苦不自作者，是他作耶？佛亦不答。世尊！若爾者，苦自作他作耶？」佛亦不答。「世尊！若爾者，苦無因無緣作耶？」佛亦不答。』如是四問，佛皆不答者，當知苦則是空。」

問曰：「佛說是經，不說苦是空。」

「隨可度眾生故作是說。是裸形迦葉謂人是苦因，有我者說：好醜皆神所作，神常清凈無有苦惱，所知所解悉皆是神，神作好醜苦樂，還受種種身。以是邪見故，問佛苦自作耶？是故佛不答。苦實非是我作。若我是苦因，因我生苦，我即無常。何以故？若法是因及從因生法，皆亦無常。若我無常，則罪福果報皆悉斷滅，修梵行福報是亦應空。若我是苦因，則無解脫。何以故？我若作苦，離苦無我能作苦者，以無身故。若無身而能作苦者，得解脫者亦應是苦。如是則無解脫，而實有解脫，是故苦自作，不然。他作苦亦不然，離苦何有人而作苦與他？複次，若

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 眾緣生果。如《中論》（Madhyamaka-karika，根本中論）中說： 『果從眾緣生，　　是緣不自在； 　若緣不自在，　　云何緣生果？』 如是，苦不得從他作。自作他作亦不然，有二過故。若說自作苦、他作苦，則有自作、他作過，是故共作苦亦不然。若苦無因生，亦不然，有無量過故。如經說：『裸形迦葉（Kasyapa，人名）問佛：「苦自作耶？」佛默然不答。「世尊！若苦不自作者，是他作耶？佛亦不答。世尊！若爾者，苦自作他作耶？」佛亦不答。「世尊！若爾者，苦無因無緣作耶？」佛亦不答。』如是四問，佛皆不答者，當知苦則是空。 問曰：『佛說是經，不說苦是空。』 隨可度眾生故作是說。是裸形迦葉謂人是苦因，有我者說：好醜皆神所作，神常清凈無有苦惱，所知所解悉皆是神，神作好醜苦樂，還受種種身。以是邪見故，問佛苦自作耶？是故佛不答。苦實非是我作。若我是苦因，因我生苦，我即無常。何以故？若法是因及從因生法，皆亦無常。若我無常，則罪福果報皆悉斷滅，修梵行福報是亦應空。若我是苦因，則無解脫。何以故？我若作苦，離苦無我能作苦者，以無身故。若無身而能作苦者，得解脫者亦應是苦。如是則無解脫，而實有解脫，是故苦自作，不然。他作苦亦不然，離苦何有人而作苦與他？複次，若

【English Translation】 English version Conditions give rise to effects. As it is said in the Madhyamaka-karika (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way): 'Effects arise from many conditions, 　These conditions are not independent; 　If conditions are not independent, 　How can conditions produce effects?' Thus, suffering cannot be created by others. Nor can it be self-created or created by both, because there are two faults. If it is said that suffering is self-created or created by others, then there are the faults of self-creation and other-creation. Therefore, suffering created by both is also not possible. If suffering arises without a cause, that is also not possible, because there are countless faults. As the sutra says: 'Kasyapa (name of a person), the naked ascetic, asked the Buddha: "Is suffering self-created?" The Buddha remained silent and did not answer. "Venerable One! If suffering is not self-created, is it created by others?" The Buddha also did not answer. "Venerable One! If that is the case, is suffering created by both self and others?" The Buddha also did not answer. "Venerable One! If that is the case, is suffering created without cause or condition?" The Buddha also did not answer.' Since the Buddha did not answer these four questions, it should be known that suffering is empty. Question: 'The Buddha spoke this sutra, but did not say that suffering is empty.' He spoke in this way to suit the beings who could be liberated. This Kasyapa, the naked ascetic, considered people to be the cause of suffering. Those who hold to a self say: good and bad are all created by God. God is always pure and free from suffering. All that is known and understood is God. God creates good, bad, suffering, and happiness, and receives various bodies in return. Because of this wrong view, he asked the Buddha whether suffering is self-created. That is why the Buddha did not answer. Suffering is actually not created by me. If I am the cause of suffering, and suffering arises from me, then I am impermanent. Why? If a dharma is a cause and a dharma arises from a cause, both are also impermanent. If I am impermanent, then the karmic results of good and evil will all be cut off, and the merit of practicing pure conduct should also be empty. If I am the cause of suffering, then there is no liberation. Why? If I create suffering, there is no 'I' apart from suffering who can create suffering, because there is no body. If one can create suffering without a body, then one who attains liberation should also be suffering. In this case, there is no liberation, but in reality there is liberation. Therefore, suffering is self-created, which is not possible. Suffering created by others is also not possible. Apart from suffering, who is there who creates suffering for others? Furthermore, if

