T30n1578_大乘掌珍論

大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1578 大乘掌珍論

No. 1578

大乘掌珍論捲上

清辯菩薩造

大唐三藏法師玄奘奉　詔譯

普為饒益一切有情。正發無上菩提大愿。等觀世間。常為種種不正尋伺。紛擾暴風亂心相續。邪見罥網之所罥網。生死樊籠之所樊籠。無量憂苦毒箭所射。諸有所行皆離明慧。故我依止如凈虛空。絕諸戲論寂靜安樂。勝義諦理悲願纏心。不忍見彼眾苦所集。為欲解脫自他相續煩惱固縛住無退壞。逾于金剛堅固輪圍。增上意樂誓處無邊。生死大海不憚其中。所受無量眾苦災橫。發金剛喻不壞精進。為正開覺如是觀察。要證出世無分別智。方能正知先所未了。一切有情聚根勝解界行差別。及能破裂自他相續所起一切有習無習眾苦根本煩惱羅網。亦能為他起真誓願。堅固受持大士戒行。然證出世無分別智。要須積習能壞一切邪見眼瞙無倒觀空安膳那藥。如是積習無倒觀空安膳那藥。要藉能遣一切所緣自性聞慧。由是或有依廣文義正抉擇門。已入法性數復勤修勝進加行。于廣文義抉擇現前。甚大劬勞心生懈倦。或有雖復未入法性而是利根。為欲令彼易證真空速入法性故。略制此掌珍論。

真性有為空　　如幻緣生故　無為無有實　　不起似空華

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本《大乘掌珍論》捲上清辯菩薩造大唐三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯爲了普遍饒益一切有情眾生，我發起無上菩提的大愿，平等地觀察世間，眾生常常受到種種不正當的尋伺所擾亂，如暴風般擾亂他們的心，使煩惱相續不斷。他們被邪見的羅網所束縛，被生死的牢籠所囚禁，被無量的憂愁痛苦毒箭所射中，一切所作所為都遠離了明智。因此，我依止如同清凈虛空般，遠離一切戲論、寂靜安樂的勝義諦理，心中充滿悲憫和誓願，不忍心看到他們被眾多的苦難所聚集。爲了解脫自己和他人相續不斷的煩惱束縛，我安住于不退轉的境界，比金剛輪圍還要堅固，以增上的意樂發誓要處於無邊的生死大海之中，不懼怕其中所遭受的無量眾苦災難，發起如同金剛般堅不可摧的精進。爲了正確地開悟，我這樣觀察：必須要證得出世間的無分別智，才能正確地瞭解先前所不瞭解的一切有情眾生的根器、殊勝的理解能力、界限、行為的差別，以及能夠破裂自己和他人相續不斷的由有習氣和無習氣所引起的一切痛苦的根本——煩惱羅網。也能夠為他人發起真實的誓願，堅定地受持菩薩的戒行。然而，要證得出世間的無分別智，必須要積累能夠摧毀一切邪見眼翳的、無顛倒地觀察空性的安膳那藥（眼藥）。像這樣積累無顛倒地觀察空性的安膳那藥，必須要憑藉能夠遣除一切所緣自性的聞慧。因此，或許有人依靠廣博的文義，通過正確的抉擇之門，已經進入了法性的行列，又勤奮地修習殊勝的精進加行，但在廣博的文義抉擇現前時，由於非常勞累而心生懈怠。或許有人雖然還沒有進入法性的行列，但是具有敏銳的根器。爲了讓他們容易證悟真空，迅速進入法性，所以我簡略地製作這部《掌珍論》。真性有為法是空性的，如同幻象一樣由因緣而生起。無為法沒有實體，不生起，就像虛空中的花朵一樣。

【English Translation】 English version The Treatise of the Palm of the Hand on the Great Vehicle, Volume 1 By Bodhisattva Qingbian (Clear Discrimination) Translated by the Tripitaka Master Xuanzang (Mysterious Trip) of the Great Tang Dynasty under Imperial Decree Universally to benefit all sentient beings, I sincerely generate the supreme great vow of Bodhi. Equally observing the world, it is constantly disturbed by various improper seekings, like a violent storm disrupting the mind's continuity. They are ensnared by the net of wrong views, imprisoned by the cage of birth and death, and shot by countless arrows of sorrow and suffering. All their actions are far from clear wisdom. Therefore, I rely on the ultimate truth, like pure space, free from all fabrications, peaceful and blissful, with compassion and vows filling my heart, unable to bear seeing them gathered by numerous sufferings. In order to liberate the continuous bonds of afflictions of myself and others, I abide in a state of non-regression, more solid than a Vajra (Diamond) wheel, with increasing aspiration, vowing to dwell in the boundless ocean of birth and death, unafraid of the countless sufferings and calamities endured therein, generating indestructible diligence like a Vajra. For the sake of correct enlightenment, I observe thus: one must realize the transcendental non-discriminating wisdom in order to correctly understand what was previously not understood: the faculties, superior understanding, realms, and behavioral differences of all sentient beings, as well as the root of all suffering—the net of afflictions—arising from habitual and non-habitual tendencies in the continuous streams of oneself and others. One can also generate true vows for others, firmly upholding the precepts and practices of a Bodhisattva. However, to realize transcendental non-discriminating wisdom, one must accumulate the 'anjana' (eye medicine) of non-inverted contemplation of emptiness, which can destroy all cataracts of wrong views. To accumulate such 'anjana' of non-inverted contemplation of emptiness, one must rely on the wisdom of hearing that can dispel the self-nature of all objects of perception. Therefore, some may rely on extensive textual meanings, enter the realm of Dharma-nature through the gate of correct discernment, and diligently cultivate superior progressive practices. However, when faced with the discernment of extensive textual meanings, they may become weary due to great exertion. Others, though not yet having entered the realm of Dharma-nature, may possess sharp faculties. In order to make it easier for them to realize emptiness and quickly enter the realm of Dharma-nature, I briefly compose this 'Treatise of the Palm of the Hand'. The true nature of conditioned existence is empty, like an illusion arising from conditions. Unconditioned existence has no reality; it does not arise, like flowers in the sky.

于自他宗計度差別雖有眾多遍計所執。然所知境略有二種。一者有為。二者無為。以諸愚夫不正覺了勝義諦理有為無為無顛倒性。妄執諸法自性差別。增益種種邪見罥網。如世有一無智畫師畫作可畏藥叉鬼像。或女人像。眩目亂意謂為實有。執實有故自起驚怖。或生貪染。于彼境界眾多計度。增長分別諸見罥網。若正覺知勝義諦理有為無為無顛倒性。爾時如世有智畫師。不執彼有真實自性。非如前說。有為無為境界差別邪見罥網。以自纏裹如蠶處繭。彼非有故。無分別慧趣入行成。

為顯斯義先辯有為。以諸世間於此境上多起分別故說是言。真性有為空如幻緣生故。此中世間同許有者。自亦許為世俗有故。世俗現量生起因緣亦許有故。眼等有為世俗諦攝。牧牛人等皆共了知。眼等有為是實有故。勿違如是自宗所許。現量共知。故以真性簡別立宗。真義自體說名真性。即勝義諦。就勝義諦立有為空。非就世俗眾緣合成。有所造作故名有為。即十二處。唯除法處一分虛空。擇非擇滅及真如性。此中復除他宗所許虛妄顯現。幻等有為若立彼為空立已成過故。若他遍計所執有為。就勝義諦實有自性。今立為空。且如眼處。一種有為就勝義諦辯其體空。空與無性虛妄顯現門之差別。是名立宗。眾緣所起男女羊鹿諸幻

