T30n1572_百字論
大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1572 百字論
No. 1572
百字論一卷
提婆菩薩造
後魏北印度三藏菩提流支譯
我今歸依聰睿師 厥名提婆有大智 能以百字演實法 除諸邪見向實相
說曰。何故造論。為破我見等。一切諸法。各有自相。
僧佉曰。一切法一相。是我要誓說。以何因緣。立一切法一相。以盡同共有一故。喻如瓶衣等。物體各有一。以是義故。常知一切法名為一相。是故一義成。內曰。非一。何以故。汝要誓言。立一相義。為一為二。若是一者。唯有要誓。不應有一。以是因緣。汝所立一。此義即破。毗舍師曰。汝言一破。我今立異。舍一過故。內曰。汝若立異。我還立一。何以故。汝若離因立異。我亦離因立一。毗舍師曰。我要立異。所以者何。諸法差別。各異相故。喻如象駝鹿馬。如是等類。其相各異。以是故。諸法相異。一切法皆異。是故異義成。內曰。汝以此彼相不同故。言異義成者。以相別故。法各是一。汝所立異。要言則壞。要言壞故。則知異相不立。外曰。以一異相不成故。我今立有相。以法各有相故。當知有相義成。有相成故。當知一異亦成。內曰。汝今立有。必應有因。若無因。而立有我。亦無因而立無。外
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 《百字論》一卷 提婆菩薩造 後魏北印度三藏菩提流支譯 我今歸依聰睿的老師，他的名字是提婆，具有大智慧，能夠用百字來闡述真實的佛法，去除各種邪見，趨向實相。 有人問道：『為什麼要造這部論？』 回答說：『爲了破除我見等一切執著。一切諸法，各有其自身的體相。』 僧佉派（Sāṃkhya，印度古代哲學流派，主張二元論）說：『一切法都是一個相，這是我所要誓言說明的。』 問道：『以什麼因緣來建立一切法是一個相的觀點呢？』 回答說：『因為一切事物最終都共同具有一個本體。』 例如瓶子、衣服等物體，各自有一個本體。因為這個緣故，應當知道一切法都名為一個相。所以，『一』的意義成立。 內道（佛教）反駁說：『並非是一個相。』 問道：『為什麼呢？』 回答說：『你誓言要建立一個相的意義，那麼這個相是一還是二？如果是一，就只有你的誓言，不應該有其他任何事物。因為這個因緣，你所建立的『一』的意義就被破斥了。』 毗舍師派（Vaiśeṣika，印度古代哲學流派，主張實在論和原子論）說：『你認為『一』的觀點被破斥，我現在建立『異』的觀點，捨棄『一』的過失。』 內道反駁說：『如果你要建立『異』的觀點，我還堅持建立『一』的觀點。』 問道：『為什麼呢？』 回答說：『如果你離開原因而建立『異』，我也同樣可以離開原因而建立『一』。 毗舍師派說：『我一定要建立『異』的觀點。』 問道：『為什麼呢？』 回答說：『因為諸法有差別，各自有不同的體相。例如大象、駱駝、鹿、馬等等，它們的體相各不相同。因為這個緣故，諸法的體相是不同的，一切法都是『異』。所以，『異』的意義成立。』 內道反駁說：『你因為彼此體相不同，就說『異』的意義成立，但因為體相有差別，法各自是一個整體。你所建立的『異』的誓言就被破壞了。誓言被破壞，就知道『異』的體相不能成立。』 外道（佛教以外的學說）說：『因為『一』和『異』的體相都不能成立，我現在建立『有相』的觀點。因為法各自具有體相，應當知道『有相』的意義成立。『有相』成立，應當知道『一』和『異』也成立。』 內道反駁說：『你現在建立『有』，必定應該有原因。如果沒有原因而建立『有』，我也同樣可以沒有原因而建立『無』。』 外道……
【English Translation】 English version The Treatise in One Hundred Syllables Composed by Bodhisattva Deva Translated by Tripiṭaka Bodhiruci from Northern India during the Later Wei Dynasty I now take refuge in the wise and intelligent teacher, whose name is Deva, possessing great wisdom, capable of expounding the true Dharma with one hundred syllables, removing all wrong views, and turning towards the true reality. Someone asked: 'Why was this treatise composed?' The answer is: 'To break through the attachment to self and all other attachments. All dharmas (phenomena) each have their own intrinsic nature.' The Sāṃkhya (an ancient Indian philosophical school advocating dualism) says: 'All dharmas are of one nature; this is what I vow to explain.' Asked: 'By what cause and condition do you establish the view that all dharmas are of one nature?' The answer is: 'Because all things ultimately share a common essence.' For example, objects such as bottles and clothes each have an essence. For this reason, it should be known that all dharmas are named as one nature. Therefore, the meaning of 'one' is established. The inner school (Buddhism) refutes: 'It is not of one nature.' Asked: 'Why?' The answer is: 'You vow to establish the meaning of one nature, then is this nature one or two? If it is one, then there is only your vow, and there should be nothing else. Because of this cause and condition, the meaning of 'one' that you have established is refuted.' The Vaiśeṣika (an ancient Indian philosophical school advocating realism and atomism) says: 'You think the view of 'one' is refuted; I now establish the view of 'different,' abandoning the fault of 'one.' The inner school refutes: 'If you want to establish the view of 'different,' I still insist on establishing the view of 'one.' Asked: 'Why?' The answer is: 'If you establish 'different' without a cause, I can also establish 'one' without a cause.' The Vaiśeṣika says: 'I must establish the view of 'different.' Asked: 'Why?' The answer is: 'Because dharmas have differences, each having different characteristics. For example, elephants, camels, deer, horses, and so on, their characteristics are different. For this reason, the characteristics of dharmas are different; all dharmas are 'different.' Therefore, the meaning of 'different' is established.' The inner school refutes: 'Because the characteristics of each are different, you say the meaning of 'different' is established, but because the characteristics are different, each dharma is a whole. The vow of 'different' that you have established is broken. When the vow is broken, it is known that the characteristic of 'different' cannot be established.' The outer school (doctrines outside of Buddhism) says: 'Because the characteristics of 'one' and 'different' cannot be established, I now establish the view of 'having characteristics.' Because dharmas each have characteristics, it should be known that the meaning of 'having characteristics' is established. When 'having characteristics' is established, it should be known that 'one' and 'different' are also established.' The inner school refutes: 'You now establish 'having,' there must be a cause. If you establish 'having' without a cause, I can also establish 'non-being' without a cause.' The outer school...