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他作苦者，則為是自在天作。如此邪見問故，佛亦不答。而實不從自在天作。何以故？性相違故。如牛子還是牛。若萬物從自在天生，皆應似自在天，是其子故。複次，若自在天作眾生者，不應以苦與子，是故不應言自在天作苦。」

問曰：「眾生從自在天生，苦樂亦從自在所生，以不識樂因，故與其苦。」

答曰：「若眾生是自在天子者，唯應以樂遮苦，不應與苦。亦應但供養自在天則滅苦得樂，而實不爾，但自行苦樂因緣而自受報，非自在天作。

「複次，彼若自在者，不應有所須。有所須自作，不名自在；若無所須，何用變化作萬物如小兒戲？

「複次，若自在作眾生者，誰復作是自在？若自在自作，則不然，如物不能自作；若更有作者，則不名自在。

「複次，若自在是作者，則于作中無有障礙，念即能作。如自在經說：『自在欲作萬物，行諸苦行，即生諸腹行蟲；復行苦行，生諸飛鳥；復行苦行，生諸人天。』若行苦行，初生毒蟲、次生飛鳥、後生人天，當知眾生從業因緣生，不從苦行有。

「複次，若自在作萬物者，為住何處而作萬物？是住處為是自在作？為是他作？若自在作者，為住何處作？若住余處作，余處復誰作？如是則無窮。若他作者，則有二自在。是事

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果有人認為苦難是由自在天（Maheśvara，印度教神祇，被認為是宇宙的創造者和毀滅者）所創造，那麼這種觀點就屬於邪見。因為佛陀不會回答這種基於邪見的問題。事實上，萬物並非由自在天所創造。為什麼呢？因為它們的本性相互違背。就像牛所生的只能是牛一樣。如果萬物都是由自在天所生，那麼它們都應該像自在天，因為它們是自在天的子女。 進一步說，如果自在天創造眾生，他不應該把苦難加於自己的子女。因此，不應該說苦難是由自在天所創造。

有人問：『眾生由自在天所生，苦樂也由自在天所生。因為眾生不認識快樂的根源，所以自在天給予他們苦難。』

回答說：『如果眾生是自在天的子女，那麼自在天應該只用快樂來遮蔽苦難，而不應該給予他們苦難。眾生也應該只要供養自在天就能滅除苦難獲得快樂。但事實並非如此，眾生是自己通過苦樂的因緣而承受果報，而不是由自在天所創造。

進一步說，如果自在天是『自在』的，他就不應該有所需求。如果他有所需求，並且自己去滿足這些需求，那就不配稱為『自在』。如果他沒有任何需求，那他為什麼要像小孩子玩遊戲一樣變化出萬物呢？』

進一步說，如果自在天創造眾生，那麼是誰創造了自在天呢？如果自在天是自己創造的，那是不可能的，就像物體不能自己創造自己一樣。如果另有創造者，那麼自在天就不能被稱為『自在』。

進一步說，如果自在天是創造者，那麼他在創造的過程中就不應該有任何障礙，只要他一想就能創造出來。就像《自在經》所說：『自在天想要創造萬物，於是進行各種苦行，就生出了腹行蟲；又進行苦行，生出了飛鳥；又進行苦行，生出了人和天。』如果通過苦行，先是生出毒蟲，然後是飛鳥，最後是人和天，那麼就應該知道眾生是由業力的因緣所生，而不是由苦行所生。

進一步說，如果自在天創造萬物，那麼他是在什麼地方創造萬物的呢？這個住所是自在天創造的，還是由其他創造者創造的呢？如果是自在天創造的，那麼自在天又是在什麼地方創造這個住所的呢？如果自在天在其他地方創造，那麼這個『其他地方』又是誰創造的呢？這樣追問下去就沒有窮盡了。如果是其他創造者創造的，那麼就存在兩個自在天。這件事情...