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本關於自宗和他宗所計度的差別，雖然有許多遍計所執（parikalpita，虛妄分別），但所知境（jñeya-viṣaya，所認識的對象）略有二種：一者有為（saṃskṛta，因緣和合而生），二者無為（asaṃskṛta，非因緣和合而生）。因為那些愚夫不能正確覺悟勝義諦（paramārtha-satya，究竟真理）的道理，對於有為和無為的無顛倒性（aviparita-svabhāva，不虛妄的本性）不能如實知見，所以虛妄執著諸法（dharma，一切事物）的自性差別，增益種種邪見罥網（mithyā-dṛṣṭi-jāla，錯誤的見解）。比如世間有一個沒有智慧的畫師，畫出可怕的藥叉（yakṣa，一種鬼神）鬼像，或者女人像，使人眼花繚亂，迷惑心意，以為是真實存在的。因為執著是真實存在的，所以自己產生驚恐，或者生起貪慾。對於這些境界，產生許多計度，增長分別諸見罥網。如果能夠正確覺知勝義諦的道理，瞭解有為和無為的無顛倒性，那麼就像世間有智慧的畫師，不會執著這些事物有真實的自性，不會像前面所說的那樣，產生有為和無為境界差別的邪見罥網，以邪見纏繞自己，就像蠶作繭自縛。因為這些邪見並非真實存在，所以能夠以無分別慧（nirvikalpa-jñāna，無分別的智慧）趣入修行，成就解脫。

爲了顯明這個道理，首先辨析有為。因為世間眾生對於有為境界，大多生起分別，所以要說明這一點。『真性有為空如幻，緣生故』。這裡所說的『有』，是世間共同認可的，自宗（svasiddhānta，自己的宗派）也認可為世俗有（saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）。世俗現量（pratyakṣa，現前所見）生起的因緣，也認可為『有』。眼等有為法（saṃskṛta-dharma，因緣和合的事物）屬於世俗諦所攝。牧牛人等都共同了知，眼等有為是真實存在的。不要違背自宗所認可的，現量共知的事實。所以用『真性』來簡別，從而建立宗義。真義自體稱為『真性』，也就是勝義諦。就勝義諦而言，有為是空。不是就世俗眾緣合成而言。有所造作，所以稱為『有為』，也就是十二處（dvādaśa-āyatana，十二種感官和對像），唯獨除去法處（dharma-āyatana，意識的對象）中的一部分虛空（ākāśa，空間）。擇滅（pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha，通過智慧選擇而達到的寂滅）和非擇滅（apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha，非通過智慧選擇而達到的寂滅）以及真如性（tathatā，事物的真實本性）。這裡還要除去他宗所許的虛妄顯現。幻等有為，如果立彼為空，就犯了已成過（siddhasādhana，論證已知的事物）的過失。如果他宗遍計所執的有為，就勝義諦而言，實有自性，現在立為空。比如眼處，一種有為，就勝義諦來辨析它的體性是空。空與無性（abhāva，不存在）和虛妄顯現（mithyā-pratibhāsa，虛假的顯現）之間的差別，這就是立宗。眾緣所起的男女羊鹿等幻象。

【English Translation】 English version Regarding the differences in calculations and discriminations made by one's own school and other schools, although there are many parikalpita (imaginary constructs), the knowable objects (jñeya-viṣaya) can be broadly classified into two types: one is saṃskṛta (conditioned, arising from causes and conditions), and the other is asaṃskṛta (unconditioned, not arising from causes and conditions). Because ignorant people do not correctly realize the truth of paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth), they do not truly see the non-inverted nature (aviparita-svabhāva) of saṃskṛta and asaṃskṛta. They falsely cling to the differences in the inherent nature of all dharmas (phenomena), increasing various nets of false views (mithyā-dṛṣṭi-jāla). For example, in the world, there is an ignorant painter who paints a terrifying image of a yakṣa (a type of spirit) or a woman, dazzling and confusing the mind, thinking it is real. Because they cling to it as real, they themselves become frightened or develop greed. Regarding these objects, they make many calculations, increasing and discriminating various nets of views. If one correctly realizes the truth of paramārtha-satya, understanding the non-inverted nature of saṃskṛta and asaṃskṛta, then it is like a wise painter who does not cling to these things as having a real inherent nature. They do not, as previously mentioned, develop nets of false views regarding the differences between saṃskṛta and asaṃskṛta. They do not wrap themselves up in these views like a silkworm in its cocoon. Because these views are not real, they can enter into practice with non-discriminating wisdom (nirvikalpa-jñāna) and achieve liberation.

To clarify this meaning, we must first analyze saṃskṛta. Because worldly beings mostly generate discriminations regarding saṃskṛta, we will explain this point. 'The true nature of saṃskṛta is empty like an illusion, because it arises from conditions.' Here, the 'existence' that the world commonly acknowledges is also acknowledged by our own school (svasiddhānta) as saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth). The causes and conditions that give rise to worldly direct perception (pratyakṣa) are also acknowledged as 'existing.' The saṃskṛta dharmas (conditioned phenomena) such as the eye are included within saṃvṛti-satya. Cowherds and others all commonly know that saṃskṛta such as the eye is real. Do not contradict what is acknowledged by our own school and commonly known through direct perception. Therefore, we use 'true nature' to distinguish and establish the doctrine. The true meaning itself is called 'true nature,' which is paramārtha-satya. Regarding paramārtha-satya, saṃskṛta is empty. It is not in terms of the combination of worldly conditions. Because it is something made, it is called 'saṃskṛta,' which is the twelve āyatanas (sense bases), except for a portion of space (ākāśa) in the dharma-āyatana (the base of mind objects). Cessation through discrimination (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha), cessation without discrimination (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha), and suchness (tathatā). Here, we must also exclude the false appearances acknowledged by other schools. If we establish illusions and other saṃskṛta as empty, we commit the fault of proving what is already established (siddhasādhana). If the saṃskṛta that is parikalpita by other schools has a real inherent nature in terms of paramārtha-satya, we now establish it as empty. For example, the eye-āyatana, a type of saṃskṛta, when analyzed in terms of paramārtha-satya, its nature is empty. The difference between emptiness, non-existence (abhāva), and false appearance (mithyā-pratibhāsa), this is called establishing the doctrine. The illusions of men, women, sheep, deer, etc., which arise from conditions.

事等。自性實無顯現似有。所立能立法皆通有。為同法喻故說如幻。隨其所應假說所立能立法同。假說同故。不可一切同喻上法皆難令有。如說女面端嚴如月。不可難令一切月法皆面上有。隨結頌法說此同喻。如是次第由此半頌。是略本處故無有失。所立有法皆從緣生。為立此因說緣生故。因等眾緣共所生故。說名緣生。即緣所起緣所現義。為遮異品立異法喻。異品無故遮義已成。是故不說于辯釋時。假說異品建立比量亦無有過。

云何此中建立比量。謂就真性眼處性空。眾緣生故。諸緣生者。皆就真性其自性空。牧牛女等尚所共了。如有威神咒術藥力。加彼草木塊磚等物。眾緣所現男女象馬宮殿園林水火等相。誑惑愚夫種種幻事。若彼自性少有實者應非顛倒。

故世尊言。一切法性非眼所見。諸緣生法皆無自性。諸有智者。若知緣生即知法性。若知法性即知空性。若知空性即見智者。又作是言。諸緣生者皆是無生。由彼都無生自性故。若說緣生即說空性。知空性者即無放逸。此中一切不空論者。皆設難言。若立一切有為皆空。便無色等如緣兔角。現量智生理不成就。似色等緣諸現量覺亦應不生。然彼實有各別內證。是故汝宗憎背法性。便有違害現量過失。及有違害共知過失。撥無一切牧牛人等同所了知

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：事物等等。自性實際上沒有顯現，只是看起來好像有。所建立的能立法（指能成立論證的理由）都普遍存在。爲了說明同法喻（正例）的緣故，才說如同幻象。根據情況，假設所建立的能立法相同。因為是假設相同，所以不能要求一切同喻都完全一樣，否則上法（指論證的標的）就難以成立。比如，說女子的面容端莊美麗如同月亮，不能要求月亮的所有特徵都在女子的面容上體現。根據總結頌詞的方法來說明這種同喻。像這樣依次說明，因為這半句頌詞是簡略的原本，所以沒有缺失。所建立的有法（指存在的現象）都是從因緣而生。爲了確立這個因（理由），才說因緣生。因為是因等等眾多因緣共同產生的，所以稱為因緣生，也就是因緣所生起、因緣所顯現的意思。爲了遮止異品（反例），確立異法喻（反例）。因為異品不存在，所以遮止的意義已經成立。因此，在辯論解釋時，不說異品，假設異品來建立比量（推理），也沒有過失。

