T30n1571_大乘廣百論釋論

大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1571 大乘廣百論釋論

No. 1571 [cf. Nos. 1569, 1570]

大乘廣百論釋論卷第一

聖天菩薩本　護法菩薩釋

三藏法師玄奘奉　詔譯

破常品第一之一

稽首妙慧如日輪　　垂光破闇開凈眼　遠布微言廣百論　　百聖隨行我當釋

論曰。為顯邪執我我所事性相皆空。方便開示三解脫門故造斯論。執見事性為方便故起相分別。隨取事相為依止故生邪愿樂。既顯事空二即非有。其我所事略有二種。謂常無常。常住事勝寂靜安樂。眾生聞樂清曠無為多生欣樂。無常事劣能引諸苦。眾生見苦熾火所燒多生厭離由是論。初先破常事。故說頌曰。

一切為果生　　所以無常性　故除佛無有　　如實號如來

論曰。諸有世間鄙執他論所說種種常住句義。多越現量所行境界。以能生果比量安立。既能生果。亦應比度從緣而生。如粗色等。若非緣生。無勝體用。應不能生。如空花等若許彼義從緣而生。即定滅壞。如所生果。所以佛說諸行無常。從緣生滅。如苦樂等。是故唯佛無顛倒說。得名如來。見一切境無掛礙故。若爾所餘無生果用此應是常。既不生果。不可比度。從緣生故。雖爾既無能生果用。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1571 大乘廣百論釋論

No. 1571 [cf. Nos. 1569, 1570]

大乘廣百論釋論卷第一

聖天菩薩本　護法菩薩釋

三藏法師玄奘奉　詔譯

破常品第一之一

稽首妙慧如日輪　　垂光破闇開凈眼遠布微言廣百論　　百聖隨行我當釋

論曰。為顯邪執我我所事性相皆空。方便開示三解脫門故造斯論。執見事性為方便故起相分別。隨取事相為依止故生邪愿樂。既顯事空二即非有。其我所事略有二種。謂常無常。常住事勝寂靜安樂。眾生聞樂清曠無為多生欣樂。無常事劣能引諸苦。眾生見苦熾火所燒多生厭離由是論。初先破常事。故說頌曰。

一切為果生　　所以無常性故除佛無有　　如實號如來

論曰。諸有世間鄙執他論所說種種常住句義。多越現量所行境界。以能生果比量安立。既能生果。亦應比度從緣而生。如粗色等。若非緣生。無勝體用。應不能生。如空花等若許彼義從緣而生。即定滅壞。如所生果。所以佛說諸行無常。從緣生滅。如苦樂等。是故唯佛無顛倒說。得名如來（Tathagata，如來）。見一切境無掛礙故。若爾所餘無生果用此應是常。既不生果。不可比度。從緣生故。雖爾既無能生果用。

【English Translation】 English version T 30 No. 1571 Commentary on the Mahayana Hundred Verses

No. 1571 [cf. Nos. 1569, 1570]

Commentary on the Mahayana Hundred Verses, Volume 1

By Bodhisattva Aryadeva, Explained by Bodhisattva Dharmapala

Translated under Imperial Order by Tripitaka Master Xuanzang

Chapter 1: Refuting Permanence, Part 1

I bow to the sun-like wisdom, which sheds light to dispel darkness and opens pure eyes. Widely spreading the subtle words of the Hundred Verses, I shall explain it following the hundred sages.

The treatise states: To reveal that the nature and characteristics of the 'self' and 'what belongs to the self' are empty, this treatise is composed to conveniently reveal the three doors of liberation. Clinging to the nature of things as a means gives rise to conceptual distinctions. Relying on the characteristics of things gives rise to perverse desires. Since it is shown that things are empty, the two ('self' and 'what belongs to the self') are non-existent. The things that belong to the 'self' are roughly of two kinds: permanence and impermanence. Permanent things are considered superior, peaceful, and blissful. When sentient beings hear of bliss, purity, and non-action, they mostly rejoice. Impermanent things are considered inferior and can lead to all kinds of suffering. When sentient beings see suffering, burned by the blazing fire, they mostly feel aversion. Therefore, this treatise first refutes permanent things. Hence, the verse says:

All things arise to produce results, Therefore, they are impermanent in nature. Thus, except for the Buddha, there is none Who is truly called the Tathagata (如來).

The treatise states: Those in the world who ignorantly cling to the various permanent meanings spoken of in other treatises mostly transcend the realm of direct perception. They establish it through inference based on the ability to produce results. Since it can produce results, it should also be inferred to arise from conditions, like coarse matter, etc. If it does not arise from conditions, it has no superior essence or function and should not be able to produce anything, like sky-flowers, etc. If they admit that that meaning arises from conditions, it is definitely subject to destruction, like the results it produces. Therefore, the Buddha said that all phenomena are impermanent, arising and ceasing from conditions, like suffering and joy, etc. Therefore, only the Buddha speaks without inverted views and is named Tathagata (如來), because he sees all realms without obstruction. If so, what remains that has no arising or result should be permanent. Since it produces no result, it cannot be inferred to arise from conditions. Even so, it has no ability to produce results.

如永滅無。應比非有。為顯此言。其義決定。故復頌曰。

無有時方物　　有性非緣生　故無時方物　　有性而常住

論曰。諸有性法。定從緣生。如苦樂等。若非緣生。定無有性。如空花等。此若有性。應從緣生。若從緣生。滅必隨逐。無容常住。如是說已。或復諸法。必依緣生。方知有性。如現在法。若非緣生。即非有性。如未來法。為辨此義故說無有時方等言。此顯所說其理決定。若時若方。若物差別。遍一切處皆無諍論。如說菩薩住循法觀。于諸法中不見少法出緣生外。又彼非處方便慇勤。何以故。頌曰。

非無因有性

論曰。彼雖方便慇勤立常。而竟不能說有道理。如是句義所立能立。一分所依不極成故。既不許有餘同類義。同喻闕故。比量不成。設復強說。終成非理。何以故。頌曰。

有因即非常

論曰。縱彼強說常性有因。既許有因。即非常性。如苦熾火相應所生。此因便能違害根本雖無生因而有了因。有因總故。即為極成。複次有執一切性皆是常。若立一切皆無常性。俱闕同喻。比量不成。此亦不然。同前過故。又彼雖立隱性為常。而立顯相有其生滅。由此足能顯無常性。遮破常性。彼論遮破。顯相是常及非有故。若說顯相亦無生滅。前位無減。后位無增。諸造論

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果永遠斷滅，那就應該不是『有』。爲了顯明這個道理，所以這樣肯定地說。因此再次用頌文說：

『沒有時間、空間、事物，有自性就不是因緣生。所以沒有時間、空間、事物，有自性就是常住。』

論中說：凡是有自性的法，必定是從因緣而生，比如苦、樂等等。如果不是從因緣而生，那就一定沒有自性，比如虛空中的花朵等等。如果這個『常性』有自性，就應該從因緣而生。如果從因緣而生，那麼生滅變化必定會隨之而來，不可能常住不變。這樣說了之後，或者又說，一切法必定依靠因緣才能知道它有自性，比如現在的法。如果不是因緣所生，那就沒有自性，比如未來的法。爲了辨明這個道理，所以說『沒有時間、空間』等等。這表明所說的道理是確定的。無論是時間、空間，還是事物的差別，在任何地方都沒有爭議。就像經文所說，菩薩安住于隨順法性的觀察中，在一切法中看不到有任何法能夠超出因緣而生。而且，在不適當的地方，再怎麼努力也是徒勞的。為什麼呢？頌文說：

『不是沒有原因而有自性。』

論中說：那些人雖然努力地想建立『常』的觀念，但最終還是不能說出道理來。像這樣的語句，所要建立的觀點和能夠成立的理由，一部分所依據的條件並不完全成立。既然不承認有其他同類的例子，那麼類比推理就缺少了共同的例子，因此比量不能成立。即使勉強說，最終也會變成不合道理。為什麼呢？頌文說：

『有原因就不是常。』

論中說：即使他們勉強說常性是有原因的，既然承認有原因，那就不是常性了，就像苦和熾熱的火焰相互作用所產生的現象一樣。這個原因就能違背根本的常性。即使沒有生起的原因，但有了因緣，有了因緣的總和，也就完全成立了。再次，有人執著於一切自性都是常的。如果說一切都是無常的，那麼雙方都缺少共同的例子，比量就不能成立。這種說法也是不對的，和前面的過失一樣。而且，他們雖然建立隱性的事物是常的，但認為顯現的事物有生滅變化。由此就足以顯示無常的性質，遮破常的性質。他們的論點遮破了顯現的事物是常的，以及不是『有』的觀點。如果說顯現的事物也沒有生滅變化，那麼前面的狀態沒有減少，後面的狀態沒有增加，那些造論者……

【English Translation】 English version: If it is eternally extinguished, it should not be 'existent'. To clarify this point, this statement is made definitively. Therefore, it is further stated in verse:

'Without time, space, or objects, that which has inherent nature is not born from conditions. Therefore, without time, space, or objects, that which has inherent nature is permanent.'

The treatise states: All phenomena with inherent nature are definitely born from conditions, such as suffering and joy. If they are not born from conditions, they definitely have no inherent nature, like flowers in the sky. If this 'permanence' has inherent nature, it should be born from conditions. If it is born from conditions, then arising and ceasing will inevitably follow, and it cannot remain permanent. Having said this, or it is further said that all phenomena must rely on conditions to know that they are existent, like present phenomena. If they are not born from conditions, then they have no inherent nature, like future phenomena. To distinguish this meaning, it is said 'without time, space,' etc. This shows that the principle stated is definite. Whether it is time, space, or the differences of objects, there is no dispute anywhere. Just as the sutra says, a Bodhisattva abides in the observation of following the Dharma nature, and in all phenomena, he does not see any phenomenon that can arise outside of conditions. Moreover, in an inappropriate place, no matter how hard one tries, it is in vain. Why? The verse says:

'It is not without a cause that there is inherent nature.'

The treatise states: Although those people try hard to establish the concept of 'permanence', they ultimately cannot explain the reason. Like such statements, the view to be established and the reason that can establish it, a part of the conditions on which they are based are not completely established. Since they do not admit that there are other similar examples, then the analogy lacks a common example, therefore the inference cannot be established. Even if they force the argument, it will ultimately become unreasonable. Why? The verse says:

'If there is a cause, then it is not permanent.'

The treatise states: Even if they force the argument that permanence has a cause, since they admit that there is a cause, then it is not permanent, like the phenomena produced by the interaction of suffering and blazing flames. This cause can violate the fundamental permanence. Even if there is no cause for arising, but there are conditions, and the sum of conditions, then it is completely established. Furthermore, some are attached to the view that all inherent natures are permanent. If it is said that everything is impermanent, then both sides lack a common example, and the inference cannot be established. This statement is also incorrect, and has the same fault as before. Moreover, although they establish that hidden phenomena are permanent, they believe that manifested phenomena have arising and ceasing. From this, it is sufficient to show the nature of impermanence, refuting the nature of permanence. Their argument refutes the view that manifested phenomena are permanent, and the view that they are not 'existent'. If it is said that manifested phenomena also have no arising and ceasing, then the previous state is not reduced, and the later state is not increased, those who create treatises...

者何所為耶。何所造耶。若謂諸法雖有隱顯而無生滅。此亦不然。前後兩位若無差別。便無增減有何隱顯。又離體外無別有位。位有隱顯。體亦應然。汝雖不欲體有生滅。理所逼故。必應信受。如是所立前後兩位。隱顯非常為同法喻。由此我立不與汝同。立常同喻定非有故。又所立義必須有因。非唯起心即可成立。故次頌曰。

故無因欲成　　真見說非有

論曰。諸有比量。能成立他所不許義。乃名能立。若離正因。但有言說。虛陳自意。義終不成。有言無因義得成者。諸有所立一切應成。縱一切成。仁今何吝。我亦無吝。彼自不成。一切皆成。汝亦不許。

複次有餘偏執明論聲常。初不待緣。后無壞滅。性自能顯。越諸根義。為決定量曾不差違。現比等量依士夫見。士夫有失見是疑因。故能依量皆難信受。此亦不然。與前所說非愛過咎。不相離故。若所依止。士夫及見皆有過故。能依諸量亦有失者。汝及汝師見及言論。既有過失。云何可信。汝所發言。便成自害若汝意謂。汝及汝師所發言詞。亦是定量。餘聲非者。無有比量。但愛自宗。亦復自違所立宗義。又以比量立明論聲非士夫造。體是常住。因及同喻。應更須成。設復能成。則為自害。又明論聲與所餘聲同是聲性。云何但說此聲是常。餘聲無

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

'這些行為是爲了什麼呢？創造了什麼呢？' 如果說諸法（dharma，事物）雖然有隱沒和顯現，卻沒有生起和滅亡，這也是不對的。前後兩個階段如果沒有差別，就沒有增加和減少，又有什麼隱沒和顯現呢？而且離開本體之外沒有別的階段，階段有隱沒和顯現，本體也應該如此。你雖然不希望本體有生起和滅亡，但道理所迫，必定應該相信接受。像這樣所建立的前後兩個階段，隱沒和顯現不是恒常的，作為相同的法（dharma，事物）的比喻。因此我所建立的與你不同，建立恒常相同的比喻必定是不存在的。而且所建立的義理必須有原因，不是僅僅動動心思就可以成立的。所以接下來說：

'所以沒有原因想要成立，真正的見解說這是不存在的'

論曰：各種比量（anumana，推理），能夠成立他人不認可的義理，才叫做能成立。如果離開正確的因（hetu，原因），只有言說，虛假地陳述自己的意思，義理最終不能成立。有人說沒有原因義理也能成立，如果這樣，所有建立的都應該成立。縱然一切都成立，你現在又吝嗇什麼呢？我也並不吝嗇，是他們自己不能成立。一切都成立，你也不認可。

再次，還有一些人偏執地認為《明論》（Minglun，一種論典）的聲音是常恒的，最初不依賴因緣，之後沒有壞滅，自效能夠顯現，超越各種根（indriya，感官）的意義，作為決定的量（pramana，認知方式）從來沒有差錯違背。現量（pratyaksa，直接感知）和比量（anumana，推理）等量依賴於士夫（purusha，人）的見解，士夫有缺失，見解是懷疑的原因，所以能夠依賴的量都難以相信接受。這也是不對的，與前面所說的非愛（advesa，不喜愛）的過失沒有分離。如果所依賴的士夫和見解都有過失，能夠依賴的各種量也有缺失，你和你的老師的見解和言論既然有過失，怎麼能相信呢？你所說的話，就成了自相矛盾。如果你認為，你和你的老師所說的話也是定量，其他的聲音不是，沒有比量，只是喜愛自己的宗派，也違背了自己所建立的宗義。又用比量來建立《明論》的聲音不是士夫所造，本體是常住的，原因和同喻，應該更需要成立。假設能夠成立，就成了自相矛盾。而且《明論》的聲音與其餘的聲音同樣是聲音的性質，為什麼只說這個聲音是常恒的，其餘的聲音不是呢？

【English Translation】 English version:

'What are these actions for? What has been created?' If it is said that although all dharmas (things) have obscuration and manifestation, they do not have arising and ceasing, this is also not correct. If there is no difference between the previous and subsequent stages, there is no increase or decrease, and what obscuration and manifestation is there? Moreover, there is no other stage apart from the entity itself. If the stage has obscuration and manifestation, the entity should also be like that. Although you do not want the entity to have arising and ceasing, compelled by reason, you must believe and accept it. The previous and subsequent stages established in this way, with obscuration and manifestation that are not constant, serve as a metaphor for the same dharma (thing). Therefore, what I establish is different from you, establishing a constant and identical metaphor that is definitely non-existent. Moreover, the meaning established must have a cause; it cannot be established merely by thinking about it. Therefore, it is said next:

'Therefore, wanting to establish without a cause, true insight says it is non-existent.'

Treatise says: Various inferences (anumana), which can establish a meaning that others do not accept, are called establishing. If one departs from the correct cause (hetu), there is only speech, falsely stating one's own meaning, and the meaning ultimately cannot be established. Some say that meaning can be established without a cause. If so, everything established should be established. Even if everything is established, what are you stingy about now? I am not stingy either; it is they themselves who cannot establish it. If everything is established, you do not accept it either.

Furthermore, some are stubbornly attached to the view that the sound of the Minglun (a treatise) is constant, initially not dependent on conditions, and without destruction afterward. Its nature can manifest itself, transcending the meaning of various senses (indriya), and as a definitive means of cognition (pramana), it has never been mistaken or contradictory. Direct perception (pratyaksa) and inference (anumana) and other means of cognition rely on the views of a person (purusha). If a person has faults, their views are a cause for doubt. Therefore, the means of cognition that can be relied upon are difficult to believe and accept. This is also not correct, as it is not separate from the fault of non-affection (advesa) mentioned earlier. If the person and views relied upon have faults, and the various means of cognition that can be relied upon also have faults, since your and your teacher's views and statements have faults, how can they be believed? What you say becomes self-contradictory. If you think that what you and your teacher say is also a definitive means of cognition, and other sounds are not, there is no inference, only fondness for your own sect, and you also contradict the doctrinal meaning you have established. Moreover, using inference to establish that the sound of the Minglun was not created by a person and that its entity is constant, the cause and the example should be further established. If it can be established, it becomes self-contradictory. Moreover, the sound of the Minglun and the remaining sounds are equally of the nature of sound. Why do you only say that this sound is constant, and the remaining sounds are not?

常亦不可說。餘人自許聲是無常。由士夫造故非是常。今則不許故是常住。法性決定。豈隨論者許與不許成常無常。不可說言一切法性隨見差別其體轉變。一物同時有多體相。更互相違。非道理故。若法隨人情計轉者。應舍自宗取所餘見。又立常者。所說道理唯依異法。無同法故。所立不成。或舍自意。是故彼宗不任推撿。唯構虛言。都無實義。

複次有餘執言。唯異法喻。即名能立。異法遍故。比量本為遮余義故。現見遮相所雜糅緣。能顯義故。為定此義。復作是言。諸所作者。既是無常。故知非作理應常住。此言為顯異法決定。此亦不然。隨自意語不能如實。顯正理故。所以者何。唯顯異義所遮事境名為同喻。其異法喻二分俱行可名為遍。若無同喻何所遍耶。不可說言自體自遍。又諸比量欲遮余義。要有同法然後方成。同法若是無異法應非有。離其同異二聚法外。更不許有餘句義故。由此即破現見遮相。所雜糅緣能顯于義。又以不見所作為因。欲成有常。終無是義。以一切處未曾見有。故說頌曰。

見所作無常　　謂非作常住　既見無常有　　應言常性無

論曰。見所作者。皆是無常。謂非作者。皆是常住。既見所作。無常性有。應言非作常住性無。諸所作者既許有體。非所作者應許無體。以

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『常』（nitya，永恒）也是不可說的。其他人自認為聲音是『無常』（anitya，無常），因為是由士夫（pudgala，人）所造，所以不是『常』。現在如果不允許這種說法，那麼聲音就是常住的。法性（dharmata，事物本性）是決定的，難道會隨著論者的允許或不允許而變成『常』或『無常』嗎？不可說一切法性隨著見解的差別而改變其本體。一件事物同時有多種體相，互相違背，這是沒有道理的。如果法隨著人的情感和計度而轉移，就應該捨棄自己的宗派，採取其他的見解。又設立『常』的人，所說的道理只依據不同的法，沒有相同的法，所以所立的觀點不能成立，或者捨棄了自己的意思。因此，他們的宗派不值得推敲檢驗，只是構造虛假的言論，完全沒有實際意義。

再次，有些人執著地說，只有『異法喻』（vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta，反例）才能稱為『能立』（sādhana，論證）。因為『異法』是普遍存在的。比量（anumāna，推論）本來就是爲了遮止其他的意義。現見的遮相和所雜糅的因緣，能夠顯明意義。爲了確定這個意義，又這樣說：凡是所作的，都是無常的，所以可知非所作的理應是常住的。這句話是爲了顯明『異法』的決定性。這也是不對的，隨自己的意思說話，不能如實地顯明正確的道理。為什麼呢？只有顯明『異義』所遮止的事境，才能稱為『同喻』（sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta，正例）。『異法喻』的兩部分都存在，才能稱為普遍。如果沒有『同喻』，又普遍於什麼呢？不可說自體自身普遍。而且，各種比量想要遮止其他的意義，必須要有相同的法才能成立。如果相同的法沒有，那麼不同的法應該也不存在。因為除了相同和不同這兩種法之外，不允許有其他的意義。由此就破斥了現見的遮相和所雜糅的因緣能夠顯明意義的說法。又以不見所作為因，想要成立有『常』，終究沒有這個道理。因為在任何地方都沒有見過這種情況。所以說偈頌：

『見到所作是無常，認為非作是常住，既然見到無常的存在，就應該說常性不存在。』

論曰：見到所作的，都是無常的，認為非所作的，都是常住的。既然見到所作的，無常性存在，就應該說非所作的，常住性不存在。凡是所作的，既然允許有體，非所作的，就應該允許沒有體。因為……

【English Translation】 English version: The 'permanent' (nitya) is also unspeakable. Others presume that sound is 'impermanent' (anitya) because it is produced by a person (pudgala), and therefore not 'permanent'. Now, if this is not allowed, then sound is permanent. The nature of reality (dharmata) is fixed; how could it become 'permanent' or 'impermanent' depending on whether the debater allows it or not? It cannot be said that the nature of all things changes its essence according to the difference in views. One thing having multiple forms and aspects simultaneously, contradicting each other, is unreasonable. If the Dharma changes according to people's emotions and calculations, one should abandon one's own school and adopt other views. Furthermore, those who establish 'permanence' base their arguments only on different dharmas, without any common dharmas, so their established view cannot stand, or they abandon their own meaning. Therefore, their school is not worth examining, merely constructing false words, completely without real meaning.

Furthermore, some insist that only 'dissimilar examples' (vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta) can be called 'proof' (sādhana), because 'dissimilarity' is universally present. Inference (anumāna) is originally for the purpose of negating other meanings. The negation of what is directly seen and the mixed conditions can reveal the meaning. To confirm this meaning, they further say: 'Whatever is produced is impermanent, so it is known that what is not produced should be permanent.' This statement is to show the decisiveness of 'dissimilarity'. This is also incorrect; speaking according to one's own intention cannot truly reveal the correct principle. Why? Only the object of negation revealed by 'different meanings' can be called a 'similar example' (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta). Both parts of the 'dissimilar example' exist to be called universal. If there is no 'similar example', what is universal? It cannot be said that the self is universally present in itself. Moreover, various inferences wanting to negate other meanings must have a common dharma to be established. If the common dharma does not exist, then the different dharma should also not exist, because apart from these two dharmas of similarity and dissimilarity, no other meaning is allowed. Therefore, this refutes the statement that the negation of what is directly seen and the mixed conditions can reveal the meaning. Also, using the non-seeing of production as a cause to establish permanence is ultimately meaningless, because this situation has never been seen anywhere. Therefore, the verse says:

'Seeing that what is produced is impermanent, one thinks that what is not produced is permanent. Since one sees the existence of impermanence, one should say that the nature of permanence does not exist.'

The treatise says: Seeing that what is produced is impermanent, one thinks that what is not produced is permanent. Since one sees the existence of impermanence in what is produced, one should say that the nature of permanence does not exist in what is not produced. Since whatever is produced is allowed to have substance, what is not produced should be allowed to have no substance. Because...

非作因於樂等有曾所未見龜毛等無皆可得故。如是非作違害能立所依自相非正能立為不爾耶。諸相違因若不遮礙。自共所許。乃于自境能立相違自相差別。今此所依共許為有。若不共許。無容依此競常無常。故非作因。不能違害所依自相。有釋此言我今不許。聚極微外有散極微。故此違因無自害失。此釋不然。彼依總相建立一切常法為有。豈勞分別聚散有無。如是釋者。空等無為都不許有。不可為難。色等極微雖依世俗許其為有。而是所作。故非所作因義不成。若於如是不成因上。作相違過亦不得成。頌中應言常性無者。正破所依空等性有。兼辨能依常住性無。若言空等無實有性。所依無故因義不成。何能違害有法自相。此亦不然。但說遮遣余有類物為此因故。因有三種。一有體法。如所作等。二無體法。如非作等。三通二法。如所知等。今所立因唯遮所作。不言別有非作自性。此因同類色等上無。于其異類龜毛等有。是故違害有法自相。又說頌曰。

愚夫妄分別　　謂空等為常

論曰。隨有所見皆無諦實。智不清白。故名愚夫。于尋思地恒自安處。推求分別諸法性相。于中或有智見猛利。虛妄計度越路而行。各恃所知皆自憍舉。互興異論檀立師資。俱未斷除分別見網。無明昏睡纏覆其心。如在夢中所緣皆

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果不是由『作』（所作性， हेतु ）引起的，那麼就像從未見過的龜毛等不存在的事物一樣，都是可以得到的。如果這樣，『非作』（非所作性， हेतु ）是否會違害能立（pakṣa）所依的自相，從而不能成為正確的能立呢？各種相違的『因』（hetu），如果不遮礙自共所許的事物，那麼就能在自己的境界中成立相違的自相差別。現在，這個所依（pakṣa）是共許為存在的。如果不共許，就無法依據它來爭論常與無常。因此，『非作』（非所作性， हेतु ）不能違害所依（pakṣa）的自相。有人解釋說：『我現在不承認聚合的極微之外有分散的極微。』因此，這個相違的『因』（hetu）沒有自害的過失。這種解釋是不對的。他們依據總相建立一切常法為存在，哪裡需要分別聚合和分散的有無呢？像這樣解釋的人，完全不承認空等無為法的存在，這是不能用來作為難題的。色等極微雖然依據世俗承認它們是存在的，但是它們是『所作』（所作性， कृतक ）的，因此『非所作』（अकृतक）的『因』（hetु）的意義不能成立。如果對於像這樣不成『因』（hetु）的事物，作相違的過失，也是不能成立的。頌中應該說『常性無者』，正是爲了破斥所依（pakṣa）空等法的存在，同時也辨明能依（dharmin）常住的自性不存在。如果說空等沒有真實的自性，因為所依（pakṣa）不存在，所以『因』（hetु）的意義不能成立，這也是不對的。只是說遮遣其餘有類的事物作為這個『因』（hetु）的緣故。『因』（hetु）有三種：一是有體法，如『所作』（所作性， कृतक ）等；二是無體法，如『非作』（अकृतक）等；三是通於二者的法，如『所知』（ज्ञेय）等。現在所立的『因』（hetु）只是遮遣『所作』（所作性， कृतक ），不說是另外有『非作』（अकृतक）的自性。這個『因』（hetु）在同類（sapakṣa）色等上沒有，在異類（vipakṣa）龜毛等上有。因此，違害了有法（dharmin）的自相。又說了頌：

愚夫妄分別，謂空等為常

論曰：隨有所見，皆無諦實，智不清白，故名愚夫。于尋思地恒自安處，推求分別諸法性相，于中或有智見猛利，虛妄計度越路而行，各恃所知皆自憍舉，互興異論檀立師資，俱未斷除分別見網，無明昏睡纏覆其心，如在夢中所緣皆現代漢語譯本：虛妄。

【English Translation】 English version: If it were not caused by 'production' (所作性, hetu), then, like the never-seen turtle hair and other non-existent things, it would be obtainable. If so, would 'non-production' (非所作性, hetu) contradict the self-nature of the substratum (pakṣa) of the probandum, thus failing to be a correct probandum? Various contradictory 'reasons' (hetu), if they do not obstruct what is mutually accepted, can establish the difference in their own realm of contradictory self-natures. Now, this substratum (pakṣa) is mutually accepted as existing. If it is not mutually accepted, there is no way to argue about permanence and impermanence based on it. Therefore, 'non-production' (非所作性, hetu) cannot contradict the self-nature of the substratum (pakṣa). Some explain this by saying, 'I do not now admit that there are scattered ultimate particles outside of aggregated ultimate particles.' Therefore, this contradictory 'reason' (hetu) does not have the fault of self-harm. This explanation is incorrect. They establish all permanent dharmas as existing based on the general characteristic, so where is the need to distinguish between the existence and non-existence of aggregation and scattering? Those who explain it this way completely deny the existence of unconditioned dharmas such as emptiness, which cannot be used as a difficulty. Although ultimate particles of form and so on are admitted to exist according to convention, they are 'produced' (所作性, कृतक), so the meaning of the 'reason' (hetu) of 'non-production' (अकृतक) cannot be established. If one makes a contradictory fault on something that is not a 'reason' (hetu) like this, it also cannot be established. The verse should say 'those without permanent nature,' precisely to refute the existence of the substratum (pakṣa), such as emptiness, and also to distinguish that the nature of the permanent abiding probandum (dharmin) does not exist. If it is said that emptiness and so on do not have a real self-nature, because the substratum (pakṣa) does not exist, the meaning of the 'reason' (hetu) cannot be established, this is also incorrect. It only says to exclude other existing kinds of things as the cause of this 'reason' (hetu). There are three kinds of 'reasons' (hetu): first, entities, such as 'production' (所作性, कृतक); second, non-entities, such as 'non-production' (अकृतक); and third, those that apply to both, such as 'knowable' (ज्ञेय). Now, the established 'reason' (hetu) only excludes 'production' (所作性, कृतक), and does not say that there is a separate self-nature of 'non-production' (अकृतक). This 'reason' (hetu) does not exist in the similar class (sapakṣa) such as form, and exists in the dissimilar class (vipakṣa) such as turtle hair. Therefore, it contradicts the self-nature of the subject (dharmin). It is also said in the verse:

'Fools falsely discriminate, thinking emptiness and so on are permanent.'

Commentary: Whatever is seen is not truly real, and the wisdom is not clear, hence the name 'fool.' They constantly settle themselves in the realm of thought, seeking and discriminating the nature and characteristics of all dharmas. Among them, some have sharp intelligence and go beyond the path with false calculations. Each relies on what they know and becomes arrogant, raising different arguments and establishing teachers and disciples. All have not yet cut off the net of discriminating views, and their minds are covered by the sleep of ignorance. Like in a dream, whatever is perceived is English version: false.

妄。非如夢智所計空等。常住實有而可信依。

複次有餘釋子執虛空等實有常住。故契經言。虛空無色無見無對。當何所依。然藉光明虛空顯了。此經義說。實有虛空常住無色無見無對。無復所依。因光明顯。或有疑難。佛既不說別有所依如風輪等。如是虛空應無體相。為釋此難。故說虛空容受有對光明等色以果顯因有實體相。又說虛空風所依止。非無體相能作所依。此亦不然。非經義故。若謂虛空是有果法。應有生滅。生滅隨故。體則無常。如色心等。若無生滅。應無體相。如龜毛等。為顯風輪離同類聚。無別所依如地輪等。所以經說。風輪依空。不遮風輪。前念現在同類同聚。生起所依。故作是說。為顯虛空無有同異生起所依如過去等無別實有常住體相故。復經說虛空無色無見無對。當何所依。不見實有色受等物。無有同異生起所依。又顯虛空因光明等。依世俗諦假施設。有如因色等假立瓶等。是故復說。然藉光明虛空顯了。不可依此即說虛空。離光明等實有體相。雖因影闇亦立虛空。然影闇中眼有障礙。或有除此更無所見。不能辯了余物有無。所以不說。然藉影闇虛空顯了。于光明中眼無障礙。若見無有餘障礙物。即便依此假立虛空。勿謗虛空假亦非有。是故不說無有虛空。又若虛空實有體相。藉諸光明

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本妄。並非如夢智所認為的空等，是常住實有而可以信賴依靠的。

其次，有些佛教徒執著于虛空等是真實存在且恒常不變的。所以契經上說：『虛空無色、無見、無對，應當依靠什麼呢？』然而憑藉光明，虛空才能顯現出來。這段經文的意思是說，如果認為虛空真實存在、恒常不變、無色、無見、無對，並且不需要依靠任何事物，只是因為光明的照耀才顯現出來，這就會產生疑問：佛既然沒有說虛空像風輪那樣有其他所依，那麼虛空就應該沒有實體。爲了解釋這個疑問，所以說虛空能夠容納有對的光明等色，用結果來顯示原因，說明虛空是有實體存在的。又說虛空是風所依止的地方，並非沒有實體，能夠作為所依。但這種說法也是不對的，因為不符合經文的原意。如果認為虛空是有果的法，就應該有生滅，隨著生滅變化，其本體就是無常的，就像色和心一樣。如果沒有生滅，就應該沒有實體，就像龜毛一樣。爲了顯示風輪不同於同類聚集，沒有像地輪等那樣的其他所依，所以經上說風輪依靠虛空，並不是要否定風輪前念、現在同類同聚生起所依。所以才這樣說。爲了顯示虛空沒有同類或異類生起的所依，就像過去等沒有其他真實存在、恒常不變的體相一樣。所以經上又說，虛空無色、無見、無對，應當依靠什麼呢？因為看不見真實存在的色、受等事物，沒有同類或異類生起的所依。又顯示虛空是因為光明等，依據世俗諦而假立的，就像因為色等而假立瓶子一樣。所以又說，憑藉光明，虛空才能顯現出來。不能因此就說虛空離開光明等，有真實的體相。雖然因為影子的黑暗也能假立虛空，但是影子黑暗中眼睛會有障礙，或者除了影子黑暗之外什麼也看不見，不能分辨其他事物的有無，所以不說憑藉影子黑暗虛空才能顯現出來。在光明中，眼睛沒有障礙，如果看見沒有其他障礙物，就可以依此假立虛空。不要誹謗虛空，認為虛空的假立也不是真實存在的。所以不說沒有虛空。又如果虛空有真實的體相，憑藉各種光明

English version Delusion. It is not like the emptiness conceived by dream-like wisdom, etc., but is permanent, real, and reliable.

Furthermore, some Buddhist practitioners hold that space (虛空, Xūkōng) and other things are real, permanent. Therefore, the sutra says: 'Space (虛空, Xūkōng) is without form, without visibility, without opposition; what should it rely on?' However, space (虛空, Xūkōng) is revealed by means of light. This sutra means that if one considers space (虛空, Xūkōng) to be real, permanent, without form, without visibility, without opposition, and not relying on anything, but only revealed by the light, then a question arises: Since the Buddha did not say that space (虛空, Xūkōng) has other supports like the wind wheel (風輪, Fēnglún), then space (虛空, Xūkōng) should have no substance. To explain this difficulty, it is said that space (虛空, Xūkōng) can accommodate the opposing light and other forms, using the result to show the cause, indicating that space (虛空, Xūkōng) has a real substance. It is also said that space (虛空, Xūkōng) is where the wind rests, not without substance, capable of being a support. But this statement is also incorrect because it does not conform to the meaning of the sutra. If it is considered that space (虛空, Xūkōng) is a fruit-like phenomenon, it should have arising and ceasing; following arising and ceasing, its substance would be impermanent, like form and mind. If there is no arising and ceasing, it should have no substance, like turtle hair. To show that the wind wheel (風輪, Fēnglún) is different from similar aggregates and has no other support like the earth wheel (地輪, Dìlún), the sutra says that the wind wheel (風輪, Fēnglún) relies on space (虛空, Xūkōng), not to deny that the wind wheel's (風輪, Fēnglún) previous thought, present thought, similar kind, and similar aggregate arise and rely on it. That is why it is said. To show that space (虛空, Xūkōng) has no similar or dissimilar arising support, just as the past, etc., has no other real, permanent substance. Therefore, the sutra also says, 'Space (虛空, Xūkōng) is without form, without visibility, without opposition; what should it rely on?' Because one does not see real form, sensation, etc., there is no similar or dissimilar arising support. It also shows that space (虛空, Xūkōng) is provisionally established based on conventional truth (世俗諦, Shìsúdì) because of light, etc., just as a vase is provisionally established because of form, etc. Therefore, it is said again, space (虛空, Xūkōng) is revealed by means of light. One cannot rely on this to say that space (虛空, Xūkōng) has a real substance apart from light, etc. Although space (虛空, Xūkōng) can also be established because of the darkness of shadows, in the darkness of shadows, the eyes are obstructed, or nothing can be seen except the darkness of shadows, and one cannot distinguish the existence or non-existence of other things, so it is not said that space (虛空, Xūkōng) is revealed by means of the darkness of shadows. In the light, the eyes are not obstructed; if one sees that there are no other obstacles, one can provisionally establish space (虛空, Xūkōng) based on this. Do not slander space (虛空, Xūkōng), thinking that the provisional establishment of space (虛空, Xūkōng) is not real either. Therefore, it is not said that there is no space (虛空, Xūkōng). Furthermore, if space (虛空, Xūkōng) has a real substance, relying on various lights

【English Translation】 English version Delusion. It is not like the emptiness conceived by dream-like wisdom, etc., but is permanent, real, and reliable.

Furthermore, some Buddhist practitioners hold that space (虛空, Xūkōng) and other things are real, permanent. Therefore, the sutra says: 'Space (虛空, Xūkōng) is without form, without visibility, without opposition; what should it rely on?' However, space (虛空, Xūkōng) is revealed by means of light. This sutra means that if one considers space (虛空, Xūkōng) to be real, permanent, without form, without visibility, without opposition, and not relying on anything, but only revealed by the light, then a question arises: Since the Buddha did not say that space (虛空, Xūkōng) has other supports like the wind wheel (風輪, Fēnglún), then space (虛空, Xūkōng) should have no substance. To explain this difficulty, it is said that space (虛空, Xūkōng) can accommodate the opposing light and other forms, using the result to show the cause, indicating that space (虛空, Xūkōng) has a real substance. It is also said that space (虛空, Xūkōng) is where the wind rests, not without substance, capable of being a support. But this statement is also incorrect because it does not conform to the meaning of the sutra. If it is considered that space (虛空, Xūkōng) is a fruit-like phenomenon, it should have arising and ceasing; following arising and ceasing, its substance would be impermanent, like form and mind. If there is no arising and ceasing, it should have no substance, like turtle hair. To show that the wind wheel (風輪, Fēnglún) is different from similar aggregates and has no other support like the earth wheel (地輪, Dìlún), the sutra says that the wind wheel (風輪, Fēnglún) relies on space (虛空, Xūkōng), not to deny that the wind wheel's (風輪, Fēnglún) previous thought, present thought, similar kind, and similar aggregate arise and rely on it. That is why it is said. To show that space (虛空, Xūkōng) has no similar or dissimilar arising support, just as the past, etc., has no other real, permanent substance. Therefore, the sutra also says, 'Space (虛空, Xūkōng) is without form, without visibility, without opposition; what should it rely on?' Because one does not see real form, sensation, etc., there is no similar or dissimilar arising support. It also shows that space (虛空, Xūkōng) is provisionally established based on conventional truth (世俗諦, Shìsúdì) because of light, etc., just as a vase is provisionally established because of form, etc. Therefore, it is said again, space (虛空, Xūkōng) is revealed by means of light. One cannot rely on this to say that space (虛空, Xūkōng) has a real substance apart from light, etc. Although space (虛空, Xūkōng) can also be established because of the darkness of shadows, in the darkness of shadows, the eyes are obstructed, or nothing can be seen except the darkness of shadows, and one cannot distinguish the existence or non-existence of other things, so it is not said that space (虛空, Xūkōng) is revealed by means of the darkness of shadows. In the light, the eyes are not obstructed; if one sees that there are no other obstacles, one can provisionally establish space (虛空, Xūkōng) based on this. Do not slander space (虛空, Xūkōng), thinking that the provisional establishment of space (虛空, Xūkōng) is not real either. Therefore, it is not said that there is no space (虛空, Xūkōng). Furthermore, if space (虛空, Xūkōng) has a real substance, relying on various lights

而顯了者。應如青等有色有見有對有依。經不應說無色無見無對無依。世俗假有。無此過失。依無礙色假立虛空。質礙等性不相應故。又此虛空四諦不攝。雖執實有。然必應許。有分別智之所了知。除五識身所引意識。其餘有漏不定外門分別意識。決定不能緣實有境。故說頌曰。

智者依世間　　亦不見此義

論曰。諸有智者。依止世間隨分別識于虛空等雖復專精愿求實義。乃至少分亦不可得。唯見依名所起分別似虛空等種種影像。

複次為破如前所執空等由遍滿故。體實有常。故說頌曰。

非唯一有分　　遍滿一切分　故知一一分　　各別有有分

論曰。時方物類各有差別。所以言分。空等與彼諸分相應。故名有分。非一有分常住真實。與一切分周遍相應。勿復令此所相應分。一一遍與一切相應。故此有分。隨所相應諸分差別成無量分。即此諸分不待余依。說名虛空。或余物類。故汝所說實有常住空等遍滿因義不成。若言空等亦由分別假立方分故無過者。此亦不然。實無方分。不離如前所說過故。瓶等亦應假立方分。依第一義方分實無。此因但于異法上有。同法既闕與義相違。又虛空等差別名言。唯依諸分和合而立。分別假立有方分故。如唯依彼色等和合。立宮殿等種種名言。此意顯

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本而顯現出來的東西，應當像青色等有顏色、能被看見、有對礙、有所依賴的事物一樣。經典不應該說它是無色、不能被看見、沒有對礙、沒有所依賴的。世俗的假有，沒有這種過失。依靠無礙的色法假立虛空，因為質礙等性質不相應。而且這個虛空不被四聖諦所包含。即使執著它是真實存在的，也必須承認它只能被有分別的智慧所了知。除了五識身所引發的意識，其餘有漏、不定的外門分別意識，絕對不能緣取真實存在的境。所以說偈頌：『智者依世間，亦不見此義。』論曰：那些有智慧的人，依靠世間的隨分別識，對於虛空等，即使非常專精地尋求真實的意義，也至少連少分都不可得。只能看到依靠名稱所產生的分別，類似虛空等的種種影像。其次，爲了破斥前面所執著的空等，因為遍滿的緣故，本體是真實存在且恒常的。所以說偈頌：『非唯一有分，遍滿一切分，故知一一分，各別有有分。』論曰：時間和空間、物體種類各有差別，所以稱為『分』。空等與那些『分』相應，所以稱為『有分』。不是一個『有分』恒常真實，與一切『分』周遍相應。不要再讓這個所相應的『分』，一一遍與一切相應。所以這個『有分』，隨著所相應的各個『分』的差別，成為無量的『分』。就是這些『分』不依賴其他，被稱為虛空，或者其他物類。所以你所說的真實存在且恒常的空等遍滿的理由不成立。如果說空等也是由分別假立方位，所以沒有過失，這也是不對的。因為實際上沒有方位，不能脫離前面所說過的過失。瓶子等也應該假立方位。依靠第一義諦，方位實際上不存在。這個理由只在異法上有，同法既然缺乏，就與意義相違背。而且虛空等差別的名稱，只是依靠各個『分』的和合而建立。因為分別假立有方位。就像只是依靠那些色等和合，建立宮殿等種種名稱。這個意思是顯而易見的。

【English Translation】 English version And what is manifested should be like blue and other colored things that are visible, have resistance, and are dependent. The scriptures should not say that it is colorless, invisible, without resistance, and without dependence. Worldly existence is hypothetical and does not have this fault. Empty space is hypothetically established based on unobstructed form, because properties such as resistance are not compatible. Moreover, this empty space is not included in the Four Noble Truths (Cattāri ariyasaccāni). Even if one clings to it as truly existent, one must admit that it can only be known by discriminating wisdom. Except for the consciousness arising from the five sense consciousnesses, the remaining defiled and uncertain external differentiating consciousnesses can never grasp truly existent objects. Therefore, a verse is spoken: 'The wise, relying on the world, also do not see this meaning.' Treatise: Those who are wise, relying on worldly differentiating consciousness regarding empty space (ākāśa) and the like, even if they diligently seek true meaning, cannot obtain even the slightest bit. They only see differentiations arising from names, images resembling empty space and the like. Furthermore, to refute the previously held view that empty space (ākāśa) and the like are truly existent and permanent due to being pervasive, a verse is spoken: 'Not a single existent part, pervades all parts, therefore know that each part, separately has existent parts.' Treatise: Time, space, and types of objects each have differences, hence the term 'part'. Empty space (ākāśa) and the like are associated with those 'parts', hence the term 'having parts'. It is not a single existent part that is permanent and truly existent, pervading all parts. Do not let this associated part be associated with everything. Therefore, this 'having parts', according to the differences of the associated parts, becomes limitless parts. These parts do not depend on anything else and are called empty space (ākāśa), or other types of objects. Therefore, your statement that truly existent and permanent empty space (ākāśa) and the like are pervasive is not established. If you say that empty space (ākāśa) and the like are also hypothetically established by differentiation, so there is no fault, this is also not correct. Because in reality there is no direction, and it cannot escape the previously mentioned faults. Pots and the like should also be hypothetically established with direction. According to the ultimate truth, direction does not exist in reality. This reason only exists in different phenomena; since the same phenomenon is lacking, it contradicts the meaning. Moreover, the different names of empty space (ākāśa) and the like are only established based on the combination of the parts. Because differentiation hypothetically establishes direction. Just like relying only on the combination of form (rūpa) and the like, various names such as palaces are established. This meaning is obvious.

示。虛空等聲唯依世俗境界而立。又若可說有方分者。應如青等不可說為常遍實有虛空等性。是則所立能立一分所依不成。

複次或有執時真實常住。以見種等眾緣和合。有時生果。有時不生。時有作用。或舒或卷。令枝條等隨其榮悴。此所說因具有離合。由是決定知實有時。時所待因都不可見。不見因故所以無生。以無生故即知無滅。無生無滅故復言常。為破彼執。故說頌曰。

若法體實有　　卷舒用可得　此定從他生　　故成所生果

論曰。時用卷舒待他方立。故此時用隨緣而轉。體相若無取捨差別諸有作用興廢不成。又時作用依他而轉。如地色等定是無常。即以此事為其同法。用所依時何容常住。故善時者作如是言。業風所引大種差別。自類為因展轉相續。循環遞代終而復始。隨緣不同冷暖觸異。分位差別說名為時。時雖具有因緣生滅。相似相續隱覆難知。豈以不知言無因等。

複次有執時體亦常亦遍。攝藏無量差別功能。外緣擊發起諸作用。芽莖等果隨用產生。此亦不然。所依時體若無遷變。能依功能豈可擊發。不見所依種等無變。而有生長芽等功能。即此擊發功能因緣。足有產生芽等作用。何須妄計無用時耶。又說頌曰。

若離所生果　　無有能生因　是故能生因　　皆成

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

論：虛空等聲音的建立，僅僅依賴於世俗的認知。又如果可以認為虛空等有方位，那麼它就應該像青色等事物一樣，不能被認為是常、遍、實有的。這樣一來，所要證明的（虛空等是常、遍、實有的）和用來證明的（聲音）之間，它們所依賴的基礎就不成立了。再次，有些人認為時間是真實、常住的。他們認為，看到種子等眾多因緣聚合，有時產生結果，有時不產生結果，是因為時間有作用，或舒展或收縮，使得枝條等隨著時間而榮盛或凋零。他們認為，這種作用具有離合性，由此可以確定時間是真實存在的。時間所依賴的因是不可見的，因為看不見因，所以沒有生起；因為沒有生起，所以沒有滅亡；因為沒有生起也沒有滅亡，所以說是常住的。爲了破斥這種觀點，所以說了下面的偈頌：『如果法的本體是實有的，舒展和收縮的作用可以被觀察到，那麼這一定是從其他事物產生的，因此成為被產生的果。』論：時間的作用，如舒展和收縮，依賴於其他事物而成立。因此，時間的作用隨著因緣而轉變。如果本體的體相沒有取捨的差別，那麼所有的作用和興衰都不能成立。而且，時間的作用依賴於其他事物而轉變，就像地面的顏色等一樣，一定是無常的。可以用這件事作為類比。作用所依賴的時間，怎麼可能是常住的呢？所以，善於觀察時間的人這樣說：業和風所引導的四大種的差別，以各自的同類為因而輾轉相續，循環更替，終結后又重新開始。隨著因緣的不同，冷暖的觸感也不同。這些分位的差別，就被稱為時間。時間雖然具有因緣生滅，但因為相似相續而難以察覺。難道能因為不瞭解，就說它沒有因等嗎？再次，有些人認為時間的本體也是常、也是遍的，它攝藏著無量的差別功能，外在的因緣衝擊它，從而引發各種作用，芽、莖等果實隨著這些作用而產生。這種觀點也是不對的。如果所依賴的時間本體沒有遷變，那麼能依賴的功能怎麼可能被衝擊引發呢？我們沒有看到所依賴的種子等沒有變化，卻有生長出芽等的功能。僅僅是這種衝擊引發的功能因緣，就足以產生芽等作用，何必妄加推測無用的時間呢？又說了下面的偈頌：『如果離開了被產生的果，就沒有能產生果的因，因此，能產生果的因，都是…'

【English Translation】 English version:

Statement: The establishment of sounds like 'space' depends solely on conventional understanding. Furthermore, if 'space' and the like could be said to have directions, they should be like 'blue' and other things, and could not be said to be permanent, pervasive, and truly existent like the nature of 'space'. In that case, the basis upon which the proposition (that 'space' is permanent, pervasive, and truly existent) and the means of proving it (sound) rely would not be established. Furthermore, some assert that time is real, permanent, and abiding. They believe that seeing the aggregation of causes and conditions such as seeds, sometimes results are produced, and sometimes they are not, because time has a function, either expanding or contracting, causing branches and the like to flourish or wither accordingly. They argue that this function has separation and union, and from this, it can be determined that time is truly existent. The cause upon which time depends is invisible; because the cause is not seen, there is no arising; because there is no arising, there is no cessation; because there is no arising and no cessation, it is said to be permanent. To refute this view, the following verse is stated: 'If the essence of a dharma is truly existent, The function of expansion and contraction can be observed, Then this must be produced from other things, Therefore, it becomes a produced result.' Statement: The function of time, such as expansion and contraction, is established dependent on other things. Therefore, the function of time changes according to conditions. If the essence of the entity has no difference in acceptance and rejection, then all functions and rise and fall cannot be established. Moreover, the function of time changes dependent on other things, just like the color of the ground and the like, which must be impermanent. This can be used as an analogy. How can the time upon which the function depends be permanent? Therefore, those who are skilled in observing time say this: The differences in the four great elements (mahābhūta) guided by karma (karma) and wind, with their own kind as the cause, continue in succession, cycling and alternating, ending and beginning again. Depending on the different conditions, the sensations of hot and cold are also different. These differences in divisions are called time. Although time has arising and ceasing due to causes and conditions, it is difficult to perceive because of its similar continuity. Can we say that it has no cause, etc., simply because we do not understand it? Furthermore, some assert that the essence of time is also permanent and pervasive, containing immeasurable different functions. External conditions strike it, thereby triggering various functions, and fruits such as sprouts and stems are produced along with these functions. This view is also incorrect. If the essence of the time upon which it depends does not change, how can the functions that depend on it be struck and triggered? We do not see that the seeds and the like upon which it depends do not change, yet there is the function of growing sprouts and the like. Merely this causal condition of striking and triggering is sufficient to generate the function of sprouts and the like, why falsely speculate about useless time? The following verse is also stated: 'If apart from the produced result, There is no cause that can produce the result, Therefore, the causes that can produce the result, Are all...'

所生果

論曰。諸法要待自所生果。有勝體用方得名因。所生若無。能生詎有。由是所執能生之因。必待余法成別因故。如苦樂等定是無常。豈不因法先有體用。後果生時因名方顯。如外眾緣先有體用。果法生已乃得緣名。時亦如是。其體常遍。具含種種生長功能。諸果生時名用方顯。又未生果亦得因名。待當果故。如稻麥種。汝所立時。其體常遍。具含種種生長功能。諸能與體既許無異。能應同體一一遍常。是則起用生一果時於一果處應生一切。如是便成因果雜亂。我立功能望所生果時處決定。故無此失。汝立功能一一常遍。不應輒許時處決定。若言論主所立功能同斯過者。此亦不然。我立功能依因緣有種種差別非遍非常。隨自因緣種種差別。所生諸果時處決定。故無起用生一果時於一果處遍生一切。所以因果不相雜亂。不同汝立時與功能。皆是遍常前後不異。是故唯汝有雜亂失。又說頌曰。

諸法必變異　　方作餘生因　如是變異因　　豈得名常住

論曰。世間共許。功能所依種子等法。必舍前位而取后位。體相轉變方為芽等所生果因。如是因性理無差失。所立常因應亦同此。體相轉變方能為因。既許轉變無容常住。豈不世間亦許種等。果未生位體相未轉。雖無作用而得名因。不爾世間雖假名

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本所生之果

論曰：一切法都需要依靠自身所產生的果。具有殊勝的體性和作用才能被稱為『因』（hetu，原因）。如果所生的果不存在，能生的因又怎麼會存在呢？因此，你們所執著的能生之因，必定要依賴其他法才能成為不同的因。例如，苦和樂等必定是無常的。難道不是因為因法先具有體性和作用，然後果產生時，因的名稱才顯現嗎？就像外在的各種因緣，先具有體性和作用，果法產生后，才獲得『緣』（pratyaya，條件）的名稱。時間也是如此，它的本體恒常周遍，具備包含種種生長的功能，各種果產生時，它的名稱和作用才顯現。而且，未產生的果也可以被稱為『因』，因為它等待著將要產生的果，就像稻麥的種子一樣。你們所設立的時間，它的本體恒常周遍，具備包含種種生長的功能。既然你們承認能與體沒有差別，那麼能也應該與體一樣，一一週遍恒常。這樣一來，在起作用產生一個果的時候，就應該在一個果的地方產生一切果，這樣就造成了因果的雜亂。我所設立的功能，是根據所生之果，在時間和地點上是決定的，所以沒有這種過失。你們所設立的功能，一一恒常周遍，不應該隨便允許時間和地點是決定的。如果說論主我所設立的功能也有同樣的過失，那是不對的。我所設立的功能，是依靠因緣而有種種差別的，不是周遍的，也不是恒常的。隨著各自的因緣有種種差別，所產生的各種果，在時間和地點上是決定的，所以不會在起作用產生一個果的時候，在一個果的地方周遍產生一切果。因此，因果不會相互雜亂，不像你們所設立的時間和功能，都是周遍恒常，前後沒有差別。所以只有你們有雜亂的過失。又說了頌：

諸法必變異，方作餘生因，如是變異因，豈得名常住。

論曰：世間普遍承認，功能所依賴的種子等法，必定捨棄之前的狀態而取用之後的狀態，本體和相狀轉變，才能成為芽等所生之果的因。這樣的因性，道理上沒有差錯。你們所設立的常因，也應該如此，本體和相狀轉變，才能成為因。既然承認轉變，就沒有容許常住的道理。難道不是世間也承認種子等，在果未產生的時候，本體和相狀沒有轉變，雖然沒有作用，但可以得到『因』的名稱嗎？如果不是這樣，世間雖然假名...

【English Translation】 English version The Fruit That Is Produced

Treatise: All dharmas must rely on the fruit they themselves produce. Only when something possesses superior essence and function can it be called a 'cause' (hetu). If the fruit that is produced does not exist, how can the cause that produces exist? Therefore, the cause of production that you cling to must rely on other dharmas to become a distinct cause. For example, suffering and happiness are certainly impermanent. Isn't it because the causal dharma first possesses essence and function, and then when the fruit is produced, the name of the cause becomes manifest? Just like external conditions (pratyaya), they first possess essence and function, and after the fruit-dharma is produced, they obtain the name 'condition'. Time is also like this; its essence is constant and pervasive, possessing and containing all kinds of growth functions. When various fruits are produced, its name and function become manifest. Moreover, the fruit that has not yet been produced can also be called a 'cause' because it awaits the fruit that will be produced, just like the seeds of rice and wheat. The time that you establish, its essence is constant and pervasive, possessing and containing all kinds of growth functions. Since you admit that the 'able' and the 'essence' are not different, then the 'able' should also be the same as the 'essence,' each being pervasive and constant. In that case, when it functions to produce one fruit, it should produce all fruits in the place of that one fruit, thus causing confusion of cause and effect. The function that I establish is determined in time and place according to the fruit that is produced, so there is no such fault. The function that you establish is constant and pervasive in each instance; you should not casually allow time and place to be determined. If you say that the function I establish has the same fault, that is not correct. The function that I establish depends on conditions and has various differences; it is neither pervasive nor constant. According to its own conditions, the various fruits that are produced are determined in time and place, so it will not pervasively produce all fruits in the place of one fruit when it functions to produce one fruit. Therefore, cause and effect are not mixed up, unlike the time and function that you establish, which are both pervasive and constant, without difference before and after. Therefore, only you have the fault of confusion. Moreover, a verse says:

All dharmas must change, to become the cause of other births, Such a changing cause, how can it be called permanent?

Treatise: The world universally acknowledges that the seeds and other dharmas on which function depends must abandon their previous state and take on a later state. The essence and appearance must transform in order to become the cause of the fruit that is produced, such as sprouts. Such a causal nature has no error in principle. The permanent cause that you establish should also be like this; the essence and appearance must transform in order to become a cause. Since you admit transformation, there is no room for permanence. Isn't it also acknowledged in the world that seeds, etc., when the fruit has not yet been produced, the essence and appearance have not transformed, and although there is no function, they can obtain the name 'cause'? If it were not so, the world, although nominally...

說。而實種等將至滅位。正能生果方得名因。種等爾時必有變異。為不根塵不滅無變而有作用生諸識耶。此亦將滅體相轉變能生諸識。故不相違。有餘師說。根塵望識如種芽等生滅道理。一切因果法不同時此難於彼便成疏遠。

複次有餘外道。執自然因體常無有生滅變異。自然為因生一切果。為破彼執故。說頌曰。

若本無今有　　自然常為因　既許有自然　　因則為妄立

論曰。若一切法本無今有。計有自然常住為因。法應自然本無今有。何用妄立自然常因。既許自然不待因故。又體自然常無變易。果未生位既未能生。果法生位應亦如是。前後一故因義不成。計自然常便失二事。謂失攝受決定因緣能生自果。及失見有所生粗果。證有自許微細常因。若謂自然要待和合眾緣資助方能生果眾緣雖別。然和合時資助自然令起總用。此一總用本無今有。是故自然體雖常有。先不生果後方能生。是亦不然。自然常有。云何不令眾緣常合。眾緣合時其性雖別。然互相助共生一果。除此更無總用可得。又自然性雖處眾緣。共和合位亦不能生。體無別故。如未生位。又常住法體相凝然。不可改轉。緣何能助。若許自然從緣改轉。如所生果應是無常。是故唯有無常諸緣。互相資助起勝體用。異於前位能生其果。非所

【現代漢語翻譯】說：『實種』（真實的種子）等將要到達滅亡的階段。只有真正能夠產生結果的才能被稱為『因』（原因）。『種』（種子）等在那時必定會有變異。難道說根、塵（感覺器官和感覺對像）不滅、沒有變化，卻能產生作用，從而生出各種『識』（意識）嗎？』這也是將要滅亡、本體和表象轉變，才能產生各種『識』。所以並不矛盾。有些老師說，根、塵對於『識』來說，就像種子和嫩芽等生滅的道理一樣。一切因果法則不同時存在，這種困難對於他們來說就變得疏遠了。

再者，有些外道認為『自然』（自然）是『因』（原因），本體恒常，沒有生滅變異。『自然』作為『因』產生一切結果。爲了破除他們的執念，所以說了這首偈頌：

『如果本來沒有現在有，自然恒常作為因，既然允許有自然，那麼原因就是虛妄設立的。』

論述：如果一切法本來沒有現在有，卻認為有自然常住作為原因，那麼法應該自然地本來沒有現在有，為什麼還要虛妄地設立自然常因呢？既然允許自然不需要依賴原因，而且本體自然恒常不變易，結果沒有產生的時候既然不能產生，結果產生的時候也應該如此。前後一樣，原因的意義就不能成立。認為自然恒常就會失去兩件事：一是失去攝受、決定因緣，能夠產生自身結果；二是失去看到有所產生的粗果，來證明自己所認為的微細常因。如果說自然需要等待和合各種因緣的資助才能產生結果，各種因緣雖然不同，但是在和合的時候，資助自然使其產生總的作用。這一個總的作用本來沒有現在有，所以自然本體雖然恒常存在，先前不能產生結果，後來才能產生。這也是不對的。自然恒常存在，為什麼不讓各種因緣恒常和合呢？各種因緣和合的時候，其性質雖然不同，但是互相幫助共同產生一個結果，除了這個之外，沒有其他的總的作用可以得到。而且自然性質即使處於各種因緣中，在共和合的狀態下也不能產生，本體沒有區別的緣故，就像沒有產生的時候一樣。而且常住法本體和表象凝固不動，不可改變，因緣怎麼能夠幫助它呢？如果允許自然從因緣改變，就像所產生的結果一樣，應該是無常的。所以只有無常的各種因緣，互相資助產生殊勝的本體和作用，不同於先前的狀態，能夠產生它的結果，而不是所謂的自然。

【English Translation】 He said: 'Real seeds' (the actual seeds) and the like will reach the stage of extinction. Only that which can truly produce a result can be called a 'cause' (hetu). 'Seeds' (bija) and the like must have changes at that time. Is it that the sense organs and sense objects (indriya and visaya) do not perish, do not change, yet can produce effects, thereby generating various 'consciousnesses' (vijnana)?' This is also about to perish, with its substance and appearance transforming, to be able to generate various 'consciousnesses'. Therefore, there is no contradiction. Some teachers say that the sense organs and sense objects in relation to 'consciousness' are like the principle of arising and ceasing of seeds and sprouts. All causal laws do not exist simultaneously; this difficulty becomes distant for them.

Furthermore, some non-Buddhist schools hold that 'nature' (prakrti) is the 'cause' (hetu), its essence is constant, without arising, ceasing, or change. 'Nature' as the 'cause' produces all results. To refute their attachment, the following verse is spoken:

'If originally non-existent, now existent, nature is always the cause, since nature is allowed to exist, then the cause is falsely established.'

Treatise: If all dharmas are originally non-existent, now existent, yet it is believed that constant nature is the cause, then dharmas should naturally be originally non-existent, now existent. Why falsely establish a constant natural cause? Since it is allowed that nature does not depend on a cause, and its essence is naturally constant and unchangeable, since the result cannot be produced when it has not yet arisen, it should be the same when the result arises. Being the same before and after, the meaning of cause cannot be established. Believing in constant nature will lose two things: first, losing the ability to receive and determine the causal conditions that can produce its own result; second, losing the ability to see the coarse result that is produced, to prove the subtle constant cause that one believes in. If it is said that nature needs to wait for the assistance of various combined conditions to produce a result, although the various conditions are different, when they combine, they assist nature to generate a total effect. This one total effect is originally non-existent, now existent, so although the essence of nature is constantly existent, it cannot produce a result earlier, but can produce it later. This is also not right. Nature is constantly existent, why not let the various conditions constantly combine? When the various conditions combine, although their natures are different, they help each other to jointly produce a result. Apart from this, there is no other total effect that can be obtained. Moreover, even if the nature of nature is in various conditions, it cannot produce in the state of co-combination, because its essence is no different, just like when it has not yet arisen. Moreover, the essence and appearance of constant dharmas are solidified and immovable, unchangeable, how can conditions help it? If it is allowed that nature changes from conditions, like the result that is produced, it should be impermanent. Therefore, only impermanent conditions help each other to generate a superior essence and effect, different from the previous state, able to produce its result, not the so-called nature.

立常能離前失。複次有諸外道建立常因。時無改變能生於果。此亦應以用相違因為喻遮遣。又說頌曰。

云何依常性　　而起于無常　因果相不同　　世所未曾見

論曰。諸行生起必似自因。故不可言生異類果。豈不現見從月愛珠引出清流。因果異類。我亦不說從因生果。所有體相一切皆同。但言因果相生義中不相離相決定相似。以於世間曾未見有如是因果不同相故。世間共見粗無常果。無不從彼無常因生。類知細果是無常故。猶如粗果因定無常。是故色等因果性法。與無常相定不相離。為決此義。復作是言。一切細果所因色等。定是無常。果無常故。譬如粗果所因色等。

複次有作是見。空等遍常。若於一分眾緣合時即依此分發生聲等。若遍所依發聲等者。住極遠境根亦應知。為破彼見故。說頌曰。

若一分是因　　余分非因者　即應成種種　　種種故非常

論曰。若謂空等眾緣合時。一分有用發生自果。余分無用自果不生。空等即應分分差別。分分體用有差別故。應如聲等定是無常。又此空等體恒周遍。能為種種自果所依。是種種相所依止故。如錦繡等可證非常。又如前說。常法凝然不可改轉。緣何能助所計空等。應亦如是體既常住。雖眾緣合何能發生聲等自果。

複次有

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：立常的觀點不能擺脫之前的錯誤。此外，還有一些外道建立常因（nityahetu），認為時間不會改變它產生結果的能力。這也應該用『用相違因』（viruddha-hetu）的比喻來駁斥。又說了頌：『怎麼能依靠常性（nityasvabhava），而產生無常（anitya）的事物？因和果的性質不同，世間從未見過這樣的情況。』論曰：諸行的生起必定類似於它們的因。因此，不能說產生不同類的果。難道沒有看到從月愛珠（candrakanta-mani）中引出清流嗎？因和果是不同類的。我並不是說從因產生的果，其所有體相都完全相同。只是說因果相生的意義中，不相離的相是決定相似的。因為在世間從未見過如此因果不同的現象。世間普遍看到粗糙的無常果，無不是從無常的因產生的。由此類推，可知細微的果也是無常的。就像粗糙的果的因一定是無常的一樣。因此，色等因果的性質，與無常的相是不可分離的。爲了明確這個道理，又這樣說：一切細微的果的因，色等，一定是無常的。因為果是無常的。譬如粗糙的果的因，色等。此外，還有人這樣認為：空等是普遍常住的。如果在某一部分，眾緣聚合時，就依靠這一部分發生聲音等。如果普遍所依的空等能發出聲音等，那麼住在極遠地方的根（indriya）也應該能感知到。爲了破斥這種觀點，說了頌：『如果一部分是因，其餘部分不是因，那麼空等就應該成為種種不同的事物。因為是種種不同的，所以不是常住的。』論曰：如果認為空等在眾緣聚合時，一部分有用，能產生自己的果，其餘部分無用，不能產生自己的果，那麼空等就應該有部分與部分之間的差別。因為部分與部分之間的體和用有差別，所以應該像聲音等一樣，一定是無常的。而且，這空等的本體恒常周遍，能作為種種不同果的所依。因為是種種相的所依止，就像錦繡等一樣，可以證明不是常住的。又如前面所說，常法是凝固不變的，緣怎麼能幫助所計的空等呢？應該也是這樣，本體既然是常住的，即使眾緣聚合，又怎麼能產生聲音等自己的果呢？此外，還有...

【English Translation】 English version: The establishment of permanence cannot escape previous errors. Furthermore, some non-Buddhist schools establish a permanent cause (nityahetu), asserting that time does not alter its ability to produce results. This should also be refuted using the analogy of 'contradictory reason' (viruddha-hetu). Moreover, a verse is stated: 'How can one rely on a permanent nature (nityasvabhava) to give rise to impermanent (anitya) things? The nature of cause and effect are different; such a thing has never been seen in the world.' Treatise says: The arising of phenomena must resemble their cause. Therefore, it cannot be said that different kinds of effects are produced. Do we not see clear streams drawn from a moon-loving gem (candrakanta-mani)? Cause and effect are of different kinds. I am not saying that the effect produced from the cause is completely identical in all its aspects. I am only saying that in the meaning of cause and effect arising together, the inseparable aspects are definitely similar. Because in the world, such different phenomena of cause and effect have never been seen. The world commonly sees coarse impermanent effects, all of which arise from impermanent causes. By analogy, it can be known that subtle effects are also impermanent. Just as the cause of coarse effects must be impermanent. Therefore, the nature of cause and effect, such as color, etc., is inseparable from the aspect of impermanence. To clarify this meaning, it is further said: The cause of all subtle effects, such as color, etc., must be impermanent. Because the effect is impermanent. For example, the cause of coarse effects, such as color, etc. Furthermore, some hold the view that space, etc., are pervasive and permanent. If, in a certain part, various conditions come together, then sounds, etc., arise relying on this part. If the universally relied-upon space, etc., can produce sounds, etc., then the senses (indriya) residing in extremely distant places should also be able to perceive them. To refute this view, a verse is stated: 'If one part is the cause, and the remaining parts are not the cause, then space, etc., should become various different things. Because they are various different things, they are not permanent.' Treatise says: If it is thought that when space, etc., come together with various conditions, one part is useful and can produce its own effect, while the remaining parts are useless and cannot produce their own effect, then space, etc., should have differences between the parts. Because the substance and function of the parts are different, they should be impermanent, like sounds, etc. Moreover, the substance of this space, etc., is constantly pervasive and can serve as the basis for various different effects. Because it is the basis for various aspects, like brocade, etc., it can be proven to be not permanent. Furthermore, as previously stated, permanent phenomena are solidified and unchangeable. How can conditions help the conceived space, etc.? It should also be like this: since the substance is permanent, even if various conditions come together, how can it produce its own effects, such as sounds, etc.? Furthermore, there are...

作是見。一分起時但從一物大等諸果展轉變異差別增長。大等諸果變故無常。一物自性不變故常。此亦不然。義相違故。大等皆用自性為體。大等變時自性應變。由此自性應是無常。體無異故。猶如大等。又此自性其體周遍。一分變時余無量分體無異故。應亦隨變。是則一分一法起時。余分余法皆應同起。如是舉體有作用故。如大等果應是無常。又以前頌兼破此執。由彼所計自性最勝三分合成。所謂薩埵剌阇答摩。第一薩埵其性明白。第二剌阇其性躁動。第三答摩其性阇昧。此三一一相用眾多。皆是神我所受用事。我以思為性。思所受用時。剌阇性躁警薩埵等令起種種轉變功能。三法和同隨於一分。變成大等。轉名最勝。譬如大海其水湛然。隨於一分風等所擊。變成種種駭浪奔濤。如是所執自性最勝。一分有用變成大等。余分無能無所轉變。是即自體應成種種。成種種故定是非常。如大等果相非常住。又三自性一一皆有明躁昧等眾多作用。自性作用既許體同。以性隨用應成多體。自性最勝無差別故。是則最勝體亦應多。自性最勝體成多故。應如大等定是無常。

複次有執極微是常。是實和合相助有所產生。自體無虧而起諸果。此亦不然。義不成故。若許和合必有方分。既有方分定是無常。若言極微遍體和合。無

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：持有這種觀點的人認為，當一個部分開始活動時，只是從一個『物』（dngos，事物）——如『大』（chen-po，偉大的）等各種結果——展現出轉變、變異、差別和增長。『大』等各種結果是變化和無常的，而這個『物』的自性是不變的，所以是常。這種說法也是不正確的，因為在義理上是相互矛盾的。『大』等都以自性作為本體。當『大』等發生變化時，自性也應該隨之變化。由此可見，自性應該是無常的，因為本體沒有差異，就像『大』等一樣。此外，這個自性的本體是周遍的。當一個部分發生變化時，其餘無數部分因為本體沒有差異，也應該隨之變化。這樣，當一個部分、一個法生起時，其餘部分、其餘法都應該同時生起。像這樣，整個本體都有作用，所以應該像『大』等結果一樣是無常的。而且，前面的頌文也兼破斥了這種執著。因為他們所認為的自性最勝是由三種成分合成的，即『薩埵』（sattva，悅性）、『剌阇』（rajas，變性）和『答摩』（tamas，惰性）。第一種『薩埵』，其性質是明白的；第二種『剌阇』，其性質是躁動的；第三種『答摩』，其性質是阇昧的。這三種成分各自都有許多作用，都是神我（shen-wo，靈魂）所受用的事物。我以思為性。當思受用時，『剌阇』的躁動性會警醒『薩埵』等，使之產生種種轉變功能。這三種法和諧統一，隨著一個部分而變化，變成『大』等，轉而稱為最勝。譬如大海，其水本來是平靜的，但隨著一部分受到風等衝擊，就會變成種種駭浪奔濤。像這樣，他們所執著的自性最勝，一部分有用，變成『大』等，其餘部分無能，沒有轉變。這就是自體應該變成種種。因為變成種種，必定是非常的，就像『大』等結果一樣不是常住的。而且，三種自性各自都有明、躁、昧等眾多作用。既然自性的作用被認為是本體相同的，那麼隨著性質的作用，就應該變成多體。自性最勝沒有差別，所以最勝的本體也應該是多的。自性最勝的本體變成多的，就應該像『大』等一樣必定是無常的。

再次，有人執著于極微（ji-wei，最小的粒子）是常，是真實的，和合相助而有所產生，自體沒有虧損而生起各種結果。這種說法也是不正確的，因為在義理上是不能成立的。如果認為和合必定有方分，既然有方分，必定是無常的。如果說極微遍體和合，沒有...

【English Translation】 English version: Those who hold this view believe that when a part begins to act, it is only from one 'thing' (dngos, object) - such as 'Great' (chen-po, the great) and other various results - that transformation, variation, difference, and growth are exhibited. The various results such as 'Great' are changing and impermanent, while the self-nature of this 'thing' is unchanging, so it is permanent. This statement is also incorrect because it is contradictory in terms of meaning. 'Great' and others all take self-nature as their substance. When 'Great' and others change, self-nature should also change accordingly. From this, it can be seen that self-nature should be impermanent, because the substance has no difference, just like 'Great' and others. Furthermore, the substance of this self-nature is all-pervasive. When one part changes, the remaining countless parts should also change accordingly because the substance has no difference. In this way, when one part, one dharma arises, the remaining parts, the remaining dharmas should all arise simultaneously. Like this, the entire substance has a function, so it should be impermanent like the results of 'Great' and others. Moreover, the previous verse also refutes this attachment. Because the self-nature most excellent that they consider is composed of three components, namely 'Sattva' (sattva, goodness), 'Rajas' (rajas, passion), and 'Tamas' (tamas, darkness). The first, 'Sattva', its nature is clear; the second, 'Rajas', its nature is restless; the third, 'Tamas', its nature is dull. Each of these three components has many functions and are all things enjoyed by the Atman (shen-wo, soul). I take thought as my nature. When thought is enjoyed, the restlessness of 'Rajas' will awaken 'Sattva' and others, causing them to produce various transformative functions. These three dharmas are harmoniously unified, changing with one part, becoming 'Great' and others, and in turn being called the most excellent. For example, the ocean, its water is originally calm, but as a part is impacted by wind and so on, it will turn into various terrifying waves and surges. Like this, the self-nature most excellent that they are attached to, one part is useful, becoming 'Great' and others, the remaining parts are incapable, without transformation. This is that the self should become various. Because it becomes various, it must be impermanent, just like the results of 'Great' and others are not permanent.

Again, some are attached to the atom (ji-wei, smallest particle) as permanent, as real, combining and helping each other to produce something, the self not being diminished and giving rise to various results. This statement is also incorrect because it cannot be established in terms of meaning. If it is thought that combination must have direction, since there is direction, it must be impermanent. If it is said that the atoms combine throughout the body, without...

方分者。此亦不然。何以故。頌曰。

在因微圓相　　于果則非有　是故諸極微　　非遍體和合

論曰。若諸極微遍體和合。無方分故非少分合。是則諸微應同一處。實果應與自因遍合。無別處故。應亦微圓。若爾應許一切句義。皆越諸根所了知境。由見所依余可知故。是則違害世間自宗。若言實果雖與自因遍體和合無別處所。然由量德積集力故。令其實果亦可得見。謂諸實果雖無住處方分差別。然由量德積集殊勝。令所依實非大似大。方分差別分明可見。此但有言都無實義。我先難汝。所生實果與諸極微既無別處。應如極微越諸根境。汝不能救何事余言。若所依實如是相現。應捨實體同彼能依。既成他相應舍自相。亦不可說。如頗胝迦不捨前相而現余相。其體無常前後異故。此若同彼。應捨實體。德依于實。實體既無。德亦非有。無實無德。誰現誰相。故可不說所生實果不捨自相而現他相。如是即應唯德可見。所有實性皆越根境。此亦違汝自所立宗。

複次有說極微有其形質。更相礙故居處不同。是則極微住雖鄰次。而處各別應不和合。若許和合處同不同。即違自執。及有分過。有說極微生處各異。雖復無間而不相觸。各據一方相避而住。積集差別似有方分。無間處生似有流轉。剎那前後展轉相

續。有因有果非斷非常。為兼破彼。故復頌曰。

於一極微處　　既不許有餘　是故亦不應　　許因果等量

論曰。如是所說諸極微相。竟不能遮有方分失。何以故。頌曰。

微若有東方　　必有東方分　極微若有分　　如何是極微

論曰。是諸極微既有質礙。日輪才舉舒光觸時。東西兩邊光影各現。逐日光移隨光影轉。承光發影處既不同。故知極微定有方分。既有方分便失極微。如是極微即可分析。應如粗物非實非常。違汝論宗極微無方分常住實有造世間萬物。

複次所執極微定有方分。行所依故。如能行者凡所遊行必有方分。若無方分則無所行。何以故。頌曰。

要取前舍后　　方得說為行

論曰。進所欣處。名為取前。退所厭處。名為舍后。要依前後方分差別起取捨用。乃名為行。離方分行所未曾見。極微既是行用所依。故知極微定有方分。若無所行行用差別。是則應撥行者為無。故說頌曰。

此二若是無　　行者應非有

論曰。依前後方起取捨用。方若非有。用亦應無。若爾雖行應如不動。若汝撥無行處行用。是則所依行者亦無。執此極微便著邪見。又諸極微若無行用。則不能造有方分果。若無所造有方分果。即諸天眼亦無所見。是則所立一切句義。越

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：接著說。有因有果，既不是斷滅，也不是恒常。爲了同時破斥這兩種觀點，所以再次用偈頌說：

『在一個最小的微粒處，既然不允許有剩餘的部分，因此也不應該允許因果等同於這個微粒。』

論述說：像這樣所說的各種極微的相狀，最終也不能遮蔽有方位的過失。為什麼呢？用偈頌說：

『如果極微有東方，必定有東方的部分；如果極微有部分，如何能是極微呢？』

論述說：這些極微既然有質礙，當太陽升起，光芒照射時，東西兩邊會各自顯現光影。隨著太陽移動，光影也隨之轉動。承受光芒和發出影子的位置既然不同，因此可知極微一定有方位。既然有方位，就失去了極微的性質。像這樣，極微就可以被分析，應該像粗大的物體一樣，不是真實的，也不是恒常的。這違反了你的論宗，即極微沒有方位，是常住的、真實的，並且創造了世間萬物。

再次，所執著的極微一定有方位，因為它能進行運動。就像能行走的事物，凡是運動必定有方位。如果沒有方位，就無法運動。為什麼呢？用偈頌說：

『需要選取前面的，捨棄後面的，才能被稱為運動。』

論述說：前進時所喜好的地方，稱為『取前』；後退時所厭惡的地方，稱為『舍后』。需要依靠前後方位的差別，產生選取和捨棄的作用，才能稱為運動。離開方位而進行的運動，從未見過。極微既然是運動作用所依賴的基礎，因此可知極微一定有方位。如果沒有運動的處所和運動的作用差別，那麼就應該否定運動者是存在的。所以用偈頌說：

『如果這兩者都不存在，運動者應該也不存在。』

論述說：依靠前後方位產生選取和捨棄的作用，如果方位不存在，作用也應該不存在。如果這樣，即使運動也應該像沒有動一樣。如果你們否定運動的處所和運動的作用，那麼所依賴的運動者也不存在。執著于這種極微，就陷入了邪見。而且，各種極微如果沒有運動的作用，就不能創造出有方位的果。如果沒有所創造的有方位的果，即使是諸天的眼睛也無法看到。那麼，所建立的一切句義，就越過了...

【English Translation】 English version: Continuing. There is cause and effect, which is neither annihilation nor permanence. To simultaneously refute those views, it is further stated in verse:

'In one ultimate atom, since it is not allowed to have any remainder, therefore it should not be allowed for cause and effect to be equal to this atom.'

The treatise says: The characteristics of these ultimate atoms, as described, ultimately cannot conceal the fault of having direction. Why? The verse says:

'If an atom has an east side, it must have an eastern part; if an atom has parts, how can it be an ultimate atom?'

The treatise says: Since these ultimate atoms have material obstruction, when the sun rises and its light shines, light and shadow will appear on the east and west sides respectively. As the sun moves, the light and shadow also move accordingly. Since the places that receive light and cast shadows are different, it can be known that the ultimate atom must have direction. Since it has direction, it loses the nature of being an ultimate atom. Like this, the ultimate atom can be analyzed, and should be like coarse matter, not real and not permanent. This violates your doctrine, that the ultimate atom has no direction, is permanent, real, and creates all things in the world.

Furthermore, the adhered-to ultimate atom must have direction, because it is the basis for movement. Just like things that can walk, all movement must have direction. If there is no direction, there is no way to move. Why? The verse says:

'It is necessary to take the front and abandon the back, in order to be called movement.'

The treatise says: The place that is liked when moving forward is called 'taking the front'; the place that is disliked when moving backward is called 'abandoning the back'. It is necessary to rely on the difference between the front and back directions to produce the action of taking and abandoning, in order to be called movement. Movement without direction has never been seen. Since the ultimate atom is the basis upon which movement depends, it can be known that the ultimate atom must have direction. If there is no place for movement and no difference in the action of movement, then the mover should be denied as existing. Therefore, the verse says:

'If these two do not exist, the mover should also not exist.'

The treatise says: Relying on the front and back directions to produce the action of taking and abandoning, if direction does not exist, action should also not exist. If so, even if there is movement, it should be like being motionless. If you deny the place of movement and the action of movement, then the mover on which it depends also does not exist. Clinging to this kind of ultimate atom leads to wrong views. Moreover, if the various ultimate atoms do not have the action of movement, they cannot create a fruit with direction. If there is no created fruit with direction, even the eyes of the gods cannot see it. Then, all the established statements go beyond...

諸根境頓絕名言。云何自立句義差別。

複次若執極微無初中后。即凈眼根亦不能見。應如空花都無所有。為顯此義。故說頌曰。

極微無初分　　中後分亦無　是則一切眼　　皆所不能見

論曰。若執極微是常是一。無生住滅三種時分。無前中后三種方分。應似空花都無實物。是則極微越諸根境。不為一切眼所觀見。自他推撿都不可得。是故不應計為實有。此中正破外道所執。極微是常無有方分。越諸根境非眼所見。兼顯極微無常有分。非越根境凈眼所見。

複次為破極微因果同處。及顯因體定是無常。故說頌曰。

若因為果壞　　是因即非常　或許果與因　　二體不同處

論曰。諸有礙物余礙逼時。若不移處必當變壞。如是極微果所侵逼。或相受入異體同居。如以細流溉粗沙聚。或復入中令其轉變。如妙藥汁注赤镕銅。若許如前則有諸分。既相受入諸分支離。如相離物不共生果。是則應無一切粗物。又若同彼有諸細分。即應如彼體是無常。若許如后自說極微。體有變壞何待徴難。若並不許。應許極微互相障隔因果別處。以有礙物處必不同。如非因果諸有礙物。又說頌曰。

不見有諸法　　常而是有對　故極微是常　　諸佛未曾說

論曰。現見石等於自住處對礙

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『諸根境頓絕名言』，如何理解這句話中『自立句義』的差別？

進一步說，如果認為極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）沒有初、中、后等部分，那麼即使是清凈的眼根（cakṣurindriya，視覺器官）也無法看見它，應該就像虛空中的花朵一樣，根本不存在。爲了闡明這個道理，所以說了這首偈頌：

『極微無初分，中後分亦無，是則一切眼，皆所不能見。』

論述：如果認為極微是常恒不變的、是唯一的，沒有生、住、滅三種時間上的劃分，也沒有前、中、后三種空間上的劃分，那麼它就應該像虛空中的花朵一樣，根本沒有實體。這樣一來，極微就超越了所有根（indriya，感官）和境（viṣaya，感官對像）的範圍，不被任何眼睛所能觀察到。無論是自己還是他人去推究考察，都無法得到它。所以，不應該認為它是真實存在的。這裡主要是爲了破斥外道（tīrthika，佛教以外的修行者）所執著的觀點，即極微是常恒不變的，沒有空間上的劃分，超越了所有根和境的範圍，不被眼睛所見。同時也暗示了極微不是常恒不變的，有空間上的劃分，不超越根和境的範圍，能被清凈的眼睛所見。

進一步說，爲了破斥極微的因果關係存在於同一處所的觀點，並且爲了闡明因的本體一定是無常的，所以說了這首偈頌：

『若因為果壞，是因即非常，或許果與因，二體不同處。』

論述：所有有障礙的物體，當受到其他障礙物的逼迫時，如果不改變位置，必定會發生變壞。像這樣，極微受到果的侵逼，或者相互容納進入，異體的極微同處一地，就像用細小的水流灌溉粗糙的沙堆一樣；或者進入其中使其發生轉變，就像將神奇的藥汁注入到燒紅的銅中。如果認可像前面所說的那樣，那麼極微就有了各個部分。既然相互容納進入，各個分支就分離了，就像相互分離的物體不能共同產生結果一樣。這樣一來，就應該不存在一切粗大的物體。又如果極微和那些細小的部分相同，那麼它就應該像那些細小的部分一樣，本體是無常的。如果認可像後面所說的那樣，那麼你自己就承認了極微的本體會發生變壞，還等待什麼來徵詢詰難呢？如果兩者都不認可，就應該認可極微互相阻礙，因和果處於不同的地方。因為有障礙的物體所處的位置必定不同，就像不是因果關係的那些有障礙的物體一樣。又說了這首偈頌：

『不見有諸法，常而是有對，故極微是常，諸佛未曾說。』

論述：現在可以看見石頭等物體在自己所處的位置上產生阻礙。

【English Translation】 English version: 'When all roots and objects are instantly cut off, names cease.' How can we understand the difference in meaning of the phrase 'self-established meaning' in this statement?

Furthermore, if one holds that the paramāṇu (atom, the smallest unit of matter) has no beginning, middle, or end, then even the pure cakṣurindriya (eye faculty, visual organ) cannot see it. It should be like a flower in the sky, completely non-existent. To clarify this meaning, the following verse is stated:

'The atom has no beginning part, nor does it have a middle or end part. Therefore, all eyes are unable to see it.'

Treatise: If one holds that the paramāṇu is permanent and one, without the three temporal divisions of arising, abiding, and ceasing, and without the three spatial divisions of front, middle, and back, then it should be like a flower in the sky, completely without substance. In this case, the paramāṇu transcends all indriya (sense faculties) and viṣaya (sense objects), and is not seen by any eye. Whether one examines it oneself or others examine it, it cannot be found. Therefore, one should not consider it to be truly existent. Here, the primary purpose is to refute the view held by tīrthika (non-Buddhist practitioners), that the paramāṇu is permanent, without spatial divisions, transcends all indriya and viṣaya, and is not seen by the eye. It also implicitly shows that the paramāṇu is not permanent, has spatial divisions, does not transcend indriya and viṣaya, and can be seen by the pure eye.

Furthermore, to refute the view that the cause and effect of the paramāṇu exist in the same place, and to clarify that the nature of the cause is definitely impermanent, the following verse is stated:

'If the cause is destroyed by the effect, then that cause is impermanent. Or perhaps the effect and the cause are two different entities in different places.'

Treatise: All obstructive objects, when pressed by other obstructive objects, if they do not change their position, will inevitably be transformed and destroyed. In this way, the paramāṇu, when pressed by the effect, either mutually accommodate and enter each other, with different entities coexisting in the same place, like irrigating a coarse sand pile with a fine stream of water; or enter into it and cause it to transform, like pouring a miraculous medicinal juice into molten red copper. If one accepts the former, then the paramāṇu has parts. Since they mutually accommodate and enter each other, the various branches separate, like separated objects that cannot jointly produce a result. In this case, there should be no coarse objects at all. Furthermore, if the paramāṇu is the same as those fine parts, then it should be impermanent in nature, like those fine parts. If one accepts the latter, then you yourself admit that the nature of the paramāṇu will be transformed and destroyed, so what are you waiting for to inquire and challenge? If neither is accepted, then one should accept that the paramāṇu mutually obstructs, and the cause and effect are in different places. Because the positions of obstructive objects must be different, like those obstructive objects that are not cause and effect. The following verse is also stated:

'One does not see any dharmas that are permanent and also obstructive. Therefore, the Buddhas have never said that the paramāṇu is permanent.'

Treatise: It is now visible that objects such as stones create obstruction in their own location.

余物。既是無常。極微亦爾。云何常住對礙與常。互相違反二法同體。理所不然。復有別釋。余物共合變壞生因。名為有對。不爾極微皆有對礙。礙證無常其義明瞭。若謂極微障礙余物。他不全許。故須別立余物共合變壞生因。比度極微是無常者。是則但應以能生義。證極微性定是無常。何以頌中說為有對。故知此言是有礙義。雖不全許。而因義成。彼許極微礙余物故。既破極微方亦隨壞。因極微果證實有方。極微既無。果則非有。何緣而立方實常耶。又方不定待緣而立。假施設有。非實非常。由上所說諸因緣故。極微是常。佛未曾說。但言諸行皆是無常。唯我大師獨稱覺者。於一切境智見無礙。所說無倒真號如來。愍彼邪徒不能歸信諸行無常。誠哉佛說無為非行。何廢常耶。然所立常無過二種。一有所作。二無所作。若有所作非謂無為。若無所作但有名想。故契經說。去來及我虛空涅槃是五種法。但有名想都無實義。

大乘廣百論釋論卷第一大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1571 大乘廣百論釋論

大乘廣百論釋論卷第二

聖天菩薩本　護法菩薩釋

三藏法師玄奘奉　詔譯破常品第一之餘

複次有執涅槃實有常樂。如契經說。苾芻當知。有涅槃界。無生無滅無相無為究竟安樂

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：關於『余物』（除極微之外的其他物質），既然它們是無常的，那麼『極微』（物質的最小單位）也是如此。怎麼能說『常住』（永恒不變的事物）具有『對礙』（相互障礙的性質）並且是常的呢？常與無常這兩種相互矛盾的性質怎麼可能存在於同一個實體中？這在道理上是不成立的。還有另一種解釋：『余物』是多種因素共同作用導致變化和壞滅的原因，因此被稱為『有對』（具有相互作用的性質）。否則，如果極微都具有『對礙』，那麼『礙』（障礙）就證明了極微是無常的，這個道理就很明顯了。如果有人認為極微會障礙其他物質，但這個觀點並不完全被接受。因此，需要另外建立『余物』是多種因素共同作用導致變化和壞滅的原因的觀點，以此來推斷極微是無常的。如果是這樣，那麼就應該僅僅用『能生』（產生變化的能力）來證明極微的性質一定是無常的。為什麼頌文中說極微『有對』呢？因此，要知道這裡說的『有對』是指『有礙』（具有障礙性）。雖然這個觀點不完全被接受，但作為論證的原因是可以成立的，因為他們承認極微會障礙其他物質。既然極微被破斥，那麼『方』（空間）也隨之被否定。因為『方』是基於極微的結果而建立的，如果極微不存在，那麼結果也就不存在。那麼，憑什麼說『方』是真實且永恒的呢？而且，『方』是不確定的，依賴於因緣而存在，只是假立的概念，不是真實的，也不是永恒的。由於以上所說的各種因緣，極微是常的這個觀點，佛陀從未說過。佛陀只是說『諸行』（一切事物）都是無常的。只有我的大師才被稱為『覺者』（覺悟的人），對於一切境界的智慧和見解都沒有障礙，所說的話沒有顛倒，真正被稱為『如來』（佛陀）。他憐憫那些邪見之人，不能相信諸行無常的道理。佛陀說『無為』（不造作的境界）不是『行』（造作的事物），這確實是真理。那麼，這又有什麼妨礙『常』（永恒）的存在呢？然而，所建立的『常』無非兩種：一是有所作為的，二是無所作為的。如果有所作為，就不能稱為『無為』。如果無所作為，那就只是一個名稱和概念而已。所以，契經上說，過去、未來、我、虛空、涅槃這五種法，都只是名稱和概念，沒有任何實際意義。

大乘廣百論釋論卷第一大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1571 大乘廣百論釋論

大乘廣百論釋論卷第二

聖天菩薩本　護法菩薩釋

三藏法師玄奘奉　詔譯破常品第一之餘

再次，有人執著于『涅槃』（佛教術語，指解脫后的境界）是真實存在且具有永恒的快樂的。正如契經上所說：『苾芻』（佛教出家眾），你們應當知道，存在『涅槃界』（涅槃的境界），它沒有生滅，沒有形相，沒有造作，是究竟的安樂。

【English Translation】 English version: Regarding 'other things' (everything other than the ultimate particles), since they are impermanent, so too are 'ultimate particles' (the smallest units of matter). How can 'permanence' (that which is eternally unchanging) have 'resistance' (the quality of mutual obstruction) and be permanent? How can these two contradictory qualities of permanence and impermanence exist in the same entity? This is logically untenable. There is another explanation: 'Other things' are the cause of change and destruction through the combined action of multiple factors, and are therefore called 'resistant' (having the quality of mutual interaction). Otherwise, if all ultimate particles had 'resistance', then 'resistance' would prove that ultimate particles are impermanent, and this principle would be clear. If someone believes that ultimate particles obstruct other things, this view is not entirely accepted. Therefore, it is necessary to establish the view that 'other things' are the cause of change and destruction through the combined action of multiple factors, in order to infer that ultimate particles are impermanent. If this is the case, then one should only use 'the ability to produce' (the ability to produce change) to prove that the nature of ultimate particles is definitely impermanent. Why does the verse say that ultimate particles are 'resistant'? Therefore, one should know that 'resistant' here means 'obstructive' (having the quality of obstruction). Although this view is not entirely accepted, it can be established as a reason for argument, because they admit that ultimate particles obstruct other things. Since ultimate particles are refuted, then 'space' (direction) is also negated accordingly. Because 'space' is established based on the result of ultimate particles, if ultimate particles do not exist, then the result also does not exist. Then, on what basis can it be said that 'space' is real and eternal? Moreover, 'space' is uncertain, dependent on conditions for its existence, and is merely a conceptual construct, not real, nor eternal. Due to the various causes and conditions mentioned above, the view that ultimate particles are permanent has never been stated by the Buddha. The Buddha only said that 'all phenomena' (all things) are impermanent. Only my master is called the 'Awakened One' (the enlightened one), whose wisdom and insight into all realms are unobstructed, whose words are not inverted, and who is truly called the 'Tathagata' (Buddha). He has compassion for those with wrong views who cannot believe in the principle of the impermanence of all phenomena. The Buddha's statement that 'unconditioned' (the uncreated realm) is not 'conditioned' (created things) is indeed the truth. Then, what hinders the existence of 'permanence' (eternity)? However, the established 'permanence' is nothing more than two types: one that is active, and one that is inactive. If it is active, it cannot be called 'unconditioned'. If it is inactive, then it is only a name and a concept. Therefore, the sutras say that the five dharmas of the past, future, self, space, and Nirvana are only names and concepts, without any real meaning.

Mahayana Hundred Verses Treatise Commentary, Volume 1 Taisho Tripitaka, Volume 30, No. 1571, Mahayana Hundred Verses Treatise Commentary

Mahayana Hundred Verses Treatise Commentary, Volume 2

By Arya Deva, Commentary by Bodhisattva Dharmapala

Translated by Tripitaka Master Xuanzang by Imperial Decree, Remaining Part of the First Chapter on Refuting Permanence

Furthermore, some are attached to the view that 'Nirvana' (Buddhist term, referring to the state after liberation) is real and has eternal bliss. As the sutras say: 'Bhikkhus' (Buddhist monks), you should know that there is a 'Nirvana realm' (the realm of Nirvana), which has no birth, no death, no form, no activity, and is ultimate bliss.

。此亦依前理教應破。又說頌曰。

離縛所縛因　　更無真解脫　產生用闕故　　設有亦名無

論曰。前已具說諸有句義越現量境于諍論時。必以生果比量安立非涅槃界能有所生。云何比知實有常樂。若許能生。則違自論。涅槃無果。違諸行故。是故涅槃體非實有。設許實有。于自依身無成勝用。何名解脫。若令己身蕭然自在。永離繫縛可名解脫。此於己身無如是用。是故設有于身無益。何黨如是無用法為。若許有用則同有為。既許無用便同兔角。諸有智者。定應不許。有用無為無用實有。故知涅槃體非實有。此中煩惱及隨煩惱。順生后受諸決定業。總名為縛。由此勢力令諸有情久處生死廣大牢獄受諸劇苦不解脫故。諸縛所招五取蘊果。總名所縛。所生苦果系屬集因不自在故。所有能除諸縛聖道。總名為因。由此永斷煩惱隨眠。不引諸業不招后苦。證得離系解脫果故。此解脫果。非離能縛所縛及因別有實體。謂從能縛得解脫時。非能縛外別證解脫。如實證見分位別故。即彼不生。名為解脫。所縛亦爾。離煩惱縛蕭然自在分位差別。名為解脫。無別有法。因亦如是。作用差別離諸煩惱。名為解脫。離聖道外無別有法。是故離此縛所縛因。無別實有涅槃解脫。

複次涅槃若有必有所依。此所依者。若蘊

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：這也應當依照前面的理證教義來破斥。又說了頌詞：

『離開能束縛的、所束縛的以及原因，就沒有真正的解脫。因為產生作用缺失的緣故，即使假設有解脫，也等同於沒有。』

論述：前面已經詳細說明，各種『有』的觀點超越了現量所能及的範圍，在辯論時，必定以生果的比量來安立，認為涅槃界不能產生任何東西。如何通過比量得知涅槃是真實常樂的呢？如果允許涅槃能產生什麼，就違背了自己的論點，因為涅槃沒有果。這與諸行（一切有為法）的性質相違背。因此，涅槃的本體不是真實存在的。假設承認涅槃是真實存在的，但它對於自身（依身）沒有成就殊勝的作用，那還叫什麼解脫呢？如果能使自身清凈自在，永遠脫離束縛，才可以稱為解脫。但涅槃對於自身沒有這樣的作用，所以即使假設有涅槃，對於自身也沒有益處。哪個宗派會認為沒有作用的東西是有用的呢？如果允許涅槃有用，那就等同於有為法。既然承認涅槃沒有用，那就等同於兔角（不存在的事物）。有智慧的人，一定不會承認有用的是無為法，無用的是實有。所以要知道涅槃的本體不是真實存在的。這裡，煩惱以及隨煩惱，順著產生後世果報的各種決定業，總稱為『縛』（束縛）。由於這種力量，使得各種有情長久地處於生死輪迴的廣大牢獄中，遭受各種劇烈的痛苦而無法解脫。各種束縛所招感的五取蘊果，總稱為『所縛』（被束縛）。所生的痛苦果報，系屬於集（苦集滅道中的集諦）的因，不自在的緣故。所有能夠去除各種束縛的聖道，總稱為『因』（原因）。由此能夠永遠斷除煩惱的隨眠，不引發各種業，不招感後世的痛苦，證得脫離繫縛的解脫果。這種解脫果，不是離開能束縛的、所束縛的以及原因之外，另外有一個實體。意思是說，從能束縛中得到解脫時，不是在能束縛之外另外證得解脫，而是如實證見分位的差別。就是那個不生，稱為解脫。所束縛也是這樣，離開煩惱的束縛，清凈自在的分位差別，稱為解脫，沒有另外的法。原因也是這樣，作用的差別，離開各種煩惱，稱為解脫，離開聖道之外沒有另外的法。因此，離開這些束縛、所束縛以及原因，沒有另外真實存在的涅槃解脫。

再次，涅槃如果存在，必定有所依靠。這個所依靠的，如果是蘊（skandha）...

【English Translation】 English version: This should also be refuted according to the preceding reasoning and teachings. Furthermore, a verse is stated:

'Apart from the binding, the bound, and the cause, there is no true liberation. Because the function of generation is lacking, even if there were liberation, it would be as if it were not.'

Treatise: It has already been explained in detail that various views of 'existence' (有) that transcend the scope of direct perception (現量) must, during debate, be established by analogy of producing effects, asserting that the realm of Nirvana (涅槃) cannot produce anything. How can it be known through analogy that Nirvana is truly eternal bliss (常樂)? If it is admitted that Nirvana can produce something, it contradicts one's own argument, because Nirvana has no effect. This contradicts the nature of all conditioned phenomena (諸行). Therefore, the essence of Nirvana is not truly existent. Even if it is admitted that Nirvana is truly existent, it does not achieve any superior function for itself (依身), so what is called liberation (解脫)? If it can make oneself pure and free, eternally liberated from bondage, it can be called liberation. But Nirvana does not have such a function for itself, so even if Nirvana exists, it is of no benefit to oneself. Which school would consider something without function to be useful? If it is admitted that Nirvana is useful, then it is the same as conditioned phenomena (有為法). Since it is admitted that Nirvana is useless, then it is the same as a rabbit's horn (兔角, an nonexistent thing). Wise people will certainly not admit that what is useful is unconditioned (無為法), and what is useless is truly existent. Therefore, know that the essence of Nirvana is not truly existent. Here, afflictions (煩惱) and secondary afflictions (隨煩惱), along with various determinate actions (決定業) that lead to future consequences, are collectively called 'binding' (縛). Because of this power, sentient beings (有情) are trapped for a long time in the vast prison of samsara (生死), suffering various intense pains without liberation. The aggregates of appropriation (五取蘊) that are the result of various bindings are collectively called 'the bound' (所縛). The resulting suffering is connected to the cause of accumulation (集, the samudaya satya of the Four Noble Truths), and is not free. All the noble paths (聖道) that can remove various bindings are collectively called 'cause' (因). By this, the latent tendencies (隨眠) of afflictions can be permanently severed, not causing various actions, not inviting future suffering, and attaining the fruit of liberation (解脫果) from bondage. This fruit of liberation is not a separate entity apart from the binding, the bound, and the cause. That is to say, when liberation is attained from the binding, liberation is not attained separately from the binding, but rather the difference in the aspect of truly seeing is realized. That non-arising is called liberation. The same is true for the bound; the difference in the aspect of being pure and free from the bondage of afflictions is called liberation, and there is no separate dharma (法). The same is true for the cause; the difference in function, being free from various afflictions, is called liberation, and there is no separate dharma apart from the noble path. Therefore, apart from these binding, the bound, and the cause, there is no other truly existent Nirvana liberation.

Furthermore, if Nirvana exists, it must have a basis (所依). If this basis is the aggregates (蘊, skandha)...

若我般涅槃時。俱不可得。故說頌曰。

究竟涅槃時　　無蘊亦無我　不見涅槃者　　依何有涅槃

論曰。住無餘依般涅槃位。前蘊永滅后蘊不生。其中都無諸蘊相續。既不見有般涅槃者。依何說有真實涅槃。若於爾時亦許施設。有其真實補特伽羅。便墮如來滅后定有。見處過失。若於爾時不施設有補特伽羅。還同前過。般涅槃者。既不可得。是故決定無實涅槃。以於世間都未曾見無貪等者。有貪等故。設復計有涅槃所依。是則涅槃有所依故。應如貪等其性無常。又若涅槃體是有者。則有緣相而可了知。應如色等不出生死。如說世尊若求涅槃體實有者不出生死。所以者何。言涅槃者。永滅眾相離諸散動。此經義言。一切世間散動妄見皆永離故。彼所發起所取能取相永滅故。證得涅槃。是故涅槃決定非是一切有執所依緣處。有說二句知其次第。涅槃永滅所緣眾相。永離一切能緣散動。涅槃既絕眾相散動。不可以有而取涅槃。然經說有涅槃界等。為破撥無涅槃者見。有執生死無始無終。決定無有般涅槃界。故佛說有煩惱眾苦熾火永滅。般涅槃界無生無滅無相無為究竟安樂。此立道理。顯生死火非常相續永無滅期。從眾緣生有損惱故。猶如世間山林熾火。謂生死苦雖無始來依眾緣生相續無斷。若遇善友聞法修行

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果我般涅槃（Parinirvana，完全的涅槃，即死亡）的時候，一切都不可得。所以說偈頌如下：

『究竟涅槃時，無蘊亦無我，不見涅槃者，依何有涅槃？』

論曰：住在無餘依般涅槃（Anupadhisesa-nirvana，沒有剩餘的涅槃）的地位，前一刻的蘊（skandha，構成個體的要素，如色、受、想、行、識）永遠滅盡，后一刻的蘊不再產生。其中完全沒有諸蘊的相續。既然不見有般涅槃者，依據什麼說有真實的涅槃呢？如果在那時也允許施設，有真實的補特伽羅（Pudgala，個體），便會墮入如來滅后仍然存在的見解的過失。如果在那時不施設補特伽羅，還是和前面的過失一樣。般涅槃者既然不可得，所以可以斷定沒有真實的涅槃。因為在世間從未曾見過沒有貪慾等的人，因為有貪慾等。假設又認為有涅槃所依賴的，那麼涅槃因為有所依賴，應該像貪慾等一樣，其性質是無常的。又如果涅槃的本體是存在的話，那麼就應該有緣相可以瞭解，應該像色等一樣不出生死。如世尊所說，如果尋求涅槃的本體是真實存在的，就不會出生死。為什麼呢？所說的涅槃，是永遠滅盡眾相，遠離各種散動。這部經的意義是說，一切世間的散動妄見都永遠遠離，那些由散動妄見所發起的所取和能取之相也永遠滅盡，才能證得涅槃。因此，涅槃絕對不是一切有執（認為事物真實存在）所依賴的緣處。有人說這兩句是爲了讓人知道其次第：涅槃永遠滅盡所緣的眾相，永遠遠離一切能緣的散動。涅槃既然斷絕了眾相和散動，就不可以認為有而執取涅槃。然而經中說有涅槃界等，是爲了破除撥無涅槃者的見解，他們認為生死無始無終，絕對沒有般涅槃界。所以佛說有煩惱眾苦熾火永遠滅盡的般涅槃界，無生無滅，無相無為，究竟安樂。這個立論的道理，顯示生死之火不是恒常相續，永遠沒有滅期，而是從眾緣而生，有損害和惱亂，就像世間的山林熾火一樣。所說的生死之苦，雖然無始以來依靠眾緣而生，相續不斷，如果遇到善友，聽聞佛法修行。

【English Translation】 English version: If, when I attain Parinirvana (complete Nirvana, i.e., death), everything is unattainable. Therefore, the verse says:

'At the time of ultimate Nirvana, there are no skandhas (aggregates) and no self. If the one who attains Nirvana is not seen, upon what does Nirvana depend?'

The treatise says: Abiding in the state of Anupadhisesa-nirvana (Nirvana without remainder), the previous skandhas (skandha, elements constituting an individual, such as form, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness) are permanently extinguished, and the subsequent skandhas do not arise. There is no continuity of skandhas within it. Since the one who attains Parinirvana is not seen, based on what can we say there is a real Nirvana? If at that time it is also allowed to posit that there is a real Pudgala (individual), then one would fall into the error of the view that the Tathagata (Buddha) still exists after extinction. If a Pudgala is not posited at that time, it is still the same as the previous error. Since the one who attains Parinirvana is unattainable, it can be concluded that there is no real Nirvana. Because in the world, no one has ever been seen without greed, etc., because there is greed, etc. Suppose it is also thought that there is something upon which Nirvana depends, then Nirvana, because it depends on something, should be impermanent in nature like greed, etc. Also, if the essence of Nirvana exists, then there should be conditions that can be understood, and it should not be born into samsara (cycle of birth and death) like form, etc. As the World Honored One said, if one seeks the essence of Nirvana to be truly existent, one will not be born into samsara. Why? What is called Nirvana is the permanent extinction of all characteristics, and the separation from all distractions. The meaning of this sutra is that all worldly distractions and delusions are permanently abandoned, and the perceived and perceiver arising from those distractions and delusions are also permanently extinguished, in order to attain Nirvana. Therefore, Nirvana is definitely not the condition upon which all clinging to existence depends. Some say that these two sentences are to let people know the order: Nirvana permanently extinguishes the characteristics of what is conditioned, and permanently separates from all distractions of what can condition. Since Nirvana has cut off all characteristics and distractions, one cannot grasp Nirvana by thinking it exists. However, the sutras say that there are Nirvana realms, etc., in order to refute the views of those who deny Nirvana, who believe that samsara has no beginning and no end, and that there is absolutely no Parinirvana realm. Therefore, the Buddha said that there is a Parinirvana realm where the blazing fire of afflictions and suffering is permanently extinguished, without birth, without death, without characteristics, without activity, and with ultimate bliss. The reasoning behind this argument shows that the fire of samsara is not constant and continuous, and will never end, but arises from conditions, causing harm and disturbance, just like the blazing fire in the mountains and forests of the world. The suffering of samsara, although arising from conditions since beginningless time and continuing without interruption, can be stopped if one encounters a good friend and practices the Dharma.

。無漏聖道現在前時。滅諸煩惱不起諸業。后苦不續。名曰涅槃。譬如世間薪盡火滅。然此涅槃聖道所證。究竟寂滅離諸性相。永絕一切分別戲論。所以契經種種宣說。皆為方便除妄見執。諸有智者應正覺知。勿謂涅槃是有無等。若於生死起諸分別。易作方便。令其斷除。若於涅槃起諸分別。其病深固難可救療。是故不應執有無等。

複次數論外道作如是言。因果散壞悕望止息。唯有思我離系獨存。爾時名為涅槃解脫。為破彼執故。說頌曰。

我時舍諸德　　離愛有何思

論曰。隨所現境分別受用。汝說名思。即執為我。此必不離根境和合。如是二事不離悕望。為滿悕望根境和合。隨所現境思即受用。般涅槃時悕望止息。因果散壞何得有思。既無有思我亦非有。云何汝說唯有思我離系獨存。爾時名為涅槃解脫。若汝復謂般涅槃時雖無有思而有我在。此亦不然。故說頌曰。

若有我無思　　便同無所有

論曰。汝宗計我思為性相。般涅槃時思既非有。性相俱滅。更無所有。復依何物而說有我。若謂爾時雖無思用而有種子我體猶存。譬如眼根見色為用。有時用滅而眼體在。此亦不然。若有所依可有是事。所以者何。功能差別。名為種子。如是種子必依於他。既無所依。何有種子。先世諸行功能

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：當無漏的聖道現在眼前時，就能滅除各種煩惱，不再造作各種業，未來的苦果不再延續，這叫做涅槃（Nirvana，解脫）。譬如世間的柴火燒盡，火焰熄滅。然而這涅槃是聖道所證得的，是究竟寂靜，遠離各種性相，永遠斷絕一切分別和戲論。所以佛經中種種的宣說，都是爲了方便去除虛妄的見解和執著。有智慧的人應該正確地覺知，不要認為涅槃是有或無等等。如果對於生死產生各種分別，還容易用方便法門，使他斷除。如果對於涅槃產生各種分別，那他的病就根深蒂固，難以救治了。所以不應該執著于有無等等。

數論外道再次這樣說：『因果散壞，悕望止息，只有思我（thinking self）脫離束縛而獨自存在，那時就叫做涅槃解脫。』爲了破除他們的執著，所以說偈頌道：

『我時舍諸德，離愛有何思？』

論曰：『隨著所顯現的境界進行分別和受用，你把它叫做思，並且執著為我。這必定離不開根（感官）和境（對像）的和合。像這樣的兩件事離不開悕望。爲了滿足悕望，根和境和合，隨著所顯現的境界，思就進行受用。般涅槃（Parinirvana，完全的涅槃）時，悕望止息，因果散壞，怎麼會有思呢？既然沒有思，我也就不存在。你為什麼說只有思我脫離束縛而獨自存在，那時就叫做涅槃解脫呢？』如果你又說，般涅槃時雖然沒有思，但是還有我存在，這也是不對的。所以說偈頌道：

『若有我無思，便同無所有。』

論曰：『你的宗派認為思是我的性相。般涅槃時，思既然不存在，性相就一起滅亡，什麼都沒有了。又依靠什麼來說有我呢？』如果說，那時雖然沒有思的作用，但是還有種子的我體存在，譬如眼根以見色為作用，有時作用滅了，而眼根的本體還在。這也是不對的。如果有所依靠，還可以有這樣的事。為什麼呢？功能的差別，叫做種子。像這樣的種子必定依靠于其他事物。既然沒有所依靠的，哪裡會有種子呢？先世的各種行為的功能

【English Translation】 English version: When the undefiled holy path is present, it extinguishes all afflictions, ceases the creation of all karmas, and prevents the continuation of future suffering. This is called Nirvana (Nirvana, liberation). It is like a fire extinguished when the firewood is burned out. However, this Nirvana is attained by the holy path. It is ultimate tranquility, free from all characteristics, and eternally cuts off all discriminations and conceptual elaborations. Therefore, the sutras speak in various ways, all for the sake of conveniently removing false views and attachments. Those with wisdom should correctly realize this and not think of Nirvana as being existent or nonexistent, and so on. If one generates various discriminations about birth and death, it is easy to use expedient means to help them cut them off. If one generates various discriminations about Nirvana, their illness is deeply rooted and difficult to cure. Therefore, one should not cling to existence, nonexistence, and so on.

The Samkhya (Samkhya) heretics again say, 'When the causes and effects are scattered and destroyed, and hope ceases, only the thinking self (thinking self) remains alone, detached from bondage. At that time, it is called Nirvana liberation.' To refute their attachment, the verse says:

'When I abandon all virtues, what thought is there apart from love?'

The treatise says, 'According to the manifested realm, one discriminates and enjoys. You call this 'thought' and cling to it as 'self.' This necessarily cannot be separated from the union of the root (sense organs) and the object (object). These two things cannot be separated from hope. To fulfill hope, the root and the object unite, and according to the manifested realm, thought enjoys. At the time of Parinirvana (Parinirvana, complete Nirvana), hope ceases, and the causes and effects are scattered and destroyed. How can there be thought? Since there is no thought, there is also no self. Why do you say that only the thinking self remains alone, detached from bondage, and that this is called Nirvana liberation?' If you say again that although there is no thought at the time of Parinirvana, there is still a self, this is also not correct. Therefore, the verse says:

'If there is a self without thought, it is the same as nothing.'

The treatise says, 'Your school considers thought to be the nature and characteristic of the self. At the time of Parinirvana, since thought does not exist, the nature and characteristic are extinguished together, and there is nothing left. What do you rely on to say that there is a self?' If you say that although there is no function of thought at that time, there is still the seed of the self existing, just as the eye root uses seeing color as its function, and sometimes the function ceases, but the substance of the eye root still exists, this is also not correct. If there is something to rely on, there could be such a thing. Why? The difference in function is called a seed. Such a seed must rely on other things. Since there is nothing to rely on, where would there be a seed? The functions of the various actions of past lives

差別所引識上。能生眼識差別功能。說名為眼。如是眼根必定依止阿賴耶識及四大種。無餘依中因果散壞。悕望思慮悉皆滅盡。都無所依。而計有我體是種子。理不應然。又若執我即是種子。由此發思差別作用。此我即應最勝所攝。有勝功能起諸法故。又若執我是種所依。由此為因。能生思果。便失自宗。思即是我。及失思我其性懈墮。唯是受者。而非作者。若所執我非即是思。汝今應說如是我相。若不說相而我成者。則應一切妄執皆成。又說頌曰。

無餘有我種　　則定能生思　要無我無思　　諸有乃無有

論曰。若無餘依般涅槃界有我種子不永拔者。則應決定生現起思。我無異故猶如前位。思若現起則有一切。何名解脫生死繫縛。若言此中雖有我種眾具闕故思不得生。此亦不然。我無異故應如前位。眾具無闕。又汝所執我體周遍。與他眾具恒共相應。無別處故猶如己有。云何而言眾具有闕。若言眾具各屬自我。雖他眾具恒共相應。不屬己故言有闕者。此亦不然。處無別故恒共相應。何不屬已。如是所執后當廣破。若說此位究竟寂滅。本無有我。今復無思。一切種子無所依故。即便永滅不生後有。如無外種芽等不生。如是即名究竟解脫。非空非有。非斷非常。非苦非樂。非我無我。非染非凈。絕諸戲論

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『差別所引識上』（由差別所引導的識）能產生眼識的差別功能，這被稱為『眼』（眼睛）。同樣的，眼根必定依賴於阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijñāna，儲存一切種子識）和四大種（四大元素：地、水、火、風）。在無餘依涅槃（nirupadhisesa-nirvana，沒有剩餘依附的涅槃）中，因果散壞，希望和思慮全部滅盡，沒有任何可以依賴的東西，卻認為有一個『我』（ātman，靈魂或自我）的本體作為種子，這在道理上是不應該的。又如果認為『我』就是種子，由此引發思慮的差別作用，那麼這個『我』就應該屬於最殊勝的範疇，因為它具有產生諸法的殊勝功能。再如果認為『我』是種子所依賴的，由此作為原因，能夠產生思慮的結果，那就違背了你自己的宗義，因為『思』（cetanā，意志或思維）就是『我』。並且也違背了『思我』（認為思就是我）的性質是懈怠的，僅僅是接受者，而不是作者的觀點。如果所認為的『我』不是『思』本身，那你現在應該說說這個『我』的相狀。如果說不出相狀，而『我』卻能成立，那麼一切虛妄的執著都應該成立。又有人說偈頌：『無餘有我種，則定能生思，要無我無思，諸有乃無有。』論曰：如果無餘依涅槃界（nirupadhisesa-nirvana-dhatu，無餘依涅槃的境界）中，『我』的種子沒有被永遠拔除，那麼就應該決定產生現起的思慮，因為『我』沒有不同，就像之前的位置一樣。如果思慮現起，那麼就有一切，還叫什麼解脫生死繫縛？如果說這裡雖然有『我』的種子，但因為眾緣不具足，所以思慮無法產生，這也是不對的，因為『我』沒有不同，應該像之前的位置一樣，眾緣沒有缺失。而且你所認為的『我』的本體是周遍的，與其他眾緣恒常相應，沒有不同的地方，就像自己擁有的東西一樣，怎麼能說眾緣有缺失呢？如果說眾緣各自屬於『我』，雖然其他眾緣恒常相應，但不屬於自己，所以說有缺失，這也是不對的，因為處所沒有區別，恒常相應，為什麼不屬於自己呢？像這樣的執著，之後會廣泛破斥。如果說這個位置是究竟寂滅的，本來就沒有『我』，現在也沒有『思』，一切種子因為沒有所依賴的，所以就永遠滅亡，不再產生後有，就像沒有外在的種子，就不會產生芽等等。這樣就叫做究竟解脫，非空非有，非斷非常，非苦非樂，非我無我，非染非凈，斷絕一切戲論。

【English Translation】 English version 『Discrimination-induced consciousness』 (the consciousness guided by discrimination) can generate the differential functions of eye-consciousness, which is called 『eye』 (cakṣus, the eye sense faculty). Similarly, the eye-faculty must rely on the Alaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness, the consciousness that stores all seeds) and the four great elements (mahābhūta, the four primary elements: earth, water, fire, and wind). In nirupadhisesa-nirvana (nirvana without remainder), the cause and effect are scattered and destroyed, hopes and thoughts are all extinguished, and there is nothing to rely on. Yet, to believe that there is a 『self』 (ātman, soul or self) as a seed is unreasonable. Furthermore, if it is believed that the 『self』 is the seed, and from this arises the differential function of thought, then this 『self』 should belong to the category of the most excellent, because it has the excellent function of generating all dharmas. Moreover, if it is believed that the 『self』 is what the seed relies on, and from this, as a cause, the result of thought can be produced, then it contradicts your own doctrine, because 『thought』 (cetanā, volition or thinking) is the 『self』. And it also contradicts the view that the nature of the 『thinking self』 (the self that is thought) is indolent, merely a receiver, and not an agent. If the 『self』 that is believed in is not 『thought』 itself, then you should now describe the characteristics of this 『self』. If the characteristics cannot be described, but the 『self』 can be established, then all false attachments should be established. Moreover, someone says in a verse: 『If there is a seed of self in nirvana without remainder, then it will definitely produce thought. If there is no self and no thought, then all existence will be non-existent.』 The treatise says: If the seed of 『self』 in the nirupadhisesa-nirvana-dhatu (the realm of nirvana without remainder) is not permanently eradicated, then it should definitely produce manifest thought, because the 『self』 is no different, just like the previous state. If thought arises, then there is everything, so what is called liberation from the bonds of birth and death? If it is said that although there is a seed of 『self』 here, thought cannot arise because the conditions are lacking, this is also incorrect, because the 『self』 is no different, it should be like the previous state, where the conditions are not lacking. Moreover, the essence of the 『self』 that you believe in is pervasive, and is constantly corresponding with other conditions, without any different place, just like something that one owns, so how can it be said that the conditions are lacking? If it is said that the conditions each belong to the 『self』, and although other conditions are constantly corresponding, they do not belong to oneself, so it is said that they are lacking, this is also incorrect, because there is no difference in location, and they are constantly corresponding, so why do they not belong to oneself? Such attachments will be widely refuted later. If it is said that this state is ultimately quiescent, originally there was no 『self』, and now there is no 『thought』, and all seeds are permanently extinguished because there is nothing to rely on, and no future existence will arise, just like if there is no external seed, sprouts and so on will not arise. This is called ultimate liberation, neither empty nor existent, neither annihilation nor eternal, neither suffering nor pleasure, neither self nor no-self, neither defiled nor pure, cutting off all conceptual elaborations.

。為止邪見撥無涅槃。故說真有常樂我凈。此方便言。不應定執。既不執有亦不撥無。如是乃名正知解脫。

複次勝論外道作如是言。若能永拔苦樂等本。棄捨一切唯我獨存。蕭然自在無所為作。常住安樂。名曰涅槃。如是涅槃決定應許。若唯苦滅無有我者。便為斷壞。何謂涅槃。又此涅槃離諸繫縛。自在為相。智者欣樂。體若都無。何所欣樂。此有虛言而無實義。為破彼執。故次頌曰。

若離苦有我　　則定無涅槃　是故涅槃中　　我等皆永滅

論曰。汝執一切苦樂等法皆是我德。乃至未滅恒常隨逐自所依我。云何此中與我相離。我無異故。應如前位與彼相應。又此樂等無餘依中應不永離自所依我是我德故。猶如數等。如汝所執一德遍德是我德故。常與我合。苦等亦然。云何相離。如是此我。于無餘依般涅槃界理所逼故。亦與苦等諸德相應。是則涅槃決定無有。我恒被縛不解脫故。生死唯有眾苦聚集。因緣力故無始輪迴。無明所迷妄生我執。謂我恒為苦火焚燒。恐失我故不求解脫。設求解脫亦不能證。妄執我故眾苦熾盛。諸有智者依真善友無倒了知如是事已。為欲息滅熾然大苦。精勤方便如救頭然。得聖慧水數數灌注。如所燒薪熾然永滅。寂靜安樂。名曰涅槃。如是生死純大苦聚。熾然永滅安樂

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：爲了阻止邪見否定涅槃，所以說真有常、樂、我、凈（涅槃的四種功德）。這只是方便之說，不應執著。既不執著于有，也不否定其無，這樣才叫做正確的認知和解脫。

勝論外道這樣說：『如果能夠永遠拔除苦樂等的根本，拋棄一切，唯有『我』（Atman）獨自存在，無拘無束，無所作為，常住安樂，這叫做涅槃。』這樣的涅槃是絕對應該認可的。如果只有苦滅，而沒有『我』存在，那就成了斷滅，還算什麼涅槃呢？而且，這種涅槃是遠離一切束縛，以自在為特徵的，智者都樂於追求。如果它的本體完全不存在，又有什麼可樂於追求的呢？』這只是虛妄之言，沒有實際意義。爲了破除他們的執著，所以接下來說：

『如果離開苦還有『我』，那就必定沒有涅槃。因此，在涅槃中，『我』等都將永遠滅盡。』

論曰：你們認為一切苦樂等法都是『我』的屬性，乃至沒有滅盡時，總是伴隨著作為它們所依的『我』。這樣，怎麼能說它們與『我』相分離呢？因為『我』沒有變化，應該像之前一樣與它們相應。而且，這些樂等在無餘依（Anupadhisesa-nirvana，有餘涅槃）中，也不應該永遠離開作為它們所依的『我』，因為它們是『我』的屬性，就像數等一樣。正如你們所認為的，一個普遍存在的屬性是『我』的屬性，總是與『我』結合在一起，苦等也是如此，怎麼能說它們相分離呢？這樣看來，這個『我』在無餘依涅槃界中，由於道理的逼迫，也與苦等諸德相應。那麼，涅槃就必定不存在，因為『我』總是被束縛，無法解脫。生死只是眾苦的聚集，由於因緣的力量，無始以來都在輪迴。由於無明的迷惑，妄生『我』執，認為『我』總是被苦火焚燒。因為害怕失去『我』，所以不求解脫。即使求解脫，也無法證得，因為妄執『我』，眾苦更加熾盛。那些有智慧的人，依靠真正的善友，正確地瞭解了這些事情之後，爲了息滅熾燃的大苦，精勤地尋求方法，就像撲滅頭上的火一樣。得到聖慧之水，反覆地灌注，就像被燒的柴火，熾燃永遠熄滅，寂靜安樂，這叫做涅槃。這樣看來，生死純粹是巨大的苦聚，熾燃永遠熄滅，才是安樂。

【English Translation】 English version: To stop the false view of denying Nirvana, it is said that there truly exists permanence, bliss, self, and purity (the four virtues of Nirvana). This is merely a provisional statement and should not be clung to. Neither clinging to existence nor denying non-existence, this is called correct knowledge and liberation.

The Vaisheshika heretics say: 'If one can permanently eradicate the root of suffering and pleasure, abandon everything, and only the 'Self' (Atman) exists alone, free and unconstrained, doing nothing, and abiding in constant bliss, this is called Nirvana.' Such Nirvana should definitely be acknowledged. If only suffering ceases and there is no 'Self' existing, then it becomes annihilation. What kind of Nirvana is that? Moreover, this Nirvana is characterized by being free from all bonds and being independent, which the wise are happy to pursue. If its essence is completely non-existent, what is there to be happy about?' These are just empty words without real meaning. To refute their attachment, it is said next:

'If there is a 'Self' apart from suffering, then there is definitely no Nirvana. Therefore, in Nirvana, the 'Self' and others will all be completely extinguished.'

Treatise says: You believe that all phenomena such as suffering and pleasure are attributes of the 'Self', and until they are extinguished, they always accompany the 'Self' on which they depend. How can you say that they are separated from the 'Self'? Because the 'Self' does not change, it should be consistent with them as before. Moreover, these pleasures, etc., in Anupadhisesa-nirvana (Nirvana with remainder), should not be permanently separated from the 'Self' on which they depend, because they are attributes of the 'Self', just like numbers, etc. As you believe, a universally existing attribute is an attribute of the 'Self', always combined with the 'Self', and so are suffering, etc. How can you say they are separated? In this way, this 'Self', in the realm of Anupadhisesa-nirvana, is also consistent with virtues such as suffering due to the compulsion of reason. Then, Nirvana definitely does not exist, because the 'Self' is always bound and cannot be liberated. Samsara is just an accumulation of all sufferings, and due to the power of causes and conditions, it has been reincarnating since beginningless time. Due to the delusion of ignorance, the attachment to the 'Self' arises falsely, thinking that the 'Self' is always burned by the fire of suffering. Because of the fear of losing the 'Self', one does not seek liberation. Even if one seeks liberation, one cannot attain it, because of the false attachment to the 'Self', the sufferings become more intense. Those who are wise, relying on true virtuous friends, correctly understand these things, and in order to extinguish the blazing great suffering, diligently seek methods, just like putting out a fire on their head. Obtaining the water of holy wisdom, repeatedly pouring it, like burning firewood, the blazing fire is extinguished forever, peaceful and happy, this is called Nirvana. In this way, samsara is purely a huge accumulation of suffering, and the blazing fire is extinguished forever, which is happiness.

涅槃。諸有智人誰不欣樂。誰有智者身嬰重病。恐身斷故欣樂此疾。唯有愚人能為是事。如地獄中諸有情類。雖為種種猛焰焚燒。大苦煎迫時無暫廢。而於自身深愛著者。皆是所作惡業勢力。無明妄見鬼魅所纏。未拔我見煩惱根本。令彼有情怖畏斷滅。智者觀見諸行相續。空無有我純大苦聚。永斷滅時何所怖畏。是故若能離於我見。必定欣樂永滅涅槃。由此亦能捨于斷見。以見我斷。名為斷見。非唯苦斷名為斷見。故契經說。見我世間永斷壞故。名為斷見。言世間者。顯我所事執我我所真實有體。聞彼斷時便生斷見。若無所執則無斷見。唯依所執我我所事。所起顛倒斷常兩見。無上大師立邊執見。由此妄見擊發生死。大苦熾火令其增廣逼迫無量無智有情。是故世尊稱讚永滅。離欲寂靜最勝安樂。令其可化深心欣樂。如是涅槃非無非有。妙智所證名為勝義。又諸義中最為勝故。過此更無所求義故。名為勝義。複次有作是說。常法定有。以勝義諦無生無滅真實善有能為所緣生聖智故。此亦不然。非勝義故。若勝義諦是實有者。應如色等從眾緣生。若非緣生。應如兔角。體非實有。又無同喻有因不成。設許因成則非常住。又勝義諦體若是有。應如瓶等。非聖智境。若真聖智緣有為境。應如余智。非真聖智。不斷煩惱不證涅槃

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：涅槃（Nirvana）。哪個有智慧的人不會欣然嚮往呢？哪個有智慧的人，即使身患重病，也會因為害怕死亡而喜歡這種疾病呢？只有愚人才會這樣做。就像地獄中的眾生，雖然被各種猛烈的火焰焚燒，遭受巨大的痛苦煎熬，沒有片刻停止，但仍然深深地執著于自身。這都是他們所造惡業的力量，被無明和錯誤的見解，以及鬼魅所迷惑。他們沒有拔除『我見』（belief in a self）的煩惱根本，所以才會害怕斷滅。有智慧的人觀察到諸行（all phenomena）的相續，是空無自我的純粹大苦聚集。當它永遠斷滅時，有什麼可害怕的呢？因此，如果能夠遠離『我見』，必定會欣然嚮往永滅的涅槃。由此也能捨棄『斷見』（annihilationism）。因為認為『我』斷滅，就叫做『斷見』，並非只有痛苦斷滅才叫做『斷見』。所以契經（sutra）說，認為『我』和世間永遠斷滅，就叫做『斷見』。這裡說的『世間』，是指『我所』（what belongs to me）的事物，執著『我』和『我所』是真實存在的。聽到它們斷滅時，就會產生『斷見』。如果沒有所執著的事物，就不會產生『斷見』。只是因為執著『我』和『我所』的事物，才會產生顛倒的『斷』和『常』（eternalism）兩種見解。無上大師（指佛陀）將這些執著于邊見的行為稱為『邊執見』（extreme views）。由於這些錯誤的見解，引發了生死輪迴的大苦熾火，使其增廣，逼迫著無量無智的眾生。因此，世尊（世尊，指佛陀）稱讚永滅、離欲、寂靜是最殊勝的安樂，使那些可以被教化的人內心深處欣然嚮往。這樣的涅槃，既非『無』也非『有』，是妙智所證悟的，稱為『勝義』（ultimate truth）。而且在各種意義中，它是最殊勝的，因為超越了它，就沒有其他可以追求的意義了，所以稱為『勝義』。另外，有人這樣認為，『勝義諦』（ultimate truth）是常住、法定的『有』（existent），因為『勝義諦』無生無滅，真實存在，能夠作為所緣（object of cognition）而生起聖智。這種說法也是不對的，因為它不是『勝義』。如果『勝義諦』是真實存在的，就應該像色（form）等事物一樣，從眾多的因緣中產生。如果不是從因緣中產生，就應該像兔角一樣，本體不是真實存在的。而且沒有相同的比喻，所以因不成（the reason is not established）。假設承認因成立，那就不是常住的。而且『勝義諦』的本體如果是『有』，就應該像瓶子等事物一樣，不是聖智的境界。如果真正的聖智緣于有為（conditioned）的境界，就應該像其他的智慧一樣，不是真正的聖智，不能斷除煩惱，不能證得涅槃。現代漢語譯本：現代漢語譯本：現代漢語譯本：現代漢語譯本：

【English Translation】 English version: Nirvana. Who among the wise would not rejoice in it? Who among the wise, even if afflicted with a serious illness, would rejoice in the illness for fear of death? Only a fool would do such a thing. Like the sentient beings in hell, although burned by various fierce flames and tormented by great suffering without a moment's respite, they are still deeply attached to themselves. This is all due to the power of their evil deeds, deluded by ignorance and wrong views, and haunted by demons. They have not uprooted the fundamental affliction of 'self-view' (belief in a self), which causes them to fear annihilation. The wise observe that the continuity of all phenomena (all phenomena) is a collection of empty, selfless, and purely great suffering. When it is permanently extinguished, what is there to fear? Therefore, if one can abandon 'self-view', one will surely rejoice in the permanent extinction of Nirvana. By this, one can also abandon 'annihilationism'. Because considering the annihilation of 'self' is called 'annihilationism', it is not only the annihilation of suffering that is called 'annihilationism'. Therefore, the sutra says that considering 'self' and the world to be permanently annihilated is called 'annihilationism'. The 'world' here refers to the things that are 'mine' (what belongs to me), clinging to 'self' and 'mine' as truly existing entities. Upon hearing of their annihilation, one develops 'annihilationism'. If there is nothing to cling to, 'annihilationism' will not arise. It is only because of clinging to 'self' and 'mine' that the inverted views of 'annihilation' and 'eternalism' arise. The Supreme Teacher (referring to the Buddha) calls these clinging to extreme views 'extreme views'. Due to these wrong views, the great fire of the cycle of birth and death is ignited, causing it to expand and oppress countless ignorant beings. Therefore, the World Honored One (世尊, referring to the Buddha) praises permanent extinction, detachment, and tranquility as the most supreme bliss, causing those who can be taught to rejoice in it from the depths of their hearts. Such Nirvana is neither 'non-being' nor 'being', but is realized by subtle wisdom, and is called 'ultimate truth' (勝義). Moreover, among all meanings, it is the most supreme, because beyond it, there is no other meaning to pursue, so it is called 'ultimate truth'. Furthermore, some argue that 'ultimate truth' (勝義諦) is permanent, fixed 'existence' (有), because 'ultimate truth' is unproduced and unceasing, truly exists, and can serve as the object of cognition (所緣) for the arising of noble wisdom. This view is also incorrect, because it is not 'ultimate'. If 'ultimate truth' were truly existent, it should arise from numerous causes and conditions, like form (色) and other things. If it does not arise from causes and conditions, it should be like a rabbit's horn, whose substance is not truly existent. Moreover, there is no similar analogy, so the reason is not established (the reason is not established). Assuming that the reason is established, then it is not permanent. Furthermore, if the substance of 'ultimate truth' were 'existent', it should be like a vase and other things, not the object of noble wisdom. If true noble wisdom were to cognize conditioned (有為) realms, it should be like other wisdoms, not true noble wisdom, unable to eliminate afflictions and unable to attain Nirvana. English version: English version: English version: English version:

。勝義諦理。非空非有。非常非無常。欲于其中求少有性。定不可得。為顯此義故。次頌曰。

寧在世間求　　非求于勝義　以世間少有　　于勝義都無

論曰。世間有法略有三種。一現所知法。如色聲等。二現受用法。如瓶衣等。如是二法世共知有不待成立。三有作用法。如眼耳等。由彼彼用證知是有。如此三法是入世俗所了受境。世間復有三種無法。謂究竟無及隨三有前後際無。為簡此無故說少有。又簡妄見所立諸法故言少有。如是世俗三有三無。依勝義說。皆非真實。以勝義諦非有非無。分別語言皆不能及。寧在世間虛偽事內。欲求有性少易可得。于勝義諦真實理中。欲求有性究竟難得。以此世間少分有性。于彼尚無。況余有性。若爾寧樂如是少有世間不須如是都無勝義。以於世間雖有種種災患過失。而有少法可得受用。勝義諦中無有少法。何所受用。不爾世間勝義有苦無苦可欣厭故。誰有智者。知水不消成重病苦。更求多飲。哀哉世間愚癡顛倒。欣贊生死眾苦熾然。厭毀勝義寂靜安樂。如此癡言何煩聽受。是故智者當勤精進觀諸法空。于生死苦應除邪愿。于勝義樂應修正愿。如是具足三解脫門。雖復久居生死大海。而非生死過失所染。蕭然解脫利樂有情。由此善通契經句義。方便善巧證法空者。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：勝義諦的真理，既非空也非有，既非常住也非無常。想要在其中尋求哪怕一絲一毫的『有』性，都是絕對不可能的。爲了彰顯這個道理，下面用偈頌來說明：

『寧可在世俗中尋求，也不要在勝義中尋求；因為世俗中尚且有少許『有』，而在勝義中則完全沒有。』

論曰：世俗中的『有』法，大致有三種：一是現量所知的法，如色、聲等；二是現量受用的法，如瓶、衣等。這兩種法，世間普遍認知為『有』，不需要特別去成立。三是有作用的法，如眼、耳等，通過它們各自的作用可以證明它們是『有』的。這三種法是進入世俗所了知的境界。

世間又有三種『無』法，即究竟的『無』，以及隨順三有（欲有、色有、無色有）的前際『無』和后際『無』。爲了簡別這些『無』，所以說『少有』。又爲了簡別妄見所建立的諸法，所以說『少有』。像這樣，世俗中的三種『有』和三種『無』，依勝義諦來說，都不是真實的。因為勝義諦既非『有』也非『無』，分別的語言都無法觸及。

寧可在世間的虛偽事物中，尋求『有』性，還稍微容易得到一些；在勝義諦的真實道理中，想要尋求『有』性，那是絕對不可能的。因為世間少分的『有』性，在勝義諦中尚且不存在，更何況其餘的『有』性呢？

如果這樣，難道寧願要世間這種少許的『有』，也不要勝義這種完全的『無』嗎？因為在世間，雖然有種種災患過失，但還有少許的法可以受用；而勝義諦中沒有任何法可以受用，又有什麼可以受用的呢？

並非如此！世間和勝義都有苦和無苦，因此才會有欣喜和厭惡。哪有智者，明知水不能止渴反而會加重病情，還去求飲更多呢？可悲啊，世間的愚癡顛倒，欣贊生死眾苦熾盛，厭毀勝義寂靜安樂。如此癡言，何必聽受？

所以，智者應當勤奮精進，觀察諸法皆空，對於生死之苦，應當去除邪愿；對於勝義之樂，應當修正愿。像這樣具足三解脫門（空、無相、無愿），即使長久居住在生死大海中，也不會被生死的過失所染污，超然解脫，利益安樂有情。由此善於通達契經的句義，方便善巧地證悟法空的人。

【English Translation】 English version: The truth of Paramārtha-satya (Ultimate Truth), is neither empty nor existent, neither permanent nor impermanent. To seek even a trace of 'existence' within it is absolutely impossible. To illustrate this point, the following verse is stated:

'It is better to seek in the mundane world, than to seek in the Ultimate Truth; because in the mundane world there is still a little 'existence', while in the Ultimate Truth there is absolutely none.'

The Treatise says: 'Existence' in the mundane world can be roughly divided into three types: first, phenomena known through direct perception, such as form and sound; second, phenomena used through direct experience, such as bottles and clothing. These two types of phenomena are universally recognized as 'existent' in the world and do not require special establishment. Third, phenomena with functions, such as eyes and ears, whose existence can be proven through their respective functions. These three types of phenomena are the realms perceived and experienced when entering the mundane world.

The mundane world also has three types of 'non-existence', namely, ultimate non-existence, and the non-existence of the past and future in accordance with the three realms of existence (the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm). To distinguish these 'non-existences', we say 'a little existence'. Also, to distinguish the phenomena established by false views, we say 'a little existence'. Thus, the three types of 'existence' and the three types of 'non-existence' in the mundane world are not real according to Paramārtha-satya (Ultimate Truth). Because Paramārtha-satya (Ultimate Truth) is neither 'existent' nor 'non-existent', and cannot be reached by discriminating language.

It is easier to seek 'existence' in the false things of the mundane world; it is absolutely impossible to seek 'existence' in the true principle of Paramārtha-satya (Ultimate Truth). Because even the small amount of 'existence' in the mundane world does not exist in Paramārtha-satya (Ultimate Truth), let alone other 'existences'?

If so, would one rather have the little 'existence' of the mundane world than the complete 'non-existence' of Paramārtha-satya (Ultimate Truth)? Because in the mundane world, although there are various disasters and faults, there are still a few things that can be used; but in Paramārtha-satya (Ultimate Truth), there is nothing to be used, so what can be used?

Not so! Both the mundane world and Paramārtha-satya (Ultimate Truth) have suffering and non-suffering, so there will be joy and aversion. Which wise person would seek to drink more water, knowing that water cannot quench thirst but will worsen the condition? Alas, the foolishness and inversion of the mundane world, praising the blazing sufferings of Samsara (cycle of rebirth), and despising the tranquil bliss of Paramārtha-satya (Ultimate Truth). Why bother listening to such foolish words?

Therefore, the wise should diligently observe that all dharmas (phenomena) are empty, and should remove wrong aspirations for the suffering of Samsara (cycle of rebirth); and should correct aspirations for the bliss of Paramārtha-satya (Ultimate Truth). In this way, possessing the three doors of liberation (emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness), even if one dwells in the ocean of Samsara (cycle of rebirth) for a long time, one will not be contaminated by the faults of Samsara (cycle of rebirth), but will be detached and liberated, benefiting and bringing joy to sentient beings. Therefore, those who are good at understanding the meaning of the sutras (scriptures) and are skillful in realizing the emptiness of dharmas (phenomena).

雖處猛焰而不焚燒。雖現死生而常解脫。

大乘廣百論釋論破我品第二之一

複次勝論外道作如是言。前說無餘般涅槃位。無蘊無我依誰而說。有涅槃者。其理不然。我定有故。若無我者。依緣何法而起我見。我見若無。執我所見亦不得有。若異生等從無始來。不起如是我我所見。應如永滅薩迦耶見。不受三界生死眾苦。又不應說緣心根身發生我見。以心根身世間說為我所有故。又我我所決定有異。所屬能屬言所詮故。如天授等所乘車等。又緣他身我見無故。若許我見緣心根身為境生者。應如天授德授等見。亦緣他身為境生起。亦不應說自他心等有差別故。我見不緣無始時來自心根等。剎那展轉前後各異。而許俱緣生我見故。又此我見不緣現在自心為境。與世現見事相違故。亦不得緣過去未來心等為境。彼無體故。如空華等不生我見。現見有我非曾當故。又於一身二心不併。故不可說緣現自心而生我見。又心念念異滅異生。若無我者。云何得有憶識習誦恩怨等事。又心根等決定不為我見所緣。男女等相此中無故。如瓶盆等。是故決定有真實我。由此為緣發生我見。因斯謂我是大丈夫。

如是所說雖有虛言。而無實義。所以者何。我若是有。應如色等從緣而生。生定歸滅則非常住。若非緣生應如兔角

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：即使身處猛烈的火焰中也不會被焚燒，即使顯現生死的狀態也常常是解脫的。

《大乘廣百論釋論》破我品第二之一

其次，勝論外道這樣說：前面所說的無餘涅槃的境界，既然沒有五蘊也沒有我，那麼依據什麼來說有涅槃呢？這種說法是不對的，因為『我』肯定是存在的。如果沒有『我』，那麼依據什麼法而生起『我見』（Sākāya-dṛṣṭi，認為五蘊和合的身體為我）呢？如果『我見』不存在，那麼執著『我所』的見解也不可能存在。如果凡夫等眾生從無始以來，不生起像『這是我』、『這是我所』這樣的見解，那麼應該像永遠斷滅薩迦耶見一樣，不再承受三界生死的種種痛苦。而且，也不應該說依靠心、根、身而生起『我見』，因為心、根、身在世間被認為是『我所有』的。而且，『我』和『我所』肯定是不同的，因為所屬和能屬的言語所表達的就是這個意思，比如天授（Devadatta）所乘坐的車等。而且，因為緣於他人的身體不會生起『我見』。如果允許『我見』以心、根、身為對像而產生，那麼應該像天授、德授（Datta）等人的見解一樣，也會緣於他人的身體而生起。也不應該說自己的和他人的心等有差別，所以『我見』不緣于無始以來自己的心、根等。剎那間轉變，前後各不相同，卻允許同時緣於它們而生起『我見』。而且，這種『我見』不緣于現在的自己的心為對象，因為這與世間現見的現象相違背。也不可能緣於過去、未來的心等為對象，因為它們沒有實體，就像虛空中的花朵等，不會生起『我見』。現在見到有『我』，而不是曾經或將要有的。而且，在一個身體上，兩種心不會同時存在，所以不可能說緣于現在的自己的心而生起『我見』。而且，心念唸唸不同，生滅不同，如果沒有『我』，怎麼會有記憶、認識、學習背誦、恩怨等事情呢？而且，心、根等肯定不是『我見』所緣的對象，因為男女等相在這裡面沒有，就像瓶子、盆子等。所以，肯定有真實的『我』存在，因為以這個『我』為緣，才發生『我見』，因此認為自己是大丈夫。

像這樣所說的，雖然有虛假的言辭，卻沒有實際的意義。為什麼呢？如果『我』是存在的，應該像色等一樣從因緣而生，生起后必定歸於滅亡，那就不是常住的。如果不是從因緣而生，應該像兔角一樣。

【English Translation】 English version: Even when dwelling in fierce flames, one is not burned. Even when appearing to be subject to birth and death, one is always liberated.

Mahayana Hundred Verses Treatise with Commentary - Chapter Two on Refuting the Self, Part One

Furthermore, the Vaiseṣika (勝論) heretics say as follows: 'As previously stated, in the state of Nirvāṇa without remainder, there are no skandhas (蘊) and no self. Based on what, then, is it said that there is Nirvāṇa? This reasoning is incorrect, because the 'self' definitely exists. If there were no 'self', based on what dharma (法) would the view of self (Sākāya-dṛṣṭi, 我見) arise? If the view of self did not exist, then the view of 'what belongs to the self' would also not exist. If ordinary beings, from beginningless time, did not generate views such as 'this is me' and 'this is mine', then they should, like the permanent cessation of the view of self, not endure the suffering of birth and death in the three realms. Moreover, it should not be said that the view of self arises based on the mind, sense faculties, and body, because the mind, sense faculties, and body are said in the world to be 'belonging to me'. Furthermore, the 'self' and 'what belongs to the self' are definitely different, because the words 'belonging' and 'possessing' express this meaning, like Devadatta (天授) and the chariot he rides. Moreover, because the view of self does not arise in relation to another's body. If it is accepted that the view of self arises with the mind, sense faculties, and body as its object, then it should, like the views of Devadatta and Datta (德授), also arise in relation to another's body. It should also not be said that there is a difference between one's own mind and the minds of others, because the view of self does not relate to one's own mind, sense faculties, etc., from beginningless time. In an instant, they change, and the past and future are different, yet it is accepted that the view of self arises in relation to them simultaneously. Moreover, this view of self does not relate to one's own present mind as its object, because this contradicts what is seen in the world. It is also impossible to relate to past or future minds, etc., as their object, because they have no substance, like flowers in the sky, which do not give rise to the view of self. Now it is seen that there is a 'self', not one that was or will be. Moreover, two minds do not exist simultaneously in one body, so it is impossible to say that the view of self arises in relation to one's own present mind. Moreover, thoughts arise and cease differently in every moment. If there were no 'self', how could there be memory, recognition, learning and recitation, gratitude and resentment, etc.? Moreover, the mind, sense faculties, etc., are definitely not the objects of the view of self, because characteristics such as male and female are not present in them, like pots and pans. Therefore, there is definitely a real 'self', because it is based on this 'self' that the view of self arises, and therefore one thinks of oneself as a great person.'

What has been said in this way, although containing false words, has no real meaning. Why? If the 'self' exists, it should, like form, arise from conditions. Having arisen, it must return to extinction, and therefore it is not permanent. If it does not arise from conditions, it should be like a rabbit's horn.

。無勝體用。何名為我。又雖立我是有是常。而竟不能立因立喻。非無因喻。所立得成。若唯立宗則得成者。一切所立皆應得成。設複方便矯立因喻。即所立我其體非常。一切有因皆非常故。又所立我定非實有。常住我性是所知故。是所說故。如瓶盆等。又所立我若是實有。應非顛倒我見所緣。若稱實見是顛倒者。一切聖智皆應顛倒。一切聖智稱境而見。既非顛倒。我見亦爾。應非顛倒。若爾我見應如聖智。非無始來生死根本。若此我見稱實而知。而無始來引生死者。聖智亦應引諸生死。則應究竟不得涅槃。是故異生愚癡顛倒。於五取蘊無我法中。妄執有我。因執我所。由此妄執我我所見。不稱實境成顛倒故。能引三界生死眾苦。若於無我五取蘊中。起聖智見通達無我及無我所。永斷生死證得涅槃。是故定應信受無我。又汝所言。以心根身世間說為我所有故。不應緣彼生我見者。我亦不應是我見境。世間亦說我所有我。有如是相。是故不應以世間說為我所故。非我見境我我所事相望不定。或有別物。或無別物。又汝所言。所屬能屬言所詮故。如天授等。我與我所定有異者。此因不定。世間亦說。如是飲食所有香味特異於常。豈離香味別有飲食。我我所見雖俱緣蘊。而或別執一蘊為我。余蘊為所。或復總執內蘊為我。外

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：無勝的『體』（本質）和『用』（功能），憑什麼能稱之為『我』（Atman）呢？而且，即使假設『我』是真實存在且恒常不變的，也無法確立有效的『因』（理由）和『喻』（比喻）。如果缺乏有效的理由和比喻，所提出的論點就無法成立。如果僅僅是提出宗（命題）就能成立，那麼一切提出的論點都應該成立。即使勉強捏造理由和比喻，那麼所提出的『我』的本質也必然不是恒常的，因為一切有因的事物都是無常的。此外，所提出的『我』必定不是真實存在的，因為常住不變的『我』的性質是可以被認識的，是可以被描述的，就像瓶子、盆子等事物一樣。而且，如果所提出的『我』是真實存在的，那麼它就不應該成為顛倒的我見的所緣（對像）。如果說符合實際的見解是顛倒的，那麼一切聖智（聖者的智慧）都應該是顛倒的。一切聖智都是如實地照見實境，既然不是顛倒的，那麼我見也應該是如此，不應該是顛倒的。如果這樣，我見就應該像聖智一樣，不是無始以來生死輪迴的根本原因。如果這種我見是如實地認識事物，卻仍然是無始以來導致生死輪迴的原因，那麼聖智也應該導致生死輪迴，那麼就應該永遠無法證得涅槃。因此，凡夫俗子由於愚癡顛倒，在五取蘊（構成生命的五種要素，即色、受、想、行、識）的無我法中，錯誤地執著于有『我』的存在，進而執著于『我所』（屬於我的事物）。由於這種錯誤地執著于『我』和『我所』的見解不符合實際情況，是顛倒的，所以能夠導致三界（欲界、色界、無色界）的生死輪迴和種種痛苦。如果在無我的五取蘊中，生起聖智的見解，通達無我和無我所，就能永遠斷絕生死輪迴，證得涅槃。因此，一定要相信和接受無我的教義。此外，你所說的，因為心、根（感官）、身體、世間都被說成是『我所有』，所以不應該緣於它們產生我見。那麼，『我』也不應該是我見的所緣對象。世間也說『我所有』的『我』，具有這樣的相狀。因此，不應該因為世間說成是『我所有』，就認為它不是我見的所緣對象。『我』和『我所』的事相之間的關係是不確定的，或者有不同的事物，或者沒有不同的事物。此外，你所說的，因為所屬和能屬的言語所表達的含義，就像天授（Devadatta）等例子一樣，『我』和『我所』必定是不同的，這個理由是不確定的。世間也說，這種飲食所具有的香味特別不同於平常。難道離開香味，還有另外的飲食存在嗎？『我』和『我所』的見解雖然都緣于蘊，但是或者分別執著於一個蘊為『我』，其餘的蘊為『我所』，或者總的執著于內蘊為『我』，外蘊為『我所』。

【English Translation】 English version: With what 'essence' (體, tǐ) and 'function' (用, yòng) can the unsurpassed be called 'I' (我, wǒ, Atman)? Furthermore, even if we assume that 'I' exists and is permanent, we cannot establish valid 'reasons' (因, yīn) and 'analogies' (喻, yù). If there are no valid reasons and analogies, the proposed argument cannot be established. If merely proposing a thesis (宗, zōng) is sufficient for establishment, then all proposed arguments should be established. Even if we forcibly fabricate reasons and analogies, the essence of the proposed 'I' must be impermanent, because all things with causes are impermanent. Moreover, the proposed 'I' must not be truly existent, because the nature of the permanent 'I' is knowable and describable, just like things such as bottles and basins. Furthermore, if the proposed 'I' is truly existent, then it should not be the object of deluded self-views. If views that accord with reality are considered deluded, then all noble wisdom (聖智, shèng zhì) should be deluded. All noble wisdom sees reality as it is, and since it is not deluded, self-view should also be the same, and should not be deluded. If so, self-view should be like noble wisdom, not the root cause of birth and death since beginningless time. If this self-view knows things as they truly are, yet still causes birth and death since beginningless time, then noble wisdom should also cause birth and death, and one should never attain Nirvana. Therefore, ordinary beings, due to ignorance and delusion, in the non-self (無我, wú wǒ) Dharma of the five aggregates (五取蘊, wǔ qǔ yùn, the five skandhas that constitute life: form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness), falsely cling to the existence of 'I', and then cling to 'mine' (我所, wǒ suǒ, what belongs to me). Because this false clinging to the views of 'I' and 'mine' does not accord with reality and is deluded, it can lead to the cycle of birth and death and all kinds of suffering in the three realms (三界, sān jiè, the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm). If, in the non-self five aggregates, one arises with the view of noble wisdom, understanding non-self and non-mine, one can forever cut off the cycle of birth and death and attain Nirvana. Therefore, one must believe in and accept the doctrine of non-self. Furthermore, what you said, because the mind, senses (根, gēn), body, and world are all said to be 'mine', one should not generate self-view based on them. Then, 'I' should also not be the object of self-view. The world also says that the 'I' that is 'mine' has such characteristics. Therefore, one should not think that it is not the object of self-view just because the world says it is 'mine'. The relationship between the phenomena of 'I' and 'mine' is uncertain; there may be different things, or there may be no different things. Furthermore, what you said, because the meanings expressed by the words of belonging and possessor, like the example of Devadatta (天授, Tiānshòu), 'I' and 'mine' must be different, this reason is uncertain. The world also says that the flavor and aroma of this food are particularly different from usual. Is there another food existing apart from the flavor and aroma? Although the views of 'I' and 'mine' both arise from the aggregates, one may separately cling to one aggregate as 'I' and the remaining aggregates as 'mine', or one may generally cling to the inner aggregates as 'I' and the outer aggregates as 'mine'.

蘊為所。故所立宗有相符過。又汝所言。以緣他身我見無故。心等非是我見境者。我亦應非我見所緣。由於他我我見無故。若緣他我不起我見。而緣自我生我見者。雖緣他身不起我見。何妨我見緣自心等。無智有情不了平等空無我理。唯于諸行無始數習我我所見。于自於他諸蘊相續。執自為我。異我為他。其中都無我之實性。又汝所言。亦不應說。自他心等有差別故。我見不緣無始時來自心根等剎那展轉前後各異。而許俱緣生我見者。此亦不然。自身前後因果相續。自望於他因果斷故。如汝所執。我體是一。前後無異。他我相別。我見自緣己身中我。力用斯盡不緣他我。我亦如是。自身前後雖唸唸別。而無始來因果不斷。如燈河等相續假一。無智有情謂為一我而生我見。他身於自因果斷故。我見不緣。又汝計我。自他相似皆遍皆常。無所繫屬。我見何緣。緣此非彼。若汝計我有所繫屬。或有所生此彼差別。應如色等其性無常。是故當知有為因果相續各異。故令我見如是差別。又汝所說。我見不緣現在自心為境等難。皆不應理。所以者何。緣自身中前後因果。相續假一生我見故。無緣現在自心等過。又一身中有多心品。因果相屬名一有情。異心品中發起我見。緣異心品計我何失。汝等所計我是實者。我見見我應如正見即

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本蘊（skandha，五蘊）是『我』和『我所』（屬於我的）的來源。因此，所建立的宗義存在不相符的過失。而且，你所說的，因為沒有緣於他人之『我』的『我見』（認為有『我』的錯誤見解），所以心等不是『我見』的境界，那麼，我也應該不是『我見』所緣的對象，因為沒有緣於他人之『我』的『我見』。如果緣於他人之『我』不生起『我見』，而緣于自身生起『我見』，那麼，即使緣於他人之身不生起『我見』，又有什麼妨礙『我見』緣于自己的心等呢？沒有智慧的有情不瞭解平等空性無我的道理，只是對於諸行（一切現象）無始以來串習『我』和『我所』的見解，對於自己和他人諸蘊的相續，執著自身為『我』，異於自身為『他』，其中都沒有『我』的真實體性。而且，你所說的也不應該成立，因為自己和他人的心等有差別。『我見』不緣于無始以來自身心識的根等，剎那展轉前後各異，卻允許同時緣于這些而生起『我見』，這也是不合理的。自身前後因果相續，相對於他人因果是斷絕的。如同你所執著的，『我』的體性是唯一的，前後沒有差異，他人之『我』和自身之『我』相互區別，『我見』緣于自身中的『我』，力量用盡，不能緣於他人之『我』。我也是這樣，自身前後雖然唸唸不同，但是無始以來因果不斷，如同燈河等相續假立為一，沒有智慧的有情認為是一個『我』而生起『我見』，他人之身對於自己因果斷絕，所以『我見』不緣於他人之身。而且，你所計度的『我』，自身和他人相似，都是普遍存在且恒常不變的，不隸屬於任何事物。『我見』為何緣于這個『我』而不是那個『我』呢？如果你計度的『我』有所隸屬，或者有所生起，存在這個和那個的差別，就應該像色等一樣其體性是無常的。所以應當知道有為法的因果相續各自不同，所以才使得『我見』有這樣的差別。而且你所說的，『我見』不緣于現在的自心作為境界等等的責難，都是不合理的。為什麼呢？因為緣于自身中前後因果相續假立為一而生起『我見』的緣故，所以沒有緣于現在的自心等等的過失。而且一身之中有多種心識品類，因果相互關聯稱為一個有情，在不同的心識品類中發起『我見』，緣于不同的心識品類計度為『我』有什麼過失呢？你們所計度的『我』是真實的，『我見』見到『我』應該像正見一樣，立即...