曰。我要言立一切法有。何以故。現見諸法。各有相故。喻如虛空中花。無有體相故。不可得瓶衣等物現有用故。當知一切法。皆是有相。以是因緣故。有義得成。內曰。汝立有者。因有相故。有因無相故。有此二俱有過。若以現相故。成有義者。現相是有。有亦是有。二有理不相成。若言因無。要誓則壞。有無俱非因故。有義則破。外曰。若破我有。汝則立無。無義得成。有還得立。喻如世人飲食。先因粗澀。故有美好。以是故。汝破我有。當知是無。內曰。汝立無者。因何而成。汝若無因。而成無我。亦無因而成有。外曰。云何而知。以無體相故。喻如熱時炎。自無體相。何況而有。少水可得。以是因緣故。一切法無一塵相可得。是故我立無義成。內曰。汝所立無。為有因。為無因。若言無因。空有要誓。若言有因。要誓則壞。汝若無無亦不成。外曰。一切法有因。汝破有無者。此義則不然。何以故。如有泥縷蒲葦等故。知一切法皆有因。內曰。無因汝。言有因故有。有因則是無。若泥中先有瓶泥蒲縷等。皆非是因。何以故。因中先有故。若因中先無。亦非是因喻。如沙中無油。沙非油因。若言亦有亦無。義亦不成。何以故。有二過故。複次有亦不生。無亦不生。若從無因生。因復何用。為若從有因生。要誓言則
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 外曰：我要主張一切法都是存在的。為什麼呢？因為我們能親眼見到諸法，它們各自都有其相狀。比如虛空中的花，因為沒有實體和相狀，所以不可得；而瓶子、衣服等事物，現在有實際的功用，應當知道一切法都是有相的。因為這個緣故，『有』的意義得以成立。 內曰：你主張『有』，是因為『有相』的緣故。那麼，『有』是因為『無相』的緣故嗎？這兩種說法都有過失。如果因為『現相』的緣故，而成立『有』的意義，那麼『現相』是『有』，『有』也是『有』，兩個『有』在道理上不能互相成立。如果說因為『無』，那麼你之前的誓言就破滅了，因為『有』和『無』都不是原因，所以『有』的意義就被破壞了。 外曰：如果破斥我的『有』，你就是主張『無』，那麼『無』的意義就得以成立，『有』也可以重新被建立。比如世人飲食，先是因為粗糙難以下嚥，所以才覺得美好。因此，你破斥我的『有』，應當知道那就是『無』。 內曰：你主張『無』，是根據什麼而成立的呢？如果你沒有原因就成立『無』，那麼『有』也可以沒有原因就成立。 外曰：怎麼知道是這樣呢？因為『無』沒有實體和相狀。比如熱天時的陽焰（熱氣形成的虛幻景象），自身沒有實體和相狀，更何況能有少許水可以得到呢？因為這個緣故，一切法沒有一塵的相狀可以得到，所以我主張『無』的意義成立。 內曰：你所主張的『無』，是有原因的，還是沒有原因的？如果說是沒有原因的，那就違背了你之前的誓言。如果說是有原因的，那麼你之前的誓言就破滅了。如果你沒有『無』，那麼『無』也不能成立。 外曰：一切法都是有原因的，你破斥『有』和『無』，這個道理是不對的。為什麼呢？比如有泥土、絲線、蒲草、蘆葦等，所以知道一切法都是有原因的。 內曰：你說沒有原因，又說因為有原因所以有。有原因就是沒有原因。如果在泥土中先有瓶子，泥土、蒲草、絲線等，都不是原因。為什麼呢？因為原因中先有了結果。如果原因中先沒有結果，也不是原因。比如沙子中沒有油，沙子就不是油的原因。如果說亦有亦無，這個意義也不能成立。為什麼呢？因為有兩個過失。而且，『有』不能生，『無』也不能生。如果從沒有原因而生，原因又有什麼用呢？如果從有原因而生，之前的誓言就...
