T30n1569_百論

大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1569 百論

No. 1569 [cf. Nos. 1570, 1571]

百論序

釋僧肇作

百論者。蓋是通聖心之津涂。開真諦之要論也。佛泥曰后八百餘年。有出家大士。厥名提婆。玄心獨悟俊氣高朗。道映當時。神超世表。故能辟三藏之重關。坦十二之幽路。擅步迦夷。為法城塹。於時外道紛然。異端競起。邪辯逼真。殆亂正道。乃仰慨聖教之陵遲。俯悼群迷之縱惑。將遠拯沉淪。故作斯論。所以防正閑邪。大明于宗極者矣。是以正化以之而隆。邪道以之而替。非夫領括眾妙。孰能若斯。論有百偈。故以百為名。理致淵玄。統群籍之要。文旨婉約。窮製作之美。然至趣幽簡。鮮得其門。有婆藪開士者。明慧內融。妙思奇拔。遠契玄蹤。為之訓釋。使沉隱之義。彰于徽翰。風味宣流。被于來葉。文藻煥然。宗涂易曉。其為論也。言而無當。破而無執。儻然靡據。而事不失真。蕭焉無寄。而理自玄會。返本之道。著乎茲矣。有天竺沙門鳩摩羅什。器量淵弘。俊神超邈。鉆仰累年。轉不可測。常味詠斯論。以為心要。先雖親譯。而方言未融。至令思尋者。躊躇于謬文。摽位者。乖迕于歸致。大秦司隸校尉安成侯姚嵩。風韻清舒。衝心簡勝。

博涉內外。理思兼通。少好大道。長而彌篤。雖復形羈時務。而法言不輟。每撫茲文。所慨良多。以弘始六年歲次壽星。集理味沙門。與什考挍正本。陶練覆疏。務存論旨。使質而不野。簡而必詣。宗致盡爾。無間然矣。論凡二十品。品各五偈。后十品。其人以為無益此土。故闕而不傳。冀明識君子。詳而攬焉。

百論捲上

提婆菩薩造　婆藪開士釋

姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯

舍罪福品第一

頂禮佛足哀世尊　　于無量劫荷眾苦　煩惱已盡習亦除　　梵釋龍神咸恭敬　亦禮無上照世法　　能凈瑕穢止戲論　諸佛世尊之所說　　並及八輩應真僧

外曰。偈言世尊之所說。何等是世尊。內曰。汝何故生如是疑。外曰種種說世尊相故生疑。有人言。葦紐天(秦言遍勝天)名世尊。又言。摩醯首羅天(秦言大自在天)名世尊。又言。迦毗羅。優樓迦。勒沙婆等仙人皆名世尊。汝何以獨言佛為世尊。是故生疑。內曰。佛知諸法實相。明瞭無礙。又能說深凈法。是故獨稱佛為世尊。外曰。諸餘導師亦能明瞭諸法相。亦能說深凈法。如迦毗羅弟子。誦僧佉經。說諸善法總相別相。於二十五諦中。凈覺分。是名善法。優樓迦弟子。誦衛世師經。言於六諦。求那諦中。日三洗。再供養火等和合。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本廣泛涉獵內外典籍，通達義理思辨。年少時便喜愛大道，年齡增長而更加篤信。雖然身形被世俗事務所束縛，但研習佛法之言從未停止。每每研讀這些經文，感慨良多。于弘始六年，歲在壽星（指年份），集合精通義理的沙門，與鳩摩羅什一起校勘正本，反覆推敲疏漏，務求儲存論著的宗旨，使其質樸而不粗俗，簡明而必然精到，宗派旨趣完全表達，沒有可以挑剔的地方。此論共二十品，每品各有五首偈頌。後面的十品，有人認為對本地（指中國）沒有益處，所以闕漏而沒有傳譯。希望明智的君子，詳細地閱讀並採納它。

《百論》捲上

提婆菩薩造　婆藪開士釋

姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯

舍罪福品第一

頂禮佛足，哀憫世間的世尊（Buddha），于無量劫中承擔眾生苦難。煩惱已經斷盡，習氣也已消除，梵天（Brahma）、帝釋天（Indra）、龍神都恭敬。也禮敬無上照亮世間的佛法（Dharma），能清凈瑕疵污垢，止息虛妄戲論。諸佛世尊所宣說的教法，以及八輩應真僧（指聲聞乘的八種果位）。

外道（指佛教以外的學說）問：偈頌中說『世尊所宣說的』，什麼是世尊？內道（指佛教）答：你為什麼會產生這樣的疑問？外道問：因為有種種關於世尊的說法，所以產生疑問。有人說，葦紐天（Vaisvanara，秦言遍勝天）名為世尊。又有人說，摩醯首羅天（Mahesvara，秦言大自在天）名為世尊。又有人說，迦毗羅（Kapila）、優樓迦（Ulukya）、勒沙婆（Rsabha）等仙人，都名為世尊。你為什麼唯獨說佛是世尊？因此產生疑問。內道答：佛了知諸法實相，明瞭通達而沒有障礙，又能宣說深奧清凈的佛法，所以唯獨稱佛為世尊。外道問：其他導師也能明瞭諸法之相，也能宣說深奧清凈的佛法。例如迦毗羅的弟子，誦讀《僧佉經》（Samkhya），宣說諸善法的總相和別相，在二十五諦中，凈覺分，就名為善法。優樓迦的弟子，誦讀《衛世師經》（Vaisesika），說在六諦中，求那諦中，每天三次洗浴，再次供養火等，使之和合。

【English Translation】 English version He extensively studied both internal and external scriptures, and was versed in both reasoning and contemplation. He loved the Great Way from a young age, and his faith grew stronger with age. Although his physical form was bound by worldly affairs, he never ceased studying the words of the Dharma. Every time he contemplated these texts, he felt a great deal of emotion. In the sixth year of the Hongshi era, in the year of Shouxing (referring to the year), he gathered monks skilled in reasoning to collate and correct the original text with Kumarajiva, repeatedly examining and clarifying omissions, striving to preserve the essence of the treatise, making it simple yet not crude, concise yet necessarily thorough, fully expressing the doctrines of the school, leaving no room for criticism. The treatise consists of twenty chapters, each with five verses. The last ten chapters were deemed by some to be of no benefit to this land (referring to China), so they were omitted and not translated. It is hoped that wise gentlemen will carefully read and adopt it.

Shata Shastra (Treatise in One Hundred Verses) Volume 1

Composed by Bodhisattva Deva, Explained by Scholar Vasu

Translated by Tripitaka Master Kumarajiva of the Yao Qin Dynasty

Chapter 1: Abandoning Merit and Demerit

I prostrate at the feet of the Buddha (Buddha), who has compassion for the world, bearing the suffering of all beings for countless kalpas (aeons). Afflictions have been exhausted, and habitual tendencies have also been eliminated. Brahma (Brahma), Indra (Indra), and the Dragon Gods all respectfully revere him. I also pay homage to the supreme Dharma (Dharma) that illuminates the world, able to purify flaws and defilements, and cease false and frivolous discussions. The teachings spoken by all the Buddhas, the World Honored Ones, as well as the eight classes of Arhats (referring to the eight stages of the Hearer Vehicle).

An outsider (referring to non-Buddhist doctrines) asks: The verse says 'spoken by the World Honored One,' who is the World Honored One? An insider (referring to Buddhism) replies: Why do you have such doubts? The outsider asks: Because there are various sayings about the World Honored One, doubts arise. Some say that Vaisvanara (Qin translation: 'Universally Victorious Heaven') is called the World Honored One. Others say that Mahesvara (Qin translation: 'Great自在 Heaven') is called the World Honored One. Still others say that sages such as Kapila (Kapila), Ulukya (Ulukya), and Rsabha (Rsabha) are all called the World Honored One. Why do you exclusively say that the Buddha is the World Honored One? Therefore, doubts arise. The insider replies: The Buddha knows the true nature of all dharmas, is clear and unobstructed, and can also expound the profound and pure Dharma, so the Buddha alone is called the World Honored One. The outsider asks: Other teachers can also understand the characteristics of all dharmas and can also expound the profound and pure Dharma. For example, the disciples of Kapila recite the Samkhya Sutra (Samkhya), expounding the general and specific characteristics of all good dharmas. Among the twenty-five Tattvas, the pure awareness aspect is called good dharma. The disciples of Ulukya recite the Vaisesika Sutra (Vaisesika), saying that among the six categories, in the category of Guna, bathing three times a day and offering fire again, combining them together.

生神分善法。勒沙婆弟子。誦尼乾子經言。五熱炙身。拔髮等受苦法。是名善法。又有諸師。行自餓法。投淵赴火。自墜高巖。寂默常立。持牛戒等。是名善法。如是等皆是深凈法。何以言獨佛能說耶。內曰。是皆邪見。覆正見故。不能說深凈法。是事後當廣說。外曰。佛說何等善法相。內曰。惡止善行法(修妒路)。佛略說善法二種。止相行相。息一切惡。是名止相。修一切善。是名行相。何等為惡。身邪行。口邪行。意邪行。身殺盜淫。口妄言兩舌惡口綺語。意貪瞋惱邪見。復有十不善道。所不攝鞭杖系閉等。及十不善道前後種種罪。是名為惡。何等為止。息惡不作。若心生。若口語。若受戒。從今日終不復作。是名為止。何等為善。身正行。口正行。意正行。身迎送合掌。禮敬等。口實語。和合語。柔軟語。利益語。意慈悲正見等。如是種種清凈法。是名善法。何等為行。於是善法中。信受修習。是名為行。外曰。汝經有過。初不吉故(修妒路)。諸師作經法。初說吉故。義味易解。法音流佈。若智人讀誦唸知。便得增壽威德尊重。如有經名婆羅呵波帝(秦言廣主經)。如是經等。初皆言吉。以初吉故。中后亦吉。汝經初說惡故是不吉。是以言汝經有過。內曰。不然。斷邪見故說是經(修妒路)。是吉。是不吉

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本外道：有些修行者認為，折磨身體是善法。例如，Nigantha（尼乾子，耆那教創始人）的弟子誦讀尼乾子經，說五熱炙身（panchagni，在身體周圍點燃五堆火）、拔頭髮等受苦的方法是善法。還有一些修行者，實行自餓（fasting to death）的方法，或者投身深淵、跳入火中、從高崖跳下，或者默默地站立不動，或者持牛戒（go-vrata，模仿牛的行為）等等，認為這些是善法。他們認為這些都是深刻而清凈的法門。為什麼你們說只有佛陀才能宣說真正的善法呢？內道：這些都是邪見，因為它們顛覆了正確的見解，所以不能宣說深刻而清凈的法。這件事以後會詳細解釋。外道：佛陀所說的善法是什麼樣的呢？內道：惡止善行法（修妒路，sutra）。佛陀簡略地說，善法有兩種：止相和行相。停止一切惡行，這叫做止相；修習一切善行，這叫做行相。什麼是惡呢？身邪行、口邪行、意邪行。身體上的殺生、偷盜、邪淫；口頭上的妄語、兩舌、惡口、綺語；意念上的貪婪、嗔恨、惱怒、邪見。還有十不善道（dasa akusala kamma）。以及不包括在十不善道之內的鞭打、囚禁等等，以及十不善道之前之後產生的各種罪惡，這些都叫做惡。什麼是止呢？停止作惡，不去做惡事。無論是心中產生惡念，還是口中說出惡語，或者受戒發誓，從今天起永遠不再做惡事，這叫做止。什麼是善呢？身正行、口正行、意正行。身體上的迎接、送別、合掌、禮敬等等；口頭上的誠實語、和合語、柔軟語、利益語；意念上的慈悲、正見等等。像這樣種種清凈的法，叫做善法。什麼是行呢？對於這些善法，信受並且修習，這叫做行。外道：你們的經典有過失，因為開頭不吉祥（修妒路，sutra）。其他宗派製作經典的方法，開頭都說吉祥的話，這樣義理容易理解，法音容易流佈。如果聰明人讀誦、唸誦、理解，就能增長壽命、威德、受到尊重。例如有部經名叫婆羅呵波帝（Brahmapati，秦言廣主經），像這樣的經典，開頭都說吉祥的話。因為開頭吉祥，所以中間和結尾也吉祥。你們的經典開頭就說惡，所以是不吉祥的。因此我說你們的經典有過失。內道：不是這樣的。爲了斷除邪見才說這部經（修妒路，sutra），這是吉祥的。什麼是不吉祥的呢？

【English Translation】 English version Outsider: Some practitioners consider tormenting the body to be a virtuous practice. For example, the disciples of Nigantha (Nigantha, founder of Jainism) recite the Nigantha Sutra, saying that the method of panchagni (five fires around the body), plucking hair, and other suffering practices are virtuous. There are also some practitioners who practice self-starvation (fasting to death), or throw themselves into abysses, jump into fires, jump off high cliffs, or silently stand still, or hold the go-vrata (cow vow, imitating the behavior of cows), etc., considering these to be virtuous practices. They believe that these are profound and pure Dharma. Why do you say that only the Buddha can proclaim the true virtuous Dharma? Insider: These are all wrong views because they subvert the correct view, so they cannot proclaim profound and pure Dharma. This matter will be explained in detail later. Outsider: What kind of virtuous Dharma does the Buddha speak of? Insider: The Dharma of ceasing evil and practicing good (sutra). The Buddha briefly said that there are two kinds of virtuous Dharma: the aspect of cessation and the aspect of practice. Ceasing all evil deeds is called the aspect of cessation; cultivating all good deeds is called the aspect of practice. What is evil? Evil deeds of body, evil deeds of speech, evil deeds of mind. Killing, stealing, and sexual misconduct of the body; false speech, divisive speech, harsh speech, and idle chatter of the mouth; greed, hatred, anger, and wrong views of the mind. There are also the ten unwholesome paths (dasa akusala kamma). As well as whipping, imprisonment, etc., which are not included in the ten unwholesome paths, and various evils that arise before and after the ten unwholesome paths, these are all called evil. What is cessation? Ceasing to do evil, not doing evil deeds. Whether evil thoughts arise in the mind, or evil words are spoken from the mouth, or vows are taken, from today onwards, never to do evil deeds again, this is called cessation. What is good? Right conduct of body, right speech, right thought. Welcoming, sending off, joining palms, paying respects, etc., of the body; truthful speech, harmonious speech, gentle speech, beneficial speech of the mouth; loving-kindness, compassion, right view, etc., of the mind. All such pure Dharma is called virtuous Dharma. What is practice? Believing in and cultivating these virtuous Dharmas, this is called practice. Outsider: Your sutra has a fault because the beginning is not auspicious (sutra). The method of making sutras by other sects is to speak auspicious words at the beginning, so that the meaning is easy to understand and the sound of the Dharma is easy to spread. If intelligent people read, recite, and understand it, they can increase their lifespan, dignity, and be respected. For example, there is a sutra called Brahmapati (Brahmapati, Chinese: Guang Zhu Jing), such sutras all speak auspicious words at the beginning. Because the beginning is auspicious, the middle and the end are also auspicious. Your sutra speaks of evil at the beginning, so it is not auspicious. Therefore, I say that your sutra has a fault. Insider: It is not like that. This sutra is spoken to cut off wrong views (sutra), this is auspicious. What is not auspicious?

。此是邪見氣。是故無過。複次無吉故(修妒路)。若少有吉。經初應言吉。此實無吉。何以故。是一事。此以為吉。彼以為不吉。或以為非吉非不吉。不定故無吉。汝愚人無方便。強欲求樂。妄生憶想。言是事吉。是事不吉。複次自他共不可得故(修妒路)。是吉法不自生。何以故。無有一法從自己生故。亦二相過故。一者生。二者能生。亦不從他生。自相無故。他相亦無。複次無窮故。以生更有生故。亦不共生。二俱過故。凡生法有三種。自他共。是三種中。求不可得。是故無吉事。外曰。是吉自生故如鹽(修妒路)。譬如鹽自性咸。能使余物咸。吉亦如是。自性吉。能使余物吉。內曰。前已破故。亦鹽相鹽中住故(修妒路)。我先破無有法自性生。複次汝意謂鹽從因緣出。是故鹽不自性咸。我不受汝語。今當還以汝語破汝所說。鹽雖他物合。物不為鹽。鹽相鹽中住故。譬如牛相不為馬相。外曰。如燈(修妒路)。譬如燈既自照。亦能照他。吉亦如是。自吉亦能令不吉者吉。內曰。燈自他無闇故(修妒路)。燈自無闇。何以故。明闇不併故。燈亦無能照。不能照故。亦二相過故。一能照。二受照。是故燈不自照。所照之處亦無闇。是故不能照他。以破闇故名照。無闇可破故非照。外曰。初生時二俱照故(修妒路)

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『這是邪見之氣，所以說沒有吉兇禍福。』此外，沒有吉祥的緣故（修妒路 Sutra，經）。如果稍微有一點吉祥，經文一開始就應該說吉祥。但實際上並沒有吉祥。為什麼呢？因為同一件事，有人認為是吉祥的，有人認為是不吉祥的，或者有人認為既非吉祥也非不吉祥。因為不確定，所以沒有吉祥。你們這些愚人沒有方便智慧，卻強行想要尋求快樂，憑空產生虛妄的念頭，說這件事是吉祥的，那件事是不吉祥的。『此外，因為自身、他者、共同都不可得（修妒路 Sutra，經）。』吉祥之法不是自身產生的。為什麼呢？因為沒有一種法是從自身產生的。而且還有二相的過失，一是生，二是能生。也不是從他者產生的，因為自身之相不存在，他者之相也不存在。『此外，因為無窮無盡的緣故。』因為生之後還有生。也不是共同產生的，因為兩者都有過失。凡是產生之法有三種：自身、他者、共同。在這三種之中，尋求都不可得，所以沒有吉祥之事。外道說：『吉祥是自身產生的，就像鹽一樣（修妒路 Sutra，經）。』譬如鹽自身具有鹹味，能夠使其他東西也變咸。吉祥也是如此，自身是吉祥的，能夠使其他東西也變得吉祥。內道說：『之前已經破斥過了，而且鹽的鹹味存在於鹽之中（修妒路 Sutra，經）。』我之前已經破斥了沒有法是自身產生的。而且，你認為鹽是從因緣產生的，所以鹽不是自身具有鹹味。我不接受你的說法。現在我將用你的說法來破斥你所說的。鹽即使和其他東西混合，其他東西也不會變成鹽，因為鹽的鹹味存在於鹽之中。譬如牛的相狀不會變成馬的相狀。外道說：『就像燈一樣（修妒路 Sutra，經）。』譬如燈既能照亮自身，也能照亮其他東西。吉祥也是如此，自身是吉祥的，也能使不吉祥的東西變得吉祥。內道說：『燈自身沒有黑暗的緣故（修妒路 Sutra，經）。』燈自身沒有黑暗。為什麼呢？因為光明和黑暗不能並存。燈也沒有能照亮的能力，因為沒有不能照亮的地方。而且還有二相的過失，一是能照亮，二是接受照亮。所以燈不能照亮自身。被照亮的地方也沒有黑暗，所以不能照亮其他東西。因為破除了黑暗才叫做照亮，沒有黑暗可以破除，所以不是照亮。外道說：『剛產生的時候，燈和被照物都同時被照亮（修妒路 Sutra，經）。』

【English Translation】 English version: 'This is the air of wrong views, therefore there is no fault.' Furthermore, there is no auspiciousness (Sutra). If there were even a little auspiciousness, the Sutra should have said 'auspicious' at the beginning. But in reality, there is no auspiciousness. Why? Because the same thing, some consider auspicious, some consider inauspicious, or some consider neither auspicious nor inauspicious. Because it is uncertain, there is no auspiciousness. You fools, without skillful means, forcibly seek happiness, and give rise to false thoughts, saying this thing is auspicious, and that thing is inauspicious. 'Furthermore, because self, other, and both are unattainable (Sutra).' Auspicious Dharma is not self-produced. Why? Because there is no Dharma that arises from itself. And there is also the fault of two aspects: one is arising, and the other is the ability to arise. Nor does it arise from others, because the characteristic of self does not exist, and the characteristic of other also does not exist. 'Furthermore, because it is endless.' Because there is arising after arising. Nor is it jointly produced, because both have faults. All arising Dharmas are of three kinds: self, other, and both. Among these three, seeking is unattainable, therefore there is no auspicious matter. The outsider says: 'Auspiciousness is self-produced, like salt (Sutra).' For example, salt itself has a salty taste and can make other things salty. Auspiciousness is also like this, it is auspicious in itself and can make other things auspicious. The insider says: 'It has already been refuted before, and the saltiness of salt resides in the salt (Sutra).' I have already refuted that no Dharma is self-produced. Moreover, you think that salt comes from conditions, so salt is not salty in itself. I do not accept your statement. Now I will use your statement to refute what you said. Even if salt is mixed with other things, other things will not become salt, because the saltiness of salt resides in the salt. For example, the appearance of a cow will not become the appearance of a horse. The outsider says: 'Like a lamp (Sutra).' For example, a lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate others. Auspiciousness is also like this, it is auspicious in itself and can make inauspicious things auspicious. The insider says: 'The lamp itself has no darkness (Sutra).' The lamp itself has no darkness. Why? Because light and darkness cannot coexist. The lamp also has no ability to illuminate, because there is no place that cannot be illuminated. And there is also the fault of two aspects: one is the ability to illuminate, and the other is to be illuminated. Therefore, the lamp cannot illuminate itself. The place that is illuminated also has no darkness, so it cannot illuminate others. Because darkness is eliminated, it is called illumination, and there is no darkness to eliminate, so it is not illumination. The outsider says: 'When it is first produced, the lamp and the illuminated object are both illuminated at the same time (Sutra).'

。我不言燈先生而後照。初生時自照。亦能照他。內曰。不然。一法有無相不可得故(修妒路)。初生時名半生。半未生。生不能照。如前說。何況未生能有所照。複次一法雲何亦有相亦無相。複次不到闇故(修妒路)。燈若已生。若未生。俱不到闇。性相違故。燈若不到闇。云何能破闇。外曰。如咒星故(修妒路)。若遙咒遠人能令惱。亦如星變在天。令人不吉。燈亦如是。雖不到闇。而能破闇。內曰。太過實故(修妒路)。若燈有力不到闇。而能破闇者。何不天竺然燈。破振旦闇。如咒星力能及遠。而燈事不爾。是故汝喻非也。複次若初吉余不吉(修妒路)。若經初言吉。余應不吉。若余亦吉。汝言初吉者。是為妄語。外曰。初吉故余亦吉(修妒路)。初吉力故余亦吉。內曰。不吉多故。吉為不吉(修妒路)。汝經初言吉。則多不吉。以不吉多故。應吉為不吉。外曰。如象手(修妒路)。譬如像有手故名有手。不以有眼耳頭等。名為有眼耳頭。如是以少吉力故。令多不吉為吉。內曰。不然無象過故(修妒路)。若象與手異。頭足等亦異。如是則無別象。若分中有分具者。何不頭中有足。如破異中說。若象與手不異者。亦無別象。若有分與分不異者。頭應是足。二事與象不異故。如破一中說。如是吉事。種種因緣求

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本我不說燈先生之後才照亮。剛出生時就能自己照亮，也能照亮其他事物。內方反駁說：『不是這樣的。因為一法的有和無兩種狀態是不可得的（修妒路(Sutra，經)）。』剛出生時名為半生，一半未生。未生不能照亮，如前面所說。更何況未生之物能照亮什麼呢？再次，一法怎麼可能既有相又無相呢？再次，因為沒有到達黑暗的緣故（修妒路(Sutra，經)）。燈如果已經產生，或者尚未產生，都無法到達黑暗，因為性質相違背。燈如果無法到達黑暗，怎麼能破除黑暗呢？外方辯駁說：『就像咒語和星像一樣（修妒路(Sutra，經)）。』如果遙遠地念咒可以使遠方的人感到困擾，也像星象的變化在天上，使人不吉利。燈也像這樣，即使沒有到達黑暗，也能破除黑暗。』內方反駁說：『這是太過分的事實（修妒路(Sutra，經)）。』如果燈有力量，即使沒有到達黑暗，也能破除黑暗，為什麼不在天竺(India)點燃燈，來破除振旦(China)的黑暗呢？就像咒語和星象的力量能夠到達遠方，而燈的情況不是這樣。所以你的比喻是不對的。再次，如果開始是吉祥的，其餘的就應該是不吉祥的（修妒路(Sutra，經)）。如果經文一開始說是吉祥的，其餘的就應該是不吉祥的。如果其餘的也是吉祥的，你說一開始是吉祥的，那就是妄語。』外方辯駁說：『因為一開始是吉祥的，所以其餘的也是吉祥的（修妒路(Sutra，經)）。因為一開始吉祥的力量，所以其餘的也是吉祥的。』內方反駁說：『因為不吉祥的很多，所以吉祥的也變成不吉祥的（修妒路(Sutra，經)）。』你的經文一開始說是吉祥的，那麼很多都是不吉祥的。因為不吉祥的很多，所以應該吉祥的也變成不吉祥的。』外方辯駁說：『就像象的手（修妒路(Sutra，經)）。』譬如象因為有手所以被稱為有手，而不是因為有眼睛、耳朵、頭等，被稱為有眼睛、耳朵、頭。像這樣，因為有少許吉祥的力量，所以使很多不吉祥的變成吉祥的。』內方反駁說：『不是這樣的，因為有無象的過失（修妒路(Sutra，經)）。』如果象和手是不同的，頭和腳等也是不同的，這樣就沒有一個單獨的象。如果在部分中有部分具備，為什麼頭中沒有腳呢？就像在破異中說的那樣。如果象和手不是不同的，也沒有一個單獨的象。如果有部分和部分不是不同的，頭應該是腳。因為兩件事和象不是不同的。就像在破一中說的那樣。像這樣，吉祥的事情，用種種因緣來尋求

【English Translation】 English version I don't say that the lamp shines only after the teacher speaks. It illuminates itself when it is first born, and it can also illuminate others. The inner party retorted: 'That's not right. Because the existence and non-existence of a single dharma are unattainable (Sutra(修妒路)).' When it is first born, it is called half-born, half-unborn. The unborn cannot illuminate, as said before. Moreover, what can the unborn illuminate? Furthermore, how can a single dharma be both with form and without form? Furthermore, because it does not reach the darkness (Sutra(修妒路)). If the lamp has already been produced, or has not yet been produced, it cannot reach the darkness, because the natures are contradictory. If the lamp cannot reach the darkness, how can it break the darkness?' The outer party argued: 'Like spells and stars (Sutra(修妒路)).' If chanting spells from afar can cause trouble to people far away, it is also like the changes of stars in the sky, making people unlucky. The lamp is also like this, even if it does not reach the darkness, it can break the darkness.' The inner party retorted: 'This is an excessive fact (Sutra(修妒路)).' If the lamp has the power to break the darkness even without reaching it, why not light a lamp in India(天竺) to break the darkness of China(振旦)? Just as the power of spells and stars can reach far away, but the situation of the lamp is not like this. So your analogy is not correct. Furthermore, if the beginning is auspicious, the rest should be inauspicious (Sutra(修妒路)). If the scripture says that the beginning is auspicious, the rest should be inauspicious. If the rest is also auspicious, then your saying that the beginning is auspicious is a lie.' The outer party argued: 'Because the beginning is auspicious, the rest is also auspicious (Sutra(修妒路)). Because of the power of the auspicious beginning, the rest is also auspicious.' The inner party retorted: 'Because there are many inauspicious things, the auspicious also becomes inauspicious (Sutra(修妒路)).' Your scripture says that the beginning is auspicious, then many are inauspicious. Because there are many inauspicious things, the auspicious should also become inauspicious.' The outer party argued: 'Like the hand of an elephant (Sutra(修妒路)).' For example, an elephant is called having a hand because it has a hand, not because it has eyes, ears, head, etc. In this way, because there is a little auspicious power, many inauspicious things are made auspicious.' The inner party retorted: 'That's not right, because there is the fault of no elephant (Sutra(修妒路)).' If the elephant and the hand are different, the head and feet are also different, then there is no separate elephant. If there are parts in the part, why are there no feet in the head? Just like it is said in breaking difference. If the elephant and the hand are not different, there is no separate elephant. If there are parts and parts that are not different, the head should be the foot. Because the two things are not different from the elephant. Just like it is said in breaking oneness. In this way, auspicious things are sought with various causes and conditions.

不可得。云何言初吉故中后亦吉。外曰。惡止止妙。何不在初。內曰。行者要先知惡。然後能止。是故先惡后止。外曰。善行應在初。有妙果故(修妒路)。諸善法有妙果。行者欲得妙果故止惡。如是應先說善行。后說惡止。內曰。次第法故。先除粗垢。次除細垢。若行者不止惡。不能修善。是故先除粗垢。后染善法。譬如浣衣。先去垢然後可染。外曰。已說惡止。不應復言善行。內曰。佈施等善行故(修妒路)。佈施是善行。非是惡止。複次如大菩薩。惡已先止。行四無量心。憐愍眾生。守護他命。是則善行非止惡。外曰。佈施是止慳法。是故佈施應是止惡。內曰。不然。若不佈施便是惡者。諸不佈施悉應有罪。複次諸漏盡人慳貪已盡。佈施時止何惡。或有人雖行佈施。慳心不止。縱復能止。然以善行為本。是故佈施是善行。外曰。已說善行。不應說惡止。何以故。惡止即是善行故。內曰。止相息。行相作。性相違故。是故說善行。不攝惡止。外曰。是事實爾。我不言惡止善行是一相。但惡止則是善法。是故若言善行。不應復言惡止。內曰。應說惡止善行。何以故。惡止名受戒時息諸惡。善行名修習善法。若但說善行福。不說惡止者。有人受戒惡止。若心不善。若心無記。是時不行善故。不應有福。是時惡止故亦有

【現代漢語翻譯】不可得。怎麼說開始是吉祥的，中間和後來也是吉祥的呢？外道說：『停止作惡就是妙。為什麼不在一開始就停止作惡呢？』內道說：『修行人必須先知道什麼是惡，然後才能停止作惡。所以先說惡，后說止惡。』外道說：『善行應該在開始的時候就做，因為它有美妙的果報（修妒路，sūtra，經）。一切善法都有美妙的果報。修行人想要得到美妙的果報，所以要停止作惡。因此，應該先說善行，后說停止作惡。』內道說：『這是次第法。先去除粗糙的污垢，然後去除細微的污垢。如果修行人不停止作惡，就不能修習善法。所以先去除粗糙的污垢，然後才能染上善法。譬如洗衣服，先去除污垢，然後才能染色。』外道說：『已經說了停止作惡，不應該再說善行。』內道說：『因為有佈施等善行（修妒路，sūtra，經）。佈施是善行，不是停止作惡。』再者，比如大菩薩，惡已經先停止了，然後修習四無量心（慈、悲、喜、舍），憐憫眾生，守護他人的生命。這就是善行，不是停止作惡。外道說：『佈施是停止慳吝的法。所以佈施應該是停止作惡。』內道說：『不是這樣的。如果不佈施就是惡，那麼所有不佈施的人都應該有罪。』再者，那些漏盡（arhat，阿羅漢）的人，慳貪已經斷盡，佈施的時候停止的是什麼惡呢？或者有人雖然行佈施，慳吝之心卻沒有停止。縱然能夠停止，也是以善行為根本。所以佈施是善行。外道說：『已經說了善行，不應該再說停止作惡。為什麼呢？停止作惡就是善行。』內道說：『停止的相是息滅，行為的相是造作，性質是相反的。所以說了善行，不包括停止作惡。』外道說：『事實確實如此。我不是說停止作惡和善行是一個相。但是停止作惡就是善法。所以如果說了善行，不應該再說停止作惡。』內道說：『應該說停止作惡和善行。為什麼呢？停止作惡是指受戒的時候停止一切惡行。善行是指修習一切善法。如果只說善行的福報，不說停止作惡的福報，那麼有人受戒停止作惡，如果心不善，或者心無記（既非善也非惡），這個時候沒有行善，不應該有福報。這個時候因為停止作惡，所以也有福報。

【English Translation】 It is not obtainable. How can it be said that the beginning is auspicious, and so are the middle and the end? The outsider says: 'Stopping evil is wonderful. Why not stop evil at the beginning?' The insider says: 'Practitioners must first know what is evil, and then they can stop it. Therefore, evil is mentioned first, and then stopping evil.' The outsider says: 'Good deeds should be done at the beginning because they have wonderful results (sūtra, 修妒路). All good dharmas have wonderful results. Practitioners want to obtain wonderful results, so they stop evil. Therefore, good deeds should be mentioned first, and then stopping evil.' The insider says: 'This is the law of sequence. First remove the coarse dirt, then remove the fine dirt. If practitioners do not stop evil, they cannot cultivate good deeds. Therefore, first remove the coarse dirt, and then be stained with good dharmas. It is like washing clothes, first removing the dirt, and then dyeing them.' The outsider says: 'Stopping evil has already been mentioned, so good deeds should not be mentioned again.' The insider says: 'Because there are good deeds such as giving (sūtra, 修妒路). Giving is a good deed, not stopping evil.' Furthermore, like the great Bodhisattvas, evil has already been stopped first, and then they cultivate the Four Immeasurable Minds (慈、悲、喜、舍, loving-kindness, compassion, joy, and equanimity), have compassion for sentient beings, and protect the lives of others. This is a good deed, not stopping evil. The outsider says: 'Giving is the method of stopping stinginess. Therefore, giving should be stopping evil.' The insider says: 'It is not like that. If not giving is evil, then all those who do not give should be guilty.' Furthermore, those who have exhausted their outflows (arhat, 阿羅漢), their stinginess has been exhausted, what evil are they stopping when they give? Or some people, although they practice giving, their stingy minds have not stopped. Even if they can stop it, it is based on good deeds. Therefore, giving is a good deed. The outsider says: 'Good deeds have already been mentioned, so stopping evil should not be mentioned again. Why? Stopping evil is a good deed.' The insider says: 'The characteristic of stopping is cessation, the characteristic of action is creation, and their natures are contradictory. Therefore, mentioning good deeds does not include stopping evil.' The outsider says: 'The fact is indeed so. I am not saying that stopping evil and good deeds are the same characteristic. But stopping evil is a good dharma. Therefore, if good deeds are mentioned, stopping evil should not be mentioned again.' The insider says: 'Stopping evil and good deeds should be mentioned. Why? Stopping evil refers to stopping all evil deeds when taking precepts. Good deeds refer to cultivating all good dharmas. If only the blessings of good deeds are mentioned, and not the blessings of stopping evil, then someone takes precepts to stop evil, if their mind is not good, or their mind is neutral (neither good nor evil), at this time they are not doing good, so they should not have blessings. At this time, because of stopping evil, they also have blessings.'