【English Translation】 English version The skandhas (aggregates) are the source of 'I' and 'mine' (belonging to me). Therefore, the established tenets have the fault of being inconsistent. Moreover, what you say, because there is no 'I-view' (the mistaken view of having an 'I') arising from others' 'I', therefore mind and so on are not the objects of 'I-view', then I should also not be the object of 'I-view', because there is no 'I-view' arising from others' 'I'. If 'I-view' does not arise from others' 'I', but arises from oneself, then even if 'I-view' does not arise from others' body, what prevents 'I-view' from arising from one's own mind and so on? Sentient beings without wisdom do not understand the principle of equality, emptiness, and no-self, but only habitually cling to the views of 'I' and 'mine' from beginningless time regarding all phenomena. Regarding the continuity of the skandhas of oneself and others, they cling to oneself as 'I' and different from oneself as 'other', but there is no real nature of 'I' in them. Moreover, what you say should not be established, because there are differences between one's own mind and others' minds. 'I-view' does not arise from the roots of one's own mind from beginningless time, which are different in each moment, but you allow 'I-view' to arise from them simultaneously, which is also unreasonable. The cause and effect of oneself before and after are continuous, but the cause and effect are cut off relative to others. Just as you cling to, the nature of 'I' is unique, without difference before and after, and the 'I' of others and oneself are different. 'I-view' arises from the 'I' in oneself, and its power is exhausted, so it cannot arise from the 'I' of others. I am also like this, although oneself is different in each moment, the cause and effect have been continuous from beginningless time, like a river of lamps that is continuously established as one. Sentient beings without wisdom think it is one 'I' and arise 'I-view'. The cause and effect of others' bodies are cut off from oneself, so 'I-view' does not arise from others' bodies. Moreover, the 'I' that you conceive, oneself and others are similar, both are universally present and constant, and do not belong to anything. Why does 'I-view' arise from this 'I' and not that 'I'? If the 'I' that you conceive belongs to something, or arises from something, and there are differences between this and that, then it should be impermanent in nature like form and so on. Therefore, it should be known that the cause and effect of conditioned phenomena are different from each other, so that 'I-view' has such differences. Moreover, what you say, the difficulty that 'I-view' does not arise from the present mind as an object, etc., is all unreasonable. Why? Because 'I-view' arises from the continuity of cause and effect before and after in oneself, so there is no fault of arising from the present mind, etc. Moreover, there are many categories of consciousness in one body, and the cause and effect are related to each other, which is called a sentient being. What fault is there in initiating 'I-view' in different categories of consciousness and conceiving it as 'I'? The 'I' that you conceive is real, and 'I-view' seeing 'I' should be like right view, immediately...

非妄見。若不見我應如邪見。則非我見。又汝所言。心等唸唸異滅異生。若無我者。云何得有憶識習誦恩怨等者。此亦不然。有情身中一一各有阿賴耶識。一類相續任持諸法種子不失。與一切法互為因果。熏習力故。得有如是憶識習誦恩怨等事。汝所計我常無變易。后位如前應無是事。有應常有。無應常無。我體一故。不可說言。我用轉變。用不離體。我亦應變。若爾此我應如色等體用俱變則是無常。若言心等皆屬於我。心等轉變有如是事。故所屬我亦得其名。若爾心等應從我起。能生果故。我應非常。若我於心無生長用。云何得言心屬於我。我既是常。不能任持心等種子。云何得有憶識等事。又汝所言。此心根等決定不為我見所緣。男女等相此中無故。如瓶等者。此因不成。男女等相身現有故。又所計我。亦應不為我見所緣。男女等相我中無故。即所立因便為不定。為顯此義。故次頌曰。

內我實非男　　非女非非二　但由無智故　　謂我為丈夫

論曰。依止身相有差別故。世俗說為男女非二。此身別相內我中無。以所計我體是一故。又男等相生生改易。亦見此生有轉變者。舍別異相取所餘相。汝所執我常無變易。無舍無取故無此相。亦不可說男女等相。雖非我體而是我德。我與德合。說為男等。所以

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：並非是錯誤的見解。如果認為我不應該像邪見一樣，那就不是我的見解了。而且你所說的，心等念頭唸唸生滅變化，如果沒有『我』的存在，怎麼會有記憶、認識、學習背誦、恩情怨恨等等事情呢？這種說法也是不對的。有情眾生的身中，每一個都有阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，儲存一切種子識），它像一條河流一樣相續不斷，保持著各種法的種子不丟失，與一切法互為因果，通過熏習的力量，才會有記憶、認識、學習背誦、恩情怨恨等等事情。你所認為的『我』是常恒不變的，後來的狀態應該和之前一樣，不應該有這些事情發生。如果『我』是常有的，就應該一直是常有的；如果『我』是沒有的，就應該一直是沒的。『我』的本體是唯一的，所以不能說『我』的作用會轉變，因為作用不離開本體，如果作用轉變了，『我』也應該轉變。如果這樣，這個『我』就應該像色法等一樣，本體和作用都變化，那就是無常的了。如果說心等都屬於『我』，心等轉變才會有這些事情，所以所屬的『我』也因此得名。如果這樣，心等就應該從『我』產生，因為『我』能產生果。那麼『我』就應該不是常恒的。如果『我』對於心沒有生長的作用，怎麼能說心屬於『我』呢？『我』既然是常恒的，就不能保持心等的種子，怎麼會有記憶、認識等事情呢？而且你所說的，這個心根等決定不是『我見』所緣的對象，因為其中沒有男女等相，就像瓶子等一樣。這個理由是不成立的，因為男女等相在身體上是存在的。而且你所認為的『我』，也不應該是『我見』所緣的對象，因為男女等相在『我』中沒有。這樣，你所提出的理由就不確定了。爲了顯示這個道理，所以接下來說偈頌：

『內我實非男，非女非非二，但由無智故，謂我為丈夫。』

論述：依靠身體的相貌有差別，世俗上說為男人、女人或者非男非女。這些身體的差別相貌在內在的『我』中是沒有的，因為你所認為的『我』的本體是唯一的。而且男人等的相貌是生生變化的，也看到這一生有轉變的人，捨棄了不同的相貌，取了其他的相貌。你所執著的『我』是常恒不變的，沒有捨棄也沒有取，所以沒有這些相貌。也不能說男女等相雖然不是『我』的本體，但是『我』的功德，『我』和功德結合，才說是男人等。所以。

【English Translation】 English version: It is not a wrong view. If it is thought that 'I' should not be like a false view, then it is not a view of 'I'. Moreover, as you say, the mind and so on arise and cease with each thought, if there were no 'I', how could there be memory, recognition, learning, recitation, gratitude, resentment, and so on? This statement is also incorrect. In the bodies of sentient beings, each has an Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness), which continues like a stream, maintaining the seeds of all dharmas without loss, and mutually acting as cause and effect with all dharmas. Through the power of熏習 (xūnxí, influence by habit), there are such things as memory, recognition, learning, recitation, gratitude, resentment, and so on. The 'I' that you conceive is constant and unchanging; the later state should be the same as the previous one, and these things should not occur. If 'I' is always existent, it should always be existent; if 'I' is non-existent, it should always be non-existent. Because the substance of 'I' is one, it cannot be said that the function of 'I' transforms, because function does not leave substance. If the function transforms, 'I' should also transform. If so, this 'I' should be like form and so on, with both substance and function changing, which would be impermanent. If it is said that the mind and so on all belong to 'I', and these things occur because the mind and so on transform, then the 'I' to which they belong also gets its name from this. If so, the mind and so on should arise from 'I', because 'I' can produce results. Then 'I' should not be constant. If 'I' has no growing function for the mind, how can it be said that the mind belongs to 'I'? Since 'I' is constant, it cannot maintain the seeds of the mind and so on, how can there be memory, recognition, and so on? Moreover, as you say, this mind-root and so on are definitely not objects cognized by 'I-view', because there are no male or female characteristics in them, like bottles and so on. This reason is not established, because male and female characteristics exist in the body. Moreover, the 'I' that you conceive should also not be an object cognized by 'I-view', because there are no male or female characteristics in 'I'. Thus, the reason you propose is uncertain. To reveal this meaning, the following verse is then said:

'The inner 'I' is truly not male, not female, nor neither; but due to ignorance, it is said that 'I' am a man.'

Commentary: Relying on the differences in the appearance of the body, it is conventionally said to be male, female, or neither. These different appearances of the body do not exist in the inner 'I', because the substance of the 'I' that you conceive is one. Moreover, the appearances of male and so on change from birth to birth, and it is also seen that there are people who transform in this life, abandoning different appearances and taking on other appearances. The 'I' that you cling to is constant and unchanging, without abandoning or taking, so it does not have these appearances. It also cannot be said that although the appearances of male and so on are not the substance of 'I', they are the virtues of 'I', and 'I' and virtue combine to be called male and so on. Therefore.

者何。樂等德中所不說故。我不共德略有九種。一苦。二樂。三貪。四瞋。五勤勇。六法。七非法。八行。九智。男女等相九所不攝。云何而言。此是我德。又樂等德遍諸所依。男女等相所依不遍。云何得說此為我德。又不可說男女等相同異性攝。由同異性。亦得說我為男女等。所以者何。同異性者。所依決定常遍所依。我既是常。男女等相常應不捨。應一切時常有三相。又男等相遍表一切我及身等。云何唯我同異性攝。又同異性所依各別。設許唯我同異性攝。云何一我有三同異。不見一依有多同異。亦不可說。如波羅奢一樹之上有三同異。波羅奢性樹性實性。我亦如是。一我體上有三同異。男性女性非男女性。所以者何。波羅奢性遍波羅奢。樹性遍樹。實性遍實。此三所依互有寬狹。我上三性皆唯遍我。所依無別。云何為喻。是故唯依無始數習妄想分別所起假相。世俗道中說為男等。非有實我有男等相。但由無明憍逸妄想。愚夫自謂我是丈夫。亦有自謂為女非二。頌中略故。且說丈夫。以身中有男女等相。所執我體男等相無。故汝比量因有不成。不定過失。若汝復言。我及身等。雖復皆有男女等相。然我是實身等是假。此亦不然。若男等相二處皆有。云何得知一假一實。應立量言。我見決定不緣實我。男女等相所雜

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：這是什麼原因呢？因為在快樂等屬性中沒有提到這些。我不共之德（Atman的獨特屬性）略有九種：一、苦（duhkha）；二、樂（sukha）；三、貪（raga）；四、瞋（dvesa）；五、勤勇（prayatna）；六、法（dharma）；七、非法（adharma）；八、行（samskara）；九、智（jnana）。男女等相（男性、女性等特徵）不包含在這九種屬性中。怎麼能說這些是我的屬性呢？而且，快樂等屬性遍及所有所依（一切事物），而男女等相所依並不普遍。怎麼能說這是我的屬性呢？此外，不能說男女等相屬於同異性（samanya-visesa）。如果通過同異性，也可以說我是男性等。為什麼呢？因為同異性，其所依是決定的，常住且遍及所依。既然我是常住的，那麼男性等相應該永遠不捨棄我，應該在一切時候都常有三種相。而且，男性等相普遍地表示一切我以及身體等。怎麼能說只有我屬於同異性呢？而且，同異性的所依是各不相同的。假設允許只有我屬於同異性，怎麼能一個我有三種同異呢？沒有見過一個所依有多種同異。也不能說，就像波羅奢（palasa）樹上具有三種同異：波羅奢性、樹性、實性。我也像這樣，一個我的體上有三種同異：男性、女性、非男女性。為什麼呢？因為波羅奢性遍及波羅奢，樹性遍及樹，實性遍及實。這三者的所依互相之間有寬窄之分。而我身上的三種屬性都只遍及我，所依沒有區別。怎麼能用這個來比喻呢？因此，只是依賴於無始以來的無數習氣、妄想分別所產生的虛假現象，在世俗的道路中說為男性等。實際上並沒有真實的我在具有男性等相。只是由於無明（avidya）、憍逸（audhata，驕慢放逸）的妄想，愚夫自己認為我是丈夫。也有自認為女性或非二者的情況。頌文中因為簡略，所以只說了丈夫。因為身體中有男女等相，而所執著的我體沒有男性等相。所以你的比量（anumana，推理）的因（hetu）有不成（asiddha）的不定（anaikantika）過失。如果你又說：『我和身體等，雖然都有男女等相，但我（Atman）是真實的，身體等是虛假的。』這也是不對的。如果男性等相在兩個地方都有，怎麼能知道一個是假的，一個是真的呢？應該建立量（pramana，有效的認知手段）來說：『我見（Atman的認知）決定不緣于真實的我，而是與男女等相混合。』

【English Translation】 English version: What is the reason for this? It is because these are not mentioned among the attributes such as pleasure. The unique attributes of Atman are roughly nine: 1. Suffering (duhkha); 2. Pleasure (sukha); 3. Attachment (raga); 4. Aversion (dvesa); 5. Effort (prayatna); 6. Dharma (dharma); 7. Adharma (adharma); 8. Action (samskara); 9. Knowledge (jnana). Characteristics such as male and female are not included in these nine attributes. How can it be said that these are my attributes? Moreover, attributes such as pleasure pervade all substrates (everything), while the substrates of characteristics such as male and female are not pervasive. How can it be said that this is my attribute? Furthermore, it cannot be said that characteristics such as male and female belong to the category of generality and particularity (samanya-visesa). If through generality and particularity, it can also be said that I am male, etc. Why? Because generality and particularity, its substrate is definite, permanent, and pervades the substrate. Since I am permanent, then characteristics such as male should never abandon me, and there should always be three characteristics at all times. Moreover, characteristics such as male universally represent all 'I' as well as the body, etc. How can it be said that only I belong to generality and particularity? Moreover, the substrates of generality and particularity are distinct from each other. Supposing it is allowed that only I belong to generality and particularity, how can one 'I' have three generalities and particularities? It has not been seen that one substrate has multiple generalities and particularities. Nor can it be said that, like the palasa (palasa) tree has three generalities and particularities: palasa-ness, tree-ness, reality-ness. I am also like this, one 'I' has three generalities and particularities: male, female, and neither male nor female. Why? Because palasa-ness pervades palasa, tree-ness pervades tree, reality-ness pervades reality. The substrates of these three have varying degrees of breadth. While the three attributes on me all only pervade me, and the substrates are not different. How can this be used as an analogy? Therefore, it is only relying on false phenomena arising from beginningless countless habits, delusional discriminations, that are spoken of as male, etc., in the mundane path. In reality, there is no real 'I' having characteristics such as male. It is only due to the delusion of ignorance (avidya) and arrogance (audhata), that foolish people think of themselves as husbands. There are also those who think of themselves as female or neither. Because of brevity in the verse, only husband is mentioned. Because there are characteristics such as male and female in the body, while the 'I' that is clung to does not have characteristics such as male. Therefore, the reason (hetu) of your inference (anumana) has the fallacy of being unestablished (asiddha) and inconclusive (anaikantika). If you say again: 'I and the body, etc., although both have characteristics such as male and female, but I (Atman) am real, and the body, etc., are false.' This is also not right. If characteristics such as male are in both places, how can it be known that one is false and one is real? A valid means of cognition (pramana) should be established to say: 'The cognition of Atman does not definitely relate to the real Atman, but is mixed with characteristics such as male and female.'

糅故。如緣身等。起男等相所雜糅心。又我見等。不緣實我有所緣故。如余心等。又我見境非是實我。男等相心之所緣故。猶如身等。故汝所言虛無實義。

複次順世外道作如是言。諸法及我大種為性。四大種外無別有物。即四大種和合為我。及身心等內外諸法。現世是有前後世無。有情數法如浮泡等。皆從現在眾緣而生。非前世來不往後世。身根和合安立差別。為緣發起男女等心。受用所依與我和合。令我體有男等相現。緣此我境復起我見。謂我是男女及非二。今應問彼。汝說大種和合變異為身根等。如是成內大種自性。為是男等。非男等耶。彼答言非。內外大種。性無異故。雖大種性內外無異。然有安立形相差別。如是世間所知形相。所有男等自性差別。皆是自心分別所起。非實物中有如是性。若爾頌曰。

若諸大種中　　無男女非二　云何諸大種　　有男等相生

論曰。若四大種本性無有男女非二。云何得有男等相生。男女等心何緣而起。受用所依雖與我合。云何令我男等相現。若我無有男女等相。云何我見。謂我是男女及非二。若本性無。雖與他合。終不能令轉成余相。亦不能令生余相心。如鮮白物雖合余色不成余相。不起余心頗胝迦等。余色合時前滅後生。不可為喻。是故決定無有實我

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：糅合。例如，由於緣于身體等，產生與男性等表象相混合的心。此外，我見等，不緣于真實的我，因為它們有所緣，如同其他心等。而且，我見的境界不是真實的我，而是男性等表象的心所緣的，就像身體等。因此，你所說的是虛無的，沒有實際意義。

再次，順世外道這樣說：諸法和我的本質是大種（Mahabhuta，四大元素）的性質。四大種之外沒有其他東西。四大種的和合就是我，以及身心等內外諸法。現世是存在的，前後世不存在。有情眾生的法就像水泡一樣，都是從現在的因緣而生，不是從前世而來，也不往後世而去。身體和根的和合建立差別，作為因緣發起男性、女性等心。受用所依與我和合，使我的本體呈現男性等表象。緣于這個我的境界，又生起我見，認為我是男性、女性以及非二者。現在應該問他們，你們說大種和合變異成為身根等，這樣形成的內在的大種自性，是男性等，還是非男性等呢？他們回答說不是。因為內外大種的性質沒有差異。雖然大種的性質內外沒有差異，但有安立的形相差別。這樣，世間所知的形相，所有的男性等自性差別，都是自心分別所產生的，不是實際事物中有這樣的性質。如果是這樣，頌文說：

『如果諸大種中，沒有男性、女性和非二者，那麼諸大種，怎麼會有男性等表象產生？』

論曰：如果四大種的本性沒有男性、女性和非二者，怎麼會有男性等表象產生？男性、女性等心又因何而起？受用所依即使與我和合，怎麼能使我呈現男性等表象？如果我沒有男性、女性等表象，我見又怎麼會認為我是男性、女性以及非二者？如果本性沒有，即使與他物結合，最終也不能使其轉變成其他表象，也不能使其產生其他表象的心，就像潔白的物體即使混合其他顏色，也不會變成其他表象，也不會產生其他心。頗胝迦（Sphatika，水晶）等與顏色結合時是前色滅后色生，不能作為比喻。因此，可以斷定沒有真實的我。

【English Translation】 English version: Mixing. For example, due to being conditioned by the body, etc., a mind arises that is mixed with the appearances of male, etc. Furthermore, views of self, etc., do not take a real self as their object, because they have an object, like other minds, etc. Moreover, the object of the view of self is not a real self, because it is the object of the mind of the appearances of male, etc., just like the body, etc. Therefore, what you say is empty and without real meaning.

Again, the Lokayata (materialist) heretics say this: All dharmas and the self are by nature of the Mahabhutas (great elements). There is nothing other than the four great elements. The combination of the four great elements is the self, as well as all internal and external dharmas such as body and mind. The present life exists, but the past and future lives do not. The dharmas of sentient beings are like bubbles, all arising from present conditions, not coming from the past life, nor going to the future life. The combination of body and senses establishes differences, as a condition for arousing minds of male, female, etc. The basis of enjoyment combines with the self, causing the self to manifest the appearance of male, etc. Conditioned by this object of the self, the view of self arises again, thinking that the self is male, female, and neither. Now, they should be asked, 'You say that the great elements combine and transform into body and senses, etc. Is the nature of the internal great elements thus formed male, etc., or non-male, etc.?' They answer that it is not. Because the nature of the internal and external great elements is not different. Although the nature of the great elements is not different internally and externally, there are established differences in form and appearance. Thus, the forms known in the world, all the differences in the nature of male, etc., are all produced by the discrimination of one's own mind, and there is no such nature in real things. If so, the verse says:

'If in the great elements, there is no male, female, or neither, how can the great elements have the appearance of male, etc., arising?'

Commentary: If the inherent nature of the four great elements does not have male, female, or neither, how can the appearance of male, etc., arise? What is the cause for the arising of minds of male, female, etc.? Even if the basis of enjoyment combines with the self, how can it cause the self to manifest the appearance of male, etc.? If the self does not have the appearance of male, female, etc., how can the view of self think that the self is male, female, and neither? If it does not have it by nature, even if it combines with other things, it ultimately cannot transform it into another appearance, nor can it cause the mind of another appearance to arise, just as a pure white object, even if mixed with other colors, will not become another appearance, nor will it cause another mind to arise. Sphatika (crystal), etc., when combined with colors, the previous color disappears and the next color arises, so it cannot be used as an analogy. Therefore, it can be determined that there is no real self.

。大種為性經久時住。有男等相我見所緣。

複次記論外道作如是言。諸法及我。一切皆與三相和合。由此三相。皆能發起三種心聲。何謂三相。一者男相。能生諸法。二者女相。能滅諸法。三非二相。能守本位。此亦不然。諸法及我。體非三相。云何能起三種心聲。亦不可說。與他合故轉成三相。前所說過不相離故。若法及我。體非三相。三相合故轉成三相。三相更無餘三相合。故此三相應非三相。應不能起三種心聲。又此三相與非相合。能使非相轉成相者。諸法及我與相合時。應令三相轉成非相。是則畢竟應不能起三種心聲。又此三相功能差別。更互相違必應不併。云何一物得有三聲。如角等物。男女非二。三聲所呼世共知故。又一物上三相功能。更互相違而得並者。應一切物皆具三相。不應現見聲有差別。又此三相若實有者。唯應依止有法非無。是則三聲應不周遍。云何現見諸方言音。有法上無。無法上有。現見境界不可誹謗。若無三相而有三聲。則一切處皆應如是。又此三相配生住滅。理不應然。男死女生非二生死。世現見故。又此三相無別實體。后當廣辨。是故但隨世俗言路。說有男等三聲差別。非別實有如是三相。外道執有如是三相。依附實我我見所緣。是顛倒智。內道不執。故無顛倒。汝不應依

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：四大種（Mahābhūta）以其性質長久存在，具有男性等表相，是我見（ātmadṛṣṭi）所執著的對象。

此外，一些記論外道（smṛtyupasthāna tīrthika）這樣說：『諸法（dharma）以及我（ātman），一切都與三種表相結合。由於這三種表相，都能發起三種心聲。』什麼是三種表相呢？第一是男相，能產生諸法；第二是女相，能滅壞諸法；第三是非二相，能守護其本位。』

這種說法也是不對的。諸法以及我，其體性並非三種表相，怎麼能生起三種心聲呢？也不可以說，因為與他者結合的緣故，才轉變成三種表相。因為前面已經說過，它們是不相分離的。如果法以及我，其體性並非三種表相，因為與三種表相結合的緣故，才轉變成三種表相，那麼這三種表相更無其他的三個表相與之結合。因此，這三種表相應該不是三種表相，應該不能生起三種心聲。而且，這三種表相與非表相結合，能使非表相轉變成表相，那麼諸法以及我與表相結合時，應該使三種表相轉變成非表相。這樣，畢竟應該不能生起三種心聲。而且，這三種表相的功能差別，更是互相違背，必定不能並存。怎麼能在一個事物上同時有三種聲音呢？比如角等事物，既非男也非女，三種聲音的稱呼為世人所共知。

而且，在一個事物上，三種表相的功能互相違背卻能並存，那麼一切事物都應該具備三種表相，不應該出現聲音有差別的現象。而且，這三種表相如果真實存在，就應該只依止於有法（bhāva dharma），而不是無（abhāva）。這樣，三種聲音應該不能周遍。為什麼現在能看到各地方言語音，有法上沒有，無法上卻有呢？親眼所見的境界是不可誹謗的。如果沒有三種表相卻有三種聲音，那麼一切地方都應該如此。

而且，這三種表相與生、住、滅相配，道理上是不應該這樣的。因為男死女生，非二生死，是世人親眼所見的。而且，這三種表相沒有別的實體，後面將會廣泛辨析。因此，只是隨順世俗的言語道路，說有男性等三種聲音的差別，並非真實存在這樣的三種表相。外道執著有這樣的三種表相，依附於真實的我，是我見所執著的對象，這是顛倒的智慧。內道不執著，所以沒有顛倒。你不應該依止。

【English Translation】 English version: The Mahābhūta (great elements) exist for a long time due to their nature, possessing appearances such as maleness, which are the objects of attachment for ātmadṛṣṭi (the view of self).

Furthermore, some smṛtyupasthāna tīrthikas (followers of mindfulness and non-Buddhist schools) say this: 'All dharmas (phenomena) and the ātman (self) are combined with three aspects. Because of these three aspects, they can all generate three kinds of mental sounds.' What are the three aspects? The first is the male aspect, which can generate all dharmas; the second is the female aspect, which can destroy all dharmas; the third is the non-dual aspect, which can maintain its original position.'

This statement is also incorrect. The nature of dharmas and the ātman is not the three aspects, so how can they generate three kinds of mental sounds? It also cannot be said that they transform into three aspects because they are combined with others. Because, as mentioned earlier, they are inseparable. If the nature of dharmas and the ātman is not the three aspects, and they transform into three aspects because they are combined with the three aspects, then these three aspects have no other three aspects to combine with. Therefore, these three aspects should not be three aspects, and they should not be able to generate three kinds of mental sounds. Moreover, if these three aspects combine with non-aspects and can transform non-aspects into aspects, then when dharmas and the ātman combine with aspects, they should transform the three aspects into non-aspects. In this way, they should ultimately not be able to generate three kinds of mental sounds. Moreover, the functional differences of these three aspects are even more contradictory to each other, and they must not coexist. How can there be three sounds in one thing at the same time? For example, things like horns are neither male nor female, and the names of the three sounds are known to the world.

Moreover, if the functions of the three aspects contradict each other but can coexist in one thing, then all things should have three aspects, and there should be no difference in sounds. Moreover, if these three aspects truly exist, they should only rely on bhāva dharma (existent phenomena), not abhāva (non-existence). In this way, the three sounds should not be pervasive. Why can we now see the dialects and sounds of various places, which are not present in existent phenomena but are present in non-existent phenomena? The realm seen with one's own eyes cannot be slandered. If there are no three aspects but there are three sounds, then all places should be like this.

Moreover, it is not reasonable to match these three aspects with the phases of arising, abiding, and ceasing. Because the death of a male and the birth of a female, and the death and birth of the non-dual, are seen by the world. Moreover, these three aspects have no other entity, which will be extensively analyzed later. Therefore, it is only in accordance with the worldly way of speaking that there are differences in the three sounds such as maleness, and there are no such three aspects in reality. The non-Buddhists are attached to these three aspects, relying on the real self, which is the object of attachment for the view of self, and this is inverted wisdom. The inner path does not cling, so there is no inversion. You should not rely on it.

。有顛倒智與無倒者。正抉擇時立為定量。以我見緣證實有我。又此我見。為隨我相執有我耶。為隨自覺執有我耶。若隨我相應。名正見。若隨自覺。應不緣我。又若初者。頌曰。

汝我余非我　　故我無定相

論曰。若汝身中我之自相。諸餘身中我亦同有。隨我自相而起我見。云何一見不緣一切。既無一見緣一切我。故知我見不隨我相。若汝身中我自相異。余身中我自相復別。汝以為我。余則為非。余以為我。汝則為非。是則此我相不決定。既無定相。便無定性。性相不定。非實非常。云何執我真實常住。又立量言。自身我見。不隨自我自相而起。不緣余我自相生故。如所餘緣所有心等。又自身我應不為緣。發自我見汝許我故。如他身我。又諸我見。定不緣我。自他境相互有無故。如青黃等能緣之心。又一切我非我見境。諸餘有法所不攝故。猶如一切兔角等無。又一切我非實我性。是所知故。如一切法。是故我見不緣實我。諸所計我無實性相。一切智者皆非所見。唯諸愚人恒深樂著。如病眼境定非實有。故不可以我見所緣。證立此我實有常住。若第二者。頌曰。

豈不于無常　　妄分別為我

論曰。若隨自覺執有我者。豈不但緣無常身等。虛妄分別執為實我。所以者何。現見世間但緣身等。前

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：有具有顛倒智慧的人和沒有顛倒智慧的人。在正確決斷的時候，將前者所立的觀點作為衡量標準。因為執著于『我』的見解，所以證實『我』的存在。那麼，這種『我見』，是隨著『我』的表相而執著于『我』呢？還是隨著自己的感覺而執著于『我』呢？如果是隨著『我』的表相，那應該被稱為正見。如果是隨著自己的感覺，那就不應該執著于『我』。如果是前者，頌文說：『你、我、其他、非我，因此，『我』沒有固定的表相。』論述說：如果在你自身中，『我』有其自身的表相，那麼在其他人的身體中，『我』也應該同樣存在。如果隨著『我』的自身表相而產生『我見』，為什麼一種見解不能涵蓋一切呢？既然沒有一種見解能夠涵蓋所有的『我』，那麼就可以知道『我見』不是隨著『我』的表相而產生的。如果在你自身中，『我』的自身表相是不同的，在其他人的身體中，『我』的自身表相又是不同的，你認為是『我』，別人就認為不是『我』。別人認為是『我』，你就認為不是『我』。那麼，這個『我』的表相是不確定的。既然沒有確定的表相，就沒有確定的自性。自性和表相都不確定，就不是真實的，也不是永恒的。為什麼還要執著于『我』是真實常住的呢？又可以立論說：自身產生的『我見』，不是隨著自身『我』的自身表相而產生的，因為它不執著于其他『我』的自身表相，就像其餘所執著的各種心等等。而且，自身之『我』不應該成為產生『我見』的條件，因為你承認『我』的存在，就像他人之『我』一樣。而且，各種『我見』，一定不執著于『我』，因為自身和他人的境界相互存在或不存在，就像能執著于青色和黃色的心一樣。而且，一切『我』都不是『我見』的境界，因為它不被其餘有法所包含，就像一切兔角等不存在的事物一樣。而且，一切『我』都不是真實的『我』的自性，因為它是可以被認識的，就像一切法一樣。因此，『我見』不執著于真實的『我』。各種被計度的『我』沒有真實的自性表相。一切有智慧的人都不會見到它，只有愚人才會一直深深地執著它。就像生病眼睛所看到的境界一定不是真實存在的一樣。所以，不能用『我見』所執著的對象，來證明『我』是真實常住的。如果是後者，頌文說：『難道不是對無常的事物，錯誤地分別執著為『我』嗎？』論述說：如果隨著自己的感覺而執著于『我』，難道不是僅僅執著于無常的身體等等，虛妄地分別執著為真實的『我』嗎？為什麼呢？因為現在看到世間僅僅執著于身體等等，前

【English Translation】 English version: There are those with inverted wisdom and those without inversion. When making correct determinations, the views established by the former are taken as the standard. Because of clinging to the view of 'I' (Atman), the existence of 'I' is confirmed. Now, is this 'I-view' (Atma-drishti) clinging to 'I' according to the appearance of 'I', or clinging to 'I' according to one's own feeling? If it is according to the appearance of 'I', it should be called right view. If it is according to one's own feeling, then it should not cling to 'I'. If it is the former, the verse says: 'You, I, others, non-I, therefore, 'I' has no fixed appearance.' The treatise says: If in your own body, 'I' has its own appearance, then in the bodies of others, 'I' should also exist in the same way. If 'I-view' arises according to the self-appearance of 'I', why does one view not encompass everything? Since there is no one view that can encompass all 'I's, it can be known that 'I-view' does not arise according to the appearance of 'I'. If in your own body, the self-appearance of 'I' is different, and in the bodies of others, the self-appearance of 'I' is also different, you consider it 'I', and others consider it not 'I'. Others consider it 'I', and you consider it not 'I'. Then, this appearance of 'I' is uncertain. Since there is no fixed appearance, there is no fixed nature. Since nature and appearance are uncertain, it is neither real nor permanent. Why then cling to 'I' as real and permanent? Furthermore, it can be argued: The 'I-view' that arises in oneself does not arise according to the self-appearance of one's own 'I', because it does not cling to the self-appearance of other 'I's, just like the various minds etc. that are clung to. Moreover, one's own 'I' should not be the condition for the arising of 'I-view', because you admit the existence of 'I', just like the 'I' of others. Moreover, various 'I-views' certainly do not cling to 'I', because the realms of self and others mutually exist or do not exist, just like the minds that can cling to blue and yellow. Moreover, all 'I's are not the realm of 'I-view', because it is not encompassed by other existing things, just like all non-existent things such as rabbit horns. Moreover, all 'I's are not the real nature of 'I', because it is knowable, just like all dharmas. Therefore, 'I-view' does not cling to the real 'I'. The various 'I's that are conceived have no real nature or appearance. All wise people do not see it, only fools constantly and deeply cling to it. Just like the realm seen by a diseased eye is certainly not real. Therefore, one cannot use the object clung to by 'I-view' to prove that 'I' is real and permanent. If it is the latter, the verse says: 'Is it not that one mistakenly clings to impermanent things as 'I'?' The treatise says: If one clings to 'I' according to one's own feeling, is it not merely clinging to impermanent bodies etc., falsely clinging to them as the real 'I'? Why? Because it is now seen that the world merely clings to bodies etc., the pre-

后隨緣分位差別。虛妄計度。我肥我瘦。我勝我劣。我明我闇。我苦我樂。身等無常可有是事。常住實我無此差別。由此比知。一切我見。皆無實我以為境界。唯緣虛妄身等為境。隨自妄想覺慧生故。如緣闇繩顛倒蛇執。又如世間虛妄分別。執有空華第二月等。必由先見世間少事。然後方執有如是事。我見執我亦復如是。先緣生滅五取蘊事。後方決定執有實我。又如夢中虛妄境界。隨先所見和合計度。我見境界亦復如是。先緣諸蘊。然後和合虛妄計度。又諸我見略有二種。一者俱生。二者分別。俱生我見。由無始來。內因力故恒與身俱。不待邪教及邪分別。任運而起。故名俱生。此復二種。一常相續。在第七識緣第八識。起自心相。即執為我。名為我見。二有間斷。在第六識緣五取蘊。或總或別起自心相。即執為我。名為我見。

如是二種。俱生我見微細難斷。數數修習勝無我觀。方能除滅分別我見。由現在世外緣力故。非與身俱。要待邪教及邪分別。然後方起。故名分別。此亦二種。一緣邪教所說蘊相。起自心相。分別為我。名為我見。二緣邪教所說我相。起自心相。分別為我。名為我見如是二種分別我見。粗重易斷聖諦現觀。初現行時即便除滅。如是所說一切我見。心外蘊境或有或無。心內蘊境一切皆有。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：由於隨順因緣，才有了地位和福分的差別，以及虛妄的計度。例如，『我』肥胖或瘦弱，『我』勝過或不如別人，『我』聰明或愚昧，『我』痛苦或快樂。如果身體等都是無常的，這些事情才有可能發生。如果存在常住不變的『實我』，就不會有這些差別。由此可以推知，一切關於『我』的見解，都沒有真實的『我』作為其對象。它們僅僅以虛妄的身體等為對象，隨著各自的妄想和覺慧而產生。這就像在黑暗中把繩子誤認為蛇一樣。又如世間虛妄的分別，執著于空中的花朵和第二個月亮等。必定是先見過世間的一些事物，然後才會執著于有這樣的事物。關於『我』的見解也是如此，先緣于生滅的五取蘊（panchaskandha，構成個體經驗的五種要素：色、受、想、行、識），然後才確定地執著于有真實的『我』。又如夢中的虛妄境界，隨著先前所見的事物而綜合計算。關於『我』的見解也是如此，先緣于諸蘊（skandha，蘊，聚集），然後綜合起來進行虛妄的計度。而且，關於『我』的見解大致有兩種：一種是俱生我見（sahaja-ātmadrsti，與生俱來的我見），另一種是分別我見（parikalpita-ātmadrsti，通過後天學習產生的我見）。俱生我見由於無始以來的內在力量，始終與身體相伴隨，不需要邪教和邪分別，自然而然地產生，所以稱為俱生。這種俱生我見又分為兩種：一種是常相續的，在第七識（manas-vijnana，末那識）緣于第八識（ālaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）時，產生自心相，就執著為『我』，稱為我見。另一種是有間斷的，在第六識（mano-vijnana，意識）緣於五取蘊時，或者總的或者分別地產生自心相，就執著為『我』，稱為我見。這兩種俱生我見非常微細難以斷除，需要反覆修習殊勝的無我觀（anātmadrsti，對無我的觀察），才能消除。分別我見由於現在世的外在因緣，並非與身體俱來，需要等待邪教和邪分別，然後才會產生，所以稱為分別。這種分別我見也有兩種：一種是緣于邪教所說的蘊相，產生自心相，分別認為是我，稱為我見。另一種是緣于邪教所說的我相，產生自心相，分別認為是我，稱為我見。這兩種分別我見粗重容易斷除，當聖諦（āryasatya，四聖諦）現觀（abhisamaya，證悟）初次現行時，就能立即消除。總而言之，所有這些關於『我』的見解，在心外的蘊境中，或者有或者沒有，但在心內的蘊境中，一切都是存在的。

【English Translation】 English version: Differences in position and fortune arise from following conditions and circumstances, along with false estimations, such as 'I' am fat or thin, 'I' am superior or inferior, 'I' am intelligent or ignorant, 'I' am suffering or happy. These things are possible if the body and so on are impermanent. If there were a permanent, real 'self', there would be no such differences. From this, it can be inferred that all views about 'self' have no real 'self' as their object. They only take the false body and so on as their object, arising from their own delusions and wisdom. This is like mistaking a rope for a snake in the dark. It is also like the false discriminations in the world, clinging to flowers in the sky and a second moon. It is necessary to have seen some things in the world first, and then to cling to having such things. The view of 'self' is also like this, first arising from the events of the impermanent five skandhas (panchaskandha, the five aggregates that constitute individual experience: form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness), and then definitively clinging to having a real 'self'. It is also like the false realms in dreams, calculated and measured according to what was seen before. The view of 'self' is also like this, first arising from the skandhas (skandha, aggregates), and then combining them to make false estimations. Moreover, there are roughly two types of views about 'self': one is innate self-view (sahaja-ātmadrsti, the self-view that is inherent from birth), and the other is conceptual self-view (parikalpita-ātmadrsti, the self-view that arises through acquired learning). Innate self-view, due to the internal power from beginningless time, is always accompanied by the body, and does not require false teachings or false discriminations, arising naturally, so it is called innate. This innate self-view is further divided into two types: one is constantly continuous, in the seventh consciousness (manas-vijnana, manas consciousness), when it cognizes the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijnana, storehouse consciousness), it produces a self-image, which is then clung to as 'self', called self-view. The other is intermittent, in the sixth consciousness (mano-vijnana, mind consciousness), when it cognizes the five skandhas, either generally or separately, it produces a self-image, which is then clung to as 'self', called self-view. These two types of innate self-view are very subtle and difficult to eradicate, requiring repeated practice of the supreme contemplation of no-self (anātmadrsti, observation of no-self) to eliminate. Conceptual self-view, due to external conditions in the present life, is not inherent with the body, requiring false teachings and false discriminations, and then it arises, so it is called conceptual. This conceptual self-view also has two types: one is arising from the skandha-images spoken of in false teachings, producing a self-image, which is then conceptually regarded as 'self', called self-view. The other is arising from the self-image spoken of in false teachings, producing a self-image, which is then conceptually regarded as 'self', called self-view. These two types of conceptual self-view are coarse and easy to eradicate, and when the direct realization of the noble truths (āryasatya, the Four Noble Truths) (abhisamaya, enlightenment) first manifests, they are immediately eliminated. In summary, all these views about 'self', in the external skandha-realms, may or may not exist, but in the internal skandha-realms, everything exists.

是故我見皆緣無常。諸蘊行相妄執為我。諸蘊行相從緣生故。是虛幻有妄所執我。非緣生故決定非有。故契經說。苾芻當知。世間沙門婆羅門等。所有我見。一切皆緣五取蘊起。

複次今應審問。諸翳盲徒空無我理。有何所失。而強分別固執我耶。若一切法空無我者。生死涅槃二事俱失。所以者何。由有我故。諸無智者樂著生死。先造能招善不善業。后受所感愛非愛果。諸有智者欣樂涅槃。先觀生死苦火煎逼。發心厭離。後方舍惡勤修諸善。得正解脫。如是一切皆由我成。我為作者。我為受者。我為苦逼發心厭離。舍惡修善證得涅槃。若爾頌曰。

我即同於身　　生生有變易　故離身有我　　常住理不然

論曰。若我先造種種行業。後方領受種種果報。是則此我體應轉變。因必有轉變。果有差別故。無有道理。因不轉變而果眾多。及非恒有。謂所執我那落迦等。諸趣諸界生差別中。若能造受種種業果。則應同身生生變易。非天授等。身無變易。先能造作善惡二業。后能領受苦樂兩果。是故我體同所依身。能造受故。生生變易。有變易故。則有生滅。生滅相應。豈得常住。又所執我不離身等。有情數攝。體非常故。如所依身。是故執我常住離身。能為作者。及為受者。生死輪迴。皆不應理。以離身等

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因此，我所見的都源於無常。各種蘊（skandha，構成個體經驗的五種要素：色、受、想、行、識）的行相被錯誤地執著為『我』。各種蘊的行相從因緣而生，所以這虛幻的『我』是被妄想所執著的。如果不是從因緣而生，那麼就決定不存在。所以契經（sutra，佛經）說：『比丘（bhiksu，佛教出家男眾），應當知道，世間的沙門（sramana，修行者）、婆羅門（brahmana，古印度僧侶階層）等，所有關於『我』的見解，一切都是緣於五取蘊（panca-upadanakkhandha，執取五蘊而產生的苦）而生起的。』

其次，現在應該審問那些被無明遮蔽，不明白空無我道理的人：『你們有什麼損失，而要強烈地分別、固執地認為有『我』呢？』如果一切法都是空無我的，那麼生死（samsara，輪迴）和涅槃（nirvana，解脫）這兩件事就都無法成立。為什麼呢？因為有了『我』，那些沒有智慧的人才會貪戀生死，先造作能夠招感善業和不善業的行為，然後承受所感得的可愛和不可愛的果報。那些有智慧的人才會欣樂涅槃，先觀察生死中的苦火煎熬逼迫，發起厭離之心，然後才捨棄惡行，勤修各種善行，得到真正的解脫。像這樣的一切都是因為『我』而成就的。『我』是作者，『我』是受者，『我』是被苦所逼迫而發起厭離之心的人，捨棄惡行、修習善行並證得涅槃的人。如果這樣，那麼頌（gatha，偈頌）說：

『我與身體相同，生生世世都有變易，所以離開身體而有常住的『我』，這個道理是不成立的。』

論（sastra，論述）說：如果『我』先造作各種各樣的行為，然後才領受各種各樣的果報，那麼這個『我』的本體就應該轉變。因為原因必定有轉變，結果才會有差別，沒有這樣的道理：原因不轉變而結果卻有很多，以及不是恒常存在的。所謂執著的『我』，在那落迦（naraka，地獄）等各種趣（gati，輪迴的去處）、各種界（dhatu，構成要素）的生命差別中，如果能夠造作和領受各種業的果報，那麼就應該像身體一樣，生生世世都有變易。而不是像天授（Devadatta，人名）等那樣，身體沒有變易，卻能先造作善惡兩種業，然後領受苦樂兩種果報。所以『我』的本體和所依的身體相同，能夠造作和領受，生生世世都有變易。因為有變易，所以就有生滅。生滅相應，怎麼能常住呢？而且所執著的『我』不離開身體等有情（sattva，有情眾生）的範疇，本體不是恒常的，就像所依的身體一樣。所以執著『我』常住、離開身體，能夠作為作者和受者，在生死中輪迴，都是不合道理的。因為離開了身體等。

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, all that I see arises from impermanence. The characteristics of the skandhas (the five aggregates constituting individual experience: form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness) are falsely clung to as 'self'. The characteristics of the skandhas arise from conditions, so this illusory 'self' is what is clung to by delusion. If it does not arise from conditions, then it definitely does not exist. Therefore, the sutra (a discourse of the Buddha) says: 'Bhikkhus (Buddhist monks), you should know that all views of 'self' held by the sramanas (ascetics), brahmanas (priestly class in ancient India), and others in the world, all arise from the five aggregates of clinging (panca-upadanakkhandha, the five aggregates that give rise to suffering through attachment).'

Furthermore, we should now question those who are blinded by ignorance and do not understand the principle of emptiness and no-self: 'What do you lose by strongly distinguishing and clinging to the idea of a 'self'?' If all dharmas (phenomena) are empty and without self, then both samsara (cycle of birth and death) and nirvana (liberation) would be impossible. Why? Because with a 'self', those without wisdom cling to samsara, first creating actions that bring about good and bad karma, and then experiencing the resulting pleasant and unpleasant consequences. Those with wisdom rejoice in nirvana, first observing the torment and oppression of the fires of suffering in samsara, generating a mind of renunciation, and then abandoning evil deeds and diligently cultivating various good deeds, attaining true liberation. All of this is accomplished because of 'self'. 'I' am the doer, 'I' am the receiver, 'I' am the one who is oppressed by suffering and generates a mind of renunciation, abandons evil deeds, cultivates good deeds, and attains nirvana. If so, then the gatha (verse) says:

'The self is the same as the body, changing in every life. Therefore, the idea of a permanent self apart from the body is not reasonable.'

The sastra (treatise) says: If the 'self' first creates various actions and then later experiences various consequences, then the nature of this 'self' should change. Because the cause must change for the results to be different, it is unreasonable for the cause not to change while the results are numerous and not constant. The so-called clung-to 'self', in the various destinies (gati, realms of rebirth) and realms (dhatu, elements) of existence, such as naraka (hell), if it can create and experience the fruits of various karmas, then it should change in every life like the body. It should not be like Devadatta (a proper name), whose body does not change, yet he can first create both good and bad deeds and then experience both pleasant and unpleasant consequences. Therefore, the nature of the 'self' is the same as the body it relies on, capable of creating and experiencing, changing in every life. Because it changes, it is subject to birth and death. Being subject to birth and death, how can it be permanent? Moreover, the clung-to 'self' is not separate from the realm of sentient beings (sattva, beings with consciousness), and its nature is not constant, just like the body it relies on. Therefore, clinging to the idea of a permanent 'self' that is separate from the body, capable of being the doer and the receiver, and transmigrating in samsara, is all unreasonable. Because it is separate from the body, etc.

無別用故。

複次云何此我能造諸業。若謂與身合故能造。由此內我有勤勇德。因此德故。與身和合起諸作業。此德作業雖待依身。而屬於我。如以金石投于樹枝。重德相應故有搖動。是德作用雖待樹枝。而屬金石。此亦不然。有觸對物。可有如是動搖作用。汝我不爾。云何身合能造諸業。所以者何。頌曰。

若法無觸對　　則無有動搖　是故身作業　　非命者能造

論曰。一切能起動搖作業。決定不離有觸對物。我無觸對。雖與身合。云何能作搖動業因。如所執時無有觸對。雖與身合不能作業。心及心法唯能生風。風與身合方能造業。故所立因無不定過。此說近因。非展轉故。又可合者必有方分。兩物相觸無間名合。所執我等既無方分。云何與身合故造業。不可假說我有方分。即有實起作業功能。勿以假名說水為火。即有實火焚燒作用。由能說人假說諸法。非能說人有差別故。令所說法其性轉變。法性決定前已具論。于本頌中。無觸對者。顯無方分。無動搖者。顯無合義。又自有動方能動他。如金石等要自有動。方能為因令樹枝動。我既無動無形礙故。何能為因令所依動。如金石等不動轉位。無觸對者顯無形礙。無形礙故自無有動。無動搖者顯非動因。如是所執無動神我。尚無能動一毫之力。況

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：沒有其他用途的緣故。

再者，這個『我』（Atman）如何能夠創造各種業（karma）呢？如果說因為與身體結合所以能夠創造，因為這個內在的『我』有勤奮勇敢的德行，因此，因為這個德行的緣故，與身體結合而產生各種作業。這個德行所產生的作業雖然依賴於身體，但屬於『我』。就像用金塊或石頭投向樹枝，因為重量的德行相應而產生搖動。這個德行的作用雖然依賴於樹枝，但屬於金塊或石頭。這種說法也是不成立的。有接觸的物體，才可能有這樣的搖動作用。你所說的『我』不是這樣，如何與身體結合就能創造各種業呢？為什麼這麼說呢？頌文說：

『如果法沒有接觸，就沒有動搖。因此身體的作業，不是命者（jiva）能創造的。』

論述說：一切能夠引起動搖作業的，必定離不開有接觸的物體。『我』沒有接觸，即使與身體結合，如何能作為搖動業的原因呢？就像所執著的『時』（kala）沒有接觸，即使與身體結合也不能產生作業。心（citta）和心法（dharma）只能產生風（vayu），風與身體結合才能創造業。所以所立的因沒有不確定的過失。這裡說的是近因，不是輾轉的原因。而且可以結合的事物必定有方位。兩個物體相接觸沒有間隙叫做結合。所執著的『我』等既然沒有方位，如何與身體結合而創造業呢？不能假設說『我』有方位，就有了實際產生作業的功能。不要因為假名說水是火，就有了實際的火的焚燒作用。由於能說的人假說諸法，不是能說的人有差別，就使所說法的性質轉變。法的性質是決定的，前面已經詳細論述過。在本頌中，『無觸對者』，顯示沒有方位。『無動搖者』，顯示沒有結合的意義。而且自己有動才能動他，如金塊石頭等，要自己有動，才能作為原因使樹枝動。『我』既然沒有動，沒有形體的阻礙，如何能作為原因使所依賴的身體動呢？如金塊石頭等不動轉的時候，沒有接觸，『無觸對者』顯示沒有形體的阻礙。因為沒有形體的阻礙，所以自己沒有動。『無動搖者』顯示不是動的原因。像這樣所執著的沒有動的神我，尚且沒有能動一毫的力量，何況…

【English Translation】 English version: There is no other purpose.

Furthermore, how can this 'self' (Atman) create various karmas? If it is said that it can create because it is combined with the body, because this inner 'self' has the virtue of diligence and courage, therefore, because of this virtue, it combines with the body and produces various actions. Although the actions produced by this virtue depend on the body, they belong to the 'self'. Just like throwing a gold nugget or a stone at a tree branch, shaking occurs because of the corresponding virtue of weight. Although the effect of this virtue depends on the tree branch, it belongs to the gold nugget or stone. This statement is also not valid. Only objects that have contact can have such shaking effects. Your 'self' is not like this, how can it create various karmas by combining with the body? Why is that? The verse says:

'If a dharma has no contact, there is no shaking. Therefore, the actions of the body, cannot be created by the 'jiva' (life force).'

The treatise says: Everything that can cause shaking actions is definitely inseparable from objects that have contact. The 'self' has no contact, even if it is combined with the body, how can it be the cause of shaking karma? Just like the 'time' (kala) that is adhered to has no contact, even if it is combined with the body, it cannot produce actions. The mind (citta) and mental phenomena (dharma) can only produce wind (vayu), and wind can create karma only when it combines with the body. Therefore, the established cause has no uncertain fault. This refers to the proximate cause, not the indirect cause. Moreover, things that can be combined must have direction. The contact of two objects without gaps is called combination. Since the adhered 'self' and others have no direction, how can they create karma by combining with the body? It cannot be assumed that the 'self' has direction, and then it has the function of actually producing actions. Do not say that water is fire because of a false name, and then it has the burning effect of real fire. Because the speaker falsely says all dharmas, it is not that the speaker is different, so that the nature of the dharma being spoken changes. The nature of dharma is definite, and has been discussed in detail earlier. In this verse, 'without contact' shows that there is no direction. 'Without shaking' shows that there is no meaning of combination. Moreover, one can only move others if one has movement oneself, such as gold nuggets and stones, which must have movement themselves in order to cause the tree branch to move. Since the 'self' has no movement and no physical obstruction, how can it cause the body it relies on to move? Like gold nuggets and stones that do not move, there is no contact, 'without contact' shows that there is no physical obstruction. Because there is no physical obstruction, there is no movement itself. 'Without shaking' shows that it is not the cause of movement. The adhered motionless divine self like this does not even have the power to move a hair, let alone...

能造業得名作者。既不造業即無有果。若不受果何名受者。

複次如汝所言。我為苦逼發心厭離舍惡修善得解脫者。此亦不然。何以故。頌曰。

我常非所害　　豈煩修護因　誰恐食金剛　　執仗防眾蠹

論曰。汝所計我既無變易。如太虛空其體常住。一切災苦皆不能害。豈煩精進修防護因。有變壞身。苦所逼害罪所涂染。理須防護。誰有智者。了知金剛物無能壞。而恐侵食。率侶執仗防諸蠹魚。唯有愚人。或為是事。可變壞物應加守衛。若汝意謂。命可害故。我亦隨害。此亦不然。我既是常。不應隨害。又汝計命三事和合。謂身我意前已遮破。我與身合無方分故。如汝所計。色等諸德無和合義。又和合者無別有性。唯有方分無間而生。既無別體。復何所害。此設可害必隨所依。所依既常。云何可害。設復害命。於我何惱。以汝所計我常無礙。如太虛空寒暑風雨霜雹無損。如是我性苦何所惱。又所執我其性凝然。前後無變。設離眾惡。復何所增而名解脫。豈不此位善法增耶。我性既常。善增何益。所執我體常無改變。余法雖生亦無增損。如是解脫。於我無用。是故執我常住無變。生死涅槃二事俱失。若空無我二事俱成。

大乘廣百論釋論卷第二大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1571 大

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：能造作業的才可稱為作者（Karta）。既然不造作業，就沒有果報。如果不承受果報，又怎麼能稱為受者（Bhokta）呢？

再者，正如你所說，我因為被痛苦逼迫，才發心厭離，捨棄惡行，修習善行，從而得到解脫。這也是不對的。為什麼呢？頌文說：

『我常非所害，豈煩修護因？誰恐食金剛，執仗防眾蠹？』

論述：你所認為的『我』既然沒有變易，就像太虛空一樣，其本體常住不變，一切災難痛苦都不能損害它，哪裡需要精進修行來修護呢？只有會變壞的身體，會被痛苦逼迫，會被罪惡涂染，才需要防護。誰有智慧的人，會明明知道金剛堅固無比，不可能被損壞，卻還害怕它被侵蝕，率領眾人拿著武器來防備蠹魚呢？只有愚人才會做這種事。可以變壞的東西才應該加以守衛。如果你認為，生命可以被損害，所以『我』也會隨之被損害，這也是不對的。『我』既然是常住不變的，就不應該隨之被損害。而且你認為的生命是三事和合而成，即身體、『我』和意識，前面已經遮破過了，『我』與身體結合沒有方位分際的緣故。就像你所認為的，色等諸德沒有和合的意義。而且和合的事物沒有單獨存在的自性，只有方位分際沒有間隔才會產生。既然沒有單獨的本體，又怎麼會被損害呢？即使可以被損害，也必定是隨著所依附的事物而損害。所依附的事物既然是常住不變的，怎麼會被損害呢？即使損害了生命，對於『我』又有什麼惱害呢？因為你所認為的『我』是常住無礙的，就像太虛空一樣，寒冷、暑熱、風雨、霜雹都不能損害它。像這樣，我的自性又怎麼會被痛苦所惱害呢？而且你所執著的『我』，其自性凝然不動，前後沒有變化。即使離開了各種惡行，又有什麼增加，從而可以稱為解脫呢？難道不是因為這個位次善法增加了嗎？我的自性既然是常住不變的，善法增加又有什麼益處呢？所執著的『我』的本體常住不變，其他法即使生起也沒有增加或減少。像這樣的解脫，對於『我』來說沒有用處。所以，執著『我』常住不變，生死和涅槃兩件事都會失去。如果空和無我，兩件事都會成就。

【English Translation】 English version: That which can create karma is called the agent (Karta). Since there is no creation of karma, there is no result. If one does not receive the result, how can one be called the receiver (Bhokta)?

Furthermore, as you say, 'I, being oppressed by suffering, generate the mind of renunciation, abandon evil deeds, and cultivate good deeds, thereby attaining liberation.' This is also not so. Why? The verse says:

'I am always unharmed; why bother with causes for protection? Who fears that Vajra (Diamond) will be eaten, and takes up arms to defend against insects?'

Commentary: Since the 'self' that you posit is immutable, like empty space, its essence is permanent. All calamities and sufferings cannot harm it. Why bother with diligent cultivation of protective causes? Only a body that is subject to change, oppressed by suffering, and stained by sins needs protection. Who is wise enough to know that Vajra (Diamond) is indestructible, yet fears it will be eaten and leads others to take up arms to defend against insects? Only a fool would do such a thing. Things that can be destroyed should be guarded. If you think that life can be harmed, and therefore the 'self' is also harmed, this is also not so. Since the 'self' is permanent, it should not be harmed along with it. Moreover, you believe that life is a combination of three things: the body, the 'self,' and consciousness. This has already been refuted, because the 'self' and the body are not combined in a spatial way. As you believe, qualities such as form have no meaning of combination. Moreover, combined things have no separate nature; they only arise when spatial divisions are without gaps. Since there is no separate entity, how can it be harmed? Even if it can be harmed, it must follow what it depends on. Since what it depends on is permanent, how can it be harmed? Even if life is harmed, what harm does it do to the 'self'? Because the 'self' that you posit is permanent and unobstructed, like empty space, cold, heat, wind, rain, frost, and hail cannot harm it. In this way, how can my nature be troubled by suffering? Moreover, the 'self' that you cling to is still and unchanging, without change before and after. Even if it is separated from all evil deeds, what is added to it that can be called liberation? Is it not because good qualities are increased in this position? Since my nature is permanent, what is the benefit of increasing good qualities? The essence of the 'self' that is clung to is permanent and unchanging; even if other dharmas arise, there is no increase or decrease. Such liberation is useless to the 'self.' Therefore, clinging to the 'self' as permanent and unchanging, both samsara (birth and death) and nirvana (liberation) are lost. If emptiness and no-self are realized, both will be accomplished.

乘廣百論釋論

大乘廣百論釋論卷第三

聖天菩薩本　護法菩薩釋

三藏法師玄奘奉　詔譯破我品第二之餘

複次有作是言。若無我者。心等生已無間即滅。宿生念智憶昔某名。即是今我此不應有。所以者何。今昔異故。世間不見憶昔他身。謂為今我。是故定有常住句義。緣之生念。言彼即我。此亦不然。我先已說。因果雖殊相續假一。緣此假一言昔是今。又說頌曰。

若有宿生念　　便謂我為常　既見昔時痕　　身亦應常住

論曰。若宿生念依相似相。見昔似今謂今為昔。便謂有我是一是常。既見今身依相似相。瘡痕似昔謂昔為今。身亦應許是常是一。此顯共知有差別物。依相續假亦謂無異。故不可以謂無異相。比知有我是一是常。又憶昔身苦樂等事。謂今是昔而是無常。亦應比知。雖謂今昔我無有異。而非常住。又雖今昔其體有異。然由昔智了受所緣。有勝功能熏在宅識。隨緣覺發念力相應。似昔所緣境界相現。如是名為憶宿生事。雖無有我是一是常。而有憶念宿生事智。世間現見服仙藥等。服之經久。藥體雖無。然有所引勝功能在。后時成熟除疾益壽。然無有我。此亦如是。若唯有念。誰爲念者。亦不可言念爲念者。以有二種俱無過故。設復有我誰爲念者。亦不可言我

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本《廣百論釋論》

聖天菩薩著護法菩薩釋

三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯破我品第二之餘

又有人這樣說：如果沒有『我』（Ātman），心識等生起后立即消滅，那麼前世的念頭和智慧，以及回憶起過去某個名字，就應該是現在的『我』，這不應該存在。為什麼呢？因為過去和現在是不同的。世間上沒有見過回憶起他人身體的事情，就認為是現在的『我』。所以，一定存在常住不變的『我』（Ātman），憑藉它才能產生念頭，說『那就是我』。這種說法也是不對的。我先前已經說過，因和果雖然不同，但相續不斷，可以假立為一。憑藉這種假立為一，才能說過去就是現在。又說了頌文：

『如果因為有前世的念頭，就認為『我』（Ātman）是常住的，既然看到過去的痕跡，身體也應該常住不變。』

論曰：如果前世的念頭是依靠相似的相狀，看到過去和現在相似，就認為現在就是過去，於是就認為有『我』（Ātman）是同一的、常住的。既然看到現在的身體依靠相似的相狀，瘡疤的痕跡和過去相似，就認為過去就是現在，那麼也應該承認身體是常住的、同一的。這表明大家都知道有差別的物體，依靠相續不斷，也可以假立為沒有差別。所以，不可以因為認為沒有差別的相狀，就推知有『我』（Ātman）是同一的、常住的。又回憶起過去身體的痛苦和快樂等事情，認為現在就是過去，但實際上是無常的，也應該由此推知，雖然認為現在和過去『我』（Ātman）沒有差別，但實際上並不是常住不變的。而且，雖然現在和過去的本體不同，但是由於過去的智慧能夠了知所緣境，具有殊勝的功能，熏習在阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna）中，隨著因緣的覺發，念力的相應，就會顯現出和過去所緣境界相似的相狀。這叫做回憶前世的事情。雖然沒有『我』（Ātman）是同一的、常住的，但有回憶前世事情的智慧。世間上可以見到服用仙藥等，服用之後經過很久，藥的本體雖然已經沒有了，但仍然有所引發的殊勝功能存在，在後來的時間成熟，可以消除疾病、增益壽命。實際上並沒有『我』（Ātman）。這裡也是這樣。如果只有念頭，那麼誰是能念者呢？也不可以說念頭就是能念者。因為這兩種說法都有過失。假設有『我』（Ātman），那麼誰是能念者呢？也不可以說『我』（Ātman）

【English Translation】 English version Śataśāstra-vaipulya-ṭīkā

Mahāyāna Śataśāstra-vaipulya-ṭīkā Volume 3

By Bodhisattva Āryadeva, Explained by Bodhisattva Dharmapāla

Translated under Imperial Order by the Tripiṭaka Master Xuanzang, Remaining Part of Chapter 2: Refutation of Self

Furthermore, some say: If there is no 『self』 (Ātman), and mental states arise and immediately cease, then the recollection of past lives, the wisdom, and the memory of a certain name from the past would imply that 『I』 am the same as that past self, which should not be possible. Why? Because the past and present are different. In the world, we do not see someone remembering another person's body and claiming it as their own present self. Therefore, there must be a permanent, unchanging 『self』 (Ātman), which allows for the arising of thoughts and the statement 『That is me.』 This is also incorrect. I have already stated that although cause and effect are different, they are continuously linked and can be conventionally considered as one. Based on this conventional unity, we can say that the past is the present. Moreover, it is said in the verse:

『If, because of having memories of past lives, One claims that the 『self』 (Ātman) is permanent, Then, since one sees traces of the past, The body should also be permanent.』

Commentary: If the memory of past lives relies on similar appearances, seeing the past as similar to the present, one claims that the present is the past, and thus believes that the 『self』 (Ātman) is the same and permanent. Similarly, seeing the present body with similar appearances, such as scars resembling those of the past, one claims that the past is the present, then one should also admit that the body is permanent and the same. This shows that everyone knows that different objects, based on continuous succession, can be conventionally regarded as undifferentiated. Therefore, one cannot infer the existence of a 『self』 (Ātman) that is the same and permanent simply because one perceives a lack of differentiation. Furthermore, recalling past experiences of suffering and happiness, one claims that the present is the past, but in reality, it is impermanent. One should also infer from this that although one claims that the 『self』 (Ātman) is no different between the past and present, it is not permanent. Moreover, although the essence of the past and present are different, the past wisdom is able to know the object of cognition, possessing a superior function that is imprinted in the Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness). When conditions arise, and the power of memory is activated, an appearance similar to the object of past cognition manifests. This is called remembering past lives. Although there is no 『self』 (Ātman) that is the same and permanent, there is the wisdom to remember past lives. In the world, we see people taking elixirs, and although the substance of the elixir disappears after a long time, the superior function it induced remains, maturing later to eliminate diseases and prolong life. In reality, there is no 『self』 (Ātman). It is the same here. If there are only thoughts, then who is the thinker? It cannot be said that the thought is the thinker, because both of these claims have flaws. Supposing there is a 『self』 (Ātman), then who is the thinker? It cannot be said that the 『self』 (Ātman)

爲念者。以所執我非智相故。若言我體雖非智相。與思合故能有思念。是則此我與思合時。于自他相應有取捨。若有取捨便是無常。若無取捨不異前故。與思合時亦無思念。是則此我。亦非念者。又說頌曰。

若我與思合　　轉成思念者　思亦應非思　　故我非常住

論曰。若所執我本性非思。與思合故轉成思念。如頗胝迦體非青等。青等合故變成青等。是則此思與非思我。而共合故應成非思。若思雖與非思我合。不捨本性不成非思。我亦應爾。雖與思合。不捨本性不成思念。頗胝迦寶青等合時。舉體別生故見異色。非即本性變成余相。以頗胝迦其體清潤。余色合故舉體別生。形相同前謂為本質。實非本性變成余色。又頗胝迦前後異體。相差別故。如青黃等。我亦應爾。云何是常。又應同此非實我性。由此即破彼論異說。謂有說言。頗胝迦寶。其性清凈不障眼目。余色合時各別處住。不捨本相不取余相。若有作意或不作意。還見本相及近彼色。復有說言。頗胝迦寶其性明徹。猶如明鏡。余色合時影現其內。見者目亂。謂成余色。而實此寶不變如前。此皆非理。違比量故。為眼所見。如電如燈。云何前後體相無變又所執我思生前後。其相有無不決定故。則應同思念念生滅。又我思合轉成思者。與苦樂合應成

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：關於『念者』（thinker, 思考者）的討論。因為你們所執著的『我』（self, 自我）並非智慧的顯現。如果你們說，『我』的本體雖然不是智慧的顯現，但與『思』（thought, 思想）結合，就能產生思念。那麼，這個『我』在與『思』結合時，對於自身和他物，應該會有取捨（acceptance and rejection, 取捨）。如果存在取捨，那就是無常（impermanent, 無常）的。如果沒有取捨，那就和之前沒有區別，與『思』結合時也不會產生思念。因此，這個『我』也不是念者。此外，還有頌文說：『如果『我』與『思』結合，轉變成為思念者，那麼『思』也應該不是『思』了，所以『我』不是常住（eternal, 永恒）的。』論曰：如果你們所執著的『我』，其本性不是『思』，因為與『思』結合而轉變成思念，就像頗胝迦（crystal, 水晶）的本體不是青色等等，因為與青色等等結合而變成青色等等。那麼，這個『思』與非『思』的『我』共同結合，應該變成非『思』。如果『思』雖然與非『思』的『我』結合，但不捨棄其本性，不變成非『思』，那麼『我』也應該如此，雖然與『思』結合，但不捨棄其本性，不變成思念。頗胝迦寶與青色等結合時，整體上會產生不同的顏色，所以看到不同的顏色，而不是其本性變成其他的相狀。因為頗胝迦的本體清澈潤澤，與其他顏色結合時，整體上會產生不同的顏色，形狀相同於之前，所以認為是本質，實際上不是本性變成了其他的顏色。而且，頗胝迦前後是不同的個體，相狀有差別，比如青色、黃色等等，『我』也應該如此，怎麼能說是常住的呢？而且應該和頗胝迦一樣，不是真實的『我』的本性。由此就駁斥了其他宗派的異端邪說。有人說，頗胝迦寶，其本性清凈，不障礙眼睛的觀看，與其他顏色結合時，各自在不同的地方存在，不捨棄本來的相狀，也不接受其他的相狀，如果有作意或者沒有作意，仍然能看到本來的相狀以及靠近它的顏色。還有人說，頗胝迦寶，其本性明亮清澈，就像明鏡一樣，與其他顏色結合時，影子會顯現在它的內部，觀看者的眼睛會迷惑，認為變成了其他的顏色，但實際上這個寶物沒有改變，和之前一樣。這些說法都是不合理的，因為違背了比量（analogy, 類比推理）。對於眼睛所見的事物，比如閃電、燈光，怎麼能說前後個體和相狀沒有變化呢？而且你們所執著的『我』，在『思』產生前後，其相狀的有無不確定，那麼應該和『思』一樣，唸唸生滅。而且，『我』與『思』結合而轉變成思念，那麼與苦樂（suffering and happiness, 苦與樂）結合，應該變成……

【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the 'thinker' (念者, niàn zhě). Because the 'self' (我, wǒ) you cling to is not a manifestation of wisdom. If you say, 'Although the essence of 'self' is not a manifestation of wisdom, it can produce thoughts when combined with 'thought' (思, sī),' then this 'self,' when combined with 'thought,' should have acceptance and rejection (取捨, qǔ shě) towards itself and others. If there is acceptance and rejection, then it is impermanent (無常, wú cháng). If there is no acceptance and rejection, then it is no different from before, and it will not produce thoughts when combined with 'thought.' Therefore, this 'self' is also not a thinker. Furthermore, there is a verse that says: 'If 'self' combines with 'thought' and transforms into a thinker, then 'thought' should also not be 'thought,' so 'self' is not eternal (常住, cháng zhù).' Treatise says: If the 'self' you cling to is not 'thought' by nature, it transforms into thought because of combining with 'thought,' just as the essence of crystal (頗胝迦, pō zhī jiā) is not blue, etc., and it becomes blue, etc., because of combining with blue, etc. Then, this 'thought' should become non-'thought' because it combines with the non-'thought' 'self.' If 'thought,' although combined with the non-'thought' 'self,' does not abandon its nature and does not become non-'thought,' then 'self' should also be like this, although combined with 'thought,' it does not abandon its nature and does not become thought. When crystal combines with blue, etc., a different color is produced as a whole, so a different color is seen, rather than its essence becoming another appearance. Because the essence of crystal is clear and moist, when combined with other colors, a different color is produced as a whole, and the shape is the same as before, so it is considered the essence, but in reality, it is not the essence that has become another color. Moreover, the crystal is a different entity before and after, and the appearances are different, such as blue, yellow, etc., and 'self' should also be like this, how can it be said to be eternal? Moreover, it should be the same as the crystal, not the real nature of 'self.' Therefore, this refutes the heretical views of other schools. Some say that the crystal is pure in nature and does not obstruct the eyes, and when combined with other colors, they exist in different places, without abandoning their original appearance and without accepting other appearances, and if there is intention or no intention, the original appearance and the color close to it can still be seen. Others say that the crystal is bright and clear in nature, like a bright mirror, and when combined with other colors, the shadow will appear inside it, and the eyes of the viewer will be confused, thinking that it has become another color, but in reality, this treasure has not changed and is the same as before. These statements are unreasonable because they violate analogy (比量, bǐ liàng). For things seen by the eyes, such as lightning and lights, how can it be said that the individuals and appearances before and after have not changed? Moreover, the existence or non-existence of the appearance of the 'self' you cling to is uncertain before and after 'thought' arises, then it should be like 'thought,' arising and ceasing moment by moment. Moreover, 'self' combines with 'thought' and transforms into thought, then combining with suffering and happiness (苦樂, kǔ lè) should become...

苦樂。若不爾者。雖苦樂合不捨前位。猶如虛空雨火無變。應非受者。故說頌曰。

我與樂等合　　種種如樂等　我如樂等故　　非一亦非常

論曰。樂等性相更互相違。故有種種我與彼合。應如樂等成種種相。故此我性應如樂等。身身各別非一非常。亦如樂等非真我性。是故離思別有我體。與思合故同於思相。名爲念者。不應道理。即念自性似所念境。相狀生時雖無主宰。似有作用假名念者。記別分明。說名爲念。一法義分無無二過。

複次數論外道作如是言。思即是我其性常住。如是思我離心心法。別有體相難可了知。所以者何。思我體相非現量境。以其自相非諸世間所共知故。非比量境。以其思相唯在於我不共余故。夫比量者。比知共相。以果等總相比因等總有所立思我由不共故。無同法喻。同法喻既無。異法亦非有。無待對故。由是思我理實為無。設許有我以思為性。應當徴問。如是我性為由他力得成思耶。為由自力得成思耶。若由他力得成思者。應是無常如眼識等。若由自力得成思者。應不待緣如虛空等。為顯此義又說頌曰。

若謂我思常　　緣助成邪執　如言火常住　　則不緣薪等

論曰。如法已生自相安住。終不更藉因及眾緣。不可生已復更生故。我亦應爾。思體既常

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：苦和樂。如果不是這樣，即使苦和樂結合，也不會改變原來的狀態，就像虛空中降下火雨，沒有變化一樣，不應該是感受者。所以經文說：『我與快樂等結合，呈現出種種如快樂等的形態，我如同快樂等一樣，不是單一的，也不是永恒的。』論述說：快樂等的性質和表象相互違背，所以有種種『我』與它們結合。『我』應該像快樂等一樣呈現出種種形態。因此，這個『我』的性質應該像快樂等一樣，每個身體各不相同，不是單一的，也不是永恒的。也像快樂等一樣，不是真實的『我』的性質。因此，離開思慮，另外存在一個『我』的實體，因為它與思慮結合，就等同於思慮的表象，被稱為『念』，這是不合理的。『念』的自性類似於所念的對象，當其表象產生時，雖然沒有主宰，但似乎有作用，所以假名為『念』。清晰地記憶和辨別，就叫做『念』。一法義分，沒有無和二的過失。複次數論外道這樣說：『思就是我，它的性質是常住的。』像這樣的『思我』，離開心和心法，另外具有實體和表象，難以瞭解。為什麼呢？因為『思我』的實體和表象不是現量（直接感知）的境界，因為它的自相不是世間眾所共知的；也不是比量（推理）的境界，因為『思』的表象只存在於『我』，不與其它事物共有。比量是通過比較來了解共相的，通過結果等總相來比較原因等總相，從而建立『思我』。由於『思我』是不共有的，所以沒有同法譬喻。既然沒有同法譬喻，異法譬喻也不存在，因為沒有對待關係。因此，『思我』實際上是不存在的。假設承認有『我』，並且以『思』為性質，就應該追問：像這樣的『我』的性質，是由他力而成就『思』呢？還是由自力而成就『思』呢？如果是由於他力而成就『思』，就應該是無常的，像眼識等一樣。如果是由於自力而成就『思』，就應該是不依賴因緣的，像虛空等一樣。爲了顯明這個道理，又說經文：『如果說我的思慮是常住的，依靠因緣的幫助才能成就，這是邪見。就像說火是常住的，就不需要依靠柴薪等一樣。』論述說：法已經產生，其自相已經安住，最終不再需要依靠因和眾緣，因為不可能已經產生又再次產生。『我』也應該這樣。『思』的本體既然是常住的，

【English Translation】 English version: Suffering and pleasure. If it were not so, even if suffering and pleasure were combined, they would not change their original state, just like fire and rain falling in the sky, without any alteration, and should not be the experiencer. Therefore, the verse says: 'I combine with pleasure, etc., manifesting in various forms like pleasure, etc. I am like pleasure, etc., not singular, nor eternal.' The treatise says: The nature and appearance of pleasure, etc., contradict each other, so there are various 'I's combined with them. 'I' should manifest in various forms like pleasure, etc. Therefore, the nature of this 'I' should be like pleasure, etc., each body being different, not singular, nor eternal. Also, like pleasure, etc., it is not the nature of the true 'I'. Therefore, apart from thought, there exists another entity of 'I', because it combines with thought, it becomes identical to the appearance of thought, and is called 'mindfulness', which is unreasonable. The self-nature of 'mindfulness' is similar to the object of thought. When its appearance arises, although there is no master, it seems to have a function, so it is falsely named 'mindfulness'. To clearly remember and distinguish is called 'mindfulness'. Dividing the meaning of one dharma, there is no fault of non-existence or duality. The heretics of the Frequencies school say: 'Thought is I, its nature is permanent.' Such a 'thought-I', apart from mind and mental factors, has another entity and appearance, which is difficult to understand. Why? Because the entity and appearance of 'thought-I' are not the realm of direct perception (present moment awareness), because its self-nature is not commonly known by the world; nor is it the realm of inference (reasoning), because the appearance of 'thought' only exists in 'I', and is not shared with other things. Inference is to understand the common characteristics through comparison, and to establish 'thought-I' by comparing the general characteristics of results, etc., with the general characteristics of causes, etc. Since 'thought-I' is not shared, there is no analogy of similar dharma. Since there is no analogy of similar dharma, the analogy of dissimilar dharma does not exist either, because there is no relationship of opposition. Therefore, 'thought-I' is actually non-existent. Assuming that there is 'I', and that 'thought' is its nature, one should ask: Is the nature of such 'I' achieved through the power of others to become 'thought'? Or is it achieved through its own power to become 'thought'? If it is achieved through the power of others to become 'thought', it should be impermanent, like eye consciousness, etc. If it is achieved through its own power to become 'thought', it should be independent of conditions, like space, etc. To clarify this principle, the verse says: 'If you say that my thought is permanent, and it relies on the help of conditions to be achieved, this is a wrong view. It is like saying that fire is permanent, and does not need to rely on firewood, etc.' The treatise says: A dharma has already arisen, its self-nature has already settled, and it will no longer need to rely on causes and conditions, because it is impossible to have already arisen and then arise again. 'I' should also be like this. Since the essence of 'thought' is permanent,

。自相安住。不依他立。云何復待轉變眾緣資助思我。令其轉變受用種種所受用具。若不依他而轉變者。則無緣助有所受用。若可轉變。應是無常。如世間火其性無常。若以酥油灌薪草。等投其火中便增熾盛。若不爾者。火勢衰微薪等若無。火則非有。既緣薪等。火豈是常。我既藉緣。寧容常住。若汝復言。我論中說。如是思我其體雖常。然藉根塵和合顯了。如瓶瓫等。由光明顯。所以者何。思我不能自然觀察。要待轉變因果相應。方得顯了。故雖藉緣而我常住。如是救義其過彌增。所以者何。不見瓶等為緣所顯而體是常。真如涅槃雖可顯了。然依世俗。非據勝義。非勝義中有常無常了不了等分別戲論。所執思我緣所顯故。應如瓶等其性非常。若汝復謂隱時思我雖無思慮而有功能。如是功能不異思慮。既無思慮。何有功能。又思功能必依思體。體既非有。能何所依。又隱時我以思為性。思既非有。我則是無。云何而言隱時思我雖無思慮而有功能。設言隱時我非思者。汝今應說。我相如何。若不說相而我成者。則應一切妄執皆成。如是推徴前已具說。又汝所執。諸有功能與功能者其性為一。是則能者。非能所依。性是一故。又於此位。無能者故。不可說言能即依能。自於自用。理相違故。亦不可說能無所依。勿有最勝。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本安住于自身，不依賴其他而存在。為何還需要依賴轉變的各種因緣來資助『思我』（Atman，神我），使其轉變並享受各種受用之物呢？如果不需要依賴其他而能轉變，那麼就沒有因緣的幫助也能有所受用。如果可以轉變，就應該是無常的，就像世間的火一樣，其性質是無常的。如果用酥油、灌注薪柴等投入火中，火勢就會更加旺盛。如果不是這樣，火勢就會衰微，沒有薪柴等，火也就不存在。既然依賴薪柴等，火怎麼能是常住的呢？『我』既然憑藉因緣，怎麼能容許是常住的呢？如果你又說，我在論中說，這樣的『思我』其本體雖然是常住的，但是憑藉根（感官）、塵（外境）的和合才能顯現出來，就像瓶子、陶器等，由光明顯現一樣。為什麼這樣說呢？因為『思我』不能自然地觀察，需要等待轉變的因果相應，才能顯現出來。所以雖然憑藉因緣，而『我』是常住的。這樣的辯解只會增加過失。為什麼這樣說呢？沒有看到瓶子等因為因緣的顯現而本體是常住的。真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性）、涅槃（Nirvana，解脫）雖然可以顯現，但是是依據世俗諦（Samvriti-satya，相對真理），而不是依據勝義諦（Paramartha-satya，絕對真理）。在勝義諦中，沒有常與無常、了與不了等分別戲論。所執著的『思我』因為因緣而顯現，應該像瓶子等一樣，其性質不是常住的。如果你又說，隱沒時的『思我』雖然沒有思慮，但是有功能。這樣的功能不異於思慮。既然沒有思慮，怎麼會有功能呢？而且思的功能必定依賴於思的本體。本體既然沒有，功能又依賴於什麼呢？而且隱沒時的『我』以思為性質，思既然沒有，『我』就是沒有。怎麼能說隱沒時的『思我』雖然沒有思慮，但是有功能呢？假設說隱沒時的『我』不是思，你現在應該說，『我』的相狀是什麼樣的？如果不說相狀而『我』成立，那麼就應該一切妄執都成立。這樣的推論前面已經詳細說明過了。而且你所執著的，諸功能與功能者其性質是一樣的。這樣的話，能者就不是功能所依賴的，因為性質是一樣的。而且在這個位置上，沒有能者，所以不能說能就是依賴於能。自己對自己作用，在道理上是相違背的。也不能說能沒有所依賴，不要有最殊勝的。

【English Translation】 English version Dwelling in oneself, not relying on others for existence. Why then is it necessary to depend on various conditions of transformation to aid the 'Atman' (Self), causing it to transform and enjoy various objects of enjoyment? If it can transform without relying on others, then there would be no need for the help of conditions to have something to enjoy. If it can transform, it should be impermanent, like fire in the world, whose nature is impermanent. If ghee, oil, firewood, and grass are added to the fire, it will blaze more intensely. If not, the fire will weaken, and without firewood, the fire will not exist. Since it depends on firewood, how can fire be permanent? Since the 'Self' relies on conditions, how can it be permanent? If you say again that, as I stated in the treatise, such an 'Atman', although its essence is permanent, manifests through the combination of the senses (root) and objects (dust), just as pots and vessels are manifested by light. Why is this so? Because the 'Atman' cannot observe naturally; it needs to wait for the corresponding cause and effect of transformation to manifest. Therefore, although relying on conditions, the 'Self' is permanent. Such a defense only increases the fault. Why is this so? We do not see that pots, etc., are manifested by conditions and their essence is permanent. Although Suchness (Tathata, the true nature of things) and Nirvana (liberation) can be manifested, they are based on conventional truth (Samvriti-satya), not on ultimate truth (Paramartha-satya). In ultimate truth, there are no conceptual constructs such as permanence and impermanence, understanding and non-understanding. The 'Atman' that is clung to, because it is manifested by conditions, should be like pots, etc., whose nature is not permanent. If you say again that the 'Atman' in its hidden state, although without thought, has function. Such function is not different from thought. Since there is no thought, how can there be function? Moreover, the function of thought must rely on the essence of thought. Since the essence does not exist, what does the function rely on? Furthermore, the 'Self' in its hidden state has thought as its nature. Since thought does not exist, the 'Self' does not exist. How can it be said that the 'Atman' in its hidden state, although without thought, has function? Suppose you say that the 'Self' in its hidden state is not thought, you should now say, what is the characteristic of the 'Self'? If the 'Self' is established without stating its characteristic, then all false clinging should be established. Such reasoning has been explained in detail earlier. Moreover, what you cling to, that the functions and the functioner are of the same nature. In that case, the functioner is not what the function relies on, because the nature is the same. Moreover, in this position, there is no functioner, so it cannot be said that the function relies on the function. Acting on oneself is contradictory in principle. Nor can it be said that the function has nothing to rely on, lest there be the most supreme.

亦無過失。所以者何。若思功能無所依止而自立者。轉變功能亦應自立。何須最勝。又汝所執。思我功能隨所受用有無量種。既許能多。如何體一。汝宗定執體能一故。世間未有一法體上不同一時能生多果。不同時者。顯於一時。一法體上能生多果。時若不同。其體必異。云何汝執一我前後有多功能起多思慮。又此思我云何一時不起一切受果思慮。若言思慮必待轉變方得起者。此亦不然。云何最勝具諸功能。而不頓起一切轉變最勝功能無障礙故。設許最勝於一時間頓起一切轉變作用。是即最勝。體應斷滅。舉體皆變。失本性故。如最勝體。我亦應然。其性皆常。具諸能故。如是汝執隱時思我具諸功能而無思慮。有多過失。終不能免。

複次有餘方便救此義言。我是思者。思為我用。非用滅時。用者隨滅現見眼等。雖無能照色等作用。而有其體。是故隱時雖無思用而有思者。我體非無。此亦不然。隱時我相應與思別。還同前過。豈不作用與作用者。體不異故無別相耶。汝言正似癡象沐浴。意避輕咎翻招重穢。思用我體既無別異。思用滅時我體應滅。是則思我皆定無常。便害自宗。何名救義。又汝所言。現見眼等雖無能照色等作用而有其體。我亦爾者。此亦不然。故次頌曰。

如至滅動物　　作用彼無有

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：也沒有過失。為什麼呢？如果思的功能不需要依靠任何東西就能自己成立，那麼轉變的功能也應該自己成立，何必需要最勝（Purusha，神我）呢？而且你所堅持的，思我（Atman，真我）的功能隨著所接受的享用有無量種。既然承認功能眾多，怎麼能說本體是一個呢？你們宗派堅定地認為本體和功能是一體的。世間沒有一種法，本體相同卻能在同一時間產生多種結果。不同時產生結果，說明在同一時間，一個法的本體上能產生多種結果。如果時間不同，那麼它的本體必定不同。為什麼你堅持一個我在前後有多種功能，產生多種思慮呢？而且這個思我為什麼不能在同一時間產生一切接受果報的思慮呢？如果說思慮必須等待轉變才能產生，這也是不對的。為什麼最勝具備各種功能，卻不能立刻產生一切轉變呢？因為最勝的功能沒有障礙。假設允許最勝在同一時間立刻產生一切轉變作用，那麼這個最勝的本體就應該斷滅，因為整個本體都發生了變化，失去了原本的性質。就像最勝的本體一樣，我也應該如此，因為它的性質都是恒常的，具備各種功能。像這樣，你所堅持的隱藏時期的思我具備各種功能卻沒有思慮，有很多過失，最終無法避免。再次，有人用其他方法來挽救這個觀點，說：『我是思考者，思考是我的作用。不是作用消失的時候，作用者也隨之消失。就像眼睛等，雖然沒有照見顏色等的作用，但還有它的本體。所以隱藏時期雖然沒有思考的作用，但還有思考者，我的本體並非沒有。』這也是不對的。隱藏時期，我和相應的思考是分離的，還是和前面一樣有過失。難道不是作用和作用者，本體沒有差異，所以沒有分離的相嗎？你說的話就像愚蠢的象洗澡，想要避免輕微的過失，反而招來嚴重的污穢。思考的作用和我的本體既然沒有差別，思考的作用消失的時候，我的本體也應該消失。那麼思考和我都必定是無常的，這樣就損害了自己的宗派，怎麼能說是挽救觀點呢？而且你所說的，現在看到的眼睛等，雖然沒有照見顏色等的作用，但還有它的本體，我也應該是這樣。這也是不對的。所以下面的頌詞說：就像到了滅盡的動物，作用在它們那裡是沒有的

【English Translation】 English version: Nor is there any fault. Why? If the function of thought could establish itself independently without relying on anything, then the function of transformation should also establish itself independently. Why would there be a need for the Purusha (the Supreme Being)? Moreover, according to your assertion, the function of the Atman (the Self) has countless varieties depending on what is being experienced. Since you admit that there are many functions, how can you say that the essence is one? Your school firmly holds that essence and function are one. In the world, there is no phenomenon where the essence is the same but can produce multiple results at the same time. Producing results at different times indicates that at the same time, one essence of a phenomenon can produce multiple results. If the times are different, then its essence must be different. Why do you insist that one Self has multiple functions before and after, producing multiple thoughts? And why can't this thinking Self produce all thoughts of receiving karmic results at the same time? If you say that thoughts must wait for transformation to arise, that is also incorrect. Why can't the Purusha, possessing all functions, immediately produce all transformations? Because the function of the Purusha has no obstruction. Suppose it is allowed that the Purusha immediately produces all transformative actions at the same time, then the essence of this Purusha should be annihilated, because the entire essence has changed, losing its original nature. Just like the essence of the Purusha, the Self should also be like that, because its nature is all constant, possessing all functions. In this way, your insistence that the thinking Self in a hidden state possesses all functions but has no thoughts has many faults and cannot be avoided in the end. Furthermore, some people use other methods to salvage this view, saying: 'I am the thinker, thinking is my function. It is not that when the function disappears, the functioner also disappears. Just like the eyes, although they do not have the function of seeing colors, they still have their essence. Therefore, although there is no function of thinking in the hidden state, there is still the thinker, my essence is not non-existent.' This is also incorrect. In the hidden state, the Self and the corresponding thought are separate, and it is still the same as before with faults. Isn't it that the function and the functioner, the essence has no difference, so there is no separate appearance? What you say is like a foolish elephant bathing, wanting to avoid minor faults but instead inviting serious filth. Since the function of thinking and the essence of the Self have no difference, when the function of thinking disappears, the essence of the Self should also disappear. Then thinking and the Self are both definitely impermanent, which harms your own school. How can it be said to be salvaging the view? Moreover, what you say, the eyes that are seen now, although they do not have the function of seeing colors, they still have their essence, I should also be like this. This is also incorrect. Therefore, the following verse says: Like animals that have reached extinction, functions are not present in them

論曰。如能照了色等作用。乃至滅來恒隨了別自境界識。由此作用即是識體。作用若滅識體則無。眼等諸根至相續斷。常無此用。自性異故。所以者何。眼等自性非能照等。故彼滅時此不隨滅。眼等所造凈色為性。汝我離思無別有體不可用滅而體獨存。豈不說我思者為相。云何乃言離思無體。汝前雖說。然不應理。所以者何。思者。思用既不同滅。應有別體我體非思。過如前說用無別體。先難復來。又思思者相待而立。俱有方成。闕一不可。思與思者。若一若異。定觸如前所說兩過。如是釋已。復有別釋。如他眼等乃至滅來。常有作用能生別物。非汝所執我思作用。許為如此別物所依照色等用。即是眼等各于自境生識功能。眼等諸根隨所生識。種種自相差別顯現。雖離因識無別有體。而離果識別有自相。汝執有我能生於思。不許離思別有自相。是故不可引為同喻。故說頌曰。

故有我無思　　其理不成就

論曰。有別相者。不同體故。可得說言一滅一在。思用思者既無別相。思若滅時思者亦滅。是故汝執有我無思所立道理。定不成就。複次有執離思別有實我。其體周遍一分生思。謂我一分先與智合。引起能生殊勝思行。后時一分意合生思。故無如前所說過失。此不應理。故說頌曰。

余方起思界　　

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：論曰：如果能夠照了色等的作用，乃至到死亡時，始終伴隨著了別自身境界的識。由此可見，這些作用就是識的本體。如果作用消失，識的本體也就不存在了。眼睛等諸根，直到相續斷絕，通常都沒有這種作用，因為它們的自性不同。為什麼這樣說呢？因為眼睛等的自性不是能夠照了等等。所以當它們滅亡時，這種照了的作用不會隨之滅亡。眼睛等是所造的清凈色為自性。你（外道）和我（佛教）都認為離開思之外沒有別的本體，不能因為作用滅亡而本體獨自存在。難道不是說『我』是以『思者』為相嗎？為什麼又說離開思就沒有本體呢？你前面雖然這樣說，但是不合道理。為什麼呢？因為思者和思的作用既然不同時滅亡，就應該有別的本體。『我』的本體不是思，過失和前面所說的一樣，作用沒有別的本體。先前的詰難又回來了。而且，思和思者是相互依存而成立的，兩者都存在才能成立，缺少一個都不行。思和思者，如果是一，或者是異，必定會觸犯前面所說的兩種過失。這樣解釋之後，還有別的解釋。就像其他的眼睛等，乃至到滅亡時，通常都有作用能夠產生別的東西，不是你所執著的『我』的思的作用。允許這種作用是別的物體所依靠的色等的作用，也就是眼睛等各自在自己的境界中產生識的功能。眼睛等諸根隨著所產生的識，種種自身差別顯現。雖然離開因識沒有別的本體，但是離開果識有自身的相狀。你執著有『我』能夠產生思，不允許離開思有別的自身相狀。所以不可以引用來作為相同的比喻。所以說偈頌：『所以有我無思，其理不成就。』論曰：有別的相狀，因為本體不同，所以可以說一個滅亡一個存在。思的作用和思者既然沒有別的相狀，思如果滅亡時，思者也滅亡。所以你執著有『我』沒有思，所建立的道理，一定不能成立。再次，有人執著離開思之外有實在的『我』，它的本體周遍，一部分產生思。說『我』的一部分先和智結合，引起能夠產生殊勝思的行為，之後一部分和意結合產生思。所以沒有像前面所說的過失。這不合道理。所以說偈頌：『余方起思界，』

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: If one can illuminate the functions of form, etc., even until death, the consciousness that distinguishes its own realm constantly accompanies it. From this, it is clear that these functions are the very substance of consciousness. If the functions cease, the substance of consciousness also ceases to exist. The sense organs such as the eyes, until their continuity is severed, generally do not have this function because their nature is different. Why is this so? Because the nature of the eyes, etc., is not to illuminate, etc. Therefore, when they perish, this illuminating function does not perish along with them. The eyes, etc., are by nature pure form that is created. You (the heretic) and I (the Buddhist) both agree that apart from thought, there is no separate substance, and the substance cannot exist independently when the function ceases. Isn't it said that 'self' is characterized by 'the thinker'? Why then do you say that there is no substance apart from thought? Although you said so earlier, it is not reasonable. Why? Because the thinker and the function of thought do not cease simultaneously, there should be a separate substance. The substance of 'self' is not thought, and the fault is the same as mentioned earlier, that the function has no separate substance. The previous challenge returns. Moreover, thought and the thinker are established in mutual dependence; both must exist for it to be established, and neither can be lacking. Thought and the thinker, if they are one, or if they are different, will inevitably incur the two faults mentioned earlier. Having explained it this way, there is another explanation. Just like other eyes, etc., even until their destruction, they usually have the function of producing other things, not the function of thought of the 'self' that you cling to. It is permissible to say that this function is the function of form, etc., on which other objects rely, which is the function of the eyes, etc., each producing consciousness in its own realm. The sense organs such as the eyes, along with the consciousness that arises, manifest various distinct characteristics of themselves. Although there is no separate substance apart from the causal consciousness, there is a distinct characteristic apart from the resultant consciousness. You cling to the idea that there is a 'self' that can produce thought, and you do not allow that there is a separate characteristic apart from thought. Therefore, it cannot be cited as a similar example. Therefore, the verse says: 『Therefore, the existence of a self without thought, the reasoning is not established.』 Treatise: Having a separate characteristic, because the substance is different, it can be said that one ceases and one remains. Since the function of thought and the thinker do not have separate characteristics, when thought ceases, the thinker also ceases. Therefore, your clinging to the idea that there is a 'self' without thought, the reasoning you have established, is certainly not established. Furthermore, some cling to the idea that apart from thought, there is a real 'self', whose substance is pervasive, and a portion of it produces thought. They say that a portion of 'self' first combines with wisdom, causing the arising of superior thought and action, and later a portion combines with intention to produce thought. Therefore, there are no faults as mentioned earlier. This is not reasonable. Therefore, the verse says: 『In another direction, the realm of arising thought,』

別處見於思

論曰。方處若異。因果不成。未見世間種與芽等。各住遠處因果得成。汝執能生殊勝思行。先於遠處我與智合。習誦經書工巧等事。令其善巧熏在我中。後於異方若無障礙。我與意合生起現思。是則分明因果異處。豈不行思所合我體。不別異故無此過耶。若爾一切行等因果悉與我合。處應皆同。便失汝宗我體周遍。一分智合引起思行。一分意合生起現思。若汝復謂如镕鐵鋌。其鋌一頭先與火合。餘頭雖復不與火合。由體一故亦漸镕銷。行思亦然。生處雖別。我體一故。因果成者。此亦不然。故次頌曰。

如鐵鋌镕銷　　我體應變壞

論曰。如镕鐵鋌。其鋌一頭先與火合。當即銷镕於後展轉熱勢相及。余離火處皆復銷镕。如是我體先於一分與智和合變生思果。於後展轉勢力相通。異處意合變生思果。是則我體應非常住。如何妄立我是常耶。又汝執我唯依少分能生於思說名思者。此亦不然。故次頌曰。

思如意量小　　我似虛空大　唯應觀自相　　則不見於思

論曰。汝執我體一分意合能生於思。說名思者。余分我體不與意合不生思故不名思者意有質礙。細似極微。我性虛通廣如空界。少分意合能發於思。余分無邊皆無思慮。故應從多觀是我相。不應就少見為思者。夫于自體假

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本別處見於思

論曰：如果處所不同，因果關係就不能成立。從未見過世間種子和芽等，各自處於遠處而因果能夠成立的。你認為能產生殊勝思行的『我』，先在遠處與智慧結合，學習誦經、書寫、工巧等事情，使其精通巧妙，熏習在我之中。之後在不同的地方，如果沒有障礙，『我』與意識結合，產生現在的思緒。那麼這分明是因果處於不同的地方。難道不是因為能行思的『我』的本體，沒有差別不同，所以沒有這個過失嗎？如果這樣，一切行為等的因果都與『我』結合，處所應該都相同，就失去了你宗派所說的『我』的本體是周遍的。一部分與智慧結合引起思行，一部分與意識結合產生現在的思緒。如果你又說，就像熔化的鐵錠，鐵錠的一頭先與火接觸，其餘的頭雖然沒有與火接觸，但因為本體是一體的，也會逐漸熔化。行思也是這樣，產生的地方雖然不同，但因為『我』的本體是一體的，因果就能成立。這也是不成立的。所以接著說偈頌：

『如鐵鋌镕銷，我體應變壞。』

論曰：就像熔化的鐵錠，鐵錠的一頭先與火接觸，立刻就會熔化，之後熱力逐漸傳遞，其餘遠離火的地方也會熔化。如果『我』的本體先在一部分與智慧和合，變化產生思的果，之後逐漸傳遞，勢力相通，在不同的地方與意識和合，變化產生思的果。那麼『我』的本體應該不是恒常不變的。怎麼能虛妄地建立『我』是常呢？而且你認為『我』只是依靠少部分才能產生思，所以才說名為思者，這也是不成立的。所以接著說偈頌：

『思如意量小，我似虛空大，唯應觀自相，則不見於思。』

論曰：你認為『我』的本體一部分與意識結合能產生思，所以說名為思者，其餘部分的『我』的本體不與意識結合，不產生思，所以不名為思者。意識有質礙，細小如極微。『我』的性質虛空通達，廣大如虛空。少部分與意識結合能引發思，其餘無邊的部分都沒有思慮。所以應該從多數方面觀察『我』的相狀，不應該就少部分而認為是思者。對於自體假

【English Translation】 English version Thoughts Arising Elsewhere

Treatise: If the locations are different, the cause and effect cannot be established. It has never been seen in the world that seeds and sprouts, etc., each residing in distant places, can have cause and effect established. You assert that the 'I' (ātman) [self, soul] that can generate superior thoughts and actions first combines with wisdom (jñāna) [knowledge, understanding] at a distance, learning to recite scriptures, write, and perform skillful crafts, making them proficient and imbuing them within me. Then, in different places, if there are no obstacles, the 'I' combines with consciousness (manas) [mind, intellect], generating present thoughts. Then it is clear that the cause and effect are in different places. Is it not because the substance of the 'I' that can perform thoughts is not different, so there is no fault? If so, the cause and effect of all actions, etc., are combined with the 'I', and the locations should all be the same, then you lose the tenet of your school that the substance of the 'I' is pervasive. One part combines with wisdom to cause thoughts and actions, and one part combines with consciousness to generate present thoughts. If you say again, like a molten iron ingot, one end of the ingot first comes into contact with fire, and although the other end does not come into contact with fire, because the substance is one, it will gradually melt. Thinking and acting are also like this, although the place of origin is different, because the substance of the 'I' is one, the cause and effect can be established. This is also not established. So then the verse says:

'Like an iron ingot melting, the substance of the 'I' should change and decay.'

Treatise: Like a molten iron ingot, one end of the ingot first comes into contact with fire, and it will immediately melt, and then the heat gradually transfers, and the other places away from the fire will also melt. If the substance of the 'I' first combines with wisdom in one part, changes and produces the fruit of thought, and then gradually transfers, the power communicates, and combines with consciousness in different places, changes and produces the fruit of thought. Then the substance of the 'I' should not be constant and unchanging. How can you falsely establish that the 'I' is permanent? Moreover, you believe that the 'I' can only generate thoughts by relying on a small part, so it is called a thinker, which is also not established. So then the verse says:

'Thoughts are as small as the measure of consciousness, the 'I' is as large as the empty space, one should only observe its own form, then one will not see thoughts.'

Treatise: You believe that one part of the substance of the 'I' can generate thoughts by combining with consciousness, so it is called a thinker, and the remaining part of the substance of the 'I' does not combine with consciousness, does not generate thoughts, so it is not called a thinker. Consciousness has substance and is as small as an atom. The nature of the 'I' is empty and pervasive, as vast as the empty space. A small part can trigger thoughts by combining with consciousness, and the remaining boundless parts have no thoughts. Therefore, one should observe the form of the 'I' from the majority of aspects, and should not consider it a thinker based on a small part. Regarding the self, false

立名言。或依多相而表于體。或為他染以彰其相。如此二事我上皆無。故我不應說名思者。若汝復言。思非我相。思是德。我是實。此實德業三種自性不相雜亂。何為不可。以汝不能離思別顯我之自相。是為不可。若不別顯我之自相。終不能立我有實體。自相畢竟不可說故。汝所立我則為無我。又汝所立我非思者。便失我相。非思者。故如色等法非我非思。又思為先所造諸業。應不屬我則成相違。與自他思俱不合故。我無思慮與彼所求。因果事物非意相遇。應如烏鵲厄多羅果。由如是等眾多過失。我便散壞終不得成。複次有餘茍避如是過網。不許我體少分起用。執能依德遍所依我。此亦不然。德若遍。我根等和合便為無用。無根等處有樂等故。若言不爾。由我一分與根等合遍生樂等。如在一處炷等行力。發起燈光明遍多處。若爾頌曰。

我德若周遍　　何為他不受

論曰。若我與德體俱遍者。一人樂等應遍諸我。何為余我皆不受耶。寧許一分我與意合。即於是處生苦樂等。我能領受。無此過失。若汝復言。我所有物唯屬於我。我能領納一人樂等。雖遍諸我然唯屬一。不繫餘人。云何令他受我苦樂。世間現見所有財物。唯主能受。非他所用。若處有別是事可然。既是同居何妨共受。諸同處物若不屬己。雖無取

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：確立名稱和言論。或者依據多種表象來表達本體，或者因為其他染污而彰顯其表象。像這樣的兩件事，我這裡都沒有。所以我不能被稱為『思者』。如果你又說，『思』不是我的表象，『思』是功德，『我』是實體。這實體、功德、行業三種自性並不混雜錯亂，為什麼不可以呢？因為你不能離開『思』而另外顯示『我』的自性，所以是不可以的。如果不能另外顯示『我』的自性，最終不能成立『我』有實體。因為自性畢竟是不可說的。你所建立的『我』就成了『無我』。而且你所建立的『我』不是『思者』，就失去了『我』的表象。不是『思者』，所以就像色等法一樣，既不是『我』也不是『思』。而且『思』作為先前所造的諸業，應該不屬於『我』，那就成了相違背。因為與自己和他人之『思』都不相合。我沒有思慮，與他們所尋求的因果事物不能用意念相遇，應該像烏鴉和喜鵲遇到厄多羅果一樣。由於像這樣的眾多過失，『我』便會散壞，最終不能成立。再次，有些人爲了避免這樣的過失，不允許『我』的本體有少部分起作用，堅持能依附的功德遍佈所依附的『我』。這也是不對的。如果功德是周遍的，『我』與根等和合便沒有用處。因為沒有根等的地方也有快樂等感受。如果說不是這樣，是因為『我』的一部分與根等結合，普遍產生快樂等感受，就像在一個地方燈芯等的作用力，發起燈的光明遍佈多處。如果是這樣，頌文說：『我的功德如果周遍，為什麼他人不能感受？』論述說：如果『我』與功德本體都是周遍的，一個人的快樂等感受應該遍及所有的『我』。為什麼其餘的『我』都不能感受呢？寧可承認一部分『我』與意根結合，就在那個地方產生苦樂等感受，『我』能夠領受，沒有這樣的過失。如果你又說，我所有的東西只屬於我，我能領納一個人的快樂等感受，即使遍及所有的『我』，但只屬於一個人，不屬於其他人。怎麼能讓他人感受我的苦樂呢？世間現在所見的所有財物，只有主人能夠享受，不是他人所能使用的。如果處所有區別，這件事還可以成立。既然是同居，為什麼不能共同享受呢？諸如同處之物如果不屬於自己，即使沒有取

【English Translation】 English version: Establishing names and statements. Either based on multiple appearances to express the substance (體), or through other defilements to manifest its appearance. Such two things, I do not have. Therefore, I should not be called a 'thinker'. If you say again, 'thought' (思) is not my appearance, 'thought' is virtue (德), 'I' (我) is reality (實). These three natures of reality, virtue, and karma are not mixed up, why not? Because you cannot separate 'thought' and separately show the self-nature of 'I', so it is not possible. If you cannot separately show the self-nature of 'I', you cannot ultimately establish that 'I' has substance. Because self-nature is ultimately unspeakable. The 'I' you establish becomes 'no-self' (無我). Moreover, the 'I' you establish is not a 'thinker', then you lose the appearance of 'I'. Not a 'thinker', so like form (色) and other dharmas, it is neither 'I' nor 'thought'. Moreover, 'thought' as the various karmas previously created, should not belong to 'I', then it becomes contradictory. Because it does not agree with one's own and others' 'thoughts'. I have no thoughts, and the cause-and-effect things they seek cannot be encountered with intention, it should be like crows and magpies encountering Erduoluo fruits. Due to such numerous faults, 'I' will be scattered and ultimately cannot be established. Furthermore, some people, in order to avoid such faults, do not allow the substance of 'I' to have a small part of its function, insisting that the virtue that can rely on pervades the 'I' that is relied upon. This is also not right. If virtue is pervasive, the combination of 'I' and the roots (根) etc. becomes useless. Because there are happiness and other feelings even in places without roots etc. If you say it is not so, it is because a part of 'I' combines with the roots etc., universally producing happiness and other feelings, just like the force of a wick etc. in one place, initiating the light of the lamp to pervade many places. If so, the verse says: 'If my virtue is pervasive, why can't others receive it?' The treatise says: If 'I' and the substance of virtue are both pervasive, one person's happiness and other feelings should pervade all 'I's. Why can't the remaining 'I's receive it? It is better to admit that a part of 'I' combines with the mind-root (意根), and in that place produces suffering and happiness and other feelings, 'I' can receive it, there is no such fault. If you say again, everything I have belongs only to me, I can receive one person's happiness and other feelings, even if it pervades all 'I's, but it belongs only to one person, not to others. How can others feel my suffering and happiness? All the wealth seen in the world now, only the owner can enjoy, not others can use. If there is a difference in location, this matter can be established. Since they live together, why can't they enjoy it together? If things in the same place do not belong to oneself, even without taking

舍自在受用。見觸受用誰復能遮。現見世間非屬己物。若同一處見觸無遮。今苦樂等無形質故。唯能見觸不可取捨。是故汝言不成救義。若言余我於他苦樂。由有闇障不能領受。如世間物雖復同居。眼無障者能有所見。眼若有障即無所觀。我亦如是。于自苦樂無闇障故。便能領受於他苦樂。雖復同居有闇障故。不能領受。若爾闇障少分轉耶。彼言不也。周遍轉故。此障彼我處不同耶。復言不也。處無別故。若爾頌曰。

能障既言通　　不應唯障一

論曰。一闇障處有無量我。處既無別一我被障。余則不然。誰能信解闇相無別。我相是同能障所障。處復無別所受樂等。其義亦然。是則有障及以無障。受與不受一切應同。不見世間有諸外闇如汝所計內闇差別。前雖執德不遍所依。而我體遍與他德合。應亦能受。過同此言。我豈不說樂等與意其處要同方能領受故無受他樂等過失。汝等外道隨自意言。非隨意言能契正理。非可照物處燈明中。而此燈明不能照了。我亦應爾。云何不受。若汝復言。雖一切我體皆周遍。而自樂等不共於他。何以故。樂等諸德由行勢力而得生故。此行勢力依法非法而能受果。故此義成。如是方便於理無益。過失同前。不成救義。如是論者。依理推徴。邪觀為先。立我常遍能作能受。義不得

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本捨棄自在的感受和受用，那麼誰又能遮蔽（阻止）見和觸的受用呢？現在看到世間的東西並非屬於自己所有。如果同一處所見和觸沒有遮蔽，現在苦樂等沒有形質的緣故，只能見和觸，不可以取捨。所以你說的話不能成立，沒有救濟的意義。如果說，『其餘的我對於他人的苦樂，由於有黑暗的遮蔽，不能領受。』就像世間的物品雖然同處一地，眼睛沒有遮蔽的人能夠看見，眼睛如果有遮蔽就不能看見。『我也是這樣，對於自己的苦樂沒有黑暗的遮蔽，就能領受；對於他人的苦樂，雖然同處一地，由於有黑暗的遮蔽，就不能領受。』如果這樣，黑暗的遮蔽是少部分轉移了嗎？他們說：『不是的，是周遍轉移的緣故。』這個遮蔽在他和我處在不同的地方嗎？又說：『不是的，處所沒有分別的緣故。』如果這樣，頌文說：『能遮蔽既然說是普遍的，不應該只遮蔽一個。』論述說：一個黑暗的遮蔽之處有無量個我，處所既然沒有分別，一個我被遮蔽，其餘的則不然。誰能相信理解黑暗的相沒有分別，我的相是相同的，能遮蔽和所遮蔽的，處所又沒有分別，所感受的樂等等，道理也是這樣。那麼有遮蔽和沒有遮蔽的，感受和不感受應該完全相同。沒有看見世間有各種外在的黑暗，像你所計度的內在黑暗的差別。前面雖然執著德不普遍所依，而我的本體是普遍的，與他人的德結合，應該也能感受，過失與此相同。我說過，樂等等和意，它們所處的地方一定要相同才能領受，所以沒有感受他人樂等等的過失。你們這些外道隨著自己的意思說話，不是隨著道理說話，不能契合正理。沒有可以照亮的物體處在燈光中，而這個燈光不能照亮，我也應該是這樣，為什麼不能感受？如果你又說：『雖然一切我的本體都是周遍的，但是自己的樂等等不與他人共同。』為什麼呢？樂等等諸德由於行為的勢力而得以產生，這個行為的勢力依據如法和不如法而能感受果報，所以這個道理成立。像這樣的方便對於道理沒有益處，過失與前面相同，不能成立，沒有救濟的意義。像這樣，論者依據道理推究考證，以邪惡的觀點為先，立我常住普遍，能作能受，義理不能成立。

【English Translation】 English version If one abandons the enjoyment of self-sovereignty, who then can obstruct the enjoyment of seeing and touching? Now, seeing that worldly things do not belong to oneself, if seeing and touching are unobstructed in the same place, then because suffering and pleasure, etc., have no form or substance, one can only see and touch them, not take or abandon them. Therefore, your words are untenable and offer no salvation. If you say, 'The remaining self, regarding the suffering and pleasure of others, cannot perceive them due to the darkness that obstructs.' Just as worldly objects, though in the same place, can be seen by those whose eyes are unobstructed, but cannot be seen if the eyes are obstructed. 'I am also like that. Regarding my own suffering and pleasure, I can perceive them because there is no darkness obstructing. Regarding the suffering and pleasure of others, though in the same place, I cannot perceive them because there is darkness obstructing.' If so, does the darkness partially transfer? They say, 'No, it transfers pervasively.' Is this obstruction in different places for them and me? Again, they say, 'No, because the places are not different.' If so, the verse says: 'Since it is said that the obstruction is universal, it should not obstruct only one.' The treatise says: In a place with one darkness obstructing, there are countless selves. Since the places are not different, if one self is obstructed, the others are not. Who can believe and understand that the characteristics of darkness are not different, that the characteristics of the self are the same, that the obstructer and the obstructed, and the place, are not different, and that the pleasure, etc., that are experienced are also the same? Then, those with obstruction and those without obstruction, experiencing and not experiencing, should all be the same. One does not see in the world various external darknesses that are different from the internal darkness that you posit. Although previously you insisted that virtues do not pervade what they rely on, since my essence is pervasive and combines with the virtues of others, I should also be able to experience them, the fault is the same as before. I have said that pleasure, etc., and the mind must be in the same place to be experienced, so there is no fault of experiencing the pleasure, etc., of others. You, the heretics, speak according to your own ideas, not according to reason, and cannot accord with the correct principle. If an object that can be illuminated is in the light of a lamp, but the lamp cannot illuminate it, I should also be like that. Why can't I experience it? If you say again, 'Although the essence of all selves is pervasive, one's own pleasure, etc., is not shared with others.' Why? Because the virtues of pleasure, etc., arise from the power of actions, and this power of actions can experience the results according to what is in accordance with the Dharma and what is not. Therefore, this principle is established. Such means are of no benefit to reason, the fault is the same as before, it cannot be established, and it offers no salvation. Thus, the treatise, based on reason, investigates and examines, taking wrong views as primary, establishing the self as permanent and pervasive, able to act and able to experience, but the meaning cannot be established.

成。

複次有說薩埵剌阇答摩三德非思而為作者。我思非作而能領受。為破此義故。次頌曰。

若德並非思　　何能造一切　彼應與狂亂　　俱癡無所成

論曰。所執三德體若非思。何能為我造化萬物。若本無思而有所造。彼與狂亂何事不同。設復如狂。斯有何失。若如狂者。為我造立所受用事。應不得成。未見世間癡狂仆匠能為主等辦如意物。又彼諸德于所作事。若無善巧應似愚人于雕畫等不能成辦于所作事。若有善巧。云何不能即自受用。為顯此義故。復頌曰。

若德能善解　　造舍等諸物　而不知受用　　非理寧過此

論曰。若言諸德如工巧者。于難作事能善施為。內外所須無不成辦。而於受用易見事中。不善了達。一何非理。除守自愚誰朋此見如是三德于受用中。亦有善巧為彼體故。如於善巧諸所作事。此顯作受者俱依三德成故。不須別立我思。為受者。若言勝性雖體非思。然隨緣勢造化萬物。為令思我自在受用。如草木等雖無所思而依業力生花果等。種種不同為人受用。若爾勝性所作無思。應同華果。受已不絕。諸有思惟而生果者。受用足已果便休廢。勝性非思。如外草木。又常不壞我受用已。所作便息。其理不然。若言三德其性黠慧。凡所施為無不善巧。我為神主能善思

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：再說，有人說薩埵（Sattva，悅性）、剌阇（Rajas，變性）、答摩（Tamas，惰性）這三種 गुण (Guna， गुण，意為性質、屬性或品質)並非通過思考而成為創造者。而我認為，即使沒有創造，我也能領受。爲了駁斥這種觀點，下面用 एक श्लोक (Shloka，頌)來說明：

『如果 गुण (Guna) 本身沒有思考能力，又怎麼能創造一切？它們應該和瘋狂、混亂一樣，愚癡而一事無成。』

論述：如果你們所堅持的三 गुण (Guna) 的本體沒有思考能力，又怎麼能為我創造萬物？如果它們原本沒有思考能力卻能有所創造，那它們和瘋狂、混亂有什麼區別？假設它們像瘋子一樣，又有什麼損失呢？如果像瘋子一樣，為我創造並建立我所受用的事物，那應該無法成功。沒見過世上愚癡瘋狂的僕人和工匠能為主人等辦成如意的東西。而且，這些 गुण (Guna) 在所做的事情上，如果沒有精巧的技能，就應該像愚笨的人一樣，在雕刻繪畫等方面無法完成。如果它們有精巧的技能，為什麼不能自己受用呢？爲了闡明這個道理，再次用 एक श्लोक (Shloka，頌)來說明：

『如果 गुण (Guna) 能夠巧妙地建造房屋等事物，卻不知道如何受用，這難道不是最不合道理的事情嗎？』

論述：如果說這些 गुण (Guna) 像工匠一樣，能夠巧妙地完成困難的事情，內外所需沒有不能辦到的，卻在受用這種容易理解的事情上，不能很好地理解，這難道不是非常不合道理嗎？除了那些自甘愚蠢的人，誰會贊同這種觀點呢？像這樣，三種 गुण (Guna) 在受用中，也有精巧的技能，因為它們是受用的本體。就像在精巧的技能中所做的事情一樣。這表明，創造者和受用者都是依靠三種 गुण (Guna) 成就的，不需要另外設立一個『我』來作為受用者。如果說勝性（Prakriti，自性）雖然本體沒有思考能力，但隨著因緣的趨勢，創造萬物，爲了讓能思考的『我』自在受用，就像草木等雖然沒有思考能力，但依靠業力生出花果等種種不同的東西，供人受用。如果這樣，勝性（Prakriti）所創造的東西沒有思考能力，應該和花果一樣，受用之後不會停止。那些通過思考而產生結果的事物，在受用滿足后，結果就會停止。勝性（Prakriti）沒有思考能力，就像外在的草木一樣，而且永遠不會損壞，即使『我』受用完畢，它所做的事情也不會停止，這個道理是不成立的。如果說三種 गुण (Guna) 的本性聰明智慧，凡是所做的事情沒有不巧妙的，『我』作為神的主宰，能夠很好地思考

【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, some say that Sattva (goodness, representing balance and harmony), Rajas (passion, representing activity and change), and Tamas (ignorance, representing inertia and darkness)—the three Gunas (qualities, attributes, or properties)—are not creators through thought. And I think that even without creating, I can receive. To refute this view, the following Shloka (verse) is stated:

'If the Gunas themselves have no capacity for thought, how can they create everything? They should be like madness and chaos, foolish and accomplishing nothing.'

Discussion: If the essence of the three Gunas that you insist on has no capacity for thought, how can they create all things for me? If they originally have no capacity for thought but can create something, what is the difference between them and madness and chaos? Suppose they are like madmen, what loss is there? If they are like madmen, creating and establishing things for me to enjoy, then it should not succeed. It has not been seen in the world that foolish and mad servants and artisans can accomplish satisfactory things for their masters, etc. Moreover, if these Gunas do not have skillful abilities in the things they do, they should be like foolish people, unable to complete things such as carving and painting. If they have skillful abilities, why can't they enjoy them themselves? To clarify this principle, the following Shloka (verse) is stated again:

'If the Gunas can skillfully build houses and other things, but do not know how to enjoy them, isn't this the most unreasonable thing?'

Discussion: If it is said that these Gunas are like artisans, able to skillfully accomplish difficult things, and there is nothing they cannot do for internal and external needs, but they cannot understand well the easily understood matter of enjoyment, isn't this very unreasonable? Who would agree with this view except those who willingly embrace foolishness? Like this, the three Gunas also have skillful abilities in enjoyment because they are the essence of enjoyment. Just like the things done in skillful abilities. This shows that the creator and the enjoyer are both accomplished by relying on the three Gunas, and there is no need to separately establish an 'I' as the enjoyer. If it is said that Prakriti (nature) , although its essence has no capacity for thought, creates all things according to the trend of causes and conditions, in order to allow the thinking 'I' to enjoy freely, just like plants and trees, although they have no capacity for thought, produce flowers and fruits and other different things by relying on karma, for people to enjoy. If so, the things created by Prakriti have no capacity for thought and should be like flowers and fruits, not stopping after being enjoyed. Those things that produce results through thought will stop after the enjoyment is satisfied. Prakriti has no capacity for thought, just like external plants and trees, and it will never be damaged, even if the 'I' finishes enjoying it, what it does will not stop, this principle is not valid. If it is said that the nature of the three Gunas is intelligent and wise, and everything they do is skillful, and the 'I', as the master of the gods, can think well

惟。令彼造作自在領受。謂彼三德了知神我。意有所須方起覺慧。隨起作用造化萬物。於是思我自在受用。汝此言說。但述自宗。于諍義中都無所用。又汝所立。我有思惟。德有覺慧。如是二種俱能領納。了別自境性相差別難可了知。是故不應虛妄分別覺慧屬德思惟在我。又德應失覺慧自相。無思惟故。猶如色等。汝言三德了知神我。意有所須方起覺慧。起作用等。此則不然。自性位中無覺慧用。誰能知我意有所須。若於爾時覺慧已起。何待知我意欲方起。若於爾時覺慧未起。云何三德初起于大。若無覺慧大體自起。一切萬物亦應自起。故此覺慧于變異果。自性因中都無所用。有餘復立比量救言。覺慧非思。是無常故。諸無常者。皆非思慮。猶如色等。如是自言違害自意。思惟分別得覺慧名。若不思惟便非覺慧。云何而說覺慧非思。又先已說覺慧思惟。俱了自境性相無別。云何覺慧無有思惟。是故汝言有自違過。又無常因有不成過。就生滅義。自宗不許。隱顯義釋。他宗不成。若言因義不應分別。但就總說此亦不然。若別俱成。可就總說。如其別見。總顯為因。別既不成。總依何立。又依作用說有隱顯。依此立為無常因義。汝立我思亦有作用。故有因義不定過失。又汝欲立覺慧體外別有我思。或我思外別有覺慧。皆不

【現代漢語翻譯】惟，讓他們造作自在地領受。說他們三種德性了知神我（Atman，真我）。心中有所需要才生起覺慧（Buddhi，智慧）。隨著覺慧生起作用，造化萬物。於是思考『我』自在受用。你這些言論，只是在陳述自己的宗派觀點，對於辯論的意義毫無用處。而且你所立論的，『我』有思惟（Manas，心），德性有覺慧，這兩種能力都能領納、辨別各自境界的體性和差別，難以理解。因此，不應該虛妄地分別覺慧屬於德性，思惟屬於『我』。而且德性應該失去覺慧的自性，因為沒有思惟的緣故，就像色等事物一樣。你說三種德性了知神我，心中有所需要才生起覺慧，生起作用等等，這是不對的。在自性位中沒有覺慧的作用，誰能知道『我』心中有所需要？如果在那個時候覺慧已經生起，何必等待知道『我』的意願才生起？如果在那個時候覺慧還沒有生起，為什麼說三種德性最初生起于大？如果沒有覺慧，大體自然生起，那麼一切萬物也應該自然生起。所以這覺慧對於變異的結果，在自性的原因中都毫無用處。還有人又設立比量來辯解說：『覺慧不是思惟，因為它是無常的。凡是無常的事物，都不是思慮，就像色等事物一樣。』這樣自己說的話違背了自己的意思。思惟分別才得到覺慧的名稱，如果不思惟就不是覺慧，怎麼能說覺慧不是思惟呢？而且先前已經說過覺慧和思惟，都能了知各自境界的體性和差別，沒有什麼區別，為什麼覺慧沒有思惟呢？所以你說的話有自相矛盾的過失。而且無常這個原因有不成立的過失。就生滅的意義來說，自己的宗派不認可；用隱顯的意義來解釋，其他宗派不認可。如果說原因的意義不應該分別，只就總的方面來說，這也是不對的。如果分別的方面都成立，才可以就總的方面來說。如果個別方面已經顯現，總體才顯現為原因。個別方面既然不成立，總體依據什麼而成立呢？而且依據作用來說有隱顯，依據這個來立為無常的原因的意義。你所立的『我』的思惟也有作用，所以有原因的意義不確定的過失。而且你想要確立覺慧的本體之外另有『我』的思惟，或者『我』的思惟之外另有覺慧，都是不可行的。

【English Translation】 Furthermore, let them create and freely receive. They say that these three Gunas (qualities, attributes) understand the Atman (Self, Soul). When the mind has a need, then Buddhi (intellect, wisdom) arises. As Buddhi arises and acts, it creates all things. Then it thinks, 'I' freely enjoy.' Your words are merely stating your own sectarian views and are of no use in this debate. Moreover, what you have established, that 'I' has Manas (mind, thought) and the Gunas have Buddhi, both of which can receive and distinguish the nature and differences of their respective realms, is difficult to understand. Therefore, one should not falsely distinguish that Buddhi belongs to the Gunas and Manas belongs to 'I.' Furthermore, the Gunas should lose the nature of Buddhi because they lack Manas, just like material forms and other things. You say that the three Gunas understand the Atman, and when the mind has a need, then Buddhi arises, and actions arise, etc. This is not correct. In the state of self-nature, there is no function of Buddhi. Who can know that 'I' has a need? If Buddhi has already arisen at that time, why wait to know 'I's intention before arising? If Buddhi has not yet arisen at that time, how can it be said that the three Gunas initially arise from the Great? If the Great arises naturally without Buddhi, then all things should also arise naturally. Therefore, this Buddhi is of no use in the cause of self-nature for the result of transformation. Others again establish an inference to argue: 'Buddhi is not Manas because it is impermanent. Whatever is impermanent is not thought, just like material forms and other things.' In this way, their own words contradict their own meaning. Thinking and discriminating give rise to the name Buddhi. If there is no thinking, then it is not Buddhi. How can it be said that Buddhi is not Manas? Moreover, it has already been said that Buddhi and Manas can both understand the nature and differences of their respective realms without any distinction. Why does Buddhi not have Manas? Therefore, your words have the fault of self-contradiction. Furthermore, the reason of impermanence has the fault of being unestablished. In terms of arising and ceasing, your own sect does not accept it; explaining it in terms of concealment and manifestation, other sects do not accept it. If you say that the meaning of the reason should not be distinguished, but only spoken of in general terms, this is also not correct. If the individual aspects are all established, then one can speak of it in general terms. If the individual aspects have already manifested, then the whole manifests as the cause. Since the individual aspects are not established, upon what does the whole rely to be established? Moreover, based on function, there is concealment and manifestation, and based on this, it is established as the meaning of the impermanent cause. The Manas of 'I' that you establish also has a function, so there is the fault of the meaning of the cause being uncertain. Furthermore, you want to establish that there is Manas of 'I' separate from the essence of Buddhi, or that there is Buddhi separate from the Manas of 'I,' both of which are not feasible.

得成。如是種類非共所許。由此汝立無得成義。是故所說我思能受三德能作。其義不成。

複次有執我體常遍無礙能造萬物。名為作者。此亦不然。義相違故。若汝執我有動作用。名為作者。即有無常及有質礙。不遍過失現見無常。不遍有礙。方有動作。常遍無礙。有動作用。曾未見故。若所執我無有動作。云何得名能造作者。是故必應許有動作。若爾應許我體無常。有礙不遍。為顯此義。故次頌曰。

有動作無常　　虛通無動作

論曰。風界勢力能生動作。謂由風界諸行流轉。于異處生相續不絕。依世俗理說名動作。依此動作說為作者。此必不越有礙無常。有礙無常即非周遍。汝宗亦許極微動作。有礙不遍前已遮遣。執為常者顯是無常。是故比量無不定過。若言我宗不許內我體有動作因不成者。此亦不然。必應許故。若無動作何名作者。汝雖不許業句動作而有作者。言依動作。如說火焰來去等言。又必應許我有作用。若全不許我有作用。我則為無。同兔角等。為顯此義。故次頌曰。

無用同無性

論曰。若汝所執。我有作用。可為作者。名言所依。若無作用。則同非有。依何說我以為作者。既無作用應不名有。若謂有言。不依作用。但依同性。及彼相應。此亦不然。世間智者依有用體。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：得成。像這樣的種類不是大家所認可的。因此，你所建立的『無得成』的意義是不成立的。所以，你所說的『我』能接受三種功德，能進行創造，這個說法是不成立的。再次，有人認為『我』的本體是常恒、周遍、無障礙的，能夠創造萬物，所以稱為『作者』。這種說法也是不對的，因為在意義上是相互矛盾的。如果你認為『我』有動作作用，所以稱為『作者』，那麼『我』就具有無常和有質礙、不周遍的過失。現量可見，無常的事物，不周遍的事物，具有障礙的事物，才會有動作。常恒、周遍、無障礙的事物，具有動作作用，這是從來沒有見過的。如果認為『我』沒有動作，怎麼能稱為能創造的『作者』呢？所以，必須承認『我』有動作。如果這樣，就應該承認『我』的本體是無常的，有障礙的，不周遍的。爲了闡明這個道理，所以接下來說：『有動作是無常的，虛空是通達的，沒有動作。』論述：風界的勢力能夠產生動作。也就是說，由於風界的各種執行流動，在不同的地方產生相續不斷的現象，依據世俗的道理，稱之為動作。依據這種動作，就說有作者。這一定不會超出有障礙和無常的範圍。有障礙和無常就不是周遍的。你們宗派也承認極微（paramāṇu）有動作，有障礙，不周遍，這在前面已經駁斥過了。執著『我』是常恒的，就表明『我』是無常的。所以，比量（anumāna）沒有不確定的過失。如果說，我宗不承認內在的『我』的本體有動作，所以因（hetu）不成立，這也是不對的，因為必須承認『我』有動作。如果沒有動作，怎麼能稱為『作者』呢？你雖然不承認業句（karma-vākya）有動作，卻有作者，這是依據動作而說的，就像說火焰來去等等。而且必須承認『我』有作用。如果完全不承認『我』有作用，那麼『我』就等於不存在，如同兔角一樣。爲了闡明這個道理，所以接下來說：『沒有作用就如同沒有自性。』論述：如果你所執著的『我』有作用，可以作為作者，是名言所依據的對象。如果沒有作用，就如同不存在一樣，依據什麼來說『我』是作者呢？既然沒有作用，就不應該稱為『有』。如果說『有』這個說法，不是依據作用，而是依據同性（sāmānya）以及與同性相應的事物，這也是不對的。世間的智者是依據有用的實體。

【English Translation】 English version: It is accomplished. Such a kind is not accepted by all. Therefore, your establishment of the meaning of 'non-accomplishment' is not established. Hence, what you say, that the 'self' is capable of receiving three virtues and capable of creating, that meaning is not established. Furthermore, some hold that the essence of the 'self' is permanent, pervasive, and unobstructed, capable of creating all things, and therefore called the 'agent'. This is also not correct, because it is contradictory in meaning. If you hold that the 'self' has action, and is therefore called the 'agent', then the 'self' has the faults of impermanence, obstruction, and non-pervasiveness. It is visibly seen that impermanent things, non-pervasive things, and obstructed things have actions. Permanent, pervasive, and unobstructed things having actions have never been seen. If it is held that the 'self' has no action, how can it be called the creating 'agent'? Therefore, it must be admitted that the 'self' has action. If so, it should be admitted that the essence of the 'self' is impermanent, obstructed, and non-pervasive. To clarify this meaning, it is said next: 'Having action is impermanent, space is pervasive, having no action.' Treatise: The power of the wind element can generate action. That is to say, due to the various movements and flows of the wind element, continuous phenomena are produced in different places, which are called actions according to worldly reasoning. Based on this action, it is said that there is an agent. This will certainly not go beyond the scope of being obstructed and impermanent. Being obstructed and impermanent is not pervasive. Your school also admits that the atom (paramāṇu) has action, is obstructed, and is not pervasive, which has been refuted before. Holding that the 'self' is permanent indicates that the 'self' is impermanent. Therefore, the inference (anumāna) has no uncertain fault. If it is said that my school does not admit that the inner essence of the 'self' has action, so the reason (hetu) is not established, this is also incorrect, because it must be admitted that the 'self' has action. If there is no action, how can it be called the 'agent'? Although you do not admit that the action of the verbal expression (karma-vākya), there is an agent, which is said based on action, like saying the flame comes and goes, etc. Moreover, it must be admitted that the 'self' has function. If it is completely not admitted that the 'self' has function, then the 'self' is equivalent to non-existence, like a rabbit's horn. To clarify this meaning, it is said next: 'Having no function is like having no self-nature.' Treatise: If the 'self' that you hold has function, it can be the agent, the object on which the name is based. If there is no function, it is like non-existence, based on what is it said that the 'self' is the agent? Since there is no function, it should not be called 'existence'. If it is said that the term 'existence' is not based on function, but on generality (sāmānya) and things corresponding to generality, this is also incorrect. Worldly wise people rely on useful entities.

說有名言。若無有用則無有體無用無體名。依誰立云何而言有作者我。若汝不了。有言所依但應受持。默不語法何須強說。我有作者有言依止。有用之體世智共許。汝必應隨。若汝定執我無作用。應如共許畢竟無法。由此比量我即為無。何不愛樂空無我理。為顯此義。故次頌曰。

何不欣無我

論曰。如過去法既無能生。諸法作用即無自體。由此同法。我亦應然。無世共許焰行等用。亦無自許往來等用。應無自體。如是我性都無所有。非唯順理。亦稱汝心。何不欣求空無我理。計不信者正為無明。所起邪執力強故耳。若汝謂我雖無別用而能為境生我見心故名作者。此亦有失。前已廣破。今復重來。又我不能為我見境。無作用故。猶如兔角此我見等亦不緣我。有所緣故。如緣色心若實有我能生我見。此我云何如善幻術。隨其所愿現種種相。誑惑世間令起種種我見差別。為顯此義。故次頌曰。

或觀我周遍　　或見量同身　或執如極微

論曰。一類外道執我周遍於一切處受苦樂故。我無形質亦無動作。不可隨身往來生死。故知內我遍於一切。一類外道作如是言。我若周遍如虛空者。不應隨身受諸苦樂。應如空界無所往來。其性湛然非作受者。是故我性應如色等隨所依身形量不定。雖無形礙而有所依

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：經中說有『名言』（Nāmadheya，表達概念的詞語）。如果『我』沒有作用，那麼就沒有『體』（Ātman，實體）也沒有『用』（Kriya，功能），沒有『體』就沒有『名』。依據什麼而建立『我』，又憑什麼說有『作者我』（Kartṛ-ātman，能動的自我）呢？如果你不明白，就應該接受並保持已有的說法，默默地不作辯論，又何必勉強說『我有作者』，『有言』（Vacana，言論）是依據『有用之體』（Kriyātmaka，具有功能的實體），這是世俗智慧所共同認可的，你必須隨順。如果你堅持認為『我』沒有作用，那就應該像大家公認的畢竟不存在的事物一樣。由此推論，『我』就是不存在的。為什麼不喜愛並信奉空無我的道理呢？爲了闡明這個道理，所以接著說頌：『為何不欣求無我？』論曰：如果過去的事物已經沒有產生作用的能力，那麼所有事物的運作也就沒有自性。由此類推，『我』也應該是這樣。既沒有世俗公認的如火焰執行等作用，也沒有自己認為的往來等作用，應該沒有自體。像這樣，『我』的本性完全不存在。這不僅符合道理，也符合你的心意。為什麼不欣求空無我的道理呢？認為不相信的人，正是因為無明所產生的邪見執著的力量太強罷了。如果你認為『我』雖然沒有其他作用，但能作為對像產生『我見』（Ātma-dṛṣṭi，對自我的執著）之心，所以稱為『作者』。這種說法也有錯誤，前面已經廣泛駁斥過了，現在再次重申。而且『我』不能作為『我見』的對象，因為它沒有作用，就像兔角一樣。這種『我見』等也不會緣于『我』，因為它有所緣，就像緣於色和心一樣。如果真實存在『我』能夠產生『我見』，那麼這個『我』又怎麼會像善於幻術的人一樣，隨著自己的意願顯現種種形象，迷惑世間，使人們產生種種不同的『我見』呢？爲了闡明這個道理，所以接著說頌：『或者觀察到「我」是周遍的，或者看到「我」的量與身體相同，或者執著「我」像極微一樣。』論曰：有一類外道認為『我』周遍於一切處，所以能感受到苦樂。『我』沒有形狀和實質，也沒有動作，不能隨著身體往來生死。所以知道內在的『我』遍佈於一切。有一類外道這樣說：如果『我』是周遍的，像虛空一樣，就不應該隨著身體感受到各種苦樂，應該像虛空一樣沒有往來，其本性是寂靜的，不是能動者和感受者。所以『我』的本性應該像色等一樣，隨著所依附的身體，形狀和大小不定。雖然沒有形狀的阻礙，但有所依附。

【English Translation】 English version: It is said that there are 'designations' (Nāmadheya, words expressing concepts). If there is no use, then there is no 'essence' (Ātman, entity) and no 'function' (Kriya, function); without 'essence,' there is no 'name.' Based on what is 'I' established, and how can it be said that there is an 'agent-self' (Kartṛ-ātman, the active self)? If you do not understand, you should accept and uphold what has been said, remaining silent and not arguing; why insist on saying 'I have an agent,' 'speech' (Vacana, statement) is based on 'essence with function' (Kriyātmaka, entity with function), which is commonly accepted by worldly wisdom, and you must follow it. If you insist that 'I' has no function, then it should be like something that is universally acknowledged as non-existent. From this inference, 'I' is non-existent. Why not rejoice in and embrace the principle of emptiness and no-self? To clarify this meaning, the following verse is stated: 'Why not rejoice in no-self?' Commentary: If past phenomena no longer have the ability to produce effects, then the operation of all phenomena has no inherent nature. By analogy, 'I' should be the same. It has neither the commonly accepted worldly functions such as the movement of flames, nor the self-perceived functions such as coming and going; it should have no self-essence. In this way, the nature of 'I' is completely non-existent. This is not only in accordance with reason but also in accordance with your own mind. Why not rejoice in the principle of emptiness and no-self? Those who disbelieve do so because the power of the wrong views and attachments arising from ignorance is too strong. If you argue that although 'I' has no other function, it can be called an 'agent' because it can generate the mind of 'self-view' (Ātma-dṛṣṭi, attachment to self) as an object. This argument is also flawed, as it has been extensively refuted before, and now it is reiterated. Moreover, 'I' cannot be the object of 'self-view' because it has no function, just like a rabbit's horn. This 'self-view' and so on will not arise from 'I' because it has an object, just like arising from form and mind. If there truly exists an 'I' that can generate 'self-view,' then how can this 'I' be like a skilled illusionist, manifesting various forms according to its own will, deceiving the world and causing people to generate various different 'self-views'? To clarify this meaning, the following verse is stated: 'Or one observes 'I' as pervasive, or sees 'I' as the same size as the body, or clings to 'I' as an atom.' Commentary: Some non-Buddhist schools believe that 'I' is pervasive in all places, so it can experience suffering and happiness. 'I' has no shape or substance, and no movement; it cannot follow the body to come and go in birth and death. Therefore, it is known that the inner 'I' pervades everything. Some non-Buddhists say this: If 'I' is pervasive, like space, it should not experience various sufferings and happiness along with the body; it should be like space, without coming and going, its nature is tranquil, not an agent or experiencer. Therefore, the nature of 'I' should be like form and so on, its shape and size are not fixed, depending on the body it relies on. Although it has no form of obstruction, it has something to rely on.

。轉變隨身受諸苦樂。雖依形質有卷有舒。而我體性無生無滅。如油渧水隨水廣狹。雖有卷舒而無增減。一類外道復作是言。若我體性隨形量者。即應如身有分有變。又汝執我隨所依身。似水依堤如油逐水。是則此我如彼水油。既變既多非常非一。引此為喻而言我體為常為一。與理相違。是故我體住于身內。形量極細如一極微。不可分析體常無變。動慮動身能作能受。此亦不然。以違理故。眾微聚積成極大身。我住其中形量甚小。云何小我能轉大身。舉體同時皆見動作。若汝意謂我量雖小。而於身中往來擊發。漸次周匝如旋火輪。以速疾故謂言俱動。若爾我體巡歷身中。應有生滅及成眾分。但是遷流至余處者。定歸生滅必有眾分。既言我轉。所至非恒。如彼燈光。豈有常一。常必非動。動即非常。我動而常。深違正理。又所執我有住有行。何得說為是常是一。若行時我不捨住性。應如住位則無所行。若行時我舍其住性。別體即生。常一何在。如是等類我執無邊。以理推徴皆不成立。為顯此義。故次頌曰。

智者達非有

論曰。若有實我性相皆同等以為緣生我見者。如是我見不應得有。種種差別更互相違。以此知無常住實我。但由久習虛妄我見熏在識中功能成熟。如身逐業緣變不同。我見隨因緣別亦爾。唯有

【現代漢語翻譯】轉變隨著身體感受各種苦樂。雖然依賴於形體的存在而有收縮和舒張，但我的本體自性沒有生滅。比如油滴入水中，隨著水面的廣闊而變化，雖然有收縮和舒張，但油的體積沒有增加或減少。有一類外道又這樣說：如果我的本體自性隨著形體的量度而變化，那就應該像身體一樣有部分和變化。而且你認為我依附於所依之身，就像水依附於堤岸，油追隨水面一樣。那麼這個我就像水和油一樣，既變化又增多，既不是常也不是一。用這個來比喻說我的本體是常是一，與道理相違背。因此，我的本體住在身體內，形體的量度極其微小，像一個極微之物，不可分析，本體常住不變。動念慮、動身體，能作能受。這也是不對的，因為違背道理。眾多微塵聚集形成極大的身體，我住在其中，形體的量度很小，怎麼能用小的我去轉動大的身體呢？整個身體同時都能看見動作。如果你認為我的量度雖然小，但在身體中往來擊打，逐漸周遍，像旋轉的火輪一樣，因為速度快，所以說是一起動。如果這樣，我的本體在身體中巡遊，應該有生滅和形成眾多部分。只是遷移流動到其他地方，必定歸於生滅，必定有眾多部分。既然說我轉動，所到的地方不是恒常的，像燈光一樣，怎麼能是常一呢？常必定不是動的，動就不是常。我說我動而常，深深違背正理。而且你所認為的我，有住有行，怎麼能說是常是一呢？如果行走時我不捨棄住的性質，應該像住在原來的位置一樣，那就沒有行走。如果行走時我捨棄了住的性質，別的個體就產生了，常一又在哪裡呢？像這些等等的我執沒有邊際，用道理來推究都不能成立。爲了顯明這個道理，所以接著說頌：『智者達非有』論曰：如果有一個真實的『我』，其自性和現象都相同，以此為緣而產生我見，那麼這樣的我見不應該有種種差別，更互相違背。因此知道沒有常住真實的『我』，只是由於長久以來習慣的虛妄我見薰染在識中，功能成熟。就像身體隨著業力，因緣變化不同，我見隨著因緣的差別也是這樣。只有...

【English Translation】 Transformation follows the body, experiencing various sufferings and pleasures. Although dependent on the form and substance, there is contraction and expansion, my essential nature has no birth and death. Like a drop of oil in water, it changes with the breadth of the water surface. Although there is contraction and expansion, the volume of the oil does not increase or decrease. A certain type of heretics also say this: If my essential nature changes with the measure of the form, then it should have parts and changes like the body. Moreover, you believe that I am attached to the body I rely on, just as water relies on the embankment and oil follows the water surface. Then this 'I' is like water and oil, both changing and increasing, neither constant nor one. Using this as a metaphor to say that my essential nature is constant and one is contrary to reason. Therefore, my essential nature dwells within the body, its measure is extremely small, like a minute particle, unanalyzable, and its essence is constant and unchanging. Moving thoughts, moving the body, being able to act and receive. This is also incorrect because it violates reason. Numerous minute particles gather to form a huge body. I dwell within it, and my measure is very small. How can I use the small 'I' to move the large body? The entire body can be seen moving simultaneously. If you think that although my measure is small, I strike back and forth in the body, gradually pervading it, like a rotating fire wheel. Because of the speed, it is said that it moves together. If so, my essential nature travels through the body, and there should be birth and death and the formation of numerous parts. It is only migrating and flowing to other places, and it will inevitably return to birth and death, and there must be numerous parts. Since it is said that I am moving, the place I arrive at is not constant, like the light of a lamp, how can it be constant and one? Constant must not be moving, and moving is not constant. I say that I am moving and constant, which deeply violates the correct principle. Moreover, the 'I' that you believe in has dwelling and movement, how can it be said to be constant and one? If I do not abandon the nature of dwelling when walking, I should be like dwelling in the original position, then there is no walking. If I abandon the nature of dwelling when walking, another individual is born, where is the constant and one? Like these and so on, the attachment to 'I' is boundless, and it cannot be established by reasoning. To clarify this principle, the following verse is then said: 'The wise realize there is no self.' Treatise says: If there is a real 'I' (ātman), whose nature and phenomena are the same, and if the view of 'I' arises from this cause, then such a view of 'I' should not have various differences and contradict each other even more. Therefore, it is known that there is no permanent and real 'I'. It is only because of the long-standing habit of false views of 'I' that are imprinted in consciousness, and their function matures. Just as the body follows karma, and the conditions change differently, the view of 'I' also changes with the difference of conditions. Only...

心相變現眾多。于中都無一我實體。故諸賢聖積無倒因。方便勤求證我非有。

複次諸有說我能證解脫。但順愚心。終違正理。所以者何。故次頌曰。

常法非可惱　　何舍惱解脫　是故計我常　　證解脫非理

論曰。若計我常無有變易。雖遭眾苦霜雹等災。如太虛空都無所損。不應智者。觀諸世間眾苦所逼。發心厭離方便正勤以證解脫。此顯我常不可惱故。雖觸眾苦應不覺知。若不覺知則無厭離。若無厭離則不正勤。若不正勤則無解脫。哀哉外道狂亂無知。譬如有人懼諸霜雹疾風瀑雨水火等災損害虛空。勤加守護。既執有我無惱湛然。詎勞自苦妄求解脫。誰有心者。顧此癡狂無緣自苦不深悲愍。外道經中咸作是說。著我生死離我涅槃。既贊舍我令欣解脫。如何固執有實我耶。為顯此義。故復頌曰。

我若實有性　　不應贊離我

論曰。我若實有。緣生我見即是真實。不應勸舍為證實我。應更慇勤勸修我見令其堅固。云何勸舍真實我見令修虛妄無我見耶。

又諸外道。或隨師教。或自尋思。起諸我見。種種諍論互相違反。云何執此為實見耶。於一我上競執紛紜乍可生疑。如何執實。若無我見不稱實我。汝不應說能證涅槃。不稱實見證涅槃者。知真趣脫。此說應虛。為顯斯義故次頌

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本心識的各種顯現變化繁多，但其中沒有一個是我（ātman，靈魂、真我）的實體。因此，諸位賢聖積累沒有顛倒的因，方便地勤奮尋求以證悟『我』並非真實存在。

進一步說，那些聲稱『我』能夠證得解脫的說法，只是順應愚昧的心，最終違背正確的道理。為什麼這麼說呢？所以接下來的偈頌說：

『常法非可惱，何舍惱解脫。是故計我常，證解脫非理。』

論述：如果認為『我』是恒常不變的，即使遭遇各種痛苦，如霜凍冰雹等災害，就像虛空一樣都不會受到損害。那麼，有智慧的人就不應該看到世間眾生被各種痛苦所逼迫，從而發起厭離之心，方便地精進努力以證得解脫。這表明『我』如果是恒常的，就不會被惱害，即使接觸到各種痛苦也應該不會覺察到。如果不能覺察到，就不會有厭離之心；如果沒有厭離之心，就不會精進努力；如果不精進努力，就不會有解脫。可悲啊，外道真是狂亂無知！譬如有人害怕霜凍冰雹、疾風暴雨、水火等災害損害虛空，而勤奮地加以守護。既然執著于『我』是無惱且清凈的，又何必徒勞地自討苦吃，妄想求解脫呢？誰有心的人會不顧及這種癡狂，不深深地悲憫這種無緣無故自討苦吃的行為呢？外道的經典中都這樣說：執著于『我』就會生死輪迴，脫離『我』就能涅槃。既然讚揚捨棄『我』能令人欣喜地獲得解脫，又為何固執地認為有真實的『我』存在呢？爲了闡明這個道理，所以接下來的偈頌說：

『我若實有性，不應贊離我。』

論述：如果『我』確實存在，那麼由因緣生起的『我見』就是真實的。不應該勸人捨棄『我見』來證實『我』的存在，而應該更加慇勤地勸人修習『我見』，使其更加堅固。怎麼能勸人捨棄真實的『我見』，而去修習虛妄的『無我見』呢？

此外，各種外道，或者隨從老師的教導，或者自己尋思，產生各種『我見』，各種爭論互相矛盾。怎麼能認為這些是真實的見解呢？在一個『我』的問題上，競相執著，紛紜複雜，或許還能讓人產生懷疑，怎麼能執著地認為是真實的呢？如果沒有符合真實『我』的見解，你就不應該說能夠證得涅槃。如果不是符合真實的見解而證得涅槃，那麼知道真理而獲得解脫的說法就應該是虛假的。爲了闡明這個道理，所以接下來的偈頌說：

【English Translation】 English version The transformations and manifestations of consciousness are numerous, but within them, there is not a single entity that is 'I' (ātman, soul, self). Therefore, the wise and noble accumulate undeceiving causes, diligently seeking through skillful means to realize that 'I' does not truly exist.

Furthermore, those who claim that 'I' can attain liberation are merely conforming to foolish minds and ultimately contradict right reason. Why is this so? Therefore, the following verse says:

'A permanent entity cannot be harmed; why abandon harm for liberation? Therefore, the belief in a permanent 'I' attaining liberation is illogical.'

Commentary: If one believes that 'I' is constant and unchanging, even if encountering various sufferings, such as frost, hail, and other calamities, it would be like empty space, completely unharmed. Therefore, wise individuals should not, upon seeing sentient beings in the world oppressed by various sufferings, generate a mind of aversion and diligently strive through skillful means to attain liberation. This shows that if 'I' is permanent, it cannot be harmed; even when encountering various sufferings, one should not be aware of them. If one is not aware, there will be no aversion; if there is no aversion, there will be no diligent striving; if there is no diligent striving, there will be no liberation. Alas, the heretics are truly confused and ignorant! It is like someone fearing that frost, hail, violent winds, torrential rain, water, fire, and other calamities will harm empty space, and diligently guarding it. Since they cling to the notion that 'I' is unperturbed and pure, why bother to inflict suffering upon themselves, vainly seeking liberation? Who with a mind would disregard this foolishness and not deeply pity this causeless self-inflicted suffering? The heretical scriptures all say this: clinging to 'I' leads to birth and death; separating from 'I' leads to nirvāṇa. Since they praise abandoning 'I' to bring joy in attaining liberation, how can they stubbornly insist that a real 'I' exists? To clarify this principle, the following verse says:

'If 'I' truly has a nature, one should not praise abandoning 'I'.'

Commentary: If 'I' truly exists, then the 'I-view' (belief in self) that arises from conditions is real. One should not advise abandoning the 'I-view' to realize the existence of 'I'; rather, one should diligently encourage cultivating the 'I-view' to make it more firm. How can one advise abandoning the real 'I-view' and instead cultivate the false 'no-I-view'?

Furthermore, various heretics, either following the teachings of their teachers or contemplating on their own, generate various 'I-views', and their various arguments contradict each other. How can one consider these to be real views? On the issue of a single 'I', they compete in clinging, with diverse and complex views, which might cause one to doubt; how can one stubbornly insist that it is real? If there is no view that conforms to the real 'I', you should not say that one can attain nirvāṇa. If one attains nirvāṇa without a view that conforms to reality, then the statement that one knows the truth and attains liberation should be false. To clarify this principle, the following verse says:

曰。

定知真實者　　趣解脫應虛

論曰。有我若實無我我所。解脫方便見應成虛。有我我所違逆涅槃隨順生死。見應是實。若顛倒見隨順涅槃。無顛倒見隨順生死。云何汝論。作如是言。定知實者能趣解脫。以此定知空無我見。得涅槃故所證非虛。我我所見涅槃時舍。應如余見是其顛倒。又汝論說我見無倒。在聞思位至修位中。我見既舍覆成顛倒。以其我相略有二種。一有。二無。有順生死。無順涅槃。故有我見入聖時舍。汝此狂論。為世所嗤。審察即無。如何實有。如繩在闇乍見言蛇。及至諦觀乃知非實。外道亦爾。無明闇中見無常身謂有常我。若得聖智諦觀此身。達空無我而證解脫。知有我見初實后虛確言稱境有信無智。既許我見初實后虛。得涅槃時應許無我。后若無者。前亦應無。為顯此義。故次頌曰。

解脫中若無　　前亦應非有

論曰。此中意顯。如解脫位我無有相。未解脫時亦應非有。性無別故。或復身等於解脫時既無有我。未解脫位。亦應無我。相無別故。諸外道等無智睡眠。瞇覆慧目不了諸行。相續道中微細差別。妄執有我是一是常。不可以其無智雜見謂證真理。要依無雜清凈智見方證真理。為顯此義。故次頌曰。

無雜時所見　　彼真性應知

論曰。以不雜火自

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：問：如果確定認知真實，那麼趨向解脫就應該是虛假的。論：如果『我』（ātman）和『我所』（mamata）是真實的，那麼尋求解脫的方法就應該成為虛假的。因為執著于『我』和『我所』是違背涅槃（nirvāṇa），順應生死的。那麼，認為『我』和『我所』是真實的這種見解就應該是真實的。如果顛倒的見解順應涅槃，那麼不顛倒的見解就順應生死，你如何立論，說確定認知真實才能趨向解脫呢？正是因為確定認知空無我的見解，才能證得涅槃，所以涅槃並非虛假。執著于『我』和『我所』的見解在涅槃時會被捨棄，應該像其他錯誤的見解一樣，是顛倒的。而且你的論述說『我』見不是顛倒的，在聞思位是正確的，到了修位中，『我』見既然被捨棄，又變成了顛倒的。因為『我』的相狀略有二種：一是有，二是無。有『我』順應生死，無『我』順應涅槃。所以有『我』的見解在進入聖位時會被捨棄。你這種狂妄的論調，會被世人恥笑。仔細審察，『我』根本不存在，怎麼能說是真實存在呢？就像在黑暗中把繩子誤看成蛇，等到仔細觀察才知道不是蛇。外道也是這樣，在無明的黑暗中，把無常的身體誤認為有常的『我』。如果得到聖智，仔細觀察這個身體，就能通達空無我，從而證得解脫。認為有『我』的見解，最初是真實的，後來是虛假的，這種說法確實符合一般人的認知，但缺乏智慧。既然承認『我』見最初是真實的，後來是虛假的，那麼在證得涅槃時，就應該承認無『我』。如果後來沒有『我』，那麼先前也應該沒有『我』。爲了闡明這個道理，所以接下來說：解脫中若無，前亦應非有。論：這裡的意思是說，就像在解脫的境界中沒有『我』的相狀一樣，在未解脫的時候也應該沒有『我』，因為『我』的自性沒有差別。或者說，就像身體在解脫時沒有『我』一樣，在未解脫時也應該沒有『我』，因為『我』的相狀沒有差別。那些外道因為沒有智慧，就像在睡眠中一樣，被無明遮蔽了智慧的眼睛，不能瞭解諸行相續流轉中的細微差別，所以妄執有『我』，認為『我』是單一的、常住的。不能把他們這種沒有智慧的雜亂見解當作是證得了真理。一定要依靠沒有雜染的清凈智慧才能證得真理。爲了闡明這個道理，所以接下來說：無雜時所見，彼真性應知。論：以不雜染的火焰自身...

【English Translation】 English version: Question: If the determination of reality is known, then striving for liberation should be false. Treatise: If 'self' (ātman) and 'belonging to self' (mamata) are real, then the means to liberation should become false. Because clinging to 'self' and 'belonging to self' is contrary to nirvāṇa and in accordance with birth and death. Then, the view that 'self' and 'belonging to self' are real should be real. If the inverted view accords with nirvāṇa, then the non-inverted view accords with birth and death, how do you argue that determining the knowledge of reality leads to liberation? It is precisely because determining the knowledge of the view of emptiness and no-self leads to the attainment of nirvāṇa, so nirvāṇa is not false. The view of clinging to 'self' and 'belonging to self' is abandoned at the time of nirvāṇa, and should be inverted like other false views. Moreover, your argument says that the view of 'self' is not inverted, it is correct in the stages of hearing and thinking, but in the stage of cultivation, since the view of 'self' is abandoned, it becomes inverted again. Because there are roughly two kinds of characteristics of 'self': one is existence, and the other is non-existence. The existence of 'self' accords with birth and death, and the non-existence of 'self' accords with nirvāṇa. Therefore, the view of the existence of 'self' is abandoned when entering the stage of sainthood. Your crazy argument will be ridiculed by the world. Upon careful examination, 'self' does not exist at all, how can it be said to be real? It is like mistaking a rope for a snake in the dark, and only realizing it is not a snake upon careful observation. The same is true of external paths, in the darkness of ignorance, they mistake the impermanent body for a permanent 'self'. If one obtains holy wisdom and carefully observes this body, one can understand emptiness and no-self, and thus attain liberation. The view that the existence of 'self' is real at first and false later is indeed in accordance with the cognition of ordinary people, but it lacks wisdom. Since it is admitted that the view of 'self' is real at first and false later, then one should admit no-'self' when attaining nirvāṇa. If there is no 'self' later, then there should be no 'self' before. To clarify this principle, it is said next: If there is no self in liberation, then there should not have been one before. Treatise: The meaning here is that, just as there is no characteristic of 'self' in the state of liberation, there should be no 'self' in the state of non-liberation, because the nature of 'self' is no different. Or, just as there is no 'self' in the body at the time of liberation, there should be no 'self' in the state of non-liberation, because the characteristics of 'self' are no different. Those external paths, because they have no wisdom, are like being asleep, their eyes of wisdom are covered by ignorance, and they cannot understand the subtle differences in the continuous flow of phenomena, so they falsely cling to 'self', thinking that 'self' is singular and permanent. Their ignorant and confused views cannot be regarded as the attainment of truth. One must rely on pure wisdom without defilement to attain the truth. To clarify this principle, it is said next: What is seen at the time of no defilement, that should be known as the true nature. Treatise: With undefiled fire itself...