【English Translation】 English version The Outsider says: I want to assert that all dharmas (phenomena, teachings) exist. Why? Because we directly see all dharmas, each having its own characteristics. For example, flowers in the sky, because they have no substance or characteristics, are unattainable. But things like bottles and clothes have present uses, so we should know that all dharmas have characteristics. Because of this reason, the meaning of 'existence' is established. The Insider says: You assert 'existence' because of 'having characteristics.' Then, does 'existence' exist because of 'not having characteristics'? Both of these statements have faults. If you establish the meaning of 'existence' because of 'present characteristics,' then 'present characteristics' are 'existence,' and 'existence' is also 'existence.' Two 'existences' cannot establish each other in reason. If you say it's because of 'non-existence,' then your previous vow is broken, because neither 'existence' nor 'non-existence' is the cause, so the meaning of 'existence' is destroyed. The Outsider says: If you refute my 'existence,' you are asserting 'non-existence,' then the meaning of 'non-existence' is established, and 'existence' can be re-established. For example, when people eat, they first find it coarse and unpalatable, and then they appreciate the deliciousness. Therefore, when you refute my 'existence,' you should know that it is 'non-existence.' The Insider says: You assert 'non-existence,' based on what is it established? If you establish 'non-existence' without a cause, then 'existence' can also be established without a cause. The Outsider says: How do you know this? Because 'non-existence' has no substance or characteristics. For example, the mirage (a shimmering illusion caused by heat) in hot weather has no substance or characteristics itself, let alone having a little water that can be obtained? Because of this reason, no dharma has even a speck of characteristic that can be obtained, so I assert that the meaning of 'non-existence' is established. The Insider says: The 'non-existence' you assert, does it have a cause, or does it not have a cause? If you say it has no cause, then you violate your previous vow. If you say it has a cause, then your previous vow is broken. If you don't have 'non-existence,' then 'non-existence' cannot be established either. The Outsider says: All dharmas have a cause, and you refute 'existence' and 'non-existence,' this reasoning is incorrect. Why? Because there is clay, thread, reeds, and rushes, so we know that all dharmas have a cause. The Insider says: You say there is no cause, and then you say there is existence because there is a cause. Having a cause is the same as having no cause. If there is a bottle already in the clay, then the clay, reeds, and thread are not the cause. Why? Because the result is already in the cause. If the result is not in the cause, then it is not the cause. For example, there is no oil in the sand, so the sand is not the cause of oil. If you say it is both existent and non-existent, this meaning cannot be established either. Why? Because there are two faults. Moreover, 'existence' cannot arise, and 'non-existence' cannot arise either. If it arises from no cause, then what is the use of a cause? If it arises from a cause, then the previous vow...
壞。汝先言一切法。皆有因生者。此事則不然。外曰。現有瓶衣等用故。則知一切法皆從因生。不相形故成。內曰。汝言有果故有因。此義不成。何以故。相形有故。若以見果有用故。言有因者。果亦是因。果若是因。則無果。無果故則無因。是故因果俱壞。若言從意自在時方。如是等因生。則是相形因。便是有為法。有為則無常。自在時方。相形而有。則不因成。外曰。我所言真實。先舊諸仙。作如是說。此法決定。終無有異。內曰。汝言法爾。此非正說。如我所說。與汝法異。汝法中所有。我法中則無。我法中所有。汝法中則無。何以故。汝言我法爾故。汝法若爾。則但自是。自是而說。則無理趣。若無理趣。則無所知。若有所知。更說勝因。若無勝因。而言法爾。則無道理。外曰。此是我家法。內曰。汝言我家法。其法則不成。汝法不自成。云何能成法。若當離因者。終無有所成。自是其法者。此則非正理。外曰。無法非因生。如兔角。龜毛。石女兒。虛空花等。如是無法。終不可得。以因緣生。如見壓油求麻。作瓶求泥。非以一法為因。能生多法。而物各有因。如泥能成瓶。不為疊因。縷能成疊。不為瓶因。以此類求余法亦爾。內曰。汝言因能生者。因不能生。此因為有所成。為有所壞。若因有所成。成汝亦
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 壞（駁斥）。你先說一切法（dharma，宇宙間的一切事物和現象）都是由因（hetu，原因）而生的，這種說法是不對的。外道（Tirthika，佛教以外的學派）說：現在有瓶子、衣服等作用，因此可知一切法都是從因產生的，因為它們相互依存才能成立。內道（Sva-mata，佛教內部的學派）說：你說因為有果（phala，結果）所以有因，這種說法不成立。為什麼呢？因為它們是相互依存而存在的。如果因為看到果的作用就說有因，那麼果也是因。如果果是因，那就沒有果了。沒有果，也就沒有因。所以因和果都破滅了。如果說是從意（citta，心意）、自在（Isvara，主宰）、時間（kala，時間）和方位（dis，方向）等因產生的，那就是相互依存的因，便是有為法（samskrta-dharma，由因緣和合而成的法）。有為法就是無常（anitya，變化不定）。自在、時間和方位，都是相互依存而存在的，所以不是因所能成就的。外道說：我所說的是真實的，先前的古仙人們都是這樣說的，這種法是決定的，終究不會有不同。內道說：你說『法爾』（dharmata，事物本性如此），這不是正確的說法。如我所說，與你的法不同。你的法中所有的，我的法中就沒有。我的法中所有的，你的法中就沒有。為什麼呢？因為你說你的法是『法爾』。你的法如果是這樣，那就只是你自己的。只是你自己的說法，就沒有道理。如果沒有道理，那就無所知。如果有所知，就應該再說出更殊勝的因。如果沒有殊勝的因，卻說『法爾』，那就沒有道理。外道說：這是我家的法。內道說：你說『我家的法』，這種法是不成立的。你的法不能自己成立，怎麼能成立法呢？如果離開因，終究沒有什麼可以成就。只是堅持自己的法，這不是正確的道理。外道說：沒有無法不是由因生的，比如兔角、龜毛、石女兒、虛空花等。像這樣的無法，終究是不可得的，因為它們不是由因緣生的。比如看到壓榨油來求麻，製作瓶子來求泥，不是用一種法作為因，就能產生多種法。而且事物各有其因，比如泥能做成瓶子，但不能做成布匹的因；線能做成布匹，但不能做成瓶子的因。用這種方式來推求其他的法也是一樣。內道說：你說因能產生果，因是不能產生果的。這個因是爲了有所成就，還是爲了有所破壞？如果因有所成就，成就你也是