如何在這裡建立比量呢？就是就真性（事物的真實本性）而言，眼處（眼根及其所對的境界）的自性是空的，因為是眾緣所生。凡是眾緣所生的，就真性而言，其自性都是空的。這是牧牛女等普通人都能理解的。比如，如果有威力的神咒、法術、藥物的力量，加持在草木、土塊、磚頭等物體上，眾緣所顯現出男女、象馬、宮殿、園林、水火等形象，迷惑愚笨的人，種種幻化的事情。如果那些形象的自性稍微有一點真實，就不應該是顛倒的。

所以世尊說：『一切法的自性不是眼睛所能見到的。』諸緣生的法都沒有自性。有智慧的人，如果知道緣生，就知道了法性；如果知道了法性，就知道了空性；如果知道了空性，就見到了智者。』又說：『諸緣生的都是無生，因為它們根本沒有生的自性。』如果說緣生，就是說空性。知道空性的人就沒有放逸。』這裡一切不承認空性的人，都設定難題說：『如果說一切有為法都是空，就沒有色等法，如同因緣產生的兔角一樣。現量（直接感知）的智慧和道理就不能成立。』類似色等因緣的現量感覺也不應該產生。然而，它們實際上有各自內在的證明。所以，你們的宗派憎恨背離法性，就有了違背現量的過失，以及違背共同認知的過失，否定了所有牧牛人等共同認知的事物。

【English Translation】 English version: Matters and so on. The self-nature is actually not manifest, but appears as if it is. The established 'able-to-establish-law' (referring to the reason that can establish an argument) is universally present. It is said to be like an illusion for the sake of illustrating the 'same-law analogy' (positive example). According to the situation, it is assumed that the established 'able-to-establish-law' is the same. Because it is assumed to be the same, it cannot be required that all 'same analogies' are completely identical, otherwise the 'upper law' (referring to the target of the argument) would be difficult to establish. For example, if it is said that a woman's face is dignified and beautiful like the moon, it cannot be required that all the characteristics of the moon are reflected on the woman's face. This 'same analogy' is explained according to the method of summarizing the verses. Explaining it in this order, because this half of the verse is a simplified original, there is no omission. The established 'existing phenomena' are all born from conditions. In order to establish this cause (reason), it is said that they are born from conditions. Because they are produced by the joint effort of causes and other conditions, they are called 'born from conditions', which means 'arisen from conditions' and 'manifested by conditions'. In order to prevent 'different categories' (counter-examples), establish 'different-law analogies' (counter-examples). Because 'different categories' do not exist, the meaning of prevention has already been established. Therefore, during debate and explanation, there is no fault in not mentioning 'different categories' and assuming 'different categories' to establish 'inference' (reasoning).

How is inference established here? It is that, in terms of true nature (the true nature of things), the self-nature of the eye-base (the eye-organ and its corresponding realm) is empty, because it is born from numerous conditions. Whatever is born from numerous conditions, in terms of true nature, its self-nature is empty. This is understood even by ordinary people like cowherd girls. For example, if the power of potent mantras, spells, and medicines is applied to objects such as grass, wood, clods of earth, and bricks, the images of men and women, elephants and horses, palaces, gardens, water, fire, etc., manifested by numerous conditions, delude foolish people with various illusory events. If those images had even a little bit of reality in their self-nature, they should not be deceptive.

Therefore, the World Honored One said: 'The self-nature of all dharmas is not visible to the eye.' All dharmas born from conditions have no self-nature. Wise people, if they know dependent arising, know dharma-nature; if they know dharma-nature, they know emptiness; if they know emptiness, they see the wise.' He also said: 'All that arises from conditions is unborn, because they have no self-nature of birth at all.' If one speaks of dependent arising, one speaks of emptiness. Those who know emptiness have no negligence.' Here, all those who do not acknowledge emptiness set up difficulties, saying: 'If it is said that all conditioned dharmas are empty, then there would be no forms, etc., like the horns of a rabbit produced by conditions.' The wisdom and reason of direct perception (present moment awareness) cannot be established. The present moment awareness of conditions similar to form, etc., should also not arise. However, they actually have their own internal proof. Therefore, your school hates and turns away from dharma-nature, and thus has the fault of contradicting direct perception, as well as the fault of contradicting common knowledge, denying what is commonly known by all cowherds and others.

眼等體故。諸有智者。今當遣除朋黨執毒。住處中慧應共思議。我所立宗。為當違害自相續中所生現量。為當違害他相續中所生現量。若言違害自相續中所生現量。諸現量覺就勝義諦自性皆空。眾緣生故。如睡夢中諸現量覺非實現量。是故我宗且不違害自相續中所生現量。若言違害他相續中所生現量。非凈眼者顯彼眾多。眼翳眩者所見不實。發蠅月等是虛妄現。違害現量應正道理。是故我宗亦不違害他相續中所生現量。若總相說如愚夫等一切世俗所生現量。今此不遮世俗有故無容違害。言有違害共知過失。此亦不然。若言違害自論共知不應道理。自論許故。設違自論是違自宗。非是違害共知過失。若言違害他論共知亦不應理。一切論興皆為破遣他共知故。若言違害牧牛人等共所了知亦不應理。諸佛弟子立一切行皆剎那滅。諸法無我亦無有情。諸勝論者。實異色等有異實等。諸數論者。覺體非思已滅未生皆是實有。如是等類廣顯自宗所有道理。皆應說名違害共知然不應許。以於此中就勝義諦觀察諸法非關牧牛人等共知。又立宗中以勝義諦簡別所立故定無容。如說違害由此亦無違自宗過。

有餘復言。性空論者。就勝義諦眼等處空。便有有法不成宗過。亦有所依不成因過。此不應理。牧牛人等共所了知。極成眼等總

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因為眼等是實體。所以有智慧的人，現在應當去除宗派偏見的毒害，在公正的地方以智慧共同思考：我所建立的宗義，是會違背自己相續中產生的現量，還是會違揹他人相續中產生的現量？如果說違背自己相續中產生的現量，那麼所有現量的覺知，就勝義諦（paramārtha-satya）的自性來說，都是空性的，因為是眾緣和合而生。就像睡夢中的各種現量覺知，並非真實的現量。因此，我的宗義暫且不違背自己相續中產生的現量。如果說違揹他人相續中產生的現量，那麼不清凈的眼睛會顯現出很多東西，有眼翳或眩暈的人所見到的不真實，如毛髮、蒼蠅、月亮等都是虛妄的顯現，違背現量是合乎正理的。因此，我的宗義也不違揹他人相續中產生的現量。如果總的來說，像愚夫等一切世俗所產生的現量，現在我不遮止世俗的存在，所以沒有違背。說有違背共知（prasiddha）的過失，這也是不對的。如果說違背自己論典的共知，是不應道理的，因為自己的論典已經允許了。假設違背自己的論典，那是違背自己的宗義，而不是違背共知的過失。如果說違背其他論典的共知，也是不應道理的，因為一切論典的興起，都是爲了破除他人共知。如果說違背牧牛人等共同了知的，也是不應道理的。諸佛的弟子主張一切行都是剎那生滅，諸法無我，也沒有有情。勝論者（Vaiśeṣika）主張實、異、色等有異實等。數論者（Sāṃkhya）主張覺的本體不是思，已滅未生的都是實有。像這些等等，廣泛地闡明自己宗義的所有道理，都應該說成是違背共知，但不應該允許。因為在這裡，就勝義諦來觀察諸法，與牧牛人等共同了知無關。又在立宗中，用勝義諦來簡別所立，所以必定沒有違背。如說違害，由此也沒有違背自己宗義的過失。還有人說，性空論者，就勝義諦來說，眼等處是空，便有有法不成宗的過失，也有所依不成因的過失。這不應道理，牧牛人等共同了知的，極成（prasiddha）的眼等總相...