有水相。知雜火時暖非水體。身等自相應知亦爾。得解脫時空無我故。雜我見位亦無有我。或復我體應知亦然。無雜位中既無有相。雜我見位有相亦無。是故應知無雜所見稱法實性雜見不然。

複次諸外道等咸設難言。若一切法空無我者。是心根身云何不斷。無常諸行空無我者。悉皆斷滅如燈火聲。此亦不然。故次頌曰。

若無常皆斷　　草等何不然

論曰。雖諸草等無我無常。然有因緣相續不斷。心根身等應知亦然。故所立因有不定過。又立因喻證心根身皆有斷滅。此言未了。為一念生無間即滅更不相續名為斷耶。為經多時相續不絕後要當盡名為斷耶。若言初者。闕于同法。燈等隨因多時起故。若言第二我亦許然。無餘涅槃生死斷故。為破前因。復說頌曰。

此理設為真　　無明亦非有

論曰。無明自性非我非常。應亦如燈自然斷滅。若如是者。無明所生貪等惑障。應自然斷。若爾即應生死繫縛。不由功用自然解脫。此二半頌俱顯前因。有不定失。內外為異。

複次諸外道等有作是說。色等諸法雖是無常。然依我故相續無斷。此亦不然。違解脫故。若色等法依我生者。我既是常前後無異。即應畢竟不證解脫。若言諸法雖依我生。然由緣助。故無此失。若爾諸法唯應由彼眾緣而生。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：有水相（水的表象）。知道混合的火在溫暖時不是水的本體。身體等自身相應的道理也應如此理解。獲得解脫時，因為空和無我，所以夾雜著我見的境界也沒有我。或者說，我的本體也應如此理解。在沒有夾雜的境界中既然沒有表象，那麼在夾雜我見的境界中，有表象也沒有表象。因此，應當知道沒有夾雜的所見才符合法的真實本性，夾雜的見解並非如此。

其次，一些外道提出了疑問：如果一切法都是空無我的，那麼心、根、身為什麼不會斷滅？如果無常的諸行是空無我的，那麼就應該像燈火和聲音一樣完全斷滅。這種說法是不對的。所以接下來用偈頌說：

『如果無常都斷滅，草等為何不然？』

論述：即使草等是無我無常的，但因為有因緣，所以能夠相續不斷。心、根、身等也應如此理解。因此，所立的因有不確定的過失。又立因喻證明心、根、身都有斷滅。這種說法還不明確。是指一念生起，沒有間斷就滅亡，不再相續叫做斷滅嗎？還是指經過很長時間相續不斷，最終還是要窮盡叫做斷滅呢？如果說是前者，就缺少同法。燈等隨著因緣，經過很長時間才生起。如果說是後者，我也認可。因為無餘涅槃時，生死就斷滅了。爲了破斥前面的因，又說了偈頌：

『這個道理如果為真，無明也應該不存在。』

論述：無明的自性不是我，也不是常。應該也像燈一樣自然斷滅。如果這樣，無明所產生的貪等煩惱障礙，應該自然斷滅。如果這樣，就應該生死繫縛，不用通過修行就自然解脫。這兩個半偈頌都顯示了前面的因，有不確定的過失。內外有所不同。

其次，一些外道這樣說：色等諸法雖然是無常的，但因為依靠我，所以相續不斷。這種說法也是不對的，因為違背了解脫。如果色等法依靠我而生，我既然是常，前後沒有差異，就應該永遠不能證得解脫。如果說諸法雖然依靠我而生，但由於因緣的幫助，所以沒有這個過失。如果這樣，諸法就應該僅僅由那些眾緣而生。

【English Translation】 English version: There is a water appearance. Knowing that mixed fire is warm, it is not the substance of water. The same should be understood for the body and other corresponding things. When liberation is attained, because of emptiness and no-self (空無我), the state mixed with self-view (我見) also has no self. Or, the substance of self should also be understood in this way. Since there is no appearance in the unmixed state, in the state mixed with self-view, there is appearance and there is no appearance. Therefore, it should be known that the unmixed view conforms to the true nature of Dharma (法), while the mixed view does not.

Furthermore, some non-Buddhist (外道) raise the question: If all dharmas (法) are empty and without self, why are the mind, roots, and body not cut off? If impermanent actions (無常諸行) are empty and without self, then they should be completely cut off like a lamp's flame and sound. This is not the case. Therefore, the following verse is said:

'If impermanence all ceased, why not grass and such?'

Commentary: Although grass and such are without self and impermanent, they continue uninterrupted due to causes and conditions. The mind, roots, and body should also be understood in this way. Therefore, the established cause has an uncertain fault. Furthermore, establishing a cause and analogy to prove that the mind, roots, and body all have cessation is unclear. Does it mean that a thought arises, ceases without interruption, and does not continue, which is called cessation? Or does it mean that after a long period of continuous existence, it will eventually come to an end, which is called cessation? If the former is meant, then it lacks similarity. Lamps and such arise after a long time due to causes. If the latter is meant, I also agree. Because in Nirvana without remainder (無余涅槃), birth and death are cut off. To refute the previous cause, another verse is said:

'If this principle were true, ignorance (無明) would also not exist.'

Commentary: The nature of ignorance is neither self nor permanent. It should also naturally cease like a lamp. If so, the afflictions and obstacles such as greed (貪) arising from ignorance should naturally cease. If so, one should be liberated from the bonds of birth and death naturally, without effort. Both of these half-verses show that the previous cause has an uncertain fault. The internal and external are different.

Furthermore, some non-Buddhists say this: Although phenomena such as form (色) are impermanent, they continue uninterrupted because they rely on self. This is also incorrect because it contradicts liberation. If phenomena such as form arise relying on self, and self is permanent and without difference before and after, then one should never attain liberation. If it is said that although phenomena arise relying on self, they do not have this fault due to the help of conditions, then phenomena should only arise from those conditions.

我復何用能生眾緣與所生果更相隨順同有同無。我既是常。一切時有。果則不爾。豈藉彼生我用難知緣力共了。如何黨我不信眾緣。為顯此義。故次頌曰。

現見色等行　　從緣生住滅　故知汝執我　　雖有而無用

論曰。色等諸行生住滅時。現見從緣不依於我。汝執我體既非緣生。即無作用如前已說。又色等法生住滅相。種類及時皆不同故。何得依一常住我緣。如燒煮等依緣別故。熟德色類亦有差別。如是差別不依一緣。謂無始來色等諸法。名言熏習種類不同。及先所造諸有趣業。種種差別功能轉變。隨所遇緣成熟發起。變生色等生等差別。所言緣者。謂精血等是其生緣。衣食定等是其住緣。毒藥災橫四大亂等。是其滅緣。諸所計我無此別用。外道愚癡強立為有。為顯此義。復說頌曰。

如緣成芽等　　緣成種等生　故無常諸法　　皆無常所起

論曰。如外種等依自因緣功能差別而得生起。復待余緣助發功力。變生自類芽等諸果。內身心等應知亦然。諸行相續同類異類。隨所遇緣生果差別。此則顯示內身心法。體無常故。如外芽等。必從自類無常因生。我于身心無能生用。非緣生故。如龜毛等。複次為顯諸法雖無有我而非斷常二過所及。故於品后。復說頌曰。

以法從緣生　　故體而

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：我再有什麼用呢？能夠產生眾多的因緣，以及由這些因緣所產生的果，它們相互隨順，同生同滅。既然我是常住不變的，那麼我應該在任何時候都存在。但果卻不是這樣，難道還需要憑藉其他因緣才能產生我嗎？我的作用難以知曉，因緣的力量共同成就。為什麼你要偏袒我，不相信眾多的因緣呢？爲了闡明這個道理，所以接著用偈頌說：

『現在可以看見的色等諸行（rupa etc.）（色蘊等），從因緣而生、而住、而滅。所以，你應該知道，你所執著的『我』（atman），雖然你認為它存在，但實際上是沒有作用的。』

論述：色等諸行（rupa etc.）在生、住、滅的時候，可以清楚地看到它們是從因緣而生，而不是依靠于『我』（atman）。你所執著的『我』（atman）的本體，既然不是從因緣而生，那就沒有作用，就像前面已經說過的。而且，色等法（rupa etc.）的生、住、滅的現象，種類和時間都不同，怎麼能夠依靠一個常住不變的『我』（atman）作為因緣呢？就像燒煮等事情，因為所依靠的因緣不同，成熟的性質和種類也會有差別。這樣的差別不是依靠一個因緣就能產生的。所謂無始以來，色等諸法（rupa etc.）的名言熏習種類不同，以及先前所造的各種趣業（karma），種種差別的功能轉變，隨著所遇到的因緣成熟而發起，變化產生色等（rupa etc.）的生等差別。所說的因緣，比如精血等是其生緣，衣食安定等是其住緣，毒藥災禍、四大（earth, water, fire, wind）錯亂等是其滅緣。你們所計度的『我』（atman）沒有這些特別的作用，外道愚癡，強行認為它存在。爲了闡明這個道理，再次用偈頌說：

『就像依靠因緣成就了芽等（sprout etc.），依靠因緣成就了種子等（seed etc.）的產生。所以，無常的諸法（impermanent dharmas），都是由無常的因緣所產生的。』

論述：就像外面的種子等（seed etc.），依靠自身的因緣，功能差別而得以生起，又等待其他的因緣來幫助引發其功力，變化產生同類的芽等（sprout etc.）諸果。內在的身心等（body and mind etc.）也應該知道是這樣。諸行（samskaras）相續，同類或者異類，隨著所遇到的因緣產生果的差別。這顯示了內在的身心法（body and mind dharmas），本體是無常的，就像外面的芽等（sprout etc.），必定是從同類的無常因所生。『我』（atman）對於身心（body and mind）沒有產生的作用，因為它不是從因緣所生，就像龜毛等。再次，爲了顯示諸法（dharmas）雖然沒有『我』（atman），但並非落入斷滅和常住兩種過失，所以在這一品之後，再次用偈頌說：

『因為法（dharma）是從因緣而生，所以本體是……』

【English Translation】 English version: What further use do I have? To be able to generate numerous causes and conditions (hetu-pratyaya), and the fruits produced by these causes and conditions, which follow each other, arising and ceasing together. Since I am permanent, I should exist at all times. But the fruit is not like that. Does it need to rely on other causes and conditions to produce me? My function is difficult to know, and the power of causes and conditions jointly accomplishes it. Why do you favor 'I' (atman) and not believe in the numerous causes and conditions? To clarify this meaning, the following verse is then spoken:

'The visible aggregates such as form (rupa) etc., arise, abide, and cease from causes and conditions. Therefore, you should know that the 'I' (atman) you cling to, although you think it exists, is actually useless.'

Treatise: When aggregates such as form (rupa) etc., arise, abide, and cease, it is clearly seen that they arise from causes and conditions, not relying on 'I' (atman). The essence of the 'I' (atman) that you cling to, since it is not born from causes and conditions, has no function, as previously stated. Moreover, the phenomena of arising, abiding, and ceasing of form (rupa) etc., differ in kind and time. How can they rely on a single, permanent 'I' (atman) as a cause and condition? Just like cooking, etc., because the causes and conditions relied upon are different, the nature and kind of maturity will also be different. Such differences cannot be produced by relying on a single cause and condition. The habitual imprints of names and words of form (rupa) etc., from beginningless time are different, as well as the various karmas (karma) created in the past. The transformation of various functions, with the maturation of the encountered causes and conditions, arises, and changes to produce the differences in the arising of form (rupa) etc. The so-called causes and conditions, such as sperm and blood, are the causes for its birth; clothing, food, and stability are the causes for its abiding; poison, disasters, and the imbalance of the four elements (earth, water, fire, wind) are the causes for its cessation. The 'I' (atman) that you conceive of does not have these special functions. The ignorant heretics forcefully assert that it exists. To clarify this meaning, the following verse is spoken again:

'Just as sprouts (sprout etc.) are formed by causes and conditions, and seeds (seed etc.) are formed by causes and conditions. Therefore, all impermanent dharmas (impermanent dharmas) are produced by impermanent causes.'

Treatise: Just like external seeds (seed etc.), relying on their own causes and conditions, their functions differentiate and are able to arise, and they wait for other causes and conditions to help trigger their power, transforming and producing fruits such as sprouts (sprout etc.) of the same kind. The internal body and mind (body and mind etc.) should also be understood in the same way. The continuity of samskaras (samskaras), whether of the same kind or different kinds, produces differences in the fruits depending on the causes and conditions encountered. This shows that the essence of the internal body and mind dharmas (body and mind dharmas) is impermanent, just like external sprouts (sprout etc.), which must be born from impermanent causes of the same kind. The 'I' (atman) has no generative function for the body and mind (body and mind), because it is not born from causes and conditions, like turtle hair. Furthermore, to show that although dharmas (dharmas) do not have an 'I' (atman), they do not fall into the two extremes of annihilation and permanence, so after this chapter, the following verse is spoken again:

'Because dharma (dharma) arises from causes and conditions, therefore its essence is...'

無斷　以法從緣滅　　故體亦非常

論曰。諸法展轉從無始來。依同類因生等流果。起後後果。續前前因。于中無間。所以不斷。若前因滅。後果不生。于中有間。可名為斷。由對治生前因力滅後果不續。所以非常。若法凝然不捨前相其體無變。可名為常。又前因滅。所以非常。後果續生所以非斷。又因生故。所以非常。能生果故。所以非斷。又唸唸別。所以非常。相似相續。所以非斷。又法非有。所以非常。亦復非無。所以非斷。有即為常。無便斷故。如是佛子遠離二邊。悟入緣生處中妙理。正觀一切非有非無。法尚性空。我豈為有。薩迦耶見及以隨眠並此所生於斯永滅。復觀諸行平等性空。彼此俱亡自他想滅。遍於一切所化有情。起無緣慈澍妙法雨。窮未來際極太虛空。利樂有情勝用無盡。此勇猛者空觀所持。眾苦熾然皆不能觸。見大生死如空宅中。妄想所牽眾多憂苦。譬如猛火騰焰震烈。焚燒無量。無智有情悲願纏心。無所怯憚。投身沒命而拔濟之。此大慧者觀空無倒。我想既除離我所執。二愛盡故。不復樂觀貪等煩惱所依止事。為饒益他常處生死。于中不染。即大涅槃。雖處塵勞無邊苦海。恒受勝樂過二涅槃。

大乘廣百論釋論卷第三大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1571 大乘廣百論釋

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本無斷以法從緣滅，故體亦非常。論曰：諸法輾轉從無始以來，依靠同類因產生等流果，引發后一個果，延續前一個因，其中沒有間斷，所以不斷。如果前一個因滅了，后一個果不產生，其中有間斷，可以稱為斷。由於對治產生，前一個因的力量滅了，后一個果不再延續，所以不是常。如果法凝固不變，不捨棄之前的狀態，它的本體沒有變化，可以稱為常。另外，前一個因滅了，所以不是常；后一個果繼續產生，所以不是斷。又因為因產生，所以不是常；能夠產生果，所以不是斷。又因爲念念不同，所以不是常；相似的相續，所以不是斷。又因為法不是實有，所以不是常；也不是沒有，所以不是斷。有就是常，沒有就是斷。像這樣，佛子遠離兩種極端，領悟到緣起的中道妙理，正確地觀察一切既非有也非無。法尚且是性空的，我怎麼會是實有呢？薩迦耶見（身見，認為五蘊和合的身體是真實的我）以及隨眠（煩惱的種子）和由此產生的種種煩惱，都在這裡永遠滅盡。再觀察諸行（一切有為法）平等性空，彼此都消失，自他的分別念滅除。普遍地對於一切所教化的有情（眾生），生起無緣慈（無條件的慈愛），降下妙法雨。窮盡未來，直至虛空，利益安樂有情，殊勝的作用沒有窮盡。這位勇猛的人，被空觀所持，眾多的苦難熾盛燃燒也不能觸及他。見到巨大的生死輪迴就像空房子中，妄想所牽引的眾多憂愁痛苦。譬如猛烈的火焰騰空震動，焚燒無量。沒有智慧的有情，被悲願纏繞內心，無所畏懼，投身沒命去救拔他們。這位大智慧的人，觀察空性沒有顛倒，我執既然消除，遠離我所執。兩種愛（我愛和我所愛）都滅盡了，不再樂觀貪等煩惱所依止的事物。爲了饒益他人，常常處於生死輪迴中，在其中不被污染，這就是大涅槃。雖然處於塵世的無邊苦海，恒常享受勝妙的快樂超過二乘的涅槃。大乘廣百論釋論卷第三大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1571 大乘廣百論釋

【English Translation】 English version Non-eternal, Non-annihilation Because phenomena cease according to conditions, their essence is also not permanent. Treatise says: All phenomena, revolving from beginningless time, rely on causes of the same kind to produce results of equal flow, giving rise to later results and continuing former causes. There is no interruption in between, so they are not annihilated. If a former cause ceases and a later result does not arise, there is an interruption in between, which can be called annihilation. Because of the arising of antidotes, the power of the former cause ceases, and the later result does not continue, so it is not permanent. If a phenomenon is solidified and does not abandon its previous state, its essence is without change, which can be called permanent. Moreover, the former cause ceases, so it is not permanent; the later result continues to arise, so it is not annihilated. Furthermore, because of the arising of causes, it is not permanent; because it can produce results, it is not annihilated. Moreover, because each thought is different, it is not permanent; similar continuity, so it is not annihilated. Moreover, because phenomena are not existent, they are not permanent; nor are they non-existent, so they are not annihilated. Existence is permanence, non-existence is annihilation. Thus, the Buddha's disciples, far from the two extremes, awaken to the wonderful principle of dependent origination, correctly observing that everything is neither existent nor non-existent. Even phenomena are empty in nature, how could 'I' be existent? Satkayadristi (belief in a self, the view that the body, a combination of the five skandhas, is a real self) and anusaya (latent tendencies of afflictions) and all the afflictions arising from them are eternally extinguished here. Furthermore, observing that all samskaras (conditioned phenomena) are equally empty in nature, both disappear, and the thought of self and other is extinguished. Universally, for all sentient beings to be taught, they arouse unconditioned compassion and pour down the rain of wonderful Dharma. Exhausting the future, reaching the vast emptiness, benefiting and bringing joy to sentient beings, the supreme function is inexhaustible. This courageous one, upheld by the view of emptiness, cannot be touched by the burning of numerous sufferings. Seeing great samsara (cycle of birth and death) as in an empty house, many worries and sufferings are drawn by delusion. Like a fierce fire soaring and shaking violently, burning immeasurably. Sentient beings without wisdom, entangled in their hearts by vows of compassion, are fearless, throwing themselves into danger to rescue them. This person of great wisdom observes emptiness without inversion. Since the attachment to self is eliminated, they are far from the attachment to what belongs to self. Because both loves (love of self and love of what belongs to self) are exhausted, they no longer optimistically rely on things that are the basis of afflictions such as greed. In order to benefit others, they are constantly in samsara, and are not defiled in it, which is great Nirvana. Although in the boundless sea of suffering of the world, they constantly enjoy supreme happiness beyond the Nirvana of the two vehicles (Shravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana). Commentary on the Hundred Verses of the Great Vehicle, Volume 3 Taisho Tripitaka, Volume 30, No. 1571, Commentary on the Hundred Verses of the Great Vehicle

論

大乘廣百論釋論卷第四

聖天菩薩本　護法菩薩釋

三藏法師玄奘奉　詔譯

破時品第三之一

複次有作是言。如說已滅未生無體。其理不然。諸有為法前後兩際作用雖無而體恒有。分位別故三世不同。無必不生有定無滅。為破此義。故次頌曰。

瓶等在未來　　即非有過現

論曰。色等諸法在未來世。過去現在二世皆空。后遇因緣二相方起。云何汝說無必不生。未來世相在過現無。云何而言有定無滅。若執未來有二世相。此不應理。故次頌曰。

未來過現有　　便是未來無

論曰。若在未來有過現相。應如后位便失未來。一法一時實有多相。互相違反其義不成。即由此理言一一世皆有多相亦不成立。

複次若謂色等有未來體。流趣二世說有過現。為破此執。復說頌曰。

未來若已謝　　而有未來體　生則恒未來　　云何成過現

論曰。若色等法有未來體。是即應無過現二世。以不可說異相法中。有別異相如苦樂等。又若一法流轉三時說三世者。便成雜亂。又色等法流轉三時。若不異者應無三世。若有異者是則異相。本無而生有已還滅。一切有為應亦如是。便為退失說常有宗。又說頌曰。

法若在未來　　現有未來相　應即為現

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本

論

《大乘廣百論釋論》卷第四

聖天菩薩本護法菩薩釋

三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯

破時品第三之一

複次，有人這樣說：『如經中所說，已經滅去和尚未產生的法沒有實體，這個道理是不對的。諸有為法雖然在前後兩個階段沒有作用，但其本體是恒常存在的。因為分位不同，所以三世（過去、現在、未來）有所不同。』爲了破斥這種觀點，所以接著說下面的偈頌：

『瓶等在未來，即非有過現。』

論曰：色等諸法在未來世，過去和現在二世都是空無。之後遇到因緣，這兩種相狀才出現。怎麼能說『無必不生』呢？未來世的相狀在過去和現在是沒有的，怎麼能說『有定無滅』呢？如果認為未來有過去和現在的相狀，這是不合理的。所以接著說下面的偈頌：

『未來過現有，便是未來無。』

論曰：如果在未來有過去和現在的相狀，那麼就應該像後面的階段一樣，失去未來的特性。一個法在同一時間實際上具有多種相狀，互相矛盾，這個道理是不能成立的。由此可以推論，認為每一世都具有多種相狀也是不能成立的。

複次，如果認為色等法具有未來的本體，流轉到過去和現在二世，所以說具有過去和現在的相狀。爲了破斥這種執著，再次說下面的偈頌：

『未來若已謝，而有未來體，生則恒未來，云何成過現？』

論曰：如果色等法具有未來的本體，那麼就應該沒有過去和現在二世。因為在不可說具有不同相狀的法中，有不同的相狀，比如苦和樂等。又如果一個法流轉於三個時間階段，所以說有三世，那麼就會變得雜亂。又色等法流轉於三個時間階段，如果不具有不同的相狀，那麼就應該沒有三世。如果具有不同的相狀，那麼就是不同的相狀，本來沒有而產生，存在之後又消滅。一切有為法都應該如此，那麼就等於退失了認為事物是常有的觀點。又說偈頌：

『法若在未來，現有未來相，應即為現。』

【English Translation】 English version

Treatise

Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya (Great Vehicle Collection Treatise), Volume 4

By Bodhisattva Āryadeva (Holy Deva Bodhisattva), Explained by Bodhisattva Dharmapāla (Dharma Protector Bodhisattva)

Translated by Tripiṭaka Master Xuanzang (Profound Tripitaka Master) under Imperial Decree

Chapter 3: Refuting Time, Part 1

Furthermore, some assert: 'As it is said, that which has ceased and that which has not yet arisen have no substance. This principle is incorrect. Although conditioned dharmas (phenomena) have no function in their prior and subsequent stages, their essence is constant. Because of different phases, the three times (past, present, future) are different.' To refute this view, the following verse is stated:

'A pot, etc., in the future, is not past or present.'

Commentary: Dharmas such as form are empty in the past and present in the future. Later, when conditions arise, these two aspects appear. How can you say 'non-existence cannot arise'? The aspect of the future does not exist in the past and present. How can you say 'existence is definitely not destroyed'? If you insist that the future has the aspects of the past and present, this is unreasonable. Therefore, the following verse is stated:

'If the future has past and present, then the future is non-existent.'

Commentary: If the future has the aspects of the past and present, then it should lose its future characteristic, just like the later stage. One dharma at one time actually has multiple aspects, which contradict each other. This principle cannot be established. From this, it can be inferred that the idea that each time has multiple aspects is also untenable.

Furthermore, if it is thought that form, etc., have a future essence, flowing into the past and present, and thus are said to have past and present aspects. To refute this attachment, the following verse is stated again:

'If the future has already passed, and yet has a future essence, then arising is always future. How can it become past and present?'

Commentary: If dharmas such as form have a future essence, then there should be no past and present. Because in the inexpressible dharmas with different aspects, there are different aspects, such as suffering and joy. Also, if one dharma flows through three times, and thus it is said to have three times, then it becomes chaotic. Furthermore, if dharmas such as form flow through three times, and if they do not have different aspects, then there should be no three times. If they have different aspects, then they are different aspects, originally non-existent but arising, existing and then ceasing. All conditioned dharmas should be like this, which would be equivalent to abandoning the view that things are permanent. The following verse is also stated:

'If a dharma is in the future, and has a future aspect, it should be present.'

在　　如何名未來

論曰。若色等法未來現有。應如現在便失未來。未來既無二世非有。彼為先故一切應無。複次有說。諸法體雖常有。然唯能取等流果用。說名現在。如是一用現在遍有。去來定無。不雜亂故。余用不爾。為破此言。故次頌曰。

去來如現有　　取果用何無

論曰。過去未來色等諸法。既如現在常有體性。為同類因取等流果。此用何故非常有耶。此取果用所待眾緣。於一切時亦常有故。如是諸法體用常有。應一切時名現在世。恒名現在義亦不成。要待去來立現在故。又未來果如現在法。已有體故不應復取。又諸果法因緣合時。若無所生則不名果。所生若有此即本無。從緣而生。體亦應爾。是則一切本無而生。有已還滅。應同前過。謂便退失說常有宗。若言其用或有或無。法體常存。故無此失。亦不應理。故次頌曰。

若體恒非無　　何為不常住

論曰。恒有名常。色等諸法體既恒有。云何非常。設許有為體皆常者。便違經說諸行無常。若言諸行體雖恒有。有為相合故是無常。此亦不然。體既常有與彼相合復何所成。豈不能成取自果用。用不離體。體亦應成。若用須成體不成者。用可生滅體應是常。若色等體常用無常者。即虛空等體用應無常。又若體常用無常故。亦令此體

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本在：如何稱之為『未來』？

論曰：如果色等法在未來已經存在，那麼就應該像現在一樣，失去其未來的性質。未來既然不存在，那麼過去和未來都不是真實存在的。因為未來是先決條件，所以一切都應該不存在。此外，有人說，諸法的本體雖然是恒常存在的，但只能獲取等流果的作用，所以才被稱為『現在』。就像這樣，一種作用在現在普遍存在，過去和未來肯定不存在，因為它們不會混淆。其他的用處則不然。爲了駁斥這種說法，所以接下來頌曰：

『過去未來如現有，取果用何無？』

論曰：過去和未來的色等諸法，既然像現在一樣具有恒常的體性，作為同類因，獲取等流果，為什麼這種作用不是恒常存在的呢？這種獲取果的作用所依賴的眾多因緣，在任何時候也都是恒常存在的。如果這些法的體性和作用都是恒常存在的，那麼就應該在任何時候都被稱為『現在世』。恒常被稱為『現在』的意義也無法成立，因為需要依賴過去和未來才能確立現在。而且，未來的果就像現在的法一樣，因為已經有了體性，所以不應該再獲取。此外，各種果法在因緣聚合時，如果沒有產生任何東西，就不能被稱為果。如果所產生的東西是存在的，那麼它原本是不存在的，是從因緣而產生的。體性也應該是這樣。那麼一切都是從原本不存在而產生的，存在之後又會消滅，應該和之前一樣有過失，也就是會退失『常有』的宗義。如果說它的作用或者存在或者不存在，法的本體是恒常存在的，所以沒有這種過失，這也是不合理的。所以接下來頌曰：

『若體恒非無，何為不常住？』

論曰：『恒』的意思是『常』。色等諸法的本體既然是恒常存在的，為什麼不是常住的呢？假設承認有為法的本體都是恒常的，那就違背了經中所說的『諸行無常』。如果說諸行的本體雖然是恒常存在的，但因為與有為相結合，所以是無常的，這也是不對的。本體既然是恒常存在的，與它相合又能成就什麼呢？難道不能成就獲取自身果的作用嗎？作用不離開本體，本體也應該被成就。如果作用需要被成就，而本體沒有被成就，那麼作用可以生滅，本體應該是常住的。如果色等的本體和作用都是無常的，那麼虛空等的本體和作用也應該是無常的。而且，如果本體和作用都是無常的，也會導致這個本體...

【English Translation】 English version In: How to Name the Future?

Treatise: If form and other dharmas already exist in the future, they should lose their future nature just like the present. Since the future does not exist, neither the past nor the future are truly existent. Because the future is a prerequisite, everything should not exist. Furthermore, some say that although the essence of all dharmas is constant, they can only obtain the function of equiflow results, so they are called 'present'. Just like this, one function is universally present in the present, and the past and future definitely do not exist because they are not confused. Other uses are not like this. To refute this statement, the following verse says:

'The past and future are like the present, why is there no function of obtaining results?'

Treatise: Since the form and other dharmas of the past and future have a constant nature like the present, as a cause of the same kind, obtaining equiflow results, why is this function not constant? The numerous conditions on which this function of obtaining results depends are also constant at all times. If the essence and function of these dharmas are constant, then they should be called 'present world' at all times. The meaning of being constantly called 'present' cannot be established either, because it needs to rely on the past and future to establish the present. Moreover, the future result, like the present dharma, should not be obtained again because it already has an essence. Furthermore, when various result dharmas gather due to causes and conditions, if nothing is produced, it cannot be called a result. If what is produced exists, then it originally did not exist, and it is produced from causes and conditions. The essence should also be like this. Then everything is produced from what originally did not exist, and after existing, it will perish, which should have the same fault as before, that is, it will retreat from the tenet of 'constant existence'. If it is said that its function either exists or does not exist, and the essence of the dharma is constant, so there is no such fault, this is also unreasonable. So the following verse says:

'If the essence is always not non-existent, why is it not permanent?'

Treatise: 'Constant' means 'permanent'. Since the essence of form and other dharmas is constant, why is it not permanent? Suppose it is admitted that the essence of conditioned dharmas is constant, then it violates the sutra which says 'all phenomena are impermanent'. If it is said that although the essence of phenomena is constant, it is impermanent because it is combined with conditioned phenomena, this is also incorrect. Since the essence is constant, what can be achieved by combining with it? Can't it achieve the function of obtaining its own result? The function does not leave the essence, and the essence should also be achieved. If the function needs to be achieved, but the essence is not achieved, then the function can arise and cease, and the essence should be permanent. If the essence and function of form and other things are impermanent, then the essence and function of space and other things should also be impermanent. Moreover, if the essence and function are impermanent, it will also cause this essence...

成無常者。用雖無常。由體常故。即令此用應亦是常。又此體用應別諦攝。以常無常義不同故。又若色等體不藉緣。而與有為諸相合者。太虛空等體亦應然。彼既不然。此云何爾。

複次過去世言。為簡別相總詮一切過去義耶。為簡總相別詮一類過去義耶。若爾何失。若簡別相總詮一切過去義者。其理不成。故次頌曰。

過去若過去　　如何成過去

論曰。若過去法一切體相悉皆過去。是則一切都無所有。如何汝說。過去是有依是體相。汝意說為過去有者亦無有故。又過去者。名為已滅。若過去世亦過去者。是則過去亦應已滅。若過去世亦已滅者。如何汝今執有過去。如彼未來現在已滅。不名未來現在世故。若依正理。應如是說。過去世言。無別實義簡去實有差別名相。依止世俗假立名相。總說過去非有別義。若汝意謂。如名飲油。雖不飲油。而假名說。世間共許別目一事。此過去言。亦復如是。簡于總相別詮一類過去義者。理亦不然。故次頌曰。

過去不過去　　如何成過去

論曰。若過去法。一切體相非悉過去。如何汝今執為過去。汝說過去色等諸法體無闕故。又過去者。名為已滅。若過去世不過去者。是則過去體非已滅。若過去體非已滅者。如何汝今執為過去。如彼未來及現在世。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本若說『成就無常』，即使『用』是無常的，但由於『體』是常的，那麼這個『用』也應該是常的。而且，這個『體』和『用』應該屬於不同的諦（Satya，真理）所攝，因為常和無常的意義不同。此外，如果色（Rupa，物質）等『體』不需要依靠因緣，就能與有為（conditioned）的諸相（Laksana，特徵）結合，那麼太虛空等『體』也應該如此。既然太虛空等不是這樣，那麼色等又怎麼會是這樣呢？其次，關於『過去世』這個說法，是爲了簡別總相，總括詮釋一切過去的意義呢？還是爲了簡別總相，分別詮釋一類過去的意義呢？如果這樣，會有什麼過失呢？如果說是簡別總相，總括詮釋一切過去的意義，那麼這個道理是不能成立的。所以接下來說偈頌：『過去若是過去，如何成過去？』論曰：如果過去法的一切體相都完全是過去的，那麼一切都應該什麼都沒有了。你又怎麼說過去是有所依據、有所體相的呢？你所認為的過去存在也是不存在的。而且，所謂『過去』，就是指已經滅去的。如果過去世也是過去的，那麼過去也應該已經滅去了。如果過去世也已經滅去了，你現在又怎麼執著于有過去呢？就像未來和現在已經滅去，就不能稱為未來和現在世一樣。如果依據正理，應該這樣說：『過去世』這個說法，並沒有別的實在意義，只是簡別去除實在的差別名相，依靠世俗假立的名相，總括地說過去，並沒有別的意義。如果你認為，就像『飲油』這個名稱，雖然沒有真的飲油，但只是假名說說，世間共同認可用它來指代一件事。這個『過去』的說法，也像這樣，是爲了簡別總相，分別詮釋一類過去的意義，這個道理也是不能成立的。所以接下來說偈頌：『過去若不過去，如何成過去？』論曰：如果過去法的一切體相不是完全過去的，那麼你現在又怎麼執著認為是過去呢？你說過去的色等諸法，體沒有缺失。而且，所謂『過去』，就是指已經滅去的。如果過去世沒有過去，那麼過去的體就不是已經滅去的。如果過去的體不是已經滅去的，你現在又怎麼執著認為是過去呢？就像未來和現在世一樣。

【English Translation】 English version If 'becoming impermanent' is asserted, even if the 'function' (use) is impermanent, because the 'substance' (essence) is permanent, then this 'function' should also be permanent. Moreover, this 'substance' and 'function' should be included in different Satyas (truths), because the meanings of permanent and impermanent are different. Furthermore, if the 'substance' of Rupa (form, matter) and other elements does not rely on conditions (pratyaya) to combine with the characteristics (Laksana) of conditioned phenomena, then the 'substance' of empty space (Akasa) and other elements should also be the same. Since that is not the case, how can this be so? Secondly, regarding the term 'past time', is it to distinguish the general characteristic and comprehensively explain all past meanings, or to distinguish the general characteristic and separately explain a category of past meanings? If so, what is the fault? If it is to distinguish the general characteristic and comprehensively explain all past meanings, then this reasoning is not established. Therefore, the following verse is stated: 'If the past is past, how does it become past?' Commentary: If all the substance and characteristics of past dharmas are entirely past, then everything should be completely non-existent. How can you say that the past has a basis and a substance? What you consider to be the existence of the past is also non-existent. Moreover, 'past' means already ceased. If the past time is also past, then the past should also have ceased. If the past time has also ceased, how can you now cling to the existence of the past? Just as the future and present have ceased and are not called future and present times. If based on correct reasoning, it should be said that the term 'past time' has no separate real meaning, but merely distinguishes and removes real differences in names and forms, relying on conventionally established names and forms to comprehensively describe the past, without any separate meaning. If you think that, like the name 'drinking oil', although no oil is actually drunk, it is just a nominal expression, and the world commonly recognizes it as referring to a specific thing. This term 'past' is also like this, to distinguish the general characteristic and separately explain a category of past meanings, this reasoning is also not established. Therefore, the following verse is stated: 'If the past is not past, how does it become past?' Commentary: If all the substance and characteristics of past dharmas are not entirely past, then how can you now cling to it as the past? You say that the substance of past Rupa (form, matter) and other dharmas is not deficient. Moreover, 'past' means already ceased. If the past time is not past, then the past substance has not ceased. If the past substance has not ceased, how can you now cling to it as the past? Just like the future and present times.

自體不滅。非過去故。豈不前說如世假名。簡于總相別詮一物。過去世法其體雖在取果用無。故名過去。汝說此用即所依體。如何體在而用滅無。若體與用不相隨逐。應如別物不成體用。又但用滅。說名過去。唯汝獨立。非世共知。云何得引飲油為喻。世間共許不可推徴。獨所立者應詰問故。若說諸法其體常有。三世不成。唯于現在實有體上。假立名故。非於現在實有體上假立三名。即失現體。是故所執過去不成。如破過去未來亦爾。未來若未來。如何成未來。未來不未來。如何成未來。總別徴難。皆同前說。

複次未來世法為藉眾緣已有生耶。未有生耶。若爾何過。若藉眾緣已有生者。其理不成。故次頌曰。

未來若有生　　如何非現在

論曰。若未來法已從緣生。及有體性應名現在。有性及生是現在相。非離現在而可了知。言雖方便令成現在。而意正為破有未來。又顯未來非現在故。應如過去決定無生。若言未來未有生者。理亦不成。故次頌曰。

未來若無生　　如何非常住

論曰。若未來法未從緣生而有體性。以無生故。如虛空等體應常住。此亦方便令成常住。而意正為破有未來。如是徴難。過去未來。體若實有無滅無生。應如空等失無常性。便違經說去來無常。如說過去未來色等

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：自體不會消滅。因為它不是過去。難道不是之前說過，就像世俗的假名，通過總的相狀來區分，詮釋一個事物。過去的世間法，它的本體雖然存在，但取果的作用已經沒有了，所以叫做過去。你說這個作用就是所依賴的本體。怎麼能本體還在而作用卻滅亡了呢？如果本體和作用不互相隨順，應該像不同的事物一樣，不能成為本體和作用。而且只是作用滅亡，就說它是過去，只有你這麼認為，世間上不是普遍認可的。怎麼能用飲油來做比喻呢？世間上普遍認可的道理是不可推翻的。對於你獨自建立的觀點，應該進行詰問。如果說諸法的本體是常有的，那麼三世就不能成立。只是在現在真實存在的本體上，假立名稱。如果不是在現在真實存在的本體上假立三個名稱，就會失去現在的本體。所以你所執著的過去是不能成立的。像破斥過去一樣，未來也是如此。如果未來是未來，怎麼能成為未來？如果未來不是未來，怎麼能成為未來？總的提問和分別的詰難，都和前面說的一樣。

再次，未來的世間法是憑藉眾緣已經產生了嗎？還是沒有產生呢？如果這樣問，有什麼過失呢？如果憑藉眾緣已經產生，這個道理是不成立的。所以接下來的頌說：

『未來若有生，如何非現在』

論曰：如果未來的法已經從因緣產生，並且具有體性，就應該叫做現在。有體性和產生是現在的相狀。不能離開現在而可以瞭解。言語上雖然方便地讓它成為現在，但真正的意思是破斥有未來。又顯示未來不是現在，應該像過去一樣，決定沒有產生。如果說未來沒有產生，這個道理也是不成立的。所以接下來的頌說：

『未來若無生，如何非常住』

論曰：如果未來的法沒有從因緣產生而有體性，因為沒有產生，就像虛空等，本體應該常住。這同樣是方便地讓它成為常住，而真正的意思是破斥有未來。像這樣提問和詰難，過去和未來，如果本體真實存在，沒有消滅也沒有產生，應該像虛空一樣失去無常的性質，就違背了經書上說的過去和未來是無常的。就像經書上說的過去和未來的色等。

【English Translation】 English version: The self does not perish. Because it is not the past. Didn't we say before, like worldly designations, distinguishing through general characteristics to explain a thing. The past worldly dharmas, although their substance exists, the function of taking effect is gone, so it is called the past. You say that this function is the very substance it relies on. How can the substance still exist while the function is extinguished? If the substance and function do not follow each other, they should be like separate things, unable to become substance and function. Moreover, only the function is extinguished, and it is said to be the past, only you think so, it is not universally recognized in the world. How can you use drinking oil as a metaphor? The universally recognized principles in the world cannot be overturned. For the views you have established alone, you should be questioned. If you say that the substance of all dharmas is constant, then the three times cannot be established. Only on the present real substance, falsely establish names. If not on the present real substance to falsely establish three names, it will lose the present substance. Therefore, the past you are attached to cannot be established. Like refuting the past, the future is also the same. If the future is the future, how can it become the future? If the future is not the future, how can it become the future? The general questions and separate refutations are all the same as what was said before.

Furthermore, does the future worldly dharma already have arising by relying on conditions, or has it not arisen? If you ask this, what is the fault? If it has already arisen by relying on conditions, this principle is not established. Therefore, the following verse says:

'If the future has arising, how is it not the present?'

Commentary: If the future dharma has already arisen from causes and conditions, and has a substance, it should be called the present. Having substance and arising are characteristics of the present. It cannot be understood apart from the present. Although the language is conveniently making it the present, the real intention is to refute the existence of the future. It also shows that the future is not the present, it should be like the past, definitely without arising. If you say that the future has not arisen, this principle is also not established. Therefore, the following verse says:

'If the future has no arising, how is it not permanent?'

Commentary: If the future dharma has not arisen from causes and conditions but has a substance, because it has no arising, like space etc., the substance should be permanent. This is also conveniently making it permanent, but the real intention is to refute the existence of the future. Like this questioning and refuting, the past and future, if the substance really exists, without extinction and without arising, it should lose the nature of impermanence like space, which violates the scriptures saying that the past and future are impermanent. Like the scriptures saying the past and future form etc.

尚是無常。何況現在。是故過去未來諸法。並非實有。現在無為所不攝故。如龜毛等不可說言世所攝故。應如現在體是實有。現在非唯是實有故。同喻不成。因或不定。或相違故。

複次往來論者作如是言。不善我宗。妄說此過。所以者何。我宗中說。諸行四相展轉相依。三世往來不相舍離。由生等合故成無常。法性不壞故說恒有。是故恒有不廢無常。符順契經。稱當正理。此前已破體既恒有。應如太虛非生等合。又以能生色等諸行。說為生相。如是能生諸行作用。未來未有。要藉因緣和合資助。然後方有。若不然者。因緣和合便成無用。若許生用本無今有有已還無。則一切行同有為故。皆亦應爾。云何而說體雖恒有而是無常。往來論者。為避如是所說過失。復作是言。若色等行與生等合。有此過者。今有為法三世往來。有世壞相應是無常。以滅壞相是無常故。世間共許一切無常滅壞為相。謂有為法。未來世壞入于現在。現在世壞復入過去。若爾頌曰。

若未來無生　　壞故非常者　過去既無壞　　何不謂無常

論曰。過去世體最居后故。更無餘世可令轉入。既守自位恒無壞滅。應如空等體非無常。如是便違契經所說。若言過去雖恒有體更無滅壞。而從現在壞已轉入。故得有生。生滅二種是無常相

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：無常的事物尚且會變化，更何況是現在呢？因此，過去和未來的諸法並非真實存在，因為它們不被現在的無為法所包含。如同龜毛等事物，不能說它們屬於世間所攝，所以不應像現在的自體一樣被認為是實有。現在並非僅僅是實有，所以這個比喻不成立，論證或者是不確定，或者是相互矛盾。

另外，往來論者這樣說：『你不瞭解我的宗義，妄加指責。』為什麼呢？因為我的宗義中說，諸行的四相（生、住、異、滅）展轉相依，三世（過去、現在、未來）往來不相舍離。由於生等四相的聚合，所以成為無常。法性不壞，所以說是恒有。因此，恒有並不妨礙無常，這符合佛經，也符合正理。』此前已經破斥過，如果自體是恒有的，就應該像虛空一樣，不需要生等四相的聚合。又以能生色等諸行的作用，稱為生相。像這樣能生諸行的作用，在未來還沒有產生，需要憑藉因緣和合資助，然後才會有。如果不是這樣，因緣和合就變得沒有用處。如果承認生起的作用本來沒有現在有，有了之後又會消失，那麼一切行都和有為法一樣，都應該如此。怎麼能說自體雖然恒有，卻是無常的呢？往來論者爲了避免上述的過失，又這樣說：『如果色等諸行與生等四相聚合，才會有這些過失。現在有為法三世往來，有世間壞滅相應，所以是無常。因為滅壞相是無常的緣故。』世間普遍認為一切無常以滅壞為相，即有為法，未來世的壞滅進入現在，現在世的壞滅又進入過去。如果這樣，頌文說：

『如果未來沒有生，因為壞滅的緣故不是恒常的，那麼過去既然沒有壞滅，為什麼不說是無常的呢？』

論曰：過去世的自體最靠後，沒有其他的世可以進入。既然守住自己的位置，恒常沒有壞滅，就應該像虛空一樣，自體不是無常的。這樣就違背了佛經所說。如果說過去雖然恒有自體，沒有滅壞，但是從現在的壞滅轉入，所以才會有生，生滅兩種是無常相。

【English Translation】 English version: Even impermanent things change, let alone the present. Therefore, the dharmas of the past and future are not truly existent because they are not encompassed by the unconditioned (無為法) of the present. Like the hair of a tortoise, one cannot say they are included in the world, so they should not be considered truly existent like the self-nature of the present. The present is not merely truly existent, so this analogy does not hold, and the argument is either uncertain or contradictory.

Furthermore, the 'Coming and Going' theorists say: 'You do not understand my doctrine and are making false accusations.' Why? Because in my doctrine, the four characteristics of conditioned phenomena (諸行四相) (birth, duration, change, and decay) are mutually dependent, and the three times (三世) (past, present, and future) come and go without separation. Due to the aggregation of birth and other characteristics, they become impermanent. The nature of dharma (法性) is not destroyed, so it is said to be constant. Therefore, constancy does not negate impermanence, which is in accordance with the sutras and conforms to right reason.' It has already been refuted that if the self-nature is constant, it should be like space (太虛), not requiring the aggregation of birth and other characteristics. Moreover, the function of generating phenomena such as form (色) is called the characteristic of birth. Such a function of generating phenomena does not yet exist in the future and requires the assistance of causal conditions (因緣) to arise. If this were not the case, the aggregation of causal conditions would be useless. If it is admitted that the function of arising originally did not exist but now exists, and after existing will cease again, then all phenomena should be the same as conditioned phenomena and should all be like that. How can it be said that the self-nature is constant but impermanent? To avoid the aforementioned faults, the 'Coming and Going' theorists further say: 'If these faults arise when phenomena such as form aggregate with birth and other characteristics, now conditioned phenomena come and go in the three times, and there is a corresponding destruction of the world, so it is impermanent because the characteristic of destruction is impermanent.' The world universally acknowledges that all impermanence has destruction as its characteristic, that is, conditioned phenomena, the destruction of the future enters the present, and the destruction of the present enters the past. If so, the verse says:

'If the future has no birth, and is not constant because of destruction, then since the past has no destruction, why not say it is impermanent?'

The treatise says: The self-nature of the past is the furthest behind, and there is no other time it can enter. Since it remains in its own position and is constantly without destruction, it should be like space, and its self-nature is not impermanent. This contradicts what the sutras say. If it is said that although the past has a constant self-nature, it has no destruction, but it enters from the destruction of the present, so there is birth, and birth and destruction are the two characteristics of impermanence.

。隨具不具並表無常。去來各一。現在具二。是故三世皆是無常。此不應理。生無有故。汝宗自執生在未來過去現在都無生用。云何今說過去有生。汝執過現已從緣生。更不藉緣。生如何有。若執過去定有生者。生必歸滅。一向記故。如現未故。復應有滅。世間亦許未來諸法可藉緣生。非過現世。又過去世非現未故。應如空等定無有生。是故能相及所相法。應如帝釋並恒策迦。一時併入常無常火。以位如體體如位故。

複次如說過去未來色等尚是無常。何況現在。汝等雖誦如是經文。而不知義。所以者何。汝執一法。往來三世。體無生滅。云何無常。又汝所執。現在法體即是去來。云何相況。不可一法自為比況。世間不見如是事故。亦不可言體雖無異位差別故。得為比況。所以者何。位若即體。體無異故。位亦無別。位若離體。位可無常。體應常住。又體如位。世所攝故。是有為故。應有差別。又汝所執三世實有不相因待。皆與生等有為相合。前後無異。現在無常。有何勝相。異彼去來。而說過去未來色等尚是無常。何況現在。若言諸法前後位別。三時轉變。故是無常。未來居前無生有滅。過去居后無滅有生。現在居中有生有滅。過未各一尚是無常。何況現在。具有二種而非無常。此亦不然。未來無生應如空等

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：隨其具備或不具備，都表明了無常的性質。過去和未來各有一次生滅，現在具備兩次生滅。因此，如果說三世都是無常的，這並不合理，因為『生』並不存在。你們宗派自己認為，『生』在過去、現在、未來都沒有作用。為什麼現在又說過去有『生』呢？你們認為過去和現在已經從因緣產生，不再依賴因緣，那麼『生』又怎麼可能存在呢？如果認為過去一定有『生』，那麼『生』必定歸於滅，因為這是一定的規律，就像現在和未來一樣。因此，過去也應該有滅。世間也承認未來諸法可以依賴因緣而生，但過去和現在則不然。而且，過去世既不是現在也不是未來，應該像虛空一樣，必定沒有『生』。所以，能相和所相之法，應該像帝釋天（Indra，天神之王）和恒策迦（恒河邊的沙洲）一樣，同時進入常與無常的火焰之中，因為位置如同本體，本體如同位置。其次，如果說過去和未來的色等尚且是無常，何況現在？你們雖然誦讀這樣的經文，卻不理解其中的含義。為什麼呢？因為你們認為一個法，往來於三世，本體沒有生滅，這怎麼能說是無常呢？而且，你們認為現在的法體就是過去和未來，這怎麼能相比呢？不能用一個法自己和自己相比。世間沒有見過這樣的事情。也不能說本體雖然沒有差異，但位置有差別，所以可以相比。為什麼呢？如果位置就是本體，本體沒有差異，那麼位置也沒有差別。如果位置離開本體，位置可以是無常的，但本體應該常住。而且，本體如同位置，被世間所包含，是有為法，應該有差別。而且，你們認為三世實有，不互相依賴，都與生等有為相合，前後沒有差異，那麼現在是無常的，有什麼優勝之處，不同於過去和未來，而說過去和未來的色等尚且是無常，何況現在？如果說諸法前後位置不同，三時轉變，所以是無常。未來在前，沒有生有滅；過去在後，沒有滅有生；現在居中，有生有滅。過去和未來各只有一種（生或滅），尚且是無常，何況現在具有兩種（生和滅）卻不是無常？這也是不對的。未來沒有生，應該像虛空一樣。

【English Translation】 English version: Whether accompanied by or devoid of, all indicate impermanence. The past and future each have one instance of arising and ceasing, while the present has two. Therefore, to say that all three times are impermanent is unreasonable, because 『arising』 does not exist. Your own school holds that 『arising』 has no function in the past, present, or future. Why do you now say that the past has 『arising』? You believe that the past and present have already arisen from conditions and no longer rely on conditions, so how can 『arising』 exist? If you believe that the past definitely has 『arising,』 then 『arising』 must lead to cessation, because that is the fixed rule, just like the present and future. Therefore, the past should also have cessation. The world also acknowledges that future phenomena can arise depending on conditions, but not the past and present. Moreover, the past is neither present nor future, and should be like space, definitely without 『arising.』 Therefore, the characterizing and characterized phenomena should be like Indra (帝釋, king of the gods) and Hengaceka (恒策迦, a sandbank on the Ganges), simultaneously entering the fire of permanence and impermanence, because position is like substance, and substance is like position. Furthermore, if you say that even the past and future forms are impermanent, how much more so the present? Although you recite such sutras, you do not understand their meaning. Why? Because you believe that one dharma travels through the three times, and its substance has no arising or ceasing, so how can it be said to be impermanent? Moreover, you believe that the substance of the present dharma is the past and future, so how can they be compared? One dharma cannot be compared to itself. The world has not seen such a thing. Nor can it be said that although the substance has no difference, the positions are different, so they can be compared. Why? If the position is the substance, and the substance has no difference, then the position also has no difference. If the position is separate from the substance, the position can be impermanent, but the substance should be permanent. Moreover, the substance is like the position, encompassed by the world, is conditioned, and should have differences. Moreover, you believe that the three times are real, do not depend on each other, and are all combined with conditioned phenomena such as arising, with no difference between before and after, then what is the superior aspect of the present being impermanent, different from the past and future, that you say even the past and future forms are impermanent, how much more so the present? If you say that the positions of phenomena are different before and after, and the three times transform, so they are impermanent. The future is in front, without arising but with cessation; the past is behind, without cessation but with arising; the present is in the middle, with both arising and cessation. The past and future each have only one (arising or cessation), and are still impermanent, how much more so the present, which has both (arising and cessation) but is not impermanent? This is also incorrect. The future has no arising, and should be like space.

。云何有滅。過去有生。應如現在云何無滅。又汝宗說。未來有生。現在有滅。過去無二。云何今者作異說耶。又現在世亦無實體。從前世來轉入後世。如何依此建立生滅。既無生滅豈是無常。所以者何。故次頌曰。

現在世無常　　非由過去等　除斯二所趣　　更無有第三

論曰。現在世法非前世來。不往後世。云何無常。汝說現在。由余世故。轉成異相。說為無常。余世謂去來。異相謂生滅。現在不可余世轉成。亦復不可轉成余世。云何現在建立生滅。頌言非由過去等者。等取未來現在世法不往未來非從過去。汝宗自許。然過去世非現所往。以世別故。譬如未來。其未來世非現所從。以世別故。猶如過去既無餘世往來轉變。云何現在生滅無常。若說現在從過去來往未來世。亦同此破。故契經說。有為諸法非前際來。不往後際。故破此執。其理決定。順聖教故。又現在法。若余世來往余世者。應往來時不捨前相。不成余相。世間現見提婆達多餘方往來相無異故。如是三世位雖許別。相無異故便成雜亂。由位與相若一若異皆有過失不可免故。汝等所宗往來論者。亦不忍許世相雜亂。是故汝今如此安立。往來生滅。不成救義。如是現在雖許往來。其無常性亦不成立。于往來時相無異故。應似空花非無常性。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本何為『滅』？既然過去有『生』，按照你們的說法，應該像現在一樣沒有『滅』。而且你們宗派說，未來有『生』，現在有『滅』，過去沒有這兩種情況。為什麼現在又做出不同的說法呢？而且現在世也沒有實體，是從前世而來，轉入後世。如何依據這個來建立『生滅』呢？既然沒有『生滅』，又怎麼能說是無常呢？這是為什麼呢？所以接下來說：

『現在世無常，非由過去等，除斯二所趣，更無有第三。』

論曰：現在世的法，不是從前世而來，也不往後世而去，怎麼能說是無常呢？你們說現在世，由於其他世的緣故，轉變成為不同的相，所以說是無常。其他的世指的是過去和未來。不同的相指的是生和滅。現在世不可能由其他世轉變而成，也不可能轉變成其他世。怎麼能在現在世建立『生滅』呢？頌文說『非由過去等』，『等』字包括了未來。現在世的法不往未來而去，也不是從過去而來，這是你們宗派自己承認的。然而，過去世不是現在世所能到達的，因為世不同。比如未來世。未來世不是現在世所由來的，因為世不同，就像過去世一樣。既然沒有其他世的往來轉變，怎麼能說現在世有生滅無常呢？如果說現在世是從過去而來，往未來而去，也同樣可以用這個道理來破斥。所以契經上說，有為諸法不是從前際而來，也不往後際而去。所以破斥這種執著，道理是確定的，因為符合聖教。而且，現在的法，如果是從其他世而來，往其他世而去，那麼在往來的時候，應該不捨棄之前的相，也不成就其他的相。世間現在可以看到，提婆達多往來於其他地方，相貌沒有改變。像這樣，三世雖然承認位有差別，但是相沒有差別，就會造成混亂。因為位和相，如果說是一，或者說是異，都有過失，無法避免。你們這些主張往來論的人，也不忍心承認世相雜亂。所以你們現在這樣安立往來生滅，不能成立救義。像這樣，現在世即使承認往來，它的無常性也不能成立。因為在往來的時候，相沒有改變，應該像空中的花一樣，不是無常的性質。

【English Translation】 English version What is 『cessation』? Since the past has 『arising,』 it should, like the present, have no 『cessation』 according to your view. Moreover, your school says that the future has 『arising,』 the present has 『cessation,』 and the past has neither. Why do you now make a different claim? Furthermore, the present world also has no substance; it comes from the past and enters the future. How can you establish 『arising and cessation』 based on this? Since there is no 『arising and cessation,』 how can it be impermanent? Why is that? Therefore, the following verse says:

『The present world is impermanent, not due to the past, etc. Besides these two destinations, there is no third.』

Treatise says: The dharma of the present world does not come from the past, nor does it go to the future. How can it be impermanent? You say that the present, due to other worlds, transforms into different appearances, and therefore it is said to be impermanent. The other worlds refer to the past and future. The different appearances refer to arising and cessation. The present cannot be transformed by other worlds, nor can it be transformed into other worlds. How can 『arising and cessation』 be established in the present? The verse says 『not due to the past, etc.,』 the 『etc.』 includes the future. The dharma of the present world does not go to the future, nor does it come from the past; this is what your school admits. However, the past world cannot be reached by the present, because the worlds are different, like the future. The future world is not originated from the present, because the worlds are different, like the past. Since there is no transformation of coming and going between other worlds, how can the present have arising, cessation, and impermanence? If you say that the present comes from the past and goes to the future, this reasoning can also be used to refute it. Therefore, the sutras say that conditioned dharmas do not come from the prior limit, nor do they go to the posterior limit. Therefore, refuting this attachment is a definite principle, because it accords with the holy teachings. Moreover, if the present dharma comes from other worlds and goes to other worlds, then in the process of coming and going, it should not abandon its previous appearance, nor should it achieve other appearances. In the world, it is now seen that when Devadatta (提婆達多) comes and goes to other places, his appearance does not change. In this way, although the three worlds are admitted to have different positions, if the appearances are not different, it will cause confusion. Because if the position and appearance are the same or different, there are faults that cannot be avoided. You, who advocate the theory of coming and going, cannot bear to admit that the appearances of the worlds are mixed up. Therefore, your current establishment of coming and going, arising and cessation, cannot establish the meaning of salvation. In this way, even if the present admits coming and going, its impermanence cannot be established. Because in the process of coming and going, the appearance does not change, it should be like a flower in the sky, not of an impermanent nature.

汝亦不許空花異相有及無常。現在若爾。即違自宗及契經說。若汝復言。三世體相雖無別異。然觀諸行粗位差別開發覺慧。故於一法自心分別安立分位。由此自心安立分位有差別故。說此一法以為無常。此亦不然。自心分別所見境界。即是自心但隨眾緣諸行種熟。自心變作種種分位。自心所變無實體相。何為精勤安立異法。但應信受諸法唯心。又覺慧等諸心心法。非隨實有諸法轉變。但隨串習成熟種子。及心所現眾緣勢力。變生種種境界差別。故外道等隨其自心變生種種諸法性相。若法性相是實有者。豈可如是隨心轉變。諸有智者。不應許彼所執現在實法有生。以必不從去來二世。更無第三可從生故。滅必隨生。生既非有。滅亦定無。以必不往去來二世。更無第三可往彼故。如是以理推撿汝宗。三世無常都不可見。有何現在殊勝無常。而契經言。何況現在。汝立一法經歷諸位。雖生等隨而無變易。相及所依前後無異。有何改轉而說無常。亦不可言隨三世位有差別故。說為無常。體既無變。位如何別。位體若異位自無常。體應常住如虛空等。是故三世但世俗有。于中都無一法真實。然于如是世俗法中。現在諸行所有生滅。由與身俱世間現見。是故現在無常義勝。依之假立去來無常。以彼去來無別有體。但依現在曾當假立

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本你也不應允許虛空中的花朵有異樣的相狀，無論是存在還是無常。如果現在是這樣，就違背了你自己的宗派以及契經的說法。如果你又說，三世（過去、現在、未來）的體性和相狀雖然沒有差別，但是觀察諸行的粗顯位次的差別，從而開發覺悟的智慧，因此對於一個法，自己的心分別安立不同的分位。由於自己的心安立的分位有差別，所以說這一個法是無常的。這也是不對的。自己的心分別所見到的境界，就是自己的心，只是隨著各種因緣，諸行（行為、現象）的種子成熟，自己的心變化成種種分位。自己的心所變化的沒有實體的相狀，為什麼要精勤地安立不同的法呢？只應當信受諸法唯心（一切法皆由心生）。而且，覺慧等各種心和心所法，不是隨著真實存在的諸法而轉變，只是隨著串習成熟的種子，以及心所顯現的各種因緣勢力，變化產生種種境界的差別。所以外道等隨著他們自己的心，變化產生種種諸法的性相。如果法的性相是真實存在的，怎麼可以這樣隨著心而轉變呢？有智慧的人，不應該允許他們所執著的現在實法有生，因為必定不是從過去和未來二世而來，也沒有第三個可以從中產生。滅亡必定跟隨產生。產生既然沒有，滅亡也必定沒有。因為必定不是前往過去和未來二世，也沒有第三個可以前往那裡。像這樣用道理推究你的宗派，三世的無常都不可見。有什麼現在殊勝的無常，而契經說，何況是現在呢？你建立一個法，經歷各種位次，雖然生等跟隨，卻沒有變易，相狀和所依前後沒有差異，有什麼改變和轉動而說是無常呢？也不可以說隨著三世的位次有差別，所以說是無常。體性既然沒有改變，位次怎麼會有差別呢？位次和體性如果不同，位次自身就是無常的，體性應該常住如同虛空等。所以三世只是世俗諦（相對真理）有，其中沒有一個法是真實的。然而在這樣的世俗法中，現在諸行的所有生滅，由於與身體同在，世間可以現見，所以現在無常的意義殊勝。依靠它來假立過去和未來的無常，因為過去和未來沒有別的體性，只是依靠現在曾經和將要假立。

【English Translation】 English version You should also not allow that empty space flowers have different appearances, whether they exist or are impermanent. If it is so now, then it contradicts your own doctrine and the sutras. If you further say that although the nature and appearance of the three times (past, present, and future) are not different, by observing the differences in the coarse positions of various phenomena, wisdom of enlightenment is developed. Therefore, for one dharma (law, phenomenon), one's own mind establishes different divisions. Because the divisions established by one's own mind are different, it is said that this one dharma is impermanent. This is also not correct. The realm seen by one's own mind's discrimination is just one's own mind, only following various conditions, the seeds of various phenomena mature, and one's own mind transforms into various divisions. What is transformed by one's own mind has no real substance or appearance. Why diligently establish different dharmas? One should only believe that all dharmas are only mind (everything arises from the mind). Moreover, wisdom of enlightenment and other mental functions (citta) and mental events (cetasika) do not change according to the real existence of dharmas, but only according to the seeds matured by habitual practice, and the power of various conditions manifested by the mind, transforming and producing various differences in realms. Therefore, non-Buddhists and others, according to their own minds, transform and produce various natures and appearances of dharmas. If the nature and appearance of dharmas are real, how can they be transformed according to the mind? Wise people should not allow that the present real dharma they cling to has birth, because it certainly does not come from the past and future two times, and there is no third from which it can arise. Cessation (nirodha) must follow arising (utpada). Since arising does not exist, cessation also certainly does not exist. Because it certainly does not go to the past and future two times, and there is no third place to which it can go. Examining your doctrine with reason in this way, the impermanence of the three times is not visible at all. What present, excellent impermanence is there, that the sutras say, 'What about the present?' You establish one dharma, experiencing various positions, although arising and so on follow, there is no change, the appearance and what it relies on are not different before and after, what change and movement is there to say it is impermanent? It also cannot be said that it is called impermanent because there are differences according to the positions of the three times. Since the nature has not changed, how can the positions be different? If the position and nature are different, the position itself is impermanent, and the nature should abide permanently like space and so on. Therefore, the three times only exist in conventional truth (samvriti-satya), and there is no one dharma that is real within them. However, in such conventional dharmas, the arising and ceasing of all present phenomena, because they are with the body and are seen by the world, the meaning of present impermanence is superior. Relying on it, past and future impermanence are falsely established, because the past and future have no other nature, but are falsely established relying on the present that was and will be.

。故依現在現見無常。假立去來曾當生滅。去來無常依現在故。現在無常勝去來世。欲使有情知去來世。不現見法尚是無常。何況現在。現與身俱。現見生滅而非無常。由是契經。作如是說。現在世法現有無常。過去未來曾當生滅。是故有情於三世事。當觀無常應深厭離。為顯諸行本無而生先無定體。故復頌曰。

若後生諸行　　先已有定體　說有定性人　　應非是邪執

論曰。如有外道起邪執言。諸行本來決定相屬。轉變時分不可改易。不由期愿及以人功。汝等亦應同彼所見。所以者何。由說因果安立差別。本來相屬不可迴轉。未來諸法四事決定。所謂因果所依所緣。如本定相而後生故。若爾不應待因緣生。既因緣生。云何本有。為顯未來諸行有體因緣無用。故次頌曰。

若法因緣生　　即非先有體　先有而生者　　生已復應生

論曰。諸行本有與生相違。如法已生不復生故。無常諸行若無生者。雖遇因緣亦無變易。則應退失無常行性。以無生故。譬如空花。若有生者。如取果用。于生位前應未有體。頌言生已復應生者。以說過門顯異法喻。謂有為行非先有性。從緣生故如取果用。諸先有者不從緣生。如已生法。若汝復言。我說諸行雖本有體不待因緣。然取果用本無而有待因緣者。此亦不

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因此，依據現在可以親眼見到的無常，假設有過去、未來、曾經、將要生滅等概念。過去和未來的無常依賴於現在的無常。現在的無常比過去和未來的無常更為顯著。想要讓有情眾生了解過去和未來的事物，即使是不能親眼見到的法也是無常的，更何況是現在的事物呢？現在的事物與身體同在，親眼見到生滅變化，怎麼能說不是無常呢？因此，契經（佛經）中這樣說：『現在世間的事物，現在就有無常；過去和未來，曾經和將要生滅。』所以，有情眾生對於過去、現在、未來三世的事情，應當觀察其無常的本質，應該深深地厭惡和遠離它們。爲了顯示諸行（一切事物）本來沒有，而是後來才產生的，原本沒有固定的體性，所以又用偈頌說：『如果後來產生的諸行（一切事物），先前已經有了固定的體性，那麼說有固定不變的自性的人，應該不是邪見。』論曰：如果有一些外道生起邪見說，諸行（一切事物）本來就是決定不變的，轉變的時間和狀態是不可改變的，不是通過祈願和人為努力可以改變的。你們也應該和他們有同樣的看法。為什麼呢？因為你們說因果的安立和差別，本來就是相互關聯，不可改變的。未來的諸法（一切事物）的四件事是決定的，也就是因、果、所依、所緣。就像原本就有的狀態，然後才產生。如果這樣，就不應該等待因緣而生。既然是因緣所生，怎麼能說是原本就有的呢？爲了顯示未來的諸行（一切事物）有體性，因緣沒有作用，所以接著用偈頌說：『如果法（事物）是因緣所生，那就不是先前就有的體性。先前就有的東西如果還要再生，那麼生了之後應該還要再生。』論曰：諸行（一切事物）的本有和生是相互矛盾的，就像法（事物）已經生了就不會再生一樣。無常的諸行（一切事物）如果沒有生，即使遇到因緣也不會有變化，那麼就應該失去無常的性質，因為沒有生。就像虛空中的花朵一樣。如果有生，就像取果實來用一樣，在生之前應該沒有體性。偈頌說『生了之後應該還要再生』，是用反駁的方式來顯示不同的法（事物）的比喻。也就是說，有為法（由因緣和合而成的法）不是先前就有的體性，而是從因緣而生，就像取果實來用一樣。先前就有的東西不是從因緣而生，就像已經生了的法（事物）一樣。如果你們又說，我說諸行（一切事物）雖然本來有體性，但不等待因緣，然而取果實來用是本來沒有，因為等待因緣才有的。這也是不合理的。

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, based on the impermanence that is directly visible in the present, we hypothetically establish the concepts of past, future, former, and about-to-be arising and ceasing. The impermanence of the past and future depends on the present impermanence. The present impermanence is more evident than the past and future. If you want sentient beings to understand the past and future, even the dharmas (phenomena) that are not directly visible are impermanent, let alone the present ones. The present is with the body, and seeing arising and ceasing, how can it be said to be not impermanent? Therefore, the Sutra (Buddhist scripture) says: 'The dharmas (phenomena) of the present world have impermanence in the present; the past and future, former and about-to-be arising and ceasing.' Therefore, sentient beings should observe the impermanent nature of the past, present, and future, and should deeply detest and stay away from them. To show that all samskaras (conditioned things) originally do not exist but are produced later, and originally have no fixed nature, therefore, it is said in the verse: 'If the samskaras (conditioned things) that arise later already had a fixed nature beforehand, then those who say there is a fixed self-nature should not be considered to have wrong views.' Treatise says: If some heretics arise with wrong views and say that all samskaras (conditioned things) are originally fixed and unchanging, and the time and state of transformation cannot be changed, and cannot be changed by prayer and human effort. You should also have the same view as them. Why? Because you say that the establishment and difference of cause and effect are originally related and cannot be changed. The four things of future dharmas (phenomena) are determined, namely cause, effect, support, and condition. It's like the original state, and then it arises. If so, it should not wait for conditions to arise. Since it is born of conditions, how can it be said to be originally existing? To show that future samskaras (conditioned things) have substance and conditions have no effect, the following verse is used: 'If a dharma (phenomenon) is born of conditions, then it does not have a pre-existing substance. If something that already exists is born again, then it should be born again after it is born.' Treatise says: The original existence and birth of all samskaras (conditioned things) are contradictory, just as a dharma (phenomenon) that has already been born will not be born again. If the impermanent samskaras (conditioned things) do not arise, even if they encounter conditions, they will not change, then they should lose the nature of impermanence, because there is no birth. It's like a flower in the sky. If there is birth, like taking fruit for use, there should be no substance before birth. The verse says 'should be born again after it is born', which is used to show the metaphor of different dharmas (phenomena) by refuting. That is to say, conditioned dharmas (dharmas compounded by causes and conditions) are not pre-existing, but arise from conditions, like taking fruit for use. Things that already exist do not arise from conditions, like dharmas (phenomena) that have already been born. If you say again, I say that although all samskaras (conditioned things) originally have substance, they do not wait for conditions, but taking fruit for use is originally non-existent, because it exists only when waiting for conditions. This is also unreasonable.

然。取自果用不離體故。應如其體亦先有性。或諸行體不離用故。應如其用非先有性。汝等所執本有諸行。如頑鐵鋌都無勝用。因果道理皆不相應。以有定性常無變故。執常有論。有多過失。謂違世間。誹謗世間一切共知因果理故。又違自宗。誹謗一切諸因諸緣生果理故。又違自言。立法本有從緣生故。又違比量。如取果用非常有故。又違現量。現見色等非常有故。由有多過。應舍此見。應知去來非離現在別有實性。世所攝故。如現在世但依現在。心變異相假施設有。現在亦非勝義諦有。從緣生故。如幻事等。又三世行皆相待立。如長短等。何有實性。又一切行皆悉無常。有生有滅。非有非無。若定是無。如兔角等應定不生。若定是有。如所執空應定不滅。若無生滅。如龜毛等。豈是無常。誰有智人。知一切行皆有生滅。而言常有依行立世。世豈是真。現在尚非真。去來何有實。若去來世實非有者。宿住死生通何所見。應知二通見曾當有。既現是無。無無差別。通力所見分限應無。是則異生三乘聖眾。知去來世劫數應同。汝執去來皆現是有。亦同此過。故次頌曰。

若見去來有　　如何不見無

論曰。去來亦有無量因果。展轉隔絕中間非有。故說為無。又汝亦說過去未來無取果等種種作用。過去未來既有有

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『然』（是的）。因為從結果的功用來看，它不離本體的緣故。應該像本體一樣，也是先有自性的。或者說，各種行的本體不離功用的緣故，應該像功用一樣，並非先有自性。你們所執著的本來就有的諸行（Samskara），就像頑固的鐵塊一樣，完全沒有殊勝的功用，因果的道理完全不相應。因為有固定的自性，永遠沒有變故。執著常有的理論，有很多過失。就是違背世間常理，誹謗世間一切共知的因果道理的緣故。又違背自己的宗義，誹謗一切諸因諸緣生果的道理的緣故。又違背自己所說的話，立法是本有，卻又說是從緣而生的緣故。又違背比量（Anumana），就像取果的功用是非常無常的緣故。又違背現量（Pratyaksha），現在所見到的色（Rupa）等是非常無常的緣故。由於有很多過失，應該捨棄這種見解。應該知道過去（Atita）、未來（Anagata）並非離開現在（Vartamana）另外有真實的自性，因為是被世所攝的緣故。就像現在世，只是依靠現在的心變異的相，假施設而有。現在也不是勝義諦（Paramarthasatya）所擁有的，因為是從緣而生的緣故，就像幻事等等。而且三世的行都是互相依賴而成立的，就像長短等等，哪裡有真實的自性呢？而且一切行都是無常的，有生有滅，非有非無。如果一定是無，就像兔角等等，應該一定不生。如果一定是有，就像你們所執著的空（Sunyata），應該一定不滅。如果沒有生滅，就像龜毛等等，怎麼會是無常呢？誰有智慧的人，知道一切行都有生滅，卻說常有，依靠行而成立世間，世間怎麼會是真實的呢？現在尚且不是真實的，過去未來怎麼會有真實呢？如果過去未來世確實沒有，宿住通（Purvanivasanusmrti）和死生通（Cyutyupapada-jnana）所見到的又是什麼呢？應該知道這兩種神通見到的是曾經有和將要有的。既然現在是無，無和無之間沒有差別，神通力所見到的分限應該沒有。那麼異生（Prthagjana）、三乘（Triyana）聖眾，知道過去未來世的劫數應該相同。你們執著過去未來都是現在有的，也同樣有這個過失。所以接下來說偈頌：『若見去來有，如何不見無』論曰：過去未來也有無量因果，輾轉隔絕，中間沒有，所以說是無。而且你們也說過去未來沒有取果等種種作用，過去未來既然是有

【English Translation】 English version: 『Indeed.』 Because taking from the result, its function does not depart from the substance. It should be like the substance, also having an inherent nature. Or, because the substance of all activities does not depart from the function, it should be like the function, not having an inherent nature. The activities (Samskara) that you cling to as being inherently existent are like stubborn iron blocks, completely without excellent function, and the principle of cause and effect is completely incompatible. Because they have a fixed nature, they never change. Clinging to the theory of permanence has many faults. That is, it contradicts worldly conventions, slandering the worldly principle of cause and effect that is known by all. It also contradicts your own tenets, slandering the principle of all causes and conditions producing effects. It also contradicts your own words, establishing that the inherent exists, yet saying that it arises from conditions. It also contradicts inference (Anumana), just as the function of taking the result is extremely impermanent. It also contradicts direct perception (Pratyaksha), as the visible form (Rupa) and so on that are seen now are extremely impermanent. Because there are many faults, you should abandon this view. You should know that the past (Atita) and future (Anagata) do not have a real nature separate from the present (Vartamana), because they are included by the world. Just like the present world, it only relies on the changing appearance of the present mind, falsely established. The present is also not possessed by the ultimate truth (Paramarthasatya), because it arises from conditions, like illusions and so on. Moreover, the activities of the three times are all established in dependence on each other, like long and short, where is there a real nature? Moreover, all activities are impermanent, having arising and ceasing, neither existent nor non-existent. If it is definitely non-existent, like a rabbit's horn and so on, it should definitely not arise. If it is definitely existent, like the emptiness (Sunyata) that you cling to, it should definitely not cease. If there is no arising and ceasing, like turtle hair and so on, how can it be impermanent? Who is wise, knowing that all activities have arising and ceasing, yet saying that they are permanent, relying on activities to establish the world, how can the world be real? The present is not real, how can the past and future be real? If the past and future worlds are truly non-existent, what is seen by the faculty of remembering past lives (Purvanivasanusmrti) and the faculty of knowing the death and rebirth of beings (Cyutyupapada-jnana)? You should know that these two superknowledges see what was and will be. Since the present is non-existent, there is no difference between non-existence and non-existence, the limits seen by the power of superknowledge should be non-existent. Then ordinary beings (Prthagjana) and the holy beings of the three vehicles (Triyana) should know the kalpas of the past and future worlds in the same way. You cling to the past and future as being existent in the present, and you also have this fault. Therefore, the following verse says: 『If you see the past and future as existent, how can you not see the non-existent?』 The treatise says: The past and future also have countless causes and effects, separated by transformations, with nothing in between, so it is said to be non-existent. Moreover, you also say that the past and future do not have various functions such as taking the result, since the past and future are existent

無二義差別。何故二通唯見其有而不見無。若不見無。諸得通者不應照見過去未來經爾所劫空無有佛。爾所劫中空無物等。是故不應唯見其有。去來現無曾當是有。以現無故不同現在。曾當有故為境差別。若同現無則無遠近時差別者。汝執去來俱是現有同在一世。應如現在無有遠近時分差別。是則諸通應不能照去來遠近時劫差別。過失既同。何得為難。若言去來雖同現有。然由行世時有前後遠近差別。故異生等見近非遠無無遠近。其過不同。此亦不然。故次頌曰。

既現有去來　　應不說為遠

論曰。過去未來既同現有。應如現在是近非遠。若言去來雖現有體而無用故說為遠者。此亦不然。用不離體。過同前說。又此意言。去來色等既同現有。同一世故。應如現在無有前後遠近差別。過去未來既無遠近。諸得通者皆應無礙。等見一切過去未來。是則如來所知無量。餘二乘等所知有量。此等差別一切應無。是故去來雖現非有。而曾當有因果不同展轉相續時分決定。由此曾當有為方便。或有久習智見猛利。復由種姓法爾殊勝。極前後際展轉相續。如其所欲皆能照知。或有習性與此相違。隨其所應但知少分。此顯去來非現有性。但得通者。自因緣力勝劣不同。方便作意有差別故。自心變似曾當有法。體相不同。遠

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本無二義差別（沒有兩種不同的意義差別）。為什麼二通（天眼通和天耳通）只能看見『有』，而不能看見『無』呢？如果不能看見『無』，那麼那些獲得神通的人，就不應該能夠照見過去未來經歷那麼多個劫的空無佛陀，以及那麼多個劫中空無一物等等。因此，不應該只能看見『有』。過去未來雖然現在沒有，但曾經或將會有，因為現在沒有，所以和現在不同。因為曾經或將會有，所以作為所觀察的境存在差別。如果和現在沒有一樣，就沒有遠近時間上的差別了。你認為過去未來都是現在存在的，同在一個時代，應該像現在一樣沒有遠近時間上的差別。這樣的話，各種神通就不應該能夠照見過去未來遠近時間上的差別。過失既然相同，為什麼還要責難呢？如果說過去未來雖然都是現在存在的，但是由於行世的時間有先後遠近的差別，所以凡夫俗子只能看見近的，不能看見遠的，沒有遠近的分別，這種過失不同。這也是不對的。所以接下來說偈頌：『既然現在有去來，應不說為遠。』論曰：過去未來既然和現在一樣存在，應該像現在一樣是近的而不是遠的。如果說過去未來雖然現在有體，但是沒有作用，所以說是遠的，這也是不對的。作用不離本體，過失和前面說的一樣。又這個意思是說，過去未來的色等等既然和現在一樣存在，在同一個時代，應該像現在一樣沒有先後遠近的差別。過去未來既然沒有遠近，那些獲得神通的人都應該沒有障礙，平等地看見一切過去未來。這樣的話，如來所知道的無量無邊，其他二乘等等所知道的有限量，這些差別應該全部沒有。所以過去未來雖然現在沒有，但不是現在有，而是曾經或將會有，因果不同，輾轉相續，時間分明。因此，以曾經或將會有作為方便，或者有人長期修習，智慧見解猛利，又由於種姓（先天稟賦）自然殊勝，極其前後際，輾轉相續，能夠如其所愿地照見知道。或者有人習性與此相反，根據情況只能知道少部分。這顯示了過去未來不是現在有的性質，只是獲得神通的人，由於自身因緣力量的勝劣不同，方便作意的差別，自身的心變現得像曾經或將要有的法，體相不同，遠近有別。

【English Translation】 English version There is no difference in meaning. Why do the two kinds of superknowledges (two kinds of abhijñā, i.e., divine eye and divine ear) only see 'existence' and not see 'non-existence'? If they cannot see 'non-existence,' then those who have attained superknowledges should not be able to perceive the emptiness of Buddhas in the past and future for so many kalpas, and the emptiness of things in so many kalpas, etc. Therefore, they should not only see 'existence.' Although the past and future do not exist now, they once existed or will exist. Because they do not exist now, they are different from the present. Because they once existed or will exist, they exist as different objects of observation. If they were the same as the present non-existence, there would be no difference in distance and time. You believe that the past and future both exist now, and are in the same era, so they should be like the present, without differences in distance and time. In that case, the various superknowledges should not be able to perceive the differences in distance and time of the past and future. Since the faults are the same, why do you criticize? If you say that although the past and future both exist now, there are differences in the order and distance of time in the world, so ordinary people can only see what is near and not what is far, and there is no distinction between near and far, then the faults are not the same. This is also incorrect. Therefore, the following verse says: 'Since the past and future exist now, they should not be said to be far.' Treatise says: Since the past and future exist in the same way as the present, they should be near rather than far, just like the present. If you say that although the past and future have substance now, they have no function, so they are said to be far, this is also incorrect. Function is inseparable from substance, and the fault is the same as what was said before. Furthermore, this means that since the colors of the past and future exist in the same way as the present, and are in the same era, they should be like the present, without differences in order and distance. Since the past and future have no distance, those who have attained superknowledges should have no obstacles and should equally see all the past and future. In that case, what the Tathagata knows is immeasurable, and what the other two vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) know is limited. All these differences should not exist. Therefore, although the past and future do not exist now, they are not existing now, but once existed or will exist. The causes and effects are different, they continue in succession, and the time is clearly defined. Therefore, taking what once existed or will exist as a means, or someone who has practiced for a long time, whose wisdom and insight are sharp, and who is naturally superior due to their lineage (innate endowment), can perceive and know as they wish, continuing in succession to the extreme past and future. Or someone whose habits are contrary to this can only know a small part as appropriate. This shows that the past and future are not of the nature of existing now, but only those who have attained superknowledges have different strengths and weaknesses due to the power of their own causes and conditions, and the differences in their skillful means and mental activities. Their own minds transform to resemble the dharmas that once existed or will exist, and their substance and appearance are different, and there are differences in distance.

近有異。依此立有過去未來時劫不同通力勝劣。非謂實有過去未來緣之起通照知遠近。為破未來法非法等先有體。性故說頌曰。

未作法若有　　修戒等唐捐

論曰。若在未來未作福行。先已有者。現在加行修施戒等。則為唐捐。又若未來先有法者。非法亦有不可斷壞。為舍惡戒勤修加行。徒自苦身都無所益。如是執有未來論者。諸有所為皆空無果。是故應舍如是惡見。信受未來非先有性。

複次執未來有小乘人言。諸行未來雖先有性。然猶未有取果功能。為欲引起取果功能。勤修加行不空無果。數論外道亦作是言。于自性中雖有種種諸法自體。而相猶隱。為欲令彼法相顯現。勤修加行不空無果。即彼異論復作是言。于自性中雖有種種諸法功能。而未有體。為成其體勤修加行不空無果。為破此三。故說頌曰。

若少有所為　　界則先非有

論曰。若先無用加行令生。先未有顯方便令有。先未有體令有體者。則不應言果先是有。用顯及體由加行成。可名為果。體隱功能本來有故。不應名果。又用顯體與體隱能不相離故。體隱功能應同用等。本無今有。是則一切皆從緣生。汝等不應說果先有。或用顯體應同體等本來是有。則應一切不從緣生。皆不名果。汝等執有未來論者。便為謗果常有非果。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：近來出現了一種不同的觀點。依據這種觀點，過去、未來時劫的不同，以及神通力的勝劣，並非意味著過去和未來是真實存在的，或者神通力能夠照見遠近，而是爲了破斥未來之法在因緣生起之前就已經存在的觀點。因此，有頌文說：『未作法若有，修戒等唐捐』論曰：如果在未來尚未造作善行時，這些善行就已經存在，那麼現在所做的修行，如佈施、持戒等，就都是徒勞無功的。又如果未來之法已經存在，那麼非法（惡行）也必然存在，且無法斷除。因此，爲了捨棄惡戒而勤奮修行，也只是徒勞地折磨自己，沒有任何益處。像這樣執著于未來存在的理論，那麼一切所作所為都將是空無結果。所以，應該捨棄這種錯誤的見解，相信未來並非先有自性。其次，執著于未來存在的小乘論者說，諸行（一切事物）在未來雖然已經具有自性，但尚未具備產生結果的功能。爲了引發產生結果的功能，勤奮修行並非徒勞無功。數論外道也這樣說，在自性（Prakriti）中雖然已經存在種種諸法的自體，但其相狀仍然是隱藏的。爲了使這些法相顯現，勤奮修行並非徒勞無功。還有一些不同的理論說，在自性中雖然已經存在種種諸法的功能，但尚未具備實體。爲了成就這些實體，勤奮修行並非徒勞無功。爲了破斥這三種觀點，所以有頌文說：『若少有所為，界則先非有』論曰：如果先前沒有作用，需要通過加行才能產生；先前沒有顯現，需要通過方便才能顯現；先前沒有實體，需要通過加行才能具備實體，那麼就不應該說果（結果）是先前就存在的。作用、顯現以及實體，通過加行而成就，可以稱之為果。而實體隱藏的功能，本來就存在，不應該稱之為果。又因為作用、顯現、實體與實體隱藏的功能不可分離，所以實體隱藏的功能應該與作用等同，都是本無今有。這樣，一切都是從因緣而生，你們不應該說果是先前就存在的。或者，作用、顯現、實體應該與實體隱藏的功能等同，本來就是存在的，那麼一切都不應該從因緣而生，都不應該稱之為果。你們這些執著于未來存在理論的人，就是在誹謗果是常有的，而不是因緣所生的果。

【English Translation】 English version: Recently, a different view has emerged. According to this view, the differences in past and future times and kalpas (aeons), as well as the superiority or inferiority of supernormal powers (abhijñā), do not mean that the past and future are truly existent, or that supernormal powers can perceive near and far. Rather, it is to refute the view that future dharmas (phenomena) already exist before the arising of conditions. Therefore, there is a verse that says: 'If unmade dharmas exist, then practicing precepts etc. is in vain.' Treatise says: If good deeds in the future, which have not yet been performed, already exist, then the current practice of giving, keeping precepts, etc., would be in vain. Furthermore, if future dharmas already exist, then non-dharmas (evil deeds) must also exist and cannot be eradicated. Therefore, diligently practicing to abandon evil precepts would only be torturing oneself in vain, without any benefit. If one adheres to the theory that the future exists, then all actions will be fruitless. Therefore, one should abandon this wrong view and believe that the future does not have inherent existence. Furthermore, some Hinayana (Small Vehicle) adherents who cling to the existence of the future say that although all phenomena (saṃskāra) already have their own nature in the future, they do not yet have the function of producing results. In order to initiate the function of producing results, diligent practice is not in vain. The Samkhya (Enumeration) heretics also say that although the self-nature (Prakriti) already contains the self-essence of various dharmas, their appearances are still hidden. In order to make these dharma appearances manifest, diligent practice is not in vain. Some different theories also say that although the self-nature already contains the functions of various dharmas, it does not yet have a substance. In order to accomplish these substances, diligent practice is not in vain. In order to refute these three views, there is a verse that says: 'If there is even a little something to be done, the realm was not there before.' Treatise says: If there was no function before, and it needs to be produced through effort; if there was no manifestation before, and it needs to be manifested through skillful means; if there was no substance before, and it needs to be endowed with substance through effort, then one should not say that the result (phala) already existed before. Function, manifestation, and substance, which are accomplished through effort, can be called results. However, the hidden function of the substance, which already exists, should not be called a result. Furthermore, because function, manifestation, and substance are inseparable from the hidden function of the substance, the hidden function of the substance should be the same as function, etc., which are non-existent before and existent now. In this way, everything arises from conditions, and you should not say that the result already existed before. Alternatively, function, manifestation, and substance should be the same as the hidden function of the substance, which are inherently existent. Then, everything should not arise from conditions, and nothing should be called a result. Those of you who cling to the theory of the existence of the future are slandering the result as being permanent, rather than a result arising from conditions.

不相離故。又若汝等矯設方便。作如是言。法雖先有。然由因故少起異相。說名果者。但此異相由因所成。可名為果。體既本有。不應名果。然此異相本無今有。如何汝等言果先有。若汝復言。相雖今起。然不離體。體先有故。亦說果相是先有者。相體既一。俱應本有。因則無用。便同謗因外道過失。

複次若執果性一切時有。便違經說諸行無常。所以者何。故次頌曰。

諸行既無常　　果則非恒有　若有初有後　　世共許非常

論曰。性非恒有。故名無常。一切無常定有生滅。生名為初。滅名為后。有初有後。是無常義。若執果性一切時有。無初無後豈是無常。彼經復言。有生滅者。以世共和粗無常相。示現三世細無常理。世間現見從緣所生。內外諸行初生后滅。不知唸唸生滅無常。故以初後生滅為因。用燈光等為同法喻。顯彼唸唸皆有生滅。本無而有。有已還無。非一切時恒有果性。恒有論者。過去未來諸行常有。無生無滅。現在諸行生滅亦無。便違自經說無常義。若言諸行體雖恒有而無常相恒共相應名無常者。此亦不然。前已略非。后當廣破。此頌義中。正破異部。兼破數論二種異說。謂隱體能雖復恒有。而顯相體或有或無。就隱體能說果先有。據顯相體說為無常。果若無常則非先有。以諸

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本因為它們不是相互分離的。又或者，如果你們虛假地設立方便之說，像這樣說：『法雖然先前就存在，但由於因緣的緣故，稍微生起不同的相狀，這被稱為果。』但這種不同的相狀是由因緣所成就的，可以被稱為果。本體既然本來就存在，就不應該被稱為果。然而，這種不同的相狀本來沒有現在才有，你們怎麼說果是先前就存在的呢？』如果你們又說：『相雖然現在才生起，但不離本體，本體先前就存在，所以也可以說果的相是先前就存在的。』相和體既然是一體的，就應該都是本來就存在的，那麼因就沒有作用了，這就等同於誹謗因緣的外道所犯的過失。

再者，如果執著于果性在一切時侯都存在，就違背了經典所說的諸行無常。為什麼這麼說呢？所以接下來的偈頌說：

『諸行既然是無常的，果就不是恒常存在的。如果事物有開始有結束，世間普遍認為它不是恒常的。』

論曰：自性不是恒常存在的，所以稱為無常。一切無常的事物必定有生有滅。生稱為開始，滅稱為結束。有開始有結束，就是無常的含義。如果執著于果性在一切時候都存在，沒有開始沒有結束，怎麼能說是無常呢？那部經典又說，有生有滅，這是用世間普遍認可的粗顯的無常之相，來揭示三世中細微的無常之理。世間現在所見，都是從因緣所生，內外諸行都是初生后滅，人們不知道唸唸生滅的無常，所以用開始和結束、生和滅作為原因，用燈光等作為相同的比喻，來顯示那唸唸都有生滅，本來沒有而現在有，有了之後又消失，不是在一切時候都恒常存在果性。如果主張恒常存在，那麼過去和未來的諸行就都是常有的，沒有生沒有滅，現在的諸行的生滅也就沒有了，這就違背了自己經典所說的無常之義。如果說諸行的本體雖然恒常存在，但無常之相恒常與之相應，所以稱為無常，這也是不對的。前面已經簡略地駁斥過，後面將要廣泛地破斥。這個偈頌的意義中，既破斥了異部的觀點，也兼破了數論的兩種不同的說法，即隱沒的體和功能雖然是恒常存在的，但顯現的相和體或者有或者沒有，就隱沒的體和功能來說，果是先前就存在的；就顯現的相和體來說，是無常的。果如果是無常的，就不是先前就存在的，因為所有的

【English Translation】 English version because they are not separate. Or, if you falsely establish expedient teachings, saying: 'Although the Dharma (法) [Dharma/Law] exists beforehand, due to causes and conditions, it slightly arises with different characteristics, which is called the effect (果) [fruit/result].' But this different characteristic is accomplished by causes and conditions, and can be called the effect. Since the substance (體) [essence/body] already exists, it should not be called the effect. However, this different characteristic did not exist before but exists now, how can you say that the effect exists beforehand?' If you further say: 'Although the characteristic arises now, it does not leave the substance, and since the substance exists beforehand, it can also be said that the characteristic of the effect exists beforehand.' Since the characteristic and the substance are one, they should both exist originally, then the cause is useless, which is equivalent to the fault committed by the heretics who slander causality.

Furthermore, if you cling to the idea that the nature of the effect exists at all times, it contradicts the sutra's statement that all phenomena (諸行) [all conditioned things] are impermanent (無常) [anicca]. Why is this so? Therefore, the following verse says:

'Since all phenomena are impermanent, the effect is not constantly existing. If things have a beginning and an end, the world universally acknowledges that they are not constant.'

Treatise says: The nature is not constantly existing, therefore it is called impermanent. All impermanent things must have arising and ceasing. Arising is called the beginning, and ceasing is called the end. Having a beginning and an end is the meaning of impermanence. If you cling to the idea that the nature of the effect exists at all times, without a beginning and without an end, how can it be said to be impermanent? That sutra also says that there is arising and ceasing, which uses the commonly recognized gross aspect of impermanence in the world to reveal the subtle principle of impermanence in the three times. What the world sees now is all born from causes and conditions, and the internal and external phenomena all arise first and cease later. People do not know the impermanence of moment-to-moment arising and ceasing, so they use the beginning and the end, arising and ceasing, as the cause, and use the light of a lamp, etc., as the same analogy, to show that every moment has arising and ceasing, originally not existing but now existing, and after existing, it disappears again, and the nature of the effect does not constantly exist at all times. If one advocates constant existence, then the past and future phenomena are all constant, without arising and without ceasing, and the arising and ceasing of the present phenomena also does not exist, which contradicts the meaning of impermanence stated in one's own sutra. If one says that although the substance of the phenomena is constantly existing, the aspect of impermanence is constantly corresponding to it, so it is called impermanent, this is also not right. It has been briefly refuted before, and it will be widely refuted later. In the meaning of this verse, it refutes both the views of the different schools and the two different sayings of the Samkhya (數論) [Samkhya] school, that is, although the hidden substance and function are constantly existing, the manifested aspect and substance either exist or do not exist. In terms of the hidden substance and function, the effect exists beforehand; in terms of the manifested aspect and substance, it is impermanent. If the effect is impermanent, it does not exist beforehand, because all

無常定有初后。初生后滅是無常義。隱體功能既無初后。無生無滅豈是無常。即以此義亦應非果。不相離救。還同前破。又彼說言。聲等樂等雖有種種分位差別。然其因果皆不相離。同依一體而建立故。此意若說聲等自性前後無異言因與果不相離者。即無所諍。以許聲等前念為因能生后念等流果故。若說聲等因果位一。是則因果應無差別。或言聲等因位有果。亦無違諍。以許一時望后望前為因果故。若言聲等。因果位別而體一者。是則相違。體一時異。不應理故。時分不同。體必異故。時雖有別體無異者。是則不可說為無常。又一體法於一時中決定無有隱顯二義。既許隱顯時有差別。是則分明許所依體。亦有差別。是故不可說言聲等分位差別建立因果。其體無異。

複次為欲示現說常有論有違宗過。故復頌曰。

應非勤解脫　　解脫無去來

論曰。若能永斷諸煩惱縛。無倒聖見未來現有。應如現在能斷煩惱能證涅槃。是則一切不由功用。從本已來自然解脫。便違自宗要勤方便修生聖道方得解脫。若許修道得解脫者。則應無有過去未來。有煩惱縛及所招苦而得解脫不應正理。若解脫者。無煩惱苦。則違自宗。說去來有。又說頌曰。

或許有去來　　貪應離貪者

論曰。前理所逼定無去來。或

彼守愚確執為有。假縱其執。故置或言得解脫時。去來二世。貪等若有。在解脫位。無貪等者。應離所依而有貪等。世間未見無所煮物而有煮等。此亦應爾。豈不諸行如是生時實無作用及作用者。但假安立二種差別。故契經言。唯有諸法。唯有因果。都無作用。理實如是。然解脫時貪等永滅。依貪等上假立作用。亦不可得無用無者。如空花等而言是有。理不得成。若解脫時猶有貪等。如未解脫。應名惡人。應造諸惡應不解脫。若言爾時雖有貪等而不成就故名解脫。既是貪等煩惱所攝。應如前位非不成就。又此去來貪等若有。應如現在能有作用。若爾脫者應造諸惡。應名惡人。又此去來貪等煩惱。若有作用應名現在。若無作用應似空花。云何而言有體無用。是故智者不應信受過去未來現有實體。

複次未生已有。違世共知。所以者何故次頌曰。

若執果先有　　造宮舍嚴具　柱等則唐捐

論曰。若宮舍等色等諸行。于未生位已有體者。世間現見為造彼物。勤加功力則為虛棄。諸有或言先雖有體而未有用。先有隱體未有顯相。先雖有能而未有體。為令有用及顯體故。勤加功力亦不唐捐。此亦不然。用顯相體與體隱能不相離故。皆應先有。已如前說。如是邪執世間相違。又一切法皆先有者。為脫眾苦設教

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：那些堅持愚昧見解的人，頑固地認為過去和未來是真實存在的。假設順從他們的執著，姑且允許他們說在獲得解脫的時候，過去和未來的貪慾等煩惱是存在的。那麼，在解脫的境界中，沒有貪慾等煩惱，就意味著貪慾等煩惱脫離了它們所依賴的基礎而存在。世間上從未見過沒有被烹煮的物體卻有烹煮的行為。這種情況也應該如此。難道不是一切諸行在生起的時候，實際上並沒有作用和作用者嗎？只不過是假立了這兩種差別而已。所以契經上說：『只有諸法，只有因果，完全沒有作用。』道理實際上就是這樣。然而，解脫的時候，貪慾等煩惱永遠滅盡，依靠貪慾等煩惱而假立的作用，也是不可能存在的。沒有作用和作用者，就像虛空中的花朵等，說它們是真實存在的，道理上是不能成立的。如果解脫的時候仍然有貪慾等煩惱，就像沒有解脫一樣，應該被稱為惡人，應該造作各種惡業，應該不能得到解脫。如果說，雖然那時有貪慾等煩惱，但是它們不起作用，所以才叫做解脫，既然它們還是屬於煩惱的範疇，就應該像之前的狀態一樣，並非不起作用。而且，這些過去和未來的貪慾等煩惱如果存在，應該像現在的貪慾等煩惱一樣能夠起作用。如果是這樣，解脫的人應該造作各種惡業，應該被稱為惡人。而且，這些過去和未來的貪慾等煩惱，如果有作用，就應該被稱為現在的煩惱；如果沒有作用，就應該像虛空中的花朵一樣。怎麼能說它們有實體卻沒有作用呢？所以，有智慧的人不應該相信過去、未來和現在有真實的實體。

更進一步說，事物在未產生之前就已經存在，這與世俗的常識相違背。這是什麼原因呢？所以接下來的頌文說：

『如果認為果在先就存在，那麼建造宮殿和準備裝飾，以及柱子等等就都是白費力氣。』

論述說：如果宮殿等顏色等諸行，在未產生的時候就已經存在實體，那麼世間現在所見到的爲了建造這些東西而勤奮努力，就都是白白浪費了。有些人或許會說，雖然先前已經存在實體，但是還沒有作用；先前有隱藏的實體，還沒有顯現的相狀；先前雖然有能力，但是還沒有實體；爲了讓它們能夠起作用和顯現實體，所以勤奮努力並不是白費力氣。這種說法也是不對的，因為作用、顯現的相狀和實體，與隱藏的實體和能力是不可分離的，都應該先前就已經存在，就像前面所說的那樣。像這樣的邪見與世間的常識相違背。而且，如果一切法都是先前就已經存在的，那麼爲了脫離眾多的痛苦而設立教法

【English Translation】 English version: Those who cling to foolish views stubbornly insist that the past and future are real. Supposing we indulge their insistence, let's grant that they say that at the time of attaining liberation, greed and other afflictions of the past and future exist. Then, in the state of liberation, the absence of greed and other afflictions would mean that greed and other afflictions exist apart from the basis upon which they depend. In the world, it has never been seen that there is cooking without something being cooked. This situation should be the same. Isn't it the case that when all phenomena (skandhas) arise, there is actually no action or actor? It is only conventionally established that there are these two differences. Therefore, the sutras say: 'There are only phenomena (dharmas), only cause and effect; there is absolutely no action.' The truth is indeed like this. However, at the time of liberation, greed and other afflictions are forever extinguished, and the action that is conventionally established based on greed and other afflictions is also impossible to exist. Without action and an actor, like flowers in the sky, etc., to say that they are real cannot be established in principle. If at the time of liberation there are still greed and other afflictions, it would be like not being liberated, and one should be called an evil person, should create all kinds of evil deeds, and should not be able to attain liberation. If it is said that although there are greed and other afflictions at that time, they do not function, so it is called liberation, since they still belong to the category of afflictions, they should be like the previous state, not non-functional. Moreover, if these past and future greed and other afflictions exist, they should be able to function like present greed and other afflictions. If that is the case, the liberated person should create all kinds of evil deeds and should be called an evil person. Moreover, if these past and future greed and other afflictions have a function, they should be called present afflictions; if they have no function, they should be like flowers in the sky. How can it be said that they have substance but no function? Therefore, wise people should not believe that the past, future, and present have real substance.

Furthermore, that things already exist before they are produced contradicts common worldly knowledge. What is the reason for this? Therefore, the following verse says:

'If it is thought that the result exists beforehand, then building palaces and preparing decorations, as well as pillars, etc., would all be in vain.'

The treatise says: If phenomena like palaces, colors, etc. (rupa), already have substance in the unproduced state, then the diligent effort that is seen in the world to build these things is all wasted. Some might say that although the substance already exists beforehand, it has no function yet; there is a hidden substance beforehand, and there is no manifested appearance yet; although there is ability beforehand, there is no substance yet; in order to enable them to function and manifest substance, the diligent effort is not in vain. This statement is also incorrect, because function, manifested appearance, and substance are inseparable from hidden substance and ability, and they should all already exist beforehand, as has been said before. Such wrong views contradict worldly knowledge. Moreover, if all phenomena (dharmas) already exist beforehand, then establishing teachings in order to escape from numerous sufferings

度生。如是等事皆不成立。此則亦與自宗相違。

複次因說執果先有者過。先無果執其過易了。為略破之。故復頌曰。

果先無亦爾

論曰。如是所執亦違世間。自宗所許果先定無。世間自宗皆不可故。有作是言。此頌義意總破一切因果別執。若因與果別有體相。云何異法能生異法。未見香味別體相生。此說不然。若體相異因果理隔。或相違損可不相生。若有諸行體相雖別。然相隨順現為因果。如何難言。因果若異。如香味別。應不相生。世間自宗皆許父子業果體異而得相生。是故因果非定不異。如是說者。此正為破定說因中無果者論。食米齊者。作如是言。種等不能親生芽等。但由種等引彼芽等。同類極微令其聚集。如如所引同類極微。如是如是合生粗果。此義不然。彼諸極微與粗麥等。種類體相皆有差別。云何同類。又是常故。應無勝用。亦不應令常法有用。云何而言由種等力引彼芽等同類極微。令其和合生粗芽等。又彼外道計離色等別有實果衣瓶等物。此類先無。由何因造。為求此果。勤加功力造作縷等。皆應無用。以彼不許如是縷等。能作親因。造同類果。若彼不許從異類因生異類果。是則粗果。定應不生。先無體故。又實極微應不能造粗同類果。汝計常故。如虛空等。所依實果既無所有。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本度化眾生等事都不能成立。這也與你自己的宗義相違背。

進一步，因為宣說執著果先於因存在有其過失。果先於因不存在的過失容易理解。爲了簡略地破斥這種觀點，所以再次用偈頌說：

『果先無亦爾』

論曰：像這樣執著也違背世間的常識。你自己的宗義所允許的果先於因必定不存在，因為這在世間和你自己的宗義中都是不可接受的。有些人這樣說：這個偈頌的意義在於總破一切因果的分別執著。如果因和果有不同的體相，那麼不同的法怎麼能產生不同的法呢？從未見過香味不同的體相能夠相互產生。這種說法是不對的。如果體相不同，因果的道理就被隔斷了，或者相互違背損害，可能不能相互產生。如果有諸多的行，體相雖然不同，但相互隨順，顯現為因果，怎麼能說因果如果不同，就像香味不同一樣，就不應該相互產生呢？世間和你自己的宗義都允許父子、業果的體性不同，但能夠相互產生。因此，因果並非一定不能不同。像這樣說的人，這正是爲了破斥那些一定說因中沒有果的人的論點。吃米飯的人這樣說：種子等不能親自產生芽等，只是由種子等引導那些芽等同類的極微，使它們聚集起來。像這樣引導同類的極微，像這樣聚合產生粗大的果實。這種說法是不對的。那些極微與粗大的麥子等，種類體相都有差別，怎麼能說是同類呢？而且極微是常恒不變的，應該沒有殊勝的作用。也不應該使常法有用。怎麼能說由種子等的力量引導那些芽等同類的極微，使它們和合產生粗大的芽等呢？還有那些外道認為離開色等，另外有真實的果實，如衣服、瓶子等物。這類東西先前不存在，由什麼原因製造出來呢？爲了求得這些果實，勤奮地加上功力製造線等，都應該沒有用處。因為他們不承認像這樣的線等，能夠作為親因，製造同類的果實。如果他們不承認從不同類的因產生不同類的果，那麼粗大的果實，一定不應該產生。因為先前沒有體性。而且真實的極微應該不能製造粗大的同類果實。你認為是常恒不變的，就像虛空等一樣。所依賴的真實果實既然什麼都沒有。

【English Translation】 English version The matter of delivering beings and so on cannot be established. This also contradicts your own tenets.

Furthermore, there is a fault in asserting that the effect exists prior to the cause. The fault of asserting that the effect does not exist prior to the cause is easily understood. Therefore, to briefly refute this view, it is again stated in the verse:

'The effect not existing prior is also thus.'

Commentary: Such an assertion also contradicts worldly conventions. The effect that your own tenets allow as definitely not existing prior to the cause is unacceptable both in the world and in your own tenets. Some say: The meaning of this verse is to generally refute all separate attachments to cause and effect. If the cause and effect have different entities, how can different dharmas produce different dharmas? It has never been seen that different entities of smell and taste can produce each other. This statement is incorrect. If the entities are different, the principle of cause and effect is severed, or if they contradict and harm each other, they may not be able to produce each other. If there are many actions, although the entities are different, they follow each other and appear as cause and effect, how can it be said that if cause and effect are different, like smell and taste, they should not produce each other? Both worldly conventions and your own tenets allow that the nature of father and son, and karmic results, are different, but they can produce each other. Therefore, cause and effect are not necessarily unable to be different. Those who say this are precisely refuting the argument of those who definitely say that there is no effect in the cause. Those who eat rice say: Seeds and so on cannot directly produce sprouts and so on, but only guide those extremely subtle particles of the same kind as the sprouts and so on, causing them to gather together. In this way, guiding extremely subtle particles of the same kind, in this way, aggregating and producing coarse effects. This statement is incorrect. Those extremely subtle particles and coarse wheat and so on have differences in kind and entity, how can they be said to be of the same kind? Moreover, since the extremely subtle particles are constant, they should have no special function. Nor should constant dharmas be made useful. How can it be said that the power of seeds and so on guides those extremely subtle particles of the same kind as the sprouts and so on, causing them to combine and produce coarse sprouts and so on? Furthermore, those non-Buddhists believe that apart from form and so on, there are other real effects, such as clothes, bottles, and other objects. These things did not exist before, by what cause are they made? In order to seek these effects, diligently adding effort to make threads and so on should all be useless. Because they do not admit that threads and so on like this can be the direct cause of producing effects of the same kind. If they do not admit that different effects are produced from different causes, then coarse effects should definitely not be produced. Because there was no entity before. Moreover, real extremely subtle particles should not be able to produce coarse effects of the same kind. You consider them to be constant, like space and so on. Since the real effects on which they depend have nothing.

能依色等行等德業。皆不得成。是則都無諸根境界。便為損壞一切所立。是故不應定執異類因中無果。世間亦見從異類因能生種種異類果故。因果道理最為微細。非定一異非先有無。若於其中執一執異先有先無。皆失正理。所以者何。因果若一。因應如果。是果非因。果應如因。是因非果。如是因果便成雜亂。又若因果定是一者。即無能生所生差別。無能生故不名為因。因既是無。果亦非有。無所生故不名為果。果既是無。因亦非有。因果二種相待立故。因果若無。說誰為一。故知因果非定是一。因果若異。應從自因生於他果。與彼異故。猶如自果。亦應自果從他因生。與彼異故。猶如自因。是則一因應生一切果。亦應一果從一切因生。又應從自因不生自果。與彼異故。猶如他果。亦應自果不從自因生。與彼異故。猶如他因。則一切因應不生果。應一切果不從因生。現見自因唯生自果不生他果。現見自果從自因生非他因生。故知因果亦非定異。若於因中先定有果。果則如因。應不更生。若於因中先定無果。則如非果。應不可生。現見從因更可生果。故知其果非先有無。如是因果非定一異非先有無其理決定。傍論已了。應復正論。

複次數論外道作如是言。果實不生其體本有。由轉變故。立有時分因果差別。為破

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果能夠依靠顏色等性質、行為等品德和事業等作用來判斷，那麼一切都無法成立。這樣一來，所有的根（感官）和境界（對像）都將不復存在，一切建立起來的理論都會被破壞。因此，不應該固執地認為不同類的因中沒有果。世間也能看到從不同類的因中產生各種不同類的果。因果的道理最為微妙，不是絕對的同一，也不是絕對的差異，不是先有，也不是先無。如果對因果關係執著于同一或差異，先有或先無，都會失去正確的道理。為什麼呢？如果因果是同一的，那麼因應該像果一樣，是果而不是因；果應該像因一樣，是因而不是果。這樣因果就變得雜亂無章。又如果因果一定是同一的，就沒有能生和所生的差別。沒有能生，就不能稱為因；因既然不存在，果也不可能存在，因為沒有所生，就不能稱為果。果既然不存在，因也不可能存在，因為因果二者是相互依存而成立的。如果因果都不存在，又說誰是同一的呢？所以說因果不是絕對的同一。如果因果是不同的，那麼應該從自己的因中產生他人的果，因為它與自己的果不同，就像他人的果一樣。也應該自己的果從他人的因中產生，因為它與自己的因不同，就像他人的因一樣。這樣一來，一個因應該產生一切的果，一個果也應該從一切的因中產生。又應該從自己的因中不產生自己的果，因為它與自己的果不同，就像他人的果一樣。也應該自己的果不從自己的因中產生，因為它與自己的因不同，就像他人的因一樣。那麼一切的因應該不產生果，一切的果應該不從因中產生。現在看到的是自己的因只產生自己的果，不產生他人的果；現在看到的是自己的果從自己的因中產生，不是從他人的因產生。所以說因果也不是絕對的差異。如果在因中先已確定有果，那麼果就應該像因一樣，不應該再產生。如果在因中先已確定沒有果，那麼就應該像非果一樣，不可能產生。現在看到的是從因中可以再生出果，所以知道果不是先有，也不是先無。像這樣，因果不是絕對的同一，也不是絕對的差異，不是先有，也不是先無，這個道理是確定的。關於旁論已經說完了，應該回到正論。複次數論外道這樣說：果實不生，它的本體本來就存在。由於轉變的緣故，才設立有時分（時間）的因果差別。爲了破斥這種觀點

【English Translation】 English version: If one could rely on characteristics such as color, conduct such as behavior, and actions such as deeds, nothing could be established. In that case, all the indriya (senses) and vishaya (sense objects) would cease to exist, and everything established would be destroyed. Therefore, one should not stubbornly insist that there is no effect in a cause of a different kind. In the world, it is also seen that various effects of different kinds can arise from causes of different kinds. The principle of cause and effect is extremely subtle, neither absolutely identical nor absolutely different, neither pre-existent nor non-existent. If one clings to identity or difference, pre-existence or non-existence, in relation to cause and effect, one will lose the correct understanding. Why is that? If cause and effect were identical, then the cause should be like the effect, being an effect and not a cause; the effect should be like the cause, being a cause and not an effect. In this way, cause and effect would become confused. Furthermore, if cause and effect were definitely identical, there would be no distinction between that which produces and that which is produced. Without that which produces, it cannot be called a cause; since the cause does not exist, the effect cannot exist either, because there is nothing produced. Since the effect does not exist, the cause cannot exist either, because cause and effect are established in mutual dependence. If cause and effect do not exist, who is said to be identical? Therefore, it is known that cause and effect are not definitely identical. If cause and effect were different, then one's own cause should produce another's effect, because it is different from one's own effect, just like another's effect. Also, one's own effect should arise from another's cause, because it is different from one's own cause, just like another's cause. In that case, one cause should produce all effects, and one effect should arise from all causes. Also, one's own cause should not produce one's own effect, because it is different from one's own effect, just like another's effect. Also, one's own effect should not arise from one's own cause, because it is different from one's own cause, just like another's cause. Then all causes should not produce effects, and all effects should not arise from causes. Now it is seen that one's own cause only produces one's own effect and does not produce another's effect; now it is seen that one's own effect arises from one's own cause and not from another's cause. Therefore, it is known that cause and effect are also not definitely different. If the effect is predetermined to exist in the cause, then the effect should be like the cause and should not arise again. If the effect is predetermined not to exist in the cause, then it should be like a non-effect and cannot arise. Now it is seen that an effect can arise again from a cause, so it is known that the effect is neither pre-existent nor non-existent. Thus, cause and effect are neither definitely identical nor definitely different, neither pre-existent nor non-existent; this principle is definite. The digression is finished; we should return to the main discussion. Again, the Samkhya (enumeration) heretics say this: The fruit does not arise; its essence is originally existent. Due to transformation, the difference between cause and effect is established in terms of time. In order to refute this view,

彼執。故復頌曰。

諸法有轉變　　慧者未曾知　唯除無智人　　妄分別為有

論曰。諸妙慧者。能知一切障外極遠深細法義。未曾知有如是諸法轉變時分因果差別。唯除外道。如陰暗夜有眩醫人妄有所見。自不能了而為他說言一切法實無生滅。但有時分因果轉變。所謂聲等。或復樂等。不捨自體。轉成余相。時分不同名為轉變。于轉變時以時分相。有差別故。說有生滅。汝今計何以為轉變。為時體耶。為時相耶。且不應說時體轉變。以轉變時汝先自執不捨自體如前位故。亦不應言時相轉變。汝執時相有生滅故。前後各別。何名轉變。又若時體不可轉變。但可時相有轉變者。應離時體別有時相。若言體相非定一異。更互為依相從而說。相由體故。前後非異。體由相故前後非一。體相相資。俱名轉變。若爾則應體由相故有生有滅。相由體故無轉無變。體有生滅則同幻事。非實非常。相無轉變則似空花。非因非果。便失自宗。亦不應言體相性一。實無因果。由義異故。得有因果。性若是一。義云何異。一異不同應有別物。既有因果分位不同。先後各異應非轉變。電光燈焰無轉變故。若言因果分位差別轉變有異。未必先後一體一時有唯量等種種分位。轉變異故。此有虛言而無實義。一法一時有生住滅。更互相違

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：他堅持己見，因此再次吟誦道：

『諸法有轉變，慧者未曾知，唯除無智人，妄分別為有。』

論曰：具有精妙智慧的人，能夠了解一切障礙之外極其深遠細微的法義，從未曾認為存在這樣的諸法轉變、時分、因果差別。只有外道，如同陰暗的夜晚有眼花的醫生妄自有所見，自己不能明瞭卻為他人說一切法實際上沒有生滅，只是有時分、因果轉變。所謂聲等，或者樂等，不捨棄自身，轉變成其他相狀，時分不同就叫做轉變。在轉變時，因為時分相狀有差別，所以說有生滅。你現在認為什麼叫做轉變？是時體呢？還是時相呢？不應該說是時體轉變，因為在轉變時，你先前自己堅持不捨棄自身，如同之前的狀態一樣。也不應該說時相轉變，你認為時相有生滅，前後各不相同，這怎麼能叫做轉變呢？又如果時體不可轉變，只能時相有轉變，那麼應該離開時體而另外存在時相。如果說體和相不是固定的一，也不是固定的異，而是互相依存，相隨從而說，相依靠體，所以前後沒有差異；體依靠相，所以前後不是一體。體和相互相資助，都叫做轉變。如果這樣，那麼就應該體因為相的緣故有生有滅，相因為體的緣故沒有轉沒有變。體有生有滅，就如同幻術一樣，不是真實的，也不是永恒的。相沒有轉變，就好像空中的花朵一樣，不是原因，也不是結果。這樣就失去了你自己的宗義。也不應該說體和相的性質是一樣的，實際上沒有因果，因為意義不同，所以才會有因果。性質如果是一樣的，意義怎麼會不同呢？一和異不同，應該有別的東西。既然有因果，分位不同，先後各異，就不應該說是轉變。電光燈焰沒有轉變的緣故。如果說因果分位差別，轉變有差異，未必先後一體一時有唯量等種種分位，轉變不同，這是虛假的言論，沒有實際意義。一個法在同一時間有生住滅，互相違背。

【English Translation】 English version: He is attached to his views, therefore he chants again:

'All dharmas have transformation, the wise have never known this, only the ignorant falsely distinguish them as existent.'

The Treatise says: Those with wonderful wisdom can understand the extremely distant, profound, and subtle meanings of dharmas beyond all obstacles. They have never known of such transformations, temporal divisions, causal differences of dharmas. Only the heretics, like a dizzy doctor in the dark night, falsely see things, unable to understand themselves, yet telling others that all dharmas actually have no arising or ceasing, but only temporal divisions and causal transformations. So-called sounds, etc., or pleasures, etc., do not abandon their own substance, but transform into other appearances. Different temporal divisions are called transformations. During transformation, because the appearances of temporal divisions are different, it is said that there is arising and ceasing. What do you now consider to be transformation? Is it the substance of time? Or the appearance of time? It should not be said that the substance of time transforms, because during transformation, you yourself insist that it does not abandon its own substance, just like its previous state. Nor should it be said that the appearance of time transforms, because you believe that the appearance of time has arising and ceasing, and is different before and after. How can this be called transformation? Furthermore, if the substance of time cannot transform, and only the appearance of time can transform, then the appearance of time should exist separately from the substance of time. If you say that substance and appearance are neither fixedly one nor fixedly different, but mutually dependent, with appearance following substance, then appearance relies on substance, so there is no difference before and after; substance relies on appearance, so they are not one before and after. Substance and appearance mutually support each other, and both are called transformation. If so, then substance should have arising and ceasing because of appearance, and appearance should have no transformation because of substance. The substance has arising and ceasing, just like an illusion, not real or permanent. The appearance has no transformation, like a flower in the sky, neither cause nor effect. This would lose your own doctrine. Nor should it be said that the nature of substance and appearance is the same, and there is actually no cause and effect, because the meanings are different, so there can be cause and effect. If the nature is the same, how can the meanings be different? One and different are not the same, there should be something else. Since there are causes and effects, different positions, and different sequences, it should not be said that there is transformation, because electric light and lamp flames have no transformation. If you say that the differences in the positions of cause and effect, and the differences in transformation, do not necessarily mean that there are various positions such as quantity at the same time, and that the transformations are different, this is false talk with no real meaning. A single dharma has arising, abiding, and ceasing at the same time, which contradict each other.

成大過故。世間不見一法一時有生住滅。唯見異法異時有三。又不應言時體常有。雖無生滅而有轉變。勿汝所執常住思我。雖無生滅亦有轉變。設許思我亦有轉變。應如樂等非思我性。又許時體有轉變者。時體即是樂等自性。如是自性。舉體應變。若爾則應失自宗義。最勝定無全體轉變。若全轉變。即是無常。又汝時分樂等三法。和合共成。應如林等。體非實有。因果亦爾。若言即用樂等為性故是實有。此亦不然。時等唯一。樂等有三。一三不同。如何相即。若必相即。樂等如時。應唯有一。時如樂等。應有其三。又如樂等遍一切時。此一一時應遍一切。如是時分應成雜亂。時既一一不遍一切。樂等亦應不遍一切。如是樂等與無量時為自性故。應成無量又如樂等隱時亦有此一一時。應亦如是則應無有隱顯差別。以一切時有一切故。由此不應決定相即。既不相即。應計為假。或應不許樂等為性。如推時分。因果亦然。又諸因果。或劣或勝。或凈或穢。云何同以一樂苦癡三法為性。若必爾者。汝等外道無始時來無所不作。同以樂等為自性故。汝等今者雖得人身。而應即是狗等下類。所食甘饌應即糞穢。誰有智者。無緣執此外道邪宗而自毀辱。是故汝說果實不生其體本有。由轉變故立有時分因果差別。正理相違。不任推究。

哀哉外道。宿習癡狂。寶愛邪宗憎背正法。盲無慧目不了是非。隨順迷徒種種妄執。如是已說時體是常相有轉變。不應正理。諸有智人審觀應舍。

大乘廣百論釋論卷第四大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1571 大乘廣百論釋論

大乘廣百論釋論卷第五

聖天菩薩本　護法菩薩釋

三藏法師玄奘奉　詔譯破時品第三之餘

複次有諸異部。于無常法說有剎那暫時住體。即依住體立有實時。為破彼言。故說頌曰。

無常何有住　　住無有何體

論曰。自相經停。故名為住。有為諸法。無常所遷。不能暫停。如何有住。既無住體。依何立時。所以者何。言無常者。或即法滅。或法滅因。一切有為無常所逼暫生即滅何容有住。住位住依無常隨逼。應如后位不得少留。若謂無常雖居住位。爾時住力能制無常。扶己所依令其暫住。此亦非理。故次頌曰。

初若有住者　　后應無變衰

論曰。生滅相續。不捨自類。后異相起名曰變衰。后位住相與前住體既無差別。何有變衰。亦不應言由后法起令前住相而有變衰。住體如前相無變故。豈非後起前住變耶。云何餘生余法名變。現見餘生余亦名變。如酪既生說乳為變。粗雖似變。細則不然。所以者何。世間乳酪同類相續。別相

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：可悲啊這些外道，長久以來的習氣是愚癡和瘋狂，珍愛邪門歪道，憎恨背離正法。他們就像瞎子一樣沒有智慧的眼睛，不能明辨是非，只是盲目地跟隨著迷惑之人，產生各種各樣的虛妄執著。像這樣，他們已經說過的『時間』的本體是常住不變的，這根本不合道理。所有有智慧的人，仔細觀察后都應該捨棄這種觀點。

《大乘廣百論釋論》卷第四大正藏第30冊 No. 1571 《大乘廣百論釋論》

《大乘廣百論釋論》卷第五

聖天菩薩本護法菩薩釋

三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯《破時品》第三之餘

再次，有一些其他的部派，對於無常的法，說有剎那（ksana）暫時存在的本體，並且依靠這個存在的本體來建立『實時』的說法。爲了破斥他們的這種說法，所以說了下面的偈頌：

『無常何有住，住無有何體』

論曰：『自相經停』，所以叫做『住』。有為諸法（conditioned dharmas），被無常所牽動，不能夠暫停，怎麼會有『住』呢？既然沒有『住』的本體，又依靠什麼來建立『時間』呢？為什麼這麼說呢？說到『無常』，或者就是法（dharma）的滅亡，或者是法滅亡的原因。一切有為法都被無常所逼迫，暫時產生就立刻滅亡，怎麼能夠容許有『住』呢？『住』的位置，『住』的所依，都被無常緊緊逼迫，應該像後面的位置一樣，不能夠稍微停留。如果說無常雖然居住在位置上，但這個時候『住』的力量能夠制約無常，扶持自己的所依，讓它暫時停留，這也是沒有道理的。所以接著說了下面的偈頌：

『初若有住者，后應無變衰』

論曰：生滅相續，不捨棄自己的類別，後面的不同相產生，叫做『變衰』。後面的位置的『住』相，和前面的『住』的本體既然沒有差別，怎麼會有『變衰』呢？也不應該說由於後面的法產生，讓前面的『住』相而有『變衰』。『住』的本體像前面一樣，相沒有改變的緣故。難道不是後面的產生讓前面的『住』改變了嗎？怎麼能說其他的產生其他的法叫做改變呢？現在看到其他的產生其他的也叫做改變，比如奶酪（curd）既然產生了，就說牛奶（milk）發生了改變。粗略來看好像是改變了，仔細來看就不是這樣。為什麼這麼說呢？世間的牛奶和奶酪是同類相續，是不同的相。

【English Translation】 English version: Alas, these heretics! Their ingrained habits are ignorance and madness. They cherish heretical doctrines and hate turning away from the true Dharma. Like the blind, they lack the eyes of wisdom and cannot distinguish right from wrong. They blindly follow deluded people, giving rise to all sorts of false attachments. As such, what they have already said—that the essence of 'time' is permanent and unchanging—is utterly unreasonable. All wise people, after careful observation, should abandon this view.

《Commentary on the Hundred Verses on the Great Vehicle》, Volume 4 Taisho Tripitaka, Volume 30, No. 1571, 《Commentary on the Hundred Verses on the Great Vehicle》

《Commentary on the Hundred Verses on the Great Vehicle》, Volume 5

By Bodhisattva Aryadeva, Explained by Bodhisattva Dharmapala

Translated under Imperial Order by the Tripitaka Master Xuanzang, Remaining Part of Chapter 3, 'Refuting Time'

Furthermore, there are some other schools that, regarding impermanent dharmas, say that there is a momentary (ksana) temporarily existing essence, and based on this existing essence, they establish the notion of 'real time'. To refute their view, the following verse is stated:

'How can there be abiding in impermanence? What essence is there in abiding?'

Commentary: 'Self-nature enduring' is called 'abiding'. Conditioned dharmas (samskrta dharmas) are moved by impermanence and cannot pause. How can there be 'abiding'? Since there is no essence of 'abiding', what is 'time' based on? Why is this so? When we speak of 'impermanence', it is either the cessation of a dharma or the cause of the cessation of a dharma. All conditioned dharmas are compelled by impermanence, arising briefly and immediately ceasing. How can they allow for 'abiding'? The position of 'abiding' and the support of 'abiding' are closely pressed by impermanence, and should be like the later position, unable to remain even slightly. If it is said that although impermanence resides in the position, at this time, the power of 'abiding' can restrain impermanence, supporting its own support and allowing it to remain temporarily, this is also unreasonable. Therefore, the following verse is stated:

'If there is abiding in the beginning, there should be no change or decay later.'

Commentary: The continuous succession of arising and ceasing, without abandoning its own category, and the arising of a later different aspect is called 'change and decay'. Since the 'abiding' aspect of the later position and the essence of 'abiding' of the former have no difference, how can there be 'change and decay'? It should also not be said that the arising of the later dharma causes the 'abiding' aspect of the former to have 'change and decay'. The essence of 'abiding' is like the former, because the aspect has not changed. Isn't it the arising of the later that changes the 'abiding' of the former? How can it be said that the arising of other dharmas is called change? Now seeing that the arising of others is also called change, for example, since curd (dadhi) has arisen, it is said that milk (ksira) has changed. Roughly speaking, it seems like a change, but in detail, it is not so. Why is this so? Milk and curd in the world are a continuous succession of the same category, but are different aspects.

難知。不悟其中有細生滅。謂前乳變由后酪生。微細理中即前住體變由後起。其義難知。

複次要自審察知有住體。方可為他說有住相。然無方便可審住體。知其定有能住於法。所以者何。故次頌曰。

譬如無一識　　能了於二義　如是無一義　　二識所能知

論曰。所識諸境要由能識。前觀后察方知是有。若有一身同類二識。於一現境前觀后察。審知境相不異於前。爾乃可言現法有住。即無一身同類二識。於一現境前觀后察。汝等云何能知現法剎那有住依此立時。汝不可言。前念意識觀未來法。后念意識察現在法。知有住體。以未來世法未有故。亦不可言。前念意識觀現在法。后念意識察過去法。知有住體。以過去世法已滅故。縱許去來法是有者。時移世易不可名住。又不可言。色等諸法于現在世住經多時。心等諸法無常迅速。故二念心同緣現在。前觀后察知其有住。既同有為如何不等。色等諸法非久時住。是有為故。猶如心等。有餘執色有住非心。此亦應以心為喻破。一有情身同類二識。定不共緣現在一法。一身同類前後識故。如緣前後青黃二心。亦不可說。五識所觀意識能審知其有住。汝等不許二識俱生。意識生時境已滅故。設許一身多識並起。各緣別境非能審知。雖許意識知五識境。然各

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：難以理解。不明白其中有細微的生滅變化。認為之前的乳變成之後的酪。在微細的道理中，之前的住體變化是由之後生起所導致的，這個道理難以理解。

進一步說，要自己審視觀察，知道有住體（Dharmasthiti，事物存在的狀態），才可以為他人說有住相（Dharmalakshana，事物存在的表象）。然而沒有方便的方法可以審視住體，知道它確實能夠安住於法（Dharma，佛法）。為什麼這麼說呢？所以接著用頌文說：

譬如沒有一個識（Vijnana，意識），能夠了知兩種意義；如同沒有一種意義，能被兩種識所知。

論曰：所認識的各種境界，需要通過能認識的主體。先觀察后審察，才能知道它是存在的。如果有一個身體，有同類的兩個識，對於同一個顯現的境界，先觀察后審察，審慎地知道境界的相狀與之前沒有差異，這樣才可以認為顯現的法有住（Sthiti，持續）。既然沒有一個身體，有同類的兩個識，對於同一個顯現的境界，先觀察后審察，你們怎麼能夠知道顯現的法在剎那間有住，並依此建立時間的概念呢？你們不能說，前一念的意識觀察未來的法，后一念的意識審察現在的法，從而知道有住體。因為未來世的法還沒有產生。也不可以說，前一念的意識觀察現在的法，后一念的意識審察過去的法，從而知道有住體。因為過去世的法已經滅亡了。縱然允許過去和未來的法是存在的，但時間推移，世界變化，不能稱之為住。又不能說，色等諸法（Rupa，物質現象）在現在世住留很長時間，而心等諸法（Citta，精神現象）無常迅速，所以兩個念頭的心同時緣于現在，先觀察后審察，就知道它有住。既然同樣是有為法（Samskrta，因緣和合而成的法），為什麼不一樣呢？色等諸法不是長時間住留，因為它們是有為法，就像心等諸法一樣。有些人認為色有住留而心沒有，這也應該用心來比喻破斥。一個有情（Sattva，眾生）的身體，同類的兩個識，一定不會共同緣于現在的一個法。因為一個身體中同類的識是前後相續的，就像緣於前后的青色和黃色兩個心一樣。也不可以說，五識（Panca-vijnana，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）所觀察到的，意識（Manovijnana，第六識）能夠審慎地知道它有住。你們不承認兩個識同時產生，意識產生的時候，境界已經滅亡了。假設允許一個身體中多個識同時生起，各自緣于不同的境界，也不能審慎地知道。

【English Translation】 English version: It is difficult to understand. Not realizing that there are subtle arising and ceasing phenomena within it. Believing that the previous milk transforms into the subsequent cheese. In subtle reasoning, the change of the previous abiding entity is caused by the subsequent arising. This meaning is difficult to understand.

Furthermore, one must examine and observe oneself to know that there is an abiding entity (Dharmasthiti, the state of existence of things) before one can tell others that there is an abiding characteristic (Dharmalakshana, the appearance of existence of things). However, there is no convenient way to examine the abiding entity and know that it can indeed abide in the Dharma (Buddha's teachings). Why is this so? Therefore, the following verse says:

For example, no one consciousness (Vijnana) can understand two meanings; just as no one meaning can be known by two consciousnesses.

The treatise says: The various realms that are cognized require a cognizing subject. Only through prior observation and subsequent examination can one know that it exists. If there is one body with two consciousnesses of the same kind, observing and examining the same manifest realm, carefully knowing that the appearance of the realm is no different from before, then it can be said that the manifest Dharma has abiding (Sthiti, duration). Since there is no one body with two consciousnesses of the same kind, observing and examining the same manifest realm, how can you know that the manifest Dharma has abiding in an instant and establish the concept of time based on this? You cannot say that the consciousness of the previous moment observes the future Dharma, and the consciousness of the subsequent moment examines the present Dharma, thereby knowing that there is an abiding entity. Because the Dharma of the future world has not yet arisen. Nor can it be said that the consciousness of the previous moment observes the present Dharma, and the consciousness of the subsequent moment examines the past Dharma, thereby knowing that there is an abiding entity. Because the Dharma of the past world has already perished. Even if it is allowed that the past and future Dharmas exist, time passes and the world changes, so it cannot be called abiding. Furthermore, it cannot be said that phenomena such as form (Rupa, material phenomena) abide for a long time in the present world, while phenomena such as mind (Citta, mental phenomena) are impermanent and rapid, so the minds of two thoughts simultaneously cognize the present, and by observing and examining, one knows that it has abiding. Since they are both conditioned phenomena (Samskrta, phenomena arising from causes and conditions), why are they different? Phenomena such as form do not abide for a long time, because they are conditioned phenomena, just like phenomena such as mind. Some people believe that form has abiding but mind does not, this should also be refuted by using mind as an analogy. In the body of a sentient being (Sattva), two consciousnesses of the same kind will certainly not simultaneously cognize one present Dharma. Because the consciousnesses of the same kind in one body are successive, just like cognizing the two minds of blue and yellow that are before and after. Nor can it be said that what is observed by the five consciousnesses (Panca-vijnana, eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness) can be carefully known by the mind consciousness (Manovijnana, the sixth consciousness) to have abiding. You do not admit that two consciousnesses arise simultaneously; when the mind consciousness arises, the realm has already perished. Assuming that multiple consciousnesses arise simultaneously in one body, each cognizing different realms, they cannot carefully know.

自變同現量攝。俱受新境非重審知。由是故說。無有一義二識能知。複次亦無一識審知二義。皆實有體。所以者何。若欲作意審知前有後境未生。審知後有前境已滅。尚無有能審一實有。況能知二現在二境。雖俱可了。皆新受故。非重審知緣余境識。不能審知余境實有。帶余相故。猶如各別緣二境心。又審察心不能審察外境實有。帶余相故。如新了受現在境心。又數論者作如是說。若立慧體念念各異知諸法者。是則不應。先求后證。先受后憶。先疑后決。所以者何。不見天授先求受疑后時祠授能證憶決。由是當知。唯有一慧常能照了一切境界。故立量言。知青等慧決定不離。知黃等慧是慧體故。如黃等慧。是故一慧知一切義。此亦不然。常法轉變皆先已破。不應重執。又汝云何知此一慧其體是常知一切義。非不審察所知慧相。可言此慧知一切境。非即此慧能自審知。色等法中曾不見故。此慧必有別慧能知。是所知故。猶如色等。又青等慧其性各別。所知異故。如自他慧。此中意明。無有一慧能重審知二境實有。不言一慧不知多法。勿一念心不了多境。又明慧體不能自審。不言慧體不能自照。勿心心法不能自證。若爾不應后時自憶。若言照境是用非體。體非照故。不隨境別照用隨緣。乃有無量有多用故。無如上失。此亦

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本自變和同時出現的量可以被包含。同時感受新的境界，而不是重複的審視認知。因此說，沒有一個意識能夠認知兩種意義。此外，也沒有一個意識能夠審視認知兩種意義，並且它們都是真實存在的實體。為什麼呢？如果想要通過作意來審視認知先前的存在，但後來的境界尚未產生；審視認知後來的存在，但先前的境界已經滅亡。尚且沒有能力審視一個真實存在的，更何況能夠認知兩個現在的境界。雖然都可以瞭解，但都是新感受的緣故，不是重複的審視認知。緣于其他境界的意識，不能審視認知其他境界的真實存在，因為它帶有其他相狀的緣故，就像各自緣于兩個境界的心一樣。而且，審察的心不能審察外境的真實存在，因為它帶有其他相狀的緣故，就像新瞭解感受現在境界的心一樣。此外，數論者這樣說：如果建立的『慧』（Buddhi）的本體，唸唸各異地認知諸法，那麼就不應該出現先求后證，先受后憶，先疑后決的情況。為什麼呢？因為沒有看到天授（Devadatta）先前尋求、接受懷疑，後來祠授（Yajnadatta）能夠證明、憶起決定的情況。因此應當知道，只有一種『慧』（Buddhi）能夠恒常地照了一切境界。所以建立量論說：認知青色等的『慧』（Buddhi）必定不離認知黃色等的『慧』（Buddhi），因為它是『慧』（Buddhi）的本體，就像黃色等的『慧』（Buddhi）一樣。所以一種『慧』（Buddhi）認知一切意義。這也是不對的。常法的轉變都已經先前被破斥了，不應該再次堅持。而且，你如何知道這一個『慧』（Buddhi）的本體是恒常的，並且認知一切意義呢？如果不是審察所認知的『慧』（Buddhi）的相狀，可以說這個『慧』（Buddhi）認知一切境界，但不能說就是這個『慧』（Buddhi）能夠自己審視認知，因為在色等法中從未見過這種情況。這個『慧』（Buddhi）必定有其他的『慧』（Buddhi）能夠認知它，因為它是一個被認知的對象，就像色等一樣。而且，認知青色等的『慧』（Buddhi）其性質各不相同，因為所認知的對象不同，就像自己和他人的『慧』（Buddhi）一樣。這裡的意思是說，沒有一種『慧』（Buddhi）能夠重複審視認知兩個境界的真實存在，而不是說一種『慧』（Buddhi）不能認知多種法，不要認為一個念頭的心不能瞭解多個境界。又說明『慧』（Buddhi）的本體不能自己審視，而不是說『慧』（Buddhi）的本體不能自己照亮，不要認為心和心法不能自己證明。如果這樣，就不應該在之後的時間自己回憶。如果說照亮境界是『用』（function）而不是『體』（essence），因為『體』（essence）不是照亮的，不隨著境界而改變，照亮的『用』（function）隨著因緣而改變，乃至於有無量多種『用』（function）的緣故，就沒有像上面那樣的過失。這也是不對的。

【English Translation】 English version Self-change and co-occurrence are included in measurement. Simultaneously experiencing new realms, not repeatedly scrutinizing cognition. Therefore, it is said that no one consciousness can cognize two meanings. Furthermore, no one consciousness can scrutinize and cognize two meanings, and both are real entities. Why? If one intends to scrutinize and cognize the prior existence, but the subsequent realm has not yet arisen; scrutinize and cognize the subsequent existence, but the prior realm has already ceased. There is not even the ability to scrutinize one real existence, let alone cognize two present realms. Although both can be understood, it is because they are newly experienced, not repeatedly scrutinized cognition. Consciousness that is related to other realms cannot scrutinize and cognize the real existence of other realms, because it carries the appearance of other realms, just like minds that each relate to two realms. Moreover, the scrutinizing mind cannot scrutinize the real existence of external realms, because it carries the appearance of other realms, just like the mind that newly understands and experiences the present realm. Furthermore, the Samkhya philosophers say this: If the essence of 'Buddhi' (intellect) is established, with each moment cognizing all dharmas differently, then there should not be a case of seeking first and proving later, experiencing first and remembering later, doubting first and deciding later. Why? Because it has not been seen that Devadatta (天授) seeks, accepts doubt first, and then Yajnadatta (祠授) can prove and remember the decision later. Therefore, it should be known that only one 'Buddhi' (慧) can constantly illuminate all realms. Therefore, the inference is established: the 'Buddhi' (慧) that cognizes blue, etc., must not be separate from the 'Buddhi' (慧) that cognizes yellow, etc., because it is the essence of 'Buddhi' (慧), just like the 'Buddhi' (慧) of yellow, etc. Therefore, one 'Buddhi' (慧) cognizes all meanings. This is also not correct. The transformation of permanent dharmas has already been refuted previously, and should not be insisted upon again. Moreover, how do you know that the essence of this one 'Buddhi' (慧) is permanent and cognizes all meanings? If it is not scrutinizing the appearance of the 'Buddhi' (慧) that is cognized, it can be said that this 'Buddhi' (慧) cognizes all realms, but it cannot be said that this 'Buddhi' (慧) can scrutinize and cognize itself, because this has never been seen in the dharmas of form, etc. This 'Buddhi' (慧) must have another 'Buddhi' (慧) that can cognize it, because it is an object to be cognized, just like form, etc. Moreover, the nature of the 'Buddhi' (慧) that cognizes blue, etc., is different, because the objects to be cognized are different, just like one's own and others' 'Buddhi' (慧). The meaning here is that no one 'Buddhi' (慧) can repeatedly scrutinize and cognize the real existence of two realms, but it is not saying that one 'Buddhi' (慧) cannot cognize multiple dharmas, do not think that the mind of one thought cannot understand multiple realms. It also explains that the essence of 'Buddhi' (慧) cannot scrutinize itself, but it is not saying that the essence of 'Buddhi' (慧) cannot illuminate itself, do not think that the mind and mental dharmas cannot prove themselves. If so, one should not remember oneself later. If it is said that illuminating the realm is 'function' (用) and not 'essence' (體), because 'essence' (體) is not illuminating, it does not change with the realm, the illuminating 'function' (用) changes with conditions, and there are even countless 'functions' (用), so there is no fault like the one above. This is also not correct.

不然。體若非照。應如色等。不名為慧。若言照用。不離體故。無斯過者。此亦不然。用不離體。照應成一。不離體故。猶如慧體。體不離用。慧應成多。不離用故。猶如照用。用隨體一。違前比量。體隨用多。違自所立。若用隨體無差別者。總緣別緣希求證得。領受憶念猶豫決定。如是等用差別應無。若體隨用有差別者。汝所立慧應唸唸別。亦應無有先求后證。先受后憶。先疑后決。是則汝言翻成自害。又汝若言慧體雖一。然用隨緣變成多種。故無失者。此亦不然。慧用隨緣變成多故。應如樂等其性非一。世間不見有色等物體常是一用變成多。世俗事中假立體用。容可施設體一用多。勝義理中無如是義。如何一物實有一多。又汝所言慧體念念各別異故。如異身慧。應無先求后證等者。因義不成。自宗不許。前後兩慧體有異故。又許照用雖唸唸別而有先求后證等事。故所立因有不定失。又樂等異別慧所緣。彼此俱。許即為同喻。由此比知緣別境識。別慧緣故。體應有異。謂青等識其體各異。別慧緣故。猶如樂等。豈不樂等於轉變時合成色等其相無異。

爾時復為一慧所緣。所立同喻。便闕能立。此非真過。我說別慧所緣為因證體有異。不言唯為別慧所緣。斯有何失。然彼樂等其性各異。必應許有別慧所緣。是故

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：並非如此。如果慧的本體不具有照了（Prakasha）的作用，那麼它就應該像色（Rupa）等一樣，不能被稱為慧。如果說慧具有照了的作用，並且這種作用不離開本體，那麼就不會有這樣的過失。但這也是不對的。如果作用不離開本體，那麼照了和本體就成了一體。因為不離開本體，慧的本體就應該像照了的作用一樣成為多種。因為不離開作用，本體就隨作用而成為多種，這違反了你之前的比量（Anumana）。本體隨作用而成為多種，這又違反了你自己的立論。如果作用隨本體而沒有差別，那麼總緣（總體認知）、別緣（個別認知）、希求證得、領受、憶念、猶豫、決定等等這些作用的差別就應該不存在。如果本體隨作用而有差別，那麼你所立的慧就應該唸唸各別，也應該沒有先求后證、先受后憶、先疑后決。這樣，你說的話就反而成了自相矛盾。而且，如果你說慧的本體雖然是一個，但作用隨因緣而變成多種，所以沒有過失，這也是不對的。慧的作用隨因緣而變成多種，就應該像樂（Sukha）等一樣，其自性不是單一的。世間上沒有看到有色等物體，其本體常是一個，而作用變成多種的。在世俗的事物中，可以假立本體和作用，容許設立本體是一個而作用是多種的情況。但在勝義諦（Paramartha）的道理中，沒有這樣的道理。怎麼能說一個事物實際上既是一又是多呢？而且，你說慧的本體念念各別不同，就像不同身體的慧一樣，所以不應該有先求后證等情況，這個因義（Hetu）是不成立的，因為自宗（Sva-tantra）不承認前後兩個慧的本體是相同的。而且，自宗也承認照了的作用雖然唸唸各別，但有先求后證等事，所以你所立的因有不定過失（Anityata-dosha）。而且，樂等與別慧所緣，彼此都承認，這就成了同喻（Sadharmya-drishtanta）。由此比量可知，緣別境的識，因為是別慧所緣，所以本體應該是有差異的。比如青識等，它們的本體各自不同，因為是別慧所緣，就像樂等一樣。難道樂等在轉變時會合成色等，而它們的相沒有差異嗎？那時又成為一慧所緣，所立的同喻就缺少能立（Sadhana）。這不是真正的過失。我說以別慧所緣為因，來證明本體是有差異的，而不是說僅僅因為是別慧所緣。這有什麼過失呢？然而，那些樂等，它們的自性各自不同，必定應該承認有別慧所緣。所以。

【English Translation】 English version: Not so. If the nature of wisdom (Prajna) does not have the function of illumination (Prakasha), then it should be like form (Rupa) and other things, and cannot be called wisdom. If it is said that wisdom has the function of illumination, and this function does not leave the nature, then there will be no such fault. But this is also not right. If the function does not leave the nature, then illumination and the nature become one. Because it does not leave the nature, the nature of wisdom should become many, just like the function of illumination. Because it does not leave the function, the nature follows the function and becomes many, which violates your previous inference (Anumana). The nature following the function and becoming many violates your own proposition. If the function follows the nature and there is no difference, then the differences in functions such as general cognition (overall perception), specific cognition (individual perception), seeking to attain, receiving, remembering, hesitating, and deciding should not exist. If the nature follows the function and there are differences, then the wisdom you posit should be different in each moment, and there should be no prior seeking and subsequent attainment, prior receiving and subsequent remembering, prior doubt and subsequent decision. In this way, what you say becomes self-contradictory. Moreover, if you say that the nature of wisdom is one, but the function changes into many according to conditions, so there is no fault, this is also not right. Because the function of wisdom changes into many according to conditions, it should be like pleasure (Sukha) and other things, whose nature is not singular. In the world, it is not seen that objects such as form have a nature that is always one, while the function changes into many. In worldly matters, it is possible to hypothetically establish nature and function, allowing the establishment of a situation where the nature is one and the functions are many. But in the ultimate truth (Paramartha), there is no such principle. How can it be said that one thing is actually both one and many? Moreover, you say that the nature of wisdom is different in each moment, just like the wisdom of different bodies, so there should be no prior seeking and subsequent attainment, etc. The reason (Hetu) for this is not established, because our own school (Sva-tantra) does not admit that the nature of the two wisdoms, before and after, are the same. Moreover, our school also admits that although the function of illumination is different in each moment, there are prior seeking and subsequent attainment, etc., so the reason you posit has the fault of uncertainty (Anityata-dosha). Moreover, pleasure and other things are different from the objects of separate wisdom, and both sides admit this, which becomes a similar example (Sadharmya-drishtanta). From this inference, it can be known that the consciousness that cognizes separate objects, because it is the object of separate wisdom, should have a different nature. For example, blue consciousness and other consciousnesses have different natures, because they are the objects of separate wisdom, just like pleasure and other things. Could it be that pleasure and other things combine into form and other things when they transform, and their appearances are not different? At that time, it becomes the object of one wisdom again, and the established similar example lacks the means of proof (Sadhana). This is not a real fault. I say that the object of separate wisdom is the reason for proving that the nature is different, not that it is only because it is the object of separate wisdom. What fault is there in this? However, those pleasures and other things, their natures are different, and it must be admitted that there are objects of separate wisdom. Therefore.

決定無有一慧。其體是常知一切義。故無一識審知二義。皆實有體。其理成立。為釋頌文起斯傍諍。今應且止辨正所論。

複次今應詰問有住論者。如是住體為待余住能住於法。為不爾耶。若爾何過。若待余住能住法者。應如所住不名能住。若不待余能住法者。所住亦爾。應不待余為顯此義。故次頌曰。

時若有餘住　　住則不成時

論曰。自性不能助成自性。故無同類同時相待。諸有為法必待異類相助而成。如慧與心。地與水等。如是若執住別有住。此住則應失於住體。待余住故。如所住法。頌中時者。是住別名。此正應言住有餘住。住不成住成文故爾。由此生等亦無同類。故所立量無不定失。又次頌曰。

時若余住無　　后滅應非有

論曰。時者謂住。余住若無。如所住法不能自住。既不自住豈能住他。如是則應不名能住。能住無故。諸有為法何能暫住經一剎那。初住既為無。后滅如何有。初住后滅相待立故。又若此住不待余住。自能住者法亦應爾。自力能住不待余住。住既是無。滅亦非有。云何汝執初住后滅。又住滅等互為助伴能起作用。住相既空。亦無滅等。是則諸法應無後滅。無後滅者何謂無常。

複次諸有為法與無常相為一為異。若爾何失。若言是異。應非無常。若言

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：決定沒有一種智慧（慧，prajna），它的體性是恒常了知一切意義的。所以沒有一個識（識，vijnana）能夠審知兩種意義，因為它們都是真實存在的。這個道理成立，是爲了解釋頌文而引起的旁論。現在應該先停止爭論，辨明我們所討論的正確之處。

其次，現在應該詰問那些持有『住』（sthiti）的論者：像這樣的『住』的體性，是需要依靠其他的『住』才能使法（dharma）安住，還是不需要？如果是需要，會有什麼過失？如果需要依靠其他的『住』才能使法安住，那麼就應該像所安住的法一樣，不能被稱為能安住者。如果不需要依靠其他的『住』就能使法安住，那麼所安住的法也應該如此，應該不需要依靠其他的『住』。爲了顯明這個道理，所以接下來的頌文說：

『時間如果存在其他的住，那麼住就不能成立時間。』

論曰：自性不能幫助成就自性，所以沒有同類同時互相依賴的情況。諸有為法（samksrta-dharma）必定要依靠異類互相幫助才能成就，比如智慧（慧，prajna）和心（心，citta），地（地，prthivi）和水（水，ap）等。像這樣，如果執著『住』之外還有其他的『住』，那麼這個『住』就應該失去它的『住』的體性，因為它依賴於其他的『住』，就像所安住的法一樣。頌文中的『時間』，是『住』的別名。這裡本應該說『住』有其他的『住』，因為『住不成住』才符合文義。由此，生（jati）等也沒有同類。所以所立的量（量，pramana）沒有不確定的過失。接下來的頌文又說：

『時間如果其他的住不存在，那麼後來的滅（bhanga）應該不存在。』

論曰：時間就是指『住』。如果其他的『住』不存在，就像所安住的法不能自己安住一樣，既然不能自己安住，怎麼能使其他安住？像這樣，那麼就不應該被稱為能安住者。能安住者不存在，諸有為法怎麼能暫時安住經歷一個剎那（ksana）？最初的『住』既然已經不存在，後來的『滅』怎麼會有？因為最初的『住』和後來的『滅』是相互依賴而成立的。又如果這個『住』不需要依靠其他的『住』，自己就能安住，那麼法也應該如此，自己有力量安住，不需要依靠其他的『住』。『住』既然是無，『滅』也不是有。你們怎麼執著最初的『住』和後來的『滅』？又『住』、『滅』等互相作為助伴才能產生作用。『住』的相（laksana）既然是空（sunya），也就沒有『滅』等。那麼諸法應該沒有後來的『滅』。沒有後來的『滅』，那還說什麼無常（anitya）？

其次，諸有為法和無常相（無常相，anitya-laksana）是一還是異？如果是一，會有什麼過失？如果說是異，應該不是無常。

【English Translation】 English version: There is definitely no wisdom (慧, prajna) whose nature is constant and knows all meanings. Therefore, no consciousness (識, vijnana) can discern two meanings, because they are both truly existent. This principle is established to address the side arguments arising from the interpretation of the verses. Now, we should first stop the debate and clarify the correctness of what we are discussing.

Furthermore, we should now question those who hold the view of 'abiding' (住, sthiti): Is the nature of such 'abiding' dependent on other 'abidings' to enable the dharma (法, dharma) to abide, or is it not? If it is dependent, what fault would there be? If it depends on other 'abidings' to enable the dharma to abide, then it should be like the dharma being abided in, and cannot be called the one who enables abiding. If it does not depend on other 'abidings' to enable the dharma to abide, then the dharma being abided in should also be like that, and should not depend on other 'abidings'. To clarify this principle, the following verse says:

'If time has other abidings, then abiding cannot establish time.'

Commentary: Self-nature cannot help to accomplish self-nature, so there is no situation of similar kinds simultaneously depending on each other. All conditioned dharmas (諸有為法, samksrta-dharma) must depend on different kinds to help each other to be accomplished, such as wisdom (慧, prajna) and mind (心, citta), earth (地, prthivi) and water (水, ap), etc. Like this, if one insists that there are other 'abidings' besides 'abiding', then this 'abiding' should lose its nature of 'abiding', because it depends on other 'abidings', just like the dharma being abided in. The 'time' in the verse is another name for 'abiding'. Here, it should have said 'abiding' has other 'abidings', because 'abiding does not establish abiding' is consistent with the meaning of the text. From this, birth (生, jati) and others also do not have similar kinds. Therefore, the established measure (量, pramana) does not have the fault of uncertainty. The following verse also says:

'If other abidings of time do not exist, then the subsequent cessation (滅, bhanga) should not exist.'

Commentary: Time refers to 'abiding'. If other 'abidings' do not exist, just like the dharma being abided in cannot abide by itself, since it cannot abide by itself, how can it enable others to abide? Like this, then it should not be called the one who enables abiding. Since the one who enables abiding does not exist, how can conditioned dharmas temporarily abide for a moment (剎那, ksana)? Since the initial 'abiding' has already ceased to exist, how can the subsequent 'cessation' exist? Because the initial 'abiding' and the subsequent 'cessation' are established by depending on each other. Also, if this 'abiding' does not need to depend on other 'abidings' and can abide by itself, then the dharma should also be like that, having the power to abide by itself and not needing to depend on other 'abidings'. Since 'abiding' is non-existent, 'cessation' is also non-existent. How do you insist on the initial 'abiding' and the subsequent 'cessation'? Also, 'abiding', 'cessation', etc., mutually act as helpers to produce effects. Since the characteristic (相, laksana) of 'abiding' is empty (空, sunya), there is also no 'cessation', etc. Then all dharmas should not have subsequent 'cessation'. Without subsequent 'cessation', what is meant by impermanence (無常, anitya)?

Furthermore, are conditioned dharmas and the characteristic of impermanence (無常相, anitya-laksana) the same or different? If they are the same, what fault would there be? If they are said to be different, they should not be impermanent.