福。是故應說惡止。亦應說善行。是惡止善行法。隨眾生意故。佛三種分別。下中上人施戒智(修妒路)。行者有三種。下智人教佈施。中智人教持戒。上智人教智慧。佈施名利益他舍財相應思。及起身口業持戒名若口語。若心生。若受戒。從今日不復作三種身邪行。四種口邪行。智慧名諸法相中。心定不動。何以說下中上。利益差降故。佈施者少利益。是名下智。持戒者中利益。是名中智。智慧者上利益。是名上智。複次施報下。戒報中。智報上。是故說下中上智。外曰。佈施者皆是下智不。內曰。不然。何以故。施有二種。一者不凈。二者凈行。不凈施是名下智人。外曰。何等名不凈施。內曰。為報施是不凈。如市易故(修妒路)。報有二種。現報后報。現報者。名稱敬愛等。后報者。後世富貴等。是名不凈施。所以者何。還欲得故。譬如賈客遠到他方。雖持雜物。多所饒益。然非憐愍眾生。以自求利故。是業不凈。佈施求報亦復如是。外曰。何等名凈施。內曰。若人愛敬利益他故。不求今世後世報。如眾菩薩。及諸上人行清凈施。是名凈施。外曰。持戒皆是中智人不。內曰。不然。何以故。持戒有二種。一者不凈。二者凈。不凈持戒者。名中智人。外曰。何等不凈持戒。內曰。持戒求樂報。為淫慾故。如覆相(

【現代漢語翻譯】福。因此應當宣說停止作惡，也應當宣說行善。這停止作惡和行善的法，是隨順眾生的意願而說的。佛陀以三種方式來區分：下等、中等、上等人，對應佈施、持戒、智慧（修妒路）。修行者有三種：下等智慧的人教導佈施，中等智慧的人教導持戒，上等智慧的人教導智慧。佈施是指利益他人，與捨棄財物相應的思念，以及由此產生的身口行為。持戒是指無論是口頭所說，還是心中所想，或者受持戒律，從今天開始不再做三種身體的邪惡行為，四種口頭的邪惡行為。智慧是指在諸法的現象中，內心安定不動搖。為什麼要說下等、中等、上等呢？因為利益的程度有差別。佈施的人利益較少，這稱為下等智慧。持戒的人利益中等，這稱為中等智慧。有智慧的人利益上等，這稱為上等智慧。再者，佈施的果報是下等的，持戒的果報是中等的，智慧的果報是上等的，因此說下等、中等、上等智慧。外道問：『佈施的人都是下等智慧的人嗎？』內道回答：『不是的。』為什麼呢？因為佈施有兩種：一種是不清凈的，一種是清凈的。不清凈的佈施稱為下等智慧的人。外道問：『什麼是不清凈的佈施？』內道回答：『爲了求回報而佈施就是不清凈的，就像市場上的交易一樣（修妒路）。』回報有兩種：現世的回報和後世的回報。現世的回報是指名聲、尊敬、愛戴等。後世的回報是指後世的富貴等。這稱為不清凈的佈施。為什麼這樣說呢？因為還想要得到回報。譬如商人遠行到其他地方，雖然帶著各種貨物，能夠帶來很多利益，但並不是憐憫眾生，而是爲了自己求取利益，這種行為是不清凈的。佈施求回報也是這樣。外道問：『什麼是清凈的佈施？』內道回答：『如果有人因為愛敬和利益他人，而不求今世和後世的回報，就像眾菩薩和諸上人所行的清凈佈施，這稱為清凈的佈施。』外道問：『持戒的人都是中等智慧的人嗎？』內道回答：『不是的。』為什麼呢？因為持戒有兩種：一種是不清凈的，一種是清凈的。不清凈的持戒的人，稱為中等智慧的人。外道問：『什麼是不清凈的持戒？』內道回答：『持戒是爲了求快樂的果報，爲了淫慾的緣故，就像覆相（指某些外道持戒的方式，目的是爲了來世獲得更好的色身）。』現代漢語譯本

【English Translation】 Therefore, it should be said to cease evil, and it should also be said to practice good. This Dharma of ceasing evil and practicing good is spoken according to the wishes of sentient beings. The Buddha distinguishes in three ways: lower, middle, and upper beings, corresponding to Dāna (giving), Śīla (morality), and Prajñā (wisdom) (Sūtra). There are three types of practitioners: those with lower wisdom teach giving, those with middle wisdom teach morality, and those with upper wisdom teach wisdom. Dāna refers to benefiting others, thoughts corresponding to relinquishing wealth, and the resulting actions of body and speech. Śīla refers to whether spoken or thought in the mind, or upholding precepts, from this day forward, no longer engaging in three kinds of evil bodily actions and four kinds of evil verbal actions. Prajñā refers to the mind being stable and unmoving amidst the phenomena of all dharmas. Why are lower, middle, and upper spoken of? Because the degree of benefit differs. Those who give benefit less, this is called lower wisdom. Those who uphold morality benefit moderately, this is called middle wisdom. Those with wisdom benefit greatly, this is called upper wisdom. Furthermore, the retribution of giving is lower, the retribution of morality is middle, and the retribution of wisdom is upper, therefore lower, middle, and upper wisdom are spoken of. An outsider asks: 'Are all those who give of lower wisdom?' An insider replies: 'No.' Why? Because there are two kinds of giving: one is impure, and one is pure. Impure giving is called a person of lower wisdom. An outsider asks: 'What is impure giving?' An insider replies: 'Giving for the sake of seeking reward is impure, like a market transaction (Sūtra).' There are two kinds of reward: present reward and future reward. Present reward refers to fame, respect, love, etc. Future reward refers to wealth and nobility in future lives, etc. This is called impure giving. Why is this so? Because one still desires to obtain reward. For example, a merchant travels far to other places, although carrying various goods and being able to bring much benefit, it is not out of compassion for sentient beings, but to seek profit for oneself, this action is impure. Giving seeking reward is also like this. An outsider asks: 'What is pure giving?' An insider replies: 'If someone, out of love, respect, and benefiting others, does not seek reward in this life or future lives, like the pure giving practiced by all Bodhisattvas and noble beings, this is called pure giving.' An outsider asks: 'Are all those who uphold morality people of middle wisdom?' An insider replies: 'No.' Why? Because there are two kinds of morality: one is impure, and one is pure. Those who uphold morality impurely are called people of middle wisdom. An outsider asks: 'What is impure morality?' An insider replies: 'Upholding morality for the sake of seeking pleasurable retribution, for the sake of lust, like covering the face (referring to certain externalist practices of upholding precepts with the aim of obtaining a better physical body in the next life).' English version

修妒路)。樂報有二種。一者生天。二者人中富貴。若持戒求天上。與天女娛樂。若人中受五欲樂。所以者何。為淫慾故。如覆相者。內欲他色。外詐親善。是名不凈持戒。如阿難語難陀。

如羝羊相觸　　將前而更卻　汝為欲持戒　　其事亦如是　身雖能持戒　　心為欲所牽　斯業不清凈　　何用是戒為

外曰。何等名凈持戒。內曰。行者作是念。一切善法。戒為根本。持戒之人。則心不悔。不悔則歡喜。歡喜則心樂。心樂得一心一心則生實智。實智生則得厭。得厭則離欲。離欲得解脫。解脫得涅槃。是名凈持戒。外曰。若上智者。郁陀羅伽等為上(修妒路)。若行智人。是名上智。今郁陀羅伽。阿羅邏外道等。應為上智人。內曰。不然。何以故。智亦有二種。一者不凈。二者凈。外曰。何等名不凈智。內曰。為世界繫縛故不凈。如怨來親(修妒路)。世界智慧增長生死。所以者何。此智還繫縛故。譬如怨家。初詐親附。久則生害。世界智亦如是。外曰。但是智慧增長生死。施戒亦爾耶。內曰。取福舍惡是行法(修妒路)。福名福報。外曰。若福名福報者。何以修妒路中但言福。內曰。福名因。福報名果。或說因為果。或說果為因。此中說因為果。譬如食千兩金。金不可食。因金得食。故名食金。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：（持戒的）目的是爲了獲得快樂的果報。快樂的果報有兩種：一是昇天，二是人間的富貴。如果持戒是爲了求生天，與天女一同享樂；如果（持戒）是爲了在人間享受五欲之樂，那又是爲了什麼呢？還是爲了淫慾的緣故。就像那些表面偽裝的人，內心貪圖他人的美色，外表卻假裝親善。這叫做不清凈的持戒。就像阿難對難陀說的那樣：如同公羊相牴觸，向前衝撞又退卻，你爲了慾望而持戒，事情也是這樣啊！身體雖然能夠持戒，內心卻被慾望所牽引，這樣的行為不清凈，又有什麼用呢？外道問：『什麼叫做清凈的持戒？』內道答：『修行人應當這樣想：一切善法，戒是根本。持戒的人，內心就不會後悔；不後悔就會歡喜；歡喜內心就會快樂；內心快樂就能得到一心；一心就能生出真實的智慧；生出真實的智慧就能產生厭離；產生厭離就能脫離慾望；脫離慾望就能得到解脫；解脫就能得到涅槃。』這叫做清凈的持戒。外道問：『如果（按照你的說法）有上等智慧的人，那麼郁陀羅伽（Udaka，古印度數論派大師）等人就是上等（修妒路 Sutra，經）了。如果（按照你的說法）有實踐智慧的人，就是有上等智慧的人，那麼郁陀羅伽、阿羅邏（Arada Kalama，釋迦牟尼的老師）等外道，就應該是上等智慧的人了。』內道答：『不是這樣的。為什麼呢？因為智慧也有兩種：一種是不清凈的，一種是清凈的。』外道問：『什麼叫做不清凈的智慧？』內道答：『因為被世界所束縛，所以不清凈。就像怨家來親近（修妒路 Sutra，經）一樣，世界的智慧只能增長生死。為什麼呢？因為這種智慧還是被束縛的緣故。譬如怨家，起初假裝親近，時間久了就會產生危害，世界的智慧也是這樣。』外道問：『難道只有智慧會增長生死，佈施和持戒也是這樣嗎？』內道答：『獲取福報，捨棄罪惡，這是修行的法則（修妒路 Sutra，經）。福報叫做福報。』外道問：『如果福報叫做福報，為什麼修妒路（Sutra，經）中只說福呢？』內道答：『福是因，福報是果。有時說因是果，有時說果是因。這裡說的是因是果。譬如吃千兩黃金，黃金是不能吃的，因為黃金才能得到食物，所以叫做吃黃金。』

【English Translation】 English version: The purpose (of upholding precepts) is to obtain the reward of happiness. There are two kinds of happiness: one is to be born in the heavens, and the other is wealth and nobility in the human realm. If one upholds precepts in order to seek birth in the heavens and enjoy pleasures with heavenly maidens; if (one upholds precepts) in order to enjoy the pleasures of the five desires in the human realm, then what is it for? It is still for the sake of lust. It is like those who disguise themselves, inwardly coveting the beauty of others, but outwardly feigning kindness. This is called impure precept-holding. It is like what Ananda said to Nanda: Like rams butting each other, advancing and then retreating, you uphold precepts for the sake of desire, and the matter is just like this! Although the body is able to uphold precepts, the mind is牽引 by desires. Such actions are impure, so what is the use of these precepts? The outsider asked: 'What is called pure precept-holding?' The insider answered: 'The practitioner should think like this: of all good dharmas, precepts are the root. A person who upholds precepts will not have regrets in their heart; without regrets, they will be joyful; with joy, their heart will be happy; with a happy heart, they can attain single-mindedness; with single-mindedness, they can generate true wisdom; with true wisdom, they can generate aversion; with aversion, they can be free from desires; with freedom from desires, they can attain liberation; with liberation, they can attain Nirvana.' This is called pure precept-holding. The outsider asked: 'If (according to your statement) those with superior wisdom, then Udaka (Udaka Ramaputta, an early teacher of meditation) and others are superior (Sutra). If (according to your statement) those with practical wisdom are people with superior wisdom, then Udaka, Arada Kalama (Alara Kalama, one of the teachers of Siddhartha Gautama) and other non-Buddhists should be people with superior wisdom.' The insider answered: 'It is not like that. Why? Because there are also two kinds of wisdom: one is impure, and the other is pure.' The outsider asked: 'What is called impure wisdom?' The insider answered: 'Because it is bound by the world, it is impure. Just like an enemy coming close (Sutra), worldly wisdom can only increase birth and death. Why? Because this wisdom is still bound. For example, an enemy initially pretends to be close, but after a long time, they will cause harm. Worldly wisdom is also like this.' The outsider asked: 'Is it only wisdom that increases birth and death, or is giving and upholding precepts also like this?' The insider answered: 'Obtaining blessings and abandoning evils is the law of practice (Sutra). Blessing is called reward.' The outsider asked: 'If blessing is called reward, why does the Sutra only say blessing?' The insider answered: 'Blessing is the cause, and reward is the effect. Sometimes the cause is said to be the effect, and sometimes the effect is said to be the cause. Here, the cause is said to be the effect. For example, eating a thousand taels of gold, gold cannot be eaten, but because of gold, one can obtain food, so it is called eating gold.'

又如見畫言是好手。因手得畫故名好手。取名著。著福報惡先已說。行名將人常行生死中。外曰。何等是不行法。內曰。俱舍(修妒路)俱名福報罪報。舍名心不著。心不著福不復往來五道。是名不行法。外曰。福不應舍。以果報妙故。亦不說因緣故(修妒路)。諸福果報妙。一切眾生常求妙果。云何可舍。又如佛言。諸比丘。于福莫畏。汝今又不說因緣。是故不應舍福。內曰。福滅時苦(修妒路)。福名福報。滅名失壞。福報滅時。離所樂事。生大憂苦。如佛說。樂受生時樂。住時樂。滅時苦。是故應舍福。又如佛言于福莫畏者。助道應行故。如佛說。福尚應舍。何況罪。外曰。罪福相違故。汝言福滅時苦者。罪生住時應樂。內曰。罪住時苦(修妒路)。罪名罪報。罪報生時苦。何況住時。如佛說。苦受生時苦。住時苦。滅時樂。汝言罪福相違故。罪生時應樂者。今當答汝何不言福罪相違故。罪滅時樂。生住時苦。外曰。常福無舍因緣故不應舍(修妒路)。汝說舍福因緣滅時苦。今常福報中。無滅苦故不應舍。如經說。能作馬祀。是人度衰老死。福報常生處常。是福不應舍。內曰。福應舍。二相故(修妒路)。是福有二相。能與樂。能與苦。如雜毒飯食時。美欲消時苦。福亦如是。複次有福報是樂因。多受則苦因。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本又如看見一幅畫，評論說這是出自一位好手（技藝精湛的人）之手。因為手（技藝）成就了畫，所以才稱其為好手。取名是執著的表現。執著于福報和惡報的後果之前已經說過了。行，指的是使人經常在生死輪迴中流轉。外道問：『什麼是不行法？』內道答：『俱舍（Kusha，修妒路 Sutra的異名）既可以帶來福報，也可以帶來罪報。舍（放棄）指的是內心不執著。內心不執著于福報，就不會再在五道（地獄、餓鬼、畜生、人、天）中往來。這叫做不行法。』外道說：『福不應該捨棄，因為它帶來的果報是美好的。而且（修妒路 Sutra）也沒有說要捨棄福報的原因。各種福報的果報都是美好的，一切眾生都在追求美好的果報，怎麼可以捨棄呢？而且佛也說過，諸位比丘，不要害怕福報。你現在又不說捨棄福報的原因，所以不應該捨棄福報。』內道答：『福報滅失的時候會帶來痛苦（修妒路 Sutra）。福，指的是福報。滅，指的是消失和敗壞。福報滅失的時候，會使人離開所喜愛的事物，產生巨大的憂愁和痛苦。就像佛說的那樣，快樂的感受產生的時候是快樂的，持續的時候是快樂的，滅失的時候是痛苦的。所以應該捨棄福報。而且佛說不要害怕福報，是因為爲了幫助修行正道，應該行持。就像佛說的那樣，福報尚且應該捨棄，更何況是罪業呢？』外道說：『罪和福是相互對立的。你說福報滅失的時候會帶來痛苦，那麼罪業產生和持續的時候應該帶來快樂。』內道答：『罪業持續的時候是痛苦的（修妒路 Sutra）。罪，指的是罪報。罪報產生的時候是痛苦的，更何況是持續的時候呢？就像佛說的那樣，痛苦的感受產生的時候是痛苦的，持續的時候是痛苦的，滅失的時候是快樂的。你說罪和福是相互對立的，罪業產生的時候應該帶來快樂，現在我反問你，為什麼不說罪和福是相互對立的，罪業滅失的時候是快樂的，產生和持續的時候是痛苦的呢？』外道說：『因為常福沒有捨棄的因緣，所以不應該捨棄（修妒路 Sutra）。你說捨棄福報的因緣是福報滅失的時候會帶來痛苦。現在常福的果報中，沒有滅失的痛苦，所以不應該捨棄。就像經書上說的那樣，能夠舉行馬祭的人，可以度過衰老和死亡。福報常常產生，所處的地方也常常是美好的。這樣的福報不應該捨棄。』內道答：『福報應該捨棄，因為它具有兩種特性（修妒路 Sutra）。這種福報具有兩種特性：既能帶來快樂，也能帶來痛苦。就像摻雜了毒藥的飯，吃的時候覺得美味，但藥效消失的時候就會感到痛苦。福報也是這樣。而且，有些福報是快樂的原因，但如果過度享受，就會成為痛苦的原因。』

【English Translation】 English version For example, seeing a painting, one says it is by a good hand (skillful person). Because the hand (skill) created the painting, it is called a good hand. Naming is a form of attachment. The consequences of attachment to merit and demerit have been discussed earlier. 'Going' refers to causing people to constantly transmigrate in the cycle of birth and death. The outsider asks: 'What is the law of non-going?' The insider replies: 'Kusha (another name for Sutra), both bring merit and demerit. 'Giving up' means the mind is not attached. If the mind is not attached to merit, it will no longer travel back and forth in the five paths (hell, hungry ghosts, animals, humans, and gods). This is called the law of non-going.' The outsider says: 'Merit should not be abandoned, because the resulting fruit is wonderful. Moreover, (Sutra) does not say the reason for abandoning merit. The fruits of all merits are wonderful, and all beings seek wonderful fruits, how can they be abandoned? Moreover, the Buddha said, 'Monks, do not fear merit.' Now you do not say the reason for abandoning merit, so merit should not be abandoned.' The insider replies: 'When merit disappears, it brings suffering (Sutra). Merit refers to the reward of merit. Disappearance refers to loss and decay. When the reward of merit disappears, it causes people to leave what they love and generate great sorrow and suffering. Just as the Buddha said, the feeling of pleasure is pleasant when it arises, pleasant when it lasts, and painful when it disappears. Therefore, merit should be abandoned. Moreover, the Buddha said not to fear merit because it should be practiced to help cultivate the right path. Just as the Buddha said, even merit should be abandoned, let alone sin?' The outsider says: 'Sin and merit are mutually opposed. You say that when merit disappears, it brings suffering, then the arising and lasting of sin should bring happiness.' The insider replies: 'The lasting of sin is painful (Sutra). Sin refers to the reward of sin. The reward of sin is painful when it arises, let alone when it lasts? Just as the Buddha said, the feeling of suffering is painful when it arises, painful when it lasts, and pleasant when it disappears. You say that sin and merit are mutually opposed, and the arising of sin should bring happiness, now I ask you in return, why not say that sin and merit are mutually opposed, the disappearance of sin is happiness, and the arising and lasting are painful?' The outsider says: 'Because constant merit has no cause for abandonment, it should not be abandoned (Sutra). You say that the cause for abandoning merit is that the disappearance of merit brings suffering. Now, in the reward of constant merit, there is no suffering of disappearance, so it should not be abandoned. Just as the scriptures say, a person who can perform a horse sacrifice can overcome old age and death. The reward of merit constantly arises, and the place where it is located is also constantly wonderful. Such merit should not be abandoned.' The insider replies: 'Merit should be abandoned because it has two characteristics (Sutra). This merit has two characteristics: it can bring both happiness and suffering. Just like rice mixed with poison, it tastes delicious when eaten, but it is painful when the effect of the medicine disappears. Merit is also like this. Moreover, some merit is the cause of happiness, but if it is over-enjoyed, it will become the cause of suffering.'

譬如近火。止寒則樂。轉近燒身則苦。是故福二相。二相故無常。是以應舍。又汝言馬祀福報常者。但有言說。無因緣故(修妒路)。馬祀福報實無常。何以故。馬祀業因緣有量故世間因若有量。果亦有量。如泥團小。瓶亦小。是故馬祀業有量故無常。複次聞汝天有瞋恚。共鬥相惱故不應常。又汝馬祀等業。從因緣生故皆無常。複次有漏凈福無常故尚應舍。何況雜罪福(修妒路)。如馬祀業中。有殺等罪故。複次如僧佉經言。祀法不凈．無常．勝負相故。是以應舍。外曰。若舍福不應作(修妒路)。若福必舍。本不應作。何有智人空為苦事。譬如陶家作器還破。內曰。生道次第法。如垢衣浣染(修妒路)。如垢衣先浣后凈乃染浣凈不虛也。所以者何。染法次第故。以垢衣不受染故。如是先除罪垢。次以福德熏心。然後受涅槃道染。外曰。舍福依何等(修妒路)。依福舍惡。依何舍福。內曰。無相最上(修妒路)。取福人天中生。取罪三惡道生。是故無相智慧最第一。無相名一切相不憶念。離一切受。過去未來現在法心無所著。一切法自性無故。則無所依。是名無相。以是方便故能捨福。何以故。除三種解脫門。第一利不可得。如佛語諸比丘。若有人言我不用空無相無作。欲得若知若見。無增上慢者。是人空言無實。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本譬如靠近火。停止寒冷就感到快樂。但如果太靠近而被燒傷，就會感到痛苦。所以福報具有兩種狀態。因為具有兩種狀態，所以是無常的，因此應當捨棄。而且你說馬祭（Ashvamedha Yajna）的福報是永恒的，這只是說說而已，沒有因緣（Hetu-pratyaya）的依據。馬祭的福報實際上是無常的。為什麼呢？因為馬祭的業因緣是有數量限制的。世間的因如果有限量，果報也有限量。比如泥團小，瓶子也小。所以馬祭的業有限量，因此是無常的。再者，我聽說你們的天神也有瞋恚，互相爭鬥惱怒，所以不應該是永恒的。而且你們的馬祭等行為，都是從因緣而生的，所以都是無常的。此外，有漏的清凈福報尚且是無常的，尚且應該捨棄，更何況是夾雜罪過的福報（修妒路，Sutra）。比如在馬祭的行業中，就有殺生等罪過。再者，如僧佉（Samkhya）經所說，祭祀之法是不清凈的、無常的、有勝負之分的，因此應當捨棄。外道說：如果捨棄福報，就不應該行善（修妒路，Sutra）。如果福報註定要捨棄，本來就不應該去做。哪有聰明人會白白地做徒勞的事情，就像陶工製作器皿然後又打破它一樣？內道說：生起道次第的法，就像洗滌染污的衣服（修妒路，Sutra）。就像染污的衣服，先洗乾淨才能染色，洗乾淨不是白費力氣。為什麼呢？因為染色的方法是有次第的。因為污垢的衣服不能被染色。像這樣，先去除罪惡的污垢，然後用福德來熏習內心，然後才能接受涅槃之道的染色。外道說：捨棄福報依靠什麼（修妒路，Sutra）？內道說：依靠福報捨棄罪惡，依靠什麼捨棄福報？內道說：無相是最上的（修妒路，Sutra）。執取福報會在人天中出生，執取罪過會在三惡道中出生。所以無相的智慧是最第一的。無相的意思是不憶念一切相，遠離一切感受，對於過去、未來、現在的法，內心沒有執著。一切法的自性是空無的，所以無所依賴。這叫做無相。用這種方法才能捨棄福報。為什麼呢？除了三種解脫門（三解脫門，trimokṣa）：空（Śūnyatā）、無相（Animitta）、無作（Apranihita），第一義是不可得的。如佛對諸比丘說：如果有人說我不用空、無相、無作，卻想要獲得知見，沒有增上慢，這個人只是空口說白話，沒有實際。

【English Translation】 English version It is like being near a fire. Stopping the cold brings joy. But moving too close and getting burned causes suffering. Therefore, merit (punya) has two aspects. Because it has two aspects, it is impermanent (anitya), and therefore should be abandoned. Moreover, you say that the merit of the horse sacrifice (Ashvamedha Yajna) is eternal, but this is just talk, without any basis in cause and condition (Hetu-pratyaya). The merit of the horse sacrifice is actually impermanent. Why? Because the causal conditions of the horse sacrifice are limited. If the cause in the world is limited, the result is also limited. For example, if the lump of clay is small, the jar is also small. Therefore, the merit of the horse sacrifice is limited, and therefore impermanent. Furthermore, I have heard that your gods also have anger (dvesha), fighting and vexing each other, so they should not be eternal. Moreover, your horse sacrifices and other actions are all born from causes and conditions, so they are all impermanent. Furthermore, even pure merit with outflows (sāsrava punya) is impermanent and should be abandoned, let alone merit mixed with sins (Sutra). For example, in the act of the horse sacrifice, there are sins such as killing. Furthermore, as the Samkhya scriptures say, the method of sacrifice is impure, impermanent, and has aspects of victory and defeat, so it should be abandoned. The outsider says: If merit is to be abandoned, then one should not do good (Sutra). If merit is destined to be abandoned, one should not do it in the first place. What wise person would do futile things in vain, like a potter making a vessel and then breaking it? The insider says: The Dharma of the gradual path to enlightenment is like washing and dyeing a soiled garment (Sutra). Just as a soiled garment must first be washed clean before it can be dyed, washing it clean is not a waste of effort. Why? Because the method of dyeing has a sequence. Because a soiled garment cannot be dyed. In this way, first remove the defilements of sin, then熏習(xunxi) the mind with merit, and then one can receive the dyeing of the path to Nirvana. The outsider says: What does one rely on to abandon merit (Sutra)? The insider says: One relies on merit to abandon evil, and what does one rely on to abandon merit? The insider says: Non-appearance (animitta) is the most supreme (Sutra). Grasping merit leads to birth in the realms of humans and gods, grasping sin leads to birth in the three evil realms. Therefore, the wisdom of non-appearance is the most supreme. Non-appearance means not remembering any appearances, being apart from all feelings, and having no attachment in the mind to the past, future, and present dharmas. The self-nature of all dharmas is empty (Śūnyatā), so there is nothing to rely on. This is called non-appearance. By this method, one can abandon merit. Why? Except for the three doors of liberation (trimokṣa): emptiness (Śūnyatā), non-appearance (Animitta), and non-action (Apranihita), the ultimate meaning is unattainable. As the Buddha said to the monks: If someone says I do not use emptiness, non-appearance, and non-action, but I want to obtain knowledge and vision, without arrogance, that person is just speaking empty words without substance.

破神品第二

外曰。不應言一切法空無相。神等諸法有故(修妒路)。迦毗羅。優樓迦等言。神及諸法有。迦毗羅言。從冥初生覺。從覺生我心。從我心。生五微塵。從五微塵生五大。從五大生十一根。神為主常。覺相。處中。常住不壞不敗。攝受諸法。能知此二十五諦。即得解脫。不知此者。不離生死。優樓迦言。實有神常。以出入息視眴壽命等相故。則知有神。複次以欲恚苦樂智慧等所依處故。則知有神。是故神是實有。云何言無。若有而言無。則為惡邪人。惡邪人無解脫。是故不應言一切法空無相。內曰。若有神而言無。是為惡邪。若無而言無。此有何過。諦觀察之。實無有神。外曰。實有神。如僧佉經中說。覺相是神。內曰。神覺為一耶。為異耶。外曰。神覺一也。內曰。覺若神相。神無常(修妒路)。若覺是神相者。覺無常故。神應無常。譬如熱是火相。熱無常故。火亦無常。今覺實無常。所以者何。相各異故。屬因緣故。本無今有故。已有還無故。外曰。不生故常(修妒路)。生相法無常。神非生相故常。內曰。若爾覺非神相(修妒路)。覺是無常。汝說神常。神應與覺異。若神覺不異者。覺無常故。神亦應無常。複次若覺是神相。無有是處。所以者何。覺行一處故(修妒路)。若覺是神相

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：　　第二品破神

外道說：不應該說一切法空無相。因為神等諸法是存在的（修妒路，梵文：Sūtra，意為經）。迦毗羅（Kapila，印度數論派哲學家）。優樓迦（Uluka，印度勝論派哲學家）等人說，神以及諸法是存在的。迦毗羅說：從冥（Prakrti，自性）最初產生覺（Buddhi，理智），從覺產生我心（Ahamkara，自我意識），從我心產生五微塵（Tanmatras，五唯），從五微塵產生五大（Mahabhutas，五大元素），從五大產生十一根（Ekadasendriya，十一根）。神（Purusha，精神）是主宰且恒常的，覺是其相，處於中間狀態，恒常住而不壞不敗，攝受諸法。能夠知曉這二十五諦（Tattvas，二十五諦）就能得到解脫，不知曉這些就不能脫離生死。優樓迦說：確實有神是恒常存在的，因為有出入息、視眴、壽命等現象，所以可知有神。再者，因為欲、恚、苦、樂、智慧等有所依處，所以可知有神。因此，神是真實存在的，怎麼能說沒有呢？如果存在卻說不存在，那就是邪惡之人。邪惡之人無法得到解脫。所以不應該說一切法空無相。內道說：如果神存在卻說不存在，那就是邪惡。如果不存在卻說不存在，這有什麼過錯呢？仔細觀察，實際上沒有神。

外道說：確實有神，如僧佉經（Samkhya，數論）中所說，覺相就是神。內道說：神和覺是一體的嗎？還是不同的？外道說：神和覺是一體的。內道說：如果覺是神的相，那麼神就是無常的（修妒路）。如果覺是神的相，因為覺是無常的，所以神也應該是無常的。譬如熱是火的相，熱是無常的，所以火也是無常的。現在覺確實是無常的。為什麼呢？因為相各不相同，依賴因緣，本來沒有現在有，已經有的還會消失。外道說：因為不生所以是常（修妒路）。有生相的法是無常的，神不是有生相的，所以是常的。內道說：如果這樣，那麼覺就不是神的相（修妒路）。覺是無常的，你說神是常的，神應該與覺不同。如果神和覺不是不同的，那麼覺是無常的，神也應該是無常的。再者，如果覺是神的相，這是不可能的。為什麼呢？因為覺只在一處活動（修妒路）。如果覺是神的相……

【English Translation】 English version: Chapter Two: Refuting the Notion of a Supreme Being

The Outsider says: 'It should not be said that all dharmas are empty and without characteristics, because gods and other dharmas exist (Sūtra).' Kapila (founder of the Samkhya school of philosophy) and Uluka (founder of the Vaisheshika school of philosophy) and others say that gods and dharmas exist. Kapila says: 'From Prakrti (primordial nature) arises Buddhi (intellect), from Buddhi arises Ahamkara (ego), from Ahamkara arise the five Tanmatras (subtle elements), from the five Tanmatras arise the five Mahabhutas (gross elements), and from the five Mahabhutas arise the eleven Indriyas (sense organs). Purusha (the self) is the master, eternal, and its characteristic is awareness. It dwells in the middle, is permanent, indestructible, and imperishable, encompassing all dharmas. One who knows these twenty-five Tattvas (principles) attains liberation; one who does not know them does not escape birth and death.' Uluka says: 'Indeed, there is a permanent god, because of the phenomena of inhalation and exhalation, blinking, and lifespan, it is known that there is a god. Furthermore, because desire, hatred, suffering, joy, wisdom, and other things have a basis, it is known that there is a god. Therefore, god truly exists. How can you say there is none? If something exists and you say it does not, then you are an evil person. Evil people cannot attain liberation. Therefore, it should not be said that all dharmas are empty and without characteristics.' The Insider says: 'If a god exists and you say it does not, that is evil. If it does not exist and you say it does not, what fault is there in this? Observe carefully, in reality, there is no god.'

The Outsider says: 'Indeed, there is a god, as stated in the Samkhya scriptures, awareness is the characteristic of god.' The Insider says: 'Are god and awareness one, or are they different?' The Outsider says: 'God and awareness are one.' The Insider says: 'If awareness is the characteristic of god, then god is impermanent (Sūtra). If awareness is the characteristic of god, because awareness is impermanent, then god should also be impermanent. For example, heat is the characteristic of fire; because heat is impermanent, fire is also impermanent. Now, awareness is indeed impermanent. Why? Because the characteristics are different, it depends on conditions, it did not exist originally but now exists, and what already exists will disappear.' The Outsider says: 'Because it is unborn, it is eternal (Sūtra). Dharmas with the characteristic of birth are impermanent; god does not have the characteristic of birth, therefore it is eternal.' The Insider says: 'If that is so, then awareness is not the characteristic of god (Sūtra). Awareness is impermanent, and you say god is eternal; god should be different from awareness. If god and awareness are not different, then because awareness is impermanent, god should also be impermanent. Furthermore, if awareness is the characteristic of god, this is impossible. Why? Because awareness acts in one place (Sūtra). If awareness is the characteristic of god...'

者。汝法中神遍一切處。覺亦應一時遍行五道。而覺行一處不能周遍。是故覺非神相。複次若爾神與覺等(修妒路)。汝以覺為神相者。神應與覺等。神則不遍。譬如火無熱不熱相。神亦如是。不應有遍不遍相。複次若以為遍。則有覺不覺相(修妒路)。汝欲令神遍。神則二相。覺不覺相。何以故。覺不遍故。神若墮覺處是則覺。若墮不覺處是則不覺。外曰。力遍故無過(修妒路)。有處覺雖無用。此中亦有覺力。是故無無覺過。內曰。不然。力有力不異故(修妒路)。若有覺力處是中覺應有用而無用。是故汝語非也。若如是說。覺無用處。亦有覺力者。但有是語。外曰。因緣合故。覺力有用(修妒路)。神雖有覺力。要待因緣合故。乃能有用。內曰。墮生相故(修妒路)。若因緣合時覺有用者。是覺屬因緣故。則墮生相。若覺神不異。神亦是生相。外曰。如燈(修妒路)。譬如燈能照物不能作物。因緣亦如是。能令覺有用。不能生覺。內曰。不然。燈雖不照瓶等。而瓶等可得。亦可持用。若因緣不合時。覺不可得。神亦不能覺苦樂。是故汝喻非也。外曰。如色(修妒路)。譬如色。雖先有燈。不照則不了。如是覺雖先有。因緣未合故亦不了。內曰。不然。自相不了故(修妒路)。若未有照。人雖不了色相自了。汝覺

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：外道：你的法中說神遍佈一切處，那麼覺（Buddhi，智慧、覺悟）也應該一時遍行於五道（地獄、餓鬼、畜生、人、天）。然而覺的執行只在一處，不能周遍，所以覺不是神（Atman，靈魂、真我）的相。此外，如果覺與神相等（修妒路 Sutra，經），你以覺為神的相，那麼神應該與覺相等，神就不遍一切處了。譬如火沒有熱與不熱的分別，神也應如此，不應有遍與不遍的分別。再者，如果認為神是遍一切處的，那麼就會有覺與不覺的分別（修妒路 Sutra，經）。你想要讓神遍一切處，神就有了兩種相：覺和不覺。為什麼呢？因為覺不是遍一切處的。神如果落在覺的處所，那就是覺；如果落在不覺的處所，那就是不覺。外道說：因為神的力量是遍一切處的，所以沒有過失（修妒路 Sutra，經）。在有些地方，覺雖然沒有用處，但其中仍然有覺的力量，所以沒有沒有覺的過失。內道反駁：不對。因為力與有力者沒有差別（修妒路 Sutra，經）。如果有覺的力量存在的地方，覺就應該有用處，但實際上卻沒有用處，所以你的說法是不對的。如果像你這樣說，覺沒有用處的地方，也有覺的力量，那只是說說而已。外道說：因為因緣和合，覺的力量才有用處（修妒路 Sutra，經）。神雖然有覺的力量，也要等待因緣和合，才能有用處。內道反駁：因為會墮入生相（修妒路 Sutra，經）。如果因緣和合時覺才有用處，那麼這個覺就屬於因緣，因此會墮入生相。如果覺與神沒有差別，那麼神也是生相。外道說：就像燈一樣（修妒路 Sutra，經）。譬如燈能照亮物體，但不能創造物體。因緣也是如此，能讓覺有用處，但不能產生覺。內道反駁：不對。燈雖然不照瓶子等物，但瓶子等物仍然可以得到，也可以拿來使用。如果因緣不和合時，覺就無法得到，神也不能覺知苦樂。所以你的比喻是不對的。外道說：就像顏色一樣（修妒路 Sutra，經）。譬如顏色，即使先有燈，不照亮也無法瞭解。如此，覺即使先存在，因緣沒有和合也無法瞭解。內道反駁：不對。因為自相無法瞭解（修妒路 Sutra，經）。如果沒有照亮，人雖然無法瞭解顏色的相狀，但自己還是能瞭解。你的覺

【English Translation】 English version: The Outsider: In your Dharma, it is said that Atman (神, soul, true self) pervades everywhere. Then Buddhi (覺, wisdom, enlightenment) should also simultaneously pervade the five realms (五道, hell, hungry ghosts, animals, humans, and gods). However, the operation of Buddhi is only in one place and cannot be all-pervasive. Therefore, Buddhi is not a characteristic of Atman. Furthermore, if Buddhi is equal to Atman (修妒路 Sutra, scripture), and you consider Buddhi as a characteristic of Atman, then Atman should be equal to Buddhi, and Atman would not be all-pervasive. For example, fire has no distinction between hot and not hot. Atman should also be like this, without the distinction of being pervasive or not pervasive. Moreover, if it is believed that Atman is all-pervasive, then there will be a distinction between Buddhi and non-Buddhi (修妒路 Sutra, scripture). You want Atman to be all-pervasive, then Atman will have two characteristics: Buddhi and non-Buddhi. Why? Because Buddhi is not all-pervasive. If Atman falls into the place of Buddhi, then it is Buddhi; if it falls into the place of non-Buddhi, then it is non-Buddhi. The Outsider says: Because the power of Atman is all-pervasive, there is no fault (修妒路 Sutra, scripture). In some places, although Buddhi is not useful, there is still the power of Buddhi within them. Therefore, there is no fault of lacking Buddhi. The Insider refutes: That's not right. Because the power and the possessor of power are not different (修妒路 Sutra, scripture). If there is a place where the power of Buddhi exists, Buddhi should be useful, but in reality, it is not useful. Therefore, your statement is incorrect. If you say it like this, in places where Buddhi is not useful, there is also the power of Buddhi, that is just empty talk. The Outsider says: Because of the combination of conditions, the power of Buddhi becomes useful (修妒路 Sutra, scripture). Although Atman has the power of Buddhi, it must wait for the combination of conditions to become useful. The Insider refutes: Because it will fall into the characteristic of arising (修妒路 Sutra, scripture). If Buddhi is only useful when conditions combine, then this Buddhi belongs to conditions, and therefore it will fall into the characteristic of arising. If Buddhi and Atman are not different, then Atman is also a characteristic of arising. The Outsider says: It's like a lamp (修妒路 Sutra, scripture). For example, a lamp can illuminate objects but cannot create objects. Conditions are also like this, they can make Buddhi useful but cannot produce Buddhi. The Insider refutes: That's not right. Although a lamp does not illuminate bottles and other things, bottles and other things can still be obtained and used. If conditions do not combine, Buddhi cannot be obtained, and Atman cannot perceive suffering and joy. Therefore, your analogy is incorrect. The Outsider says: It's like color (修妒路 Sutra, scripture). For example, with color, even if there is a lamp beforehand, it cannot be understood without illumination. Similarly, even if Buddhi exists beforehand, it cannot be understood if conditions do not combine. The Insider refutes: That's not right. Because the self-nature cannot be understood (修妒路 Sutra, scripture). If there is no illumination, although people cannot understand the appearance of color, they can still understand themselves. Your Buddhi

相自不了。是故汝喻非也。複次以無相故。色相不以人知故為色相。是故若不見時常有色。汝知是神相。不應以無知處為知。無知處為知。是事不然。汝法中知覺一義。外曰。優樓迦弟子。誦衛世師經。言知與神異。是故神不墮無常中。亦不無知。何以故。神知合故。如有牛(修妒路)。譬如人與牛合故人名有牛。如是神情意塵合故。神有知生。以神合知故。神名有知。內曰。牛相牛中住。非有牛中(修妒路)。牛相牛中住。不在有牛中。是故雖人牛合有牛不作牛。但牛為牛。如是雖神知合。知相知中住。神不為知。汝言神情意塵合故知生。是知知色塵等。是故但知能知非神知。譬如火能燒。非有火人燒。外曰。能用法故(修妒路)。人雖有見相用燈則見離燈則不見。神雖有能知用知則知離知則不知。內曰。不然。知即能知故(修妒路)。以情意塵合故知生。是知能知色等諸塵。是故知即能知非是所用。若知即能知。神復何用。燈喻非也。何以故。燈不知色等故(修妒路)。燈雖先有。不能知色等。非知法故。是故但知能知色。若不能知。不名為知。是故縱有能知。彼能何用。外曰。馬身合故神為馬(修妒路)。譬如神與馬身合故。神名為馬。神雖異身。亦名神為馬。如是神知合故神名為知。內曰。不然。身中神非馬

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『相自不了』（自性不能瞭解自性）。因此，你的比喻是不對的。再者，因為無相的緣故，色相不是因為人能知曉才成為色相。因此，如果不見的時候，色相仍然存在，你認為那是神（Atman）的相。不應該把無知的地方當作有知。把無知的地方當作有知，這是不合理的。在你的法中，知覺是一個含義。外道說：優樓迦（Ulluka）的弟子，誦讀衛世師經（Vaisheshika Sutra），說知與神是不同的。因此，神不會墮入無常之中，也不會沒有知覺。為什麼呢？因為神與知結合的緣故。比如有牛的人（Gomata），譬如人與牛結合，所以人被稱為『有牛』。如此，神與情意塵（感覺、意念、塵境）結合，所以神有知覺產生。因為神與知結合的緣故，神被稱為『有知』。內道說：牛的相在牛的自身中存在，不在『有牛』的人中。牛的相在牛的自身中存在，不在有牛的人中。因此，即使人與牛結合，『有牛』的人也不會變成牛，只有牛才是牛。如此，即使神與知結合，知的相在知自身中存在，神也不會變成知。你說神與情意塵結合，所以知覺產生。這個知覺能知曉色塵等。因此，只有知覺才能知曉，不是神能知曉。譬如火能燃燒，不是擁有火的人能燃燒。外道說：因為能使用法的緣故。人雖然有視覺，使用燈就能看見，離開燈就看不見。神雖然有能知的能力，使用知就能知曉，離開知就不能知曉。內道說：不對。知本身就是能知，所以才能知曉。因為情意塵結合，所以知覺產生。這個知覺能知曉色等諸塵。因此，知本身就是能知，不是被使用的工具。如果知本身就是能知，那神又有什麼用呢？燈的比喻是不對的。為什麼呢？因為燈不能知曉色等（事物）。燈雖然先存在，但不能知曉色等，因為它不是知的法。因此，只有知才能知曉色。如果不能知曉，就不稱為知。因此，縱然有能知的能力，那個能力又有什麼用呢？外道說：馬身結合，所以神被稱為馬。譬如神與馬身結合，所以神被稱為馬。神雖然與身體不同，也稱神為馬。如此，神與知結合，所以神被稱為知。內道說：不對。身體中的神不是馬。

【English Translation】 English version 'Self cannot understand itself' (Atman cannot understand Atman). Therefore, your analogy is incorrect. Furthermore, because of the absence of form (無相), form is not form because people can perceive it. Therefore, if form exists even when unseen, you consider that to be the characteristic of Atman (神). One should not regard the place of unknowing as knowing. To regard the place of unknowing as knowing is unreasonable. In your doctrine, perception has one meaning. The outsider says: The disciples of Ulluka (優樓迦), reciting the Vaisheshika Sutra (衛世師經), say that knowing and Atman are different. Therefore, Atman will not fall into impermanence, nor will it be without knowing. Why? Because Atman and knowing are combined. For example, a person with a cow (Gomata 修妒路), just as a person is combined with a cow, so the person is called 'having a cow'. Thus, Atman is combined with feelings, intentions, and dust (sensations, thoughts, and dust realms 情意塵), so Atman has knowing arising. Because Atman is combined with knowing, Atman is called 'having knowing'. The insider says: The characteristic of a cow resides within the cow itself, not within the person 'having a cow'. The characteristic of a cow resides within the cow itself, not within the person having a cow. Therefore, even if a person is combined with a cow, the person 'having a cow' will not become a cow; only the cow is a cow. Thus, even if Atman is combined with knowing, the characteristic of knowing resides within knowing itself; Atman will not become knowing. You say that Atman is combined with feelings, intentions, and dust, so knowing arises. This knowing can know color, dust, etc. Therefore, only knowing can know; it is not Atman that can know. For example, fire can burn; it is not the person possessing fire who can burn. The outsider says: Because of the ability to use the Dharma (能用法故). Although a person has sight, they can see by using a lamp; without a lamp, they cannot see. Although Atman has the ability to know, it can know by using knowing; without knowing, it cannot know. The insider says: That's not right. Knowing itself is the ability to know, so it can know. Because feelings, intentions, and dust are combined, knowing arises. This knowing can know color and other dusts. Therefore, knowing itself is the ability to know; it is not a tool to be used. If knowing itself is the ability to know, then what is the use of Atman? The analogy of the lamp is incorrect. Why? Because the lamp cannot know color and other things. Although the lamp exists first, it cannot know color and other things because it is not the Dharma of knowing. Therefore, only knowing can know color. If it cannot know, it is not called knowing. Therefore, even if there is the ability to know, what is the use of that ability? The outsider says: The body of a horse is combined, so Atman is called a horse. For example, Atman is combined with the body of a horse, so Atman is called a horse. Although Atman is different from the body, Atman is also called a horse. Thus, Atman is combined with knowing, so Atman is called knowing. The insider says: That's not right. The Atman in the body is not a horse.