【English Translation】 English version: Because the eye and other sense organs are substantial entities. Therefore, all wise individuals should now eliminate the poison of partisan attachments and, in a neutral place, contemplate with wisdom: Does the tenet I establish contradict the direct perception arising in my own mental continuum, or does it contradict the direct perception arising in the mental continuum of others? If it is said to contradict the direct perception arising in my own mental continuum, then all direct perceptions, in terms of the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), are empty of inherent existence, because they arise from a collection of causes and conditions. Like the various direct perceptions in a dream, they are not real direct perceptions. Therefore, my tenet does not contradict the direct perception arising in my own mental continuum. If it is said to contradict the direct perception arising in the mental continuum of others, then impure eyes manifest many things, and what is seen by those with cataracts or dizziness is not real. Hair, flies, the moon, and so on, are false appearances, and contradicting direct perception is in accordance with correct reasoning. Therefore, my tenet also does not contradict the direct perception arising in the mental continuum of others. Generally speaking, like the direct perceptions arising from all worldly beings such as fools, I do not now negate the existence of the conventional, so there is no contradiction. To say there is a contradiction of what is commonly known (prasiddha) is also incorrect. If it is said to contradict what is commonly known in one's own treatise, that is unreasonable, because one's own treatise has already accepted it. Assuming it contradicts one's own treatise, that is contradicting one's own tenet, not contradicting what is commonly known. If it is said to contradict what is commonly known in other treatises, that is also unreasonable, because the rise of all treatises is for the purpose of refuting what is commonly known by others. If it is said to contradict what is commonly known by cowherds and others, that is also unreasonable. The disciples of the Buddhas assert that all phenomena are momentary, that all phenomena are without self, and that there are no sentient beings. The Vaiśeṣikas assert that substance, quality, action, etc., are different substances, qualities, actions, etc. The Sāṃkhyas assert that the nature of awareness is not thought, and that what has ceased and what has not yet arisen are all real. Like these and so on, extensively explaining all the reasoning of one's own tenet should all be called contradicting what is commonly known, but it should not be accepted. Because here, examining phenomena in terms of the ultimate truth is unrelated to what is commonly known by cowherds and others. Furthermore, in establishing the tenet, the established is distinguished by the ultimate truth, so there is definitely no contradiction. As it is said to contradict, therefore there is also no fault of contradicting one's own tenet. Others again say that, for those who assert emptiness of inherent existence, in terms of the ultimate truth, the eye and other sense bases are empty, so there is the fault of the subject not being established, and there is also the fault of the basis not being an established reason. This is unreasonable. What is commonly known by cowherds and others, the general characteristic of the eye and other sense bases that are well-known (prasiddha)...

為宗故。即說彼法以為因故。此似有法不成宗過。亦似所依不成因過。

有諸不善正理論者。作是難言。若就真性眼等皆空。眾緣生故。眼等既空云何緣生。若緣生者云何體空。如是宗因更相違故。便成與宗相違過失。此若矯舉立宗過失。方便顯因無同法喻。或不成過。如說聲是常一切無常故。此方便顯非一切故。不明瞭因有不成過。以聲攝在一切中故亦無同喻。如何是常而非一切。此不應理。緣生故。因及如幻喻皆共知故因喻併成。是故汝難終不能令智者意悅。有性論者復作是言。汝應信受眼根有性有所作故。諸無性者非有所作。如石女兒。眼有所作謂生眼識。如所說因有勢用故。眼定有性。此若就彼非學所成。牧牛等慧所知自性。依世俗說。成立眼等有為有性。便立已成。若就勝義無同法喻。唯遮異品。所愛義成。不應道理。如計音聲常住論者。說聲是常所聞性故。瓶等無常非所聞性。聲既所聞是故性常。又依世間共知同喻有所作故成相違因。能立眼等皆是世俗言說所攝。自性有故。

余復難言。有為空者。若因若喻皆攝在中。種類同故闕比量過。今此頌中總說量果。于觀察時及立量時。眼等一一別立為宗。故無此過。總立一切有為為宗亦無此過。緣生故因二宗皆許。非不成故。若說眼空其性空故。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因為要確立這個宗旨，所以才說那個法作為原因。這似乎有『有法不成宗』的過失，也似乎有『所依不成因』的過失。

有一些不擅長正理論的人，提出這樣的詰難：如果就真性而言，眼等都是空性的，因為是眾緣所生。眼等既然是空性的，又怎麼能緣生呢？如果說是緣生的，又怎麼能說是體性空呢？像這樣，宗旨和原因互相矛盾，就構成了與宗旨相違背的過失。這如果巧妙地提出立宗的過失，方便地顯示原因沒有同法譬喻，或者是不成立的過失。例如說『聲音是常住的，因為一切都是無常的』。這方便地顯示了『並非一切』，不明確的原因有不成立的過失。因為聲音被包含在一切之中，所以也沒有同法譬喻。怎麼能既是常住的，又不是一切呢？這不合道理。因為『緣生』這個原因以及如幻的譬喻都是大家共同知道的，所以原因和譬喻都能成立。因此，你的詰難終究不能讓智者感到滿意。有性論者又這樣說：『你應該相信眼根是有自性的，因為它有所作用。那些沒有自性的東西，是沒有所作用的，比如石女兒。』眼有所作用，指的是產生眼識。像所說的原因那樣具有勢用，所以眼必定是有自性的。這如果就那些非學習所得，而是牧牛等人的智慧所知的自性，依據世俗的說法，成立眼等是有為有自性的，那就成了成立已經成立的。如果就勝義而言，就沒有同法譬喻，只能遮遣異品，所要成立的意義已經成立，這不應道理。例如那些計較聲音常住的論者，說『聲音是常住的，因為它是可被聽聞的。瓶子等是無常的，因為它們不是可被聽聞的。聲音既然是可被聽聞的，所以它的自性是常住的。』又依據世間共同知道的同法譬喻，因為有所作用而成為相違的原因，能夠成立眼等都是世俗言說所包含的，因為自性存在。

還有人進一步詰難說：『有為法是空性的，那麼原因和譬喻都被包含在其中，種類相同，缺少比量的過失。』現在這首頌中總括地說了量和果。在觀察時以及建立量時，眼等一一分別地被立為宗旨，所以沒有這個過失。總括地建立一切有為法為宗旨，也沒有這個過失。因為『緣生』這個原因，兩個宗旨都認可，所以不是不成立的。如果說『眼是空性的，因為它的自性是空性的』。

【English Translation】 English version: It is because of establishing this tenet that the Dharma is spoken of as the cause. This seems to have the fault of 'a dharma that cannot be a subject' and also seems to have the fault of 'the basis not being a valid reason'.

Some who are not skilled in correct reasoning raise this objection: 'If, in terms of true nature, the eye and so on are all empty because they arise from conditions, and if the eye and so on are empty, how can they arise from conditions? If they arise from conditions, how can their essence be empty?' In this way, the tenet and the reason contradict each other, resulting in the fault of contradicting the tenet. If this cleverly raises the fault of establishing a tenet, it conveniently shows that the reason has no example with similar properties, or that it is an unestablished reason. For example, saying 'Sound is permanent because everything is impermanent.' This conveniently shows 'not everything,' and the unclear reason has the fault of being unestablished. Because sound is included in everything, there is also no example with similar properties. How can something be both permanent and not everything? This is unreasonable. Because the reason 'arising from conditions' and the example of 'like an illusion' are commonly known, both the reason and the example are established. Therefore, your objection ultimately cannot please the wise. Proponents of inherent existence further say: 'You should believe that the eye faculty has inherent existence because it has a function. Those without inherent existence have no function, like the child of a barren woman.' The eye has a function, which is to generate eye consciousness. Because the reason as stated has power, the eye definitely has inherent existence. If this relies on the nature known by those whose wisdom is not acquired through learning, such as cowherds, and establishes that the eye and so on are conditioned and have inherent existence according to conventional truth, then it becomes establishing what is already established. If it relies on ultimate truth, there is no example with similar properties, only the opposite class is negated, and the meaning to be established is already established, which is unreasonable. For example, those who argue that sound is permanent say, 'Sound is permanent because it is audible. Pots and so on are impermanent because they are not audible. Since sound is audible, its nature is permanent.' Furthermore, relying on a commonly known example in the world, it becomes a contradictory reason because it has a function, which can establish that the eye and so on are all included in conventional speech because inherent existence exists.