【English Translation】 English version Objection: You first stated that all dharmas (everything in the universe) arise from a cause (hetu), but this is not the case. The Tirthikas (non-Buddhist schools) say: Now there are functions of pots, clothes, etc., so it is known that all dharmas arise from causes, because they are established by mutual dependence. The Sva-mata (Buddhist school) says: You say that because there is a result (phala), there is a cause, but this statement is not valid. Why? Because they exist interdependently. If you say there is a cause because you see the function of the result, then the result is also a cause. If the result is a cause, then there is no result. If there is no result, then there is no cause. Therefore, both cause and result are destroyed. If you say it arises from causes such as intention (citta), Isvara (sovereign), time (kala), and direction (dis), then that is an interdependent cause, which is a conditioned dharma (samskrta-dharma). Conditioned dharmas are impermanent (anitya). Isvara, time, and direction exist interdependently, so they cannot be accomplished by a cause. The Tirthika says: What I say is true, the ancient sages of the past all said so, this dharma is definite, and there will never be any difference. The Sva-mata says: You say 'dharmata' (the nature of things is so), this is not a correct statement. As I say, it is different from your dharma. What is in your dharma is not in my dharma. What is in my dharma is not in your dharma. Why? Because you say your dharma is 'dharmata'. If your dharma is like this, then it is only your own. Just your own statement has no reason. If there is no reason, then there is nothing to know. If there is something to know, then you should say a more superior cause. If there is no superior cause, but you say 'dharmata', then there is no reason. The Tirthika says: This is the dharma of my family. The Sva-mata says: You say 'the dharma of my family', this dharma is not established. Your dharma cannot establish itself, how can it establish dharma? If you leave the cause, nothing can be accomplished in the end. Just insisting on one's own dharma is not a correct principle. The Tirthika says: There is no non-existence that is not born of a cause, such as rabbit horns, turtle hair, stone daughters, and empty space flowers. Such non-existence is ultimately unattainable because they are not born of causes and conditions. For example, seeing pressing oil to seek sesame, making bottles to seek mud, it is not possible to use one dharma as a cause to produce multiple dharmas. And things each have their own cause, such as mud can be made into bottles, but cannot be the cause of cloth; thread can be made into cloth, but cannot be the cause of bottles. Use this method to seek other dharmas as well. The Sva-mata says: You say that the cause can produce the result, but the cause cannot produce the result. Is this cause for something to be accomplished, or for something to be destroyed? If the cause is for something to be accomplished, accomplishing you is also
成我。若因有所壞。壞我亦壞汝。以何為喻。如火能燒物。燒汝亦燒我。若於彼處熱。在此亦復然。複次更明此義。若言有因而成。成汝亦成我。因雖有所生。因法不俱成。汝立聲法是常。作要誓說。以何為因。無身是因。以何為喻。虛空為喻。虛空者。無身而常。以是故名聲作常。復有異說。名聲無常。以何故。聲是作法故無常。以何為喻。如瓶因泥輪繩人功水等而成瓶。以作因生故。瓶無常如聲從唇齒喉舌眾緣生故。聲亦無常。非此二因能有所成。汝言真實。其義有成。妄說虛因。理則不立。汝說要誓。有要時無誓。有誓時無要。二字不俱要誓則壞。如因法未生非為因。以滅亦非因。如子未生不名為生。以滅亦非生。以是故無因。外曰。汝雖破因果。我說有我法故。因果則還成。內曰。汝言有我法。以何為體。若以知識為我。知識則無常。知瓶智以滅知疊智始生。若知識非我。我則無知。我若無知。則無苦樂。如是之我。則無體相。若言我與知合故我有知。知與我合故。知亦非知。外曰。有我。所以者何。瓶衣等物。是我所故。當知有我。內曰。有一過故。瓶與有一。不異故有一。若瓶非瓶有一亦應是瓶。是則多瓶。若有一非瓶。是則無瓶。外曰。有一瓶。一故有過。我今立異。舍一過故。內曰。汝說異則無。瓶
有無故無瓶喻。如異比丘異婆羅門。當知無比丘婆羅門。若瓶異有則是無。如刀與鞘。有異可見。瓶有一異。亦應可見。今有一異。不可見故。異義不成。外曰。一異雖壞。現見有瓶。喻如虛空中花。無故不可見。瓶現見故。當知有瓶。內曰。不見。何故不見。汝言現見。為眼見。為識見。若眼見者。死人有眼。亦應見。若識見者。盲人有識。亦應見。若根識一一別不見。和合亦不見。喻如一盲不能見。眾盲亦不見。外曰。有瓶有色故有瓶。內曰。汝言有色故有瓶。色與瓶為一為異。瓶色若一。見余色時。亦應見瓶。若色異瓶。瓶非可見。則無瓶。若以見為瓶。瓶在障處。眼不見時。瓶應非瓶若色與瓶一。瓶壞時余色亦應壞。外曰。我法不生不滅。見亦不壞。不見亦不壞。何以故。我法常有故。因中有果。微細不現。以先有故。后得成大。以是故知有因果。內曰。先有不須作。如泥有瓶不須陶師。如縷有疊不須織師。以瓶疊待功匠成故知因中無果。若因中已有果者。則無未來法。若無未來法。則無生滅。無生滅亦無善惡。無善惡亦無作業罪福果報。如是則一切法無。複次若因中先有微細果。而無粗者。是粗便先無而後有。是則生滅。違汝先說。又若微細先有。則非生法。非生法故。則壞三世。三世若無。當知一切法亦