(修妒路)。馬身即馬也。汝謂身與神異。則神與馬異。云何以神為馬。是故此喻非也。以神喻神。則墮負處。外曰。如黑疊(修妒路)。譬如黑疊。黑雖異疊。疊與黑合故名為黑疊。如是知雖異神神與知合故神名為知。內曰。若爾無神(修妒路)。若神與知合故神名為知。神應非神。何以故。我先說知即是能知。若知不名神。神亦不名能知。若他合故以他為名者。知與神合何不名知為神。又如先說黑疊喻者。自違汝經。汝經黑是求那。疊是陀羅驃。陀羅驃不作求那。求那不作陀羅驃。外曰。如有杖(修妒路)。譬如人與杖合故人名有杖。不但名杖。杖雖與人合。杖不名有人。亦不名人。如是神與知合故神名能知。不但名知。亦非是知。與神合故。知名為神。內曰。不然。有杖非杖(修妒路)。雖杖與有杖合有杖不為杖。如是知相知中非神中。是故神非能知。外曰。僧佉人復言。若知與神異。有如上過。我經中無如是過。所以者何。覺即神相故。我以覺相為神。是故常覺無不覺。內曰。雖已先破。今當更說。若覺相神不一(修妒路)。覺有種種苦樂覺等。若覺是神相。神應種種。外曰。不然。一為種種相。如頗梨(修妒路)。如一頗梨珠隨色而變。或青黃赤白等。如是一覺。隨塵別異。或覺苦或覺樂等覺雖種種相。實

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本 (修妒路，Sūtra)。馬的身軀就是馬。你說身和神是不同的，那麼神和馬也是不同的。怎麼能用神來代表馬呢？因此，這個比喻是不恰當的。如果用神來比喻神，那就自相矛盾了。外道辯駁說：就像黑色的布匹(修妒路，Sūtra)。比如黑色的布匹，黑色雖然不同於布匹，但布匹和黑色結合在一起，所以稱為黑色的布匹。同樣，知覺雖然不同於神，但神和知覺結合在一起，所以神被稱為知覺。內道反駁說：如果這樣，就沒有神了(修妒路，Sūtra)。如果神和知覺結合在一起，所以神被稱為知覺，那麼神就不應該是神了。為什麼呢？我先前說過，知覺就是能知。如果知覺不被稱為神，那麼神也不被稱為能知。如果因為和其他事物結合而以其他事物的名稱命名，那麼知覺和神結合，為什麼不稱知覺為神呢？又如先前所說的黑色布匹的比喻，這與你自己的經典相違背。你的經典中，黑色是求那（guna，屬性），布匹是陀羅驃（dravya，實體）。陀羅驃不能成為求那，求那也不能成為陀羅驃。外道辯駁說：就像有手杖的人(修妒路，Sūtra)。比如人和手杖結合在一起，所以人被稱為有手杖的人，但不僅僅是手杖。手杖雖然和人結合在一起，但手杖不被稱為有人，人也不被稱為手杖。同樣，神和知覺結合在一起，所以神被稱為能知，但不僅僅是知覺，也不是知覺。因為與神結合，所以知覺被稱為神。內道反駁說：不是這樣的。有手杖的人不是手杖(修妒路，Sūtra)。即使手杖和有手杖的人結合在一起，有手杖的人也不是手杖。同樣，知覺的相在知覺中，而不是在神中。因此，神不是能知。外道辯駁說：僧佉（Samkhya）派的人又說，如果知覺和神是不同的，就會有像上面一樣的過失。我的經典中沒有這樣的過失。為什麼呢？因為覺就是神的相，所以我以覺的相作為神。因此，神是常覺的，沒有不覺的時候。內道反駁說：雖然先前已經駁斥過了，現在再進一步說明。如果覺的相和神不是一體的(修妒路，Sūtra)。覺有種種，比如苦覺、樂覺等。如果覺是神的相，那麼神就應該是種種的。外道辯駁說：不是這樣的。一個是種種相，就像頗梨（sphatika，水晶）(修妒路，Sūtra)。就像一塊頗梨珠，隨著顏色的不同而變化，或者呈現青色、黃色、紅色、白色等。同樣，一個覺，隨著塵埃的不同而不同，或者覺察到痛苦，或者覺察到快樂等。覺雖然有種種相，但實際上是...

【English Translation】 English version (Sūtra). A horse's body is simply a horse. You say that the body and the spirit are different, then the spirit and the horse are also different. How can you use the spirit to represent the horse? Therefore, this metaphor is inappropriate. If you use the spirit to symbolize the spirit, then you contradict yourself. The heretic argues: Like a black cloth (Sūtra). For example, a black cloth, although the black color is different from the cloth, the cloth and the black color are combined together, so it is called a black cloth. Similarly, although perception is different from the spirit, the spirit and perception are combined together, so the spirit is called perception. The insider refutes: If so, there is no spirit (Sūtra). If the spirit and perception are combined together, so the spirit is called perception, then the spirit should not be the spirit. Why? I said earlier that perception is the ability to perceive. If perception is not called spirit, then spirit is not called the ability to perceive. If it is named after other things because it is combined with other things, then perception and spirit are combined, why not call perception spirit? Also, like the metaphor of the black cloth mentioned earlier, this contradicts your own scriptures. In your scriptures, black is guna (attribute), and cloth is dravya (substance). Dravya cannot become guna, and guna cannot become dravya. The heretic argues: Like a person with a staff (Sūtra). For example, a person and a staff are combined together, so the person is called a person with a staff, but not just a staff. Although the staff is combined with the person, the staff is not called a person with a staff, and the person is not called a staff. Similarly, the spirit and perception are combined together, so the spirit is called the ability to perceive, but not just perception, nor is it perception. Because it is combined with the spirit, perception is called spirit. The insider refutes: That's not right. A person with a staff is not a staff (Sūtra). Even if the staff and the person with a staff are combined together, the person with a staff is not a staff. Similarly, the aspect of perception is in perception, not in the spirit. Therefore, the spirit is not the ability to perceive. The heretic argues: The Samkhya school also says that if perception and spirit are different, there will be the same faults as above. There are no such faults in my scriptures. Why? Because awareness is the aspect of the spirit, so I take the aspect of awareness as the spirit. Therefore, the spirit is always aware, and there is no time when it is not aware. The insider refutes: Although it has been refuted before, I will explain it further now. If the aspect of awareness and the spirit are not one (Sūtra). There are various kinds of awareness, such as the awareness of suffering, the awareness of happiness, etc. If awareness is the aspect of the spirit, then the spirit should be various. The heretic argues: That's not right. One is various aspects, like sphatika (crystal) (Sūtra). Like a piece of sphatika, it changes with different colors, or appears blue, yellow, red, white, etc. Similarly, one awareness, different with different dusts, or perceives pain, or perceives happiness, etc. Although awareness has various aspects, it is actually...

是一覺。內曰。若爾罪福一相(修妒路)。若益他覺是名福。若損他覺是名罪。一切慧人心信是法。若益他覺損他覺是一者。應罪福一相。如施盜等亦應一。複次如珠。先有隨色而變。然覺共緣生。是故汝喻非也。複次珠新新生滅故。相則不一。汝言珠一者。是亦非也。外曰。不然。果雖多作者一。如陶師(修妒路)。如一陶師作瓶瓫等。非作者一故果便一也。如是一覺能作損益等業。內曰。陶師無別異(修妒路)。譬如陶師身一無異相。而與瓶瓫等異。然益他覺損他覺。實有異相。又損益等與覺不異。是故汝喻非也。外曰。實有神。比知相故(修妒路)。有物雖不可現知。以比相故知。如見人先去然後到彼。日月東出西沒。雖不見去。以到彼故知去。如是見諸求那依陀羅驃。以比知相故知有神。神知合故。神名能知。內曰。是事先已破。今當更說。不知非神(修妒路)。汝法神遍廣大而知少。若神知者。有處有時不知。是則非神。有處名身外。有時名身內。睡眠悶等是時不知。若神知相有處有時不知。是則非神。何以故。無知相故。汝以知相有神者。空無實也。外曰。行無故知無如煙(修妒路)。如煙是火相。炭時無煙。是時雖無煙而有火。如是知雖神相。若有知。若無知。神應常有。內曰。不然。神能知故(修妒

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：外道：是一覺（Eka-buddhi，單一覺知）。內道：如果這樣，罪和福就成了一個相（Eka-lakshana，單一相）。（修妒路，Sutra，經）內道：如果利益他人的覺知，這叫做福；如果損害他人的覺知，這叫做罪。一切有智慧的人都相信這個道理。如果利益他人的覺知和損害他人的覺知是同一個，那麼罪和福就應該是一個相。比如佈施和偷盜等也應該是一樣的。內道：再比如珠子，先有隨著顏色而變化的特性。然而覺知是共同因緣所生。所以你的比喻是不對的。內道：而且珠子是新新生滅的，所以相不是一樣的。你說珠子是一個，這也是不對的。外道：不是這樣的。果雖然多，但作者是一個。比如陶師（Kumbhakara，製陶者）。（修妒路，Sutra，經）外道：比如一個陶師製作瓶子、盆子等。不是因為作者是一個，果就變成一個。像這樣，一個覺知能作損害和利益等的業。內道：陶師沒有差別異（Naanaa-tva，多種性）。（修妒路，Sutra，經）內道：譬如陶師身體是一個，沒有不同的相，而與瓶子、盆子等不同。然而利益他人的覺知和損害他人的覺知，確實有不同的相。而且損害和利益等與覺知不是沒有差別。所以你的比喻是不對的。外道：確實有神我（Atman，靈魂），通過比知相（Anumaana，推論）可以知道。（修妒路，Sutra，經）外道：有些事物雖然不能直接看見，但可以通過比知相來知道。比如看見人先離開然後到達那裡。太陽和月亮從東邊升起，在西邊落下。雖然看不見離開的過程，但因為到達那裡，所以知道有離開。像這樣，看見諸求那（Guna，屬性）依附於陀羅驃（Dravya，實體），通過比知相，就知道有神我。神我和知結合在一起，神我就叫做能知者。內道：這件事先前已經破斥過了，現在應當再次說明。不知就不是神我。（修妒路，Sutra，經）內道：按照你的說法，神我遍佈廣大，但知道的卻很少。如果神我是能知者，那麼在某個地方、某個時間就應該有不知道的時候，這樣就不是神我了。某個地方指的是身體之外，某個時間指的是身體之內。睡眠、昏悶等就是不知道的時候。如果神我的知相在某個地方、某個時間不知道，那麼就不是神我。為什麼呢？因為沒有知相的緣故。你用知相來說有神我，這是空無實義的。外道：行為沒有了，所以知也沒有了，就像煙一樣。（修妒路，Sutra，經）外道：比如煙是火的相。燒成炭的時候沒有煙。這個時候雖然沒有煙，但有火。像這樣，知雖然是神我的相，但無論有知還是沒有知，神我應該常有。內道：不是這樣的。因為神我是能知者。（修妒路，Sutra，經）

【English Translation】 English version: Outsider: It is a single consciousness (Eka-buddhi). Insider: If so, sin and merit become a single characteristic (Eka-lakshana). (Sutra) Insider: If benefiting others' consciousness is called merit, and harming others' consciousness is called sin, all wise people believe in this principle. If benefiting others' consciousness and harming others' consciousness are the same, then sin and merit should be a single characteristic. For example, giving and stealing should also be the same. Insider: Furthermore, like a pearl, it first has the characteristic of changing with color. However, consciousness arises from shared conditions. Therefore, your analogy is incorrect. Insider: Moreover, the pearl is newly arising and ceasing, so the characteristics are not the same. Your saying that the pearl is one is also incorrect. Outsider: It is not like that. Although there are many results, the creator is one. Like a potter (Kumbhakara). (Sutra) Outsider: For example, one potter makes bottles, pots, etc. It is not because the creator is one that the results become one. In this way, one consciousness can perform actions of harming and benefiting, etc. Insider: The potter has no distinct differences (Naanaa-tva). (Sutra) Insider: For example, the potter's body is one, without different characteristics, but it is different from bottles, pots, etc. However, benefiting others' consciousness and harming others' consciousness indeed have different characteristics. Moreover, harming and benefiting, etc., are not without differences from consciousness. Therefore, your analogy is incorrect. Outsider: Indeed, there is a self (Atman), which can be known through inference (Anumaana). (Sutra) Outsider: Some things, although they cannot be directly seen, can be known through inference. For example, seeing a person leave first and then arrive there. The sun and moon rise in the east and set in the west. Although the process of leaving cannot be seen, because of arriving there, it is known that there is leaving. In this way, seeing the qualities (Guna) attached to the substance (Dravya), through inference, it is known that there is a self. The self and knowledge are combined together, and the self is called the knower. Insider: This matter has already been refuted before, and now it should be explained again. Not knowing is not the self. (Sutra) Insider: According to your statement, the self is vast and extensive, but knows very little. If the self is the knower, then there should be times and places where it does not know, and thus it is not the self. A certain place refers to outside the body, and a certain time refers to inside the body. Sleep, unconsciousness, etc., are times of not knowing. If the characteristic of the self's knowledge is not known in a certain place or at a certain time, then it is not the self. Why? Because there is no characteristic of knowing. Your using the characteristic of knowing to say there is a self is empty and without real meaning. Outsider: Action is gone, so knowledge is also gone, like smoke. (Sutra) Outsider: For example, smoke is a characteristic of fire. When it is burned into charcoal, there is no smoke. Although there is no smoke at this time, there is fire. In this way, although knowledge is a characteristic of the self, whether there is knowledge or no knowledge, the self should always exist. Insider: It is not like that. Because the self is the knower. (Sutra)

路)。若不知時。欲令有神者。神則不能知。亦無知相。所以者何。汝神無知時亦有神故。複次若無煙時。現見有火知有火。神若有知。若無知無能見者。是故汝喻非也。複次汝說見共相比知故有神。此亦非也。所以者何。見去者去法到彼故(修妒路)。若離去者無去法。離去法無去者。到彼如是見去者曰到彼必知有去法。若離神無知。是事不然。是故不應以知故知有神。不可見龜而有毛想。不可見石女而有兒想。如是不應見知便有神想。外曰。如手取(修妒路)。如手有時取。有時不取。不可以不取時不名為手。手常名手。神亦如是。有時知。有時不知。不可以不知時不名為神。神常名神。內曰。取非手相(修妒路)。取是手業非手相。何以故。不以取故知為手。汝以知即神相。此喻非也。外曰。定有神。覺苦樂故(修妒路)。若無覺者。則無覺身獨。不能覺苦樂。何以故。死人有身。不能覺苦樂。如是知有身者。能覺苦樂。此則為神。是故定有神。內曰。若惱亦斷(修妒路)。如刀害身。是時生惱。若刀害神。神亦有惱者。神亦應斷。外曰。不然。無觸故如空(修妒路)。神無觸故不可斷。如燒舍時。內空無觸故不可燒但有熱。如是斷身時。內神無觸故不可斷。但有惱。內曰。若爾無去(修妒路)。若神無觸。身

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：（外道：）如果不知道時間，想要讓神知道，神也不能知道，也沒有知道的相狀。為什麼呢？因為你的神在沒有知覺的時候也有神性存在。再者，如果沒有煙的時候，（人們）現在看見有火，就知道有火。如果神有知覺，或者沒有知覺，都沒有能見的能力，所以你的比喻是不對的。再者，你說看見共同相比就知道有神，這也是不對的。為什麼呢？看見是去者（能見者）的去法（作用），到達彼岸的緣故（經文）。如果離開去者就沒有去法，離開去法就沒有去者。到達彼岸也是這樣，看見去者說到達彼岸必定知道有去法。如果離開神就沒有知覺，這件事是不成立的。所以不應該因為有知覺就認為有神。不能因為看見烏龜就想像它有毛，不能因為看見石女就想像她有兒子。這樣，不應該因為看見知覺就想像有神的存在。（外道：）比如手取物（經文）。比如手有時取物，有時不取物，不可以因為不取物的時候就不叫手，手永遠叫手。神也是這樣，有時有知覺，有時沒有知覺，不可以因為沒有知覺的時候就不叫神，神永遠叫神。（內道：）取物不是手的相狀（經文）。取物是手的行為，不是手的相狀。為什麼呢？不能因為取物就知道是手。你認為知覺就是神的相狀，這個比喻是不對的。（外道：）一定有神，因為能感覺到苦樂（經文）。如果沒有感覺者，就沒有能感覺苦樂的身體。為什麼呢？死人有身體，卻不能感覺苦樂。這樣，知道有身體的人，才能感覺苦樂，這就是神。所以一定有神。（內道：）如果惱害也能斷絕（經文）。比如刀傷害身體，這時產生惱害。如果刀傷害神，神也有惱害的話，神也應該被斬斷。（外道：）不是這樣的，因為沒有觸覺，像虛空一樣（經文）。神沒有觸覺，所以不可斬斷。比如燒房子的時候，裡面的空間沒有觸覺，所以不可燒，但有熱。這樣，斬斷身體的時候，裡面的神沒有觸覺，所以不可斬斷，但有惱害。（內道：）如果這樣，就沒有去處（經文）。如果神沒有觸覺，身體

【English Translation】 English version: (The Outsider:) If one does not know the time, and wants to make the spirit know, the spirit also cannot know, and has no appearance of knowing. Why is that? Because your spirit also has spirit even when it has no awareness. Furthermore, if there is no smoke, (people) now see that there is fire, and know that there is fire. If the spirit has awareness, or has no awareness, it has no ability to see, so your analogy is not correct. Furthermore, you say that seeing together and comparing, one knows that there is a spirit, this is also not correct. Why is that? Seeing is the going-dharma (function) of the goer (seer), because it reaches the other shore (Sutra). If one separates from the goer, there is no going-dharma; if one separates from the going-dharma, there is no goer. Reaching the other shore is also like this, seeing the goer say that reaching the other shore certainly knows that there is going-dharma. If one separates from the spirit, there is no awareness, this matter is not established. Therefore, one should not think that there is a spirit because there is awareness. One cannot imagine that a tortoise has hair because one sees a tortoise; one cannot imagine that a stone woman has a son. Like this, one should not imagine that there is a spirit because one sees awareness. (The Outsider:) For example, the hand takes (Sutra). For example, the hand sometimes takes things, and sometimes does not take things; one cannot not call it a hand when it does not take things, the hand is always called a hand. The spirit is also like this, sometimes it has awareness, sometimes it has no awareness; one cannot not call it a spirit when it has no awareness, the spirit is always called a spirit. (The Insider:) Taking is not the characteristic of the hand (Sutra). Taking is the action of the hand, not the characteristic of the hand. Why is that? One cannot know that it is a hand because it takes things. You think that awareness is the characteristic of the spirit, this analogy is not correct. (The Outsider:) There is certainly a spirit, because one can feel suffering and joy (Sutra). If there is no feeler, there is no body that can feel suffering and joy. Why is that? A dead person has a body, but cannot feel suffering and joy. Like this, the person who knows that there is a body can feel suffering and joy, this is the spirit. Therefore, there is certainly a spirit. (The Insider:) If harm can also be cut off (Sutra). For example, a knife harms the body, at this time suffering arises. If a knife harms the spirit, and the spirit also has suffering, then the spirit should also be cut off. (The Outsider:) It is not like this, because it has no touch, like emptiness (Sutra). The spirit has no touch, so it cannot be cut off. For example, when burning a house, the space inside has no touch, so it cannot be burned, but there is heat. Like this, when cutting off the body, the spirit inside has no touch, so it cannot be cut off, but there is suffering. (The Insider:) If that is so, there is no going (Sutra). If the spirit has no touch, the body

不應到余處。何以故。去法從思惟生。從身動生。身無思惟。非覺法故。神無動力。非身法故。如是身不應到余處。外曰。如盲跛(修妒路)。譬如盲跛相假能去。如是神有思惟。身有動力。和合而去。內曰。異相故(修妒路)。如盲跛。二觸二思惟故法應能去。身神無二事故不應去。是故無去法。若不爾有如上斷過。複次汝謂空熱。此事不然。何以故。空無觸故。微熱遍空。身觸覺熱非空熱也。但假言空熱。外曰。如舍主惱(修妒路)。如燒舍時。舍主惱而不燒。如是身斷時。神但惱而不斷。內曰。不然。無常故燒(修妒路)。舍燒時。草木等無常故。亦燒亦熱。空常故不燒不熱。如是身無常故。亦惱亦斷。神常故不惱不斷。複次舍主遠火故不應燒。汝經言。神遍滿故。亦應斷壞。外曰。必有神取色等故(修妒路)。五情不能知五塵。非知法故。是故知神能知。神用眼等。知色等諸塵。如人以鐮收刈五穀。內曰。何不用耳見(修妒路)。若神見有力。何不用耳見色。如火能燒。處處皆燒。又如人或時無鐮手亦能斷。又如舍有六向。人居其內所在能見。神亦如是。處處應見。外曰。不然。所用定故。如陶師(修妒路)。神雖有見力。然眼等所伺不同。于塵各定故。不能用耳見色。如陶師雖能作瓶。離泥不能作。如是神

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本不應該到其他地方去。為什麼呢？因為『去』這種行為是從思惟產生的，是從身體的動作產生的。身體本身沒有思惟能力，因為它不是能覺知的法。神識沒有動力，因為它不是身體的法。因此，身體不應該到其他地方去。外道辯駁說：就像盲人和跛子（修妒路）。譬如盲人和跛子互相依靠才能行走。同樣，神識有思惟，身體有動力，兩者結合才能去。內道反駁說：因為他們的狀態不同（修妒路）。就像盲人和跛子，兩者都有觸覺和思惟，所以才能行走。身體和神識沒有共同的作用，所以不應該能去。因此，沒有『去』這種行為。如果不是這樣，就會有像上面所說的斷滅的過失。再者，你所說的『空熱』，這件事是不成立的。為什麼呢？因為空沒有觸覺。微熱遍佈于空間，身體所觸覺到的熱不是空的熱。只是假借言說為空熱。外道辯駁說：就像房子的主人感到煩惱（修妒路）。就像房子被燒燬時，房子的主人感到煩惱但沒有被燒燬。同樣，身體斷滅時，神識只是感到煩惱而沒有斷滅。內道反駁說：不是這樣的，因為無常所以被燒燬（修妒路）。房子被燒燬時，草木等因為無常，所以既被燒燬又感到熱。空是常住的，所以不會被燒燬也不會感到熱。同樣，身體因為無常，所以既感到煩惱又會斷滅。神識是常住的，所以不會感到煩惱也不會斷滅。再者，房子的主人遠離火，所以不應該被燒燬。你的經典說，神識遍滿一切處，也應該被斷滅和破壞。外道辯駁說：必定有神識去取色等（修妒路）。五種感官不能感知五塵，因為它們不是能知覺的法。因此，能知覺的是神識。神識通過眼睛等感官，來感知色等各種塵境，就像人用鐮刀收割五穀。內道反駁說：為什麼不用耳朵去看（修妒路）？如果神識的見聞能力很強，為什麼不用耳朵去看顏色？就像火能燃燒，到處都能燃燒。又像人有時沒有鐮刀，用手也能折斷。又像房子有六個方向，人住在裡面，無論在哪裡都能看到。神識也應該是這樣，在任何地方都能看到。外道辯駁說：不是這樣的，因為作用是固定的。就像陶師（修妒路）。神識雖然有見的能力，但眼睛等感官所司掌的不同，對於塵境各有固定，所以不能用耳朵去看顏色。就像陶師雖然能製作瓶子，但離開了泥土就不能製作。神識也是這樣。

【English Translation】 English version One should not go to other places. Why? Because the act of 'going' arises from thought and from the movement of the body. The body itself has no capacity for thought, as it is not a conscious dharma. The spirit has no motive force, as it is not a bodily dharma. Therefore, the body should not go to other places. The outsider argues: It is like a blind man and a lame man (Sutra). For example, a blind man and a lame man can go places by relying on each other. Similarly, the spirit has thought, and the body has motive force; they can go together by combining. The insider refutes: Because their states are different (Sutra). Like a blind man and a lame man, both have touch and thought, so they can go. The body and the spirit have no common function, so they should not be able to go. Therefore, there is no such thing as 'going.' If it were not so, there would be the fault of annihilation as mentioned above. Furthermore, what you call 'empty heat' is not valid. Why? Because emptiness has no touch. Slight heat pervades space, and the heat felt by the body is not the heat of emptiness. It is merely a metaphorical expression of empty heat. The outsider argues: It is like the master of the house being troubled (Sutra). Just as when a house is burned down, the master of the house is troubled but not burned down. Similarly, when the body is destroyed, the spirit is only troubled but not destroyed. The insider refutes: It is not so, because it is impermanent that it is burned (Sutra). When a house is burned, grass and trees, etc., are burned and feel hot because they are impermanent. Emptiness is permanent, so it is neither burned nor feels hot. Similarly, the body is troubled and destroyed because it is impermanent. The spirit is permanent, so it is neither troubled nor destroyed. Furthermore, the master of the house is far from the fire, so he should not be burned. Your scripture says that the spirit pervades everywhere, so it should also be destroyed and ruined. The outsider argues: There must be a spirit that takes color, etc. (Sutra). The five senses cannot perceive the five dusts because they are not conscious dharmas. Therefore, it is the spirit that can perceive. The spirit uses the eyes and other senses to perceive various dusts such as color, just as a person uses a sickle to harvest grain. The insider refutes: Why not use the ears to see (Sutra)? If the spirit's ability to see and hear is strong, why not use the ears to see colors? Just as fire can burn, it can burn everywhere. Also, just as a person can break things with his hands even without a sickle, and just as a house has six directions, and a person living inside can see from anywhere, so should the spirit be able to see from anywhere. The outsider argues: It is not so, because the function is fixed. Like a potter (Sutra). Although the spirit has the ability to see, the eyes and other senses have different functions, and each is fixed for a particular dust, so it cannot use the ears to see colors. Just as a potter can make a pot but cannot make it without clay, so is the spirit.

雖有見力。非眼不能見。內曰。若爾盲(修妒路)。若神用眼見。則神與眼異。神與眼異。則神無眼。神無眼云何見。汝陶師喻者。是亦不然。所以者何。離泥更無有瓶。泥即為瓶。而眼色異故。外曰。有神異情動故(修妒路)。若無神者。何故見他食果。口中生涎。如是不應以眼知味。有眼者能知。複次一物眼身知故(修妒路)。如人眼先識瓶等。闇中雖不用眼。身觸亦知。是故知有神。內曰。如盲。修妒路中已破。複次若眼見他食果。而口生涎者。餘情何以不動。身亦如是。外曰。如人燒(修妒路)。譬如人雖能燒。離火不能燒。神亦如是。用眼能見。離眼不能見。內曰。火燒(修妒路)。言人燒者。是則妄語。何以故。人無燒相。火自能燒。如風動木。相揩生火。焚燒山澤。無有作者。是故火自能燒。非人燒也。外曰。如意(修妒路)。如死人雖有眼無意故。神則不見。若有意神則見。如是神用眼見。離眼不見。內曰。若有意能知。無意不能知者。但意行眼等門中便知。神復何用。外曰。意不自知。若意意相知。此則無窮。我神一故。以神知意非無窮也。內曰。神亦神(修妒路)。若神知意。誰復知神。若神知神。是亦無窮。我法以現在意知過去意。意法無常故無咎。外曰。云何除神(修妒路)。若除神云何但

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本雖有視覺能力，但沒有眼睛就不能看見。外道辯論說：『如果這樣，那麼盲人（修妒路，Sutra，經）又怎麼解釋？如果神通過眼睛來看，那麼神和眼睛是不同的。神和眼睛不同，那麼神就沒有眼睛。神沒有眼睛，又怎麼能看見呢？你用陶工的比喻，也是不恰當的。為什麼呢？因為離開泥土就沒有瓶子，泥土就是瓶子。而眼睛和顏色是不同的。』外道辯論說：『因為有神異的情感在活動（修妒路）。如果沒有神，為什麼看見別人吃水果，口中會流口水呢？這樣不應該用眼睛來知味道。有眼睛的人才能知道。』又說：『因為一個東西，眼睛和身體都能知道（修妒路）。比如人眼睛先認識瓶子等等，在黑暗中雖然不用眼睛，身體觸控也能知道。所以知道有神。』內道辯論說：『像盲人的情況，在修妒路中已經駁斥過了。』又說：『如果眼睛看見別人吃水果，而口中流口水，那麼其他的情感為什麼不動呢？身體也是這樣。』外道辯論說：『就像人燒東西（修妒路）。』譬如人雖然能燒東西，離開火就不能燒。神也是這樣，用眼睛能看見，離開眼睛就不能看見。內道辯論說：『火燒（修妒路）。』說人燒東西，那就是妄語。為什麼呢？因為人沒有燒的相狀。火自己能燒。像風吹動樹木，互相摩擦生火，焚燒山澤，沒有作者。所以火自己能燒，不是人燒的。外道辯論說：『如意（修妒路）。』像死人雖然有眼睛，因為沒有意，神就不能看見。如果有意，神就能看見。這樣神用眼睛看見，離開眼睛就不能看見。內道辯論說：『如果用意能知道，沒有意就不能知道，那麼只要意在眼睛等感官的門中活動就能知道，神又有什麼用呢？』外道辯論說：『意不能自己知道。如果意和意互相知道，這就無窮無盡了。我的神是唯一的，用神來知道意，就不是無窮無盡的。』內道辯論說：『神也需要神來認知（修妒路）。』如果神知道意，誰又來知道神呢？如果神知道神，這也是無窮無盡的。我的佛法用現在的意來知道過去的意，意的法則是無常的，所以沒有過失。外道辯論說：『如何去除神（修妒路）？如果去除神，為什麼只……』

【English Translation】 English version Although there is the power of sight, one cannot see without eyes. The heretic argues: 'If that's the case, how do you explain the blind (Sutra)? If the spirit sees through the eyes, then the spirit and the eyes are different. If the spirit and the eyes are different, then the spirit has no eyes. If the spirit has no eyes, how can it see? Your analogy of the potter is also inappropriate. Why? Because there is no pot without clay; clay is the pot. But the eyes and colors are different.' The heretic argues: 'Because there is the activity of a divine emotion (Sutra). If there is no spirit, why does saliva flow in the mouth when seeing others eat fruit? It shouldn't be that the eyes know the taste. Only those with eyes can know.' Furthermore, 'Because one thing can be known by both the eyes and the body (Sutra). For example, the eyes first recognize a bottle, etc. Even in the dark, although the eyes are not used, the body can know through touch. Therefore, it is known that there is a spirit.' The Buddhist argues: 'The case of the blind has already been refuted in the Sutra.' Furthermore, 'If the eyes see others eating fruit and saliva flows in the mouth, why don't other emotions move? The same is true for the body.' The heretic argues: 'Like a person burning something (Sutra).' For example, although a person can burn something, they cannot burn without fire. The spirit is the same; it can see with the eyes, but cannot see without the eyes. The Buddhist argues: 'Fire burns (Sutra).' Saying that a person burns something is false. Why? Because a person has no characteristic of burning. Fire can burn itself. Like wind moving trees, rubbing against each other to create fire, burning mountains and marshes, there is no author. Therefore, fire can burn itself, not a person. The heretic argues: 'As intended (Sutra).' Like a dead person, although they have eyes, the spirit cannot see because there is no intention. If there is intention, the spirit can see. Thus, the spirit sees with the eyes, but cannot see without the eyes. The Buddhist argues: 'If one can know with intention, and cannot know without intention, then as long as the intention acts in the doors of the senses such as the eyes, one can know. What use is the spirit then?' The heretic argues: 'Intention cannot know itself. If intention and intention know each other, this is endless. My spirit is unique; using the spirit to know intention is not endless.' The Buddhist argues: 'The spirit also needs a spirit to know it (Sutra).' If the spirit knows intention, who knows the spirit? If the spirit knows the spirit, this is also endless. My Dharma uses the present intention to know the past intention. The Dharma of intention is impermanent, so there is no fault. The heretic argues: 'How to remove the spirit (Sutra)? If the spirit is removed, why only...'