【English Translation】 English version: If someone believes that suffering is created by Maheśvara (a Hindu deity, considered the creator and destroyer of the universe), then that view is a false view. Because the Buddha would not answer such questions based on false views. In fact, all things are not created by Maheśvara. Why? Because their natures contradict each other. Just as what is born of a cow is only a cow. If all things are born from Maheśvara, then they should all resemble Maheśvara, because they are his children. Furthermore, if Maheśvara creates beings, he should not inflict suffering on his children. Therefore, it should not be said that suffering is created by Maheśvara.

Someone asks: 'Beings are born from Maheśvara, and happiness and suffering are also born from Maheśvara. Because beings do not recognize the source of happiness, Maheśvara gives them suffering.'

The answer is: 'If beings are the children of Maheśvara, then Maheśvara should only use happiness to cover up suffering, and should not give them suffering. Beings should also only need to make offerings to Maheśvara to eliminate suffering and obtain happiness. But this is not the case. Beings themselves bear the consequences through the causes and conditions of suffering and happiness, and it is not created by Maheśvara.'

Furthermore, if Maheśvara is 'independent', he should not have any needs. If he has needs and satisfies them himself, then he is not worthy of being called 'independent'. If he has no needs, then why does he transform all things like a child playing games?'

Furthermore, if Maheśvara creates beings, then who created Maheśvara? If Maheśvara created himself, that is impossible, just as an object cannot create itself. If there is another creator, then Maheśvara cannot be called 'independent'.

Furthermore, if Maheśvara is the creator, then he should not have any obstacles in the process of creation, and he should be able to create as soon as he thinks of it. Just as the 'Maheśvara Sutra' says: 'Maheśvara wanted to create all things, so he performed various ascetic practices, and then crawling insects were born; then he performed ascetic practices again, and birds were born; then he performed ascetic practices again, and humans and gods were born.' If poisonous insects are born first through ascetic practices, then birds, and finally humans and gods, then it should be known that beings are born from the causes and conditions of karma, and not from ascetic practices.

Furthermore, if Maheśvara creates all things, then where does he create all things? Is this dwelling place created by Maheśvara, or by another creator? If it is created by Maheśvara, then where does Maheśvara create this dwelling place? If Maheśvara creates in another place, then who created this 'other place'? There is no end to such questioning. If it is created by another creator, then there are two Maheśvaras. This matter...

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不然，是故世間萬物非自在所作。

「複次，若自在作者，何故苦行供養於他，欲令歡喜從求所愿？若苦行求他，當知不自在。

「複次，若自在作萬物，初作便定，不應有變，馬則常馬，人則常人；而今隨業有變，當知非自在所作。

「複次，若自在所作者，即無罪福、善惡、好醜，皆從自在作故；而實有罪福，是故非自在所作。

「複次，若眾生從自在生者，皆應敬愛，如子愛父；而實不爾，有憎、有愛，是故當知非自在所作。

「複次、若自在作者，何故不盡作樂人、盡作苦人，而有苦者、樂者？當知從憎、愛生，故不自在；不自在故，非自在所作。

「複次，若自在作者，眾生皆不應有所作；而眾生方便各有所作，是故當知非自在所作。

「複次，若自在作者，善惡苦樂事不作而自來，如是壞世間法。持戒修梵行，皆無所益。而實不爾，是故當知非自在所作。

「複次，若福業因緣故於眾生中大，餘眾生行福業者亦復應大，何以貴自在？若無因緣而自在者，一切眾生亦應自在；而實不爾，當知非自在所作。若自在從他而得，則他復從他，如是則無窮，無窮則無因。

「如是等種種因緣，當知萬物非自在生，亦無有自在。如是邪見問他作，故佛亦不答

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 不是這樣的，因此世間萬物不是自在（Ishvara，主宰）所創造的。

『再者，如果自在是創造者，為何還要苦行供養其他的神，希望他們歡喜，從而向他們祈求願望呢？如果需要苦行祈求他人，就應當知道他不是自在的。』

『再者，如果自在創造萬物，最初創造時就應該固定不變，不應該有變化，馬就永遠是馬，人就永遠是人；而現在隨著業力而有變化，應當知道不是自在所創造的。』

『再者，如果是自在所創造的，那就沒有罪福、善惡、好醜之分了，因為一切都是自在創造的；但實際上有罪福之分，所以不是自在所創造的。』

『再者，如果眾生是從自在所生的，都應該敬愛自在，就像兒子愛父親一樣；但實際上並非如此，有憎恨，有愛，所以應當知道不是自在所創造的。』

『再者，如果是自在創造者，為什麼不全部創造快樂的人，全部創造痛苦的人，而是既有痛苦的人，也有快樂的人呢？應當知道這是從憎恨和愛產生的，所以不自在；因為不自在，所以不是自在所創造的。』