是一。應無有住。為顯此義。故復頌曰。

法與無常異　　法則非無常

論曰。色等諸法名無常者。無常相合說為無常。色受想等其相各別。自性有異。故非無常。若爾色等異無常故。應如空等。體非無常。若言色等雖有差別。而用無常以為共相。如是共相若離色等。色等異彼。還同前過。若言色等與彼共相體不相離。是則色等無異性故。應失自相。若言諸法各有二相。謂自及共不相舍離。如是二種一通一別。相不同故。應非一體。如無常相。非即色等。如是色等亦非無常。相既有異。雖共和合而體不同。猶如色味。若謂色等實非無常。無常合故假說無常。如執杖人說名為杖。故無色等非無常過。若爾修習無常觀者。于其色等非無常法。自心增益立為無常。此無常觀應成顛倒。若爾不應能斷煩惱。是故無常應即色等。若即色等復失自相。如是諸法自相共相。世俗道中相待假立。不可定執為一為異。于勝義理都不可論。已說無常與法異過。為顯一過。復說頌曰。

法與無常一　　法應非有住

論曰。無常與住。性相相違。云何一法具有二種。如苦與樂。性相相違。尚不相應。況同一體。若色等法與無常一。是則決定無暫住義。如何依住立有實時。

複次有作是說。如上所言。諸法無常何有住

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：是一。不應有任何執著。爲了闡明這個道理，所以再次用偈頌說：

『法與無常異，法則非無常。』

論曰：色等諸法被稱為無常，是因為無常的相狀與它們結合在一起，才說它們是無常的。色、受、想等，它們的相狀各自不同，自性也有差異，所以不是無常。如果這樣說，色等與無常不同，應該像空等一樣，本體不是無常。如果說色等雖然有差別，但都以無常作為共同的相狀，那麼這個共同的相狀如果離開色等，色等與它不同，還是和前面的過失一樣。如果說色等與這個共同的相狀本體不相分離，那麼色等因為沒有差異性，就應該失去自身的相狀。如果說諸法各有兩種相狀，即自身相狀和共同相狀，兩者不相舍離，那麼這兩種相狀，一種是共通的，一種是特別的，相狀不同，應該不是一體的。就像無常的相狀，不是即色等。這樣，色等也不是無常。相狀既然有差異，即使共同和合，本體也不同，就像色和味。如果認為色等實際上不是無常，因為與無常結合，所以假說為無常，就像執杖的人被稱為杖一樣，所以沒有色等不是無常的過失。如果這樣，修習無常觀的人，對於色等這些不是無常的法，只是自己的心增益，立為無常，這個無常觀應該成為顛倒。如果這樣，就不應該能斷除煩惱。所以，無常應該就是色等。如果即是色等，又會失去自身的相狀。像這樣，諸法的自身相狀和共同相狀，在世俗的道理中，是相互對待而假立的，不可執著地認為是同一或不同。在勝義的道理中，都不可討論。已經說了無常與法不同的過失，爲了顯示同一的過失，再次用偈頌說：

『法與無常一，法應非有住。』

論曰：無常與住，性質和相狀相互違背，怎麼能一個法具有兩種性質？就像苦和樂，性質和相狀相互違背，尚且不相應，何況是同一本體。如果色等法與無常是一體的，那麼就決定沒有暫時安住的意義。如何依靠安住而建立有實時的存在？

再次，有人這樣說，如上面所說，諸法無常，哪裡有安住？

【English Translation】 English version: It is one. There should be no attachment. To clarify this meaning, it is further stated in verse:

'The Dharma (law, principle) is different from impermanence, the Dharma (law, principle) is not impermanent.'

Treatise says: The various Dharmas (laws, principles) such as form are called impermanent because the characteristic of impermanence is combined with them, hence they are said to be impermanent. Form, sensation, perception, etc., have different characteristics and different natures, so they are not impermanent. If so, since form, etc., are different from impermanence, they should be like emptiness, etc., whose substance is not impermanent. If it is said that although form, etc., have differences, they all use impermanence as a common characteristic, then if this common characteristic is separated from form, etc., and form, etc., are different from it, it is still the same as the previous fault. If it is said that form, etc., and this common characteristic are not separated in substance, then form, etc., should lose their own characteristics because they have no difference. If it is said that all Dharmas (laws, principles) have two characteristics, namely their own and common characteristics, which are not separated from each other, then these two characteristics, one is common and the other is special, and since the characteristics are different, they should not be one. Just like the characteristic of impermanence, it is not identical to form, etc. Thus, form, etc., are also not impermanent. Since the characteristics are different, even if they are combined together, their substance is different, just like color and taste. If it is thought that form, etc., are actually not impermanent, but because they are combined with impermanence, they are falsely said to be impermanent, just like a person holding a staff is called a staff, so there is no fault that form, etc., are not impermanent. If so, for those who practice the contemplation of impermanence, for these Dharmas (laws, principles) such as form, which are not impermanent, it is only their own mind that increases and establishes them as impermanent, and this contemplation of impermanence should become inverted. If so, it should not be able to cut off afflictions. Therefore, impermanence should be identical to form, etc. If it is identical to form, etc., it will lose its own characteristics. Like this, the own and common characteristics of Dharmas (laws, principles) are conditionally established in the worldly truth, and it is not possible to cling to them as being the same or different. In the ultimate truth, they cannot be discussed. The fault of impermanence being different from the Dharma (law, principle) has already been stated. To show the fault of being the same, it is again stated in verse:

'The Dharma (law, principle) is the same as impermanence, the Dharma (law, principle) should not have abiding.'

Treatise says: Impermanence and abiding are contradictory in nature and characteristics. How can one Dharma (law, principle) have two kinds of natures? Just like suffering and happiness, their natures and characteristics are contradictory, and they are not even corresponding, let alone being the same substance. If Dharmas (laws, principles) such as form are one with impermanence, then there is definitely no meaning of temporary abiding. How can the existence of real time be established based on abiding?

Furthermore, some say that, as mentioned above, since all Dharmas (laws, principles) are impermanent, where is there any abiding?

者。此不應理。所以者何。諸法自性雖復同時。然其作用前後差別。如四大種為共有因。體必同時。用有先後。如是三相體雖俱有。而彼作用時分不同。先生相用。次住后滅。住相用時。雖有無常。而無勝用。住有用故。能住所依住相用訖無常得。次復起勝用滅所依法。此亦不然。生住滅相自性作用。皆互相違。如苦樂等。必不併起。云何體俱用有先後。自性相違而許並起。何不許彼作用同時。用既不俱。體亦應爾四大種喻。理未必然。用不同時。體亦應爾。又住無常體若俱有。不應作用先後不同。若謂住強無常劣故。住先起用無常後起。此亦不然。故次頌曰。

無常初既劣　　住力定應強　此二復何緣　　后見成顛倒

論曰。體既同時。用有先後。故不可說二相力齊。定應住勝無常是劣。若爾何緣后時復見。無常力勝摧伏住力。滅壞所依及住相等。后時住力應制無常。以力強故猶如初位。於此中間無別方便可令住相力用損減。及令無常力用增盛。若言住相作用已訖。故於此時其力損減。彼無常相先未作用故於此時其力增盛。此亦不然。理相違故。住與無常先後體一。何緣力用衰盛不同。住相爾時體無虧減。何緣力用炊有衰損。又住相用齊何當止。若言住用唯一剎那。何緣此住極為知定。若住相力唯有爾

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：這種說法是不合理的。為什麼呢？因為諸法的自性雖然是同時存在的，但它們的作用卻有先後差別。比如四大種（地、水、火、風，構成物質世界的四種基本元素）作為共同的原因，它們的本體必然是同時存在的，但它們的作用卻有先後。同樣，生、住、滅三相（事物從產生、存在到消滅的三個階段）本體雖然同時具有，但它們的作用在時間上是不同的。先生相起作用，然後是住相，最後是滅相。住相起作用的時候，雖然有無常，但沒有強大的作用。因為住相在起作用，能夠安住所依之法。住相的作用結束后，無常才得勢，然後產生強大的作用，滅壞所依之法。這種說法也是不對的。生、住、滅三相的自性作用是互相違背的，就像苦和樂一樣，必定不會同時產生。怎麼能說它們的本體是同時存在的，而作用卻有先後呢？自性相違卻允許同時產生，為什麼不允許它們的作用也同時產生呢？既然作用不同時，那麼本體也應該是不同的。用四大種來比喻，道理並不必然成立。作用不同時，本體也應該是不同的。而且，住和無常的本體如果同時存在，就不應該作用有先後不同。如果說住相的力量強，無常的力量弱，所以住相先起作用，無常後起作用，這種說法也是不對的。所以接下來說：『無常初既劣，住力定應強，此二復何緣，后見成顛倒。』論曰：本體既然是同時存在的，作用卻有先後，所以不能說住相和無常相的力量相等，一定應該是住相強而無常相弱。如果是這樣，為什麼後來又看到無常的力量強大，摧毀住相的力量，滅壞所依之法以及住相等呢？後來住相的力量應該制服無常，因為住相的力量強，就像最初的時候一樣。在這中間，沒有其他的方法可以讓住相的力量減弱，以及讓無常的力量增強。如果說住相的作用已經結束了，所以在這個時候它的力量減弱；而無常相先前沒有起作用，所以在這個時候它的力量增強。這種說法也是不對的，因為在道理上是相違背的。住相和無常相在時間上是先後，本體是一樣的，為什麼力量的衰盛不同呢？住相在那個時候本體沒有虧損，為什麼力量卻有衰減呢？而且住相的作用到什麼時候停止呢？如果說住相的作用只有一個剎那（極短的時間單位），為什麼這個住相如此的堅定呢？如果住相的力量只有那麼一點點

【English Translation】 English version: This statement is unreasonable. Why? Because although the self-natures of all dharmas (phenomena, things) exist simultaneously, their functions have sequential differences. For example, the four great elements (earth, water, fire, and wind, the four basic elements that constitute the material world) as a common cause, their essence must exist simultaneously, but their functions have a sequence. Similarly, although the three characteristics of arising, abiding, and ceasing (the three stages of a thing from arising, existing to ceasing) simultaneously possess the essence, their functions are different in time. The characteristic of arising functions first, then the characteristic of abiding, and finally the characteristic of ceasing. When the characteristic of abiding is functioning, although there is impermanence (anitya), it does not have a strong function. Because the characteristic of abiding is functioning, it can abide in the dharma (law, principle, phenomenon) on which it depends. After the function of the characteristic of abiding ends, impermanence gains power, and then produces a strong function, destroying the dharma on which it depends. This statement is also incorrect. The self-nature functions of the three characteristics of arising, abiding, and ceasing are mutually contradictory, just like suffering and happiness, they will certainly not arise simultaneously. How can it be said that their essence exists simultaneously, but their functions have a sequence? Allowing mutually contradictory self-natures to arise simultaneously, why not allow their functions to arise simultaneously as well? Since the functions are not simultaneous, then the essence should also be different. Using the analogy of the four great elements, the reasoning is not necessarily valid. If the functions are not simultaneous, then the essence should also be different. Moreover, if the essence of abiding and impermanence exist simultaneously, then their functions should not have different sequences. If it is said that the power of abiding is strong and the power of impermanence is weak, so the characteristic of abiding functions first and impermanence functions later, this statement is also incorrect. Therefore, it is said next: 'Since impermanence is initially weak, the power of abiding should definitely be strong. What is the reason that later we see it become reversed?' The treatise says: Since the essence exists simultaneously, but the functions have a sequence, it cannot be said that the powers of the characteristics of abiding and impermanence are equal, it should definitely be that abiding is strong and impermanence is weak. If this is the case, why do we later see that the power of impermanence is strong, destroying the power of abiding, destroying the dharma on which it depends, as well as the characteristic of abiding, etc.? Later, the power of abiding should subdue impermanence, because the power of abiding is strong, just like in the beginning. In the middle of this, there is no other way to make the power of the characteristic of abiding weaken, and to make the power of impermanence strengthen. If it is said that the function of the characteristic of abiding has ended, so at this time its power weakens; while the characteristic of impermanence has not functioned before, so at this time its power strengthens. This statement is also incorrect, because it is contradictory in reasoning. The characteristic of abiding and the characteristic of impermanence are sequential in time, and the essence is the same, why are the strengths and weaknesses of the powers different? The essence of the characteristic of abiding is not diminished at that time, why does the power have a decline? Moreover, when does the function of the characteristic of abiding stop? If it is said that the function of abiding is only one kshana (an extremely short unit of time), why is this abiding so firm? If the power of the characteristic of abiding is only that little

所。謂能住法經一剎那。若爾無常今復何用。住力既盡所住諸法自然不住。何用滅為。如是住相初后體同。所作事業亦無有異。有時起用有時不起。此義難了。智者應思。又於後時無常力勝能滅住相。彼此同知。由是亦應信無常力前位已勝能摧住相。若爾住相常應無用。何執如是無用住為。是故智者應信無住。既無有住。時依何立。又執無常初劣后勝。並執住相初勝后劣。皆不應理。故復頌曰。

若遍諸法體　　無常力初劣　應都無有住　　或一切皆常

論曰。若無常相初時力劣。不能滅法。法自然住。何緣執此無用住耶。是則住相應本無有。以無用故。猶如兔角。若言住相初時力勝能伏無常。則一切時皆應得勝。體無異故。若爾有為常應不滅便違經說諸行無常。

複次今應詰問貪住相人。諸有為法為無常相決定俱生。為作用時無常始起。初且不然。故次頌曰。

無常若恒有　　住相應常無

論曰。有為諸法無常所遷不能暫停。先已具辨。此無常相損害有為。如極暴惡怨家債主。常隨遷逼不令暫住。是故若說一切有為恒有無常。則常無住。后亦不然。故復頌曰。

或彼法先常　　后乃非常住

論曰。若剎那終無常始起。此無常相前位應無。爾時彼法應成常住。無無常故。如虛

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：問：如果說『能住法』（neng zhu fa）[能夠保持事物狀態的法]只能持續一剎那（yi cha na）[極短的時間單位]，那麼無常（wu chang）[事物變化不居的狀態]還有什麼用呢？如果『住力』（zhu li）[保持事物狀態的力量]耗盡，所保持的諸法（zhu fa）[一切事物和現象]自然就不能保持，又何必需要『滅』（mie）[消滅]呢？如此說來，『住相』（zhu xiang）[事物保持不變的狀態]從開始到結束本體都是相同的，所起的作用也沒有什麼不同，只是有時起作用，有時不起作用，這個道理難以理解，智者應該仔細思考。又，如果認為在後來的時間裡，無常的力量勝過『住相』，能夠消滅它，這是彼此都知道的。由此也應該相信，無常的力量在先前就已經勝過『住相』，能夠摧毀它。如果這樣，『住相』就應該始終沒有用處，為什麼還要執著于這種沒有用處的『住相』呢？所以智者應該相信沒有『住』（zhu）[保持不變的狀態]。既然沒有『住』，時間又依據什麼而成立呢？還有，認為無常最初弱小，後來強大，以及認為『住相』最初強大，後來弱小，都是不合道理的。所以再次用偈頌說：『如果無常的力量遍及諸法本體，最初卻很弱小，那麼要麼應該根本沒有『住』，要麼一切都應該是常（chang）[永恒不變的狀態]』。論：如果無常的相（xiang）[事物表現出來的狀態]最初力量弱小，不能消滅法，法自然保持不變，為什麼要執著于這種沒有用處的『住』呢？這樣說來，『住相』就應該根本不存在，因為它沒有用處，就像兔子的角一樣。如果說『住相』最初力量強大，能夠壓制無常，那麼任何時候都應該能夠得勝，因為它的本體沒有變化。如果這樣，有為法（you wei fa）[由因緣和合而生的事物]就應該永遠不會消滅，這便違背了佛經所說的『諸行無常』（zhu xing wu chang）[一切事物都是無常變化的]。其次，現在應該質問那些貪戀『住相』的人：諸有為法是與無常相決定同時產生，還是在起作用的時候無常才開始產生？首先，前一種說法是不對的。所以再次用偈頌說：『如果無常始終存在，那麼『住相』就應該始終不存在』。論：有為諸法被無常所遷移，不能暫停，前面已經詳細說明過了。這種無常相損害有為法，就像極其兇暴的怨家債主， постоянно преследует и притесняет, не давая ни минуты покоя. Поэтому, если утверждать, что все обусловленные вещи постоянно подвержены непостоянству, то постоянства не существует. 后一種說法也是不對的。所以再次用偈頌說：『或者那個法先前是常，後來才變得非常住』。論：如果剎那結束時無常才開始產生，那麼這種無常相在先前就應該不存在。那時，那個法就應該成為常住，因為沒有無常，就像虛空（xu kong）[沒有實體，不可分割的空間]一樣。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: If the 'ability to abide by the Dharma' (neng zhu fa) [the Dharma that can maintain the state of things] lasts only for a kshana (yi cha na) [an extremely short unit of time], then what is the use of impermanence (wu chang) [the state of things changing and not staying the same]? If the 'power of abiding' (zhu li) [the power to maintain the state of things] is exhausted, the dharmas (zhu fa) [all things and phenomena] that are maintained will naturally not be able to be maintained, so what is the need for 'extinction' (mie) [annihilation]? In this case, the 'aspect of abiding' (zhu xiang) [the state of things remaining unchanged] is the same in essence from beginning to end, and the functions it performs are no different, only sometimes it functions and sometimes it does not. This principle is difficult to understand, and the wise should think carefully. Also, if it is believed that in later times, the power of impermanence surpasses the 'aspect of abiding' and can destroy it, this is known to each other. From this, it should also be believed that the power of impermanence has already surpassed the 'aspect of abiding' in the past and can destroy it. If so, the 'aspect of abiding' should always be useless, so why cling to this useless 'aspect of abiding'? Therefore, the wise should believe that there is no 'abiding' (zhu) [the state of remaining unchanged]. Since there is no 'abiding', what is time based on? Also, the idea that impermanence is initially weak and later strong, and that the 'aspect of abiding' is initially strong and later weak, are both unreasonable. Therefore, it is said again in verse: 'If the power of impermanence pervades the essence of all dharmas, but is initially weak, then either there should be no 'abiding' at all, or everything should be permanent (chang) [the state of being eternal and unchanging].' Treatise: If the aspect (xiang) [the state of things manifested] of impermanence is initially weak and cannot destroy the Dharma, and the Dharma naturally remains unchanged, why cling to this useless 'abiding'? In this case, the 'aspect of abiding' should not exist at all, because it is useless, like a rabbit's horn. If it is said that the 'aspect of abiding' is initially powerful and can suppress impermanence, then it should be able to prevail at any time, because its essence does not change. If so, conditioned dharmas (you wei fa) [things that arise from the combination of causes and conditions] should never be destroyed, which would contradict the sutras that say 'all conditioned things are impermanent' (zhu xing wu chang) [all things are impermanent and changing]. Secondly, those who are attached to the 'aspect of abiding' should now be questioned: Do conditioned dharmas arise simultaneously with the aspect of impermanence, or does impermanence only begin to arise when they function? First of all, the former statement is incorrect. Therefore, it is said again in verse: 'If impermanence always exists, then the 'aspect of abiding' should always not exist.' Treatise: Conditioned dharmas are moved by impermanence and cannot pause, as has been explained in detail earlier. This aspect of impermanence harms conditioned dharmas, like an extremely violent enemy and creditor, constantly pursuing and oppressing, not giving a moment's rest. Therefore, if it is asserted that all conditioned things are constantly subject to impermanence, then there is no permanence. The latter statement is also incorrect. Therefore, it is said again in verse: 'Or that Dharma was previously permanent, and only later became impermanent.' Treatise: If impermanence only begins to arise at the end of a kshana, then this aspect of impermanence should not exist before. At that time, that Dharma should become permanent, because there is no impermanence, like space (xu kong) [empty, indivisible space].

空等。非常住名。如無常體。別有少法。但由遠離無常相故。立常住名。由此色等失有為性。若言后時必當滅故無斯過者。此亦不然。無為法中曾未見故。如虛空等初離無常。后決定無可滅壞義。有為諸法應亦如是。如何后時必當壞滅。又初色等與后無異。應如后位無常所隨。

複次為攝上義。故復頌曰。

若法無常俱　　而言有住者　無常相應妄　　或住相應虛

論曰。若有為法無常相俱而言有為有住相者。如是二相性相相違。是則定應一虛一實。所以者何。若言住相有勝力用住持有為令暫不滅。住力既盡。諸有為法自然滅壞。若爾滅相復何所為。或后住相應如前位。有勝力用伏彼無常令其無力滅所依法。若爾何緣執無常相。若言無常雖有力用能滅諸法。而法初時勢力微劣未為強敵。故無常相權時放舍令暫得住。若爾住相復何所為。或前無常應如后位。滅所依法令不暫停。若爾何緣執有住相。

複次有作是言。前說無住有何體者。此說不然。住體雖無然有不住。諸法自體不可撥無。應作是言。諸行生滅展轉相續。無間滅時有剎那頃無住法體。所以者何。無常力用遷流不住。立之為滅。法體無者。滅何所依。若說法外有無常相為法滅因。亦同此難。我亦不撥諸法皆無。但言汝等所執真實。時

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：空等，不是常住之名（Nitya-sthita-samjna）。因為沒有常恒不變的自體（Atma），別處也沒有其他少許的法（Dharma）。只是因為遠離了無常之相（Anitya-laksana），才安立了常住之名。因此，色（Rupa）等法失去了有為的性質。如果說，『因為之後必定會壞滅，所以沒有這個過失』，這也是不對的。因為在無為法（Asamskrta-dharma）中，從未見過這種情況。比如虛空（Akasa）等，最初遠離無常，之後決定沒有可以滅壞的意義。有為諸法（Samskrta-dharma）也應該如此。為何之後必定會壞滅？而且，最初的色等和之後的沒有差異，應該像之後的狀態一樣，被無常所隨逐。

其次，爲了總括上述意義，所以再次用頌文說：

『如果法（Dharma）與無常（Anitya）同時存在，卻說有住相（Sthita-laksana），那麼與無常相應的說法是虛妄的，或者與住相相應的說法是虛假的。』

論曰：如果有為法與無常之相同時存在，卻說有為法有住相，那麼這兩種相的性質相互違背。那麼必定有一個是虛假的，一個是真實的。為什麼呢？如果說住相有強大的作用，能夠住持有為法，使其暫時不滅。住相的力量一旦耗盡，諸有為法自然就會滅壞。如果這樣，滅相（Nirodha-laksana）又有什麼作用呢？或者之後的住相，應該像之前的狀態一樣，有強大的作用，壓制無常，使其沒有力量滅壞所依之法。如果這樣，為何要執著無常之相呢？如果說無常雖然有力量，能夠滅壞諸法，但是法最初的時候，勢力微弱，還不是強大的敵人，所以無常相暫時放過，讓其暫時得以存在。如果這樣，住相又有什麼作用呢？或者之前的無常，應該像之後的狀態一樣，滅壞所依之法，使其不能暫停。如果這樣，為何要執著有住相呢？

其次，有人這樣說：前面所說的無住（Asthita），有什麼自體呢？這樣說是不對的。住的自體雖然沒有，但是有不住。諸法的自體不可否認。應該這樣說：諸行（Samskara）生滅，輾轉相續，在無間滅的時候，有剎那頃的無住法體。為什麼呢？無常的力量遷流不住，安立為滅。如果法體沒有，滅又依附於什麼呢？如果說在法外有無常相，作為法滅的原因，也同樣有這個難題。我也不否認諸法都沒有，只是說你們所執著的真實，是暫時的。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Emptiness' and so on, are not names of permanence (Nitya-sthita-samjna). As there is no constant self (Atma), nor are there any other few dharmas (Dharma) elsewhere. It is only because of being apart from the characteristic of impermanence (Anitya-laksana) that the name of permanence is established. Therefore, form (Rupa) and other dharmas lose their conditioned nature. If it is said, 'Because it will surely perish later, there is no such fault,' this is also not right. Because in unconditioned dharmas (Asamskrta-dharma), this has never been seen. For example, space (Akasa) and so on, initially separate from impermanence, later definitely have no meaning of being destroyed. Conditioned dharmas (Samskrta-dharma) should also be like this. Why must they surely perish later? Moreover, the initial form and so on are no different from the later ones, and should, like the later state, be accompanied by impermanence.

Furthermore, in order to summarize the above meaning, it is again said in verse:

'If a dharma (Dharma) exists simultaneously with impermanence (Anitya), yet it is said to have the characteristic of abiding (Sthita-laksana), then the statement corresponding to impermanence is false, or the statement corresponding to abiding is unreal.'

The treatise says: If a conditioned dharma exists simultaneously with the characteristic of impermanence, yet it is said that the conditioned dharma has the characteristic of abiding, then the natures of these two characteristics contradict each other. Then one must be false and the other real. Why? If it is said that the characteristic of abiding has a strong function, capable of sustaining the conditioned dharma, causing it not to perish temporarily. Once the power of abiding is exhausted, all conditioned dharmas will naturally perish. If so, what is the function of the characteristic of cessation (Nirodha-laksana)? Or the subsequent characteristic of abiding should, like the previous state, have a strong function, suppressing impermanence, causing it to have no power to destroy the dharma it relies on. If so, why cling to the characteristic of impermanence? If it is said that although impermanence has the power to destroy all dharmas, the dharma is initially weak and not yet a strong enemy, so the characteristic of impermanence temporarily releases it, allowing it to exist temporarily. If so, what is the function of the characteristic of abiding? Or the previous impermanence should, like the subsequent state, destroy the dharma it relies on, preventing it from pausing. If so, why cling to the characteristic of abiding?

Furthermore, some say: What is the self-nature of the non-abiding (Asthita) mentioned earlier? This is not right. Although the self-nature of abiding does not exist, there is non-abiding. The self-nature of dharmas cannot be denied. It should be said that the arising and ceasing of formations (Samskara) continue in succession, and at the moment of uninterrupted cessation, there is a momentary self-nature of non-abiding dharma. Why? The power of impermanence flows and does not abide, and is established as cessation. If the self-nature of dharma does not exist, what does cessation rely on? If it is said that there is a characteristic of impermanence outside of dharma, as the cause of the cessation of dharma, there is also this difficulty. I do not deny that all dharmas do not exist, but only say that what you cling to as real is temporary.

所依體皆不可得。所以者何。執有住體與時為依。前已廣破執有生滅與時為依。亦不應理。所以者何。本無今有假說名生。本有今無假說名滅。如是生滅既非實有。云何依此執有實時。復云何知生滅是假。本無今有名生。本有今無名滅。生之與滅皆二合成。如舍如林。豈名真實。又生與滅二分所成。半有半無。如何定有。又本無分不名為生。體非有故。如龜毛等。其今有分亦不名生。體非無故。如涅槃等。又本有分不名為滅。體非無故。如虛空等。其今無分。亦不名滅。體非有故。如兔角等。一一別分既非生滅。二種和合豈是生滅。假名諸法。是事可然。真實法中無如是義。又于生滅各二分中。本無未來今無過去。去來二際已滅未生。其體既無非實生滅。今有本有俱現在攝。豈一剎那生滅並有。不可現在有二剎那。初名為生。后名為滅。時既有別。世云何同。若必爾者。世應雜亂。生時滅未有。應名未來。滅時生已無。應名過去。又滅滅法令無入過去滅。在現在說名有。生既生法令有入現在生。應未來說名無。又本無時名為未來。於今有時名為現在。于本有時名為現在。其今無時名為過去。云何二世合成一時。而言此時決定實有。如是推徴生滅非實。不應依此立有實時。若有為法無實生滅。如何上言無常所遷。暫生即

滅何容有住。無常既無何能遷法。我上所言。皆為破執。隨他意語非自意。然彼執無常復執有住。為破彼住且許無常。今住既無。無常亦破。不應謂我定許無常。我如良醫應病與藥。諸有所說皆隨所宜。故所發言不應定執。若色等法實有住者。容可審知。是有為性既無有住。復非無為。是故不應執為實有。既色等法非定實有。云何汝等依此立時。世俗可然。非為勝義。

複次有作是說。若離有為別立住體。能住於法既言有過。即有為法。前前剎那能生後後。名住何失。此亦不然。最後剎那諸有為法不生後果。應無住相。既無住相。應名無為。若爾已前諸有為法。與此同類應非有為。若有為法後後剎那續前前故名住相者。此亦不然。后念生時若與前念為住相者。生相應無。若爾有為應無四相。若後生時。望前為住。當位名生二相俱有。是即說生以為住相。名雖有異用應無別。如是四相既無別用。何須立此無用相為。最後剎那既無後念。續此而生。應無住相。是故即法住相亦無。

複次有作是言。令有為法于將滅時能生後果。是住相用由此用故。諸有為法雖不暫停而有住相。此亦不然。最後剎那不生後果。應無住相。過同前說。若謂爾時亦能生后。余緣闕故後果不生。既彼後果畢竟不生。云何知前有能生用。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『滅』（nirodha，寂滅）又怎麼能容許『住』（sthiti，住相）的存在呢？如果『無常』（anitya，諸行無常）本身都不存在，又怎麼能讓法（dharma，佛法）遷流變化呢？我之前所說的，都是爲了破除執著。那只是隨順他人的意思而說的，並非我自己的本意。然而，他們執著于『無常』，又執著于『住』。爲了破除他們對『住』的執著，我才姑且承認『無常』。現在，既然『住』不存在，那麼『無常』也就不成立了。不應該說我一定認可『無常』。我如同一個好醫生，應該根據病情來給藥。我所說的一切，都是根據具體情況而定的。所以，對於我所說的話，不應該執著不變。如果色（rupa，物質）、受（vedana，感受）、想（samjna，概念）、行（samskara，行為）、識（vijnana，意識）等法確實有『住』的存在，或許還可以仔細審查。但是，有為法（samskrta，有為法）既然沒有『住』，又不是無為法（asamskrta，無為法），所以不應該執著它們是真實存在的。既然色等法不是絕對真實存在的，你們又怎麼能依據它們來建立『時』（kala，時間）的概念呢？這在世俗層面或許可以接受，但在勝義（paramartha，勝義諦）層面是不成立的。

再者，有人這樣說：如果離開有為法另外設立一個『住』的實體，認為它能夠使法停留，既然這樣說有問題，那麼有為法的前一個剎那能夠產生后一個剎那，這就可以稱為『住』，有什麼過失呢？這也是不對的。因為最後一個剎那的有為法不能產生後續的結果，應該沒有『住相』。既然沒有『住相』，就應該稱為無為法。如果這樣，那麼之前的那些有為法，與這最後一個剎那同類，應該不是有為法。如果說有為法后一個剎那延續前一個剎那，所以稱為『住相』，這也是不對的。后念產生時，如果與前念互為『住相』，那麼『生』（jati，生相）就應該沒有作用。如果這樣，有為法就應該沒有四相（caturlaksana，四相：生、住、異、滅）。如果后念產生時，相對於前念來說是『住』，那麼在它自身的位置上，『生』和『住』二相同時存在。這就是說把『生』當作『住相』，雖然名稱不同，但作用應該沒有區別。這樣，四相既然沒有區別，又何必設立這個沒有作用的『住相』呢？最後一個剎那既然沒有後念延續它而產生，應該沒有『住相』。所以，就法本身而言，『住相』也是不存在的。

再者，有人這樣說：使有為法在將要滅亡的時候能夠產生後續的結果，這就是『住相』的作用。由於這個作用，有為法雖然沒有暫停，但卻有『住相』。這也是不對的。因為最後一個剎那不能產生後續的結果，應該沒有『住相』。這個過失與前面所說的一樣。如果說，即使在最後一個剎那，它也能產生後續的結果，只是因為其他因緣缺失，所以後續的結果沒有產生。既然那個後續的結果最終沒有產生，又怎麼知道之前的剎那有能夠產生後續結果的作用呢？

【English Translation】 English version How can 『nirodha』 (cessation) accommodate 『sthiti』 (duration)? If 『anitya』 (impermanence) itself does not exist, how can the dharma (teachings) change and transform? All that I said before was to break attachments. Those were words spoken according to others' intentions, not my own. However, they are attached to 『anitya』 and also attached to 『sthiti』. To break their attachment to 『sthiti』, I temporarily acknowledged 『anitya』. Now that 『sthiti』 does not exist, then 『anitya』 is also not established. It should not be said that I definitely approve of 『anitya』. I am like a good doctor who gives medicine according to the illness. Everything I say is based on specific circumstances. Therefore, one should not cling to my words as unchanging. If rupa (form), vedana (feeling), samjna (perception), samskara (mental formations), and vijnana (consciousness) truly had 『sthiti』, perhaps it could be carefully examined. However, since samskrta (conditioned phenomena) does not have 『sthiti』 and is not asamskrta (unconditioned phenomena), one should not cling to them as truly existing. Since rupa and other dharmas are not absolutely real, how can you establish the concept of 『kala』 (time) based on them? This may be acceptable in the mundane realm, but it is not established in the paramartha (ultimate truth).

Furthermore, some say: If we establish a separate entity of 『sthiti』 apart from samskrta, believing that it can make the dharma remain, since there is a problem with saying that, then the previous moment of samskrta can produce the next moment, which can be called 『sthiti』. What is the fault in that? This is also incorrect. Because the last moment of samskrta cannot produce subsequent results, it should not have the 『sthiti-lakshana』 (characteristic of duration). Since there is no 『sthiti-lakshana』, it should be called asamskrta. If so, then the previous samskrtas, being of the same kind as this last moment, should not be samskrta. If it is said that the subsequent moment of samskrta continues the previous moment, so it is called 『sthiti-lakshana』, this is also incorrect. When the subsequent thought arises, if it and the previous thought are mutually 『sthiti-lakshana』, then 『jati』 (birth) should have no function. If so, samskrta should not have the four laksanas (four characteristics: birth, duration, change, and cessation). If the subsequent thought, in relation to the previous thought, is 『sthiti』, then in its own position, the two characteristics of 『jati』 and 『sthiti』 exist simultaneously. This is to say that 『jati』 is taken as 『sthiti-lakshana』. Although the names are different, the function should be no different. Thus, since the four laksanas have no difference, why establish this useless 『sthiti-lakshana』? Since the last moment has no subsequent thought continuing it to arise, it should have no 『sthiti-lakshana』. Therefore, as far as the dharma itself is concerned, 『sthiti-lakshana』 also does not exist.

Furthermore, some say: To enable samskrta to produce subsequent results when it is about to perish is the function of 『sthiti-lakshana』. Because of this function, although samskrta does not pause, it has 『sthiti-lakshana』. This is also incorrect. Because the last moment cannot produce subsequent results, it should not have 『sthiti-lakshana』. This fault is the same as what was said before. If it is said that even in the last moment, it can produce subsequent results, but because other conditions are lacking, the subsequent results do not arise. Since that subsequent result ultimately does not arise, how do we know that the previous moment has the function of being able to produce subsequent results?

若見前時同類有用。比知最後亦有用者。此亦不然。現見異故。前時諸行有後果生。最後諸行後果不續。得果既別。為因豈同。若同爲因。應俱有果若爾最後。剎那不成。又汝不應前後諸行。以同類故更相比決。謂皆為因。勿后無果。例前亦爾。或前有果例后亦然。又前諸行亦非一向。于將滅時能生後果。入滅定等最後念心。不能生后等流果故。亦不應言望后。亦行為同類因。種類別故。勿阿羅漢入無餘心緣生他識。或無識身名同類因取等流果。若爾應無永滅度義。若言後心緣生他識。或無識身。非因緣故。無有過者。此亦不然。入滅定等最後念心。望后色行亦非因緣。云何生彼名住相力。若言色行望彼後心以同性故。是等流果後心與彼為同類因。是因緣故名住力者。入無餘心望他身識及無識身。汝宗亦許有同性義。云何非彼同類因耶。夫因緣者。自類熏習生果功能非余法也。是故汝立住相不成。非一切法生同類故。又因緣者。世俗假立。如何依彼立實住相。又汝五因取果與果皆許因緣。云何但說一同類因取果一用為住相力。又未來世無實有體。云何望彼為同類因。過去未來非現在世及無為攝。同兔角等。非實有性。是故因時果未有故。如望兔角非彼實因。果現前時因已無故。如從龜毛非彼實果。因果尚非真實有體。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本如果看到先前同類的法有用，就推斷最後（的法）也有用，這也是不對的。因為現在所見的情況不同。先前諸行的確有後果產生，但最後諸行的後果卻不延續。既然所得的果報不同，作為原因怎麼能相同呢？如果相同作為原因，就應該都有果報。如果這樣，最後剎那就不能成立。而且，你不應該因為前後諸行是同類，就互相比較來判斷，認為它們都是原因，擔心後面沒有果報，就以前面的情況為例。或者前面有果報，就以後面的情況也必然有果報。而且，前面的諸行也並非總是能在將要滅盡時產生後果。例如，進入滅盡定等狀態的最後念頭，就不能產生後續的等流果。也不應該說，期望後面的（果報），也是因為行為是同類因而導致的。因為種子類別不同。不要認為阿羅漢進入無餘涅槃時，心緣生他人的意識，或者無意識的身體，是同類因，並以此取得等流果。如果這樣，就沒有永恒滅度的意義了。如果說後面的心緣生他人的意識，或者無意識的身體，不是因為因緣的緣故，所以沒有過失。這也是不對的。進入滅盡定等狀態的最後念頭，對於後面的色行來說，也不是因緣，怎麼能產生所謂的『住相力』呢？如果說色行對於後面的心，因為是同性的緣故，是等流果，而後面的心與色行是同類因，因為是因緣的緣故，所以稱為『住力』。那麼，進入無餘涅槃的心，對於他人的身識以及無意識的身體，你們宗派也承認有同性，為什麼不是它們的同類因呢？所謂的因緣，是自類熏習產生果報的功能，而不是其他法。因此，你所建立的『住相』不能成立，因為不是一切法都能產生同類（果）的緣故。而且，因緣是世俗假立的，如何依靠它來建立真實的『住相』？而且，你們的五因取果、與果都承認是因緣，為什麼只說同類因取果的一種作用是『住相力』？而且，未來世沒有真實存在的自體，怎麼能期望它作為同類因呢？過去和未來不屬於現在世，也不屬於無為法所攝，如同兔角一樣，沒有真實存在的性質。因此，在作為原因的時候，果還沒有產生，就像期望兔角一樣，不是它的真實原因。果報顯現的時候，原因已經消失，就像從龜毛中無法產生真實的果報一樣。因和果尚且不是真實存在的自體。

【English Translation】 English version If one sees that similar phenomena in the past were useful, and infers that the last (phenomena) will also be useful, this is also incorrect. Because what is seen now is different. The previous actions did indeed produce consequences, but the consequences of the last actions do not continue. Since the results obtained are different, how can the causes be the same? If they are the same as causes, then they should all have consequences. If so, the last moment cannot be established. Moreover, you should not compare and judge the previous and subsequent actions because they are of the same kind, thinking that they are all causes, and worrying that there will be no consequences later, using the previous situation as an example. Or if there are consequences before, then the consequences must be the same later. Moreover, the previous actions are not always able to produce consequences when they are about to be extinguished. For example, the last thought in entering cessation meditation (Nirodha-samāpatti) cannot produce subsequent isoflow results (Nisyanda-phala). It should also not be said that expecting the later (results) is also due to the fact that the behavior is of the same kind as the cause. Because the types of seeds are different. Do not think that when an Arhat (one who has attained Nirvana) enters Parinirvana (complete Nirvana), the mind produces the consciousness of others, or the unconscious body, is a similar cause, and obtains isoflow results from it. If so, there is no meaning of eternal extinction. If it is said that the subsequent mind produces the consciousness of others, or the unconscious body, not because of the cause and condition, so there is no fault. This is also incorrect. The last thought in entering cessation meditation, for the subsequent form (Rūpa) and activity (Samskara), is not a cause and condition, how can it produce the so-called 'power of the characteristic of abiding' (sthiti-lakshana-bala)? If it is said that form and activity for the subsequent mind, because it is of the same nature, is the isoflow result, and the subsequent mind and form and activity are the same kind of cause, because it is the cause and condition, so it is called 'abiding power'. Then, the mind entering Parinirvana, for the body consciousness of others and the unconscious body, your sect also admits that there is the same nature, why is it not their similar cause? The so-called cause and condition is the function of self-category perfuming to produce results, not other dharmas. Therefore, the 'characteristic of abiding' that you established cannot be established, because not all dharmas can produce similar (results). Moreover, cause and condition is a worldly establishment, how can it be relied upon to establish the real 'characteristic of abiding'? Moreover, your five causes of taking results and giving results all admit that they are cause and condition, why do you only say that one function of the same kind of cause taking results is 'the power of the characteristic of abiding'? Moreover, the future world does not have a real self-nature, how can it be expected to be a similar cause? The past and the future do not belong to the present world, nor are they included in the unconditioned dharma (Asamskrta-dharma), like rabbit horns, they do not have a real nature. Therefore, when it is the cause, the result has not yet been produced, just like expecting rabbit horns, it is not its real cause. When the result appears, the cause has disappeared, just like a real result cannot be produced from tortoise hair. Cause and effect are not real self-nature.

依立住相豈得實有。既無住相。時何所依。是故定無實有時體。

複次云何定知諸法有體而依法體執有實時。若由現見知法有體。此亦不然。見非實故。所以者何。故次頌曰。

無所見見無　　迴心緣妄境　是故唯虛假　　有憶念名生

論曰。一切所見皆識所為。離識無有一法是實。謂無始來數習諸見。隨所習見。隨所遇緣。隨自種子成熟差別。變似種種法相而生。猶如夢中所見事等。皆虛妄現都無一實。一切皆是心識所為。云何定知諸法有體。外境若無內識應有。猶如夢等無境有心。云何復起如是妄執。境既是無識。如何有識體。定有亦不可知自體。不能知自體故。汝等不許識並生故。設復許有諸識並生。亦無展轉親相緣義。云何能知識體定有。若爾大乘應如夢啞。撥一切法皆悉是虛。不能辨說一切世間出世間法自性差別。或復不如諸夢啞者。彼能分別種種境界。但闕語緣不能辨說。今此不能分別諸法。亦不能說。是大苦哉。我等不能隨善如是大乘所立虛假法義。以一切法皆可現見不可撥無現見法故。奇哉可愍。薄福愚人不能信解大乘法義。若有能見可見所見。能見既無誰見所見。以諸能見不能自審。知自有體亦不審他。于審察時能見所見。皆無所有不可審察。是故不應執現見法。決定有體。以

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本依附於所執著的表象，怎麼能得到真實的存在呢？既然沒有可以依附的表象，那麼時間又依賴於什麼呢？因此，可以確定時間並沒有真實的自體。

進一步說，怎麼能確定諸法（dharma）具有自體，並且執著於法體而認為有真實的時間呢？如果因為現見而得知法有自體，這也是不正確的，因為所見並非真實。為什麼這麼說呢？所以接下來的頌文說：

『無所見見無，迴心緣妄境，是故唯虛假，有憶念名生。』

論述說：一切所見都是心識所造作的，離開心識沒有一法是真實的。這是因為無始以來多次習染各種見解，隨著所習染的見解，隨著所遇到的因緣，隨著自身種子成熟的差別，變現出種種法相而生起，猶如夢中所見的事物等等，都是虛妄的顯現，沒有一個是真實的。一切都是心識所為。怎麼能確定諸法有自體呢？如果外境不存在，那麼內在的心識應該存在，猶如夢等沒有外境卻有心識。為什麼又會生起這樣的虛妄執著呢？外境既然是無，心識又怎麼會有自體呢？確定心識有自體也是不可能的，因為自體不能認識自體。你們不承認諸識同時生起。即使承認諸識同時生起，也沒有互相作為親近的因緣的意義。怎麼能知道心識的自體是確定的呢？如果這樣，大乘（Mahāyāna）就應該像啞巴一樣，否定一切法都是虛假的，不能辨別說明一切世間和出世間法的自性差別。或者還不如那些夢中的啞巴，他們還能分別種種境界，只是缺少語言的因緣而不能辨說。現在這些人既不能分別諸法，也不能說話，真是太可悲了！我們不能隨順像這樣的大乘所建立的虛假法義，因為一切法都可以現見，不可否定現見的法。真是奇怪又可憐，沒有福報的愚人不能相信和理解大乘的法義。如果有人能見到能見者、可見者和所見者，能見者既然不存在，誰又能見到所見者呢？因為諸能見者不能自己審察，知道自己有自體，也不能審察其他。在審察的時候，能見者和所見者都是不存在的，不可審察的。因此，不應該執著現見的法，認為它決定有自體。

【English Translation】 English version How can one obtain a real existence by clinging to perceived appearances? Since there are no appearances to cling to, what does time rely on? Therefore, it is certain that time does not have a real substance.

Furthermore, how can one be certain that all dharmas (dharmas) have a substance, and cling to the substance of the dharma, believing that there is real time? If it is because of direct perception that one knows that dharmas have a substance, this is also incorrect, because what is seen is not real. Why is this so? Therefore, the following verse says:

'Without seeing, seeing is not; turning the mind, it clings to illusory realms; therefore, it is only false; the name of recollection arises.'

The treatise says: All that is seen is created by consciousness; apart from consciousness, there is not a single dharma that is real. This is because, from beginningless time, one has repeatedly cultivated various views. According to the views cultivated, according to the conditions encountered, according to the differences in the maturation of one's own seeds, various appearances of dharmas are manifested and arise, like the things seen in a dream, etc., all of which are illusory appearances, none of which are real. All are created by consciousness. How can one be certain that dharmas have a substance? If external realms do not exist, then internal consciousness should exist, like dreams, etc., which have no external realms but have consciousness. Why then does such a false clinging arise? Since external realms are non-existent, how can consciousness have a substance? It is also impossible to determine that consciousness has a substance, because the substance itself cannot know itself. You do not admit that all consciousnesses arise simultaneously. Even if you admit that all consciousnesses arise simultaneously, there is no meaning of mutual relationship as close causes. How can one know that the substance of consciousness is certain? If so, the Mahāyāna (Mahāyāna) should be like a mute, denying that all dharmas are false, unable to distinguish and explain the differences in the self-nature of all worldly and transcendental dharmas. Or perhaps they are not even as good as the mutes in dreams, who can still distinguish various realms, but lack the condition of language and cannot speak. Now these people cannot distinguish dharmas, nor can they speak, which is truly pitiful! We cannot follow such false dharma teachings established by the Mahāyāna, because all dharmas can be directly perceived, and one cannot deny the directly perceived dharmas. It is truly strange and pitiable that foolish people without merit cannot believe and understand the teachings of the Mahāyāna. If someone can see the seer, the seen, and the object of seeing, since the seer does not exist, who can see the object of seeing? Because all seers cannot examine themselves, know that they have a substance, nor can they examine others. At the time of examination, the seer and the seen are all non-existent and cannot be examined. Therefore, one should not cling to the directly perceived dharmas, believing that they certainly have a substance.

迴心時諸所緣境皆虛假故。所以者何。起憶念時實無見等種種境界。但隨因緣自心變似。見等種種境相而生。以所憶念非真實故。唯有虛假憶念名生。如所曾更諸法體相。迴心追憶。故名爲念。當憶念時曾所更境皆無有故。能念亦無。而名念者。隨順串習顛倒諸見。假名施設。由此念故。世間有情妄起種種分別諍論。競執諸法自性差別。沒惡見泥不能自出。若無所見亦無所聞。是則一切都無所有。云何今時編石為筏。諸有行愿復何所為。隨順世俗所見所聞。強假施設。不應為難。勝義理中二俱不許。一切分別戲論絕故。非諸如來有法可說。亦無有法少有所得。故契經言。如來昔在燃燈佛所。無有少法可說可取。若爾精進則為唐捐。應棄如來甘露聖教。為欲方便除倒見執。施設二事。俱無有過。既言一切所見能見皆無所有。云何無過。雖無真實所見能見。而諸愚夫顛倒謂有。為欲除彼增上慢見。隨順世間施設無過。若能隨此聖教修行。隨俗說為真佛弟子。世俗愚夫隨自心變顛倒境相而起見心。佛非其境于彼無用。云何說為如來弟子。由佛願行為增上緣。起彼見心。故亦無失。謂佛世尊在昔因位。為欲利樂一切有情。發起無邊功用願行。由此證得無分別慧。因此慧力發起無量利樂有情作用無盡。諸有情類用佛願行。所得妙

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本迴心之時，所有憶念的境界都是虛假的。為什麼這麼說呢？因為生起憶念的時候，實際上並沒有見到等等種種境界。只是隨著因緣，自己的心變化顯現出好像見到等等種種境相而生起。因為所憶念的不是真實的，所以只有虛假的憶念之名產生。如同曾經經歷過的諸法體相，回過頭來追憶，所以叫做『念』。當憶念的時候，曾經經歷過的境界都已經不存在了，能憶念的心也並不存在。而之所以稱之為『念』，是隨順串習的顛倒見解，假名安立的。由於這種憶念，世間的有情妄想生起種種分別諍論，爭相執著諸法的自性差別，沉沒在惡見的泥潭中不能自拔。如果什麼都看不到，什麼都聽不到，那麼一切就都空無所有了。為什麼現在還要編石頭做筏子（比喻修行）呢？所有的行愿又有什麼用呢？這是隨順世俗所見所聞，勉強假立的施設，不應該以此來為難。在勝義諦的道理中，這兩者都是不被允許的，因為一切分別戲論都已斷絕。諸佛如來並沒有什麼法可以宣說，也沒有什麼法可以稍微得到。所以契經上說，如來過去在燃燈佛那裡，沒有什麼法可以宣說可以獲取。如果這樣，那麼精進就白費了，應該拋棄如來的甘露聖教。爲了方便去除顛倒見解的執著，才施設這兩種說法，都沒有過失。既然說一切所見能見都是空無所有，為什麼說沒有過失呢？雖然沒有真實的所見能見，但是那些愚癡的人顛倒地認為有。爲了去除他們增上慢的見解，隨順世間施設，沒有過失。如果能夠隨順這個聖教修行，就可以隨順世俗的說法，成為真正的佛弟子。世俗的愚夫隨著自己的心變化，對顛倒的境相生起見解，佛不是他們的境界，對他們沒有用處。為什麼說他們是如來的弟子呢？由於佛的願行作為增上緣，生起他們的見解，所以也沒有過失。佛世尊在過去因地的時候，爲了利益安樂一切有情，發起了無邊的功用願行。因此證得了無分別慧。因為這種智慧的力量，發起了無量利益安樂有情的作用，沒有窮盡。諸有情類運用佛的願行，所得到的妙 English version When the mind turns back, all the objects of recollection are false. Why is that? Because when recollection arises, there are actually no various realms such as seeing. It is only that, according to conditions, one's own mind transforms and appears as if seeing various aspects of realms, and thus arises. Because what is recollected is not real, only the name of false recollection arises. It is like turning back and recalling the forms and characteristics of all dharmas that have been experienced, hence it is called 'recollection'. When recollecting, the realms that were once experienced no longer exist, and the ability to recollect also does not exist. The reason it is called 'recollection' is that it follows the habitual inverted views, and is a provisional designation. Because of this recollection, sentient beings in the world falsely give rise to various discriminations and disputes, vying to cling to the self-nature and differences of all dharmas, sinking into the mud of evil views and unable to extricate themselves. If there is nothing seen and nothing heard, then everything is completely empty. Why then build a raft out of stones (a metaphor for practice) now? What is the use of all vows and practices? This is a forced provisional designation that follows what is seen and heard in the mundane world, and should not be used to create difficulties. In the ultimate truth, both are not permitted, because all discriminating fabrications are cut off. The Tathagatas have no dharma to speak, nor is there any dharma that can be obtained even slightly. Therefore, the sutras say that the Tathagata, in the past, at the place of Dipamkara Buddha (Burning Lamp Buddha), had no dharma to speak or obtain. If that is the case, then diligent effort is in vain, and the nectar-like sacred teachings of the Tathagata should be abandoned. In order to conveniently remove the clinging to inverted views, these two things are provisionally established, and there is no fault in either. Since it is said that all that is seen and all that can see are empty, why is it said that there is no fault? Although there is no real seen or seer, foolish people mistakenly believe there is. In order to remove their arrogance and pride, it is provisionally established in accordance with the world, and there is no fault. If one can practice according to these sacred teachings, then one can be called a true disciple of the Buddha according to worldly conventions. Worldly fools, following the transformations of their own minds, give rise to views about inverted realms, but the Buddha is not their realm and is of no use to them. Why then are they called disciples of the Tathagata? Because the vows and practices of the Buddha are the predominant condition for the arising of their views, so there is no fault. The World Honored One, in the past, when he was on the causal ground, in order to benefit and bring happiness to all sentient beings, initiated boundless meritorious vows and practices. Because of this, he attained non-discriminating wisdom. Because of the power of this wisdom, he initiated immeasurable actions to benefit and bring happiness to sentient beings, without end. All sentient beings, using the vows and practices of the Buddha, obtain wonderful

【English Translation】 English version When the mind turns back, all the objects of recollection are false. Why is that? Because when recollection arises, there are actually no various realms such as seeing. It is only that, according to conditions, one's own mind transforms and appears as if seeing various aspects of realms, and thus arises. Because what is recollected is not real, only the name of false recollection arises. It is like turning back and recalling the forms and characteristics of all dharmas that have been experienced, hence it is called 'recollection'. When recollecting, the realms that were once experienced no longer exist, and the ability to recollect also does not exist. The reason it is called 'recollection' is that it follows the habitual inverted views, and is a provisional designation. Because of this recollection, sentient beings in the world falsely give rise to various discriminations and disputes, vying to cling to the self-nature and differences of all dharmas, sinking into the mud of evil views and unable to extricate themselves. If there is nothing seen and nothing heard, then everything is completely empty. Why then build a raft out of stones (a metaphor for practice) now? What is the use of all vows and practices? This is a forced provisional designation that follows what is seen and heard in the mundane world, and should not be used to create difficulties. In the ultimate truth, both are not permitted, because all discriminating fabrications are cut off. The Tathagatas have no dharma to speak, nor is there any dharma that can be obtained even slightly. Therefore, the sutras say that the Tathagata, in the past, at the place of Dipamkara Buddha (Burning Lamp Buddha), had no dharma to speak or obtain. If that is the case, then diligent effort is in vain, and the nectar-like sacred teachings of the Tathagata should be abandoned. In order to conveniently remove the clinging to inverted views, these two things are provisionally established, and there is no fault in either. Since it is said that all that is seen and all that can see are empty, why is it said that there is no fault? Although there is no real seen or seer, foolish people mistakenly believe there is. In order to remove their arrogance and pride, it is provisionally established in accordance with the world, and there is no fault. If one can practice according to these sacred teachings, then one can be called a true disciple of the Buddha according to worldly conventions. Worldly fools, following the transformations of their own minds, give rise to views about inverted realms, but the Buddha is not their realm and is of no use to them. Why then are they called disciples of the Tathagata? Because the vows and practices of the Buddha are the predominant condition for the arising of their views, so there is no fault. The World Honored One, in the past, when he was on the causal ground, in order to benefit and bring happiness to all sentient beings, initiated boundless meritorious vows and practices. Because of this, he attained non-discriminating wisdom. Because of the power of this wisdom, he initiated immeasurable actions to benefit and bring happiness to sentient beings, without end. All sentient beings, using the vows and practices of the Buddha, obtain wonderful

慧為增上緣。自心變現能順世間。最勝生道及順出世。決定勝道諸佛形相。及所說法。緣自心相起增上慢。謂我見佛聞說法音。信順修行世出世行。是故說為如來弟子。若爾應從顛倒願行。生無分別無倒見慧。以本願行見有利樂一切有情而生起故。設許如是有何相違。因果異類豈不相違。又一一因應生一切。隨因勢用生異類果。彼此俱許有何相違。如從有漏發生無漏。非根生根。非識生識。不可見此能生異類。即令一一皆生一切。同見同知。不應為難。彼此俱有非愛過故。又世俗法力用難思。不可一一難令齊等。現見世間末達那果。及余能發風病等物。若有如量如時服者。除風病等為無病因。羯羅那等則不如是。是故異類雖得相生。而非一因生一切果。又本願行亦非顛倒。以能了知諸法實義。於一切法無所執著。能為無上妙果生因。雖復發心起諸勝行。求無上果利樂有情。然似幻師起諸幻事。都無所執。故非顛倒。複次如前應問。云何定知諸法有體而依法體執有實時。若彼答言由隨法體起現見心。後重審察能自了知。我昔曾更如是境界。若無法體起現見心。后時不應如是審察。是故定知諸法有體。復應問彼。重審察時為有法體可現見不。彼言。不也。所以者何。生已即滅。彼於今時無所見見。謂無所見而生於見。又應

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本慧是增上緣（Adhipati-pratyaya，強有力的條件）。自心變現能夠順應世間，最殊勝的生道以及順應出世，決定殊勝之道，諸佛的形相，以及所說的法。緣于自心之相而生起增上慢（Abhimana，驕慢），認為我見到了佛，聽聞了說法之音，信受奉行世間和出世間的修行。因此被稱為如來的弟子。如果這樣，那麼應該從顛倒的願行，產生無分別的無倒見慧（Aviparita-darshana-jnana，不顛倒的見與智慧），因為本願行是爲了見到利益和安樂一切有情眾生而生起的。假設允許這樣，有什麼相違背的呢？因果不同類別難道不是相違背的嗎？而且每一個因應該產生一切果。隨著因的勢用而產生不同類別的果，彼此都允許，有什麼相違背的呢？比如從有漏（Sasrava，有煩惱）產生無漏（Anasrava，無煩惱），非根生根，非識生識，不可見此能生異類，即使令一一都生一切，同見同知，不應該以此為難。彼此都有非愛的過失。而且世俗法的力量難以思議，不可一一要求齊等。現在見到世間的末達那果（Madanaphala，一種果實），以及其他能夠引發風病等的物品，如果有人按照劑量和時間服用，去除風病等，成為無病的因，羯羅那（Karana，原因）等則不是這樣。因此，不同類別雖然可以相互產生，但不是一個因產生一切果。而且本願行也不是顛倒的，因為它能夠了知諸法的真實意義，對於一切法沒有執著，能夠成為無上妙果的生因。雖然發起心，生起各種殊勝的修行，求無上果，利益安樂有情眾生，然而就像幻術師變出各種幻象，都沒有執著，所以不是顛倒的。再次，像前面一樣應該問：怎麼能確定諸法有自體，而依法體執著有實時的存在？如果他回答說：由於隨著法體生起現見之心，後來重新審察能夠自己了知，我過去曾經經歷過這樣的境界。如果沒有法體生起現見之心，後來不應該這樣審察。所以能確定諸法有自體。又應該問他：重新審察時，有法體可以現見嗎？他回答說：沒有。為什麼呢？因為生起后立即滅亡，他現在沒有什麼可見的，所謂無所見而生起見。又應該現代漢語譯本

【English Translation】 English version Wisdom is a dominant condition (Adhipati-pratyaya). The transformation of one's own mind can accord with the world, the most supreme path of birth, and accord with transcendence, the decisive supreme path, the forms of all Buddhas, and the Dharma they preach. Relying on the appearance of one's own mind, arrogant pride (Abhimana) arises, thinking, 'I have seen the Buddha, heard the sound of the Dharma being preached, and faithfully practice worldly and transmundane practices.' Therefore, they are called disciples of the Tathagata. If so, then from inverted vows and practices, non-discriminating, non-inverted wisdom (Aviparita-darshana-jnana) should arise, because the original vows and practices arise to see the benefit and happiness of all sentient beings. If this is allowed, what contradicts it? Are not different categories of cause and effect contradictory? Moreover, each cause should produce all effects. According to the power of the cause, different categories of effects arise. If both sides allow this, what contradicts it? For example, from the defiled (Sasrava) arises the undefiled (Anasrava), non-root arises from root, non-consciousness arises from consciousness. It is not possible to see this giving rise to different categories, even if each gives rise to all. Seeing and knowing the same, it should not be difficult to accept. Both sides have the fault of non-love. Moreover, the power of worldly dharmas is inconceivable, and it is not possible to demand equality in every aspect. Now we see in the world the Madanaphala fruit and other things that can cause wind diseases. If someone takes them according to dosage and time, they remove wind diseases and become the cause of no disease. Karana (cause) and others are not like this. Therefore, although different categories can arise from each other, it is not that one cause produces all effects. Moreover, the original vows and practices are not inverted, because they can understand the true meaning of all dharmas, and have no attachment to all dharmas, and can become the cause of the birth of supreme wonderful fruits. Although one generates the mind, arises various supreme practices, seeks the supreme fruit, and benefits and brings happiness to sentient beings, it is like a magician creating various illusions, without any attachment, so it is not inverted. Furthermore, as before, one should ask: How can one be certain that all dharmas have a self-nature, and according to the body of the Dharma, cling to the existence of real time? If he answers: Because the mind of direct perception arises along with the body of the Dharma, and later, upon re-examination, one can know for oneself, 'I have experienced such a state in the past.' If the mind of direct perception does not arise from the body of the Dharma, one should not re-examine in this way later. Therefore, one can be certain that all dharmas have a self-nature. One should also ask him: When re-examining, is there a body of the Dharma that can be directly perceived? He answers: No. Why? Because it arises and immediately ceases. He has nothing visible at this time, so-called nothing seen but seeing arises. Also, one should

問彼。重審察時前現見心為可回返憶我昔見如是境耶。彼言。不也。所以者何。過去諸法不可回返。故無迴心。謂無有能回過去心來至現在若爾今時由誰審察。能決定知諸法有體。彼言由念。所以者何。要依現見後方有念。非無法體可有現見。是故定知諸法有體。此但有言而無實義。所以者何。一切憶念但緣有名無實境起。由此憶念唯緣妄境。是故唯有世俗虛假憶念名生。謂于非有虛妄境界。如對目前分明記憶。故名憶念。實無有體顛倒相現。故名非有。虛妄境界。是故不應隨虛妄見計度諸法謂實有體。

複次汝上所言。要依現見後方有念。非無法體有現見者。此亦不然。前已略說。見非實故。所見能見皆無所有。是故不可以其現見證法有體。前雖略說。而未廣辯。云何定知諸法非有。諸所執有略有二種。一者無為。二者有為。無為是常。先已廣破。謂若有用能生諸法。應如有為非無為體。若無有用不能生法。應如兔角。其體是無。有為有二。謂過未有。及現在有。過去未來如前已辯。謂曾當有非現有體。若現有體應名現在。若言無用。故非現在。既現有體。云何無用。若言其用必藉緣故。非恒有者。用可無常。體不藉緣應是常住。若言此體能起于用。用非常故。體亦無常。是則此體能起于用。用暫有故。體非

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本問他們：『如果重新審查，先前顯現的心是否可以回溯，讓你回憶起過去所見的景象？』他們回答：『不能。』為什麼呢？因為過去的諸法不可回溯，所以沒有回溯的心。也就是說，沒有能夠將過去的心帶到現在的能力。如果這樣，那麼現在是誰在審查，能夠確定地知道諸法是有實體的呢？』他們回答：『由念。』為什麼呢？因為必須依靠現見之後才會有念，如果沒有法體，就不可能有現見。所以可以確定地知道諸法是有實體的。』這只是有言語而沒有實際意義。為什麼呢？因為一切憶念都只是緣于有名無實的境界而生起。因此，憶念只是緣于虛妄的境界。所以只有世俗虛假的憶念產生，也就是說，對於不存在的虛妄境界，就像在眼前一樣分明地記憶，所以叫做憶念。實際上沒有實體，只是顛倒的現象顯現，所以叫做非有、虛妄的境界。因此，不應該隨著虛妄的見解來推測諸法是真實存在的。再次，你們上面所說：『必須依靠現見之後才會有念，如果沒有法體，就不可能有現見。』這也是不對的。前面已經簡略地說過，見不是真實的，所見和能見都是不存在的。因此，不可以用現見來證明法是有實體的。前面雖然簡略地說過，但還沒有詳細辯論。如何確定地知道諸法不是真實存在的呢？所執著的存在略有二種：一種是無為（Nirvana，不生不滅的境界），一種是有為（Saṃskṛta，因緣和合而成的現象）。無為是常，先前已經廣泛破斥過，如果無為有作用能夠產生諸法，就應該像有為一樣，而不是無為的體性。如果無為沒有作用，不能產生法，就應該像兔角一樣，其體性是不存在的。有為有兩種，一種是過去和未來，一種是現在。過去和未來如前面已經辯論過，是曾經或將要存在，而不是現在存在的實體。如果現在存在實體，就應該叫做現在。如果說現在沒有作用，所以不是現在。既然現在存在實體，怎麼會沒有作用呢？如果說它的作用必須依靠因緣，所以不是恒常存在的，那麼作用可以是無常的，而體性不依靠因緣，應該是常住的。如果說這個體效能夠產生作用，因為作用是暫時的，所以體性也是無常的。那麼這個體效能夠產生作用，因為作用是暫時的，所以體性不是。

【English Translation】 English version Question them: 'If re-examined, can the previously manifested mind be traced back, allowing you to recall the past scenes you saw?' They answer: 'No.' Why? Because the past Dharmas (phenomena) cannot be traced back, so there is no tracing back of the mind. That is, there is no ability to bring the past mind to the present. If so, who is examining now, able to know for sure that Dharmas have substance?' They answer: 'By memory (smṛti).' Why? Because memory must rely on direct perception (pratyakṣa) before it can arise. Without a Dharma-body (dharma-kāya), there can be no direct perception. Therefore, it can be known for sure that Dharmas have substance.' This is just words without real meaning. Why? Because all memories only arise from unreal realms that have names. Therefore, memory only arises from illusory realms. So only worldly, false memories arise, that is, for non-existent, illusory realms, like remembering clearly as if it were before one's eyes, so it is called memory. In reality, there is no substance, only a reversed phenomenon appears, so it is called non-existent, illusory realm. Therefore, one should not speculate that Dharmas are real based on false views. Furthermore, what you said above: 'Memory must rely on direct perception before it can arise. Without a Dharma-body, there can be no direct perception.' This is also not right. It has been briefly said before that seeing is not real, and what is seen and what can see are all non-existent. Therefore, direct perception cannot be used to prove that Dharma has substance. Although it has been briefly said before, it has not been discussed in detail. How can one know for sure that Dharmas are not real? The existence that is clung to is roughly of two kinds: one is unconditioned (Asamskrita/Nirvana), and the other is conditioned (Samskrita). The unconditioned is permanent, and it has been widely refuted before. If the unconditioned has a function that can produce Dharmas, it should be like the conditioned, not the nature of the unconditioned. If the unconditioned has no function and cannot produce Dharmas, it should be like a rabbit's horn, whose nature is non-existent. The conditioned is of two kinds: one is past and future, and the other is present. The past and future have been debated before, that is, they are entities that once existed or will exist, not entities that exist now. If there is a present entity, it should be called the present. If it is said that the present has no function, then it is not the present. Since there is a present entity, how can it have no function? If it is said that its function must rely on conditions, so it is not constant, then the function can be impermanent, and the nature does not rely on conditions and should be permanent. If it is said that this nature can produce function, because the function is temporary, the nature is also impermanent. Then this nature can produce function, because the function is temporary, the nature is not.

恒有。又若有為體恒是有而能起用。故非無為。虛空等體亦許恒有。何不起用說名有為。無為恒有而不起用。有為起用如何恒有。又過去體定非現有。名已滅故。過去攝故。如過去用。未來世體亦非現有。名未生故。未來攝故。如未來用。若言去來體雖是有不名現有非現在故。所立比量便立已成。此理不然。汝立三世體非本無今有。亦非本有今無。一切時有。如所執空故名現有。非現世攝名為現有。我今遮破恒現前有。是故比量非立已成。若汝不許去來二世其體現有。則應如用先後是無。體非常有。是則一切有為之法。若體若用皆待眾緣。本無今有本有今無。便失汝宗。法體常有。若言去來體是現有。世所攝故。猶如現在。理亦不成。汝許去來用非現有。是世所攝。則所立量有不定失。若言去來體是實有。世所攝故。如現在者。理亦不然。若依勝義我宗現在。亦非實有則無同喻。若依世俗用瓶瓫等。是世所攝而非實有。則所立量有不定過。若言去來體是實有。余非實有。所不攝故。如共所知實有法者。此亦不然。若依勝義無同法喻。若依世俗便立已成。我宗亦許去來曾當是實有故。又如共知世俗實法。余非實有。所不攝故。應非去來體現實有。如是等類有多相違。又去來體非現實有。余實有法。所不攝故。如共所知非

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：恒有。又如果『有為』（saṃskṛta，指由因緣和合而成的現象）的本體是恒常存在的，並且能夠產生作用，那麼它就不是『無為』（asaṃskṛta，指不依賴因緣而存在的現象）。虛空等的本體也被認為是恒常存在的，為什麼它們不能產生作用而被稱作『有為』呢？『無為』是恒常存在但不產生作用，『有為』產生作用又如何能恒常存在呢？而且，過去的本體一定不是現在存在的，因為它被稱為『已滅』，屬於過去。就像過去的作用一樣。未來的本體也不是現在存在的，因為它被稱為『未生』，屬於未來。就像未來的作用一樣。如果說過去和未來的本體雖然存在，但不被稱為『現在存在』，因為它們不是現在的，那麼你所建立的比量（anumāna，一種推理形式）就成了『立已成』（siddhasādhana，指所要證明的論點已經被證明）。這個道理是不成立的。你所建立的三世（過去、現在、未來）的本體不是原本沒有現在才有的，也不是原本有現在才沒有的，而是一切時都有的，就像你所執著的『空』（śūnyatā，佛教中的空性概念）一樣，所以被稱為『現在存在』。但它不是現在世所包含的，所以被稱為『現在存在』。我現在要破斥這種恒常現在存在的觀點，所以你的比量不是『立已成』。如果你不承認過去和未來二世的本體是現在存在的，那麼它們就應該像作用一樣，有先後次第，不是恒常存在的。這樣，一切『有為』之法，無論是本體還是作用，都依賴於眾多因緣，原本沒有現在才有，原本有現在才沒有，那就失去了你宗派所主張的法體常有的觀點。如果說過去和未來的本體是現在存在的，因為它被世所包含，就像現在一樣，這個道理也是不成立的。你承認過去和未來的作用不是現在存在的，但它被世所包含，那麼你所建立的量（anumāna）就有了『不定過』（anaikāntika，指理由不確定）。如果說過去和未來的本體是真實存在的，因為它被世所包含，就像現在一樣，這個道理也是不成立的。如果依據勝義諦（paramārtha-satya，佛教中的真理），我宗派認為現在也不是真實存在的，那就沒有相同的比喻。如果依據世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，佛教中的世俗真理），像瓶子、瓦罐等，是被世所包含的，但不是真實存在的，那麼你所建立的量就有了『不定過』。如果說過去和未來的本體是真實存在的，因為它不被其他非真實存在的所包含，就像共同認知到的真實存在的法一樣，這也是不成立的。如果依據勝義諦，就沒有相同的比喻。如果依據世俗諦，就成了『立已成』，因為我宗派也承認過去和未來曾經和將要是真實存在的。又像共同認知到的世俗真實存在的法，不被其他非真實存在的所包含，那麼它就不應該是過去和未來的本體，不是現實存在的。像這樣有很多的矛盾之處。而且，過去和未來的本體不是現實存在的，因為它不被其他真實存在的法所包含，就像共同認知到的非真實存在的法一樣。

【English Translation】 English version: It is constant. Furthermore, if the essence of 'saṃskṛta' (conditioned phenomena, that which is compounded of causes and conditions) is constantly existent and capable of arising into function, then it is not 'asaṃskṛta' (unconditioned phenomena, that which exists independently of causes and conditions). The essence of space, etc., is also accepted as constantly existent. Why is it not capable of arising into function and called 'saṃskṛta'? 'Asaṃskṛta' is constantly existent but does not arise into function. How can 'saṃskṛta' arise into function and still be constantly existent? Moreover, the essence of the past is definitely not presently existent, because it is called 'extinguished' and belongs to the past. Like the function of the past. The essence of the future is also not presently existent, because it is called 'unborn' and belongs to the future. Like the function of the future. If you say that although the essence of the past and future exists, it is not called 'presently existent' because it is not present, then the syllogism (anumāna, a form of reasoning) you establish becomes 'siddhasādhana' (proving what is already proven). This reasoning is not valid. The essence of the three times (past, present, and future) that you establish is not originally non-existent and now existent, nor originally existent and now non-existent, but exists at all times, like the 'śūnyatā' (emptiness, the Buddhist concept of emptiness) that you cling to, so it is called 'presently existent'. But it is not included in the present world, so it is called 'presently existent'. I am now refuting this view of constant present existence, so your syllogism is not 'siddhasādhana'. If you do not admit that the essence of the past and future two times is presently existent, then they should be like functions, having a sequence of before and after, and not constantly existent. Thus, all 'saṃskṛta' dharmas (conditioned phenomena), whether essence or function, depend on numerous causes and conditions, originally non-existent and now existent, originally existent and now non-existent, then you lose the view of your school that the essence of dharmas is constant. If you say that the essence of the past and future is presently existent, because it is included in the world, like the present, this reasoning is also not valid. You admit that the function of the past and future is not presently existent, but it is included in the world, then the measure (anumāna) you establish has the fault of 'anaikāntika' (uncertain reason). If you say that the essence of the past and future is truly existent, because it is included in the world, like the present, this reasoning is also not valid. If according to paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth, the Buddhist truth), my school believes that the present is also not truly existent, then there is no similar example. If according to saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth, the Buddhist conventional truth), like pots, jars, etc., are included in the world, but are not truly existent, then the measure you establish has the fault of 'anaikāntika'. If you say that the essence of the past and future is truly existent, because it is not included in other non-truly existent things, like commonly known truly existent dharmas, this is also not valid. If according to paramārtha-satya, there is no similar example. If according to saṃvṛti-satya, it becomes 'siddhasādhana', because my school also admits that the past and future were and will be truly existent. Also, like commonly known conventional truly existent dharmas, not being included in other non-truly existent things, then it should not be the essence of the past and future, not really existent. There are many contradictions like this. Moreover, the essence of the past and future is not really existent, because it is not included in other truly existent dharmas, like commonly known non-

實有法。如是等類比量無邊。是故去來非現有體。但依現在假名建立。謂現在心緣曾當法。似彼相現假說去來。實非過未。由此去來共所許法。非離現在別有實體。自宗所許世所攝故。猶如現在諸立過去。未來有體如現在者。皆同數論外道所計自性體常用有起謝。彼既有過。此亦應然。是故自稱佛弟子者。應舍此執。現在諸法雖世俗有而非勝義。所以者何。若勝義有。應不藉緣。既待緣生猶如幻事。如何可說是真實有。又現在法有生有滅。猶如幻化。云何實有。若現在法是實有者。應如所執虛空等性。無生無滅。豈名現在。又現在法已生未滅。二分合成。已生待未來。未滅待過去。相待立故。非實有體。如粗細等。攬非實法和合而成。如樹林等。云何實有。又于現在一一法上有多種性。如何實有。謂一一法皆有蘊性處性界性有漏無漏世出世間色心等性有無量種。于諸性中誰實誰假。不可說言。如是等性是義差別同依一體。除此諸性更有何體。亦不可言。一性是體余性是義。同名為性無有差別。云何一體。余皆是義。亦不可言。如是等性是名差別。其義是一。若爾不應生別行解。亦不可言。差別行解但緣其名。苦無常等種種行解。皆緣義故。是故一一有為法體皆用無量性相合成。如舍林等非真實有。但依世俗說有實體。

若言諸性皆是共相。以可說故。如軍林等。是假非實。比量所得。自相是實現量所得。既言是實。其相如何。現量所得云何可說。若不可說。如何言實。若可言實。即應可說。云何自相是不可說。若言自相假說為實。非是真實。是則一切若假若實。皆依世俗假想施設云何汝等定執諸法皆有實體。若一切法皆非實有。如何現前分明可見。映象水月健達縛城。夢境幻事第二月等。分明可見。豈實有耶。世間所見皆無有實。云何以見證法是真。覺時所見一切非真。是識所緣如夢所見。夢心所見決定非真。亂識所緣如第二月。如是雖無真實法體。而能為境。生現見心。因斯展轉發生憶念。前後俱緣非真有境。是故不可以生憶念證法是真。法既非真。時如何實。若緣妄境生於倒見。境可是虛。見應是實。境既是虛。見云何實。如在夢中。謂眼等識緣色等境。覺時知彼二事俱無。妄境倒心亦復如是。愚夫謂有。聖者知無。有倒心境二種皆虛。無倒境心俱應是實。世俗可爾。勝義不然。以勝義中心言絕故。若於勝義心言絕者。云何數說。心境是虛。為破實執。故且言虛。實執若除。虛亦不有。若實若虛。皆為遣執。依世俗說。非就勝義。勝義諦言亦是假立。為翻世俗非有定詮。現見心境可言是無。憶念境心云何非有。現見尚無。憶念

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本若說諸法的自性都是共相（共同的性質），因為它們是可以被描述的，就像軍隊、森林等等，這些都是虛假的，不是真實的，是通過比量（推理）得到的。而自相（獨特的性質）是真實的，是通過現量（直接感知）得到的。既然說是真實的，那麼它的相狀是怎樣的呢？現量所得的東西怎麼可以用語言描述呢？如果不可描述，又怎麼能說是真實的呢？如果可以用語言描述，那就應該可以被描述，為什麼說自相是不可描述的呢？如果說自相只是假說為真實，並非真的真實，那麼一切無論是假的還是真的，都是依據世俗的假想施設，為什麼你們一定要執著諸法都有實體呢？如果一切法都不是真實存在的，為什麼眼前可以分明地看見呢？就像鏡中的影像、水中的月亮、健達縛城（海市蜃樓）、夢境、幻術、第二個月亮等等，分明可見，難道是真實存在的嗎？世間所見到的東西都沒有真實性，怎麼可以用所見來證明法是真實的呢？覺醒時所見的一切都不是真實的，是意識所緣取的，就像夢中所見。夢中的心所見到的東西，肯定不是真實的。迷亂的意識所緣取的，就像第二個月亮。像這樣，即使沒有真實的法體，也能作為境界，產生現見的心理。因此輾轉發生憶念，前後都緣取非真實存在的境界。所以不可以用產生憶念來證明法是真實的。法既然不是真實的，時間又怎麼是真實的呢？如果緣取虛妄的境界而產生顛倒的見解，境界可能是虛假的，見解應該是真實的。境界既然是虛假的，見解怎麼會是真實的呢？就像在夢中，認為眼等識緣取色等境界，醒來時才知道那兩種事物都不存在。虛妄的境界和顛倒的心也是這樣，愚夫認為有，聖者知道沒有。有顛倒的心和境界兩種都是虛假的，沒有顛倒的境界和心都應該是真實的。在世俗層面可以這樣說，但在勝義層面不是這樣，因為在勝義層面，心和語言都斷絕了。如果在勝義層面心和語言都斷絕了，為什麼還要多次說心和境界是虛假的呢？爲了破除對實體的執著，所以姑且說它是虛假的。如果對實體的執著消除了，虛假也不存在了。無論是真實還是虛假，都是爲了遣除執著，是依據世俗來說的，不是就勝義而言的。勝義諦的語言也是假立的，爲了推翻世俗的非有，沒有固定的詮釋。現見的心和境界可以說是不存在的，憶念的境界和心怎麼能說不存在呢？現見尚且不存在，憶念又怎麼會存在呢？

【English Translation】 English version If it is said that the nature of all dharmas are common characteristics (共相, shared attributes), because they can be spoken of, like armies, forests, etc., these are false and not real, obtained through inference (比量). But the self-characteristic (自相, unique attribute) is real, obtained through direct perception (現量). Since it is said to be real, what is its form? How can what is obtained through direct perception be described in words? If it cannot be described, how can it be said to be real? If it can be said to be real, then it should be describable. Why is it said that the self-characteristic is indescribable? If it is said that the self-characteristic is only falsely said to be real, and is not truly real, then everything, whether false or real, is based on conventional conceptual constructs. Why do you insist that all dharmas have substance? If all dharmas are not truly existent, why can they be clearly seen before our eyes? Like images in a mirror, the moon in water, Gandharva cities (健達縛城, mirages), dreams, illusions, a second moon, etc., they are clearly visible, but are they truly existent? What is seen in the world has no reality. How can what is seen be used to prove that the Dharma is true? Everything seen in the waking state is not true; it is what is cognized by consciousness, like what is seen in a dream. What is seen by the mind in a dream is definitely not true. What is cognized by a confused consciousness is like a second moon. In this way, even without a real dharma-body, it can serve as an object, giving rise to the mind of direct perception. Therefore, recollection arises in turn, and both before and after, it cognizes a non-truly existent object. Therefore, one cannot use the arising of recollection to prove that the Dharma is true. Since the Dharma is not true, how can time be real? If one generates a reversed view by cognizing a false object, the object may be false, but the view should be real. Since the object is false, how can the view be real? Just as in a dream, one thinks that the eye consciousness, etc., cognize objects such as form, but upon waking, one knows that both things do not exist. False objects and reversed minds are also like this. Fools think they exist, but sages know they do not. Having reversed minds and objects, both are false; not having reversed objects and minds, both should be real. This may be so in the conventional sense, but not in the ultimate sense, because in the ultimate sense, mind and language are cut off. If in the ultimate sense mind and language are cut off, why repeatedly say that mind and object are false? To break the attachment to reality, we tentatively say it is false. If the attachment to reality is removed, falsity will also not exist. Whether real or false, it is all to dispel attachment, based on conventional speech, not in terms of the ultimate meaning. The language of the ultimate truth is also falsely established, to overturn the non-existence of the conventional, without a fixed interpretation. The mind and object of direct perception can be said to be non-existent, but how can the object and mind of recollection be said to be non-existent? Direct perception does not exist, how can recollection exist?

豈有。若一切法都非實有。如何世間現造善惡。若無善惡。苦樂亦無。是則撥無一切因果。若撥因果則為邪見。豈不怖此邪見罪耶。奇哉世間愚癡難悟。唯知怖罪不識罪因。一切善惡苦樂因果。並世俗有。勝義中無。我依勝義言不可得。不撥世俗何成邪見。於世俗中執勝義有。不稱正理。是為邪見。今於此中為破時執。略說諸法俗有真無。其義虛實研究是非。於後品中當廣分別。已略成立遠離二邊中道實義。諸有聰慧樂勝義人當勤修學。謂常無常二邊邪執。如其次第。略破應知。

大乘廣百論釋論卷第五大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1571 大乘廣百論釋論

大乘廣百論釋論卷第六

聖天菩薩本　護法菩薩釋

三藏法師玄奘奉　詔譯

破見品第四

複次若如所言諸法性相世俗事有勝義理空。如來於中智見無礙。言音辯了巧悟他心。如何世間猶為種種妄見所魅諍論紛紜。由能聞者有過失故。何者名為聞者過失。謂貪己見。不求勝解。于善惡說不能了知。若無如是三種過失。是則名為聞正法器。為顯此義故說頌曰。

稟和希勝慧　　是法器應知　異此有師資　　無因獲勝利

論曰。要具三德名為法器。一者稟性柔和無有偏黨。恒自審察不貪己見。二者常希勝解

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：怎麼會呢？如果一切法都不是真實存在的，那麼世間現在所造的善惡又是怎麼回事呢？如果沒有善惡，苦樂也就不存在了。這樣就等於否定了一切因果。如果否定因果，那就是邪見。難道不害怕這種邪見的罪過嗎？奇怪啊，世間的愚癡之人難以醒悟，只知道害怕罪過，卻不認識罪過的根源。一切善惡苦樂因果，都是世俗諦（Samvriti-satya）中存在的，在勝義諦（Paramartha-satya）中是不存在的。我依據勝義諦說不可得，並沒有否定世俗諦，怎麼會構成邪見呢？在世俗諦中執著勝義諦的存在，是不符合正理的，這就是邪見。現在在這裡爲了破除時執，簡略地說諸法在世俗諦中存在，在勝義諦中不存在，它的意義是虛假的還是真實的，應該研究是非。在後面的品中應當廣泛地分別。已經簡略地成立了遠離二邊的中道實義，那些有智慧、喜歡勝義諦的人應當勤奮修學。所謂常與無常二邊的邪執，應當按照次第，簡略地破除，應該知道。《大乘廣百論釋論》卷第五大正藏第30冊 No. 1571 《大乘廣百論釋論》《大乘廣百論釋論》卷第六聖天菩薩（Aryadeva）本護法菩薩（Dharmapala）釋三藏法師玄奘（Xuanzang）奉詔譯破見品第四再次，如果像你所說，諸法的自性與現象在世俗諦中存在，在勝義諦中是空性的，如來（Tathagata）于其中智慧見解沒有障礙，言語清晰明瞭，善於領悟他人心意。為什麼世間仍然被種種虛妄的見解所迷惑，爭論紛紛呢？這是因為聽聞者有過失的緣故。什麼叫做聽聞者的過失呢？就是貪戀自己的見解，不尋求殊勝的理解，對於善惡的說法不能夠明瞭。如果沒有像這樣的三種過失，這樣就叫做聽聞正法的法器。爲了顯明這個意義，所以說了這首偈頌：『稟性和諧、希望殊勝的智慧，這樣的人是法器，應當知道。與此不同，即使有師長的教導，也無法獲得勝利。』論曰：必須要具備三種德行才能稱為法器。第一，稟性柔和，沒有偏袒，經常自我審察，不貪戀自己的見解。第二，常常希望殊勝的理解。

【English Translation】 English version: How could that be? If all dharmas (phenomena) are not truly existent, then how can the creation of good and evil be explained in the world? If there is no good and evil, then there is no suffering and happiness either. This would be equivalent to denying all causality. If causality is denied, that is a false view. Are you not afraid of the sin of this false view? How strange, the foolish people of the world are difficult to awaken, only knowing to fear sin, but not recognizing the cause of sin. All good and evil, suffering and happiness, and causality, exist in conventional truth (Samvriti-satya), but do not exist in ultimate truth (Paramartha-satya). I rely on ultimate truth to say that they are unobtainable, and I have not denied conventional truth, so how can it constitute a false view? To cling to the existence of ultimate truth within conventional truth is not in accordance with right reason, and this is a false view. Now, in order to refute the clinging to time, I briefly say that dharmas exist in conventional truth, but do not exist in ultimate truth. Whether its meaning is false or true should be investigated. In the following chapters, it should be extensively distinguished. The Middle Way's true meaning, which is far from the two extremes, has already been briefly established. Those who are wise and delight in ultimate truth should diligently study it. The false views of the two extremes of permanence and impermanence should be refuted in order, and should be known. Mahayana Hundred Verses Treatise Explanation, Volume 5 Taisho Tripitaka, Volume 30, No. 1571, Mahayana Hundred Verses Treatise Explanation Mahayana Hundred Verses Treatise Explanation, Volume 6 By Aryadeva (Holy Deva) Bodhisattva, Explained by Dharmapala Bodhisattva Translated by Tripitaka Master Xuanzang (Hiuen Tsang) under Imperial Decree Chapter Four: Refuting Views Furthermore, if, as you say, the nature and characteristics of dharmas exist in conventional truth, and are empty in ultimate truth, and the Tathagata (Thus Come One) has unobstructed wisdom and insight into them, and his speech is clear and eloquent, and he is skilled at understanding the minds of others, why is the world still deluded by various false views, and why are there so many disputes? This is because the listeners have faults. What are the faults of the listeners? It is clinging to their own views, not seeking superior understanding, and not being able to understand the teachings of good and evil. If there are no such three faults, then such a person is called a vessel for hearing the true Dharma. In order to clarify this meaning, this verse is spoken: 'One who is harmonious in nature and desires superior wisdom, should be known as a vessel for the Dharma. Different from this, even with the teachings of a teacher, one cannot obtain victory.' The treatise says: One must possess three virtues to be called a vessel for the Dharma. First, one must be gentle in nature, without bias, constantly examining oneself, and not clinging to one's own views. Second, one must always desire superior understanding.

求法無厭。不守己分而生喜足。三者為性聰慧于善惡言能正了知德失差別。若無如是所說三德。雖有師資終無勝利。言勝利者。所謂師資開悟證得如其次第。如彼六師諸外道等。雖聞正法而無所證。非佛于彼無愍濟心。亦非聖教不中正理。以於世間所應度者。聞佛聖教皆已度訖。為顯此義故次頌曰。

說有及有因　　凈與凈方便　世間自不了　　過豈在牟尼

論曰。諸佛如來無礙智見。觀利他事不過四種。謂所舍證及此二因。體義皆真名言非謬。即是四諦聖教所攝。佛雖廣說而彼不知。過在世間非牟尼失。以諸外道覺慧庸微。及闕正修故不能解。如彼烈日放千光明。盲者不見於日無咎。

複次彼諸外道。定為無明放逸睡眠纏覆心識。于自所許不能信依。所以者何。故次頌曰。

舍諸有涅槃　　邪宗所共許　真空破一切　　如何彼不欣

論曰。諸外道宗皆言棄捨我所有事。唯我獨存遠離羈纏。蕭然解脫無為惔怕。名曰涅槃。離相真空絕諸妄境。亦無分別執有等心。觀此能除一切心境。正歸無上大般涅槃。不違汝等所求解脫。如何憎背而不生欣。我等涅槃唯除我所。空亦破我知何所欣。汝涅槃中若有我者。必不離所何成涅槃。我如前破。不應重執故當欣此離我真空。有則可除空無能遣。執

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

求法沒有厭足的時候，不守護自己的本分卻生起喜足之心。具備這三點，就能在善惡言論方面表現出聰慧，能夠正確瞭解功德和過失的差別。如果沒有像上面所說的三種德行，即使有師長和資助，最終也不會有勝利。所說的勝利，是指師長和資助能夠開悟，並按次第證得。就像那些六師（Six heretical teachers）等外道，即使聽聞了正法，也沒有證悟。不是佛陀對他們沒有慈悲憐憫之心，也不是聖教不符合中正的道理，而是因為在世間所應該度化的人，聽聞佛陀的聖教都已經度化完畢。爲了彰顯這個道理，所以接著用偈頌說：『說有及有因，凈與凈方便，世間自不了，過豈在牟尼（釋迦牟尼佛的尊稱）？』論述說：諸佛如來具有無礙的智慧和見解，觀察利益他人的事情不會超過四種，即所捨棄的、所證得的，以及這二者的原因。它們的本體和意義都是真實的，言語表達也沒有謬誤，這就是四諦（Four Noble Truths）所包含的聖教。佛陀雖然廣泛地宣說，但他們卻不瞭解，過錯在於世間的人，而不是牟尼的過失。因為那些外道的覺悟和智慧非常平庸，而且缺乏正確的修行，所以不能理解。就像強烈的太陽放出千萬道光明，盲人看不見，不能歸咎於太陽。再次，那些外道，一定是被無明（ignorance）、放逸（negligence）、睡眠（sloth）所纏縛，覆蓋了心識，對於自己所認可的道理也不能信賴和依靠。為什麼呢？所以接著用偈頌說：『舍諸有涅槃，邪宗所共許，真空破一切，如何彼不欣？』論述說：各種外道宗派都說要捨棄我所擁有的事物，唯有我獨自存在，遠離束縛和牽纏，清靜解脫，無為恬淡，這叫做涅槃（Nirvana）。遠離一切相的真空（Emptiness），斷絕一切虛妄的境界，也沒有分別執著有等等的心。觀察這個真空，能夠去除一切心和境界，真正歸於無上的大般涅槃（Great Nirvana）。這並不違揹你們所尋求的解脫，為什麼憎恨背離而不生起歡喜呢？我們所說的涅槃，只是去除我所擁有的，真空也破除了我，知道還有什麼可以歡喜的呢？如果你們的涅槃中還有我存在，必定不能離開我所擁有的，又怎麼能成就涅槃呢？我已經在前面破斥過了，不應該再次執著，所以應當歡喜這個遠離我的真空。有，還可以去除，空，就沒有什麼可以遣除的了，執著于有，就不能解脫。

【English Translation】 English version:

Seeking the Dharma without satiety, and generating contentment without guarding one's own proper share. Possessing these three qualities, one can demonstrate intelligence in matters of good and evil, and correctly understand the differences between merit and demerit. If one lacks the three virtues mentioned above, even with teachers and resources, there will ultimately be no victory. The 'victory' referred to means that teachers and resources can enlighten and lead to attainment in due order. Like the Six Heretical Teachers (Six heretical teachers) and other non-Buddhist schools, even if they hear the correct Dharma, they do not attain enlightenment. It is not that the Buddha lacks compassion for them, nor that the Holy Teachings are not in accordance with correct principles, but because those in the world who should be liberated have already been liberated by hearing the Buddha's Holy Teachings. To illustrate this point, the following verse is then stated: 'Speaking of existence and its cause, purity and the means to purity, the world does not understand itself; how can the fault lie with Muni (an honorific title for Shakyamuni Buddha)?' Treatise says: The Buddhas and Tathagatas possess unimpeded wisdom and vision, and their observation of benefiting others does not exceed four aspects: what is to be abandoned, what is to be attained, and the causes of these two. Their essence and meaning are all true, and their verbal expressions are not mistaken. These are the Holy Teachings contained within the Four Noble Truths (Four Noble Truths). Although the Buddha extensively expounds them, they do not understand, and the fault lies with the world, not with Muni. Because the non-Buddhists' awareness and wisdom are mediocre, and they lack correct practice, they cannot understand. It is like the intense sun emitting thousands of rays of light; if a blind person cannot see it, the sun is not to blame. Furthermore, those non-Buddhists are certainly entangled and covered by ignorance (ignorance), negligence (negligence), and sloth (sloth), which obscure their minds. They cannot trust or rely on what they themselves acknowledge. Why is this so? Therefore, the following verse is stated: 'Abandoning all existence for Nirvana (Nirvana), which is commonly accepted by heretical schools, Emptiness (Emptiness) shatters everything; why are they not delighted?' Treatise says: Various non-Buddhist schools all say to abandon what I possess, so that only I exist alone, far from bondage and entanglement, serene and liberated, inactive and tranquil, which is called Nirvana (Nirvana). Emptiness (Emptiness), which is devoid of all characteristics, cuts off all illusory realms, and has no discriminating thoughts of clinging to existence, etc. Observing this Emptiness can remove all mind and realms, and truly return to the unsurpassed Great Nirvana (Great Nirvana). This does not contradict the liberation you seek, so why do you hate and turn away without rejoicing? The Nirvana we speak of only removes what I possess, and Emptiness also shatters the 'I,' so what is there to rejoice in? If there is still an 'I' in your Nirvana, it cannot be separated from what 'I' possess, so how can it be Nirvana? I have already refuted this before, and you should not cling to it again, so you should rejoice in this Emptiness that is free from 'I.' Existence can still be removed, but Emptiness cannot be eliminated. Clinging to existence cannot lead to liberation.

有起過觀空即除。空有二途德失懸隔。云何汝等黨有誹空。可愍邪徒癡狂無智。不能信受有益真空。常好邪求無益妄有。而於正教反生嫌嫉。如彼惡子淫亂迷心。耽媔色聲猖蹶無禮。于母慈訓不知敬從。自任兇頑反生怨害。

複次若離真空畢竟無別舍證方便。故次頌曰。

不知舍證因　　無由能捨證　是故牟尼說　　清涼余定無

論曰。彼諸外道雖復發心。求證涅槃及捨生死。由不善知舍證方便。于所舍證終不能成。憎背真空耽著妄有。故於方便名不善知。除真空觀無捨生死。及證涅槃別方便故。諸有貪求外道見者。終不能得出世清涼。言清涼者則是一切苦及苦因究竟寂靜。唯有空觀是證得因。除此更無別方便故。如是空觀佛法中有。一切外道邪論所無。故牟尼說四沙門果。我法中有。余法定無。以諸外道執著己見誹空觀故不證涅槃。云何應知我等所執定非舍證正方便耶。前已具說。執常句義立實有時。皆有過失后當廣破。執根境等故知汝執非正方便。又諸外道于涅槃處。實不能離我所見等。而謂彼處有自內我。解脫我所名為涅槃。所以者何。我與我所畢竟無有相離義故。汝不可言苦樂等法。于涅槃處遠離於我。汝自立為我所有故。如汝所執我之自體。亦不可言我之自體。非我所有同喻無因。勿汝

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果生起執著，認為觀空可以去除一切，那麼就錯了。執著于『空』和『有』這兩條道路，其功德和過失相差懸殊。為什麼你們這些人要偏袒『有』而誹謗『空』呢？真是可憐的邪見之徒，愚癡瘋狂，沒有智慧，不能信受有益的真空之理，總是喜歡邪求無益的虛妄之『有』，反而對正教產生嫌棄和嫉妒。就像那些被迷惑心智的惡劣之子，沉溺於聲色犬馬，行為放蕩無禮，對於母親慈愛的教誨，不知道尊敬和聽從，反而仗著自己的兇狠頑劣，產生怨恨和加害之心。

其次，如果離開了真空之理，就畢竟沒有其他的捨棄和證悟的方便。所以接下來說：

『不知舍證因，無由能捨證，是故牟尼說，清涼余定無。』

論述：那些外道雖然也發心，想要證得涅槃，捨棄生死，但是由於不善於瞭解捨棄和證悟的方便，所以對於所要捨棄和證悟的，最終不能成就。他們憎恨背離真空之理，沉溺於虛妄之『有』，所以說他們對於方便不善於瞭解。除了觀真空之外，沒有其他捨棄生死以及證得涅槃的方便。那些貪求外道見解的人，最終不能得到出世的清涼。所謂清涼，就是指一切痛苦以及痛苦的根源都徹底寂靜。只有空觀才是證得清涼的根本原因，除了這個之外，沒有其他的方便。這樣的空觀，只有在佛法中才有，一切外道的邪論中都沒有。所以釋迦牟尼（牟尼，指釋迦牟尼佛）說，四沙門果（四沙門果，佛教修行證果的四個階段），只有我的佛法中有，其他教法中沒有。因為那些外道執著于自己的見解，誹謗空觀，所以不能證得涅槃。怎麼才能知道我們所執著的，一定不是捨棄和證悟的正當方便呢？前面已經詳細說過，執著于常句的意義，建立真實的『有』，都有過失，後面會廣泛地破斥。執著于根、境等等，所以知道你們的執著不是正當的方便。而且，那些外道對於涅槃的境界，實際上不能離開『我所見』等等，卻說那個境界有自己的內在之『我』，把解脫『我所』叫做涅槃。為什麼呢？因為『我』和『我所』畢竟沒有相互分離的意義。你們不能說苦樂等等法，在涅槃的境界中遠離於『我』，因為你們自己立為『我』所擁有的。就像你們所執著的『我』的自體，也不能說『我』的自體不是『我』所擁有的，這就像一個沒有原因的比喻。不要你們...

【English Translation】 English version: If attachment arises, thinking that contemplating emptiness can remove everything, then that is wrong. Holding onto the paths of 'emptiness' and 'existence,' their merits and faults are vastly different. Why do you people favor 'existence' and slander 'emptiness'? Truly pitiable are these heretical fools, ignorant and mad, without wisdom, unable to believe and accept the beneficial truth of true emptiness, always liking to wrongly seek useless, false 'existence,' and instead generating aversion and jealousy towards the true teachings. Like those wicked children whose minds are deluded, indulging in sensual pleasures, behaving dissolutely and without manners, not knowing to respect and obey their mother's loving instructions, but instead relying on their own ferocity and stubbornness, generating resentment and harm.

Furthermore, if one departs from the principle of true emptiness, then there are ultimately no other expedient means for abandoning and realizing. Therefore, it is said in the following verse:

'Not knowing the cause of abandonment and realization, there is no way to abandon and realize. Therefore, Muni (Muni, referring to Shakyamuni Buddha) said, coolness (清涼, coolness, referring to the state of Nirvana) is not found in other doctrines.'

Commentary: Those non-Buddhists, although they may generate the aspiration to attain Nirvana and abandon birth and death, because they do not skillfully understand the expedient means of abandoning and realizing, they ultimately cannot achieve what they seek to abandon and realize. They hate and turn away from the principle of true emptiness, indulging in false 'existence,' so it is said that they are not skilled in understanding the expedient means. Apart from contemplating emptiness, there are no other expedient means for abandoning birth and death and attaining Nirvana. Those who crave the views of non-Buddhists will ultimately not be able to attain the coolness of transcending the world. So-called coolness refers to the ultimate quiescence of all suffering and the causes of suffering. Only the contemplation of emptiness is the fundamental cause of attaining coolness; apart from this, there are no other expedient means. Such contemplation of emptiness is only found in the Buddha-dharma, and is not found in all non-Buddhist heretical doctrines. Therefore, Shakyamuni (牟尼, Muni, referring to Shakyamuni Buddha) said that the four fruits of a Shramana (四沙門果, four stages of enlightenment in Buddhism) are only found in my Buddha-dharma, and are not found in other teachings. Because those non-Buddhists cling to their own views and slander the contemplation of emptiness, they cannot attain Nirvana. How can one know that what we hold onto is definitely not the proper expedient means for abandoning and realizing? It has already been explained in detail earlier that clinging to the meaning of the 'constant' statement and establishing a real 'existence' all have faults, which will be extensively refuted later. Clinging to the sense bases, objects, etc., therefore it is known that your clinging is not the proper expedient means. Moreover, those non-Buddhists, in the realm of Nirvana, actually cannot depart from 'what I see,' etc., but say that there is an inherent 'self' in that realm, and call liberation from 'what is mine' Nirvana. Why? Because 'I' and 'what is mine' ultimately have no meaning of separation. You cannot say that suffering and pleasure, etc., are far from 'I' in the realm of Nirvana, because you yourselves establish them as belonging to 'I.' Just like the very nature of 'I' that you cling to, you also cannot say that the very nature of 'I' does not belong to 'I,' which is like a metaphor without a cause. Do not you...

所執我無自體。便似空華有違宗過。是故汝等外道所執。不能究竟舍離生死。亦不能證究竟涅槃。由此應知非正方便。

複次諸外道等。製造書論雖彼所詮少分有實。謂說施等是牽引因。能招善趣及余勝樂。又說殺等是牽引因。能招惡趣及余劇苦。然彼書論前後相違。亦復許為殺生等業。又能引發諸惡見趣。亦從如是見趣所生。如有盲人遇游正道。或時迷失復履邪途。外道書論亦復如是。有實有虛不可依信。若爾如來三藏聖教。或有所說難可信解。是則一切內外經書。無可信者成太過失。所以者何。佛經中說種種神變不可思議。又說甚深真實義理。諸有情類不能測量。復說如來三業作用。聲聞乘等所不能知。謂無功用普於十方無量無邊極遠世界。隨諸有情一一根性。無量無數品類差別。如其所樂能於一時現妙色身饒益無盡。雖斷一切尋伺分別。而能為彼無量有情宣說無邊甚深廣大真實美妙無盡法音。於一念頃能除有情無量無邊心行穢垢。其心雖無實生實滅。亦無一切能緣所緣而一念頃普於一切所知境界現見周盡。于現見時遠離一切能見所見分別思惟。雖斷一切隨眠纏縛。而於三有現受死生。雖久離欲而生欲界。現處居家迫迮牢獄。貯畜種種財谷珍奇。養育妻兒親眷僮僕。如是等事皆難信知。故我於此深懷猶豫。

事若唯有誠可生疑。然事亦空故。次頌曰。

若於佛所說　　深事以生疑　可依無相空　　而生決定信

論曰。此頌意言。如來為怖外道群鹿。大師子吼示現真空。如是真空其義決定。分明理教所共成立。諸有智者用為定量。銳難精思皆不能越。隨順空理無倒勤修。眾善莊嚴成無上果。於此應生決定信解。唯空是實余並非真。但是如來隨物機欲。善權方便顯示宣揚。又佛所言雖有無量。略唯二種。謂空不空。若於不空有所疑者。可依空理比度應知。諸法皆空云何可見。由識言境有義不成。諸法體相略有二種。謂識所識及言所言。一境同時有多識起。隨見差別境相不同。此識不應隨外境起。由一境體多相不成。故知所識決定非有。言是假立唯詮共相。一切共相皆非實有。多法成故如軍林等。又諸共相皆依別法。所依別法其數無邊。諸近見者不能普見。既不見別。不應見總。如二性等依二等物不見所依必不能見。如是共相既非所見。如何依彼建立能詮。是故共相但假施設。非為實有可為言詮。又諸共相若實有者。一一法上全有分有俱不得成。一一法上若全有者。應如別法共相不成。一一法上若分有者。應成多分非一共相。又實等上無別有一。實等總性慧所緣故。如非實等。總性即是諸法共相。是故共相非有實

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果事情僅僅因為真實而產生懷疑，那是因為事情本身也是空性的。接下來是偈頌：『如果對於佛陀所說的甚深道理產生懷疑，可以依靠無相空性的道理，從而產生堅定的信心。』論曰：這首偈頌的意思是說，如來爲了震懾外道群鹿，像大師子吼一樣示現真空。這樣的真空，其意義是確定的，通過明確的道理和教義共同成立。所有有智慧的人都將其作為衡量標準，即使是銳利的辯論和精密的思考都不能超越。隨順空性的道理，不顛倒地勤奮修行，用各種善行莊嚴自己，最終成就無上的果位。對於這一點，應該產生堅定的信解，只有空性是真實的，其餘都不是真實的。這些都只是如來隨順眾生的根機和慾望，用善巧方便來顯示和宣揚。而且，佛陀所說的話雖然有無量，但概括起來只有兩種：空和不空。如果對於不空有所懷疑，可以依靠空性的道理來比較衡量，應該知道諸法皆空，怎麼可能看見呢？因為通過意識和語言所表達的境界，有些道理是不能成立的。諸法的體性和現象，概括起來有兩種：意識所認識的和語言所表達的。同一個境界，同時可以有多種意識產生，隨著所見的不同，境界的現象也不同。這種意識不應該隨著外境而產生，因為一個境界不可能有多種不同的現象。所以，要知道意識所認識的，絕對不是真實存在的。語言是虛假安立的，只是詮釋共同的相狀。一切共同的相狀都不是真實存在的，因為是由多種法組成的，比如軍隊和森林等。而且，各種共同的相狀都是依靠個別的法而存在的，所依靠的個別法數量是無限的，那些只能看到眼前事物的人，不可能全部看到。既然看不到個別，就不應該看到總體。比如二性等，依靠二等事物，看不到所依靠的，必定不能看到。像這樣，共同的相狀既然不是所能見到的，如何依靠它來建立能詮釋的語言呢？所以，共同的相狀只是虛假地施設，不是真實存在的，不能用語言來詮釋。而且，各種共同的相狀如果真實存在，那麼在每一個法上，全部存在或部分存在都不能成立。在每一個法上，如果全部存在，應該像個別的法一樣，共同的相狀就不能成立。在每一個法上，如果部分存在，應該成為多個部分，而不是一個共同的相狀。而且，在真實等之上，沒有另外一個真實等的總的性質，因為智慧所緣的緣故，就像非真實等一樣。總的性質就是諸法的共同相狀。所以，共同的相狀不是真實存在的。

【English Translation】 English version: If doubt arises simply because something is considered true, it is because that thing is also empty. Next is the verse: 'If one has doubts about the profound matters spoken by the Buddha, one can rely on the principle of signless emptiness to generate firm faith.' Commentary: The meaning of this verse is that the Tathagata, in order to terrify the deer-like heretics, manifested true emptiness like a great lion's roar. Such true emptiness is definite in its meaning, established jointly by clear reason and doctrine. All wise individuals use it as a standard, and even sharp debates and precise thinking cannot surpass it. By following the principle of emptiness, diligently cultivating without inversion, and adorning oneself with various good deeds, one ultimately achieves the unsurpassed fruit. One should generate firm faith and understanding in this, that only emptiness is real, and the rest is not true. These are merely skillful means displayed and proclaimed by the Tathagata in accordance with the faculties and desires of beings. Moreover, although the Buddha's words are immeasurable, they can be summarized into two types: emptiness and non-emptiness. If one has doubts about non-emptiness, one can compare and measure it by relying on the principle of emptiness, and one should know that all dharmas are empty, so how can they be seen? Because some principles cannot be established through the realms expressed by consciousness and language. The essence and phenomena of dharmas can be summarized into two types: those recognized by consciousness and those expressed by language. The same realm can give rise to multiple consciousnesses simultaneously, and the phenomena of the realm differ according to what is seen. This consciousness should not arise following external objects, because one realm cannot have multiple different phenomena. Therefore, one should know that what is recognized by consciousness is definitely not real. Language is falsely established and only interprets common characteristics. All common characteristics are not real because they are composed of multiple dharmas, such as armies and forests. Moreover, various common characteristics rely on individual dharmas, and the number of individual dharmas relied upon is infinite. Those who can only see what is in front of them cannot see all of them. Since one cannot see the individual, one should not see the whole. For example, two natures, etc., rely on two kinds of things; if one cannot see what is relied upon, one will definitely not be able to see. In this way, since common characteristics are not what can be seen, how can one rely on them to establish language that can interpret? Therefore, common characteristics are only falsely established and are not real, so they cannot be interpreted by language. Moreover, if various common characteristics really exist, then being entirely present or partially present on each dharma cannot be established. If they are entirely present on each dharma, they should be like individual dharmas, and common characteristics cannot be established. If they are partially present on each dharma, they should become multiple parts instead of one common characteristic. Moreover, there is no other general nature of reality, etc., above reality, etc., because it is the object of wisdom, just like non-reality, etc. The general nature is the common characteristic of all dharmas. Therefore, common characteristics are not real.

體。但諸世間假共施設。如是諸法。或識所識。或言所言。二種推徴俱非實有除此二境更無別法。故應信解諸法皆空。由此契經有如是說。諸法實性無示無對。皆同一相。所謂無相。諸法性相非言所行。言不能詮故名無示。非心心法所行境故。非緣有對之所能對故名無對。非超二種所行相外別有余相故名無相。空相無二故名一相。不為妄執貪等毒箭損害。真見所證真空分明可了故名為相。又真空理離有無等一切法相故名無相。無相無二故說為一。即以如是無相為相。故名為相非別有相。

複次彼諸外道作如是言。諸佛所說略有二種謂空不空空言若實余說應虛。若佛所言一分是實。則類余分亦非虛者。我等所言亦應如是。云何總撥言不可信。汝等外道于現事中有謬失故不可依信。所以者何。故次頌曰。

觀現尚有妄　　知后定為虛

論曰。彼諸外道邪覺亂心。淺近事中尚有顛倒。況於後世深遠難知。因果理中而無謬失。是故所言不可依信。於何淺近我有倒耶謂勝論者計同異等是現量境。諸數論者計苦樂等是現量境。如是等事其數無邊。皆有顛倒。所以者何。如勝論執同異性等是現量境。其理不成。牛馬等性分別意識。於色等法假施設有。越諸根境非現量得。遍諸所依無差別故。如和合體。彼計第六和合

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

體性。但所有世間都是虛假共同施設的。像這樣的諸法，或者被意識所認識，或者被言語所表達，這兩種推求考察都不是真實存在的。除了這兩種境界，再沒有其他的法。所以應當相信和理解諸法皆空。因此，有這樣的契經說：諸法的真實體性，既不能指示，也不能對立，完全是同一體相，這就是所謂的無相。諸法的體性和表相，不是言語所能表達的，言語不能完全詮釋，所以叫做『無示』。不是心和心法所能行境，不是因緣和對立所能對治，所以叫做『無對』。不是超越這兩種所行之相外，另有其他的相，所以叫做『無相』。空相沒有兩種差別，所以叫做『一相』。不被虛妄執著的貪等毒箭所損害，通過真正的見解所證悟的真空，分明可以瞭解，所以叫做『相』。而且，真空的道理遠離有和無等一切法的表相，所以叫做『無相』。無相沒有兩種差別，所以說是一。就是以這樣的無相作為相，所以叫做相，而不是另外有相。

再者，那些外道這樣說：諸佛所說的，大致有兩種，即空和不空。如果空的說法是真實的，那麼其他的說法就應該是虛假的。如果佛所說的一部分是真實的，那麼類似的其他部分也應該不是虛假的。我們所說的也應該是這樣。為什麼全部否定，說言語不可相信呢？你們這些外道，在現實的事情中都有錯誤，所以不可依賴和相信。為什麼這樣說呢？所以接下來說：

觀察現在尚且有虛妄，就知道以後必定是虛假的。

論述：那些外道邪惡的覺悟擾亂了心，在淺近的事情中尚且有顛倒，更何況對於後世深遠難以瞭解的因果道理，怎麼會沒有錯誤呢？因此，他們所說的話不可依賴和相信。在什麼淺近的事情上，我有顛倒呢？比如勝論者認為同異等是現量境（直接感知到的境界），數論者認為苦樂等是現量境。像這樣的事情，數量無數，都有顛倒。為什麼這樣說呢？比如勝論派執著同異性等是現量境，這個道理不能成立。牛馬等的性質，是分別意識對於色等法虛假施設的，超越了諸根的境界，不是現量所能得到的。普遍存在於各個所依處，沒有差別，就像和合的整體。他們認為第六種和合

【English Translation】 English version:

Substance. But all the worlds are falsely and jointly established. Such dharmas, whether cognized by consciousness or expressed by language, neither of these two kinds of investigation is truly existent. Apart from these two realms, there are no other dharmas. Therefore, one should believe and understand that all dharmas are empty. Hence, there is such a sutra saying: The true nature of all dharmas is neither demonstrable nor opposable, all are of the same characteristic, which is called no-characteristic (無相, alakṣaṇa). The nature and characteristics of dharmas are not within the realm of language; language cannot fully express them, hence it is called 'no-demonstration' (無示, anidarśana). It is not the realm of mind and mental functions, nor can it be opposed by causes and conditions and opposition, hence it is called 'no-opposition' (無對, apratigha). It is not that there is another characteristic beyond the characteristics of these two realms, hence it is called 'no-characteristic'. The characteristic of emptiness has no duality, hence it is called 'one characteristic' (一相, ekarasa). It is not harmed by the poisonous arrows of false attachments such as greed; the emptiness (真空, śūnyatā) realized through true insight can be clearly understood, hence it is called 'characteristic' (相, lakṣaṇa). Moreover, the principle of emptiness is apart from all characteristics of dharmas such as existence and non-existence, hence it is called 'no-characteristic'. No-characteristic has no duality, hence it is said to be one. It is with such no-characteristic as the characteristic, hence it is called characteristic, and there is no separate characteristic.

Furthermore, those heretics say thus: What the Buddhas say is roughly of two kinds, namely emptiness and non-emptiness. If the saying of emptiness is true, then the other sayings should be false. If a part of what the Buddha says is true, then the other similar parts should also not be false. What we say should also be like this. Why deny everything and say that language is not to be believed? You heretics have errors in present matters, so you cannot be relied upon and believed. Why is this so? Therefore, it is said next:

Observing the present still has falsehood, knowing that the future is certainly false.

Treatise: Those heretics' evil awareness disturbs the mind, and there are still inversions in shallow matters, let alone in the deep and difficult-to-understand principles of cause and effect in future lives, how can there be no errors? Therefore, what they say cannot be relied upon and believed. In what shallow matters do I have inversions? For example, the Vaiśeṣika (勝論者) school considers sameness and difference, etc., to be the objects of direct perception (現量境, pratyakṣa), and the Sāṃkhya (數論者) school considers suffering and happiness, etc., to be the objects of direct perception. Such things are countless in number, and all have inversions. Why is this so? For example, the Vaiśeṣika school clings to sameness and difference, etc., as the objects of direct perception, but this principle cannot be established. The nature of cows and horses, etc., is falsely established by the discriminating consciousness on dharmas such as form, and it transcends the realm of the senses, and cannot be obtained by direct perception. It is universally present in all substrates without difference, like a combined whole. They consider the sixth combination (和合, samavāya)

句義。其體是一遍諸所依。越諸根境非現量得。同異等性其義亦爾。云何執為現量境界。又彼論說有實句義。是現量境。理亦不然。所以者何。瓶衣等物分別意識。於色等法假施設有。云何執為現量境界。然彼論說瓶衣等物因德業實同異合故。為眼所見及身所觸。故是根境現量所知。此必不然。先明因德所引實智非現量攝。謂因青等暖等諸德所引實智。定非見觸現量所攝。非業同異實所引生依隨余相合所生故。如因香味所引實智。因業引生實智亦爾。如其所應比量遮破。謂因諸業所引實智。亦非見觸現量所攝。非同異性實所引生依隨余相合所生故。如因香味所引實智。因實引生所有實智。如見壺等知是牛等。既破壺等諸實句義。非所見觸。即已破彼所引實智。以壺等智必因德業方乃得生。此前已破。是故亦非現量所攝。因同異性所引實智。亦非見觸現量所攝。依隨余相合所生故。如非實等所有諸智。謂非實智于德業等言此非實依隨余相合所生故。定非見觸現量所攝。余智亦爾。由是應知。一切句義假合生智。皆非真實緣彼現量。謂緣實智非是真實。緣實現量假合生故。如德等智。如是乃至緣和合智亦非真實。緣彼現量假合生故。如實等智故不應執六句義中有現量境。是故勝論于其現世淺近事中亦有顛倒。

複次

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：句義（padārtha，事物範疇）。它的本體是普遍存在於一切所依之物中。超越了諸根（indriya，感覺器官）和境（viṣaya，感覺對像），不是現量（pratyakṣa，直接認知）所能獲得的。同性（sāmānya，共性）、異性（viśeṣa，殊性）和等性（samavāya，和合性）的意義也是如此。怎麼能執著地認為是現量境界呢？而且他們的論典中說有真實的句義，是現量的境界，這個道理也是不成立的。為什麼呢？瓶子、衣服等事物，分別意識（vikalpa-jñāna，分別識）只是在色等法上假立施設的，怎麼能執著地認為是現量境界呢？然而他們的論典中說，瓶子、衣服等物，因為因（hetu，原因）、德（guṇa，性質）、業（karma，作用）、實（dravya，實體）、同性、異性和合性（samavāya，和合）的緣故，為眼睛所見和身體所觸，所以是根境（indriya-viṣaya，感覺器官和感覺對像）的現量所知。這必定是不對的。首先說明因和德所引發的實智（dravya-jñāna，實體認知）不是現量所攝。所謂因青色等、暖熱等諸德所引發的實智，一定不是見觸現量所攝。不是由業、同異性、實所引發，而是依隨其他相合而產生的緣故，就像因香味所引發的實智一樣。因業引發的實智也是如此，應該用比量（anumāna，推理）來遮破。所謂因諸業所引發的實智，也不是見觸現量所攝。不是由同異性、實所引發，而是依隨其他相合而產生的緣故，就像因香味所引發的實智一樣。因實所引發的所有實智，就像看見壺等，知道是牛等。既然已經破斥了壺等諸實句義不是所見所觸，就已經破斥了它們所引發的實智。因為壺等的認知必定要依靠因、德、業才能產生，而這些之前已經被破斥了，所以也不是現量所攝。因同異性所引發的實智，也不是見觸現量所攝。因為是依隨其他相合而產生的緣故，就像非實等所有的諸智。所謂非實智，對於德、業等說這不是實，是因為依隨其他相合而產生的緣故，一定不是見觸現量所攝。其他的智也是如此。由此應該知道，一切句義假合產生的智，都不是真實緣彼現量。所謂緣實智不是真實的，因為緣實現量是假合產生的，就像德等智。像這樣乃至緣和合智也不是真實的，因為緣彼現量是假合產生的，就像實等智。所以不應該執著六句義（ṣaṭ padārtha，六種事物範疇）中有現量境。因此，勝論派（Vaiśeṣika，勝論派）對於現世淺近的事情中也有顛倒。複次

【English Translation】 English version: The meaning of padārtha (categories of reality). Its essence pervades all that is relied upon. Transcending the senses (indriya) and their objects (viṣaya), it cannot be attained through direct perception (pratyakṣa). The meanings of sāmānya (generality), viśeṣa (particularity), and samavāya (inherence) are also similar. How can one be attached to considering it a realm of direct perception? Moreover, their treatise states that there is a real padārtha, which is an object of direct perception. This reasoning is also incorrect. Why? Objects such as pots and clothes are merely conceptual constructs (vikalpa-jñāna) falsely attributed to forms and other phenomena. How can one be attached to considering them realms of direct perception? However, their treatise states that objects such as pots and clothes are seen by the eye and touched by the body because of hetu (cause), guṇa (quality), karma (action), dravya (substance), sāmānya, viśeṣa, and samavāya (inherence). Therefore, they are known through direct perception of the senses and their objects (indriya-viṣaya). This is certainly not correct. First, it should be clarified that the real knowledge (dravya-jñāna) arising from cause and quality is not included in direct perception. The real knowledge arising from qualities such as blue and warmth is definitely not included in the direct perception of sight and touch. It is not produced by action, generality, particularity, or substance, but rather arises from dependence on other combinations, just like the real knowledge arising from smell and taste. The real knowledge arising from action is also similar, and should be refuted by inference (anumāna). The real knowledge arising from actions is also not included in the direct perception of sight and touch. It is not produced by generality, particularity, or substance, but rather arises from dependence on other combinations, just like the real knowledge arising from smell and taste. All real knowledge arising from substance, such as seeing a pot and knowing it is a cow, etc. Since it has already been refuted that the real padārthas such as pots are not seen or touched, the real knowledge arising from them has already been refuted. Because the knowledge of pots, etc., must rely on cause, quality, and action to arise, and these have already been refuted, it is therefore not included in direct perception. The real knowledge arising from generality and particularity is also not included in the direct perception of sight and touch. Because it arises from dependence on other combinations, like all knowledge of non-substance, etc. The knowledge of non-substance, regarding qualities, actions, etc., saying that this is not substance, is definitely not included in the direct perception of sight and touch because it arises from dependence on other combinations. Other knowledge is also similar. Therefore, it should be known that all knowledge arising from the false combination of padārthas is not truly related to that direct perception. The so-called knowledge related to real substance is not real, because the direct perception it is related to arises from false combination, like the knowledge of qualities, etc. Likewise, even the knowledge related to inherence is not real, because the direct perception it is related to arises from false combination, like the knowledge of substance, etc. Therefore, one should not be attached to the idea that there is a realm of direct perception among the six padārthas (ṣaṭ padārtha). Thus, the Vaiśeṣika school also has inversions regarding shallow and proximate matters in the present world. Furthermore

彼數論者執色等法三德合成。是實非假現量所得。理亦不然。多法成故。如軍林等。色等應假。云何言實。又樂等三其性別故。如未變位不應成一。又色等法若是實有。應如樂等非三合成。又樂等三其相各異。云何和合共成一相。不可合時轉為一相。與未合時體無別故。又樂等三性既各異。相不應同。汝執性相定是一故。性應如相同。相應如性異。又樂等別。色等是總。汝執總別既定是一。總應如別是三非一。別應如總。是一非三。云何別三成於總一。又轉變時樂等三德若不和合共成一相。如未轉時其相差別。不應現見是一色等。若三和合共成一相應失樂等三種別相不可說言樂等三德各有二相。一總二別。所以者何。總相若一不應即三。總相若三不應見一。若言樂等一一皆有。樂等三相共相和雜難可了知。故見一者。此亦不然。各有三相還應見三。如何見一。云何可知樂等有異。又若一一皆有三相。何須和合共成色等。即應一一能成色等。根境差別為我受用。又此三德各有三相。互有差別。如何色等其相是一。又若樂等一一皆能成色等法。一一法體皆三合成。是則諸法若性若相。應無差別。同以三德三相成故。若爾所有大等因果。唯量諸大諸根差別。一切不成世間現見情與非情凈穢等物。現比等量亦無差別。違諸世間

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本彼數論者認為，色（rupa，形態）、等（等同於其他基本元素）等法，由三種屬性（三德，triguna）合成。他們認為這是真實的，並非虛假，可以通過現量（pratyaksa，直接感知）獲得。但這種觀點在理上是不成立的。因為是由多種法組成的，就像軍隊、森林等一樣，色等應該是虛假的，怎麼能說是真實的呢？而且，樂（sukha，快樂）、等（等同於其他情感）這三種屬性，它們的性質各不相同，就像未發生轉變的狀態一樣，不應該成為一體。此外，色等法如果是真實存在的，就應該像樂等一樣，不是由三種屬性合成的。再者，樂等三種屬性，它們的相狀（lakshana，特徵）各不相同，怎麼能和合在一起，共同形成一個相狀呢？如果說在不可和合的時候轉變為一個相狀，那麼與未和合的時候相比，本體並沒有區別。而且，樂等三種屬性的性質既然各不相同，相狀就不應該相同。你認為性質和相狀必定是一致的，那麼性質應該像相狀一樣不同，相狀應該像性質一樣不同。此外，樂等是別相（vyakti，個別），色等是總相（jati，總體）。你認為總相和別相必定是一致的，那麼總相應該像別相一樣是三，而不是一；別相應該像總相一樣是一，而不是三。怎麼能說別相的三種屬性形成總相的一呢？而且，在轉變的時候，樂等三種屬性如果不和合在一起，共同形成一個相狀，那麼就像未轉變的時候一樣，它們的相狀是有差別的，不應該顯現為一體的色等。如果說三種屬性和合在一起，共同形成一個相狀，那麼就應該失去樂等三種屬性各自的差別相狀。不能說樂等三種屬性各有兩種相狀，一種是總相，一種是別相。為什麼呢？總相如果是一，就不應該是三；總相如果是三，就不應該被看作一。如果說樂等每一個屬性都具有樂等三種相狀，那麼樂等三種相狀混合在一起，難以瞭解，所以才看到一個相狀，這種說法也是不成立的。因為每一個屬性都各有三種相狀，還應該看到三種相狀，怎麼會只看到一個相狀呢？怎麼能知道樂等屬性是不同的呢？而且，如果每一個屬性都具有三種相狀，何必和合在一起，共同形成色等呢？每一個屬性就應該能夠形成色等，根（indriya，感官）和境（visaya，對像）的差別，才能為我所受用。而且，這三種屬性各有三種相狀，相互之間有差別，色等的相狀怎麼會是一致的呢？而且，如果樂等每一個屬性都能形成色等法，那麼每一個法的本體都是由三種屬性合成的，那麼所有法的性質和相狀，應該沒有差別，因為都是由三種屬性和三種相狀形成的。如果這樣，所有的大（mahabhuta，五大元素）等因果，只能衡量諸大和諸根的差別，一切都不能成立。世間現量所見的有情（sattva，眾生）和非情（非眾生），清凈和污穢等事物，現量和比量（anumana，推論）等量，也沒有差別，這與世間的常識相違背。

【English Translation】 English version The Samkhya (數論者) philosophers assert that rupa (色, form) and other dharmas (法, elements) are composed of three gunas (三德, qualities). They believe this is real, not illusory, and can be known through pratyaksa (現量, direct perception). However, this view is not logically sound because it is composed of multiple dharmas, like an army or a forest. Rupa (色) and others should be considered illusory; how can they be said to be real? Furthermore, sukha (樂, pleasure) and other gunas (等, qualities), being distinct in their nature, should not become one, just as they are not one in their unmanifested state. Moreover, if rupa (色) and other dharmas (法) are truly existent, they should not be composed of three gunas (三德), like sukha (樂) and others. Moreover, sukha (樂) and the other three gunas (等), each have different lakshanas (相狀, characteristics). How can they combine to form a single characteristic? If they transform into a single characteristic when they cannot combine, then there is no difference in essence compared to when they are uncombined. Furthermore, since the natures of sukha (樂) and the other three gunas (等) are different, their characteristics should not be the same. You assert that nature and characteristic are invariably one, so nature should be different like characteristic, and characteristic should be different like nature. Moreover, sukha (樂) and others are vyakti (別相, particulars), while rupa (色) and others are jati (總相, universals). You assert that universals and particulars are invariably one, so universals should be three like particulars, not one; and particulars should be one like universals, not three. How can the three attributes of particulars form the one universal? Moreover, during transformation, if sukha (樂) and the other three gunas (等) do not combine to form a single characteristic, then their characteristics are different, just as they are in their untransformed state. They should not appear as the unified rupa (色) and others. If the three gunas (三德) combine to form a single characteristic, then they should lose their individual characteristics of sukha (樂) and others. It cannot be said that sukha (樂) and the other three gunas (等) each have two characteristics, one universal and one particular. Why? If the universal characteristic is one, it should not be three; if the universal characteristic is three, it should not be seen as one. If it is said that each of sukha (樂) and others possesses the three characteristics of sukha (樂) and others, then the three characteristics of sukha (樂) and others are mixed together and difficult to understand, which is why only one characteristic is seen. This statement is also untenable because each attribute has three characteristics, so three characteristics should still be seen. How can only one characteristic be seen? How can it be known that sukha (樂) and other attributes are different? Moreover, if each attribute has three characteristics, why combine them to form rupa (色) and others? Each attribute should be able to form rupa (色) and others, so that the difference between indriya (根, sense organs) and visaya (境, objects) can be experienced by me. Moreover, these three gunas (三德) each have three characteristics, and there are differences between them. How can the characteristics of rupa (色) and others be the same? Moreover, if each of sukha (樂) and other attributes can form rupa (色) and other dharmas (法), then the essence of each dharma (法) is composed of three gunas (三德). Then, the nature and characteristics of all dharmas (法) should be indistinguishable because they are all formed by three gunas (三德) and three characteristics. If so, all causes and effects, such as the mahabhutas (大, great elements), can only measure the differences between the great elements and the sense organs, and nothing can be established. The sentient beings (sattva, 有情) and non-sentient beings (非情), purity and impurity, and other things seen by direct perception in the world, as well as the inferences (anumana, 比量) and other means of knowledge, would also be indistinguishable, which contradicts worldly knowledge.

現所見故。成大過失。如是等類。外道邪師所執雖多。皆不應理。誰能撓攪糞穢聚為。我佛法中多諸法將。已摧彼敵。故不煩詞。如是外道于淺近處。白日夷途尚致顛蹶。況于深遠險絕稠林巨夜重昏而無謬失。誰有識者。信彼邪言為止歸邪。故復頌曰。

諸依彼法行　　被誑終無已

論曰。若諸有情隨彼外道昧見倒執所說法行。彼隨惡友邪教化力。妄見熏習所任持故。誹毀如來證所起法。獲大罪業其量無邊。由是因緣墮諸惡趣。受大憂苦無有出期。故有智者。勿類愚夫隨惡友行而自欺誑。應隨諸佛真實無罪。速證出離聖教修行。

複次如上所言。佛經中說種種神變不可思議。又說甚深真實義理。諸有情類不能測量。乃至廣說。如是等事。難信知者誠如所言。諸佛功德所說義理。皆甚深故難可信知汝等愚夫薄福少智。唯求自利不願濟他。未飲大悲甘露法味。豈能信解如是法門。若有慧光破無明闇。深心悲愍一切有情。求佛菩提具廣大福。乃能信解如是法門。謂諸如來昔無量劫。悲慧種姓熏發其心。為拔有情生死大苦。為求無上正等菩提。于諸佛所恭敬供養。聽聞正法系念思惟。修集無邊法隨法行。謂施戒忍勤定慧等。種種難行微妙勝行。殷重無間修習圓滿。證得無上正等菩提。獲不思議自在神力。本願

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：現在所見的緣故，會造成大的過失。像這些等等，外道邪師所執著的雖然很多，但都不合道理。誰能把糞便堆積起來攪動成美味佳餚呢？我佛法中有很多法將，已經摧毀了他們的敵對勢力，所以不必多費口舌。這些外道在淺近的地方，即使是白天走平坦的道路尚且會顛倒跌倒，更何況在深遠險峻、稠密的森林和漫長黑暗的夜晚中，怎麼可能沒有謬誤和過失呢？哪個有見識的人會相信他們的邪說，最終走向邪路呢？所以再次用偈頌說：『凡是依照他們的法修行的人，最終都會被欺騙而沒有止境。』論曰：如果各種有情眾生，隨著那些外道的愚昧見解和顛倒執著所說的法去修行，他們由於受到惡友和邪教的教化力量的影響，被虛妄的見解熏習所控制，誹謗如來所證悟的法，會獲得極大的罪業，其數量無邊無際。由於這個因緣，會墮入各種惡趣，遭受巨大的憂愁痛苦，沒有脫離的期限。所以有智慧的人，不要像愚夫一樣跟隨惡友的行為而自我欺騙。應該跟隨諸佛真實無罪的教導，迅速證得出離的聖教修行。再次，就像上面所說的，佛經中說種種神通變化不可思議，又說甚深真實的義理，各種有情眾生不能測量，乃至廣說，像這些等等事情，難以令人相信。誠如你們所說，諸佛的功德和所說的義理，都是非常深奧的，所以難以令人相信。你們這些愚夫，福薄智淺，只求自己得到利益而不願意幫助他人，沒有品嚐過大悲甘露的法味，怎麼能夠相信和理解這樣的法門呢？如果有人具有智慧的光芒，能夠破除無明的黑暗，深深地悲憫一切有情眾生，爲了求得佛的菩提，具備廣大的福德，才能相信和理解這樣的法門。也就是說，諸如來在過去無量劫中，以悲心和智慧的種姓薰陶啓發他們的心，爲了拔除有情眾生死的大苦，爲了求得無上正等菩提（Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi，無上正等正覺），在諸佛面前恭敬供養，聽聞正法，繫念思惟，修集無邊的法隨法行，也就是佈施、持戒、忍辱、精進、禪定、智慧等等，種種難行微妙殊勝的修行，殷重而沒有間斷地修習圓滿，證得無上正等菩提，獲得不可思議的自在神力，本來的願力。

【English Translation】 English version: Because of what is seen now, great faults will be created. Like these and other similar things, although the attachments of externalist heretical teachers are many, none of them are reasonable. Who can stir up a pile of excrement into a delicious delicacy? In my Buddha-dharma, there are many Dharma generals who have already destroyed their enemies, so there is no need to waste words. These externalists, in shallow places, even stumble and fall on smooth roads in broad daylight, let alone in deep and distant, dangerous and dense forests, and long, dark nights, how can they not have errors and faults? Who with discernment would believe their heretical words and ultimately go astray? Therefore, it is again said in verse: 'Those who follow their teachings will ultimately be deceived without end.' Treatise says: If various sentient beings follow the teachings of those externalists' ignorant views and inverted attachments, they, influenced by the power of evil friends and heretical teachings, and controlled by the熏習 (xunxi, habitual influence) of false views, slander the Dharma realized by the Tathagata (Tathagata, 如來), and will obtain extremely great karma, the amount of which is boundless. Because of this cause, they will fall into various evil realms, suffer great sorrow and pain, and have no hope of escape. Therefore, wise people should not, like foolish people, follow the actions of evil friends and deceive themselves. They should follow the true and faultless teachings of the Buddhas and quickly realize the practice of the holy teachings of liberation. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the Buddhist scriptures say that various miraculous transformations are inconceivable, and also say that the profound and true meanings cannot be measured by various sentient beings, and so on. Such things are difficult for people to believe. As you say, the merits of the Buddhas and the meanings they speak of are all very profound, so they are difficult for people to believe. You foolish people, with little merit and little wisdom, only seek your own benefit and are unwilling to help others, and have not tasted the flavor of the nectar of great compassion, how can you believe and understand such Dharma doors? If someone has the light of wisdom to break through the darkness of ignorance, deeply compassionates all sentient beings, seeks the Bodhi (Bodhi, 菩提) of the Buddha, and possesses great merit, then they can believe and understand such Dharma doors. That is to say, the Tathagatas, in countless past kalpas (kalpa, 劫), nurtured and inspired their minds with the lineage of compassion and wisdom, in order to remove the great suffering of birth and death of sentient beings, and in order to seek Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi (Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi, 無上正等正覺), respectfully made offerings to the Buddhas, listened to the Dharma, kept it in mind and contemplated it, cultivated boundless Dharma-following practices, that is, giving, precepts, patience, diligence, meditation, wisdom, etc., various difficult, subtle, and excellent practices, diligently and continuously cultivated to perfection, realized Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi, obtained inconceivable self-mastery and divine power, and their original vows.

所引妙用無窮。於此何緣而不信解。現見世間機關等事。先勢所引任運動搖。如是如來殊勝神變。本願所引任運施為。又如世間習幻術者。若極成滿處多人眾妙用難思。何況如來。久修勝定增上滿足。神通作用而可測量。是故汝等於諸如來不思議事。應生信解。于佛圓德自在神通。當至心求。勿懷放逸。有聲聞等於佛無邊不思議力。自知絕分悲號傷嘆。聲振三千。汝等云何誹謗不信。

複次諸有智者。自往涅槃昧識逢師不能隨學。為顯此義。故說頌曰。

智者自涅槃　　是能作難作　愚夫逢善導　　而無隨趣心

論曰。煩惱纏縛無始時來。數習堅強牢固難斷。涅槃虛寂無相無名。勝德無邊高深難證。諸有智者。不因他教。自然能度生死大海。證得究竟大般涅槃。是大丈夫能作難作。愚夫久沒諸欲淤泥。耽味歡娛不求出離。如狗貪咬染血枯骨。雖杖逼之猶不棄捨。愚夫亦爾。味著諸欲聖言訶責。亦不厭離。如是智者。自然開覺證大涅槃。是作難作。愚夫放逸無所覺知。雖遇聖言不希寂滅。

複次生死甚苦涅槃極樂。過失功德粗著易了。如何有情安然不欲。厭背生死欣趣涅槃。以彼愚癡有怖畏故。謂懷我愛聞涅槃空。恐證無餘我便斷滅。由此怖畏。是故不欲厭背生死欣趣涅槃。如是怖畏由少智生

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：所展現的奇妙作用是無窮無盡的。對於這些，有什麼理由不去相信和理解呢？現在可以看到世間的機關等事物，一開始的勢頭所引導，就能隨意運動搖擺。同樣，如來的殊勝神通變化，也是由本願所引導，能夠自然而然地施行作為。又比如世間那些學習幻術的人，如果技藝極其成熟圓滿，在眾多人面前所展現的奇妙作用是難以思議的。更何況是如來，經過長久地修習殊勝禪定，增上圓滿，他的神通作用又怎麼可以衡量呢？所以你們對於諸如來不可思議的事情，應該生起信心和理解。對於佛的圓滿功德和自在神通，應當至誠懇切地祈求，不要心懷放逸。有些聲聞弟子對於佛的無邊不可思議力量，自知自己無法達到，悲傷嘆息，聲音震動三千大千世界。你們怎麼可以誹謗而不相信呢？

再次說明，有些有智慧的人，自己前往涅槃的道路，卻因為迷惑而無法識別導師，不能跟隨學習。爲了顯明這個道理，所以說了這首偈頌：

『智者自涅槃，是能作難作；愚夫逢善導，而無隨趣心。』

論述：煩惱的纏縛從無始以來，經過無數次的習染，已經變得堅強牢固，難以斷除。涅槃是虛空寂靜的，沒有形相，沒有名稱。它的殊勝功德是無邊無際的，高深莫測，難以證得。那些有智慧的人，不需要依靠他人的教導，自然就能夠度過生死的苦海，證得究竟的大般涅槃。這是大丈夫能夠做到難做的事情。愚蠢的人長久地沉沒在各種慾望的泥潭中，貪戀其中的快樂，不尋求出離。就像狗貪婪地啃咬沾染了血的枯骨一樣，即使用棍子逼迫它，它也不肯放棄。愚蠢的人也是這樣，貪戀執著于各種慾望，即使聖人的言語呵斥，也不厭倦離開。像這樣，有智慧的人，自然開悟覺醒，證得大涅槃，這是做到了難做的事情。愚蠢的人放縱懈怠，沒有什麼覺悟，即使遇到聖人的教誨，也不希望得到寂滅。

再次說明，生死是極其痛苦的，涅槃是極其快樂的。過失和功德，粗略地觀察就很容易明白。為什麼有些眾生安然不動，不想要厭離生死，欣然趨向涅槃呢？因為他們愚癡，心懷怖畏的緣故。他們因為懷有我愛（Atma-sneha），聽到涅槃是空（Sunyata），就害怕證得無餘涅槃（Parinirvana）后，『我』（Atma）便會斷滅。因為這種怖畏，所以不想要厭離生死，欣然趨向涅槃。這樣的怖畏，是由缺少智慧而產生的。

【English Translation】 English version: The wonderful functions it manifests are infinite. For what reason should one not believe and understand this? We can see in the world that machines and other things, once set in motion, can move and sway at will. Similarly, the sublime miraculous transformations of the Tathagata (如來, 'Thus Come One', an epithet of the Buddha) are guided by his original vows, enabling him to act spontaneously. Furthermore, consider those who practice illusionary arts in the world. If their skills are extremely refined and perfected, the wondrous functions they display before large crowds are inconceivable. How much more so is the Tathagata, who has cultivated superior Samadhi (勝定, superior concentration) for a long time, increasing and perfecting it? How can his miraculous powers be measured? Therefore, you should generate faith and understanding in the inconceivable matters of the Tathagatas. Towards the Buddha's perfect virtues and unhindered miraculous powers, you should earnestly seek them with all your heart, without harboring negligence. Some Sravakas (聲聞, 'hearers', disciples) are aware that they cannot attain the Buddha's boundless and inconceivable power, and they lament with sorrow, their voices shaking the three thousand great thousand worlds. How can you slander and disbelieve?

Furthermore, some wise individuals, on their own path to Nirvana (涅槃, liberation), become confused and fail to recognize the teacher, unable to follow and learn. To clarify this meaning, a verse is spoken:

'The wise attain Nirvana on their own; this is doing the difficult. The foolish encounter a good guide, but have no mind to follow.'

Commentary: The entanglements of afflictions have been present since beginningless time. Through countless repetitions, they have become strong, firm, and difficult to sever. Nirvana is empty and tranquil, without form or name. Its superior virtues are boundless, profound, and difficult to realize. Those with wisdom, without relying on the teachings of others, can naturally cross the ocean of birth and death, and attain ultimate Great Nirvana. This is a great person capable of doing the difficult. Foolish individuals are long submerged in the mud of desires, indulging in pleasure and not seeking liberation. Like a dog greedily gnawing on a blood-stained, dried bone, even when forced away with a stick, it will not abandon it. Foolish individuals are the same, clinging to desires, and even when rebuked by the words of the sages, they do not tire of them or leave them. In this way, wise individuals naturally awaken and realize Great Nirvana; this is doing the difficult. Foolish individuals are lax and unaware, and even when encountering the words of the sages, they do not aspire to tranquility.

Furthermore, birth and death are extremely painful, and Nirvana is extremely blissful. Faults and merits are easily understood with a cursory observation. Why is it that some sentient beings remain at ease, not wanting to renounce birth and death and joyfully approach Nirvana? It is because they are foolish and harbor fear. Because they cherish self-love (Atma-sneha), when they hear that Nirvana is emptiness (Sunyata), they fear that upon realizing Parinirvana (無餘涅槃, Nirvana without remainder), the 'self' (Atma) will be extinguished. Because of this fear, they do not want to renounce birth and death and joyfully approach Nirvana. Such fear arises from a lack of wisdom.

。所以者何。故次頌曰。

不知無怖畏　　遍知亦復然　定由少分知　　而生於怖畏

論曰。若諸有情都無覺慧。於一切法無所了知。彼于涅槃不生怖畏。若有遍知諸法正理。彼達生死及與涅槃。生死生時唯假苦生。生死滅時唯假苦滅。本來無我諸法皆空。故於涅槃全無怖畏。若有但解般涅槃時。諸行皆滅都無所有。不知行苦任運自滅。無實體用離我我所。彼由身見我愛所持。聞涅槃中空無所有。懼我斷滅便生怖畏。如是怖畏因少智生。故有智者應正除斷。又非串習故生怖畏。所以者何。故次頌曰。

生死順流法　　愚夫常習行　未曾修逆流　　是故生怖畏

論曰。諸異生者說名愚夫。煩惱隨眠無不成就。欣生厭死不樂涅槃。從無始來數曾受領。增上生道可愛異熟。未曾修習決定勝道。增上生道諸果異熟。貪等隨眠所依止處。雖為苦火常所焚燒。而不覺知歡娛遊戲。于生死苦常習行故。不知過患無厭離心。于其解脫無罪樂味。由不曾知不樂修證。如世溷豬耽樂糞穢。清閑美膳非所欣求。如是愚夫樂生死苦。于解脫樂無希慕意。由未串習。聞說其名不能信受。反生怖畏。諸有智者由思擇力。于解脫樂應正勤求。勿類愚夫倒生厭怖。

複次諸有信求無倒解脫。或性賢善。或由慧力。將修真

【現代漢語翻譯】所以是為什麼呢？因此接下來說偈頌：

『不知無怖畏，遍知亦復然，定由少分知，而生於怖畏。』

論中說：如果所有有情眾生都沒有覺悟的智慧，對一切法一無所知，那麼他們對涅槃（Nirvana）[佛教術語，指解脫生死輪迴的境界]不會產生恐懼。如果有人完全瞭解諸法的正理，那麼他就能通達生死和涅槃。生死產生時，只是假立的苦產生；生死滅亡時，只是假立的苦滅亡。本來就沒有『我』，一切法皆是空性，所以對於涅槃完全沒有恐懼。如果有人只理解般涅槃（Parinirvana）[佛教術語，指佛或阿羅漢的完全寂滅]時，一切諸行都滅盡，什麼都沒有了，卻不知道諸行之苦是自然消滅的，沒有實體作用，遠離了『我』和『我所』。這種人由於身見和我愛的執持，聽到涅槃中空無所有，害怕『我』斷滅，便產生恐懼。這樣的恐懼是由於缺少智慧而產生的，所以有智慧的人應該正確地斷除它。而且，不是因為不習慣而產生恐懼。為什麼呢？因此接下來說偈頌：

『生死順流法，愚夫常習行，未曾修逆流，是故生怖畏。』

論中說：那些異生（Prthagjana）[佛教術語，指凡夫，未開悟的人]被稱為愚夫，煩惱隨眠沒有不成就的，喜歡生厭惡死，不樂於涅槃。從無始以來無數次領受，增長上生之道可愛異熟果報，卻從未修習決定勝道。增長上生之道諸果異熟，是貪等隨眠所依止的地方，即使被苦火常常焚燒，也不覺知，反而歡娛遊戲。因為對生死之苦常常習行，所以不知道過患，沒有厭離之心，對於解脫沒有無罪的快樂滋味，由於不曾知道，不樂於修證，就像世間的豬沉溺於糞穢，清閑美好的食物不是它們所欣求的。像這樣，愚夫樂於生死之苦，對於解脫之樂沒有希求羨慕之意，由於沒有串習，聽到解脫的名字不能信受，反而產生恐懼。那些有智慧的人，應該通過思考抉擇的力量，對於解脫之樂正確地勤奮追求，不要像愚夫一樣顛倒地產生厭惡和恐懼。

再次，那些有信心尋求無顛倒解脫的人，或者天性賢善，或者由於智慧的力量，將要修習真

【English Translation】 Why is that? Therefore, the following verse is recited:

'Not knowing, there is no fear; complete knowledge is also the same. Fear is certainly born from knowing only a little.'

The treatise says: If all sentient beings have no awakened wisdom and know nothing about all dharmas (Dharma)[Buddhist term, referring to the teachings of the Buddha or the laws of nature], they will not be afraid of Nirvana (Nirvana)[Buddhist term, referring to the state of liberation from the cycle of birth and death]. If someone fully understands the true principles of all dharmas, then he can comprehend birth and death and Nirvana. When birth and death arise, it is only the arising of a false suffering; when birth and death cease, it is only the cessation of a false suffering. Originally, there is no 'self,' and all dharmas are empty, so there is no fear at all of Nirvana. If someone only understands that at the time of Parinirvana (Parinirvana)[Buddhist term, referring to the complete extinction of a Buddha or Arhat], all activities cease and there is nothing left, but does not know that the suffering of activities naturally ceases, without substantial function, and is separate from 'self' and 'what belongs to self,' then, because of being held by the view of self and love of self, upon hearing that Nirvana is empty and without anything, he fears the annihilation of 'self' and thus generates fear. Such fear is born from little wisdom, so wise people should correctly eliminate it. Moreover, fear is not born from lack of familiarity. Why is that? Therefore, the following verse is recited:

'The dharma of the stream of birth and death is what fools constantly practice. They have never cultivated against the stream, therefore they generate fear.'

The treatise says: Those ordinary beings (Prthagjana)[Buddhist term, referring to ordinary people, those who are not enlightened] are called fools. They have not accomplished all the latent tendencies of afflictions, they like birth and dislike death, and they do not rejoice in Nirvana. From beginningless time, they have received countless times the fruits of the path of increased goodness and pleasant maturation, but they have never cultivated the path of definite excellence. The fruits and maturation of the path of increased goodness are the places where the latent tendencies of greed and other afflictions reside. Even though they are constantly burned by the fire of suffering, they do not realize it, but instead rejoice and play. Because they constantly practice the suffering of birth and death, they do not know the faults, have no aversion, and have no taste for the blameless joy of liberation. Because they have never known it, they do not rejoice in cultivating it, just like worldly pigs who indulge in filth, and do not seek pure and beautiful food. In this way, fools rejoice in the suffering of birth and death, and have no desire or admiration for the joy of liberation. Because they are not familiar with it, they cannot believe it when they hear its name, but instead generate fear. Those who are wise should, through the power of reflection and discernment, correctly and diligently seek the joy of liberation, and not, like fools, perversely generate aversion and fear.

Furthermore, those who have faith and seek undeluded liberation, or are virtuous by nature, or through the power of wisdom, are about to cultivate the truth

實見方便時。若於其中為作障礙。所獲罪業其量無邊。為顯此義。故說頌曰。

諸有愚癡人　　障他真實見　無由生善趣　　如何證涅槃

論曰。真實空見是證圓滿無上智因。又是永滅一切無義涅槃方便。此方便道是不思議功德生處。由是展轉疾證菩提。不住涅槃利樂無盡。隨其所化無量有情根性不同。安立種子及成熟等。利樂無窮諸有愚人。由無明闇覆自慧眼。不見真空。復以邪說及余方便。障他所修。如前功德。彼獲罪業無量無邊。唯有如來能知其際。由重惡業染壞其心。後生善趣去之甚遠。隨眠纏縛相續堅牢。種種業因能為重障。方便順忍尚不得生。正見涅槃如何可證。知障正法罪業既深。智者應當自防勿犯。

複次諸有障他修正法者。彼后自引邪見令生。此邪見罪過於毀戒。為顯此義。故復頌曰。

寧毀犯尸羅　　不損壞正見

論曰。如契經言。寧毀凈戒不壞正見。此意云何。毀凈戒者唯能自壞。若壞正見兼壞自他。令無量生受大苦果。及失無量無邊利樂。又毀戒者由犯戒故常懷慚愧訶厭自身。壞正見者無慚無愧。贊成邪見恒自貢高。又毀戒者不增邪見。若壞正見令破戒惡未生而生。生已增廣堅固難壞。又毀凈戒但障生天。壞正見者障涅槃樂。所以者何。故次頌曰。

尸羅

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：當見到真實的方便法門時，如果有人在其中設定障礙，那麼他所獲得的罪業是無邊無際的。爲了彰顯這個道理，所以說了這首偈頌：

『那些愚癡的人，障礙他人證見真實，沒有機會往生善趣，又如何能夠證得涅槃？』

論中說：真實的空性見解是證得圓滿無上智慧的原因，也是永遠滅除一切無意義之事的涅槃方便。這種方便道是不可思議功德的生起之處。由此輾轉迅速證得菩提（覺悟），不住于涅槃而利益安樂無窮。隨著所教化的無量有情（眾生）根性不同，安立種子和成熟等等，利益安樂無窮。那些愚蠢的人，由於無明黑暗遮蔽了自己的智慧之眼，不見真空（空性），又用邪說和其他方便，障礙他人所修的如前功德。他們所獲得的罪業無量無邊，只有如來（佛）才能知道它的邊際。由於深重的惡業染污破壞了他的心，以後往生善趣就非常遙遠了。隨眠（煩惱的種子）纏縛相續堅固，種種業因能成為嚴重的障礙，方便順忍（隨順忍辱）尚且不能生起，又如何能夠證得正見涅槃？知道障礙正法的罪業如此深重，有智慧的人應當自己防範，不要觸犯。

進一步說，那些障礙他人修正法的人，他們以後會自己引發邪見產生。這種邪見的罪過超過了毀壞戒律。爲了彰顯這個道理，所以又說了這首偈頌：

『寧願毀壞尸羅（戒律），也不要損壞正見。』

論中說：如契經（佛經）所說：『寧願毀壞清凈的戒律，也不要破壞正見。』這是什麼意思呢？毀壞清凈戒律的人只能自己敗壞自己，如果破壞了正見，就會同時敗壞自己和他人，使無量眾生遭受巨大的苦果，並且失去無量無邊的利益安樂。而且毀壞戒律的人，由於犯戒的緣故，常常懷有慚愧之心，呵斥厭惡自身。破壞正見的人，沒有慚愧之心，贊成邪見，總是自以為是。而且毀壞戒律的人不會增長邪見，如果破壞了正見，就會使破戒的惡行未生而生，生起后增長擴大，堅固難以破壞。而且毀壞清凈戒律，僅僅是障礙往生天界，破壞正見的人，會障礙涅槃的安樂。為什麼這樣說呢？所以接著說了這首偈頌：

尸羅（戒律）

【English Translation】 English version: When a real expedient is seen, if one creates obstacles within it, the amount of sin acquired is boundless. To reveal this meaning, a verse is spoken:

'Those foolish people who obstruct others from seeing the truth, have no way to be born in good realms, how can they attain Nirvana?'

The treatise says: Real emptiness-seeing is the cause of attaining perfect unsurpassed wisdom. It is also an expedient for the eternal extinction of all meaningless Nirvana. This expedient path is the place where inconceivable merits arise. Because of this, one quickly attains Bodhi (enlightenment) in succession, dwells not in Nirvana, and benefits and delights endlessly. According to the different natures of the countless sentient beings to be transformed, seeds are established and matured, etc., benefiting and delighting endlessly. Those foolish people, because of the darkness of ignorance covering their wisdom eyes, do not see true emptiness (emptiness), and also use wrong views and other expedients to obstruct others' cultivation of the aforementioned merits. The sins they acquire are immeasurable and boundless, only the Tathagata (Buddha) can know its extent. Because of the heavy evil karma that contaminates and destroys their minds, their future birth in good realms is very distant. The latent tendencies (seeds of affliction) are bound and continue firmly. Various karmic causes can become heavy obstacles. Even expedient forbearance (patient acceptance) cannot arise, how can right view Nirvana be attained? Knowing that the sin of obstructing the Dharma is so deep, the wise should guard themselves and not commit it.

Furthermore, those who obstruct others from cultivating the right Dharma, will later cause wrong views to arise in themselves. The sin of this wrong view exceeds that of breaking precepts. To reveal this meaning, another verse is spoken:

'It is better to break Śīla (precepts) than to damage right view.'

The treatise says: As the Sutra (Buddhist scripture) says: 'It is better to break pure precepts than to damage right view.' What does this mean? Those who break pure precepts can only ruin themselves. If right view is damaged, both oneself and others are ruined, causing countless beings to suffer great painful consequences, and lose immeasurable and boundless benefits and delights. Moreover, those who break precepts often feel ashamed and disgusted with themselves because of breaking the precepts. Those who damage right view are shameless and without remorse, praising wrong views and always being arrogant. Moreover, those who break precepts do not increase wrong views. If right view is damaged, it will cause the evil of breaking precepts to arise if it has not yet arisen, and to increase and expand if it has already arisen, making it firm and difficult to break. Moreover, breaking pure precepts only obstructs birth in the heavens, while damaging right view obstructs the bliss of Nirvana. Why is this so? Therefore, the following verse is spoken:

Śīla (precepts)

生善趣　　正見得涅槃

論曰。毀戒壞見。雖復俱能損壞善因障礙樂果。然毀戒輕。壞見極重。所以者何。持戒生天增長結縛受生死苦。正見能證三乘菩提得涅槃樂。是故智者勿壞正見。

複次諸法真理何者是邪。謂一切法空無我理。若爾此理亦有過失。所以者何。如有一類聞空無我謂法皆無。誹撥一切因果正理。乃至斷滅一切善根。此自見有過。非空無我咎。由惡取空妄起邪見。行諸惡行空無我理。心言不測非彼所證。愚夫聞說諸法皆空。不知聖意。便撥世俗因果亦無滅諸善法。此豈是空無我過失。聖說空教有何意耶。為遣一切虛妄有執。若爾亦應說諸法有。為遣妄執諸法空故。實爾若有執諸法空。如來亦說諸法是有。既為遣執說有說空。諸法真理為空為有。諸法真理非有非空。分別戲論皆不能及。何緣聖說非虛妄耶。為除邪執故非虛妄。空有二教俱能除執。何故如來多說空教。以諸有情多分執有。生死多分從有執生。是故如來為除有執滅生死苦。多說空教。若空若有皆是教門。何故前說空為真理。方便假說亦不相違。又此空言是遮非表。非唯空有亦復空空。遍遣執心令契諸法。非有非空究竟真理。諸法真理實非空性。空為門故假說為空。真理非空。空為門者。真理非有。應有為門。隨機說門。有亦無

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本生善趣，正見得涅槃。

論曰：毀壞戒律和邪見，雖然都能損壞善因，障礙快樂的結果，但毀壞戒律較輕，邪見極其嚴重。為什麼呢？因為持戒能生天，但增長結縛，承受生死之苦；而正見能證得聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘的菩提，獲得涅槃的快樂。因此，有智慧的人不要毀壞正見。

複次，諸法的真理，什麼是邪見呢？就是認為一切法是空，沒有我的道理。如果這樣，這個道理也有過失。為什麼呢？比如有一類人，聽到空和無我，就認為一切法都沒有，誹謗一切因果正理，甚至斷滅一切善根。這是他們自己的見解有過失，不是空和無我的過錯。由於錯誤地執取空，妄生邪見，行各種惡行，他們用心思也無法測度空無我的道理，不是他們所能證得的。愚笨的人聽到說諸法皆空，不知道聖人的意思，就否定世俗的因果，滅除各種善法。這難道是空無我的過失嗎？聖人說空教有什麼用意呢？是爲了去除一切虛妄的執著。如果這樣，也應該說諸法是有，爲了去除對諸法空的妄執。確實如此，如果有人執著諸法是空，如來也會說諸法是有。既然爲了去除執著而說有說空，那麼諸法的真理是空還是有呢？諸法的真理既不是有也不是空，分別戲論都不能達到。為什麼聖人所說是非虛妄的呢？爲了去除邪執，所以不是虛妄的。空和有這兩種教法都能去除執著，為什麼如來多說空教呢？因為眾生大多執著于有，生死大多從對有的執著產生。所以如來爲了去除對有的執著，滅除生死之苦，多說空教。無論是空還是有，都是教法之門。為什麼前面說空是真理呢？這是方便的假說，並不矛盾。而且這個『空』字是遮止，不是表述。不僅要空有，還要空空，普遍地去除執著之心，使之契合諸法。非有非空才是究竟的真理。諸法的真理實際上不是空性，因為空是入門的方法，所以假說為空。真理不是空，空是入門的方法。真理不是有，應該以有為入門的方法。隨機應變地說各種法門，有也沒有一定。

【English Translation】 English version 'Born in good realms, right view attains Nirvana.'