意知諸塵。內曰。如火熱相(修妒路)。譬如火熱。無有作者。火性自熱。無有不熱之火。如是意是知相。雖復離神性知故能知。神知異故神不應知。外曰。應有神宿習念相續故。生時憂喜行(修妒路)。如小兒生。便知行憂喜等事。無有教者。以先世宿習憶念相續故。今世還為種種業。是故知有神亦常相。內曰。遍云何念(修妒路)。神常遍諸塵。無不念時。念從何生。複次若念一切處生。念亦應遍一切處。如是一切處應一時念。若念分分處生。神則有分。有分故無常。複次若神無知。若知非神。此事先已破。外曰。合故念生(修妒路)。若神意合。以勢發故念生。何以故。神意雖合。勢不發者。則念不生。內曰。雖先已破。今當重說。神若知相。不應生念。若非知相。亦不應生念。複次若念知(修妒路)。若念生是時知。若念不生。是時不知。應念即是知。神復何用。外曰。應有神。左見右識故(修妒路)。如人先左眼見。后右眼識。不應彼見此識。以內有神故。左見右識。內曰。共答二眼(修妒路)。分知不名知。複次若爾無知。複次遍云何念。複次若念知。複次何不用耳見。複次若爾盲。複次如左眼見。不應右眼識。神亦不應此分見彼分識。是故不應以左眼見。右眼識故。便有神。外曰。念屬神故神知(修妒

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本內（佛教辯論者）：意（manas，第六意識）識知諸塵（visaya，感官對像）。如經文所說：『如火有熱相（tejo-dhatu，火界）。』譬如火的熱性，並非由誰創造，而是火的本性使然，沒有不熱的火。同樣，意的本性是識知，即使它與神我（atman）分離，也能識知。因為神我的識知與意不同，所以神我不應具有識知能力。外（非佛教辯論者）：應有神我，因為有宿習（vasana，習氣）和念（smrti，記憶）的相續。如經文所說：『出生時有憂喜行（samskara，行）。』例如，小孩子出生后，自然知道憂愁、喜悅等情緒，無需他人教導。這是因為前世的宿習和憶念相續，導致今世產生種種行為。因此，可知有神我，且神我是常相（nitya，永恒）的。內：神我如何產生念？如果神我普遍存在於所有塵境中，無時無刻不在念，那麼念從何處產生？進一步說，如果念在所有地方同時產生，那麼念也應普遍存在於所有地方。這樣，所有地方的事物應同時被唸到。如果念在不同的地方分部分產生，那麼神我就是有部分的。有部分就意味著無常（anitya，非永恒）。此外，如果神我沒有知覺，或者知覺不是神我的屬性，這些問題之前已經辯駁過了。外：神我與意結合，產生念。當神我與意結合，其力量發動時，念就產生了。為什麼呢？因為即使神我與意結合，如果力量沒有發動，念就不會產生。內：雖然之前已經辯駁過，現在我將再次說明。如果神我是知覺的，就不應產生念。如果神我不是知覺的，也不應產生念。進一步說，如果念是知（jnana，知識），那麼念產生時就是知，念不產生時就是不知。這樣，念本身就是知，那還需要神我做什麼呢？外：應有神我，因為左眼所見，右眼能識。如經文所說：『左見右識。』例如，人先用左眼看，然後用右眼識別。不應是左眼所見，右眼卻能識別，因為內在有神我，所以左眼所見，右眼才能識別。內：兩個眼睛共同回答。分別的知覺不能稱為知。進一步說，如果這樣，那就等於沒有知覺。進一步說，神我如何產生念？進一步說，為什麼不用耳朵看？進一步說，如果這樣，那就是盲人。進一步說，正如左眼所見，右眼不應識別。神我也不應是這部分看見，那部分識別。因此，不應因為左眼所見，右眼識別，就認為有神我。外：念屬於神我，所以神我具有知覺。

【English Translation】 English version Inner (Buddhist debater): The mind (manas, the sixth consciousness) cognizes all objects (visaya, sense objects). As the sutra says: 'Like the hot nature of fire (tejo-dhatu, fire element).' For example, the heat of fire is not created by anyone, but it is the nature of fire itself; there is no fire that is not hot. Similarly, the nature of the mind is cognition; even if it is separate from the self (atman), it can still cognize. Because the self's cognition is different from the mind's, the self should not have the ability to cognize. Outer (Non-Buddhist debater): There should be a self because there is a continuity of latent tendencies (vasana, habits) and memory (smrti, recollection). As the sutra says: 'At birth, there are tendencies of sorrow and joy (samskara, formations).' For example, when a child is born, it naturally knows emotions such as sorrow and joy without being taught. This is because of the continuity of latent tendencies and recollections from previous lives, which leads to various actions in this life. Therefore, it can be known that there is a self, and the self is eternal (nitya, permanent). Inner: How does the self generate memory? If the self is universally present in all objects and is constantly remembering, then where does memory arise from? Furthermore, if memory arises simultaneously in all places, then memory should also be universally present in all places. In this way, things in all places should be remembered at the same time. If memory arises in different places in parts, then the self is partial. Being partial means being impermanent (anitya, non-eternal). Moreover, if the self has no awareness, or if awareness is not an attribute of the self, these issues have been debated before. Outer: The self combines with the mind to generate memory. When the self combines with the mind, and its power is activated, memory arises. Why? Because even if the self combines with the mind, if the power is not activated, memory will not arise. Inner: Although it has been debated before, I will explain it again. If the self is conscious, it should not generate memory. If the self is not conscious, it should not generate memory either. Furthermore, if memory is knowledge (jnana, wisdom), then when memory arises, it is knowledge, and when memory does not arise, it is not knowledge. In this way, memory itself is knowledge, so what is the need for the self? Outer: There should be a self because what the left eye sees, the right eye can recognize. As the sutra says: 'The left sees, the right recognizes.' For example, a person first sees with the left eye and then recognizes with the right eye. It should not be that what the left eye sees, the right eye can recognize, because there is a self within, so what the left eye sees, the right eye can recognize. Inner: The two eyes answer together. Separate perception cannot be called knowledge. Furthermore, if that's the case, then it's equivalent to having no knowledge. Furthermore, how does the self generate memory? Furthermore, why not use the ears to see? Furthermore, if that's the case, then it's a blind person. Furthermore, just as what the left eye sees, the right eye should not recognize. The self should also not be that this part sees and that part recognizes. Therefore, it should not be assumed that there is a self because what the left eye sees, the right eye recognizes. Outer: Memory belongs to the self, so the self has awareness.

路)。念名神法。是念神中生。是故神用念知。內曰。不然。分知不名知(修妒路)。若神一分處知生。神則分知。若神分知。神不名知。外曰。神知非分知。何以故。神雖分知。神名知。如身業(修妒路)。譬如身份手有所作名為身作。如是神雖分知。神名知。內曰。若爾無知(修妒路)。汝法神遍意少。神意合故神知生。是知與意等少。若以少知神名知者。汝何不言以多不知故神名不知。又汝身業喻者。此事不然。何以故。分有分一異不可得故。外曰。如衣分燒(修妒路)。譬如衣一分燒名為燒衣。如是神雖一分知。名為神知。內曰。燒亦如是(修妒路)。若衣一分燒。不名為燒。應名分燒。汝以一分燒故衣名燒者。今多不燒應名不燒。何以故。是衣多不燒。實有用故。是以莫著語言。

破一品第三

外曰。應有神。有一瓶等。神所有故(修妒路)。若有神則有神所有。若無神則無神所有。有一瓶等是神所有故有神。內曰。不然。何以故。神已不可得故。今思惟有一瓶等。若以一有。若以異有。二俱有過。外曰。有一瓶等。若以一有。有何過。內曰。若有一瓶一。如一一切成。若不成。若顛倒(修妒路)。若有一瓶一者。如因陀羅釋迦憍尸迦。其有因陀羅處。則有釋迦憍尸迦。如是隨有處則有一瓶。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：外道說：唸誦神的名字的方法，是從唸誦神的過程中產生的。因此，神通過唸誦來認知。內道說：不對。部分認知不能稱為認知（修妒路，sūtra）。如果神的一部分產生認知，那麼神就是部分認知。如果神是部分認知，那麼神就不能稱為認知。外道說：神的認知不是部分認知。為什麼呢？因為神雖然是部分認知，但仍然可以稱為認知，就像身體的活動（修妒路，sūtra）。譬如身體的一部分，手有所動作，就稱為身體的動作。同樣，神雖然是部分認知，仍然可以稱為神的認知。內道說：如果這樣，那就是無知（修妒路，sūtra）。你們的法認為神是普遍的，但意念是少的。神和意念結合，神的認知才產生。那麼這種認知就和意念一樣是少的。如果因為有少許認知就稱神為認知，那麼你們為什麼不說因為有更多的不認知，所以神應該被稱為不認知呢？而且你們用身體的活動來比喻，這件事是不對的。為什麼呢？因為部分、有部分、單一、差異，這些都是不可得的。外道說：就像衣服的一部分被燒（修妒路，sūtra）。譬如衣服的一部分被燒，就稱為燒衣服。同樣，神雖然一部分認知，就稱為神的認知。內道說：燒也是這樣（修妒路，sūtra）。如果衣服的一部分被燒，不能稱為燒衣服，應該稱為部分燒。你們因為一部分被燒就稱衣服為燒，那麼現在大部分沒有被燒，應該稱為沒有燒。為什麼呢？因為這件衣服大部分沒有被燒，實際上還有用處。所以不要執著于語言。破一品第三外道說：應該有神，因為有一瓶等事物，是神所擁有的（修妒路，sūtra）。如果有神，那麼就有神所擁有的事物。如果沒有神，那麼就沒有神所擁有的事物。有一瓶等事物是神所擁有的，所以有神。內道說：不對。為什麼呢？因為神已經不可得了。現在思考有一瓶等事物，如果以『一』的方式存在，或者以『異』的方式存在，兩種情況都有過失。外道說：有一瓶等事物，如果以『一』的方式存在，有什麼過失？內道說：如果有一瓶是一體的，那麼就像因陀羅（Indra，帝釋天）、釋迦（Śakra，能天帝釋）、憍尸迦（Kauśika，因陀羅的別名），凡是有因陀羅的地方，就有釋迦和憍尸迦。同樣，無論什麼地方有，就有一瓶。

【English Translation】 English version: Outsider: The method of reciting the name of a deity arises from the process of reciting the deity's name. Therefore, the deity uses recitation to know. Insider: That's not right. Partial knowing cannot be called knowing (sūtra). If a part of the deity generates knowing, then the deity is partial knowing. If the deity is partial knowing, then the deity cannot be called knowing. Outsider: The deity's knowing is not partial knowing. Why? Because even though the deity is partial knowing, it is still called knowing, like the actions of the body (sūtra). For example, if a part of the body, the hand, performs an action, it is called an action of the body. Similarly, even though the deity is partial knowing, it is still called the deity's knowing. Insider: If that's the case, then it is ignorance (sūtra). Your doctrine holds that the deity is pervasive, but the mind is limited. The deity and the mind combine, and then the deity's knowing arises. Then this knowing is as limited as the mind. If you call the deity knowing because of a little knowing, then why don't you say that because there is more not-knowing, the deity should be called not-knowing? Moreover, your analogy of the actions of the body is not correct. Why? Because part, having part, oneness, difference, these are all unattainable. Outsider: Like a part of a garment being burned (sūtra). For example, if a part of a garment is burned, it is called burning the garment. Similarly, even though the deity knows in part, it is called the deity's knowing. Insider: Burning is also like that (sūtra). If a part of a garment is burned, it should not be called burning the garment, it should be called partial burning. If you call the garment burned because a part is burned, then now that most of it is not burned, it should be called not burned. Why? Because most of this garment is not burned, and it is actually useful. Therefore, do not cling to language. Chapter 3: Refuting Oneness Outsider: There should be a deity, because there are things like a pot, which are possessed by the deity (sūtra). If there is a deity, then there are things possessed by the deity. If there is no deity, then there are no things possessed by the deity. There are things like a pot, which are possessed by the deity, so there is a deity. Insider: That's not right. Why? Because the deity is already unattainable. Now consider things like a pot, if they exist in a 'one' way, or if they exist in a 'different' way, both cases have faults. Outsider: If things like a pot exist in a 'one' way, what fault is there? Insider: If a pot is one, then like Indra (帝釋天), Śakra (能天帝釋), Kauśika (因陀羅的別名), wherever there is Indra, there is Śakra and Kauśika. Similarly, wherever there is existence, there is a pot.

隨一處則有有瓶。隨瓶處則有有一。若爾衣等諸物亦應是瓶。有一瓶一故。如是其有一物皆應是瓶。今瓶衣等物悉應是一。複次有常故一瓶亦應常。複次若說有則說一瓶。複次一是數。有瓶。亦應是數。複次若瓶五身。有一亦應五身。若瓶有形有對。有一亦應有形有對。若瓶無常。有一亦應無常。是名如一一切成。若處處有。是中無瓶。今處處瓶是亦無瓶。有不異故。複次事事有。不是瓶。今瓶則非瓶。有不異故。複次若說有。不攝一瓶。今說一瓶。亦不應攝一瓶。有不異故。複次若有非瓶。瓶亦非瓶。有不異故。是名如一一切不成。若欲說瓶應說有。欲說有應說瓶。複次汝瓶成故。有一亦成。若有一成故瓶亦應成。以一故是名如一一切顛倒(此中四紙辯名字無可傳譯)。外曰。物有一故無過(修妒路)。物是有。亦是一。是故若有瓶處必有有一。非有一處皆是瓶。複次若說瓶。當知已攝有一。非說有一必攝瓶。內曰。瓶有二。何故二無瓶(修妒路)。若有一瓶一。何故有一處無瓶。複次云何說有一不攝瓶。外曰。瓶中瓶有定故(修妒路)。瓶中瓶有與瓶不異。而異於衣物等。是故在在處瓶。是中有瓶有。亦在在處瓶有。是中有瓶非在在有處有瓶。內曰。不然。瓶有不異故(修妒路)。有是總相。何以故。若說有則信

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本隨處都有『有瓶』（既存在瓶子這件事）。隨著瓶子的存在，就存在『一』（既數量為一）。如果這樣，衣服等其他事物也應該成為瓶子，因為它們也『有一』。像這樣，凡是『有一』的事物都應該成為瓶子。那麼，現在瓶子、衣服等事物都應該成為同一個東西。再者，因為『有』是常，所以『一瓶』也應該是常。再者，如果說『有』，就應該說『一瓶』。再者，『一』是個數字，那麼『有瓶』也應該是個數字。再者，如果瓶子有五蘊之身，那麼『一』也應該有五蘊之身。如果瓶子有形狀、有對礙，那麼『一』也應該有形狀、有對礙。如果瓶子是無常的，那麼『一』也應該是無常的。這叫做『如一一切成』。如果處處都有『有』，那麼任何地方都沒有瓶子。現在處處都有瓶子，那麼實際上也沒有瓶子，因為『有』是不變的。再者，事物都有『有』，但事物不是瓶子，那麼瓶子就不是瓶子，因為『有』是不變的。再者，如果說『有』，不能涵蓋『一瓶』，那麼現在說『一瓶』，也不應該涵蓋『一瓶』，因為『有』是不變的。再者，如果『有』不是瓶子，那麼瓶子也不是瓶子，因為『有』是不變的。這叫做『如一一切不成』。如果想要說瓶子，就應該說『有』；想要說『有』，就應該說瓶子。再者，因為你的瓶子成立，所以『一』也成立。如果『一』成立，那麼瓶子也應該成立。因為『一』的緣故，這叫做『如一一切顛倒』（這裡四紙辯論名字，無法翻譯）。外道說：事物『有一』沒有過失（修妒路(Sutra，經)）。事物是『有』，也是『一』。因此，如果存在瓶子的地方，必定存在『有一』。但存在『有一』的地方，不一定都是瓶子。再者，如果說瓶子，應當知道已經包含了『有一』。但說『有一』，不一定包含瓶子。內道說：瓶子有二，為什麼二沒有瓶子（修妒路(Sutra，經)）？如果『有一瓶』，那麼『一』。為什麼『有一』的地方沒有瓶子？再者，為什麼說『有一』不包含瓶子？外道說：瓶中之『有』是確定的（修妒路(Sutra，經)）。瓶中之『有』與瓶子沒有區別，但與衣服等事物不同。因此，在任何地方存在瓶子，那麼這個地方就存在『有』。也存在任何地方有瓶子，這個地方就有瓶子，而不是任何地方有『有』的地方就有瓶子。內道說：不是這樣的。因為『有』與瓶子沒有區別（修妒路(Sutra，經)）。『有』是總相。為什麼這麼說？如果說『有』，就相信『有』。

【English Translation】 English version Wherever there is 'having a bottle' (meaning the existence of a bottle), there is 'one' (meaning a quantity of one). If so, clothes and other things should also be bottles, because they also 'have one'. Like this, everything that 'has one' should become a bottle. Then, now bottles, clothes, and other things should all be the same thing. Furthermore, because 'having' is constant, 'one bottle' should also be constant. Furthermore, if you say 'having', you should say 'one bottle'. Furthermore, 'one' is a number, so 'having a bottle' should also be a number. Furthermore, if a bottle has the five skandhas (five aggregates of clinging), then 'one' should also have the five skandhas. If a bottle has shape and resistance, then 'one' should also have shape and resistance. If a bottle is impermanent, then 'one' should also be impermanent. This is called 'as one, everything becomes'. If 'having' is everywhere, then there is no bottle anywhere. Now that bottles are everywhere, there is actually no bottle, because 'having' is unchanging. Furthermore, things have 'having', but things are not bottles, so bottles are not bottles, because 'having' is unchanging. Furthermore, if saying 'having' does not cover 'one bottle', then saying 'one bottle' now should also not cover 'one bottle', because 'having' is unchanging. Furthermore, if 'having' is not a bottle, then a bottle is also not a bottle, because 'having' is unchanging. This is called 'as one, nothing becomes'. If you want to say bottle, you should say 'having'; if you want to say 'having', you should say bottle. Furthermore, because your bottle is established, 'one' is also established. If 'one' is established, then the bottle should also be established. Because of 'one', this is called 'as one, everything is reversed' (the debate about names on these four papers cannot be translated). The outsider says: There is no fault in things 'having one' (Sutra (Sutra, scripture)). Things 'have', and are also 'one'. Therefore, if there is a place where there is a bottle, there must be 'having one'. But where there is 'having one', it is not necessarily all bottles. Furthermore, if you say bottle, you should know that it already includes 'having one'. But saying 'having one' does not necessarily include bottle. The insider says: There are two bottles, why are there no bottles in two (Sutra (Sutra, scripture))? If 'having one bottle', then 'one'. Why is there no bottle where there is 'having one'? Furthermore, why does saying 'having one' not include bottle? The outsider says: The 'having' in the bottle is certain (Sutra (Sutra, scripture)). The 'having' in the bottle is no different from the bottle, but it is different from clothes and other things. Therefore, wherever there is a bottle, there is 'having' in this place. There is also a bottle wherever there is a bottle, and there is a bottle in this place, rather than a bottle wherever there is 'having'. The insider says: That's not right. Because 'having' is no different from the bottle (Sutra (Sutra, scripture)). 'Having' is the general characteristic. Why do you say that? If you say 'having', you believe 'having'.

瓶等諸物。若說瓶不信衣等諸物。是故瓶是別相。有是總相。云何為一。外曰。如父子(修妒路)。譬如一人亦子亦父。如是總相亦是別相。別相亦是總相。內曰。不然。子故父(修妒路)。若未生子不名為父。子生然後為父。複次是喻同我。汝則非也。外曰。應有瓶。皆信故(修妒路)。世人眼見信有瓶用。是故應有瓶。內曰。有不異故一切無(修妒路)。若瓶與有不異者。瓶應是總相非別相。別相無故。總相亦無。因有別相故有總相。若無別相則無總相。是二無故。一切皆無。外曰。如足分等名身(修妒路)。如頭足分等。雖不異身。非但足為身。如是瓶與有雖不異。而瓶非總相。內曰。若足與身不異。何故足不為頭(修妒路)。若頭足分等。與身不異者。足應是頭。是二與身不異故。如因陀羅釋迦不異故。因陀羅即釋迦。外曰。諸分異故無過(修妒路)。分有分不異。非分分不異。是故頭足不一。內曰。若爾無身(修妒路)。若足與頭異。頭與足分等異。如是。但有諸分。更無有分。名之為身。外曰。不然。多因一果現故。如色等是瓶(修妒路)。如色分等多因現一瓶果。此中非但色為瓶。亦不離色為瓶。是故色分等不為一。足分等與身亦如是。內曰。如色等瓶亦不一(修妒路)。若瓶與色聲香味觸五分不異者

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本瓶等諸物：如果說『瓶』，就不包括衣服等物。因此，『瓶』是別相（ विशिष्ट लक्षण, specific characteristic）。『有』是總相（सामान्य लक्षण, general characteristic）。外曰：如何理解『一』？外曰：比如父子（修妒路，sūtra，經）。譬如一人既是兒子又是父親。如此，總相也是別相，別相也是總相。內曰：不然。因為先有子然後才有父（修妒路，sūtra，經）。如果未生子，就不能稱為父親。有了兒子之後才能成為父親。而且，這個比喻對我是有利的，對你則不然。外曰：應該承認『瓶』的存在，因為人們都相信它（修妒路，sūtra，經）。世人親眼看見，相信有瓶並且使用它，所以應該承認『瓶』的存在。內曰：因為『有』沒有差別，所以一切皆無（修妒路，sūtra，經）。如果『瓶』與『有』沒有差別，那麼『瓶』應該是總相而不是別相。因為沒有別相，所以總相也沒有。因為有別相，所以才有總相。如果沒有別相，那麼就沒有總相。總相和別相都沒有，那麼一切皆無。外曰：比如頭、足等部分合起來稱為『身』（修妒路，sūtra，經）。如同頭、足等部分，雖然與身體沒有差別，但不能說僅僅足就是身體。如此，『瓶』與『有』雖然沒有差別，但『瓶』不是總相。內曰：如果足與身沒有差別，為什麼足不能是頭（修妒路，sūtra，經）？如果頭、足等部分與身體沒有差別，那麼足就應該是頭。因為頭和足與身體沒有差別。如同因陀羅（Indra，帝釋天）和釋迦（Śākya，釋迦族）沒有差別，所以因陀羅就是釋迦。外曰：因為各個部分不同，所以沒有過失（修妒路，sūtra，經）。部分與整體沒有差別，但各個部分之間有差別。所以頭和足不是同一個。內曰：如果這樣，就沒有『身』了（修妒路，sūtra，經）。如果足與頭不同，頭與足等部分不同，那麼就只有各個部分，而沒有一個整體叫做『身』。外曰：不是這樣的。因為多個因產生一個果的現象是存在的。比如顏色等構成瓶子（修妒路，sūtra，經）。如同顏色等多個部分呈現出一個瓶子的結果。這裡不能說僅僅顏色就是瓶子，也不能說離開顏色有瓶子。所以顏色等部分不是一個整體。足等部分與身體也是如此。內曰：如同顏色等，瓶子也不是一個整體（修妒路，sūtra，經）。如果瓶子與色、聲、香、味、觸這五種成分沒有差別的話……

【English Translation】 English version 『Pot』 and other things: If one says 『pot,』 it does not include clothes and other things. Therefore, 『pot』 is a specific characteristic (viśiṣṭa lakṣaṇa). 『Existence』 is a general characteristic (sāmānya lakṣaṇa). Externalist: How is 『one』 understood? Externalist: For example, father and son (sūtra). Just as one person is both a son and a father. Likewise, the general characteristic is also a specific characteristic, and the specific characteristic is also a general characteristic. Internalist: Not so. Because first there is a son, and then there is a father (sūtra). If a son is not yet born, he cannot be called a father. Only after a son is born can he be a father. Moreover, this analogy favors me, but not you. Externalist: The existence of 『pot』 should be acknowledged because people believe in it (sūtra). People see with their own eyes, believe in the existence of pots, and use them, so the existence of 『pot』 should be acknowledged. Internalist: Because 『existence』 has no difference, everything is non-existent (sūtra). If 『pot』 and 『existence』 have no difference, then 『pot』 should be a general characteristic rather than a specific characteristic. Because there is no specific characteristic, there is also no general characteristic. Because there is a specific characteristic, there is a general characteristic. If there is no specific characteristic, then there is no general characteristic. If both general and specific characteristics are non-existent, then everything is non-existent. Externalist: For example, parts such as the head and feet are called 『body』 (sūtra). Like the head, feet, and other parts, although they are not different from the body, one cannot say that only the foot is the body. Likewise, although 『pot』 and 『existence』 are not different, 『pot』 is not a general characteristic. Internalist: If the foot and the body are not different, why can't the foot be the head (sūtra)? If the head, feet, and other parts are not different from the body, then the foot should be the head. Because the head and foot are not different from the body. Just as Indra (帝釋天) and Śākya (釋迦族) are not different, so Indra is Śākya. Externalist: Because the parts are different, there is no fault (sūtra). The part and the whole are not different, but the parts are different from each other. Therefore, the head and foot are not the same. Internalist: If so, there is no 『body』 (sūtra). If the foot is different from the head, and the head is different from the foot and other parts, then there are only the parts, and there is no whole called 『body.』 Externalist: It is not so. Because the phenomenon of multiple causes producing one effect exists. For example, colors and other things constitute a pot (sūtra). Just as multiple parts such as colors present the result of a pot. Here, one cannot say that only color is the pot, nor can one say that there is a pot apart from color. Therefore, parts such as color are not a whole. The same is true for parts such as the foot and the body. Internalist: Just like colors and other things, the pot is also not a whole (sūtra). If the pot is not different from the five components of form, sound, smell, taste, and touch...

。不應言一瓶。若言一瓶。色分等亦應一。色等與瓶不異故。外曰。如軍林(修妒路)。若象馬車步。多眾合故名為軍。又鬆柏等。多樹合故名為林。非獨松為林。亦不離松為林。軍亦爾。如是非一色名為瓶。亦不離色為瓶。內曰。眾亦如瓶(修妒路)。若松柏等。與林不異者。不應言一林。若言一林者。松柏等亦應一。與林不異故。如松樹根莖。枝節華葉。亦應如是破。如軍等一切物。盡應如是破。外曰。受多瓶故(修妒路)。汝說色分等多(修妒路)。瓶亦應多。是故欲破一瓶而受多瓶。內曰。非色等多故瓶多(修妒路)。我說汝過非受多瓶。汝自言色分等多。無別瓶法為色等果。外曰。有果。以不破因。有因故果成(修妒路)。汝破瓶果。不破色等瓶因。若有因必有果。無無果因。複次色等瓶因。是微塵果。汝受色等故。因果俱成。內曰。如果無因亦無(修妒路)。如瓶與色等多分不異故。瓶不應一。今色等多分與瓶不異故。色等不應多。又如汝言。無無果因。今果破故。因亦自破。汝法因果一故。複次三世為一(修妒路)。泥團時現在。瓶時未來。土時過去。若因果一。泥團中應有瓶土。是故三世時為一。已作今作當作者。如是語壞。外曰。不然。因果相待成故。如長短(修妒路)。如因長見短。因短見長。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本不應該說只有一個瓶子。如果說只有一個瓶子，那麼組成瓶子的各個部分（色分）也應該是一個。因為各個部分（色等）與瓶子沒有區別。外道辯駁說：就像軍隊和森林一樣（修妒路，梵文Sūtra的音譯，意為『經』）。因為大象、馬、車、步兵等眾多要素組合在一起，所以稱為軍隊；又像松樹、柏樹等多種樹木組合在一起，所以稱為森林。並非只有松樹才能構成森林，也不是脫離松樹才能構成森林。軍隊也是如此。不是單一的顏色構成瓶子，也不是脫離顏色構成瓶子。內道反駁說：眾多要素也像瓶子一樣（修妒路）。如果松樹、柏樹等與森林沒有區別，就不應該說只有一個森林。如果說只有一個森林，那麼松樹、柏樹等也應該是一個，因為它們與森林沒有區別。就像松樹的根、莖、枝、節、花、葉，也應該這樣分析。像軍隊等一切事物，都應該這樣分析。外道辯駁說：因為接受了多個瓶子（修妒路）。你說組成瓶子的各個部分（色分）有很多（修妒路），那麼瓶子也應該有很多。所以，你想破斥一個瓶子，卻接受了多個瓶子。內道反駁說：不是因為組成瓶子的各個部分（色等）有很多，瓶子就有很多（修妒路）。我說你犯了過失，不是因為接受了多個瓶子。你自己說組成瓶子的各個部分（色分）有很多，沒有獨立的瓶子作為各個部分（色等）的結果。外道辯駁說：有結果。因為沒有破斥原因，有原因所以結果才能成立（修妒路）。你破斥了瓶子這個結果，卻沒有破斥組成瓶子的各個部分（色等）這個原因。如果有原因，必定有結果，沒有沒有結果的原因。而且，組成瓶子的各個部分（色等）這個原因是微塵的結果。你接受了組成瓶子的各個部分（色等），所以原因和結果都成立。內道反駁說：如果結果不存在，原因也不存在（修妒路）。就像瓶子與組成瓶子的各個部分（色等）沒有區別，所以瓶子不應該是一個。現在組成瓶子的各個部分（色等）與瓶子沒有區別，所以各個部分（色等）不應該有很多。又像你說的那樣，沒有沒有結果的原因，現在結果已經被破斥，原因也自然被破斥。因為你的法中，原因和結果是一體的。而且，過去、現在、未來是同一個（修妒路）。泥團是現在，瓶子是未來，泥土是過去。如果原因和結果是同一個，那麼泥團中應該有瓶子和泥土。所以，過去、現在、未來是同一個，像『已經做了』、『現在做』、『將要做』這樣的話就錯了。外道辯駁說：不是這樣的。因為原因和結果是相互依存才能成立的，就像長和短一樣（修妒路）。因為有長才能看到短，因為有短才能看到長。

【English Translation】 English version One should not say 'one pot'. If one says 'one pot', then the constituent parts (色分, sè fēn - components of form) should also be one, because the parts (色等, sè děng - etc. of form) are not different from the pot. The outsider argues: Like an army (軍, jūn) and a forest (林, lín) (修妒路, xiū dù lù - Sūtra). Because elephants, horses, chariots, infantry, and other numerous elements are combined, it is called an army. Also, because pine trees, cypress trees, and other various trees are combined, it is called a forest. It is not only pine trees that constitute a forest, nor is it apart from pine trees that a forest exists. The army is also like that. It is not a single color that constitutes a pot, nor is it apart from color that a pot exists. The insider refutes: The multitude is also like a pot (修妒路). If pine trees, cypress trees, etc., are not different from the forest, one should not say there is only one forest. If one says there is only one forest, then pine trees, cypress trees, etc., should also be one, because they are not different from the forest. Just like the roots, stems, branches, nodes, flowers, and leaves of a pine tree, they should also be analyzed in this way. Like the army and all other things, everything should be analyzed in this way. The outsider argues: Because multiple pots are perceived (修妒路). You say that the constituent parts (色分) of the pot are many (修妒路), then there should also be many pots. Therefore, you want to refute one pot, but you accept multiple pots. The insider refutes: It is not because the constituent parts (色等) of the pot are many that there are many pots (修妒路). I say you have made a mistake, not because you accept multiple pots. You yourself say that the constituent parts (色分) are many, and there is no separate pot as the result of the parts (色等). The outsider argues: There is a result. Because the cause is not refuted, the result can be established because there is a cause (修妒路). You refute the pot as the result, but you do not refute the constituent parts (色等) of the pot as the cause. If there is a cause, there must be a result; there is no cause without a result. Moreover, the constituent parts (色等) of the pot are the result of subtle particles. You accept the constituent parts (色等), so both cause and result are established. The insider refutes: If the result does not exist, the cause also does not exist (修妒路). Just like the pot is not different from the many parts (色等) that constitute it, the pot should not be one. Now that the constituent parts (色等) are not different from the pot, the parts (色等) should not be many. Also, as you say, there is no cause without a result; now that the result has been refuted, the cause is naturally refuted. Because in your dharma, cause and result are one. Moreover, the three times (past, present, future) are one (修妒路). The lump of clay is the present, the pot is the future, and the earth is the past. If cause and result are one, then the lump of clay should contain the pot and the earth. Therefore, the past, present, and future are one, and words like 'already done', 'doing now', 'will do' are wrong. The outsider argues: It is not like that. Because cause and result are established by mutual dependence, like long and short (修妒路). Because there is long, one can see short; because there is short, one can see long.

如是泥團觀瓶則是因。觀土則是果。內曰。因他相違共過故。非長中長相。亦非短中及共中(修妒路)。若實有長相。若長中有。若短中有。若共中有。是不可得。何以故。長中無長相。以因他故。因短故為長短中亦無長性。相違故。若短中有長。不名為短。長短共中亦無長。二俱過故。若長中有。若短中有。先說有過。短相亦如是。若無長短。云何相待。◎

百論捲上大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1569 百論

百論卷下

提婆菩薩造　婆藪開士釋

姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯

◎破異品第四

外曰。汝先言。有一瓶異。是亦有過。有何等過。內曰。若有等異一一無(修妒路)。若有一瓶異各各無。瓶與有一異者。此瓶非有非一。有與一瓶異者。非瓶非一。一與有瓶異者。非瓶非有。如是各各失。複次若瓶失有一不應失。有失一瓶不應失。一失有瓶不應失。以異故。譬如此人滅。彼人不應滅。外曰。不然。有一合故。有一瓶成(修妒路)。有一瓶雖異瓶與有合故瓶名有。瓶與一合故瓶名一。汝言瓶失有一不應失者。是語非也。何以故。異合故。異有三種。一合異。二別異。三變異。合異者。如陀羅驃求那。別異者。如此人彼人。變異者。如牛糞團變為灰團。以異合故。瓶失

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果這樣，將泥團視為瓶子的原因是因，而觀察泥土則是果。內方辯駁說：『因為因與他者相互違背，所以存在過失。因此，不存在長中之長相，也不存在短中以及共中（修妒路）。』如果確實存在長相，無論是在長中、短中還是共中，都是不可能得到的。為什麼呢？因為長中沒有長相，這是因為依賴於他者。因為依賴於短，所以在長短之中也沒有長性，因為相互違背。如果在短中有長，那就不應該被稱為短。在長短共同之中也沒有長，因為兩種情況都有過失。如果長中有，或者短中有，之前已經說過存在過失。短相也是如此。如果沒有長短，又如何相互對待呢？

《百論》捲上大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1569 《百論》

《百論》卷下

提婆菩薩造婆藪開士釋

姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯

◎破異品第四

外方辯駁說：『你先前說，有一個瓶子是不同的，這也是有過失的。有什麼樣的過失呢？』內方辯駁說：『如果有一、瓶、異，那麼每一者都是不存在的（修妒路）。』如果有一個瓶子是不同的，那麼瓶子與『有』、『一』是不同的，那麼這個瓶子就既不是『有』也不是『一』。『有』與『一』、瓶子是不同的，那麼就不是瓶子也不是『一』。『一』與『有』、瓶子是不同的，那麼就不是瓶子也不是『有』。像這樣，每一者都喪失了自身。再者，如果瓶子喪失了，『有』和『一』不應該喪失；如果『有』喪失了，『一』和瓶子不應該喪失；如果『一』喪失了，『有』和瓶子不應該喪失。因為它們是不同的。譬如這個人死了，那個人不應該死。』外方辯駁說：『不是這樣的。因為『有』、『一』結合在一起，所以『有』、『一』、瓶子才得以成立（修妒路）。』『有』、『一』、瓶子雖然不同，但是瓶子與『有』結合在一起，所以瓶子被稱為『有』；瓶子與『一』結合在一起，所以瓶子被稱為『一』。你說瓶子喪失了，『有』和『一』不應該喪失，這種說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為異是結合在一起的。異有三種：一是合異，二是別異，三是變異。合異，比如陀羅驃（Dravyaguna，實體與屬性）；別異，比如這個人、那個人；變異，比如牛糞團變為灰團。因為異是結合在一起的，所以瓶子喪失了。

【English Translation】 English version: If so, considering the mud ball as the cause of the pot is the cause, while observing the soil is the effect. The internal party argues: 'Because the cause contradicts the other, there is a fault. Therefore, there is no long characteristic within the long, nor is there within the short or the common (Sutra).' If there truly exists a long characteristic, whether it is in the long, short, or common, it is impossible to obtain. Why? Because there is no long characteristic within the long, this is because it relies on the other. Because it relies on the short, there is no long nature within the long and short, because they contradict each other. If there is long within the short, then it should not be called short. There is no long within the common of long and short, because both situations have faults. If there is long within the long, or long within the short, it has been said before that there is a fault. The short characteristic is also like this. If there is no long or short, how can they treat each other?

Shastra on the Hundred Verses, Volume 1 Taisho Tripitaka Volume 30, No. 1569, Shastra on the Hundred Verses

Shastra on the Hundred Verses, Volume 2

Composed by Deva Bodhisattva, Explained by Vasu Scholar

Translated by Kumarajiva of the Yao Qin Dynasty

◎ Chapter 4: Refuting Difference

The external party argues: 'You said earlier that there is a different pot, this also has a fault. What kind of fault is there?' The internal party argues: 'If there is existence (Eka), pot (Bhinna), and difference (Anyatva), then each of them is non-existent (Sutra).' If there is a different pot, then the pot is different from 'existence' and 'one', then this pot is neither 'existence' nor 'one'. 'Existence' is different from 'one' and the pot, then it is neither the pot nor 'one'. 'One' is different from 'existence' and the pot, then it is neither the pot nor 'existence'. Like this, each of them loses itself. Furthermore, if the pot is lost, 'existence' and 'one' should not be lost; if 'existence' is lost, 'one' and the pot should not be lost; if 'one' is lost, 'existence' and the pot should not be lost. Because they are different. For example, if this person dies, that person should not die.' The external party argues: 'It is not like this. Because 'existence' and 'one' are combined together, therefore 'existence', 'one', and the pot can be established (Sutra).' Although 'existence', 'one', and the pot are different, but the pot is combined with 'existence', so the pot is called 'existence'; the pot is combined with 'one', so the pot is called 'one'. You say that if the pot is lost, 'existence' and 'one' should not be lost, this statement is not correct. Why? Because difference is combined together. There are three types of difference: one is combined difference (Samavaya), two is separate difference (Visesa), and three is changing difference (Vikara). Combined difference, such as Dravyaguna (substance and quality); separate difference, such as this person, that person; changing difference, such as a cow dung ball changing into an ash ball. Because difference is combined together, therefore the pot is lost.'