『再者，如果是自在創造者，眾生都不應該有所作為；而眾生通過努力各有作為，所以應當知道不是自在所創造的。』

『再者，如果是自在創造者，善惡苦樂的事情不去做也會自己到來，這樣就破壞了世間的法則。持戒修行梵行，都沒有任何益處。但實際上並非如此，所以應當知道不是自在所創造的。』

『再者，如果因為福業的因緣，所以在眾生中變得偉大，那麼其餘修行福業的眾生也應該變得偉大，為什麼要推崇自在呢？如果沒有因緣而是自在的話，一切眾生也應該自在；但實際上並非如此，應當知道不是自在所創造的。如果自在是從其他事物那裡得到的，那麼其他事物又從其他事物那裡得到，這樣就會無窮無盡，無窮無盡就沒有原因了。』

『像這樣種種因緣，應當知道萬物不是從自在而生，也沒有自在的存在。像這樣的邪見是提問他人所造成的，所以佛陀也不回答。』

【English Translation】 English version: It is not so. Therefore, all things in the world are not made by Ishvara (the Lord).

'Furthermore, if Ishvara is the creator, why does he practice asceticism and make offerings to other deities, desiring them to be pleased so that he can seek his wishes from them? If he needs to practice asceticism to seek from others, then know that he is not independent (free).'

'Furthermore, if Ishvara creates all things, they should be fixed and unchanging from the beginning of creation. A horse should always be a horse, and a person should always be a person. But now, they change according to karma, so know that they are not created by Ishvara.'

'Furthermore, if things are created by Ishvara, then there would be no distinction between sin and merit, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, because everything would be created by Ishvara. But in reality, there is sin and merit, so it is not created by Ishvara.'

'Furthermore, if beings are born from Ishvara, they should all respect and love Ishvara, just as a son loves his father. But in reality, it is not so; there is hatred and love, so know that it is not created by Ishvara.'

'Furthermore, if Ishvara is the creator, why does he not create all beings as happy beings or all beings as suffering beings, but instead there are both suffering and happy beings? Know that this arises from hatred and love, so he is not independent. Because he is not independent, it is not created by Ishvara.'

'Furthermore, if Ishvara is the creator, beings should not have to do anything. But beings each make efforts and do things, so know that it is not created by Ishvara.'

'Furthermore, if Ishvara is the creator, good, evil, suffering, and happiness would come without being made, and this would destroy the laws of the world. Upholding precepts and practicing pure conduct would be of no benefit. But in reality, it is not so, so know that it is not created by Ishvara.'

'Furthermore, if one becomes great among beings because of the cause and condition of meritorious karma, then other beings who practice meritorious karma should also become great. Why then exalt Ishvara? If there is no cause and condition but Ishvara is independent, then all beings should also be independent. But in reality, it is not so, so know that it is not created by Ishvara. If Ishvara is obtained from others, then those others are obtained from others, and so on without end, and without end there is no cause.'

'Through such various causes and conditions, know that all things are not born from Ishvara, and there is no Ishvara. Such wrong views are caused by questioning others, so the Buddha does not answer.'

---

。

「共作亦不然，有二過故。眾因緣和合生，故不從無因生，佛亦不答。」

「是故此經但破四種邪見，不說苦為空。」

答曰：「佛雖如是說，從眾因緣生苦；破四種邪見，即是說空。說苦從眾因緣生，即是說空義。何以故？若從眾因緣生，則無自性，無自性即是空。如苦空，當知有為、無為及眾生一切皆空。」

觀三時門第十一

複次，一切法空。何以故？因與有因法，前時、后時、一時生不可得故。如說：

若法先、后、共，　　是皆不成者， 　是法從因生，　　云何當有成？

先因後有因，是事不然。何以故？若先因后從因生者，先因時則無有因，與誰為因？若先有因后因者，無因時有因已成，何用因為？若因、有因一時，是亦無因，如牛角一時生，左右不相因。如是因非是果因，果非是因果，一時生故。是故三時因果皆不可得。