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有無故無瓶的譬喻。如同其他的比丘（Bhiksu，佛教出家男眾）和婆羅門（Brahmana，古印度社會中的祭司階層）。應當知道沒有比丘和婆羅門。如果瓶子是不同的存在，那就是不存在。如同刀和刀鞘。不同是可以看見的。瓶子的一和異也應該可以看見。現在一和異都不可見，所以，『異』的意義不能成立。外道說：『一和異雖然被破壞了，但現在明明看見有瓶子。』這好比虛空中的花，因為不存在所以看不見。瓶子現在明明可以看見，所以，應當知道有瓶子。內道說：『你看不見。為什麼看不見？你說現在明明可以看見，是用眼睛看見的，還是用意識看見的？如果是用眼睛看見的，死人有眼睛，也應該能看見。如果是用意識看見的，盲人有意識，也應該能看見。如果根和識各自不能看見，那麼和合在一起也不能看見。』這好比一個瞎子不能看見，一群瞎子也不能看見。 外道說：『因為有瓶子和顏色，所以有瓶子。』內道說：『你說因為有顏色所以有瓶子，那麼顏色和瓶子是一樣的還是不同的？如果瓶子的顏色是一樣的，看見其他的顏色時，也應該看見瓶子。如果顏色和瓶子是不同的，瓶子就不是可以看見的，那就沒有瓶子。如果把看見當作瓶子，瓶子在被遮擋的地方，眼睛看不見時，瓶子應該就不是瓶子。如果顏色和瓶子是一樣的，瓶子壞的時候，其他的顏色也應該壞。』外道說：『我的法不生不滅，看見也不會壞，看不見也不會壞。為什麼呢？因為我的法是常有的。因中含有果，雖然微細而不顯現，因為先有，所以後來才能變得粗大。因此，可以知道有因果。』內道說：『如果先有，就不需要製作。如同泥土裡有瓶子，就不需要陶師。如同絲線里有布匹，就不需要織師。因為瓶子和布匹需要工匠才能完成，所以知道因中沒有果。如果因中已經有果，就沒有未來的法。如果沒有未來的法，就沒有生滅。沒有生滅，也就沒有善惡。沒有善惡，也就沒有作業、罪、福和果報。這樣，一切法都不存在。』 再次，如果因中先有微細的果，而沒有粗大的果，那麼粗大的果就是先沒有而後有，這就是生滅，違背了你先前所說。而且，如果微細的果先有，就不是生法。因為不是生法，就破壞了三世（過去、現在、未來）。三世如果不存在，應當知道一切法也不存在。
【English Translation】 English version There is the analogy of a pot without a cause. Like other Bhiksus (Bhiksu, Buddhist monks) and Brahmanas (Brahmana, the priestly class in ancient Indian society). It should be known that there are no Bhiksus and Brahmanas. If the pot is a different existence, then it is non-existent. Like a knife and its sheath. Difference can be seen. The oneness and difference of the pot should also be visible. Now that oneness and difference are not visible, therefore, the meaning of 'difference' cannot be established. The outsider says: 'Although oneness and difference are destroyed, we clearly see the pot now.' This is like a flower in the sky, which is invisible because it does not exist. The pot is clearly visible now, therefore, it should be known that there is a pot. The insider says: 'You cannot see it. Why can't you see it? You say you can clearly see it now, is it seen with the eyes, or with consciousness? If it is seen with the eyes, then a dead person has eyes, and should also be able to see. If it is seen with consciousness, then a blind person has consciousness, and should also be able to see. If the root and consciousness cannot see separately, then they cannot see together.' This is like one blind person cannot see, and a group of blind people cannot see. The outsider says: 'Because there is a pot and color, there is a pot.' The insider says: 'You say that because there is color, there is a pot, then are the color and the pot the same or different? If the color of the pot is the same, then when seeing other colors, one should also see the pot. If the color and the pot are different, then the pot is not visible, and there is no pot. If seeing is taken as the pot, and the pot is in a place that is blocked, when the eyes cannot see it, the pot should not be a pot. If the color and the pot are the same, when the pot is broken, the other colors should also be broken.' The outsider says: 'My Dharma does not arise or cease, seeing will not be destroyed, and not seeing will not be destroyed. Why? Because my Dharma is constant. The cause contains the effect, although it is subtle and not manifest, because it exists first, it can later become coarse. Therefore, it can be known that there is cause and effect.' The insider says: 'If it exists first, then it does not need to be made. Just as there is a pot in the mud, there is no need for a potter. Just as there is cloth in the thread, there is no need for a weaver. Because the pot and cloth need craftsmen to complete them, it is known that there is no effect in the cause. If there is already an effect in the cause, there is no future Dharma. If there is no future Dharma, there is no arising and ceasing. Without arising and ceasing, there is no good and evil. Without good and evil, there is no action, sin, merit, and karmic retribution. In this way, all Dharmas do not exist.' Again, if there is a subtle effect in the cause first, and there is no coarse effect, then the coarse effect is first non-existent and then existent, this is arising and ceasing, which contradicts what you said earlier. Moreover, if the subtle effect exists first, it is not a Dharma of arising. Because it is not a Dharma of arising, it destroys the three times (past, present, future). If the three times do not exist, it should be known that all Dharmas do not exist.