一亦失。一失瓶亦失。有常故不失。內曰。若爾多瓶(修妒路)。瓶與有合故有瓶。瓶與一合故一瓶。又瓶亦瓶。是故多瓶。汝言陀羅驃求那合異故瓶失一亦失一失瓶亦失者。我欲破汝異。云何以異證異。應更說因。外曰。總相故。求那故。有一非瓶(修妒路)。有是總相故非瓶。一是求那故非瓶。瓶是陀羅驃。內曰。若爾無瓶(修妒路)。若有是總相故非瓶。一是求那故非瓶。瓶是陀羅驃故。非有非一。是則無瓶。外曰。受多瓶(修妒路)。汝先說多瓶。欲破一瓶。更受多瓶。內曰。一無故多亦無(修妒路)。汝言瓶與有合故有瓶。瓶與一合故一瓶。又瓶亦瓶。若爾世界言一瓶。而汝以為多瓶。是故一瓶為多瓶。一為多故。則無一瓶。一瓶無故多亦無。先一后多故。複次初數無故(修妒路)。數法初一。若一與瓶異。則瓶不為一。一無故多亦無。外曰。瓶與有合故(修妒路)。瓶與有合故瓶名有。非盡有。如是瓶與一合故瓶名一。非盡一。內曰。但有是語。此事先已破。若有非瓶則無瓶。今當更說瓶應非瓶(修妒路)。若瓶與有合故瓶有。是有非瓶。若瓶與非瓶合者。瓶何以不作非瓶。外曰。無無合故非非瓶(修妒路)。非瓶名無瓶。無則無合。是故瓶不作非瓶。今有有故應有合。有合故瓶有。內曰。今有合瓶故(

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：外曰：一亦失（如果一個東西消失了，那麼），一失瓶亦失（一個瓶子的一部分消失了，那麼整個瓶子也消失了）。有常故不失（如果『有』是永恒不變的，那麼它就不應該消失）。內曰：若爾多瓶（修妒路，你的理論導致了多個瓶子的存在）。瓶與有合故有瓶（瓶子和『有』結合，所以才有了瓶子），瓶與一合故一瓶（瓶子和『一』結合，所以才有一個瓶子）。又瓶亦瓶（而且瓶子還是瓶子本身）。是故多瓶（所以存在多個瓶子）。汝言陀羅驃求那合異故（你說實體和屬性的結合是不同的），瓶失一亦失（瓶子的一部分消失了，瓶子的整體也消失了），一失瓶亦失者（如果『一』消失了，瓶子也消失了），我欲破汝異（我想駁斥你說的『不同』）。云何以異證異（你如何用『不同』來證明『不同』呢）？應更說因（你應該給出更多的理由）。外曰：總相故（因為總相），求那故（因為屬性），有一非瓶（修妒路，『有』和『一』不是瓶子）。有是總相故非瓶（『有』是總相，所以不是瓶子），一是求那故非瓶（『一』是屬性，所以不是瓶子）。瓶是陀羅驃（瓶子是實體）。內曰：若爾無瓶（修妒路，如果這樣，那麼就沒有瓶子了）。若有是總相故非瓶（如果『有』是總相，所以不是瓶子），一是求那故非瓶（如果『一』是屬性，所以不是瓶子）。瓶是陀羅驃故（瓶子是實體），非有非一（既不是『有』，也不是『一』）。是則無瓶（那麼就沒有瓶子了）。外曰：受多瓶（修妒路，承認存在多個瓶子）。汝先說多瓶（你先承認存在多個瓶子），欲破一瓶（想要駁斥一個瓶子的存在），更受多瓶（現在又承認存在多個瓶子）。內曰：一無故多亦無（修妒路，如果『一』不存在，那麼『多』也不存在）。汝言瓶與有合故有瓶（你說瓶子和『有』結合，所以才有了瓶子），瓶與一合故一瓶（瓶子和『一』結合，所以才有一個瓶子）。又瓶亦瓶（而且瓶子還是瓶子本身）。若爾世界言一瓶（如果這樣，世俗上說一個瓶子），而汝以為多瓶（你卻認為是多個瓶子）。是故一瓶為多瓶（所以一個瓶子就是多個瓶子）。一為多故（因為『一』變成了『多』），則無一瓶（那麼就沒有一個瓶子了）。一瓶無故多亦無（如果一個瓶子不存在，那麼多個瓶子也不存在）。先一后多故（因為先有『一』，後有『多』）。複次初數無故（修妒路，此外，最初的數字不存在）。數法初一（計數的起始是『一』）。若一與瓶異（如果『一』和瓶子是不同的），則瓶不為一（那麼瓶子就不是『一』）。一無故多亦無（如果『一』不存在，那麼『多』也不存在）。外曰：瓶與有合故（修妒路，瓶子和『有』結合）。瓶與有合故瓶名有（瓶子和『有』結合，所以瓶子被稱為『有』），非盡有（但不是完全等同於『有』）。如是瓶與一合故瓶名一（同樣，瓶子和『一』結合，所以瓶子被稱為『一』），非盡一（但不是完全等同於『一』）。內曰：但有是語（這只是說說而已）。此事先已破（這件事之前已經被駁斥過了）。若有非瓶則無瓶（如果『有』不是瓶子，那麼就沒有瓶子）。今當更說瓶應非瓶（修妒路，現在我們進一步討論，瓶子應該不是瓶子）。若瓶與有合故瓶有（如果瓶子和『有』結合，所以瓶子是『有』），是有非瓶（那麼『有』就不是瓶子）。若瓶與非瓶合者（如果瓶子和『非瓶子』結合），瓶何以不作非瓶（瓶子為什麼不變成『非瓶子』呢）？外曰：無無合故非非瓶（修妒路，因為『無』沒有結合，所以不是『非瓶子』）。非瓶名無瓶（『非瓶子』被稱為『無瓶子』）。無則無合（『無』就沒有結合）。是故瓶不作非瓶（所以瓶子不會變成『非瓶子』）。今有有故應有合（現在因為有『有』，所以應該有結合）。有合故瓶有（因為有結合，所以瓶子是『有』）。內曰：今有合瓶故（現在因為有結合的瓶子）

【English Translation】 English version: External: If one is lost, if one part of the pot is lost, then the pot is lost. If 'existence' is constant, then it should not be lost. Internal: If there are many pots (Sutra, your theory leads to the existence of multiple pots). Because the pot combines with 'existence', there is a pot. Because the pot combines with 'one', there is one pot. Moreover, the pot is also a pot. Therefore, there are many pots. You say that the combination of dravya (substance) and guna (quality) is different, so if the pot loses one part, the whole pot is lost, and if 'one' is lost, the pot is lost. I want to refute your 'difference'. How can you prove 'difference' with 'difference'? You should give more reasons. External: Because of the general characteristic, because of the quality, 'existence' and 'one' are not pots (Sutra). 'Existence' is a general characteristic, so it is not a pot. 'One' is a quality, so it is not a pot. The pot is a dravya (substance). Internal: If so, there is no pot (Sutra, if that's the case, then there is no pot). If 'existence' is a general characteristic, so it is not a pot. If 'one' is a quality, so it is not a pot. The pot is a dravya (substance), so it is neither 'existence' nor 'one'. Then there is no pot. External: Accept that there are many pots (Sutra, acknowledge the existence of multiple pots). You first said there were many pots, wanting to refute the existence of one pot, and now you acknowledge the existence of many pots. Internal: If 'one' does not exist, then 'many' does not exist either (Sutra, if 'one' does not exist, then 'many' does not exist). You say that because the pot combines with 'existence', there is a pot. Because the pot combines with 'one', there is one pot. Moreover, the pot is also a pot. If so, the world says one pot, but you think it is many pots. Therefore, one pot is many pots. Because 'one' becomes 'many', then there is no one pot. If one pot does not exist, then many do not exist either. Because there is 'one' first, then 'many'. Furthermore, because the initial number does not exist (Sutra, moreover, the initial number does not exist). The beginning of counting is 'one'. If 'one' is different from the pot, then the pot is not 'one'. If 'one' does not exist, then 'many' does not exist either. External: Because the pot combines with 'existence' (Sutra, the pot combines with 'existence'). Because the pot combines with 'existence', the pot is called 'existence', but it is not entirely 'existence'. Similarly, because the pot combines with 'one', the pot is called 'one', but it is not entirely 'one'. Internal: This is just talk. This matter has already been refuted before. If 'existence' is not a pot, then there is no pot. Now we will further discuss that the pot should not be a pot (Sutra, now we further discuss that the pot should not be a pot). If the pot combines with 'existence', so the pot is 'existence', then 'existence' is not a pot. If the pot combines with 'non-pot', why doesn't the pot become 'non-pot'? External: Because 'non-existence' does not combine, it is not 'non-pot' (Sutra, because 'non-existence' does not combine, it is not 'non-pot'). 'Non-pot' is called 'non-existent pot'. 'Non-existence' has no combination. Therefore, the pot does not become 'non-pot'. Now because there is 'existence', there should be combination. Because there is combination, the pot is 'existence'. Internal: Now because there is a combined pot (now because there is a combined pot)

修妒路)。若非瓶則無有。無有則無合。今有合瓶故有應為瓶。若汝謂瓶未與有合故無。無故無合。如先說。無法故無合。如是未與有合時瓶則無法。無法故不應與有合。外曰。不然。有了瓶等故如燈(修妒路)。有非但瓶等諸物因。亦能了瓶等諸物。譬如燈能照諸物。如是有能了瓶故。則知有瓶。內曰。若有法能瞭如燈。瓶應先有(修妒路)。今先有諸物然後以燈照了。有若如是者。有未合時。瓶等諸物應先有。若先有者。後有何用若有未合時。無瓶等諸物。有合故有者。有是作因。非了因。複次若以相可相成。何故一不作二(修妒路)。若汝以有為瓶相故。知有瓶者。若離相可相之物則不成。是故有亦變更有相。若更無相知有法為有者。瓶等亦應爾。燈喻先已破。複次如燈自照。不假外照。瓶亦自有。不待外有。外曰。如身相(修妒路)。如以足分知有分為身足更不求相。如是以有為瓶相故知有瓶有更不求相。內曰。若分中有分具者。何故頭中無足(修妒路)。若有身法。于足分等中。為具有耶。為分有耶。若具有者。頭中應有足。身法一故。若分有者。亦不然。何以故。有分如分(修妒路)。若足中有分與足分等。余分中亦爾者。則有分與分為一。是故無有有分名為身。如是足分等自有有分亦同破。有分無故。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本（修妒路，Sūtra）如果不是因為瓶子，就不會有『有』。沒有『有』，就不會有結合。現在因為有結合，所以應該有瓶子。如果你說瓶子還沒有和『有』結合，所以沒有『有』，沒有『有』就沒有結合，就像先前所說的那樣。因為沒有法，所以沒有結合。這樣，在沒有和『有』結合的時候，瓶子就沒有法。沒有法，就不應該和『有』結合。外道說：『不是這樣的。因為有了瓶子等，就像燈一樣。（修妒路，Sūtra）』『有』不僅僅是瓶子等事物的因，也能照亮瓶子等事物。譬如燈能照亮各種事物，同樣，『有』能照亮瓶子，因此就知道有瓶子。內道說：『如果『有』這種法能夠像燈一樣照亮事物，那麼瓶子應該先存在。（修妒路，Sūtra）』現在是先有各種事物，然後用燈來照亮。如果『有』是這樣的話，那麼在『有』沒有結合的時候，瓶子等事物應該先存在。如果已經先存在了，那麼後來的『有』有什麼用呢？如果在『有』沒有結合的時候，沒有瓶子等事物，因為『有』結合了才有的，那麼『有』是作因，而不是了因。『再者，如果用相可以互相成就，為什麼一不能變成二呢？（修妒路，Sūtra）』如果你因為『有』是瓶子的相，所以知道有瓶子，那麼離開相和可以成為相的事物，就不能成立。所以，『有』也變成更有相。如果更沒有相，知道『有』法為『有』，那麼瓶子等也應該這樣。燈的譬喻先前已經駁斥過了。『再者，就像燈自己照亮自己，不需要外來的照亮，瓶子也是自己存在，不需要外來的『有』。』外道說：『就像身體的相一樣。（修妒路，Sūtra）』就像用腳的部分知道有部分，身體和腳不再尋求相。同樣，用『有』作為瓶子的相，所以知道有瓶子，『有』不再尋求相。內道說：『如果在部分中有部分具足，為什麼頭中沒有腳呢？（修妒路，Sūtra）』如果『有』身體的法，在腳的部分等中，是具有呢？還是部分有呢？如果是具有，那麼頭中應該有腳，因為身體的法是一體的。如果是部分有，也不對。為什麼呢？『有』的部分就像部分一樣。（修妒路，Sūtra）如果腳中有部分與腳的部分等同，其餘部分中也是這樣，那麼『有』的部分與部分為一體。所以沒有『有』的部分名為身體。像這樣，腳的部分等自己有『有』的部分也同樣被駁斥。因為沒有『有』的部分。

【English Translation】 English version (Sūtra) If it were not for the pot, there would be no 'existence'. If there is no 'existence', there would be no combination. Now, because there is a combination, there should be a pot. If you say that the pot has not yet combined with 'existence', so there is no 'existence', and without 'existence' there is no combination, as said before. Because there is no dharma, there is no combination. Thus, when not combined with 'existence', the pot has no dharma. Without dharma, it should not combine with 'existence'. The outsider says: 'It is not so. Because there are pots, etc., like a lamp. (Sūtra)' 'Existence' is not only the cause of pots and other things, but also illuminates pots and other things. Just as a lamp can illuminate all things, so 'existence' can illuminate the pot, and therefore we know there is a pot. The insider says: 'If this dharma of 'existence' can illuminate things like a lamp, then the pot should exist first. (Sūtra)' Now, there are various things first, and then the lamp is used to illuminate them. If 'existence' is like this, then when 'existence' is not combined, pots and other things should exist first. If they already exist, then what is the use of the later 'existence'? If there are no pots and other things when 'existence' is not combined, and they exist because 'existence' is combined, then 'existence' is the efficient cause, not the illuminating cause. 'Furthermore, if the characteristic can be mutually accomplished, why can't one become two? (Sūtra)' If you know there is a pot because 'existence' is the characteristic of the pot, then it cannot be established without the characteristic and the thing that can become the characteristic. Therefore, 'existence' also becomes more characteristic. If there is no characteristic, and you know the dharma of 'existence' as 'existence', then pots, etc., should also be like this. The analogy of the lamp has already been refuted. 'Furthermore, just as a lamp illuminates itself and does not need external illumination, the pot also exists on its own and does not need external 'existence'.' The outsider says: 'Like the characteristic of the body. (Sūtra)' Just as knowing there is a part by the part of the foot, the body and the foot no longer seek the characteristic. Similarly, using 'existence' as the characteristic of the pot, we know there is a pot, and 'existence' no longer seeks the characteristic. The insider says: 'If there is a part complete in the part, why is there no foot in the head? (Sūtra)' If the dharma of 'existence' of the body is complete in the part of the foot, etc., or is it partially present? If it is complete, then there should be a foot in the head, because the dharma of the body is one. If it is partially present, it is also not right. Why? The part of 'existence' is like a part. (Sūtra) If there is a part in the foot that is the same as the part of the foot, etc., and it is the same in the other parts, then the part of 'existence' and the part are one. Therefore, there is no part of 'existence' called the body. In this way, the part of the foot, etc., having its own part of 'existence' is also refuted. Because there is no part of 'existence'.

諸分亦無。外曰。不然。微塵在故(修妒路)。諸分不無。何以故。微塵無分。不在分中。微塵集故。能生瓶等果。是故應有有分。內曰。若集為瓶一切瓶(修妒路)。汝言微塵無分。但有是語。后當破。今當略說。微塵集為瓶時。若都集為瓶。一切微塵盡應為瓶。若不都集為瓶。一切非瓶。外曰。如縷渧集力。微塵亦爾(修妒路)。如一一縷。不能制象。一一水渧。不能滿瓶。多集則能。如是。微塵集故。力能為瓶。內曰。不然。不定故(修妒路)。譬如一一石女。不能有子。一一盲人。不能見色。一一沙。不能出油。多集亦不能。如是微塵。一一不能。多亦不能。外曰。分分有力。故非不定(修妒路)。縷渧分分有力能制象。滿瓶。石女盲沙。分分無力故。多亦無力。是故非不定。不應以石女盲沙為喻。內曰。分有分一異過故(修妒路)。分有分。若一若異。是過先已破。複次有分無故分亦無。若有分未有時。分不可得。云何有作力。若有分已有者。分力何用。外曰。汝是破法人(修妒路)。世人盡見瓶等諸物。汝種種因緣破。是故汝為破法人。內曰。不然。汝言有與瓶異。我說若有與瓶異。是則無瓶。複次無見有有見無等(修妒路)。汝與破法人同。乃復過甚。何以故。頭足分等和合現是身。汝言非身離是已別

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本諸分（構成微塵的更小部分）也是不存在的。外道辯駁說：『不然，因為微塵存在（修妒路，梵文Sūtra，意為經），所以諸分不是不存在的。』為什麼呢？因為微塵沒有更小的部分，它不是由更小的部分組成的。微塵聚集在一起，能夠產生瓶子等結果。因此，應該承認微塵是有更小部分的。內部辯駁說：『如果微塵聚集就成了瓶子，那麼所有的微塵（修妒路）都應該變成瓶子。』你說微塵沒有更小的部分，這只是說說而已，以後會駁斥。現在簡單地說，微塵聚整合為瓶子時，如果全部聚集都變成了瓶子，那麼所有的微塵都應該完全變成瓶子；如果不是全部聚集都變成瓶子，那麼就根本沒有瓶子。外道辯駁說：『就像線和水滴聚集產生力量一樣，微塵也是如此（修妒路）。』就像一根線不能制服大象，一滴水不能裝滿瓶子，但很多聚集在一起就能做到。同樣，微塵聚集在一起，就能產生瓶子的力量。內部辯駁說：『不然，因為這是不確定的（修妒路）。』比如一個石女（不能生育的女子）不能生孩子，一個盲人不能看見顏色，一粒沙子不能榨出油，即使很多聚集在一起也不能。同樣，微塵單個不能，多個也不能。外道辯駁說：『因為每一部分都有力量，所以不是不確定的（修妒路）。』線和水滴的每一部分都有力量，能夠制服大象，裝滿瓶子。而石女、盲人、沙子的每一部分都沒有力量，所以即使很多聚集在一起也沒有力量。因此，這不是不確定的，不應該用石女、盲人、沙子來做比喻。內部辯駁說：『因為部分和整體有一異的過失（修妒路）。』部分和整體，如果是一，如果是異，這些過失之前已經駁斥過了。再者，如果沒有整體，部分也不存在。如果整體還沒有存在的時候，部分是無法獲得的，又怎麼能產生作用力呢？如果整體已經存在了，那部分的力量又有什麼用呢？外道辯駁說：『你是破法之人（修妒路）。』世人都看見瓶子等事物，你用各種因緣來破斥，所以你是破法之人。內部辯駁說：『不然，你說有和瓶子是不同的，我說如果「有」和瓶子是不同的，那麼就沒有瓶子了。』再者，沒有看見「有」，有看見「無」等等（修妒路）。你和破法之人一樣，甚至更加過分。為什麼呢？頭、足、身體各部分和合在一起，顯現出身體，你說不是身體，離開這些部分是另外的。 English version The divisions (smaller parts constituting a micro-dust) also do not exist. The outsider argues: 'No, because micro-dust exists (Sūtra), therefore the divisions are not non-existent.' Why? Because micro-dust has no smaller parts; it is not composed of smaller parts. Micro-dusts gathering together can produce results such as a pot. Therefore, it should be admitted that micro-dust has smaller parts. The insider argues: 'If gathering micro-dusts becomes a pot, then all micro-dusts (Sūtra) should become pots.' You say micro-dust has no smaller parts; this is just talk, and it will be refuted later. Now, to put it simply, when micro-dusts gather to become a pot, if all the gathering becomes a pot, then all micro-dusts should completely become pots; if not all the gathering becomes a pot, then there is no pot at all. The outsider argues: 'Just as threads and water droplets gathering produce power, so too with micro-dusts (Sūtra).' Just as one thread cannot subdue an elephant, one drop of water cannot fill a pot, but many gathering together can. Similarly, micro-dusts gathering together can produce the power of a pot. The insider argues: 'No, because it is uncertain (Sūtra).' For example, a barren woman cannot have children, a blind person cannot see colors, a grain of sand cannot yield oil, even if many gather together. Similarly, micro-dusts individually cannot, and many cannot either. The outsider argues: 'Because each part has power, it is not uncertain (Sūtra).' Each part of thread and water droplets has power to subdue an elephant and fill a pot. But each part of a barren woman, a blind person, and sand has no power, so even if many gather together, they have no power. Therefore, it is not uncertain, and one should not use a barren woman, a blind person, or sand as an analogy. The insider argues: 'Because there is the fault of one or different between the part and the whole (Sūtra).' The part and the whole, if they are one, if they are different, these faults have been refuted before. Furthermore, if there is no whole, the part does not exist. If the whole has not yet existed, the part cannot be obtained, so how can it produce force? If the whole already exists, then what is the use of the part's power? The outsider argues: 'You are a destroyer of the Dharma (Sūtra).' Everyone sees things like pots, and you use various causes and conditions to refute them, so you are a destroyer of the Dharma. The insider argues: 'No, you say that 'existence' and a pot are different. I say that if 'existence' and a pot are different, then there is no pot.' Furthermore, not seeing 'existence,' seeing 'non-existence,' and so on (Sūtra). You are the same as a destroyer of the Dharma, even more so. Why? The head, feet, and body parts combine together to manifest the body, and you say it is not the body, that being apart from these parts is something else.

【English Translation】 The divisions (smaller parts constituting a micro-dust) also do not exist. The outsider argues: 'No, because micro-dust exists (Sūtra), therefore the divisions are not non-existent.' Why? Because micro-dust has no smaller parts; it is not composed of smaller parts. Micro-dusts gathering together can produce results such as a pot. Therefore, it should be admitted that micro-dust has smaller parts. The insider argues: 'If gathering micro-dusts becomes a pot, then all micro-dusts (Sūtra) should become pots.' You say micro-dust has no smaller parts; this is just talk, and it will be refuted later. Now, to put it simply, when micro-dusts gather to become a pot, if all the gathering becomes a pot, then all micro-dusts should completely become pots; if not all the gathering becomes a pot, then there is no pot at all. The outsider argues: 'Just as threads and water droplets gathering produce power, so too with micro-dusts (Sūtra).' Just as one thread cannot subdue an elephant, one drop of water cannot fill a pot, but many gathering together can. Similarly, micro-dusts gathering together can produce the power of a pot. The insider argues: 'No, because it is uncertain (Sūtra).' For example, a barren woman cannot have children, a blind person cannot see colors, a grain of sand cannot yield oil, even if many gather together. Similarly, micro-dusts individually cannot, and many cannot either. The outsider argues: 'Because each part has power, it is not uncertain (Sūtra).' Each part of thread and water droplets has power to subdue an elephant and fill a pot. But each part of a barren woman, a blind person, and sand has no power, so even if many gather together, they have no power. Therefore, it is not uncertain, and one should not use a barren woman, a blind person, or sand as an analogy. The insider argues: 'Because there is the fault of one or different between the part and the whole (Sūtra).' The part and the whole, if they are one, if they are different, these faults have been refuted before. Furthermore, if there is no whole, the part does not exist. If the whole has not yet existed, the part cannot be obtained, so how can it produce force? If the whole already exists, then what is the use of the part's power? The outsider argues: 'You are a destroyer of the Dharma (Sūtra).' Everyone sees things like pots, and you use various causes and conditions to refute them, so you are a destroyer of the Dharma. The insider argues: 'No, you say that 'existence' and a pot are different. I say that if 'existence' and a pot are different, then there is no pot.' Furthermore, not seeing 'existence,' seeing 'non-existence,' and so on (Sūtra). You are the same as a destroyer of the Dharma, even more so. Why? The head, feet, and body parts combine together to manifest the body, and you say it is not the body, that being apart from these parts is something else.

有有分為身。複次輪軸等和合現為車。汝言離是已別有車。是故汝為妄語人。◎

◎破情品第五

外曰。定有我所有法現前有故(修妒路)。情塵意合故知生。此知是現前知。是知實有故。情塵意有。內曰。見色已。知生何用(修妒路)。若眼先見色。然後知生者。知復何用。若先知生。然後眼見色者。是亦不然。何以故。若不見色因緣無故生亦無(修妒路)。若眼先不見色。則因緣不合。不合故知不應生。汝言情塵意合故知生。若不合時知生者。是則不然。外曰。若一時生有何過。內曰。若一時生。是事不然。生無生共不一時生。有故無故。先已破故(修妒路)。若見知先有。相待一時生。若先無。若先半有半無。於三中。一時生者。是則不然。何以故。若先有見知者。不應更生。以有故。若先無者。亦不應生。以無故。若無者。則無相待。亦無生。若半有半無者。前二修妒路各已破故。複次一法雲何亦有亦無。複次若一時生。知不待見。見不待知。複次眼為到色見耶。為不到色見耶若眼去。遠遲見(修妒路)。若眼去到色乃見者。遠色應遲見。近色應速見。何以故去法爾故。而今近瓶遠月一時見。是故知眼不去。若不去則無和合。複次若眼力不到色。而見色者。何故見近不見遠遠近應一時見。複次眼

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本有為法可分為身（skandha，蘊）。再比如，輪軸等組合在一起，才顯現為車。你說離開這些組成部分，另外存在一個車，所以你是在說謊。 ◎破情品第五外道說：『一定有我所擁有的法，因為它們顯現在眼前。』（修妒路，梵語：sūtra，經）情（vedanā，感受）、塵（rūpa，色）、意（manas，意）結合，所以產生知（vijñāna，識）。這個知是現前知，所以知是真實存在的，因此情、塵、意也是存在的。內道說：『見到色（rūpa，色）之後，知（vijñāna，識）的產生有什麼用呢？』（修妒路，梵語：sūtra，經）如果眼睛先見到色，然後知才產生，那麼知還有什麼用？如果先有知產生，然後眼睛才見到色，這也是不合理的。為什麼呢？如果不見色，因緣不存在，所以知也不會產生。（修妒路，梵語：sūtra，經）如果眼睛先沒有見到色，那麼因緣就不會聚合。因為不聚合，所以知不應該產生。你說情、塵、意結合，所以產生知。如果不結合的時候知也產生，那是不合理的。外道說：『如果同時產生，有什麼過失呢？』內道說：『如果同時產生，這是不合理的。生（utpāda，生）和無生（anutpāda，無生）不能同時產生，有（bhāva，有）和無（abhāva，無）的原因，之前已經破斥過了。』（修妒路，梵語：sūtra，經）如果見（darśana，見）和知（vijñāna，識）先前存在，相互等待同時產生；如果先前不存在；如果先前一半存在一半不存在。在這三種情況中，如果同時產生，那是不合理的。為什麼呢？如果先前存在見和知，就不應該再生，因為已經存在了。如果先前不存在，也不應該產生，因為不存在。如果不存在，就沒有相互等待，也沒有產生。如果一半存在一半不存在，那麼前兩個修妒路（梵語：sūtra，經）已經各自破斥過了。再者，一個法怎麼可能既存在又不存在呢？再者，如果同時產生，知不依賴於見，見也不依賴於知。再者，眼睛是到達色才見到呢？還是不到達色就見到呢？如果眼睛去到遠處，就會遲緩地見到。（修妒路，梵語：sūtra，經）如果眼睛去到色才見到，那麼遠處的色應該遲緩地見到，近處的色應該快速地見到。為什麼呢？因為去是自然規律。但是現在近處的瓶子和遠處的月亮同時被見到，所以知道眼睛並沒有去到那裡。如果不去到那裡，就沒有和合。再者，如果眼睛的力量沒有到達色，就能見到色，那麼為什麼見到近處卻見不到遠處呢？遠近應該同時見到。再者，眼睛...

【English Translation】 English version Conditioned dharmas can be divided into skandhas (aggregates). Furthermore, the combination of axles and other parts manifests as a chariot. You say that apart from these components, there is a separate chariot. Therefore, you are speaking falsely. ◎ Chapter Five: Refuting Affection The outsider says: 'There must be dharmas that I possess, because they appear before me.' (Sūtra) The combination of feeling (vedanā), object (rūpa), and mind (manas) gives rise to consciousness (vijñāna). This consciousness is present consciousness, so consciousness is real, and therefore feeling, object, and mind also exist. The insider says: 'After seeing form (rūpa), what is the use of the arising of consciousness (vijñāna)?' (Sūtra) If the eye sees form first, and then consciousness arises, then what is the use of consciousness? If consciousness arises first, and then the eye sees form, that is also unreasonable. Why? If form is not seen, the condition does not exist, so consciousness will not arise. (Sūtra) If the eye does not see form first, then the conditions will not come together. Because they do not come together, consciousness should not arise. You say that the combination of feeling, object, and mind gives rise to consciousness. If consciousness arises even when they do not combine, that is unreasonable. The outsider says: 'If they arise simultaneously, what fault is there?' The insider says: 'If they arise simultaneously, that is unreasonable. Arising (utpāda) and non-arising (anutpāda) cannot arise simultaneously, and the reasons for existence (bhāva) and non-existence (abhāva) have already been refuted. (Sūtra) If seeing (darśana) and consciousness (vijñāna) existed previously, waiting for each other to arise simultaneously; if they did not exist previously; if they were half existent and half non-existent previously. In these three cases, if they arise simultaneously, that is unreasonable. Why? If seeing and consciousness existed previously, they should not arise again, because they already exist. If they did not exist previously, they should not arise either, because they do not exist. If they do not exist, there is no mutual waiting, and no arising. If they are half existent and half non-existent, then the previous two sūtras have already refuted them separately. Furthermore, how can a dharma be both existent and non-existent? Furthermore, if they arise simultaneously, consciousness does not depend on seeing, and seeing does not depend on consciousness. Furthermore, does the eye reach the object to see it? Or does it see it without reaching it? If the eye goes to a distance, it will see slowly. (Sūtra) If the eye goes to the object to see it, then distant objects should be seen slowly, and near objects should be seen quickly. Why? Because going is a natural law. But now the near pot and the distant moon are seen simultaneously, so we know that the eye has not gone there. If it does not go there, there is no combination. Furthermore, if the power of the eye does not reach the object, but it can see the object, then why can it see near objects but not distant objects? Near and far should be seen simultaneously. Furthermore, the eye...

設去者。為見已去耶。為不見去耶。若見已去。復何用(修妒路)。若眼先見色。事已辨去。復何用。若不見去。不如意所取(修妒路)。若眼先不見色而去者。如意所取則不能取。眼無知故。趣東則西。複次無眼處亦不取(修妒路)。若眼去到色而取色者。身則無眼。身無眼故。此則無取。若眼不去。而取色者。色則無眼。色無眼故。彼亦無取。複次若眼不去。而取色者。應見天上色。及障外色。然不見。是故此事非也。外曰。眼相見故(修妒路)。見是眼相。于緣中有力能取。性自爾故。內曰。若眼見相自見眼(修妒路)。若眼見相。如火熱相。自熱能令他熱。如是眼若見相應自見眼。然不見。是故眼非見相。外曰。如指(修妒路)。眼雖見相。不自見眼。如指端不能自觸。如是眼雖見相。不能自見。內曰。不然。觸指業故(修妒路)。觸是指業非指相。汝言見是眼相者。何不自見眼。是故指喻非也。外曰。光意去故見色(修妒路)。眼光及意去故。到彼能取色。內曰。若意去到色。此無覺(修妒路)。意若到色者。意則在彼。意若在彼。身則無意。猶如死人。然意實不去。遠近一時取故。雖念過去未來。念不在過去未來。念時不去故。外曰意在身(修妒路)。意雖在身。而能遠知。內曰。若爾不合(修妒路)。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本設想眼識的執行方式。是看見之後才執行呢？還是沒有看見就執行呢？如果看見之後才執行，那還需要（修妒路，梵文：Sūtra，佛經中的經文）做什麼呢？如果眼睛先看見了顏色，事情已經辨別清楚並過去了，那還需要做什麼呢？如果沒有看見就執行，那就像意識隨意選取（修妒路）一樣。如果眼睛沒有看見顏色就執行，就像意識隨意選取一樣，那就無法選取，因為眼睛沒有知覺的緣故，會朝東卻走到西。而且，沒有眼睛的地方也無法選取（修妒路）。如果眼睛執行到顏色那裡才選取顏色，那麼身體就沒有眼睛了。身體沒有眼睛，那麼就無法選取。如果眼睛不執行，而選取顏色，那麼顏色就沒有眼睛了。顏色沒有眼睛，那麼它也無法選取。而且，如果眼睛不執行而選取顏色，應該能看見天上的顏色，以及障礙物之外的顏色。然而實際上看不見，所以這種說法是不對的。外道說：眼睛是憑藉相互看見的緣故（修妒路）。看見是眼睛的特性，在因緣之中有力量能夠選取，這是它的本性。內道說：如果眼睛能看見相互的特性，那應該能自己看見自己（修妒路）。如果眼睛能看見相互的特性，就像火的熱性一樣，自己熱也能讓其他東西熱。這樣，眼睛如果能看見相互的特性，就應該能自己看見自己。然而實際上看不見，所以眼睛不是能看見相互特性的。外道說：就像手指一樣（修妒路）。眼睛雖然能看見相互的特性，但不能自己看見自己，就像指尖不能自己觸控自己一樣。這樣，眼睛雖然能看見相互的特性，但不能自己看見自己。內道說：不是這樣的。觸控是指的動作（修妒路）。觸控是指的動作，而不是手指的特性。你如果說看見是眼睛的特性，為什麼不能自己看見自己呢？所以手指的比喻是不對的。外道說：是光和意識執行過去才能看見顏色（修妒路）。眼睛的光和意識執行過去，到達那裡才能選取顏色。內道說：如果意識執行到顏色那裡，那就沒有感覺了（修妒路）。如果意識到達顏色那裡，意識就在那裡了。意識如果在那裡，身體就沒有意識了，就像死人一樣。然而意識實際上並沒有執行過去，因為遠近的物體能同時被感知。即使是回憶過去和思考未來，意識也不是在過去和未來，因為思考的時候意識並沒有執行過去。外道說：意識是在身體里的（修妒路）。意識雖然在身體里，卻能知道遠方的事情。內道說：如果這樣，就不合理了（修妒路）。

【English Translation】 English version Suppose the going one. Does it go having seen, or does it go not having seen? If it goes having seen, what further use is there for the (Sūtra)? If the eye first sees the color, and the matter is already discerned and gone, what further use is there? If it goes not having seen, it is like the mind taking at will (Sūtra). If the eye goes without first seeing the color, like the mind taking at will, then it cannot take, because the eye has no knowledge. It goes east but ends up west. Furthermore, in a place without eyes, it also cannot take (Sūtra). If the eye goes to the color and then takes the color, then the body has no eyes. Because the body has no eyes, then there is no taking. If the eye does not go, and then takes the color, then the color has no eyes. Because the color has no eyes, then it also cannot take. Furthermore, if the eye does not go, and then takes the color, it should see colors in the sky, and colors beyond obstructions. But it does not see them. Therefore, this matter is not so. The outsider says: The eye sees because of mutual seeing (Sūtra). Seeing is the characteristic of the eye. In the causal conditions, it has the power to take. This is its nature. The insider says: If the eye sees mutual characteristics, it should see itself (Sūtra). If the eye sees mutual characteristics, like the heat of fire, which is hot itself and can make others hot, then if the eye sees mutual characteristics, it should see itself. But it does not see itself. Therefore, the eye is not a seeing characteristic. The outsider says: Like a finger (Sūtra). Although the eye sees mutual characteristics, it does not see itself, just as the fingertip cannot touch itself. Thus, although the eye sees mutual characteristics, it cannot see itself. The insider says: It is not so. Touching is the action of the finger (Sūtra). Touching is the action of the finger, not the characteristic of the finger. If you say that seeing is the characteristic of the eye, why does it not see itself? Therefore, the analogy of the finger is not correct. The outsider says: It is because the light and mind go that color is seen (Sūtra). The light of the eye and the mind go, and reaching there, they can take the color. The insider says: If the mind goes to the color, then there is no sensation (Sūtra). If the mind reaches the color, then the mind is there. If the mind is there, then the body has no mind, like a dead person. But the mind does not actually go, because near and far are taken at the same time. Even when thinking about the past and future, the mind is not in the past and future, because the mind does not go when thinking. The outsider says: The mind is in the body (Sūtra). Although the mind is in the body, it can know things far away. The insider says: If so, it is not consistent (Sūtra).

若意在身。而色在彼。色在彼故。則無和合。若無和合。不能取色。外曰。不然。意光色合故見(修妒路)。眼意在身和合。以意力故。令眼光與色合。如是見色。是故不失和合。內曰。若和合故見生無見者(修妒路)。汝謂和合故見色。若言但眼見色。但意取色者。是事不然。外曰。受和合故取色成(修妒路)。汝受和合。則有和合。若有和合。應有取色。內曰。意非見。眼非知。色非見知。云何見(修妒路)。意異眼故。意非見相。非見相故。不能見眼。四大造故。非知相。非知相故。不能知色。亦非見相。亦非知相。如是雖復和合。云何取色。耳鼻舌身亦如是破。

破塵品第六

外曰。應有情瓶等可取故(修妒路)。今現見瓶等諸物可取故。若諸情不能取諸塵。當用何等取。是故知有情能取瓶等諸物。內曰。非獨色是瓶。是故瓶非現見(修妒路)。瓶中色現可見。香等不可見。不獨色為瓶。香等合為瓶。瓶若現可見者。香等亦應現可見。而不可見。是故瓶非現見。外曰。取分故一切取信故(修妒路)。瓶一分可見故瓶名現見。何以故。人見瓶已信知我見是瓶。內曰。若取分不一切取(修妒路)。瓶一分色可見。香分等不可見今分不作有分。若分作有分者。香等諸分亦應可見。是故瓶非儘可見。是事

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：外方說：如果意識在身體里，而顏色在外面，顏色在外面的緣故，就沒有和合。如果沒有和合，就不能獲取顏色。外方反駁說：不是這樣的。意識的光和顏色結合，所以才能看見（修妒路，Sutra）。眼睛和意識在身體里和合，憑藉意識的力量，使眼睛的光和顏色結合，這樣才能看見顏色。所以沒有失去和合。內方反駁說：如果和合就能產生看見，那麼沒有看見的人（修妒路，Sutra）是怎麼回事？你認為和合才能看見顏色。如果說只是眼睛看見顏色，只是意識獲取顏色，這種說法是不對的。外方說：接受和合，所以獲取顏色才能成立（修妒路，Sutra）。你接受和合，那麼就有和合。如果有和合，就應該能夠獲取顏色。內方反駁說：意識不是看見，眼睛不是知覺，顏色不是看見也不是知覺，怎麼能看見呢（修妒路，Sutra）？意識和眼睛不同，意識不是看見的相狀。因為不是看見的相狀，所以不能看見眼睛。顏色由四大構成，不是知覺的相狀。因為不是知覺的相狀，所以不能知覺顏色。也不是看見的相狀，也不是知覺的相狀。像這樣即使和合，怎麼能獲取顏色？耳朵、鼻子、舌頭、身體也可以用同樣的方法來駁斥。

破塵品第六

外方說：應該有情、瓶子等可以獲取的緣故（修妒路，Sutra）。現在明明看見瓶子等各種物體可以獲取，如果各種感官不能獲取各種塵埃，那麼應該用什麼來獲取？所以知道有情能夠獲取瓶子等各種物體。內方反駁說：不是隻有顏色才是瓶子，所以瓶子不是直接可見的（修妒路，Sutra）。瓶子中的顏色可以直接看見，香味等不能看見。不是隻有顏色才是瓶子，香味等合在一起才是瓶子。如果瓶子可以直接看見，那麼香味等也應該可以直接看見，但是卻不能看見。所以瓶子不是直接可見的。外方說：獲取一部分，所以一切都相信獲取了（修妒路，Sutra）。瓶子的一部分可以看見，所以瓶子被稱為直接可見。為什麼呢？因為人們看見瓶子后，就相信自己看見的是瓶子。內方反駁說：如果獲取一部分，就不是全部獲取（修妒路，Sutra）。瓶子的一部分顏色可以看見，香味等部分不能看見。現在一部分不能構成有部分。如果一部分能構成有部分，那麼香味等各種部分也應該可以看見。所以瓶子不是全部都可以看見。這件事

【English Translation】 English version: The externalist says: 'If consciousness is in the body, and color is outside, because color is outside, there is no combination. If there is no combination, one cannot grasp color.' The externalist objects: 'That's not so. The light of consciousness and color combine, therefore one can see (Sutra).' The eye and consciousness combine in the body, and by the power of consciousness, the light of the eye combines with color, and thus one sees color. Therefore, there is no loss of combination.' The internalist refutes: 'If combination gives rise to seeing, what about those who do not see (Sutra)?' You say that combination allows one to see color. If you say that only the eye sees color, and only consciousness grasps color, that is not correct.' The externalist says: 'Receiving combination, therefore grasping color is established (Sutra).' You receive combination, therefore there is combination. If there is combination, one should be able to grasp color.' The internalist refutes: 'Consciousness is not seeing, the eye is not knowing, color is neither seeing nor knowing, how can one see (Sutra)?' Consciousness is different from the eye, consciousness is not the aspect of seeing. Because it is not the aspect of seeing, it cannot see the eye. Color is made of the four great elements, it is not the aspect of knowing. Because it is not the aspect of knowing, it cannot know color. It is neither the aspect of seeing, nor the aspect of knowing. Even if there is combination like this, how can one grasp color? The ear, nose, tongue, and body can also be refuted in the same way.