問曰：「汝破因果法，三時中亦不成。若先有破後有可破，則未有可破，是破破誰？若先有可破，而後有破，可破已成，何用破為？若破可破一時，是亦無因，如牛角一時生，左右不相因故。如是破不因可破，可破不因破。」

答曰：「汝破可破中，亦有是過。若諸法空，則無破、無可破，我今說空，則成我所說。若我

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 「共同造作也不是這樣，因為有兩種過失。眾多的因緣和合而生，所以不是從無因而生，佛陀也不會這樣回答。」 「因此這部經只是破除四種邪見，而不是說苦是空。」 回答說：「佛陀雖然這樣說，苦是從眾多的因緣而生；破除四種邪見，就是說空。說苦從眾多的因緣生，就是說空的含義。為什麼呢？如果從眾多的因緣而生，就沒有自性，沒有自性就是空。如同苦是空，應當知道有為法、無為法以及眾生一切都是空。」 觀三時門第十一 再者，一切法都是空。為什麼呢？因為因和有因法，前時、后時、一時生都是不可能得到的。如經文所說： 『如果法是先、后、共時產生，這些都是不能成立的， 這個法是從因產生的，怎麼會有成就呢？』 先有因而後有有因，這件事是不成立的。為什麼呢？如果先有因而後從因產生，那麼先有因的時候就沒有有因，與誰作為因呢？如果先有有因而後有因，沒有因的時候有因已經成就，還要因做什麼呢？如果因和有因同時，這也是沒有因，如同牛角同時生長，左右不互相作為因。這樣因不是果的因，果不是因的果，因為是同時產生的。所以三種時期的因果都是不可能得到的。 問：『你破斥因果法，在三種時間中也不能成立。如果先有破而後有可破，那麼還沒有可破，這個破要破誰呢？如果先有可破，而後有破，可破已經成就，還要破做什麼呢？如果破和可破同時，這也是沒有因，如同牛角同時生長，左右不互相作為因。這樣破不作為可破的因，可破不作為破的因。』 答：『你破斥可破中，也有這種過失。如果諸法是空，就沒有破、沒有無可破，我現在說空，就成就我所說的。如果我

【English Translation】 English version: 『It is also not like a joint creation, because there are two faults. It arises from the aggregation of many causes and conditions, so it does not arise from no cause. The Buddha would not answer in that way either.』 『Therefore, this sutra only refutes the four wrong views, and does not say that suffering is empty.』 The answer is: 『Although the Buddha said it like this, suffering arises from many causes and conditions; refuting the four wrong views is the same as saying emptiness. Saying that suffering arises from many causes and conditions is the meaning of saying emptiness. Why? If it arises from many causes and conditions, then it has no self-nature, and no self-nature is emptiness. Just as suffering is empty, it should be known that conditioned dharmas (有為, yǒu wéi), unconditioned dharmas (無為, wú wéi), and all beings are empty.』 Chapter Eleven: Observing the Three Times Furthermore, all dharmas are empty. Why? Because it is impossible to obtain cause and caused dharma (有因法, yǒu yīn fǎ) arising in the past, future, or at the same time. As it is said: 『If a dharma arises before, after, or together, All of these are untenable. This dharma arises from a cause, How can it be accomplished?』 It is not the case that there is a cause first and then a caused dharma. Why? If there is a cause first and then it arises from the cause, then when there is a cause first, there is no caused dharma, so with whom does it act as a cause? If there is a caused dharma first and then a cause, when there is no cause, the caused dharma has already been accomplished, so what is the use of a cause? If the cause and the caused dharma are at the same time, then there is also no cause, just as the horns of a cow grow at the same time, and the left and right do not act as causes for each other. Thus, the cause is not the cause of the effect, and the effect is not the effect of the cause, because they arise at the same time. Therefore, the cause and effect of the three times are all unobtainable. Question: 『You refute the law of cause and effect, and it cannot be established in the three times. If there is a refutation first and then something to be refuted, then there is nothing to be refuted yet, so who does this refutation refute? If there is something to be refuted first and then a refutation, the thing to be refuted has already been accomplished, so what is the use of refuting it? If the refutation and the thing to be refuted are at the same time, then there is also no cause, just as the horns of a cow grow at the same time, and the left and right do not act as causes for each other. Thus, the refutation does not act as a cause for the thing to be refuted, and the thing to be refuted does not act as a cause for the refutation.』 Answer: 『In your refutation of the refutable, there is also this fault. If all dharmas are empty, then there is no refutation and nothing to be refuted. Now I speak of emptiness, and it accomplishes what I say. If I