Treatise says: Breaking precepts and holding wrong views, although both can damage good causes and obstruct the results of happiness, breaking precepts is lighter, while holding wrong views is extremely serious. Why is this? Because upholding precepts leads to rebirth in heavens, but increases bonds and suffering in samsara; while right view can realize the Bodhi of the Three Vehicles (Sravakayana, Pratyekabuddhayana, and Bodhisattvayana) and attain the bliss of Nirvana. Therefore, wise people should not destroy right view.

Furthermore, regarding the truth of all dharmas, what is a wrong view? It is the idea that all dharmas are empty and without self. If so, this principle also has faults. Why is this? For example, there are some who, upon hearing of emptiness and no-self, think that all dharmas do not exist, slandering all principles of cause and effect, and even destroying all good roots. This is their own view that has faults, not the fault of emptiness and no-self. Due to wrongly grasping emptiness, they falsely generate wrong views and engage in various evil deeds. Their minds cannot fathom the principle of emptiness and no-self, it is not something they can realize. Foolish people, upon hearing that all dharmas are empty, not knowing the intention of the sages, then deny worldly cause and effect and extinguish all good dharmas. Is this the fault of emptiness and no-self? What is the purpose of the sages teaching emptiness? It is to remove all false attachments. If so, one should also say that dharmas exist, in order to remove the false attachment to the emptiness of dharmas. Indeed, if someone is attached to the emptiness of dharmas, the Tathagata (如來，another name of Buddha) will also say that dharmas exist. Since both existence and emptiness are taught to remove attachments, is the truth of all dharmas emptiness or existence? The truth of all dharmas is neither existence nor emptiness, and cannot be reached by conceptual elaborations. Why is what the sages say not false? It is not false because it removes wrong attachments. Both the teachings of emptiness and existence can remove attachments. Why does the Tathagata teach emptiness more often? Because most sentient beings are attached to existence, and most of the sufferings of samsara arise from attachment to existence. Therefore, in order to remove attachment to existence and extinguish the suffering of samsara, the Tathagata teaches emptiness more often. Whether it is emptiness or existence, both are doors to the teachings. Why was it said earlier that emptiness is the truth? This is a provisional and expedient teaching, and is not contradictory. Moreover, the word 'emptiness' is a negation, not an affirmation. Not only should one empty existence, but also empty emptiness, universally removing the mind of attachment, so that it accords with all dharmas. Neither existence nor emptiness is the ultimate truth. The truth of all dharmas is actually not emptiness, but emptiness is taught as a means of entry. The truth is not empty, emptiness is the door. The truth is not existence, existence should be the door. Teach various Dharma doors according to the situation, existence is also not fixed.

過。然其門義順在於空有有有等皆順執心。空空空等皆違妄執。故有智者。聞說空言應離一切有無等執。悟法真理非有非無。勿起有無分別戲論。

複次劣慧者。前不應輒說空無我理增其惡見。所以者何。故次頌曰。

寧彼起我執　　非空無我見　后兼向惡趣　　初唯背涅槃

論曰。彼謂世間諸劣慧者。我執即是薩迦耶見。其我所見亦帶我執。故我執言亦攝彼見。我執雖復不稱正理。而寧彼起過失輕故。空無我見雖稱正理。然彼不能如實了達。因斯誹撥諸法皆無。過失重故。寧彼不起。云何此二過失輕重。謂初我執唯背涅槃。后惡取空兼向惡趣。彼劣慧者惡取空時。尚厭善根。況諸含識。彼由厭背善及世間。斷滅善根損害含識。非唯棄背清涼涅槃。亦持自身足地獄火。起我見者。無如是事。所以者何。彼貪我樂欲我離苦。不造眾罪廣修諸福。脫諸惡趣不失人天。但怖涅槃不證解脫。故契經說。寧起我見如妙高山。非惡取空增上慢者。若爾諸法空無我理。鄰近險趣。聖不應說。劣慧者前實不應說。而勝慧者隨此修行獲大義利。故須為說。所以者何。故次頌曰。

空無我妙理　　諸佛真境界　能怖眾惡見　　涅槃不二門

論曰。求解脫者除妙空觀。無別方便能證涅槃。智者欲除諸惡見垢。

{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本：\n\n過失。然而，其門徑和意義在於順應空和有等概念，這些都順應執著的心。而空空空等概念，都違背虛妄的執著。所以有智慧的人，聽到宣說空的言論，應該遠離一切有無等的執著，領悟法的真正道理，既非有也非無，不要生起有無的分別和戲論。\n\n再次，對於低劣智慧的人，不應該輕易地宣說空和無我的道理，這會增長他們的惡見。為什麼呢？所以接下來說：\n\n『寧可生起我執，也不要產生空無我的邪見，\n後者兼會導致墮入惡趣，前者僅僅是背離涅槃。』\n\n論述說：這裡所說的世間低劣智慧的人，我執就是薩迦耶見（身見，認為五蘊和合的身體是真實的我）。他們所認為的『我所』的見解也帶有我執。所以『我執』這個詞也包括了『我所』的見解。我執雖然不符合正理，但寧可讓他們生起我執，因為過失較輕。空無我的見解雖然符合正理，但他們不能如實地理解，因此誹謗一切法都是空無，過失嚴重。寧可讓他們不生起空無我的見解。這兩種過失的輕重如何區分呢？我執僅僅是背離涅槃，而惡取空則兼會導致墮入惡趣。那些低劣智慧的人，錯誤地理解空的時候，甚至厭惡善根，更何況是其他有情眾生。他們由於厭惡和背離善以及世間，斷滅善根，損害有情眾生。不僅拋棄了清涼的涅槃，也用自己的腳踩進了地獄的火焰。而生起我見的人，不會有這樣的事情。為什麼呢？因為他們貪戀我的快樂，希望我遠離痛苦，不會造作眾多的罪惡，廣泛地修習各種福德，脫離各種惡趣，不會失去人天的果報，只是害怕涅槃，不能證得解脫。所以契經上說：『寧可生起像妙高山一樣高的我見，也不要成為惡取空的增上慢者。』如果這樣，諸法空無我的道理，豈不是鄰近危險的境地？聖者不應該宣說。對於低劣智慧的人，確實不應該宣說。而對於殊勝智慧的人，隨順這個道理修行，可以獲得巨大的利益。所以必須為他們宣說。為什麼呢？所以接下來說：\n\n『空無我的微妙道理，是諸佛真正的境界，\n能夠使眾多的惡見感到恐懼，是通往涅槃的不二法門。』\n\n論述說：想要獲得解脫的人，除了微妙的空觀，沒有其他方便能夠證得涅槃。有智慧的人想要去除各種惡見的污垢，", "English version:\n\nFaults. However, its gateway and meaning lie in aligning with concepts like emptiness and existence, which conform to the clinging mind. Conversely, concepts like emptiness of emptiness contradict false clinging. Therefore, wise individuals, upon hearing discourses on emptiness, should distance themselves from all attachments to existence, non-existence, and so on, realizing the true principle of Dharma, which is neither existent nor non-existent, and avoiding the arising of discriminatory and speculative debates about existence and non-existence.\n\nFurthermore, for those of inferior intellect, one should not readily expound the principles of emptiness and non-self, as this would augment their wrong views. Why is that? Therefore, the following verse states:\n\n『Better to arise with self-grasping, than to have a wrong view of emptiness and non-self,\nthe latter leads to evil destinies as well, the former only turns away from Nirvana.』\n\nThe treatise states: Here, the worldly individuals of inferior intellect are referred to, whose self-grasping is the same as Satkayadrishti (the view of a real self in the aggregates, considering the body composed of the five aggregates as the real self). Their views of 『mine』 also carry self-grasping. Therefore, the term 『self-grasping』 also includes the view of 『mine』. Although self-grasping does not conform to the right principle, it is better to let them arise with self-grasping, because the fault is lighter. Although the view of emptiness and non-self conforms to the right principle, they cannot truly understand it, and therefore slander that all dharmas are empty and non-existent, which is a serious fault. It is better not to let them arise with the view of emptiness and non-self. How are the severity of these two faults distinguished? Self-grasping only turns away from Nirvana, while wrongly grasping emptiness leads to evil destinies as well. Those of inferior intellect, when wrongly understanding emptiness, even detest good roots, let alone other sentient beings. Because they detest and turn away from goodness and the world, they sever good roots and harm sentient beings. They not only abandon the cool Nirvana, but also step into the fires of hell with their own feet. Those who arise with self-view do not have such things happen. Why is that? Because they are greedy for my happiness, hoping that I will be free from suffering, they will not commit many sins, and will widely cultivate various merits, escape from various evil destinies, and will not lose the rewards of humans and gods, but are afraid of Nirvana and cannot attain liberation. Therefore, the sutra says: 『Better to arise with a self-view as high as Mount Meru, than to be an arrogant person who wrongly grasps emptiness.』 If so, isn't the principle of emptiness and non-self of all dharmas close to dangerous situations? The saints should not expound it. For those of inferior intellect, it should indeed not be expounded. But for those of superior intellect, following this principle in practice can obtain great benefits. Therefore, it must be expounded for them. Why is that? Therefore, the following verse states:\n\n『The subtle principle of emptiness and non-self, is the true realm of all Buddhas,\nable to frighten numerous evil views, is the non-dual gateway to Nirvana.』\n\nThe treatise states: Those who want to attain liberation, apart from the subtle contemplation of emptiness, have no other means to attain Nirvana. Wise individuals want to remove the defilements of various evil views," "專有名詞解釋：\n薩迦耶見 (Satkayadrishti): 身見，認為五蘊和合的身體是真實的我\n涅槃 (Nirvana): 佛教術語，指解脫生死輪迴的境界\n妙高山 (Mount Meru): 佛教宇宙觀中的須彌山，被認為是世界的中心" ] }

離此無有餘勝方便。有見執有所緣境故。如余有見不證涅槃。亦不能除諸惡見垢。修此空行至究竟者。能證極果無上菩提。普為有情方便開示。復令圓證所求妙果。諸有能成自他利樂。空無我觀最為勝因。故應善知有情根性。方便開示令其悟入。

複次如來為除惡見鬼魅。說空無我阿揭陀藥。所以者何。諸惡見者。聞說空名皆生怖畏。漸次調伏自然息除。為顯此義。故說頌曰。

愚聞空法名　　皆生大怖畏　如見大力者　　怯劣悉奔逃

論曰。愚謂惡見。損覆慧眼。彼聞空名。諸惡見命自然損害。空雖無心欲害惡見。而力大故。聞名自滅。如聞虎名怯者自喪。又如世間調善龍象。于其兩頰威汗交流。雖復無心損害物命。而彼龍象威力大故。其見聞者驚怖奔逃。空理亦然。威力大故。令惡見者聞名驚怖。自然損滅。空理無心。非為損物。證空理者。應為害他。若證真空其心寂靜。平等無二。豈欲害他。然為利樂諸有情故。方便開示空無我理。懷惡見者。聞之自滅。為顯此義。故次頌曰。

諸佛雖無心　　說摧他論法　而他論自壞　　如野火焚薪

論曰。諸佛無心欲摧他論。然為利樂所化有情。開示昔來諸佛廣路。謂一切法性相皆空。前後如來無不游履。從因至果引導群迷。外道邪徒諸惡

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：沒有比這更殊勝的方便法門了。因為那些執著于有緣境界的人，就像其他持有常見的人一樣，無法證得涅槃（Nirvana，寂滅），也不能去除各種邪惡見解的污垢。修習這種空性之行直至究竟的人，能夠證得最高的果位——無上菩提（Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi，無上正等正覺）。普遍地為有情眾生開示這種方便法門，又能讓他們圓滿證得所求的微妙果實。能夠成就自利和他利安樂的，空無我觀是最殊勝的原因。所以應該善於瞭解有情眾生的根性，方便地開示，使他們能夠領悟並進入。

再者，如來（Tathagata，佛陀）爲了去除惡見鬼魅，宣說了空無我這種阿揭陀藥（Agada，萬應靈藥）。為什麼這麼說呢？因為那些持有惡見的人，聽到『空』這個名字都會產生恐懼，逐漸地調伏，自然就會止息消除。爲了彰顯這個意義，所以說了這首偈頌：

愚人聽到空法之名，都會產生極大的怖畏，就像見到大力士一樣，怯懦弱小的人都會奔逃。

論曰：愚人指的是持有惡見的人，他們的惡見損害並遮蔽了智慧之眼。他們聽到『空』這個名字，各種惡見的生命自然就會受到損害。空性雖然沒有想要傷害惡見的心，但是因為力量強大，所以聽到名字就會自行消滅，就像聽到老虎的名字，膽怯的人自己就會喪命一樣。又像世間調馴良好的龍象，在它的兩頰，威嚴的汗水交流，即使它沒有想要損害其他生物的生命，但是因為龍象的威力強大，所以見到或聽到的人都會驚恐地奔逃。空性的道理也是這樣，因為威力強大，所以讓持有惡見的人聽到名字就會驚恐，自然就會損滅。空性的道理沒有心，不是爲了損害事物。證悟空性道理的人，應該爲了傷害他人嗎？如果證得了真空，他的心就會寂靜，平等而無二，怎麼會想要傷害他人呢？然而爲了利益安樂一切有情眾生，方便地開示空無我的道理，懷有惡見的人，聽到之後就會自行消滅。爲了彰顯這個意義，所以接著說了這首偈頌：

諸佛雖然沒有想要摧毀其他論點的心，但宣說了摧毀其他論點的法，而其他的論點自己就會壞滅，就像野火焚燒柴薪一樣。

論曰：諸佛沒有想要摧毀其他論點的心，然而爲了利益安樂所要教化的有情眾生，開示了過去諸佛所走的廣闊道路，即一切法的自性與現象都是空性的。過去和未來的如來沒有不走這條道路的，從因到果引導眾生脫離迷惑。外道邪徒各種邪惡

【English Translation】 English version: There is no other superior expedient beyond this. Those who cling to objects of perception, like other adherents of eternalism, cannot attain Nirvana (extinction of suffering), nor can they remove the defilements of evil views. Those who cultivate this practice of emptiness to its ultimate end can attain the supreme fruit—Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi (unexcelled complete enlightenment). Universally revealing this expedient to sentient beings, it also enables them to perfectly realize the wonderful fruit they seek. The contemplation of emptiness and selflessness is the most excellent cause for achieving benefit and happiness for oneself and others. Therefore, one should be skilled in understanding the dispositions of sentient beings and expediently reveal this to them, enabling them to awaken and enter.

Furthermore, the Tathagata (Buddha), in order to remove the evil views that are like demonic influences, speaks of emptiness and selflessness as the Agada (universal remedy). Why is this so? Because those who hold evil views become fearful upon hearing the name of 'emptiness,' and gradually, through this taming, they naturally cease and are eliminated. To manifest this meaning, the following verse is spoken:

Fools, upon hearing the name of the Dharma of emptiness, all generate great fear, just as upon seeing a powerful person, the cowardly and weak all flee.

Commentary: 'Fools' refers to those who hold evil views, which harm and obscure the eye of wisdom. Upon hearing the name of 'emptiness,' the life of various evil views is naturally harmed. Although emptiness has no intention to harm evil views, because its power is great, they are destroyed upon hearing its name, just as upon hearing the name of a tiger, the timid perish themselves. Also, like a well-trained dragon-elephant in the world, from whose cheeks flows majestic sweat, even though it has no intention to harm the lives of other beings, because the dragon-elephant's power is great, those who see or hear it flee in terror. The principle of emptiness is also like this; because its power is great, it causes those who hold evil views to be terrified upon hearing its name, and they are naturally destroyed. The principle of emptiness has no mind and is not intended to harm things. Should one who has realized the principle of emptiness harm others? If one has realized true emptiness, their mind is tranquil, equal, and without duality; how could they desire to harm others? However, for the sake of benefiting and bringing happiness to all sentient beings, they expediently reveal the principle of emptiness and selflessness, and those who harbor evil views are destroyed upon hearing it. To manifest this meaning, the following verse is spoken:

Although the Buddhas have no intention to destroy the doctrines of others, they speak the Dharma that destroys the doctrines of others, and the doctrines of others are destroyed by themselves, like a wildfire burning firewood.

Commentary: The Buddhas have no intention to destroy the doctrines of others, but for the sake of benefiting and bringing happiness to the sentient beings they are to teach, they reveal the vast path traveled by the Buddhas of the past, namely, that the nature and phenomena of all things are empty. The Buddhas of the past and future all tread this path, guiding beings from cause to effect, leading them out of delusion. The heretics and evil followers of external paths, all kinds of evil

見論。聞斯空教自然壞滅。如在山林野火騰焰。濕薪積木烈日所幹。雖無有人持火來就。然薪逼火如自引燒。惡見邪徒諸論亦爾。空教勢力而自崩摧。

複次諸外道宗皆說妄有。欲令棄捨故說真空。所以者何。故次頌曰。

諸有悟正法　　定不樂邪宗　為余出偽門　　故顯真空義

論曰。有智自能簡別真偽。遇此正法不樂邪宗。如識寶人得無價寶。終不復樂余水精珠。諸外道宗皆立妄有。去正法遠如假偽門。誑惑有情令失大利。故我顯示佛教真空。令彼邪徒趣真背偽。

複次何緣外道欣樂邪宗。厭背聖教。由身見力。若知無我必無欣厭。所以者何。故次頌曰。

若知佛所說　　真空無我理　隨順不生欣　　乖違無厭怖

論曰。若知佛教空無我理。斷除身見所起隨眠。觀察世間如空舍宅。虛妄諸行生死輪迴。興盛無欣衰損無厭。無憂無喜無畏泰然。若有身見謂我損益。衰盛起時便生憂喜。因斯便有怖畏無窮。故有智人應除我執。

複次諸外道眾。由著我執。能為自縛亦縛有情。所損既多。深可悲愍。為顯此義。故說頌曰。

見諸外道眾　　為多無義因　樂正法有情　　唯不深悲愍

論曰。諸外道眾貪愛我執。能令自他起無量罪。薩迦耶見是一切惡生根本故。如

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

見《論》。聽說空的教義自然會壞滅，就像在山林中野火蔓延，濕柴和堆積的木頭被烈日曬干。即使沒有人拿著火來點燃，柴火也會因為靠近火焰而自燃。錯誤的見解和邪惡的理論也是如此，空的教義憑藉自身的力量而崩塌。

此外，所有外道的宗派都說存在虛妄的『有』，爲了讓他們捨棄這些虛妄的『有』，所以才說真空。為什麼這麼說呢？所以接下來頌文說：

『諸有悟正法，定不樂邪宗，為余出偽門，故顯真空義。』

《論》中說：有智慧的人自然能夠分辨真假。遇到這種正法，就不會喜歡邪惡的宗派。就像認識寶物的人得到了無價之寶，最終不會再喜歡其他的水晶珠。所有外道的宗派都建立在虛妄的『有』之上，遠離正法就像虛假的門，欺騙迷惑眾生，使他們失去巨大的利益。所以我才顯示佛教的真空，讓那些邪惡的人走向真實，背離虛偽。

此外，為什麼外道喜歡邪惡的宗派，厭惡背離聖教呢？這是因為身見的力量。如果知道沒有『我』，必然沒有喜歡和厭惡。為什麼這麼說呢？所以接下來頌文說：

『若知佛所說，真空無我理，隨順不生欣，乖違無厭怖。』

《論》中說：如果知道佛教空和無我的道理，斷除身見所引起的隨眠（煩惱的潛在狀態），觀察世間就像空曠的房屋，虛妄的諸行（行為）和生死輪迴，興盛沒有什麼可高興的，衰敗沒有什麼可厭惡的，沒有憂愁，沒有喜悅，沒有恐懼，泰然自若。如果有了身見，認為『我』受到了損害或利益，在衰敗或興盛的時候，就會產生憂愁和喜悅，因此就會產生無窮的恐懼。所以有智慧的人應該去除我執。

此外，所有的外道眾，因為執著於我執，能夠束縛自己，也束縛眾生。所造成的損害既然很多，就非常值得悲憫。爲了顯示這個意義，所以說頌文：

『見諸外道眾，為多無義因，樂正法有情，唯不深悲愍。』

《論》中說：所有的外道眾貪愛我執，能夠使自己和他人產生無量的罪惡。薩迦耶見（身見）是一切罪惡產生的根本，所以……

【English Translation】 English version:

See the Shastra (Treatise). Hearing that the doctrine of emptiness (Śūnyatā) will naturally perish, like a wildfire spreading in the mountains and forests, where damp firewood and piled-up wood are dried by the scorching sun. Even if no one brings fire to it, the firewood will ignite itself due to its proximity to the flame. False views and heretical theories are also like this; the doctrine of emptiness collapses by its own power.

Furthermore, all non-Buddhist (Tīrthika) schools assert the existence of illusory 'being' (bhāva). To encourage them to abandon these illusory 'beings,' emptiness (Śūnyatā) is taught. Why is this so? Therefore, the following verse says:

'Those who awaken to the true Dharma (Pravacana), Will certainly not delight in heretical sects. To expose the false gates for others, Therefore, the meaning of emptiness is revealed.'

The Shastra says: Those with wisdom can naturally distinguish between truth and falsehood. Upon encountering this true Dharma, they will not delight in heretical sects. Like someone who recognizes treasures and obtains a priceless jewel, they will ultimately not delight in other crystal beads. All non-Buddhist schools establish themselves on illusory 'being,' far from the true Dharma, like false gates, deceiving and bewildering sentient beings, causing them to lose great benefits. Therefore, I reveal the emptiness of Buddhism, so that those heretics may turn towards truth and away from falsehood.

Furthermore, why do non-Buddhists delight in heretical sects and abhor the holy teachings? It is due to the power of self-view (ātma-dṛṣṭi). If one knows there is no 'self' (ātman), there will certainly be no delight or abhorrence. Why is this so? Therefore, the following verse says:

'If one knows what the Buddha (Buddha) taught, The principle of emptiness and no-self (anātman), In accordance, no joy arises, In opposition, no aversion or fear.'

The Shastra says: If one knows the Buddhist principle of emptiness and no-self, cutting off the latent tendencies (anuśaya) arising from self-view, observing the world like an empty house, illusory actions (karma) and the cycle of birth and death (saṃsāra), there is no joy in prosperity and no aversion in decline, no sorrow, no joy, no fear, but peaceful serenity. If one has self-view, thinking that 'I' am harmed or benefited, joy and sorrow will arise when decline or prosperity occurs, and therefore, endless fear will arise. Therefore, wise people should eliminate attachment to self.

Furthermore, all non-Buddhist groups, because they are attached to self-grasping (ātmagraha), are able to bind themselves and also bind sentient beings. Since the harm caused is great, they are very worthy of compassion. To reveal this meaning, the verse says:

'Seeing all non-Buddhist groups, Causing many meaningless causes, Sentient beings who delight in the true Dharma, Are only not deeply pitied.'

The Shastra says: All non-Buddhist groups are greedy for self-grasping, which can cause themselves and others to generate immeasurable sins. Satkayadrishti (satkāya-dṛṣṭi) (self-view) is the root of all evil, therefore...

說所有惡不善法。一切皆以薩迦耶見為本而生。諸有中懷樂善法者。自無定執隨順他緣。為彼外道邪言誑惑。亦貪我見起無量罪。如是外道能令自他俱起種種堅固纏縛。唯有智人而不悲愍。故樂正法凈意有情。起利樂心應深悲愍。慇勤為說無我真空。令修正見離諸繫縛。

複次諸佛菩薩常住於世。實有真凈利樂他心。何故世間猶有無量信邪倒見謗法有情。由佛所說境智甚深微細難悟。外道不爾。所以者何。故次頌曰。

婆羅門離系　　如來三所宗　眼耳意能知　　故佛法深細

論曰。諸婆羅門唯常習誦虛言為道。耳識能知。非是深細離系外道。唯以露形身體臭穢種種猛利自苦為道。眼識能知。亦非深細如來聖教。以證真空無漏慧劍。永斷所有內煩惱賊。獲得無上正等菩提。利益安樂一切含識。理教意趣甚深微細。諸有通達如實理者。于佛聖教或知不知。由佛理教最深細故。外道愚夫不能悟入。外信外道粗淺邪言。少信如來深細聖教。世間多信婆羅門者。以婆羅門多行誑詐。誦咒祠火自苦除愆。矯設吉祥妄說禍福。為活命故種種方便。誑諸女人戍達羅等。令于彼所生希有心。供給所須推為尊貴。古昔黠慧諸婆羅門。隱造明書言自然有。唯得自誦不許他觀。贊婆羅門最為尊貴。剎帝利等皆是卑賤。給施

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：宣說所有邪惡不善之法，一切都以薩迦耶見（認為五蘊和合的身體為我所有）為根本而產生。那些心中懷有樂善之法的人，自身沒有堅定的主見，隨順他人的因緣，被那些外道的邪說迷惑，也貪戀我見，從而產生無量的罪惡。像這樣的外道，能夠使自己和他人一同產生種種堅固的纏縛。只有具有智慧的人才不會對他們生起悲憫之心。所以，喜愛正法、內心清凈的有情，應當生起利益安樂之心，深深地悲憫他們，慇勤地為他們宣說無我真空的道理，使他們修正知見，脫離各種束縛。

其次，諸佛菩薩常常安住於世間，確實具有真實清凈、利益安樂他人的心。為什麼世間仍然有無量相信邪說、顛倒知見、誹謗正法的有情呢？這是因為佛所說的境界和智慧非常深奧、微妙、難以領悟。外道則不是這樣。為什麼呢？所以接著用偈頌說：

『婆羅門離系，如來三所宗，眼耳意能知，故佛法深細』

論述說：那些婆羅門（古印度教祭司）只是常常學習誦讀虛妄的言論作為修行之道，用耳朵就能聽懂，不是深奧微妙的。離系外道（耆那教）只是以裸露身體、身體臭穢以及種種猛烈痛苦的自我折磨作為修行之道，用眼睛就能看到，也不是深奧微妙的。如來（佛陀）的聖教，是用證悟空性的無漏智慧之劍，永遠斷除所有內在的煩惱賊，獲得無上的正等菩提（徹底覺悟），利益安樂一切有情。其道理、教義和意趣非常深奧微妙。那些通達如實道理的人，對於佛的聖教，或者瞭解，或者不瞭解，因為佛的道理和教義最深奧微妙的緣故。外道的愚夫不能領悟進入。世人相信外道粗淺的邪說，卻很少相信如來深奧微妙的聖教。世間上多數人相信婆羅門，因為婆羅門大多施行欺騙，誦咒、祭火、自我折磨來消除罪過，假裝吉祥，胡說禍福，爲了活命而用種種方便，欺騙那些女人和戍達羅（古印度第四等級，奴隸）等人，使她們對他們產生稀有之心，供給他們所需，推崇他們為尊貴。古時候聰明的婆羅門，秘密地製造書籍，說是自然而有的，只允許自己誦讀，不允許他人觀看，讚揚婆羅門最為尊貴，剎帝利（古印度第二等級，武士）等都是卑賤的，應該給予婆羅門佈施。

【English Translation】 English version: It speaks of all evil and unwholesome dharmas. All arise from the root of Satkayadrishti (the view that the aggregates of body and mind are 'I' or 'mine'). Those who cherish wholesome dharmas in their hearts, lacking firm convictions, follow external conditions and are deluded by the heretical words of outsiders. They also crave the view of 'self,' giving rise to immeasurable sins. Such outsiders can cause both themselves and others to develop various firm entanglements. Only the wise do not feel compassion for them. Therefore, sentient beings who delight in the true Dharma and possess pure minds should generate a heart of benefit and joy, deeply pitying them, and diligently explain the truth of non-self and emptiness, enabling them to correct their views and be freed from all bonds.

Furthermore, the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas constantly abide in the world, truly possessing a pure heart of benefiting and bringing joy to others. Why then are there still countless sentient beings in the world who believe in heretical views, have inverted perceptions, and slander the Dharma? This is because the realms and wisdom spoken of by the Buddha are extremely profound, subtle, and difficult to comprehend. It is not so with the outsiders. Why is this so? Therefore, the following verse is spoken:

'The Brahmanas and the Nirgranthas, the three refuges of the Tathagata, can be known by the eye, ear, and mind; therefore, the Buddha's Dharma is profound and subtle.'

The treatise says: Those Brahmanas (ancient Indian priests) only constantly practice reciting empty words as the path, which can be known by the ear and are not profound or subtle. The Nirgranthas (Jain ascetics) only take nakedness, a foul-smelling body, and various fierce self-mortifications as the path, which can be known by the eye and are also not profound or subtle. The holy teachings of the Tathagata (Buddha) use the sword of non-outflow wisdom that realizes emptiness to forever cut off all internal afflictions, attain unsurpassed complete enlightenment (Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi), and benefit and bring joy to all sentient beings. The principles, teachings, and intentions are extremely profound and subtle. Those who understand the true principles, either know or do not know the Buddha's teachings, because the Buddha's principles and teachings are most profound and subtle. The foolish of the outsiders cannot awaken and enter. The world believes in the shallow and heretical words of the outsiders, but few believe in the profound and subtle holy teachings of the Tathagata. Most people in the world believe in the Brahmanas because the Brahmanas mostly practice deception, reciting mantras, offering sacrifices to fire, and self-mortification to eliminate sins, falsely setting up auspiciousness, and falsely speaking of misfortune and fortune, using various means to deceive women and Shudras (the fourth caste in ancient India, laborers), causing them to have rare thoughts towards them, providing them with what they need, and promoting them as noble. In ancient times, clever Brahmanas secretly created books, saying that they were naturally existing, only allowing themselves to recite them, not allowing others to view them, praising the Brahmanas as the most noble, and the Kshatriyas (the second caste in ancient India, warriors) and others as lowly, and should give offerings to the Brahmanas.

所須獲無量福。愚夫無智不能測量。謂真福田信敬供養。然彼明書非自然有。有所詮故如世俗言。又彼明書非盡稱理。非聖說故如虛誑言。婆羅門種非實尊貴。非真福田。常行乞丐養妻兒故如貧癩者故。有智人不應歸信。婆羅門法既多誑詐。離系外道所學如何。彼所學法多順愚癡。所以者何。故次頌曰。

婆羅門所宗　　多令行誑詐　離系外道法　　多分順愚癡

論曰。離系外道都不知真。唯貪后樂現受劇苦。諸有所言多不合理。愚癡種類聚結成群。為世愚癡之所歸信。云何決定知彼愚癡。以露身形無羞恥故。如狂如畜。如似嬰兒。若婆羅門實非尊貴。何緣貴勝亦敬事之。以彼習誦諸明論故。諸婆羅門。實無所識。為活命故於一切時誦諸明論。詐現異相。以動人心。世間貴勝不審觀察。謂其有德故敬事之。又明論中雖無勝義。而有世俗少分禮儀。世間貴勝為習學故。彼雖無德亦申敬事。余有不誦諸明論者。以同類故世俗相承不審觀察亦兼敬事。離系外道與彼不同。云何世間亦多敬事。以其薄知星曆道度觀鳥解夢占相吉兇。故凡愚人多申敬事。又婆羅門誦諸明論以難成故世共敬之。離系外道以苦行故世共愍念。此皆不能解脫生死。諸有智者當正了知。勿隨彼見。故次頌曰。

恭敬婆羅門　　為誦諸明故

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：將獲得無量的福報。愚昧無知的人無法衡量這種福報。這是因為真正的福田是值得信仰、尊敬和供養的。然而，那些所謂的『明書』（Veda，吠陀經）並非自然而有，因為它們有所詮釋，就像世俗的言論一樣。而且，那些『明書』並非完全合乎道理，因為它們不是聖人所說，就像虛假的謊言一樣。婆羅門種姓並非真正尊貴，也不是真正的福田，因為他們常常乞討來養活妻子兒女，就像貧窮的麻風病人一樣。有智慧的人不應該歸信他們。婆羅門教法既然有諸多欺騙和虛假，那麼那些脫離束縛的外道（離系外道，Nigantha）所學又是如何呢？他們所學的法大多順應愚癡。為什麼這麼說呢？所以接下來用偈頌說：婆羅門所宗，多令行誑詐；離系外道法，多分順愚癡。論曰：離系外道根本不知道真理，只貪圖死後的快樂，現在卻承受著極大的痛苦。他們所說的話大多不合道理。愚癡的人們聚集在一起，結成群伙，成為世間愚癡之人的歸信之處。如何才能確定他們是愚癡的呢？因為他們裸露身體，沒有羞恥之心，就像瘋子、畜生，或者像嬰兒一樣。如果婆羅門真的不是尊貴的，為什麼貴族和有權勢的人也尊敬他們呢？因為他們習慣誦讀各種『明論』（Veda，吠陀經）。那些婆羅門，實際上沒有什麼真知灼見，爲了活命，他們隨時誦讀各種『明論』，虛假地顯現出奇異的表象，以此來打動人心。世間的貴族和有權勢的人不仔細觀察，認為他們有德行，所以尊敬他們。而且，『明論』中雖然沒有殊勝的意義，但有世俗少許的禮儀。世間的貴族和有權勢的人爲了學習這些禮儀，即使他們沒有德行，也表達尊敬。其餘那些不誦讀『明論』的人，因為是同類，世俗相沿襲，不仔細觀察，也一併尊敬。離系外道與他們不同，為什麼世間也有很多人尊敬他們呢？因為他們略微懂得星曆、道度、觀鳥、解夢、占卜吉兇，所以凡夫愚人大多表達尊敬。而且，婆羅門誦讀各種『明論』，因為難以成就，世人都尊敬他們。離系外道因為苦行，世人都憐憫他們。這些都不能解脫生死。所有有智慧的人應當正確地瞭解，不要隨從他們的見解。所以接下來用偈頌說：恭敬婆羅門，為誦諸明故；

【English Translation】 English version: They will obtain immeasurable blessings. Foolish and ignorant people cannot fathom them. This is because the true field of merit is worthy of faith, respect, and offerings. However, those so-called 'Ming Shu' (Veda, the Vedas) are not naturally existent, because they have interpretations, just like worldly speech. Moreover, those 'Ming Shu' are not entirely reasonable, because they are not spoken by sages, just like false lies. The Brahmin caste is not truly noble, nor is it a true field of merit, because they often beg to support their wives and children, just like poor lepers. Wise people should not take refuge in them. Since Brahmin teachings have many deceptions and falsehoods, what about the learning of those detached outsiders (Nigantha, the Jains)? What they learn mostly conforms to ignorance. Why is this so? Therefore, the following verse says: What Brahmins uphold mostly leads to deceitful practices; the teachings of detached outsiders mostly conform to ignorance. Commentary: The detached outsiders do not know the truth at all, only coveting future pleasures, but now enduring extreme suffering. Most of what they say is unreasonable. Foolish people gather together, forming groups, becoming the refuge of the world's ignorant people. How can it be determined that they are ignorant? Because they expose their bodies, without shame, like madmen, animals, or like infants. If Brahmins are not truly noble, why do nobles and powerful people also respect them? Because they are accustomed to reciting various 'Ming Lun' (Veda, the Vedas). Those Brahmins, in reality, have no true insight. To make a living, they recite various 'Ming Lun' at all times, falsely displaying strange appearances, in order to move people's hearts. The world's nobles and powerful people do not carefully observe, thinking that they have virtue, so they respect them. Moreover, although there is no supreme meaning in the 'Ming Lun', there are some worldly etiquettes. The world's nobles and powerful people, in order to learn these etiquettes, express respect even if they have no virtue. Others who do not recite the 'Ming Lun', because they are of the same kind, follow worldly customs, and without careful observation, also respect them together. The detached outsiders are different from them, so why do many people in the world also respect them? Because they have a slight understanding of astrology, the paths of stars, observing birds, interpreting dreams, and divination of good and bad omens, so ordinary and foolish people mostly express respect. Moreover, Brahmins recite various 'Ming Lun', because it is difficult to achieve, the world respects them. The detached outsiders, because of ascetic practices, the world pities them. These cannot liberate from birth and death. All wise people should understand correctly, do not follow their views. Therefore, the following verse says: Respecting Brahmins is because they recite the 'Ming Lun';

愍念離系者　　由自苦其身

論曰。婆羅門法勤誦諸明。世以為難故共恭敬。然諸明論非解脫因。但有虛言無實義故。離系外道極自苦身。亦以為難。世共愍念。云何自苦非解脫因。是異熟果非善法故。彼拔髮等所生身苦。由過去世惡行所招。是業異熟非善法故。如樂異熟非解脫因。若言此苦現功力生。非異熟果因不成者。此亦不然。彼所受苦是異熟果。以無所益與色根識俱生苦故。如地獄中所受身苦。自部亦有不許此苦。是異熟者。應以此量而決了之。諸有身苦非異熟者。亦非能證解脫親因。有漏身受現緣生故。如淫慾樂。又彼自苦非解脫因。違聖教故。如自害苦。彼師所說。非是聖教。非如來等所共說故。如淫書等。故彼自苦。但是前世惡行所招。及以現在愚癡所起。定非能證真解脫因。

複次有作是言。依尊勝身能得解脫。世間尊勝謂婆羅門。故婆羅門能證解脫。非余雜類可得涅槃。此說不然。故次頌曰。

如苦業所感　　非真解脫因　勝身業所生　　亦非證解脫

論曰。如離系宗所受身苦。業異熟故非解脫因。婆羅門身設許尊勝。亦業所感非解脫因。身雖不能親證解脫。而身中善是解脫因。若爾余身善亦如是。云何但說婆羅門耶。又婆羅門根境等法。與餘種類一切皆同。云何自

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本　『愍念離系者，由自苦其身』

論曰：婆羅門法勤奮誦讀各種明咒（Veda，古印度教的經典），世人認為很難做到，所以共同恭敬。然而，這些明咒並非解脫的原因，因為它們只有虛假言辭而沒有實際意義。離系外道（Nigantha，耆那教的別稱）極其刻苦地折磨自己的身體，也被認為是難能可貴，世人共同憐憫。為什麼說自我折磨不是解脫的原因呢？因為這是異熟果（Vipāka-phala，由先前行為產生的果報），而不是善法。他們拔頭髮等行為所產生的身體痛苦，是由過去世的惡行所招致的，是業的異熟果，而不是善法。正如快樂的異熟果不是解脫的原因一樣。如果說這種痛苦是現在努力產生的，不是異熟果，那麼這個論點是不成立的。他們所承受的痛苦是異熟果，因為它毫無益處，並且與色根識（感官和意識）同時產生的痛苦一樣。如同地獄中所受的身體痛苦。他們自己的宗派中也有人不允許這種痛苦是異熟果。應該用這個標準來判斷。凡是身體的痛苦不是異熟果的，也不是能夠證明解脫的直接原因，因為有漏之身所受的痛苦是現在因緣所生，如同淫慾之樂。而且，他們的自我折磨不是解脫的原因，因為它違背了聖教（ārya-dharma，聖者的教導），如同自我傷害的痛苦。他們的老師所說，不是聖教，因為不是如來（Tathāgata，佛陀的稱號）等所共同宣說的，如同**等。所以他們的自我折磨，只是前世惡行所招致的，以及現在愚癡所引起的，肯定不是能夠證明真正解脫的原因。

複次，有人這樣說：依靠尊勝之身（具有優越條件的身軀）能夠得到解脫，世間尊勝指的是婆羅門（Brāhmaṇa，印度教祭司），所以婆羅門能夠證得解脫，其餘的雜類不能得到涅槃（Nirvana，佛教的最高目標）。這種說法是不對的。所以接下來說：

『如苦業所感，非真解脫因；勝身業所生，亦非證解脫。』

論曰：如同離系宗所承受的身體痛苦，因為是業的異熟果，所以不是解脫的原因。婆羅門的身軀即使被認為是尊勝的，也是業所感召的，不是解脫的原因。身體雖然不能親自證得解脫，但是身體中的善行是解脫的原因。如果這樣，那麼其餘身體中的善行也是如此，為什麼只說婆羅門呢？而且，婆羅門的根、境等法，與其餘種類的一切都相同，為什麼自

【English Translation】 English version 『Afflicted are those who are detached, through self-mortification.』

Treatise: The Brahmanical law diligently recites various mantras (Veda), which the world considers difficult, hence they are commonly respected. However, these mantras are not the cause of liberation, because they only have empty words without real meaning. The Niganthas (another name for Jainism), extremely torment their own bodies, which is also considered difficult, and the world commonly pities them. Why is self-mortification not the cause of liberation? Because it is a result of past actions (Vipāka-phala), not a virtuous deed. The bodily suffering caused by their pulling out hair and other practices is brought about by evil deeds in past lives; it is the result of karma, not a virtuous deed. Just as the result of pleasurable experiences is not the cause of liberation. If it is said that this suffering is produced by present effort, not a result of past actions, then this argument is not valid. The suffering they endure is a result of past actions, because it is of no benefit and is like the suffering experienced in hell, arising simultaneously with the sense organs and consciousness. Even within their own sect, some do not allow that this suffering is a result of past actions. This standard should be used to determine it. All bodily suffering that is not a result of past actions is also not a direct cause that can prove liberation, because the suffering experienced by a defiled body arises from present conditions, like the pleasure of lust. Moreover, their self-mortification is not the cause of liberation, because it contradicts the holy teachings (ārya-dharma), like the suffering of self-harm. What their teachers say is not the holy teaching, because it is not commonly spoken by the Tathāgata (title of the Buddha) and others, like ** and so on. Therefore, their self-mortification is only brought about by evil deeds in past lives and caused by present ignorance; it is definitely not the cause that can prove true liberation.

Furthermore, some say that one can attain liberation by relying on a superior body (a body with superior conditions). The world considers Brahmins (Brāhmaṇa, Hindu priests) to be superior, so Brahmins can attain liberation, and other mixed classes cannot attain Nirvana (the ultimate goal of Buddhism). This statement is incorrect. Therefore, it is said next:

『As suffering is caused by bad karma, it is not the cause of true liberation; a superior body born of karma is also not the proof of liberation.』

Treatise: Just as the bodily suffering endured by the Niganthas is not the cause of liberation because it is the result of karma, even if the body of a Brahmin is considered superior, it is also caused by karma and is not the cause of liberation. Although the body cannot personally attain liberation, the good deeds within the body are the cause of liberation. If so, then the good deeds in other bodies are also the same, why only speak of Brahmins? Moreover, the faculties, objects, and other things of Brahmins are all the same as those of other classes, why

言彼勝餘劣。是故彼說。唯誑愚夫。諸有智人不應信受。然婆羅門非勝餘類。此洲人故。如戍達羅。戍達羅等非劣彼姓。此洲人故。如婆羅門既言外道所說皆虛。未知如來法有何實。為遣此疑。故說頌曰。

略言佛所說　　具二別余宗　不害生人天　　觀空證解脫

論曰。佛說無量深妙法門。利樂有情要唯二種。一者不害能感人天。二者觀空能證解脫。損惱他意及所發生。身語二業總名為害。若能斷彼所說害法。修諸善因名為不害。謂十善業。佈施愛語利行同事。及諸靜慮無色定等。由此得生人天善趣。受諸勝妙無染果報。依此能除一切煩惱。及能修習無量善因。真如實際離相名空。正觀此空。證涅槃樂空無我理。于諸法中無相無名。咸同一味寂靜安樂。即是涅槃。此必觀空。方可證故。如是善趣解脫二因。唯佛法中具足可得。外道雖說施等少分。生人天因而不圓滿。所以者何。彼諸外道無有顯析因果智故。不言意思生勝福故。無別解脫律儀法故。善趣粗業尚不委知。涅槃妙因故其絕分。如來所說理教周圓。外道邪徒如何不樂。由佛正教違彼邪宗。乖本所貪。故不欣樂。為顯此義。而說頌曰。

世人耽自宗　　如愛本生地　正法能摧滅　　邪黨不生欣

論曰。如本生地雖不膏腴。久處其中而

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本言說他們的優勝和別人的低劣。因此他們說：『只不過是欺騙愚笨的人罷了，有智慧的人不應該相信接受。』然而，婆羅門並非勝過其他種姓，因為他們是這塊大陸上的人，就像戍達羅（首陀羅，印度教四大種姓之一，等級最低的種姓）一樣。戍達羅等人並不比他們的種姓低賤，因為他們是這塊大陸上的人，就像婆羅門一樣。既然說外道所說都是虛假的，（那麼）不知道如來的佛法有什麼真實之處？爲了消除這種疑惑，所以說了這首偈頌：

簡略地說，佛所說的（法）具備兩種不同於其他宗派的（特點）：不損害眾生，使人天得益，觀察空性，證得解脫。

論曰：佛所說的無量深奧微妙的法門，利益安樂有情眾生，主要只有兩種。第一種是不損害（眾生），能感得人天福報。第二種是觀察空性，能證得解脫。損害惱亂他人的意圖以及由此所產生的身語二業，總稱為『害』。如果能夠斷除那些導致損害的法，修習各種善因，就叫做『不害』。也就是十善業（不殺生、不偷盜、不邪淫、不妄語、不兩舌、不惡口、不綺語、不貪、不嗔、不癡），佈施、愛語、利行、同事，以及各種禪定、無色定等等。通過這些可以得生人天善道，享受各種殊勝美妙、沒有染污的果報。依靠這些能夠去除一切煩惱，並且能夠修習無量善因。真如實際，遠離一切相，叫做『空』。正確地觀察這種空性，證得涅槃的快樂，（因為）空性是無我的真理。在一切法中，沒有相狀，沒有名稱，完全是一種味道，寂靜安樂，這就是涅槃。這必定要通過觀察空性，才可以證得。像這樣，善趣和解脫這兩種原因，只有在佛法中才能夠完全具備。外道雖然也說佈施等少部分（法），可以產生人天福報，但是並不圓滿。為什麼呢？因為那些外道沒有明確分析因果的智慧。不說意念可以產生殊勝的福報，沒有特殊的解脫律儀法。對於善趣的粗淺事業尚且不能詳細瞭解，對於涅槃的微妙原因，就完全沒有份了。如來所說的道理和教法周全圓滿，外道的邪惡之徒怎麼會喜歡呢？由於佛的正教違背了他們的邪惡宗派，不符合他們原本所貪求的，所以不歡喜。爲了顯示這個道理，所以說了這首偈頌：

世人沉溺於自己的宗派，就像愛戀自己的故鄉一樣。正法能夠摧毀（他們的邪見），邪惡的黨徒不會感到欣喜。

論曰：就像自己的故鄉雖然不肥沃富饒，（人們）長久居住其中而（感到習慣）。

【English Translation】 English version They speak of their own superiority and the inferiority of others. Therefore, they say: 'It is only deceiving the foolish; those with wisdom should not believe or accept it.' However, Brahmins are not superior to other castes simply because they are from this continent, just like Shudras (the lowest of the four varnas in Hinduism). Shudras and others are not inferior to their caste simply because they are from this continent, just like Brahmins. Since it is said that what the non-Buddhists say is all false, what truth is there in the Tathagata's Dharma? To dispel this doubt, the following verse is spoken:

In brief, what the Buddha taught Possesses two distinctions from other sects: It does not harm beings, benefiting humans and gods, Observing emptiness, one attains liberation.

Treatise: The immeasurable, profound, and subtle Dharma doors taught by the Buddha, which benefit and bring happiness to sentient beings, are mainly of two kinds. The first is non-harming, which can bring about the blessings of humans and gods. The second is observing emptiness, which can lead to liberation. The intention to harm and disturb others, and the physical and verbal actions that arise from it, are collectively called 'harm.' If one can cut off those dharmas that lead to harm and cultivate various good causes, it is called 'non-harming.' That is, the ten virtuous actions (not killing, not stealing, not engaging in sexual misconduct, not lying, not speaking divisively, not speaking harshly, not engaging in frivolous speech, not being greedy, not being angry, not being deluded), giving, loving speech, beneficial conduct, cooperation, and various meditations, formless meditations, and so on. Through these, one can be born in the good realms of humans and gods, enjoying various supreme, wonderful, and undefiled fruits. Relying on these, one can remove all afflictions and cultivate immeasurable good causes. Suchness, reality, being free from all forms, is called 'emptiness.' Correctly observing this emptiness, one attains the bliss of Nirvana, (because) emptiness is the truth of no-self. In all dharmas, there is no form, no name, completely one taste, peaceful and blissful, this is Nirvana. This must be attained through observing emptiness. In this way, the two causes of good realms and liberation can only be fully possessed in the Buddha's Dharma. Although non-Buddhists also speak of giving and other small parts (of the Dharma), which can produce the blessings of humans and gods, it is not complete. Why? Because those non-Buddhists do not have the wisdom to clearly analyze cause and effect. They do not say that thoughts can produce supreme blessings, and they do not have special precepts for liberation. They cannot even understand the superficial affairs of good realms in detail, and they have no share in the subtle causes of Nirvana. The principles and teachings spoken by the Tathagata are complete and perfect, so how could the evil followers of non-Buddhists like them? Because the Buddha's true teachings violate their evil sects and do not conform to what they originally craved, they are not happy. To show this principle, the following verse is spoken:

Worldly people are addicted to their own sects, Just like being in love with their own homeland. The true Dharma can destroy (their wrong views), Evil factions will not feel happy.

Treatise: Just like one's own homeland, although not fertile and rich, (people) have lived there for a long time and (feel accustomed to it).

不願舍。自宗亦爾。雖與理違。以本師承故不能離。尚不欲樂餘外道宗。況慕如來甘露聖教。甚深實相真空智火。能焚外道邪執積薪。違彼本心。故不欣樂。諸有智者應善思惟。勿染邪宗致違正法。

複次佛法普照如盛日輪。求勝智人應當信仰。為顯此義。故說頌曰。

有智求勝德　　應信受真宗　正法如日輪　　有目因能見

論曰。此中顯示要具二德能信大乘。一者有知。二者希求殊勝功德。大乘能滅一切邪宗。隨順大乘多所饒益。謂自能證無上涅槃。令他有情亦出生死。大乘正法如彼日輪。普為世間破無明闇。有慧目者因此法光。分明照知真偽色像。背邪從正避險求安。利樂自他無不成辦。諸有智者應信大乘。勿顧邪宗誹毀正法。自受沉溺生死淤泥。誑惑有情令失大利。智與愚異。謂識是非智勿似愚不辨真偽。若有真實利樂他心。應以大乘摧邪立正。勤修空觀速證菩提。利樂有情窮未來際。

大乘廣百論釋論卷第六大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1571 大乘廣百論釋論

大乘廣百論釋論卷第七

聖天菩薩本　護法菩薩釋

三藏法師玄奘奉　詔譯

破根境品第五

複次如上所言。后當廣破根境等者。我今當說。根是了別境界所依。將欲破根先除其

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本

不願捨棄（自己的宗派）。自己的宗派也是這樣，即使與道理相違背，因為是傳承自本師，所以不能捨棄。尚且不願喜歡其他外道的宗派，更何況是仰慕如來甘露般的聖教，甚深真實的空性智慧之火，能夠焚燒外道邪見的積薪，違揹他們的本心，所以不歡喜。所有有智慧的人應該好好思維，不要沾染邪宗導致違背正法。

再次，佛法普照如同盛大的日輪，尋求殊勝智慧的人應當信仰。爲了顯明這個道理，所以說偈頌：

『有智求勝德，應信受真宗，正法如日輪，有目因能見。』

論曰：這裡顯示了要具備兩種德行才能信受大乘。一是具有智慧，二是希求殊勝的功德。大乘能夠滅除一切邪宗，隨順大乘能夠帶來很多利益，即自己能夠證得無上涅槃，令其他有情也能脫離生死。大乘正法如同那日輪，普遍為世間破除無明的黑暗。有智慧之眼的人因此法的光明，分明地照知真偽的色像，背離邪惡而歸從正道，避開危險而尋求安樂，利益自己和他人沒有不能成就的。所有有智慧的人應該信受大乘，不要顧及邪宗而誹謗正法，自己遭受沉溺在生死淤泥中，欺騙迷惑有情令其失去大利益。智慧與愚蠢不同，在於能識別是非，有智慧的人不要像愚蠢的人一樣不辨別真偽。如果具有真實利益他人之心，應當以大乘摧毀邪見，樹立正法，勤奮修習空觀，迅速證得菩提，利益有情直到未來際。

《大乘廣百論釋論》卷第六大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1571 《大乘廣百論釋論》

《大乘廣百論釋論》卷第七

聖天菩薩本護法菩薩釋

三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯

破根境品第五

再次，如上面所說，後面應當廣泛破斥根（indriya，了別境界所依）境（visaya，境界）等，我現在應當開始說。根是了別境界所依，將要破斥根，先要去除其...

【English Translation】 English version

Unwilling to abandon (one's own school). One's own school is also like this; even if it contradicts reason, because it is inherited from the original teacher, it cannot be abandoned. One is unwilling to even like other non-Buddhist schools, let alone admire the nectar-like holy teachings of the Tathagata (如來，one who has thus come), the profoundly real fire of emptiness-wisdom, which can burn the accumulated firewood of non-Buddhist heretical views, contradicting their original intentions, so they do not rejoice. All wise people should contemplate well, and not be contaminated by heretical schools, leading to violations of the true Dharma (正法，true Dharma).

Furthermore, the Buddha-dharma shines universally like a great sun, and those who seek superior wisdom should have faith. To clarify this meaning, a verse is spoken:

'Those with wisdom seeking superior virtues, should believe and accept the true school, The true Dharma is like the sun, those with eyes can see because of it.'

Commentary: Here it is shown that two virtues are necessary to believe in the Mahayana (大乘，Great Vehicle). First, having knowledge; second, seeking superior merits. The Mahayana can eliminate all heretical schools, and following the Mahayana brings many benefits, namely, one can attain unsurpassed Nirvana (涅槃，liberation), and also liberate other sentient beings from birth and death. The Mahayana true Dharma is like the sun, universally dispelling the darkness of ignorance for the world. Those with the eyes of wisdom, because of the light of this Dharma, clearly know the true and false forms, turn away from evil and follow the right, avoid danger and seek peace, and benefit themselves and others without anything not being accomplished. All wise people should believe in the Mahayana, and not care for heretical schools and slander the true Dharma, suffering drowning in the mud of birth and death, deceiving and confusing sentient beings, causing them to lose great benefits. Wisdom is different from foolishness, in that it can distinguish right from wrong; wise people should not be like foolish people who do not distinguish truth from falsehood. If one has a true heart to benefit others, one should use the Mahayana to destroy heresy and establish the right, diligently cultivate the contemplation of emptiness, quickly attain Bodhi (菩提，enlightenment), and benefit sentient beings until the end of the future.

《Commentary on the Hundred Verses of Mahayana》Volume 6 Tripitaka Volume 30 No. 1571 《Commentary on the Hundred Verses of Mahayana》

《Commentary on the Hundred Verses of Mahayana》Volume 7

Aryadeva (聖天，holy deva) - Author, Vasubandhu (護法，defender of Dharma) - Commentary

Tripitaka Master Xuanzang (玄奘，Tang dynasty Buddhist monk) - Translated by Imperial Order

Chapter 5: Refuting the Roots and Objects

Furthermore, as mentioned above, later I will extensively refute the roots (indriya, faculties) and objects (visaya, sense objects), etc., I should now begin to speak. The root is what the consciousness relies on to distinguish objects. To refute the root, first remove its...

境。境既除已根亦隨亡。迦比羅云。瓶衣等物唯色等成。諸根所行體是實有。為破此計。故說頌曰。

于瓶諸分中　　可見唯是色　言瓶全可見　　如何能悟真

論曰。汝宗自說眼等諸根各取自境不相雜亂。眼唯見色。瓶通四塵。豈見色時全見瓶體。此顯瓶體非眼所見。非唯色故。猶如聲等。豈不瓶體亦是色耶。我不言瓶體唯非色。但言瓶體非唯色成。故所立因無不成失。汝于現事既有乖違。而言悟真。此何可信。如眼所見唯色非瓶。香等亦然。故次頌曰。

諸有勝慧人　　隨前所說義　于香味及觸　　一切類應遮

論曰。鼻舌身根。其境各異。全取瓶體。義亦不成。瓶非三根所取境界。一一比量如前應知。聲既非恒。故此不說類其色等。聲亦應然。如是一切瓶衣車等。皆非色根所取境界。非定意識取于外境。必隨色根。瓶等既非色根境界。意亦應爾。若不爾者。盲聾等人。亦應了別色等外境。如是瓶等非根所行。皆是自心分別所起。若言瓶等與色等法體無異故。眼等諸根。如取自境。亦取瓶等。是故諸根。亦能漸次取瓶等境。若爾瓶等應是一切色根所行。即違諸根各取自境。或一瓶等體應成多。或許諸根不取瓶等。唯色等體是根境故。色等各別既非是瓶。如何合時成實瓶體。若言瓶等眾分

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本境（dhyāna，禪定）。境既除已根亦隨亡。迦比羅（Kapila，印度古哲學家）云：『瓶、衣等物唯色等成，諸根所行體是實有。』為破此計，故說頌曰：

『于瓶諸分中，可見唯是色，言瓶全可見，如何能悟真？』

論曰：汝宗自說眼等諸根各取自境不相雜亂，眼唯見色。瓶通四塵，豈見色時全見瓶體？此顯瓶體非眼所見，非唯色故，猶如聲等。豈不瓶體亦是色耶？我不言瓶體唯非色，但言瓶體非唯色成，故所立因無不成失。汝于現事既有乖違，而言悟真，此何可信？如眼所見唯色非瓶，香等亦然。故次頌曰：

『諸有勝慧人，隨前所說義，于香味及觸，一切類應遮。』

論曰：鼻舌身根，其境各異，全取瓶體，義亦不成。瓶非三根所取境界，一一比量如前應知。聲既非恒，故此不說類其色等，聲亦應然。如是一切瓶衣車等，皆非色根所取境界，非定意識取于外境，必隨色根。瓶等既非色根境界，意亦應爾。若不爾者，盲聾等人，亦應了別色等外境。如是瓶等非根所行，皆是自心分別所起。若言瓶等與色等法體無異故，眼等諸根，如取自境，亦取瓶等。是故諸根，亦能漸次取瓶等境。若爾瓶等應是一切色根所行，即違諸根各取自境。或一瓶等體應成多。或許諸根不取瓶等，唯色等體是根境故。色等各別既非是瓶，如何合時成實瓶體？若言瓶等眾分

【English Translation】 English version The state (dhyāna, meditation). Once the state is eliminated, the roots also perish. Kapila (an ancient Indian philosopher) said: 'Jars, clothes, and other objects are only composed of color, etc. The objects perceived by the senses are truly existent.' To refute this view, the following verse is spoken:

'Among the parts of a jar, only color is visible. If one says the whole jar is visible, how can one realize the truth?'

Treatise says: Your school itself says that the senses such as the eyes each grasp their own objects without mixing. The eye only sees color. A jar encompasses the four elements. How can one see the whole jar when seeing color? This shows that the jar is not seen by the eye, because it is not only color, like sound, etc. Isn't the jar also color? I do not say that the jar is not color, but I say that the jar is not only composed of color. Therefore, the established reason is not unfulfilled. You contradict present reality and yet speak of realizing the truth. How can this be believed? Just as the eye sees only color and not the jar, so it is with smell, etc. Therefore, the next verse says:

'Those with superior wisdom should, according to the previously stated meaning, reject everything similar in smell, taste, and touch.'

Treatise says: The nose, tongue, and body senses each have different objects. It is also not reasonable to grasp the whole jar. The jar is not an object grasped by the three senses. Each analogy should be understood as before. Since sound is not constant, it is not discussed here in the same category as color, etc. Sound should also be the same. Thus, all jars, clothes, carts, etc., are not objects grasped by the color sense. It is not that fixed consciousness grasps external objects and necessarily follows the color sense. Since jars, etc., are not objects of the color sense, so it should be with the mind. If not, blind and deaf people should also be able to distinguish external objects such as color. Thus, jars, etc., are not objects perceived by the senses, but are all produced by the discrimination of one's own mind. If one says that jars, etc., are no different in substance from color, etc., therefore, the senses such as the eyes, just as they grasp their own objects, also grasp jars, etc. Therefore, the senses can also gradually grasp objects such as jars. If so, jars, etc., should be objects perceived by all color senses, which contradicts the idea that each sense grasps its own object. Or one jar, etc., should become many in substance. Or perhaps the senses do not grasp jars, etc., because only the substance of color, etc., is the object of the senses. Since each separate color, etc., is not a jar, how can they combine to form a real jar? If one says that the parts of a jar

合成。見一分時言見瓶等。如見城分亦名見城。此亦不然。城非實故。城體是假。眾分合成。見一分時不名全見。瓶等若爾。是假非真。汝等云何執實可見。又見一分言可見者。其理不然。故次頌曰。

若唯見瓶色　　即言見瓶者　既不見香等　　應名不見瓶

論曰。若和合中有眾多分。由一分故全得其名。謂於一瓶有色等分。由見色故言見瓶者。所餘香等既不可見。應從多分言不見瓶。亦不應言色體是勝。瓶一分故。猶如香等。色等於瓶既無勝劣。應從香等名不可見。世間立名。或從多分。或就最勝。色上全無。香等有一。是故瓶等應從香等名不可見。是則外色亦應非實。是可見性。是瓶衣等不可見法。一分攝故。猶如香等世間共知。瓶色可見。云何得立不可見耶。世間所知隨自心變。假說可見非外實色。今遮心外實有可見。故不相違不可見法。無所有故。應不可說。所以者何。可見無故名不可見。無法都無如何可說。可見之法以有體故。可為他說。此亦不然。無體之法亦是說因。若不爾者。不可見言現應無有。又見於色都無所益。何故說色以為可見。非不可見。所以者何。非由能見及不能見。令色有異。云何由見說色可見。非由不見說不可見。如瓶上色是可見故。說瓶可見。瓶上香等不可見故。亦應

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本合成。例如，當只看到瓶子的一部分時，就說看到了整個瓶子。就像只看到城墻的一部分就說看到了整個城市一樣。但這是不對的，因為城市並非真實存在，城市的整體是虛假的，由多個部分組成。當只看到一部分時，不能說是完全看到了整個城市。如果瓶子等也是如此，那麼它們也是虛假的，而非真實的。你們怎麼能執著于認為它們是真實可見的呢？而且，只看到一部分就說看到了整體，這個道理是不成立的。所以接下來說：

『如果僅僅看見瓶子的顏色，就說看見了瓶子，既然看不見香味等，就應該說沒有看見瓶子。』

論述：如果在和合的事物中有許多部分，因為看見了其中一部分就說看見了整體。例如，在一個瓶子上有顏色等部分，因為看見了顏色就說看見了瓶子，那麼其餘的香味等既然看不見，就應該從大部分來說沒有看見瓶子。也不應該說顏色比其他部分更重要，因為它只是瓶子的一部分，就像香味等一樣。顏色等在瓶子上沒有優劣之分，應該從香味等來說是不可見的。世間建立名稱，或者從大部分，或者就最殊勝的部分。顏色上完全沒有，香味等卻存在。因此，瓶子等應該從香味等來說是不可見的。那麼，外在的顏色也應該不是真實的，因為可見的性質，是瓶子、衣服等不可見法的一部分所包含的，就像香味等一樣，這是世間都知道的。瓶子的顏色是可見的，怎麼能說是不可見的呢？世間所知隨著自己的心而變化，假說可見，並非外在真實的顏色。現在遮止心外真實存在的可見，所以與不可見法並不矛盾。因為不可見法沒有自性，所以應該不可說。為什麼呢？因為可見不存在，所以才叫做不可見。沒有法，完全沒有，怎麼能說呢？可見之法因為有自體，所以可以為他人說。但這也是不對的，沒有自體的法也是說的原因。如果不是這樣，那麼『不可見』這個詞現在應該不存在。而且，看見顏色並沒有什麼益處，為什麼說顏色是可見的，而不是不可見的呢？為什麼呢？不是因為能看見或不能看見，就讓顏色有什麼不同。怎麼能因為看見就說顏色是可見的，而不是因為看不見就說顏色是不可見的呢？就像瓶子上的顏色是可見的，所以說瓶子是可見的。瓶子上的香味等是不可見的，也應該...

【English Translation】 English version Synthesis. For example, when seeing only a part of a bottle, it is said that the entire bottle is seen. Just as seeing only a part of a city wall is called seeing the entire city. But this is not correct, because a city is not truly existent; the whole of a city is an illusion, composed of many parts. When only a part is seen, it cannot be said that the entire city is fully seen. If bottles and the like are also like this, then they are also illusory, not real. How can you cling to the idea that they are truly visible? Moreover, saying that one sees the whole by seeing only a part is not logically sound. Therefore, it is said next:

'If one only sees the color of a bottle, and then says one sees the bottle, since one does not see the scent, etc., one should say one does not see the bottle.'

Discussion: If there are many parts in a composite thing, and one says one sees the whole because one sees one part. For example, on a bottle there are parts such as color, etc., and because one sees the color, one says one sees the bottle, then since the remaining scents, etc., are not seen, one should say one does not see the bottle, based on the majority of parts. Nor should one say that color is more important than other parts, because it is only a part of the bottle, just like scents, etc. Color, etc., have no superiority or inferiority on the bottle; one should say it is invisible based on scents, etc. The establishment of names in the world is either based on the majority of parts or on the most superior part. Color has nothing complete on it, but scents, etc., exist. Therefore, bottles, etc., should be said to be invisible based on scents, etc. Then, external color should also not be real, because the nature of visibility is contained in a part of invisible dharmas such as bottles, clothes, etc., just like scents, etc., which is known by the world. The color of a bottle is visible, how can it be said to be invisible? What is known in the world changes with one's own mind, falsely saying it is visible, not the real external color. Now, we are preventing the real existence of visibility outside the mind, so it does not contradict invisible dharmas. Because invisible dharmas have no self-nature, they should be unspeakable. Why? Because visibility does not exist, so it is called invisibility. If there is no dharma, completely none, how can it be spoken? The dharma of visibility, because it has a self-nature, can be spoken to others. But this is also not correct; a dharma without self-nature is also a cause for speaking. If this were not the case, then the word 'invisible' should not exist now. Moreover, seeing color has no benefit; why say color is visible, and not invisible? Why? It is not because one can see or cannot see that color is any different. How can one say color is visible because one sees it, and not say color is invisible because one does not see it? Just like the color on a bottle is visible, so one says the bottle is visible. The scents, etc., on a bottle are invisible, and should also...

說瓶。為不可見其理等故。又眼見時。說色可見。眼不見時。亦應說色為不可見。其理等故。瓶之與色。既有可見不可見義。何故今者。偏破可見立不可見。可見起執。遮可見故言不可見。非立瓶色為不可見。又色亦非全體可見。如何由色而說見瓶。所以者何。故次頌曰。

有障礙諸色　　體非全可見　彼分及中間　　由此分所隔

論曰。有障礙色非全可見。彼分中間此分所隔。如隔壁等所有諸色。雖見一分而不見余。故應如瓶名不可見。于諸分中此分非勝。余分為多。此應從多名不可見。粗色漸析未至極微。常有多分。若至極微非色根境。是故諸色皆不可見。豈不極微外面傍布無所障隔。相鄰而住全可見耶。眾微總相是假非實。一一別相非色根境。有礙極微面有彼此。如何得立色法實有全體可見。雖諸極微總相是假。一一別住實不可見。然諸極微和合相助。不可分析。面有彼此。故一一微其體實有。全分可見。此亦不然。故次頌曰。

極微分有無　　應審諦思察　引不成為證　　義終不可成

論曰。極微亦與余物合故。應如粗物有分是假。破常品中已辨極微有分非實。極微一一既不可見。云何和合相助可見。若相助時。不捨本相。不應相助若捨本相應非極微。以相助時。若如本細應無助力

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：關於瓶子的討論。因為瓶子的道理不可見等等原因。又，當眼睛能看到時，說顏色是可見的。當眼睛看不到時，也應該說顏色是不可見的。道理是一樣的。瓶子和顏色，既然有可見和不可見的含義，為什麼現在偏偏要破斥可見，而立不可見呢？因為可見會引起執著，爲了遮蔽這種執著，所以說不可見。並不是要確立瓶子和顏色是不可見的。而且顏色也不是全部可見的。怎麼能因為顏色而說能看見瓶子呢？為什麼這麼說呢？所以接下來說偈頌：『有障礙的各種顏色，其本體不是全部可見的，它們的部分和中間，被這些部分所隔開。』論述：有障礙的顏色不是全部可見的。它們的部分和中間被這些部分所隔開。比如被墻壁等隔開的所有顏色。雖然能看到一部分，卻看不到其餘部分。所以應該像瓶子一樣，稱作不可見。在各個部分中，這個部分並不比其他部分更殊勝。其餘部分更多。因此應該按照多數，稱作不可見。粗糙的顏色逐漸分解，還沒有達到極微的程度，常常有很多部分。如果達到極微，就不是色根的境界。因此，各種顏色都是不可見的。難道不是極微的外面四面分佈，沒有阻礙和間隔，相鄰而住，全部可見嗎？眾多極微的總相是虛假的，不是真實的。每一個個別的相都不是色根的境界。有障礙的極微，表面有彼此之分。怎麼能確立色法是真實存在，並且全部可見的呢？雖然各種極微的總相是虛假的。每一個個別存在實際上是不可見的。然而各種極微和合相助，不可分析，表面有彼此之分。所以每一個極微的本體是真實存在的，全部可見。這種說法也是不對的。所以接下來說偈頌：『極微有分還是無分，應該仔細地思考和考察。引用不能成立的論證，最終也不能成立。』論述：極微也和其餘物體結合，應該像粗糙的物體一樣，有部分是虛假的。在破斥常品的討論中，已經辨明極微有部分不是真實的。極微一個個既然不可見，怎麼能和合相助而可見呢？如果相助時，不捨棄原本的形態，就不應該相助。如果捨棄原本的形態，就不應該是極微。因為相助時，如果像原本一樣細微，應該沒有助力。

【English Translation】 English version: Discussion on the pot. Because the principle of the pot is invisible, etc. Also, when the eye can see, it is said that color is visible. When the eye cannot see, it should also be said that color is invisible. The principle is the same. Since the pot and color have both visible and invisible meanings, why now specifically refute the visible and establish the invisible? Because the visible gives rise to attachment, to obscure this attachment, it is said to be invisible. It is not to establish that the pot and color are invisible. Moreover, color is not entirely visible. How can one say that one sees the pot because of color? Why is this said? Therefore, the following verse is said: 'Various colors with obstacles, their substance is not entirely visible, their parts and middle, are separated by these parts.' Treatise: Colors with obstacles are not entirely visible. Their parts and middle are separated by these parts. For example, all colors separated by walls, etc. Although one part can be seen, the rest cannot be seen. Therefore, it should be called invisible like a pot. Among the various parts, this part is not more superior than the other parts. The remaining parts are more numerous. Therefore, it should be called invisible according to the majority. Coarse colors gradually decompose, not yet reaching the state of ultimate minute particles (paramāṇu), and often have many parts. If it reaches the state of ultimate minute particles, it is not the realm of the sense faculty of color. Therefore, all colors are invisible. Isn't it that the outside of the ultimate minute particles is distributed in all directions, without obstruction or separation, residing adjacently, and entirely visible? The general appearance of numerous ultimate minute particles is false, not real. Each individual appearance is not the realm of the sense faculty of color. Obstructed ultimate minute particles have distinctions of front and back. How can it be established that the dharma of color is truly existent and entirely visible? Although the general appearance of various ultimate minute particles is false. Each individual existence is actually invisible. However, various ultimate minute particles combine and assist each other, are inseparable, and have distinctions of front and back on the surface. Therefore, the substance of each ultimate minute particle is truly existent and entirely visible. This statement is also incorrect. Therefore, the following verse is said: 'Whether the ultimate minute particle has parts or no parts, should be carefully considered and examined. Quoting arguments that cannot be established, will ultimately not be established.' Treatise: The ultimate minute particle also combines with other objects, and should be like coarse objects, having parts that are false. In the discussion of refuting permanence, it has already been clarified that having parts is not real for ultimate minute particles. Since each ultimate minute particle is invisible, how can they combine and assist each other to be visible? If they do not abandon their original form when assisting each other, they should not assist each other. If they abandon their original form, they should not be ultimate minute particles. Because when assisting each other, if they are as subtle as the original, they should have no assistance.

。應不可見。若轉成粗應非極微。應假非實審思極微。由有礙故。有分非實不可全見。是故不可引證諸色實而可見。如色由前所說道理。有分無實非色根境。如是一切有質礙法。皆眾分成非色根境。為顯此義。故復頌曰。

一切有礙法　　皆眾分所成

論曰。諸有礙法以慧析之。皆有眾分相依而立。析若未盡。恒如粗事。眾分合成是假非實。析之若盡便歸於空。如畢竟無越色根境。諸可見者皆眾分成。世所共知。並假非實。細分障隔不可全見。極微相助。理復不成。諸有礙物皆可析之。盡未盡時歸空是假。是故都無真實色法可見可聞可嗅嘗等。所詮色法既非根境。能詮亦然。故次頌曰。

言說字亦然　　故非根所取

論曰。一切所聞音聲言說。漸次分析至一字名。此亦如前。猶有細分。復漸分析乃至極微。此非所聞。猶有細分。復漸分析乃至都無。析未盡來。是有礙故。常有細分。是假非實。又聲細分前後安立。互不相續。體無合義。非實詮表。非實可聞。其理分明。故復別說。若聲細分同時而生。非前後立如色細分。薩羅羅薩。如是等字。同時可聞。義應無別。如是已破色等五塵。體是實有色根所得。

複次有說。形色是眼所見。今應徴問。如是形色。為離顯色。為即顯耶。若離顯者。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：不應該是可見的。如果轉變成為粗大的事物，那就不應該是極微了。應該認識到它是虛假的而不是真實的，仔細地思考極微的性質。由於有阻礙的緣故，有部分的物體不是真實的，不能完全被看見。因此，不能以此來證明諸色是真實的並且可以被看見的。如同顏色由前面所說的道理，有部分是無實的，不是色根（cakṣurindriya）和色境（rūpāyatana）。像這樣，一切有質礙的法，都是由眾多分組成的，不是色根和色境。爲了顯明這個道理，所以再次用頌文說：『一切有礙法，皆眾分所成。』論曰：各種有阻礙的法，用智慧去分析它們，都是由眾多的部分相互依靠而成立的。如果分析沒有窮盡，就始終像是粗大的事物一樣，由眾多分合成的是虛假的而不是真實的。如果分析窮盡了，就歸於空無。如同畢竟沒有超出色根和色境。各種可以被看見的事物都是由眾多分組成的，這是世間所共知的，並且是虛假的而不是真實的。細小的部分相互阻隔，不能完全被看見。極微相互幫助，這個道理也是不能成立的。各種有阻礙的物體都可以被分析，在沒有分析窮盡的時候歸於空，是虛假的。因此，根本沒有真實的色法可以被看見、可以被聽見、可以被嗅到、可以被嚐到等等。所詮釋的色法既然不是根境，那麼能詮釋的也同樣如此。所以接著用頌文說：『言說字亦然，故非根所取。』論曰：一切所聽到的音聲言說，逐漸地分析到一個字的名詞，這個也像前面所說的一樣，仍然有細小的部分。再逐漸地分析乃至極微（paramāṇu），這個不是所能聽到的，仍然有細小的部分。再逐漸地分析乃至完全沒有。在沒有分析窮盡之前，因為是有阻礙的緣故，常常有細小的部分，是虛假的而不是真實的。而且聲音的細小部分前後安立，互相不相連續，本體沒有聚合的意義，不是真實地詮表，不是真實地可以被聽到的，這個道理很分明。所以特別說明，如果聲音的細小部分同時產生，不是像顏色的細小部分那樣前後安立。薩羅羅薩（sararasa）這樣的字，同時可以被聽到，意義應該沒有差別。像這樣已經破斥了色等五塵（pañca viṣaya），本體是實有的，被色根所獲得。再次，有人說，形狀和顏色是眼睛所能看見的。現在應該徵詢和詢問，像這樣的形狀和顏色，是離開顯色（varṇa）而存在，還是就是顯色呢？如果離開顯色而存在，

【English Translation】 English version: It should not be visible. If it were to transform into something coarse, then it would not be an ultimate particle (paramāṇu). One should recognize that it is false and not real, carefully contemplating the nature of the ultimate particle. Because of its obstructiveness, an object with parts is not real and cannot be fully seen. Therefore, one cannot use this to prove that all forms (rūpa) are real and can be seen. Just as form, according to the aforementioned reasoning, has parts that are unreal and are not the sense base of sight (cakṣurindriya) and the object of sight (rūpāyatana). Likewise, all phenomena with material obstruction are composed of many parts and are not the sense base of sight and the object of sight. To clarify this meaning, it is further stated in verse: 'All obstructive phenomena are composed of many parts.' Treatise says: All obstructive phenomena, when analyzed with wisdom, are established by relying on numerous parts. If the analysis is not exhaustive, it always appears as something coarse. That which is composed of many parts is false and not real. If the analysis is exhaustive, it returns to emptiness. Just as there is ultimately nothing beyond the sense base of sight and the object of sight. All things that can be seen are composed of many parts, which is commonly known in the world, and are false and not real. Minute parts obstruct each other and cannot be fully seen. The idea of ultimate particles (paramāṇu) assisting each other is also untenable. All obstructive objects can be analyzed; when not exhaustively analyzed, they return to emptiness and are false. Therefore, there is no real form that can be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, etc. Since the form that is being explained is not a sense base or object, then that which explains it is also not. Therefore, the following verse is stated: 'Speech and words are also like that, therefore they are not apprehended by the senses.' Treatise says: All audible sounds and speech, gradually analyzed down to a single word, are also like the previous case, still having minute parts. Further gradual analysis down to the ultimate particle (paramāṇu), which is not audible, still has minute parts. Further gradual analysis down to complete non-existence. Before the analysis is exhaustive, because it is obstructive, it always has minute parts, and is false and not real. Moreover, the minute parts of sound are established sequentially, not continuously, and the substance has no meaning of aggregation, is not a real expression, and is not really audible. This principle is very clear. Therefore, it is specifically stated that if the minute parts of sound arise simultaneously, they are not established sequentially like the minute parts of color. Words like 'sararasa' can be heard simultaneously, and the meaning should be no different. In this way, the five objects of sense (pañca viṣaya), such as form, whose substance is real and obtained by the sense base of sight, have been refuted. Furthermore, some say that shape and color are seen by the eye. Now, one should inquire and ask whether such shape and color exist apart from visible color (varṇa), or whether they are the same as visible color? If they exist apart from visible color,

應非眼見。離青等故。如樂音等。若即顯者。應如顯色。亦非眼見。前已廣論。又說頌曰。

雖顯色有形　　云何取形色

論曰。若離顯色別有形者。云何依顯而取形耶。如離顯色有樂音等。自根取時不依于顯。然依顯色而取于形。如遠見火。知暖總相。是故形色決定應非色根所取。或非眼見。若復有言。不依青等而取形者。應如是破。不動顯處形色了別。必色根境。了別為先緣形相故。諸緣形相必色根境。了別為先。如旋火輪形相了別。或如闇中形相了別。有作是言。形顯二色其體各別。能了異故。如香味等。現見世間長等青等。能了各異。若爾世間諸大造色。與金銀等能了異故。應有別體。因既不定。宗義豈成。或復云何取形色者。若形實有是眼所見。云何依觸而取形耶。不見青等依觸而取。形既依觸而可了知。應如澀等非眼所見。此因若言定依于觸而了形者。依于顯色。應不了形。若言依觸定了形者。觸風水等應亦了形。此難非理。我意但言。形可依觸而了知故。非眼所見。不言形了依觸決然。若爾顯色亦依觸了。應不可見。如依觸故。知火色等。此必長等差別所隔。方可了知。故所立因無不定失。所以者何。若依于觸了別青等。定是比知。非眼所見。青等共相此必長等差別所隔。非親依觸。不可難

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本不應該是眼睛所見。因為形離開了青色等顯色。就像樂音等一樣。如果形是獨立顯現的，應該像顯色一樣，也是眼睛所見。但前面已經廣泛討論過，形不是眼見。又說了頌詞：『即使顯色有形狀，如何才能獲取形狀的顏色呢？』論曰：如果離開顯色而另外存在形狀，那麼如何依靠顯色來獲取形狀呢？就像離開顯色而存在樂音等，感官在獲取它們的時候不依賴於顯色。然而，獲取形狀卻要依賴於顯色，就像從遠處看到火，知道它具有溫暖的總的特徵。因此，形狀的顏色必定不是色根（視覺器官）所能獲取的，或者說不是眼睛所能見到的。如果有人說，不依賴於青色等顯色也能獲取形狀，應該這樣反駁：在不改變顯色的情況下，對形狀顏色的辨別，必定是色根的境界。因為辨別是先緣于形狀的表象。凡是緣于形狀表象的，必定是色根的境界，並且辨別在先。就像旋轉的火輪的形狀表象的辨別。或者像在黑暗中對形狀表象的辨別。有人這樣認為，形狀和顯色是兩種不同的實體，因為它們能被不同的感官所感知，就像香味等一樣。現在看到世間的長短等形狀和青色等顏色，能被不同的感官所感知。如果這樣說，那麼世間諸如土、水、火、風四大所造的顏色，與金銀等顏色，因為能被不同的感官所感知，也應該有不同的實體。因為這個原因是不確定的，所以你的宗義怎麼能成立呢？或者說，如何獲取形狀的顏色呢？如果形狀確實存在，並且是眼睛所見，那麼如何依靠觸覺來獲取形狀呢？沒有看到青色等顏色是依靠觸覺來獲取的。形狀既然可以依靠觸覺來了解，那麼應該像澀味等一樣，不是眼睛所見。如果用這個原因來說明形狀必定是依靠觸覺來了解的，那麼依靠顯色就應該不能瞭解形狀。如果說依靠觸覺才能確定形狀，那麼觸碰到風、水等也應該能瞭解形狀。這種責難是不合理的。我的意思是說，形狀可以通過觸覺來了解，所以不是眼睛所見，並不是說了解形狀完全依賴於觸覺。如果這樣，顯色也可以通過觸覺來了解，應該也是不可見的，就像依靠觸覺來了解火的顏色等。這必定是被長短等差別所隔斷，才能瞭解。所以所立的因沒有不確定的過失。為什麼這樣說呢？如果依靠觸覺來辨別青色等顏色，那一定是比量所知，不是眼睛所見。青色等顏色的共同特徵必定是被長短等差別所隔斷，不是直接依靠觸覺，所以不能以此來責難。

【English Translation】 English version It should not be seen by the eye. Because form is separate from blue and other manifest colors. Like sounds, etc. If form were independently manifest, it should be visible to the eye like manifest colors. But it has already been extensively discussed that form is not seen by the eye. Furthermore, a verse states: 'Even though manifest colors have shape, how can one grasp the shape-color?' The treatise says: If shape exists separately from manifest color, how can one grasp shape by relying on manifest color? Just as sounds, etc., exist separately from manifest color, the senses do not rely on manifest color when grasping them. However, grasping shape relies on manifest color, like seeing fire from afar and knowing its general characteristic of warmth. Therefore, shape-color must not be grasped by the sense organ of color (the visual organ), or it is not seen by the eye. If someone says that one can grasp shape without relying on blue and other manifest colors, one should refute them thus: Discriminating shape-color without changing the manifest color must be the realm of the sense organ of color. Because discrimination is primarily conditioned by the appearance of shape. Whatever is conditioned by the appearance of shape must be the realm of the sense organ of color, and discrimination must precede it. Like the discrimination of the appearance of a rotating fire wheel. Or like the discrimination of the appearance of shape in the dark. Some say that shape and manifest color are two different entities because they can be perceived by different senses, like smell and taste, etc. Now, seeing the length, etc., of shapes and the blue, etc., of colors in the world, they can be perceived by different senses. If that is the case, then the colors created by the four great elements (earth, water, fire, and wind) in the world, and the colors of gold, silver, etc., should also have different entities because they can be perceived by different senses. Because this reason is uncertain, how can your doctrine be established? Or how does one grasp shape-color? If shape truly exists and is seen by the eye, then how can one grasp shape by relying on touch? One does not see blue and other colors being grasped by relying on touch. Since shape can be understood by relying on touch, it should not be seen by the eye, like roughness, etc. If one uses this reason to say that shape must be understood by relying on touch, then relying on manifest color should not allow one to understand shape. If one says that one can determine shape by relying on touch, then touching wind, water, etc., should also allow one to understand shape. This objection is unreasonable. My intention is to say that shape can be understood through touch, so it is not seen by the eye, not that understanding shape completely relies on touch. If that is the case, manifest color can also be understood through touch, and should also be invisible, like understanding the color of fire, etc., through touch. This must be separated by differences such as length, etc., to be understood. Therefore, the established reason does not have the fault of being uncertain. Why is this so? If one relies on touch to discriminate blue and other colors, then it must be known through inference, not seen by the eye. The common characteristic of blue and other colors must be separated by differences such as length, etc., not directly relying on touch, so one cannot use this to object.

言。形亦應爾。以形於觸無決定故。顯有決定。故不相類。如是已破離顯有形。即顯亦非。故次頌曰。

即顯取顯色　　何故不由身

論曰。形若即是青等顯色。顯色如形應由身取。是則顯色身觸應知。即是形故。猶如形色。身觸知形不知其顯。故知顯色非即是形。此意說形非即顯色。不同知故。猶如樂音。形若與顯非即非離。應如車等其體非真。形體若實。如青色等。應與顯色或即或離。又諸形類無別極微。一一極微無長等故。離顯極微別有長等。極微自性難可了知。形顯極微。量既無別。云何離顯別有實形。亦不可說。一一極微有長等相。長等如粗體可分析。何謂極微。又諸極微量無差別。彼此共許。今說極微有長等相便違自宗。汝所學宗許極微量。無差別故。亦應信受。離顯無形。若言極微雖無長等而由積整合長等形。即顯極微整合長等。何須別執有形極微。又長等形非如青等。極細分析本相猶存。故長等形非色根境。無實體故。猶若空花。若諸極微非實長等。如何積整合長等耶。汝許極微體非粗大。云何積整合粗大耶。是故長等非。實有性。但是青等積集所成。

複次勝論宗中。離色等外別立實有同異性等。彼由能依色等勢力為色根境。此亦不然前說色等非色根取。故彼亦非色根境界。彼宗

有說。實等要因粗德色德合故方見。若無二德。應如極微及空中風。雖有不見。此亦不然。粗如長等。析即歸無。色非可見。並如前說。如何因斯能見實等。彼復有說。所依實等要由能依色故可見。如熱水中。水覆火色。雖有火實而不可見。即彼論中有破此說。青等染色染白衣時。不見白色應不見衣。不可說言。由見染色見染所依。染所依實與衣合故。亦得見衣。所以者何。水火二實既共和合。由見水色即見於水。亦應由此見於火實。彼宗二師俱不合理。且借彼一以破彼宗。為破彼執。復說頌曰。

離色有色因　　應非眼所見　二法體既異　　如何不別觀

論曰。色所依實名為色因。如是色因若離青等。應如味等非眼所見。色與色因性相若異。如青黃等應可別觀。實既離色。不可別觀。應如色體無別實性。實之與色亦可別觀。如見青黃二解別故。如是二解非色根識。假合生故如非實心。

複次或勝論者作如是言。諸色實有。而言聚色非實有故不可見者。若執一處。有眾多色可有此過。我說同類處必不同。故於一處唯有一色。無此過者。此亦不然。若色實有應不可見。無細分故。如虛空等。此因不定。以色性等亦無細分而可見故。汝云何知離色體外別有色性。復云何知色性可見。為破彼執。故說離色

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：有人說，實體等要素需要粗大的屬性和顏色屬性結合才能被看見。如果沒有這兩種屬性，就應該像極微（最小的物質單位）和空中的風一樣，即使存在也無法被看見。但這種說法是不對的。粗大如長短等屬性，分析到最後就歸於虛無。顏色並非可見，這些都如前面所說。怎麼能因為這些就能看見實體等要素呢？他們又說，所依賴的實體等要素要通過能依賴的顏色才能被看見，就像熱水中，水覆蓋了火的顏色，即使有火的實體也無法被看見。但他們的理論中也有反駁這種說法的。青色等染料染白衣服時，看不見白色，就應該看不見衣服。不能說，因為看見了染料的顏色，所以看見了染料所依賴的物體。染料所依賴的實體與衣服結合在一起，所以也能看見衣服。為什麼這麼說呢？水和火兩種實體既然共同結合在一起，因為看見了水的顏色就看見了水，也應該因此看見火的實體。他們的宗派的兩位論師都不合理。暫且借用他們其中一位的觀點來反駁他們的宗派。爲了反駁他們的執著，又說了下面的偈頌：『離開顏色有顏色之因，應該不是眼睛所能看見的。兩種法的體性既然不同，為什麼不能分別觀察？』論述說，顏色所依賴的實體稱為顏色之因。像這樣的顏色之因如果離開青色等顏色，就應該像味道等一樣不是眼睛所能看見的。顏色和顏色之因的性質如果不同，就像青色和黃色等一樣應該可以分別觀察。實體既然離開了顏色，就不能分別觀察，應該像顏色本身一樣沒有不同的實體性質。實體和顏色也可以分別觀察，就像看見青色和黃色兩種不同的理解一樣。像這樣的兩種理解不是色根的意識，因為是虛假結合產生的，就像不是真實的內心一樣。再次，或者勝論者這樣說，各種顏色是真實存在的，但聚積的顏色不是真實存在的，所以不可見。如果執著於一個地方有多種顏色，可能會有這種過失。我說同類的處所必定不同，所以在同一個地方只有一種顏色，沒有這種過失。這種說法也是不對的。如果顏色是真實存在的，就應該不可見，因為沒有細微的部分，就像虛空等一樣。這個因是不確定的，因為顏色的性質等也沒有細微的部分，但是可以看見。你怎麼知道離開顏色本體之外還有不同的顏色性質？又怎麼知道顏色性質是可見的？爲了反駁他們的執著，所以說離開顏色。

【English Translation】 English version: Some say that entities (實, shí) and other elements can only be seen when combined with coarse attributes and color attributes. If these two attributes are absent, they should be like the ultimate particles (極微, jí wēi) and the wind in the sky, which cannot be seen even if they exist. But this statement is incorrect. Coarse attributes such as length are reduced to nothing when analyzed. Color is not visible, as mentioned earlier. How can one see entities and other elements because of these? They also say that the entities and other elements that are relied upon can only be seen through the color that relies on them, just like in hot water, the water covers the color of the fire, and even if the entity of fire exists, it cannot be seen. But there are refutations of this statement in their own theories. When blue dye is used to dye white clothes, if the white color cannot be seen, then the clothes should not be seen. It cannot be said that because the color of the dye is seen, the object that the dye relies on is seen. The entity that the dye relies on is combined with the clothes, so the clothes can also be seen. Why is this so? Since the two entities of water and fire are combined together, because the color of water is seen, the water is seen, and the entity of fire should also be seen because of this. The two teachers of their sect are both unreasonable. Let's borrow the viewpoint of one of them to refute their sect. To refute their attachment, the following verse is said: 'The cause of color apart from color, should not be seen by the eye. Since the nature of the two dharmas is different, why can't they be observed separately?' The treatise says that the entity that color relies on is called the cause of color. If such a cause of color is separated from colors such as blue, it should not be seen by the eye, just like taste and other things. If the nature of color and the cause of color are different, they should be able to be observed separately, just like blue and yellow. Since the entity is separated from color, it cannot be observed separately, and should not have a different entity nature like the color itself. The entity and color can also be observed separately, just like seeing two different understandings of blue and yellow. Such two understandings are not the consciousness of the color root, because they are produced by false combination, just like not being a real mind. Furthermore, or the Vaiśeṣika (勝論者, Shèng lùn zhě) say that various colors are real, but accumulated colors are not real, so they are invisible. If one is attached to having multiple colors in one place, there may be this fault. I say that places of the same kind must be different, so there is only one color in the same place, and there is no such fault. This statement is also incorrect. If color is real, it should be invisible, because there are no subtle parts, just like space and other things. This cause is uncertain, because the nature of color and other things also do not have subtle parts, but they can be seen. How do you know that there is a different color nature outside of the color body? And how do you know that the color nature is visible? To refute their attachment, it is said to be apart from color.

有色因等。此中色性說為色因。色智色言藉此生故。若此色性異色體一。周遍一切離青等處。亦應可見離青等處。既不可見。色性定應非眼所見。有作是言。若執色性其體周遍。容有此失。我說色性隨自所依。各各不同。無斯過者。此亦不然。若色性等隨自所依體不同者。無青等處。青等欻生。有青等處。青等欻滅。爾時色性與所依色。其處不同。應各別立。而汝不許云何無過。若言色性有遷動能。轉至余處或復新起。是即此性非一非常。既許一常體應周遍。還同前失。離青等處亦應可見。既不可見。應非眼境。豈不中間或余法上無了因故不可見耶。何名爲了因。謂形量差別。若爾色性應不可見。所依諸色無形量故。又此色性應非眼見。體周遍故。如聲性等。色與色性體相若異。應可別觀如青黃等。然此二種不可別觀。是色是性故無有異。不可說言。見而不了。是色是性二相差別。色性相異應如青黃。為緣發生似己見故。能見既同。所見應一。故離色外無別色性。既無色性離色可見。如何比量因不定耶。餘聲性等隨其所應。一一研尋例如前破。

複次勝論宗中說。地水火有色觸故。皆為眼身二根所得。世間共許。地等三大是眼所見身所覺故。風唯身得。以無色故。此亦不然。已破眼見。當破身覺。若隨世間共所

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：有色因等等。這裡所說的『色性』，可以被認為是『色』的『因』。因為對於『色』的認知和描述都依賴於它。如果這個『色性』與『色』的本體是同一的，並且普遍存在於一切地方，那麼在沒有青色等顏色的地方，也應該能夠看到『色性』。既然在沒有青色等顏色的地方看不到『色性』，那麼『色性』一定不是眼睛所能看到的。有人這樣說：如果認為『色性』的本體是普遍存在的，那麼可能會有上述的錯誤。我認為『色性』隨著它所依賴的物體而各自不同，這樣就不會有上述的過失。這種說法也是不對的。如果『色性』等等隨著它所依賴的物體而本體不同，那麼在沒有青色等顏色的地方，青色等顏色突然產生；在有青色等顏色的地方，青色等顏色突然消失。這時，『色性』和它所依賴的『色』，它們的位置不同，應該各自獨立存在。但是你們不允許這樣，怎麼能說沒有過失呢？如果說『色性』具有移動的能力，可以轉移到其他地方或者重新產生，那麼這個『色性』就不是單一不變的。既然承認它是單一不變的，那麼它的本體就應該是普遍存在的，這樣就和前面的錯誤一樣了，在沒有青色等顏色的地方也應該能夠看到『色性』。既然在沒有青色等顏色的地方看不到『色性』，那麼『色性』就不應該是眼睛所能感知的對象。難道不是因為中間或者其他法上沒有明顯的『了因』（hetu）所以才看不到嗎？什麼叫做『了因』呢？就是指形狀和大小的差別。如果這樣，那麼『色性』應該就是不可見的，因為它所依賴的各種『色』沒有形狀和大小。而且，這個『色性』應該不是眼睛所能看到的，因為它的本體是普遍存在的，就像聲音的『聲性』一樣。『色』和『色性』如果本體不同，應該可以分別觀察到，就像青色和黃色一樣。但是這兩種東西不能分別觀察到，因為它們是『色』也是『色性』，所以沒有不同。不能說，看到了但是不清楚，因為『色』和『色性』的兩種形態沒有差別。『色性』和『色』的形態不同，應該像青色和黃色一樣，因為作為緣而發生，看起來像自己所見到的那樣。能見的能力既然相同，所見的對象應該就是同一個。所以，在『色』之外沒有其他的『色性』。既然沒有『色性』，離開『色』就可以看到，怎麼能說比量推理的『因』是不確定的呢？其餘的『聲性』等等，根據它們各自的情況，一一研究，例子和前面一樣可以被駁倒。

再次，勝論派（Vaisheshika）中說，地、水、火因為有顏色和觸覺，所以都能被眼睛和身體這兩種感官所感知，這是世間普遍認可的。地等三大是眼睛所能看到，身體所能感覺到的。風只能被身體感覺到，因為它沒有顏色。這種說法也是不對的，已經駁斥了眼睛所見，接下來駁斥身體所覺。如果按照世間的普遍認知……

【English Translation】 English version: There are causes of color, and so on. Here, 'color-nature' (色性, rupa-svabhava) is said to be the cause of color (色因, rupa-hetu). Because knowledge and description of color arise from it. If this color-nature is identical to the substance of color and pervades everything, then it should also be visible in places devoid of blue, etc. Since it is not visible in places devoid of blue, etc., color-nature is definitely not what the eye sees. Some say: If one holds that color-nature is pervasive in its substance, then there might be this fault. I say that color-nature varies according to what it depends on, so there is no such fault. This is also not right. If color-nature, etc., differ in substance according to what they depend on, then in places without blue, etc., blue, etc., would suddenly arise; and in places with blue, etc., blue, etc., would suddenly disappear. At that time, color-nature and the color it depends on would be in different places and should be established separately. But you do not allow this, so how can you say there is no fault? If you say that color-nature has the ability to move, transferring to other places or newly arising, then this nature is neither one nor permanent. Since you admit that it is one and permanent, its substance should be pervasive, which is the same as the previous fault: it should also be visible in places devoid of blue, etc. Since it is not visible, it should not be an object of the eye. Isn't it because there is no clear 'hetu' (了因, linga-hetu) in the middle or on other dharmas that it is not visible? What is called a 'hetu'? It refers to differences in shape and size. If so, then color-nature should be invisible, because the various colors it depends on have no shape or size. Moreover, this color-nature should not be seen by the eye, because its substance is pervasive, like the 'sound-nature' (聲性, shabda-svabhava) of sound. If color and color-nature differ in substance, they should be observable separately, like blue and yellow. But these two cannot be observed separately, because they are color and also color-nature, so there is no difference. One cannot say, 'I see but do not understand,' because the two aspects of color and color-nature have no difference. Color-nature and color should be different, like blue and yellow, because they arise as conditions and appear like what one sees. Since the ability to see is the same, what is seen should be the same. Therefore, there is no separate color-nature apart from color. Since there is no color-nature, it can be seen apart from color, so how can you say that the 'reason' (因, hetu) in the inference is uncertain? The remaining 'sound-nature', etc., should be examined one by one according to their respective situations, and the examples can be refuted as before.

Furthermore, in the Vaisheshika (勝論宗) school, it is said that earth, water, and fire, because they have color and touch, can be perceived by both the eye and the body. This is universally accepted in the world. The three great elements, earth, etc., are what the eye can see and the body can feel. Wind can only be felt by the body because it has no color. This is also not right. The eye's perception has already been refuted, and next, the body's perception will be refuted. If according to the common knowledge of the world...

許者。身唯能覺觸德非余。所以者何。故次頌曰。

身覺于堅等　　共立地等名　故唯于觸中　　說地等差別

論曰。世間身覺堅濕暖動。便共施設地水火風。是故唯觸名為地等。非離觸外有別所依。地等四實此義意言。地等四實不離於觸。身所覺故。如堅等觸。若執地等非觸所攝。應如味等非身所覺。若於堅等立地等名。則無所諍。體無別故。若立地等是觸所依。非即堅等。違此比量。頌中初半明地等大。自相身覺即觸所攝。後半明彼地等共相。非觸所攝。身不能覺。唯是分別意識所知。前色性等自相共相。隨其所應類亦應爾。

複次地等諸大。于燒等時無異相生。故非根境。如燒瓶等。于熟位中有異相生。謂赤色等。此諸異相德句所攝。離此無別實句相生。如何可言。離德別有地等實句身根所覺。為顯此義。故復頌曰。

瓶所見生時　　不見有異德　體生如所見　　故實性都無

論曰。瓶等燒時有赤色等。諸德相起現見異前。除此更無實句瓶體。與未燒位差別而生。瓶等實句若別有體。應如德句有異相起。能燒所燒和合等位。既無有別實句相生。應如空等非實有性。亦非色根所取境界。但是分別意識所知。世俗諦收假而非實。

複次外道余乘。各別所執粗顯境相。我已略遮

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：問：什麼是『許』？答：身體只能覺察到觸覺的特性，而不能覺察到其他的。為什麼這麼說呢？因此接下來說偈頌：『身體覺察到堅硬等，共同建立地等名稱，所以只有在觸覺中，才說地等的差別。』論述：世間上的身體覺察到堅硬、潮濕、溫暖、運動，就共同施設為地、水、火、風。因此只有觸覺才能稱為地等，並非離開觸覺之外還有別的所依。地等四種實體，這是從意義上來說的。地等四種實體不離開觸覺，因為是身體所覺察到的，就像堅硬等觸覺。如果認為地等不是觸覺所包含的，就應該像味覺等一樣不是身體所覺察到的。如果在堅硬等上面建立地等名稱，那就沒有什麼可爭論的，因為本體沒有差別。如果說地等是觸覺所依賴的，但不是堅硬等本身，那就違背了這個比量。頌文的前半部分說明地等四大（Mahābhūta）的自相是身體所覺察到的，也就是觸覺所包含的。後半部分說明地等的共相不是觸覺所包含的，身體不能覺察到，只是分別意識所知。前面的色性等的自相和共相，也應該按照各自的情況類推。進一步說，地等諸大（Mahābhūta），在燃燒等時候沒有不同的相產生，所以不是根的境界，就像燃燒的瓶子等，在燒熟的時候有不同的相產生，比如紅色等。這些不同的相是被『德』（Guna）的範疇所包含的，離開這些就沒有別的『實』（Dravya）的範疇產生。怎麼能說離開『德』（Guna）之外，還有地等『實』（Dravya）的範疇是身體的根所覺察到的呢？爲了顯示這個意義，所以又說偈頌：『瓶子被燒時，不見有異德，本體如所見，所以實性都無。』論述：瓶子等燃燒的時候，有紅色等各種『德』（Guna）的相產生，顯現出和之前不同。除了這些，就沒有別的『實』（Dravya）的瓶子本體，和未燃燒的時候有差別而產生。瓶子等的『實』（Dravya）如果另有本體，就應該像『德』（Guna）的範疇一樣有不同的相產生。能燃燒的和所燃燒的結合等時候，既然沒有別的『實』（Dravya）的相產生，就應該像虛空等一樣不是真實存在的性質，也不是色根所取的境界，只是分別意識所知，屬於世俗諦所包含的假象而不是實有。更進一步說，外道和其他乘，各自所執著的粗顯的境界相，我已經略微遮破了。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: What is '許' (Xu, acceptance/permission)? Answer: The body can only perceive the characteristic of touch, and not others. Why is that? Therefore, the following verse is said: 'The body perceives hardness, etc., jointly establishing the names of earth, etc. Therefore, only in touch are the differences of earth, etc., spoken of.' Treatise: The worldly body perceives hardness, wetness, warmth, and motion, and jointly establishes them as earth, water, fire, and wind. Therefore, only touch can be called earth, etc.; there is no other basis apart from touch. The four realities of earth, etc., are spoken of in this sense. The four realities of earth, etc., are inseparable from touch because they are perceived by the body, like the touch of hardness, etc. If one holds that earth, etc., are not included in touch, they should not be perceived by the body, like taste, etc. If the names of earth, etc., are established on hardness, etc., then there is nothing to dispute, because the substance is not different. If it is said that earth, etc., are what touch relies on, but are not hardness, etc., themselves, then this contradicts the analogy. The first half of the verse clarifies that the self-characteristics of the great elements (Mahābhūta) such as earth, etc., are perceived by the body, which is included in touch. The second half clarifies that the common characteristics of earth, etc., are not included in touch; the body cannot perceive them, and they are only known by the discriminating consciousness. The self-characteristics and common characteristics of the preceding color-nature, etc., should also be inferred accordingly. Furthermore, the great elements (Mahābhūta) such as earth, etc., do not produce different appearances during burning, etc., so they are not the objects of the senses, like burning pots, etc., which produce different appearances when fired, such as red color, etc. These different appearances are included in the category of 'qualities' (Guna); apart from these, no other category of 'substance' (Dravya) is produced. How can it be said that apart from 'qualities' (Guna), there is a category of 'substance' (Dravya) such as earth, etc., that is perceived by the body's senses? To illustrate this meaning, the following verse is said: 'When a pot is fired, no different qualities are seen to arise; the substance arises as seen. Therefore, substantiality is completely absent.' Treatise: When pots, etc., are fired, various qualities (Guna) such as red color arise, appearing different from before. Apart from these, there is no other substantial pot-entity (Dravya) that arises differently from the unfired state. If the substance (Dravya) of pots, etc., had a separate entity, it should produce different appearances like the category of qualities (Guna). Since no other substantial appearance (Dravya) is produced when the burner and the burned combine, it should not be a real nature like space, etc., nor is it the object taken by the color-sense; it is only known by the discriminating consciousness and belongs to the conventional truth, which is an illusion and not real. Furthermore, I have briefly refuted the coarse and manifest realms of objects that are clung to by other paths and non-Buddhist schools.

。今當總破外道余乘遍計所執一切境相。謂彼境相略有二種。一有質礙。二無質礙。有質礙境皆可分析。有質礙故。如舍如林。析即歸空。或無窮過。是故不可執為實有。無質礙境亦非實有。無質礙故。猶若空花。又所執境略有二種。一者有為。二者無為。諸有無法從緣生故。猶如幻事非實有體。諸無為法亦非實有。以無生故。譬似龜毛。又所執境一一法上。隨諸義門有眾多性。若是實有。應互相違。復析歸空或無窮過。又所執色應非實色。是所知故。猶如聲等。廣說乃至。所執諸法應非實法。是所知故。猶如色等。由此道理。一切所執若有若無皆非真實。諸有智者應正了知。有無等境皆依世俗。假立名相。非真勝義。複次已破其境。復為破根。先破余乘。故說頌曰。

眼等皆大造　　何眼見非余

論曰。眼等五根皆四大種。所造凈色為其自性。故契經言。謂四大種所造凈色。名眼等根。此世俗言非勝義說。若執為實其義不成。所以者何。同是造色。何緣見用。唯眼非余。未見世間二法相似。所起作用更互不同。豈不諸根其相有異。謂各能作自識所依。此果有異非相差別。相既無別。果如何異。用有異故。其果不同。現見世間用殊相一。如諸藥草。損益用別。堅等相同。相既是同。用應非異。又應諸根即是

【現代漢語翻譯】現在應當總的破除外道和其他乘（指小乘）所普遍計度的執著，即一切境相。他們所執著的境相略有二種：一是有質礙的，二是無質礙的。有質礙的境都可以分析，因為它們有質礙，就像房屋和樹林一樣。一旦分析，最終歸於空，或者導致無窮的過失。因此，不可執著它們為真實存在。無質礙的境也不是真實存在，因為它們沒有質礙，就像空中的花朵一樣。此外，所執著的境略有二種：一是有為法，二是無為法。所有的有為法都是從因緣而生，就像幻術一樣，沒有真實的自體。所有的無為法也不是真實存在，因為它們沒有生起，就像烏龜的毛一樣。此外，在所執著的每一個法上，隨著各種義理的角度，存在著眾多的自性。如果是真實存在，這些自性應該互相違背，最終分析歸於空，或者導致無窮的過失。此外，所執著的色法應該不是真實的色法，因為它是所知的對象，就像聲音等一樣。廣泛地說，所執著的一切法應該不是真實的法，因為它是所知的對象，就像色法等一樣。由於這些道理，一切所執著的，無論是有還是無，都不是真實的。所有有智慧的人應該正確地瞭解，有和無等境都是依據世俗的觀念，假立名相，並非真正的勝義諦。其次，已經破除了他們所執著的境，現在進一步破除他們的根（指眼耳鼻舌身意六根）。首先破除其他乘（指小乘）的觀點，所以說偈頌：『眼等皆大造，何眼見非余』論曰：眼等五根都是由四大種（地水火風）所造的清凈色，這是它們的自性。所以契經上說：『所謂四大種所造的清凈色，名為眼等根。』這只是世俗的說法，不是勝義的說法。如果執著它們為真實存在，這個道理是不能成立的。為什麼呢？同樣是造色，為什麼見的作用只有眼根才能做到，而不是其他的根呢？沒有見過世間兩種相似的事物，所起的作用會互相不同。難道不是因為諸根的相狀有所差異嗎？因為各自能夠作為自識所依，所以果報有所不同，但這並不是相狀上的差別。相狀既然沒有差別，果報怎麼會有不同呢？因為作用不同，所以果報不同。現在看到世間作用不同但相狀相同的事物，就像各種藥草一樣，損害和利益的作用不同，但堅硬等性質相同。相狀既然相同，作用應該沒有差異。那麼，諸根應該就是...

【English Translation】 Now, we should completely refute the externalist and other vehicles' (referring to Hinayana) universally conceived attachments, that is, all objective appearances. The objective appearances they are attached to can be broadly divided into two types: one with material obstruction and the other without material obstruction. All objects with material obstruction can be analyzed because they have material obstruction, like houses and forests. Once analyzed, they ultimately return to emptiness or lead to infinite faults. Therefore, they cannot be clung to as truly existent. Objects without material obstruction are also not truly existent because they lack material obstruction, like flowers in the sky. Furthermore, the objects they are attached to can be broadly divided into two types: conditioned phenomena and unconditioned phenomena. All conditioned phenomena arise from causes and conditions, like illusions, and have no real self-nature. All unconditioned phenomena are also not truly existent because they have no arising, like turtle hair. Moreover, on each phenomenon they are attached to, there are numerous natures according to various perspectives of meaning. If they were truly existent, these natures should contradict each other, ultimately analyzing to emptiness or leading to infinite faults. Furthermore, the form they are attached to should not be true form because it is an object of knowledge, like sound, etc. Broadly speaking, all phenomena they are attached to should not be true phenomena because they are objects of knowledge, like form, etc. Due to these reasons, all that is clung to, whether existent or non-existent, is not real. All wise people should correctly understand that objects such as existence and non-existence are based on conventional concepts, falsely established names, and are not the true ultimate truth (paramārtha). Next, having refuted their attached objects, we will further refute their roots (referring to the six sense organs: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind). First, refute the views of other vehicles (referring to Hinayana), so the verse says: 'The eyes and others are all created by the great elements, why does the eye see and not the others?' The treatise says: The five sense organs, such as the eye, are all pure forms created by the four great elements (earth, water, fire, and wind), which is their nature. Therefore, the sutra says: 'The pure forms created by the four great elements are called the eye and other sense organs.' This is only a conventional statement, not an ultimate statement. If you cling to them as truly existent, this reasoning cannot be established. Why? Since they are all created forms, why is it that only the eye can perform the function of seeing, and not the other sense organs? It has never been seen in the world that two similar things have different functions. Is it not because the characteristics of the sense organs are different? Because each can serve as the basis for its own consciousness, the results are different, but this is not a difference in characteristics. Since the characteristics are not different, how can the results be different? Because the functions are different, the results are different. Now we see in the world things that have different functions but the same characteristics, like various herbs, which have different functions of harm and benefit, but the same properties of hardness, etc. Since the characteristics are the same, the functions should not be different. Then, the sense organs should be...

大種。生識用別名眼等根。如即堅等作用不同。得藥草名種種差別。此不應然。相用體一。名有異故。由見等用有差別故。即顯眼等相有差別。非有別用。依無別相。用既不同相必有異。故離大種別有義成。若爾藥草用既不同。亦應離大別有其體。許有別體于義何違。若如見等全離大種。義可無違。然非全離。何得無違。若言眼等性類雖同而相有異。便違自宗。汝宗性類即法體相。性類既同。相由何異。不可一體有同不同。二相差別俱非假有。如一色上無有青黃二相差別。若一法性可分二相。于中一一復應可分。如是展轉應析至空。或至無窮。常非實有。又眼等根體由何異。由見等因有差別故。豈非見等同用大種。以為其因。云何有別。若由大種有差別故。所生見等有差別者。即應依此差別大種。眼識等生何用眼等。非唯大種是見等因。如何可言。彼無異故。見等無別。復有何因。謂善惡業。此業復由貪樂見等眾緣展轉差別而生。由此業故見等有異。若多滿業別感見等。其義可然。若唯一業總感一身。如何有異。又色界身業無差別唯厭味等一業所招。彼界諸根應無差別。若言一業有多功能。故所感身諸根別者。業與功能俱是作用。如何一用而有多用。不言一用復有多用。但說一體有多功能。由此功能發生多果。如同分

眼。體雖是一而能生識及生自類。假說可然。實云何爾。一即是多。理相違故。若許一業有多功能。感多根者何不許業。唯感一根能生多識。如是抑難於理何益。又一根處有損益時。余根亦應同有損益。又若一根身應鄙陋。我不抑汝。令唯一根。但欲挫汝一業多用。又業力故。無有諸根同時損益。如地獄中。雖有猛火焚燒其身。而彼有情諸根不滅。又由根處身相端嚴。如青盲人形非鄙陋。又若一業能生多果。以生別識證有別根。如是比量應不成立。此有彼有。此無彼無。但可成立差別功能。不應證有差別體相。又即此業差別功能。何不能生差別諸識。諸識生時業已滅故。無能生用。若爾眼等應不從彼業用而生。若業所引習氣猶存能生眼等。何不從彼業引習氣諸識生耶。此不應然。生無色界眼等五識。應亦現行業習所依。識體有故。立有色根。無如是失。生無色界大種無故。造色亦無。何緣生彼無大種耶。離色貪故。即由此因損害識種。故眼等識于彼不生。此不應然。非於境界離貪慾故。能緣識種亦被損害。勿于欲界。得離欲者。或於三界得離欲者。能緣彼識畢竟不生。若言所依由自地業所引發故能生諸識。身生色界于欲界境應不能緣。若爾應言。生無色界無境界故。彼識不生。何故不緣下地境起。若言于彼已離貪故不

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本眼（眼睛）。雖然說身體是一個整體，但能夠產生意識以及產生同類的感覺。假設這樣說是可以的，但實際上是怎樣的呢？如果說一個是多，這在道理上是相違背的。如果允許一個業（karma）有多種功能，能夠感知多個根（感官），為什麼不允許一個業只感知一個根，卻能產生多種意識呢？這樣強行辯駁又有什麼用呢？而且，如果一個根在某個地方受到損害或得到益處，其他的根也應該同樣受到損害或得到益處。再者，如果只有一個根，身體應該顯得醜陋鄙俗。我並不強迫你只承認一個根，只是想挫敗你認為一個業有多種用途的觀點。而且，由於業力的緣故，不會有所有的根同時受到損害或得到益處。比如在地獄中，雖然有猛火焚燒身體，但那些眾生的所有根都不會滅亡。還有，由於根的緣故，身體的相貌會端正莊嚴，比如盲人雖然看不見，但形體並不醜陋鄙俗。再者，如果一個業能夠產生多種結果，那麼通過產生不同的意識來證明有不同的根，這樣的比量（推理）應該不能成立。因為『此有彼有，此無彼無』，只能證明有不同的功能，不應該證明有不同的體相。而且，為什麼這個業的不同功能不能產生不同的意識呢？因為當各種意識產生的時候，業已經滅亡了，沒有產生的作用了。如果這樣，那麼眼等（眼睛等）應該不是從那個業的作用而產生的。如果說業所引發的習氣仍然存在，能夠產生眼等，為什麼不從那個業所引發的習氣產生各種意識呢？這不應該這樣說。生無（無色界）沒有眼等五識，應該也是現行業習所依賴的。因為識的體性存在，所以說有色根，沒有這樣的過失。生無沒有大種（四大元素），所以造色也沒有。為什麼會產生沒有大種的情況呢？因為離開了對色的貪慾。正是因為這個原因，損害了識的種子，所以眼等識在那裡不會產生。這不應該這樣說。不是因為對境界離開了貪慾，能夠緣取的識的種子也會被損害。不要在欲界，得到離欲的人，或者在三界得到離欲的人，能夠緣取那個識就畢竟不產生。如果說所依賴的根由自己所在地的業所引發，所以能夠產生各種意識，那麼生無在欲界的境界中應該不能緣取。如果這樣，應該說，生無沒有境界的緣故，那個識不會產生。為什麼不緣取下地的境界而生起呢？如果說因為對那個境界已經離開了貪慾，所以不緣取。

【English Translation】 English version Eye. Although the body is one, it can generate consciousness and produce its own kind. Hypothetically speaking, it may be so. But what is the reality? If one is many, it contradicts reason. If it is allowed that one karma has multiple functions, capable of sensing multiple roots (senses), why not allow one karma to sense only one root but generate multiple consciousnesses? What is the benefit of such forceful argument? Moreover, if one root is harmed or benefited in one place, the other roots should also be similarly harmed or benefited. Furthermore, if there is only one root, the body should appear ugly and base. I am not forcing you to acknowledge only one root, but merely want to thwart your view that one karma has multiple uses. Moreover, due to the power of karma, there will not be all the roots being harmed or benefited simultaneously. For example, in hell, although fierce fires burn the body, all the roots of those beings do not perish. Also, due to the roots, the appearance of the body will be upright and dignified, such as a blind person, although unable to see, does not have an ugly and base form. Furthermore, if one karma can produce multiple results, then using the generation of different consciousnesses to prove the existence of different roots, such an analogy should not be established. Because 'this exists, that exists; this does not exist, that does not exist,' can only prove the existence of different functions, and should not prove the existence of different entities. Moreover, why can't the different functions of this karma generate different consciousnesses? Because when the various consciousnesses arise, the karma has already ceased, and has no generating function. If so, then the eyes, etc., should not arise from the function of that karma. If the habitual tendencies induced by karma still exist and can generate eyes, etc., why don't the various consciousnesses arise from the habitual tendencies induced by that karma? This should not be said in this way. The formless realm (Arupaloka) does not have the five consciousnesses of the eyes, etc., and should also be dependent on the present active habitual tendencies. Because the nature of consciousness exists, it is said that there are form roots, and there is no such fault. The formless realm does not have the great elements (four great elements), so there is no form either. Why does the situation of not having the great elements arise? Because of leaving the desire for form. It is precisely because of this reason that the seed of consciousness is harmed, so the consciousnesses of the eyes, etc., do not arise there. This should not be said in this way. It is not because one has left desire for the realm that the seed of consciousness that can apprehend is also harmed. Do not let it be that in the desire realm, those who have attained detachment from desire, or those who have attained detachment from desire in the three realms, the consciousness that can apprehend that realm will ultimately not arise. If it is said that the dependent root is induced by the karma of its own realm, so it can generate various consciousnesses, then the formless realm should not be able to apprehend the realm of the desire realm. If so, it should be said that the formless realm does not have a realm, so that consciousness does not arise. Why does it not arise by apprehending the realm of the lower realm? If it is said that because one has already left desire for that realm, one does not apprehend it.

能緣者。此先已說。先何所說。謂生上地應不能緣下地境界。若即業種能生五識。不應根處有損益故。識隨損益。所以者何。非業習氣用彼為依。彼變異故。識隨變異。由現彼識有損益故。令業習氣亦有損益。所以者何。世間現有緣即心境妄分別識。能令余法損益事成。如在夢心妄謂心等。若不覺知根處損益。能依之識損益應無。此中必有微細覺受。如是等類問答無窮。恐厭繁詞。故應且止。諸法性相微細甚深。淺識之儔極難開悟。且應隨俗說有諸根。非卒研窮能契實義。故次頌曰。

故業果難思　　牟尼真實說

論曰。此頌義言。諸業眼等異熟因果。不可思議。唯有如來能深了達。非余淺識智力所行。應隨世間且說為有。非暫思擇能會其真。諸法實性內證所知。非世尋思所行境界。若執實有。理必不然。所以者何。違比量故。謂眼非見。如耳等根。耳亦非聞。如眼根等。鼻不能嗅。如舌等根。舌不能嘗。如鼻根等。身不能覺。如上諸根。一切皆由造色性故。或大種故。或業果故。又眼等根皆有質礙。故可分析令悉歸空。或無窮過。是故不應執為實有。但是自心隨因緣力。虛假變現如幻事等。俗有真無。

複次數論外道作如是言。色等境界皆二根取。謂眼等見及內智知。今應審察。見智于境。為同一

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

『能緣者』（指能夠緣取境界的事物）。這個問題前面已經說過了。前面說了什麼呢？就是說生到上界的天人，不應該能夠緣取地獄的境界。如果說業的種子能夠產生五識，那麼根和處（指六根和六處）就不應該有損益的變化，因為識是隨著損益而變化的。為什麼這樣說呢？因為業的習氣不是以根和處作為所依，而是以心為依。根和處發生變異，識也隨著發生變異。由於顯現的那個識有損益，所以使得業的習氣也有損益。為什麼這樣說呢？世間現在有緣取即心即境的虛妄分別識，能夠使其他法的損益成為事實。就像在夢中，心中虛妄地認為有心等等。如果不覺知根和處的損益，那麼所依的識的損益就應該沒有。這裡面必定有微細的覺受。像這樣的問答無窮無盡，恐怕大家厭煩冗長的言辭，所以應該暫時停止。諸法的體性和現象微細而深奧，淺薄的見識很難開悟。應該暫且隨順世俗的說法，說有諸根。不是一下子研究窮盡就能契合真實的意義。所以接著用頌說：『所以業果難思，牟尼真實說。』論中解釋說：這句頌的意思是說，諸業（指各種行為）以及眼等（指眼根等）的異熟（指不同時期的果報）因果，是不可思議的。只有如來（Tathagata，佛的稱號）能夠深刻地瞭解通達，不是其他淺薄的見識和智力所能達到的。應該隨順世間的說法，暫且說為有，不是暫時地思考選擇就能領會它的真諦。諸法的真實體性是內在證悟所知的，不是世間的尋思所能達到的境界。如果執著認為是實有，道理上必定是不成立的。為什麼這樣說呢？因為違背了比量（anumana，一種推理方式）的緣故。也就是說，眼不是見，就像耳等根一樣。耳也不是聞，就像眼根等一樣。鼻不能嗅，就像舌等根一樣。舌不能嘗，就像鼻根等一樣。身不能覺，就像上面的諸根一樣。一切都是由於造色（rupa，物質）的性質的緣故，或者由於大種（mahabhuta，組成物質的基本元素）的緣故，或者由於業果的緣故。而且，眼等根都有質礙（指有形體的阻礙），所以可以分析，使它們完全歸於空，或者導致無窮的過失。因此，不應該執著認為是實有。這只是自心隨著因緣的力量，虛假地變現，就像幻術等一樣。在世俗的層面是有的，在真實的層面是沒有的。再次，數論外道（Samkhya，古印度的一個哲學流派）這樣說：色等境界都是兩個根所取，就是眼等（指眼根等）的見和內在的智所知。現在應該審察，見和智對於境界，是同一的嗎？

【English Translation】 English version:

'The able-to-cognize' (referring to things that can cognize objects). This has already been discussed earlier. What was said earlier? It was said that beings born in higher realms should not be able to cognize the objects of lower realms. If the seeds of karma can produce the five consciousnesses, then the roots and places (referring to the six roots and six places) should not have increase or decrease, because consciousness changes with increase and decrease. Why is this so? Because the karmic habit is not based on the roots and places, but on the mind. When the roots and places change, consciousness also changes accordingly. Because the manifested consciousness has increase and decrease, it causes the karmic habit to also have increase and decrease. Why is this so? In the world, there is now the false discriminating consciousness that cognizes mind and object as one, which can make the increase or decrease of other dharmas a reality. Just like in a dream, the mind falsely thinks that there is mind, etc. If one is not aware of the increase or decrease of the roots and places, then the increase or decrease of the consciousness that relies on them should not exist. There must be subtle sensations in this. Such questions and answers are endless, and fearing that everyone will be tired of lengthy words, it should be stopped for now. The nature and characteristics of all dharmas are subtle and profound, and it is extremely difficult for shallow knowledge to be enlightened. One should temporarily follow the worldly saying that there are roots. It is not possible to grasp the true meaning by researching exhaustively all at once. Therefore, it is followed by a verse: 'Therefore, karmic results are difficult to fathom, the Muni (Buddha) truthfully said.' The treatise explains: The meaning of this verse is that the causes and effects of all karmas (referring to various actions) and the ripening (referring to the fruition in different times) of the eye, etc. (referring to the eye root, etc.) are inconceivable. Only the Tathagata (Tathagata, title of the Buddha) can deeply understand and penetrate them, not other shallow knowledge and intellectual power can reach. One should follow the worldly saying and temporarily say that they exist, not temporarily thinking and choosing can comprehend its truth. The true nature of all dharmas is known by inner realization, not the realm that worldly thinking can reach. If one clings to the belief that it is real, it must not be established in principle. Why is this so? Because it violates the anumana (anumana, a method of reasoning). That is to say, the eye is not seeing, like the ear root, etc. The ear is not hearing, like the eye root, etc. The nose cannot smell, like the tongue root, etc. The tongue cannot taste, like the nose root, etc. The body cannot feel, like the above roots, etc. All are due to the nature of rupa (rupa, matter), or due to the mahabhuta (mahabhuta, basic elements that make up matter), or due to karmic results. Moreover, the eye root, etc. all have obstruction (referring to physical obstruction), so they can be analyzed to make them completely return to emptiness, or lead to infinite faults. Therefore, one should not cling to the belief that they are real. This is just the mind falsely manifesting according to the power of conditions, like illusions, etc. It exists in the conventional level, but does not exist in the real level. Again, the Samkhya (Samkhya, an ancient Indian philosophical school) heretics say: Objects such as form are taken by two roots, that is, the seeing of the eye, etc. (referring to the eye root, etc.) and the knowing of the inner intellect. Now it should be examined, is the seeing and knowing of the intellect the same for the object?

時。為有先後。設許先後。誰后誰先。先後同時。皆不應理。所以者何。故次頌曰。

智緣未有故　　智非在見先　居后智唐捐　　同時見無用

論曰。見是智緣智隨見起。若未有見智必不生。如生盲人無了色智。是故智起定非見先。若居見后智即唐捐。見已了色智復何用。汝宗法起必為我須。非但隨因任運起故。若見已了復須起智。應一境上了了無窮。若二同時見應無用。兩法俱有因果不成。如牛二角。如苦樂等。汝應不許見為智因。若智知境不由見生。盲聾等人應明瞭境。又不應有盲聾等人。以皆分明了色等故。又不應立五有情根。意獨能了色等境故。

複次有立眼耳境合方知。其理不然。故次頌曰。

眼若行至境　　色遠見應遲　何不亦分明　　照極遠近色

論曰。眼謂眼光是眼用故。不離眼故。亦得眼名。若此眼光行至色處。何故遠色見不淹遲。如何月輪與諸近色。舉目齊見無遲速耶。未見世間有行動物一時俱至遠近二方。由是因緣應立比量。照遠色見不至遠色。照近色見時無異故。如近色見。照近色見不至近色。照遠色見時無異故。如遠色見。又若眼光至色方見。極遠近色應見分明。與非近遠見應無異。既有差別。故非至境。非鼻等根。于香味觸有此遠近明昧不同。由是比

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

當時。如果說見和智有先後順序。假設有先後順序，那麼誰先誰后呢？如果說見和智是同時的，也都不合道理。為什麼呢？所以接著用頌文說：

『智緣未有故，智非在見先，居后智唐捐，同時見無用。』

論述說：見是智的緣，智隨著見而生起。如果沒有見，智一定不會產生。就像天生盲人沒有了別顏色的智慧一樣。因此，智的生起一定不是在見之前。如果智在見之後，那麼智就是白費力氣。見已經了別了顏色，智又有什麼用呢？你們宗派認為法的生起一定是爲了我的需要，不僅僅是隨因緣任運生起。如果見已經了別了，還需要生起智，那麼對於同一個境界的了別就應該無窮無盡。如果見和智是同時的，那麼見就應該沒有用處。兩種法同時存在，因果關係就不能成立，就像牛的兩隻角，就像苦和樂一樣。你們不應該允許見作為智的因。如果智知道境界不是由見產生的，那麼盲人和聾人應該也能明瞭境界。也不應該有盲人和聾人，因為他們都能分明了別顏色等等。也不應該設立五種有情根（pancha indriya），因為意根（mano-indriya）單獨就能了別顏色等境界。

再次，有人認為眼根（cakkhu-indriya）和境界（visaya）結合才能知覺，這個道理是不對的。所以接著用頌文說：

『眼若行至境，色遠見應遲，何不亦分明，照極遠近色。』

論述說：眼，指的是眼光，是眼的作用。因為是眼的作用，不離開眼，所以也可以稱為眼。如果這個眼光執行到色（rupa）的處所，為什麼看遠處的顏色不會延遲呢？為什麼月亮和近處的顏色，舉眼就能同時看到，沒有遲速的差別呢？沒有見過世間有行動的物體能夠同時到達遠處和近處兩個地方。因為這個原因，應該建立比量：照遠處的顏色，見（darsana）沒有到達遠處的顏色；照近處的顏色，見的時間沒有差異。就像近處的顏色被見一樣。照近處的顏色，見沒有到達近處的顏色；照遠處的顏色，見的時間沒有差異。就像遠處的顏色被見一樣。又如果眼光到達顏色才能看見，那麼極遠和極近的顏色應該看得一樣清楚，和非遠非近的顏色應該沒有差別。既然有差別，就不是到達境界。鼻子等根（ghana-indriya）對於香味觸（gandha, rasa, photthabba）沒有這種遠近明暗的不同。因此可以推斷出……

【English Translation】 English version:

At that time. If there is a sequence between seeing (darsana) and wisdom (jnana), assuming there is a sequence, who is first and who is last? If seeing and wisdom are simultaneous, that is also unreasonable. Why? Therefore, the following verse is said:

'If the cause of wisdom does not exist, wisdom is not prior to seeing. If it is after, wisdom is in vain. If simultaneous, seeing is useless.'

The treatise says: Seeing is the condition for wisdom, and wisdom arises following seeing. If there is no seeing, wisdom will certainly not arise, just as a person born blind has no wisdom to distinguish colors. Therefore, the arising of wisdom is definitely not before seeing. If wisdom is after seeing, then wisdom is in vain. Seeing has already discerned the color, what use is wisdom then? Your school believes that the arising of phenomena must be for my need, not just arising spontaneously according to conditions. If seeing has already discerned, and wisdom still needs to arise, then the discernment of the same object should be endless. If seeing and wisdom are simultaneous, then seeing should be useless. If two dharmas exist simultaneously, the cause-and-effect relationship cannot be established, like the two horns of a cow, like suffering and happiness. You should not allow seeing to be the cause of wisdom. If wisdom knows the object not through seeing, then the blind and deaf should also be able to clearly understand the object. There should also be no blind and deaf people, because they can all clearly distinguish colors, etc. There should also be no establishment of the five sense faculties (pancha indriya), because the mind faculty (mano-indriya) alone can distinguish colors and other objects.

Furthermore, some argue that the eye faculty (cakkhu-indriya) must combine with the object (visaya) to perceive, but this reasoning is incorrect. Therefore, the following verse is said:

'If the eye travels to the object, seeing distant colors should be delayed. Why is it not also clear, illuminating extremely distant and near colors?'

The treatise says: 'Eye' refers to the eye's light, which is the function of the eye. Because it is the function of the eye and does not leave the eye, it can also be called the eye. If this eye's light travels to the place of color (rupa), why is seeing distant colors not delayed? How is it that the moon and nearby colors are seen simultaneously with a glance, without any difference in speed? It has never been seen in the world that a moving object can reach both distant and near places simultaneously. Because of this reason, a syllogism should be established: When illuminating distant colors, seeing (darsana) does not reach distant colors; when illuminating near colors, the time of seeing is no different. Just like near colors being seen. When illuminating near colors, seeing does not reach near colors; when illuminating distant colors, the time of seeing is no different. Just like distant colors being seen. Also, if the eye's light reaches the color to be seen, then extremely distant and extremely near colors should be seen equally clearly, and there should be no difference from colors that are neither far nor near. Since there is a difference, it is not reaching the object. The nose and other faculties (ghana-indriya) do not have this difference in clarity between near and far for smells, tastes, and tactile sensations (gandha, rasa, photthabba). Therefore, it can be inferred that...

知眼不至境。于近遠境用差別故。猶如磁石。又眼趣色先見不見。二俱不然。故次頌曰。

若見已方行　　行則為無用　若不見而往　　定欲見應無

論曰。本為見色行趣于境。其色已見。行復何為見已方行。又違先立眼之與耳境合方知。亦不可言不見而往。眇無指的行趣何方。如瞽目人所欲趣向不定能至。此亦應然。不見而往應無住期。或於中間遇色便止。期心往者或果所求。或由力竭中塗而住。如是二種理既不成。更無第三。故非境合。

複次有說。眼根不合故見。此亦不然。故次頌曰。

若不往而觀　　應見一切色　眼既無行動　　無遠亦無障

論曰。不合體無相無別故。應見一切。或全不觀。所以者何。緣無差別。從緣有法差別不成。豈不諸色由遠由障而不見耶。眼既不行何遠何障而令不見若眼與色不合而見。應無遠近障無障殊。不合之因無差別故。有見不見。理不得成。又極遠名無實有體。云何能礙令見不生。非二中間諸法名遠。彼于見用不能礙故。若執中間諸法名遠。礙見用者。遠障應同。言眼趣色。亦有此過。謂極遠名無實體等。執眼為常行趣於色。實有此過。所以者何。執眼無常行趣於色。可言力竭不至遠方。若執眼常用無變壞行趣於色。過與前同。行與不行二俱有

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『知眼』（眼睛的認知能力）並非直接到達『境』（所觀察的外部對像）。因為對於近處和遠處的『境』，眼睛的認知運用了不同的方式。這就像磁石一樣（對不同距離的鐵塊有不同的吸引力）。而且，眼睛趨向于『色』（顏色和形狀），是先看到再行動，還是先行動再看到？這兩種說法都不對。所以接下來的頌文說：

『如果看到之後才行動，那麼行動就變得沒有意義了；如果沒看到就行動，那麼想要看到的目標應該無法實現。』

論述：原本是爲了看到『色』而行動，趨向于『境』。如果已經看到了『色』，那麼行動還有什麼意義呢？這違背了先前所說的『眼睛和耳朵與外部對像結合才能感知』的觀點。也不能說沒看到就行動，因為盲目地行動，沒有明確的目標，又怎麼能到達目的地呢？就像盲人一樣，想要去的地方不確定，就無法到達。這種情況也應該如此。沒看到就行動，應該沒有到達的期限。或者在半路遇到『色』就停下來。如果心中有目標而前往，或許能達到所求，或許因為力氣耗盡而停在半路。像這樣，兩種道理都不能成立，也沒有第三種可能。所以並非是眼睛和外部對像結合。

另外，有人說，眼睛不與『境』結合也能看到。這種說法也不對。所以接下來的頌文說：

『如果不前往就能觀察，那麼應該能看到一切顏色；眼睛既然沒有行動，就沒有遠近，也沒有阻礙。』

論述：如果不結合，本體就沒有差別，應該能看到一切。或者完全看不到。為什麼呢？因為沒有差別。從因緣產生的法，差別就無法成立。難道不是因為顏色有遠近和阻礙才看不到嗎？眼睛既然沒有行動，哪裡來的遠近和阻礙導致看不到呢？如果眼睛和顏色不結合就能看到，那麼應該沒有遠近的差別，沒有阻礙和無阻礙的差別。不結合的原因沒有差別，有看到和沒看到，道理就無法成立。而且，所謂的極遠，只是一個沒有實體的名稱，怎麼能阻礙看到呢？並非是兩者之間的諸法叫做遠，因為它們不能阻礙看到的作用。如果認為中間的諸法叫做遠，阻礙了看到的作用，那麼遠和阻礙應該相同。說眼睛趨向于顏色，也有這個過失，即所謂的極遠，只是一個沒有實體的名稱等等。如果認為眼睛是常態，行動趨向于顏色，確實有這個過失。為什麼呢？如果認為眼睛是無常的，行動趨向于顏色，可以說力氣耗盡而無法到達遠方。如果認為眼睛是常態，沒有變化和損壞，行動趨向于顏色，那麼過失和前面相同。行動和不行動，兩種說法都有問題。

【English Translation】 English version The 『knowing eye』 (the cognitive ability of the eye) does not reach the 『objects』 (external objects being observed) directly. Because for near and far 『objects』, the eye's cognition uses different methods. This is like a magnet (having different attraction to iron at different distances). Moreover, does the eye tend towards 『form』 (color and shape), seeing before acting, or acting before seeing? Neither of these is correct. Therefore, the following verse says:

『If one acts after seeing, then the action becomes meaningless; if one acts without seeing, then the desired object should not be seen.』

Discussion: Originally, one acts to see 『form』, tending towards the 『object』. If the 『form』 has already been seen, then what is the point of acting? This contradicts the previously stated view that 『the eye and ear can only perceive when combined with external objects』. It also cannot be said that one acts without seeing, because acting blindly, without a clear goal, how can one reach the destination? Just like a blind person, if the place one wants to go is uncertain, one cannot reach it. This situation should be the same. Acting without seeing should have no time limit for arrival. Or one stops halfway upon encountering 『form』. If one goes with a goal in mind, one may achieve what one seeks, or one may stop halfway due to exhaustion. Like this, neither of the two reasons can be established, and there is no third possibility. Therefore, it is not the combination of the eye and external objects.

Furthermore, some say that the eye can see without combining with the 『object』. This statement is also incorrect. Therefore, the following verse says:

『If one can observe without going, then one should be able to see all forms; since the eye has no movement, there is no near or far, and no obstruction.』

Discussion: If there is no combination, the substance has no difference, and one should be able to see everything. Or one cannot see anything at all. Why? Because there is no difference. From the dharma produced by conditions, difference cannot be established. Isn't it because colors have distance and obstruction that they cannot be seen? Since the eye has no movement, where do the distance and obstruction come from that cause it not to be seen? If the eye can see without combining with color, then there should be no difference between near and far, and no difference between obstruction and no obstruction. The reason for not combining has no difference, and the reason for seeing and not seeing cannot be established. Moreover, the so-called extreme distance is just a name without substance, how can it obstruct seeing? It is not the dharmas between the two that are called distance, because they cannot obstruct the function of seeing. If one believes that the dharmas in between are called distance, obstructing the function of seeing, then distance and obstruction should be the same. Saying that the eye tends towards color also has this fault, that is, the so-called extreme distance is just a name without substance, and so on. If one believes that the eye is constant, and the action tends towards color, there is indeed this fault. Why? If one believes that the eye is impermanent, and the action tends towards color, one can say that one is exhausted and cannot reach the distance. If one believes that the eye is constant, without change or damage, and the action tends towards color, then the fault is the same as before. Acting and not acting, both statements have problems.

過。故眼見色非行不行。豈不光明助眼令見光明被障故不見耶。夜分遠望珠燈中色。既隔闇障應不能觀。若言眼根雖不至色然同磁石遠近用殊。此亦不然。疑難等故。世間共見。何疑難耶。此亦不然。真俗異故。世間見俗汝執為真。世亦不知不合而見。如何可說與磁石同。

前諸頌中雖正破眼。亦兼破耳。以義同故。謂若耳根境合知者。不應遠近一時俱聞。聲從質來。既有遠近。不應一念同至耳根。耳無光明。不應趣境。設許趣境。過同眼根。又聲離質來入耳聞。亦不應理。鐘鼓等聲現不離質。遠可聞故。若耳與聲無聞而取。應如香等不辨方維。若耳與聲不合而取。應無遠近一切皆聞。不合體無相無別故。或應一切皆不能聞。是故耳根聲合不合。實取自境二俱不成。

複次若執眼根能見於色。應見自性。所以者何。故次頌曰。

諸法體相用　　前後定應同　如何此眼根　　不見於眼性

論曰。法體相用前後應同。展轉相望無別性故。眼若能見應如我思。於一切時以見為體。是則眼根不對境位。應常能見如對境時。彼位色無而有見用。應以眼體為其所觀。若無色時眼不能見。應有色位亦不能觀。又若眼根以見為體。應能自見如彼光明。即違自宗。根非根境。若不自見。應不見他。如生盲人都無

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

因此，眼見色並非行或不行。難道不是光明幫助眼睛才能看見嗎？如果光明被遮蔽，就看不見了。夜晚遠遠地看珠燈中的顏色，既然隔著黑暗的阻礙，應該不能看見。如果說眼根雖然不能到達色塵，但像磁石一樣，遠近作用不同，這也是不對的，因為有同樣的疑問和困難。世間普遍所見，有什麼疑問和困難呢？這也是不對的，因為真諦和俗諦不同。世間所見是俗諦，你卻執著為真諦。世間也不知道不接觸就能看見。怎麼能說和磁石一樣呢？

前面的頌文中雖然主要破斥眼根，但也兼破斥耳根，因為道理相同。如果說耳根與境相合才能知覺，就不應該遠近同時都能聽到。聲音從物體傳來，既然有遠近，就不應該在一念之間同時到達耳根。耳朵沒有光明，不應該趨向外境。假設允許趨向外境，過失和眼根相同。又，聲音離開物體進入耳朵才能聽到，也不合道理。鐘鼓等聲音現在不離開物體，遠處也能聽到。如果耳朵不與聲音接觸就能聽取，應該像香等一樣不能分辨方位。如果耳朵與聲音不接觸就能聽取，應該沒有遠近之分，一切都能聽到，因為不接觸的物體沒有形相，沒有差別。或者應該一切都不能聽到。所以，耳根與聲音接觸或不接觸，實際取用自身所對的境界，兩種情況都不能成立。

再者，如果認為眼根能看見色塵，應該能看見自己的體性。為什麼這樣說呢？所以接下來的頌說：

諸法體相用，前後定應同。如何此眼根，不見於眼性？

論曰：法的體、相、用，前後應該相同，輾轉相望沒有差別性。眼如果能見，應該像我的思想一樣，在任何時候都以見為體。這樣，眼根不對著外境的時候，應該常常能見，就像對著外境的時候一樣。那個時候沒有色塵卻有見的作用，應該以眼的本體作為它所觀察的對象。如果沒有色塵的時候，眼睛不能見，應該在有色塵的時候也不能觀察。又，如果眼根以見為體，應該能自己看見，就像光明一樣，這就違背了自己的宗義，根不是根的境界。如果不自己看見，應該看不見其他事物，就像天生的盲人一樣，什麼都看不見。

【English Translation】 English version:

Therefore, seeing color with the eye is neither 'going' nor 'not going'. Isn't it that light helps the eye to see? If the light is obstructed, it cannot see. Looking at the color of a pearl lamp from afar at night, since it is separated by the obstruction of darkness, it should not be visible. If it is said that although the eye-sense does not reach the color-object, it is like a magnet, with different functions at different distances, this is also incorrect, because there are the same doubts and difficulties. What doubts and difficulties are there in what is commonly seen in the world? This is also incorrect, because the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya) and the conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya) are different. What the world sees is the conventional truth, but you cling to it as the ultimate truth. The world also does not know that it can see without contact. How can it be said to be the same as a magnet?

Although the previous verses mainly refute the eye-sense, they also indirectly refute the ear-sense, because the reasoning is the same. If it is said that the ear-sense knows only when it is in contact with the object, then one should not be able to hear both near and far at the same time. Since sound comes from an object and has distance, it should not reach the ear-sense simultaneously in one thought-moment. The ear has no light, so it should not go towards the object. If it is allowed to go towards the object, the fault is the same as with the eye-sense. Also, it is unreasonable for sound to leave the object and enter the ear to be heard. Sounds from bells and drums, etc., are currently inseparable from the object, and can be heard from afar. If the ear takes the sound without contact, it should be like smells, unable to distinguish direction. If the ear takes the sound without contact, there should be no distinction between near and far, and everything should be heard, because objects that do not touch have no form and no difference. Or perhaps nothing should be heard at all. Therefore, whether the ear-sense is in contact with the sound or not, it is not possible to actually take its own object in either case.

Furthermore, if one holds that the eye-sense can see color-objects, it should be able to see its own nature. Why is this so? Therefore, the following verse says:

The essence, characteristics, and function of all dharmas (dharmas) should always be the same. How can this eye-sense not see its own nature?

The treatise says: The essence, characteristics, and function of dharmas should be the same before and after, and there should be no difference when viewed in relation to each other. If the eye can see, it should be like my thought, always having seeing as its essence. In this way, when the eye-sense is not facing an external object, it should always be able to see, just as when it is facing an object. At that time, there is no color-object, but there is the function of seeing, so the essence of the eye should be what it observes. If the eye cannot see when there is no color-object, it should not be able to observe even when there is a color-object. Also, if the eye-sense has seeing as its essence, it should be able to see itself, like light, which contradicts its own doctrine that the sense is not the object of the sense. If it does not see itself, it should not see others, like a person born blind, who sees nothing.

所見。又汝宗言。眼等色等諸法相用樂等所成。相用雖殊其體無別。眼見色體即是自觀。亦違自宗。根非根境。又眼見色稱實而觀。色與眼根體真是一。如能見色應見眼根。既不見根。應不見色。不可眼色體實有殊。勿違自宗。同樂等性不應說眼不稱實觀。勿違自宗。現量所攝。若言自見世事相違。此亦不然。體用別故。若言見用即是樂等。青等亦然。應不可見。若言根境其體有殊。便違自宗。俱樂等性不可一性。有眾多體轉變亦然。不離性故。若言其體即別即同。除汝巧言誰能說此。根境體一見境非根。如是宗言。極難信解。如破眼見。耳等例然。根境皆同樂等性故。又應一境一切根行。亦應一根行一切境。是則根境安立不成。故不應言諸根實有。

複次鵂鹠子言。我宗根境其性有異。不同彼失。所以者何。眼等五根隨其次第。即是火空地水風實。眼見三實。謂火地水及見於色。身覺四實。謂除其空。兼覺于觸。耳唯聞聲。鼻唯嗅香。舌唯嘗味。故我師宗不同彼失。若爾根境有異有同。異且可然。同如彼失。眼等火等其相不同。如何五根五實為性。地水火實。異青等故。非眼所觀。地水火風若體異觸。應非身覺。是故汝宗亦有多過。又彼宗執眼色意我四法合故能見於色。此亦不然。故次頌曰。

眼中無色

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：你（對方宗派）的觀點是，眼、色等諸法，由相、用、樂等構成。相和用雖然不同，但其本體沒有區別。眼見色，其本體就是自觀，這也違背了你自己的宗義。根不是根境。又說眼見色是如實而觀，色與眼根的本體真實是一。如果能見色，就應該能見眼根，既然不能見眼根，就不應該能見色。不可說眼和色的本體實際上有差別，否則就違背了你自己的宗義。與樂等性質相同，不應該說眼不能如實地觀察。不要違揹你自己的宗義，現量所攝。如果說自見，這與世俗之事相違背。這也不對，因為體和用是不同的。如果說見用就是樂等，那麼青等也應該如此，應該不可見。如果說根和境的本體有差別，就違背了你自己的宗義。俱樂等性質不可能是一性的。有眾多本體，轉變也是如此，因為不離其本性。如果說其本體既有差別又有相同，除了你巧言善辯，誰能說出這種話？根和境的本體是一，見境而非根，這樣的宗義，極難令人信服。如同破斥眼見一樣，耳等也是如此。因為根和境都具有相同的樂等性質。又應該一個境被所有根所行，也應該一個根行於所有境。這樣，根和境的安立就不能成立。所以不應該說諸根是實有的。其次，鵂鹠子（對方宗派的論師）說：『我宗的根和境，其性質是有差異的，不同於他們的過失。』為什麼呢？眼等五根，按照次第，分別是火、空、地、水、風的實體。眼見三種實體，即火、地、水，以及見色。身覺四種實體，即除了空之外，兼覺觸。耳只聞聲，鼻只嗅香，舌只嘗味。所以我的師宗不同於他們的過失。如果這樣，根和境有異有同。有異還可以，相同就如同他們的過失了。眼等和火等，其相不同，如何五根以五實為性質？地、水、火的實體，與青等不同，所以不是眼所能觀察的。地、水、火、風如果本體與觸不同，就不應該是身所覺知的。所以你的宗義也有很多過失。而且他們的宗義認為眼、色、意、我四法合在一起才能見色。這也是不對的。所以接下來說頌：『眼中無色』

【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, your (the opposing school's) view is that the eye, form, and other dharmas are composed of characteristics, functions, pleasure, and so on. Although the characteristics and functions are different, their essence is not distinct. The eye seeing form, its essence is self-observation, which also contradicts your own tenets. The root is not the root-object. Moreover, you say that the eye sees form as it truly is, and the essence of form and the eye-root are truly one. If one can see form, one should be able to see the eye-root. Since one cannot see the eye-root, one should not be able to see form. It is not permissible to say that the essence of the eye and form are actually different, lest you contradict your own tenets. Being of the same nature as pleasure and so on, one should not say that the eye does not observe truthfully. Do not contradict your own tenets, which are encompassed by direct perception. If you say it is self-seeing, this contradicts worldly affairs. This is also not right, because essence and function are different. If you say seeing function is the same as pleasure and so on, then the same should be true of blue and so on, and they should be invisible. If you say the essence of the root and object are different, then you contradict your own tenets. The nature of being together, and so on, cannot be of one essence. Having many essences, transformation is also the same, because it does not depart from its essence. If you say its essence is both different and the same, who can say such a thing except for your clever words? The essence of the root and object are one, seeing the object but not the root. Such a tenet is extremely difficult to believe and understand. Just as the seeing of the eye is refuted, so it is with the ear and so on. Because the root and object both have the same nature of pleasure and so on. Furthermore, one object should be acted upon by all roots, and one root should act upon all objects. In that case, the establishment of root and object cannot be established. Therefore, one should not say that the roots are truly existent. Secondly, the Owl Son (a teacher of the opposing school) says: 'The nature of the root and object in my school are different, unlike their faults.' Why is that? The five roots, the eye and so on, in their respective order, are the realities of fire, space, earth, water, and wind. The eye sees three realities, namely fire, earth, and water, and sees form. The body feels four realities, namely, excluding space, and also feels touch. The ear only hears sound, the nose only smells fragrance, and the tongue only tastes flavor. Therefore, my teacher's school is different from their faults. If that is so, the root and object are different and the same. Being different is acceptable, but being the same is like their faults. The eye and so on, and fire and so on, have different characteristics. How can the five roots be of the nature of the five realities? The realities of earth, water, and fire are different from blue and so on, so they are not observable by the eye. If the essence of earth, water, fire, and wind are different from touch, they should not be felt by the body. Therefore, your tenets also have many faults. Moreover, their tenets hold that the eye, form, mind, and self, when combined, can see form. This is also not right. Therefore, the following verse is said: 'In the eye, there is no form.'

識　　識中無色眼　色內二俱無　　何能合見色

論曰。眼色識二各別無二。非和合故。無見用生。三法合時與別無異。如何可執有見用生。有小乘說。此難不然。誰言合時與別無異。諸法一一雖各無能。而和合時相依有用。若和合位有異相生。與前不同。應非眼等。若和合位無異相生。與前既同。應無見用。若言同類有異相生。此亦不然。理相違故。類之與相其體不殊。如何可言類同相異。同異二義互相乖違。而言體一。必不應理。若眼等三能生見用。爾時見用應亦生三。不可同時有因有果。而三起見。非見起三。一剎那中彼此俱有。如何相望有因非因。又應同時無因果義。果體已有。豈復須因。若不同時應許先後。同時不立先後豈成。果時無因。果是誰果。因時無果。因是誰因。若爾應無一切因果。尚不許有。況立其無。而說種種因果不同。此世俗言。非為勝義。正破外道。兼破小乘。故此頌中唯破眼等。我或已破。故不重論。如破眼等合故見色。耳等亦應隨義而破。

複次耳所聞聲能成名句詮表法義勝色等塵。故於此中重審觀察。令知詮表俗有真無。為所聞聲能詮表義。為不爾耶。若爾何失。初且不然。故次頌曰。

所聞若能表　　何不成非音

論曰。所聞與音聲之異目。俱能顯義。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本識（vijñāna，意識）識中無色眼（cakṣus，眼根）色內二俱無何能合見色

    論曰。眼色識二各別無二。非和合故。無見用生。三法合時與別無異。如何可執有見用生。有小乘說。此難不然。誰言合時與別無異。諸法一一雖各無能。而和合時相依有用。若和合位有異相生。與前不同。應非眼等。若和合位無異相生。與前既同。應無見用。若言同類有異相生。此亦不然。理相違故。類之與相其體不殊。如何可言類同相異。同異二義互相乖違。而言體一。必不應理。若眼等三能生見用。爾時見用應亦生三。不可同時有因有果。而三起見。非見起三。一剎那中彼此俱有。如何相望有因非因。又應同時無因果義。果體已有。豈復須因。若不同時應許先後。同時不立先後豈成。果時無因。果是誰果。因時無果。因是誰因。若爾應無一切因果。尚不許有。況立其無。而說種種因果不同。此世俗言。非為勝義。正破外道。兼破小乘。故此頌中唯破眼等。我或已破。故不重論。如破眼等合故見色。耳等亦應隨義而破。

    複次耳所聞聲能成名句詮表法義勝色等塵。故於此中重審觀察。令知詮表俗有真無。為所聞聲能詮表義。為不爾耶。若爾何失。初且不然。故次頌曰。

所聞若能表       何不成非音

    論曰。所聞與音聲之異目。俱能顯義。

【English Translation】 English version Consciousness (vijñāna): Within consciousness, there is no color, no eye (cakṣus, eye sense organ). Within color, both are absent. How then can they combine to see color?

Treatise: The eye, color, and consciousness are distinct and not one. Because they are not combined, no function of seeing arises. When these three dharmas combine, there is no difference from being separate. How can one insist that the function of seeing arises? Some Hinayanists say that this objection is not valid. Who says that combination is no different from separation? Although each dharma is incapable on its own, they are useful when they depend on each other in combination. If a different characteristic arises in the state of combination, differing from before, it should not be the eye, etc. If no different characteristic arises in the state of combination, being the same as before, there should be no function of seeing. If you say that a different characteristic arises within the same category, this is also not valid because it contradicts reason. The category and the characteristic are not different in essence. How can you say that the category is the same but the characteristic is different? The meanings of 'same' and 'different' contradict each other, yet you say they are one in essence. This is certainly not reasonable. If the eye, etc., can produce the function of seeing, then the function of seeing should also produce the three. It is impossible to have cause and effect simultaneously. The three arise from seeing, not seeing from the three. They both exist in one kṣaṇa (instant). How can they be cause and non-cause in relation to each other? Also, there should be no cause-and-effect at the same time. If the substance of the effect already exists, why is a cause still needed? If they are not simultaneous, then succession should be allowed. If simultaneity is not established, how can succession be established? If there is no cause at the time of the effect, whose effect is it? If there is no effect at the time of the cause, whose cause is it? If so, there should be no cause and effect at all. It is not even allowed to exist, let alone establishing its absence. To say that various causes and effects are different is a worldly saying, not ultimate truth. It refutes the heretics and also the Hinayanists. Therefore, this verse only refutes the eye, etc. I may have already refuted it, so I will not discuss it again. Just as seeing color is refuted because of the combination of the eye, etc., the ear, etc., should also be refuted according to the meaning.

Furthermore, the sound heard by the ear can form names and sentences to express the meaning of the Dharma, surpassing dust such as color. Therefore, carefully examine this to understand that expression is conventionally existent but ultimately non-existent. Does the sound heard express meaning, or not? If so, what is the fault? Initially, it is not so. Therefore, the next verse says:

If what is heard can express, why does it not become non-sound?

Treatise: What is heard and sound are different terms, both capable of revealing meaning.