無。若因中先有果。乳中已有酪。若言先無而後有者。當知是作法。以是故一切法因中先有。更不須作。外曰。若因中先有果是過者今說因中先無。而後果生。離無生滅。是故無過。有生滅故。亦有亦無。內曰。無生有生非一時故。若瓶泥中已有。不須輪繩人功等成。若無如龜毛不可紡織令使有用。以是故。有亦不生。無亦不生。又受身為自生從他生。二俱有過。若自生更何用生。以是故自生無身。若不從自生云何而從他生。若言自他生。是亦俱有過。以是故一切法無生。外曰。若無身。不應有生住滅有為三相。若有有為。則有無為。有為無為成故。一切法亦成。內曰。無有為法。汝言三相。為次第生。為一時生。次第亦有過。一時亦有過。若次第生。生時無住滅。住時無生滅。滅時無生住。以是故不得次第生。又若生有住。生自無體。住何所住。生體自無。住云何有。無生無住。如石女兒。是則無法。若有生住為滅所滅。生住既無。滅何能滅。如壞兔角空有壞名。外曰。汝言生住滅次第不可得。有為相如二頭三手不可得。三相亦不可得。若三相一時亦不可得。何以故。若生中有滅。生則非生。若滅中有生。滅則非滅。住中生滅。破亦如是。生滅相違。云何一時。以是故三相次第生不可得。一時生亦不可得。又汝言三
相。為與有為作相。為與無為作相。若與有為作相。生是有為。應有三相。住滅亦爾。如是之相。則為無窮。相若無窮。汝不應說有為法但有三相。要誓則壞。若相相無為。云何有為相而能相無為。外曰。汝若不欲令作有為相應作無為相。何以故。無為遍一切處。無方所故。是故應與無為作相。內曰。無為有方所。我今問汝。虛空為有方所。為無方所。虛空若有方所。應在汝身邊。亦在彼身邊。若爾便是有分。有分則有邊。若言虛空無方所。為汝身遍虛空。虛空遍汝身。若虛空遍汝身。汝身遍虛空。是則有邊際。如瓶衣疊等。有邊故無常。虛空爾者。亦是無常。又復常因能生常果。因若無常。果云何常。如因泥生瓶。泥無常故。瓶亦無常。有方所故。名為無常。又復汝所言常。有因故常。無因故常。二俱有過。若言從因生是常者。如瓶衣等物。從因生故。皆亦無常。汝若以離因生法是常。我亦以離因生法是無常。若必有離因生法而常者。為是稱理言。為是偏黨說。今應分明更說其因。外曰。因有二種。作因了因。從作因生是無常。如瓶衣等物。作因生故無常。從了因生法是常。如燈能照闇中眾物。闇去物現。非作法故是常。以是故。從作因生者是無常。從了因生者是常。內曰。如瓶等物。現見故是有。無為非現見故是
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：相。是爲了與有為法（指有生滅變化的世間法）相應而設立的相，還是爲了與無為法（指沒有生滅變化的涅槃）相應而設立的相？如果與有為法相應而設立相，那麼生是有為法，就應該有三相：生、住、滅。住和滅也同樣如此。像這樣，相就會無窮無盡。如果相是無窮無盡的，你就不應該說有為法只有三相，這樣你的誓言就破滅了。如果相與無為法相應，那麼有為法的相怎麼能夠與無為法相應呢？ 外道說：『你如果不希望設立有為法的相，就應該設立無為法的相。』為什麼呢？因為無為法遍一切處，沒有固定的處所。所以應該與無為法相應。 內道說：『無為法是有處所的。我現在問你，虛空是有處所，還是沒有處所？如果虛空有處所，就應該在你身邊，也在他身邊。如果是這樣，虛空就是有部分的，有部分就有邊際。如果說虛空沒有處所，那麼是你的身體遍佈虛空，還是虛空遍佈你的身體？如果虛空遍佈你的身體，你的身體遍佈虛空，那麼虛空就是有邊際的，就像瓶子、衣服、疊起來的東西等。因為有邊際，所以是無常的。如果虛空也是這樣，那麼虛空也是無常的。而且，常的因能夠產生常的果。如果因是無常的，果怎麼會是常的呢？就像用泥土製造瓶子，因為泥土是無常的，所以瓶子也是無常的。因為有處所，所以被稱為無常。』 外道又說：『你所說的常，是因為有因而常，還是因為沒有因而常？這兩種說法都有過失。如果說是從因生而常，就像瓶子、衣服等物，因為是從因生出來的，所以都是無常的。如果你認為離開因所生的法是常，我也認為離開因所生的法是無常。如果必定有離開因所生的法是常的，這是合乎道理的說法，還是偏袒的說法？現在應該分明地說出其中的原因。』 外道說：『因有兩種：作因和了因。從作因生出來的東西是無常的，比如瓶子、衣服等物，因為是作因生出來的，所以是無常的。從了因生出來的法是常的，比如燈能夠照亮黑暗中的東西，黑暗消失，東西顯現，這不是製造出來的，所以是常的。因此，從作因生出來的東西是無常的，從了因生出來的東西是常的。』 內道說：『像瓶子等物，因為現在可以看見，所以是存在的。無為法不是現在可以看見的，所以是……』
【English Translation】 English version: 'Phase'. Is the 'phase' established in relation to conditioned phenomena (Samskrta-dharma, referring to worldly phenomena subject to birth and death), or is it established in relation to unconditioned phenomena (Asamskrta-dharma, referring to Nirvana, which is free from birth and death)? If the 'phase' is established in relation to conditioned phenomena, then 'birth' is a conditioned phenomenon, and there should be three phases: birth, duration, and cessation. The same applies to duration and cessation. In this way, the 'phases' would be endless. If the 'phases' are endless, you should not say that conditioned phenomena have only three phases; your vow would then be broken. If the 'phase' is related to unconditioned phenomena, how can the 'phase' of conditioned phenomena be related to unconditioned phenomena? The outsider said: 'If you do not wish to establish the 'phase' of conditioned phenomena, you should establish the 'phase' of unconditioned phenomena.' Why? Because unconditioned phenomena pervade all places and have no fixed location. Therefore, it should be related to unconditioned phenomena. The insider said: 'Unconditioned phenomena do have a location. I now ask you, does space have a location, or does it not have a location? If space has a location, it should be near you and also near him. If so, space is partial, and if it is partial, it has boundaries. If you say that space has no location, then does your body pervade space, or does space pervade your body? If space pervades your body, and your body pervades space, then space has boundaries, like a bottle, clothes, or folded items. Because it has boundaries, it is impermanent. If space is like this, then space is also impermanent.' Furthermore, a permanent cause can produce a permanent effect. If the cause is impermanent, how can the effect be permanent? Just like making a bottle from clay, because the clay is impermanent, the bottle is also impermanent. Because it has a location, it is called impermanent. The outsider further said: 'The permanence you speak of, is it permanent because of a cause, or is it permanent because of no cause? Both of these statements have faults. If you say it is permanent because it arises from a cause, like bottles, clothes, and other things, because they arise from a cause, they are all impermanent. If you believe that a dharma arising without a cause is permanent, I also believe that a dharma arising without a cause is impermanent. If there must be a dharma arising without a cause that is permanent, is this a reasonable statement, or is it a biased statement? Now you should clearly state the reason for it.' The outsider said: 'There are two kinds of causes: the operative cause (Karana-hetu) and the illuminative cause (Pratyaya-hetu). What arises from the operative cause is impermanent, such as bottles, clothes, and other things, because they arise from the operative cause, they are impermanent. The dharma arising from the illuminative cause is permanent, such as a lamp that can illuminate things in the darkness; the darkness disappears, and the things appear. This is not something made, so it is permanent. Therefore, what arises from the operative cause is impermanent, and what arises from the illuminative cause is permanent.' The insider said: 'Things like bottles, because they can be seen now, they exist. Unconditioned phenomena are not visible now, so they are...'