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說破、可破定有者，應作是難；我不說破、可破定有故，不應作是難。」

問曰：「眼見先時因，如陶師作瓶。亦有後時因，如因弟子有師，如教化弟子已，后時識知是弟子。亦有一時因，如燈與明。若說前時因、后時因、一時因不可得，是事不然。」

答曰：「如陶師作瓶，是喻不然。何以故？若未有瓶，陶師與誰作因？如陶師，一切前因皆不可得。后時因亦如是不可得，若未有弟子，誰為是師？是故后時因亦不可得。若說一時因如燈明，是亦同疑因，燈明一時生，云何相因？如是因緣空故，當知一切有為法、無為法、眾生皆空。」

觀生門第十二

複次，一切法空。何以故？生、不生、生時不可得故，今生已不生，不生亦不生，生時亦不生。如說：

生果則不生，　　不生亦不生， 　離是生不生，　　生時亦不生。

生名果起出，未生名未起未出未有，生時名始起未成。是中生果不生者，是生生已不生。何以故？有無窮過故，作已更作故。若生生已生第二生，第二生生已生第三生，第三生生已生第四生；如初生生已有第二生，如是生則無窮。是事不然，是故生不生。複次，若謂生生、已生所用生生，是生不生而生。是事不然。何以故？初生不生而生，是則二種生：生已而生

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果有人說『破斥』，並且『可以破斥』是確定的，那麼就應該這樣反駁他；我沒有說『破斥』，並且『可以破斥』不是確定的，所以不應該這樣反駁我。

有人問：『眼睛看到先前的因，比如陶工製作瓶子。也有後來的因，比如因為有弟子才有老師，比如教化弟子之後，後來才認識到這是弟子。也有一時的因，比如燈和光明。如果說先前的因、後來的因、一時的因都不可得，這件事情是不對的。』

回答說：『比如陶工製作瓶子，這個比喻是不對的。為什麼呢？如果還沒有瓶子，陶工和誰作為因呢？就像陶工一樣，一切先前的因都是不可得的。後來的因也是這樣不可得，如果沒有弟子，誰是老師呢？所以後來的因也是不可得的。如果說一時的因就像燈和光明，這也是同樣的疑問因，燈和光明同時產生，怎麼能互相作為因呢？像這樣因緣是空性的，應當知道一切有為法、無為法、眾生都是空性的。』

觀生門第十二

再次，一切法都是空性的。為什麼呢？生、不生、生時都不可得。現在生已經不生，不生也不生，生時也不生。就像所說的：

生果則不生， 不生亦不生， 離是生不生， 生時亦不生。

『生』是指果的生起和出現，『未生』是指未生起、未出現、未有，『生時』是指開始生起但未完成。其中『生果不生』，是指生已經生了就不再生了。為什麼呢？因為有無窮的過失，做了之後又再做。如果生已經生了，又生第二個生，第二個生已經生了，又生第三個生，第三個生已經生了，又生第四個生；就像初生已經生了，然後有第二個生，這樣生就無窮無盡了。這件事情是不對的，所以生不生。再次，如果說生生、已經生了的所用的生生，這個生是不生而生。這件事情是不對的。為什麼呢？初生不生而生，那麼就有兩種生：生了之後又生。

【English Translation】 English version: If someone says 'refutation,' and 'can be refuted' is definite, then one should refute him in this way; I did not say 'refutation,' and 'can be refuted' is not definite, so one should not refute me in this way.

Someone asks: 'The eye sees the prior cause, like a potter making a pot. There is also a later cause, like because there is a disciple, there is a teacher, like after teaching a disciple, one later recognizes that this is a disciple. There is also a simultaneous cause, like a lamp and light. If you say that the prior cause, the later cause, and the simultaneous cause are all unattainable, this is not right.'

The answer is: 'Like a potter making a pot, this analogy is not right. Why? If there is no pot yet, with whom does the potter make a cause? Like the potter, all prior causes are unattainable. The later cause is also unattainable in this way, if there is no disciple, who is the teacher? Therefore, the later cause is also unattainable. If you say that the simultaneous cause is like a lamp and light, this is also the same doubtful cause, the lamp and light arise simultaneously, how can they be causes of each other? Like this, the causes and conditions are empty, one should know that all conditioned dharmas (有為法), unconditioned dharmas (無為法), and sentient beings are empty.'