表即是詮。此中顯示聲不能詮。設許能詮。便失聲性。以聲自相定不能詮。無分別識所了知故。如余自相。又聲自相定不能表。所欲說義。同喻無故。如不共因。聲之共相非耳所聞。一一皆依多法成故。有細分故。如非實等。此若能詮便失聲性非所聞故。猶如樂等。非離聲性別有所聞。猶如色等。非聲性故。后亦不然。故次頌曰。

聲若非能詮　　何故緣生解

論曰。若所聞聲不能詮表。不應由此名句智生。唯句與名能詮表義。故於此處不說文身。又若語聲不能詮表。應同餘響非義智因。若爾不應聞聲了義。聞既了義應是能詮豈不意識耳識後生。依所聞聲假立共相。此能詮表引義智生。意識生時。聲與耳識二俱已滅。共相何依。聲體既無。誰之共相。若謂念力追憶前聲。心等依之假立共相。應心心法各別所緣。不隨心緣應非心法。若謂共相不要依聲。唯分別心假想建立。如何此相唯屬於聲。若言因聲而得起者。耳根識等豈非此因。又耳識生不緣共相。如何定作立共相因。若言如色見已便增。此亦同疑。不可為證。若言諸法功力難思。既爾云何強立共相。若言二相同依一聲自相先聞后意俱了。聲相既異。體云何同。心相既殊。體亦應別。不可意識二相合緣。念唯記前所取相故。若聲共相念不由聞。自相亦應不

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『表』（表示）即是『詮』（詮釋）。這其中顯示了聲音本身不能詮釋意義。假設允許聲音能夠詮釋意義，那麼就會喪失聲音的自性，因為聲音的自性是固定的，不能詮釋，因為它只能被無分別的意識所認知，就像其他的自性一樣。而且，聲音的自性也不能表達想要說的意義，因為沒有相同的比喻，就像不共因一樣。聲音的共相不是耳朵所能聽到的，因為每一個共相都依賴於多種法才能成立，而且有細微的差別，就像非實有等。如果這個共相能夠詮釋意義，那麼就會喪失聲音的自性，因為它不是耳朵所能聽到的，就像快樂等。沒有離開聲音的自性而能被聽到的東西，就像顏色等，因為它不是聲音的自性。後面的說法也是不成立的。所以接下來的頌文說：

『聲音如果不能詮釋，為什麼緣于聲音會產生理解？』

論曰：如果所聽到的聲音不能詮釋意義，那麼就不應該由此產生名句的智慧。只有句子和名稱能夠詮釋意義，所以在這裡不說文身（文字的形體）。而且，如果語言的聲音不能詮釋意義，那麼就應該像其他的聲響一樣，不是義理智慧的原因。如果這樣，就不應該聽到聲音而理解意義。既然聽到聲音就能理解意義，那麼聲音就應該是能詮釋的。難道不是意識在耳識之後產生，依靠所聽到的聲音假立共相，這個共相能夠詮釋意義，引導義理智慧的產生嗎？意識產生的時候，聲音和耳識都已經消滅了，共相依靠什麼呢？聲音的本體既然已經不存在，那麼共相又是誰的呢？如果說是依靠念力的追憶，回憶起之前的聲音，心等依靠它假立共相，那麼心和心法應該各有不同的所緣，不應該隨著心緣而轉，不應該是心法。如果說共相不需要依靠聲音，只是分別心假想建立的，那麼這個共相怎麼會只屬於聲音呢？如果說是因為聲音才得以產生，那麼耳根識等難道不是這個原因嗎？而且耳識的產生不緣于共相，怎麼能確定它是建立共相的原因呢？如果說就像看到顏色之後就會增長（對顏色的認識），這也同樣令人懷疑，不能作為證據。如果說諸法的功力難以思議，既然這樣，又為什麼要強行建立共相呢？如果說兩種相都依靠一個聲音，自相先被聽到，然後意識也理解了，聲音的相既然不同，本體怎麼會相同呢？心的相既然不同，本體也應該不同。意識不可能同時緣兩種相，因爲念只是記住之前所取的相。如果聲音的共相的念不是通過聽聞產生的，那麼自相也應該不能。

【English Translation】 English version 'Expression' is 'interpretation'. This shows that sound itself cannot interpret meaning. If it is allowed that sound can interpret meaning, then the self-nature of sound will be lost, because the self-nature of sound is fixed and cannot interpret, because it can only be recognized by non-discriminating consciousness, just like other self-natures. Moreover, the self-nature of sound cannot express the meaning to be said, because there is no same metaphor, just like the uncommon cause. The common characteristic of sound is not what the ear can hear, because each common characteristic depends on multiple dharmas to be established, and there are subtle differences, just like non-realities, etc. If this common characteristic can interpret meaning, then the self-nature of sound will be lost, because it is not what the ear can hear, just like happiness, etc. There is nothing that can be heard without leaving the self-nature of sound, just like colors, etc., because it is not the self-nature of sound. The latter statement is also not valid. So the following verse says:

'If sound cannot interpret, why does understanding arise from sound?'

Treatise says: If the sound heard cannot interpret meaning, then the wisdom of names and sentences should not arise from it. Only sentences and names can interpret meaning, so the body of words (the form of words) is not mentioned here. Moreover, if the sound of language cannot interpret meaning, then it should be like other sounds, not the cause of the wisdom of meaning. If so, one should not understand meaning by hearing sound. Since one can understand meaning by hearing sound, then sound should be able to interpret. Isn't it that consciousness arises after ear consciousness, relying on the sound heard to falsely establish a common characteristic, which can interpret meaning and lead to the arising of the wisdom of meaning? When consciousness arises, sound and ear consciousness have already disappeared, what does the common characteristic rely on? Since the substance of sound no longer exists, then whose common characteristic is it? If it is said that it relies on the power of mindfulness to recall the previous sound, and the mind, etc., rely on it to falsely establish a common characteristic, then the mind and mental dharmas should each have different objects, and should not follow the mind's object, and should not be mental dharmas. If it is said that the common characteristic does not need to rely on sound, but is only falsely established by discriminating mind, then how can this common characteristic only belong to sound? If it is said that it is because of sound that it can arise, then aren't the ear root consciousness, etc., the cause of this? Moreover, the arising of ear consciousness does not depend on the common characteristic, how can it be determined that it is the cause of establishing the common characteristic? If it is said that it is like seeing a color and then increasing (the knowledge of the color), this is also doubtful and cannot be used as evidence. If it is said that the power of all dharmas is inconceivable, then why forcibly establish a common characteristic? If it is said that the two characteristics both rely on one sound, the self-characteristic is heard first, and then consciousness also understands, since the characteristics of sound are different, how can the substance be the same? Since the characteristics of the mind are different, the substance should also be different. It is impossible for consciousness to simultaneously perceive two characteristics, because mindfulness only remembers the previously taken characteristic. If the mindfulness of the common characteristic of sound is not produced through hearing, then the self-characteristic should also not be.

聞而憶二先別了后可合緣。別了既無。合緣豈有。是故共相非實能詮。亦非音聲。定不能表。雖廣諍論而理難窮。應止傍言推尋本義。

複次執聲與耳合不合聞。多同色破。又聲與耳合故能聞。理必不然。故次頌曰。

聲若至耳聞　　如何了聲本

論曰。本謂說者。聲起源故。若聲離本來至耳聞。如何得知能發聲者。既了發處聲必不來。亦不應言耳往聲處。用無光質。何以知行。又詮表聲不可全了。所以者何。故次頌曰。

聲無頓說理　　如何全可知

論曰。名句細分漸次而生。耳不頓聞。如何全了。亦不應說追念故知。念必似前具如先辨。不可離念率爾能知。應不藉聞意別能了。若爾聾者應自了聲。或能說人言音無用。若言聞聲次第緣力引故全了。此亦不然。次全了心不必生故。若言全了必次聞生。此亦不然。天耳通后必隔定心。方全了故。又余意識從聞聲后。亦經多時方全了故。不可執有實詮表聲。先耳能聞后意能了。但是虛妄分別識心。變現言音謂為詮表。

複次應審推徴聲名何法。其體實有。是耳所聞。若爾不然。故次頌曰。

乃至非所聞　　應非是聲性　先無而後有　　理定不相應

論曰。未來聲體非耳所聞。眼等五根取現境故。則未來聲應非聲性。非所聞

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：聽聞和憶念這二者在先前分離之後，怎麼可能結合在一起產生關聯呢？既然已經分離了，結合的因緣又怎麼會存在呢？因此，共同存在的聲和相併非真實的能詮釋者，也不是聲音本身，肯定無法完全表達意義。即使廣泛地爭論，也難以窮盡真理。應該停止無關緊要的言論，去推尋根本的意義。進一步說，執著于聲音與耳朵結合或不結合才能聽聞，這與之前破斥色法的論證有很多相似之處。而且，如果說聲音與耳朵結合才能聽聞，這個道理必然是不成立的。所以接下來頌文說：『聲音如果到達耳朵才能被聽聞，如何瞭解聲音的本來源頭？』論曰：這裡所說的『本』，指的是說話的人，是聲音的起源之處。如果聲音離開其本來之處，到達耳朵才能被聽聞，那麼如何得知是誰發出的聲音呢？既然已經瞭解了聲音發出的地方，聲音必定沒有來到耳朵。也不應該說耳朵前往聲音發出的地方，因為耳朵沒有光芒和實體，怎麼知道它能移動呢？而且，詮釋和表達聲音不可能完全瞭解。為什麼這麼說呢？所以接下來頌文說：『聲音沒有同時表達一切的道理，如何能夠完全可知？』論曰：名句需要細緻地分辨，是逐漸產生的，而耳朵不是同時聽聞一切，如何能夠完全瞭解呢？也不應該說通過追憶才能知道，因為追憶必定類似於先前經歷，就像之前辨析的那樣。不可能離開憶念而突然就能知道。那麼，應該是不憑藉聽聞，而是通過意識來分別瞭解。如果這樣，那麼聾子應該也能自己瞭解聲音。或者能說話的人的言語就沒有用了。如果說聽聞聲音是按照次第，憑藉因緣的力量引導，所以才能完全瞭解，這也是不成立的。因為完全瞭解的心不一定產生。如果說完全瞭解必定是隨著聽聞而產生，這也是不成立的。因為獲得天耳通之後，必定要隔開禪定之心，才能完全瞭解。而且，其餘的意識從聽聞聲音之後，也經過很長時間才能完全瞭解。所以，不可執著于有真實的能詮釋表達的聲音，是先由耳朵聽聞，後由意識瞭解。這只不過是虛妄分別的識心，變現出言語聲音，認為它能詮釋表達。進一步說，應該仔細地推究審查，聲音和名稱是什麼樣的法？它的本體是真實存在的，並且是耳朵所能聽聞的嗎？如果這樣認為，那是不對的。所以接下來頌文說：『乃至不是所聽聞的，應該不是聲音的體性。先前沒有而後有，這個道理必定不相應。』論曰：未來的聲音，不是耳朵所能聽聞的，因為眼等五根只能取現在的境界。那麼，未來的聲音應該不是聲音的體性，因為不是所聽聞的。

【English Translation】 English version: How can hearing and recollection, after being separate, combine to create a connection? Since they are already separate, how can there be a cause for combination? Therefore, the co-existing sound and appearance are not the real expressers, nor are they the sound itself, and they definitely cannot fully express the meaning. Even with extensive debate, it is difficult to exhaust the truth. One should stop irrelevant speech and seek the fundamental meaning. Furthermore, the attachment to sound combining or not combining with the ear to enable hearing has many similarities to the previous refutation of form (rupa). Moreover, if it is said that sound must combine with the ear to be heard, this principle is certainly not established. Therefore, the following verse says: 'If sound must reach the ear to be heard, How can one understand the origin of the sound?' Commentary: The 'origin' here refers to the speaker, the source of the sound. If the sound leaves its origin and reaches the ear to be heard, how can one know who emitted the sound? Since the place where the sound originated is already known, the sound must not have come to the ear. It should also not be said that the ear goes to the place where the sound originates, because the ear has no light or substance, how can one know that it can move? Moreover, it is impossible to fully understand the interpretation and expression of sound. Why is that? Therefore, the following verse says: 'Sound does not have the principle of expressing everything at once, How can it be fully known?' Commentary: Names and sentences need to be carefully distinguished and are gradually produced, but the ear does not hear everything at once, how can it be fully understood? It should also not be said that one knows through recollection, because recollection must be similar to previous experiences, just as analyzed before. It is impossible to know suddenly without recollection. Then, one should understand separately through consciousness without relying on hearing. If so, then the deaf should also be able to understand sound themselves. Or the speech of those who can speak would be useless. If it is said that hearing sound is in sequence, guided by the power of conditions, so it can be fully understood, this is also not established. Because the mind that fully understands does not necessarily arise. If it is said that full understanding must arise with hearing, this is also not established. Because after obtaining divine hearing (天耳通), one must separate from the mind of samadhi (禪定) in order to fully understand. Moreover, the other consciousnesses also take a long time to fully understand after hearing the sound. Therefore, one should not cling to the idea that there is a real sound that can interpret and express, which is first heard by the ear and then understood by the consciousness. This is just the mind of false discrimination (虛妄分別), transforming speech and sound, and thinking that it can interpret and express. Furthermore, one should carefully investigate and examine, what kind of dharma (法) are sound and name? Is its substance real and can it be heard by the ear? If one thinks so, that is not correct. Therefore, the following verse says: 'Even what is not heard, Should not be the nature of sound. What is not there before and then exists, This principle is certainly not in accordance.' Commentary: The future sound is not heard by the ear, because the five senses (眼等五根), such as the eye, can only take the present realm. Then, the future sound should not be the nature of sound, because it is not heard.

故。如色等塵。若未來聲與現同類。現可聞故。彼亦名聲。應現在聲與彼同類。彼非聲故。現亦非聲。又從未來流入現在。現可從彼說為非聲。未來不從現在流入。如何由現說彼為聲。若現可聞是聲性者。應此聲性本無而生。則違汝宗。先有聲性。聲性先有。應非始生既非始生。后應無滅。無生無滅聲性應常。又過去聲應非聲性。非所聞故。如未來聲。若未非聲。流入現在。現是聲故。說彼為聲。應現在聲流入過去。過非聲故。現亦非聲。若爾則應三世聲性相待而立。皆非實聲。又現在聲從未來至得名生者。應過去聲從現在至亦說名生。則過去聲應名現在。后應更滅。若過去聲從現在至得名滅者。應現在聲從未來至亦說名滅。則現在聲應名過去。后應不滅。未來無二應說為常。有滅有生應名過現。如是推徴聲性散壞。色等亦爾。如理應思。

複次有數論者作是執言。心往境處方能了別。此亦同前根往境破。又不應說心離於根獨能了境。故次頌曰。

心若離諸根　　去亦應無用

論曰。心若離根定不能了。色等諸法去亦唐捐。若不待根心獨了境。盲聾等類應了諸塵。或復應無盲聾等類。此前已辨。無假重論。又養諸根心則明利。是故決定心不離根。有執內心其體周遍。用依各別往所了塵。用即是心現境

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本因此，如果色等塵（rupa-adi-dhatu，指色、聲、香、味、觸五種感官對像）與未來的聲音和現在的聲音是同類的，那麼因為現在的聲音可以被聽到，未來的聲音也應該被稱為『聲音』。如果現在的聲音與未來的聲音是同類的，而未來的聲音不是聲音，那麼現在的聲音也不是聲音。此外，如果未來的聲音流入現在，那麼現在的聲音可以被說成不是聲音，但未來聲音不是從現在流入的，怎麼能因為現在的聲音而說未來聲音是聲音呢？如果現在的聲音是可以被聽到的，並且具有聲音的自性（svabhava，事物固有的性質），那麼這種聲音的自性應該是本來沒有而產生的，這就違背了你們宗派的觀點，即聲音的自性是先已存在的。如果聲音的自性是先已存在的，那麼它就不應該是開始產生的，既然不是開始產生的，那麼之後就不應該有滅亡。沒有產生也沒有滅亡，聲音的自性就應該是常恒不變的。此外，過去的聲音不應該是聲音的自性，因為它不是可以被聽到的，就像未來的聲音一樣。如果過去的聲音不是聲音，當它流入現在時，因為現在是聲音，所以說過去的聲音是聲音。那麼現在的聲音流入過去，過去不是聲音，所以現在也不是聲音。如果是這樣，那麼過去、現在、未來三世的聲音自性就應該是相互依賴而成立的，都不是真實的聲音。此外，如果現在的聲音從未來而來才被稱作產生，那麼過去的聲音從現在而來也應該被稱作產生，那麼過去的聲音就應該被稱為現在，之後應該再次滅亡。如果過去的聲音從現在而來才被稱作滅亡，那麼現在的聲音從未來而來也應該被稱作滅亡，那麼現在的聲音就應該被稱為過去，之後應該不再滅亡。未來沒有二（指沒有產生和滅亡兩種狀態），應該被說成是常恒不變的。有滅亡有產生，應該被稱作過去和現在。像這樣推究，聲音的自性就會散壞。色等也是如此，應該如理思維。

其次，有些數論者（Samkhya，印度古代哲學流派）持有這樣的觀點：心（citta，意識）前往對像之處才能了別（jnana，認知）。這種觀點也和前面根前往對像之處的破斥一樣。不應該說心離開諸根（indriya，感覺器官）就能獨自了別對象。所以接下來的頌文說：

『心若離諸根，去亦應無用』

論曰：心如果離開諸根，就一定不能了別色等諸法，前往對象也是徒勞無功的。如果不依賴諸根，心就能獨自了別對象，那麼盲人、聾人等就應該能了別諸塵（visaya，感官對像）。或者應該沒有盲人、聾人等。這些之前已經辨析過了，無需再次論述。而且，滋養諸根，心就會明利。所以可以確定心不離開諸根。有些人認為內心其體周遍，用依各別，前往所了之塵，用即是心現境。

【English Translation】 English version Therefore, if forms and other sense objects (rupa-adi-dhatu, referring to the five sense objects: form, sound, smell, taste, and touch) are of the same kind as future sounds and present sounds, then because present sounds can be heard, future sounds should also be called 'sounds'. If present sounds are of the same kind as future sounds, and future sounds are not sounds, then present sounds are also not sounds. Furthermore, if future sounds flow into the present, then present sounds can be said to be not sounds, but future sounds do not flow from the present, so how can future sounds be called sounds because of present sounds? If present sounds are audible and have the nature of sound (svabhava, the inherent nature of things), then this nature of sound should be produced from nothing, which contradicts your sect's view that the nature of sound exists beforehand. If the nature of sound exists beforehand, then it should not be initially produced, and since it is not initially produced, it should not cease later. Without arising and without ceasing, the nature of sound should be constant. Furthermore, past sounds should not be the nature of sound, because they are not audible, just like future sounds. If past sounds are not sounds, when they flow into the present, because the present is sound, it is said that past sounds are sounds. Then present sounds flow into the past, and the past is not sound, so the present is also not sound. If this is the case, then the nature of sound in the past, present, and future should be established in mutual dependence, and none of them are real sounds. Furthermore, if present sounds are called arising only when they come from the future, then past sounds should also be called arising when they come from the present, then past sounds should be called the present, and then they should cease again. If past sounds are called ceasing only when they come from the present, then present sounds should also be called ceasing when they come from the future, then present sounds should be called the past, and then they should not cease. The future has no two (referring to the absence of both arising and ceasing), and should be said to be constant. Having ceasing and having arising should be called the past and the present. Investigating in this way, the nature of sound will be destroyed. The same is true for forms and other sense objects, and one should think about it rationally.

Secondly, some Samkhya philosophers (Samkhya, an ancient Indian philosophical school) hold the view that the mind (citta, consciousness) can only cognize (jnana, cognition) when it goes to the object. This view is refuted in the same way as the previous refutation of the senses going to the object. It should not be said that the mind can cognize objects independently of the senses (indriya, sense organs). Therefore, the following verse says:

'If the mind is separate from the senses, going would also be useless.'

Commentary: If the mind is separate from the senses, it will certainly not be able to cognize forms and other phenomena, and going to the object will also be in vain. If the mind can cognize objects independently of the senses, then the blind, the deaf, and others should be able to cognize sense objects (visaya, sense objects). Or there should be no blind, deaf, and others. These have been discussed before, and there is no need to discuss them again. Moreover, nourishing the senses will make the mind sharp. Therefore, it can be determined that the mind is not separate from the senses. Some people think that the inner mind is pervasive in its essence, and its function depends on each individual, going to the perceived object, and the function is the mind manifesting the object.

行相。起即了境。去復何為。不可執言別現別了。勿現色等了聲等塵。又心不應離用趣境。汝執體遍行趣何方。又不應然。故次頌曰。

設如是命者　　應常無有心

論曰。心若趣塵。體則不遍。心常往境。我應無心。然微細心身中恒有。睡眠悶等諸位常行。有息等故。夢可得故。勞倦增故。引覺心故。任持身故。觸身覺故。又若內身恒無心者。如死屍等。害應無愆。供應無福。則與空見外道應同。有執心體不遍不行。但用有行亦同此過。心用心體不相離故。又若心體往趣前塵。有觸內身應無覺受。應勤思慮不損內心。若執其心非自境合。應如余境。亦不能知。應一一心知一切境。或一一境一切心知。如是諸宗執實根境。皆不應理。應信非真。豈不大乘亦同此過。設許少實。此過應同若爾應無世間諸事。想顛倒故。謂彼非無想者是何。而由顛倒令謂世事是有非無。想謂想蘊。故次頌曰。

令心妄取塵　　依先見如焰　妄立諸法義　　是想蘊當知

論曰。初心生時取青等相。如立標幟為后憶持。取越色根所行境相。故名為想。由此想故。后時能憶境相分明。雖一切心皆有其想。而果位勝故說依先。以後分明顯先是有。此想妄立一切世間有情無情諸法義相。如依陽焰有水想生。誑惑自心亦為他說。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『行相』（Ākāra，形態）。如果心識的生起是爲了了別外境，那麼『去』（移動）又是爲了什麼呢？不應該執著于說『別現』（分別顯現）和『別了』（分別了別）。不要讓心識顯現色等，了別聲等塵境。而且，心識不應該離開作用而趨向外境。如果你們執著於心體是周遍的，那麼心識的『行』（移動）又趨向何方呢？這不應該是這樣的。所以接下來說偈頌：『設如是命者，應常無有心。』論曰：如果心識趨向塵境，那麼心體就不是周遍的。如果心識總是前往外境，那麼我就應該沒有心識。然而，微細的心識在身體中一直存在，在睡眠、昏悶等狀態中也一直執行，因為有呼吸等現象，因為可以做夢，因為勞累會增加，因為會引發覺知心，因為能任持身體，因為能觸及身體而產生感覺。而且，如果內在身體中一直沒有心識，就像死屍一樣，那麼作惡應該沒有罪過，供養應該沒有福報，那就和持『空見』（Śūnyatā-dṛṣṭi）的外道一樣了。有些人執著於心體不周遍也不移動，只是作用在移動，也同樣有這個過失，因為心識和心體是不可分離的。而且，如果心體前往前方的塵境，那麼觸及內在身體時應該沒有感覺。應該勤加思考，不要損害內心。如果執著於心識並非與自己的境界相合，那麼應該像對待其他境界一樣，也不能了知。應該一個心識了知一切境界，或者一個境界被一切心識了知。像這樣，各種宗派執著于真實的根和境界，都是不合理的，應該相信它們不是真實的。難道大乘也同樣有這個過失嗎？即使承認少許真實，這個過失也應該相同。如果這樣，那麼世間的一切事物都應該不存在，因為有『想顛倒』（Saṃjñā-viparyāsa）。所謂『彼非無想者是何』（那個沒有想的人是什麼），而由於顛倒，使得人們認為世間事物是存在的而不是不存在的。『想』（Saṃjñā）指的是想蘊。所以接下來說偈頌：『令心妄取塵，依先見如焰，妄立諸法義，是想蘊當知。』論曰：最初的心識生起時，取青色等的相狀，就像設立標記一樣，爲了以後憶持。取超越色根所行境界的相狀，所以名為『想』。由於這個『想』，後來能夠清晰地憶起境界的相狀。雖然一切心識都有『想』，但是果位的『想』更為殊勝，所以說『依先』，因為後來的分明顯現，先前是存在的。這個『想』虛妄地建立一切世間有情和無情諸法的意義和相狀，就像依靠陽焰而產生有水的想法一樣，迷惑自己的心，也迷惑他人。

【English Translation】 English version 『Ākāra』 (行相, aspect). If the arising of consciousness is for the purpose of cognizing external objects, then what is the purpose of 『going』 (去, movement)? One should not cling to the idea of 『separate manifestation』 (別現, separate appearance) and 『separate cognition』 (別了, separate knowing). Do not let consciousness manifest forms and cognize sounds and other sense objects. Moreover, consciousness should not leave its function to go towards external objects. If you cling to the idea that the nature of consciousness is pervasive, then where does the 『going』 (行, movement) of consciousness go? This should not be the case. Therefore, the following verse is stated: 『If it is asserted thus, there should always be no mind.』 Commentary: If consciousness goes towards sense objects, then the nature of consciousness is not pervasive. If consciousness always goes to external objects, then I should have no consciousness. However, subtle consciousness is always present in the body, and it always functions in states such as sleep and faintness, because there are phenomena such as breathing, because dreams are possible, because fatigue increases, because it triggers the mind of awareness, because it sustains the body, and because it touches the body and produces sensation. Moreover, if there is no consciousness in the inner body, like a corpse, then committing evil should not be a transgression, and making offerings should not bring merit, which would be the same as the heretics who hold the 『view of emptiness』 (Śūnyatā-dṛṣṭi). Some cling to the idea that the nature of consciousness is neither pervasive nor moving, but only its function is moving, which also has this fault, because consciousness and its nature are inseparable. Moreover, if the nature of consciousness goes to the sense objects in front, then there should be no sensation when touching the inner body. One should diligently contemplate and not harm the inner mind. If one clings to the idea that consciousness is not combined with its own object, then it should be like other objects, and it cannot be known either. One consciousness should know all objects, or one object should be known by all consciousnesses. Thus, various schools cling to the real roots and objects, which are all unreasonable, and one should believe that they are not real. Does the Mahayana also have this fault? Even if one admits a little reality, this fault should be the same. If so, then all things in the world should not exist, because there is 『perception-inversion』 (Saṃjñā-viparyāsa). What is meant by 『what is that which has no perception』 (彼非無想者是何)? And because of inversion, people think that worldly things exist and are not non-existent. 『Perception』 (想, Saṃjñā) refers to the aggregate of perception. Therefore, the following verse is stated: 『Causing the mind to falsely grasp objects, relying on previous views like a mirage, falsely establishing the meaning of all dharmas, this is known as the aggregate of perception.』 Commentary: When the initial consciousness arises, it grasps the appearance of blue, etc., like setting up a mark for later remembrance. It grasps the appearance of the object that transcends the realm of the sense organ of sight, so it is called 『perception』 (想, Saṃjñā). Because of this 『perception』, one can later clearly remember the appearance of the object. Although all consciousnesses have 『perception』, the 『perception』 of the fruition is more excellent, so it is said 『relying on previous』, because the later clear manifestation exists previously. This 『perception』 falsely establishes the meaning and appearance of all sentient and non-sentient dharmas in the world, just like relying on a mirage and generating the idea that there is water, deceiving one's own mind and also deceiving others.

由此妄想建立根塵及余世間諸事差別。為顯此想依多法成是假非真。故說想蘊。又顯世間法義差別。皆由想立。故說當知。豈不五識緣實有塵。隨五識行。意識亦爾。想與諸識境界必同。何得定言想為顛倒。誰言諸識緣實有塵。而妄為難。故次頌曰。

眼色等為緣　　如幻生諸識

論曰。如諸幻事體實雖無而能發生種種妄識。眼等亦爾。體相皆虛。如矯誑人。生他妄識想隨此發。境豈為真。根境皆虛。如先具述。此所生識亦復非真。所現皆虛猶如幻事。非諸識體即所現塵。勿同彼塵。識無緣慮。亦不離塵別有識體。離所現境識相更無。如何可言識體實有。如有頌曰。

彼能緣諸識　　非即所現塵　亦不離彼塵　　故無相可取

有說幻事皆實非虛。咒術功能加木石等。令其現似車馬等相。此相或用聲等為體。或體即是識之一分。為破彼救。故次頌曰。

若執為實有　　幻喻不應成

論曰。若幻是實聲等為體。如餘聲等應不名幻。若言幻事迅速不停。如化所為。故說名幻。此亦不然。體既實有。如餘聲等。何不名真。迅速不停亦非幻相。勿電光等亦得幻名。若言誑惑世間名幻。幻相非虛。何名誑惑。若言能生常等倒故。即應余法亦得幻名。又不應言幻是識分。非解了性。豈即是心。或應

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：由此虛妄的念想建立起根、塵（六根和六塵，即感覺器官和感覺對像）以及其他世間諸事的差別。爲了顯示這種念想是依靠多種條件形成的，是虛假的而不是真實的，所以說是想蘊。又爲了顯示世間法的意義差別，都是由念想建立的，所以說『當知』。難道不是五識緣取真實存在的塵境，意識也隨五識而行嗎？想與諸識的境界必定相同，怎麼能斷定說想是顛倒的呢？誰說諸識緣取真實存在的塵境，而用這種問題來發難呢？所以接著用頌文說：『眼色等為緣，如幻生諸識』論述：就像各種幻術，其本體實際上並不存在，卻能發生種種虛妄的意識。眼等也是這樣，其體性和現象都是虛假的，如同狡猾欺騙的人，產生他人虛妄的意識，念想隨著這些而發生，境界怎麼會是真實的呢？根和境都是虛假的，正如先前詳細敘述的。由此所產生的識也不是真實的，所顯現的都是虛假的，就像幻術一樣。不是說諸識的本體就是所顯現的塵境，不要把它們等同於那些塵境。識沒有緣慮，也不離開塵境而有另外的識體。離開了所顯現的境界，識的相狀就更不存在了，怎麼能說識的本體是真實存在的呢？正如頌文所說：『彼能緣諸識，非即所現塵，亦不離彼塵，故無相可取』有人說幻術都是真實的而不是虛假的，咒術的功能加持在木頭石頭等上面，讓它們顯現出像車馬等的形象。這些形象或者以聲音等為本體，或者本體就是識的一部分。爲了駁斥這種辯解，所以接著用頌文說：『若執為實有，幻喻不應成』論述：如果認為幻術是真實存在的，以聲音等為本體，就像其他的聲音等一樣，就不應該叫做幻術。如果說幻術的事情迅速不停留，就像變化所做的一樣，所以說叫做幻術，這也是不對的。本體既然是真實存在的，就像其他的聲音等一樣，為什麼不叫做真呢？迅速不停留也不是幻術的相狀，難道閃電等也可以叫做幻術嗎？如果說迷惑世間所以叫做幻術，幻術的相狀不是虛假的，那又迷惑了什麼呢？如果說能產生常等顛倒的認識，那就應該其他的法也可以叫做幻術。又不應該說幻術是識的一部分，不是解了的性質，怎麼就是心呢？或者應該...

【English Translation】 English version: From this deluded thought, the differences of the roots, dusts (the six sense organs and their corresponding objects), and other worldly affairs are established. To show that this thought is formed by relying on many conditions and is false rather than true, it is called the Skandha of Thought (Saṃjñāskandha). Furthermore, to show that the differences in the meanings of worldly dharmas are all established by thought, it is said, 'It should be known.' Isn't it the case that the five consciousnesses perceive actually existing dust realms, and the consciousness also follows the five consciousnesses? The realms of thought and the various consciousnesses must be the same, so how can it be definitively said that thought is inverted? Who says that the various consciousnesses perceive actually existing dust realms and uses this question to create difficulties? Therefore, the following verse is said: 'Eye, color, etc., as conditions, like illusions, give rise to various consciousnesses.' Treatise: Just like various illusions, whose substance actually does not exist but can give rise to various false consciousnesses, the eye and so on are also like this. Their substance and appearance are both false, like cunning and deceitful people, producing false consciousnesses in others. Thoughts arise along with these, so how can the realm be real? The roots and realms are both false, as previously described in detail. The consciousnesses produced from this are also not real, and what is manifested is all false, like illusions. It is not that the substance of the various consciousnesses is the same as the manifested dust realms; do not equate them with those dust realms. Consciousness has no object of thought, nor is there a separate substance of consciousness apart from the dust realms. Apart from the manifested realm, there is no further appearance of consciousness. How can it be said that the substance of consciousness is actually existent? As the verse says: 'Those consciousnesses that can perceive are not the manifested dust, nor are they apart from that dust, therefore, there is no characteristic to be grasped.' Some say that illusions are all real and not false. The power of mantras is applied to wood, stones, etc., causing them to appear like images of carts, horses, etc. These images either take sound, etc., as their substance, or the substance is a part of consciousness. To refute this defense, the following verse is said: 'If one insists they are real, the analogy of illusion cannot be established.' Treatise: If it is thought that illusions are actually existent, taking sound, etc., as their substance, then like other sounds, etc., they should not be called illusions. If it is said that the affairs of illusions are rapid and unceasing, like what is done by transformation, so they are called illusions, this is also not right. Since the substance is actually existent, like other sounds, etc., why is it not called real? Rapid and unceasing is also not the characteristic of illusion; can lightning, etc., also be called illusions? If it is said that they delude the world, so they are called illusions, and the appearance of illusion is not false, then what is being deluded? If it is said that they can produce inverted perceptions of permanence, etc., then other dharmas should also be called illusions. Furthermore, it should not be said that illusion is a part of consciousness; it is not the nature of understanding, so how can it be the mind? Or it should be...

異名。說唯識義。應信諸法皆不離心。如何一心實有多分。或應信受識體非真。若識是真而許多分。應一切法其體皆同。若識體一而現二分。如陽焰中現似有水。則不應言幻是識分。其體實有識無二故。非所執水是陽焰分。如何喻識體一分多。若爾大乘說何為幻。我所說幻。如世共知。覺慧推尋諸幻事性。實不可得。言豈能詮。故一切法皆如幻事。其中都無少實可得。如有頌言。

以覺慧推尋　　諸法性非有　故說為無性　　非戲論能詮

是故諸法因緣所生。其性皆空猶如幻事。若法性空而現似有。何異罥索籠系太虛。法性理然汝何驚異。世事難測。其類寔繁。為證斯言。故次頌曰。

世間諸所有　　無不皆難測　根境理同然　　智者何驚異

論曰。如一思業能感當來。內外無邊果相差別。極善工匠所不能為。是名世間第一難測。又如外種生長芽莖。無量枝條花葉根果。形色間雜嚴麗宛然。是名世間第二難測。又如淫女身似糞坑九孔常流種種不凈。而貪慾者見發淫情。是名世間第三難測。又如花樹。名曰無憂。淫女觸之。眾花競發枝條垂拂如有愛心。是名世間第四難測。又如花樹名好樂音。聞作樂聲舉身搖動。枝條嫋娜如舞躍人。是名世間第五難測。又如花樹名好鳥吟。聞鳥吟聲即便搖動。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：問：異名（不同的名稱）說的是唯識（唯有識）的意義，應該相信一切諸法都不離心。但為什麼說一心實際上有很多分呢？或者應該相信識的本體不是真實的。如果識是真實的，卻有很多分，那麼一切法的本體都應該相同。如果識的本體是一個，卻顯現出二分，就像陽焰（陽光下的海市蜃樓）中顯現出好像有水一樣，那麼就不應該說幻是識的一部分，因為它的本體是真實存在的，識沒有二元性。你所執著的水不是陽焰的一部分。如何用這個比喻來說明識的本體是一個，卻顯現出多分呢？如果是這樣，大乘（Mahayana）佛教所說的幻又是什麼呢？答：我所說的幻，就像世間普遍認知的那樣。用覺慧（覺悟的智慧）去推究各種幻事的性質，實際上是不可得的，言語又怎麼能完全表達呢？所以說一切法都如幻事，其中沒有絲毫真實可得。正如頌中所說：用覺慧去推尋，諸法的自性並非實有，所以說它是無自性的，不是戲論（無意義的言論）所能詮釋的。因此，一切諸法都是因緣（hetu-pratyaya）所生，它們的自性皆空，猶如幻事。如果法的自性是空的，卻顯現得好像存在，這和用罥索（繩索）籠罩虛空有什麼區別呢？法的自性本來如此，你又有什麼驚異的呢？世間的事情難以測度，種類繁多。爲了證明這一點，所以接著說：世間所有的一切，沒有不難以測度的，根（indriya）、境（visaya）的道理也是一樣，智者又有什麼驚異的呢？論：比如一個思業（思想行為）能夠感得未來無邊無際、內外不同的果報，這是極好的工匠也做不到的，這叫做世間第一難測。又比如外面的種子生長出芽莖，無量的枝條、花葉、根果，形狀顏色各不相同，非常美麗，這叫做世間第二難測。又比如女人的身體，好像糞坑一樣，九孔經常流出各種不乾淨的東西，但是貪慾的人卻認為頭髮、乳房很美，這叫做世間第三難測。又比如花樹，名叫無憂（Asoka），女人觸控它，眾花競相開放，枝條垂下來，好像有愛心一樣，這叫做世間第四難測。又比如花樹，名叫好樂音（Priyasravana），聽到音樂的聲音，全身搖動，枝條婀娜多姿，好像跳舞的人一樣，這叫做世間第五難測。又比如花樹，名叫好鳥吟（Priyabhana），聽到鳥叫的聲音，就搖動起來。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: The different names speak of the meaning of Vijnanavada (consciousness-only), and one should believe that all dharmas (phenomena) are inseparable from the mind. How can one mind actually have many parts? Or should one believe that the substance of consciousness is not real? If consciousness is real but has many parts, then the substance of all dharmas should be the same. If the substance of consciousness is one but manifests as two parts, like water appearing in a mirage, then it should not be said that illusion is a part of consciousness, because its substance is actually real, and consciousness has no duality. The water you cling to is not a part of the mirage. How can this metaphor be used to explain that the substance of consciousness is one but manifests as many parts? If so, what is illusion according to Mahayana Buddhism? Answer: The illusion I speak of is like what is commonly known in the world. When one investigates the nature of various illusory things with awakened wisdom (bodhi-jnana), it is actually unattainable, and how can words fully express it? Therefore, it is said that all dharmas are like illusions, in which there is not the slightest reality to be found. As the verse says: Using awakened wisdom to investigate, the nature of all dharmas is not real, therefore it is said to be without self-nature, and cannot be fully expressed by frivolous talk. Therefore, all dharmas are produced by causes and conditions (hetu-pratyaya), their nature is empty, like illusions. If the nature of dharmas is empty but appears to exist, what is the difference between using a snare to cover the void? The nature of dharmas is inherently so, why are you surprised? Worldly affairs are difficult to fathom and are of many kinds. To prove this, it is said next: Everything in the world is difficult to fathom, the principle of the roots (indriya) and objects (visaya) is the same, why are the wise surprised? Commentary: For example, a single thought-karma (thought-action) can bring about boundless, internal and external, different karmic retributions in the future, which even the best craftsman cannot do. This is called the first unfathomable thing in the world. Also, for example, an external seed grows into sprouts and stems, with countless branches, leaves, flowers, fruits, shapes, and colors that are mixed and beautiful. This is called the second unfathomable thing in the world. Also, for example, a woman's body is like a dung pit, with nine orifices constantly flowing with various impure things, but those who are greedy think that the hair and breasts are beautiful. This is called the third unfathomable thing in the world. Also, for example, a flower tree called Asoka (sorrowless), when a woman touches it, all the flowers bloom in competition, and the branches hang down as if with love. This is called the fourth unfathomable thing in the world. Also, for example, a flower tree called Priyasravana (fond of pleasant sounds), when it hears the sound of music, its whole body shakes, and the branches are graceful, like a dancing person. This is called the fifth unfathomable thing in the world. Also, for example, a flower tree called Priyabhana (fond of pleasant bird songs), when it hears the sound of birds singing, it shakes.

枝條嫋娜如喜抃人。是名世間第六難測。又如生上經無量生。退下生時便求母乳。騰躍嬉戲寢食貪淫。是名世間第七難測。又如欣樂無上菩提。應正勤修微妙善法。而行放逸撥法皆無。是名世間第八難測。又如厭舍迫迮居家。至道場中而營俗務。貪著財色無悔愧心。是名世間第九難測。又如凈定所發神通。妙用無邊不相障礙。隨心所欲一切皆成。是名世間第十難測。如是難測世事無邊。根境有無方之甚易。世俗故有。勝義故空。諸有智人不應驚異。為顯諸法俗有真空。故於品終。復說頌曰。

諸法如火輪　　變化夢幻事　水月彗星響　　陽焰及浮雲

論曰。如旋火輪變化夢等。雖現似有而實皆空。諸法亦然。愚夫妄執分別謂有。其體實無。離妄執時都無所見。如凈眼者不睹空花。無為聖智所見乃真。能緣所緣行相滅故。如是善順契經所言。有為識心所行非實。是故根境皆俗非真。由識所行如火輪等。諸外道輩所見非真。由執有無如眩翳等。欲求聖智除妄契真。應順如來圓凈法教。

大乘廣百論釋論卷第七大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1571 大乘廣百論釋論

大乘廣百論釋論卷第八

聖天菩薩本　護法菩薩釋

三藏法師玄奘奉　詔譯

破邊執品第六

如是

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：枝條嫋娜，如同喜悅而舞蹈的人。這被稱為世間第六種難以預測的事情。又比如投生到上界，經歷無量次的生命，一旦退墮到地獄，便開始尋求母乳，騰躍嬉戲，沉迷於睡眠和飲食，貪戀淫慾。這被稱為世間第七種難以預測的事情。又比如欣樂於無上菩提（Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi，無上正等正覺），本應精勤地修習微妙的善法，卻放縱懈怠，否定一切佛法。這被稱為世間第八種難以預測的事情。又比如厭惡捨棄狹隘的居家生活，來到道場中卻經營世俗事務，貪戀財物美色，沒有絲毫悔恨羞愧之心。這被稱為世間第九種難以預測的事情。又比如清凈禪定所引發的神通，其妙用無邊無際，沒有任何障礙，隨心所欲，一切都能成就。這被稱為世間第十種難以預測的事情。像這樣難以預測的世事無邊無際，根（indriya，感覺器官）和境（visaya，感覺對像）的有無，其實非常容易理解。世俗諦（samvrti-satya）上是存在的，勝義諦（paramartha-satya）上是空性的。有智慧的人不應該對此感到驚異。爲了顯示諸法在世俗諦上存在，而在勝義諦上是空性的，所以在這一品的結尾，再次用偈頌說道：『諸法如火輪，變化夢幻事，水月彗星響，陽焰及浮雲。』論曰：如同旋轉的火輪、變化和夢境等，雖然顯現得好像存在，但實際上都是空性的。一切諸法也是如此。愚昧的人虛妄地執著，分別認為它們是存在的，但它們的本體實際上是不存在的。當遠離虛妄執著時，就什麼也看不見。如同擁有清凈眼睛的人，不會看到空中的花朵。只有無為的聖智所見才是真實的，因為能緣（grahaka，能認知的主體）和所緣（grahya，被認知的客體）的行相都已滅盡。這樣就很好地順應了契經（sutra，佛經）所說，有為的識心所行都不是真實的。因此，根和境都是世俗諦上的存在，而不是真諦。由於識心所行就像火輪等，所以那些外道所見都不是真實的。由於執著于有和無，就像患有眼翳一樣。想要尋求聖智，去除虛妄，契合真理，就應該遵循如來圓滿清凈的法教。《大乘廣百論釋論》卷第七《大正藏》第30冊 No. 1571 《大乘廣百論釋論》《大乘廣百論釋論》卷第八聖天菩薩本，護法菩薩釋三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯破邊執品第六如是

【English Translation】 English version: The branches sway gracefully, like people rejoicing and dancing. This is called the sixth unfathomable thing in the world. Furthermore, like being born in the upper realms, experiencing countless lives, once fallen to the lower realms, one immediately seeks mother's milk, leaps and plays, indulging in sleep and food, and craving lust. This is called the seventh unfathomable thing in the world. Furthermore, like rejoicing in Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi (無上菩提，supreme complete enlightenment), one should diligently cultivate subtle virtuous dharmas, yet one indulges in negligence, denying all Buddhist teachings. This is called the eighth unfathomable thing in the world. Furthermore, like being weary of and abandoning the narrow confines of home life, yet engaging in worldly affairs in the Bodhimanda (道場，place of enlightenment),貪著財色，貪戀財物美色，without any remorse or shame. This is called the ninth unfathomable thing in the world. Furthermore, like the supernatural powers arising from pure Samadhi (凈定，pure concentration), their wondrous functions are boundless and without obstruction, whatever one desires, everything is accomplished. This is called the tenth unfathomable thing in the world. Like these unfathomable worldly affairs are boundless, the existence or non-existence of the indriya (根，sense organs) and visaya (境，sense objects) is actually very easy to understand. They exist in Samvrti-satya (世俗諦，conventional truth), and are empty in Paramartha-satya (勝義諦，ultimate truth). Wise people should not be surprised by this. In order to show that all dharmas exist in conventional truth, and are empty in ultimate truth, therefore at the end of this chapter, it is said again in verse: 『All dharmas are like a fire wheel, transformations, dreamlike events, water moon, comet's sound, mirage, and floating clouds.』 Treatise says: Like a rotating fire wheel, transformations, and dreams, although they appear to exist, they are actually all empty. All dharmas are also like this. Foolish people falsely cling, discriminating and thinking they exist, but their substance is actually non-existent. When one is away from false clinging, one sees nothing at all. Like those with pure eyes do not see flowers in the sky. Only what is seen by unconditioned noble wisdom is true, because the characteristics of the grahaka (能緣，the grasper) and the grahya (所緣，the grasped) have ceased. Thus, it well accords with what the sutra (契經，scripture) says, the activities of conditioned consciousness are not real. Therefore, the sense organs and sense objects are all conventional, not true. Because what consciousness acts upon is like a fire wheel, etc., what those non-Buddhists see is not true. Because of clinging to existence and non-existence, like having cataracts. If one wants to seek noble wisdom, remove falsehood, and accord with truth, one should follow the Tathagata's (如來，the Thus Come One) perfect and pure Dharma teachings. 《Mahayana Hundred Verses Treatise with Commentary》 Volume 7 《Taisho Tripitaka》 Volume 30 No. 1571 《Mahayana Hundred Verses Treatise with Commentary》《Mahayana Hundred Verses Treatise with Commentary》 Volume 8 By Bodhisattva Aryadeva (聖天菩薩), Commentary by Bodhisattva Dharmapala (護法菩薩) Tripiṭaka Master Xuanzang (玄奘) translated by imperial order Chapter Six on Refuting Extreme Views Thus

已辨根境皆虛。復為滌除非真句義邊執垢穢。故說頌曰。

諸法若實有　　應不依他成　既必依他成　　定知非實有

論曰。若一切法性相實有。應不依他而得成立。既色等法必依他成。如此彼岸定非實有。鵂鹠所執實等句義。有等為因而得顯了。有等句義復因實等。為自所依方可了別。又色等法待自因緣。及光明等而得顯現。不見少法自體為依。故色等塵皆非實有。若言相待雖立別名而此彼岸其體實有。即色等故。同喻不成。此說不然。色等相待體相無異。此彼兩岸相待有殊。故此彼岸非即色等。其體非實。同喻得成。又彼所宗實等句義。若無因立。應似空花。若有因成。應同幻事。故不可執其體實有。數論宗中色等諸法。不離樂等依樂等成。樂等亦應依他而立。若不爾者。轉變應無。有因無因類同前說。是故色等其體非真。複次諸外道宗執有瓶等。即色離色皆不得成。以必依他瓶等可了。如前同喻。其體非真。不可說言。瓶等即色瓶依色了。故不依他。所以者何。故次頌曰。

非即色有瓶

論曰。非即色體可立有瓶。聲等亦成瓶自性故。色非聲等為其自性。如何可立色即是瓶。聲等亦應非即瓶體。義同色破。故不別論。又一一瓶多法為體。色等不爾。如何即瓶。色等即瓶應如瓶一。瓶即色

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：已經辨明根（indriya，感覺器官）和境（visaya，感覺對像）都是虛幻的。爲了進一步洗滌那些執著于『非真』句義的垢穢，所以宣說了這首偈頌：

諸法如果真實存在，就不應該依賴其他條件才能成立；既然必定依賴其他條件才能成立，必定可知它不是真實存在的。

論曰：如果一切法的自性和現象是真實存在的，那麼它就不應該依賴其他條件而得以成立。既然色（rupa，形態）等法必定依賴其他條件才能成立，那麼如此的此岸和彼岸必定不是真實存在的。鵂鹠（貓頭鷹）所執著的『實』等句義，是因為『有』等才得以顯現；而『有』等句義又因為『實』等作為其所依賴的基礎，才能被瞭解。而且，色等法依賴於自身的因緣，以及光明等條件才能顯現，沒有見到任何法以自身為依據。所以色等塵境都不是真實存在的。如果說相互依賴雖然建立了不同的名稱，但是此岸和彼岸的本體是真實存在的，因為它們就是色等。這樣的比喻是不成立的。這種說法是不對的。色等相互依賴，其本體和現象沒有差異；而此岸和彼岸相互依賴，其差異是顯著的。所以此岸和彼岸不是色等，它們的本體不是真實的，所以這個比喻是成立的。而且，他們所宗奉的『實』等句義，如果沒有原因來成立，就應該像虛空中的花朵一樣；如果有原因來成立，就應該像幻化出來的事物一樣。所以不可執著於它的本體是真實存在的。在數論宗（Samkhya）中，色等諸法不離開樂（sukha，快樂）等，依賴於樂等而成立，那麼樂等也應該依賴於其他條件而成立。如果不是這樣，轉變就不應該發生。有原因和沒有原因的情況，與前面所說的情況相同。因此，色等的本體不是真實的。再次，那些外道宗派執著于瓶子等是存在的，無論是即色（與色相同）還是離色（與色不同）都不能成立，因為瓶子等必定依賴於其他條件才能被瞭解，如同前面的比喻一樣，它們的本體不是真實的。不能說瓶子等就是色，瓶子依賴於色才能被瞭解，所以不依賴於其他條件。為什麼呢？所以接下來說了這首偈頌：

不是即色有瓶

論曰：不是在色的本體上可以建立有瓶子。因為聲音等也成了瓶子的自性。色不是聲音等的自性，怎麼可以建立色就是瓶子呢？聲音等也應該不是瓶子的本體，道理與破斥色相同，所以不另外討論。而且，一個瓶子以多種法為本體，而色等不是這樣，怎麼能說就是瓶子呢？色等就是瓶子，應該像瓶子一樣是單一的，瓶子就是色。

【English Translation】 English version: It has already been discerned that the indriya (sense organs) and visaya (sense objects) are both illusory. To further cleanse the defilements of clinging to the meaning of 'non-true' statements, the following verse is spoken:

If all dharmas (phenomena) were truly existent, they should not depend on others to be established; since they must depend on others to be established, it must be known that they are not truly existent.

Treatise: If the self-nature and characteristics of all dharmas were truly existent, then they should not depend on others to be established. Since rupa (form) and other dharmas must depend on others to be established, then such a 'this shore' and 'that shore' must not be truly existent. The meaning of 'real' and other terms clung to by the owl (believed to be fond of clinging to fixed views) are revealed because of 'existence' and other terms; and the meaning of 'existence' and other terms can only be understood because 'real' and other terms serve as their basis of dependence. Moreover, rupa and other dharmas depend on their own causes and conditions, as well as light and other conditions, to appear; no dharma is seen to rely on itself as its basis. Therefore, rupa and other sense objects are not truly existent. If it is said that although different names are established through mutual dependence, the substance of 'this shore' and 'that shore' is truly existent because they are rupa and so on, then this analogy is not valid. This statement is incorrect. When rupa and so on are mutually dependent, their substance and characteristics are not different; but when 'this shore' and 'that shore' are mutually dependent, their differences are significant. Therefore, 'this shore' and 'that shore' are not rupa and so on, and their substance is not real, so this analogy is valid. Moreover, if the meaning of 'real' and other terms that they uphold is established without a cause, it should be like a flower in the sky; if it is established with a cause, it should be like an illusion. Therefore, one should not cling to the idea that its substance is truly existent. In Samkhya (enumeration) school, rupa and other dharmas do not depart from sukha (pleasure) and so on, and are established by relying on sukha and so on; then sukha and so on should also be established by relying on other conditions. If this is not the case, transformation should not occur. The situation with and without a cause is the same as described earlier. Therefore, the substance of rupa and so on is not real. Furthermore, those non-Buddhist schools cling to the existence of a pot and so on, but neither being identical to rupa (form) nor different from rupa can be established, because the pot and so on must depend on other conditions to be understood, just like the previous analogy, their substance is not real. It cannot be said that the pot and so on are rupa, and the pot depends on rupa to be understood, so it does not depend on other conditions. Why is that? Therefore, the following verse is spoken:

A pot does not exist as identical to rupa (form).

Treatise: It cannot be established that a pot exists as identical to the substance of rupa, because sound and so on also become the self-nature of the pot. Rupa is not the self-nature of sound and so on, how can it be established that rupa is the pot? Sound and so on should also not be the substance of the pot, the reasoning is the same as refuting rupa, so it is not discussed separately. Moreover, one pot has multiple dharmas as its substance, while rupa and so on are not like this, how can it be said that they are the pot? If rupa and so on are the pot, they should be as singular as the pot, and the pot is rupa.

等應如彼多。故不可言瓶。與色等體俱實有相即而成。若謂色體散時。體非瓶聚即轉為瓶。亦應色體散時。體是色聚轉成非色。若色聚時亦瓶亦色。是則一法應有二相。此前已破體應成多。是故瓶等非即色等。有作是說。離色有瓶。德實異故。應無此失。瓶依有等方可了知。是假非真已如前說。又不可執離色有瓶。所以者何。故次頌曰。

非離色有瓶

論曰。非離色等別有實句。瓶衣等物為色等依。所以者何。瓶衣等物若非色等。應如空等非色等依。是則應無瓶衣等物。以不共德無故如意。意必是無。非無常故。如先所破我虛空等。是故瓶等非離色等。若即若離。義既不成。瓶等皆虛。理應成立。

複次瓶等色等互相依成。理俱不然。故次頌曰。

非依瓶有色　　非有瓶依色

論曰。瓶等色等體皆非實。如何定立能依所依。此中依言或表因義。欲顯實德。因果不成。鵂鹠子執依瓶等因有色等果。此違比量。謂非色等瓶等為因。是色等聲所詮表故。取色等心所緣境故。如色性等常故無因。數論師執依色等因有瓶等果。亦違比量。謂非瓶等色等為因。不離彼故。樂等性故。即如色等彼執色等。與其有性非即非離。非即有故。應如兔角。非瓶等因。若言色等即是有性。應同有性體無差別。若言色

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

因此不能說瓶（ghata）與色（rupa）等實體具有相同的真實自性，從而相即而成。如果認為色體的分散狀態，其自性並非瓶的聚集狀態，因此轉變成為瓶，那麼也應該說色體分散時，其自性是色的聚集狀態，從而轉變成非色。如果色聚集時既是瓶又是色，那麼一個法就應該具有兩種相。此前已經破斥過，自性應該成為多種。因此，瓶等不是與色等相同。

有人這樣說：離開色而有瓶，因為德（guna）的實體不同，應該沒有這種過失。瓶依賴於有（bhava）等才能被瞭解，是虛假的而非真實的，這在前面已經說過了。又不能執著于離開色而有瓶。為什麼呢？所以接下來說：

『非離色有瓶』

論曰：不是離開色等而有實在的句義，瓶、衣服等物是色等的所依。為什麼呢？瓶、衣服等物如果不是色等，應該像空（akasa）等一樣不是色等的所依。這樣就應該沒有瓶、衣服等物。因為沒有不共的德，就像如意（cintamani）一樣。意必是沒有的，因為不是無常的緣故，就像先前破斥的我（atman）、虛空等一樣。因此，瓶等不是離開色等而存在的。如果即或離的意義都不能成立，瓶等都是虛假的，這個道理應該成立。

再次，瓶等與色等互相依賴而成立，這個道理都不成立。所以接下來說：

『非依瓶有色，非有瓶依色』

論曰：瓶等、色等的實體都不是真實的，如何確定能依和所依的關係？這裡說的『依』，或者表示原因的意義，想要顯示真實的德，原因和結果都不能成立。鵂鹠子（Uluka）認為依靠瓶等作為原因，有色等作為結果。這違反了比量（anumana）。也就是說，不是色等以瓶等為原因，因為這是色等的聲音所詮釋表達的緣故，是取色等的心所緣的境界的緣故，就像色性等是常的，所以沒有原因。數論師（Samkhya）認為依靠色等作為原因，有瓶等作為結果。也違反了比量。也就是說，不是瓶等以色等為原因，因為不離開它們，是樂等自性的緣故，就像色等一樣。他們認為色等與其有性（astitva）非即非離。因為不是即有，應該像兔角一樣，不是瓶等的原因。如果說色等就是有性，應該與有性的實體沒有差別。如果說色

【English Translation】 English version:

Therefore, it cannot be said that a pot (ghata) and form (rupa), etc., have the same real nature and thus are identical. If it is argued that when the elements of form are scattered, their nature is not the collected state of a pot, and therefore it transforms into a pot, then it should also be said that when the elements of form are scattered, their nature is the collected state of form, and therefore it transforms into non-form. If, when form is collected, it is both a pot and form, then one dharma should have two characteristics. It has been refuted before that the nature should become multiple. Therefore, pots, etc., are not the same as form, etc.

Some say this: there is a pot apart from form, because the substance of qualities (guna) is different, and there should be no such fault. A pot can only be known by relying on existence (bhava), etc., and is false rather than true, as has been said before. Furthermore, one cannot cling to the idea that there is a pot apart from form. Why? Therefore, the following verse says:

'There is no pot apart from form.'

Treatise: There is no real meaning apart from form, etc. Pots, clothes, etc., are the basis of form, etc. Why? If pots, clothes, etc., were not form, etc., they should not be the basis of form, etc., like space (akasa), etc. Then there should be no pots, clothes, etc. Because there is no uncommon quality, like a wish-fulfilling jewel (cintamani). Intention must be non-existent, because it is not impermanent, like the self (atman), space, etc., which were refuted earlier. Therefore, pots, etc., do not exist apart from form, etc. If the meaning of identity or difference cannot be established, then pots, etc., are all illusory, and this principle should be established.

Furthermore, the principle that pots, etc., and form, etc., arise in mutual dependence is not established. Therefore, the following verse says:

'Form does not depend on a pot, nor does a pot depend on form.'

Treatise: The substance of pots, etc., and form, etc., are not real, so how can the relationship of dependence and support be established? Here, the word 'dependence' may express the meaning of cause, wanting to show real qualities, but cause and effect cannot be established. The Uluka school holds that relying on pots, etc., as a cause, there are forms, etc., as a result. This contradicts inference (anumana). That is to say, form, etc., do not have pots, etc., as a cause, because they are expressed by the sound of form, etc., and are the object of the mind that grasps form, etc., just as the nature of form, etc., is constant and therefore has no cause. The Samkhya school holds that relying on form, etc., as a cause, there are pots, etc., as a result. This also contradicts inference. That is to say, pots, etc., do not have form, etc., as a cause, because they do not depart from them and are of the nature of pleasure, etc., just like form, etc. They hold that form, etc., and its existence (astitva) are neither identical nor different. Because it is not identical with existence, it should be like a rabbit's horn and not the cause of pots, etc. If it is said that form, etc., is existence, then there should be no difference in substance from existence. If it is said that form

等樂等為性。既許體同。無斯過者。此亦不然。違汝自宗根境別故。復大過失。樂苦癡三有性亦同。應無異故。若言樂等非是有性。應如兔角。其體都無。色等亦應同彼非有。不相離故。如樂等三是即一切皆非實有。故非色等為瓶等因。

複次勝論者言。彼立同性與諸法一。有斯過者。我立同性與諸法異。由相異故。應無此失。諸法相望有同有異。法體局別。所以名異。有性該通。所以名同。通局既殊。故相有異。由相異故。異外有同。若如是者。同異句義。應異性外別立有同。有同異故。如所同法。若言不爾。此同異性。境界異故。異外無同。其所同法。境界一故。法外有同。若爾諸法應有異性。所以者何。故次頌曰。

若見二相異　　謂離瓶有同　二相既有殊　　應離瓶有異

論曰。若見諸法同異相異。即於法外別立有同。既見諸法同異相殊。應於法外別立有異。同異二相俱遍諸法。異應如同離法別有。設許法外有異有同。此復應有餘同異性。如是展轉同異無窮。則不可知二相差別。二皆遍故。俱無窮故。異應如同名同非異。同應如異名異非同。是故法外無別同異。又若實等與有性別。應不能知實等是有。帶別相智不能審知。余別相法。前已具辨。如何世間于非有性實等法上起有智耶。若言實

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果快樂等等同於有性（astitva，存在），既然你已經承認了體性相同，那麼就不會有超過這個的過失了。但這也是不對的，因為這違背了你自己的宗義，根（indriya，感官）和境（vishaya，對像）是不同的緣故。而且，這會造成更大的過失，快樂、痛苦和愚癡這三者如果和有性相同，那麼它們之間應該沒有差別。如果說快樂等等不是有性，那麼它們應該像兔角一樣，其體性根本不存在。色等等也應該和它們一樣，不是有性，因為它們不可分離。如果快樂等三者就是一切，那麼一切都不是真實存在的，所以色等等不能作為瓶子等等的原因。

其次，勝論派（Vaisheshika，印度哲學流派）的人說，他們所建立的同性（samanya，共性）與諸法（dharma，事物）是一體的，這會產生上述的過失。而我們所建立的同性與諸法是相異的，因為它們的相（lakshana，特徵）不同，所以應該不會有這個過失。諸法相互比較，既有相同之處，也有不同之處，法的體性是侷限和分別的，所以叫做異；有性是普遍貫通的，所以叫做同。普遍和侷限既然不同，所以它們的相也有差異。因為相有差異，所以在異之外還有同。如果這樣的話，同異的句義，應該在異性之外另外建立有同，因為有同異的緣故，就像所同的法一樣。如果說不是這樣，那麼這個同異性，因為境界不同，所以在異之外沒有同，其所同的法，因為境界相同，所以在法之外有同。如果這樣，諸法應該有異性。為什麼呢？所以接下來說：

『如果看到兩種相的差異，就認為在瓶子之外有同，兩種相既然有差別，就應該在瓶子之外有異。』

論曰：如果看到諸法的同異之相不同，就在法之外另外建立有同。既然看到諸法的同異之相有差別，就應該在法之外另外建立有異。同異這兩種相都普遍存在於諸法之中，異應該如同同一樣，離開法而單獨存在。假設承認法之外有異有同，那麼這又應該有其他的同異性。像這樣輾轉下去，同異無窮無盡，那麼就無法知道兩種相的差別了，因為兩者都普遍存在，而且都是無窮無盡的。異應該如同同一樣，只是名稱相同而本質不同；同應該如同異一樣，只是名稱不同而本質相同。所以，在法之外沒有另外的同異。

又如果實體（dravya，物質）、屬性（guna，性質）等等與有性有區別，那麼應該無法知道實體等等是有。帶有區別之相的智慧無法審慎地瞭解其他的區別之相的法，前面已經詳細辨析過了。為什麼世間會對非有性的實體等等法產生有性的認知呢？如果說實體

【English Translation】 English version: If pleasure, etc., are identical to 'astitva' (existence), since you have already admitted that their essence is the same, there would be no fault greater than this. But this is also incorrect, because it contradicts your own doctrine, as the 'indriya' (sense organs) and 'vishaya' (objects) are different. Moreover, this would cause an even greater fault: if pleasure, pain, and ignorance are the same as 'astitva', then there should be no difference between them. If you say that pleasure, etc., are not 'astitva', then they should be like rabbit horns, whose essence does not exist at all. Color, etc., should also be the same as them, not 'astitva', because they are inseparable. If pleasure, etc., are everything, then everything is not truly existent, so color, etc., cannot be the cause of pots, etc.

Secondly, the 'Vaisheshika' (school of Indian philosophy) says that the 'samanya' (generality) they establish is one with all 'dharma' (things), which would lead to the aforementioned fault. But the 'samanya' that we establish is different from all 'dharma', because their 'lakshana' (characteristics) are different, so there should be no such fault. When comparing 'dharma' to each other, there are both similarities and differences. The essence of 'dharma' is limited and distinct, so it is called different; 'astitva' is universal and pervasive, so it is called the same. Since universality and limitation are different, their characteristics are also different. Because the characteristics are different, there is sameness outside of difference. If this is the case, then the meaning of sameness and difference should establish sameness separately outside of difference, because there are both sameness and difference, just like the 'dharma' that is the same. If you say it is not like this, then this sameness and difference, because their realms are different, there is no sameness outside of difference; the 'dharma' that is the same, because its realm is the same, there is sameness outside of 'dharma'. If this is the case, then all 'dharma' should have difference. Why? Therefore, it is said next:

'If you see the difference between two characteristics, you think there is sameness outside of the pot; since the two characteristics are different, there should be difference outside of the pot.'

The treatise says: If you see that the characteristics of sameness and difference of 'dharma' are different, then you establish sameness separately outside of 'dharma'. Since you see that the characteristics of sameness and difference of 'dharma' are different, you should establish difference separately outside of 'dharma'. Both the characteristics of sameness and difference are universally present in all 'dharma'. Difference should be like sameness, existing separately from 'dharma'. If you admit that there is difference and sameness outside of 'dharma', then there should be other sameness and difference. If it goes on like this, sameness and difference will be endless, then it will be impossible to know the difference between the two characteristics, because both are universally present and both are endless. Difference should be like sameness, only the name is the same but the essence is different; sameness should be like difference, only the name is different but the essence is the same. Therefore, there is no separate sameness and difference outside of 'dharma'.

Also, if 'dravya' (substance), 'guna' (quality), etc., are different from 'astitva', then it should be impossible to know that 'dravya', etc., exist. Wisdom with the characteristic of difference cannot carefully understand other 'dharma' with the characteristic of difference, which has already been analyzed in detail earlier. Why does the world have the cognition of existence for 'dharma' such as 'dravya', etc., which are not 'astitva'? If 'dravya'

等雖非有性與有合故起有智者。則實等法假名為有。體非真有。應說為無。如邊鄙人立餐立溺。便痢不洗。不嚼楊枝。假號為牛。非真牛犢。實等亦爾。假有真無。又汝應言。何者真有餘與有合。假說有耶。若言有性是真有者。其理不然。無差別故。有與實等齊有智緣。如何可言一真一假。又真有假有應非一。智緣真假相別故。如王與王使。又言實等其體各異。有性是同。故與有別。此亦不然。實等真體亦無有異。但可功能相等有別。有性亦爾。功用有殊。云何定執有異實等。所以者何。俱所知故。並非無故。同有用故。應互相似皆異皆同。是故有性非離實等。

複次今應問彼。法外有性以何為喻知實有耶。若言如一所依實等。其相各別不生數智。一數是同能生數智。法與數合名一瓶等。由相異故。實等非一有與法殊。此為同喻。若爾瓶等非一智知。體非一故。如二三等。若言瓶等體雖非一而一合故名為一者。是則此一雖非瓶等與瓶等合。應名瓶等。為顯此義。故次頌曰。

若一不名瓶　　瓶應不名一

論曰。譬如一數與實等合。不名實等。如是實等雖與一合。應不名一。更互相合義無別故。世間不應名一瓶等。或復實等與一合時。為成一相。為當不爾。若成一相應捐實等。一數相非實等體故。若捐

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果你們認為，『實』（Satya，真諦）、『等』（Etc.，等等）這些法，雖然本身並非『有性』（Svabhāva，自性），但因為與『有』（Asti，存在）結合，所以能生起『有』的認知，那麼，『實』等法只是假名為『有』，其本體並非真實存在，應該說它們是『無』（Nasti，不存在）。就像邊遠地區的人，隨便吃喝拉撒，便后也不清洗，不嚼楊枝，卻假稱自己為『牛』，但並非真正的牛犢。『實』等法也是如此，假名為『有』，實則為『無』。此外，你們應該說明，什麼是真正的『有』，能與其他法結合，而被假稱為『有』呢？如果你們說『有性』是真正的『有』，那麼這個道理是不成立的，因為沒有差別。『有』與『實』等法，同樣都是產生認知的條件，怎麼能說一個是真，一個是假呢？而且，真『有』和假『有』應該不是同一個，因為認知它們的條件不同，就像國王和國王的使者。還有，你們說『實』等法的本體各不相同，而『有性』是相同的，所以『有性』與『實』等法不同。這種說法也不對。『實』等法的真實本體也沒有不同，只是功能相等，所以有所區別。『有性』也是如此，功用有差別。為什麼一定要執著地認為『有性』與『實』等法不同呢？原因是什麼呢？因為它們都是被認知的對象，並非不存在，而且都有用處。因此，它們應該互相相似，既相同又不同。所以，『有性』並非獨立於『實』等法之外。進一步說，現在應該反問他們，在法之外的『有性』，用什麼比喻來證明它是真實存在的呢？如果他們說，就像一個所依（Āśraya，依靠）中的『實』等法，它們的相狀各不相同，不能產生數的認知，而『一』（Eka，單一）這個數是相同的，能產生數的認知，法與數結合，就叫做『一個瓶子』等等。因為相狀不同，所以『實』等法不是『一』，『有』與法不同。這是個相同的比喻。如果這樣，那麼瓶子等事物就不能被『一』的認知所認知，因為它們的本體不是『一』，就像二和三等等。如果他們說，瓶子等的本體雖然不是『一』，但因為結合成一個整體，所以叫做『一』，那麼這個『一』雖然不是瓶子等，但與瓶子等結合，應該叫做瓶子等。爲了闡明這個道理，所以接下來說偈頌：『若一不名瓶，瓶應不名一』論曰：譬如『一』這個數與『實』等法結合，不叫做『實』等法，這樣，『實』等法雖然與『一』結合，也不應該叫做『一』。更互相結合，意義沒有區別。世間不應該叫做『一個瓶子』等等。或者，『實』等法與『一』結合時，是爲了形成『一』的相狀，還是不是這樣？如果形成『一』的相狀，就應該捨棄『實』等法，因為『一』的相狀不是『實』等法的本體。如果捨棄...

【English Translation】 English version: If you argue that 'Satya' (Truth), 'Etc.' (and so on) – these dharmas, although not inherently possessing 'Svabhāva' (own-being or self-nature), give rise to the cognition of 'Asti' (existence) because of their association with 'Asti' (existence), then 'Satya' etc. are merely nominally 'Asti'. Their essence is not truly existent; they should be described as 'Nasti' (non-existence). It's like people in remote regions who eat, drink, and defecate carelessly, not cleaning themselves after defecation, nor chewing on willow twigs, yet falsely call themselves 'cattle,' but they are not real calves. 'Satya' etc. are similar: nominally 'Asti,' but truly 'Nasti'. Furthermore, you should explain what truly 'Asti' is, which can combine with other dharmas and be falsely called 'Asti.' If you say that 'Svabhāva' is truly 'Asti,' then this reasoning is not valid because there is no difference. 'Asti' and 'Satya' etc. are equally conditions for generating cognition. How can one be said to be true and the other false? Moreover, true 'Asti' and false 'Asti' should not be the same, because the conditions for cognizing them are different, like a king and the king's messenger. Also, you say that the essences of 'Satya' etc. are different, while 'Svabhāva' is the same, so 'Svabhāva' is different from 'Satya' etc. This is also incorrect. The true essences of 'Satya' etc. are not different either; they are only distinguished by the equality of their functions. 'Svabhāva' is also like this, with differences in its functions. Why must you stubbornly insist that 'Svabhāva' is different from 'Satya' etc.? What is the reason? Because they are all objects of cognition, not non-existent, and they are all useful. Therefore, they should be mutually similar, both the same and different. Thus, 'Svabhāva' is not separate from 'Satya' etc. Furthermore, now they should be asked, what analogy is used to know that 'Svabhāva' outside of dharmas is truly existent? If they say, like 'Satya' etc. in one Āśraya (support or basis), their characteristics are different and cannot generate numerical cognition, while the number 'Eka' (one) is the same and can generate numerical cognition. A dharma combined with a number is called 'one pot' etc. Because the characteristics are different, 'Satya' etc. are not 'one,' and 'Asti' is different from the dharma. This is a similar analogy. If so, then pots etc. cannot be known by the cognition of 'one' because their essence is not 'one,' like two and three etc. If they say that although the essence of pots etc. is not 'one,' they are called 'one' because they are combined into a whole, then this 'one,' although not pots etc., should be called pots etc. because it is combined with pots etc. To clarify this meaning, the following verse is then stated: 'If one is not called a pot, then a pot should not be called one.' The treatise says: Just as the number 'one' combined with 'Satya' etc. is not called 'Satya' etc., so too, although 'Satya' etc. are combined with 'one,' they should not be called 'one.' Combining with each other further, the meaning is no different. The world should not be called 'one pot' etc. Or, when 'Satya' etc. combine with 'one,' is it to form the characteristic of 'one,' or is it not? If it forms the characteristic of 'one,' then 'Satya' etc. should be abandoned, because the characteristic of 'one' is not the essence of 'Satya' etc. If abandoned...

實等。一數應無。以數必依實等成故。若言實等不成一相。應非一智一言所了。雖與彼合。體非彼故。如空合人智言各別。若如槊等與人合故。雖與人異而得人名。其理不然。彼假說故。若言實等名為一者。亦是假說。理又不然。無真一故。若言一數是真一者。理亦不然。智言同故。若言一數遍該實等。實等不爾。故非真一。理亦不然。前已破故。謂不應為一智所緣。實等亦應非真有異。于實等上起數智言。既說為假。于其數上實等智言。例亦應爾。相待智言二無別故。如何可說一假一真。故立量言。所執實等非真實等。數智數言所行境故。如一二等。所執一等非真數體。實等智言所行境故。猶如實等。是故一切其體非真。又數與實曾無合時。云何乃言瓶與一合。說瓶為一。所以者何。故次頌曰。

瓶一曾無合　　瓶應無一名

論曰。實居空處一在實中。處既不同。豈得名合。則應一數不表一瓶。由處不同如二等數。若作是說。能依所依體互相遍。故名為合。此亦不然。故次頌曰。

若色遍於實　　色應得大名　敵論若非他　　應申自宗義

論曰。若色等德遍所依實。應如實體亦得大名。地等處廣既得大名。色等亦然。如何非大。又色等德應有形礙。稱地等故。猶如地等。是則色等不依他成。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：真實等等。一個數不應該存在。因為數必定依賴於真實等等才能成立。如果說真實等等不能成為一個相，那麼它就不應該被一個智慧和一個言語所理解。即使它與那個智慧和言語結合，它的本體也不是那個智慧和言語，就像空間與人的智慧和言語各自不同一樣。如果像長矛等等與人結合，即使它與人不同，也能得到人的名稱，這個道理是不成立的，因為那是假說的緣故。如果說真實等等被稱為『一』，這也是假說，道理也是不成立的，因為沒有真實的『一』。如果說一個數是真實的『一』，這個道理也是不成立的，因為智慧和言語是相同的。如果說一個數普遍包含真實等等，而真實等等不是這樣，所以它不是真實的『一』，這個道理也是不成立的，因為前面已經破斥過了。就是說，不應該成為一個智慧所緣的對象。真實等等也應該不是真實存在的差異。在真實等等之上產生數目的智慧和言語，既然說是假的，那麼在那個數上產生真實等等的智慧和言語，也應該同樣是假的。因為相待的智慧和言語沒有區別。怎麼能說一個是假的，一個是真的呢？所以建立論證說：你所執著的真實等等不是真實的真實等等，因為它是數目的智慧和言語所行境的對象，就像一、二等等一樣。你所執著的一個等等不是真實的數體，因為它是真實等等的智慧和言語所行境的對象，就像真實等等一樣。因此，一切的本體都不是真實的。而且，數與真實從來沒有結合的時候，怎麼能說瓶子與『一』結合，說瓶子是『一』呢？所以接著用偈頌說：『瓶子與『一』從來沒有結合，瓶子應該沒有『一』這個名稱。』論曰：真實存在於空間中，『一』存在於真實之中。處所既然不同，怎麼能稱為結合呢？那麼，『一』這個數就不應該表示一個瓶子，因為處所不同，就像二等等數一樣。如果這樣說：能依和所依的本體互相遍及，所以稱為結合，這也是不成立的。所以接著用偈頌說：『如果顏色遍及於真實，顏色應該得到大的名稱。敵論如果不是其他的，應該闡述自己宗派的義理。』論曰：如果顏色等等的德遍及所依的真實，應該像實體一樣得到大的名稱。土地等等處所廣大，既然得到大的名稱，顏色等等也應該這樣，怎麼能不是大的呢？而且，顏色等等的德應該有形體障礙，因為稱量土地等等的緣故，就像土地等等一樣。這樣，顏色等等就不是依賴他而成。

【English Translation】 English version: The real, and so on. A number should not exist. Because a number must rely on the real, and so on, to be established. If it is said that the real, and so on, cannot become one aspect, then it should not be understood by one wisdom and one speech. Even if it combines with that wisdom and speech, its essence is not that wisdom and speech, just as space and human wisdom and speech are different. If, like a spear and so on, it combines with a person, even if it is different from the person, it can obtain the person's name. This reasoning is not valid because it is a hypothetical statement. If it is said that the real, and so on, is called 'one,' this is also a hypothetical statement, and the reasoning is also not valid because there is no true 'one.' If it is said that one number is the true 'one,' this reasoning is also not valid because wisdom and speech are the same. If it is said that one number universally encompasses the real, and so on, but the real, and so on, is not like that, so it is not the true 'one,' this reasoning is also not valid because it has already been refuted before. That is to say, it should not be an object cognized by one wisdom. The real, and so on, should also not be truly existing differences. Since the wisdom and speech of numbers arising on the real, and so on, are said to be false, then the wisdom and speech of the real, and so on, arising on that number should also be false. Because the relative wisdom and speech have no difference. How can it be said that one is false and one is true? Therefore, establish the argument: The real, and so on, that you adhere to is not the true real, and so on, because it is the object of the realm of the wisdom and speech of numbers, just like one, two, and so on. The one, and so on, that you adhere to is not the true essence of number because it is the object of the realm of the wisdom and speech of the real, and so on, just like the real, and so on. Therefore, the essence of everything is not true. Moreover, number and reality have never combined, so how can it be said that a bottle combines with 'one,' saying that the bottle is 'one'? Therefore, the following verse is said: 'The bottle and 'one' have never combined; the bottle should not have the name 'one'.' The treatise says: Reality exists in space, and 'one' exists in reality. Since the locations are different, how can they be called combined? Then, the number 'one' should not represent a bottle because the locations are different, just like the numbers two, and so on. If it is said that the essence of the dependent and the depended mutually pervade, so it is called combined, this is also not valid. Therefore, the following verse is said: 'If color pervades reality, color should obtain a great name. If the opponent's argument is not different, they should explain the meaning of their own school.' The treatise says: If the qualities of color, and so on, pervade the reality on which they depend, they should obtain a great name like the entity. Since the locations of earth, and so on, are vast and obtain a great name, color, and so on, should also be like this. How can they not be great? Moreover, the qualities of color, and so on, should have physical obstacles because they measure earth, and so on, just like earth, and so on. In this way, color, and so on, are not dependent on others to be formed.

有形礙故。如所依實俱有形礙。處應不同。實之與德應非因果。如是等類。過失眾多。汝所立宗。便為散壞。若言色等德句所攝故無形礙。此亦不然。敵論非他。應申宗義。對他敵論自敘唐捐。我佛法中聰睿勇猛。見真理者。于汝所宗六種句義。如狂寱語無承敬心。徒引何益。或複色等依地等時。為一分轉。猶如樂等。為遍轉耶。若一分轉。應一實上有德無德有青無青。如是等過。若言遍轉。色等諸德應亦名大。與實處同猶如地等。實在空中德居實上。所據各別。如何處同。我意不言。同依一處。但言德實其體相遍據空量等。故說處同。德若名大。應更有德。然德無德。故不名大。敵論非他。應申宗義。對他敵論自敘唐捐。或復此中言雖難德。同實名大而意難實。同德無形以其處同。猶如色等。我宗地等。皆有形質如何同德。無形礙耶敵論非他。應申宗義。對他敵論自敘唐捐。或複色等與其果實同依因實和合而生。諸因實中果體皆遍。處無別故。德應如實。亦立大名。實應如德不立大稱。若言我宗實大非德不可相類。其理不然。敵論非他。應申宗義。對他敵論自敘唐捐。或復彼宗極微量小。眾微和合起粗果時。粗果與因處無別故。極微與色應成粗大。色與粗果應成極微。若言我宗因小果大色無形量。理亦不然。敵論非

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因為有形礙的緣故。如果所依的實體都具有形礙，那麼它們所處的位置應該不同。實體和德（guna）之間應該不是因果關係。像這樣的過失有很多。你所建立的宗義，就變成散亂毀壞了。如果說色等包含在德的範疇內，所以沒有形礙，這也是不對的。對方的辯論不是針對其他人，應該闡述自己的宗義。對他人進行辯論，自己敘述是徒勞的。我們佛法中聰明勇猛、見到真理的人，對於你所宗奉的六種句義，就像是狂人的胡話一樣，沒有承敬之心，徒勞地引用有什麼用呢？或者色等依附於地等時，是一部分轉移，就像樂等一樣，還是全部轉移呢？如果是一部分轉移，那麼應該在一個實體上既有德又沒有德，既有青色又沒有青色，像這樣有過失。如果說是全部轉移，那麼色等諸德也應該被稱為『大』（maha），與實體所處的位置相同，就像地等一樣。實體在空中，德位於實體之上，所佔據的位置各不相同，怎麼能說位置相同呢？我的意思不是說它們共同依附於一個位置，只是說德和實體，它們的體相遍佈于虛空等量，所以說位置相同。德如果被稱為『大』，應該還有德。然而德沒有德，所以不能被稱為『大』。對方的辯論不是針對其他人，應該闡述自己的宗義。對他人進行辯論，自己敘述是徒勞的。或者這裡雖然責難德，認為德和實體一樣被稱為『大』，但實際上是責難實體，認為實體和德一樣沒有形體，因為它們所處的位置相同，就像色等一樣。我宗的地等，都有形質，怎麼能像德一樣，沒有形礙呢？對方的辯論不是針對其他人，應該闡述自己的宗義。對他人進行辯論，自己敘述是徒勞的。或者色等和它的果實，共同依附於因實體，和合而生。在諸因實體中，果實的體性都遍佈其中，因為位置沒有區別，德應該像實體一樣，也被稱為『大』。實體應該像德一樣，不被稱為『大』。如果說我宗的實體是『大』，不是德，不能相互類比，這個道理是不對的。對方的辯論不是針對其他人，應該闡述自己的宗義。對他人進行辯論，自己敘述是徒勞的。或者他們宗派的極微（paramanu）量非常小，眾多極微和合產生粗果時，粗果和因所處的位置沒有區別，極微和色應該變成粗大。色和粗果應該變成極微。如果說我宗的因小果大，色沒有形量，這個道理也是不對的。對方的辯論不是……

【English Translation】 English version: Because of having form and obstruction (rupa-pratighata). If the realities (dravya) on which they depend all have form and obstruction, then their locations should be different. Reality and quality (guna) should not be cause and effect. Such kinds of faults are numerous. Your established tenet (paksha) becomes scattered and destroyed. If you say that color (rupa) etc. are included in the category of quality, therefore they have no form and obstruction, this is also not right. The opponent's argument is not directed at others; you should expound your own tenet. Arguing against others and narrating oneself is in vain. In our Buddha-dharma, those who are intelligent, courageous, and see the truth, regard your six categories of meaning as like the raving of a madman, without any respectful heart. What is the benefit of quoting them in vain? Or, when color etc. depend on earth (prthivi) etc., do they transfer partially, like pleasure (sukha) etc., or do they transfer completely? If they transfer partially, then on one reality there should be both quality and no quality, both blue and no blue, such faults arise. If you say they transfer completely, then color etc., all qualities, should also be called 'great' (maha), being in the same location as the reality, like earth etc. Reality is in space (akasha), quality resides on the reality, the locations they occupy are different, how can you say the locations are the same? My intention is not to say they commonly depend on one location, but only to say that the essence of quality and reality pervades the same amount of space etc., therefore we say the locations are the same. If quality is called 'great', there should be another quality. However, quality has no quality, therefore it cannot be called 'great'. The opponent's argument is not directed at others; you should expound your own tenet. Arguing against others and narrating oneself is in vain. Or, although here you criticize quality, saying that quality and reality are both called 'great', in reality you are criticizing reality, saying that reality and quality are both without form, because they are in the same location, like color etc. In my tenet, earth etc. all have form and substance, how can they be like quality, without form and obstruction? The opponent's argument is not directed at others; you should expound your own tenet. Arguing against others and narrating oneself is in vain. Or, color etc. and its fruit (phala) depend together on the causal reality (karana-dravya), arising in combination. In all causal realities, the nature of the fruit pervades, because there is no difference in location, quality should be like reality, also called 'great'. Reality should be like quality, not called 'great'. If you say that in my tenet, reality is 'great', not quality, and they cannot be compared, this reasoning is not correct. The opponent's argument is not directed at others; you should expound your own tenet. Arguing against others and narrating oneself is in vain. Or, in their school, the atom (paramanu) is extremely small. When many atoms combine and produce a gross effect (sthula-phala), because the location of the gross effect and the cause are not different, the atom and color should become gross and large. Color and the gross effect should become atoms. If you say that in my tenet, the cause is small and the effect is large, and color has no form or measure, this reasoning is also not correct. The opponent's argument is not...

他。應申宗義。對他敵論自敘唐捐。

如是已說有。數色等離實有體多。諸過難其同異性如有應遮共。德如數余。不共德及業差別。如色等破。于諸實中各別轉故。勝論所執唯有爾所為心言因顯諸法有。以理推究。皆不得成。故不應執。又說頌曰。

有數等能相　　顯所相不成　除此更無因　　故諸法非有

論曰。已辨有性數及色等不能顯有自所依法。除此無有餘決定因。可證諸法其體實有。不可無因立有諸法。勿有所立一切皆成。故不可言諸法實有。應隨世俗假說非無。唯此無愆堪任推究。異此違越世俗己宗。鵂鹠所宗實等非有。非有性故。猶若空花。有性亦無。非實等故。猶如兔角。是故皆虛。

複次數論者言。諸法不待有性數等而可了知。故先諸失於我無過。為破彼言。復說頌曰。

離別相無瓶　　故瓶體非一　一一非瓶故　　瓶體亦非多

論曰。色香味等體相不同。別根所行非余根境。離彼諸法無別有瓶。故如色等瓶體非一。既不許一瓶體應多。一一非瓶如何多體。色等性相展轉不同。豈得各成一類瓶體。若一一法其體皆瓶。共和合時。可名多體。既無此義。瓶體非多。亦不應言。瓶體實有。而不可說為一為多。兔角龜毛非實有故。豈不色等合成軍林。說名一多。瓶亦

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：他（指勝論外道）。應該闡述其宗義，駁斥對方的論點，揭示其自述的理論是徒勞無功的。

像這樣已經說明了『有』。數量、顏色等與實體分離，認為實體是多，存在諸多過失，難以解釋它們的同異性。如果存在，就應該像遮止共同屬性一樣遮止。德，如數量等，以及非共同屬性和業的差別，就像顏色等一樣被破斥。因為它們在各種實體中各自獨立運作。勝論派所執著的，僅僅認為這些是心和語言的原因，能夠顯現諸法的存在。但通過理性的推究，都不能成立。所以不應該執著於此。又說了頌詞：

『有』、數量等能作為相（lakṣaṇa），卻不能顯現所相（lakṣya），除了這些，再沒有其他原因，所以諸法並非實有。

論曰：已經辨析了『有性』、數量以及顏色等，不能顯現其自身所依之法。除了這些，沒有其他決定的原因，可以證明諸法的體性是真實存在的。不能沒有原因就說諸法存在，否則任何主張都會成立。所以不能說諸法是真實存在的，應該隨順世俗的假說，並非不存在。只有這樣才沒有過失，可以進行推究。與此相違背，就是違背世俗和自己的宗義。鵂鹠（貓頭鷹）所宗的實體等並非實有，因為它們沒有『有性』，就像空中的花朵一樣。『有性』也沒有，因為它不是實體等，就像兔子的角一樣。所以都是虛假的。

再次，數論者說：諸法不需要依賴『有性』、數量等就可以被了知，所以之前的那些過失對我來說沒有影響。爲了駁斥他的說法，又說了頌詞：

離開各個不同的相，就沒有瓶子，所以瓶子的本體不是一；如果每一個都不是瓶子，那麼瓶子的本體也不是多。

論曰：顏色、香味等的體相不同，不同的根所行持的境界不是其他根的境界。離開這些法，沒有另外的瓶子。所以像顏色等一樣，瓶子的本體不是一。既然不允許瓶子的本體是一，那麼瓶子的本體應該是多。如果每一個都不是瓶子，怎麼能說是多體呢？顏色等的性質和相狀各不相同，怎麼能各自成為一類瓶子的本體呢？如果每一個法，它的本體都是瓶子，共同和合的時候，可以稱為多體。既然沒有這個道理，瓶子的本體就不是多。也不應該說，瓶子的本體是真實存在的，但不能說是一還是多。因為兔子的角、烏龜的毛不是真實存在的。難道不是顏色等合成了軍隊和森林，可以稱為一或多嗎？瓶子也是

【English Translation】 English version: He (referring to the Vaiśeṣika heretics). Should expound his own tenets, refute the opponent's arguments, and reveal that his self-proclaimed theories are futile.

As has been said about 『existence』 (astitva). Number, color, etc., are separate from substance (dravya), considering substance to be multiple, there are many faults, and it is difficult to explain their sameness and difference. If it exists, it should be prevented like preventing common properties. Qualities (guṇa), such as number, etc., as well as uncommon properties and the differences in action (karma), are refuted like color, etc. Because they operate independently in various substances. What the Vaiśeṣika school adheres to is merely considering these to be the causes of mind and language, capable of manifesting the existence of phenomena. But through rational investigation, none of them can be established. Therefore, one should not adhere to this. Furthermore, a verse is spoken:

『Existence』, number, etc., can serve as characteristics (lakṣaṇa), but cannot manifest what is characterized (lakṣya), Apart from these, there are no other causes, therefore phenomena are not truly existent.

Commentary: It has already been analyzed that 『existence-ness』 (astitva), number, and color, etc., cannot manifest the dharma on which they themselves rely. Apart from these, there are no other definitive causes that can prove that the nature of phenomena is truly existent. One cannot say that phenomena exist without a cause, otherwise any assertion would be established. Therefore, one cannot say that phenomena are truly existent, one should follow the conventional assumptions of the world, not that they do not exist. Only in this way is there no fault, and it can be investigated. Contradicting this is contradicting the world and one's own tenets. What the owl (śyena) adheres to, such as substance, etc., is not truly existent, because they do not have 『existence-ness』, just like flowers in the sky. 『Existence-ness』 also does not exist, because it is not substance, etc., just like a rabbit's horn. Therefore, they are all false.

Again, the Sāṃkhya philosophers say: Phenomena do not need to rely on 『existence-ness』, number, etc., to be known, so the previous faults do not affect me. To refute his statement, another verse is spoken:

Apart from the various different characteristics, there is no pot, so the essence of the pot is not one; If each one is not a pot, then the essence of the pot is also not many.

Commentary: The nature and characteristics of color, smell, etc., are different, the realm practiced by different senses is not the realm of other senses. Apart from these dharmas, there is no other pot. Therefore, like color, etc., the essence of the pot is not one. Since it is not allowed that the essence of the pot is one, then the essence of the pot should be many. If each one is not a pot, how can it be said to be many essences? The nature and characteristics of color, etc., are different from each other, how can each become the essence of a category of pots? If each dharma, its essence is a pot, when they are jointly combined, it can be called many essences. Since there is no such reason, the essence of the pot is not many. Nor should it be said that the essence of the pot is truly existent, but it cannot be said to be one or many. Because the rabbit's horn and the turtle's hair are not truly existent. Isn't it that color, etc., combine to form armies and forests, which can be called one or many? The pot is also

應爾。此唯世俗假說軍林。其中都無軍林實體。若執實有。應如瓶破。汝亦不說別有軍林。又色香等無共合義。故不可說和合為瓶。所以者何。故次頌曰。

非無有觸體　　與有觸體合　故色等諸法　　不可合為瓶

論曰。合謂其體展轉相觸。此唯有觸。謂地水等色聲香味。非觸所攝。如何相觸或觸觸耶。既無有觸。合義不成。如無觸思。終無合義。若言色等有相觸義。應觸所攝。猶如地等則唯觸體同類相合色等諸塵。定無合理。合則便失。色等性故。設許色等聚集名合。而色等性終非實瓶。所以者何。故次頌曰。

色是瓶一分　　故色體非瓶　有分既為無　　一分如何有

論曰。色等聚集總說為瓶。色唯一分。理非瓶體。不可以瓶為瓶一分。如是聲等例亦應然。一一非瓶。皆瓶分故。如是瓶分。理亦不成。

有分既無。分為誰分。色等一一其體非瓶。除此更無真實瓶體。瓶體無故。瓶分亦無。豈色等塵實為瓶分。軍林等物假說為有。分與有分即離難思。應隨世間所見而說。不可委細推究其真。又若色等體實是瓶。一切應瓶。故次頌曰。

一切色等性　　色等相無差　唯一類是瓶　　余非有何理

論曰。瓶衣車等所依事中。色等能依性相無別。若色等體皆實是瓶。衣等亦

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：應如你所說。這僅僅是世俗假立的『軍林』（軍隊和森林），其中根本沒有『軍林』的實體。如果執著地認為它真實存在，就應該像瓶子破碎一樣，你也無法說出另外存在一個『軍林』。而且，色、香等法沒有共同結合的意義，所以不能說和合而成瓶子。為什麼呢？所以接下來說偈頌：

『非無有觸體，與有觸體合，故色等諸法，不可合為瓶。』

論曰：『合』是指它們的本體輾轉相觸。這裡只有『有觸』，指的是地、水等，而色、聲、香、味不屬於『觸』的範疇。如何相觸，或者觸碰『觸』呢？既然沒有『有觸』，結合的意義就無法成立，就像沒有觸覺的思緒，終究沒有結合的意義。如果說色等有相觸的意義，就應該屬於『觸』的範疇，就像地等一樣，那麼就只有『觸』的本體同類相合，色等諸塵，一定沒有結合的道理。結合就會失去色等的自性。假設允許色等聚集叫做『合』，而色等的自性終究不是真實的瓶子。為什麼呢？所以接下來說偈頌：

『色是瓶一分，故色體非瓶，有分既為無，一分如何有。』

論曰：色等聚集總的來說叫做瓶子。色只是瓶子的一個部分，道理上不是瓶子的本體。不可以瓶子作為瓶子的一個部分。像這樣，聲等也應該如此，每一個都不是瓶子，都是瓶子的一個部分。像這樣，瓶子的部分，道理上也無法成立。

『有分』既然沒有，『分』又是誰的『分』呢？色等每一個的本體都不是瓶子，除了這些，再沒有真實的瓶子本體。瓶子的本體沒有，瓶子的部分也沒有。難道色等微塵真的是瓶子的部分嗎？『軍林』等事物只是假說為存在，『分』與『有分』即離難思。應該隨著世間所見而說，不可以委細地推究它的真實。又如果色等的本體真的是瓶子，一切都應該是瓶子。所以接下來說偈頌：

『一切色等性，色等相無差，唯一類是瓶，余非有何理。』

論曰：瓶子、衣服、車子等所依的事物中，色等能依的自性沒有差別。如果色等的本體都是真實的瓶子，衣服等也應該是瓶子。

【English Translation】 English version: It should be as you say. This is merely a conventional designation of 'army-forest' (Junlin) (army and forest), in which there is no real entity of 'army-forest'. If one clings to it as truly existing, it should be like a broken pot, and you cannot say that there is another 'army-forest'. Moreover, color, smell, etc., have no meaning of combining together, so it cannot be said that they combine to form a pot. Why? Therefore, the following verse says:

'Not without tangible substance, combining with tangible substance, therefore color and other dharmas, cannot combine to form a pot.'

Treatise says: 'Combining' refers to their substance touching each other in turn. Here, there is only 'tangible', referring to earth, water, etc., while color, sound, smell, taste are not included in the category of 'touch'. How can they touch each other, or touch 'touch'? Since there is no 'tangible', the meaning of combining cannot be established, just like thoughts without touch, there is ultimately no meaning of combining. If it is said that color, etc., have the meaning of touching each other, they should belong to the category of 'touch', just like earth, etc., then only the substance of 'touch' combines with similar things, and the dust of color, etc., certainly has no reason to combine. Combining would lose the nature of color, etc. Suppose it is allowed that the gathering of color, etc., is called 'combining', but the nature of color, etc., is ultimately not a real pot. Why? Therefore, the following verse says:

'Color is a part of the pot, therefore the substance of color is not the pot, since the whole is non-existent, how can a part exist.'

Treatise says: The gathering of color, etc., is generally called a pot. Color is only a part of the pot, and logically it is not the substance of the pot. The pot cannot be taken as a part of the pot. Likewise, sound, etc., should also be the same, each is not the pot, but a part of the pot. In this way, the part of the pot cannot be established logically.

Since the 'whole' is non-existent, whose 'part' is it? The substance of each of color, etc., is not the pot, and besides these, there is no real substance of the pot. Since the substance of the pot is non-existent, the part of the pot is also non-existent. Could it be that the dust of color, etc., is really a part of the pot? 'Army-forest' and other things are only conventionally said to exist, 'part' and 'whole' are difficult to think about separately. It should be said according to what is seen in the world, and its reality cannot be investigated in detail. Also, if the substance of color, etc., is really the pot, everything should be the pot. Therefore, the following verse says:

'The nature of all colors, etc., the characteristics of colors, etc., are not different, if only one kind is the pot, what reason is there for the rest not to be?'

Treatise says: Among the things on which pots, clothes, carts, etc., depend, the nature of the dependent color, etc., is no different. If the substance of color, etc., is all real pots, clothes, etc., should also be pots.

應皆是瓶體。即色等故。如共許瓶。或所執瓶應非瓶體。即色等故。如衣車等。色等不應同而有異。依之建立瓶等類殊。汝宗更無同異性故。不由細分安布差別。令其瓶等其相有異。同以色等為自性故。瓶等不應異於色等。違自所執因果一故。如瓶衣等有不異失。色等亦然。即一瓶故。又不應說色異味等不異瓶等。故次頌曰。

若色異味等　　不異於瓶等　瓶等即味等　　色何即瓶等

論曰。瓶等即用味等為體。應如味等與色有異。故不可言色異味等。不異瓶等理相違故。亦不應言味等一一與色等異不異瓶等瓶等即用。色等諸法以為自體。無別性故。如是已辨色等諸法與瓶等一其義不成。今當顯說與瓶等異理亦不成。故次頌曰。

瓶等既無因　　體應不成果　故若異色等　　瓶等定為無

論曰。地等大體攬色等成。故五大因即五唯量。謂攬聲量成於空大。更加觸量成於風大。復加色量成於火大。又加味量成於水大。總攬五量成於地大。大望瓶等同體相成。如量能成。同類果故。若異色等。瓶等無因。既無有因。體應非果。以一切果待因成故。是故若言瓶等異色。即應瓶等非果非因。非色等故。如龜毛等。又非根境。非因果故。色根所行無非因果。此非因果根所不行。或復應無瓶等諸法。非因

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：應全是瓶子的本體，因為它們就是顏色等等。就像大家公認的瓶子一樣。或者你所執著的瓶子應該不是瓶子的本體，因為它們就是顏色等等，就像衣服、車子等等。顏色等等不應該相同卻又有差異，而瓶子等等的類別卻依賴於它們而建立。你的宗派里更沒有相同和差異的性質，不能通過細微的區分和排列的差別，使瓶子等等的形態有所不同，因為它們都以顏色等等為自性。瓶子等等不應該與顏色等等不同，因為這違反了你所執著的因果是一體的觀點。就像瓶子、衣服等等有不相異的過失，顏色等等也是如此，因為它們就是一個瓶子。另外，不應該說顏色與味道等等不同，但味道等等與瓶子等等沒有不同。所以接下來的頌文說：

『如果顏色與味道等不同，味道等與瓶等沒有不同，瓶等就等同於味道等，那麼顏色為何等同於瓶等？』

論述：瓶子等等是用味道等等作為本體的，應該像味道等等與顏色有差異一樣。所以不能說顏色與味道等等不同，但味道等等與瓶子等等沒有不同，這在道理上是相互矛盾的。也不應該說味道等等每一個都與顏色等等不同，但與瓶子等等沒有不同，因為瓶子等等就是用顏色等等諸法作為自身的本體，沒有其他自性。像這樣已經辨明顏色等等諸法與瓶子等等是一體的觀點是不成立的。現在應當說明與瓶子等等不同，在道理上也是不成立的。所以接下來的頌文說：

『瓶等既然沒有原因，其本體應該不能成為結果。所以如果瓶等與顏色等不同，瓶等必定是不存在的。』

論述：地等等五大是由顏色等等組成的。所以五大的因就是五唯（tanmatra），也就是用聲量組成空大（akasa），再加上觸量組成風大（vayu），再加色量組成火大（tejas），又加味量組成水大（apas），總共用五量組成地大（prthivi）。五大對於瓶子等等來說，是同體相互成就的，就像量能成就同類的結果一樣。如果瓶子等等與顏色等等不同，瓶子等等就沒有原因。既然沒有原因，其本體應該不是結果，因為一切結果都依賴於原因才能成立。所以如果說瓶子等等與顏色不同，那麼瓶子等等就應該不是結果也不是原因，因為它不是顏色等等，就像龜毛等等一樣。又不是根（indriya）的境界，因為它不是原因也不是結果。顏色根所行使的沒有不是原因和結果的。這個不是原因也不是結果，根所不能行使的。或者應該沒有瓶子等等諸法，因為它不是原因。

【English Translation】 English version: They should all be the essence of the pot (瓶體, píng tǐ), because they are color (色, sè) and so on. Just like the commonly accepted pot. Or the pot you adhere to should not be the essence of the pot, because they are color and so on, just like clothes, carts, and so on. Color and so on should not be the same yet different, while the categories of pots and so on are established based on them. In your school, there is no such thing as the nature of sameness and difference. It cannot be that subtle distinctions and arrangements make the forms of pots and so on different, because they all have color and so on as their self-nature. Pots and so on should not be different from color and so on, because this violates your view that cause and effect are one. Just like pots, clothes, and so on have the fault of not being different, color and so on are also like that, because they are one pot. Also, it should not be said that color is different from taste (味, wèi) and so on, but taste and so on are not different from pots and so on. Therefore, the following verse says:

'If color is different from taste and so on, and taste and so on are not different from pots and so on, and pots and so on are equal to taste and so on, then why is color equal to pots and so on?'

Discussion: Pots and so on use taste and so on as their essence, and should be different from color, just like taste and so on are different from color. Therefore, it cannot be said that color is different from taste and so on, but taste and so on are not different from pots and so on, because this is logically contradictory. It should also not be said that each of taste and so on is different from color and so on, but not different from pots and so on, because pots and so on use color and so on as their own essence, without any other self-nature. In this way, it has been clarified that the view that color and so on are one with pots and so on is not established. Now it should be explained that being different from pots and so on is also not established in reason. Therefore, the following verse says:

'Since pots and so on have no cause, their essence should not become a result. Therefore, if pots and so on are different from color and so on, pots and so on must be non-existent.'

Discussion: The great elements (大, dà) such as earth (地, dì) are composed of color and so on. Therefore, the cause of the five great elements is the five tanmatras (五唯, wǔ wéi), that is, using the quantity of sound (聲量, shēng liàng) to form space (空大, kōng dà) (akasa), adding the quantity of touch (觸量, chù liàng) to form wind (風大, fēng dà) (vayu), adding the quantity of color to form fire (火大, huǒ dà) (tejas), and adding the quantity of taste to form water (水大, shuǐ dà) (apas), and using the total of the five quantities to form earth (地大, dì dà) (prthivi). The five great elements, in relation to pots and so on, are mutually accomplished in the same essence, just as quantity can accomplish the result of the same kind. If pots and so on are different from color and so on, pots and so on have no cause. Since there is no cause, their essence should not be a result, because all results depend on causes to be established. Therefore, if it is said that pots and so on are different from color, then pots and so on should be neither a result nor a cause, because they are not color and so on, just like turtle hair and so on. Also, it is not the realm of the senses (根, gēn) (indriya), because it is neither a cause nor a result. What the color sense operates on is not without cause and result. This is neither a cause nor a result, and the senses cannot operate on it. Or there should be no dharmas (法, fǎ) such as pots and so on, because it is not a cause.

果故。如石女兒。自性許因思我許果。根所顯故。無不定失。如是數論所立瓶等。若一若異皆不得成。

複次勝論者言。瓦等細分生瓶等故。瓶等有因。既有其因。體即是果。有因是果。其體非無。此亦不然。故次頌曰。

瓶等因若有　　可為瓶等因　瓶等因既無　　如何生瓶等

論曰。瓦等細分依余法成。何能為因生於瓶等。不見世間依他而立。非自有法能作他因。豈不種等雖依他立而能為因生於芽等。此同有難。非救前失。世所共知何容致難。汝之所執異世所知。故於此中同彼有難。世所知法。依他生已。不復重生。不依他立。由自有力。能作他因。汝執不然。依他成法乃至未滅。恒依他住。因若滅無果即隨滅。故汝所執異世所知。無體無能豈生他果。或有因法有體有能。可能生他余有因法。汝執瓦等極微為因。或余為因此並非有。以無因故。瓦等體無。無體無力何能生果。彼論宗中。因有二種。俱能生果。謂常無常諸無常因。必依常立常非有故。無常亦無。無無常因。果由何有。故彼因果皆不得成。

複次有作是言。瓶等瓦等諸和合物。從本以來同類因果展轉相續隨類不同。其體實有一而可見。此亦不然。諸和合物漸次分析歸於色等。色等如前已辨非有。云何依彼有和合物。此和合物

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本果和因的關係就像『石女兒』（比喻虛幻的事物），自性論者如果認為『我』是原因，那麼『思』就是結果。因為根顯現的緣故，這並非沒有不確定的過失。就像數論派所建立的瓶子等等，無論說它們是一還是異，都不能成立。

其次，勝論派的人說，瓦等的細微部分產生了瓶子等，所以瓶子等是有原因的。既然有原因，那麼它的本體就是結果。有原因就是結果，那麼它的本體就不是沒有。這種說法也是不對的。所以接下來說：

『瓶等的因如果存在，才能成為瓶等的因；瓶等的因如果不存在，如何產生瓶等？』

論曰：瓦等的細微部分依賴於其他法才能成立，怎麼能作為原因產生瓶子等呢？世間上看不到依賴於其他而成立的事物，能以自身固有的法作為其他事物的因。難道種子等雖然依賴於其他而成立，卻能作為原因產生芽等嗎？這種說法同樣有困難，並不能彌補之前的過失。世間普遍知道的道理，為什麼還要提出疑問呢？你所執著的與世間所知不同，所以在這裡和你一樣有困難。世間所知的法，依賴於其他而產生后，不會再次產生。不依賴於其他而成立，因為自身有力量，能夠作為其他事物的因。你所執著的不是這樣，依賴於其他而成立的法，乃至沒有滅亡，一直依賴於其他而存在。原因如果滅亡，結果就隨著滅亡。所以你所執著的與世間所知不同，沒有本體，沒有能力，怎麼能產生其他結果呢？或者有的因法有本體，有能力，可能產生其他有因的法。你認為瓦等的極微是原因，或者其他是原因，這並非是存在的。因為沒有原因的緣故，瓦等的本體不存在。沒有本體，沒有力量，怎麼能產生結果呢？在勝論派的宗義中，原因有兩種，都能產生結果。所謂常和無常，各種無常的因，必定依賴於常而成立，常如果不存在，無常也不存在。沒有無常的因，結果由什麼而有呢？所以他們的因果都不能成立。

其次，有人這樣說，瓶子等瓦等各種和合物，從本來就有的同類因果輾轉相續，隨著種類不同。它們的本體實際上是一個，而且可以看見。這種說法也是不對的。各種和合物逐漸分析，歸於色等。色等如前面已經辨析過，是不存在的。怎麼能依賴它們而有和合物呢？這個和合物

【English Translation】 English version The relationship between cause and effect is like the 'son of a barren woman' (a metaphor for something illusory). If the Samkhya (數論) school posits 'I' as the cause, then 'thought' is the effect. Because the root manifests, this is not without the fault of indeterminacy. Like the pot, etc., established by the Samkhya school, whether they are said to be one or different, neither can be established.

Furthermore, the Vaisheshika (勝論) school says that the subtle parts of clay, etc., produce pots, etc., so pots, etc., have a cause. Since there is a cause, its substance is the effect. Having a cause is the effect, so its substance is not non-existent. This is also not correct. Therefore, the following verse says:

'If the cause of pots, etc., exists, it can be the cause of pots, etc.; if the cause of pots, etc., does not exist, how can pots, etc., be produced?'

The treatise says: The subtle parts of clay, etc., are established by relying on other dharmas. How can they be the cause of producing pots, etc.? It is not seen in the world that something established by relying on others can use its own inherent dharma as the cause of others. Could it be that seeds, etc., although established by relying on others, can be the cause of producing sprouts, etc.? This statement has the same difficulty and does not remedy the previous fault. Why raise questions about what is universally known in the world? What you adhere to is different from what is known in the world, so you have the same difficulty as them here. Dharmas known in the world, once produced by relying on others, are not produced again. Not established by relying on others, because they have their own power, they can be the cause of others. What you adhere to is not like this. Dharmas established by relying on others, until they are not destroyed, always exist by relying on others. If the cause is destroyed, the effect will be destroyed accordingly. Therefore, what you adhere to is different from what is known in the world. Without substance and without ability, how can it produce other effects? Or some causal dharmas have substance and ability, and may produce other causal dharmas. You believe that the ultimate atoms of clay, etc., are the cause, or that others are the cause, but this is not existent. Because there is no cause, the substance of clay, etc., does not exist. Without substance and without power, how can it produce an effect? In the Vaisheshika school's doctrine, there are two kinds of causes, both of which can produce effects. The so-called permanent and impermanent, all impermanent causes must be established by relying on the permanent. If the permanent does not exist, the impermanent also does not exist. Without an impermanent cause, how can there be an effect? Therefore, their cause and effect cannot be established.

Furthermore, some say that pots, etc., clay, etc., all aggregates, from the beginning, are similar causes and effects that continue in succession, differing according to their kind. Their substance is actually one and can be seen. This statement is also not correct. All aggregates are gradually analyzed and return to color, etc. Color, etc., as has been analyzed before, does not exist. How can there be aggregates relying on them? This aggregate

一及可見皆如前破。不應重執。又色等法共和合時無有一體。故次頌曰。

色等和合時　　終不成香等　故和合一體　　應如瓶等無

論曰。色等合時。終不展轉變成香等。故雖和合不成一體。勿舍別相失色等名。由是因緣和合一體應如瓶等。其體實無。謂如瓶等離色等法無別體故。一體不成和合亦然。非離色等有別體故。體不成一。又和合時一一細分非和合故。應如未合不合成一細分。不應各名和合。勿一合內有多合體。是故和合體非實有。又和合物必依色成。色體尚無和合焉有。色體無者。如次頌曰。

如離於色等　　瓶體實為無　色體亦應然　　離風等非有

論曰。應知。此中四大造色俱名為色變壞相故。變壞色相大造合成故。離大造無實有性。不可此中唯一是色。勿唯此一變壞非余。又亦不應一切是色。勿一切色皆同一體。體若有殊應失色性。不可一性有眾多體。勿一切法皆同一性。是故色名無實有體。唯依風等假立色名。如色體虛。受等亦爾。領納等相推體實無。唯有世間虛假名相。若無大造。如何世間有火等物燒煮等用。又若一切皆無所有。諸所安立應不得成。我不言無諸法體用。但說汝論所立皆無。謂世所知色受等體燒煮等用。一切非無。若諸愚夫分別倒見所執體用。我說為

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

前面已經破斥過『一』和『可見』的觀點，不應再次執著。而且，色等法（rūpa, etc.，指色蘊等）共同和合時，並不存在一個統一的實體。因此，接下來的頌文說：

『色等和合時，終不成香等，故和合一體，應如瓶等無。』

論曰：色等和合時，最終不會轉變成為香等。因此，即使和合也無法形成一個統一的實體。不要因為和合就捨棄各自的特性，失去色等的名稱。因為這個緣故，和合的統一體應該像瓶子等一樣，其實體並不存在。就像瓶子等離開色等法就沒有單獨的實體一樣，統一體也無法成立，和合也是如此。因為離開色等就沒有單獨的實體，所以統一體無法成立。而且，和合時，每一個細小的部分都不是和合的，應該像未和合一樣，不能形成一個統一的細分。不應該各自稱為和合，不要在一個和合體內有多個和合體。因此，和合的實體不是真實存在的。而且，和合物必定依賴於色而形成，如果色的實體都不存在，和合又怎麼可能存在呢？色的實體不存在，就像接下來的頌文所說：

『如離於色等，瓶體實為無，色體亦應然，離風等非有。』

論曰：應該知道，這裡四大（mahābhūta，地、水、火、風）和造色（upādā rūpa，由四大所造的色法）都稱為色，因為它們具有變壞的特性。因為變壞是色的特性，由四大和合而成，所以離開四大和造色就沒有真實的自性。不能說其中只有一種是色，不要只有這一種變壞，而不是其他的。而且也不應該說一切都是色，不要一切色都是同一個實體。如果實體有差別，就應該失去色的特性。不能說一個自性有多個實體，不要一切法都是同一個自性。因此，色的名稱沒有真實的實體，只是依賴於風等假立的色名。就像色的實體是虛幻的，受等（vedanā, etc.，感受等）也是如此。領納等相（sanjñā, etc.，領受等相）推究起來實體並不存在，只有世間的虛假名相。如果沒有四大和造色，世間怎麼會有火等事物，以及燒煮等作用呢？而且如果一切都沒有，那麼所安立的都應該無法成立。我不是說諸法的體和作用都不存在，只是說你所論證的那些實體都不存在。世間所知的色受等實體，燒煮等作用，一切都不是沒有。如果是那些愚夫分別的顛倒見解所執著的實體和作用，我說那是沒有的。

【English Translation】 English version:

The arguments against 'one' and 'visible' have already been presented, and should not be reasserted. Furthermore, when rūpa (form) and other dharmas (色等法) combine, there is no single unified entity. Therefore, the following verse states:

'When rūpa, etc., combine, they never become smell, etc.; therefore, the unified whole should be like a pot—nonexistent.'

Commentary: When rūpa, etc., combine, they ultimately do not transform into smell, etc. Therefore, even when combined, they do not form a single entity. Do not abandon their individual characteristics and lose the names of rūpa, etc., simply because they are combined. For this reason, the unified whole should be like a pot, etc., which has no real substance. Just as a pot, etc., has no separate substance apart from rūpa, etc., so too, a unified whole cannot be established, and neither can a combination. Because there is no separate substance apart from rūpa, etc., a single entity cannot be established. Moreover, at the time of combination, each minute part is not combined; it should be like something uncombined, unable to form a single, minute division. One should not individually call them combined; there should not be multiple combined entities within a single combination. Therefore, the substance of a combination is not truly existent. Furthermore, a combined object must depend on rūpa to be formed; if the substance of rūpa does not exist, how can a combination exist? The substance of rūpa does not exist, as the following verse states:

'Just as the substance of a pot is truly nonexistent apart from rūpa, etc., so too should the substance of rūpa be; it does not exist apart from wind, etc.'

Commentary: It should be understood that here, the four great elements (mahābhūta, 四大) and derived rūpa (upādā rūpa, 造色) are both called rūpa because they have the characteristic of change and decay. Because change and decay are the characteristics of rūpa, and it is formed by the combination of the four great elements, there is no real self-nature apart from the four great elements and derived rūpa. One cannot say that only one of these is rūpa; do not let only this one change and decay, and not the others. Furthermore, one should not say that everything is rūpa; do not let all rūpa be the same entity. If the entities are different, they should lose the characteristic of rūpa. One cannot say that one self-nature has multiple entities; do not let all dharmas be the same self-nature. Therefore, the name of rūpa has no real substance; it is merely a name of rūpa provisionally established depending on wind, etc. Just as the substance of rūpa is illusory, so too are vedanā (feeling, 受) and the others. When the characteristics of perception, etc. (sanjñā, etc., 領納等相) are investigated, their substance does not exist; there are only worldly, false names and appearances. If there were no four great elements and derived rūpa, how could there be things like fire, etc., in the world, and functions like burning and cooking? Furthermore, if everything were nonexistent, then everything established would be impossible to establish. I am not saying that the substance and function of all dharmas do not exist, but only that the entities you argue for do not exist. The substances of rūpa, vedanā, etc., known in the world, and the functions of burning and cooking, etc., are not all nonexistent. It is the entities and functions grasped by the deluded views of foolish people that I say are nonexistent.

無。非諸聖人見此為有。妄情所執都無有故。

複次勝論者說。火是能燒。地是所燒。其體真實燒煮等用。亦真實有熟變色等。現可知故。今應詰問。火何所燒。為暖為余。汝應審答。並許何失二俱不然。所以者何。故次頌曰。

暖即是火性　　非暖如何燒　故薪體為無　　離此火非有

論曰。暖非所燒即火性故。于自有用現事相違。又汝宗中所燒非暖。故不應執暖為所燒。亦不應言所燒是地。非暖性故。猶如水風薪是所燒。所燒無故。薪體非有。薪體既無。火依何立。火必依薪而得生起。所燒薪盡。火便無故。能燒所燒既並非有。熟變色等豈實有耶。故執實有能燒所燒燒煮等用。皆不應理。有說此頌不唯破彼勝論外道地是所燒。但總破言地等諸法。非暖性故。非所暖體。此說不然。非暖性故。既無同喻。應不成因。不可說言。如未燒位。地等色聚。非是所燒。于彼聚中常有暖性。異相隨故。亦名所燒。苦樂等法隨所依身。由火變異亦名所燒。無色界法前世下地所牽引故。亦名所燒。故非此因所引同喻。設為同喻。理亦不然。燒非燒名。唯有觸物。世間共許。非余法故。此非燒名。雖通余法而局同類。如非實言。又小乘人不執實有所燒等法。何用破為。若言破彼世俗所燒。便違世間。何成比量。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：並非所有聖人都認為這是真實存在的。因為這只是虛妄的情感執著，實際上並不存在。

此外，勝論者（Vaisheshika，印度哲學流派，主張實在論和原子論）說，火是能燒之物，地是被燒之物。它們的本體是真實的，燒煮等作用也是真實存在的，因為熟、變色等現象是顯而易見的。現在應該質問他們，火燒的是什麼？是暖（熱）還是其他？你們應該仔細回答。如果兩者都不承認，就會陷入自相矛盾的境地。為什麼呢？所以接下來的頌文說：

『暖即是火性，非暖如何燒？故薪體為無，離此火非有。』

論曰：暖不是被燒之物，因為暖是火的本性。這與實際情況相違背。而且，在你們的宗派中，被燒之物不是暖。因此，不應該執著于暖是被燒之物，也不應該說被燒之物是地，因為它不具有暖的性質。就像水和風一樣。薪柴是被燒之物，因為被燒之物不存在，所以薪柴的本體不存在。薪柴的本體既然不存在，火又依靠什麼而存在呢？火必定依靠薪柴才能生起。如果被燒的薪柴燒盡了，火也就消失了。能燒之物和被燒之物既然都不存在，熟、變色等現象又怎麼可能是真實存在的呢？因此，執著于真實存在能燒之物、被燒之物以及燒煮等作用，都是不合道理的。有人說，這首頌文不僅是爲了駁斥勝論外道的地是被燒之物的觀點，而且是爲了總的駁斥地等諸法，因為它們不具有暖的性質，不是被暖的物體。這種說法是不對的。因為不具有暖的性質，所以沒有相同的比喻，因此不能構成因。不能說，像未燃燒時的地等色聚，不是被燒之物。因為在那些色聚中，始終存在暖的性質，不同的相貌伴隨著它們，因此也可以稱為被燒之物。苦、樂等法隨著所依之身，由於火的變化，也可以稱為被燒之物。由於無表法（無表色，一種不可見的色法）前世下地的牽引，也可以稱為被燒之物。因此，這個因所引用的比喻是不恰當的。即使作為比喻，道理也是不成立的。燒和非燒的名稱，只有觸物才具有，這是世間公認的，而不是其他法。這個非燒的名稱，雖然可以通用於其他法，但侷限於同類。就像非真實的話語一樣。而且，小乘人不執著于真實存在被燒等法，又何必去駁斥他們呢？如果說駁斥的是他們世俗所認為的被燒之物，那就違背了世間的常識，又怎麼能構成比量呢？

【English Translation】 English version: Not all sages see this as real. Because it is merely the attachment of deluded emotions, and in reality, it does not exist.

Furthermore, the Vaisheshikas (an Indian philosophical school advocating realism and atomism) say that fire is the burner, and earth is what is burned. Their substance is real, and the functions of burning and cooking are also real, because phenomena such as ripening and discoloration are clearly visible. Now, one should question them, what does fire burn? Is it warmth (heat) or something else? You should answer carefully. If you deny both, you will fall into self-contradiction. Why? Therefore, the following verse says:

'Warmth is the nature of fire; how can what is not warm be burned? Therefore, the substance of fuel is non-existent; without it, fire cannot exist.'

The treatise says: Warmth is not what is burned because warmth is the nature of fire. This contradicts the actual situation. Moreover, in your school, what is burned is not warmth. Therefore, one should not cling to warmth as what is burned, nor should one say that what is burned is earth, because it does not have the nature of warmth, like water and wind. Fuel is what is burned, and because what is burned does not exist, the substance of fuel does not exist. Since the substance of fuel does not exist, what does fire rely on to exist? Fire must rely on fuel to arise. If the fuel that is burned is exhausted, the fire will also disappear. Since neither the burner nor what is burned exists, how can phenomena such as ripening and discoloration be real? Therefore, clinging to the real existence of the burner, what is burned, and the functions of burning and cooking is unreasonable. Some say that this verse is not only to refute the Vaisheshika heretics' view that earth is what is burned, but also to generally refute all dharmas such as earth, because they do not have the nature of warmth and are not objects of warmth. This statement is incorrect. Because it does not have the nature of warmth, there is no similar analogy, so it cannot constitute a cause. One cannot say that, like the aggregates of earth and other colors in their unburned state, they are not what is burned. Because in those aggregates, there is always the nature of warmth, and different appearances accompany them, so they can also be called what is burned. Suffering, joy, and other dharmas, along with the body they rely on, can also be called what is burned due to the changes of fire. Due to the influence of avijnapti-rupa (unmanifested form, a type of invisible form) from the lower realms of previous lives, it can also be called what is burned. Therefore, the analogy cited by this cause is inappropriate. Even if it is used as an analogy, the reasoning is not valid. The names of burning and non-burning only apply to tangible objects, which is universally acknowledged, and not to other dharmas. This name of non-burning, although it can be applied to other dharmas, is limited to the same category, like untrue words. Moreover, Hinayanists do not cling to the real existence of what is burned and other dharmas, so why refute them? If it is said that what is being refuted is what they commonly consider to be burned, then that contradicts worldly knowledge, so how can it constitute a valid inference?

複次離系外道作如是言。地大極微及余果物。雖非是火而與火合。由雜火故。似暖相現。然彼地等真實非燒。異暖性故。亦非非燒。似暖相故。雖俱不可說而實是所燒。此亦不然。故次頌曰。

余暖雜故成　　如何不成火　若余不成暖　　由火法應無

論曰。若地大等由火雜故真成暖性。應令成火。暖觸攝故。如實火大。若彼火雜不成暖性。由火為因所生熟變。異觸諸法亦應無有。如火不能生余暖觸。若無熟變色等諸法誰能燒煮燒煮于誰。故燒煮等皆非實。有火非實能燒。觸所攝故。如地大等。地非實所燒。觸所攝故。如火大等。能煮所煮準此應破。故彼所執。其理不成。

複次應重審問。食米齊宗諸火極微為有薪不。無且非理。故次頌曰。

若火微無薪　　應離薪有火

論曰。若火極微離薪而有。粗火同彼應不託薪。若不託薪即應無有燒煮等用。如火極微。若爾即應失於火性。無燒煮用。如地水風。不見世間有如是火無燒煮用及離於薪。故火極微必依薪有。如現見火依附於薪。或應信知極微非火。無火用故。猶若龜毛。有亦不然。故次頌曰。

火微有薪者　　應無火極微

論曰。若火極微恒與薪合應名粗火。何謂極微。於一切時與薪合故。應如粗火失極微性。地與彼

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：　　此外，離系外道（Nirgrantha，古印度教派，主張苦行以解脫）這樣說：『地大極微（earth element atoms）以及其他果實等物，雖然不是火，但與火結合。由於與火混合，就好像顯現出溫暖的性質。然而，那些地大等實際上並非被燒燬，因為它們具有不同的溫暖性質。也不能說它們不是被燒燬的，因為它們看起來具有溫暖的性質。雖然兩者都無法明確說明，但實際上它們是被燒燬的。』這種說法也是不正確的。所以接下來用偈頌說：

其餘暖性混合而成，　如何不能成為火？　如果其餘不能成為暖性，　由於火的法則，應該沒有。

論述：如果地大等由於與火混合而真正成為溫暖的性質，那麼就應該變成火，因為它屬於溫暖的觸覺範疇，就像真正的火大（fire element）一樣。如果與火混合不能成為溫暖的性質，那麼由於火作為原因所產生的熟變（transformation through cooking）等不同的觸覺現象也應該不存在，就像火不能產生其他的溫暖觸覺一樣。如果沒有熟變、顏色等現象，誰能夠燒煮？燒煮的對象又是誰？因此，燒煮等都不是真實的。火也不是真實能夠燒的，因為它屬於觸覺範疇，就像地大等一樣。地也不是真實被燒的，因為它屬於觸覺範疇，就像火大等一樣。能煮和所煮，可以按照這個道理來駁斥。所以他們的主張是不成立的。

此外，應該重新審問：食用米飯的齊宗（齊宗，意義不明，疑為某種祭祀或儀式）等火的極微，是否有薪柴？如果沒有，那就不合道理。所以接下來用偈頌說：

如果火的極微沒有薪柴，　應該離開薪柴而有火。

論述：如果火的極微離開薪柴而存在，那麼粗火（gross fire）也應該像它們一樣不需要依靠薪柴。如果不依靠薪柴，就應該沒有燒煮等作用，就像火的極微一樣。如果這樣，就應該失去火的性質，沒有燒煮的作用，就像地、水、風一樣。世間沒有看到過這樣的火，沒有燒煮的作用，並且脫離薪柴。所以火的極微必定依靠薪柴而存在，就像現在看到的火依附於薪柴一樣。或者應該相信極微不是火，因為它沒有火的作用，就像龜毛一樣。說它有也是不正確的。所以接下來用偈頌說：

火的極微如果有薪柴，　應該沒有火的極微。

論述：如果火的極微總是與薪柴結合，就應該叫做粗火，還叫什麼極微？因為它在任何時候都與薪柴結合，應該像粗火一樣失去極微的性質。地大和它...

【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, the Nirgrantha (a ancient Indian religious sect advocating asceticism for liberation) say thus: 'Earth element atoms (earth element atoms) and other fruits, though not fire, combine with fire. Due to the mixture with fire, it seems to manifest a warm nature. However, those earth elements, etc., are not actually burned because they have a different warm nature. Nor can it be said that they are not burned, because they appear to have a warm nature. Although both are indescribable, they are actually burned.' This statement is also incorrect. Therefore, the following verse says:

That which is formed by the mixture of other warmth, How can it not become fire? If the rest cannot become warmth, Due to the law of fire, there should be none.

Treatise: If earth elements, etc., truly become warm in nature due to the mixture with fire, then they should become fire, because it belongs to the category of warm touch, just like the real fire element. If mixing with fire cannot become warm in nature, then the cooked transformations (transformation through cooking) and other different tactile phenomena produced by fire as a cause should also not exist, just as fire cannot produce other warm tactile sensations. If there are no cooked transformations, colors, etc., who can cook? And who is the object of cooking? Therefore, cooking, etc., are not real. Fire is also not really able to burn, because it belongs to the category of touch, just like earth elements, etc. Earth is also not really burned, because it belongs to the category of touch, just like fire elements, etc. The cooker and the cooked can be refuted according to this principle. Therefore, their assertion is untenable.

Furthermore, one should re-examine: Do the fire atoms of the Qizong (Qizong, meaning unclear, suspected to be a kind of sacrifice or ritual) that eat rice have firewood? If not, it is unreasonable. Therefore, the following verse says:

If the fire atoms have no firewood, There should be fire apart from firewood.

Treatise: If fire atoms exist apart from firewood, then gross fire (gross fire) should also not rely on firewood like them. If it does not rely on firewood, then there should be no burning or cooking functions, just like fire atoms. If so, it should lose the nature of fire, without the function of burning and cooking, like earth, water, and wind. The world has not seen such fire, without the function of burning and cooking, and separated from firewood. Therefore, fire atoms must exist relying on firewood, just as the fire seen now is attached to firewood. Or one should believe that atoms are not fire, because it has no function of fire, like turtle hair. It is also incorrect to say that it has. Therefore, the following verse says:

If the fire atoms have firewood, There should be no fire atoms.

Treatise: If fire atoms are always combined with firewood, it should be called gross fire, what is it called atoms? Because it is always combined with firewood, it should lose the nature of atoms like gross fire. Earth and it...

合亦不成微。余亦應然。種類同故。則應決定無一極微。色法既然心法亦爾。心與心法俱生滅故。又一切法一體不成。所以者何。故次頌曰。

審觀諸法時　　無一體實有

論曰。諸有為法待因緣成。積集而生。積集而滅。無有一法其體獨存。於一體中復漸分析。乃至極細猶有眾分。若諸法體非一應多。此亦不然。故次頌曰。

一體既非有　　多體亦應無

論曰。要先有一。后積成多。一體尚無。多體焉有。又汝執一藉緣生多。一體既無。多體豈有。一體非有。前已具論。是故定無真實多體。雖彼所執一我獨存。而體周圓與多我合。又多法合一體不成。一既不成。多由何立。豈不空等獨一無二。世咸共了是一體耶。世共所知。是假非實。汝所執實非世所知。如何得知空等一體。唯是假有。故次頌曰。

若法更無餘　　汝謂為一體　諸法皆三性　　故一體為無

論曰。若謂諸法更無餘伴唯一獨存。說名為一。空等諸法一一體上皆有三性。謂有一物。有謂大有。一謂一數。物謂物類。即實德業三中隨一。故虛空等一一法上皆有三性。若不爾者。虛空等上有一智言。應不得起。由是無有一法獨存。如何可言實有一體。若言有一皆表實等。故唯實等名有一物。是則有一無有一故。應不能起有

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：合起來也不能構成極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）。其餘的法也應該如此，因為種類相同。那麼，就應該確定沒有一個最小的極微。色法（rūpa，物質現象）既然如此，心法（citta，精神現象）也是這樣。因為心和心法同時生滅。而且，一切法的一體性不能成立。為什麼呢？所以接下來說：『審視觀察諸法時，沒有一個真實存在的一體。』論述：所有的有為法（saṃskṛta，由因緣和合而成的法）都依賴因緣而成就，積聚而生起，積聚而消滅。沒有一個法是其體性獨自存在的。在一個整體中又逐漸分析，乃至到最細微的程度，仍然有眾多部分。如果諸法的體性不是一，就應該是多。但這樣也不對。所以接下來說：『一體既然不存在，多體也應該不存在。』論述：要先有一個，然後積累形成多。一體尚且沒有，哪裡有多體呢？而且，你認為一依靠因緣而生多。一體既然沒有，多體怎麼會有呢？一體不存在，前面已經詳細論述過了。所以一定沒有真實的多體。即使他們所認為的唯一存在的我（ātman，靈魂），其體性周遍圓滿，與多個我結合。而且，多個法合起來也不能構成一體。一既然不能成立，多又從何而立呢？難道虛空（ākāśa，空間）等是唯一無二的，世人都共同認為是一個整體嗎？世人共同認為的，是假有的，不是真實的。你所執著的真實，不是世人所知道的。怎麼能知道虛空等是一個整體呢？這只是假有。所以接下來說：『如果法沒有其餘部分，你認為它是一個整體，諸法都有三種自性（trisvabhāva，遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性），所以一體是不存在的。』論述：如果認為諸法沒有其餘伴隨，唯一獨自存在，就說它是一。虛空等諸法，每一個體上都有三種自性。所謂『有一物』，『有』是指『大有』，『一』是指『一數』，『物』是指『物類』，即實（dravya，實體）、德（guṇa，性質）、業（karma，活動）三者中的任何一個。所以虛空等每一個法上都有三種自性。如果不是這樣，在虛空等上面，『有一』的知覺和言說，就不應該能夠生起。因此，沒有一個法是獨自存在的。怎麼能說真實存在一體呢？如果說『有一』都表示『實』等，所以只有『實』等才稱為『有一物』。這樣，因為沒有『一』，『有』就應該不能生起。

【English Translation】 English version: Even combined, they cannot form a paramāṇu (the smallest unit of matter). Other dharmas should also be the same, because they are of the same kind. Then, it should be determined that there is no ultimate paramāṇu. Since rūpa (material phenomena) is like this, so is citta (mental phenomena). Because mind and mental phenomena arise and cease simultaneously. Moreover, the oneness of all dharmas cannot be established. Why? Therefore, it is said next: 'When carefully observing all dharmas, there is no single, truly existing entity.' Commentary: All saṃskṛta (conditioned dharmas, those arising from causes and conditions) depend on causes and conditions to be accomplished, accumulating to arise, and accumulating to cease. There is no single dharma whose essence exists independently. Within a single entity, there is gradual analysis, even to the finest degree, there are still many parts. If the essence of dharmas is not one, it should be many. But this is also not correct. Therefore, it is said next: 'Since one entity does not exist, many entities should also not exist.' Commentary: There must first be one, and then accumulation forms many. If one entity does not exist, where are many entities? Moreover, you believe that one relies on conditions to generate many. Since one entity does not exist, how can many entities exist? The non-existence of one entity has been discussed in detail earlier. Therefore, there is definitely no real many entities. Even if they believe that the only existing ātman (soul) is whose essence is pervasive and complete, combining with multiple selves. Moreover, multiple dharmas cannot combine to form one entity. Since one cannot be established, where does many stand? Could it be that ākāśa (space) and others are uniquely singular, and the world commonly believes it to be a single entity? What the world commonly believes is hypothetical, not real. The reality you cling to is not known by the world. How can one know that space and others are a single entity? This is only hypothetical. Therefore, it is said next: 'If a dharma has no remainder, you consider it to be one entity, all dharmas have three natures (trisvabhāva, parikalpita-svabhāva, paratantra-svabhāva, pariniṣpanna-svabhāva), therefore, one entity does not exist.' Commentary: If it is believed that dharmas have no other companions, existing solely alone, it is said to be one. Each of the dharmas such as space has three natures on each entity. The so-called 'there is a thing', 'there is' refers to 'great existence', 'one' refers to 'one number', 'thing' refers to 'category of things', that is, any one of dravya (substance), guṇa (quality), and karma (action). Therefore, each dharma such as space has three natures. If it is not like this, then the perception and speech of 'there is one' should not be able to arise on space and others. Therefore, there is no dharma that exists alone. How can it be said that there is a real one entity? If it is said that 'there is one' all represent 'real' and so on, so only 'real' and so on are called 'there is a thing'. In this way, because there is no 'one', 'there is' should not be able to arise.

一智言。若言假說無斯過者。此亦不然。前已破故。謂智言等誰假誰真。應併爲真。或俱是假。又一切法其相雖殊。應得實名或德或業。是故假說。其過彌深。終不能除。一成三失。一有三性一體不成。一既不成三亦非有。是故諸法非一非多。而言一多是假非實。或有異釋。一法成三。謂一法言簡異非一非一極略。所謂二種。簡二及前即成二性。根本法體以為第三。故一切法皆有三性。今應徴問。簡二取一。乃是自心分別有異。如何令法。成三性耶。又簡前二彌成其一。非二非多名為一故。是則立一反破其三。何名以三而破其一。復有異釋一法成三。簡去來今三非有故。如無君等簡異立名。此簡三無故成三性。此釋非理。所以者何。異類無邊豈唯三種。簡無立有。無不唯三。簡有立名有過千數。如何但說一法成三。又相簡別。唯在自心。或在名言。何關法體。是故此釋于破無能。復有釋言。常先已破。今此唯破執有無常。所執無常皆有三性。謂生住滅。顯在諸經。此亦不然。生住滅相。時分各異。如苦樂舍必不同時。時既不同。體相亦別。何名一法其性有三。又若說生無間即滅。應言二性。何得論三。又生滅時前後各異。如去來世不名一法。如何難言一法二性。是故此釋理亦不成。復有釋言。諸有為法極於一念。於一

念中有多剎那時分性故。如臘縛等。言三性者。顯性非一。不唯有三。此亦不然。時分前後非一法故。如何可說一法有三。是故如前釋為最勝。諸法一一非一非多。隨世俗言有多有一。世俗諸法隨世俗情。假立為有。不任推究。諸有智人於世俗法。應隨說有勿固尋思。若有尋思世俗諸法。求其性相不異有人。手執燈炬入于闇室。求闇性相。所以者何。世俗諸法猶如幻闇。眾緣所成不任思求。求即散壞。

複次為顯世間所執諸法皆非真實。及顯外道所執不同。故次頌曰。

有非有俱非　　一非一雙泯　隨次應配屬　　智者達非真

論曰。一切世間色等句義。名言所表。心慧所知。情執不同。略有四種。謂有非有俱許俱非。隨次應知。配四邪執。謂一非一雙許雙非。數論外道執有等性。與諸法一即當有句。此執非真。所以者何。若青等色與色性一。應如色性其體皆同。五樂等聲與聲性一。應如聲性其體皆同。香味觸等類亦應爾。眼等諸根與根性一。應如根性其體皆同。應一一根取一切境。應一一境對一切根。又一切法與有性一。應如有性其體皆同。又樂苦癡及與思我。與有性一。應如有性其體皆同。是則汝宗所立差別皆不成就。故彼所執決定非真。勝論外道說有等性。與法非一當非有句。此亦非真。所

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：念頭中有剎那的時間分割，就像臘縛（Lava，極短的時間單位）等。說三種自性，是爲了顯示自性並非單一，並非只有三種。這種說法也不對。因為時間分割有前後，不是單一的法，怎麼能說一個法有三種自性呢？所以像前面解釋的那樣才是最殊勝的。一切法，每一個都不是單一也不是眾多。隨著世俗的說法，可以說有多有少。世俗的法隨著世俗的情感，假立為有，不能推究。有智慧的人對於世俗的法，應該隨著所說而承認其存在，不要固執地尋思。如果尋思世俗的法，尋求它的自性和現象，就好像有人手持燈炬進入黑暗的房間，尋求黑暗的自性和現象一樣。為什麼呢？因為世俗的法就像幻象和黑暗，由眾多因緣和合而成，不能思求，一思求就會散壞。

其次，爲了顯示世間所執著的諸法都不是真實的，以及顯示與外道所執著的不同，所以接著說偈頌：

有、非有、俱非，一、非一、雙泯，依次應該配屬，智者明白這些都不是真實的。

論曰：一切世間的色等句義，名言所表達的，心慧所知道的，情感執著不同的，大概有四種，就是有、非有、俱許、俱非，依次應該知道，配屬四種邪執，就是一、非一、雙許、雙非。數論外道執著有等性，與諸法是一，就屬於『有』句。這種執著不是真實的。為什麼呢？如果青色等與色性是一，應該像色性一樣，它們的本體都相同。五種樂聲等與聲性是一，應該像聲性一樣，它們的本體都相同。香味觸等也應該這樣。眼等諸根與根性是一，應該像根性一樣，它們的本體都相同。應該每一個根都能取一切境，應該每一個境都能對應一切根。又一切法與有性是一，應該如有性一樣，它們的本體都相同。又樂、苦、癡以及思、我，與有性是一，應該如有性一樣，它們的本體都相同。這樣，你們宗派所建立的差別就都不能成立。所以他們的執著決定不是真實的。勝論外道說有等性，與法不是一，就屬於『非有』句。這也不是真實的。

【English Translation】 English version: Because there are momentary divisions in a thought, like Lava (an extremely short unit of time) and so on. Saying 'three natures' is to show that nature is not singular, not just three. This is also not correct. Because time divisions have before and after, it is not a single dharma, how can one say that one dharma has three natures? Therefore, the previous explanation is the most excellent. All dharmas, each one is neither singular nor many. According to worldly speech, one can say there are many or few. Worldly dharmas, according to worldly emotions, are falsely established as existent, and cannot be investigated. Wise people, regarding worldly dharmas, should acknowledge their existence according to what is said, and not stubbornly ponder them. If one ponders worldly dharmas, seeking their nature and characteristics, it is like someone holding a lamp and entering a dark room, seeking the nature and characteristics of darkness. Why? Because worldly dharmas are like illusions and darkness, formed by the aggregation of many causes and conditions, and cannot be contemplated; once contemplated, they will disintegrate.

Furthermore, to show that all dharmas clung to by the world are not real, and to show the difference from what is clung to by external paths, the following verse is then spoken:

'Is, is not, both not, one, not one, both extinguished, should be assigned in order, the wise understand these are not real.'

Commentary: All worldly meanings of form, etc., expressed by names and words, known by mind and wisdom, with different emotional attachments, are roughly of four kinds, namely: 'is', 'is not', 'both affirmed', 'both denied', which should be known in order, corresponding to the four wrong views, namely: 'one', 'not one', 'both affirmed', 'both denied'. The Samkhya (number) heretics cling to the equality of existence, being one with all dharmas, which belongs to the 'is' statement. This clinging is not real. Why? If blue color, etc., are one with the nature of color, they should be the same in essence as the nature of color. The five pleasant sounds, etc., are one with the nature of sound, they should be the same in essence as the nature of sound. The same should be true for smell, taste, touch, etc. The eyes and other sense organs are one with the nature of the organs, they should be the same in essence as the nature of the organs. Each organ should be able to grasp all objects, and each object should correspond to all organs. Furthermore, all dharmas are one with the nature of existence, they should be the same in essence as the nature of existence. Also, pleasure, suffering, delusion, and thought, and 'I', are one with the nature of existence, they should be the same in essence as the nature of existence. In that case, the distinctions established by your school would not be established. Therefore, their clinging is definitely not real. The Vaisheshika (particularity) heretics say that the equality of existence is not one with the dharmas, which belongs to the 'is not' statement. This is also not real.

以者何。若青等色與色性異。應如聲等非眼所行。聲等亦然。異聲等性應如色等。非耳等境。又一切法非有性者。應如兔角。其體本無。是則應同空無我論。或同餘道邪見師宗。豈不有性非即諸法。法雖非有而有有耶。所依法無。能依豈有。又有性上無別有性。應不名有所餘諸法。雖有有性非有性故。其體應無。是則一切所立句義。皆不得成。便同撥無邪見外道。故彼所執決定非真。無慚外道執有等性。與彼諸法亦一亦異。當於亦有亦非有句。此亦非真。所以者何。若有等性與色等一。同數論過。與色等異。同勝論失一異二種。性相相違而言體同。理不成立。一應非一。即異故如異。異應非異。即一故如一。一異既不成。有非有焉立。一異相異而言體同。則一切法皆應無異。異相既無一相何有。一異二相相待立故。若謂一法待對不同名一異者。即應一異二並非真。或隨一假一法二相。互相乖違。俱言是真。必不應理。故彼所執決定非真。邪命外道執有等性。與彼諸法非一非異。當於非有非非有句。此亦非真。所以者何。若有等性與法非一。同勝論過。與法非異。同數論失。又一異相世共知有。汝獨撥無違世間失。又汝所說非一異言。為但是遮為偏有表。若偏有表應不雙非。若但是遮應無所執。有遮有表理互相違。無表

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：這是什麼意思呢？如果青色等顏色與色性（Rupasvabhava，色的自性）不同，就應該像聲音等一樣，不是眼睛所能感知的。聲音等也是如此，如果與聲性（Shabdasvabhava，聲音的自性）不同，就應該像顏色等一樣，不是耳朵等感官的境界。而且，如果一切法沒有自性，就應該像兔角一樣，其本體本來就不存在，那就應該等同於空無我論，或者等同於其他外道的邪見。難道不是有自性，但又不等同於諸法嗎？法雖然沒有，但有『有』嗎？所依之法都沒有，能依之『有』又怎麼會有呢？而且，在有性之上沒有另外的有性，就不應該稱作有所餘的諸法。即使有『有性』，但因為不是『有性』的緣故，其本體應該不存在。這樣一來，一切所建立的語句和意義，都不能成立，就等同於否定一切的邪見外道。所以他們所執著的決定不是真實的。無慚外道執著『有』等性，與那些諸法既是一又是異。當用于『亦有亦非有』的語句。這也是不真實的。為什麼呢？如果『有』等性與色等是一，就犯了數論（Samkhya）的過失；如果與色等是異，就犯了勝論（Vaisheshika）的過失。一和異是兩種相互矛盾的性質，卻說本體相同，道理上不能成立。『一』應該不是『一』，因為是『異』的緣故，就像『異』一樣；『異』應該不是『異』，因為是『一』的緣故，就像『一』一樣。一和異既然不能成立，『有』和『非有』又怎麼能成立呢？一和異的相狀不同，卻說本體相同，那麼一切法都應該沒有差別。如果『異』的相狀沒有了，『一』的相狀又怎麼會有呢？一和異這兩種相狀是相互依存而成立的。如果說一個法因為待對的對象不同而名為一或異，那就應該一和異都不是真實的，或者隨著其中一個而虛假，一個法有兩種相互矛盾的相狀，都說是真實的，必定不合道理。所以他們所執著的決定不是真實的。邪命外道執著『有』等性，與那些諸法既非一也非異。當用于『非有非非有』的語句。這也是不真實的。為什麼呢？如果『有』等性與法非一，就犯了勝論的過失；如果與法非異，就犯了數論的過失。而且，一和異的相狀世間普遍知道存在，你卻獨自否定，這是違背世間的過失。而且，你所說的『非一異』的言語，是僅僅遮止，還是偏向于有所表述？如果偏向于有所表述，就不應該雙重否定；如果僅僅是遮止，就應該沒有什麼執著。有遮止和有表述，道理上互相矛盾，沒有表述。

【English Translation】 English version: What does this mean? If blue and other colors are different from Rupasvabhava (the nature of form), they should be like sound and other things, not perceptible by the eye. The same goes for sound and other things; if they are different from Shabdasvabhava (the nature of sound), they should be like colors and other things, not within the realm of the ear and other senses. Moreover, if all dharmas have no inherent nature, they should be like rabbit horns, whose substance does not exist in the first place. Then it should be equivalent to the theory of emptiness and no-self, or equivalent to the heretical views of other external paths. Isn't it that there is a nature, but it is not identical to all dharmas? Although the dharma does not exist, is there 'existence'? If the dharma on which it depends does not exist, how can the 'existence' on which it relies exist? Moreover, there is no other existence on top of existence, so it should not be called the remaining dharmas that have existence. Even if there is 'existence', because it is not 'existence', its substance should not exist. In this way, all the established statements and meanings cannot be established, and it is equivalent to the heretical external paths that deny everything. Therefore, what they cling to is definitely not true. The shameless heretics cling to 'existence' and other natures, which are both one and different from those dharmas. It should be used in the statement 'both existent and non-existent'. This is also not true. Why? If 'existence' and other natures are the same as form and other things, it commits the fault of Samkhya (enumerationism); if it is different from form and other things, it commits the fault of Vaisheshika (atomism). One and different are two contradictory qualities, but to say that the substance is the same is not logically tenable. 'One' should not be 'one', because it is 'different', just like 'different'; 'different' should not be 'different', because it is 'one', just like 'one'. Since one and different cannot be established, how can 'existence' and 'non-existence' be established? The appearances of one and different are different, but to say that the substance is the same, then all dharmas should have no difference. If the appearance of 'different' is gone, how can the appearance of 'one' exist? The two appearances of one and different are established in mutual dependence. If it is said that a dharma is called one or different because of the different objects it faces, then one and different should not be true, or false with one of them. A dharma has two contradictory appearances, and both are said to be true, which must be unreasonable. Therefore, what they cling to is definitely not true. The Ajivika (fatalist) heretics cling to 'existence' and other natures, which are neither one nor different from those dharmas. It should be used in the statement 'neither existent nor non-existent'. This is also not true. Why? If 'existence' and other natures are not one with the dharma, it commits the fault of Vaisheshika; if it is not different from the dharma, it commits the fault of Samkhya. Moreover, the appearances of one and different are universally known to exist in the world, but you alone deny them, which is the fault of contradicting the world. Moreover, is the language of 'neither one nor different' that you speak merely prohibitive, or is it biased towards something expressed? If it is biased towards something expressed, it should not be doubly negative; if it is merely prohibitive, there should be no clinging. There is prohibition and there is expression, which are logically contradictory, without expression.

無遮言成戲論。汝執諸法性相非空。而說雙非。但為避過此雙非語。亦不應論。違汝所宗法性相故。若諸法性一一俱非。此俱非言亦不應說。舉言必有俱非性故。是則汝曹應常結舌。發言便壞自論所宗。默亦不成。以俱非故。語默俱失。一何苦哉。誰有智人而不悲愍。故彼所執決定非真。如是世間四種外道。邪論惡見擾壞其心。虛妄推尋諸法性相。皆不中理競執紛紜。于諸法中起四種謗。謂有非有雙許雙非。增益損減相違戲論。是故世間所執非實。

複次外道余乘弊魔惡友邪論惡見擾壞其心。于其世間虛偽諸法。種種思構妄執為真。于相續假謂是真常。積集假中執為實有。為顯此義。復說頌曰。

于相續假法　　惡見謂真常　積集假法中　　邪執言實有

論曰。有為諸行前滅後生。無始時來展轉相續。生滅變異微細難知。因果連綿其狀如一。愚夫惡見謂是真常。邪執糾紛遞相誹斥。色等諸法恃托因緣。虛假整合都無實體。微細積聚密合難分。眾分和同冥然似一。愚夫僻執言有實體。各據一途互興諍論。又于相續積集假中。不達諸門分位假有。橫計種種義類不同。執一法中有多實性。如是所迷自性差別。皆由惡見邪執而生。緣此輪迴諸趣諸有。備受眾苦未有出期。是故應除惡見邪執。信解諸法因緣集

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：無遮止的言論就成了戲論。你執著于諸法的自性（svabhāva）和相狀（lakṣaṇa）並非空性（śūnyatā），卻說『雙非』（既非有也非非有）。但爲了避免『雙非』的過失，也不應該談論，因為這違背了你所宗的法性（dharmatā）和自相（svalakṣaṇa）。如果諸法的自性一一都是『非』，那麼這個『俱非』的說法也不應該說，因為舉出言論必定有『俱非』的性質。這樣，你們就應該永遠閉嘴，一發言就破壞了自己所宗的理論。沉默也不行，因為是『俱非』的緣故。說話和沉默都失敗了，這是何等的痛苦啊！誰有智慧的人而不悲憫呢？所以他們所執著的決定不是真實的。像這樣，世間四種外道，以邪論和惡見擾亂他們的心，虛妄地推求諸法的自性和相狀，都不合道理，競相執著，紛紜雜亂。于諸法中生起四種誹謗，即『有』、『非有』、『雙許』（既肯定有也肯定非有）、『雙非』，增益和損減，互相違背的戲論。所以世間所執著的不是真實的。

其次，外道、其他乘的邪說、惡魔、壞朋友、邪論和惡見擾亂他們的心，對於世間虛假的諸法，種種思索構想，錯誤地執著為真實。對於相續的假象，認為是真常；在積集的假象中，執著為實有。爲了顯示這個意義，再說頌偈：

『于相續假法，惡見謂真常；積集假法中，邪執言實有。』

論曰：有為法（saṃskṛta dharma）的諸行，前滅後生，從無始以來輾轉相續，生滅變異微細難以察覺，因果連綿，它的形狀如一。愚夫以惡見認為是真常。邪執糾紛，互相誹斥。色等諸法，依賴因緣，虛假整合，都沒有實體。微細的積聚，緊密結合難以分開，眾多部分和諧相同，闇昧地好像一個整體。愚夫偏頗地執著說有實體，各自根據一種途徑，互相興起爭論。又在相續和積集的假象中，不通達諸門的分位假有，橫加揣測種種義類不同，執著一個法中有多種實性。像這樣所迷惑的自性差別，都是由惡見和邪執而生。因為這個緣故，輪迴于諸趣諸有，備受眾苦，沒有脫離的期限。所以應該去除惡見和邪執，信解諸法是因緣和合。

【English Translation】 English version: Unrestrained speech becomes frivolous talk. You cling to the notion that the nature (svabhāva) and characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of all dharmas are not empty (śūnyatā), yet you speak of 'neither both' (neither existent nor non-existent). However, to avoid the fault of 'neither both,' one should not even discuss it, as it contradicts your own doctrine of the nature of dharmas (dharmatā) and their intrinsic characteristics (svalakṣaṇa). If the nature of all dharmas is individually 'not,' then this statement of 'neither both' should also not be uttered, because any statement necessarily possesses the nature of 'neither both.' Thus, you should remain perpetually silent, for any utterance would undermine the tenets of your own doctrine. Silence is also untenable because of 'neither both.' Speech and silence both fail; how miserable! Who with wisdom would not feel compassion? Therefore, what they cling to is definitely not true. In this way, the four types of non-Buddhist (tīrthika) in the world, with their heretical theories and evil views, disturb their minds, vainly speculating about the nature and characteristics of dharmas, all without reason, competing in clinging to confused notions. They give rise to four types of slander regarding dharmas, namely 'existence,' 'non-existence,' 'both' (affirming both existence and non-existence), and 'neither both,' increasing and decreasing, contradictory frivolous talk. Therefore, what the world clings to is not real.

Furthermore, non-Buddhists, adherents of other vehicles, evil demons, bad friends, heretical theories, and evil views disturb their minds. Regarding the false dharmas of the world, they engage in various thoughts and constructs, mistakenly clinging to them as real. Regarding the illusion of continuity, they consider it truly permanent; in the illusion of accumulation, they cling to it as truly existent. To illustrate this meaning, a verse is further stated:

'In the illusion of continuity, evil views regard it as truly permanent; in the illusion of accumulation, heretical clinging declares it truly existent.'

Treatise: The conditioned (saṃskṛta) phenomena of all activities arise and cease in succession, continuing from beginningless time, with subtle and difficult-to-perceive changes of arising and ceasing. The continuous connection of cause and effect appears as one. Foolish people, with evil views, consider it truly permanent. Heretical clinging is confused, mutually slandering each other. Dharmas such as form (rūpa) rely on conditions (pratyaya) and are falsely assembled, lacking any substance. Subtle accumulations are closely combined and difficult to separate; numerous parts harmoniously coincide, obscurely resembling a single whole. Foolish people stubbornly cling to the notion that there is substance, each relying on a single path, mutually engaging in disputes. Moreover, in the illusion of continuity and accumulation, they do not understand the provisional existence of divisions in various aspects, arbitrarily speculating that different categories of meaning exist, clinging to the notion that there are multiple real natures within a single dharma. Such deluded distinctions of self-nature arise from evil views and heretical clinging. Because of this, they transmigrate through various realms and existences, enduring all kinds of suffering without any prospect of liberation. Therefore, one should eliminate evil views and heretical clinging, and believe and understand that all dharmas are aggregates of conditions.

成。是假非真。無顛倒理。

複次為顯諸法眾緣所成。非一非常無我無法。猶如幻化。情有理無。是俗非真。復說頌曰。

諸法眾緣成　　性羸無自在　虛假依他立　　故我法皆無

論曰。諸法虛假眾緣所成。起住依他體無自在。唸唸生滅眾分整合。非一非常猶如幻化。愚夫執有。智者達無。故於其中無我無法。一切外道及所餘乘。計一計常為我為法。一常非有我法定無。故辨緣成顯二無我。

複次有作是言。字名句合詮表自心。所欲說義一一各別。雖不能詮而和合時。能有所表。若義非有。詮亦應無。既有能詮。定應有義。為破彼執。故次頌曰。

果眾緣合成　　離緣無別果　如是合與果　　諸聖達皆無

論曰。此頌意言。諸無為法非緣成故。猶若空花。體用都無。如前廣說。諸有為法眾緣所成。如幻所為無實體用。緣合成果果不離緣。如樹成林林非異樹。攬緣成果順世俗言。勝義理中無如是事。故諸聖者了達皆無。所以者何。名之與句並字所成。字復攬于眾分為體。字一一分多剎那成。前後剎那無和合義。要前念滅后念方生。生有滅無其理決定。無之與有合義不成。前後二時有亦不合。時分異故。猶如去來。合義既無。字分焉有。尚無字分。字型豈成。字型既無。名句非有

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：是虛假的，不是真實的，沒有顛倒的道理。

再次，爲了顯示諸法由眾多因緣和合而成，不是單一的，不是永恒的，沒有我，沒有法，就像幻化一樣。情識上有，道理上無，這是世俗諦，不是真諦。所以再次宣說偈頌：

諸法由眾緣和合而成，自性羸弱沒有自主性，虛假不實依他而立，所以我和法都是不存在的。

論曰：諸法虛假不實，由眾多因緣和合而成，生起和存在都依賴於其他事物，本體沒有自主性。唸唸生滅，由眾多部分集合而成，不是單一的，不是永恒的，就像幻化一樣。愚昧的人執著於它的存在，有智慧的人通達它的不存在。所以在其中沒有我，沒有法。一切外道以及其餘的乘，計執為單一的，計執為永恒的，執著為我，執著為法。單一和永恒是不存在的，我和法決定是沒有的。所以辨明因緣和合而成，是爲了顯示二無我（人無我、法無我）。

再次，有人這樣認為：字、名、句的組合，可以詮釋表達自心所想要說的意義，每一個字、名、句都有各自不同的含義，雖然單獨不能完全詮釋，但是當它們組合在一起的時候，就能夠表達意義。如果意義不存在，那麼能詮釋的字、名、句也應該不存在。既然有能詮釋的字、名、句，那麼一定有被詮釋的意義。爲了破除這種執著，所以接著宣說偈頌：

果由眾緣和合而成，離開因緣就沒有獨立的果，像這樣，和合與果，諸位聖者通達都是不存在的。

論曰：這個偈頌的意思是說，諸無為法不是由因緣和合而成的，就像虛空中的花朵一樣，本體和作用都沒有，如同前面廣泛解說的那樣。諸有為法由眾多因緣和合而成，就像幻術所變現的事物一樣，沒有真實的本體和作用。因緣和合產生果，果不離開因緣，就像樹木構成森林，森林不是獨立於樹木之外的。憑藉因緣和合產生果，這是順應世俗的說法。在勝義諦的道理中，沒有這樣的事情。所以諸位聖者通達這些都是不存在的。為什麼呢？名和句是由字組成的，字又是由眾多部分組成的。每一個字又由多個剎那組成。前後剎那之間沒有和合的意義，必須是前一個念頭滅去，后一個念頭才產生。產生有滅亡，這是必然的道理。沒有和有，和合的意義不能成立。前後兩個時間，有也不能和合，因為時間有差別，就像過去和未來一樣。和合的意義既然不存在，字的組成部分怎麼會有呢？尚且沒有字的組成部分，字的本體怎麼能成立呢？字的本體既然不存在，名和句也就不存在了。

【English Translation】 English version: It is false, not true, and there is no principle of reversal.