Others further object: 'If conditioned phenomena are empty, then both the reason and the example are included within it, and because they are of the same type, there is the fault of lacking a valid inference.' Now, this verse summarizes the measure and the result. During observation and when establishing the measure, the eye and so on are individually established as the subject, so there is no such fault. Establishing all conditioned phenomena as the subject in general also has no such fault. Because the reason 'arising from conditions' is accepted by both subjects, it is not unestablished. If it is said that 'the eye is empty because its nature is empty.'

此所說因可有是過。亦非無喻幻等有故。若立所說喻中幻等以為宗者。便有重立。已成過故。有少智者作是難言。若立一切有為性空。因有為故其性亦空。是則此因有不成過。此似不成非真不成。如佛弟子立一切行皆無有我。由有因故。有難此因諸行中攝。亦無我故有不成過。又數論者立諸顯事以苦樂癡為其自性。與思別故。有難此因顯事中攝。亦以樂等為其性故有不成過。又勝論者立聲無常。所作性故。有難此因用聲為體亦無常故有不成過。如是等類諸敵論者。雖廣勤求立論者過。如所說理畢竟無能破壞他論。若有此理。何處誰能建立比量。壞我所樂所說道理。

復有難言。緣生故因終不能立。所應立義以性空故。如石女兒所發音聲。此因於自有不成過。若說他宗所許為因亦不應理。以就他宗說性空故。其義未了。若非有義。是因義者。此因不成非非有故。若是虛妄顯現有義。是因義者。石女兒聲畢竟無故。此喻則無能立之法。又由化聲有不定過。彼能成辦無量有情。利樂事故。又非他宗獨不許因。能立所立一不成故。猶如他宗所不成因。相違比量所損害故。有太過失所隨逐故。如立慧等非心相應。行蘊攝故。如名身等立虛空等皆非是常。德所依故。猶如地等立我非思。非顯事故。猶如最勝。如是等類壞一切

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果按照你所說的原因，可能會有這樣的過失。但並非沒有比喻，比如幻術等現象的存在。如果把所說之比喻中的幻術等作為宗（要證明的論點），那就犯了重複設立的錯誤，因為這已經是成立的。有些缺乏智慧的人會提出這樣的詰難：如果立論說一切有為法的自性是空，因為它們是有為法，所以它們的自性也是空。那麼，這個原因就犯了『不成』的過失。但這只是表面上的『不成』，並非真正的『不成』。例如，佛陀的弟子立論說一切行（一切行為）都是無我的，因為它們有因。有人會反駁說，這個原因本身也包含在諸行之中，也是無我的，所以犯了『不成』的過失。又如，數論者立論說諸顯事（顯現的事物）的自性是苦、樂、癡，因為它們與思（思想）不同。有人會反駁說，這個原因本身也包含在顯事之中，也以樂等為自性，所以犯了『不成』的過失。又如，勝論者立論說聲音是無常的，因為它是被製造出來的。有人會反駁說，這個原因本身就是以聲音為本體，也是無常的，所以犯了『不成』的過失。像這樣，各種敵對的論者，雖然廣泛地尋求立論者的過失，但像我所說的道理，最終是無法被破壞的。如果存在這樣的道理，那麼在何處、由誰能夠建立比量（推理），來破壞我所樂於接受和宣說的道理呢？還有人會提出詰難說：因為是緣起（依賴條件而生）的，所以原因終究無法成立，因為所要建立的意義是性空的，就像石女兒所發出的聲音一樣。這個原因對於自身來說，就犯了『不成』的過失。如果說以其他宗派所認可的作為原因，也是不合理的，因為就其他宗派來說，性空的意義尚未明確。如果不是『有』的意義，而是原因的意義，那麼這個原因就不成立，因為它不是『非有』的。如果是虛妄顯現的『有』的意義，作為原因的意義，那麼石女兒的聲音畢竟是不存在的，這個比喻就沒有能成立的法則。而且，由於化現的聲音，會有『不定』的過失，因為它能夠成辦無量有情（眾生）的利益和安樂之事。而且，並非只有其他宗派不認可原因，能立（能證明者）和所立（所要證明者）都不能成立，就像其他宗派所不認可的原因一樣，因為與相違的比量相損害，所以有『太過』的過失所伴隨。例如，立論說慧等不是與心相應的，因為它們屬於行蘊。就像名身等一樣，立論說虛空等都不是常恒的，因為它們是德（性質）所依賴的，就像地等一樣。立論說我不是思，因為它不是顯事，就像最勝一樣。像這樣，就能破壞一切。

【English Translation】 English version: According to what you say, there might be such a fault. But it's not that there are no analogies, such as illusions. If you establish the illusions in the said analogy as the thesis (the point to be proven), then you commit the fault of re-establishing what is already established. Some with little wisdom raise this objection: If you assert that the nature of all conditioned phenomena is empty, because they are conditioned, then their nature is also empty. Then, this reason commits the fault of 'unestablished'. But this is only seemingly 'unestablished', not truly 'unestablished'. For example, the Buddha's disciples assert that all actions are without self, because they have causes. Someone might object that this reason itself is included in the actions and is also without self, thus committing the fault of 'unestablished'. Or, for example, the Samkhya philosophers assert that the nature of all manifest phenomena is suffering, pleasure, and delusion, because they are different from thought. Someone might object that this reason itself is included in the manifest phenomena and also has pleasure, etc., as its nature, thus committing the fault of 'unestablished'. Or, for example, the Vaisheshika philosophers assert that sound is impermanent, because it is produced. Someone might object that this reason itself is sound and is also impermanent, thus committing the fault of 'unestablished'. Like this, various opposing debaters, although they diligently seek the faults of the proponent, ultimately cannot destroy the doctrine I have spoken. If such a doctrine exists, then where and by whom can an inference be established to destroy the doctrine that I delight in and proclaim? Furthermore, some might object: Because it arises from conditions, the reason ultimately cannot be established, because the meaning to be established is empty in nature, like the sound produced by a barren woman's child. This reason, for itself, commits the fault of 'unestablished'. If you say that what is accepted by other schools is the reason, that is also unreasonable, because, according to other schools, the meaning of emptiness is not yet clear. If it is not the meaning of 'existence' but the meaning of reason, then this reason is not established, because it is not 'non-existence'. If it is the meaning of illusory appearance of 'existence' as the meaning of reason, then the sound of a barren woman's child is ultimately non-existent, and this analogy has no means of establishing. Moreover, due to the emanated sound, there is the fault of 'indecisiveness', because it can accomplish the benefit and happiness of countless sentient beings. Furthermore, it is not only other schools that do not accept the reason; both the establisher and the established cannot be established, just like the reason not accepted by other schools, because it is harmed by contradictory inferences, so it is accompanied by the fault of 'too much'. For example, asserting that wisdom, etc., are not concomitant with the mind, because they are included in the aggregate of formations. Just like name and form, asserting that space, etc., are not permanent, because they are dependent on qualities, just like earth, etc. Asserting that the self is not thought, because it is not a manifest phenomenon, just like the supreme. Like this, everything can be destroyed.