Chapter 12: Observing the Gate of Production (觀生門第十二)

Furthermore, all dharmas are empty. Why? Production (生), non-production (不生), and the time of production (生時) are all unattainable. Now, production has already ceased to produce, non-production also does not produce, and the time of production also does not produce. As it is said:

The produced fruit does not produce, non-production also does not produce, Apart from this production and non-production, the time of production also does not produce.

'Production' means the arising and appearance of the fruit, 'non-production' means not yet arisen, not yet appeared, not yet existent, 'the time of production' means beginning to arise but not yet completed. Among these, 'the produced fruit does not produce' means that production has already produced and does not produce again. Why? Because there is the fault of infinity, after doing it, doing it again. If production has already produced, and then produces a second production, the second production has already produced, and then produces a third production, the third production has already produced, and then produces a fourth production; like the initial production has already produced, and then there is a second production, in this way production is endless. This is not right, therefore production does not produce. Furthermore, if one says that production produces, the production that has already produced uses production to produce, this production is non-production producing. This is not right. Why? The initial production is non-production producing, then there are two kinds of production: having produced and then producing.

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、不生而生，故汝先定說而今不定。如作已不應作、燒已不應燒、證已不應證，如是生已不應更生；是故生法不生。

不生法亦不生。何以故？不與生合故，又一切不生有生過故。若不生法生，則離生有生，是則不生。若離生有生，則離作有作、離去有去、離食有食，如是則壞世俗法。是事不然，是故不生法不生。複次，若不生法生，一切不生法皆應生；一切凡夫未生阿耨多羅三藐三菩提皆應生，不壞法阿羅漢煩惱不生而生，兔馬等角不生而生。是事不然，是故不應說不生而生。