Furthermore, to reveal that all dharmas are formed by various causes and conditions, they are not singular, not constant, without self, and without dharma, like illusions. They exist in perception but not in reality, which is conventional truth, not ultimate truth. Therefore, it is said in verse:

All dharmas arise from various causes, Their nature is weak, without autonomy, False and dependent they are established, Therefore, both 'I' and 'dharma' are nonexistent.

Commentary: All dharmas are false and formed by various causes and conditions. Their arising and existence depend on others, and their essence lacks autonomy. They arise and cease moment by moment, composed of many parts. They are not singular, not constant, like illusions. The ignorant cling to their existence, while the wise realize their non-existence. Therefore, there is no 'I' and no 'dharma' within them. All non-Buddhist paths and other vehicles cling to singularity and permanence, clinging to 'I' and 'dharma'. Singularity and permanence do not exist; 'I' and 'dharma' are definitely nonexistent. Therefore, clarifying the formation by causes and conditions reveals the two non-selves (non-self of person and non-self of phenomena).

Furthermore, some say: words, names, and phrases combine to express the meaning desired by the mind. Each word, name, and phrase has its own distinct meaning. Although they cannot fully express the meaning individually, when they are combined, they can express something. If the meaning does not exist, then the words, names, and phrases that express it should also not exist. Since there are words, names, and phrases that can express meaning, there must be a meaning to be expressed. To refute this clinging, the following verse is stated:

The fruit is formed by various causes, Without causes, there is no separate fruit, Thus, combination and fruit, The sages realize are all nonexistent.

Commentary: The meaning of this verse is that unconditioned dharmas are not formed by causes and conditions, like flowers in the sky, lacking both essence and function, as explained extensively before. Conditioned dharmas are formed by various causes and conditions, like things created by illusion, without real essence or function. Causes combine to produce a fruit, and the fruit does not exist apart from the causes, just as trees form a forest, and the forest is not separate from the trees. Relying on causes to produce a fruit is in accordance with conventional speech. In the principle of ultimate truth, there is no such thing. Therefore, the sages realize that these are all nonexistent. Why? Names and phrases are composed of words, and words are composed of many parts. Each word is composed of many moments. There is no meaning of combination between successive moments; it is necessary for the previous thought to cease before the next thought arises. Arising has cessation; this is a definite principle. Non-existence and existence cannot be combined. The two times, past and future, cannot be combined because time is different, like going and coming. Since the meaning of combination does not exist, how can the parts of a word exist? If there are no parts of a word, how can the essence of a word be established? Since the essence of a word does not exist, names and phrases do not exist.

。無字名句。合義不成。如何可言字名句合能詮表義。然諸世間隨自心變。謂有眾字和合為名。復謂眾名和合為句。謂此名句能有所詮。能詮所詮皆自心變。諸心所變情有理無。聖者于中如實知見。云何知見。謂見彼法皆是愚夫虛妄識心分別所作假而非實俗有真無。隨順世間權說為有。是故一切能詮所詮。俗有真無不應固執。

複次于諸所緣空無我見。能速成辦自利利他。所以者何。愚夫于境執我我所。生死輪迴。聖者于中達空無我。速證常樂。能巧利他。是故應修空無我見。令自利滿妙用無窮。為顯此見是利自他正真要道。故說頌曰。

識為諸有種　　境是識所行　見境無我時　　諸有種皆滅

論曰。識能發生諸煩惱業。由此三有生死輪迴。故說識心為諸有種。能牽後有得識食名。如是識心緣色等起。無所緣境識必不生。若能正觀境為無我。所緣無故能緣亦無。能所既亡眾苦隨滅。證寂無影清涼涅槃。至此位時名自利滿。諸有本願為利益他。住此位中化用無盡。亦令有識證此涅槃。是故欲求自他勝利真方便者。應正勤修空無我見。復有別釋。識為諸有種者。謂宅識中種種熏成諸業習氣無明有愛所隨增故。能感三有生死輪迴。識為所依。故說為識。境是識所行者。識中習氣由執色等境界熏成隨縛境

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：沒有文字可以構成名句。如果組合起來沒有意義，怎麼能說文字和名句的組合能夠表達意義呢？然而，世間之人隨著自己的心念變化，認為有許多文字組合成為名稱，又認為許多名稱組合成為句子，認為這些名稱和句子能夠表達某種意義。能表達的和被表達的，都是自己心念的變化。這些心念的變化，在情理上是有的，但實際上是沒有的。聖者對此如實地知見。如何知見呢？就是見到這些法都是愚夫虛妄的識心分別所造作的，是虛假的而不是真實的，在世俗上說是有的，但實際上是沒有的。只是隨順世間的說法，權且說它為有。所以，一切能表達的和被表達的，在世俗上說是有的，但實際上是沒有的，不應該固執地認為它們是真實存在的。

其次，對於一切所緣之境，修習空無我見，能夠迅速成就自利利他。為什麼這樣說呢？因為愚夫對於外境執著于『我』（ātman）和『我所』（ātmanīya，屬於我的），所以會生死輪迴。而聖者對此通達空無我，就能迅速證得常樂（nityasukha）。並且能夠巧妙地利益他人。所以，應該修習空無我見，使自利圓滿，妙用無窮。爲了顯示這種見解是利益自己和他人真正重要的途徑，所以說偈頌如下：

『識為諸有種，境是識所行，見境無我時，諸有種皆滅。』

論曰：識能夠產生各種煩惱和業，由此導致三有（traidhātuka，欲界、色界、無色界）的生死輪迴。所以說識心是諸有的種子，能夠牽引後有，得到『識食』（vijñāna-āhāra）的名稱。這樣的識心緣於色等境界而生起，如果沒有所緣之境，識必定不會生起。如果能夠正確地觀察到外境是無我的，因為沒有所緣，所以能緣（識）也就不存在了。能緣和所緣都消失了，各種痛苦也隨之滅除，證得寂靜無影、清涼的涅槃（nirvāṇa）。達到這種境界時，就叫做自利圓滿。那些原本發願要利益他人的人，安住于這種境界中，化度眾生的作用是無窮無盡的，也能讓有識之士證得這種涅槃。所以，想要尋求自利利他的真正方便之法的人，應該努力修習空無我見。還有另一種解釋：『識為諸有種』，是指阿賴耶識（ālayavijñāna）中種種熏習而成的各種業的習氣，以及無明（avidyā）和有愛（bhava-taṇhā）的隨增，能夠感得三有的生死輪迴。識是所依，所以說為識。『境是識所行』，是指識中的習氣由於執著色等境界熏習而成，隨縛于外境。

【English Translation】 English version: No words can form a meaningful sentence. If combined without meaning, how can it be said that the combination of words and sentences can express meaning? However, worldly people, according to their own mental changes, believe that many words combine to form names, and many names combine to form sentences, believing that these names and sentences can express some meaning. What can be expressed and what is expressed are all changes of one's own mind. These mental changes exist in sentiment but not in reality. Sages know and see this as it truly is. How do they know and see it? They see that these dharmas are all made by the false discriminating mind of foolish people, are false rather than real, exist conventionally but not truly. They provisionally say they exist in accordance with worldly speech. Therefore, all that can be expressed and all that is expressed exist conventionally but not truly, and should not be stubbornly clung to as real.

Furthermore, cultivating the view of emptiness and non-self (anātman) towards all objects of perception can quickly accomplish self-benefit and the benefit of others. Why is this so? Because foolish people are attached to 'self' (ātman) and 'what belongs to self' (ātmanīya) in relation to external objects, they will be reborn in saṃsāra. But sages, understanding emptiness and non-self in this, can quickly attain constant bliss (nityasukha). And they can skillfully benefit others. Therefore, one should cultivate the view of emptiness and non-self, so that self-benefit is fulfilled and its wonderful function is inexhaustible. To show that this view is the truly important path for benefiting oneself and others, the verse says:

'Consciousness is the seed of all existence, the object is what consciousness acts upon, when one sees the object as non-self, all seeds of existence are extinguished.'

The treatise says: Consciousness can generate various afflictions and karma, which leads to the cycle of birth and death in the three realms (traidhātuka, the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm). Therefore, the mind of consciousness is said to be the seed of all existence, which can lead to future existence and obtain the name 'consciousness-food' (vijñāna-āhāra). Such a mind of consciousness arises in relation to objects such as form, and if there is no object of perception, consciousness will certainly not arise. If one can correctly observe that the external object is non-self, because there is no object of perception, the perceiver (consciousness) also does not exist. When both the perceiver and the perceived disappear, all suffering also ceases, and one attains the quiet, shadowless, cool nirvāṇa. When this state is reached, it is called the fulfillment of self-benefit. Those who originally vowed to benefit others, abiding in this state, the function of transforming sentient beings is inexhaustible, and they can also enable those with consciousness to attain this nirvāṇa. Therefore, those who want to seek the true expedient method of benefiting themselves and others should diligently cultivate the view of emptiness and non-self. There is another explanation: 'Consciousness is the seed of all existence' refers to the various karmic tendencies that have been accumulated in the ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness), as well as the increase of ignorance (avidyā) and craving for existence (bhava-taṇhā), which can cause the cycle of birth and death in the three realms. Consciousness is the basis, so it is called consciousness. 'The object is what consciousness acts upon' refers to the tendencies in consciousness that are formed by clinging to objects such as form, and are bound to external objects.

界。是所依故。名曰所行。見境無我時者。謂無我見觀一切境性相空時。諸有種皆滅者。由無我見永斷一切無明有愛二種隨眠。由此二種是發業因。及能潤業令生果故。斷此二種業果不生。爾時所有諸戲論事及煩惱事。種子俱斷。故名皆滅。非一切種識等皆無。所以者何。由聖道起但滅一切虛妄分別戲論習氣。令有漏法畢竟不生。一類有情。諸無漏法無所依故。亦皆斷滅。一類有情。由本願力所任持故。無漏諸識相續不斷。能為殊勝廣大甚深無礙辯等無邊功德所依止處。又由識等增上力故。圓滿究竟神通作用。窮未來際任運相續。如是皆由本願行力所引發故。自利利他功德無盡。令諸有情成熟解脫。盡未來際妙用無窮。是故應修空無我觀舍諸邊執。

大乘廣百論釋論卷第八大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1571 大乘廣百論釋論

大乘廣百論釋論卷第九

聖天菩薩本　護法菩薩釋

三藏法師玄奘奉　詔譯

破有為相品第七

複次已別分別根境無我。今當總辨有為相空。謂色心等諸有為法。具生住滅三有為相生為首故。先當破生。生相既亡。住滅隨遣。有說果體本無而生。為破彼言。故說頌曰。

若本無而生　　先無何不起

論曰。種等諸因至變壞位。能引芽等

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『界』，是所依之處，所以叫做『所行』。『見境無我時者』，是指以無我之見觀察一切境的自性和現象皆為空性的時候。『諸有種皆滅者』，由於無我之見能夠永遠斷除一切無明和有愛這兩種隨眠（煩惱的潛在狀態）。因為這兩種隨眠是引發業的原因，並且能夠滋潤業使之產生結果。斷除了這兩種隨眠，業和果就不會產生。那時，所有虛妄分別的戲論之事以及煩惱之事，其種子都一同斷滅，所以叫做『皆滅』。並非一切種子、識等都沒有了。為什麼呢？因為聖道生起，只是滅除一切虛妄分別的戲論習氣，使有漏法（受煩惱影響的法）畢竟不再產生。對於一類有情來說，由於無漏法（不受煩惱影響的法）沒有所依之處，也都會斷滅。對於另一類有情來說，由於本願力的任持，無漏的諸識相續不斷，能夠成為殊勝廣大甚深無礙的辯才等無邊功德的所依止處。又由於識等的增上力，圓滿究竟神通作用，直到未來際都自然相續。這些都是由於本願行力所引發的緣故，自利利他的功德無窮無盡，使諸有情成熟解脫，直到未來際妙用無窮。所以應當修習空無我觀，捨棄各種邊見執著。

《大乘廣百論釋論》卷第八大正藏第30冊 No. 1571 《大乘廣百論釋論》

《大乘廣百論釋論》卷第九

聖天菩薩本護法菩薩釋

三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯

破有為相品第七

接下來，已經分別辨析了根（感官）和境（對像）的無我，現在應當總的辨析有為相（事物生滅變化的現象）的空性。所謂色（物質）、心（精神）等諸有為法，具有生、住、滅三種有為相，以生為首。所以先應當破斥生。生相既然消亡，住和滅也隨之遣除。有人說果的本體本來沒有而生出來，爲了破斥這種說法，所以說了下面的頌：

『若本無而生先無何不起』

論曰：種子等諸因到了變壞的階段，能夠引生芽等。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Realm' is what is relied upon, hence it is called 'that which is traversed'. 'When seeing the absence of self in objects' refers to the time when, with the view of no-self, one observes that the nature and characteristics of all objects are empty. 'All seeds of existence are extinguished' is because the view of no-self can permanently sever all ignorance and craving, these two kinds of latent afflictions (Sanskrit: anusaya). Because these two are the causes that initiate karma and can nourish karma to produce results, when these two are severed, karma and its results will not arise. At that time, all matters of conceptual proliferation and afflictions, their seeds are all extinguished together, hence it is called 'all extinguished'. It is not that all seeds, consciousness, etc., are non-existent. Why? Because when the holy path arises, it only extinguishes all the habitual tendencies of false conceptual proliferation, causing conditioned dharmas (dharmas influenced by afflictions) to ultimately not arise. For one type of sentient beings, because unconditioned dharmas (dharmas not influenced by afflictions) have no basis to rely on, they will also be extinguished. For another type of sentient beings, due to the sustaining power of their original vows, the continuity of unconditioned consciousnesses is not severed, and they can become the basis for unsurpassed, vast, profound, unimpeded eloquence and other boundless merits. Furthermore, due to the increased power of consciousness, etc., the complete and ultimate supernatural abilities naturally continue until the end of the future. All of this is due to the power of the original vows and practices that have been initiated, so the merits of benefiting oneself and others are inexhaustible, enabling sentient beings to mature and attain liberation, with infinite wonderful functions until the end of the future. Therefore, one should cultivate the view of emptiness and no-self, and abandon all extreme attachments.

Commentary on the Hundred Verses of the Great Vehicle, Volume 8 Taisho Tripitaka Volume 30, No. 1571, Commentary on the Hundred Verses of the Great Vehicle

Commentary on the Hundred Verses of the Great Vehicle, Volume 9

By Arya Deva (Sheng Tian Bodhisattva), Explained by Vasubandhu (Hu Fa Bodhisattva)

Translated by the Tripitaka Master Xuanzang under Imperial Decree

Chapter 7: Refuting the Characteristics of Conditioned Phenomena

Next, having separately analyzed the absence of self in the sense faculties (Sanskrit: indriya) and their objects (Sanskrit: visaya), we should now generally analyze the emptiness of the characteristics of conditioned phenomena (Sanskrit: samskrta-laksana). The so-called conditioned dharmas such as form (Sanskrit: rupa) and mind (Sanskrit: citta) possess the three characteristics of conditioned phenomena: arising (Sanskrit: utpada), abiding (Sanskrit: sthiti), and ceasing (Sanskrit: nirodha), with arising being the foremost. Therefore, we should first refute arising. Once the characteristic of arising is eliminated, abiding and ceasing are also consequently eliminated. Some say that the entity of the result originally does not exist and then arises. To refute this statement, the following verse is stated:

'If it arises from non-existence, why does it not arise when there is prior non-existence?'

Commentary: When the various causes such as seeds reach the stage of change and decay, they can give rise to sprouts, etc.

諸果令生。若諸因中本無諸果。何故芽等此位方生。后位如先果應不起。先位如後果亦應生。又從此因應生彼果。或應此果從彼因生。若此彼因無彼此果而不生者。彼此因力應亦不生同本無故。若爾一切因果皆無。便違自宗所說因果。有說果體本有而生。為破彼言。復說頌曰。

本有而生者　　後有復應生

論曰。若諸因中本有諸果。何故芽等后不更生。后位如今。果應更起。今位如后。果不應生。又果本來因中有體。何故此位乃說為生。若言今時方得顯者。顯不離體應本非無。今位如先亦應不顯。先同此位顯應非無。顯本非無今復顯者。后應更顯。是則無窮本有與生義相乖反。言果本有。生必不成。既無有生。果義便失。果義既失。便無有因。則違自宗有因果義。

複次果先無論作如是言。果或違因。故非並有。此言非理。故次頌曰。

果若能違因　　先無不應理

論曰。勝論者說。果或違因。或不違因。果違因者。合違于業。合果後生。前業滅故。又相違法略有二種。一能障礙。二能壞滅。后謂合德滅壞業因。初謂合德障礙重等。令其所起墜等業無。如是合德其體未有。應不能違先所起業。世間未見無體能違。汝不應言。合德與業如囚與膾。俱有相違。勿違自宗。因果不併。若許一念

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果各種結果的生起，是因為各種因中本來就存在這些結果，那麼為什麼芽等等只在這個階段才生起呢？按照這種說法，後面的階段應該像之前的階段一樣，結果不應該生起；之前的階段也應該像後面的階段一樣，結果也應該生起。而且，應該從這個因生起那個果，或者應該這個果從那個因生起。如果這個因和那個因，沒有彼此的結果而不生起，那麼彼此因的力量也應該不生起，因為它們本來就沒有。如果這樣，一切因果都將不存在，這就違背了你們宗派所說的因果關係。有人說果的本體本來就存在而生起，爲了駁斥這種說法，再次說了下面的偈頌：

『本來就存在而生起，後面應該再次生起。』

論述：如果各種因中本來就存在各種結果，為什麼芽等等在後面不再生起呢？後面的階段像現在的階段一樣，結果應該再次生起；現在的階段像後面的階段一樣，結果不應該生起。而且，果本來就在因中具有本體，為什麼在這個階段才說是生起呢？如果說現在這個時候才得以顯現，那麼顯現不離開本體，應該本來就不是沒有。現在的階段像之前的階段一樣，也應該不顯現，顯現應該本來就不是沒有。顯現本來就不是沒有，現在又顯現，那麼後面應該再次顯現，這樣就無窮無盡了。本來就存在和生起的意義相互矛盾。說果本來就存在，生起必定不能成立。既然沒有生起，果的意義就喪失了。果的意義既然喪失了，就沒有因了，這就違背了你們宗派所說的有因果的意義。

再次，果先於因無論如何都不能這樣說。果可能違背因，所以不能同時存在。這種說法沒有道理，所以接著說了下面的偈頌：

『如果果能夠違背因，那麼先前不存在就不合理。』

論述：勝論者說，果可能違背因，也可能不違背因。果違背因的情況是，合違背了業（karma），合果後生，之前的業已經滅亡。而且，相互違背略有二種，一是能夠障礙，二是能夠壞滅。後面指的是合德（samavāya）滅壞了業因，前面指的是合德障礙了重等等，使得它們所引起的墜等等業無法產生。像這樣，合德的本體還沒有存在，應該不能違背先前所產生的業。世間沒有見過沒有本體能夠違背的。你們不應該說，合德與業像囚犯與劊子手一樣，都具有相互違背的關係。不要違揹你們宗派的觀點，因果不能同時存在。如果允許一念（ksana）

【English Translation】 English version: If various results arise because these results are inherently present in the various causes, then why do sprouts, etc., only arise at this stage? According to this view, later stages should be like earlier stages, and results should not arise; earlier stages should also be like later stages, and results should arise. Moreover, that result should arise from this cause, or this result should arise from that cause. If this cause and that cause, without each other's results, do not arise, then the power of each other's causes should also not arise, because they are inherently non-existent. If so, all causes and results will not exist, which contradicts your school's assertion of cause and effect. Some say that the essence of the result is inherently existent and arises. To refute this statement, the following verse is stated again:

'Being inherently existent and arising, it should arise again later.'

Discussion: If various results are inherently present in the various causes, why do sprouts, etc., not arise again later? Later stages are like the present stage, and results should arise again; the present stage is like the later stage, and results should not arise. Moreover, the result inherently possesses a substance in the cause, why is it said to arise only at this stage? If it is said that it is only manifested at this time, then the manifestation does not depart from the substance and should not be inherently non-existent. The present stage is like the previous stage, and it should also not be manifested, and the manifestation should not be inherently non-existent. If the manifestation is inherently non-existent and now manifests again, then it should manifest again later, and so on endlessly. The meanings of being inherently existent and arising contradict each other. Saying that the result is inherently existent, arising must not be established. Since there is no arising, the meaning of the result is lost. Since the meaning of the result is lost, there is no cause, which contradicts your school's assertion of the meaning of cause and effect.

Again, it cannot be said that the result precedes the cause in any way. The result may contradict the cause, so they cannot exist simultaneously. This statement is unreasonable, so the following verse is stated next:

'If the result can contradict the cause, then being non-existent beforehand is unreasonable.'

Discussion: The Vaisheshika (Sheng Lun Zhe) school says that the result may contradict the cause, or it may not contradict the cause. The case where the result contradicts the cause is that samavāya (He) contradicts karma (Ye), the combined result arises later, and the previous karma has already ceased. Moreover, there are roughly two types of mutual contradiction: one is the ability to obstruct, and the other is the ability to destroy. The latter refers to samavāya destroying the cause of karma, and the former refers to samavāya obstructing heaviness, etc., causing the falling, etc., karma caused by them to be unable to arise. Like this, the substance of samavāya has not yet existed, and it should not be able to contradict the previously produced karma. The world has not seen anything without substance being able to contradict. You should not say that samavāya and karma are like a prisoner and an executioner, both having a mutually contradictory relationship. Do not contradict your school's view that cause and effect cannot exist simultaneously. If you allow a moment (ksana)

業與合俱。后亦應然。無差別故。便違自論及世共知。故不應言。果先非有。

複次果先有論作如是言。一切因中果體先有。此亦非理。故次頌曰。

果立因無用　　先有亦不成

論曰。數論者說。一切因中果體先有。此亦不然。生果顯果。故說名因。果體本來已生已顯。因便無用。所以者何。體與顯生不相離故。應如其體從本非無。本有顯生因義非有。因非有故。果義不成。便違自宗。立有因果。

複次諸法生時義不成故。不應定執諸法有生。所以者何。故次頌曰。

此時非有生　　彼時亦無生　此彼時無生　　何時當有生

論曰。果已有時。其體有故。如本有法。應不名生。果未有時。其體無故。如定無法。亦不名生。又諸果法用起名生。其體既無。用依何立。又能生果。故說名因。果體既無。因何所起。既無所起因義不成。因義不存果從何出。除此二位更無生時。故定無生如虛空等。又若執法體恒是有。定不名生。無所起故。用雖有起。此在未來。無故非生。現在已有。自宗不許。除此二位無別生時。是故無生其理決定。

或勝論執多實為因。積集共生一合德果。闕眾緣時未有合德。由是故說。此時無生。具眾緣時。已有合德。由是故說。彼時無生。以初合時合體有

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：業與合（karma and combination）兩者同時存在。之後的情況也應如此，因為沒有差別。如果說果先於因存在，就違背了他們自己的理論以及世俗的常識，所以不應該說果先於因存在。

其次，如果『果先有論』（the theory of the pre-existence of the effect）這樣說：一切因中，果的本體都預先存在。這也是不合理的。所以接下來頌文說：

『果立因無用，先有亦不成』

論曰：數論者（Samkhya）說，一切因中，果的本體都預先存在。這也是不對的。產生果和顯現果，所以才稱為因。如果果的本體本來就已經產生和顯現，那麼因就沒有作用了。為什麼呢？因為本體和顯現的產生是不可分離的。應該像本體一樣，從根本上就不是沒有的。如果本體本來就存在，那麼顯現和產生的因的意義就不存在了。因為因不存在，果的意義也就不成立，這就違背了他們自己宗派所立的有因果的理論。

再次，諸法產生的時候，意義不能成立，所以不應該執著地認為諸法有產生。為什麼呢？所以接下來頌文說：

『此時非有生，彼時亦無生，此時彼時無生，何時當有生』

論曰：如果果已經存在，那麼它的本體就存在，就像本來就存在的法一樣，不應該稱為產生。如果果還沒有存在，那麼它的本體就不存在，就像完全不存在的法一樣，也不應該稱為產生。而且，諸果法的作用生起才叫做產生，如果它的本體不存在，作用又依據什麼而成立呢？又因為能夠產生果，所以才稱為因。如果果的本體不存在，因又從何處生起呢？既然沒有生起之處，因的意義就不成立，因的意義不存在，果又從何處產生呢？除了這兩種情況，再沒有其他的產生時間了，所以可以確定沒有產生，就像虛空一樣。而且，如果執著於法的本體恒常存在，那就一定不能稱為產生，因為沒有生起之處。即使作用有生起，那也是在未來，因為不存在，所以不是產生。現在已經存在，但他們自己的宗派不承認。除了這兩種情況，沒有其他的產生時間。因此，沒有產生是確定的道理。

或者勝論者（Vaisheshika）認為，多個實體的集合是因，積累集合共同產生一個結合的德果（guna）。缺少眾多因緣的時候，還沒有結合的德，因此說，『此時無生』。具備眾多因緣的時候，已經有結合的德，因此說，『彼時無生』。因為最初結合的時候，結合的本體存在。

【English Translation】 English version: Karma (action) and combination exist simultaneously. The same should apply afterward, as there is no difference. If one says that the effect exists before the cause, it contradicts their own theory and common worldly knowledge. Therefore, it should not be said that the effect exists before the cause.

Furthermore, if the 'theory of the pre-existence of the effect' states that the essence of the effect pre-exists in all causes, this is also unreasonable. Therefore, the following verse says:

'Establishing the effect renders the cause useless; pre-existence is also untenable.'

Commentary: The Samkhya (enumeration) school says that the essence of the effect pre-exists in all causes. This is incorrect. The production and manifestation of the effect are why it is called a cause. If the essence of the effect has already been produced and manifested, then the cause is useless. Why? Because the essence and the production of manifestation are inseparable. It should be like the essence, which is fundamentally not non-existent. If the essence already exists, then the meaning of the cause for manifestation and production does not exist. Because the cause does not exist, the meaning of the effect is not established, which contradicts their own school's theory of establishing cause and effect.

Again, the meaning cannot be established when all dharmas (phenomena) arise, so one should not stubbornly believe that all dharmas have arising. Why? Therefore, the following verse says:

'At this time, there is no arising; at that time, there is also no arising; at this time and that time, there is no arising; when, then, will there be arising?'

Commentary: If the effect already exists, then its essence exists, like a dharma that already exists, and it should not be called arising. If the effect does not yet exist, then its essence does not exist, like a dharma that is completely non-existent, and it should also not be called arising. Moreover, the function of all effect-dharmas arising is called arising. If its essence does not exist, upon what does the function rely to be established? Also, because it can produce the effect, it is called a cause. If the essence of the effect does not exist, from where does the cause arise? Since there is no place of arising, the meaning of the cause is not established, and if the meaning of the cause does not exist, from where does the effect come? Apart from these two situations, there is no other time of arising. Therefore, it is certain that there is no arising, like empty space. Furthermore, if one clings to the idea that the essence of a dharma is constantly existent, then it certainly cannot be called arising, because there is no place of arising. Even if the function arises, it is in the future, and because it does not exist, it is not arising. It already exists in the present, but their own school does not acknowledge it. Apart from these two situations, there is no other time of arising. Therefore, the principle of no arising is certain.

Or, the Vaisheshika (particularist) school believes that the collection of multiple substances is the cause, and the accumulated collection jointly produces a combined quality-effect (guna). When many conditions are lacking, there is no combined quality, therefore it is said, 'At this time, there is no arising.' When many conditions are present, there is already a combined quality, therefore it is said, 'At that time, there is no arising.' Because at the time of the initial combination, the essence of the combination exists.

故。應如后位不得名生。后位已生。不重生故。可不名生。初位不然。名生何咎。后若不生果應違實。而汝不許。果實相違障破相違合德違業。不違于實。前已略明。除此彼時更無異位。是故合德決定無生。如是色等依託實因。實未有時果體未有。由是故說。此時無生。實已有時果體已有。由是故說。彼時無生。以初有時色等有故。應如后位不得名生。離此彼時更無別位。是故色等決定無生。如是合德障礙重等。令其不生墜墮等業。此能障體有時無時。彼業不生。準前應說。離有無時更無異位。故墜等業決定無生。或數論執。乳等因變成酪等果。故說名生。因體有時因性未變。由是故說。此時無生。若於爾時因性已變便失因性。應不名因。果體有時因即成果。由是故說。彼時無生。若於爾時果體生者。應異法起非即因成。除此彼時更無異位。是故酪等決定無生。自性等因成大等果。準此推究。皆非有生。

複次所生無故生義不成。所以者何。故次頌曰。

如生於自性　　生義既為無　於他性亦然　　生義何成有

論曰。說常有宗色等五蘊。數論外道樂等三德。諸法生時不令自性有變異故。生義不成。法未生時。一切生用皆未有故。生義不成。諸法生時。不令他性有變異故。生義不成。諸法生已。一

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因此，應該像后位（已經產生的狀態）一樣，不能稱作『生』。因為后位已經產生，所以不再重新產生，因此可以不稱作『生』。但初位（尚未產生的狀態）不是這樣，稱作『生』有什麼過錯呢？如果后位不產生，那麼就應該違背事實，而你們（數論外道）不允許這種情況發生。果實與實相違背，障礙與破相違背，合德與行業相違背，但並不違背於事實，這在前面已經略微說明。除了此時彼時，再沒有其他的狀態，因此合德決定不會產生。像這樣，色等（五蘊）依託于真實的因，在實因尚未存在時，果體的自體也不存在，因此才說，此時沒有產生。實因已經存在時，果體的自體已經存在，因此才說，彼時沒有產生。因為最初有時，色等才存在，應該像后位一樣，不能稱作『生』。離開此時彼時，再沒有其他的狀態，因此色等決定不會產生。像這樣，合德、障礙、重等，使它們不產生墜落等行業。這種能夠障礙的自體，有時存在，有時不存在，那麼這些行業就不會產生。按照前面的說法，應該說，離開有和無時，再沒有其他的狀態，所以墜落等行業決定不會產生。或者數論派認為，乳等因變成酪等果，所以說叫做『生』。因的自體存在時，因的性質尚未改變，因此才說，此時沒有產生。如果在那個時候，因的性質已經改變，那麼就失去了因的性質，應該不能叫做因。果體存在時，因就變成了果，因此才說，彼時沒有產生。如果在那個時候，果體已經產生，那麼就應該是不同的法產生，而不是由因變成的。除了此時彼時，再沒有其他的狀態，因此酪等決定不會產生。自性等因變成大等果，按照這個來推究，都不是真正地產生。其次，所生之法不存在，所以『生』的意義不能成立。為什麼呢？所以接下來的頌文說：『如果生於自性（自身），那麼生的意義就等於沒有；如果生於他性（其他），那麼生的意義又怎麼能夠成立呢？』論曰：說常有宗（勝論派）的色等五蘊（rupa, vedana, sanna, sankhara, vinnana），數論外道的樂等三德（sattva, rajas, tamas），諸法產生時，如果不讓自性（svabhava）有變異，那麼生的意義就不能成立。法未產生時，一切生的作用都沒有，所以生的意義不能成立。諸法產生時，如果不讓其他性質有變異，那麼生的意義就不能成立。諸法產生之後，一切...

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, it should be like the later state (the state that has already arisen), and cannot be called 'birth'. Because the later state has already arisen, it does not arise again, so it can be called 'not birth'. But the initial state (the state that has not yet arisen) is not like this, what is wrong with calling it 'birth'? If the later state does not arise, then it should contradict the facts, but you (Samkhya school) do not allow this to happen. The fruit contradicts the reality, the obstruction contradicts the destruction, the combined qualities contradict the actions, but it does not contradict the reality, which has been briefly explained earlier. Apart from this time and that time, there is no other state, so the combined qualities will definitely not arise. Like this, form etc. (the five skandhas) rely on the real cause, and when the real cause does not yet exist, the substance of the fruit body does not exist either, so it is said that there is no arising at this time. When the real cause already exists, the substance of the fruit body already exists, so it is said that there is no arising at that time. Because initially there is existence, form etc. exist, it should be like the later state, and cannot be called 'birth'. Apart from this time and that time, there is no other state, so form etc. will definitely not arise. Like this, combined qualities, obstructions, heaviness, etc., cause them not to produce falling and other actions. This substance that can obstruct, sometimes exists, sometimes does not exist, then these actions will not arise. According to the previous statement, it should be said that apart from existence and non-existence, there is no other state, so falling and other actions will definitely not arise. Or the Samkhya school believes that milk etc. as the cause changes into cheese etc. as the effect, so it is called 'birth'. When the substance of the cause exists, the nature of the cause has not yet changed, so it is said that there is no arising at this time. If at that time, the nature of the cause has already changed, then it loses the nature of the cause, and should not be called the cause. When the substance of the fruit exists, the cause becomes the fruit, so it is said that there is no arising at that time. If at that time, the substance of the fruit has already arisen, then it should be a different dharma arising, not transformed from the cause. Apart from this time and that time, there is no other state, so cheese etc. will definitely not arise. The self-nature etc. as the cause becomes the great etc. as the effect, according to this investigation, none of them are truly arising. Furthermore, because what is produced does not exist, the meaning of 'birth' cannot be established. Why? Therefore, the following verse says: 'If it arises from its own nature (svabhava), then the meaning of birth is equal to non-existence; if it arises from other nature (parabhava), then how can the meaning of birth be established?' Treatise says: The Vaisheshika school says that the five skandhas (rupa, vedana, sanna, sankhara, vinnana) such as form etc. are permanent, and the Samkhya school says that the three qualities (sattva, rajas, tamas) such as pleasure etc. are permanent. When dharmas arise, if they do not allow the self-nature (svabhava) to have changes, then the meaning of birth cannot be established. When dharmas have not arisen, all the functions of birth do not exist, so the meaning of birth cannot be established. When dharmas arise, if they do not allow other natures to have changes, then the meaning of birth cannot be established. After dharmas arise, all...

切生用皆已息故。生義不成。不可說言色等樂等相用有變故說名生。以于生時性與相用。若一若異過等違宗。亦不可言色等樂等自性有變故說名生。勿于生時色等樂等變成受等苦等自性。有作是言。果先有論。有前失故。生義可無。果先無論。因緣和合果體將成。生義應有。果將成時其體未有。如何可說果從緣生。知因有能當成果體。如言煮飯故說果生。若爾生名應假非實。色等生時猶未有故。如是假說理亦無違。以生時無後方見故。若爾見位乃可名生。以于見時方說生故。如何不了言理而問。雖見時說非見時生。說因見生非因生故。何故生時無有此見。以見無故。知生時無。如何不知義理而答。豈不見無名為無見。何得以問而作其答。若爾應有問答無窮。無見見無。言無盡故。又亦不可說無為生。無似空花違生理故。至現有位亦不名生。有似無為違生理故。所生無故。生義不成。複次執有生者。作如是言。果有三時。前後差別將成作用。及究竟時顯彼不成。故次頌曰。

初中后三位　　生前定不成

論曰。果先無論。于未生時三位不成。無無別故。初中后位依有而彰。未生體無如何可立。或應許果未起非無。見彼三時唯依有故。果先有論。于未生時三位不成。有無別故。有體無別相用未興。如何可言三時

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本由於一切產生之用已經止息，所以『生』（utpāda，產生）的意義無法成立。不能說因為『色』（rūpa，色蘊）等、『樂』（sukha，樂受）等的狀態和作用發生了變化，所以稱之為『生』。如果在產生的時候，自性和作用是一還是異，都會有過失，並且違背宗義。也不能說因為『色』等、『樂』等的自性發生了變化，所以稱之為『生』。不要在產生的時候，『色』等、『樂』等變成『受』（vedanā，感受）等、『苦』（duḥkha，苦受）等的自性。有人這樣說：如果主張『果先有論』（satkāryavāda，果先於因存在），因為前面已經有過失，所以『生』的意義可以不存在。如果主張『果先無論』（asatkāryavāda，果先於因不存在），因緣和合，果的本體將要形成，『生』的意義應該存在。果將要形成的時候，它的本體還沒有，怎麼能說果是從因緣產生的呢？知道因有能力能夠成就果的本體，就像說煮飯，所以說果產生。如果這樣，『生』這個名稱應該是假立的，不是真實的。因為『色』等產生的時候還沒有果的本體。這樣假說在道理上也沒有違背，因為在產生的時候沒有，之後才看到。如果這樣，在看到的時候才可以稱為『生』，因為在看到的時候才說產生。為什麼不瞭解道理而發問？雖然在看到的時候說，但不是在看到的時候產生。說因為看到而產生，不是因為因產生。為什麼產生的時候沒有這種看到？因為沒有看到，所以知道產生的時候沒有。為什麼不知道義理而回答？難道沒看到『無』（abhāva，不存在）這個名稱就是沒有看到嗎？怎麼可以用提問來作為回答？如果這樣，應該有問答無窮的情況。沒有看到，看到沒有，言語沒有窮盡的時候。又不能說『無』是『生』，『無』就像空中的花朵，違背了產生的道理。到了現有的時候，也不能稱為『生』，有就像『無』，違背了產生的道理。所產生的果不存在，所以『生』的意義不能成立。再次，執著有『生』的人，這樣說：果有三個階段，前後差別，將要形成作用，以及究竟的時候，顯示這些不能成立。所以接下來說偈頌：『初中后三位，生前定不成』論曰：如果主張『果先無論』，在未產生的時候，三個階段不能成立，因為沒有和沒有沒有區別。初、中、后三個階段依靠有而彰顯，未產生的本體沒有，怎麼能成立？或者應該允許果還沒有生起，但不是沒有，因為看到這三個階段只依靠有。如果主張『果先有論』，在未產生的時候，三個階段不能成立，因為有和沒有沒有區別。有的本體沒有區別，狀態和作用沒有興起，怎麼能說有三個階段？

【English Translation】 English version Since all functions of arising have ceased, the meaning of 『utpāda』 (arising) cannot be established. It cannot be said that because the states and functions of 『rūpa』 (form, the form aggregate), 『sukha』 (pleasure, pleasant feeling), etc., have changed, it is called 『arising』. If, at the time of arising, the nature and function are either the same or different, there will be faults and it will contradict the tenets. Nor can it be said that because the nature of 『rūpa』, 『sukha』, etc., has changed, it is called 『arising』. Do not let 『rūpa』, 『sukha』, etc., become the nature of 『vedanā』 (feeling, sensation), 『duḥkha』 (suffering, painful feeling), etc., at the time of arising. Someone might say: If one asserts 『satkāryavāda』 (the doctrine that the effect pre-exists in the cause), because there has been a fault before, the meaning of 『arising』 can be non-existent. If one asserts 『asatkāryavāda』 (the doctrine that the effect does not pre-exist in the cause), when the causes and conditions come together, the substance of the effect will be formed, and the meaning of 『arising』 should exist. When the effect is about to be formed, its substance does not yet exist, how can it be said that the effect arises from causes and conditions? Knowing that the cause has the ability to accomplish the substance of the effect, just like saying cooking rice, therefore it is said that the effect arises. If so, the name 『arising』 should be a hypothetical one, not a real one. Because when 『rūpa』, etc., arise, the substance of the effect does not yet exist. There is no contradiction in reason for such a hypothetical statement, because it does not exist at the time of arising, and is only seen later. If so, it can be called 『arising』 at the time of seeing, because it is said to arise at the time of seeing. Why ask without understanding the reason? Although it is said at the time of seeing, it does not arise at the time of seeing. It is said to arise because of seeing, not because of the cause arising. Why is there no such seeing at the time of arising? Because there is no seeing, it is known that there is none at the time of arising. Why answer without knowing the meaning and reason? Haven't you seen that the name 『abhāva』 (non-existence) is the same as not seeing? How can you use a question as an answer? If so, there should be endless questions and answers. Not seeing, seeing non-existence, words have no end. Furthermore, it cannot be said that 『abhāva』 is 『arising』, 『abhāva』 is like a flower in the sky, which violates the principle of arising. When it comes to the existing state, it cannot be called 『arising』 either, existence is like 『abhāva』, which violates the principle of arising. Because the effect that arises does not exist, the meaning of 『arising』 cannot be established. Again, those who cling to the existence of 『arising』 say this: The effect has three stages, the difference between before and after, the function about to be formed, and the time of completion, showing that these cannot be established. Therefore, the following verse is said: 『The three stages of beginning, middle, and end, definitely cannot be before arising.』 Treatise says: If one asserts 『asatkāryavāda』, the three stages cannot be established when it has not yet arisen, because there is no difference between non-existence and non-existence. The three stages of beginning, middle, and end are manifested by relying on existence, how can the substance that has not yet arisen be established? Or it should be allowed that the effect has not yet arisen, but it is not non-existent, because it is seen that these three stages only rely on existence. If one asserts 『satkāryavāda』, the three stages cannot be established when it has not yet arisen, because there is no difference between existence and non-existence. The substance of existence has no difference, the state and function have not arisen, how can it be said that there are three stages?

有異。又此三位既不同時。生亦不成。故次頌曰。

二二既為無　　一一如何有

論曰。初中后位相待而成。二二既無。一一豈有。亦不可說三位同時。初中后名依時立故。又不可說三時並有。勿有此三相雜亂過。汝亦不許三位同時。故有一時三定非有。若言覺慧於色等法。觀二二時立一一位。是則三位假有真無。違汝師宗三時實有。是故三位唯假非真。不應定執果有三位。

複次色等諸法決定無生。能生因緣不成立故。生者決定從自從他從俱因緣。三皆不可。為顯此義。故說頌曰。

非離於他性　　唯從自性生　非從他及俱　　故生定非有

論曰。一法一時自為因果。理不成故。非從自生。若一體中有二相別。說為因果。自義不成。自言遮他。顯于自相果從因起。何謂自生。又體如相應不成一。相如其體應不成二。是故所言一體二相。說為因果。理必不成。又自生言依義生不依義生者。則非自生。不依義生。便同樹響何能定表。諸法自生。又自生言依慧生不依慧生者。則從他生。不依慧生。應同狂醉言無根系。難可信依。又自生言生他解不生他解者。便失自宗。他解不生髮言無益。何緣強立自生論耶。現見世間法從緣起。言自生者。與此相違。又若自生應違世法。刀不自割。針不自縫

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本有異。又此三位（初、中、后位）既不同時，生起也不可能。所以接下來說偈頌：

二二既為無　　一一如何有

論曰：初、中、后位相互依存才能成立。如果二二（兩個兩個）都沒有，一一（單獨一個）又怎麼會有呢？也不可以說三位（初、中、后位）同時存在，因為初、中、后這些名稱是根據時間而建立的。也不可以說三時（初時、中時、后時）並存，否則會有這三種狀態混雜的過失。你們也不允許三位同時存在，所以說一時之中三位並存必定是不成立的。如果說覺慧在觀察色等法時，觀察兩個兩個（二二）的階段而建立一個一個（一一）的階段，那麼這三位（初、中、后位）就是假有而真無，這違背了你們老師的宗義，即三時實有。因此，這三位只是假有而不是真有，不應該執著地認為果有三位。

複次，色等諸法決定沒有生起，因為能生起它們的因緣不能成立。所謂生起，必定是從自身、從他者、或者從自身和他者共同的因緣而生。這三種情況都是不可能的。爲了闡明這個道理，所以說偈頌：

非離於他性　　唯從自性生　非從他及俱　　故生定非有

論曰：一個法在同一時間自己作為自己的因和果，這個道理是不成立的，所以不是從自身生起。如果一個本體中有兩種不同的相，並說它們是因和果，那麼自體的意義就不能成立。『自』這個詞遮止了『他』，顯示了從自身之相，果是從因產生的。什麼是自生呢？又，本體如果像相一樣，就不能成為一個；相如果像本體一樣，就不應該成為兩個。因此，所說的一個本體具有兩種相，並說它們是因和果，這個道理必定不能成立。又，說『自生』是指依義而生還是不依義而生？如果不依義而生，那就不是自生。如果不依義而生，就如同樹的迴響一樣，怎麼能確定地表達諸法的自生呢？又，說『自生』是指依慧而生還是不依慧而生？如果不依慧而生，那就如同狂醉之人的言語一樣，沒有根基，難以令人相信和依賴。又，說『自生』是指生起他人的理解還是不生起他人的理解？如果不生起他人的理解，那就失去了自己的宗義。如果他人的理解沒有生起，那麼發言就沒有益處。為什麼還要強行建立自生論呢？現在看到世間法是從因緣生起的，說自生就與此相違背。又，如果自生，就應該違背世間法，刀不應該自己割，針不應該自己縫。

【English Translation】 English version There is difference. Moreover, since these three positions (initial, middle, and final) do not occur simultaneously, arising is also impossible. Therefore, the following verse is spoken:

If two-two is non-existent, how can one-one exist?

Treatise: The initial, middle, and final positions are established in dependence on each other. If two-two (pairs) are non-existent, how can one-one (single) exist? It is also not possible to say that the three positions (initial, middle, and final) exist simultaneously, because the names 'initial,' 'middle,' and 'final' are established based on time. Nor can it be said that the three times (initial time, middle time, final time) exist concurrently, otherwise there would be the fault of these three states being mixed up. You also do not allow the three positions to exist simultaneously, so it is certain that the three positions existing at one time is not established. If it is said that discriminating wisdom, when observing phenomena such as form, establishes one-one positions by observing two-two stages, then these three positions (initial, middle, and final) are falsely existent but truly non-existent, which contradicts your teacher's doctrine that the three times are truly existent. Therefore, these three positions are only falsely existent and not truly existent; one should not stubbornly insist that the result has three positions.

Furthermore, phenomena such as form are definitely without arising, because the causes and conditions that could give rise to them are not established. Arising must necessarily be from oneself, from others, or from causes and conditions that are both from oneself and others. All three of these are impossible. To clarify this meaning, the following verse is spoken:

Not apart from other's nature, solely from self-nature arising; Not from other or both, therefore arising is definitely non-existent.

Treatise: It is unreasonable for a single phenomenon to be its own cause and effect at the same time, so it does not arise from itself. If there are two different aspects within one entity, and they are said to be cause and effect, then the meaning of 'self' is not established. The word 'self' precludes 'other,' showing that from the aspect of self, the effect arises from the cause. What is self-arising? Moreover, if the entity is like the aspect, it cannot be one; if the aspect is like the entity, it should not be two. Therefore, the statement that one entity has two aspects and that they are cause and effect is certainly unreasonable. Furthermore, does 'self-arising' refer to arising in accordance with meaning or not in accordance with meaning? If it does not arise in accordance with meaning, then it is not self-arising. If it does not arise in accordance with meaning, it is like the echo of a tree; how can it definitely express the self-arising of phenomena? Furthermore, does 'self-arising' refer to arising in accordance with wisdom or not in accordance with wisdom? If it does not arise in accordance with wisdom, then it is like the words of a mad or drunken person, without foundation, difficult to believe and rely on. Furthermore, does 'self-arising' refer to giving rise to others' understanding or not giving rise to others' understanding? If it does not give rise to others' understanding, then one loses one's own doctrine. If others' understanding does not arise, then speaking is useless. Why then insist on establishing the theory of self-arising? Now we see that worldly phenomena arise from causes and conditions; to say self-arising contradicts this. Furthermore, if there is self-arising, it should contradict worldly phenomena; a knife should not cut itself, and a needle should not sew itself.

。又自生言依汝生不依汝生者。非謂自生不依汝生。應非汝說。哀哉愚昧不識自言。又言自生同無因論。撥無一切生果因緣。有作是言。自不生自生時無故。如已滅無。若言生時其體已有。應如現在生用唐捐。體顯名生。亦不應理。顯與體異便失自生。顯與體同顯應本有。顯若本有生用應無。故自生言定不中理。言從他起。理亦不然。以法生時自體未有。既無有自熟對名他。因緣名他。對於自果。自果未有。他義不成。若言生時自果已有。因緣無用非謂他生。顯故名生。亦不應理。顯不離體應本非無。又因名他對異於果。果異因故。應亦名他。因果俱他。便無有自。自非有故。他亦應無。從他生言便無有義。又慧觀果說因為他。果之與因必不俱有。因時無果。誰藉他生。果時無因。從誰他起。豈不以慧觀后觀前。說從他生言無有失。謂觀當果或念過因。因果俱成猶如父子。假名可爾。理實不然。因果異時有無不併。如何可執實從他生。如父子言。亦不應理。世間父子多有同時。雖復一無而可假說。因果不爾。法喻豈同。若謂先時于異體物。以慧觀察取其異相。次於因果觀后念前。建立自他二相差別。后發語時不觸前二。但隨想說法從他生。故法喻同無前過失。此救非理。所以者何。異物同時無因果義。因之與果必不同

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本又有人說，『自生』（svayamutpāda，自身產生）依賴於『汝生』（paranimitta，由他產生），而不是不依賴於『汝生』。這不是說『自生』不依賴於『汝生』，這不應該是你說的。可悲啊，多麼愚昧，不認識自己的話！又說『自生』等同於『無因論』（ahetuvāda，無因論者），否定一切產生結果的因緣。有人這樣說：『自身不生自身，自身產生時沒有原因，就像已經滅亡的事物一樣。』如果說產生時它的本體已經存在，那麼應該像現在一樣，產生的功用是徒勞的。本體顯現稱為產生，也不合道理。顯現與本體不同，就失去了『自生』的意義；顯現與本體相同，顯現應該本來就存在。顯現如果本來就存在，產生的功用應該沒有。所以，『自生』的說法一定不合道理。說從『他』（para，其他）而起，道理也不對。因為法產生時，它的自體還沒有。既然沒有自體，哪裡有相對的『他』呢？因緣稱為『他』，是相對於自身的結果而言的。自身的結果還沒有，『他』的意義就不能成立。如果說產生時自身的結果已經存在，因緣就沒有用處，那就不是『他生』了。顯現的緣故稱為產生，也不合道理。顯現不離本體，應該本來就不是沒有的。而且，因稱為『他』，是因為它與結果不同。結果與因不同，也應該稱為『他』。因和果都是『他』，就沒有『自』了。『自』不是有的，『他』也應該沒有。從『他』產生的說法就沒有意義。又用智慧觀察結果，說因為『他』。結果與因必定不能同時存在。因存在時沒有結果，憑藉誰而『他生』呢？結果存在時沒有因，從誰而『他起』呢？難道不是用智慧觀察後來的結果，再觀察之前的因，說從『他』產生，這樣說就沒有過失了嗎？說是觀察將來的結果，或者回憶過去的因，因和果都成立，就像父子一樣，可以假名這麼說，但道理上實在不是這樣。因和果是不同的時間，有和無不能並存，怎麼可以執著于實在地從『他』產生呢？像父子這樣的說法，也不合道理。世間的父子大多有同時存在的，即使實際上沒有，也可以假名這麼說。因和果不是這樣，法和比喻怎麼能相同呢？如果說先在不同的物體上，用智慧觀察，選取它們不同的相狀，然後在因果上，觀察後來的，回憶之前的，建立『自』和『他』兩種相的差別，後來發語時沒有觸及之前的兩種相，只是隨著想像說法，說從『他』產生，所以法和比喻相同，沒有之前的過失。這種辯解沒有道理。為什麼呢？不同的物體同時存在，沒有因果的意義。因和果必定不同時存在。

【English Translation】 English version Furthermore, someone might say, 'Self-origination' (svayamutpāda, arising from oneself) relies on 'other-origination' (paranimitta, arising from others), rather than not relying on 'other-origination.' This is not to say that 'self-origination' does not rely on 'other-origination'; you shouldn't say that. Alas, how foolish, not recognizing one's own words! It is also said that 'self-origination' is equivalent to 'no-cause theory' (ahetuvāda, the doctrine of causelessness), denying all the causes and conditions for producing results. Someone might say this: 'The self does not originate from itself; when the self originates, there is no cause, just like something that has already ceased to exist.' If it is said that when it originates, its essence already exists, then it should be like the present, where the function of origination is in vain. The manifestation of the essence being called origination is also unreasonable. If the manifestation is different from the essence, then the meaning of 'self-origination' is lost; if the manifestation is the same as the essence, the manifestation should already exist. If the manifestation already exists, the function of origination should be absent. Therefore, the statement of 'self-origination' is definitely unreasonable. Saying that it arises from 'other' (para, another), the reasoning is also incorrect. Because when a dharma originates, its own essence does not yet exist. Since there is no self-essence, where is the relative 'other'? Conditions are called 'other' in relation to the result of the self. If the result of the self does not yet exist, the meaning of 'other' cannot be established. If it is said that when it originates, the result of the self already exists, then the conditions are useless, and it is not 'other-origination.' Being called origination because of manifestation is also unreasonable. Manifestation is inseparable from the essence; it should not be non-existent from the beginning. Moreover, the cause is called 'other' because it is different from the result. Since the result is different from the cause, it should also be called 'other.' If both cause and result are 'other,' then there is no 'self.' Since the 'self' is not existent, the 'other' should also be non-existent. The statement of arising from 'other' has no meaning. Furthermore, using wisdom to observe the result, it is said to be because of 'other.' The result and the cause must not exist simultaneously. When the cause exists, there is no result; relying on whom does 'other-origination' occur? When the result exists, there is no cause; from whom does 'other-arising' occur? Isn't it that using wisdom to observe the later result and then observing the previous cause, saying that it arises from 'other,' so there is no fault in saying this? It is said to be observing the future result or recalling the past cause; both cause and result are established, just like father and son. It can be nominally said so, but in principle, it is really not like that. Cause and result are different times; existence and non-existence cannot coexist. How can one be attached to truly arising from 'other'? The statement like father and son is also unreasonable. Most fathers and sons in the world exist simultaneously; even if they don't actually exist, it can be nominally said so. Cause and result are not like this; how can dharma and metaphor be the same? If it is said that first, on different objects, using wisdom to observe, selecting their different characteristics, and then on cause and result, observing the later and recalling the previous, establishing the difference between the two characteristics of 'self' and 'other,' and later, when speaking, not touching the previous two characteristics, but simply following imagination and saying that it arises from 'other,' so dharma and metaphor are the same, and there is no previous fault. This defense is unreasonable. Why? Different objects existing simultaneously have no meaning of cause and result. Cause and result must not exist simultaneously.

時。父子不然。何得為喻。又若假說此義非無。汝執為真。故不應理。若言何為咀嚼虛空。現見因緣能生於果。果相異彼。說彼為他。何假繁詞。固相徴難。隨意勿說。他與非他。必有能生所生差別。此足為喜。何藉多言。言隨欲生。無勞窮詰恣汝常喜熟與相遮。憂喜自心妄想生故。汝言必有能生所生。為假為真隨汝意答。若言是假違汝所宗。若言是真。難詰何咎。所生未有對何能生。能生已無所生何對。故就勝義他生不成。依世俗論徒言無益。夫興諍論為見不同。舉世咸知。何勞泛說。故不應執定從他生。自他俱生。亦不中理。如前二失。積在汝宗。別既不成。總如何立。由是諸法決定無生。自他俱生皆非理故。

複次能生所生同時前後。俱不應理。故定無生。所以者何。故次頌曰。

前後及同時　　二俱不可說　故生與瓶等　　唯假有非真

論曰。若所生法在能生前。既離能生所生何有。此所生法設離能生。是則能生便為無用。若所生法在能生后。無所依止何有能生。設離所生能生何用。又此二法若不同時。能是誰能所為何所。若所生法與能生俱。生既同時。應不相待。如牛兩角互不相依。應無能生所生差別。所生未有能生亦無。所生有時能生何用。如是二法前後同時。理俱不成。故生非有。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

當時，父子關係並非如此，如何能作為比喻呢？又假設這種說法並非沒有道理，你卻執著認為是真的，所以不合邏輯。如果說什麼是『咀嚼虛空』，明明看見因緣能夠產生結果，結果的相狀與因緣不同，說結果是『他』，何必用繁瑣的言辭，固執地相互詰難，隨意不要說『他』與『非他』，必定有能生和所生的差別，這足以令人高興，何必多說呢？言語隨著慾望產生，無需窮盡詰問，任憑你常常喜歡用熟悉的道理來互相遮蔽，憂愁和喜悅都是自心的妄想所生。你說必定有能生和所生，是假設的還是真實的？隨你的意思回答。如果說是假設的，就違背了你的宗義；如果說是真實的，詰難又有什麼過錯？所生之法還沒有產生，對於什麼而能生？能生之法已經沒有了，所生之法又對於什麼而存在？所以就勝義諦而言，『他生』是不成立的。依世俗諦來論，徒勞無益。發起爭論是因為見解不同，這是世人都知道的，何必泛泛而談呢？所以不應該執著地認為一切都是從『他』而生。

自生和他生同時產生，也是不合道理的，如同前面所說的兩種過失，都積累在你的宗義中。『別』既然不能成立，『總』又如何能成立呢？因此，諸法決定是無生的，因為自生、他生、俱生都是不合道理的。

再次，能生和所生，無論是同時、前後，都不合道理，所以一定是無生的。為什麼這樣說呢？所以接著用偈頌說：

『前後及同時，二俱不可說，故生與瓶等，唯假有非真。』

論曰：如果所生之法在能生之前，既然離開了能生，所生又怎麼會有呢？這個所生之法，假設離開了能生，那麼能生就變得沒有用了。如果所生之法在能生之後，沒有所依止，又怎麼會有能生呢？假設離開了所生，能生又有什麼用呢？又，這兩種法如果不是同時，能生是誰能生？所生是什麼所生？如果所生之法與能生同時，生既然是同時的，應該互不依賴，如同牛的兩角互相不依賴一樣，應該沒有能生和所生的差別。所生之法還沒有產生，能生之法也沒有；所生之法已經產生，能生之法又有什麼用呢？像這樣，兩種法無論是前後還是同時，在道理上都是不能成立的，所以生不是真實存在的。 English version:

At that time, the relationship between father and son is not like that, how can it be used as a metaphor? Furthermore, even if this statement is not without reason, you cling to it as true, so it is illogical. If you ask what is meant by 'chewing emptiness,' it is clearly seen that causes and conditions can produce results, and the appearance of the result is different from the causes and conditions. Saying that the result is 'other,' why use verbose language and stubbornly argue with each other? Do not arbitrarily say 'other' and 'not other,' there must be a difference between what can produce and what is produced. This is enough to be joyful, why say more? Words arise according to desire, there is no need to exhaustively question. Let you often like to use familiar principles to obscure each other, sorrow and joy are born from the delusions of your own mind. You say there must be what can produce and what is produced, is it hypothetical or real? Answer as you wish. If you say it is hypothetical, you violate your own doctrine; if you say it is real, what fault is there in questioning? If what is produced has not yet arisen, with respect to what can it arise? If what can produce has already ceased, with respect to what does what is produced exist? Therefore, from the perspective of ultimate truth (paramārtha), 'other-origination' (parotpāda) is not established. To argue based on conventional truth (saṃvṛti), is futile. Initiating disputes is because of differing views, which everyone knows, why speak of it generally? Therefore, one should not stubbornly believe that everything arises from 'other'.

The simultaneous arising of self and other is also unreasonable, like the two faults mentioned earlier, which are accumulated in your doctrine. Since 'distinction' cannot be established, how can 'totality' be established? Therefore, all dharmas are definitely unarisen, because self-origination (svotpāda), other-origination, and simultaneous origination (yugapadutpāda) are all unreasonable.

Furthermore, whether the producer and the produced are simultaneous, before, or after, none of these are reasonable, so it is definitely unarisen. Why is this so? Therefore, it is followed by a verse:

'Before, after, and simultaneous, both cannot be said, therefore, origination is like a pot, only conventionally existent, not truly existent.'

Commentary: If what is produced is before what can produce, since it is separated from what can produce, how can what is produced exist? If this what is produced is separated from what can produce, then what can produce becomes useless. If what is produced is after what can produce, without a basis, how can what can produce exist? If it is separated from what is produced, what use is what can produce? Also, if these two dharmas are not simultaneous, who is the producer producing? What is the produced being produced? If what is produced and what can produce are simultaneous, since origination is simultaneous, they should not depend on each other, like the two horns of a cow do not depend on each other, there should be no difference between what can produce and what is produced. If what is produced has not yet arisen, what can produce does not exist; if what is produced has already arisen, what use is what can produce? Like this, whether the two dharmas are before, after, or simultaneous, they cannot be established in reason, so origination is not truly existent.

【English Translation】 English version: At that time, the relationship between father and son is not like that, how can it be used as a metaphor? Furthermore, even if this statement is not without reason, you cling to it as true, so it is illogical. If you ask what is meant by 'chewing emptiness,' it is clearly seen that causes and conditions can produce results, and the appearance of the result is different from the causes and conditions. Saying that the result is 'other,' why use verbose language and stubbornly argue with each other? Do not arbitrarily say 'other' and 'not other,' there must be a difference between what can produce and what is produced. This is enough to be joyful, why say more? Words arise according to desire, there is no need to exhaustively question. Let you often like to use familiar principles to obscure each other, sorrow and joy are born from the delusions of your own mind. You say there must be what can produce and what is produced, is it hypothetical or real? Answer as you wish. If you say it is hypothetical, you violate your own doctrine; if you say it is real, what fault is there in questioning? If what is produced has not yet arisen, with respect to what can it arise? If what can produce has already ceased, with respect to what does what is produced exist? Therefore, from the perspective of ultimate truth (paramārtha), 'other-origination' (parotpāda) is not established. To argue based on conventional truth (saṃvṛti), is futile. Initiating disputes is because of differing views, which everyone knows, why speak of it generally? Therefore, one should not stubbornly believe that everything arises from 'other'. The simultaneous arising of self and other is also unreasonable, like the two faults mentioned earlier, which are accumulated in your doctrine. Since 'distinction' cannot be established, how can 'totality' be established? Therefore, all dharmas are definitely unarisen, because self-origination (svotpāda), other-origination, and simultaneous origination (yugapadutpāda) are all unreasonable. Furthermore, whether the producer and the produced are simultaneous, before, or after, none of these are reasonable, so it is definitely unarisen. Why is this so? Therefore, it is followed by a verse: 'Before, after, and simultaneous, both cannot be said, therefore, origination is like a pot, only conventionally existent, not truly existent.' Commentary: If what is produced is before what can produce, since it is separated from what can produce, how can what is produced exist? If this what is produced is separated from what can produce, then what can produce becomes useless. If what is produced is after what can produce, without a basis, how can what can produce exist? If it is separated from what is produced, what use is what can produce? Also, if these two dharmas are not simultaneous, who is the producer producing? What is the produced being produced? If what is produced and what can produce are simultaneous, since origination is simultaneous, they should not depend on each other, like the two horns of a cow do not depend on each other, there should be no difference between what can produce and what is produced. If what is produced has not yet arisen, what can produce does not exist; if what is produced has already arisen, what use is what can produce? Like this, whether the two dharmas are before, after, or simultaneous, they cannot be established in reason, so origination is not truly existent.

隨俗說有。能生所生不可推徴。時分同異。複次執果有生必依新舊。新舊無故生不得成。由二俱非諸法自相。互相違反必不同時。設許同時應離法有。若離法有誰舊誰新。汝不應言異體相表。現見法外無舊無新。亦不應言同體俱有。更相違故。如善惡心前後亦非。故次頌曰。

舊若在新前　　前生不應理　舊若居新后　　後生理不成

論曰。現見世間前新后舊。不應蔽執前舊后新。要前有新後轉成舊。舊若前有新則為無。新名前生舊名后故。新若無者舊亦應無。新舊既無生依何有。舊居新后。理亦不然。法新起時既無有舊。體無別故。后亦應無。若言后時別生舊體。是則新起。何謂舊生。後生嬰孩赤色未變。而名耆舊。理必不然。若法初生而名舊者。則一切法畢竟無新。新既為無舊亦非有。舊必以新為前導故。若謂諸法念念別生。恒名為新。都無舊者。舊既非有新亦應無。簡舊名新舊無何簡。所簡無故。能簡亦無。是故不應執有新舊。既無新舊生豈得成。然諸世間見有為法。相似相續謂為一體。前盛后衰說為新舊。聖隨彼說有舊有新。依此立生假而非實。

複次果體若生。必依過去未來現在因體而生。然皆不成。故次頌曰。

現非因現起　　亦非因去來　未來亦不因　　去來今世起

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：隨順世俗的說法而假設有（新舊），能生之法和所生之法是不可推究的。時間、部分、相同、相異等概念也是如此。進一步說，如果執著于果的產生必須依賴於新和舊，那麼新和舊本身如果沒有確定的依據，果的產生就無法成立。因為新和舊二者都不是諸法（一切事物）的自性（自身本來的性質），互相之間是矛盾的，必定不能同時存在。假設允許同時存在，那麼就應該脫離法（事物）而存在。如果脫離法而存在，那麼誰是舊的，誰是新的呢？你不應該說異體的相互表現。現在看到在法之外沒有舊也沒有新。也不應該說同體同時具有新和舊，因為這與前面的觀點相互矛盾。如同善心和噁心不能同時存在一樣。所以接下來說：『舊的如果在新的前面，新的產生就不合道理；舊的如果在新的後面，舊的產生在道理上也不能成立。』論：現在看到世間是先有新的，後有舊的，不應該被矇蔽而執著于先舊后新。一定要先有新的，然後轉變成為舊的。舊的如果在新的前面，那麼新就等於沒有產生。因為先有新，然後才稱之為舊。如果新沒有產生，那麼舊也應該沒有。新和舊都沒有，那麼產生又依賴於什麼呢？舊的在新的後面，在道理上也是不成立的。當法（事物）新產生的時候，既然沒有舊的，因為本體沒有差別，那麼後來也應該沒有。如果說後來另外產生舊的本體，那麼這是新產生，怎麼能說是舊產生呢？後生的嬰兒，赤色沒有改變，卻稱之為年老，在道理上必定是不成立的。如果法（事物）剛產生就稱之為舊的，那麼一切法（事物）最終都沒有新的。新既然沒有，舊的也就沒有。舊的必定以新的作為先導。如果認為諸法（事物）唸唸之間各自產生，一直稱之為新的，完全沒有舊的，舊的既然沒有，新的也應該沒有。簡化舊的名稱為新的，舊的都沒有，簡化什麼呢？因為所要簡化的沒有，能簡化的也就沒有。因此不應該執著于有新和舊。既然沒有新和舊，產生怎麼能夠成立呢？然而世間看到有為法（因緣和合而成的法），相似相續，認為是同一個整體。前面旺盛後面衰敗，就說成是新和舊。聖人隨順他們的說法，說有舊有新。依靠這個而建立產生，是假設的而不是真實的。進一步說，果的本體如果產生，必定依賴於過去、未來、現在的因的本體而產生。然而這些都不能成立。所以接下來說：『現在不是因為現在而產生，也不是因為過去和未來而產生；未來也不是因為過去、現在而產生。』

【English Translation】 English version: According to conventional truth, we speak of 'new' and 'old'. However, the producer and the produced are ultimately untraceable. The same applies to concepts like time, parts, sameness, and difference. Furthermore, if one insists that the arising of an effect (果, guǒ) must depend on 'new' and 'old', then the arising of the effect cannot be established if 'new' and 'old' themselves lack a firm basis. This is because 'new' and 'old' are not the inherent nature (自相, zìxiàng) of all dharmas (諸法, zhūfǎ) (all phenomena); they contradict each other and cannot exist simultaneously. If we were to allow them to exist simultaneously, they would have to exist independently of dharmas. If they exist independently of dharmas, then who is 'old' and who is 'new'? You should not say that they are mutual expressions of different entities. We see that outside of dharmas, there is neither 'old' nor 'new'. Nor should you say that they co-exist within the same entity, because this contradicts the previous point, just as wholesome and unwholesome thoughts cannot exist simultaneously. Therefore, it is said: 'If the 'old' precedes the 'new', the arising of the 'new' is illogical; if the 'old' follows the 'new', the arising of the 'old' is logically untenable.' Commentary: We see in the world that the 'new' comes before the 'old'; we should not be deluded into clinging to the idea that the 'old' precedes the 'new'. The 'new' must come first, and then it transforms into the 'old'. If the 'old' exists before the 'new', then the 'new' is as good as non-existent, because the 'new' comes first, and then it is called 'old'. If the 'new' does not arise, then the 'old' should also not exist. If neither 'new' nor 'old' exists, then what does arising depend on? The 'old' following the 'new' is also logically untenable. When a dharma (phenomenon) newly arises, since there is no 'old' because the essence is undifferentiated, then there should also be nothing later. If you say that the 'old' essence arises separately later, then this is the arising of the 'new'; how can it be called the arising of the 'old'? If a newborn infant, whose complexion has not changed, is called 'old', it is certainly illogical. If a dharma (phenomenon) is called 'old' as soon as it arises, then ultimately there is no 'new' in all dharmas (phenomena). Since the 'new' does not exist, the 'old' also does not exist, because the 'old' must be preceded by the 'new'. If it is thought that all dharmas (phenomena) arise separately in each moment, and are always called 'new', and there is no 'old' at all, then since the 'old' does not exist, the 'new' should also not exist. If we simplify the name of the 'old' as 'new', what are we simplifying if the 'old' does not exist? Because what is to be simplified does not exist, the simplifier also does not exist. Therefore, we should not cling to the existence of 'new' and 'old'. Since there is neither 'new' nor 'old', how can arising be established? However, the world sees conditioned dharmas (有為法, yǒuwéi fǎ) (dharmas arising from causes and conditions) as similar and continuous, and considers them to be a single entity. When the former is flourishing and the latter is declining, they are called 'new' and 'old'. The sages follow their way of speaking and say that there is 'old' and 'new'. Relying on this, they establish arising, which is hypothetical and not real. Furthermore, if the essence of the effect (果, guǒ) arises, it must depend on the essence of the cause (因, yīn) in the past, future, and present. However, none of these can be established. Therefore, it is said: 'The present does not arise from the present, nor does it arise from the past and future; the future also does not arise from the past and present.'

論曰。現在果法非現因生。因果同時理不成故。雖形影等因果同時。是假非真隨俗而說。去來二世已滅未生。體相是無因用非有。又現在法體相已成。豈更藉他三世因起。未來果法不因去來。已滅未生無因用故。豈不現在將欲滅時。有體為因生未來果。未來無體生何所依。若言未來生時有體。應名現在。何謂未來。汝不應言生即是有。亦不可說有即是生。有若即生。生應現在。生若即有。有應未來。有在未來。未來應現在。生居現在。現在應未來。則違汝宗世相揩定。亦違自說生在未來。故不可言現在將滅。為因引起未來果生。生時有無皆有失故。

複次有說。未來體相具有。由此生用得有所依。生遷未來令入現在。滅遷現在令入過去。為破彼言故說頌曰。

若具即無來　　既滅應非往

論曰。猶如現在。體相具故。未來不應來入現在。或應未來。非現等故。體相不具。猶若空花。又應未來非現在故。猶如過去不入現在。又若未來體相已具。應無生用。猶如現在。或未來世生用應無。以非現在猶如過去。色等諸法雖居現在。定當滅故。亦名為滅。此現在法不往過去。時定異故。猶如未來。又現在法應如過去。不往過去。由非未來。又過去時。非現所往如未來等。世所攝故。現在亦非。未來所入。世所

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：論曰：現在的果法不是由現在的因產生的，因為因果同時在道理上是不能成立的。雖然像形和影這樣的因果關係是同時的，但那是假象，不是真實的，只是隨順世俗的說法。過去和未來二世已經滅去和尚未產生，它們的體性和相狀是空無的，沒有因的作用。而且現在的法的體性和相狀已經成就，怎麼還需要憑藉其他三世的因來產生呢？未來的果法不是由過去和未來產生的，因為已經滅去和尚未產生的沒有因的作用。難道不是說現在將要滅去的時候，有體性作為因，產生未來的果嗎？未來沒有體性，生從何處依附呢？如果說未來產生的時候有體性，就應該叫做現在，為什麼說是未來呢？你不應該說生就是有，也不可以說有就是生。有如果是生，生就應該是現在。生如果是有，有就應該是未來。有在未來，未來就應該是現在。生在現在，現在就應該是未來。那就違背了你宗派關於世相的固定說法，也違背了你自己說的生在未來。所以不能說現在將要滅去，作為因引起未來果的產生，因為生的時候無論是有還是無，都有過失。

複次，有人說，未來體性和相狀都具備，因此生起的作用才有所依憑。生遷移未來，使之進入現在；滅遷移現在，使之進入過去。爲了破斥這種說法，所以說了下面的偈頌：

『若具即無來，既滅應非往。』

論曰：就像現在一樣，體性和相狀都具備，未來就不應該進入現在。或者應該說未來不是現在等等，因為體性和相狀不具備，就像虛空中的花朵一樣。又應該說未來不是現在，就像過去一樣，不進入現在。又如果未來體性和相狀已經具備，就應該沒有生起的作用，就像現在一樣。或者未來世的生起作用應該沒有，因為它不是現在，就像過去一樣。色等諸法雖然處於現在，必定會滅去，所以也叫做滅。這現在的法不前往過去，因為時間是確定的，不同的，就像未來一樣。又現在的法應該像過去一樣，不前往過去，因為它不是未來。又過去時，不是現在所前往的，就像未來等等，因為它被世所攝。現在也不是未來所進入的，因為它被世所攝。

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise says: The fruit-dharma of the present is not produced by the cause of the present, because the principle of cause and effect occurring simultaneously is untenable. Although cause and effect are simultaneous like form and shadow, it is a false appearance, not real, and is merely a conventional saying. The past and future two times have already ceased and have not yet arisen, their substance and characteristics are empty and without causal function. Moreover, the substance and characteristics of the present dharma have already been accomplished, so how could it rely on the causes of the other three times to arise? The fruit-dharma of the future is not caused by the past and future, because what has already ceased and has not yet arisen has no causal function. Isn't it said that when the present is about to cease, it has substance as a cause to produce the future fruit? The future has no substance, so where does birth rely on? If it is said that the future has substance when it arises, it should be called the present, so why is it called the future? You should not say that birth is existence, nor can you say that existence is birth. If existence is birth, then birth should be the present. If birth is existence, then existence should be the future. If existence is in the future, then the future should be the present. If birth is in the present, then the present should be the future. That would contradict your sect's fixed view of the characteristics of the world, and it would also contradict your own statement that birth is in the future. Therefore, it cannot be said that the present is about to cease and acts as a cause to bring about the birth of the future fruit, because whether birth is with or without substance, there are faults.

Furthermore, some say that the future has substance and characteristics, and therefore the function of arising has something to rely on. Birth moves the future, causing it to enter the present; cessation moves the present, causing it to enter the past. To refute this statement, the following verse is spoken:

'If complete, then there is no coming; since ceased, it should not go.'

Treatise says: Just like the present, because substance and characteristics are complete, the future should not come into the present. Or it should be said that the future is not the present, etc., because substance and characteristics are not complete, like flowers in the sky. Also, it should be said that the future is not the present, just like the past, not entering the present. Also, if the future has complete substance and characteristics, then there should be no function of arising, just like the present. Or the function of arising in the future should not exist, because it is not the present, just like the past. Although phenomena such as form reside in the present, they will certainly cease, so they are also called cessation. This present dharma does not go to the past, because time is fixed and different, just like the future. Also, the present dharma should be like the past, not going to the past, because it is not the future. Also, the past time is not what the present goes to, just like the future, etc., because it is encompassed by the world. The present is also not what the future enters, because it is encompassed by the world.

攝故。猶如未來。過去未來。非現等故。應如兔角體相俱無。未來體無。生依何有。故不應執色等果生。生既是無滅亦非有。但隨俗說有滅有生。似有而無。猶如幻等。為顯此義。復說頌曰。

法體相如是　　幻等喻非虛

論曰。色等諸法。前後際無。現不久停。猶如幻等。又色等法。若從緣生。如幻所為。皆非實有。非緣生者。皆似空花。性相俱空。不應言有。法既非有。生等定無。如何可說。生遷未來令入現在。滅遷現在令入過去。

複次生住滅相前後同時。理俱不成。故不應執。所以者何。故次頌曰。

生住滅三相　　同時有不成　前後亦為無　　如何執為有

論曰。一體一時有眾多相。互相違反理必不成。若執同時體應各異。既執體一。應不同時。執不同時。亦不應理。所相體一。如何異時。法體生時住滅未有。至住滅位生相已無。而言體同。極為迷謬。若言前後相異體同。善惡色心體應是一。然舍前相后相起時。體與相同。應有捨得。如何可執前後體同。三體不同。亦不應理。以生住滅遍諸有為。三體如何各唯一相。許各一相。理亦不然。滅體無生應非因起。生體無滅應性是常。住無滅生應非蘊攝。若許一一。復有三相。有如前過。或復無窮。同時前後。三相不成。更無異途

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本因此，就像未來一樣，過去和未來，因為不是現在等等原因，應該像兔角一樣，本體和表象都無所有。未來沒有本體，又依據什麼而產生呢？所以不應該執著於色等果的產生。既然產生是虛無的，那麼滅亡也不是真實存在的。只不過是隨順世俗的說法，說有生有滅，看起來好像有，實際上沒有，就像幻象一樣。爲了彰顯這個道理，再次用偈頌說道：

法的本體和表象就是這樣，幻象等的比喻不是虛假的。

論述：色等諸法，前後際都是空無，現在也無法長久停留，就像幻象一樣。又，色等法，如果是從因緣而生，就像幻象所變現的一樣，都不是真實存在的。不是從因緣而生的，都像空中的花朵一樣，本體和表象都是空無，不應該說它們是存在的。法既然不是真實存在的，那麼生等也必定是虛無的，怎麼能說，生遷動未來，讓它進入現在；滅遷動現在，讓它進入過去呢？

更進一步說，生、住、滅三種相，前後同時，在道理上都不能成立，所以不應該執著於它們。為什麼這麼說呢？所以接著用偈頌說道：

生、住、滅三種相，同時存在不能成立，前後存在也是虛無，怎麼能執著它們是存在的呢？

論述：一個本體，一個時間，有眾多相，互相違背，在道理上必定不能成立。如果執著于同時存在，那麼本體應該各不相同。既然執著于本體是一個，那麼就不應該同時存在。執著于不同時存在，也不合道理。所相的本體是一個，怎麼會是不同時呢？法的本體在產生的時候，住和滅還沒有出現；到了住和滅的階段，產生的相已經消失了，卻說本體相同，這是非常荒謬的。如果說前後相不同，本體相同，那麼善惡的色心，本體應該是一個。然而捨棄前面的相，後面的相生起的時候，本體和相，應該有捨棄和得到。怎麼能執著前後本體相同呢？三個本體不同，也不合道理。因為生、住、滅遍及所有的有為法，三個本體怎麼會各自只有一個相呢？如果允許各自只有一個相，道理上也是不成立的。滅的本體沒有產生，應該不是從因產生的。生的本體沒有滅亡，應該本性是常。住沒有滅和生，應該不是蘊所包含的。如果允許每一個相，又有三個相，就會有像前面一樣的過失，或者無窮無盡。同時和前後，三種相都不能成立，再沒有其他的途徑了。

【English Translation】 English version Therefore, just like the future, the past and the future, because they are not present, etc., should be like a rabbit's horn, both substance and appearance being non-existent. If the future has no substance, what does its arising depend on? Therefore, one should not cling to the arising of effects such as form. Since arising is non-existent, cessation is also not real. It is only in accordance with conventional speech that we say there is arising and cessation, appearing as if they exist, but in reality, they do not, like illusions. To reveal this meaning, it is said again in verse:

The substance and appearance of phenomena are like this; the metaphors of illusions, etc., are not false.

Treatise: Phenomena such as form have no beginning or end, and do not remain for long in the present, like illusions. Furthermore, if phenomena such as form arise from conditions, like what is created by illusions, they are all not real. Those that do not arise from conditions are like flowers in the sky, both substance and appearance being empty. One should not say they exist. Since phenomena are not real, arising, etc., are certainly non-existent. How can one say that arising moves the future to enter the present, and cessation moves the present to enter the past?

Furthermore, the characteristics of arising, abiding, and ceasing, whether simultaneous or sequential, cannot be established in principle. Therefore, one should not cling to them. Why is this so? Therefore, it is said in the following verse:

The three characteristics of arising, abiding, and ceasing cannot exist simultaneously; nor can they exist sequentially. How can one cling to them as existing?

Treatise: It is impossible in principle for one substance at one time to have many characteristics that contradict each other. If one clings to simultaneous existence, then the substances should be different. Since one clings to the substance being one, they should not be simultaneous. Clinging to non-simultaneous existence is also unreasonable. How can the substance of what is characterized be one if they are at different times? When the substance of a phenomenon arises, abiding and ceasing have not yet appeared; when it reaches the stage of abiding and ceasing, the characteristic of arising has already disappeared, yet one says the substance is the same, which is extremely absurd. If one says the characteristics are different sequentially, but the substance is the same, then the substance of good and evil, form and mind, should be one. However, when the previous characteristic is abandoned and the subsequent characteristic arises, the substance and the characteristic should have abandonment and acquisition. How can one cling to the substance being the same sequentially? The three substances being different is also unreasonable. Because arising, abiding, and ceasing pervade all conditioned phenomena, how can the three substances each have only one characteristic? If one allows each to have only one characteristic, it is also not established in principle. The substance of cessation has no arising, so it should not arise from a cause. The substance of arising has no cessation, so its nature should be permanent. Abiding has no cessation and arising, so it should not be included in the aggregates. If one allows each characteristic to have three characteristics again, there will be the same faults as before, or it will be endless. Simultaneous and sequential, the three characteristics cannot be established, and there is no other way.

。如何執有。

複次若離所相別有生等。應如色等有生等相。則生等相應無異體。所以者何。故次頌曰。

若生等諸相　　復別有生等　應住滅如生　　或生住如滅

論曰。若生等相自所依俱。如自所依別有生等。此生等相幖幟既同。其體如何。展轉有異。若言生等如色等法。雖生等俱而體有異。礙等相別。體異可然。生等相同。體如何異。生等作用既有差別。應如色等其體各異。此因不定如眼等根。用雖有多。而體一故。用有差別不可例同。眼等用殊時同故體一。生等用別時。異故體多。生等何緣用時有異。自體俱起不待異時。作用如何待時有異。住滅二相初既用無。后亦應然。體無別故。或復生等同與法俱等有生故。應互相似。一一皆有他諸作用。或自作用一一皆無。是故不應別有生等。

複次色等諸法與生等相其體為異。為不異耶。異且不然。故次頌曰。

所相異能相　　何為體非常

論曰。色等諸法若異生等。如擇滅等應無生滅。不應觀彼皆是無常。觀彼無常應成顛倒。若言色等與生等合。雖觀無常而非顛倒。如名杖角以作人牛。此不應爾。異生等故。應似無為。非生等合。色等生等。體相若異。如何以一心慧而觀。謂色等生色等住滅。故色等法非異生等。不異亦非。故

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如何執持這些相呢？更進一步說，如果離開所相（lakṣaṇa，特徵）而另外存在生等（utpāda，產生等），那麼應該像色等（rūpa，顏色等）一樣具有生等相。這樣一來，生等相就應該沒有不同的自體。為什麼這麼說呢？所以接下來說偈頌：『如果生等這些相，另外存在生等，那麼住（sthiti，持續）、滅（bhaṅga，消滅）應該像生一樣，或者生、住應該像滅一樣。』論述：如果生等相和它所依的法（dharma，事物）同時存在，就像它所依的法另外存在生等一樣，那麼這些生等相的標誌既然相同，它們的本體如何展轉而有差異呢？如果說生等像色等法一樣，雖然和生等同時存在，但本體有差異，因為有礙等相的差別，本體的差異還可以理解。但生等相同，本體如何差異呢？生等的作用既然有差別，應該像色等一樣，它們的本體各自不同。這個因是不確定的，就像眼等根（indriya，感官），作用雖然有很多，但本體是一個。作用有差別，不能類比相同。眼等的作用不同，是因為時間相同所以本體是一個；生等的作用不同，是因為時間不同所以本體是多個。生等為什麼作用的時間有差異呢？因為自體同時生起，不等待不同的時間，作用怎麼會等待時間而有差異呢？住、滅二相最初既然沒有作用，後來也應該沒有作用，因為本體沒有差別。或者生等和法同時存在，因為有生，所以應該互相相似，每一個都應該有其他的各種作用，或者自己的作用每一個都沒有。所以不應該另外存在生等。更進一步說，色等諸法和生等相，它們的本體是不同的，還是不不同的呢？如果是不同的，那就不對了。所以接下來說偈頌：『所相（lakṣaṇīya，被相的事物）和能相（lakṣaṇa，相）不同，憑什麼本體不是常恒的呢？』論述：色等諸法如果和生等不同，那麼應該像擇滅（pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha，通過智慧力而達到的滅）等一樣沒有生滅，不應該觀察它們都是無常的。觀察它們是無常的，應該成為顛倒（viparyāsa，錯誤的認知）。如果說色等和生等結合，雖然觀察是無常的，但不是顛倒，就像用名字、木杖、牛角來製作人或牛一樣。這不應該這樣，因為和生等不同，應該像無為法（asaṃskṛta-dharma，不依賴條件產生的法）一樣。不是和生等結合。色等和生等，本體和相如果不同，如何用一心一慧來觀察呢？所謂色等生、色等住、色等滅。所以色等法不是和生等不同的。不不同也是不對的。

【English Translation】 English version: How are these characteristics to be apprehended? Furthermore, if, apart from the characterized (lakṣaṇa), there exist separate origination etc. (utpāda, etc.), then they should have characteristics of origination etc. like form etc. (rūpa, etc.). In that case, the characteristics of origination etc. should have no distinct essence. Why is that? Therefore, the following verse is stated: 'If the characteristics of origination etc., exist separately from origination etc., then duration (sthiti) and cessation (bhaṅga) should be like origination, or origination and duration should be like cessation.' Treatise: If the characteristics of origination etc. exist simultaneously with their substratum (dharma), just as their substratum has separate origination etc., then since these characteristics of origination etc. have the same mark, how can their essence be different in turn? If it is said that origination etc. are like form etc., although they exist simultaneously with origination etc., their essence is different because of the difference in characteristics such as obstruction, then the difference in essence is understandable. But origination etc. are the same, how can their essence be different? Since the functions of origination etc. have differences, their essence should be different like form etc. This reason is uncertain, like the sense organs (indriya) such as the eye. Although there are many functions, the essence is one. The difference in function cannot be analogized as the same. The difference in the function of the eye etc. is because the time is the same, so the essence is one; the difference in the function of origination etc. is because the time is different, so the essence is multiple. Why is there a difference in the time of the function of origination etc.? Because the self arises simultaneously, without waiting for a different time, how can the function wait for time to have a difference? Since the characteristics of duration and cessation initially have no function, they should also have no function later, because the essence has no difference. Or origination etc. exist simultaneously with the dharma, because there is origination, they should be similar to each other, and each should have various other functions, or each should have none of its own functions. Therefore, origination etc. should not exist separately. Furthermore, are the essences of form etc. and the characteristics of origination etc. different or not different? If they are different, then that is not right. Therefore, the following verse is stated: 'If the characterized (lakṣaṇīya) and the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) are different, why is the essence not permanent?' Treatise: If form etc. are different from origination etc., then they should have no origination and cessation like cessation through discrimination (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha), and they should not be observed as impermanent. Observing them as impermanent should become inverted (viparyāsa). If it is said that form etc. are combined with origination etc., although they are observed as impermanent, it is not inverted, just like using names, staffs, and horns to make people or cows. This should not be the case, because it is different from origination etc., and it should be like unconditioned dharma (asaṃskṛta-dharma). It is not combined with origination etc. If the essence and characteristics of form etc. and origination etc. are different, how can they be observed with one mind and one wisdom? So-called origination of form etc., duration of form etc., cessation of form etc. Therefore, form etc. are not different from origination etc. Not different is also not right.

次頌曰。

不異四應同　　或復全非有

論曰。若色等法不異生等。應如生等析一成三。生等亦應混三成一。與色等法體不異故。或生等相各失自體。與其住等體不異故。色等亦然應失自體。與其生等體為一故。是則應無所相色等。所相無故能相亦無。則無有為。無為亦爾。相待立故。一切應無。故色等法非異生等。

複次因果有無皆不可立。生依彼故。亦不得成。所以者何。故次頌曰。

有不生有法　　有不生無法　無不生有法　　無不生無法

論曰。有生有法義不得成。生有同時。遞相違故。有生無法亦不得成。如已滅無。非所生故。無生有法理不得成。如未生無非能生故。無生無法亦不得成。如前二無非因果故。或二無法因果不成。如畢竟無非因果故。如是已破因果異體。為破同體。復說頌曰。

有不成有法　　有不成無法　無不成有法　　無不成無法

論曰。有成有法。其理不成。有法已成。成無用故。成覆成者。成則無窮。若成異相。其體應別。相異體一。理必不然。相與其體不相離故。有成無法。理亦不成。其相異故。如苦樂等。或復有無應無差別。有無體一。與理相違。無成有法。其義不成。如有成無所說過故。無成無法。義亦不成。如前有無相成過故。或

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：總結性的偈頌說：『不異於四相（四相：生、住、異、滅）應相同，或者完全不存在。』論述：如果色等法（色等法：指構成物質世界的基本元素）與生等（生等：指生、住、異、滅四相）沒有區別，那麼應該像生等一樣，將一個東西分解成三個。生等也應該混合三個成為一個，因為它們與色等法的本體沒有區別。或者生等各自的相狀會失去其自身特性，因為它們與住等（住等：指住、異、滅三相）的本體沒有區別。色等也是如此，應該失去其自身特性，因為它們與生等的本體是一體的。這樣一來，應該不存在被相狀所標識的色等。因為被相狀標識的事物不存在，能標識的相狀也就不存在。那麼就不會存在有為法（有為法：指由因緣和合而生的事物）。無為法（無為法：指不生不滅、無因無緣的事物）也是如此，因為它們是相互依賴而成立的。一切都應該不存在。所以，色等法與生等不是沒有區別的。進一步說，因果的有無都無法成立。因為生是依賴於彼（彼：指因）而產生的，所以也無法成立。為什麼呢？所以接下來的偈頌說：『有不生有法，有不生無法，無不生有法，無不生無法。』論述：有生有法（有法：指已經存在的事物）的道理不能成立，因為生和有是同時的，相互矛盾。有生無法（無法：指不存在的事物）也不能成立，就像已經滅亡的事物，不是所能產生的。無生有法（有法：指已經存在的事物）的道理不能成立，就像未產生的事物，不是能產生的。無生無法（無法：指不存在的事物）也不能成立，就像前面兩種不存在的事物，不是因果關係。或者兩種不存在的事物，因果關係不能成立，就像畢竟不存在的事物，不是因果關係。像這樣已經破斥了因果是異體的觀點。爲了破斥因果是同體的觀點，再次說了這個偈頌：『有不成有法，有不成無法，無不成有法，無不成無法。』論述：有成就已經存在的事物（有法），這個道理不能成立。因為已經存在的事物已經成就，再成就就沒有用處了。如果成就之後再成就，那麼成就就會無窮無盡。如果成就的是不同的相狀，那麼它們的本體應該不同。相狀不同而本體相同，這個道理必然不成立，因為相狀與它的本體是不可分離的。有成就沒有的事物（無法），這個道理也不能成立，因為它們的相狀不同，就像苦和樂等。或者有和無應該沒有差別，有和無的本體是一體的，這與道理相違背。無成就已經存在的事物（有法），這個道理不能成立，就像有成就沒有的事物所說過的過失一樣。無成就沒有的事物（無法），這個道理也不能成立，就像前面有和無相互成就的過失一樣。或者

【English Translation】 English version: The following verse summarizes: 'Not different from the four marks (four marks: birth, duration, change, extinction), they should be the same, or completely non-existent.' Treatise: If phenomena such as form (form: the basic elements constituting the material world) are not different from birth, etc. (birth, etc.: referring to the four marks of birth, duration, change, and extinction), then they should be like birth, etc., dividing one thing into three. Birth, etc., should also mix three into one, because their essence is not different from phenomena such as form. Or the characteristics of birth, etc., would each lose their own nature, because their essence is not different from duration, etc. (duration, etc.: referring to the three marks of duration, change, and extinction). Phenomena such as form are also the same, they should lose their own nature, because their essence is one with birth, etc. In that case, there should be no form, etc., that are characterized by marks. Because things characterized by marks do not exist, the characterizing marks also do not exist. Then there would be no conditioned phenomena (conditioned phenomena: things that arise from the combination of causes and conditions). Unconditioned phenomena (unconditioned phenomena: things that neither arise nor cease, without cause or condition) are also the same, because they are established in mutual dependence. Everything should be non-existent. Therefore, phenomena such as form are not without difference from birth, etc. Furthermore, the existence or non-existence of cause and effect cannot be established. Because birth depends on 'that' ('that': referring to the cause) to arise, it also cannot be established. Why? Therefore, the following verse says: 'Existence does not produce existence, existence does not produce non-existence, non-existence does not produce existence, non-existence does not produce non-existence.' Treatise: The principle of existence producing existence (existence: referring to things that already exist) cannot be established, because birth and existence are simultaneous, mutually contradictory. Existence producing non-existence (non-existence: referring to things that do not exist) also cannot be established, like things that have already perished, they are not what can be produced. The principle of non-existence producing existence (existence: referring to things that already exist) cannot be established, like things that have not yet arisen, they are not what can produce. Non-existence producing non-existence (non-existence: referring to things that do not exist) also cannot be established, like the previous two non-existent things, they are not cause and effect. Or two non-existent things, the relationship of cause and effect cannot be established, like things that are completely non-existent, they are not cause and effect. In this way, the view that cause and effect are different entities has been refuted. To refute the view that cause and effect are the same entity, this verse is said again: 'Existence does not accomplish existence, existence does not accomplish non-existence, non-existence does not accomplish existence, non-existence does not accomplish non-existence.' Treatise: Existence accomplishing what already exists (existence), this principle cannot be established. Because what already exists is already accomplished, accomplishing it again is useless. If it is accomplished and then accomplished again, then accomplishment would be endless. If what is accomplished is a different characteristic, then their essence should be different. Different characteristics but the same essence, this principle is certainly not established, because the characteristic and its essence are inseparable. Existence accomplishing what does not exist (non-existence), this principle also cannot be established, because their characteristics are different, like suffering and joy, etc. Or existence and non-existence should have no difference, the essence of existence and non-existence is one, this contradicts the principle. Non-existence accomplishing what already exists (existence), this principle cannot be established, like the fault that has been said about existence accomplishing what does not exist. Non-existence accomplishing what does not exist (non-existence), this principle also cannot be established, like the fault of existence and non-existence accomplishing each other as before. Or

復無者。即是數論所執自性。不依他成。雖有隱能而無顯體。依彼所執故說為無。如是有無因果同異。皆不成故。決定無生。

複次已生未生。生用已滅及未得故。俱無有生。除已未生。有生時體不可知故。亦無有生。若言生時二半為體。謂生半分。半分未生。此亦不然。故次頌曰。

半生半未生　　非一生時體　或已未生位　　應亦是生時

論曰。半生未生非生時體。生未生故。如已未生。如已未生有二相別非生時體。生時亦然。有生未生二種相異。如何可立為一生時。或應已生及未生位。亦共合說為一生時。有生未生二相異故。如汝所執半生未生。此顯生時已未生位。皆失自性。故定無生。豈不生時具有二相。已生半分半分未生。已生未生各有一相。如何可難令互相成。一一別觀可生時異。總觀二相豈異生時。若言生時體一相二。已未生位體二相殊。故已未生與生時異。如何體一二相相違。相既不同。體應成二。非一有分從二分生。勿違生時。二半為體。若半已起名作生時。半既未生應名未起。又半生已生用已無。半復未生生用未有。如何二半合立生時。若生用無名生時者。已未生位應名生時。便失自宗三位差別。故離二位無別生時。生時既無二位非有。是故諸法決定無生。

複次應問

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：再說『無』，就是數論（Samkhya）所執著的『自性』（Prakriti），不依賴其他而成就。雖然有潛在的能力，卻沒有顯現的形體。依照他們所執著的，所以說它是『無』。像這樣，有和無、原因和結果、相同和不同，都不能成立，所以可以斷定沒有產生。其次，已產生和未產生，因為產生的功用已經滅去和尚未得到，所以都沒有產生。除了已產生和未產生之外，產生的『時』（kala）的本體是不可知的，所以也沒有產生。如果說產生的時候以『二半』為本體，也就是一半產生，一半未產生，這也是不對的。所以接下來說：『一半產生一半未產生，不是一個產生時的本體；或者已產生和未產生的位置，也應該是產生時。』論述：一半產生一半未產生，不是產生時的本體，因為有產生和未產生。就像已產生和未產生，已產生和未產生有兩種不同的相，不是產生時的本體，產生時也是這樣。有產生和未產生兩種相不同，怎麼可以成立為一個產生時？或者應該把已產生和未產生的位置，也共同合起來說成一個產生時，因為有產生和未產生兩種相不同。就像你所執著的一半產生一半未產生，這顯示產生時、已產生和未產生的位置，都失去了自性，所以可以斷定沒有產生。難道不是產生時具有兩種相嗎？已產生一半，未產生一半。已產生和未產生各有一種相，怎麼可以責難，讓它們互相成就？一一分別觀察，可以發現產生時是不同的。總的觀察兩種相，難道和產生時不同嗎？如果說產生時的本體是一個，相是兩個，已產生和未產生的位置，本體是兩個，相是不同的，所以已產生和未產生與產生時不同。怎麼能說本體是一個，兩個相卻相反呢？相既然不同，本體應該成為兩個。不是一個有分從兩個分產生，不要違背產生時，以二半為本體。如果一半已經生起，就叫做產生時，一半既然沒有產生，就應該叫做未生起。又一半產生，產生的功用已經沒有，一半又未產生，產生的功用還沒有，怎麼能把兩半合起來成立產生時？如果產生的功用沒有，就叫做產生時，那麼已產生和未產生的位置，應該叫做產生時，就失去了你宗派的三種位置的差別。所以離開兩種位置，沒有別的產生時。產生時既然沒有，兩種位置也不是有。因此，諸法可以斷定沒有產生。其次，應該問

【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, 'non-existence' is what the Samkhya (number theorists) adhere to as 'Prakriti' (self-nature), which does not depend on others to be accomplished. Although it has latent abilities, it does not have a manifest form. According to their adherence, it is said to be 'non-existent'. Like this, existence and non-existence, cause and effect, sameness and difference, all cannot be established, so it can be determined that there is no arising. Secondly, the already arisen and the not-yet-arisen, because the function of arising has already ceased and has not yet been obtained, therefore neither has arisen. Apart from the already arisen and the not-yet-arisen, the substance of the 'time' (kala) of arising is unknowable, so there is also no arising. If it is said that the time of arising takes 'two halves' as its substance, that is, one half has arisen and one half has not arisen, this is also not correct. Therefore, it is said next: 'Half arisen and half not-yet-arisen, is not the substance of a single time of arising; or the positions of already arisen and not-yet-arisen, should also be the time of arising.' Treatise: Half arisen and half not-yet-arisen is not the substance of the time of arising, because there is arising and not-yet-arising. Like the already arisen and the not-yet-arisen, the already arisen and the not-yet-arisen have two different characteristics, not the substance of the time of arising, the time of arising is also like this. There are two different characteristics of arising and not-yet-arising, how can it be established as a single time of arising? Or the positions of already arisen and not-yet-arisen should also be combined and called a single time of arising, because there are two different characteristics of arising and not-yet-arising. Like your adherence to half arisen and half not-yet-arisen, this shows that the time of arising, the positions of already arisen and not-yet-arisen, have all lost their self-nature, so it can be determined that there is no arising. Isn't it that the time of arising has two characteristics? Half already arisen, half not-yet-arisen. The already arisen and the not-yet-arisen each have one characteristic, how can it be questioned to make them accomplish each other? Observing each one separately, it can be found that the time of arising is different. Observing the two characteristics in total, isn't it different from the time of arising? If it is said that the substance of the time of arising is one, and the characteristics are two, the positions of already arisen and not-yet-arisen, the substance is two, and the characteristics are different, so the already arisen and the not-yet-arisen are different from the time of arising. How can it be said that the substance is one, but the two characteristics are contradictory? Since the characteristics are different, the substance should become two. It is not that one with parts arises from two parts, do not contradict the time of arising, taking two halves as the substance. If one half has already arisen, it is called the time of arising, since one half has not arisen, it should be called not-yet-arisen. Also, one half has arisen, the function of arising has already ceased, and one half has not yet arisen, the function of arising has not yet been obtained, how can the two halves be combined to establish the time of arising? If the function of arising is non-existent, it is called the time of arising, then the positions of already arisen and not-yet-arisen should be called the time of arising, and the three positions of your sect would be lost. Therefore, apart from the two positions, there is no other time of arising. Since the time of arising is non-existent, the two positions are also not existent. Therefore, it can be determined that all dharmas do not arise. Secondly, it should be asked

。迷徒生時。自性為因緣起。為是自然。初且不然。故次頌曰。

生時若是果　　體即非生時

論曰。若生時體從因緣生。即非生時。已有體故。未來將起故名生時。未來體無。說誰為果。若言此位觀待當來。至現在時名為果者。亦應說近。何立遠名。如是生時非已生故。如未生位非實生時。又此生時時遠攝故。如已滅位。何謂生時。若言生時體雖未有。眾緣會故已得近名。同是未來。體俱非有。余遠此近差別何緣。亦違汝宗去來皆遠。故汝所執但有虛言。后亦不然。故次頌曰。

生時若自然　　應失生時性

論曰。若生時體非因緣生。應是無為失生時性。若非緣起得名生時。一切無為應生時攝。又非緣起應類空花。體既是無。豈生時攝。若體非有名作生時。即一切無。應生時攝。是故諸法無實生時。

複次有作是說。若無生時。已生未生亦應非有。生時已過未至生時。建立已生未生二位。生時無者二位亦無。又無生時二位應合。故有二位。中間生時。為破彼言。故次頌曰。

已生異未生　　別有中間位　生時異二位　　應別有中間

論曰。若謂已生未生不合。由生時位隔在中間。若無生時二位應合。如兩界首必有封疆。是故生時定應有者。生時二位應有中間。未生生時。生

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：當迷惑的凡夫俗子思考事物產生的時候，會認為是自性（Sva-bhāva，事物自身存在的本性）作為因緣而生起，還是自然而然產生的呢？最初的觀點是不成立的。所以接下來用偈頌說：

『產生的時候如果是果，那麼它的本體就不是產生的時候。』

論述：如果產生時候的本體是從因緣而生，那就不是產生的時候。因為已經有了本體的緣故。未來將要生起，所以叫做產生的時候。未來的本體是沒有的，說誰是果呢？如果說這個階段是觀察等待將來，到現在的階段才叫做果，也應該說接近。為什麼要立一個遙遠的名字呢？像這樣，產生的時候不是已經產生的緣故，就像未產生的階段不是真實的產生的時候。而且這個產生的時候，時間上是遙遠的緣故，就像已經滅亡的階段。什麼是產生的時候呢？如果說產生的時候本體雖然沒有，因為眾多因緣聚合的緣故，已經得到了接近的名字，同樣是未來，本體都沒有，其餘的遙遠和這個接近有什麼差別呢？也違背了你的宗派，過去和未來都是遙遠的。所以你所執著的只有虛假的話語。後面的觀點也是不成立的。所以接下來用偈頌說：

『產生的時候如果是自然，就應該失去產生時候的性質。』

論述：如果產生時候的本體不是因緣所生，應該是無為法（Asamskrta，不依賴任何條件而存在的狀態），失去產生時候的性質。如果不是因緣生起而得到產生時候的名字，一切的無為法都應該被包括在產生時候之中。而且不是因緣生起，應該類似於空中的花朵。本體既然是沒有，怎麼能被包括在產生的時候之中呢？如果本體沒有卻被命名為產生的時候，那麼一切的沒有，都應該被包括在產生的時候之中。因此，諸法沒有真實的產生的時候。

進一步說，有人這樣認為：如果沒有產生的時候，已經產生和未產生也應該沒有。產生的時候已經過去，還沒有到達產生的時候，建立已經產生和未產生這兩個階段。產生的時候沒有，這兩個階段也沒有。而且沒有產生的時候，這兩個階段應該合併。所以有這兩個階段，中間有產生的時候。爲了破斥他們的言論，所以接下來用偈頌說：

『已生和未生是不同的，另外有中間的階段；產生的時候和這兩個階段不同，應該另外有中間。』

論述：如果認為已生和未生不合並，因為產生的時候的階段隔在中間。如果沒有產生的時候，這兩個階段應該合併，就像兩個國家的邊界一定有封鎖和疆界。因此產生的時候一定應該有。產生的時候，未生、生……

【English Translation】 English version: When deluded beings contemplate the arising of things, do they consider it to be due to Sva-bhāva (self-nature, the inherent nature of things) as the cause and condition, or does it arise naturally? The initial view is untenable. Therefore, the following verse is stated:

'If the time of arising is a result, then its essence is not the time of arising.'

Treatise: If the essence of the time of arising arises from causes and conditions, then it is not the time of arising. Because it already has an essence. It is about to arise in the future, so it is called the time of arising. The essence of the future does not exist, so who is said to be the result? If it is said that this stage observes and waits for the future, and it is called the result when it reaches the present stage, then it should also be said to be near. Why establish a distant name? In this way, the time of arising is not already arisen, just like the unarisen stage is not the real time of arising. Moreover, this time of arising is distant in time, just like the extinguished stage. What is the time of arising? If it is said that although the essence of the time of arising does not exist, it has obtained a near name because of the assembly of many causes and conditions, it is the same future, and the essence does not exist. What is the difference between the distant and the near? It also violates your sect, as the past and future are both distant. Therefore, what you cling to is only false words. The latter view is also untenable. Therefore, the following verse is stated:

'If the time of arising is natural, then it should lose the nature of the time of arising.'

Treatise: If the essence of the time of arising is not born of causes and conditions, it should be Asamskrta (unconditioned, a state that does not depend on any conditions to exist), losing the nature of the time of arising. If it is not born of causes and conditions and obtains the name of the time of arising, then all Asamskrta should be included in the time of arising. Moreover, if it is not born of causes and conditions, it should be like flowers in the sky. Since the essence does not exist, how can it be included in the time of arising? If the essence does not exist but is named the time of arising, then all non-existence should be included in the time of arising. Therefore, all dharmas do not have a real time of arising.

Furthermore, some say that if there is no time of arising, then the already arisen and the not yet arisen should also not exist. The time of arising has passed, and the time of arising has not yet arrived, establishing the two stages of already arisen and not yet arisen. If there is no time of arising, then these two stages also do not exist. Moreover, if there is no time of arising, these two stages should merge. Therefore, there are these two stages, with the time of arising in between. To refute their words, the following verse is stated:

'The already arisen and the not yet arisen are different, and there is another intermediate stage; the time of arising is different from these two stages, and there should be another intermediate stage.'

Treatise: If it is thought that the already arisen and the not yet arisen do not merge because the stage of the time of arising is in between. If there is no time of arising, these two stages should merge, just like the borders of two countries must have blockades and boundaries. Therefore, the time of arising must exist. At the time of arising, not yet arisen, arising...

時生已。更相異故。如是中間復有中間。展轉增長有無窮過。過無窮故。難立生時。又已未生種類別故。如色聲等無別中間。既無中間。生時何有。又生時位若在未來。即名未生。未來攝故。若居現在。即名已生。現在攝故。若非現未不名生時。如過去等。是故諸法無別生時。

複次假許生時已未生位三分各別。而審推徴。為捨生時得已生位。為當不捨得此位耶。初不應然。故次頌曰。

若謂生時舍　　方得已生時　是則應有餘　　得時而可見

論曰。若捨生時得已生位。未得已得兩位中間。應有得時如生時位。若許爾者。余復有餘。如前生時有無窮過。過無窮故。難立得時。若捨生時得已生位。離此二位無別得時。從未生時至已生位。應離二位無別生時。又捨生時得已生位。體應有異。非一法生。后亦不然。故次頌曰。

若至已生位　　理必無生時　已生有生時　　云何從彼起

論曰。已生生時必不俱有。時分異故。猶如去來。若已生位有生時者。或應同體。或異體俱。則非已生從生時起。自從自起。世現相違。俱有非因。如牛兩角。若言一體二相不同。得說為因無斯過者。二相前後體不應同。二相俱時應非因果。又若同體生時已生。于自他性應失應得。相不離體。如體應同。體不

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

當事物已經產生時，因為狀態不斷變化，所以會有連續不斷的中間狀態。這樣循環下去，就會產生無窮無盡的過失。因為過失無窮無盡，所以很難確定一個確切的產生時刻。而且，已經產生和尚未產生的狀態，它們的種類是不同的。比如顏色、聲音等等，它們之間沒有中間狀態。既然沒有中間狀態，那麼產生時刻又怎麼可能存在呢？此外，產生時刻如果位於未來，那就應該叫做尚未產生，因為它屬於未來；如果位於現在，那就應該叫做已經產生，因為它屬於現在。如果既不屬於現在也不屬於未來，那就不能叫做產生時刻，就像過去一樣。因此，一切事物並沒有一個獨立的產生時刻。

進一步說，假設產生時刻、已經產生和尚未產生的狀態，這三者是各自獨立的。那麼仔細推究，是捨棄產生時刻才能得到已經產生的狀態呢？還是不捨棄產生時刻就能得到這個狀態呢？首先，前一種情況是不應該成立的。所以接下來的頌文說：

『如果說捨棄產生時刻，才能得到已經產生的時刻，那麼就應該有一個剩餘的、得到時刻的狀態，而且這個狀態是可以被看見的。』

論述：如果捨棄產生時刻才能得到已經產生的狀態，那麼在尚未得到和已經得到的這兩種狀態之間，應該有一個得到時刻，就像產生時刻一樣。如果承認這一點，那麼就會有無窮無盡的剩餘狀態，就像前面討論產生時刻時一樣，會產生無窮無盡的過失。因為過失無窮無盡，所以很難確定得到時刻。如果捨棄產生時刻才能得到已經產生的狀態，那麼離開這兩種狀態，就沒有其他的得到時刻。從尚未產生的狀態到已經產生的狀態，應該離開這兩種狀態，沒有其他的產生時刻。而且，如果捨棄產生時刻才能得到已經產生的狀態，那麼它們的本體應該是有區別的，而不是同一個事物產生。后一種情況也是不成立的。所以接下來的頌文說：

『如果到達已經產生的狀態，那麼道理上一定沒有產生時刻。如果已經產生還有產生時刻，那麼它又怎麼會從那裡產生呢？』

論述：已經產生的狀態和產生時刻一定不會同時存在，因為時間是不同的，就像過去和未來一樣。如果已經產生的狀態還有產生時刻，那麼它們要麼是同一個本體，要麼是不同的本體同時存在。這樣，就不是已經產生的狀態從產生時刻產生，而是自己從自己產生。自己從自己產生，這與世俗的現象是相違背的。同時存在也不是原因，就像牛的兩隻角一樣。如果說它們是同一個本體，只是兩種不同的相，所以可以被說成是原因，沒有這種過失。那麼這兩種相在時間上的先後順序，它們的本體就不應該是相同的。如果這兩種相是同時存在的，那麼它們就不應該是因果關係。而且，如果是同一個本體，那麼產生時刻和已經產生的狀態，對於自身和他者的性質，應該是失去或者得到。相不離開本體，就像本體應該相同一樣。本體不

【English Translation】 English version:

When something has already arisen, because its state is constantly changing, there are continuous intermediate states. If this continues in a cycle, it will produce endless faults. Because the faults are endless, it is difficult to determine an exact moment of arising. Moreover, the states of having already arisen and not yet arisen are different in kind. For example, color, sound, and so on, have no intermediate states between them. Since there are no intermediate states, how can there be a moment of arising? Furthermore, if the moment of arising is located in the future, then it should be called not yet arisen, because it belongs to the future; if it is located in the present, then it should be called already arisen, because it belongs to the present. If it belongs neither to the present nor to the future, then it cannot be called a moment of arising, just like the past. Therefore, all things do not have a separate moment of arising.

Furthermore, suppose that the moment of arising, the state of having already arisen, and the state of not yet arisen are each independent. Then, upon careful examination, is it by abandoning the moment of arising that one obtains the state of having already arisen? Or is it by not abandoning the moment of arising that one obtains this state? First, the former case should not be valid. Therefore, the following verse says:

'If it is said that by abandoning the moment of arising, one obtains the moment of having already arisen, then there should be a remaining state of obtaining the moment, and this state should be visible.'

Discussion: If by abandoning the moment of arising, one obtains the state of having already arisen, then between the two states of not yet obtained and already obtained, there should be a moment of obtaining, just like the moment of arising. If this is admitted, then there will be endless remaining states, just like when discussing the moment of arising, there will be endless faults. Because the faults are endless, it is difficult to determine the moment of obtaining. If by abandoning the moment of arising, one obtains the state of having already arisen, then apart from these two states, there is no other moment of obtaining. From the state of not yet arisen to the state of having already arisen, there should be no other moment of arising apart from these two states. Moreover, if by abandoning the moment of arising, one obtains the state of having already arisen, then their essence should be different, and it is not the same thing arising. The latter case is also not valid. Therefore, the following verse says:

'If one reaches the state of having already arisen, then in principle there is no moment of arising. If the already arisen still has a moment of arising, then how does it arise from there?'

Discussion: The state of having already arisen and the moment of arising certainly do not exist simultaneously, because the times are different, just like the past and the future. If the state of having already arisen still has a moment of arising, then they are either the same essence or different essences existing simultaneously. In this way, it is not the state of having already arisen arising from the moment of arising, but oneself arising from oneself. Oneself arising from oneself contradicts worldly phenomena. Existing simultaneously is also not a cause, just like the two horns of a cow. If it is said that they are the same essence, but two different aspects, so it can be said to be a cause, and there is no such fault. Then, the order of these two aspects in time, their essence should not be the same. If these two aspects exist simultaneously, then they should not be a cause-and-effect relationship. Moreover, if it is the same essence, then the moment of arising and the state of having already arisen, with respect to the nature of oneself and others, should be lost or gained. The aspect does not leave the essence, just as the essence should be the same. The essence does not

離相。如相應別。體同相別。理必不然。法之與時體無有異。故不可說時異法同。一法一時有同有異。說為因果。理必不成。如從生時至已生位。進退徴責過難多途。從未生時至生時位。研核詰問如理應思。是故生時非別實有。

複次立有生時已生位別。此無實義。但有虛言。所以者何。故次頌曰。

未至已生位　　若立為生時　何不謂無瓶　　未生無別故

論曰。若立生時非已生位。將至此位名作生時。瓶名已生。生時未至。已生位故。瓶體定無。瓶體既無。生依何法。不可無法名作生時。勿一切無皆名生位。故應于有立生時名。若謂生時其體已有無斯過者。此亦不然。未至已生與未生位無差別故。有義不成。若謂生時是未來世。最後位故非體全無。此不應理。同未來攝等非已生。無前後故。若未來世。半有半無。有同已生。世應雜亂。故生時位。但有虛言。生時既無。生亦非有。

複次若謂生時體雖未滿。而用起故非是全無。非有非無不同兩位。是故諸法別有生時。此亦不然。故次頌曰。

非生時有用　　能簡未生時　亦非體未圓　　別於已生位

論曰。未生生時無用有用。二位差別。理不可然。生時體無。用應非有。生時體有。應是已生。設許生時有能起用。而體未有。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：離相（離開表象）。如果相應有差別，本體相同而表象不同，這個道理必然不成立。法的本體和時間的本體沒有差異，所以不能說時間不同而法相同。一個法在一個時間裡有相同也有不同，如果說這是因果關係，道理必然不成立。比如從產生的時候到已經產生的狀態，前進後退地責問，會有很多過失和困難。從沒有產生的時候到產生的時候，仔細研究考察，應該如理思維。因此，產生的時候不是一個獨立的實有。再次，如果認為存在一個獨立的產生之時和已產生之位的區別，這沒有實際意義，只是虛妄的言論。為什麼呢？所以接下來頌文說：『未至已生位，若立為生時，何不謂無瓶，未生無別故。』論曰：如果認為產生之時不是已產生之位，將要到達這個位置才叫做產生之時，瓶子叫做已產生。產生之時還沒有到達已產生之位，所以瓶子的本體一定不存在。瓶子的本體既然不存在，產生依靠什麼法呢？不能因為沒有法就叫做產生之時，不要一切都沒有都叫做產生之位。所以應該在有的基礎上建立產生之時的名稱。如果認為產生之時的本體已經有了，沒有了沒有的過失，這也是不對的。未到達已產生之位和未產生之位沒有差別。有的意義不能成立。如果認為產生之時是未來世，因為是最後的位置所以不是完全沒有，這個道理不成立。和未來所包含的沒有產生的狀態一樣，沒有前後之分。如果未來世一半有，一半沒有，有和已產生的狀態相同，世界應該雜亂。所以產生之時，只是虛妄的言論。產生之時既然沒有，產生也不是實有。再次，如果認為產生之時本體雖然沒有圓滿，但是作用已經開始，所以不是完全沒有。非有非無不同於兩種狀態。所以諸法有獨立的產生之時。這也是不對的。所以接下來頌文說：『非生時有用，能簡未生時，亦非體未圓，別於已生位。』論曰：未產生之時和產生之時，沒有作用和有作用，這兩種狀態的差別，道理上不成立。產生之時本體沒有，作用應該也沒有。產生之時本體有，應該就是已產生。假設允許產生之時有能夠產生作用，但是本體還沒有。

【English Translation】 English version: Separation from characteristics. If there is a distinction in correspondence, and the essence is the same but the characteristics are different, this principle is necessarily not valid. There is no difference in essence between the Dharma and time, so it cannot be said that time is different while the Dharma is the same. One Dharma at one time has both similarities and differences. If this is said to be cause and effect, the principle is necessarily not established. For example, from the time of arising to the state of having already arisen, questioning back and forth will lead to many faults and difficulties. From the time of not yet arising to the time of arising, careful examination and inquiry should be thoughtfully considered. Therefore, the time of arising is not a separate, real existence. Furthermore, to establish a distinction between the time of arising and the state of having already arisen has no real meaning, but is merely empty talk. Why is this so? Therefore, the following verse says: 'If the time of arising is established as not yet reaching the state of having already arisen, why not say there is no pot, since there is no difference from the state of not yet arising?' Commentary: If it is thought that the time of arising is not the state of having already arisen, and that reaching this state is called the time of arising, and the pot is called having already arisen, then since the time of arising has not yet reached the state of having already arisen, the essence of the pot certainly does not exist. Since the essence of the pot does not exist, what Dharma does arising rely on? It cannot be that the absence of Dharma is called the time of arising; do not call everything that does not exist the state of arising. Therefore, the name of the time of arising should be established on the basis of existence. If it is thought that the essence of the time of arising already exists, without the fault of non-existence, this is also not correct. There is no difference between the state of not yet reaching the state of having already arisen and the state of not yet arising. The meaning of existence cannot be established. If it is thought that the time of arising is the future, and because it is the final position, it is not completely non-existent, this principle is not valid. It is the same as the state of not yet arising contained in the future, without any before or after. If the future is half existent and half non-existent, and existence is the same as the state of having already arisen, the world should be chaotic. Therefore, the time of arising is merely empty talk. Since the time of arising does not exist, arising is also not real. Furthermore, if it is thought that although the essence of the time of arising is not yet complete, its function has already begun, so it is not completely non-existent. Neither existent nor non-existent is different from the two states. Therefore, all Dharmas have an independent time of arising. This is also not correct. Therefore, the following verse says: 'The time of arising does not have a function to distinguish it from the time of not yet arising, nor is its essence incomplete, different from the state of having already arisen.' Commentary: There is no difference in principle between the state of not yet arising and the time of arising, in terms of having a function and not having a function. If the essence of the time of arising does not exist, its function should also not exist. If the essence of the time of arising exists, it should be already arisen. Suppose it is allowed that the time of arising has the ability to produce a function, but its essence does not yet exist.

應名未生。非未生名別有少法。但遮已起名未生時。既名未生。何能簡彼。若少有體。應名已生。既非已生。應無少體。不可一法半有半無。有無相違不同體故。若許體別。有即已生。無即未生。生時豈有。故離二位無別生時。

複次或應生時即已生位。非無有故。如已生時。為顯此因。故說頌曰。

前位生時無　　后位方言有　兼成已生位　　故此位非無

論曰。未起用時名為前位。於此前位未有生時。正起用時。名為后位。於此后位方有生時。是則生時成已生位。有異前故。如已生時。非體全無。可與前異。所言兼者。謂舍全無。即未生時。名全無位。生時舍彼。是有非無。由此兼前成已生位。若舍無位必至有時。有即已生中無異位。依何而立別有生時。是故生時即已生位。非無有故。如已生時。又此生時應許有體。若無有體生用應無。體用並無。生時豈有。若無體用而有生時。則一切無。皆應頓起。無無異故。如此生時。又若生時體用非有。因緣和合應無所為。有不生無。如前已說。故生時位是有非無。有即已生。更無異位。故不應立別有生時。

複次無別生時理應信受。愚猶固執。略復推徴。如是生時為無為有。有即已起。無即未生。除此孰為生時位體。為顯此理。復說頌曰。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『應名未生』（ying ming wei sheng，指稱名為『未生』的狀態），並非在『未生』之名以外，另有少許實法存在。這只是爲了遮止已經生起的事物，而稱其為『未生』之時。既然名為『未生』，又如何能區分它呢？如果稍微具有實體，就應該稱作『已生』。既然不是『已生』，就應該沒有任何實體。不可能有一個法既部分存在又部分不存在，因為存在和不存在是相互矛盾的，不能存在於同一個實體中。如果允許實體不同，存在即是『已生』，不存在即是『未生』，那麼生起的時候又在哪裡呢？所以，離開『已生』和『未生』這兩種狀態，就不存在其他的『生時』。

進一步說，或者應該認為『生時』（sheng shi，生起的時間）就是『已生位』（yi sheng wei，已經生起的狀態），因為它不是沒有的，就像『已生時』一樣。爲了闡明這個原因，所以說偈頌如下：

『前位生時無，后位方言有，兼成已生位，故此位非無。』

論曰：未起作用的時候，稱作『前位』（qian wei，之前的狀態）。在這個『前位』，沒有『生時』。正在起作用的時候，稱作『后位』（hou wei，之後的狀態）。在這個『后位』，才有了『生時』。這樣，『生時』就成了『已生位』，因為它與之前不同，就像『已生時』一樣，不是完全沒有實體，所以可以與之前不同。所說的『兼』（jian，兼具）的意思是，捨棄了完全沒有的狀態，也就是『未生時』，稱作完全沒有的狀態。『生時』捨棄了那個狀態，是有而不是沒有。因此，兼具之前的狀態，就成了『已生位』。如果捨棄了沒有的狀態，必定會達到有的狀態，有就是『已生』，其中沒有不同的狀態。依靠什麼來建立另外的『生時』呢？所以，『生時』就是『已生位』，因為它不是沒有的，就像『已生時』一樣。而且，這個『生時』應該允許它具有實體。如果沒有實體，生起的作用就應該沒有。實體和作用都沒有，『生時』又怎麼會有呢？如果沒有實體和作用，卻有『生時』，那麼一切沒有的東西，都應該立刻生起，因為沒有和沒有之間沒有區別。就像這個『生時』一樣。而且，如果『生時』的實體和作用都沒有，因緣和合應該沒有什麼作用。有不能生無，就像前面已經說過的。所以，『生時』的狀態是有而不是沒有，有就是『已生』，沒有其他的狀態。所以不應該建立另外的『生時』。

進一步說，沒有另外的『生時』的道理，理應相信接受，但愚昧的人仍然固執己見，所以略微再次推究。像這樣的『生時』，是無還是有？有就是已經生起，無就是未生。除了這些，還有什麼是『生時』的狀態和實體呢？爲了闡明這個道理，再次說偈頌如下：

【English Translation】 English version: 'Ying ming wei sheng' (應名未生, the state referred to as 'not yet born') does not mean that there is a slight dharma existing separately from the name 'not yet born.' It merely prevents things that have already arisen from being called the time of 'not yet born.' Since it is called 'not yet born,' how can it be distinguished? If it has a slight substance, it should be called 'already born.' Since it is not 'already born,' it should have no substance at all. It is impossible for a single dharma to be half existent and half non-existent, because existence and non-existence are contradictory and cannot exist in the same entity. If different entities are allowed, existence is 'already born,' and non-existence is 'not yet born.' Then where is the time of arising? Therefore, apart from the two states of 'already born' and 'not yet born,' there is no other 'time of arising' (生時, sheng shi).

Furthermore, perhaps the 'time of arising' should be considered the same as the 'state of already born' (已生位, yi sheng wei), because it is not non-existent, just like the 'time of already born.' To clarify this reason, the following verse is spoken:

'The previous state has no time of arising, the subsequent state has the expression of existence, combining to form the state of already born, therefore this state is not non-existent.'

The treatise says: The time when the function has not yet arisen is called the 'previous state' (前位, qian wei). In this 'previous state,' there is no 'time of arising.' The time when the function is just arising is called the 'subsequent state' (后位, hou wei). In this 'subsequent state,' there is the 'time of arising.' Thus, the 'time of arising' becomes the 'state of already born,' because it is different from the previous state, just like the 'time of already born,' which is not completely without substance and can therefore be different from the previous state. The term 'combining' (兼, jian) means abandoning the state of complete non-existence, which is the 'time of not yet born,' called the state of complete non-existence. The 'time of arising' abandons that state and is existent rather than non-existent. Therefore, combining the previous state, it becomes the 'state of already born.' If the state of non-existence is abandoned, the state of existence must be reached, and existence is 'already born,' with no different state within it. Upon what can another 'time of arising' be established? Therefore, the 'time of arising' is the 'state of already born,' because it is not non-existent, just like the 'time of already born.' Moreover, this 'time of arising' should be allowed to have substance. If there is no substance, the arising function should be non-existent. If both substance and function are non-existent, how can there be a 'time of arising'? If there is no substance or function, but there is a 'time of arising,' then everything that is non-existent should arise immediately, because there is no difference between non-existence and non-existence, just like this 'time of arising.' Furthermore, if the substance and function of the 'time of arising' are both non-existent, the combination of causes and conditions should have no effect. Existence cannot produce non-existence, as has been said before. Therefore, the state of 'time of arising' is existent rather than non-existent, and existence is 'already born,' with no other state. Therefore, another 'time of arising' should not be established.

Furthermore, the principle that there is no other 'time of arising' should be believed and accepted, but the ignorant still stubbornly cling to their views, so it is briefly investigated again. Is such a 'time of arising' non-existent or existent? Existence is already arisen, and non-existence is not yet born. Apart from these, what else is the state and substance of the 'time of arising'? To clarify this principle, the following verse is spoken again:

有時名已生　　無時名未起　除茲有無位　　誰復謂生時

論曰。所執生時推徴其性。不過二種。謂有及無。如是有無二位所攝。除此無別中間生時。汝等何緣非理橫執。此極粗淺。而汝尚迷。況復幽微。汝能思測。故應信受無別生時。生時既無。生如何有。是故諸法理實無生。生既實無。住滅亦爾。生為先故非有義成。故不別遮住滅二相。

複次已別廣破果先有無。為總略遮果先有等。故於品后。復說頌曰。

諸有執離因　　無別所成果　轉生及轉滅　　理皆不可成

論曰。數論所執。果不離因。果同其因。體本實有。如是果體生滅不成。果不離因同因常故。因果體一差別理無。諸法性常無增無減。是則所作唐設其功。少有所為便違自論。有不可滅無不可生。大等亦應無生滅義。即自性故。如樂苦癡。又大不應從自性起。自能起自。世現相違。是則世間現見因果。生滅作用一切皆無。世現所知。汝尚誹毀。況能信受深隱義耶。如是觀生都非實有。生無實故。滅亦實無。但隨世間說有生滅。隨世所說是俗非真。勝義理中無生無滅。一切法性非斷非常生滅既無。法應常住如前廣破。常性實無。若爾應無一切法性。不爾我說俗法非無。豈不我宗說一自性。轉變力故無所不為。雖有所為而無生

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本　有時名稱已經產生（名已生），有時名稱尚未出現（名未起）。　除了存在（有）和不存在（無）這兩種狀態之外，還有誰會認為存在一個『生時』呢？

論曰：你們所執著的『生時』，推究其性質，不外乎兩種：即存在（有）和不存在（無）。既然『生時』被存在和不存在這兩種狀態所涵蓋，那麼除了這兩種狀態之外，就不存在其他的『生時』了。你們為何要不合道理地強行執著呢？這道理極其淺顯，而你們尚且迷惑不解，更何況是幽深微妙的道理，你們又怎能思量測度呢？所以，你們應當信受不存在其他的『生時』。既然『生時』不存在，那麼『生』又怎麼可能存在呢？因此，諸法的道理實際上是沒有『生』的。既然『生』實際上不存在，那麼『住』和『滅』也是如此。因為『生』是『住』和『滅』的前提，所以沒有『生』的道理成立，因此就不再分別破斥『住』和『滅』這兩種相狀。

再次，已經分別廣泛地破斥了『果』先於『因』存在（果先有）和『果』先於『因』不存在（果先無）的觀點，爲了總括地簡略地遮止『果先有』等等的觀點，所以在這一品的後面，又說了這首偈頌：

那些執著『果』不離『因』（離因），沒有與『因』不同的『果』（無別所成果）的人，　關於『轉變而生』（轉生）以及『轉變而滅』（轉滅）的說法，在道理上都是不能成立的。

論曰：數論派（Samkhya）所執著的觀點是，『果』不離『因』，『果』等同於『因』，『果』的本體本來就是真實存在的。如果這樣，那麼『果』的生滅就不能成立。因為『果』不離『因』，等同於『因』，是常恒不變的。『因』和『果』的本體是一體的，不存在差別，在道理上是不成立的。諸法的自性是常恒不變的，既不會增加，也不會減少。如果是這樣，那麼（數論派）所作的努力都是白費的。稍微有所作為，就違背了他們自己的理論。存在的事物不可能滅亡，不存在的事物不可能產生。那麼，『大』（Mahat）等等也應該沒有生滅的意義，因為它們就是自性（Prakriti）本身。如同快樂（Sukha）、痛苦（Duhkha）、愚癡（Moha）一樣。而且，『大』不應該從自性產生，自己能夠產生自己，這與世間的現象相違背。如果是這樣，那麼世間現在所見的因果、生滅作用就全部都不存在了。世間現在所知的事物，你們尚且誹謗毀壞，又怎麼能夠信受深奧隱秘的道理呢？像這樣觀察，『生』根本就不是真實存在的。因為『生』不是真實存在的，所以『滅』也不是真實存在的。只不過是隨順世間的說法，說有『生』和『滅』。隨順世間所說的，是世俗諦（Samvriti-satya），而不是勝義諦（Paramartha-satya）。在勝義諦的道理中，沒有『生』，也沒有『滅』。一切法的自性，既不是斷滅的，也不是常恒不變的。既然『生』和『滅』都不存在，那麼法就應該是常住的，如同前面廣泛破斥的那樣。常恒不變的自性實際上是不存在的。如果這樣，那麼就應該沒有一切法的自性了。不是這樣的，我說世俗諦的法不是沒有。難道不是我的宗義說，有一種自性，因為轉變的力量，所以無所不能為嗎？雖然有所作為，但是沒有『生』……

【English Translation】 English version 　Sometimes a name has already arisen (nama utpanna), sometimes a name has not yet arisen (nama anutpanna). 　Apart from these positions of existence (asti) and non-existence (nasti), who would assert a 'time of arising' (utpada-kala)?

Commentary: The 'time of arising' that you assert, when its nature is investigated, is nothing more than two kinds: namely, existence and non-existence. Since the 'time of arising' is encompassed by these two states of existence and non-existence, there is no separate intermediate 'time of arising' apart from these two. Why do you irrationally and stubbornly cling to this? This principle is extremely shallow, yet you are still confused and do not understand it. How much more so with profound and subtle principles, which you cannot possibly comprehend? Therefore, you should accept that there is no separate 'time of arising'. Since the 'time of arising' does not exist, how can 'arising' itself exist? Therefore, the reality of all dharmas is that they do not arise. Since 'arising' does not truly exist, so too with 'dwelling' and 'cessation'. Because 'arising' is the prerequisite for 'dwelling' and 'cessation', the argument that there is no 'arising' is established, and therefore there is no need to separately refute the characteristics of 'dwelling' and 'cessation'.

Furthermore, having already separately and extensively refuted the views that the 'effect' exists prior to the 'cause' (karya purva asti) and that the 'effect' does not exist prior to the 'cause' (karya purva nasti), in order to comprehensively and briefly negate the views of 'effect existing prior' etc., this verse is stated again after the chapter:

Those who hold that the 'effect' is not separate from the 'cause' (hetu aprthak), that there is no 'effect' different from the 'cause' (karya aprthak siddha), 　The arguments for 'transformation and arising' (parinama utpada) and 'transformation and cessation' (parinama nirodha) are all untenable.

Commentary: The view held by the Samkhya school (Samkhya) is that the 'effect' is not separate from the 'cause', the 'effect' is identical to the 'cause', and the substance of the 'effect' is originally real. If this is the case, then the arising and cessation of the 'effect' cannot be established. Because the 'effect' is not separate from the 'cause', it is identical to the 'cause' and is constant and unchanging. The substance of the 'cause' and the 'effect' are one and the same, and there is no difference, which is untenable in principle. The nature of all dharmas is constant and unchanging, neither increasing nor decreasing. If this is the case, then the efforts made (by the Samkhya school) are all in vain. Making even the slightest effort would contradict their own theory. What exists cannot be destroyed, and what does not exist cannot arise. Then, 'Mahat' (Mahat) etc. should also have no meaning of arising and cessation, because they are the very nature (Prakriti) itself, just like pleasure (Sukha), pain (Duhkha), and delusion (Moha). Moreover, 'Mahat' should not arise from Prakriti; that something can produce itself contradicts worldly phenomena. If this is the case, then all the cause-and-effect relationships and the functions of arising and cessation that are seen in the world would not exist at all. You slander and destroy what is known in the world, how can you believe in profound and hidden principles? Observing in this way, 'arising' is not truly real at all. Because 'arising' is not truly real, neither is 'cessation' truly real. It is only in accordance with worldly conventions that 'arising' and 'cessation' are spoken of. What is spoken of in accordance with worldly conventions is conventional truth (Samvriti-satya), not ultimate truth (Paramartha-satya). In the principle of ultimate truth, there is no 'arising' and no 'cessation'. The nature of all dharmas is neither annihilation nor permanence. Since 'arising' and 'cessation' do not exist, then dharmas should be permanent, as refuted extensively earlier. A permanent nature does not actually exist. If this is the case, then there should be no nature of all dharmas. It is not so; I say that conventional dharmas are not non-existent. Does not my doctrine say that there is one nature, which, because of the power of transformation, is capable of doing everything? Although there is action, there is no 'arising'...

滅斷常等過。所以者何。果起不生性變成故。果謝不滅歸本性故。果性非常前變滅故。果性非斷後變生故。轉變非恒。故非定有。自性不易。故非定無。此亦不然。諸法生滅理既不立。汝宗所執轉變豈存。又轉變言及自性等。前已廣破。無宜重執。故汝所說理必不然。有作是言。我經部等。因緣和合無間果生。果起酬因復能生后如是展轉。無始時來。因果連綿相續不絕。無有生滅斷常等過。所以者何。相續無始。故無有生。未得對治相續不盡。故無有滅。相續改轉。所以非常。相續連綿。所以非斷。非一性故亦非轉變。此亦不然。若有生滅可有相續。生滅既無。相續何有。無生滅義。前已廣論。相續有終。是則為斷。相續無始。是則為常。相續體一。即有轉變。故立相續。過失彌多。有作是言。我說諸法常有部等。一切有為。從本以來性相實有。酬前起后三世遷流。無有斷常生滅等過。所以者何。體恒有故。無生無滅。有為相合。所以非常。果起酬因。所以非斷。唸唸別故。非變非續。此亦不然。說常有宗先已破故。色等諸法體若恒有。應似無為離有為相。便同數論一切皆常。不可說言用有生滅。用不離體應同體常。體不離用。應非恒有。若用本有。應不名生。若用本無應非可起。用未生位生用未有。不可名生。用已

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本破除斷滅、常恒等過失。為什麼呢？因為果的生起不是本來就有的自性變化而產生的。果的消逝也不是迴歸到它本來的自性。果的自性不是常恒不變的，而是先前變化消滅的。果的自性也不是斷滅的，而是後來變化產生的。這種轉變不是永恒不變的，所以不是固定存在的。自性不容易改變，所以不是固定不存在的。這種說法也是不對的，如果諸法生滅的道理都不能成立，那麼你所執著的轉變又怎麼能存在呢？而且關於轉變和自性等問題，前面已經廣泛地駁斥過了，不應該再重複執著。所以你所說的道理必定是不對的。有人這樣說，比如經部（Sautrantika，佛教部派之一）等宗派：因緣和合，沒有間隔地產生果。果的生起酬報于因，又能產生後面的果，像這樣輾轉相續，從無始以來，因果連綿相續不斷絕，沒有生滅、斷常等過失。為什麼呢？因為相續沒有開始，所以沒有生。沒有得到對治，相續就不會窮盡，所以沒有滅。相續不斷改變，所以不是常恒的。相續連綿不斷，所以不是斷滅的。不是單一的自性，所以也不是轉變。這種說法也是不對的。如果有生滅，才可能有相續。生滅既然沒有，相續又怎麼會有呢？沒有生滅的道理，前面已經廣泛地論述過了。相續有終結，那就是斷滅。相續沒有開始，那就是常恒。相續的本體是單一的，那就是轉變。所以建立相續，過失更多。有人這樣說，比如我說諸法常有部（Sarvastivada，一切有部，佛教部派之一）等宗派：一切有為法，從根本上來說，自性、相狀都是真實存在的。酬報先前，產生後來的，三世遷流，沒有斷滅、常恒、生滅等過失。為什麼呢？因為本體恒常存在，所以沒有生滅。有為法相互結合，所以不是常恒的。果的生起酬報于因，所以不是斷滅的。唸唸不同，所以不是變化，也不是相續。這種說法也是不對的。說常有的宗派，先前已經被駁斥過了。色（rupa，物質）等諸法的本體如果恒常存在，應該像無為法一樣，脫離有為法的相狀，那就和數論派（Samkhya，古印度哲學流派）一樣，一切都是常恒的，不能說作用有生滅。作用不離開本體，應該和本體一樣是常恒的。本體不離開作用，就不是恒常存在的。如果作用本來就有，就不應該叫做生。如果作用本來沒有，就不應該可以產生。在作用還沒有產生的時候，生用的作用還沒有，不能叫做生。作用已經...

【English Translation】 English version Eliminating the faults of annihilation, permanence, etc. Why? Because the arising of the result does not originate from an inherent nature that changes. The cessation of the result does not return to its original nature. The nature of the result is not permanent, but rather changes and ceases. The nature of the result is not annihilated, but rather changes and arises later. This transformation is not constant, so it is not fixed. The self-nature is not easily changed, so it is not fixed as non-existent. This statement is also incorrect. If the principle of the arising and ceasing of all dharmas cannot be established, how can the transformation you cling to exist? Moreover, the issues of transformation and self-nature, etc., have been extensively refuted earlier, and should not be clung to again. Therefore, what you say must be incorrect. Some say, such as the Sautrantika (a Buddhist school): Through the combination of causes and conditions, the result arises without interruption. The arising of the result repays the cause and can generate the subsequent result. In this way, turning and continuing, from beginningless time, the cause and result are continuously connected without interruption, without the faults of arising, ceasing, annihilation, or permanence. Why? Because the continuity has no beginning, so there is no arising. Without obtaining the antidote, the continuity will not end, so there is no ceasing. The continuity constantly changes, so it is not permanent. The continuity is continuous, so it is not annihilated. It is not a single nature, so it is not a transformation. This statement is also incorrect. If there is arising and ceasing, there can be continuity. Since there is no arising and ceasing, how can there be continuity? The meaning of no arising and ceasing has been extensively discussed earlier. Continuity has an end, which is annihilation. Continuity has no beginning, which is permanence. The substance of continuity is singular, which is transformation. Therefore, establishing continuity has even more faults. Some say, such as the Sarvastivada (the 'All Exists' school of Buddhism): All conditioned dharmas, from the root, have real existence in their self-nature and characteristics. Repaying the past and generating the future, the three times flow without the faults of annihilation, permanence, arising, or ceasing. Why? Because the substance is constantly existent, so there is no arising or ceasing. Conditioned dharmas combine with each other, so they are not permanent. The arising of the result repays the cause, so it is not annihilated. Each thought is different, so it is not transformation or continuity. This statement is also incorrect. The school that says everything is permanent has already been refuted. If the substance of dharmas such as rupa (form, matter) is constantly existent, it should be like unconditioned dharmas, detached from the characteristics of conditioned dharmas. Then it would be like Samkhya (an ancient Indian philosophical school), where everything is permanent, and it cannot be said that the function has arising and ceasing. The function does not leave the substance, so it should be permanent like the substance. The substance does not leave the function, so it is not constantly existent. If the function originally exists, it should not be called arising. If the function originally does not exist, it should not be able to arise. When the function has not yet arisen, the function of arising has not yet existed, so it cannot be called arising. The function has already...

生位。生用已息。亦不名生。除此二位無別生時。前已廣說。故不可執。諸法用生。生既是無。滅亦非有。又若色等有為相合。故是無常。此有為相無餘相合。應非無常。若言此相與余相合。是則無窮。若言有為有大小相。展轉相相非無窮者。此亦不然。如色等法。余相合故。不名能相。生等亦然。與余相合。應非能相。又如大相。不以所相色等諸法為其能相。小相亦爾。不應所相大生等法以為能相。若別有相應至無窮。若別無相。應成常住。又有為相定非實有。若實有者。與理相違。所以者何。如無為法。有無為相。離法實無。此亦應然。同三相故。無為實有。前已廣遮。一切有為亦非實有。以慧分析便歸空故。又對無為立有為法。無為無故。有為亦無。有為無為若從緣起。即同幻事。若不藉緣便似空花。故不應執以為實有。如契經言。有為無為皆是世俗。分別假立其體俱空。除為無為。更無別法設復說有。但是虛言。有為無為攝一切法。此二空故諸法皆空。空中都無分別戲論。虛通無礙即聖慧明。故契經言。一切諸法從本皆空。空即無性。由無性故。即是般若波羅蜜多。其中都無少法可說。為生為滅。為斷為常。為一為異。為來為去。天帝當知。若有凈信諸善男子或善女人。能如是說。不謗般若波羅蜜多。異此說

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『生位』（產生的位置，指事物產生的狀態）。『生用已息』（產生的功用已經停止），也不叫做『生』。除了這兩種狀態，沒有其他的產生時刻。之前已經詳細說明過，所以不應該執著于『生』的實在性。諸法的功用產生，既然『生』是空無的，那麼『滅』也不是實有的。而且，如果色等有為法是相互結合而成的，那麼它們就是無常的。如果這個有為相不與其他相結合，那麼它應該不是無常的。如果說這個相與其他相結合，那麼就會導致無窮無盡。如果說有為法有大小之相，輾轉相連，不會無窮無盡，這也是不對的。就像色等法，因為與其他相結合，所以不能稱為能相（具有作用的相）。『生』等也是如此，與其他相結合，應該不是能相。又比如大的相，不以所相的色等諸法作為它的能相，小的相也是這樣，不應該以所相的大『生』等法作為它的能相。如果另外有相，就會導致無窮無盡；如果另外沒有相，就應該成為常住不變的。而且，有為相必定不是真實存在的。如果真實存在，就與道理相違背。為什麼這麼說呢？比如無為法，有無為相，離開法本身就不是真實存在的，有為法也應該如此，因為它與三相（生、住、滅）相同。無為法是真實存在的，之前已經廣泛地駁斥過了。一切有為法也不是真實存在的，用智慧分析，最終歸於空性。而且，爲了對應無為法才設立有為法，無為法既然是空無的，有為法也是空無的。有為和無為如果從因緣而生起，就如同幻象一般；如果不依靠因緣，就如同空中的花朵。所以不應該執著它們是真實存在的。如同契經所說，有為和無為都是世俗的，分別假立的，它們的本體都是空性的。除了有為和無為，再沒有其他的法了，即使說有，也只是虛妄之言。有為和無為涵蓋了一切法，這二者都是空性的，所以一切法都是空性的。在空性中，沒有任何分別戲論，虛空通達無礙，這就是聖慧光明。所以契經說，一切諸法從根本上就是空性的，空性就是無自性。因為沒有自性，所以就是般若波羅蜜多。其中沒有任何法可以被說成是生、是滅、是斷、是常、是一、是異、是來、是去。天帝應該知道，如果有具有清凈信仰的善男子或善女人，能夠這樣說，就不會誹謗般若波羅蜜多。與此不同的說法……'

【English Translation】 English version: 'Birth-position' (the state of arising, referring to the state in which things arise). 'Birth-function having ceased' (the function of arising has stopped), it is also not called 'birth'. Apart from these two states, there is no other moment of arising. This has been explained in detail before, so one should not cling to the reality of 'birth'. Since the function of phenomena arises, and 'birth' is empty, then 'cessation' is also not real. Moreover, if conditioned dharmas such as form are combined, then they are impermanent. If this conditioned characteristic does not combine with other characteristics, then it should not be impermanent. If it is said that this characteristic combines with other characteristics, then it will lead to endlessness. If it is said that conditioned dharmas have large and small characteristics, which are interconnected and not endless, this is also incorrect. Just like dharmas such as form, because they combine with other characteristics, they cannot be called the 'able-characteristic' (the characteristic that has an effect). 'Birth' and so on are also like this, combining with other characteristics, they should not be the 'able-characteristic'. Furthermore, just like the large characteristic, it does not take the characterized dharmas such as form as its 'able-characteristic', and the small characteristic is also like this, it should not take the characterized large 'birth' and so on as its 'able-characteristic'. If there is another characteristic, it will lead to endlessness; if there is no other characteristic, it should become permanent. Moreover, the conditioned characteristic is definitely not truly existent. If it were truly existent, it would contradict reason. Why is this? For example, with unconditioned dharmas, there is an unconditioned characteristic, which is not truly existent apart from the dharma itself. Conditioned dharmas should also be like this, because they are the same as the three characteristics (birth, abiding, cessation). Unconditioned dharmas are truly existent, which has been widely refuted before. All conditioned dharmas are also not truly existent, and when analyzed with wisdom, they ultimately return to emptiness. Moreover, conditioned dharmas are established in contrast to unconditioned dharmas. Since unconditioned dharmas are empty, conditioned dharmas are also empty. If conditioned and unconditioned dharmas arise from conditions, they are like illusions; if they do not rely on conditions, they are like flowers in the sky. Therefore, one should not cling to them as truly existent. As the sutras say, conditioned and unconditioned are both conventional, falsely established, and their essence is empty. Apart from conditioned and unconditioned, there are no other dharmas, and even if there are, they are just empty words. Conditioned and unconditioned encompass all dharmas, and since these two are empty, all dharmas are empty. In emptiness, there are no discriminating fabrications, and unobstructed penetration is the light of holy wisdom. Therefore, the sutras say that all dharmas are fundamentally empty, and emptiness is no-self-nature. Because there is no self-nature, it is Prajnaparamita. There is no dharma within it that can be said to be birth, cessation, severance, permanence, oneness, otherness, coming, or going. O Indra, you should know that if there are virtuous men or women with pure faith who can say this, they will not slander Prajnaparamita. Different from this saying...'

者。皆名為謗。若說常空應墮斷滅。遮常有故。不墮此邊。執常不空應墮斷滅。常無因果名斷滅故。我諸所說皆是遮言。遮謂遮他生滅等執。無生非滅。唯為遮生。無滅非生。但為遮滅。非斷常等。類此應知。雖涅槃時生死斷滅。此方便說是假非真。如說天中有常樂等。是隨俗說。非稱實言。應以前說諸句文詞隨其所應破諸妄執。我等皆妄。誰復為真。謂畢竟空心言路絕。分別戲論皆不能行。唯諸聖賢內智所證。是故智者應正勤修。證此真空舍彼妄執。

大乘廣百論釋論卷第九大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1571 大乘廣百論釋論

大乘廣百論釋論卷第十

聖天菩薩本　護法菩薩釋

三藏法師玄奘奉　詔譯

教誡弟子品第八

複次正論已立邪道伏膺。於密義中尚餘微滯。以凈理教。重顯真宗。遣彼余疑。故說頌曰。

由少因緣故　　疑空謂不空　依前諸品中　　理教應重遣

論曰。雖一切法本性皆空。而初學徒未能見故。追愛妄有怖達深空。或為余緣未能決了。以正理教重顯前宗。令彼除疑舍諸倒執。既一切法本性皆空。未達此空。以何為性。諸法無我。此復云何。謂無自性應正曉示。何假轉音正示無由。以無體故。但可假說。諸法無我無性可取。故名為

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：這些都被稱為誹謗。如果說常空，就應該墮入斷滅論，因為遮止了常有，所以不墮入這一邊。執著常不空，就應該墮入斷滅論，因為常無因果被稱為斷滅。我所說的一切都是遮止之言，遮止是指遮止他人的生滅等執著。無生並非滅，只是爲了遮止生；無滅並非生，只是爲了遮止滅，不是斷常等，類似的情況應該知道。雖然涅槃時生死斷滅，這只是方便之說，是假的不是真的。如同說天中有常樂等，這是隨順世俗的說法，不是真實的言語。應該用前面所說的各種語句文詞，隨其所應地破除各種虛妄的執著。我們都是虛妄的，誰又是真實的呢？所謂畢竟空，心和言語的道路都斷絕了，分別戲論都不能進行，只有聖賢的內在智慧所證悟的才是真實的。所以智者應該精進修行，證悟這個真空，捨棄那些虛妄的執著。

《大乘廣百論釋論》卷第九大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1571 《大乘廣百論釋論》

《大乘廣百論釋論》卷第十

聖天菩薩本護法菩薩釋

三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯

教誡弟子品第八

再次，正確的理論已經確立，邪道已經屈服，但在隱秘的意義中還殘留著細微的滯礙，所以用清凈的道理教導，重新顯明真實的宗旨，消除他們剩餘的疑惑，所以說了這首偈頌：

『由於少許因緣的緣故，懷疑空性認為不是空性，依據前面各品中的道理和教導，應該重新遣除（這些疑惑）。』

論曰：雖然一切法的本性都是空性（Śūnyatā），但初學者未能見到這個空性，追逐愛戀虛妄的有，害怕通達甚深的空性，或者因為其他原因未能決斷了悟。所以用正確的道理和教導，重新顯明前面的宗旨，讓他們消除疑惑，捨棄各種顛倒的執著。既然一切法的本性都是空性，未通達這個空性，以什麼作為它的自性呢？諸法無我（Anātman），這又是什麼意思呢？就是沒有自性（Svabhāva），應該正確地曉示。為什麼要假借轉音才能正確地曉示呢？因為沒有實體，所以只能假借言說。諸法無我，沒有自性可以執取，所以稱為空性。

【English Translation】 English version: These are all called slander. If one says 'permanently empty', one should fall into annihilationism, because it negates permanence, thus not falling into this extreme. Holding onto 'permanently not empty', one should fall into annihilationism, because permanence without cause and effect is called annihilation. All that I say are words of negation, negation meaning negating others' attachments to arising and ceasing, etc. Non-arising is not ceasing, only to negate arising; non-ceasing is not arising, only to negate ceasing, not permanence or annihilation, etc. Similar cases should be understood. Although at the time of Nirvāṇa, birth and death are extinguished, this is a provisional saying, false not true. Like saying there is permanence and bliss in the heavens, etc., this is following conventional speech, not speaking truthfully. One should use the previously mentioned phrases and words to refute various false attachments as appropriate. We are all false, who then is true? So-called ultimate emptiness, the path of mind and speech is cut off, discriminating conceptualizations cannot proceed. Only the inner wisdom realized by the sages is true. Therefore, the wise should diligently cultivate, realize this true emptiness, and abandon those false attachments.

Treatise on the Extensive Explanation of the Mahāyāna Hundred Verses, Volume 9 Taishō Tripiṭaka, Volume 30, No. 1571, Treatise on the Extensive Explanation of the Mahāyāna Hundred Verses

Treatise on the Extensive Explanation of the Mahāyāna Hundred Verses, Volume 10

By Āryadeva (Śāntideva) Bodhisattva, Explained by Dharmapāla Bodhisattva

Translated by the Tripiṭaka Master Xuanzang under Imperial Decree

Chapter 8: Admonishing Disciples

Furthermore, the correct doctrine has been established, and the wrong path has been subdued. However, subtle doubts still remain in the hidden meaning. Therefore, with pure reasoning, the true principle is revealed again to dispel their remaining doubts. Thus, the verse is spoken:

'Because of slight causes and conditions, they doubt emptiness and think it is not empty. Based on the principles and teachings in the previous chapters, these (doubts) should be dispelled again.'

Commentary: Although the inherent nature of all dharmas is emptiness (Śūnyatā), beginners are unable to see it. They pursue and cherish illusory existence, fearing to realize profound emptiness, or for other reasons, they are unable to make a decisive understanding. Therefore, with correct reasoning and teachings, the previous principle is revealed again, so that they can dispel doubts and abandon all inverted attachments. Since the inherent nature of all dharmas is emptiness, if one has not realized this emptiness, what is its nature? All dharmas are without self (Anātman), what does this mean? It means there is no self-nature (Svabhāva), which should be correctly shown. Why is it necessary to use metaphorical language to correctly show it? Because there is no substance, it can only be spoken of metaphorically. All dharmas are without self, there is no self-nature to grasp, therefore it is called emptiness.