無。何以故。無為無體相故無法。舍有舍無。二俱舍故。能斷我見。及我所見。便得涅槃。如經中說。如智境見一切法空。識無所取故心識滅。種子滅。外曰。若有為法無體相。云何而有實。內曰。如夢。世諦法皆如夢。夢非實有。又非是無。亦非無因。如世諦法。非有相。非無相。非無因。如似屋宅。若有體相。未作時應見。若言無。不應得見。假梁椽基壁故。而有成用。非是無因。以是故。一切法非是有。非是無。亦非無因。是故如夢。外曰。若一切法如夢。老少中年取瓶時何故不取疊等。取疊時何不亦取瓶等。今見取瓶不取余物。以名有定故。當知一切法不如夢。內曰。名非是體。若名是體。如有瓶名。即應便有盛乳酪等用。如世智人言但瓶。空名已有用者。不應復須陶師造作。山價市瓶。如身有三名。若男若女。非男非女。以身取名。則統於三。若以名求名。則三不相攝。是故名體有異。複次如瓶有聲可聞。有色可見。瓶嗅觸亦得如是。則有多瓶。又瓶有口咽底腹。是名非一。復應多瓶。以此觀察。名字虛假。當知無實。如佛所說偈。
世間有假名 相如熱時炎 音聲猶如響 世間相如夢
外曰。汝雖種種破法是有。若言有法。則壞汝說。若言是無。無何所破。內曰。汝法有體相。我則有所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：無。為什麼呢？因為無為沒有實體和表相，所以無法描述。捨棄『有』和捨棄『無』，因為兩者都應捨棄，才能斷除我見（認為有一個真實的『我』的見解）和我所見（與『我』相關的見解），從而證得涅槃（佛教術語，指解脫生死輪迴的境界）。正如經書中所說：『如智者以智慧觀照，見一切法皆空，識（佛教術語，指認識作用）無所執取，所以心識滅盡，種子（佛教術語，指業力的潛在力量）也滅盡。』 外道問：『如果說有為法（佛教術語，指由因緣和合而生的事物）沒有實體和表相，那麼它怎麼能真實存在呢？』 內道答：『就像夢一樣。世俗諦（佛教術語，指世俗認知的真理）的法都像夢一樣，夢不是真實存在的，但也不是完全沒有，也不是沒有原因的。就像世俗諦的法，非有相，非無相，也非無因。』就像房屋，如果有實體和表相，在建造之前就應該能看見。如果說沒有，那就不應該能看見。憑藉梁、椽、地基和墻壁，房屋才能建成併發揮作用，所以不是沒有原因的。因此，一切法非是有，非是無，亦非無因，所以說如夢。 外道問：『如果一切法都像夢一樣，那麼老年人、青年人和中年人在拿瓶子的時候，為什麼不拿疊起來的衣物等東西？拿疊起來的衣物時，為什麼不也拿瓶子等東西？現在看到拿瓶子而不拿其他東西，是因為名稱有固定的指代。由此可知，一切法不像夢。』 內道答：『名稱不是實體。如果名稱是實體，比如有『瓶』這個名稱，就應該立刻具有盛放乳酪等東西的作用。如果世俗聰明人說，僅僅是『瓶』這個空名就已經具有作用，那就不應該再需要陶匠製造。就像在市場上買瓶子一樣。又比如身體有三個名稱：男、女、非男非女。用身體來取名，則統攝這三個名稱。如果用名稱來求名稱，那麼這三個名稱就不能相互統攝。所以名稱和實體是有區別的。』 『再比如，瓶子有聲音可以聽見，有顏色可以看見，瓶子的氣味和觸感也可以感知。這樣就有了多個瓶子。而且瓶子有口、頸、底、腹，名稱不是單一的，應該有多個瓶子。通過這樣的觀察，可知名字是虛假的，應當明白沒有真實的存在。』正如佛所說的偈語： 『世間有假名，相如熱時炎，音聲猶如響，世間相如夢。』 外道問：『你雖然用種種方法破斥法是『有』的觀點，如果說有法，那就破壞了你自己的說法。如果說是『無』，那麼你又在破斥什麼呢？』 內道答：『如果你的法有實體和表相，我才能有所破斥。』
【English Translation】 English version: No. Why is that? Because Nirvana (Wuwei) has no substance or form, therefore it is indescribable. Abandon 'existence' and abandon 'non-existence,' because both should be abandoned in order to sever the view of self (the view that there is a real 'self') and the view of what belongs to the self (views related to the 'self'), thereby attaining Nirvana (Buddhist term, referring to the state of liberation from the cycle of birth and death). As it is said in the scriptures: 'As the wise see with wisdom, they see that all dharmas (Buddhist term, referring to phenomena or teachings) are empty, and consciousness (Buddhist term, referring to the function of cognition) has nothing to grasp, so consciousness ceases, and the seeds (Buddhist term, referring to the potential force of karma) also cease.' The outsider asks: 'If it is said that conditioned dharmas (Buddhist term, referring to things that arise from causes and conditions) have no substance or form, then how can they truly exist?' The insider answers: 'It's like a dream. The dharmas of conventional truth (Buddhist term, referring to truth as perceived by ordinary people) are all like dreams. Dreams are not truly existent, but they are not completely non-existent either, nor are they without cause. Like the dharmas of conventional truth, they are neither with form, nor without form, nor without cause.' Like a house, if it had substance and form, it should be visible before it is built. If it is said to have none, then it should not be visible. Relying on beams, rafters, foundations, and walls, the house can be built and function, so it is not without cause. Therefore, all dharmas are neither existent, nor non-existent, nor without cause, so it is said to be like a dream. The outsider asks: 'If all dharmas are like dreams, then why do the elderly, young people, and middle-aged people not take folded clothes, etc., when taking a bottle? Why not also take bottles, etc., when taking folded clothes? Now we see taking a bottle and not taking other things, because the name has a fixed reference. From this, it can be known that all dharmas are not like dreams.' The insider answers: 'Name is not substance. If name were substance, for example, if there is the name 'bottle,' it should immediately have the function of holding milk, cheese, etc. If worldly wise people say that the empty name 'bottle' already has a function, then there should be no need for a potter to make it. It's like buying a bottle in the market. Also, for example, the body has three names: male, female, neither male nor female. Using the body to name, then it encompasses these three names. If using name to seek name, then these three names cannot encompass each other. Therefore, name and substance are different.' 