Chapter Six: Refuting Dust

The externalist says: 'There should be sentient beings, bottles, etc. that can be grasped (Sutra).' Now it is clearly seen that bottles and other objects can be grasped. If the various senses cannot grasp the various dusts, then what should be used to grasp them? Therefore, it is known that sentient beings can grasp bottles and other objects.' The internalist refutes: 'Color alone is not a bottle, therefore a bottle is not directly visible (Sutra).' The color in a bottle can be seen directly, but smell, etc. cannot be seen. Color alone is not a bottle, smell, etc. combined are a bottle. If a bottle could be seen directly, then smell, etc. should also be able to be seen directly, but they cannot be seen. Therefore, a bottle is not directly visible.' The externalist says: 'Grasping a part, therefore everything is believed to be grasped (Sutra).' One part of a bottle can be seen, therefore a bottle is called directly visible. Why? Because after people see a bottle, they believe that what they see is a bottle.' The internalist refutes: 'If one grasps a part, one does not grasp everything (Sutra).' One part of a bottle, the color, can be seen, but the smell, etc. cannot be seen. Now a part cannot constitute a whole. If a part could constitute a whole, then the various parts such as smell should also be able to be seen. Therefore, a bottle cannot be seen entirely. This matter...

如破一破異中說。外曰。有瓶可見。受色現可見故(修妒路)。汝受色現見故。瓶亦應現見。內曰。若此分現見。彼分不現見(修妒路)。汝謂色現見。是事不然。色有形故。彼分中分不現見。以此分障故。彼分亦如是複次如前若收分不一切取彼應答此。外曰。微塵無分故不盡破(修妒路)。微塵無分故。一切現見。有何過。內曰。微塵非現見(修妒路)。汝經言。微塵非現見。是故不能成現見法。若微塵亦現見。與色同破。外曰。瓶應現見。世人信故(修妒路)。世人盡信瓶是現見有用故。內曰。現見無非瓶無(修妒路)。汝謂若不現見瓶。是時無瓶者。是事不然。瓶雖不現見非無瓶。是故瓶非現見外曰。眼合故無過(修妒路)。瓶雖現見相眼未會時人自不見。是瓶非不現見相。內曰。如現見生無有亦非實(修妒路)。若瓶未與眼合時未有異相。后見時有少異相生者。當知此瓶現見相生今實無異相生。是故現見相不生。如現見相生無瓶有亦無。外曰。五身一分破。余分有(修妒路)。五身是瓶。汝破一色。不破香等。今香等不破故應有塵。內曰。若不一切觸云何色等合(修妒路)。汝言。五身為瓶。是語不然。何以故。色等一分是觸。余分非觸。云何觸不觸合。是故非五身為瓶。外曰。瓶合故(修妒路)。色分等各

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如《破一破異中說》所說。外道說：『瓶子是可見的，因為它接受顏色並顯現可見（修妒路）。』你因為接受顏色並顯現可見，所以瓶子也應該顯現可見。內道說：『如果這個部分顯現可見，那個部分就不顯現可見（修妒路）。』你說顏色顯現可見，這是不對的。因為顏色有形狀，它的部分中的部分不顯現可見，因為這個部分遮障了它。那個部分也是如此。再次，如同前面所說，如果收攝部分而不全部取，就應該回答這個問題。外道說：『微塵沒有部分，所以不會完全被破斥（修妒路）。』微塵沒有部分，所以一切都顯現可見，有什麼過失？內道說：『微塵不是顯現可見的（修妒路）。』你的經書說，微塵不是顯現可見的，所以不能成立顯現可見的法。如果微塵也顯現可見，就和顏色一樣被破斥。外道說：『瓶子應該顯現可見，因為世人相信（修妒路）。』世人都相信瓶子是顯現可見的，而且是有用的。內道說：『顯現可見並非沒有瓶子就沒有（修妒路）。』你說如果不顯現可見瓶子，那時就沒有瓶子，這是不對的。瓶子雖然不顯現可見，但並非沒有瓶子。所以瓶子不是顯現可見的。外道說：『眼睛閉合所以沒有過失（修妒路）。』瓶子雖然顯現可見，但眼睛沒有接觸到時，人自己看不見。這是瓶子並非不顯現可見的相。內道說：『如同顯現可見的生起，沒有也有並非真實（修妒路）。』如果瓶子未與眼睛接觸時沒有不同的相，後來看到時有少許不同的相生起，應當知道這個瓶子的顯現可見的相生起，現在實際上沒有不同的相生起。所以顯現可見的相不生起。如同顯現可見的相生起，沒有瓶子有也沒有。外道說：『五身的一部分被破斥，其餘部分存在（修妒路）。』五身是瓶子。你破斥了一種顏色，沒有破斥香等。現在香等沒有被破斥，所以應該有塵。內道說：『如果不一切接觸，顏色等如何結合（修妒路）？』你說五身是瓶子，這話不對。為什麼呢？顏色等的一部分是觸，其餘部分不是觸。如何觸和非觸結合？所以非五身為瓶子。外道說：『瓶子是結合的（修妒路）。』顏色等部分各自

【English Translation】 English version: As stated in the Breaking Down Oneness and Difference. The outsider says: 'A pot is visible because it receives color and appears visible (Sutra [修妒路]).' Because you accept color and appear visible, the pot should also appear visible. The insider says: 'If this part appears visible, that part does not appear visible (Sutra [修妒路]).' You say that color appears visible, but this is not correct. Because color has shape, its part within a part does not appear visible, because this part obstructs it. That part is also the same. Furthermore, as stated before, if you gather parts without taking all of them, you should answer this question. The outsider says: 'A dust mote has no parts, so it cannot be completely refuted (Sutra [修妒路]).' Because a dust mote has no parts, everything appears visible. What fault is there? The insider says: 'A dust mote is not visibly apparent (Sutra [修妒路]).' Your scripture says that a dust mote is not visibly apparent, so it cannot establish the dharma of being visibly apparent. If a dust mote were also visibly apparent, it would be refuted like color. The outsider says: 'A pot should appear visible because people believe it (Sutra [修妒路]).' People all believe that a pot is visibly apparent and useful. The insider says: 'Visible appearance is not such that without a pot, there is no appearance (Sutra [修妒路]).' You say that if a pot does not appear visible, then there is no pot. This is not correct. Although a pot does not appear visible, it is not that there is no pot. Therefore, a pot is not visibly apparent. The outsider says: 'Closing the eyes is not a fault (Sutra [修妒路]).' Although a pot appears visible, when the eyes have not made contact, people themselves do not see it. This is the aspect of the pot not being visibly apparent. The insider says: 'Like the arising of visible appearance, neither non-existence nor existence is real (Sutra [修妒路]).' If there is no different aspect when the pot has not made contact with the eyes, and later, when it is seen, a slightly different aspect arises, you should know that this aspect of the pot's visible appearance arises, but in reality, no different aspect arises. Therefore, the aspect of visible appearance does not arise. Like the arising of visible appearance, neither the absence of a pot nor its presence is real. The outsider says: 'One part of the five aggregates is refuted, the remaining parts exist (Sutra [修妒路]).' The five aggregates are the pot. You refute one color, but you do not refute fragrance, etc. Now that fragrance, etc., have not been refuted, there should be dust. The insider says: 'If there is not complete contact, how do color, etc., combine (Sutra [修妒路])?' You say that the five aggregates are the pot. This statement is not correct. Why? One part of color, etc., is touch, and the remaining part is not touch. How do touch and non-touch combine? Therefore, the five aggregates are not the pot. The outsider says: 'The pot is a combination (Sutra [修妒路]).' The parts of color, etc., each

各不合。而色分等與瓶合。內曰。異除云何瓶觸合(修妒路)。若瓶與觸異者。瓶則非觸。非觸云何與觸合。若除色等。更無瓶法。若無瓶法。云何觸與瓶合。外曰。色應現見信經故(修妒路)。汝經言。色名四大。及四大造。造色分中。色入所攝。是現見。汝云何言無現見色。內曰。四大非眼見。云何生現見(修妒路)。地堅相。水濕相。火熱相。風動相。是四大非眼見者。此所造色應非現見。外曰。身根取故四大有(修妒路)。今身根取四大故四大有。是故火等諸物四大所造亦應有。內曰。火中一切熱故(修妒路)。四大中但火是熱相。余非熱相。今火中四大都是熱相。是故火不為四身。若余不熱不名為火。是故火不為四身。地堅相。水濕相。風動相亦如是。外曰。色應可見。現在時有故(修妒路)。以眼情等現在時取塵故。是名現在時。若眼情等不能取色塵等則無現在時。今實有現在時。是故色可見。內曰。若法后故初亦故(修妒路)。若法后故相現。是相非故時生。初生時已隨有。微故不知。故相轉現。是時可知。如人著屐。初已微故隨之。不覺不知。久則相現。若初無故后亦無。是應常新。若然者故相不應生。是以初微故隨之後則相現。今諸法不住故。則無住時。若無住時。無取塵處。外曰。受新故故。有

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本各不合。而色分等與瓶合。內曰：『異除云何瓶觸合？』（修妒路）。若瓶與觸異者，瓶則非觸。非觸云何與觸合？若除色等，更無瓶法。若無瓶法，云何觸與瓶合？外曰：『色應現見，信經故。』（修妒路）。汝經言：『色名四大，及四大造。造色分中，色入所攝。是現見。』汝云何言無現見色？內曰：『四大非眼見，云何生現見？』（修妒路）。地堅相，水濕相，火熱相，風動相，是四大非眼見者。此所造色應非現見。外曰：『身根取故四大有。』（修妒路）。今身根取四大故四大有。是故火等諸物四大所造亦應有。內曰：『火中一切熱故。』（修妒路）。四大中但火是熱相，余非熱相。今火中四大都是熱相。是故火不為四身。若余不熱不名為火。是故火不為四身。地堅相，水濕相，風動相亦如是。外曰：『色應可見，現在時有故。』（修妒路）。以眼情等現在時取塵故，是名現在時。若眼情等不能取色塵等則無現在時。今實有現在時。是故色可見。內曰：『若法后故初亦故。』（修妒路）。若法后故相現，是相非故時生。初生時已隨有，微故不知。故相轉現，是時可知。如人著屐，初已微故隨之，不覺不知。久則相現。若初無故后亦無。是應常新。若然者故相不應生。是以初微故隨之後則相現。今諸法不住故，則無住時。若無住時，無取塵處。外曰：『受新故故，有。』

【English Translation】 English version They do not combine. And the divisions of form, etc., combine with the pot. The internal says: 'How can the touch of the pot combine when they are different?' (Sūtra). If the pot and touch are different, then the pot is not touch. If it is not touch, how can it combine with touch? If form, etc., are removed, there is no pot-dharma. If there is no pot-dharma, how can touch combine with the pot? The external says: 'Form should be directly seen, because the scripture is believed.' (Sūtra). Your scripture says: 'Form is named the four great elements, and what is made by the four great elements. Among the divisions of made-form, it is included in the realm of form. It is directly seen.' How can you say there is no directly seen form? The internal says: 'The four great elements are not seen by the eye, how can direct seeing arise?' (Sūtra). Earth has the characteristic of solidity, water has the characteristic of wetness, fire has the characteristic of heat, wind has the characteristic of motion. These four great elements are not seen by the eye. The form made by these should not be directly seen. The external says: 'Because the body-sense takes them, the four great elements exist.' (Sūtra). Now, because the body-sense takes the four great elements, the four great elements exist. Therefore, things like fire, which are made by the four great elements, should also exist. The internal says: 'Because everything in fire is hot.' (Sūtra). Among the four great elements, only fire has the characteristic of heat, the others do not have the characteristic of heat. Now, in fire, all four great elements are hot. Therefore, fire is not constituted by the four bodies. If the rest is not hot, it is not called fire. Therefore, fire is not constituted by the four bodies. The same is true for the characteristic of solidity of earth, the characteristic of wetness of water, and the characteristic of motion of wind. The external says: 'Form should be visible, because it exists in the present time.' (Sūtra). Because the eye-sense, etc., take dust in the present time, it is called the present time. If the eye-sense, etc., cannot take form-dust, etc., then there is no present time. Now, there really is a present time. Therefore, form is visible. The internal says: 'If a dharma is old later, then it was also old initially.' (Sūtra). If a dharma's characteristic appears later, this characteristic is not born at the time of oldness. It already existed when it was first born, but it was subtle and not known. The old characteristic transforms and appears, and then it can be known. It is like a person wearing shoes. Initially, it is subtle and follows along, without being felt or known. After a long time, the characteristic appears. If it did not exist initially, then it will not exist later either. It should always be new. If that is the case, then the old characteristic should not arise. Therefore, it is because it was subtle initially that it follows along, and then the characteristic appears later. Now, because all dharmas do not abide, there is no time of abiding. If there is no time of abiding, there is no place to take dust. The external says: 'Because of the newness and oldness of sensation, there is.'

現在時(修妒路)。汝受新相故相。觀生時名為新。觀異時名為故。是二相非過去時可取。亦非未來時可取。以現在時故。新故相可取。內曰。不然。生故新。異故故(修妒路)。若法久生新相已過是新相。異新則名故。若故相生故則為新。是新是故但有言說。第一義中無新無中無故。外曰。若爾得何利。內曰。得永離(修妒路)。若新不作中。中不作故。如種子芽莖節壞華實等各不合。各不合故諸法不住。不住故遠離。遠離故不可得取。

破因中有果品第七

外曰。諸法非不住。有不失故。無不生故(修妒路)。有相諸法如泥團。從團底。從底腹。從腹咽。從咽口。前後為因果。種種果生時。種種因不失。若因中無果。果則不生。但因變為果。是故有諸法。內曰。若果生故有不失。因失故有失(修妒路)。汝言瓶果生時泥團不失。瓶即是泥團。若瓶果生。是時失泥團因故。是則無因。若泥團不失。不應分別泥團瓶有異。今實見形．時．力．知．名等有異故有應失。外曰。如指屈申(修妒路)。指雖屈申形異。實是一指。如是泥團形瓶形雖異。而泥不異。內曰。不然業能異故(修妒路)。屈申是指業。指是能。若業即是能者。屈時應失指。複次屈申應是一。如汝經泥團即是瓶故。指喻非也。外曰。如少壯

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本現在時（修妒路 Sutra）。你接受新的狀態，因此有『新』的狀態。觀察出生時，稱之為『新』。觀察變化時，稱之為『故』。這兩種狀態不是過去時可以獲取的，也不是未來時可以獲取的。因為是現在時，所以『新』和『故』的狀態可以被獲取。內方說：不對。因為產生而有『新』，因為變化而有『故』（修妒路 Sutra）。如果一個法持續產生，『新』的狀態已經過去，這種『新』的變化就叫做『故』。如果『故』的狀態產生，那麼它就是『新』的。這個『新』和『故』只是言語上的表達。在第一義諦中，沒有『新』，沒有『中』，沒有『故』。外方說：如果這樣，能得到什麼利益？內方說：能得到永遠的解脫（修妒路 Sutra）。如果『新』不變成『中』，『中』不變成『故』，就像種子、芽、莖、節、壞、花、果實等，各自不相合。因為各自不相合，所以諸法不住留。因為不住留，所以遠離。因為遠離，所以不可得取。

破因中有果品第七

外方說：諸法不是不住留的，因為有不失壞的，沒有不產生的（修妒路 Sutra）。有相的諸法就像泥團。從泥團的底部，從底部到腹部，從腹部到頸部，從頸部到口部，前後是因果關係。種種果產生時，種種因沒有失壞。如果因中沒有果，果就不會產生。只是因轉變為果。所以有諸法。內方說：如果果因為產生而有不失壞，那麼因因為失壞而有失壞（修妒路 Sutra）。你說瓶子這個果產生時，泥團沒有失壞。瓶子就是泥團。如果瓶子這個果產生，這時就失去了泥團這個因，那麼就沒有因了。如果泥團沒有失壞，就不應該區分泥團和瓶子有不同。現在確實看到形狀、時間、力量、知識、名稱等有不同，所以應該有失壞。外方說：就像手指的屈伸（修妒路 Sutra）。手指雖然屈伸，形狀不同，但實際上是一個手指。像這樣，泥團的形狀和瓶子的形狀雖然不同，但是泥土沒有不同。內方說：不對，因為業能夠使之不同（修妒路 Sutra）。屈伸是指的業，手指是能。如果業就是能，那麼屈的時候應該失去手指。再次，屈伸應該是一樣的，就像你說的泥團就是瓶子一樣，所以手指的比喻是不對的。外方說：就像少壯

【English Translation】 English version Present Time (Sutra). You accept new states, therefore there is a 'new' state. Observing the time of birth, it is called 'new'. Observing the time of change, it is called 'old'. These two states cannot be obtained in the past, nor can they be obtained in the future. Because it is the present time, the states of 'new' and 'old' can be obtained. The internal party says: That's not right. Because of production, there is 'new', and because of change, there is 'old' (Sutra). If a dharma continues to arise, and the 'new' state has passed, this change of 'new' is called 'old'. If the 'old' state arises, then it is 'new'. This 'new' and 'old' are just verbal expressions. In the ultimate truth, there is no 'new', no 'middle', and no 'old'. The external party says: If so, what benefit can be obtained? The internal party says: Eternal liberation can be obtained (Sutra). If 'new' does not become 'middle', and 'middle' does not become 'old', like seeds, sprouts, stems, nodes, decay, flowers, fruits, etc., they do not combine with each other. Because they do not combine with each other, all dharmas do not abide. Because they do not abide, they are far away. Because they are far away, they cannot be obtained.

Chapter Seven: Refuting the Existence of the Result in the Cause

The external party says: Dharmas do not not abide, because there are things that are not lost, and there is nothing that is not produced (Sutra). Dharmas with characteristics are like a lump of clay. From the bottom of the lump, from the bottom to the belly, from the belly to the neck, from the neck to the mouth, the front and back are cause and effect. When various results arise, various causes are not lost. If there is no result in the cause, the result will not arise. It is just that the cause transforms into the result. Therefore, there are dharmas. The internal party says: If the result has no loss because of arising, then the cause has loss because of loss (Sutra). You say that when the result of the pot arises, the lump of clay is not lost. The pot is the lump of clay. If the result of the pot arises, then the cause of the lump of clay is lost, so there is no cause. If the lump of clay is not lost, then there should be no distinction between the lump of clay and the pot. Now we actually see differences in shape, time, strength, knowledge, name, etc., so there should be loss. The external party says: Like the bending and stretching of a finger (Sutra). Although the finger bends and stretches, the shape is different, but it is actually one finger. In this way, although the shape of the lump of clay and the shape of the pot are different, the clay is not different. The internal party says: That's not right, because karma can make them different (Sutra). Bending and stretching refers to karma, and the finger is the ability. If karma is the ability, then the finger should be lost when bending. Furthermore, bending and stretching should be the same, just like you said that the lump of clay is the pot, so the analogy of the finger is not correct. The external party says: Like youth and old age

老(修妒路)。如一人身亦少亦壯亦老。因果亦如是。內曰。不一故(修妒路)。少不作壯。壯不作老。是故汝喻非也。複次若有不失。無失(修妒路)。若有不失者。泥團不應變為瓶。是則無瓶。若有不失者。無無故亦不應失。然則都無失。外曰。無失有何咎(修妒路)。若常故無失。泥團不應變為瓶。無無常有何過。內曰。若無無常。無罪福等(修妒路)。若無無常。罪福等悉亦當無。何以故。罪人常為罪人。不應為福。福人常無福人。不應為罪。罪福等者。佈施竊盜。持戒犯戒等。如是皆無。外曰。因中先有果。因有故(修妒路)。若泥中先無瓶。泥不應為瓶因。內曰。若因先有果故有果。果無故因無果(修妒路)。若泥團作瓶。泥不失故。因中有果。是瓶若破。應因中無果。外曰。因果一故(修妒路)。如土因泥果。泥因瓶果。因變為果。更無異法。是故不應因中無果。內曰。若因果一。無未來(修妒路)。如泥團現在。瓶為未來。若因果一。則無未來。無未來故。亦無現在。無現在故亦無過去。如是三世亂。外曰。名等失名等生故(修妒路)。更無新法。而故法不失。但名隨時異。如一泥團為瓶。瓶破為瓫瓫破還為泥。如是都無去來。瓶瓫安在。但隨時得名。其實無異。內曰。若爾因無果(修妒路)。若名

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本老(修妒路，Sutras)。譬如一個人的身體，有年少、壯年和老年各個階段。因果關係也是如此。外道說：『不是一樣的緣故(修妒路，Sutras)。少年不會變成壯年，壯年也不會變成老年。所以你的比喻是不對的。』內道反駁：『再者，如果存在不失壞的，以及沒有失壞的(修妒路，Sutras)。如果存在不失壞的，那麼泥團就不應該變成瓶子，這樣就應該沒有瓶子。如果存在不失壞的，沒有無常的緣故，也不應該失壞。這樣就根本沒有失壞。』外道說：『沒有失壞有什麼過錯呢(修妒路，Sutras)？如果因為常住的緣故沒有失壞，泥團就不應該變成瓶子。沒有無常有什麼過錯呢？』內道反駁：『如果沒有無常，就沒有罪福等等(修妒路，Sutras)。如果沒有無常，罪福等等都應當沒有。為什麼呢？罪人永遠是罪人，不應該有福報。有福之人永遠是有福之人，不應該有罪過。罪福等等，比如佈施和偷盜，持戒和犯戒等等，這些都將不存在。』外道說：『因為果在因中已經存在，因為有因的緣故(修妒路，Sutras)。如果泥土中先前沒有瓶子，泥土就不應該成為瓶子的因。』內道反駁：『如果因為因中先前有果的緣故而有果，果不存在的緣故，因就沒有果(修妒路，Sutras)。如果泥團變成瓶子，泥團沒有失壞的緣故，因中就有果。如果瓶子破碎，就應該因中沒有果。』外道說：『因為因果是一體的緣故(修妒路，Sutras)。比如土是泥的因，泥是瓶的果。因變成果，沒有其他的法。所以不應該因中沒有果。』內道反駁：『如果因果是一體的，就沒有未來(修妒路，Sutras)。比如泥團是現在，瓶子是未來。如果因果是一體的，就沒有未來。沒有未來，也就沒有現在。沒有現在，也就沒有過去。這樣三世就混亂了。』外道說：『因為名稱等等消失，名稱等等產生(修妒路，Sutras)。沒有新的法，而舊的法沒有消失。只是名稱隨著時間變化。比如一個泥團變成瓶子，瓶子破碎變成瓦片，瓦片破碎又變成泥土。這樣都沒有來去。瓶子和瓦片在哪裡呢？只是隨著時間得到不同的名稱，其實沒有不同。』內道反駁：『如果這樣，因中就沒有果(修妒路，Sutras)。如果名稱

【English Translation】 English version Old (Sutras). For example, a person's body has stages of youth, adulthood, and old age. The cause and effect relationship is also like this. The outsider says: 'It is not the same reason (Sutras). Youth will not become adulthood, and adulthood will not become old age. So your analogy is not correct.' The insider refutes: 'Furthermore, if there exists something that does not perish, and something that has not perished (Sutras). If there exists something that does not perish, then the lump of clay should not become a bottle, so there should be no bottle. If there exists something that does not perish, due to the absence of impermanence, it should not perish either. Then there is no perishing at all.' The outsider says: 'What is wrong with not perishing (Sutras)? If it does not perish because of permanence, the lump of clay should not become a bottle. What is wrong with not having impermanence?' The insider refutes: 'If there is no impermanence, there are no merits and demerits, etc. (Sutras). If there is no impermanence, merits and demerits should all be absent. Why? A sinner is always a sinner and should not have blessings. A blessed person is always a blessed person and should not have sins. Merits and demerits, such as giving and stealing, upholding precepts and breaking precepts, etc., will all not exist.' The outsider says: 'Because the effect already exists in the cause, because there is a cause (Sutras). If there was no bottle in the clay beforehand, the clay should not be the cause of the bottle.' The insider refutes: 'If there is an effect because the effect already exists in the cause, because the effect does not exist, the cause has no effect (Sutras). If the lump of clay becomes a bottle, because the lump of clay has not perished, there is an effect in the cause. If the bottle breaks, there should be no effect in the cause.' The outsider says: 'Because cause and effect are one (Sutras). For example, earth is the cause of clay, and clay is the effect of the bottle. The cause becomes the effect, and there is no other dharma. So there should not be no effect in the cause.' The insider refutes: 'If cause and effect are one, there is no future (Sutras). For example, the lump of clay is the present, and the bottle is the future. If cause and effect are one, there is no future. Without the future, there is no present either. Without the present, there is no past either. Thus, the three times are confused.' The outsider says: 'Because names, etc., disappear, and names, etc., arise (Sutras). There is no new dharma, and the old dharma has not disappeared. Only the name changes with time. For example, a lump of clay becomes a bottle, the bottle breaks and becomes a tile, and the tile breaks and becomes clay again. Thus, there is no coming or going. Where are the bottle and the tile? They only get different names with time, but in reality, there is no difference.' The insider refutes: 'If so, there is no effect in the cause (Sutras). If the name'

失名生者。此名先無後有故因中無果。若名先有泥即是瓶。是故知非先有果。外曰。不定故(修妒路)。泥團中不定出一器。是故泥中不定有名。內曰若泥不定果亦不定(修妒路)。若泥團中瓶不定。汝言因中先有果亦不定。外曰。微形有故(修妒路)。泥團中瓶形微故難知。陶師力故。是時明瞭。泥中瓶雖不可知。當知泥中必有微形。有二種不可知。或無故不知。或有以因緣故不知。因緣有八。何等八。遠故不知。如遠國土。近故不知。如眼睫。根壞故不知。如聾盲。心不住故不知。如人意亂。細故不知。如微塵。障故不知。如壁外事。勝故不知。如大水少鹽。相似故不知。如一粒米投大聚中。如是泥團中瓶。眼雖不見。要不從蒲出。是故微瓶定在泥中。內曰。若先有微形因無果(修妒路)。若瓶未生時。泥中有微形。后粗時可知者。是則因中無果。何以故。本無粗相后乃生故。是以因中無果。外曰。因中應有果。各取因故(修妒路)。因中應先有果。何以故。作瓶取泥不取蒲。若因中無果者。亦可取蒲。而人定知泥能生瓶。埏埴成器。堪受燒故。是以因中有果。內曰。若當有有。若當無無(修妒路)。汝言。泥中當出瓶故。因中先有果。今瓶破故應當無果。是以因中無果。外曰。生住壞次第有故無過(修妒路)。

瓶中雖有破相。要先生次住后破。何以故。未生無破故。內曰。若先生非后無果同(修妒路)。若泥中有瓶生便壞者。何故要先生后壞。不先壞後生。汝言。未生故無破。如是瓶未生時。無住無壞。此二先無後有故。因中無果。外曰。汝破有果故。有斷過(修妒路)。若因中有果為非者。應因中無果。若因中無果。則墮斷滅。內曰。續故不斷。壞故不常(修妒路)。汝不知耶。從穀子牙等相續故不斷。穀子等因壞故不常。如是諸佛說十二分因緣生法。離因中有果。無果故不著斷常。行中道入涅槃。

破因中無果品第八

外曰。生有故一當成(修妒路)。汝言因緣故諸法生。是生若因中先有。若因中先無。此生有故。必當有一。內曰。生無生不生(修妒路)。若有生。因中先有。因中先無。如是思惟不可得。何況無生。汝若有瓶生。為瓶初瓶時有耶。為泥團后非瓶時有耶。若瓶初瓶時有瓶生者。是事不然何以故。瓶已有故。是初中后共相因待。若無中后則無初。若有瓶初。必有中后。是故瓶已先有。生復何用。若泥團后非瓶時瓶生者。是亦不然。何以故。未有故。若瓶無初中后。是則無瓶。若無瓶云何有瓶生。複次若有瓶生。若泥團后瓶時應有。若瓶初泥團時應有。泥團后瓶時無瓶生。何以故。已有故亦非

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：外曰：即使瓶子已經有了破損的跡象，也應該是先有存在，然後才有破損。這是為什麼呢？因為沒有產生，所以就沒有破損。內曰：如果先生（產生）之後，沒有結果，那就和修妒路（sutra，經）所說的一樣了。如果泥土中有瓶子產生，然後又壞掉，那麼為什麼要先產生后壞掉呢？為什麼不先壞掉后產生呢？你說，因為沒有產生，所以就沒有破損。如果這樣，瓶子在沒有產生的時候，就沒有存在，也沒有壞掉。這兩種情況都是先沒有，後有，所以原因中沒有結果。外曰：你破斥原因中有結果，所以有斷滅的過失（修妒路）。如果原因中有結果是不對的，那麼原因中就應該沒有結果。如果原因中沒有結果，那就墮入了斷滅論。內曰：因為相續不斷，所以不是斷滅；因為會壞滅，所以不是常恒（修妒路）。你難道不知道嗎？從穀子的種子到牙等，都是相續不斷的，所以不是斷滅；穀子的種子等原因會壞滅，所以不是常恒。諸佛就是這樣宣說十二因緣生法，既不認為原因中有結果，也不認為原因中沒有結果，所以不執著于斷滅和常恒，行於中道，進入涅槃。

破因中無果品第八

外曰：因為有產生，所以一定有一個東西會形成（修妒路）。你說因為因緣和合，所以諸法產生。這個產生，如果原因中先有，或者原因中先沒有。這個產生因為有，所以必定會有一個東西形成。內曰：產生不是產生，不產生也不是產生（修妒路）。如果是有產生，那麼原因中是先有，還是原因中先沒有呢？這樣思考是得不到答案的。更何況是沒有產生呢？如果你說有瓶子的產生，那麼是在瓶子最初是瓶子的時候有產生呢？還是在泥團後來不是瓶子的時候有產生呢？如果在瓶子最初是瓶子的時候有瓶子的產生，這是不對的。為什麼呢？因為瓶子已經存在了。這個最初、中間、最後是互相依賴的。如果沒有中間和最後，就沒有最初。如果有瓶子的最初，就一定有中間和最後。所以瓶子已經先存在了，產生又有什麼用呢？如果在泥團後來不是瓶子的時候瓶子產生，這也是不對的。為什麼呢？因為還沒有存在。如果瓶子沒有最初、中間、最後，那就沒有瓶子。如果沒有瓶子，怎麼會有瓶子的產生呢？再次，如果有瓶子的產生，那麼應該在泥團後來是瓶子的時候有，或者在瓶子最初是泥團的時候有。泥團後來是瓶子的時候沒有瓶子的產生。為什麼呢？因為已經存在了，也不是。

【English Translation】 English version: Outsider: Even if there are signs of breakage in a pot, there must first be existence, and then breakage. Why is that? Because there is no breakage without arising. Insider: If there is arising without a result, it is the same as stated in the sutra. If a pot arises from clay and then breaks, why must it first arise and then break? Why not break first and then arise? You say that because there is no arising, there is no breakage. If so, when the pot has not yet arisen, there is neither existence nor breakage. Both of these are first non-existent and then existent, so there is no result in the cause. Outsider: You refute the existence of a result in the cause, so there is the fault of annihilation (sutra). If it is incorrect that there is a result in the cause, then there should be no result in the cause. If there is no result in the cause, then one falls into annihilationism. Insider: Because of continuity, it is not annihilation; because of destruction, it is not permanence (sutra). Don't you know? From the seed of grain to the sprout, there is continuity, so it is not annihilation; the cause of the seed of grain, etc., is destroyed, so it is not permanence. Thus, the Buddhas speak of the twelve links of dependent origination, neither asserting that there is a result in the cause nor that there is no result in the cause, so they do not cling to annihilation or permanence, and they follow the Middle Way to enter Nirvana (Nirvana, liberation).

Chapter Eight: Refuting the Absence of Result in the Cause

Outsider: Because there is arising, one thing must be formed (sutra). You say that because of conditions, all dharmas (dharmas, phenomena) arise. If this arising is pre-existent in the cause, or non-existent in the cause, because this arising exists, one thing must be formed. Insider: Arising is not arising, and non-arising is not arising (sutra). If there is arising, is it pre-existent in the cause, or non-existent in the cause? Thinking in this way yields no answer. How much more so with non-arising? If you say there is the arising of a pot, does it arise when the pot is first a pot, or does it arise when the clay is later not a pot? If the arising of the pot occurs when the pot is first a pot, this is not correct. Why is that? Because the pot already exists. This beginning, middle, and end are mutually dependent. If there is no middle and end, there is no beginning. If there is a beginning of the pot, there must be a middle and end. Therefore, the pot already exists, so what is the use of arising? If the pot arises when the clay is later not a pot, this is also not correct. Why is that? Because it does not yet exist. If the pot has no beginning, middle, and end, then there is no pot. If there is no pot, how can there be the arising of a pot? Furthermore, if there is the arising of a pot, it should occur when the clay is later a pot, or when the pot is first clay. There is no arising of a pot when the clay is later a pot. Why is that? Because it already exists, and it is not.

瓶初泥團時有瓶生。何以故。未有故。外曰。生時生故無咎(修妒路)。我不言若已生。若未生有瓶生。第二法生時是生。內曰。生時亦如是(修妒路)。生時如先說。若生是則生已若未生。云何有生。生時名半生半未生。二俱過。亦如前破。是故無生。外曰。產生一義故(修妒路)。我不言瓶生已有生。亦不言未生有生。今瓶現成。是即瓶生。內曰。若爾生后(修妒路)。成名生已。若無生無初無中。若無初亦無中無成。是故不應以成為生。生在後故。外曰。初中后次第生故無咎(修妒路)。泥團次第生瓶底腹咽口等。初中后次第生。非泥團次有成瓶。是故非泥團時有瓶生。亦非瓶時有瓶生。亦非無瓶生。內曰。初中后非次第生(修妒路)。初名無前有後。中名有前有後。后名有前無後。如是初中后共相因待。若離云何有。是故初中后不應次第生。一時生亦不然(修妒路)。若一時生。不應言是初是中是后。亦不相因待。是故不然。外曰。如生住壞(修妒路)。如有為相。生住壞次第有。初中后亦如是。內曰。生住壞亦如是(修妒路)。若次第有。若一時有。是二不然。何以故。無住則無生。若無住有生者。亦應無生有住壞亦如是。若一時。不應分別是生是住是壞。複次一切處有一切(修妒路)。一切處名三有為相

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本外曰：最初的泥團狀態存在時，瓶子就產生了。為什麼呢？內曰：因為還沒有原因（修妒路 Sutra，經）。外曰：在產生的時候產生，所以沒有過失（修妒路 Sutra，經）。內曰：我不是說如果已經產生，或者沒有產生，瓶子就會產生。第二種法產生的時候就是產生。內曰：產生的時候也像這樣（修妒路 Sutra，經）。產生的時候就像先前所說的那樣。如果產生就是已經產生，如果未產生，怎麼會有產生呢？產生的時候，名稱是半產生半未產生。這兩種說法都已過去。也像前面那樣破斥。所以沒有產生。外曰：產生是一個意思（修妒路 Sutra，經）。內曰：我不是說瓶子產生的時候已經有產生，也不是說未產生的時候有產生。現在瓶子已經顯現完成，這就是瓶子的產生。內曰：如果這樣，那麼產生之後（修妒路 Sutra，經）。完成的名稱就是已經產生。如果沒有產生，就沒有開始，沒有中間。如果沒有開始，也就沒有中間，沒有完成。所以不應該以完成作為產生。因為產生在完成之後。外曰：開始、中間、後來依次產生，所以沒有過失（修妒路 Sutra，經）。泥團依次產生瓶底、腹部、頸部、口部等等。開始、中間、後來依次產生。不是泥團依次有完成的瓶子。所以不是泥團狀態的時候有瓶子的產生。也不是瓶子狀態的時候有瓶子的產生。也不是沒有瓶子的時候產生瓶子。內曰：開始、中間、後來不是依次產生（修妒路 Sutra，經）。開始的名稱是沒有前面有後面。中間的名稱是有前面有後面。後來的名稱是有前面沒有後面。像這樣，開始、中間、後來互相依賴。如果離開，怎麼會有呢？所以開始、中間、後來不應該依次產生。一時產生也不對（修妒路 Sutra，經）。如果一時產生，不應該說是開始、是中間、是後來。也不互相依賴。所以不對。外曰：就像生、住、壞（修妒路 Sutra，經）。就像有為相，生、住、壞依次存在。開始、中間、後來也像這樣。內曰：生、住、壞也像這樣（修妒路 Sutra，經）。如果依次存在，或者一時存在。這兩種說法都不對。為什麼呢？沒有住就沒有生。如果沒有住而有產生，也應該沒有生而有住。壞也像這樣。如果一時，不應該分別是生、是住、是壞。再次，一切處有一切（修妒路 Sutra，經）。一切處名稱是三有為相（Samskrta-laksana，有為法的特徵）。

【English Translation】 English version Questioner: When the initial lump of clay exists, the pot is produced. Why is that? Answerer: Because there is no cause yet (Sutra). Questioner: It is produced at the time of production, so there is no fault (Sutra). Answerer: I am not saying that if it has already been produced, or has not been produced, the pot will be produced. The second dharma is produced at the time of production. Answerer: It is also like this at the time of production (Sutra). It is like what was said before at the time of production. If it is produced, then it has already been produced. If it has not been produced, how can there be production? At the time of production, the name is half-produced and half-unproduced. Both of these statements have passed. It is also refuted as before. Therefore, there is no production. Questioner: Production and completion are the same meaning (Sutra). Answerer: I am not saying that when the pot is produced, there is already production, nor am I saying that when it is not produced, there is production. Now the pot is manifested and completed, and that is the production of the pot. Answerer: If that is the case, then after production (Sutra). The name of completion is already produced. If there is no production, there is no beginning, no middle. If there is no beginning, there is no middle, no completion. Therefore, one should not take completion as production. Because production is after completion. Questioner: The beginning, middle, and end are produced in sequence, so there is no fault (Sutra). The lump of clay produces the bottom, belly, neck, mouth, etc. of the pot in sequence. The beginning, middle, and end are produced in sequence. It is not that the lump of clay sequentially has a completed pot. Therefore, it is not that when there is a lump of clay, there is the production of a pot. Nor is it that when there is a pot, there is the production of a pot. Nor is it that when there is no pot, a pot is produced. Answerer: The beginning, middle, and end are not produced in sequence (Sutra). The name of the beginning is having an end without a beginning. The name of the middle is having a beginning and an end. The name of the end is having a beginning without an end. Like this, the beginning, middle, and end depend on each other. If they are separated, how can there be? Therefore, the beginning, middle, and end should not be produced in sequence. It is also not correct to produce them at the same time (Sutra). If they are produced at the same time, one should not say that it is the beginning, the middle, or the end. Nor do they depend on each other. Therefore, it is not correct. Questioner: Like arising, abiding, and ceasing (Sutra). Like conditioned characteristics, arising, abiding, and ceasing exist in sequence. The beginning, middle, and end are also like this. Answerer: Arising, abiding, and ceasing are also like this (Sutra). If they exist in sequence, or exist at the same time. Both of these statements are incorrect. Why is that? Without abiding, there is no arising. If there is arising without abiding, there should also be abiding without arising. Ceasing is also like this. If it is at the same time, one should not distinguish between arising, abiding, and ceasing. Furthermore, everything is in every place (Sutra). The name of everything is the three conditioned characteristics (Samskrta-laksana).