問曰：「不生而生者，如有因緣和合時方作者，方便具足是則不生而生，非一切不生而生，是故不應以一切不生而生為難。」

答曰：「若法生時方作者，方便眾緣和合生，是中先定有不生，先無亦不生，又有無亦不生，是三種求生不可得，如先說。是故不生法不生。

「生時亦不生。何以故？有生生過，不生而生過故。生時法，生分不生，如先說。未生分亦不生，如前說。

「複次，若離生有生時，則應生時生，而實離生無生時，是故生時亦不生。

「複次，若人說生時生，則有二生：一、以生時為生，二、以生時生。無有二法，云何言有二生？是故生時亦不生。

「複次，未有生，無生時，

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： '不生而生'是不成立的，所以你先前確定地說，現在又說不確定。如同已經做了不應該再做，已經燒了不應該再燒，已經證得了不應該再證得一樣，這樣，已經生了就不應該再生；因此，生法（具有生性的法）是不生的。 不生法（沒有生性的法）也是不生的。為什麼呢？因為它不與生結合，而且一切不生之法會有生起的過失。如果'不生法'生起，那麼就成了離開生而有生，這就等於'不生'了。如果離開生而有生，那麼就成了離開作而有作，離開去而有去，離開食而有食，這樣就會破壞世俗的法則。這種情況是不可能的，所以說'不生法'是不生的。再者，如果'不生法'生起，那麼一切'不生法'都應該生起；一切凡夫在未生起阿耨多羅三藐三菩提（anuttara-samyak-sambodhi，無上正等正覺）之前都應該生起，不壞法的阿羅漢（arhat，已證得涅槃的聖者）煩惱不生而生，兔和馬等的角不生而生。這種情況是不可能的，所以不應該說'不生而生'。 有人問：'不生而生'，比如有因緣和合的時候才產生作用，方便具足了，這就是'不生而生'，不是一切'不生'都會生，所以不應該用一切'不生而生'來責難。 回答說：如果法在生起的時候才產生作用，依靠方便和眾多的因緣和合而生，這裡面先確定有'不生'，先前沒有也不生，又有和沒有也不生，這三種情況求生都是不可能得到的，如先前所說。所以'不生法'是不生的。 '生時'（生起的時候）也是不生的。為什麼呢？因為有'生'的生起的過失，以及'不生而生'的過失。'生時'的法，'生'的部分是不生的，如先前所說。未生起的部分也是不生的，如先前所說。 再者，如果離開'生'而有'生時'，那麼就應該在'生時'生起，但實際上離開'生'是沒有'生時'的，所以'生時'也是不生的。 再者，如果有人說'生時'生起，那麼就會有兩個生起：一是以'生時'為生起，二是以'生時'生。沒有兩種法，怎麼能說有兩個生起呢？所以'生時'也是不生的。 再者，在沒有生起之前，就沒有'生時'。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Not-arisen arising' is not established, therefore you first determinedly spoke, and now you say it is uncertain. Just as what has been done should not be done again, what has been burned should not be burned again, what has been attained should not be attained again, in the same way, what has arisen should not arise again; therefore, the dharma of arising (the dharma that has the nature of arising) does not arise. The dharma of non-arising (the dharma that does not have the nature of arising) also does not arise. Why? Because it does not combine with arising, and also because all dharmas of non-arising would have the fault of arising. If the 'dharma of non-arising' arises, then it becomes arising apart from arising, which is equivalent to 'non-arising'. If there is arising apart from arising, then there is doing apart from doing, going apart from going, eating apart from eating, and in this way, it would destroy the worldly laws. This situation is impossible, therefore it is said that the 'dharma of non-arising' does not arise. Furthermore, if the 'dharma of non-arising' arises, then all 'dharmas of non-arising' should arise; all ordinary beings before arising to anuttara-samyak-sambodhi (anuttara-samyak-sambodhi, unsurpassed perfect enlightenment) should arise, the arhat (arhat, a saint who has attained nirvana) of indestructible dharma whose afflictions do not arise, yet arise, and the horns of rabbits and horses, etc., do not arise, yet arise. This situation is impossible, therefore it should not be said 'not-arisen arising'. Someone asks: 'Not-arisen arising', for example, when conditions are harmonious, then it produces an effect, and when the means are complete, this is 'not-arisen arising', not all 'non-arising' will arise, so it should not be used to criticize all 'not-arisen arising'. The answer is: If a dharma only produces an effect when it arises, relying on means and the harmony of many conditions to arise, then there is definitely 'non-arising' here, and it does not arise if it did not exist before, and it does not arise if it both exists and does not exist, and these three situations of seeking arising are impossible to obtain, as previously stated. Therefore, the 'dharma of non-arising' does not arise. The 'time of arising' (the moment of arising) also does not arise. Why? Because there is the fault of the arising of 'arising', and the fault of 'not-arisen arising'. The dharma of the 'time of arising', the part of 'arising' does not arise, as previously stated. The part that has not arisen also does not arise, as previously stated. Furthermore, if there is a 'time of arising' apart from 'arising', then it should arise at the 'time of arising', but in reality, there is no 'time of arising' apart from 'arising', so the 'time of arising' also does not arise. Furthermore, if someone says that the 'time of arising' arises, then there will be two arisings: one is taking the 'time of arising' as arising, and the other is arising at the 'time of arising'. There are not two dharmas, how can it be said that there are two arisings? Therefore, the 'time of arising' also does not arise. Furthermore, before there is arising, there is no 'time of arising'.

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生於何處行？生若無行處，則無生時生，是故生時亦不生。

「如是生、不生、生時皆不成，生法不成故。無生，住、滅亦如是。生、住、滅不成故，則有為法亦不成；有為法不成故，無為法亦不成；有為、無為法不成故，眾生亦不成。是故當知一切法無生，畢竟空寂故。」

十二門論一卷

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 從何處產生而行？如果產生沒有行處，那麼就沒有產生時的產生，因此產生時也不是真正的產生。

『像這樣，產生、不產生、產生時都不成立，產生的法則不能成立。沒有產生，安住、滅亡也是如此。產生、安住、滅亡不能成立，那麼有為法也不能成立；有為法不能成立，無為法也不能成立；有為法、無為法不能成立，眾生也不能成立。因此應當知道一切法沒有產生，畢竟是空寂的。』

《十二門論》一卷

【English Translation】 English version: From where does one arise and proceed? If arising has no place to proceed to, then there is no arising at the time of arising; therefore, at the time of arising, there is also no arising.

『Thus, arising, non-arising, and the time of arising are all unestablished, because the law of arising is unestablished. No arising, abiding, and ceasing are also like this. Because arising, abiding, and ceasing are unestablished, then conditioned dharmas (有為法) are also unestablished; because conditioned dharmas are unestablished, unconditioned dharmas (無為法) are also unestablished; because conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are unestablished, sentient beings are also unestablished. Therefore, one should know that all dharmas are without arising, ultimately empty and still.』

《Twelve Gate Treatise》, one fascicle

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