宗。過失隨逐故。定應信二宗共許。方名為因。由此道理如所說過無容得有。

有餘不善正理論者。為顯宗過復作是言。若自性空所立能立皆不成就。如石女兒所發音聲。能立攝在有為中故同彼所立。其性亦空。以俱空故。所立能立並不成就。彼遣所立。能立法體。即是遣于有法自相顯立宗過。彼因自他互不成故。不決定故。喻有過故。如次前說亦不應理。雖設異端終不能掩自宗過失。有餘復設別異方便掩自宗過。作如是言。所說真性有為空者。此立宗言其義未了。若就真性一切有為皆無有實。是立宗義。此所說言亦復攝在有為中故。同諸有為亦應無實。若所說言非無實者。有為亦應皆非無實。此言破自所立義故名違自言立宗過失。如立一切言說皆妄。若就真性一切有為都無所有。是立宗義。即謗一切皆無所有。如是所立便墮邪見。此中如說。我定依於我。誰言他是依。智者我善調。故得昇天樂。彼就世俗說心為我。就勝義諦立為非我。無違自言。立宗過失此亦如是。此是就世俗性說有眼等。就勝義諦立彼皆空故無過失。復如有說。一切生法皆歸於死。牟尼所言定無虛妄。自身既生亦應歸死。不相離故。彼所立宗雖能證自亦歸於死。是所許故無違自言。立宗過失此亦如是。說就真性有為皆空。眾緣生故。所立宗

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：宗（Siddhanta，宗義）。因為過失總是伴隨著它。所以，必須是雙方宗派都認可的，才能稱為因（Hetu，理由）。因此，正如前面所說，沒有理由可以反駁。

有些不善於正理論的人，爲了揭示宗義的過失，又這樣說：如果自性是空，那麼所建立的能立（Sadhana，論證）都不能成立，就像石女兒發出的聲音一樣。能立包含在有為法（Samskrta，因緣和合的事物）中，所以和所立（Sadhya，需要證明的命題）一樣，其自性也是空的。因為都是空性，所以所立和能立都不能成立。他們否定所立和能立的法體，這就是否定有法的自相，從而顯現出立宗的過失。他們所提出的因，因為自他和他人互不認可，所以是不決定的；譬喻也有過失，就像前面所說的那樣，也是不合理的。即使設立不同的論點，最終也無法掩蓋自己宗義的過失。還有一些人設立其他不同的方便法門來掩蓋自己宗義的過失，他們這樣說：所說的真性有為空，這個立宗的說法，其含義還不明確。如果就真性而言，一切有為法都沒有真實性，這是立宗的含義。那麼，這個所說的言語也包含在有為法中，所以和所有的有為法一樣，也應該沒有真實性。如果所說的言語不是沒有真實性，那麼有為法也應該都不是沒有真實性。這個說法破壞了自己所立的義理，所以叫做違背自己言論的立宗過失。就像立論說一切言語都是虛妄的，如果就真性而言，一切有為法都一無所有，這是立宗的含義。這就是誹謗一切都一無所有，這樣的立論就墮入了邪見。就像經中所說：『我一定依靠於我，誰說他是依靠？智者調伏自我，所以能夠昇天享樂。』他們就世俗諦（Samvriti-satya，相對真理）而言，說心為我（Atman，靈魂）；就勝義諦（Paramartha-satya，絕對真理）而言，立為非我（Anatman，無我）。沒有違背自己言論的過失，這裡也是這樣。這是就世俗性而言，說有眼等；就勝義諦而言，立他們都是空性，所以沒有過失。又比如有人說：『一切生法都歸於死，牟尼（Muni，聖人）所說的一定沒有虛妄。』自身既然是生法，也應該歸於死，不能分離。他們所立的宗義雖然能夠證明自己也歸於死，但是這是他們所認可的，所以沒有違背自己言論的立宗過失，這裡也是這樣。說就真性而言，有為法都是空性，因為是眾緣所生，所立的宗義

【English Translation】 English version: The tenet (Siddhanta). Because faults always follow it. Therefore, only what is accepted by both schools can be called a reason (Hetu). Hence, as said before, there is no reason to refute it.

Some theorists who are not good at logic, in order to reveal the faults of the tenet, say: If the self-nature is empty, then the established proof (Sadhana) cannot be established, just like the sound produced by a stone woman. The proof is included in conditioned phenomena (Samskrta), so it is the same as the established proposition (Sadhya), and its nature is also empty. Because both are empty, the established proposition and the proof cannot be established. They deny the entity of the established proposition and the proof, which is to deny the self-nature of the existing phenomena, thus revealing the fault of establishing a tenet. The reason they put forward is uncertain because it is not recognized by themselves and others; the analogy also has faults, just like what was said before, it is also unreasonable. Even if different arguments are set up, they cannot cover up the faults of their own tenet. Some people set up other different expedient methods to cover up the faults of their own tenet, and they say: The so-called true nature of conditioned phenomena is empty, the meaning of this established tenet is not yet clear. If in terms of true nature, all conditioned phenomena have no reality, this is the meaning of establishing a tenet. Then, this so-called statement is also included in conditioned phenomena, so like all conditioned phenomena, it should also have no reality. If the so-called statement is not without reality, then conditioned phenomena should not be without reality. This statement destroys the meaning of what one has established, so it is called the fault of establishing a tenet that violates one's own words. It's like arguing that all words are false. If in terms of true nature, all conditioned phenomena are non-existent, this is the meaning of establishing a tenet. This is to slander that everything is non-existent, and such an argument falls into wrong views. It's like what the sutra says: 'I will definitely rely on myself, who says he is relying on? The wise tame themselves, so they can ascend to heaven and enjoy happiness.' They say that the mind is the self (Atman) in terms of conventional truth (Samvriti-satya); in terms of ultimate truth (Paramartha-satya), they establish it as non-self (Anatman). There is no fault in violating one's own words, and it is the same here. This is to say that there are eyes, etc. in terms of conventional nature; in terms of ultimate truth, they establish that they are all empty, so there is no fault. For example, someone says: 'All born dharmas return to death, and what the Muni (sage) said is definitely not false.' Since one's own body is a born dharma, it should also return to death and cannot be separated. Although the tenet they established can prove that they also return to death, this is what they recognize, so there is no fault in establishing a tenet that violates their own words, and it is the same here. It is said that in terms of true nature, conditioned phenomena are all empty, because they are born from various conditions, the established tenet

言既眾緣生亦應性空。不相離故。此立宗言雖能證自言說性空是所許故。無有自破所立義失。如梵志言。世尊。一切我皆不忍。佛言。梵志忍此事不。此中梵志固忍此事。而言一切我皆不忍。彼言違自所許事故。可有違害。自所言過。非一切處皆有此失。世尊余處說。一切行皆無有我。又余處說。諸行無常有生滅法。若不爾者。既說諸行無我無常。佛亦應有如所說過。然無彼失。如遮諸行我性常性。此立宗言。亦許同彼無我常故。此亦如是說有為空。所立宗言。亦許性空。此則順成自所許義。是故汝說。此言破自所立義故。此因不成。又如數論立諸顯事樂等為性。雖有難言顯事。若以樂等為性。所立宗言。亦應用彼樂等為性。所立宗言。若非彼性顯事亦應非彼為性。然所立宗無如是過。如立有為無常無我。亦無如彼所說宗失。此亦如是無所說過。意所許故。又彼論者不救所立。而返難言。若就真性有為無實。所說有為無實之言。亦應無實。此難不能免自宗過。妄說他宗同彼有失。如世癡賊既被推徴不能自雪而立道理誣誷他言。汝亦是賊此非審察。所出言詞又彼所言。若就真性一切有為都無所有。是立宗義。即謗一切皆無所有。如是所立墮邪見者。此中宗義如前廣說謂空無性虛妄顯現門之差別。非一切種皆謗為無。故汝