。若生住壞亦有為相者。今生中應有三相。是有為法故。一一中復有三相。然則無窮。住壞亦如是。若生住壞中更無三相。今生住壞不名有為相。若汝謂生生共生如父子。是事不然。如是生生若因中先有相待。若因中先無相待。若因中先少有。少無相待。是三種破情中已說。複次如父先有然後生子。是父更有父。是故此喻非也。外曰。定有生。可生法有故(修妒路)。若有生有可生若無生則無可生。今瓶等可生法現有故必有生。內曰。若有生無可生(修妒路)。若瓶有生瓶則已生不名可生。何以故。若無瓶亦無瓶生。是故若有生則無可生。何況無生。複次自他共亦如是(修妒路)。若生可生是二。若自生若他生。若共生。破吉中已說。外曰。定有。生可生共成故(修妒路)。非先有生後有可生。一時共成。內曰。生可生不能生(修妒路)。若可生能成生者。則生是可生。不名能生。若無生何有可生。是故二事皆無。複次有無相待不然(修妒路)。今可生未有故。無生則是有。有無何得相待。是故皆無。外曰。生可生相待故諸法成(修妒路)。非但生可生相待成。是二相待故。瓶等諸物成。內曰。若從二生。何以無三(修妒路)。汝言生可生相待故諸法成。若從二生果者。何不有第三法。如父母生子。今離生可生。更無

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果生、住、壞也有有為相，那麼現在生之中應該有三種相，因為它是有為法。每一種相中又各有三種相，這樣就會無窮無盡。住和壞也是如此。如果生、住、壞中不再有三種相，那麼生、住、壞就不能稱為有為相。如果你們認為生生相生，如同父子，這是不對的。像這樣，生生相生，如果因中先有相待，或者因中先無相待，或者因中先少有、少無相待，這三種破斥已經在前面說過了。而且，如同父親先存在然後生兒子，那麼這個父親又應該有父親，所以這個比喻是不恰當的。外道說：『一定有生，因為可生之法存在（修妒路 Sutra）。如果存在生，就有可生；如果沒有生，就沒有可生。現在瓶子等可生之法已經存在，所以必定有生。』內道說：『如果存在生，就沒有可生（修妒路 Sutra）。如果瓶子有生，那麼瓶子就已經產生了，不能稱為可生。為什麼呢？如果沒有瓶子，也就沒有瓶子的生。所以，如果存在生，就沒有可生，更何況沒有生呢？』而且，自己、他、共同也是如此（修妒路 Sutra）。如果生和可生是二者，無論是自生、他生，還是共生，這些破斥已經在前面說過了。外道說：『一定有生，因為生和可生共同成就（修妒路 Sutra）。不是先生有生，後有可生，而是一時共同成就。』內道說：『生和可生不能生（修妒路 Sutra）。如果可生能夠成就生，那麼生就是可生，不能稱為能生。如果沒有生，哪裡來的可生呢？所以這兩者都是不存在的。』而且，有和無相互對待是不成立的（修妒路 Sutra）。現在可生還沒有存在，所以沒有生就是有。有和無怎麼能夠相互對待呢？所以這些都是不存在的。外道說：『生和可生相互對待，所以諸法才能成就（修妒路 Sutra）。不僅僅是生和可生相互對待才能成就，而是這兩者相互對待，瓶子等諸物才能成就。』內道說：『如果從二者產生，為什麼沒有第三者（修妒路 Sutra）？你們說生和可生相互對待，所以諸法才能成就。如果從二者產生結果，為什麼沒有第三種法，如同父母生孩子？現在離開了生和可生，不再有第三者。

【English Translation】 English version: If origination, duration, and decay also have the characteristics of conditioned phenomena, then within origination itself, there should be three characteristics, because it is a conditioned phenomenon. And within each of these characteristics, there are again three characteristics, leading to an infinite regress. The same applies to duration and decay. If origination, duration, and decay do not have these three characteristics, then they cannot be called characteristics of conditioned phenomena. If you argue that origination gives rise to origination, like father and son, that is not correct. In this way, if origination giving rise to origination depends on prior existence in the cause, or depends on prior non-existence in the cause, or depends on a little existence and a little non-existence in the cause, these three refutations have already been discussed earlier. Moreover, just as a father exists first and then gives birth to a son, then that father should also have a father, so this analogy is inappropriate. The externalist says: 'There must be origination, because the potential for origination exists (修妒路 Sutra).' If origination exists, then there is the potential for origination; if there is no origination, there is no potential for origination. Now, the potential for origination, such as a pot, exists, so there must be origination.' The internalist says: 'If origination exists, there is no potential for origination (修妒路 Sutra).' If a pot has origination, then the pot has already arisen and cannot be called potential for origination. Why? If there is no pot, there is no origination of the pot. Therefore, if origination exists, there is no potential for origination, let alone no origination.' Moreover, self, other, and both are also like this (修妒路 Sutra). If origination and potential for origination are two, whether it is self-origination, other-origination, or both-origination, these refutations have already been discussed earlier. The externalist says: 'There must be origination, because origination and potential for origination accomplish it together (修妒路 Sutra). It is not that origination exists first and then potential for origination exists later, but they accomplish it together at the same time.' The internalist says: 'Origination and potential for origination cannot originate (修妒路 Sutra).' If potential for origination can accomplish origination, then origination is potential for origination and cannot be called capable of origination. If there is no origination, where does potential for origination come from? Therefore, both of these do not exist.' Moreover, the mutual dependence of existence and non-existence is not established (修妒路 Sutra). Now, potential for origination does not yet exist, so the absence of origination is existence. How can existence and non-existence depend on each other? Therefore, all of these do not exist. The externalist says: 'Origination and potential for origination depend on each other, so all phenomena can be accomplished (修妒路 Sutra). It is not only that origination and potential for origination depend on each other to be accomplished, but these two depend on each other, so all things like pots can be accomplished.' The internalist says: 'If it arises from two, why is there no third (修妒路 Sutra)?' You say that origination and potential for origination depend on each other, so all phenomena can be accomplished. If a result arises from two, why is there no third phenomenon, like parents giving birth to a child? Now, apart from origination and potential for origination, there is no third.

有瓶等第三法。是故不然。外曰。應有生因壞故(修妒路)。若果不生因不應壞。今見瓶因壞故應有生。內曰。因壞故生亦滅(修妒路)。若果生者。是果為因壞時有耶。為壞後有耶。若因壞時有者。與壞不異故生亦滅。若壞後有者。因已壞故無因。無因故果不應生。複次因中果定故(修妒路)。若因中先有果先無果。二俱無生。何以故。若因中無果者。何以但泥中有瓶。縷中有布。若其俱無。泥應有布。縷應有瓶。若因中先有果者。是因中是果生。是事不然。何以故。是因即是果。汝法因果不異故。是故因中若先有果。若先無果。是皆不生。複次因果多故(修妒路)。若因中先有果者。則乳中有酪酥等。亦酥中有酪乳等。若乳中有酪酥等。則一因中多果。若酥中有酪乳等。則一果中多因。如是先後因果一時俱有過。若因中無果亦如是過。是故因中有果無果。是皆無生。外曰。因果不破故。生可產生(修妒路)。汝言因中多果。果中多因。為過不言無因果。是故生可產生。內曰。物物。非物非物互不生(修妒路)。物不生物。非物不生非物。物不生非物。非物不生物。若物生物。如母生子者。是則不然。何以故。母實不生子。子先有從母出故。若謂從母血分生。以為物生物者。是亦不然。何以故。離血分等母不可得故

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本有瓶等第三法。因此說不然。外道說：『應該有生，因為因會壞滅（修妒路 Sutra）。如果果不生，因就不應該壞滅。現在看到瓶子的因壞滅，所以應該有生。』內道說：『因為因壞滅，所以生也滅（修妒路 Sutra）。如果果是生出來的，那麼這個果是在因壞滅的時候有呢？還是在壞滅之後有呢？如果因壞滅的時候有，那麼和壞滅沒有區別，所以生也滅了。如果壞滅之後有，那麼因已經壞滅了，所以沒有因。沒有因，所以果不應該生。』再者，因中果是決定的（修妒路 Sutra）。如果因中先有果，或者先無果，這兩種情況都不會有生。為什麼呢？如果因中沒有果，為什麼只有泥土中有瓶子，絲線中有布？如果什麼都沒有，泥土就應該有布，絲線就應該有瓶子。如果因中先有果，那麼就是因中生果，這是不對的。為什麼呢？因為因就是果，你們的法認為因果沒有區別。所以，因中如果先有果，或者先無果，都不會有生。再者，因果很多（修妒路 Sutra）。如果因中先有果，那麼牛奶中就有奶酪、酥油等，酥油中也有奶酪、牛奶等。如果牛奶中有奶酪、酥油等，那麼一個因中就有多個果。如果酥油中有奶酪、牛奶等，那麼一個果中就有多個因。這樣，先後因果同時都存在過失。如果因中沒有果，也有同樣的過失。所以，因中有果或者無果，都不會有生。』外道說：『因果沒有被破壞，所以生可以產生（修妒路 Sutra）。你說因中多果，果中多因，這只是過失，不能說沒有因果。所以生可以產生。』內道說：『物、非物、非物非物，互相不生（修妒路 Sutra）。物不生物，非物不生非物，物不生非物，非物不生物。如果物生物，就像母親生孩子一樣，這是不對的。為什麼呢？母親實際上不生孩子，孩子先有，然後從母親出來。如果說從母親的血分等產生，認為是物生物，這也是不對的。為什麼呢？離開血分等，就無法得到母親。』

【English Translation】 English version The third method is having a pot, etc. Therefore, it is not so. The outsider says: 'There should be arising because the cause decays (Sutra). If the effect does not arise, the cause should not decay. Now we see that the cause of the pot decays, so there should be arising.' The insider says: 'Because the cause decays, arising also ceases (Sutra). If the effect is produced, is this effect present when the cause decays, or is it present after decay? If it is present when the cause decays, then it is no different from decay, so arising also ceases. If it is present after decay, then the cause has already decayed, so there is no cause. Without a cause, the effect should not arise.' Furthermore, the effect in the cause is determined (Sutra). If the effect is already present in the cause, or if the effect is not present in the cause, neither case will have arising. Why? If there is no effect in the cause, why is there only a pot in the clay and cloth in the thread? If there is nothing in either, then the clay should have cloth, and the thread should have a pot. If the effect is already present in the cause, then the effect arises from the cause, which is not correct. Why? Because the cause is the effect, and your doctrine considers the cause and effect to be no different. Therefore, if the effect is already present in the cause, or if the effect is not present, there will be no arising. Furthermore, there are many causes and effects (Sutra). If the effect is already present in the cause, then there is cheese, ghee, etc., in the milk, and there is milk, cheese, etc., in the ghee. If there is cheese, ghee, etc., in the milk, then there are multiple effects in one cause. If there is milk, cheese, etc., in the ghee, then there are multiple causes in one effect. Thus, the prior and subsequent causes and effects all have faults simultaneously. If there is no effect in the cause, there is also the same fault. Therefore, whether there is an effect in the cause or not, there will be no arising.' The outsider says: 'The cause and effect are not destroyed, so arising can be generated (Sutra). You say that there are many effects in the cause and many causes in the effect, which is only a fault and does not mean there are no causes and effects. Therefore, arising can be generated.' The insider says: 'Things, non-things, and neither things nor non-things do not arise from each other (Sutra). A thing does not arise from a thing, a non-thing does not arise from a non-thing, a thing does not arise from a non-thing, and a non-thing does not arise from a thing. If a thing arises from a thing, like a mother giving birth to a child, that is not correct. Why? Because the mother does not actually give birth to the child; the child exists first and then comes out of the mother. If you say that it arises from the mother's blood, etc., and consider it a thing arising from a thing, that is also not correct. Why? Because without the blood, etc., the mother cannot be obtained.'

。若謂如變生。以為物生物者。是亦不然。何以故。壯即變為老。非壯生老故。若謂如鏡中像。以為物生物者。是亦不然。何以故。鏡中像無所從來故。複次如鏡中像與面相似。余果亦應與因相似。而不然。是故物不生物。非物不生非物者。如兔角不生兔角。物不生非物者。如石女不生子。非物不生物者。如龜毛不生蒲。是故無有生法。複次若物生物者。是應二種法生。若因中有果。若因中無果。是則不然。何以故。若因中先無果者。因不應生果。因邊異果不可得故。若因中先有果。云何生滅。不異故(修妒路)。若瓶與泥團不異者。瓶生時泥團不應滅。泥團亦不應為瓶因。若泥團與瓶不異者。瓶不應生瓶。亦不應為泥團果。是故若因中有果。若因中無果。物不生物。

破常品第九

外曰。應有諸法。無因。常法不破故(修妒路)。汝雖破有因法。不破無因常法。如虛空時方微塵涅槃是無因法不破故應有諸法。內曰。若強以為常。無常同(修妒路)。汝有因故說常耶。無因故說常耶。若常法有因。有因則無常。若無因說常者。亦可說無常。外曰。了因故無過(修妒路)。有二種因。一作因。二了因。若以作因。是則無常。我虛空等常法。以了因故說常。非無因故說常。亦非有因故說無常。是故非強為常。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果有人說，就像變化產生一樣，認為事物產生事物，這也是不對的。為什麼呢？因為壯年會變為衰老，但不是壯年產生衰老。如果有人說，就像鏡中的影像一樣，認為事物產生事物，這也是不對的。為什麼呢？因為鏡中的影像沒有任何來源。再者，就像鏡中的影像與面容相似一樣，其餘的果也應該與因相似，但事實並非如此。所以，事物不能產生事物。非事物不能產生非事物，就像兔子角不能產生兔子角。事物不能產生非事物，就像石女不能生孩子。非事物不能產生事物，就像烏龜毛不能生長蒲草。因此，沒有所謂的『生』法。再者，如果事物能產生事物，那麼應該有兩種情況：要麼因中存在果，要麼因中不存在果。但這些都不成立。為什麼呢？如果因中先前沒有果，那麼因就不應該產生果，因為在因的旁邊無法找到不同的果。如果因中先前存在果，又怎麼會有生滅呢？因為它們沒有區別（修妒路 Sutra）。如果瓶子與泥團沒有區別，那麼瓶子產生時，泥團不應該消失，泥團也不應該成為瓶子的因。如果泥團與瓶子沒有區別，那麼瓶子不應該產生瓶子，也不應該成為泥團的果。所以，無論因中存在果，還是因中不存在果，事物都不能產生事物。

破常品第九

外道說：應該存在諸法，是無因而生的。因為常法沒有被破除（修妒路 Sutra）。你們雖然破除了有因的法，但沒有破除無因的常法。比如虛空（ākāśa），時間（kāla），方位（diś），微塵（paramāṇu）和涅槃（nirvāṇa）這些都是無因的法，因為沒有被破除，所以應該存在諸法。內道說：如果強行認為是常，那麼就和無常一樣了（修妒路 Sutra）。你是由於有因而說它是常呢？還是由於無因而說它是常呢？如果常法有因，那麼有因就不是常。如果因為無因而說是常，那麼也可以說是無常。外道說：因為是了因，所以沒有過失（修妒路 Sutra）。有兩種因：一是作因，二是了因。如果是作因，那就是無常。我所說的虛空等常法，是因爲了因才說是常，不是因為無因而說是常，也不是因為有因而說是無常。所以不是強行認為是常。

【English Translation】 English version: If one says, 'Like transformation gives rise, taking things to produce things,' that is also not so. Why? Because youth transforms into old age, but youth does not produce old age. If one says, 'Like the image in a mirror, taking things to produce things,' that is also not so. Why? Because the image in a mirror has no origin. Furthermore, just as the image in a mirror resembles the face, the remaining effects should also resemble the cause, but that is not the case. Therefore, things do not produce things. Non-things do not produce non-things, like a rabbit's horn does not produce a rabbit's horn. Things do not produce non-things, like a barren woman does not produce a child. Non-things do not produce things, like turtle hair does not grow reeds. Therefore, there is no such thing as 'production.' Furthermore, if things can produce things, then there should be two possibilities: either the effect exists in the cause, or the effect does not exist in the cause. But neither of these holds true. Why? If the effect did not previously exist in the cause, then the cause should not produce the effect, because a distinct effect cannot be found beside the cause. If the effect previously existed in the cause, then how can there be arising and ceasing? Because they are not different (Sutra). If a pot and a lump of clay are not different, then when the pot arises, the lump of clay should not cease, and the lump of clay should not be the cause of the pot. If the lump of clay and the pot are not different, then the pot should not produce the pot, nor should it be the effect of the lump of clay. Therefore, whether the effect exists in the cause or the effect does not exist in the cause, things do not produce things.

Chapter Nine: Refuting Permanence

The outsider says: There should be dharmas that exist without a cause, because permanent dharmas have not been refuted (Sutra). Although you have refuted dharmas with causes, you have not refuted permanent dharmas without causes. For example, space (ākāśa), time (kāla), direction (diś), atoms (paramāṇu), and nirvana (nirvāṇa) are all dharmas without causes, and because they have not been refuted, there should be dharmas that exist. The insider says: If you forcibly consider it permanent, then it is the same as impermanent (Sutra). Do you say it is permanent because of a cause, or do you say it is permanent because of no cause? If a permanent dharma has a cause, then having a cause is not permanent. If you say it is permanent because of no cause, then you can also say it is impermanent. The outsider says: Because it is a 'knowing cause' (了因), there is no fault (Sutra). There are two kinds of causes: a 'productive cause' (作因) and a 'knowing cause' (了因). If it is a productive cause, then it is impermanent. The permanent dharmas I speak of, such as space, are said to be permanent because of a knowing cause, not because they are without a cause, nor because they are impermanent due to having a cause. Therefore, it is not forcibly considered permanent.

內曰。是因不然(修妒路)。汝雖說常法有因。是因不然。神先已破。余常法后當破。外曰。應有常法。作法無常故。不作法是常(修妒路)。眼見瓶等諸物無常。若異此法應是常。內曰。無亦共有(修妒路)。汝以作法相違故。名不作法。今見作法中有相故。應無不作法。複次汝以作法相違故。不作法為常者。今與作法不相違故。是應無常。所以者何。不作法作法同無觸故。不作法應無常。如是遍常不遍常。悉已總破。今當別破。外曰。定有虛空法。常亦遍亦無分。一切處一切時。信有故(修妒路)。世人信一切處有虛空。是故遍信過去未來現在一切時有虛空。是故常。內曰。分中分合故分不異(修妒路)。若瓶中向中虛空。是中虛空為都有耶。為分有耶。若都有者。則不遍。若是為遍。瓶亦應遍。若分有者。虛空但是分無有。有分名為虛空。是故虛空非遍。亦非常。外曰。定有虛空。遍相亦常。有作故(修妒路)。若無虛空者。則無舉無下。無去來等。所以者何。無容受處故。今實有所作。是以有虛空。亦遍亦常。內曰。不然。虛空處虛空(修妒路)。若有虛空法。應有住處。若無住處。是則無法。若虛空孔穴中住者。是則虛空住處空中。有容受處故。而不然。是以虛空不住孔穴中。亦不實中住。何以故。實無空

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本內道：『這個因是不成立的（修妒路）。你雖然說常法有因，但這個因是不成立的。神我（Atman）先前已經被破斥，其餘的常法之後也將被破斥。』外道：『應該有常法，因為有為法是無常的，所以無為法是常的（修妒路）。我們親眼看到瓶子等事物是無常的。如果有一種法與此不同，那它就應該是常法。』內道：『無為法也是共同存在的（修妒路）。你因為有為法的相違性，才稱之為無為法。現在看到有為法中存在著相，所以應該不存在無為法。』『再者，你因為有為法的相違性，才認為無為法是常法。現在因為與有為法不相違，所以它應該也是無常的。為什麼呢？因為無為法和有為法同樣沒有觸覺。所以無為法應該是無常的。』『像這樣，遍常和不遍常，都已經全部破斥過了。現在應當分別破斥。』外道：『一定有虛空法（Akasa），它是常、遍一切處且沒有分割的。因為一切處、一切時，人們都相信有虛空（修妒路）。世人相信一切處都有虛空，所以普遍相信過去、未來、現在一切時都有虛空。所以虛空是常的。』內道：『部分中的分割和結合，導致分割與整體沒有區別（修妒路）。如果瓶子中的、方向中的虛空，這個中間的虛空是全部都有呢？還是部分有呢？如果全部都有，那麼它就不遍一切處。如果是遍一切處，那麼瓶子也應該遍一切處。如果只是部分有，那麼虛空只是部分存在，有部分才叫做虛空。所以虛空不是遍一切處的，也不是常的。』外道：『一定有虛空，它具有遍一切處的相，也是常的。因為它有所作用（修妒路）。如果沒有虛空，那麼就沒有舉起、沒有放下、沒有去來等等。為什麼呢？因為沒有容納之處。現在確實有所作用，所以有虛空，它也是遍一切處且是常的。』內道：『不是這樣的。虛空存在於虛空之處（修妒路）。如果有虛空法，就應該有住處。如果沒有住處，那就是沒有法。如果虛空住在孔穴中，那麼就是虛空住在空處中，因為有容納之處。但事實並非如此。所以虛空不住在孔穴中，也不住在實體中。為什麼呢？因為實體沒有空隙。』

【English Translation】 English version The Internalist said: 'This reason is not valid (Sutra). Although you say that permanent dharmas have a cause, this cause is not valid. The self (Atman) has already been refuted, and the remaining permanent dharmas will be refuted later.' The Externalist said: 'There should be permanent dharmas, because conditioned dharmas are impermanent, therefore unconditioned dharmas are permanent (Sutra). We see with our own eyes that things like pots are impermanent. If there is a dharma different from this, then it should be permanent.' The Internalist said: 'The unconditioned also exists in common (Sutra). You call it unconditioned because of the opposition to conditioned dharmas. Now seeing that there are characteristics in conditioned dharmas, there should be no unconditioned dharmas.' 'Furthermore, you consider the unconditioned to be permanent because of its opposition to conditioned dharmas. Now, because it is not opposed to conditioned dharmas, it should also be impermanent. Why? Because the unconditioned and the conditioned are equally without tactile sensation. Therefore, the unconditioned should be impermanent.' 'In this way, both pervasive permanence and non-pervasive permanence have been completely refuted. Now we should refute them separately.' The Externalist said: 'There must be space (Akasa) as a dharma, which is permanent, pervasive, and undivided. Because in all places and at all times, people believe in space (Sutra). People believe that there is space everywhere, so they universally believe that there is space at all times in the past, future, and present. Therefore, space is permanent.' The Internalist said: 'The division and combination within a part cause the division to be no different from the whole (Sutra). If the space in the pot and the space in a direction, is this space in the middle entirely present, or partially present? If it is entirely present, then it is not pervasive. If it is pervasive, then the pot should also be pervasive. If it is only partially present, then space only exists partially, and having a part is called space. Therefore, space is neither pervasive nor permanent.' The Externalist said: 'There must be space, which has the characteristic of being pervasive and is also permanent. Because it has a function (Sutra). If there were no space, then there would be no lifting up, no putting down, no going and coming, and so on. Why? Because there is no place to accommodate. Now there is indeed a function, so there is space, which is also pervasive and permanent.' The Internalist said: 'That is not so. Space exists in the place of space (Sutra). If there were a dharma of space, there should be a dwelling place. If there is no dwelling place, then there is no dharma. If space dwells in a hole, then space dwells in an empty place, because there is a place to accommodate. But this is not the case. Therefore, space does not dwell in a hole, nor does it dwell in a solid object. Why? Because a solid object has no emptiness.'

故(修妒路)。是實不名空。若無空則無住處。以無容受處故。複次汝言作處是虛空者。實中無作處故。則無虛空。是故虛空亦非遍亦非常。複次無相故無虛空。諸法各各有相。以有相故知有諸法。如地堅相。水濕相。火熱相。風動相。識知相。而虛空無相。是故無。外曰。虛空有相。汝不知故無。無色是虛空相。內曰。不然。無色名破色。非更有法。猶如斷樹。更無有法。是故無有虛空相。複次虛空無相。何以故。汝說無色。是虛空相者。若色未生。是時無虛空相。複次色是無常法。虛空是有常法。若色未有時。應先有虛空法。若未有色無所滅。虛空則無相。若無相則無法。是故非無色是虛空相。但有名而無實。諸遍常亦如是總破。外曰。有時法。常相有故(修妒路)。有法雖不可現見。以共相比知故信有。如是時。雖微細不可見。以節氣花實等故知有時。此則見果知因。複次以一時不一時。久近等相故。可知有時。無不有時。是故常。內曰。過去未來中無。是故無未來(修妒路)。如泥團時現在。土時過去。瓶時未來。此則時相常故。過去時不作未來時。汝經言。時是一法。是故過去時終不作未來時。亦不作現在時。若過去作未來者。則有雜過。又過去中無未來時。是故無未來。現在亦如是破。外曰。受過去故有

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本故（修妒路，梵文Sutra，意為經）。『實』不應被稱為『空』。如果沒有『空』，就沒有安住之處，因為沒有容納之處的緣故。再者，你說『作處』是虛空，但實際上『實』中沒有『作處』，所以沒有虛空。因此，虛空既不是普遍存在的，也不是永恒不變的。再者，因為沒有相狀，所以沒有虛空。諸法各有各的相狀，因為有相狀，所以知道有諸法，例如地的堅硬相，水的潮濕相，火的熱相，風的流動相，識的知覺相。而虛空沒有相狀，所以不存在。外道說：『虛空有相，你不知道，所以才說沒有。無色就是虛空的相。』內道說：『不對。無色是指破除色法，並非另外存在一種法，就像砍斷樹木，不再有樹木存在一樣。所以沒有虛空的相。』再者，虛空沒有相狀。為什麼呢？你說無色是虛空的相，如果色法尚未產生，那時就沒有虛空的相。再者，色是無常法，虛空是有常法。如果色法未產生時，應該先有虛空法。如果未有色法，無從破滅，虛空則沒有相狀。如果沒有相狀，那就不是法。所以，無色不是虛空的相，只是有名而無實。諸如普遍存在和永恒不變等說法，也一併破斥。外道說：『有時法，因為常相存在（修妒路）。有些法雖然不能直接看見，但可以通過共同的相狀來推知，所以相信它的存在。就像時間，雖然微細不可見，但可以通過節氣、花開花落、果實成熟等現象來得知時間的存在。這就是見果知因。』再者，通過一時、不一時、長久、短暫等相狀，可以得知時間的存在。沒有不存在於時間中的事物，所以時間是常。內道說：『過去和未來之中沒有，所以沒有未來（修妒路）。』就像泥團是現在，土是過去，瓶是未來。這說明時間的相是常。過去的時間不會變成未來的時間。你的經書中說，時間是一種法。所以過去的時間終究不會變成未來的時間，也不會變成現在的時間。如果過去的時間可以變成未來的時間，就會有混雜的過失。而且過去之中沒有未來的時間，所以沒有未來。現在也是這樣破斥。外道說：『因為領受過去，所以有。』

【English Translation】 English version Therefore (Sutra, meaning scripture). 'Reality' should not be called 'emptiness'. If there is no 'emptiness', there is no place to dwell, because there is no place to accommodate. Furthermore, you say that 'the place of action' is emptiness, but in reality, there is no 'place of action' in 'reality', so there is no emptiness. Therefore, emptiness is neither pervasive nor eternal. Moreover, because there is no characteristic, there is no emptiness. All dharmas (phenomena) have their own characteristics, and because there are characteristics, we know that there are dharmas, such as the hardness of earth, the wetness of water, the heat of fire, the movement of wind, and the knowing of consciousness. But emptiness has no characteristic, so it does not exist. The outsider says: 'Emptiness has a characteristic, you do not know it, so you say it does not exist. Non-color is the characteristic of emptiness.' The insider says: 'That is not right. Non-color means the destruction of color, it is not another dharma that exists, just like cutting down a tree, there is no more tree. So there is no characteristic of emptiness.' Furthermore, emptiness has no characteristic. Why? You say that non-color is the characteristic of emptiness, but if color has not yet arisen, then there is no characteristic of emptiness. Furthermore, color is an impermanent dharma, and emptiness is a permanent dharma. If color has not yet arisen, then the dharma of emptiness should exist first. If there is no color, there is nothing to destroy, and emptiness has no characteristic. If there is no characteristic, then it is not a dharma. Therefore, non-color is not the characteristic of emptiness, it is just a name without substance. All such as pervasiveness and eternity are also refuted together. The outsider says: 'There is time, because the characteristic of permanence exists (Sutra). Some dharmas cannot be directly seen, but they can be inferred through common characteristics, so we believe in their existence. Just like time, although it is subtle and invisible, it can be known through the seasons, the blooming and falling of flowers, and the ripening of fruits. This is seeing the effect and knowing the cause.' Furthermore, through characteristics such as one time, not one time, long, and short, we can know the existence of time. There is nothing that does not exist in time, so time is constant. The insider says: 'There is nothing in the past and future, so there is no future (Sutra).' Just like a lump of clay is the present, earth is the past, and a pot is the future. This shows that the characteristic of time is constant. The past time will not become the future time. Your scriptures say that time is one dharma. So the past time will never become the future time, nor will it become the present time. If the past time can become the future time, there will be a mixed fault. And there is no future time in the past, so there is no future. The present is also refuted in this way. The outsider says: 'Because of receiving the past, there is.'

時(修妒路)。汝受過去時故。必有未來時。是故實有時法。內曰。非未來相過去(修妒路)。汝不聞我先說過去土不作未來瓶。若墮未來相中。是為未來相。云何名過去。是故無過去。外曰。應有時。自相別故(修妒路)。若現在有現在相。若過去有過去相。若未來有未來相。是故有時。內曰。若爾一切現在(修妒路)。若三時自相有者。今盡應現在。若未來是為無。若有不名未來應名已來。是故此義不然。外曰。過去未來行自相故無咎(修妒路)。過去時。未來時。不行現在相。過去時行過去相。未來時行未來相。是各各行自相故無過。內曰。過去非過去(修妒路)。若過去過去者。不名為過去。何以故。離自相故。如火舍熱。不名為火。離自相故。若過去不過去者。今不應說過去時行過去相。未來亦如是破。是故時法無實。但有言說。外曰。實有方。常相有故(修妒路)。日合處是方相。如我經說。若過去。若未來。若現在。日初合處。是名東方。如是余方隨日為名。內曰。不然。東方無初故(修妒路)。日行四天下。繞須彌山。郁單越日中。弗于逮日出。弗于逮人以為東方。弗于逮日中。閻浮提日出。閻浮提人以為東方。閻浮提日中。拘耶尼日出。拘耶尼人以為東方。拘耶尼日中。郁單越日出。郁單越人以為

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本時(修妒路，梵文：Sūtra，意為經)。外道：你接受過去時存在，因此必定有未來時。所以時間是真實存在的。內道：並非未來狀態的過去(修妒路，梵文：Sūtra，意為經)。你沒聽我說過，過去的泥土不能做成未來的瓶子。如果落入未來狀態中，那就是未來狀態了。怎麼能叫做過去呢？所以沒有過去。外道：應該有時存在，因為它們各自有不同的特性(修妒路，梵文：Sūtra，意為經)。如果現在有現在的特性，過去有過去的特性，未來有未來的特性，所以時間是存在的。內道：如果這樣，一切都應該是現在(修妒路，梵文：Sūtra，意為經)。如果三時各自有自己的特性，那麼現在就應該包含一切。如果未來存在，那就是不存在。如果存在，就不應該叫做未來，而應該叫做已來。所以這個說法不對。外道：過去和未來執行在各自的狀態中，沒有過失(修妒路，梵文：Sūtra，意為經)。過去時，未來時，不執行在現在的狀態中。過去時執行在過去的狀態中，未來時執行在未來的狀態中。它們各自執行在自己的狀態中，所以沒有過失。內道：過去不是過去(修妒路，梵文：Sūtra，意為經)。如果過去是過去，那就不叫做過去。為什麼呢？因為它已經離開了自己的狀態。就像火失去了熱量，就不叫做火一樣，因為它離開了自己的狀態。如果過去不是過去，那麼現在就不應該說過去時執行在過去的狀態中。未來也是一樣可以被駁倒的。所以時間不是真實存在的，只是言語上的表達。外道：方位是真實存在的，因為它們有恒常的特性(修妒路，梵文：Sūtra，意為經)。太陽升起的地方就是東方。就像我的經書里說的，無論是過去、未來還是現在，太陽最初升起的地方，就叫做東方。其他的方位也根據太陽的位置來命名。內道：不對。東方沒有最初的起始點(修妒路，梵文：Sūtra，意為經)。太陽執行在四大天下，環繞須彌山(Sumeru)。在郁單越(Uttarakuru)是中午，在弗于逮(Pūrvavideha)是日出。弗于逮(Pūrvavideha)的人認為那是東方。在弗于逮(Pūrvavideha)是中午，在閻浮提(Jambudvīpa)是日出。閻浮提(Jambudvīpa)的人認為那是東方。在閻浮提(Jambudvīpa)是中午，在拘耶尼(Aparagodānīya)是日出。拘耶尼(Aparagodānīya)的人認為那是東方。在拘耶尼(Aparagodānīya)是中午，在郁單越(Uttarakuru)是日出。郁單越(Uttarakuru)的人認為

【English Translation】 English version Time (Sūtra). The Outsider: Because you accept the past time, there must be future time. Therefore, time is real. The Insider: Not the past that is in the state of the future (Sūtra). Haven't you heard me say that past clay cannot be made into a future pot? If it falls into the state of the future, then it is the state of the future. How can it be called the past? Therefore, there is no past. The Outsider: There should be time, because they each have different characteristics (Sūtra). If the present has the characteristics of the present, the past has the characteristics of the past, and the future has the characteristics of the future, then time exists. The Insider: If so, everything should be the present (Sūtra). If the three times each have their own characteristics, then the present should contain everything. If the future exists, then it does not exist. If it exists, it should not be called the future, but should be called 'already come'. So this statement is not correct. The Outsider: The past and future operate in their own states without fault (Sūtra). Past time, future time, do not operate in the present state. Past time operates in the past state, and future time operates in the future state. They each operate in their own states, so there is no fault. The Insider: The past is not the past (Sūtra). If the past is the past, then it is not called the past. Why? Because it has left its own state. Just as fire loses heat, it is not called fire, because it has left its own state. If the past is not the past, then it should not be said now that past time operates in the past state. The future can also be refuted in the same way. Therefore, time is not real, but only a verbal expression. The Outsider: Direction is real, because they have constant characteristics (Sūtra). The place where the sun rises is the east. Just as my scriptures say, whether it is past, future, or present, the place where the sun first rises is called the east. The other directions are also named according to the position of the sun. The Insider: That's not right. The east has no initial starting point (Sūtra). The sun travels in the four great continents, circling Mount Sumeru. It is noon in Uttarakuru, and sunrise in Pūrvavideha. The people of Pūrvavideha consider that to be the east. It is noon in Pūrvavideha, and sunrise in Jambudvīpa. The people of Jambudvīpa consider that to be the east. It is noon in Jambudvīpa, and sunrise in Aparagodānīya. The people of Aparagodānīya consider that to be the east. It is noon in Aparagodānīya, and sunrise in Uttarakuru. The people of Uttarakuru consider

東方。如是悉是東方南方。西方北方。複次日不合處。是中無方。以無相故。複次不定故。此以為東方。彼以為西方。是故無實方。外曰。不然。是方相一天下說故(修妒路)。是方相因一天下說。非為都說。是故東方非無初過。內曰。若爾有邊(修妒路)。若日先合處。是名東方者。則諸方有邊。有邊故有分。有分故無常。是故言說有方。實為無方。外曰。雖無遍常有不遍常微塵。是果相有故(修妒路)。世人或見果知有因。或見因知有果。如見芽等知有種子。世界法。見諸生物。先細后粗故。可知二微塵為初果。以一微塵為因。是故有微塵。圓而常。以無因故。內曰。二微塵非一切身合。果不圓故(修妒路)。諸微塵果生時。非一切身合。何以故。二微塵等果。眼見不圓故。若微塵身一切合者。二微塵等果亦應圓。複次若身一切合。二亦同壞。若微塵重合則果高。若多合則果大。以一分合故微塵有分。有分故無常。複次微塵無常。以虛空別故(修妒路)。若有微塵。應當與虛空別。是故微塵有分。有分故無常。複次以色味等別故(修妒路)。若微塵是有。應有色味等分。是故微塵有分。有分故無常。複次有形法有相故。若微塵有形。應有長短方圓等。是故微塵有分。有分故無常。無常故無微塵。外曰。有涅槃法。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：東方。像這樣，所有這些都是東方、南方、西方、北方。再者，太陽不照到的地方，那裡就沒有方位。因為沒有形相的緣故。再者，因為方位是不定的。這裡認為是東方，那裡認為是西方。所以沒有真實的方位。外道說：『不是這樣的。方位是世間普遍認同的（修妒路，梵文：Sūtra，意為經）。』方位是根據世間普遍認同而說的，不是完全沒有根據的。所以東方不是沒有初始的過失。內道說：『如果這樣，那麼方位就有邊際了（修妒路）。』如果太陽最初照到的地方，就叫做東方，那麼所有的方位都有邊際。有邊際就有分割。有分割就是無常。所以說是說有方位，實際上是沒有方位的。外道說：『即使沒有普遍常住的，也有不普遍常住的微塵。這是果的相狀所證明的（修妒路）。』世人有時見到果就知道有因，有時見到因就知道有果。比如見到芽等就知道有種子。世界的法則是，見到各種生物，先細小后粗大。所以可以知道兩個微塵是最初的果，以一個微塵為因。所以有微塵，是圓而常住的，因為它沒有產生的原因。內道說：『兩個微塵不是整體結合成一個身體，因為果不是圓的（修妒路）。』各種微塵的果產生時，不是整體結合成一個身體。為什麼呢？因為兩個微塵等形成的果，眼睛看到不是圓的。如果微塵的身體是整體結合的，那麼兩個微塵等形成的果也應該是圓的。再者，如果身體是整體結合的，那麼兩個微塵也會同時壞滅。如果微塵重疊結合，那麼果就高。如果多個微塵結合，那麼果就大。因為是一部分結合，所以微塵有分割。有分割就是無常。再者，微塵是無常的，因為與虛空有區別（修妒路）。如果存在微塵，那麼它應當與虛空有所區別。所以微塵有分割。有分割就是無常。再者，因為顏色、味道等有區別（修妒路）。如果微塵是存在的，那麼它應該有顏色、味道等部分。所以微塵有分割。有分割就是無常。再者，有形狀的法是有相狀的。如果微塵有形狀，那麼它應該有長短、方圓等。所以微塵有分割。有分割就是無常。無常所以沒有微塵。外道說：『有涅槃法。』

【English Translation】 English version: East. Thus, all these are east, south, west, and north. Furthermore, where the sun does not reach, there is no direction. Because there is no form. Moreover, because it is not fixed. This is considered east, that is considered west. Therefore, there is no real direction. The outsider says: 'It is not so. Direction is universally acknowledged in the world (Sūtra).' Direction is spoken of based on universal agreement in the world, not entirely without basis. Therefore, the east is not without initial fault. The insider says: 'If so, then the directions have boundaries (Sūtra).' If the place where the sun first reaches is called east, then all directions have boundaries. Having boundaries means having division. Having division means impermanence. Therefore, saying there are directions is just a manner of speaking; in reality, there are no directions. The outsider says: 'Even if there is no universally permanent thing, there are non-universally permanent atoms. This is proven by the appearance of the fruit (Sūtra).' People sometimes see the fruit and know there is a cause, and sometimes see the cause and know there is a fruit. For example, seeing sprouts, one knows there are seeds. The law of the world is that seeing various living beings, they are first small and then large. So it can be known that two atoms are the initial fruit, with one atom as the cause. Therefore, there are atoms, which are round and permanent, because they have no cause of arising. The insider says: 'Two atoms do not combine into a single body, because the fruit is not round (Sūtra).' When the fruits of various atoms arise, they do not combine into a single body. Why? Because the fruit formed by two atoms, etc., is not seen as round by the eye. If the body of atoms were entirely combined, then the fruit formed by two atoms, etc., should also be round. Furthermore, if the bodies were entirely combined, then the two atoms would also perish simultaneously. If atoms are combined by overlapping, then the fruit is high. If many atoms are combined, then the fruit is large. Because they are combined in part, atoms have division. Having division means impermanence. Furthermore, atoms are impermanent because they are distinct from space (Sūtra). If atoms exist, then they should be distinct from space. Therefore, atoms have division. Having division means impermanence. Furthermore, because colors, tastes, etc., are distinct (Sūtra). If atoms exist, then they should have parts such as color and taste. Therefore, atoms have division. Having division means impermanence. Furthermore, things with shape have characteristics. If atoms have shape, then they should have length, width, squareness, roundness, etc. Therefore, atoms have division. Having division means impermanence. Because of impermanence, there are no atoms. The outsider says: 'There is Nirvana.'