空。如契經言。空名諸法。無我無性無執無取。勝義理中。都無少法有我有性可說名空。若爾空名應不可說。實不可說。但假立名。如說太虛。雖無自性實不可說。而假立名。空既離言。有應可說亦不可說。實無體故。如說諸法實性都無。無性理中無二無說。若爾說者言及所言。一切皆空。今應無說。既有所說。應不皆空。為顯此疑。故次頌曰。

能所說若有　　空理則為無

論曰。言能說者。謂能說人。言及所言。俱名所說。此三總攝有為無為。謂眼等根及色等境。此若實有。何法為空。為遣此疑。故復頌曰。

諸法假緣成　　故三事非有

論曰。能說言義三事性空。假託眾緣而成立故。余宗亦許。諸法名言皆是自心。隨俗安立。如是說者。言及所言。皆勝義無。唯世俗有。如何謂此三事不空。云何定知三事非有。謂依他立。如幻所為。不依他成。皆如兔角是故三事自性皆空。為益世間假有言說。又汝何為疑難真空。我意猶望成昔有見。應舍此意。所以者何。非破他宗能成己見。如破他說。無礙故常。非即能成自無常性。設有此理汝亦不成。所以者何。故次頌曰。

若唯說空過　　不空義即成　不空過已明　　空義應先立

論曰。若唯破空不空成者。不空已破空義應成。前諸品中

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『空』，正如契經所說，『空』指的是諸法（dharma，宇宙間一切事物和現象）。沒有我（ātman，靈魂），沒有自性（svabhāva，事物內在的、不變的性質），沒有執著（graha，對事物或觀念的固守），沒有取（upādāna，獲取或執取）。在勝義諦（paramārtha-satya，最高的真理）的層面，沒有任何事物可以被說成是具有『我』或『自性』的『空』。如果這樣，『空』這個名稱應該就無法被述說了。實際上是無法述說的，只是假立一個名稱，就像說『太虛』（虛空）一樣，雖然沒有自性，實際上無法述說，但還是假立一個名稱。既然『空』超越了言語，那麼『有』應該可以述說嗎？也是無法述說的，因為它實際上沒有實體。就像說諸法的實性根本不存在一樣，在無自性的道理中，沒有二元對立，也沒有任何述說。如果這樣，述說者、言語以及所要述說的內容，一切都應該是『空』的，那麼現在應該就沒有述說了。既然現在有所述說，那麼一切就不應該都是『空』的。爲了消除這個疑問，所以接下來說：『能說與所說，若有空理無。』論曰：能說者，指能說話的人。言語及所說內容，都屬於所說。這三者總括了有為法（saṃskṛta，由因緣和合而成的現象）和無為法（asaṃskṛta，不依賴因緣的現象）。如果這些是真實存在的，那麼什麼法才是『空』呢？爲了消除這個疑問，所以又說：『諸法假緣成，故三事非有。』論曰：能說者、言語和所說內容的自性是空的，因為它們是依賴眾多因緣而成立的。其他宗派也承認，諸法的名稱和言語都是自心所安立的，隨順世俗的約定。這樣說來，述說者、言語以及所說內容，在勝義諦中都是不存在的，只有在世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，相對的、世俗的真理）中才存在。怎麼能說這三件事不是空的呢？如何確定這三件事不是真實存在的呢？因為它們是依他而立的，就像幻術所變現的事物一樣。不依賴他而成的事物，就像兔角一樣，所以這三件事的自性都是空的。爲了利益世間，才假立言說。而且，你為什麼要懷疑真空的道理呢？你的意思是想恢復你以前的觀點嗎？應該捨棄這種想法。為什麼呢？因為破斥其他宗派並不能成立自己的觀點，就像破斥他說『無礙故常』（沒有阻礙所以是常）並不能成立自己所說的『無常』一樣。即使有這種道理，你也無法成立你的觀點。為什麼呢？所以接下來說：『若唯說空過，不空義即成，不空過已明，空義應先立。』論曰：如果僅僅說『空』有過失，『不空』的意義就能成立，那麼『不空』的過失已經在前面說明了，『空』的意義應該早就成立了。在前面的各個品中，

【English Translation】 English version: 『Emptiness.』 As the sutra says, 『Emptiness』 refers to all dharmas (dharma, all things and phenomena in the universe). There is no self (ātman, soul), no inherent existence (svabhāva, the intrinsic and unchanging nature of things), no clinging (graha, the fixed adherence to things or ideas), and no grasping (upādāna, acquisition or clinging). In the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya, the highest truth), there is no dharma that can be said to have a 『self』 or 『inherent existence』 that can be called 『empty.』 If so, the name 『emptiness』 should be unspeakable. In reality, it is unspeakable, but a name is provisionally established, just like saying 『great void』 (space), although it has no inherent existence and is actually unspeakable, a name is still provisionally established. Since 『emptiness』 transcends language, should 『existence』 be speakable? It is also unspeakable because it actually has no substance. Just like saying that the true nature of all dharmas does not exist at all, in the principle of no inherent existence, there is no duality and no speaking. If so, the speaker, the speech, and what is to be spoken, everything should be 『empty,』 then there should be no speaking now. Since there is speaking now, then everything should not be 『empty.』 To dispel this doubt, it is said next: 『If the speaker and the spoken exist, then the principle of emptiness is absent.』 Commentary: The speaker refers to the person who can speak. Speech and what is spoken both belong to what is spoken. These three encompass conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta, phenomena arising from causes and conditions) and unconditioned phenomena (asaṃskṛta, phenomena not dependent on causes and conditions). If these are truly existent, then what dharma is 『empty』? To dispel this doubt, it is said again: 『All dharmas arise from dependent origination, therefore these three are non-existent.』 Commentary: The nature of the speaker, speech, and what is spoken is empty because they are established relying on numerous conditions. Other schools also admit that the names and speech of all dharmas are established by one's own mind, following worldly conventions. In this way, the speaker, speech, and what is spoken are all non-existent in the ultimate truth, and only exist in the conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya, relative, worldly truth). How can it be said that these three things are not empty? How can it be determined that these three things are not truly existent? Because they are dependently established, like things manifested by illusion. Things that are not dependent on others, like rabbit horns, so the nature of these three things is all empty. For the benefit of the world, speech is provisionally established. Moreover, why do you doubt the principle of emptiness? Do you mean to restore your previous view? You should abandon this idea. Why? Because refuting other schools cannot establish one's own view, just like refuting his saying 『unobstructed therefore permanent』 cannot establish one's own saying 『impermanent.』 Even if there is such a principle, you cannot establish your view. Why? So it is said next: 『If only the fault of emptiness is spoken, then the meaning of non-emptiness is established; the fault of non-emptiness has already been explained, the meaning of emptiness should be established first.』 Commentary: If only saying 『emptiness』 has a fault, and the meaning of 『non-emptiness』 can be established, then the fault of 『non-emptiness』 has already been explained earlier, and the meaning of 『emptiness』 should have been established long ago. In the previous chapters,

。已說一切立不空義所有過失。若汝欲成不空義者。先當方便除前過失。不除前失但說空過。汝不空義終不得成。非顯他人有失無德。即能成己有德無愆。要具二能方成己見。謂立與破。故次頌曰。

諸欲壞他宗　　必應成己義　何樂談他失　　而無立己宗

論曰。要具立破自見方成。立破二能見所依故。唯彰他失。不顯己宗自義得成。終無是理。何緣汝輩唯樂破空。不念欲成己之有義。故於立破二事應均。方可得成自宗有義。汝欲立有畢竟無能。故諸法空其理決定。豈不空論。此過亦齊不顯己宗唯彰他失。此質非理。空無我宗。前諸品中。已廣顯故。然空無我遣有我成。故破汝宗我宗已立。若爾空論但有虛言。空無我名無實義故。如是如是。誠如所言。空無我名。是假非實。為破他執假立自宗。他執既除自宗隨遣。為顯此義。復說頌曰。

為破一等執　　假立遣為宗　他三執即除　　自宗隨不立

論曰。一異及非。名為三執。俱同一異。故不別論。一等三宗。若正觀察皆歸無性。無少可存。彼性本空。非由今破。故契經說。迦葉當知。所見本空非由今破。諸修空者證本性空。故諸破言皆是假說。立亦應爾。權設非真。諸法皆空。宗依何立。依汝所執。故我立宗。所執既無。宗應不立。汝謂

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：已經說完了『一切建立皆為空』的觀點所存在的所有過失。如果你想要成就『不空』的意義，首先應當想辦法去除之前的過失。如果不去除之前的過失，只說『空』的過失，你的『不空』的意義終究不能成立。僅僅揭示他人有過失而沒有功德，並不能成就自己有功德而沒有過錯。要具備建立和破除兩種能力，才能成就自己的見解。所以接下來說道：

『那些想要摧毀他人宗派的人，必須先成就自己的義理。為什麼只喜歡談論他人的過失，而不建立自己的宗派呢？』

論述：要具備建立和破除自己見解的能力才能成就，因為建立和破除兩種能力是見解所依賴的。僅僅彰顯他人的過失，而不顯揚自己的宗派，自己的義理就能成立，終究沒有這樣的道理。什麼緣故你們只喜歡破斥『空』，而不想著成就自己的『有』的義理呢？所以在建立和破除兩件事上應該均衡，才可以成就自己宗派的『有』的義理。你想要建立『有』，畢竟沒有能力，所以諸法皆空的道理是決定的。難道『空』的論述，也同樣存在不顯揚自己宗派，只彰顯他人過失的過失嗎？這種指責沒有道理。『空』和『無我』的宗派，在前面的各品中，已經廣泛地闡述過了。然而『空』和『無我』是爲了遣除『有我』，從而成就『無我』。所以破斥你的宗派，我的宗派就已經成立了。如果這樣，『空』的論述就只有虛假的言辭，『空』和『無我』的名稱沒有真實的意義了。是的，是的，確實如你所說，『空』和『無我』的名稱，是虛假的而不是真實的。爲了破斥他人的執著，假立自己的宗派。他人的執著既然已經去除，自己的宗派也隨之遣除。爲了闡明這個意義，再次說道：

『爲了破斥『一』和『等』的執著，假立『遣除』作為宗派。他人的三種執著（一、異、非）即已去除，自己的宗派也隨之不成立。』

論述：『一』、『異』以及『非』，被稱為三種執著。『俱』、『同』、『一』、『異』，所以不分別論述。『一』、『等』三種宗派，如果正確地觀察，都歸於無自性，沒有絲毫可以存在。它們的自性本來就是空的，不是由於現在才破斥的。所以契經說：『迦葉（Kasyapa，人名）應當知道，所見本來就是空的，不是由於現在才破斥的。』那些修習『空』的人，證悟到本性空。所以各種破斥的言論都是假說的，建立也應該是這樣，權且設立而不是真實的。諸法皆空，宗派依據什麼而建立呢？依據你所執著的。所以我才建立宗派。所執著的既然沒有了，宗派應該就不成立。你認為

【English Translation】 English version: All the faults of the view that 'all establishments are not empty' have been discussed. If you wish to establish the meaning of 'not empty', you should first find a way to remove the previous faults. If you do not remove the previous faults and only talk about the faults of 'emptiness', your meaning of 'not empty' will ultimately not be established. Merely revealing that others have faults and no merits cannot establish that you have merits and no faults. You must have both the ability to establish and the ability to refute in order to establish your own view. Therefore, the following is said:

'Those who wish to destroy the doctrines of others must first establish their own principles. Why delight in discussing the faults of others without establishing one's own doctrine?'

Commentary: One must have the ability to establish and refute one's own views in order to be successful, because the ability to establish and refute are what views rely on. Merely highlighting the faults of others without revealing one's own doctrine, one's own principles can be established, there is ultimately no such reason. Why do you only delight in refuting 'emptiness' without thinking of establishing your own meaning of 'existence'? Therefore, one should be balanced in establishing and refuting, so that one can establish the meaning of 'existence' in one's own doctrine. If you want to establish 'existence', you ultimately have no ability, so the principle that all dharmas are empty is definite. Does the discussion of 'emptiness' also have the fault of not revealing one's own doctrine and only highlighting the faults of others? This accusation is unreasonable. The doctrine of 'emptiness' and 'no-self' has been extensively explained in the previous chapters. However, 'emptiness' and 'no-self' are to eliminate 'self', thereby establishing 'no-self'. Therefore, by refuting your doctrine, my doctrine has already been established. If so, the discussion of 'emptiness' only has false words, and the names of 'emptiness' and 'no-self' have no real meaning. Yes, yes, it is indeed as you say, the names of 'emptiness' and 'no-self' are false and not real. In order to refute the attachments of others, one provisionally establishes one's own doctrine. Since the attachments of others have been removed, one's own doctrine is also removed accordingly. To clarify this meaning, it is said again:

'In order to refute the attachments of 'one' and 'equal', one provisionally establishes 'removal' as the doctrine. When the three attachments of others (one, different, and non-) are removed, one's own doctrine is also not established accordingly.'

Commentary: 'One', 'different', and 'non-' are called the three attachments. 'Both', 'same', 'one', and 'different' are not discussed separately. The three doctrines of 'one', 'equal', etc., if observed correctly, all return to no-self-nature, and there is nothing that can exist. Their self-nature is originally empty, not because it is refuted now. Therefore, the sutras say: 'Kasyapa (a name) should know that what is seen is originally empty, not because it is refuted now.' Those who practice 'emptiness' realize the emptiness of the original nature. Therefore, all words of refutation are provisional, and establishment should also be like this, temporarily established and not real. All dharmas are empty, what does the doctrine rely on to be established? It relies on what you are attached to. That is why I establish the doctrine. Since what is attached to is gone, the doctrine should not be established. You think

為有。故宗非無。為存自宗應許他有。為遣汝執。故立我宗。汝所執無。我宗彌立。雖爾不可立空為宗。現見世間瓶等有故。雖空無我比量多端。而被強威現量所伏。不爾瓶等非現量知。所以者何。故次頌曰。

許瓶為現見　　空因非有能　余宗現見因　　此宗非所許

論曰。我若許瓶現量所得。空因比量可說無能。然我說瓶非現量得。空因比量何為無能。瓶等諸塵皆非現見。破根境等。諸品已論。不可余宗。謂瓶現見對此安立。為證有因。所見若同可引為證。所見既異。誰肯順從。是故空因不違現量。能立諸法性相皆空。瓶等諸塵世間現見。若以比量皆立為空。是則世間無不空法。空無翻對應不得成。為舉此疑。故說頌曰。

若無不空理　　空理如何成

論曰。夫立空理翻對不空。不空若無。空亦非有。如何可立諸法皆空。為決此疑。故復頌曰。

汝既不立空　　不空應不立

論曰。立不空者翻對於空。既不信空。不空焉立。如何可立諸法不空。汝不信空而得立有。我不執有何廢立空。若言不空亦有所對。謂互有無及定無空。我空亦然。對世俗有。遣彼妄有。故立真空。又所立空專為遣執。不必對有方立於空。如為遣常說無常教。雖常非有而立無常。又汝此中不應疑難。翻對在有

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因為有（為有）的緣故，所以宗義並非是無（故宗非無）。爲了儲存自己的宗義，應該允許他人持有（為存自宗應許他有）。爲了去除你的執著，所以建立我的宗義（為遣汝執，故立我宗）。你所執著的無，正是我宗義得以確立的基礎（汝所執無，我宗彌立）。即使如此，也不可以建立空作為宗義（雖爾不可立空為宗），因為顯而易見世間存在瓶子等事物（現見世間瓶等有故）。雖然有空和無我的種種比量推理（雖空無我比量多端），但都被強大的現量所壓倒（而被強威現量所伏）。否則，瓶子等事物就不是現量所知了（不爾瓶等非現量知）。因此，接下來頌文說（所以者何，故次頌曰）：『允許瓶子為現量所見，那麼空性的因就不能成立（許瓶為現見，空因非有能）。其他宗派以現量為因，而此宗並不允許（余宗現見因，此宗非所許）。』論述：如果我允許瓶子是現量所獲得的，那麼空性的因的比量就可以說是沒有能力成立的（我若許瓶現量所得，空因比量可說無能）。然而我說瓶子不是現量所獲得的，那麼空性的因的比量又怎麼會沒有能力呢（然我說瓶非現量得，空因比量何為無能）？瓶子等諸塵都不是現量所見（瓶等諸塵皆非現見）。破斥根、境等的各種品類，之前已經討論過了（破根境等，諸品已論）。不可以像其他宗派那樣，認為瓶子是現量所見，並以此來安立（不可余宗，謂瓶現見對此安立）。作為證明存在的因，所見如果相同，可以引用作為證據（為證有因，所見若同可引為證）。所見既然不同，誰會順從呢（所見既異，誰肯順從）？因此，空性的因並不違背現量，能夠成立諸法自性空相（是故空因不違現量，能立諸法性相皆空）。瓶子等諸塵，世間認為是現量所見（瓶等諸塵世間現見），如果用比量都成立為空，那麼世間就沒有不空的法了（若以比量皆立為空，是則世間無不空法）。空和不空沒有相互對應，就不能成立（空無翻對應不得成）。爲了提出這個疑問，所以說頌文（為舉此疑，故說頌曰）：『如果沒有不空的道理，空性的道理如何成立（若無不空理，空理如何成）？』論述：建立空性的道理，是與不空相對立的（夫立空理翻對不空）。如果不空不存在，空也不存在（不空若無，空亦非有）。如何能夠成立諸法皆空呢（如何可立諸法皆空）？爲了解決這個疑問，所以又說頌文（為決此疑，故復頌曰）：『你既然不建立空，那麼不空也應該不能成立（汝既不立空，不空應不立）。』論述：建立不空的人，是與空相對立的（立不空者翻對於空）。既然不相信空，不空又怎麼能成立呢（既不信空，不空焉立）？如何能夠成立諸法不空呢（如何可立諸法不空）？你不相信空，卻能夠成立有，我不執著有，又有什麼妨礙我建立空呢（汝不信空而得立有，我不執有何廢立空）？如果說不空也有所對應，比如相互的有無以及決定沒有空（若言不空亦有所對，謂互有無及定無空）。我的空也是這樣，針對世俗的有，去除那些虛妄的有，所以建立真空（我空亦然，對世俗有，遣彼妄有，故立真空）。而且所建立的空，專門是爲了去除執著，不一定非要與有相對立才能建立空（又所立空專為遣執，不必對有方立於空）。比如爲了去除常，才說無常的教義（如為遣常說無常教），即使常並不存在，也仍然可以建立無常（雖常非有而立無常）。而且你不應該在這裡質疑，相互對應存在於有之中（又汝此中不應疑難，翻對在有）。

【English Translation】 English version: Because there is 'being' (for there is), therefore, the tenet is not 'non-being' (hence the tenet is not non-existent) (故宗非無). To preserve one's own tenet, one should allow others to have 'being' (為存自宗應許他有). To dispel your attachment, therefore, I establish my tenet (為遣汝執，故立我宗). The 'non-being' that you are attached to is the very foundation upon which my tenet is established (汝所執無，我宗彌立). Even so, one should not establish emptiness as a tenet (雖爾不可立空為宗), because it is evident that things like jars exist in the world (現見世間瓶等有故). Although there are various inferences for emptiness and no-self (雖空無我比量多端), they are all subdued by the powerful direct perception (而被強威現量所伏). Otherwise, things like jars would not be known by direct perception (不爾瓶等非現量知). Therefore, the following verse says (所以者何，故次頌曰): 'If a jar is admitted to be perceived by direct perception, then the reason for emptiness cannot be established (許瓶為現見，空因非有能). Other schools use direct perception as a reason, but this school does not admit it (余宗現見因，此宗非所許).' Commentary: If I admit that a jar is obtained by direct perception, then the inference for the reason of emptiness can be said to be incapable (我若許瓶現量所得，空因比量可說無能). However, I say that a jar is not obtained by direct perception, so how can the inference for the reason of emptiness be incapable (然我說瓶非現量得，空因比量何為無能)? All phenomena such as jars are not perceived by direct perception (瓶等諸塵皆非現見). The refutation of the sense faculties, objects, etc., has already been discussed in previous chapters (破根境等，諸品已論). One cannot, like other schools, claim that a jar is perceived by direct perception and establish it as such (不可余宗，謂瓶現見對此安立). As a reason for proving existence, if the perceptions are the same, it can be cited as evidence (為證有因，所見若同可引為證). Since the perceptions are different, who would follow (所見既異，誰肯順從)? Therefore, the reason for emptiness does not contradict direct perception and can establish that all phenomena are empty in nature (是故空因不違現量，能立諸法性相皆空). The world considers phenomena such as jars to be perceived by direct perception (瓶等諸塵世間現見). If all are established as empty by inference, then there would be no non-empty phenomena in the world (若以比量皆立為空，是則世間無不空法). Emptiness and non-emptiness would not correspond, and it could not be established (空無翻對應不得成). To raise this doubt, the following verse is said (為舉此疑，故說頌曰): 'If there is no principle of non-emptiness, how can the principle of emptiness be established (若無不空理，空理如何成)?' Commentary: Establishing the principle of emptiness is in opposition to non-emptiness (夫立空理翻對不空). If non-emptiness does not exist, then emptiness also does not exist (不空若無，空亦非有). How can it be established that all phenomena are empty (如何可立諸法皆空)? To resolve this doubt, the following verse is said again (為決此疑，故復頌曰): 'Since you do not establish emptiness, then non-emptiness should also not be established (汝既不立空，不空應不立).' Commentary: Those who establish non-emptiness are in opposition to emptiness (立不空者翻對於空). Since you do not believe in emptiness, how can non-emptiness be established (既不信空，不空焉立)? How can it be established that all phenomena are non-empty (如何可立諸法不空)? You do not believe in emptiness, yet you can establish existence. I do not cling to existence, so what prevents me from establishing emptiness (汝不信空而得立有，我不執有何廢立空)? If you say that non-emptiness also has a corresponding opposite, such as mutual existence and non-existence, and the definite absence of emptiness (若言不空亦有所對，謂互有無及定無空), my emptiness is also like that, directed towards conventional existence, removing those false existences, therefore establishing true emptiness (我空亦然，對世俗有，遣彼妄有，故立真空). Moreover, the emptiness that is established is specifically for removing attachments, and it is not necessary to establish emptiness only in opposition to existence (又所立空專為遣執，不必對有方立於空). For example, to remove permanence, the teaching of impermanence is taught (如為遣常說無常教), even though permanence does not exist, impermanence can still be established (雖常非有而立無常). Moreover, you should not doubt here, the correspondence exists within existence (又汝此中不應疑難，翻對在有).

不在於空。有事非無有翻有對。空理非有何對何翻。若謂不然。空是宗故。如立色等。無常為宗。此無常宗。既定是有。空宗亦爾。應必非無。此說非真。因不定故。世間現見。無亦是宗。理亦應然。故次頌曰。

若許有無宗　　有宗方可立　無宗若非有　　有宗應不成

論曰。無宗若有。對立有宗。無宗若無。有宗何對若言無對而立有宗。即自違前責空有對。若一切法無不皆空。無我真空咸同一味。如何現見諸法不同。此亦不然。世俗有故。勝義無故。理不相違。為顯此義。故說頌曰。

若諸法皆空　　如何火名暖　此如前具遣　　火暖俗非真

論曰。若一切法本性皆空。如何世間有火等異。世俗事有。諸法不同。勝義理空。無火等異。故汝疑難於理不然。火等如前破根境等。已具觀察是俗非真。如何此中復為疑難。若法非有空何所遮。空有所遮。故法應有。若爾四論展轉相遮。皆應是真。便違自意。為顯此義。故說頌曰。

若謂法實有　　遮彼說為空　應四論皆真　　見何過而舍

論曰。遮所遮故建立能遮。所遮若無能遮豈有如言非雨。故說名冬。冬時所遮雨時必有。空遮有故有定非無。此亦不然。因不定故。一等四論展轉相遮皆應是真。是所遮故。真即無過。皆應可宗。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本不在於空本身。如果存在事物，那麼『非無』就與『有』相對立。如果空的道理不是『有』，那麼什麼與什麼相對立，什麼又被推翻呢？如果說不是這樣，因為『空』是宗（Skt: siddhānta，佛教術語，指已成立的教義或宗派主張），就像建立色等法（Skt: rūpa，佛教術語，指物質現象）的無常為宗一樣。這個無常宗既然被確定為『有』，那麼空宗也應該如此，必定不是『無』。這種說法是不真實的，因為因（Skt: hetu，佛教術語，指理由或原因）是不確定的。世間現見的，『無』也是宗。道理也應該如此。所以接下來說偈頌：『如果允許有無宗（Skt: siddhānta，佛教術語，指已成立的教義或宗派主張），有宗（Skt: siddhānta，佛教術語，指已成立的教義或宗派主張）才可以成立。無宗（Skt: siddhānta，佛教術語，指已成立的教義或宗派主張）如果不是有，有宗（Skt: siddhānta，佛教術語，指已成立的教義或宗派主張）應該不能成立。』論曰：無宗（Skt: siddhānta，佛教術語，指已成立的教義或宗派主張）如果是有，就與有宗（Skt: siddhānta，佛教術語，指已成立的教義或宗派主張）相對立。無宗（Skt: siddhānta，佛教術語，指已成立的教義或宗派主張）如果是無，有宗（Skt: siddhānta，佛教術語，指已成立的教義或宗派主張）與什麼相對立呢？如果說沒有對立而成立有宗（Skt: siddhānta，佛教術語，指已成立的教義或宗派主張），那就自己違背了前面責難空有對立的說法。如果一切法沒有不空的，無我真空（Skt: śūnyatā，佛教術語，指空性）都同一種味道，為什麼現見諸法不同呢？這也不對，因為世俗（Skt: saṃvṛti，佛教術語，指相對的、世間的真理）中有，勝義（Skt: paramārtha，佛教術語，指絕對的、究竟的真理）中無，道理不相違背。爲了顯示這個意義，所以說偈頌：『如果諸法皆空（Skt: śūnyatā，佛教術語，指空性），為什麼火的名字是暖？這就像前面已經具備地遣除了，火的溫暖在世俗（Skt: saṃvṛti，佛教術語，指相對的、世間的真理）中不是真實的。』論曰：如果一切法的本性皆空（Skt: śūnyatā，佛教術語，指空性），為什麼世間有火等差別？世俗（Skt: saṃvṛti，佛教術語，指相對的、世間的真理）的事物是有，諸法不同。勝義（Skt: paramārtha，佛教術語，指絕對的、究竟的真理）的道理是空（Skt: śūnyatā，佛教術語，指空性），沒有火等差別。所以你的疑難在道理上是不對的。火等就像前面破斥根境等一樣，已經具備地觀察了是世俗（Skt: saṃvṛti，佛教術語，指相對的、世間的真理）而不是真實的。為什麼在這裡又提出疑難呢？如果法不是有，空（Skt: śūnyatā，佛教術語，指空性）遮止什麼呢？空（Skt: śūnyatā，佛教術語，指空性）有所遮止，所以法應該是有。如果這樣，四種理論輾轉互相遮止，都應該是真實的，就違背了自己的意思。爲了顯示這個意義，所以說偈頌：『如果認為法是真實存在的，爲了遮止它才說空（Skt: śūnyatā，佛教術語，指空性），那麼四種理論都應該是真實的，看到什麼過失而捨棄呢？』論曰：因為遮止所遮止的，所以建立能遮止的。所遮止的如果沒有，能遮止的怎麼會有呢？就像說『不是下雨』，所以叫做冬天。冬天所遮止的下雨，在下雨的時候必定有。空（Skt: śūnyatā，佛教術語，指空性）遮止有，所以有必定不是無。這也不對，因為因（Skt: hetu，佛教術語，指理由或原因）是不確定的。同樣，四種理論輾轉互相遮止，都應該是真實的，因為是被遮止的。真實就是沒有過失，都應該可以作為宗（Skt: siddhānta，佛教術語，指已成立的教義或宗派主張）。

【English Translation】 English version It is not about emptiness itself. If there are things, then 'not non-existence' is opposed to 'existence'. If the principle of emptiness is not 'existence', then what is opposed to what, and what is overturned? If you say it is not so, because 'emptiness' is the tenet (Skt: siddhānta, Buddhist term, referring to established doctrines or sectarian claims), just as establishing impermanence as the tenet for form (Skt: rūpa, Buddhist term, referring to material phenomena) and so on. Since this impermanence tenet is determined to be 'existence', then the emptiness tenet should also be like this, and it must not be 'non-existence'. This statement is not true, because the cause (Skt: hetu, Buddhist term, referring to reason or cause) is uncertain. In the world, it is seen that 'non-existence' is also a tenet. The principle should also be like this. Therefore, the following verse is said: 'If it is allowed to have a tenet of existence and non-existence (Skt: siddhānta, Buddhist term, referring to established doctrines or sectarian claims), then the tenet of existence (Skt: siddhānta, Buddhist term, referring to established doctrines or sectarian claims) can be established. If the tenet of non-existence (Skt: siddhānta, Buddhist term, referring to established doctrines or sectarian claims) is not existence, then the tenet of existence (Skt: siddhānta, Buddhist term, referring to established doctrines or sectarian claims) should not be able to be established.' Treatise says: If the tenet of non-existence (Skt: siddhānta, Buddhist term, referring to established doctrines or sectarian claims) is existence, it is opposed to the tenet of existence (Skt: siddhānta, Buddhist term, referring to established doctrines or sectarian claims). If the tenet of non-existence (Skt: siddhānta, Buddhist term, referring to established doctrines or sectarian claims) is non-existence, what is the tenet of existence (Skt: siddhānta, Buddhist term, referring to established doctrines or sectarian claims) opposed to? If you say that there is no opposition and the tenet of existence (Skt: siddhānta, Buddhist term, referring to established doctrines or sectarian claims) is established, then you contradict yourself by criticizing the opposition between emptiness and existence. If all dharmas are not empty, and selflessness and emptiness (Skt: śūnyatā, Buddhist term, referring to emptiness) are all of the same taste, why are different dharmas seen? This is also not right, because there is existence in the conventional (Skt: saṃvṛti, Buddhist term, referring to relative, worldly truth), and there is no existence in the ultimate (Skt: paramārtha, Buddhist term, referring to absolute, ultimate truth), so the principles do not contradict each other. To show this meaning, the following verse is said: 'If all dharmas are empty (Skt: śūnyatā, Buddhist term, referring to emptiness), why is the name of fire warm? This is like what has already been eliminated before, the warmth of fire is not real in the conventional (Skt: saṃvṛti, Buddhist term, referring to relative, worldly truth).' Treatise says: If the nature of all dharmas is empty (Skt: śūnyatā, Buddhist term, referring to emptiness), why are there differences such as fire in the world? Conventional (Skt: saṃvṛti, Buddhist term, referring to relative, worldly truth) things exist, and dharmas are different. The principle of the ultimate (Skt: paramārtha, Buddhist term, referring to absolute, ultimate truth) is empty (Skt: śūnyatā, Buddhist term, referring to emptiness), and there are no differences such as fire. Therefore, your doubts are not right in principle. Fire and so on are like the previous refutation of roots and objects, and it has already been observed that they are conventional (Skt: saṃvṛti, Buddhist term, referring to relative, worldly truth) and not real. Why are you raising doubts here again? If the dharma is not existent, what does emptiness (Skt: śūnyatā, Buddhist term, referring to emptiness) negate? Emptiness (Skt: śūnyatā, Buddhist term, referring to emptiness) negates something, so the dharma should be existent. If so, the four theories mutually negate each other, and they should all be true, which violates your own intention. To show this meaning, the following verse is said: 'If you think that the dharma is really existent, then emptiness (Skt: śūnyatā, Buddhist term, referring to emptiness) is said to negate it, Then the four theories should all be true, what fault do you see to abandon them?' Treatise says: Because what is negated is negated, the negator is established. If what is negated does not exist, how can the negator exist? It's like saying 'it's not raining', so it's called winter. The rain that is negated in winter must exist when it rains. Emptiness (Skt: śūnyatā, Buddhist term, referring to emptiness) negates existence, so existence must not be non-existence. This is also not right, because the cause (Skt: hetu, Buddhist term, referring to reason or cause) is uncertain. Similarly, the four theories mutually negate each other, and they should all be true, because they are negated. Truth is without fault, and they should all be able to be taken as tenets (Skt: siddhānta, Buddhist term, referring to established doctrines or sectarian claims).

汝見何愆。舍三執一。故不可說實有所遮。若諸所遮皆實有者。自言無過。汝過應真汝撥無空。此空應實。若一切法性相都無。是則世間皆應斷滅。尚不執有。況復執無。執有執無皆成過故。為顯此義。故說頌曰。

若諸法都無　　生死應非有　諸佛何曾許　　執法定為無

論曰。若法全無應無生死。因果展轉相續輪迴。非定執無。何得為難。我說世俗因果非無。諸佛世尊智見無礙。亦未曾許定有定無。如契經中。佛告迦葉。諸法性相非有非無。有是一邊。無是第二。謂常與斷。此二中間。無色無見無住無像。不可表示不可施設。此意說言。世俗有故。依之建立生死輪迴。勝義空故。諸法性相非有非無。心言路絕。若一切法真離有無。復以何緣而言俗有。真雖無二俗有何乖。應離於真別有其俗。雖不相離而義有殊。俗順世情真談實理。故真無二俗有多途。又一切宗皆許無二。而有種種體類不同。是故不應輒。生疑難。為顯此義。故說頌曰。

若真離有無　　何緣言俗有　汝本宗亦爾　　致難復何為

論曰。若色等法真離有無。復有何緣而言俗有。因果不斷生死輪迴。俗順世情因緣假有。真談實理非有非無。汝等本宗皆許無二。而言法有輒難何為。所以者何。如諸句義非即是有。勿一切法其體

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：你看到了什麼過失，要捨棄三種執著而只執著於一種？所以不能說確實有什麼被遮蔽了。如果所有被遮蔽的事物都是真實存在的，那麼你自稱沒有過錯。你的過錯應該真實存在，你否定空性，那麼這個空性就應該是真實存在的。如果一切法的自性和現象都完全不存在，那麼世間的一切都應該斷滅。尚且不執著于有，更何況執著于無呢？執著于有和執著于無都會造成過錯。爲了闡明這個道理，所以說了這首偈頌：『如果一切法都無自性，那麼生死輪迴就不應該存在。諸佛何時允許過，執著於法必定是無呢？』論曰：如果法完全不存在，那麼就不應該有生死輪迴，因果輾轉相續。不應該一定執著于無，怎麼能以此來責難我呢？我說世俗的因果不是沒有。諸佛世尊的智慧見解沒有障礙，也未曾允許一定有或一定無。如契經中所說，佛告訴迦葉（Kasyapa，佛陀的弟子）：諸法的自性和現象，非有非無。有是一邊，無是第二邊，指的是常與斷。這兩種極端之間，沒有顏色，沒有可見性，沒有住處，沒有形象，不可表示，不可施設。這個意思是說，因為世俗的存在，所以依此建立生死輪迴；因為勝義諦是空性的，所以諸法的自性和現象非有非無，心和言語的道路都斷絕了。如果一切法在真諦上遠離有和無，又因為什麼緣故說在俗諦上存在呢？真諦雖然沒有二元對立，俗諦的存在又有什麼妨礙呢？應該離開真諦而另外存在俗諦。雖然不相分離，但在意義上有區別。俗諦順應世間的情感，真諦談論真實的道理。所以真諦沒有二元對立，俗諦有多條途徑。而且一切宗派都允許沒有二元對立，但有種種體類不同。所以不應該隨便產生疑問和責難。爲了闡明這個道理，所以說了這首偈頌：『如果真諦遠離有和無，因為什麼緣故說俗諦存在呢？你們本來的宗義也是這樣，提出責難又有什麼用呢？』論曰：如果色等法在真諦上遠離有和無，又因為什麼緣故說在俗諦上存在呢？因果不斷，生死輪迴，俗諦順應世間的情感，因緣和合而假有。真諦談論真實的道理，非有非無。你們這些宗派本來都允許沒有二元對立，卻說法的存在，責難我有什麼用呢？為什麼這樣說呢？例如各種句子的意義並非就是有，不要認為一切法的本體

【English Translation】 English version: What fault do you see that you abandon the three attachments and cling to one? Therefore, it cannot be said that there is indeed something being obscured. If all that is obscured were truly existent, then you would claim to be without fault. Your fault should truly exist, and your denial of emptiness means that this emptiness should be truly existent. If the nature and phenomena of all dharmas were completely non-existent, then everything in the world should be annihilated. One should not cling to existence, let alone non-existence. Clinging to existence and clinging to non-existence both lead to faults. To clarify this meaning, the following verse is spoken: 'If all dharmas were completely without nature, then samsara (birth and death) should not exist. When have the Buddhas ever allowed that clinging to dharmas is definitely non-existence?' Treatise says: If dharmas were completely non-existent, then there should be no samsara, the continuous cycle of cause and effect. One should not definitely cling to non-existence; how can you use this to challenge me? I say that worldly cause and effect are not non-existent. The wisdom and insight of the Buddhas, the World Honored Ones, are without obstruction, and they have never allowed definite existence or definite non-existence. As it is said in the sutras, the Buddha told Kasyapa (one of the Buddha's main disciples): The nature and phenomena of dharmas are neither existent nor non-existent. Existence is one extreme, and non-existence is the second, referring to permanence and annihilation. Between these two extremes, there is no color, no visibility, no dwelling place, no image, unrepresentable, and un-establishable. This means that because of worldly existence, samsara is established based on it; because ultimate truth is emptiness, the nature and phenomena of dharmas are neither existent nor non-existent, and the path of mind and speech is cut off. If all dharmas are truly free from existence and non-existence, then for what reason do you say they exist in conventional truth? Although ultimate truth is non-dual, what harm does conventional existence cause? Conventional truth should exist separately from ultimate truth. Although they are not separate, there is a difference in meaning. Conventional truth accords with worldly emotions, while ultimate truth speaks of the true principle. Therefore, ultimate truth is non-dual, while conventional truth has many paths. Moreover, all schools allow non-duality, but there are various different categories. Therefore, one should not casually raise doubts and challenges. To clarify this meaning, the following verse is spoken: 'If ultimate truth is free from existence and non-existence, for what reason do you say that conventional truth exists? Your own school is also like this, so what is the point of raising challenges?' Treatise says: If forms and other dharmas are free from existence and non-existence in ultimate truth, then for what reason do you say they exist in conventional truth? Cause and effect are continuous, samsara continues, conventional truth accords with worldly emotions, and is provisionally existent due to causes and conditions. Ultimate truth speaks of the true principle, neither existent nor non-existent. Your schools originally all allow non-duality, but you say that dharmas exist, so what is the point of challenging me? Why do I say this? For example, the meanings of various sentences are not simply existence, do not think that the essence of all dharmas

皆同。亦非非有。勿一切法其體皆無。非有非無。雖遍諸法而立種種。句義不同。我法亦然。何煩致難。由此道理余難亦通。所以者何。故次頌曰。

諸法若都無　　差別應非有　執諸法皆有　　差別亦應無

論曰。若一切法實性都無。所有世間因果差別。謂從眼等眼識等生。此皆應無。無無別故。此同上釋。謂不執無。執有執無皆非理故。又若執有其過亦同。所以者何。若一切法皆同有性。所有世間因果差別。謂從眼等眼識等生。此皆應無有無別故。定於有上隨相不同。建立世間諸法差別。我亦如是。真故雖空于俗有中建立差別。故汝所難即為唐捐。有劣慧人復生疑難。若法非有則定應無。能破有因。此難非理世俗有故。汝執非無。能立有因何故非有。為顯此義。復說頌曰。

若謂法非有　　無能破有因　破有因已明　　汝宗何不立

論曰。若謂諸法性相皆無能破有因。亦非有者。此慧極劣。以于現前粗顯事中不能了故。世俗所攝。能破有因前已廣明。何謂非有。汝不可說俗有非因。勝義理中無立破故。若不忍許能破有因。何不立因證自宗有。如我廣說能破有因。汝立有因一未曾見。如何可執諸法非空。空言是破。破他便立。有言是立。自立方成。是故我空無勞別立。汝所執有須別立因。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：皆同。亦非非有。勿謂一切法的本體皆是空無。既非實有，也非空無。雖然普遍存在於各種法中，但又建立種種差別。句子的意義不同。我所說的法也是如此。何必多此一舉，提出詰難呢？由此道理，其他的詰難也都可以理解了。為什麼這麼說呢？所以接著用偈頌說：

諸法如果全都空無，差別就不應該存在；如果執著諸法皆為實有，差別也同樣不應該存在。

論曰：如果一切法的真實自性都是空無，那麼世間所有的因果差別，比如從眼等（眼根等）產生眼識等（眼識等），這些都應該不存在。因為沒有空無的差別。這和上面的解釋相同。意思是不要執著于空無。執著于實有或執著于空無，都是不合道理的。又如果執著于實有，其過失也相同。為什麼這麼說呢？如果一切法都具有相同的實有自性，那麼世間所有的因果差別，比如從眼等（眼根等）產生眼識等（眼識等），這些都應該不存在，因為沒有實有的差別。確定在實有之上，隨著表相的不同，建立世間的各種法差別。我也是這樣。在真諦上雖然是空，但在俗諦的實有中建立差別。所以你所提出的詰難，就是徒勞無功的。有些智慧低下的人又產生疑問，如果法不是實有，那麼就必定是空無，能夠破斥實有的原因。這種詰難是不合道理的，因為在世俗諦中是存在的。你執著于不是空無，能夠成立實有的原因，為什麼不是實有呢？爲了闡明這個道理，又說了偈頌：

如果說諸法不是實有，就沒有能夠破斥實有的原因；破斥實有的原因已經闡明，你的宗派為什麼不成立呢？

論曰：如果說諸法的自性和表相都是空無，能夠破斥實有的原因，也不是實有，這種智慧就極其低下。因為對於眼前粗顯的事物都不能理解。在世俗諦所攝受的範圍內，能夠破斥實有的原因，前面已經廣泛闡明。什麼叫做不是實有呢？你不能說世俗諦的實有不是原因。因為在勝義諦的道理中，沒有成立和破斥。如果不肯承認能夠破斥實有的原因，為什麼不成立原因來證明自己宗派的實有呢？就像我廣泛地闡述能夠破斥實有的原因一樣，你所成立的實有原因，一個也沒有見過。怎麼可以執著諸法不是空呢？空這個詞是破斥。破斥他人，自己就成立。有這個詞是成立。自己成立，才能成立。因此，我所說的空，不需要另外成立。你所執著的實有，需要另外成立原因。

【English Translation】 English version: All are the same. Also, it is not 'not-being'. Do not [think] that the essence of all dharmas is non-existent. It is neither existent nor non-existent. Although pervading all dharmas, it establishes various distinctions. The meanings of the sentences are different. My Dharma is also like this. Why bother to raise difficulties? By this reasoning, other difficulties can also be understood. Why is that? Therefore, the following verse is said:

If all dharmas were completely non-existent, there should be no distinctions; If one clings to all dharmas as existent, there should also be no distinctions.

Treatise: If the true nature of all dharmas were completely non-existent, then all worldly distinctions of cause and effect, such as the arising of eye-consciousness etc. from the eye etc. (eye sense organs etc.), should not exist. Because there is no distinction of non-existence. This is the same as the above explanation. It means not clinging to non-existence. Clinging to existence or clinging to non-existence are both unreasonable. Furthermore, if one clings to existence, the fault is also the same. Why is that? If all dharmas had the same nature of existence, then all worldly distinctions of cause and effect, such as the arising of eye-consciousness etc. from the eye etc. (eye sense organs etc.), should not exist, because there is no distinction of existence. It is determined on existence, and according to the differences in appearance, the distinctions of all worldly dharmas are established. I am also like this. Although empty in the ultimate truth, I establish distinctions in the conventional truth of existence. Therefore, your difficulty is in vain. Some people with inferior wisdom raise doubts again, if a dharma is not existent, then it must be non-existent, which can refute the cause of existence. This difficulty is unreasonable, because it exists in the conventional truth. You cling to not being non-existent, which can establish the cause of existence, why is it not existent? To clarify this meaning, the following verse is said again:

If it is said that dharmas are not existent, there is no cause that can refute existence; Since the cause of refuting existence has been clarified, why is your school not established?

Treatise: If it is said that the nature and characteristics of dharmas are all non-existent, and there is a cause that can refute existence, and it is also not existent, then this wisdom is extremely inferior. Because one cannot understand the obvious things in front of them. Within the scope of the conventional truth, the cause that can refute existence has been extensively clarified earlier. What is meant by not being existent? You cannot say that the existence of the conventional truth is not a cause. Because in the principle of ultimate truth, there is no establishment or refutation. If you do not tolerate admitting the cause that can refute existence, why not establish a cause to prove the existence of your own school? Just as I have extensively explained the cause that can refute existence, I have never seen a single cause of existence that you have established. How can one cling to the idea that dharmas are not empty? The word 'emptiness' is refutation. By refuting others, one establishes oneself. The word 'existence' is establishment. Only by establishing oneself can one be established. Therefore, my emptiness does not need to be established separately. The existence that you cling to needs to establish a separate cause.

別因既無。何緣知有。破因易得立因難成。故破有因未為奇妙。若爾汝宗。何不破空。為破彼言。故說頌曰。

說破因易得　　是世俗虛言　汝何緣不能　　遮破真空義

論曰。破因易得是俗虛言。未見有因破真空故。小乘外道雖惡真空。而未有因破真空義。如何可說易得破因。諸法性空易立難破。諸法性有難立易傾。真偽皎然。如何固執。有被立破。固網所籠自出無能。矯作是說。聲為定量。表法有無。既有有聲。法應定有。法若非有。有聲應無。為破此言。故說頌曰。

有名詮法有　　謂法實非無　無名錶法無　　法實應非有

論曰。彼立諸名以聲為性。此立名等。非即是聲。故但舉名以破彼執。有聲詮有。汝執所詮法實非無。無聲表無。應信所詮。法實非有無聲非量。便自違宗。故汝所言非為證有。此劣慧者欲脫己愆。徒設功勞終不能免。依實有法立實有名。因實有名生實有解。法若非有。應無有名。有名若無。應無有解。既有有解。故法非無。此亦不然。假立名故。為顯此義。故說頌曰。

由名解法有　　遂謂法非無　因名知法無　　應信法非有

論曰。若聞有名生於有解。遂謂諸法是有非無。既聞無名生於無解。應信諸法非有是無。此既不然。彼云何爾。依名生解。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『別因』既然不存在，又怎麼知道『有』呢？駁斥『因』容易，建立『因』卻很難成功。所以，駁斥『有』的『因』並不算奇妙。如果這樣，你們宗派為什麼不去駁斥『空』呢？爲了駁斥他們這種說法，所以說了這首偈頌：『說駁斥『因』容易』，這是世俗的虛妄之言。你們為什麼不能遮破『真空』的意義呢？論述：『駁斥『因』容易』是世俗的虛妄之言，沒有見過任何『因』可以駁斥『真空』的緣故。小乘和外道雖然厭惡『真空』，但沒有用任何『因』來駁斥『真空』的意義。怎麼能說容易找到駁斥『因』呢？諸法的自性是『空』，容易建立卻難以駁斥；諸法的自性是『有』，難以建立卻容易傾覆。真實和虛偽非常明顯，為什麼還要固執呢？『有』被建立和駁斥，就像被堅固的羅網所籠罩，自己無法脫身，虛假地作出這種說法。聲（聲音）作為定量，表明法的『有』和『無』。既然有『有聲』，法就應該確定是『有』；法如果不是『有』，『有聲』就應該不存在。爲了駁斥這種說法，所以說了這首偈頌：有名來詮釋法的『有』，就說這個法實際上不是『無』；沒有名稱來表示法的『無』，就應該認為這個法實際上不是『有』。論述：他們建立各種名稱，以聲音作為其自性。我們建立名稱等，不是直接就是聲音。所以只舉出名稱來駁斥他們的執著。『有聲』詮釋『有』，你們執著所詮釋的法實際上不是『無』；『無聲』表示『無』，就應該相信所詮釋的法實際上不是『有』。『無聲』不是衡量標準，就自相矛盾了。所以你們所說的話不能證明『有』。這些低劣智慧的人想要擺脫自己的過錯，徒勞地努力最終也不能免除。依靠實際存在的法來建立實際存在的名稱，因為實際存在的名稱而產生實際存在的理解。法如果不是『有』，就應該沒有名稱；名稱如果沒有，就應該沒有理解。既然有理解，所以法不是『無』。這種說法也不對，因為是假立名稱的緣故。爲了顯示這個意義，所以說了這首偈頌：因為名稱而理解法的『有』，就認為法是『有』而不是『無』；因為名稱而知道法的『無』，就應該相信法不是『有』而是『無』。論述：如果聽到名稱就產生『有』的理解，就認為諸法是『有』而不是『無』。既然聽到沒有名稱就產生『無』的理解，就應該相信諸法不是『有』而是『無』。既然這種情況不對，那麼他們的情況為什麼就對呢？依靠名稱產生理解。

【English Translation】 English version: Since 『hetu』 (cause) does not exist, how can one know 『existence』? Refuting a 『hetu』 is easy, but establishing one is difficult to achieve. Therefore, refuting the 『hetu』 of 『existence』 is not particularly marvelous. If that's the case, why doesn't your school refute 『emptiness』? To refute their statement, this verse is spoken: 『Saying that refuting a 『hetu』 is easy』 is a false statement of the world. Why can't you refute the meaning of 『true emptiness』? Treatise: 『Refuting a 『hetu』 is easy』 is a false statement of the world, because no 『hetu』 has been seen to refute 『true emptiness』. Although the Hinayana and non-Buddhist schools dislike 『true emptiness』, they have not used any 『hetu』 to refute the meaning of 『true emptiness』. How can it be said that it is easy to find a refuting 『hetu』? The nature of all dharmas is 『empty』, easy to establish but difficult to refute; the nature of all dharmas is 『existence』, difficult to establish but easy to overturn. The truth and falsehood are very clear, why insist on clinging to it? 『Existence』 is established and refuted, like being covered by a solid net, unable to escape on its own, falsely making this statement. Sound is taken as a quantity to indicate the 『existence』 and 『non-existence』 of dharmas. Since there is 『existence-sound』, the dharma should definitely be 『existence』; if the dharma is not 『existence』, 『existence-sound』 should not exist. To refute this statement, this verse is spoken: Having a name to explain the 『existence』 of a dharma, it is said that this dharma is actually not 『non-existence』; having no name to represent the 『non-existence』 of a dharma, it should be believed that this dharma is actually not 『existence』. Treatise: They establish various names, taking sound as their nature. We establish names, etc., not directly as sound. Therefore, only names are mentioned to refute their attachment. 『Existence-sound』 explains 『existence』, you insist that the dharma explained is actually not 『non-existence』; 『non-existence-sound』 represents 『non-existence』, it should be believed that the dharma explained is actually not 『existence』. 『Non-existence-sound』 is not a measure, which contradicts itself. Therefore, what you say cannot prove 『existence』. These people of inferior wisdom want to escape their faults, making futile efforts that ultimately cannot be avoided. Relying on actually existing dharmas to establish actually existing names, because of actually existing names, actually existing understanding arises. If the dharma is not 『existence』, there should be no name; if there is no name, there should be no understanding. Since there is understanding, the dharma is not 『non-existence』. This statement is also incorrect, because the name is falsely established. To show this meaning, this verse is spoken: Because of the name, the 『existence』 of the dharma is understood, and it is thought that the dharma is 『existence』 rather than 『non-existence』; because of the name, the 『non-existence』 of the dharma is known, and it should be believed that the dharma is not 『existence』 but 『non-existence』. Treatise: If hearing a name gives rise to the understanding of 『existence』, it is thought that all dharmas are 『existence』 rather than 『non-existence』. Since hearing no name gives rise to the understanding of 『non-existence』, it should be believed that all dharmas are not 『existence』 but 『non-existence』. Since this situation is incorrect, why is their situation correct? Understanding arises relying on the name.

是證空因謂為有因。必不應理。法體若有何待有名。既待有名方生有解。故知諸法體實為無。但假立名世共流佈。有名決定無實所詮。如人號牛依想立故。名能遣有而立有因。不異有人以明為闇。有若可說是假非真。所以者何。故次頌曰。

諸世間可說　　皆是假非真　離世俗名言　　乃是真非假

論曰。世間言說皆隨自心。為共流傳假想安立。法若可說是假非真。非假是真定不可說。諸可說者皆俗非真。前諸品中已廣成立。故所執有是假非真。如舍如軍。可言說故。一等四執。前已具遮。更不立余真實有法。是則此論應墮無邊。為釋此疑。故說頌曰。

謗諸法為無　　可墮于無見　唯蠲諸妄執　　如何說墮無

論曰。謗諸有法可墮無邊。唯遣妄情豈墮無執。為破有執且立為無。有執若除無亦隨遣。又世俗有前已數論。故不應言。此墮無執。唯許俗有。真應是無。不許真無。應許真有。此言非理。故次頌曰。

有非真有故　　無亦非真無　既無有真無　　何有于真有

論曰。若有真有可有真無。真有既無。真無豈有。無真無故。真有亦無。真非有無。如前屢辯。如何復執真是有無。若真非無何意頻說。諸法性相俗有真無。此說意言。唯俗是有。真無此有。故說真無。若爾此真俗

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果因為證悟空性，就認為存在一個『有』的因，這必定是不合道理的。如果法的本體是真實存在的，又何必等待名稱呢？既然需要等待名稱才能產生理解，所以可知諸法的本體實際上是空無的，只是爲了方便世俗流通而假立名稱。名稱雖然存在，但實際上並沒有實在的所指，就像人們給牛起名字，只是依隨自己的想法而設立的。用名稱來否定『有』，並以此作為『有』的起因，這和有人用光明來證明黑暗沒有區別。如果『有』是可以被言說的，那麼它就是虛假的，而不是真實的。為什麼這麼說呢？所以接下來說道：『世間一切可言說的事物，都是虛假的，而不是真實的。』『脫離了世俗的名稱和言語，才是真實的，而不是虛假的。』論曰：世間的言語和說法，都是隨著各自的心意，爲了共同流傳而假想安立的。法如果可以用言語來說明，那就是虛假的，而不是真實的。不是虛假的，才是真實的，而真實的，一定是不可言說的。所有可以言說的，都是世俗的，而不是真實的。在前面的各個品中，已經廣泛地論證了這一點。所以你所執著的『有』，是虛假的，而不是真實的，就像房屋和軍隊一樣，是可以被言說的。對於『一』和『四』的執著，前面已經詳細地駁斥過了，這裡不再另外建立真實的『有』法。如果這樣，那麼這部論就應該落入無邊的境地。爲了解釋這個疑問，所以說了下面的偈頌：『誹謗諸法為無，可能會墮入斷滅見。』『僅僅是去除各種虛妄的執著，怎麼能說是墮入了空無呢？』論曰：誹謗諸『有』法，可能會墮入斷滅邊。僅僅是去除虛妄的情感，怎麼會墮入空無的執著呢？爲了破除對『有』的執著，姑且立為『無』。如果對『有』的執著被去除，那麼『無』也會隨之被去除。而且，世俗的『有』，前面已經多次討論過了，所以不應該說這部論墮入了空無的執著。只承認世俗的『有』，認為真諦應該是『無』，如果不承認真諦是『無』，就應該承認真諦是『有』，這種說法是不合道理的。所以接下來說道：『有不是真實的有，所以無也不是真實的無。』『既然沒有真實的無，又怎麼會有真實的有呢？』論曰：如果有真實的『有』，那麼才可能有真實的『無』。既然沒有真實的『有』，那麼怎麼會有真實的『無』呢？因為沒有真實的『無』，所以真實的『有』也沒有。真實既不是『有』，也不是『無』，就像前面多次辯論過的那樣。為什麼還要執著于真實是『有』還是『無』呢？如果真實不是『無』，為什麼要頻繁地說諸法的自性、現象，在世俗中是『有』，在真諦中是『無』呢？這種說法的意思是，只有世俗是『有』，真諦中沒有這種『有』，所以才說真諦是『無』。如果這樣，那麼這個真諦和世俗

【English Translation】 English version: If, because of realizing emptiness, one claims there is a cause for 'existence', it is certainly unreasonable. If the essence of phenomena were truly existent, why would it need a name? Since understanding arises only when a name is given, it is known that the essence of all phenomena is actually non-existent. Names are merely conventionally established for common usage in the world. Names exist, but they do not actually refer to anything real, just as people name cows based on their own ideas. Using names to negate 'existence' and claiming it as the cause of 'existence' is no different from someone using light to prove darkness. If 'existence' can be spoken of, then it is false, not true. Why is this so? Therefore, the following is said: 'All that can be spoken of in the world is false, not true.' 'To be apart from conventional names and language is true, not false.' The treatise says: Worldly speech and expressions all follow one's own mind, established through imagined conventions for common transmission. If phenomena can be explained by language, then they are false, not true. What is not false is true, and what is true is certainly unspeakable. All that can be spoken of is conventional, not true. This has been extensively established in the previous chapters. Therefore, the 'existence' you cling to is false, not true, like houses and armies, which can be spoken of. The clinging to 'one' and 'four' has been thoroughly refuted earlier, and there is no need to establish any other truly existent phenomena here. If so, then this treatise should fall into endlessness. To explain this doubt, the following verse is said: 'To slander all phenomena as non-existent may lead to nihilistic views.' 'Merely removing deluded attachments, how can it be said to fall into non-existence?' The treatise says: To slander all 'existent' phenomena may lead to the extreme of nihilism. Merely removing deluded emotions, how can it fall into the clinging to non-existence? To refute the clinging to 'existence', we temporarily establish 'non-existence'. If the clinging to 'existence' is removed, then 'non-existence' will also be removed along with it. Moreover, conventional 'existence' has been discussed numerous times before, so it should not be said that this treatise falls into the clinging to non-existence. Only admitting conventional 'existence', thinking that the ultimate truth should be 'non-existence', if one does not admit that the ultimate truth is 'non-existence', then one should admit that the ultimate truth is 'existence', this statement is unreasonable. Therefore, the following is said: 'Existence is not truly existent, so non-existence is also not truly non-existent.' 'Since there is no true non-existence, how can there be true existence?' The treatise says: If there were true 'existence', then there could be true 'non-existence'. Since there is no true 'existence', how can there be true 'non-existence'? Because there is no true 'non-existence', therefore true 'existence' also does not exist. Truth is neither 'existence' nor 'non-existence', as has been debated many times before. Why still cling to whether truth is 'existence' or 'non-existence'? If truth is not 'non-existence', why frequently say that the nature and appearance of all phenomena are 'existent' in the conventional world and 'non-existent' in the ultimate truth? The meaning of this statement is that only the conventional is 'existent', and there is no such 'existence' in the ultimate truth, so it is said that the ultimate truth is 'non-existent'. If so, then this ultimate truth and the conventional...

無為體。若不爾者。應別有真。若別有真有非唯俗。有既唯俗。真體應無。真體若無。何欣修證。此中一類釋此難言。我說真無是遮非表。世間妄見執有為真。遮此有真不表無體。然其真體即是俗無。非離俗無別有真體。言真無者。謂俗無真。此遮其真。無別所表。此于言義未究其源。誰謂真無別有所表。若遮余法別有所詮。是遮表言。遮余法已表余共相。如非眾生非黃門等。若遮余法無別所詮。是唯遮言。遮所遮已。其力斯竭。如勿食肉勿飲酒等。此真無言。唯遮其真無別所表。不言可悉。如非有言。唯遮其有不詮非有。亦不表余。若詮其無或表余法。則不應說此非有言。若非有言詮于有者。非無之說應表其無。如是遮言。愚智同了彼無疑難。重說何為。彼難意言。有若唯俗。真即非有。何所修證但說真無。是遮非表。乃至廣說。豈釋難耶。復有釋言。修無我觀方便究竟。見真理時一切俗有皆不顯現。故說真無。此亦不然。意難了故。若俗非有說名為真。應無所證。若別有真。是所證者。則不應言有唯是俗。又違經說都無所見。乃名見真少有所見。即非見真。是故此言亦非正釋。如是釋者。應作是言。真非有無。心言絕故。為破有執假說為無。為破無執假說為有。有無二說皆世俗言。勝義理中有無俱遣。聖智所證。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本無為（asaṃskṛta）的本體。如果不是這樣，就應該另外存在一個『真』（satya）。如果另外存在一個『真』，那麼『有』（bhava）就不只是世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya）的『有』。如果『有』僅僅是世俗諦的『有』，那麼真諦（paramārtha-satya）的本體就應該不存在。如果真諦的本體不存在，那麼修習和證悟又有什麼意義呢？這裡有一類人解釋這個難題說：我說『真無』（satyam nāsti）是遮遣，而不是表述。世間人錯誤地認為『有』是『真』，遮遣這種『有真』的觀念，並不是要表述一個『無』的本體。然而，那個『真』的本體就是世俗諦的『無』。不是離開世俗諦的『無』，另外存在一個『真』的本體。說『真無』，是指世俗諦沒有『真』。這只是遮遣它的『真』，沒有另外要表述的東西。這種說法沒有窮究言語和意義的根源。誰說『真無』另外有所表述呢？如果遮遣其他法，另外有所詮釋，這是遮遣兼表述的言語。遮遣其他法之後，就表述了其他的共相（sāmānya-lakṣaṇa），例如『非眾生』（na sattva）、『非黃門』（na paṇḍaka）等。如果遮遣其他法，沒有另外的詮釋，這只是遮遣的言語。遮遣所要遮遣的之後，它的作用就停止了，例如『勿食肉』（māṃsaṃ na bhakṣayet）、『勿飲酒』（surāṃ na pibet）等。這個『真無』的言語，只是遮遣它的『真』，沒有另外要表述的東西，不用說就可以明白，就像『非有』（na asti）這個詞，只是遮遣『有』，不詮釋『非有』，也不表述其他。如果詮釋『無』或者表述其他法，就不應該說這是『非有』的言語。如果『非有』的言語詮釋『有』，那麼『非無』的說法就應該表述『無』。像這樣的遮遣言語，愚笨和聰明的人都能明白，他們不會有疑問和困難，重複說這些做什麼呢？他們的難題是說：如果『有』僅僅是世俗諦的『有』，那麼『真』就不是『有』。修習和證悟什麼呢？只說『真無』，是遮遣而不是表述，乃至廣說，這難道是解釋難題嗎？又有人解釋說：修習無我觀（anātma-darśana）是方便，究竟時，見到真理（tattva）時，一切世俗諦的『有』都不顯現，所以說『真無』。這種說法也不對，因為難題已經很清楚了。如果世俗諦不是『有』，說它名為『真』，應該沒有什麼可以證悟的。如果另外有『真』，是所證悟的，那麼就不應該說『有』僅僅是世俗諦的『有』。又違背了經文所說『都無所見，才名為見真』，稍微有所見，就不是見真。所以這種說法也不是正確的解釋。像這樣解釋的人，應該這樣說：『真』不是『有』也不是『無』，因為心和言語都無法達到。爲了破除對『有』的執著，假說為『無』。爲了破除對『無』的執著，假說為『有』。『有』和『無』這兩種說法都是世俗的言語。在勝義諦（paramārtha）的道理中，『有』和『無』都要捨棄，這是聖智（ārya-jñāna）所證悟的。

【English Translation】 English version The essence of the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta). If it were not so, there should be a separate 'truth' (satya). If there is a separate 'truth', then 'existence' (bhava) is not solely the 'existence' of conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya). If 'existence' is only conventional, then the essence of ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya) should not exist. If the essence of ultimate truth does not exist, then what is the point of practice and realization? Here, one group interprets this difficulty by saying: When I say 'truth is non-existent' (satyam nāsti), it is a negation, not an affirmation. Worldly people mistakenly believe 'existence' to be 'truth'. Negating this idea of 'existence as truth' does not affirm an essence of 'non-existence'. However, that essence of 'truth' is the 'non-existence' of conventional truth. It is not that there is a separate essence of 'truth' apart from the 'non-existence' of conventional truth. Saying 'truth is non-existent' means that conventional truth lacks 'truth'. This only negates its 'truth' and does not affirm anything else. This explanation does not delve into the source of language and meaning. Who says that 'truth is non-existent' affirms something else? If negating other dharmas affirms something else, it is a negation with affirmation. After negating other dharmas, it affirms other common characteristics (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa), such as 'not a sentient being' (na sattva), 'not a eunuch' (na paṇḍaka), etc. If negating other dharmas does not affirm anything else, it is only a negation. After negating what is to be negated, its function ceases, such as 'do not eat meat' (māṃsaṃ na bhakṣayet), 'do not drink alcohol' (surāṃ na pibet), etc. This statement 'truth is non-existent' only negates its 'truth' and does not affirm anything else. It is understood without saying, just like the term 'non-existence' (na asti) only negates 'existence', does not explain 'non-existence', and does not affirm anything else. If it explains 'non-existence' or affirms other dharmas, it should not be said that this is the term 'non-existence'. If the term 'non-existence' explains 'existence', then the statement 'not non-existent' should affirm 'non-existence'. Such negating statements are understood by both the foolish and the wise, and they have no doubts or difficulties. What is the point of repeating them? Their difficulty is: If 'existence' is only the 'existence' of conventional truth, then 'truth' is not 'existence'. What is there to practice and realize? Only saying 'truth is non-existent' is a negation, not an affirmation, and so on. Is this explaining the difficulty? Others explain it by saying: Practicing the contemplation of no-self (anātma-darśana) is a means, and when it reaches its culmination, when one sees the truth (tattva), all the 'existence' of conventional truth does not appear, so it is said that 'truth is non-existent'. This explanation is also incorrect because the difficulty is already clear. If conventional truth is not 'existence', calling it 'truth', there should be nothing to realize. If there is a separate 'truth' that is to be realized, then it should not be said that 'existence' is only the 'existence' of conventional truth. It also contradicts the sutra which says 'seeing nothing at all is called seeing the truth', and seeing even a little is not seeing the truth. Therefore, this explanation is also not a correct interpretation. Those who explain it in this way should say: 'Truth' is neither 'existence' nor 'non-existence' because the mind and language cannot reach it. To break the attachment to 'existence', it is falsely said to be 'non-existence'. To break the attachment to 'non-existence', it is falsely said to be 'existence'. Both statements of 'existence' and 'non-existence' are conventional language. In the principle of ultimate truth (paramārtha), both 'existence' and 'non-existence' must be abandoned. This is what is realized by noble wisdom (ārya-jñāna).

非有非無。而有而無。后當廣說。有作是難。證法空因為有為無。有則余法亦應是有。無則不能證諸法空。為舉此難。故說頌曰。

有因證法空　　法空應不立

論曰。空必依因方可得立。若不爾者。一切應成。因既不空。余亦應爾。唯陽焰等水等性空。則所立宗皆不成就。為釋此難。復說頌曰。

宗因無異故　　因體實為無

論曰。數論師等。總別無異。勤勇無間所發等因。皆即是聲。應如聲體。不通余故。因體不成勝論師等。計總與別或異不異。其不異者。過同前師。異即如前諸品已破。故異不異皆不成因。由此故說。宗因無異。因體實無。又所立因體若實有。應與宗體或一或異。然不可說因與宗體。或一或異。非一異故。猶若軍林。是假非真。世俗所攝。隨順世間虛妄分別。建立種種宗因不同。遣諸邪執。邪執既遣宗因亦亡。故不可言法同因有。宗因假立皆俗非真。復有難言。證法空喻為無為有。無則不能證諸法空。有則諸法如喻應有。此亦不然。故次頌曰。

謂空喻別有　　例諸法非空　唯有喻應成　　內我同烏黑

論曰。喻則是因一分所攝。因既俗有。喻亦應然。若謂離因別有喻體。以例諸法是有非空。此定不然。離因之喻必不能證所立義宗。如所立宗非因攝故。若非因

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：非有也非無，而說有也說無，之後會廣泛解釋。有人提出這樣的難題：用以證明法空的『因』，是有還是無？如果『因』是有，那麼其他法也應該是有；如果『因』是無，那麼就不能證明諸法是空。爲了提出這個難題，所以說了下面的偈頌：『以有因證法空，法空應不成立。』論曰：空必須依靠『因』才能成立。如果不是這樣，一切都應該成立。既然『因』不是空，那麼其他法也應該如此。只有陽焰等的水等性質是空，那麼所立的宗義都不能成立。爲了解釋這個難題，又說了下面的偈頌：『宗因無異故，因體實為無。』論曰：數論師等，總和別沒有差異。勤奮努力沒有間斷所發出的聲音等『因』，都即是聲音。應該像聲音的本體一樣，不通用於其他事物。『因』的本體不能成立。勝論師等，認為總和別或者相異或者不相異。如果不相異，過失和之前的論師相同；如果相異，就像之前諸品已經破斥的那樣。所以相異和不相異都不能成立『因』。因此才說，宗和『因』沒有差異，『因』的本體實際上是無。又，所立的『因』的本體如果真實存在，應該和宗的本體或者是一或者相異。然而不能說『因』和宗的本體，或者是一或者相異。不是一也不是異，就像軍隊和森林，是假立的不是真實的，屬於世俗範疇，隨順世間的虛妄分別，建立種種宗和『因』的不同。遣除各種邪見，邪見既然被遣除，宗和『因』也消失了。所以不能說法和『因』一樣存在。宗和『因』是假立的，都是世俗的不是真實的。又有人提出難題：用以證明法空的『喻』，是無還是有？如果是無，那麼就不能證明諸法是空；如果是有，那麼諸法應該像『喻』一樣存在。這也是不對的。所以接著說了下面的偈頌：『謂空喻別有，例諸法非空，唯有喻應成，內我同烏黑。』論曰：『喻』則是『因』的一部分。『因』既然是世俗有，『喻』也應該如此。如果認為離開『因』另外有『喻』的本體，用來比擬諸法是有而不是空，這一定是不對的。離開『因』的『喻』一定不能證明所立的義宗，因為所立的宗不是『因』所包含的。如果不是『因』

【English Translation】 English version: Neither existent nor nonexistent, yet described as existent and nonexistent, which will be explained extensively later. Someone raises this difficulty: Is the 'cause' (hetu) used to prove the emptiness of phenomena existent or nonexistent? If the 'cause' is existent, then other phenomena should also be existent; if the 'cause' is nonexistent, then it cannot prove the emptiness of all phenomena. To raise this difficulty, the following verse is stated: 'If the emptiness of phenomena is proven by an existent cause, then the emptiness of phenomena should not be established.' Treatise says: Emptiness must be established based on a 'cause'. If not, everything should be established. Since the 'cause' is not empty, then other phenomena should also be so. Only the water-like nature of mirages, etc., is empty, then the established tenet cannot be established. To explain this difficulty, the following verse is stated again: 'Because the thesis (paksa) and the cause are not different, the substance of the cause is actually nonexistent.' Treatise says: The Samkhya school, etc., do not differentiate between the general and the specific. The sound, etc., produced by diligent effort without interruption, is identical to sound. It should be like the substance of sound, not applicable to other things. The substance of the 'cause' cannot be established. The Vaisheshika school, etc., consider the general and the specific to be either different or not different. If not different, the fault is the same as the previous school; if different, it has been refuted in the previous chapters. Therefore, both different and not different cannot establish the 'cause'. Therefore, it is said that the thesis and the 'cause' are not different, and the substance of the 'cause' is actually nonexistent. Furthermore, if the substance of the established 'cause' truly exists, it should be either identical to or different from the substance of the thesis. However, it cannot be said that the 'cause' and the substance of the thesis are either identical or different. It is neither identical nor different, like an army and a forest, which are falsely established and not real, belonging to the conventional realm, following the false discriminations of the world, establishing various differences between the thesis and the 'cause'. Eliminating various wrong views, and once wrong views are eliminated, the thesis and the 'cause' also disappear. Therefore, it cannot be said that phenomena exist like the 'cause'. The thesis and the 'cause' are falsely established, and are all conventional and not real. Someone raises another difficulty: Is the 'example' (drstanta) used to prove the emptiness of phenomena nonexistent or existent? If nonexistent, then it cannot prove the emptiness of all phenomena; if existent, then all phenomena should exist like the 'example'. This is also incorrect. Therefore, the following verse is stated next: 'If it is said that the empty example is separately existent, to exemplify that phenomena are not empty, only the existent example should be established, like the inner self being the same as black.' Treatise says: The 'example' is a part of the 'cause'. Since the 'cause' is conventionally existent, the 'example' should also be so. If it is thought that there is a separate substance of the 'example' apart from the 'cause', to exemplify that phenomena are existent and not empty, this is definitely incorrect. The 'example' apart from the 'cause' definitely cannot prove the established meaning of the thesis, because the established thesis is not included in the 'cause'. If it is not the 'cause'

喻能立義宗。內我如烏。黑性應立。又應一切所立皆成。無因事同易可得故。由是喻體必不離因。故應同因不可為難。若一切法本性皆空。證見此空有何勝德。為敘此難。故說頌曰。

若法本性空　　見空有何德

論曰。非於離我諸行法中證見我空少有勝德。諸法亦爾。若本性空。證見此空。何所饒益。若無所益何用劬勞。修能證空無量加行。為釋此難。復說頌曰。

虛妄分別縛　　證空見能除

論曰。諸法諸行雖空無我。而諸愚夫虛妄分別執一異等。由此虛妄分別勢力。生長貪等煩惱隨眠。隨緣發生諸善惡業。沒三有海相續輪迴。三苦所煎不能自出。勤修加行證無我空。漸次斷除虛妄分別。隨其所應證三菩提。自利利他功德無盡。虛妄分別其體是何。謂三界心心所有法。豈不此法亦本性空。如諸愚夫所執色等。何能引苦煎迫有情。若此雖空而能引苦。是則色等亦有此能。何故但言虛妄分別。雖色心等皆本性空。而要依于虛妄分別。計度諸法為有為無。因是發生雜染清凈。由斯含識染凈不同。是故但言虛妄分別。法若實有。是事可然。法既實無。如何計度。為有無等。染凈不同。如夢等中。雖無色等。而有種種相現分明。此喻不然。于夢等位有分別故。作用非無。分別為依。現諸境像起諸染凈。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『喻能立義宗』（通過比喻能夠成立宗義）。如果『內我』（內在的自我）像烏鴉一樣，具有『黑性』（黑色的性質），就應該成立。而且，一切所要成立的都應該能夠成立，因為沒有原因的事情很容易得到。因此，比喻的本體一定不離開原因，所以應該與原因相同，不能作為難題。如果一切法的本性都是空性，那麼證悟到這種空性有什麼殊勝的功德呢？爲了敘述這個難題，所以說了下面的偈頌：『若法本性空，見空有何德』論曰：如果不是在遠離『我』的諸行法中證悟到『我空』（無我）而獲得少許殊勝的功德，那麼諸法也是如此。如果本性是空性，證悟到這種空性，有什麼利益呢？如果沒有利益，又何必辛勤勞作，修習能夠證悟空性的無量加行呢？爲了解釋這個難題，又說了下面的偈頌：『虛妄分別縛，證空見能除』論曰：諸法諸行雖然是空性、無我的，但是那些愚昧的人由於虛妄分別，執著于『一』（相同）、『異』（不同）等等。由於這種虛妄分別的力量，生長出貪婪等等煩惱隨眠，隨著因緣發生各種善業惡業，沉沒在三有（欲有、色有、無色有）的海洋中，相續輪迴，被三種痛苦（苦苦、壞苦、行苦）所煎熬，不能自己解脫。勤奮修習加行，證悟無我空性，逐漸斷除虛妄分別，隨著所應證悟的，證得三菩提（聲聞菩提、緣覺菩提、佛菩提），自利利他的功德無窮無盡。虛妄分別的本體是什麼呢？就是三界（欲界、色界、無色界）的心和心所有法。難道這些法不也是本性空性的嗎？就像那些愚昧的人所執著的色法等等一樣，怎麼能夠引生痛苦，煎迫有情呢？如果這些法雖然是空性的，卻能夠引生痛苦，那麼色法等等也應該有這種能力，為什麼只說虛妄分別呢？雖然色法和心法等等都是本性空性的，但是一定要依靠虛妄分別，去計度諸法為『有』（存在）或『無』（不存在），因此發生雜染和清凈。由於這個原因，眾生的染污和清凈各不相同。所以只說虛妄分別。如果法是真實存在的，這件事還可以成立。法既然是真實不存在的，如何計度為『有』或『無』等等，導致染污和清凈各不相同呢？就像在夢中等等，雖然沒有色法等等，但是有種種景象顯現得非常清楚。這個比喻是不對的，因為在夢中等等，有分別存在，作用並非沒有。以分別作為依據，顯現各種境界影像，生起各種染污和清凈。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Yu Neng Li Yi Zong' (宗, Sectarianism established through analogies). If the 'inner self' (內我) is like a crow, possessing 'black nature' (黑性), it should be established. Moreover, everything to be established should be able to be established, because things without a cause are easily obtained. Therefore, the essence of the analogy must not be separated from the cause, so it should be the same as the cause and cannot be considered a difficulty. If the inherent nature of all dharmas is emptiness, then what special merit is there in realizing this emptiness? To address this difficulty, the following verse is spoken: 'If the nature of dharmas is emptiness, what merit is there in seeing emptiness?' The treatise says: If one does not realize 'selflessness' (我空) in the dharmas of actions that are separate from 'self' (我) and gain some special merit, then it is the same with all dharmas. If the inherent nature is emptiness, what benefit is there in realizing this emptiness? If there is no benefit, why bother to diligently cultivate the immeasurable practices that can realize emptiness? To explain this difficulty, the following verse is spoken again: 'Delusive discrimination binds, the view of emptiness can remove it.' The treatise says: Although all dharmas and actions are empty and selfless, those ignorant people, due to delusive discrimination, cling to 'one' (相同, same), 'different' (不同) and so on. Due to the power of this delusive discrimination, the latent tendencies of greed and other afflictions grow, and various good and bad karmas arise according to conditions, sinking in the ocean of the three realms of existence (三有, desire realm, form realm, formless realm), continuously transmigrating, tormented by the three kinds of suffering (三苦, suffering of suffering, suffering of change, pervasive suffering), unable to liberate themselves. Diligently cultivating practices, realizing selfless emptiness, gradually eliminating delusive discrimination, and according to what should be realized, attaining the three Bodhis (三菩提, Śrāvakabodhi, Pratyekabodhi, Buddhabodhi), the merits of benefiting oneself and others are endless. What is the essence of delusive discrimination? It is the mind and mental factors of the three realms (三界, desire realm, form realm, formless realm). Are these dharmas not also inherently empty? Just like the form dharmas and so on that those ignorant people cling to, how can they cause suffering and torment sentient beings? If these dharmas, although empty, can cause suffering, then form dharmas and so on should also have this ability, why only talk about delusive discrimination? Although form and mind and so on are all inherently empty, it is necessary to rely on delusive discrimination to speculate whether dharmas are 'existent' (有) or 'non-existent' (無), and therefore defilement and purity arise. For this reason, the defilement and purity of sentient beings are different. Therefore, only delusive discrimination is mentioned. If dharmas are truly existent, this matter can be established. Since dharmas are truly non-existent, how can they be speculated as 'existent' or 'non-existent' and so on, leading to different defilements and purities? Just like in dreams and so on, although there are no form dharmas and so on, there are various scenes that appear very clearly. This analogy is incorrect, because in dreams and so on, there is discrimination, and the function is not absent. Relying on discrimination, various realm images appear, and various defilements and purities arise.

是事可然。今既皆空。無實分別。誰能起此作用不同。無體有能曾所未見。若無有體而有功能。兔角龜毛應皆有用。又無煩惱或無善根。而諸有情有染凈者。已斷煩惱應更輪迴。未種善根應獲常樂。此中一類釋此難言。世俗非無。故無此失。應問世俗非諦實耶。彼答不然。隨世俗量是實有故。亦名諦實。如何可說一法一時。有無相違俱名諦實。生等亦爾。一法一時。有生無生。有滅無滅。有斷無斷。有常無常。有來無來。有去無去。乃至廣說。更互相違。如何可言俱是諦實。彼作是說。一法一時。無義為真有義為俗。義差別故互不相違。猶如世間施等善法。性有漏故得不善名。善根相應。故亦名善。俱名諦實而不相違。此理不然。施等善法觀待異故。可不相違一法一時。有無二諦無別觀待。何得無違。所以者何。安和名善。善有二種。所謂世間及出世間。出世善法。畢竟能害煩惱諸纏。究竟安和名勝義善。世間善法。暫時有能畢竟無能。暫時能伏煩惱纏故。名世俗善。非永能斷煩惱纏故。亦得名為勝義不善。此善不善互不相違。有能無能時分異故。如施等善住一剎那。說名有能。過此已后必不能住。說名無能。有能無能雖在一法。時分異故而不相違。第二剎那施等不住。既無有體。誰名無能。由彼體無能定非有。能非

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本此事是可能的。既然現在一切都是空性，沒有真實的分別，那麼誰能產生這些不同的作用呢？沒有自體卻有作用，這是前所未見的。如果說沒有自體卻有作用，那麼兔角（比喻不存在的事物）和龜毛（比喻不存在的事物）應該都有用處了。又或者說，如果沒有煩惱或者沒有善根，而眾生卻有染污和清凈，那麼已經斷除煩惱的人應該還會輪迴，沒有種下善根的人應該獲得恒常的快樂。對此，有一類人解釋說：『世俗諦（相對於勝義諦，指世間普遍認同的真理）並非沒有，所以沒有這些過失。』應該反問：『世俗諦不是真實的嗎？』他們回答說：『不是的，按照世俗的衡量，它是真實存在的，所以也叫做諦實。』如何能說一個法在同一時間，有和無這兩種相反的狀態都叫做諦實呢？生等（生、住、異、滅）也是如此，一個法在同一時間，有生和無生，有滅和無滅，有斷和無斷，有常和無常，有來和無來，有去和無去，乃至廣泛地說，都互相違背，如何能說都是諦實呢？他們這樣說：『一個法在同一時間，從某個角度來說是真實的，從另一個角度來說是世俗的，因為角度不同，所以互不相違。』就像世間的佈施等善法，因為本質上有煩惱，所以可以被稱為不善，因為與善根相應，所以也叫做善，都叫做諦實而不相違背。這個道理是不成立的。佈施等善法因為觀察的角度不同，所以可以不相違背，而一個法在同一時間，有和無這兩種真諦沒有不同的觀察角度，怎麼能沒有違背呢？為什麼這麼說呢？安穩平和叫做善，善有兩種，即世間善和出世間善。出世間的善法，畢竟能夠損害煩惱和各種纏縛，究竟的安穩平和叫做勝義善（究竟真實的善）。世間的善法，暫時有作用，畢竟沒有作用，暫時能夠降伏煩惱的纏縛，所以叫做世俗善，不能永遠斷除煩惱的纏縛，所以也可以叫做勝義不善（究竟真實的不善）。這種善和不善互不相違背，因為有作用和沒有作用的時間不同，比如佈施等善法住在一個剎那，可以說是有作用，過了這個時間之後必定不能住，就說是沒有作用，有作用和沒有作用雖然在同一個法上，但因為時間不同而不相違背。第二個剎那，佈施等不住，既然沒有自體，誰叫做沒有作用呢？因為它的自體沒有了，作用肯定是不存在的，作用不是...

【English Translation】 English version This matter is possible. Now that everything is empty, without real distinctions, who can generate these different functions? Having function without substance is unprecedented. If there is function without substance, then rabbit horns (a metaphor for non-existent things) and turtle hair (a metaphor for non-existent things) should all be useful. Furthermore, if there is no affliction or no root of goodness, and yet sentient beings have defilement and purity, then those who have cut off afflictions should still be reborn in samsara, and those who have not planted roots of goodness should attain constant happiness. To this, one group explains: 'Conventional truth (relative to ultimate truth, referring to the truth universally recognized in the world) is not non-existent, so there are no such faults.' One should ask in return: 'Is conventional truth not real?' They answer: 'No, according to conventional measurement, it is truly existent, so it is also called truth.' How can one say that a dharma at the same time, having and not having these two contradictory states are both called truth? Birth and so on (birth, abiding, change, cessation) are also like this, a dharma at the same time, having birth and no birth, having cessation and no cessation, having severance and no severance, having permanence and no permanence, having coming and no coming, having going and no going, and so on extensively, all contradict each other, how can one say that they are all truth? They say this: 'A dharma at the same time, from one perspective is true, from another perspective is conventional, because the perspectives are different, so they do not contradict each other.' Just like worldly good deeds such as giving, because they are inherently afflicted, they can be called unwholesome, because they are associated with roots of goodness, they are also called wholesome, both are called truth and do not contradict each other. This reasoning is not valid. Good deeds such as giving can be non-contradictory because the perspectives of observation are different, but a dharma at the same time, having and not having these two truths do not have different perspectives of observation, how can there be no contradiction? Why is this so? Peace and harmony are called good, there are two kinds of good, namely worldly good and supramundane good. Supramundane good, after all, can harm afflictions and various entanglements, ultimate peace and harmony is called ultimate good (ultimate true good). Worldly good, temporarily has function, after all has no function, temporarily can subdue the entanglements of afflictions, so it is called conventional good, cannot permanently cut off the entanglements of afflictions, so it can also be called ultimate unwholesome (ultimate true unwholesome). This good and unwholesome do not contradict each other, because the time of having function and not having function is different, for example, good deeds such as giving abide in one instant, it can be said to have function, after this time it will definitely not abide, it is said to have no function, having function and not having function although on the same dharma, but because the time is different, they do not contradict each other. In the second instant, giving and so on do not abide, since there is no self-nature, who is called having no function? Because its self-nature is gone, function is certainly non-existent, function is not...

有故即名無能。或能無能時分無異。所望境別。故不相違。所以者何。暫時能伏貪等纏故。名為有能。不能斷滅貪等種故。名曰無能。如服酥膏能除風疾。不遣痰癊。有能無能。時分雖同。而所望境有差別故。互不相違一法一時。有無二諦境無差別。何得無違。彼復救言。如一念識我執依故。世俗名我由勝義故。亦名無我。我無我別。而不相違一法一時。有無亦爾。雖無境別而不相違。此亦不然。我無我義不相違故。所以者何。一剎那心不自在故。名為無我。我執所依。亦名為我。如契經言。若識是我應得自在。不應轉變。而諸愚夫。依發我執故說名我。不自在義我執依義。雖同一識而不相違。一法一時有無相及。俱名諦實。豈得無違。汝今為成。有無二諦同在一法。互不相違。雖引眾多世間譬喻種種方便。終不能成。彼重救言。如一青色。據自故有。望他故無。諸法亦然。一一法性。據俗故有。望真故無。此亦不然。青黃體異。可據自有。望他為無。俗之與真其體不別。據自可有望誰為無。尋究其俗實即是真。非考彼青實成黃色。故汝所立法喻不同。又俗與真體不相離。如何俗體望真為無。如契經中。佛告善現。世俗勝義無各別體。世俗真如即是勝義。非離其色別有于空。乃至識空亦復如是。如何一法無別境時。二

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本有作用的緣故就叫做『無能』（無法真正發揮作用）。或者說，『能』（暫時起作用）和『無能』（無法根除）在時間上沒有區別，只是期望達到的目標不同，所以並不矛盾。為什麼這麼說呢？因為暫時能夠壓伏貪婪等煩惱的纏繞，所以叫做『有能』（暫時起作用）；不能斷滅貪婪等煩惱的種子，所以叫做『無能』（無法根除）。就像服用酥油膏能夠去除風病，卻不能去除痰病一樣，『有能』和『無能』，時間上雖然相同，但期望達到的目標有差別，所以互相不矛盾。如果一個法在一個時間點上，『有』和『無』兩種真理所針對的目標沒有差別，怎麼會沒有矛盾呢？對方又辯解說：『比如一個念頭，因為是我執（對自我的執著）所依賴的，所以在世俗層面被稱為『我』；但從勝義（究竟真理）的角度來說，也可以被稱為『無我』。『我』和『無我』是不同的，但並不矛盾。一個法在一個時間點上，『有』和『無』也是如此，雖然沒有目標上的差別，但並不矛盾。』這種說法也是不對的，因為『我』和『無我』的含義本身就不矛盾。為什麼這麼說呢？因為一個剎那的心念是不自在的，所以叫做『無我』；但它又是『我執』所依賴的，所以也可以叫做『我』。就像經書上說的：『如果意識是『我』，就應該能夠自在，不應該轉變。』但那些愚昧的人，因為執著于『我』，所以說它為『我』。不自在的含義和『我執』所依賴的含義，雖然是同一個意識，但並不矛盾。一個法在一個時間點上，『有』和『無』相互關聯，都叫做真實，怎麼會沒有矛盾呢？你現在爲了證明『有』和『無』兩種真理可以同時存在於一個法中，並且互不矛盾，雖然引用了很多世間的比喻，用盡各種方法，最終也不能成功。對方再次辯解說：『比如一種青色，就其自身而言是『有』（存在），但相對於其他顏色而言就是『無』（不存在）。一切法也是這樣，每一個法的自性，就世俗層面而言是『有』（存在），但從真諦層面來說就是『無』（空性）。』這種說法也是不對的，青色和黃色在體性上是不同的，所以可以說就其自身而言是『有』，相對於其他顏色而言是『無』。但世俗和真諦在體性上並沒有區別，就其自身而言是『有』，相對於誰而言是『無』呢？探究世俗的本質，實際上就是真諦，而不是考察青色后發現它的本質是黃色。所以你所立的比喻和要證明的道理不同。而且世俗和真諦在體性上是不可分離的，怎麼能說世俗的體性相對於真諦而言是『無』呢？就像經書里，佛告訴善現（Subhuti）：『世俗諦和勝義諦沒有各自獨立的體性，世俗的真如就是勝義諦，不是離開色之外還有空，乃至識空也是這樣。』如果一個法沒有不同的目標時，怎麼能同時存在兩種...

【English Translation】 English version Because of a cause, it is called 'incapable' (unable to truly function). Or, 'capable' (temporarily functioning) and 'incapable' (unable to eradicate) are not different in time, but the desired goals are different, so they are not contradictory. Why is this so? Because it can temporarily subdue the entanglement of greed and other afflictions, it is called 'capable' (temporarily functioning); it cannot cut off the seeds of greed and other afflictions, so it is called 'incapable' (unable to eradicate). Just as taking ghee can remove wind disease but cannot remove phlegm disease, 'capable' and 'incapable', although the time is the same, the desired goals are different, so they do not contradict each other. If, for one dharma at one point in time, the targets of the two truths, 'existence' and 'non-existence', are not different, how can there be no contradiction? The other party then argues: 'For example, a thought, because it is relied upon by the ego-grasping (attachment to self), is called 'self' in the conventional realm; but from the perspective of ultimate truth (paramārtha), it can also be called 'non-self'. 'Self' and 'non-self' are different, but not contradictory. For one dharma at one point in time, 'existence' and 'non-existence' are also like this, although there is no difference in target, they are not contradictory.' This statement is also incorrect, because the meanings of 'self' and 'non-self' are not contradictory in themselves. Why is this so? Because a momentary thought is not independent, so it is called 'non-self'; but it is also relied upon by 'ego-grasping', so it can also be called 'self'. Just as the scriptures say: 'If consciousness were 'self', it should be independent and should not change.' But those ignorant people, because they are attached to 'self', call it 'self'. The meaning of non-independence and the meaning of being relied upon by 'ego-grasping', although it is the same consciousness, are not contradictory. For one dharma at one point in time, 'existence' and 'non-existence' are related to each other and are both called real, how can there be no contradiction? You are now trying to prove that the two truths of 'existence' and 'non-existence' can coexist in one dharma and are not contradictory, although you have cited many worldly metaphors and used all kinds of methods, you will ultimately not succeed. The other party argues again: 'For example, a blue color, in itself, is 'existent' (exists), but relative to other colors, it is 'non-existent' (does not exist). All dharmas are also like this, the nature of each dharma, in the conventional realm, is 'existent' (exists), but from the perspective of ultimate truth, it is 'non-existent' (emptiness).' This statement is also incorrect, blue and yellow are different in nature, so it can be said that in itself it is 'existent', relative to other colors it is 'non-existent'. But conventional truth and ultimate truth are not different in nature, in itself it is 'existent', relative to whom is it 'non-existent'? Investigating the essence of the conventional, it is actually the ultimate truth, rather than examining the blue color and finding that its essence is yellow. Therefore, the metaphor you have established is different from the principle to be proved. Moreover, conventional truth and ultimate truth are inseparable in nature, how can it be said that the nature of the conventional is 'non-existent' relative to the ultimate truth? Just as in the scriptures, the Buddha told Subhuti (善現): 'Conventional truth and ultimate truth do not have their own independent nature, the suchness of the conventional is the ultimate truth, it is not that there is emptiness apart from form, and so on, the emptiness of consciousness is also like this.' If a dharma does not have different targets, how can there be two...

義相違俱名諦實。由是古昔軌範諸師。情事不同安立二諦。世俗諦語近顯俗情。勝義諦言遠表實事。世俗諸法雖稱俗情。而事是虛。故非諦實。又現量證緣起色心。言不能詮。應非俗諦。故契經說。所有世間名句所詮。名為俗諦。此經意說。世共所知。能詮所詮相應法義。及為詮表非共所知。法義經書。名為俗諦。現量所證緣起色心。非言所詮。亦非俗諦。若言假立名言所詮。故此色心亦俗諦攝。究竟勝義應亦非真。假立名言所詮表故。究竟勝義無此色心。真理都無。事有法故。非二諦攝。此法應無。則違世間現量所證。若言是有非二諦收。應立第三。非真俗諦。若言雖有緣起色心。是諸世間現量所得。而非究竟勝義諦收。假說名為世俗諦攝。隨意假立世俗名言。有實色心則無諍論。此為依故染凈義成。若謂色心世俗故有。由勝義故非有非生。如是所言。為有何義。若言如彼無分別智。所行境界究竟空無。不如是有。故說非有。若爾所行究竟無故。無分別智應不得生。設許得生亦非真智。緣無境故。如了余無。智既非真。境應是俗。雖言色心不如是有。而復彌顯色心實有。由說非有究竟無故。無異相故。定應是有。既定是有。由是亦應許此色心實有生等。若汝意謂。雖複色心亦有亦生。而非勝義。應先審定。勝義是何

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果意義相反卻都稱為諦實，那麼古代的軌範師們，因為理解不同而安立了二諦（Two Truths）。世俗諦（Relative Truth）的說法接近於顯現世俗的情感，勝義諦（Ultimate Truth）的說法則深遠地表達了真實的事物。世俗的諸法雖然被稱為世俗的情感，但實際上是虛假的，所以不是諦實。而且，現量（Direct Perception）所證悟的緣起（Dependent Origination）的色（Form）和心（Mind），是語言無法完全表達的，因此不應屬於世俗諦。所以契經（Sutra）說，所有世間的名句所詮釋的，稱為世俗諦。這部經的意思是說，世間共同知道的，能詮釋和所詮釋相互對應的法義，以及爲了詮釋表達非共同知道的法義的經書，稱為世俗諦。現量所證悟的緣起的色和心，不是語言所能詮釋的，也不是世俗諦。如果說假立名言所詮釋的，所以這色和心也屬於世俗諦的範疇，那麼究竟勝義也應該不是真實的，因為也是假立名言所詮釋表達的。究竟勝義中沒有這色和心，真理完全沒有，因為事物有法，所以不屬於二諦的範疇。這個法應該沒有，那就違背了世間現量所證悟的。如果說是有，但不被二諦所包含，那就應該建立第三種，既不是真諦也不是俗諦。如果說雖然有緣起的色和心，是世間現量所得，而不是究竟勝義諦所包含，假說名為世俗諦所包含，隨意假立世俗名言，有真實的色心就沒有爭論了。因為依靠這個，染污和清凈的意義才能成立。如果認為色心因為是世俗諦所以有，因為勝義諦所以非有非生，這樣說有什麼意義呢？如果說像無分別智（Non-Discriminating Wisdom）所行境界那樣究竟空無，不如這樣有，所以說非有。如果這樣，所行境界究竟空無，無分別智應該不能產生。假設允許產生也不是真智，因為緣于沒有境，就像瞭解其他沒有一樣。既然智慧不是真實的，境界應該是世俗的。雖然說色心不如這樣有，卻更加明顯地顯示了色心是真實存在的，因為說非有是究竟沒有，沒有不同之處，必定應該是有。既然必定是有，因此也應該允許這色心有真實的生等。如果你的意思是，即使色心也有也有生，但不是勝義諦，應該先審定，勝義諦是什麼。

【English Translation】 English version: If meanings that contradict each other are both called 'true,' then ancient teachers, due to differing understandings, established the Two Truths (Dva Satya). The Relative Truth (Samvriti-satya) is a statement that closely reveals worldly emotions, while the Ultimate Truth (Paramartha-satya) profoundly expresses the true nature of things. Although worldly phenomena are referred to as worldly emotions, they are actually false and therefore not 'true.' Furthermore, the form (Rupa) and mind (Citta) arising from Dependent Origination (Pratitya-samutpada), as directly perceived (Pratyaksha), cannot be fully expressed by language and should not belong to the Relative Truth. Therefore, the Sutras (Agama) state that whatever is expressed by names and phrases in the world is called the Relative Truth. This Sutra means that the Dharma teachings commonly known in the world, where the expressing and the expressed correspond, as well as scriptures that express Dharma teachings not commonly known, are called the Relative Truth. The form and mind arising from Dependent Origination, as directly perceived, cannot be expressed by language and are not the Relative Truth. If it is said that the form and mind are also included in the Relative Truth because they are expressed by conventionally established terms, then the Ultimate Truth should also not be real, because it is also expressed by conventionally established terms. In the Ultimate Truth, there is no form and mind, and there is no truth at all, because things have Dharma. Therefore, it does not belong to the Two Truths. This Dharma should not exist, which would contradict what is directly perceived in the world. If it is said that it exists but is not included in the Two Truths, then a third truth should be established, which is neither the Ultimate Truth nor the Relative Truth. If it is said that although there is form and mind arising from Dependent Origination, which is directly perceived by the world, it is not included in the Ultimate Truth and is falsely called the Relative Truth, then there is no dispute if worldly terms are arbitrarily established and there is real form and mind. Because of this, the meaning of defilement and purification can be established. If it is thought that form and mind exist because of the Relative Truth, and do not exist or arise because of the Ultimate Truth, what is the meaning of saying so? If it is said that it is ultimately empty like the realm of Non-Discriminating Wisdom (Nirvikalpa-jnana), and not as existent as this, therefore it is said to be non-existent. If so, since the realm of action is ultimately empty, Non-Discriminating Wisdom should not arise. Even if it is allowed to arise, it is not true wisdom, because it is based on a non-existent object, just like understanding other non-existences. Since wisdom is not real, the realm should be relative. Although it is said that form and mind are not as existent as this, it more clearly shows that form and mind are real, because saying non-existent means ultimately non-existent, with no difference, and it must be existent. Since it must be existent, it should also be allowed that this form and mind have real arising, etc. If your intention is that even though form and mind also exist and arise, they are not the Ultimate Truth, it should first be determined what the Ultimate Truth is.

。然後可言。此非勝義。若言勝義是無分別。智慧所行究竟空無。此先已破。謂彼所行究竟無故。無分別智應不得生。乃至廣說。又此所行非真勝義。以是無故。猶如兔角。或非有故。如彼空花。若言勝義是可研窮。此亦不然。境無異故。夫研窮者。不捨世俗。又世俗法不可研窮。此可研窮應離世俗。然非離俗別有勝義。故不可說此可研窮。是故汝言非勝義相。若謂余宗所執勝義。都非有故。是勝義相。此亦不然。彼謂緣生暫住等性。名為勝義。今撥非有。便違自宗及現量等。若言諦實是勝義相。是則世俗應非諦實。何故前言俗為諦實。設許唯說非有非生。名為諦實。是有是生唯假言說。妄分別立既非諦實。唯假言說妄分別立。如何能起染凈作用。故彼釋難。其理不成。非說龜毛名為有體。即有作用能縛世間。復有餘師釋此難曰。分別所執法體是無。因緣所生法體是有。由斯發起煩惱隨眠。繫縛世間輪迴三有。或修加行證無我空。得三菩提脫生死苦。因緣生法雖通色心。而心是源所以偏說。虛妄分別能縛世間。厭此能修證空加行。雖有境界若無有心。虛妄尋思終不繫縛亦不能厭修無我空。證三菩提出離生死。為證此義。引契經言。

遍計所執無　　依他起性有　妄分別失壞　　墮增減二邊

此中一類釋此

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：然後你可以說，這並非勝義（paramārtha，究竟真實）。如果說勝義是無分別智（nirvikalpa-jñāna，不帶任何概念的智慧）所行，是究竟空無，這之前已經駁斥過了。因為那個無分別智所行是究竟空無的，無分別智就不應該產生，乃至更廣的論述。而且，這個無分別智所行並非真正的勝義，因為它是不存在的，就像兔角一樣；或者因為它不是真實存在的，就像空中的花朵。如果說勝義是可以被研窮的，這也是不對的，因為境（viṣaya，對像）沒有不同。研窮的人，不會捨棄世俗（saṃvṛti，相對真理）。而且世俗法是不可研窮的，這個可研窮的勝義應該脫離世俗。然而，並非脫離世俗之外另有勝義。所以不能說這個可研窮的是勝義。因此，你說的並非勝義的相（lakṣaṇa，特徵）。如果認為其他宗派所執著的勝義，因為根本不存在，所以是勝義的相，這也是不對的。他們認為緣起（pratītyasamutpāda，事物相互依存的產生）的暫住等性，名為勝義。現在否定它不存在，就違背了自己的宗派以及現量（pratyakṣa，直接感知）等。如果說諦實（tathatā，真實性）是勝義的相，那麼世俗就不應該是諦實的。為什麼之前說世俗是諦實的呢？假設只說非有非生，名為諦實，是有是生只是假言說，虛妄分別建立的，既然不是諦實的，只是假言說，虛妄分別建立的，如何能產生染凈的作用呢？所以他們解釋這個難題，其道理是不成立的。不能說龜毛名為有體，就能產生作用，能束縛世間。又有其他論師解釋這個難題說：分別所執的法體是無，因緣所生的法體是有。由此發起煩惱隨眠（anuśaya，潛在的煩惱），繫縛世間輪迴三有（tribhava，三種存在狀態）。或者修習加行（prayoga，實踐），證悟無我空性（anātman-śūnyatā，沒有自我和空虛的真理），得到三菩提（trayo bodhi，三種覺悟），脫離生死苦。因緣生法雖然包括色（rūpa，物質）心（citta，精神），而心是根源，所以偏重說明。虛妄分別能束縛世間，厭惡這個，能修習證悟空性的加行。雖然有境界，如果沒有心，虛妄尋思（vitarka，思考）最終不能束縛，也不能厭惡修習無我空性，證悟三菩提，出離生死。爲了證明這個意義，引用契經（sūtra，佛經）說：遍計所執無，依他起性有，妄分別失壞，墮增減二邊。此中一類解釋這個。

【English Translation】 English version: Then you can say that this is not paramārtha (ultimate truth). If you say that paramārtha is what is practiced by nirviklpa-jñāna (non-discriminating wisdom), which is ultimately empty, this has already been refuted. Because what is practiced by that non-discriminating wisdom is ultimately empty, non-discriminating wisdom should not arise, and so on. Moreover, what is practiced by this is not true paramārtha, because it does not exist, like a rabbit's horn; or because it is not truly existent, like flowers in the sky. If you say that paramārtha can be thoroughly investigated, this is also incorrect, because the viṣaya (object) is no different. Those who investigate do not abandon saṃvṛti (conventional truth). Moreover, conventional truth cannot be thoroughly investigated; this investigable paramārtha should be separate from conventional truth. However, there is no paramārtha separate from conventional truth. Therefore, it cannot be said that this investigable thing is paramārtha. Therefore, what you say is not the lakṣaṇa (characteristic) of paramārtha. If it is thought that the paramārtha held by other schools, because it does not exist at all, is the characteristic of paramārtha, this is also incorrect. They consider the temporary nature of pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination) to be paramārtha. Now, denying that it exists contradicts one's own school and pratyakṣa (direct perception), etc. If it is said that tathatā (suchness) is the characteristic of paramārtha, then saṃvṛti should not be tathatā. Why was it said earlier that saṃvṛti is tathatā? Suppose it is only said that non-existence and non-arising are called tathatā, and that existence and arising are merely nominal, established by false discrimination. Since they are not tathatā, but merely nominal, established by false discrimination, how can they produce the functions of defilement and purification? Therefore, their explanation of this difficulty is not valid. It cannot be said that rabbit hair is called a substance and can produce the function of binding the world. There are other teachers who explain this difficulty by saying: the nature of what is grasped by discrimination is non-existent, and the nature of what arises from causes and conditions is existent. From this arises the anuśaya (latent tendencies) of afflictions, binding the world in the cycle of tribhava (three realms of existence). Or, by practicing prayoga (application), one realizes anātman-śūnyatā (the emptiness of self), attains trayo bodhi (three enlightenments), and escapes the suffering of birth and death. Although what arises from causes and conditions includes rūpa (form) and citta (mind), the mind is the source, so it is emphasized. False discrimination can bind the world; by being disgusted with this, one can practice the application of realizing emptiness. Although there are objects, if there is no mind, false vitarka (thought) will ultimately not bind, nor can it cause disgust to practice the emptiness of no-self, realize the three enlightenments, and escape from birth and death. To prove this meaning, the sūtra (scripture) says: The parikalpita (completely conceptualized nature) is non-existent, the paratantra (dependent nature) is existent, false discrimination is lost, falling into the two extremes of increase and decrease. One type of person explains this.

義言。名是遍計所執。義是依他起性。名于其義非有故無。義隨世間非無故有。不可引此證有依他。此釋不然。義相違故。若名于義非有故無。義亦于名是無何有。又于其義所立名言。既因緣生如義應有。若妄所執能詮性無。妄執所詮其性豈有。名隨世俗有詮表能。汝不許為依他起性。義亦隨俗假說有能。何不許為遍計所執。世俗假立能詮所詮。無應並無有應齊有。如何經說一有一無。故汝所言。不符經義。應信遍計所執性無。是諸世間妄情立故。依他起性從因緣生。非妄情為應信是有。彼證己義。復引經言。

由立此此名　　詮于彼彼法　彼皆性非有　　由法性皆然

此頌不能證成彼義。經意不說。名于義無但說所詮。法性非有辨諸法性。皆不可詮。名言所詮。皆是共相。諸法自相皆絕名言。自相非無共相非有。此中略說。所詮性無非謂能詮。其性實有。故頌但說彼非有言。不爾應言此性非有。彼為證此依他性無。復引經中所說略頌。

無有少法生　　亦無少法滅　凈見觀諸法　　非有亦非無

此亦不能證依他起其性非有。所以者何。此頌意明遍計所執自性差別。能詮所詮其體皆空。無生無滅離執凈見。觀諸世間。因緣所生非無非有。故此非證依他起無。若有依他何緣經說。一切法性無不

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：對方辯論說：『名稱』是遍計所執性（Parikalpita，完全是虛妄分別的自性），『意義』是依他起性（Paratantra，由因緣和合而生起的自性）。名稱對於它所指代的意義來說，因為沒有真實的自體所以是『無』；而意義隨著世俗的約定俗成而存在，所以是『有』。因此，不能引用這個例子來證明依他起性的存在。』這種解釋是不對的，因為『意義』本身就存在矛盾。如果說名稱對於意義來說，因為沒有真實的自體所以是『無』，那麼意義對於名稱來說，又怎麼會是『有』呢？而且，對於意義所建立的名稱，既然是因緣所生，就應該像意義一樣是『有』。如果說虛妄分別所執著的能詮釋的名稱沒有自性，那麼虛妄分別所執著的所詮釋的意義，它的自性又怎麼會存在呢？名稱隨著世俗的約定俗成而具有詮釋表達的功能，你不允許它是依他起性；意義也隨著世俗的假說而具有作用，為什麼不允許它是遍計所執性呢？世俗假立的能詮釋和所詮釋，如果『無』就應該一起『無』，如果『有』就應該一起『有』，為什麼佛經上說一個『有』一個『無』呢？所以你所說的不符合佛經的意義。應該相信遍計所執性是『無』，因為這是世間虛妄分別情識所設立的。依他起性是從因緣而生，不是虛妄分別情識所能左右的，所以應該相信它是『有』。爲了證明自己的觀點，對方又引用佛經上的話：『由於安立了這個這個名稱，來詮釋那個那個法，那些法都是沒有自性的，因為法的自性都是如此。』這個偈頌不能證明對方的觀點。佛經的意思不是說名稱對於意義來說是『無』，只是說所詮釋的『法性』是沒有自性的，辨析諸法的自性，都是不可用名稱言語來詮釋的。名稱言語所詮釋的，都是共相（general characteristics），諸法的自相（specific characteristics）都是超越名稱言語的。自相不是『無』，共相不是『有』。這裡簡略地說所詮釋的自性是『無』，不是說能詮釋的名稱的自性是真實存在的。所以偈頌只是說『那些法』沒有自性，否則應該說『這個自性』沒有自性。爲了證明依他起性是『無』，對方又引用佛經中所說的簡略偈頌：『沒有絲毫的法產生，也沒有絲毫的法滅去，以清凈的見地觀察諸法，既不是『有』也不是『無』。』這個偈頌也不能證明依他起性的自性是『無』。為什麼呢？這個偈頌的意思是說明遍計所執的自性差別，能詮釋的和所詮釋的，它們的本體都是空性的。沒有產生，沒有滅去，遠離執著，以清凈的見地來觀察諸世間，因緣所生的法既不是『無』也不是『有』。所以這個偈頌不能證明依他起性是『無』。如果依他起性是『有』，為什麼佛經上說一切法的自性沒有不...

【English Translation】 English version: The opponent argues: 'Name' is Parikalpita (遍計所執性, the nature of complete delusion), 'meaning' is Paratantra (依他起性, the nature arising from conditions). Name is 'non-existent' in relation to its meaning because it lacks a real self-nature; while meaning exists according to worldly conventions, so it is 'existent'. Therefore, this example cannot be cited to prove the existence of Paratantra. This explanation is incorrect because 'meaning' itself is contradictory. If name is 'non-existent' in relation to meaning because it lacks a real self-nature, then how can meaning be 'existent' in relation to name? Moreover, the name established for meaning, since it arises from conditions, should be 'existent' like meaning. If the expressible name grasped by delusion has no self-nature, then how can the expressed meaning grasped by delusion have its self-nature? Name has the function of expressing and representing according to worldly conventions, but you do not allow it to be Paratantra; meaning also has a function according to worldly assumptions, why not allow it to be Parikalpita? The expressible and expressed, falsely established by worldly conventions, should both be 'non-existent' if 'non-existent', and both be 'existent' if 'existent'. Why does the Buddhist scripture say one is 'existent' and the other is 'non-existent'? Therefore, what you say does not conform to the meaning of the Buddhist scriptures. One should believe that Parikalpita is 'non-existent' because it is established by the deluded consciousness of the world. Paratantra arises from conditions and is not controlled by deluded consciousness, so one should believe it is 'existent'. To prove their point, the opponent further quotes from the Buddhist scriptures: 'Because this this name is established, to express that that dharma, those dharmas are all without self-nature, because the nature of dharmas is all like this.' This verse cannot prove the opponent's point. The meaning of the Buddhist scripture is not that name is 'non-existent' in relation to meaning, but only that the 'nature of dharma' that is expressed is without self-nature. Analyzing the nature of dharmas, all are inexpressible by names and words. What names and words express are all general characteristics (共相), the specific characteristics (自相) of dharmas are beyond names and words. Specific characteristics are not 'non-existent', general characteristics are not 'existent'. Here it is briefly said that the nature of what is expressed is 'non-existent', not that the nature of the expressible name is truly existent. Therefore, the verse only says 'those dharmas' have no self-nature, otherwise it should say 'this nature' has no self-nature. To prove that Paratantra is 'non-existent', the opponent further quotes the brief verse spoken in the Buddhist scriptures: 'No dharma is produced, nor is any dharma extinguished, observing all dharmas with pure vision, neither 'existent' nor 'non-existent'.' This verse also cannot prove that the self-nature of Paratantra is 'non-existent'. Why? The meaning of this verse is to explain the self-nature differences of Parikalpita, the expressible and the expressed, their essence is all emptiness. No production, no extinction, away from attachment, observing all the worlds with pure vision, the dharmas arising from conditions are neither 'non-existent' nor 'existent'. Therefore, this verse cannot prove that Paratantra is 'non-existent'. If Paratantra is 'existent', why do the Buddhist scriptures say that the nature of all dharmas is not...

皆空。又契經言。佛告善現。色等諸法自性皆無。復有經言。佛告大慧。一切法性皆無有生。先有先無不可生故。此有密意。密意如何。謂此諸經唯破遍計所執自性。非一切無。若一切無便成邪見。云何知有此密意耶。余契經中顯了說故。謂薄伽梵說如是言。我唯依于相應自性說一切法自性皆無。若有如言而生執著。謂染凈法自性皆無。彼惡取空名為邪見。相應自性即是世間。遍計所執由心轉變。似外諸塵。依此諸塵起諸倒執。因此倒執計有自他。能詮所詮相應自性染凈諸法。即是依他。故知諸經有此密意。又到彼岸般若經中。佛自分明判有無義。遍計所執所集所增。所取常恒無變易法。如是一切皆名為無。因緣所生皆說為有。又余經說。遍計所執自性無生。依他起性所攝諸法從因緣生。又慧度經作如是說。行慧度者善知色性。善知色生善知色如乃至廣說。又諸經說。諸法無性無生滅等。皆應分別不可如言。執爲了義勿世俗諦。諸法亦無。便惡取空成大邪見。此言非理。所以者何。于了義經異分別故。世尊自說。若諸經中說空無相無愿無行無生無滅。無有自性無有有情命者主宰補特伽羅解脫門等名了義經。我言合理。以于余經佛自決判我依遍計所執自性。于余經中說一切法皆無自性無生無滅本來寂靜自性涅槃。依依他

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本皆空。此外，《契經》（Sutra）中說，佛告訴善現（Subhuti，須菩提）：『色（rupa，物質）、受（vedana，感受）、想（samjna，認知）、行（samskara，意志）、識（vijnana，意識）等諸法的自性都是空無的。』又有經中說，佛告訴大慧（Mahamati）：『一切法的自性都是無生的，因為先前存在或先前不存在的事物都無法產生。』這其中有密意（hidden meaning）。這密意是什麼呢？意思是這些經文僅僅是爲了破除遍計所執自性（parikalpita-svabhava，遍計所執的自性），並非說一切皆無。如果一切皆無，那就成了邪見（false view）。如何得知其中有此密意呢？因為其他的《契經》中明確地說明了這一點。薄伽梵（Bhagavan，佛）這樣說：『我僅僅是依據相應自性（dependent nature）來說一切法的自性都是空無的。如果有人按照字面意思而產生執著，認為染污法（defiled dharmas）和清凈法（pure dharmas）的自性都是空無的，那麼這種錯誤地理解空性就叫做邪見。』相應自性就是世間（world），遍計所執由心轉變，看起來像是外在的諸塵（external objects）。依據這些塵境產生各種顛倒執著（inverted perceptions）。因為這些顛倒執著，就認為有自我和他者，能詮釋者和所詮釋者。相應自性的染污法和清凈法，就是依他起性（paratantra-svabhava，依他起性）。因此可知，這些經文有這樣的密意。此外，在《到彼岸般若經》（Perfection of Wisdom Sutra）中，佛親自明確地判別了有和無的意義。遍計所執所集、所增、所取的常恒不變易之法，這一切都稱為『無』。因緣所生的法，都說為『有』。又有經中說，遍計所執自性是無生的，依他起性所攝的諸法是從因緣而生的。此外，《慧度經》（Wisdom Sutra）中這樣說：『修行慧度（prajnaparamita，般若波羅蜜多）的人，善於瞭解色的自性，善於瞭解色的生起，善於瞭解色的如如（tathata，真如），乃至廣說。』此外，諸經所說的諸法無性、無生滅等，都應該加以分別，不能按照字面意思執著，認為這是了義（definitive meaning），認為世俗諦（conventional truth）的諸法也是空無的，這樣就會錯誤地理解空性，成為大邪見。這種說法是不合理的。為什麼呢？因為對於了義經有不同的分別。世尊親自說：『如果在諸經中說空、無相（animitta，無相）、無愿（apranihita，無愿）、無行（無作）、無生、無滅、無有自性、無有有情（sentient being）、命者（jiva，命者）、主宰（controller）、補特伽羅（pudgala，補特伽羅）、解脫門（door to liberation）等，就稱爲了義經。』我的說法是合理的，因為在其他的經中，佛親自決斷說，我是依據遍計所執自性。在其他的經中說一切法皆無自性、無生無滅、本來寂靜、自性涅槃（nirvana，涅槃），是依據依他起性。

【English Translation】 English version All is emptiness. Moreover, the Sutra says, 'The Buddha told Subhuti (善現): The self-nature of all dharmas, such as form (色), feeling (受), perception (想), volition (行), and consciousness (識), is empty.' Another Sutra says, 'The Buddha told Mahamati (大慧): The nature of all dharmas is unborn, because what previously existed or did not exist cannot be produced.' There is a hidden meaning (密意) in this. What is this hidden meaning? It means that these Sutras only aim to refute the imputed nature (遍計所執自性, parikalpita-svabhava), not that everything is non-existent. If everything were non-existent, it would become a false view (邪見). How do we know that there is this hidden meaning? Because other Sutras clearly state this. The Bhagavan (薄伽梵, Buddha) said, 'I only say that the self-nature of all dharmas is empty based on the dependent nature (相應自性). If someone becomes attached to the literal meaning and thinks that the self-nature of defiled dharmas (染污法) and pure dharmas (清凈法) is empty, then this wrong understanding of emptiness is called a false view.' The dependent nature is the world, and the imputed nature is transformed by the mind, appearing like external objects (諸塵). Based on these objects, various inverted perceptions (顛倒執著) arise. Because of these inverted perceptions, one thinks there is self and other, the expresser and the expressed. The defiled and pure dharmas of the dependent nature are the dependently arisen nature (依他起性, paratantra-svabhava). Therefore, it can be known that these Sutras have such a hidden meaning. Furthermore, in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutra (到彼岸般若經), the Buddha himself clearly distinguished the meaning of existence and non-existence. The permanent and unchanging dharmas that are imputed, accumulated, increased, and grasped are all called 'non-existent.' Dharmas that arise from conditions are all said to be 'existent.' Another Sutra says that the imputed nature is unborn, and the dharmas included in the dependently arisen nature arise from conditions. Moreover, the Wisdom Sutra (慧度經) says, 'One who practices wisdom perfection (慧度, prajnaparamita) is skilled in knowing the nature of form, skilled in knowing the arising of form, skilled in knowing the suchness (如如, tathata) of form, and so on.' Furthermore, the Sutras that say that dharmas are without self-nature, without arising and ceasing, etc., should all be distinguished and not be attached to literally, thinking that this is the definitive meaning (了義), and thinking that the dharmas of conventional truth (世俗諦) are also empty. This would be a wrong understanding of emptiness and become a great false view. This statement is unreasonable. Why? Because there are different distinctions for the definitive meaning Sutras. The World-Honored One himself said, 'If the Sutras say emptiness, signlessness (無相, animitta), wishlessness (無愿, apranihita), non-action (無行), non-arising, non-ceasing, without self-nature, without sentient beings (有情), life-principle (命者, jiva), controller (主宰), person (補特伽羅, pudgala), door to liberation (解脫門), etc., these are called definitive meaning Sutras.' My statement is reasonable, because in other Sutras, the Buddha himself determined that I am based on the imputed nature. In other Sutras, it is said that all dharmas are without self-nature, without arising and ceasing, originally quiescent, and the nature of nirvana (涅槃), which is based on the dependently arisen nature.

起自性說言。諸有情心生滅流轉。乃至廣說。又余經中。佛告具壽舍利子言。色自性空。自性空故無生無滅。無生滅故無有變易。受想行識亦復如是。此依遍計所執自性。說自性空無生滅等。以諸愚夫隨自心變色等諸法周遍計度。執有真實自性差別。世尊依彼說色等法自性皆空。無生滅等依他起性。由無遍計所執性故。亦說為空。非自性空。無生滅等。如來處處說三自性。皆言遍計所執性空。依他圓成二性是有。故知空教別有意趣。不可如言撥無諸法。如言取義名謗大乘。故契經言。若有菩薩。如言取義不求如來所說意趣。是名於法非理作意。亦名非處信解大乘。若有菩薩不如其言而取于義。思求如來所說意趣。是名於法如理作意。亦名是處信解大乘。若爾云何釋此經句。佛告天子。汝等當知。佛于菩提都無所得。亦無少法。可生可滅。所以者何。以一切法無生無滅。是故如來出現世間。有作是釋。諸佛證得大菩提時。遠離一切分別戲論。雖出世間而不可說有證得等。復有釋言。佛以菩提為其自性。故無所得。如契經言。菩提即佛。佛即菩提。故無所得。如其法性而覺知故。不生先無不滅先有。以諸法性離戲論故。無生無滅。無上菩提。現在前故。說名如來出現世間。又契經說。善現當知。色名諸色無性之性受想行等

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：從自性說的角度來說，一切有情眾生的心念都處於生滅流轉之中，乃至更廣的範圍都是如此。另外，在其他的經典中，佛陀告訴具壽舍利子說：『色（rūpa，物質）的自性是空，因為自性是空，所以沒有生滅。沒有生滅，所以沒有變易。受（vedanā，感受）、想（saṃjñā，知覺）、行（saṃskāra，意志）、識（vijñāna，意識）也是如此。』這裡是依據遍計所執自性（parikalpita-svabhāva，完全是虛妄分別的自性）而說自性空，沒有生滅等等。因為那些愚昧的人隨著自己的心念變化，對色等諸法進行周遍的計度，執著于有真實的自性差別。世尊依據他們的這種執著，說色等法的自性皆空，沒有生滅等等。依他起性（paratantra-svabhāva，依他而起的自性），因為沒有遍計所執性，所以也說是空，並非自性空，沒有生滅等等。如來在不同的地方講到三種自性（trisvabhāva，三種自性），都說遍計所執性是空，而依他起性和圓成實性（pariniṣpanna-svabhāva，圓滿成就的自性）是存在的。所以要知道空性的教義有其特殊的意趣，不能按照字面意思否定一切法的存在。如果按照字面意思理解，就叫做誹謗大乘。所以契經上說：『如果有菩薩按照字面意思理解，不尋求如來說法的真實意趣，這就叫做對法不如理作意，也叫做在不適當的地方信解大乘。如果有菩薩不按照字面意思理解，而是尋求如來說法的真實意趣，這就叫做對法如理作意，也叫做在適當的地方信解大乘。』如果這樣，那麼應該如何解釋這段經文呢？佛告訴天子說：『你們應當知道，佛在菩提（bodhi，覺悟）中沒有任何所得，也沒有任何少許的法是可以生滅的。』為什麼呢？因為一切法都沒有生滅。所以如來才出現在世間。有一種解釋是：諸佛證得大菩提時，遠離一切分別戲論，雖然出現在世間，但不能說有證得等等。還有一種解釋是：佛以菩提作為自己的自性，所以沒有所得。如契經所說：『菩提即是佛，佛即是菩提。』所以沒有所得。因為如實地覺知了法的本性，所以不是先生后無，也不是先無後生。因為諸法的本性遠離戲論，所以沒有生滅。無上菩提現在顯現，所以說名叫如來出現在世間。另外，契經上說：『善現（Subhūti，須菩提），你應該知道，色名為諸色無性之性，受想行等也是如此。』

【English Translation】 English version: From the perspective of the Svabhāva-vāda (self-nature doctrine), the minds of all sentient beings are in a state of arising, ceasing, and flowing, and so on extensively. Furthermore, in other sutras, the Buddha told the Venerable Śāriputra (舍利子): 'Rūpa (色, form) is empty of self-nature. Because it is empty of self-nature, there is no arising or ceasing. Because there is no arising or ceasing, there is no change. Vedanā (受, feeling), saṃjñā (想, perception), saṃskāra (行, volition), and vijñāna (識, consciousness) are also the same.' This is based on the Parikalpita-svabhāva (遍計所執自性, the imputed nature) to say that self-nature is empty, without arising or ceasing, and so on. Because those foolish people, according to the changes of their own minds, pervasively conceptualize the dharmas such as rūpa, clinging to the belief that there are real differences in self-nature. The World-Honored One, based on their clinging, said that the self-nature of dharmas such as rūpa is all empty, without arising or ceasing, and so on. The Paratantra-svabhāva (依他起性, the dependent nature), because it lacks the Parikalpita-svabhāva, is also said to be empty, not empty of self-nature, without arising or ceasing, and so on. The Tathāgata (如來) in various places speaks of the Trisvabhāva (三種自性, three natures), saying that the Parikalpita-svabhāva is empty, while the Paratantra-svabhāva and Pariniṣpanna-svabhāva (圓成實性, the perfected nature) exist. Therefore, it should be known that the teachings on emptiness have their special intention, and one cannot deny the existence of all dharmas according to the literal meaning. If one understands according to the literal meaning, it is called slandering the Mahāyāna. Therefore, the sutra says: 'If a Bodhisattva understands according to the literal meaning, without seeking the true intention of the Tathāgata's teachings, this is called non-reasoning attention to the Dharma, and it is also called believing in the Mahāyāna in an inappropriate place. If a Bodhisattva does not understand according to the literal meaning, but seeks the true intention of the Tathāgata's teachings, this is called reasoning attention to the Dharma, and it is also called believing in the Mahāyāna in an appropriate place.' If so, how should this sutra passage be explained? The Buddha told the Deva (天子): 'You should know that the Buddha has nothing to gain in Bodhi (菩提, enlightenment), nor is there any dharma that can arise or cease.' Why? Because all dharmas have no arising or ceasing. Therefore, the Tathāgata appears in the world. One explanation is: When the Buddhas attain Great Bodhi, they are far from all conceptual proliferations, and although they appear in the world, it cannot be said that there is attainment, and so on. Another explanation is: The Buddha takes Bodhi as his own self-nature, so there is nothing to be gained. As the sutra says: 'Bodhi is the Buddha, and the Buddha is Bodhi.' Therefore, there is nothing to be gained. Because the nature of the Dharma is truly known, it is not that it arises after being non-existent, nor that it ceases after being existent. Because the nature of all dharmas is free from conceptual proliferations, there is no arising or ceasing. Because unsurpassed Bodhi is now manifest, it is said to be the Tathāgata appearing in the world. Furthermore, the sutra says: 'Subhūti (善現), you should know that rūpa is called the nature of the non-nature of rūpa, and so are vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra, and so on.'

。廣說亦爾。此經意明。依他起性以其遍計所執色等無性所顯離言法性為其自性。若一切法都無所有。如何無性而復言性。若言色等世俗無性。即是色等勝義之性。與理相違。所以者何。夫勝義者。分別戲論所不能及。豈得以無為其自性。若以無性為自性者。應類余無不名勝義。應不能證無上菩提。則違自宗成大過失。依他起性若實有者。便違經說。故契經言。

諸法從緣起　　緣法兩皆無　能如是正知　　名通達緣起　若法從緣生　　此法都無性　若法都無性　　此法非緣生

如是二經說緣生法。雖無自性而不相違。以從緣生法有二種。一者遍計所執。二者依他起性。此中意明。遍計所執自性非有不說依他。若說依他都無自性。便撥染凈二法皆無。名惡取空自他俱損。此妄分別誰復能遮。得正見時自當能遣。今且應問。依他起性何智所知。謂無分別智所引生世間凈智。既無分別。何名世間。謂言此智是無分別。若有分別應不能行。諸法實相但應緣彼遍計所執雖有分別。而說能行法實相者。虛妄分別。應亦能行諸法實相。又今未得無分別后法實相智。如何定知有依他起。此依他起非如現見蛇執所依。如何定言實有此性。唯無分別智所引生世間凈智知依他起。與論相違。如彼論言。遍計執性何智所行。

為凡智耶。為聖智耶。俱非所行。以無相故。依他起性何智所行。俱是所行。然非出世聖智所行。又言五事幾是所取。幾是能取。三是所取。分別正智通能所取。名相分別。分別所取正智有二。一緣真如。第二是彼所引生故。今猶未得相等。又是依他起性。故彼論言。遍計所執五事不攝。依他起性四事所攝。若依他起世智所緣而說非空。甚可嗤笑。諸法實相非是世間。心智所行如前屢辨。故不應說。實有依他論說依他。亦凡智境據自證受。故不相違。依他起性即心心法從緣起時。變似種種相名等塵實自證受而增上慢。謂取外塵。然諸外遮遍計所執。無體相故非所緣緣。故非聖凡智所行境。一切有漏心及心法。唯能證受自所現塵。未能如實證余心境。無漏世智相應心品。由性離染自他俱證。故說依他凈智所了。與論所說理不相乖。汝嗤笑言。自呈愚昧。非顯我說與理相違。若從緣生心及心法。同遍計執皆自性空。便似空花何能繫縛。三有含識生死輪迴。是故依他非無體實。論者本意決定應然。若不爾者。何緣故說。妄分別縛證空能除。誰睹龜毛能計能縛。誰見兔角能證能除。由是應知。有心心法。但無心外所執諸塵。云何定知諸法唯識。處處經說。於此何疑。故契經言。佛告善現。無毛端量實物可依。愚夫異生造諸業行

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本是凡夫的智慧，還是聖人的智慧所行？都不是。因為沒有（能取、所取）相的緣故。依他起性（緣起而生，非實有）是何種智慧所行？都是（世俗智慧）所行。然而不是出世聖智所行。又說五事（名、相、分別、正智、如如）中，哪些是所取（被認知），哪些是能取（能認知）？三事（名、相、分別）是所取。分別正智（能分別事物的智慧）通於能取和所取。名和相是分別所取，正智有二種，一是緣于真如（事物本性），第二是真如所引發的。現在還沒有得到平等性，又是依他起性。所以彼論說，遍計所執（虛妄分別）五事不攝，依他起性四事所攝。如果依他起性是世俗智慧所緣，而說它不是空性，那就很可笑了。諸法的真實相不是世間心智所能行，如前多次辨析。所以不應該說實有依他，論說依他，也是凡夫智慧的境界，根據各自的證悟和領受，所以不相違背。依他起性即心和心法，從因緣生起時，變現出種種像名等塵，實際上是各自證悟和領受，而增上慢（虛妄的執著），認為取到了外塵。然而諸外塵遮止了遍計所執，因為沒有自體相，所以不是所緣緣（認識的對象），所以不是聖人和凡夫智慧所行的境界。一切有漏心（有煩惱的心）及心法，只能證悟和領受自己所顯現的塵境，不能如實地證悟其他的心境。無漏世智（沒有煩惱的世間智慧）相應的心品，由於本性遠離染污，自己和他人都能證悟，所以說依他起性是清凈智慧所了知的，與論中所說不相違背。你嗤笑，是自己顯露愚昧，不是顯示我說與道理相違背。如果從因緣生起的心和心法，同遍計所執一樣都是自性空，就好像空中的花朵一樣，怎麼能繫縛三有（欲界、色界、無色界）含識，生死輪迴呢？所以依他起性不是沒有體性實有的。論者的本意一定是這樣。如果不是這樣，為什麼說妄分別能束縛，證悟空效能夠解除束縛呢？誰見過烏龜的毛能計算能束縛？誰見過兔子的角能證悟能解除？由此應該知道，有心和心法，但沒有心外所執著的諸塵。怎麼能確定諸法唯識呢？處處經中都這樣說，對此有什麼懷疑呢？所以契經說，佛告訴善現（須菩提），沒有毛髮端那麼小的實物可以依靠，愚夫異生（凡夫）造作諸業行。

【English Translation】 English version Is it the domain of ordinary wisdom or sacred wisdom? It is not the domain of either, because it lacks characteristics (of grasper and grasped). What wisdom operates on the dependent nature (arising from conditions, not inherently existent)? Both (mundane wisdom) operate on it. However, it is not the domain of transcendent sacred wisdom. Furthermore, among the five aspects (name, form, discrimination, right knowledge, suchness), how many are grasped and how many are grasping? Three aspects (name, form, discrimination) are grasped. Discriminating right knowledge (wisdom that distinguishes things) encompasses both grasper and grasped. Name and form are discriminated as grasped, and right knowledge has two aspects: first, it is based on suchness (the true nature of things), and second, it is generated by suchness. Now, it has not yet attained equality, and it is also of dependent nature. Therefore, that treatise says that the completely imputed nature (false discrimination) is not included in the five aspects, while the dependent nature is included in the four aspects. If the dependent nature is the object of mundane wisdom and is said not to be empty, it is laughable. The true nature of phenomena is not the domain of worldly mind and wisdom, as has been repeatedly explained before. Therefore, it should not be said that the dependent nature exists in reality. The treatise speaks of the dependent nature as being within the realm of ordinary wisdom, based on self-awareness and acceptance, so there is no contradiction. The dependent nature, that is, the mind and mental factors, when arising from conditions, appear as various forms, names, and so on. In reality, it is self-awareness and acceptance, but with an increase in arrogance (false attachment), it is thought that external dust is being grasped. However, these external dusts prevent the completely imputed nature, because they have no inherent characteristics, so they are not the object of perception, and therefore not the domain of sacred or ordinary wisdom. All contaminated minds (minds with afflictions) and mental factors can only realize and accept the dust that appears to them, and cannot truly realize other minds and environments. The mind associated with uncontaminated worldly wisdom (worldly wisdom without afflictions), because of its nature of being free from defilement, can realize both itself and others, so it is said that the dependent nature is understood by pure wisdom, which is not contrary to what is said in the treatise. Your ridicule only reveals your own ignorance, and does not show that my words contradict reason. If the mind and mental factors arising from conditions are all inherently empty like the completely imputed nature, then how can they bind sentient beings in the three realms (desire realm, form realm, formless realm) to the cycle of birth and death, just like flowers in the sky? Therefore, the dependent nature is not without substance and reality. The original intention of the treatise must be this. If not, why would it be said that false discrimination can bind, and realizing emptiness can release the binding? Who has ever seen turtle hair that can be counted and bound? Who has ever seen rabbit horns that can be realized and released? From this, it should be known that there are mind and mental factors, but there are no external dusts that are clung to outside the mind. How can it be determined that all phenomena are only mind? It is said everywhere in the sutras, so what doubt is there about this? Therefore, the sutra says, the Buddha told Subhuti, 'There is no real object as small as a hair's breadth to rely on, and foolish ordinary beings create various karmic actions.'

。唯有顛倒與彼為依。顛倒即是虛妄分別。虛妄分別即心心法。又契經言。無有少法自性可得。唯有能造。能造即是心及心法。又契經說三界唯心。如是等經其數無量。是故諸法唯識理成。豈不決定執一切法實唯有識亦成顛倒。是則應如色等諸法顛倒境故其體實無。又境既無識云何有。不應一識二分合成。勿當失於心自一相。若言識體實無二分。能緣所緣行相空故。但隨世俗同所了知有能緣心故說唯識。則應亦說境界非無。世俗同知有心境故。若許實有少分識體。應說此體。其相如何。既不可言能識所識。如何定說唯有識耶。諸契經言。唯有識者。為令觀識舍彼外塵。既舍外塵妄心隨息。妄心息故證會中道。故契經言。

未達境唯心　　起二種分別　達境唯心已　　分別亦不生　知諸法唯心　　便舍外塵相　由此息分別　　悟平等真空

愚夫異生貪著境味。受諸欲樂無舍離心。生死輪迴沒三有海。受諸劇苦解脫無因。如來慈悲。方便為說諸法唯識。令舍外塵。舍外塵已妄識隨滅。妄識滅故便證涅槃。故契經言。

如世有良醫　　妙藥投眾病　諸佛亦如是　　為物說唯心

雖說極微亦可分析。據方所故。如舍如瓶。此難極微可成多分。是假非實。不可全無。若不爾者。心及心法。一剎那中

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：只有顛倒才與它（實有）互為依存。顛倒就是虛妄分別。虛妄分別就是心和心法。而且契經上說，沒有絲毫法具有自性可以獲得，只有能造作（者）。能造作的就是心和心法。還有契經說，三界唯有心。像這樣的經典，數量無量。因此，諸法唯識的道理成立。難道執著一切法真實唯有識，不也成了顛倒嗎？如果是這樣，那麼就應該像色等諸法一樣，因為是顛倒的境界，所以它的本體實際上是沒有的。而且境界既然沒有，識又怎麼會有呢？不應該說一個識由兩個部分合成，不要喪失了心自身單一的體相。如果說識的本體實際上沒有能緣和所緣這兩個部分，因為能緣和所緣的行相是空無的，只是隨順世俗共同認知有能緣的心，所以才說唯識，那麼也應該說境界並非沒有，因為世俗共同認知有心和境界。如果允許真實存在少部分的識體，就應該說這個識體的相狀如何。既然不能說是能識和所識，如何能確定地說唯有識呢？諸契經說唯有識，是爲了讓人們觀察識，捨棄外在的塵境。既然捨棄了外在的塵境，虛妄的心念就會隨之止息。虛妄的心念止息了，就能證悟契合中道。所以契經上說：『未達境唯心，起二種分別；達境唯心已，分別亦不生；知諸法唯心，便舍外塵相；由此息分別，悟平等真空。』愚癡的凡夫貪戀執著于外境的滋味，享受各種慾望的快樂，沒有捨棄遠離的心，在生死輪迴中沉沒於三有（欲有、色有、無色有）之海，遭受各種劇烈的痛苦，沒有解脫的原因。如來慈悲，方便地為他們說諸法唯識，讓他們捨棄外在的塵境。捨棄外在的塵境后，虛妄的識念就會隨之滅除。虛妄的識念滅除后，就能證得涅槃。所以契經上說：『如世有良醫，妙藥投眾病；諸佛亦如是，為物說唯心。』雖然說極微（物質的最小單位）也可以分析，因為它有方位和處所。比如房屋和瓶子。這種說法難以成立，因為極微可以分解成多個部分，是虛假的而不是真實的。但也不能完全沒有，如果不是這樣，心和心法，在一剎那間

【English Translation】 English version: Only delusion is dependent on it (substantial existence). Delusion is false discrimination (vikalpa). False discrimination is mind and mental phenomena (citta-caitta). Moreover, the sutras say that there is not a single dharma (phenomenon) that has self-nature (svabhava) that can be obtained; there is only that which can create (kartr). That which can create is mind and mental phenomena. Furthermore, the sutras say that the Three Realms (trayo dhātu) are only mind. Such sutras are countless. Therefore, the principle that all dharmas are only consciousness (vijnana) is established. Does not the determined clinging to the idea that all dharmas are truly only consciousness also become a delusion? If so, then it should be like form (rupa) and other dharmas, because they are the object of delusion, their substance is actually non-existent. And since the object is non-existent, how can consciousness exist? It should not be said that one consciousness is composed of two parts, lest we lose the single characteristic of the mind itself. If it is said that the substance of consciousness actually has no two parts, because the aspects of the grasper (grahaka) and the grasped (grahya) are empty, but following worldly convention, it is said that there is only consciousness because there is a mind that grasps, then it should also be said that the realm is not non-existent, because worldly convention recognizes both mind and realm. If it is admitted that there is actually a small part of the substance of consciousness, it should be said what the characteristics of this substance are. Since it cannot be said to be the grasper and the grasped, how can it be definitively said that there is only consciousness? The sutras that say there is only consciousness are to cause one to observe consciousness and abandon external dust (bahirdhā). Since external dust is abandoned, deluded thoughts cease. Because deluded thoughts cease, one realizes the Middle Way (madhyama). Therefore, the sutras say: 『Not understanding that the realm is only mind, two kinds of discriminations arise; having understood that the realm is only mind, discriminations do not arise; knowing that all dharmas are only mind, one abandons the appearance of external dust; thereby, discriminations cease, and one awakens to equal emptiness (samata-sunyata).』 Foolish ordinary beings (prthagjana) are greedy and attached to the taste of objects, enjoying various pleasures of desire, without the intention of abandoning and leaving them, and are submerged in the sea of the Three Existences (tri-bhava) (desire realm, form realm, formless realm) in the cycle of birth and death, suffering all kinds of intense pain, without the cause of liberation. The Tathagata (Tathāgata), out of compassion, expediently teaches them that all dharmas are only consciousness, causing them to abandon external dust. After external dust is abandoned, deluded consciousness is extinguished. After deluded consciousness is extinguished, one attains Nirvana (nirvana). Therefore, the sutras say: 『As in the world there is a good physician, who applies wonderful medicine to all diseases, so too are the Buddhas, who teach only mind for the sake of beings.』 Although it is said that even the ultimate particle (paramanu) can be analyzed because it has a location and place, like a house or a bottle, this statement is difficult to establish because the ultimate particle can be divided into multiple parts, and is therefore false rather than real. But it cannot be completely non-existent. If it were not so, mind and mental phenomena, in a single instant,

時分攝故。如歲月等眾分合成。亦可全無。成大過失。如是等類隨見不同。分隔聖言令成多分。互興諍論各執一邊。既不能除惡見塵垢。誰能契當諸佛世尊所說大乘清深妙旨。未會真理隨己執情。自是非他深可怖畏。應舍執著空有兩邊。領悟大乘不二中道。如契經說。菩薩當知。身見為根所生諸見。感匱法業繫縛世間。輕彼撥無諸法邪見。及於此見稱讚流通。因是所生感匱法業。經無量劫墜那落迦。惡趣輪迴受大憂苦。昔微善力來至人中。愚鈍盲聾多諸憂苦。身形卑陋人不喜觀。鄙拙言辭聞皆不悅。或宿曾種增上善根。來生人間受殊勝報。由昔攝受謗法業因。偏執如來破相。空教。非毀所說顯實法門。令諸世間非法謂法。法謂非法。非義謂義。義謂非義。自損損他深可悲愍。然佛所說無不甚深。二諦法門最為難測。今且自勵依了義經。略辨指歸息諸諍論。世俗諦者。謂從緣生世出世間色心等法。親證離說展轉可言。親證為先後方起說。此世俗諦亦有亦生。假令所成猶諸幻事。從分別起如夢所為。有相可言名世俗諦。勝義諦者。謂聖所知分別名言。皆所不及自內所證。不由他緣無相絕言。名勝義諦。如是略說。二諦法門。正法學徒同無所諍。依前世俗染凈法生。依后勝義證於寂滅。是故聖說心境有三。一者有言有相心境

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因為時間分割的緣故，就像年、月等眾多分段合成一樣，（如果）完全沒有（智慧），就會造成大的過失。像這些情況，隨著見解的不同，把神聖的言教分割成許多部分，互相爭論，各自堅持一邊，這樣既不能去除錯誤的見解和塵垢，誰又能契合諸佛世尊所說的大乘清凈深奧的妙旨呢？不明白真正的道理，隨著自己的執著和情感，認為自己是對的，別人是錯的，這是非常可怕的。應該捨棄執著，擺脫空和有兩邊的偏見，領悟大乘不二的中道。正如契經所說：『菩薩應當知道，以身見（Sakkāya-diṭṭhi，認為五蘊為我）為根本所產生的各種見解，會招感匱乏佛法的業，束縛世間。輕視、否定諸法的邪見，以及對此見解的稱讚和流通，因此所產生的招感匱乏佛法的業，會使人經歷無數劫墜入那落迦（Naraka，地獄），在惡趣中輪迴，遭受巨大的憂愁和痛苦。過去微小的善的力量使他來到人間，卻愚鈍、盲聾，有很多憂愁和痛苦，身形卑微醜陋，人們不喜歡看，言辭粗俗笨拙，聽了都不高興。』或者前世曾經種下增上的善根，來生人間享受殊勝的果報，但由於過去接受了誹謗佛法的業因，偏執如來破相、空性的教義，詆譭所說的顯明真實的法門，使世間認為不是佛法的當成佛法，認為佛法的當成不是佛法，認為沒有意義的當成有意義，認為有意義的當成沒有意義，自己損害自己，也損害他人，實在令人悲憫。然而佛所說的一切都非常深奧，二諦（Dve Satya，勝義諦和世俗諦）的法門最為難以測度。現在姑且自我勉勵，依靠了義經（Nītārtha Sūtra，究竟了義的經典），簡略地辨明其要旨，平息各種爭論。世俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya）是指從因緣而生的世間和出世間的色法和心法等，親自證悟后才能說，輾轉可以言說。先有親證，然後才開始說，這世俗諦既有也是生滅的，假借因緣所成，就像各種幻象一樣，從分別念產生，就像夢中所為。有相可以言說的，叫做世俗諦。勝義諦（Paramārtha-satya）是指聖者所知，分別名言都無法企及，自己內心所證悟的，不依賴其他因緣，沒有相狀，言語斷絕，叫做勝義諦。這樣簡略地說，二諦的法門，正法修學者之間沒有爭論。依靠前面的世俗諦，產生染污和清凈的法，依靠後面的勝義諦，證得寂滅。所以聖人說心和境有三種：第一種是有言語有相狀的心境。

【English Translation】 English version: Because of the division of time, just as years, months, and other segments are combined, (if) there is a complete lack (of wisdom), it will cause great faults. Like these situations, with differing views, dividing the sacred teachings into many parts, arguing with each other, each insisting on one side, in this way, not only can they not remove erroneous views and defilements, but who can accord with the profound and subtle essence of the Great Vehicle spoken by all the Buddhas and World Honored Ones? Not understanding the true principle, following one's own attachments and emotions, thinking oneself is right and others are wrong, this is very frightening. One should abandon attachments, get rid of the prejudices of both emptiness and existence, and comprehend the non-dual Middle Way of the Great Vehicle. As the sutra says: 'Bodhisattvas should know that the various views arising from the root of self-view (Sakkāya-diṭṭhi, considering the five aggregates as self) will attract the karma of lacking the Dharma, binding the world. Disparaging and denying the heretical views of all dharmas, as well as praising and circulating these views, the karma of lacking the Dharma produced thereby will cause one to fall into Naraka (hell) for countless kalpas, and to be reborn in evil realms, suffering great sorrow and pain. The small power of past good deeds brings him to the human world, but he is dull, blind, deaf, and has many sorrows and pains. His body is humble and ugly, people do not like to look at him, and his words are crude and clumsy, and no one is pleased to hear them.' Or, in the past, he had planted increasing good roots, and in the next life, he will enjoy superior rewards in the human world, but because he accepted the karmic cause of slandering the Dharma in the past, he is prejudiced against the Tathagata's teachings of breaking form and emptiness, and he slanders the Dharma doors that reveal the truth, causing the world to regard what is not the Dharma as the Dharma, and what is the Dharma as not the Dharma, to regard what is meaningless as meaningful, and what is meaningful as meaningless, harming oneself and harming others, which is truly pitiful. However, everything the Buddha said is very profound, and the Dharma door of the Two Truths (Dve Satya, the ultimate truth and the conventional truth) is the most difficult to measure. Now, let us encourage ourselves, relying on the definitive meaning sutras (Nītārtha Sūtra, sutras of ultimate and definitive meaning), to briefly clarify its essence and quell all disputes. Conventional truth (Saṃvṛti-satya) refers to the worldly and transcendental dharmas of form and mind, etc., which arise from conditions, and can be spoken after personal realization, and can be spoken about in turn. First there is personal realization, and then one begins to speak. This conventional truth both exists and arises and ceases, and is made up of borrowed causes, just like various illusions, arising from discrimination, just like what is done in a dream. What has form and can be spoken of is called conventional truth. Ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya) refers to what is known by the sages, which cannot be reached by discriminating words, which is realized in one's own mind, which does not depend on other conditions, which has no form, and which is cut off from words, is called ultimate truth. Thus, briefly speaking, there is no dispute between practitioners of the true Dharma regarding the Dharma door of the Two Truths. Relying on the previous conventional truth, defiled and pure dharmas arise, and relying on the latter ultimate truth, one attains nirvana. Therefore, the sages say that there are three kinds of mind and object: the first is the mind and object with words and forms.

。二者無言有相心境。三者無言無相心境。初于名言能有覺悟亦有隨眠。次於名言雖有隨眠而無覺悟。後於名言隨眠覺悟一向永無。初二緣世俗。后一緣勝義。復有永離言說隨眠。后所得心通緣二諦。若於世俗起堅執見。及於世俗起不順見。此二俱名虛妄分別。是生一切無義利門。繫縛有情令不解脫。空無我見能悉斷除。令諸有情離三有縛。自證究竟寂滅涅槃。亦轉化他令得解脫。拔除正習障根本故。若於世俗起不順見。此于勝義定有乖違。為明此見。故說頌曰。

法成一成無　　違真亦違俗　故與有一異　　二俱不可言

論曰。若執諸法與其有性。定為一者。法則成一。定為異者。法則成無。是即違真。亦復違俗。所以者何。若一切法與有性一。色應如聲是聲非色。聲應如色。是色非聲。即有性故。法應成一若一切法。與有性異。即色聲等。體悉成無。非有性故。如空花等。若執諸法與一性等。定一異過。如應當知。是故有等與法一異。二種妄見違俗及真。俱是俱非相違戲論。過同一異。故不別論。于勝義中有無等寂。一切問難皆不得成。為顯此義。故說頌曰。

有非有俱非　　諸宗皆寂滅　于中欲興難　　畢竟不能申

論曰。勝義理中無少有法。以一切法本性無性。故有見宗於斯寂滅。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：二者處於無言但有相的心境。三者處於無言且無相的心境。最初，對於名言（nama-rupa，名和色，指一切有形和無形的事物）能夠有所覺悟，但也存在隨眠（anusaya，煩惱的潛在傾向）。其次，對於名言雖然存在隨眠，但沒有覺悟。最後，對於名言，隨眠和覺悟都永遠不會產生。最初的兩種情況是基於世俗諦（samvrti-satya，相對真理），最後一種情況是基於勝義諦（paramartha-satya，絕對真理）。還有一種是永遠脫離言語概念的隨眠。證得這種境界后，所得的心能夠普遍地認知二諦。如果對於世俗諦產生堅固的執著，或者對於世俗諦產生不順從的見解，這兩種情況都叫做虛妄分別（vikalpa，錯誤的認知）。這是產生一切無意義和無利益的途徑，束縛有情（sattva，眾生）使他們無法解脫。空（sunyata，空性）和無我（anatman，無我性）的見解能夠完全斷除這些虛妄分別，使所有有情脫離三有（trai-bhavya，欲界、色界、無色界）的束縛，親自證得究竟寂滅的涅槃（nirvana，解脫）。也能轉化他人，使他們獲得解脫，因為這能拔除正確的習氣和障礙的根本。如果對於世俗諦產生不順從的見解，這必定與勝義諦相違背。爲了闡明這種見解，所以說了這首偈頌：『法若成立為一，或成立為無，都違背真理，也違背世俗。所以，說事物與「有」是一或異，這兩種說法都不可取。』論曰：如果執著諸法與其「有性」必定是一體的，那麼法則會成為一體。如果執著必定是不同的，那麼法則會成為虛無。這既違背了真理，也違背了世俗。為什麼這麼說呢？如果一切法與「有性」是一體的，那麼色（rupa，物質）應該像聲（shabda，聲音）一樣，是聲音而不是顏色；聲音應該像顏色一樣，是顏色而不是聲音。因為它們都具有「有性」，法則應該成為一體。如果一切法與「有性」是不同的，那麼色、聲等事物的本體都會成為虛無，因為它們不具有「有性」，就像空花一樣。如果執著諸法與「一性」等同，那麼必定會犯下一和異的過失，應該明白這一點。因此，說「有」等同於法，或者與法相異，這兩種虛妄的見解都違背了世俗諦和勝義諦，都是既是又非的相互矛盾的戲論。過失與一異相同，所以不單獨討論。在勝義諦中，有和無等概念都寂滅了，一切問難都無法成立。爲了闡明這個道理，所以說了這首偈頌：『有、非有、俱非有，各種宗派都寂滅。如果想在其中提出疑問，最終也無法表達。』論曰：在勝義諦的道理中，沒有絲毫的法存在，因為一切法的本性都是無自性的。所以，持有「有」見解的宗派在這裡寂滅。

【English Translation】 English version: The second is a state of mind that is without words but has characteristics. The third is a state of mind that is without words and without characteristics. Initially, there is both awareness and latent tendencies (anusaya) regarding names and forms (nama-rupa, referring to all tangible and intangible things). Secondly, although there are latent tendencies regarding names and forms, there is no awareness. Finally, regarding names and forms, latent tendencies and awareness are both permanently absent. The first two are related to conventional truth (samvrti-satya, relative truth), and the last one is related to ultimate truth (paramartha-satya, absolute truth). Furthermore, there is a permanent separation from the latent tendencies of language. The mind attained after this universally cognizes the two truths. If one develops a firm attachment to conventional truth, or if one develops a non-compliant view towards conventional truth, both of these are called false discriminations (vikalpa, incorrect cognitions). These are the gateways to all meaningless and unprofitable things, binding sentient beings (sattva, beings) and preventing them from liberation. The views of emptiness (sunyata, emptiness) and selflessness (anatman, no-self) can completely eliminate these false discriminations, liberating all sentient beings from the bonds of the three realms (trai-bhavya, the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm), personally realizing the ultimate, peaceful nirvana (nirvana, liberation). It can also transform others, enabling them to attain liberation, because it eradicates the root of correct habits and obstacles. If one develops a non-compliant view towards conventional truth, this will definitely contradict ultimate truth. To clarify this view, the following verse is spoken: 『If a phenomenon is established as one, or established as non-existent, both contradict the truth and also contradict convention. Therefore, saying that things are either one with or different from 'existence' is unacceptable.』 The treatise says: If one insists that phenomena and their 'existence' are definitely one, then the law will become one. If one insists that they are definitely different, then the law will become non-existent. This contradicts both truth and convention. Why is this so? If all phenomena are one with 'existence,' then form (rupa, matter) should be like sound (shabda, sound), being sound and not color; sound should be like color, being color and not sound. Because they all possess 'existence,' the law should become one. If all phenomena are different from 'existence,' then the essence of things like form and sound will all become non-existent, because they do not possess 'existence,' like a flower in the sky. If one insists that phenomena are identical to 'oneness,' then one will definitely commit the fault of one and different, which should be understood. Therefore, saying that 'existence' is the same as or different from phenomena, both of these false views contradict conventional truth and ultimate truth, and are both contradictory and nonsensical fabrications. The fault is the same as with one and different, so it is not discussed separately. In ultimate truth, concepts like existence and non-existence are all pacified, and all questions cannot be established. To clarify this principle, the following verse is spoken: 『Existence, non-existence, and neither existence nor non-existence, all schools of thought are pacified. If one tries to raise questions within them, one will ultimately be unable to express them.』 The treatise says: In the principle of ultimate truth, there is not the slightest phenomenon that exists, because the nature of all phenomena is without inherent existence. Therefore, schools of thought that hold the view of 'existence' are pacified here.

依有見故非有見生。此見既亡彼見隨滅。真若非有聖智不行。聖智所行必非非有。故非有見不證其真。聖智觀真不觀非有。簡俗有故說真非有。真非有言還依俗說。真非有教能順趣真。是故諸經多說非有。有非有見於此既除。俱是俱非皆應類遣。以其有等皆可表詮。真絕表詮故非有等。一切惡見擾動其心。于正理中廣興邪難。皆依如是有等見生。此見既除彼亦隨滅。雖欲猛勵抗論真空。由無所依措言何寄。如空無底足不可依。諸有大心發弘誓者。欲窮來際利樂有情。應正斷除妄見塵垢。應妙悟入善逝真空。為滿所求當勤修學。

已除見有累　　復遣執無塵　善開妙中道　　愿世咸歸寂

聖天菩薩造論既周。重敘摧邪。復說頌曰。

我在為燎邪宗火　　沃以如來正教酥　又扇因明廣大風　　誰敢如蛾投猛焰

三藏法師。于鷲嶺北得聞此論。隨聽隨翻。自慶成功。而說頌曰。

聖天護法依智悲　　為挫群邪制斯論　四句百非皆殄滅　　其猶劫火燎纖毫　故我殉命訪真宗　　欣遇隨聞隨譯訖　愿此速與諸舍識　　俱升無上佛菩提

大乘廣百論釋論卷第十

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本因為執著于『有』的見解，所以才會產生『非有』的見解。當這種『有』的見解消失時，那『非有』的見解也隨之滅亡。如果真理真的不存在，那麼聖人的智慧就無法執行。聖人的智慧所執行的，必定不是『非有』。所以，執著于『非有』的見解，就無法證得真理。聖人的智慧觀察真理，而不是觀察『非有』。爲了區分世俗的『有』，所以說真理是『非有』。說真理是『非有』，仍然是依據世俗的說法。『真非有』的教導能夠順應趨向真理。因此，許多佛經都說『非有』。當『有』和『非有』的見解在這裡被去除時，『既是』和『既非』的見解也應該依此類推去除。因為『有』等等都可以用語言表達，而真理超越了語言的表達，所以不能用『非有』等等來表達。一切邪惡的見解擾亂人們的心，在正確的道理中廣泛地興起邪惡的辯難，都是依據『如是』、『有』等等見解而產生的。當這些見解被去除時，那些邪惡的辯難也隨之滅亡。即使想要猛烈地辯論真空，由於沒有所依賴的基礎，又能把言語寄託在哪裡呢？就像虛空沒有底部，腳無法依靠一樣。那些有大心，發廣大誓願的人，想要在未來的時間裡利益眾生，使他們快樂，就應該正確地斷除虛妄見解的塵垢，應該巧妙地領悟進入善逝（Sugata）的真空。爲了滿足所求，應當勤奮地修行學習。

已經去除執著于『有』的累贅，又去除執著于『無』的塵埃，　　善於開顯微妙的中道，愿世間都歸於寂靜。

聖天（Āryadeva）菩薩造論已經完成，再次敘述摧毀邪說，又說了頌：

我在這裡是爲了燃燒邪惡宗派的火焰，用如來（Tathāgata）的正教甘露來澆灌它，　　又扇動因明（Hetuvidyā）廣大的風，誰敢像飛蛾一樣投入這猛烈的火焰？

三藏法師在鷲嶺（Gṛdhrakūṭa）北面聽聞此論，隨聽隨翻譯，為自己的成功而慶賀，並說了頌：

聖天（Āryadeva）和護法（Dharmapāla）依靠智慧和慈悲，爲了挫敗各種邪說而製作這部論，　　四句百非都被消滅，就像劫火燃燒細小的毫毛一樣。　　所以我冒著生命危險尋訪真宗，欣喜地遇到並隨聽隨翻譯完成。　　愿此論迅速地給予那些捨棄了錯誤見解的人，一起升到無上的佛菩提（Buddhbodhi）。

《大乘廣百論釋論》卷第十

【English Translation】 English version Because of clinging to the view of 'existence', the view of 'non-existence' arises. When this view of 'existence' disappears, that view of 'non-existence' also vanishes. If the truth truly did not exist, then the wisdom of the saints would not be able to operate. What the wisdom of the saints operates on must not be 'non-existence'. Therefore, clinging to the view of 'non-existence' cannot lead to the realization of truth. The wisdom of the saints observes the truth, not 'non-existence'. In order to distinguish it from the mundane 'existence', it is said that the truth is 'non-existence'. Saying that the truth is 'non-existence' is still based on mundane speech. The teaching of 'truth as non-existence' can accord with and lead towards the truth. Therefore, many sutras speak of 'non-existence'. When the views of 'existence' and 'non-existence' are removed here, the views of 'both' and 'neither' should also be removed in the same way. Because 'existence' and so on can all be expressed in language, but the truth transcends linguistic expression, so it cannot be expressed by 'non-existence' and so on. All evil views disturb people's minds, and widely raise evil arguments in correct reasoning, all arising from clinging to views such as 'thus it is', 'existence', and so on. When these views are removed, those evil arguments also vanish. Even if one wants to vehemently argue about emptiness, since there is no basis to rely on, where can one place one's words? It is like the void having no bottom, where the feet cannot rely. Those who have great minds and make great vows, wanting to benefit sentient beings and bring them happiness in the future, should correctly cut off the dust and defilements of false views, and should skillfully awaken to and enter the emptiness of the Sugata (善逝). In order to fulfill what is sought, one should diligently practice and study.

Having removed the burden of clinging to 'existence', and also removed the dust of clinging to 'non-existence', Skillfully revealing the wonderful Middle Way, may the world all return to tranquility.

Āryadeva (聖天) having completed the treatise, again narrates the destruction of heterodoxies, and speaks the following verse:

I am here to ignite the fire that burns away evil doctrines, watering it with the nectar of the Tathāgata's (如來) correct teachings, And fanning it with the vast wind of Hetuvidyā (因明), who dares to throw themselves into this fierce flame like a moth?

The Tripitaka Master, having heard this treatise north of Gṛdhrakūṭa (鷲嶺), translated it as he listened, celebrating his success, and spoke the following verse:

Āryadeva (聖天) and Dharmapāla (護法), relying on wisdom and compassion, composed this treatise to defeat various heterodoxies, The four sentences and hundred negations are all annihilated, just like a cosmic fire burning fine hairs. Therefore, I risked my life to seek the true doctrine, joyfully encountering it and completing the translation as I listened. May this treatise quickly grant those who have abandoned wrong views, to ascend together to unsurpassed Buddhbodhi (佛菩提).

Mahayana Hundred Verses Treatise, Commentary, Volume 10