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：既然一切事物都是由眾多因緣和合而生，那麼它們也應該是本性空無的，因為它們不能脫離因緣而獨立存在。因此，我所提出的這個論點（一切事物本性空無）即使能夠證明我所說的話也是本性空無的，也沒有自我矛盾的過失，因為這是我所認可的。就像一個婆羅門說：『世尊，我什麼都不能忍受。』佛陀反問：『婆羅門，你忍受這件事嗎？』這個婆羅門實際上是忍受這件事的，但他卻說自己什麼都不能忍受，他的話語違背了他自己所認可的事實，所以才會有自我矛盾的過失。但並非所有情況下都會出現這種過失。世尊在其他地方說過：『一切行都是無我的。』又在其他地方說過：『諸行是無常的，有生滅的規律。』如果不是這樣，既然佛陀說了諸行是無我、無常的，那麼佛陀也應該有像你所說的過失了。但實際上並沒有這種過失，就像遮止諸行的我性和常性一樣，我所提出的這個論點也認可諸行是無我、無常的。這個道理也是一樣的，我說有為法是空性的，我所提出的這個論點也認可空性。這正是順應和成就了我自己所認可的意義。所以你說『這個論點會推翻自己所要建立的意義』，這個理由是不成立的。又比如，數論派認為諸顯事（Prakrti，自性）的本質是快樂等（樂、苦、暗三種屬性）。即使有人反駁說：『如果諸顯事的本質是快樂等，那麼你所提出的論點也應該以快樂等為本質。』或者說：『如果不是快樂等的本質，那麼諸顯事也應該不是快樂等的本質。』但數論派的論點並沒有這樣的過失，就像建立有為法是無常、無我一樣，也沒有像你所說的論點上的過失。這個道理也是一樣的，我的論點沒有任何過失，因為這是我內心所認可的。而且，對方的論者不設法補救自己所提出的論點，反而反過來責難說：『如果就真性（Paramarthasatya，勝義諦）而言，有為法是沒有實體的，那麼你所說的「有為法沒有實體」這句話也應該沒有實體。』這種責難並不能免除他們自己宗派的過失，他們只是妄加指責其他宗派也有同樣的過失。就像一個愚癡的盜賊，被抓住了之後，不能為自己辯解，反而強詞奪理地誣陷別人說：『你也是盜賊。』這種說法是不經過審察的。而且，他們所說的話，『如果就真性而言，一切有為法都是空無所有的』，這是他們所提出的論點，實際上是在誹謗一切都是空無所有的。像這樣所提出的論點，是會墮入邪見的。我所提出的宗義，就像前面廣泛解釋的那樣，是指空無自性、虛妄顯現等方面的差別，而不是誹謗一切都是空無。所以你…… English version: Since all phenomena arise from the aggregation of numerous causes and conditions, they should also be empty of inherent existence, because they cannot exist independently of causes and conditions. Therefore, this thesis that I propose (that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence), even if it can prove that my own words are also empty of inherent existence, does not have the fault of self-contradiction, because this is what I acknowledge. It is like a Brahmin saying: 'World-Honored One, I cannot endure anything.' The Buddha asked in return: 'Brahmin, do you endure this?' This Brahmin actually endures this, but he says that he cannot endure anything, his words contradict the facts that he himself acknowledges, so there is the fault of self-contradiction. But this fault does not occur in all cases. The World-Honored One said elsewhere: 'All conditioned phenomena are without self.' And elsewhere he said: 'All conditioned phenomena are impermanent, with the law of arising and ceasing.' If it were not so, since the Buddha said that conditioned phenomena are without self and impermanent, then the Buddha should also have the fault as you said. But in reality, there is no such fault, just as negating the self-nature and permanence of conditioned phenomena, this thesis that I propose also acknowledges that conditioned phenomena are without self and impermanent. The same principle applies here, I say that conditioned phenomena are empty, and this thesis that I propose also acknowledges emptiness. This is precisely in accordance with and accomplishing the meaning that I myself acknowledge. So you say 'this thesis will overturn the meaning that you want to establish', this reason is not valid. Also, for example, the Samkhya school posits that the essence of Prakrti (primordial nature) is pleasure, etc. (the three attributes of pleasure, pain, and dullness). Even if someone refutes: 'If the essence of Prakrti is pleasure, etc., then the thesis you propose should also have pleasure, etc. as its essence.' Or: 'If it is not the essence of pleasure, etc., then Prakrti should also not be the essence of pleasure, etc.' But the Samkhya school's thesis does not have such a fault, just as establishing that conditioned phenomena are impermanent and without self, there is no fault in the thesis as you said. The same principle applies here, my thesis has no fault, because this is what I acknowledge in my heart. Moreover, the opponent's debater does not try to remedy the thesis he proposes, but instead blames in return, saying: 'If in terms of Paramarthasatya (ultimate truth), conditioned phenomena have no substance, then the sentence you said "conditioned phenomena have no substance" should also have no substance.' This blame cannot exempt their own school from fault, they are just falsely accusing other schools of having the same fault. It is like a foolish thief, after being caught, cannot defend himself, but instead forcibly slanders others, saying: 'You are also a thief.' This statement is not made after careful consideration. Moreover, what they said, 'If in terms of Paramarthasatya, all conditioned phenomena are completely non-existent', this is the thesis they propose, is actually slandering that everything is completely non-existent. The thesis proposed in this way will fall into wrong views. The doctrine I propose, as explained extensively earlier, refers to the differences in aspects such as emptiness of inherent existence, illusory appearance, etc., and is not slandering that everything is empty. So you...

【English Translation】 English version: Since all phenomena arise from the aggregation of numerous causes and conditions, they should also be empty of inherent existence, because they cannot exist independently of causes and conditions. Therefore, this thesis that I propose (that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence), even if it can prove that my own words are also empty of inherent existence, does not have the fault of self-contradiction, because this is what I acknowledge. It is like a Brahmin saying: 'World-Honored One, I cannot endure anything.' The Buddha asked in return: 'Brahmin, do you endure this?' This Brahmin actually endures this, but he says that he cannot endure anything, his words contradict the facts that he himself acknowledges, so there is the fault of self-contradiction. But this fault does not occur in all cases. The World-Honored One said elsewhere: 'All conditioned phenomena are without self.' And elsewhere he said: 'All conditioned phenomena are impermanent, with the law of arising and ceasing.' If it were not so, since the Buddha said that conditioned phenomena are without self and impermanent, then the Buddha should also have the fault as you said. But in reality, there is no such fault, just as negating the self-nature and permanence of conditioned phenomena, this thesis that I propose also acknowledges that conditioned phenomena are without self and impermanent. The same principle applies here, I say that conditioned phenomena are empty, and this thesis that I propose also acknowledges emptiness. This is precisely in accordance with and accomplishing the meaning that I myself acknowledge. So you say 'this thesis will overturn the meaning that you want to establish', this reason is not valid. Also, for example, the Samkhya school posits that the essence of Prakrti (primordial nature) is pleasure, etc. (the three attributes of pleasure, pain, and dullness). Even if someone refutes: 'If the essence of Prakrti is pleasure, etc., then the thesis you propose should also have pleasure, etc. as its essence.' Or: 'If it is not the essence of pleasure, etc., then Prakrti should also not be the essence of pleasure, etc.' But the Samkhya school's thesis does not have such a fault, just as establishing that conditioned phenomena are impermanent and without self, there is no fault in the thesis as you said. The same principle applies here, my thesis has no fault, because this is what I acknowledge in my heart. Moreover, the opponent's debater does not try to remedy the thesis he proposes, but instead blames in return, saying: 'If in terms of Paramarthasatya (ultimate truth), conditioned phenomena have no substance, then the sentence you said "conditioned phenomena have no substance" should also have no substance.' This blame cannot exempt their own school from fault, they are just falsely accusing other schools of having the same fault. It is like a foolish thief, after being caught, cannot defend himself, but instead forcibly slanders others, saying: 'You are also a thief.' This statement is not made after careful consideration. Moreover, what they said, 'If in terms of Paramarthasatya, all conditioned phenomena are completely non-existent', this is the thesis they propose, is actually slandering that everything is completely non-existent. The thesis proposed in this way will fall into wrong views. The doctrine I propose, as explained extensively earlier, refers to the differences in aspects such as emptiness of inherent existence, illusory appearance, etc., and is not slandering that everything is empty. So you...