常。無煩惱。涅槃不異故(修妒路)。愛等諸煩惱永盡。是名涅槃。有煩惱者。則有生死。無煩惱故。永不復生死。是故涅槃為常。內曰。不然。涅槃作法故(修妒路)。因修道故。無諸煩惱。若無煩惱。是即涅槃者。涅槃則是作法。作法故無常。複次若無煩惱。是名無所有。若涅槃與無煩惱不異者。則無涅槃。外曰。作因故(修妒路)。涅槃為無煩惱作因。內曰。不然。能破非破(修妒路)。若涅槃能為解脫者。則非解脫。複次未盡煩惱時。應無涅槃。所以者何。無果故無因。外曰。無煩惱果(修妒路)。此涅槃非是無煩惱。亦非無煩惱因是無煩惱果。是故非無涅槃。內曰。縛可縛方便異此無用(修妒路)。縛名煩惱及業。可縛名眾生。方便名八聖道。以道解縛故。眾生得解脫。若有涅槃。異此三法。則無所用。複次無煩惱。是名無所有。無所有不應為因。外曰。有涅槃。是若無(修妒路)。若縛可縛方便三事無處。是名涅槃。內曰。畏處云何可染(修妒路)。以無常過患故。智者于有為法。棄捐離欲。若涅槃無有諸情及所欲事者。則涅槃于有為法甚大畏處。汝何故心染。涅槃名離一切著。滅一切憶想。非有非無。非物非非物。譬如燈滅不可論說。外曰。誰得涅槃(修妒路)。是涅槃何人得。內曰。無得涅槃(修妒

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本常。沒有煩惱。涅槃（Nirvana，寂滅）與這些沒有區別（修妒路，梵語：Sutra，經）。愛等各種煩惱永遠止息，這叫做涅槃。有煩惱的人，就有生死輪迴；沒有煩惱，就永遠不再有生死。所以說涅槃是常。內：不對。涅槃是造作出來的（修妒路，梵語：Sutra，經）。因為修行正道，所以沒有各種煩惱。如果沒有煩惱，那就是涅槃，那麼涅槃就是造作出來的。造作出來的就是無常的。再者，如果沒有煩惱，就等於什麼都沒有。如果涅槃與沒有煩惱沒有區別，那就沒有涅槃。外：因為是因（修妒路，梵語：Sutra，經）。涅槃是作為沒有煩惱的因。內：不對。能破與非破（修妒路，梵語：Sutra，經）。如果涅槃能夠帶來解脫，那就不是解脫。再者，在煩惱沒有斷盡的時候，應該沒有涅槃。為什麼呢？因為沒有果就沒有因。外：是無煩惱的果（修妒路，梵語：Sutra，經）。這個涅槃不是沒有煩惱，也不是沒有煩惱的因，而是沒有煩惱的果。所以說不是沒有涅槃。內：束縛、可束縛和方便與此不同，此無用處（修妒路，梵語：Sutra，經）。束縛指的是煩惱和業，可束縛指的是眾生，方便指的是八聖道。通過八聖道解脫束縛，眾生才能得到解脫。如果有涅槃，與這三法不同，那就沒有任何用處。再者，沒有煩惱，就等於什麼都沒有。什麼都沒有不應該作為因。外：有涅槃，是如果無（修妒路，梵語：Sutra，經）。如果束縛、可束縛和方便這三件事都沒有處所，這就叫做涅槃。內：畏懼之處怎麼能被染污（修妒路，梵語：Sutra，經）？因為無常的過患，智者對於有為法，拋棄、遠離慾望。如果涅槃沒有各種情慾和所欲之事，那麼涅槃對於有為法來說，就是非常可怕的地方。你為什麼還要心生染著？涅槃的意思是脫離一切執著，滅除一切憶念和想像，非有非無，非物非非物。譬如燈熄滅了，無法用言語來描述。外：誰能得到涅槃（修妒路，梵語：Sutra，經）？這個涅槃是什麼人才能得到的？內：沒有人能得到涅槃（修妒路，梵語：Sutra，經）。

【English Translation】 English version Constant. Without afflictions. Nirvana (Nirvana, extinction) is not different from these (Sutra). The cessation of all afflictions such as love is called Nirvana. Those with afflictions have birth and death; without afflictions, there is no more birth and death. Therefore, Nirvana is constant. Inner: That's not right. Nirvana is created (Sutra). Because of practicing the right path, there are no various afflictions. If there are no afflictions, that is Nirvana, then Nirvana is created. What is created is impermanent. Furthermore, if there are no afflictions, it is equivalent to having nothing. If Nirvana is no different from having no afflictions, then there is no Nirvana. Outer: Because it is a cause (Sutra). Nirvana is the cause of having no afflictions. Inner: That's not right. What can be broken and what cannot be broken (Sutra). If Nirvana can bring liberation, then it is not liberation. Furthermore, when afflictions have not been completely extinguished, there should be no Nirvana. Why? Because without a result, there is no cause. Outer: It is the result of having no afflictions (Sutra). This Nirvana is not without afflictions, nor is it the cause of having no afflictions, but it is the result of having no afflictions. Therefore, it is not that there is no Nirvana. Inner: Bondage, what can be bound, and the means are different from this; this is useless (Sutra). Bondage refers to afflictions and karma, what can be bound refers to sentient beings, and the means refers to the Eightfold Noble Path. By liberating bondage through the Eightfold Noble Path, sentient beings can attain liberation. If there is Nirvana that is different from these three dharmas, then it is of no use. Furthermore, having no afflictions is equivalent to having nothing. Having nothing should not be a cause. Outer: There is Nirvana, if there is nothing (Sutra). If bondage, what can be bound, and the means have no place, this is called Nirvana. Inner: How can a place of fear be defiled (Sutra)? Because of the faults of impermanence, wise people abandon and renounce desires for conditioned dharmas. If Nirvana has no desires and wants, then Nirvana is a very frightening place for conditioned dharmas. Why do you still have attachments? Nirvana means detachment from all attachments, extinguishing all memories and imaginations, neither existent nor non-existent, neither a thing nor not a thing. It is like a lamp that has been extinguished, which cannot be described in words. Outer: Who can attain Nirvana (Sutra)? What kind of person can attain this Nirvana? Inner: No one can attain Nirvana (Sutra).

路)。我先說如燈滅。不可言東去南西北方四維上下去。涅槃亦如是。一切語滅。無可論說。是無所有。誰當得者。設有涅槃。亦無。得者。若神得涅槃。神是常是遍故。不應得涅槃。五陰亦不得涅槃。何以故。五陰無常故。五陰生滅故。如是涅槃當屬誰。若言得涅槃。是世界中說。

破空品第十

外曰。應有諸法破有故。若無破余法有故(修妒路)。汝破一切法相是破若有。不應言一切法空。以破有故。是破有故。不名破一切法。若無破一切法有。內曰。破如可破(修妒路)。汝著破故。以有無法欲破是破。汝不知耶。破成故。一切法空無所有是破若有。已墮可破中空無所有。是破若無。汝何所破。如說無第二頭。不以破故便有。如人言無。不以言無故有。破可破亦如是。外曰。應有諸法。執此彼故(修妒路)。汝執異法故說一法過。執一法故說異法過。是二執成故有一切法。內曰。一非所執。異亦爾(修妒路)。一異不可得。先已破。先已破故無所執。複次若有人言。汝無所執。我執一異法。若有此問。應如是破。外曰。破他法故。汝是破法人(修妒路)。汝好破他法。強為生過。自無所執。是故汝是破人。內曰。汝是破人(修妒路)。說空人無所執無所執故。非破人汝執自法破他執故汝是破人。外

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：我先說如燈熄滅（涅槃的境界就像燈火熄滅一樣）。不能說它向東、南、西、北、四維、上、下哪個方向去了。涅槃也是這樣，一切言語都止息，沒有什麼可以論說的。它是空無所有的，誰能得到它呢？即使假設有涅槃，也沒有能得到它的人。如果神能得到涅槃，那麼神是常住的、普遍存在的，不應該再得到涅槃。五蘊（色、受、想、行、識）也不能得到涅槃。為什麼呢？因為五蘊是無常的，五蘊是生滅變化的。這樣看來，涅槃應當屬於誰呢？如果說能得到涅槃，這只是世俗中的一種說法。

第十品破空品

外道說：應該有諸法存在，因為有破除『有』的緣故。如果沒有破除『有』，那麼其他法就應該存在（修妒路（梵文Sutra的音譯，意為經））。你破除一切法相，這是破除『有』。不應該說一切法空，因為破除了『有』的緣故。因為破除了『有』，所以不能說是破除了一切法。如果沒有破除一切法中的『有』，內道說：破除就像可以被破除的一樣（修妒路）。你執著于破除，因為有了『有』和『無』，才想要破除這個『破』。你不知道嗎？因為破除已經成立，一切法空無所有，這是破除『有』。已經落入可以被破除的境地，空無所有。這是破除『無』。你還要破除什麼呢？就像說沒有第二個頭，不能因為破除了它就真的存在了。就像有人說『無』，不能因為說了『無』就真的存在了。破除可以被破除的也是這樣。外道說：應該有諸法存在，因為執著于『此』和『彼』的緣故（修妒路）。你因為執著于不同的法，所以說一個法的過失。因為執著於一個法，所以說不同法的過失。這兩種執著成立，所以有一切法。內道說：『一』不是所執著的，『異』也是這樣（修妒路）。『一』和『異』都不可得，之前已經破除了。因為之前已經破除了，所以沒有什麼可以執著的。再次，如果有人說：你沒有什麼可以執著的，我執著于『一』和『異』法。如果有這樣的問題，應該這樣破除。外道說：因為破除其他法，所以你是破法之人（修妒路）。你喜歡破除其他法，強行為他人制造過失，自己沒有什麼可以執著的。所以你是破法之人。內道說：你才是破法之人（修妒路）。說空的人沒有什麼可以執著的，因為沒有什麼可以執著的，所以不是破法之人。你執著于自己的法，破除他人的執著，所以你才是破法之人。外道

【English Translation】 English version: I will first speak of it as the extinguishing of a lamp (the state of Nirvana is like the extinguishing of a lamp). It cannot be said to go east, south, west, north, the four intermediate directions, up, or down. Nirvana is also like this; all speech ceases, and there is nothing to discuss. It is devoid of all things; who can attain it? Even if we assume there is Nirvana, there is no one who can attain it. If a god could attain Nirvana, then the god is permanent and omnipresent, and should not need to attain Nirvana. The five skandhas (form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness) also cannot attain Nirvana. Why? Because the five skandhas are impermanent, the five skandhas are subject to arising and ceasing. In that case, to whom does Nirvana belong? If it is said that one can attain Nirvana, this is merely a saying in the world.

Chapter Ten: Refuting Emptiness

The Outsider says: There should be dharmas (phenomena, teachings) because there is the refutation of 'existence.' If there were no refutation of 'existence,' then other dharmas should exist (Sutra (Sanskrit Sutra, meaning scripture)). You refute all dharma characteristics, and this is refuting 'existence.' It should not be said that all dharmas are empty because 'existence' is refuted. Because 'existence' is refuted, it cannot be said that all dharmas are refuted. If there is no refutation of 'existence' in all dharmas, the Insider says: Refutation is like that which can be refuted (Sutra). You are attached to refutation; because there is 'existence' and 'non-existence,' you want to refute this 'refutation.' Do you not know? Because refutation is established, all dharmas are empty and devoid of all things; this is refuting 'existence.' It has already fallen into the state of being able to be refuted, empty and devoid of all things. This is refuting 'non-existence.' What do you want to refute? It is like saying there is no second head; it does not mean that it exists because it is refuted. It is like someone saying 'non-existence'; it does not mean that it exists because 'non-existence' is said. Refuting that which can be refuted is also like this. The Outsider says: There should be dharmas because there is attachment to 'this' and 'that' (Sutra). Because you are attached to different dharmas, you speak of the fault of one dharma. Because you are attached to one dharma, you speak of the fault of different dharmas. These two attachments are established, so there are all dharmas. The Insider says: 'One' is not what is attached to, and 'different' is also like this (Sutra). 'One' and 'different' are unattainable; they have already been refuted before. Because they have already been refuted before, there is nothing to be attached to. Furthermore, if someone says: You have nothing to be attached to; I am attached to the dharma of 'one' and 'different.' If there is such a question, it should be refuted like this. The Outsider says: Because you refute other dharmas, you are a refuter of dharmas (Sutra). You like to refute other dharmas, forcibly creating faults for others, and you have nothing to be attached to yourself. Therefore, you are a refuter of dharmas. The Insider says: You are the refuter of dharmas (Sutra). The one who speaks of emptiness has nothing to be attached to; because there is nothing to be attached to, they are not a refuter of dharmas. You are attached to your own dharma and refute the attachments of others, so you are the refuter of dharmas. The Outsider

曰。破他法故自法成(修妒路)。汝破他法時自法即成。何以故。他法若負。自法勝故。是以我非破人。內曰。不然。成破非一故(修妒路)。成名稱歎功德。破名出其過罪。嘆德出罪不名為一。複次成名有畏(修妒路)。畏名無力。若人自於法畏故。不能成於他法。不畏故好破。是故成破不一。若破他法是即自成法者。汝何故先言。說空人。但破他法。自無所執。外曰。說他執過自執成(修妒路)。汝何以不自執成法。但破他法。破他法故。即是自成法。內曰。破他法自法成故。一切不成(修妒路)。破他法故自法成。自法成故一切不成。一切不成故。我無所成。外曰。不然。世間相違故(修妒路)。若諸法空無相者。世間人盡不信受。內曰。是法世間信(修妒路)。是因緣法世間信受。所以者何。因緣生法是即無相。汝謂乳中有酪酥等。童女已妊。諸子食中已有糞。又除梁椽等別更有屋。除縷別有布。或言因中有果。或言因中無果。或言離因緣諸法生。其實空不應言說世事。是人所執誰當信受。我法不爾。與世人同故。一切信受。外曰。汝無所執是法成(修妒路)。汝言無執是即執。又言我法與世人同。是則自執。內曰。無執不名執如無(修妒路)。我先說因緣生諸法是即無相。是故我無所執。無所執不名為執。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本外曰：你說，因為破斥了別人的法，自己的法就成立了（修妒路）。你破斥別人的法時，自己的法就成立了。為什麼呢？因為別人的法如果失敗了，自己的法就勝利了。因此，我不是在破斥別人。內曰：不對。成立和破斥不是一回事（修妒路）。成立是稱讚功德，破斥是指出過錯罪行。稱讚功德和指出罪過不能算作一回事。而且，成立別人的法會有畏懼（修妒路）。畏懼是因為沒有力量。如果一個人因為對自己的法畏懼，就不能成立別人的法。不畏懼就喜歡破斥。所以，成立和破斥不是一回事。如果破斥別人的法就是成立自己的法，你為什麼先前說，說空的人只是破斥別人的法，自己沒有任何主張呢？外曰：說出別人的執著的過失，就是成立自己的執著（修妒路）。你為什麼不自己成立自己的法，而只是破斥別人的法呢？破斥別人的法，就是成立自己的法。內曰：因為破斥別人的法，自己的法就成立，自己的法成立，一切就都不成立（修妒路）。因為破斥別人的法，自己的法就成立；自己的法成立，一切就都不成立。一切都不成立，所以我沒有什麼可以成立的。外曰：不對。因為世間是相互對立的（修妒路）。如果諸法都是空無自性的，世間的人都不會相信接受。內曰：這種法是世間所信受的（修妒路）。這種因緣法是世間所信受的。為什麼呢？因為因緣所生的法就是無自性的。你認為牛奶中有酪酥等，童女已經懷孕，孩子吃的食物中已經有糞便，又除了梁椽等之外還有房屋，除了線之外還有布。或者說因中有果，或者說因中無果，或者說離開因緣諸法也能生。這些其實都是空洞的，不應該說世間的事情。是這些人所執著的，誰會相信接受呢？我的法不是這樣，與世人相同，所以一切人都信受。外曰：你沒有任何執著，這就是法成立（修妒路）。你說沒有執著，這就是執著。又說我的法與世人相同，這就是自己的執著。內曰：沒有執著不叫做執著，就像沒有一樣（修妒路）。我先前說因緣所生的諸法就是無自性的。所以我沒有任何執著。沒有執著不叫做執著。 English version Objector: You say that by refuting others' doctrines, one's own doctrine is established (Sutra). When you refute others' doctrines, your own doctrine is established. Why? Because if others' doctrines fail, your own doctrine prevails. Therefore, I am not refuting others. Internal: That's not right. Establishment and refutation are not the same thing (Sutra). Establishment is praising merits and virtues, while refutation is pointing out faults and transgressions. Praising virtues and pointing out faults cannot be considered the same thing. Moreover, establishing others' doctrines involves fear (Sutra). Fear arises from a lack of strength. If a person fears their own doctrine, they cannot establish others' doctrines. Not fearing leads to a fondness for refutation. Therefore, establishment and refutation are not the same thing. If refuting others' doctrines is the same as establishing one's own, why did you previously say that those who speak of emptiness only refute others' doctrines and have no position of their own? Objector: Pointing out the faults in others' attachments is establishing one's own attachments (Sutra). Why don't you establish your own doctrine, but only refute others' doctrines? Refuting others' doctrines is establishing your own doctrine. Internal: Because by refuting others' doctrines, one's own doctrine is established, and when one's own doctrine is established, everything is unestablished (Sutra). Because by refuting others' doctrines, one's own doctrine is established; and when one's own doctrine is established, everything is unestablished. Because everything is unestablished, I have nothing to establish. Objector: That's not right. Because the world is mutually contradictory (Sutra). If all dharmas (phenomena) are empty and without inherent nature, people in the world will not believe or accept it. Internal: This dharma (teaching) is believed by the world (Sutra). This teaching of dependent origination is believed by the world. Why? Because dharmas arising from dependent origination are without inherent nature. You think that milk contains curds and ghee, that a virgin is already pregnant, that the food children eat already contains feces, and that there is a house apart from the beams and rafters, and cloth apart from the threads. Or you say that the effect is in the cause, or that the effect is not in the cause, or that dharmas arise apart from dependent origination. These are actually empty and should not be said about worldly matters. Who will believe and accept what these people are attached to? My dharma is not like that; it is the same as the world, so everyone believes and accepts it. Objector: You have no attachments, and that is how the dharma is established (Sutra). You say you have no attachments, but that is an attachment. And you say that my dharma is the same as the world, but that is your own attachment. Internal: Having no attachments is not called attachment, just like nothingness (Sutra). I said earlier that dharmas arising from dependent origination are without inherent nature. Therefore, I have no attachments. Having no attachments is not called attachment.

【English Translation】 English version Objector: You say, 'Because one refutes the doctrines of others, one's own doctrine is established' (Sutra). When you refute the doctrines of others, your own doctrine is established. Why? Because if the doctrines of others fail, your own doctrine prevails. Therefore, I am not refuting others. Internal: That's not right. Establishment and refutation are not the same thing (Sutra). Establishment is praising merits and virtues, while refutation is pointing out faults and transgressions. Praising virtues and pointing out faults cannot be considered the same thing. Moreover, establishing the doctrines of others involves fear (Sutra). Fear arises from a lack of strength. If a person fears their own doctrine, they cannot establish the doctrines of others. Not fearing leads to a fondness for refutation. Therefore, establishment and refutation are not the same thing. If refuting the doctrines of others is the same as establishing one's own, why did you previously say that those who speak of emptiness only refute the doctrines of others and have no position of their own? Objector: Pointing out the faults in others' attachments is establishing one's own attachments (Sutra). Why don't you establish your own doctrine, but only refute the doctrines of others? Refuting the doctrines of others is establishing your own doctrine. Internal: Because by refuting the doctrines of others, one's own doctrine is established, and when one's own doctrine is established, everything is unestablished (Sutra). Because by refuting the doctrines of others, one's own doctrine is established; and when one's own doctrine is established, everything is unestablished. Because everything is unestablished, I have nothing to establish. Objector: That's not right. Because the world is mutually contradictory (Sutra). If all dharmas (phenomena) are empty and without inherent nature, people in the world will not believe or accept it. Internal: This dharma (teaching) is believed by the world (Sutra). This teaching of dependent origination is believed by the world. Why? Because dharmas arising from dependent origination are without inherent nature. You think that milk contains curds and ghee, that a virgin is already pregnant, that the food children eat already contains feces, and that there is a house apart from the beams and rafters, and cloth apart from the threads. Or you say that the effect is in the cause, or that the effect is not in the cause, or that dharmas arise apart from dependent origination. These are actually empty and should not be said about worldly matters. Who will believe and accept what these people are attached to? My dharma is not like that; it is the same as the world, so everyone believes and accepts it. Objector: You have no attachments, and that is how the dharma is established (Sutra). You say you have no attachments, but that is an attachment. And you say that my dharma is the same as the world, but that is your own attachment. Internal: Having no attachments is not called attachment, just like nothingness (Sutra). I said earlier that dharmas arising from dependent origination are without inherent nature. Therefore, I have no attachments. Having no attachments is not called attachment.

譬如言無。是實無。不以言無故便有無。無執亦如是。外曰。汝說無相法故。是滅法人(修妒路)。若諸法空無相。此執亦無。是則無一切法。無一切法故。是名滅法人。內曰。破滅法人。是名滅法人(修妒路)。我自無法。則無所破。汝謂我滅法。而欲破者。是則滅法人。外曰。應有法。相待有故(修妒路)。若有長必有短。若有高必有下。有空必有實。內曰。何有相待。一破故(修妒路)。若無一。則無相待。若少有不空。應有相待。若無不空則無空。云何相待。外曰。汝無成是成(修妒路)。如言室空無馬則有無馬。如是汝雖言諸法空無相。而能生種種心故。應有無。是則無成是成。內曰。不然。有無一切無故(修妒路)。我實相中。種種法門。說有無皆空。何以故。若無有亦無無。是故有無一切無。外曰。破不然。自空故(修妒路)。諸法自性空。無有作者。以無作故。不應有破。如愚癡人。欲破虛空。徒自疲勞。內曰。雖自性空。取相故縛(修妒路)。一切法雖自性空。但為邪想分別故縛。為破是顛倒故。言破。實無所破。譬如愚人見熱時焰。妄生水想。逐之疲勞。智者告。言此非水也。為斷彼想。不為破水。如是諸法性空。眾生取相故著。為破是顛倒故。言破實無所破。外曰。無說法。大經無故(修妒路

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：例如說『無』，這是真實的『無』。但不能因為說了『無』，就真的存在一個『無』。對於『無』的執著也是如此。外道說：『你所說的無相法，是斷滅法（修妒路，梵文：Sūtra，意為經）。如果一切法都是空無相的，那麼這種執著也是不存在的。這樣就什麼法都沒有了。什麼法都沒有，這就是斷滅法。』內道說：『破斥斷滅法的人，才是真正的斷滅法（修妒路）。我自己本來就沒有法，所以無從破起。你認為我在斷滅法，而想要破斥我，那你才是真正的斷滅法。』外道說：『應該有法，因為是相互依存而存在的（修妒路）。如果存在『長』，必定存在『短』；如果存在『高』，必定存在『下』；有『空』必定有『實』。』內道說：『有什麼是相互依存的呢？因為『一』已經被破除了（修妒路）。如果沒有『一』，就沒有相互依存。如果稍微有一點不空，就應該有相互依存。如果沒有不空，就沒有空，又怎麼能相互依存呢？』外道說：『你沒有成就，這本身就是一種成就（修妒路）。比如，說房間空無一物，沒有馬，那麼就存在『沒有馬』。同樣，你雖然說諸法空無相，但卻能生出種種心念，所以應該存在『無』。那麼，沒有成就，這本身就是一種成就。』內道說：『不是這樣的。因為有和無，一切都是不存在的（修妒路）。我在實相中，用種種法門，說有和無都是空。為什麼呢？因為如果沒有『有』，也就沒有『無』。所以，有和無，一切都是不存在的。』外道說：『破斥是不成立的，因為諸法自性本空（修妒路）。諸法的自性是空，沒有作者。因為沒有作者，所以不應該有破斥。就像愚癡的人，想要破斥虛空，只是徒勞無功。』內道說：『雖然自性本空，但因為執取相狀，所以被束縛（修妒路）。一切法雖然自性本空，但因為邪想分別的緣故，所以被束縛。爲了破除這種顛倒，所以才說破斥，實際上沒有什麼可破的。譬如愚人看到熱時的陽焰，錯誤地以為是水，追逐它而疲勞。智者告訴他，說這不是水。爲了斷除他的妄想，而不是爲了破斥水。同樣，諸法自性本空，眾生因為執取相狀而產生執著。爲了破除這種顛倒，所以才說破斥，實際上沒有什麼可破的。』外道說：『沒有說法，因為《大經》中沒有（修妒路）。』

【English Translation】 English version: For example, saying 'non-existence' is truly 'non-existence'. But just because one says 'non-existence', it doesn't mean that non-existence actually exists. Attachment to 'non-existence' is also like this. The outsider says: 'The Dharma of no-characteristics that you speak of is the Dharma of annihilation (Sūtra, meaning scripture). If all Dharmas are empty and without characteristics, then this attachment also does not exist. Then there are no Dharmas at all. Having no Dharmas at all is called the Dharma of annihilation.' The insider says: 'One who refutes the Dharma of annihilation is truly practicing the Dharma of annihilation (Sūtra). I myself have no Dharma, so there is nothing to refute. You say that I am annihilating the Dharma and want to refute me, then you are the one practicing the Dharma of annihilation.' The outsider says: 'There should be Dharmas, because they exist in dependence on each other (Sūtra). If there is 'long', there must be 'short'; if there is 'high', there must be 'low'; if there is 'empty', there must be 'real'.' The insider says: 'What is dependent on each other? Because 'one' has already been refuted (Sūtra). If there is no 'one', there is no mutual dependence. If there is a little bit of non-emptiness, there should be mutual dependence. If there is no non-emptiness, there is no emptiness, so how can there be mutual dependence?' The outsider says: 'Your lack of accomplishment is itself an accomplishment (Sūtra). For example, saying that a room is empty and there is no horse, then there is 'no horse'. Similarly, although you say that all Dharmas are empty and without characteristics, you can generate various thoughts, so there should be 'non-existence'. Then, lack of accomplishment is itself an accomplishment.' The insider says: 'It is not like that. Because existence and non-existence, everything is non-existent (Sūtra). In the true reality, I use various Dharma gates to say that existence and non-existence are both empty. Why? Because if there is no 'existence', there is also no 'non-existence'. Therefore, existence and non-existence, everything is non-existent.' The outsider says: 'Refutation is not established, because the self-nature of all Dharmas is empty (Sūtra). The self-nature of all Dharmas is empty, there is no creator. Because there is no creator, there should be no refutation. Like a foolish person who wants to refute the empty space, it is just futile labor.' The insider says: 'Although the self-nature is empty, one is bound because of grasping at appearances (Sūtra). Although all Dharmas are empty in their self-nature, they are bound because of wrong thoughts and discriminations. In order to break this inversion, we speak of refutation, but in reality, there is nothing to refute. For example, a foolish person sees a heat haze and mistakenly thinks it is water, chasing after it and becoming tired. A wise person tells him that it is not water. In order to cut off his delusion, not to refute the water. Similarly, the self-nature of all Dharmas is empty, and sentient beings become attached because of grasping at appearances. In order to break this inversion, we speak of refutation, but in reality, there is nothing to refute.' The outsider says: 'There is no Dharma teaching, because it is not in the Great Sutra (Sūtra).'

)。汝破有破無。破有無。今墮非有非無。是非有非無不可說。何以故。有無相不可得故。是名無說法。是無說法。衛世師經。僧佉經。尼干法等大經中。皆無故不可信。內曰。有第四(修妒路)。汝大經中。亦有無說法。如衛世師經。聲不名大。不名小。僧佉經。泥團非瓶非非瓶。尼干法。光非明非闇。如是諸經。有第四無說法。汝何言無。外曰。若空不應有說(修妒路)。若都空以無說法為是今者何以說善惡法教化耶。內曰。隨俗語故無過(修妒路)。諸佛說法。常依俗諦。第一義諦。是二皆實。非妄語也。如佛雖知諸法無相。然告阿難。入舍衛城乞食。若除土木等。城不可得。而隨俗語故。不墮妄語。我亦隨佛學故無過。外曰。俗諦無不實故(修妒路)。俗諦若實。則入第一義諦。若不實。何以言諦。內曰。不然。相待故。如大小(修妒路)。俗諦於世人為實。于聖人為不實。譬如一柰。于棗為大。于瓜為小。此二皆實。若於棗言小。于瓜言大者。是則妄語。如是隨俗語故無過。外曰。知是過得何等利(修妒路)。如初舍罪福乃至破空。如是諸法皆見有過得何等利。內曰。如是舍我。名得解脫(修妒路)。如是三種破諸法。初舍罪福中破神。后破一切法。是名無我無我所。又于諸法。不受不著。聞有不喜。聞無

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本外曰：你破斥『有』，破斥『無』，破斥『有無』，現在落入『非有非無』的境地。這『非有非無』是不可說的。為什麼呢？因為『有』和『無』的相狀都不可得。這叫做『無說法』。這『無說法』，在衛世師經、僧佉經、尼干法等大經中，都是沒有的，所以不可信。內曰：你的大經中，也有『無說法』，例如衛世師經說，聲音不名為『大』，也不名為『小』；僧佉經說，泥團不是瓶，也不是『非瓶』；尼干法說，光不是『明』，也不是『暗』。像這些經，都有第四種『無說法』，你為什麼說沒有呢？外曰：如果一切皆空，就不應該有說法（修妒路）。如果一切都空，以『無說法』為是，那麼現在為什麼還要說善惡之法來教化呢？內曰：隨順世俗的語言，就沒有過失（修妒路）。諸佛說法，常常依據俗諦和第一義諦。這兩種諦都是真實的，不是妄語。例如佛雖然知道諸法無相，但仍然告訴阿難，進入舍衛城乞食。如果除去土木等，城就不可得，但隨順世俗的語言，就不算妄語。我也隨順佛陀學習，所以沒有過失。外曰：俗諦沒有不真實的緣故（修妒路）。如果俗諦是真實的，那就進入第一義諦；如果不真實，為什麼還說是『諦』呢？內曰：不是這樣的，因為是相對待的緣故，就像大小（修妒路）。俗諦對於世人來說是真實的，對於聖人來說是不真實的。譬如一個柰（蘋果），對於棗來說是大的，對於瓜來說是小的。這兩種說法都是真實的。如果對於棗說小，對於瓜說大，那就是妄語。像這樣隨順世俗的語言，就沒有過失。外曰：知道這些過失能得到什麼利益（修妒路）？像最初捨棄罪福，乃至破斥空，像這樣諸法都見到有過失，能得到什麼利益？內曰：像這樣捨棄『我』，就叫做得到解脫（修妒路）。像這樣三種破斥諸法，最初捨棄罪福中破斥神我，最後破斥一切法，這叫做無我、無我所。又對於諸法，不接受，不執著，聽到『有』不歡喜，聽到『無』

【English Translation】 English version The Outsider says: You refute 'existence,' refute 'non-existence,' and refute 'existence and non-existence.' Now you have fallen into the realm of 'neither existence nor non-existence.' This 'neither existence nor non-existence' is inexpressible. Why? Because the characteristics of 'existence' and 'non-existence' are unattainable. This is called 'no-teaching.' This 'no-teaching' is not found in the great scriptures such as the Vaisheshika Sutra, the Samkhya Sutra, and the Nirgrantha doctrines, so it is not credible. The Insider says: In your great scriptures, there is also 'no-teaching.' For example, the Vaisheshika Sutra says that sound is not called 'large' nor is it called 'small'; the Samkhya Sutra says that a lump of clay is not a pot, nor is it 'not-a-pot'; the Nirgrantha doctrines say that light is neither 'brightness' nor 'darkness.' Like these scriptures, there is a fourth kind of 'no-teaching.' Why do you say there is none? The Outsider says: If everything is empty, there should be no teaching (Sutra). If everything is empty, and 'no-teaching' is correct, then why do you still speak of the laws of good and evil to teach? The Insider says: Following conventional language, there is no fault (Sutra). When the Buddhas teach, they always rely on conventional truth and ultimate truth. Both of these truths are real, not false speech. For example, although the Buddha knows that all dharmas are without characteristics, he still tells Ananda to enter Shravasti to beg for food. If you remove earth, wood, etc., the city cannot be obtained, but following conventional language, it is not considered false speech. I also follow the Buddha's teachings, so there is no fault. The Outsider says: Conventional truth is not without falsehood (Sutra). If conventional truth is real, then it enters ultimate truth; if it is not real, why is it called 'truth'? The Insider says: It is not like that, because it is relative, like large and small (Sutra). Conventional truth is real for worldly people, but not real for sages. For example, an apple is large compared to a jujube, and small compared to a melon. Both of these statements are true. If you say it is small compared to a jujube, and large compared to a melon, then that is false speech. Like this, following conventional language, there is no fault. The Outsider says: Knowing these faults, what benefit is obtained (Sutra)? Like initially abandoning merit and demerit, and even refuting emptiness, seeing faults in all these dharmas, what benefit is obtained? The Insider says: Like this, abandoning 'self' is called obtaining liberation (Sutra). Like this, the three kinds of refutations of all dharmas, initially abandoning merit and demerit, refuting the self, and finally refuting all dharmas, this is called no-self, no-self-possession. Furthermore, regarding all dharmas, not accepting, not clinging, not rejoicing when hearing 'existence,' hearing 'non-existence'

不憂。是名解脫。外曰。何以言名得解脫。不實得解脫耶。內曰。畢竟清凈故。破神故。無人破涅槃故。無解脫。云何言人得解脫。于俗諦故。說名解脫。

百論卷下

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

『不憂』，這就被稱為解脫。外道問道：『為什麼說只是名義上的解脫，而不是真實地獲得解脫呢？』內道回答：『因為畢竟是清凈的緣故，因為破除了神我的緣故，因為沒有人能破除涅槃（Nirvana，佛教術語，指熄滅煩惱后的境界）的緣故，所以實際上沒有解脫。』『既然如此，為什麼又說人能獲得解脫呢？』『這是在世俗諦（Samvriti-satya，佛教術語，指相對真理，即世俗層面的真理）的層面來說的，所以稱之為解脫。』出自《百論》下卷

【English Translation】 English version:

『No sorrow,』 this is called liberation (moksha). The outsider asks: 『Why do you say it is merely nominal liberation, and not actual attainment of liberation?』 The insider replies: 『Because it is ultimately pure, because the self (atman) is destroyed, because no one can destroy Nirvana (Nirvana, Buddhist term, the state of extinguishing afflictions), therefore there is actually no liberation.』『If that is so, why do you say that a person can attain liberation?』『This is spoken of in terms of conventional truth (Samvriti-satya, Buddhist term, relative truth, truth on the conventional level), therefore it is called liberation.』 From Shata Shastra (Bai Lun) Volume 2