'Furthermore, for example, a bottle has a sound that can be heard, a color that can be seen, and the smell and touch of the bottle can also be perceived. Thus, there are multiple bottles. Moreover, the bottle has a mouth, neck, bottom, and belly, and the name is not singular, there should be multiple bottles. Through such observation, it can be known that names are false, and it should be understood that there is no real existence.' As the Buddha said in the verse: 'In the world there are false names, appearances like heat haze, sounds like echoes, the world's appearances are like dreams.' The outsider asks: 'Although you use various methods to refute the view that dharmas are 'existent,' if you say there are dharmas, then you are destroying your own statement. If you say they are 'non-existent,' then what are you refuting?' The insider answers: 'If your dharmas have substance and form, then I can refute something.'
破。若本無體者。則我無所破。說曰。
大人平等相 心無有染著 亦無有不染 都無有止住 諸有體相者 有欲及斷欲 成就不壞信 而舍諸邪見 蠲除邪見網 眾穢悉滅盡 能棄三毒刺 勤行修正道 善察如是法 深生信敬心 信心求實法 不趣向三有 不取于無有 得證寂滅道 一切法無一 如是法無異 云何是有相 因法則無體 非相形而有 自是法不然 汝法則不成 如此不用因 汝當說體相 一則是有過 若爾則無體 五情不取塵 色法有名字 所見亦無體 以有不須作 彼法無有生 有為法無體 如此亦有方 等如夢無異 相亦無有異 此是百字論 提婆之所說
百字論一卷
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：駁斥。如果事物本質上沒有自性（svabhāva），那麼我就沒有什麼可以破斥的。經文說：
『大人的平等之相，內心沒有染著， 也沒有不染著，完全沒有任何止住。 凡是有實體和相狀的，有慾望以及斷除慾望， 成就不可破壞的信心，從而捨棄各種邪見。 去除邪見之網，各種污穢全部滅盡， 能夠拋棄貪嗔癡三毒之刺，勤奮修行正確的道路。 善於觀察這樣的法，深深地生起信心和敬意， 以信心尋求真實的法，不趨向欲有（kāmadhātu）、色有（rūpadhātu）和無色有（arūpadhātu）這三有（tribhava）， 不執取于虛無，得以證悟寂滅之道（nirvana）。 一切法沒有單一性，這樣的法也沒有差異性， 怎麼能說是有相的呢？因為法則沒有自性。 不是通過相狀來形成的，法本身就不是這樣的。 你的法則不能成立，這樣就不需要原因。 你應該說說自性，如果自性是單一的，那就是一種過失。 如果這樣，那就沒有自性，五根（pañcendriya）不取塵境。 色法（rūpa）有名字，所見到的也沒有自性。 因為存在就不需要造作，那個法沒有產生。 有為法（saṃskṛta）沒有自性，這樣也有道理。 就像夢一樣沒有差異，相狀也沒有差異。 這是《百字論》，是提婆（Āryadeva）所說的。』
《百字論》一卷
【English Translation】 English version: Refutation. If there is no inherent existence (svabhāva), then I have nothing to refute. It says:
'The adult's state of equality, the mind has no attachment, Nor is there non-attachment, there is absolutely no abiding. All who have substance and form, have desire and the cessation of desire, Accomplish indestructible faith, and abandon all wrong views. Remove the net of wrong views, all defilements are completely extinguished, Able to discard the three poisons (triviṣa) of thorns, diligently practice the correct path. Skillfully observe such a dharma, deeply generate faith and reverence, With faith seek the true dharma, not inclining towards the three realms of existence (tribhava): desire realm (kāmadhātu), form realm (rūpadhātu), and formless realm (arūpadhātu), Not grasping at non-existence, attaining the path of nirvana. All dharmas have no oneness, such dharmas have no difference, How can there be characteristics? Because the law has no inherent existence. It is not formed by appearance, the dharma itself is not like this. Your law cannot be established, so there is no need for a cause. You should talk about inherent existence, if inherent existence is singular, then that is a fault. If so, then there is no inherent existence, the five senses (pañcendriya) do not grasp dust. Form (rūpa) has a name, what is seen also has no inherent existence. Because there is existence, there is no need to create, that dharma has no birth. Conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta) have no inherent existence, so there is also a direction. Equal like a dream, there is no difference, the appearance also has no difference. This is the 'Hundred Verses', spoken by Āryadeva.'
The 'Hundred Verses', one fascicle.