不應作如是難。

復有餘師懷聰睿慢作是難言。若諸有為就勝義諦猶如幻等空無自性。即是非有。執非有故便為無見。彼欲覆障自宗過難。矯設謗言。寧俱有過勿空論者。所立量成。謗勝義諦過失大故。此非有言。是遮詮義。汝執此言表彰為勝。我說此言遮止為勝。此非有言。唯遮有性。功能斯盡無有勢力。更詮余義。如世間說。非白絹言。不可即執。此言詮黑。與能說者作立宗過。非白絹言。唯遮白絹。功能斯盡更無餘力。詮表黑絹赤絹黃絹。今此論中就勝義諦于有為境避常見邊。且遮有性。如是余處避斷見邊遮于無性雙避二邊遮有無性。為避所餘妄執過失。乃至一切心之所行悉皆遮止。所行若滅心正隨滅。又于余處說阿難陀。若執有性即墮常邊。若執無性即墮斷邊。如是余處說迦葉波。有是一邊無是第二。由如是等阿笈摩故。及當所說諸道理故。我所立宗無觸如糞無見過失。

有不忍見自宗道理過難所集為欲隱映復作是言。性空論者雖常欣求無分別慧。而恒分別一切有為無為空性。即是成立遍計所執虛妄分別失自樂宗。如是亦遮故無此過。有餘復言。所說空因若就世俗。或就勝義。于自於他因義不成。二宗共許。不顯差別。總相法門明正理者。許為因故。汝所立難。似不成過非真不成。如勝論者立聲

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：不應該這樣提出詰難。

還有其他一些老師，懷著聰明的傲慢，這樣提出詰難：如果一切有為法（Samskrta，指由因緣和合而成的現象）就勝義諦（Paramārtha-satya，佛教用語，指最高的真理）而言，就像幻象一樣，是空無自性的，那就是『非有』。如果執著于『非有』，那就成了斷見（Uccheda-ditthi，佛教術語，認為人死後一切皆無的錯誤見解）。他們爲了掩蓋自己宗派的過失和詰難，就虛假地設定誹謗之言，說：『寧可雙方都有過失，也不要讓空性論者所建立的量（Pramana，指認識真理的工具）成立。』因為誹謗勝義諦的過失太大。這個『非有』的說法，是遮詮義（Prasajya-pratisedha，佛教邏輯術語，指通過否定來限定意義）。你執著于這個說法是表彰（Vidhi，佛教邏輯術語，指肯定性的陳述）為殊勝，我說這個說法是遮止（Pratisedha，佛教邏輯術語，指否定性的陳述）為殊勝。這個『非有』的說法，僅僅遮止『有性』，功能到此為止，沒有勢力再去詮釋其他的意義。就像世間所說，『非白絹』這句話，不可立即執著于這句話就詮釋了黑色的意思，如果這樣，對於能說者來說，就構成了立宗的過失。『非白絹』這句話，僅僅遮止白絹，功能到此為止，沒有餘力再去詮釋表彰黑絹、赤絹、黃絹。現在這個論中，就勝義諦而言，對於有為的境界，爲了避免常見邊（Sasvata-ditthi，佛教術語，認為事物是永恒不變的錯誤見解），姑且遮止『有性』。像這樣，在其他地方，爲了避免斷見邊，遮止『無性』，雙重避免這兩種邊見，遮止『有』和『無』的自性。爲了避免其餘的妄執過失，乃至一切心之所行，全部都加以遮止。所行如果滅盡，心也就正確地隨之滅盡。又在其他地方，佛陀對阿難陀（Ānanda，釋迦牟尼佛的十大弟子之一，以記憶力強著稱）說：如果執著于『有性』，就墮入常邊；如果執著于『無性』，就墮入斷邊。像這樣，在其他地方，佛陀對迦葉波（Kāśyapa，佛教中的重要人物，以頭陀苦行著稱）說：『有』是一邊，『無』是第二邊。由於像這些阿笈摩（Āgama，佛教術語，指聖教或經論）的緣故，以及將要說的各種道理的緣故，我所建立的宗（Siddhānta，佛教術語，指宗義或主張）沒有像接觸糞便一樣的過失。

有些人不忍心看到自己宗派的道理被過分詰難所困擾，爲了隱瞞掩蓋，又這樣說：空性論者雖然常常欣求無分別慧（Nirvikalpa-jñāna，佛教術語，指沒有分別的智慧），卻恒常分別一切有為法和無為法為空性，這就是成立了遍計所執（Parikalpita，佛教術語，指虛妄分別所執著的自性）的虛妄分別，喪失了自己所樂的宗義。像這樣也加以遮止，所以沒有這個過失。還有人說：所說的空因（Śūnyatā-hetu，佛教術語，指以空性作為理由或原因）如果就世俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya，佛教用語，指世俗的真理）而言，或者就勝義諦而言，對於自己和他人，因的意義都不能成立。兩個宗派共同承認，不顯示差別。總相法門（Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa，佛教術語，指共相或普遍性的特徵）的明理者，允許作為因的緣故，你所提出的詰難，像是『不成』的過失，而不是真正的『不成』。就像勝論者（Vaiśeṣika，印度古代哲學流派，重視實體和差別）建立聲音……

【English Translation】 English version: Such objections should not be made.

Furthermore, some other teachers, harboring pride in their cleverness, raise this objection: 'If all conditioned phenomena (Samskrta), in terms of the ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), are like illusions, empty and without inherent existence, then they are 'non-existent.' If one clings to 'non-existence,' it becomes nihilistic view (Uccheda-ditthi). They, in order to conceal the faults and objections of their own school, falsely set up slanderous words, saying: 'Rather let both sides have faults than allow the establishment of the proof (Pramana) established by the emptiness theorists.' Because the fault of slandering the ultimate truth is too great. This statement of 'non-existence' is a negative implication (Prasajya-pratisedha). You cling to this statement as an affirmation (Vidhi) as superior; I say this statement as a negation (Pratisedha) is superior. This statement of 'non-existence' only negates 'existence'; its function ends there, and it has no power to interpret other meanings. Just as the world says, 'non-white silk' cannot be immediately grasped as meaning black. If so, it constitutes a fault of establishing a thesis for the speaker. 'Non-white silk' only negates white silk; its function ends there, and it has no power to interpret or affirm black silk, red silk, or yellow silk. Now, in this treatise, in terms of the ultimate truth, regarding the realm of conditioned phenomena, in order to avoid the extreme of eternalism (Sasvata-ditthi), we provisionally negate 'existence.' In this way, in other places, in order to avoid the extreme of nihilism, we negate 'non-existence,' doubly avoiding these two extremes, negating the nature of 'existence' and 'non-existence.' In order to avoid the remaining faults of clinging, even all the activities of the mind are completely stopped. If the activities cease, the mind also correctly ceases along with them. Also, in other places, the Buddha said to Ānanda (Ānanda, one of the ten great disciples of Shakyamuni Buddha, known for his strong memory): 'If you cling to 'existence,' you fall into the extreme of eternalism; if you cling to 'non-existence,' you fall into the extreme of nihilism.' In this way, in other places, the Buddha said to Kāśyapa (Kāśyapa, an important figure in Buddhism, known for his ascetic practices): 'Existence is one extreme, non-existence is the second.' Because of these Āgamas (Āgama, Buddhist term referring to sacred teachings or scriptures), and because of the various reasons that will be stated, the doctrine (Siddhānta) I have established has no fault like touching feces.

Some people, unable to bear seeing the reasoning of their own school troubled by excessive objections, in order to conceal and cover up, say: 'Although emptiness theorists constantly seek non-conceptual wisdom (Nirvikalpa-jñāna), they constantly distinguish all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena as empty of inherent existence, which is to establish the false discrimination of what is imputed (Parikalpita), losing their own cherished doctrine.' In this way, it is also negated, so there is no such fault. Others say: 'The stated reason of emptiness (Śūnyatā-hetu), whether in terms of conventional truth (Saṃvṛti-satya) or ultimate truth, the meaning of the reason cannot be established for oneself or others. The two schools commonly acknowledge it, without showing any difference. Those who understand the general characteristic (Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) of the Dharma allow it as a reason, so the objection you raise is like a fault of 'unestablished,' not a true 'unestablished.' Just as the Vaiśeṣika (Vaiśeṣika, an ancient Indian philosophical school that emphasizes substance and difference) establishes sound...'

無常所作性故。聲常論者說彼過言。分別因義咽喉等作。或杖等作。如是分別因義不成。如數論者立能聞等五有情根非所造色。是根性故。猶如意根眼等五根。造色論者說彼過言。根性故因。若大造性。或樂等性。于自於他如是分別因義不成。彼二種說。似不成過非真不成。故不應理。此亦如是。復有餘師。以聰明慢貪自宗愛瞇亂慧目。不能觀察善說珍寶自論鄙穢得失差別。妄顯所立譬喻過言。咒術藥力加被華果塊磚等物。令其種種象馬兔等色相顯現。我宗不許。彼自性空。同喻便闕。所立無故。若言如幻象馬等相。無有他實像馬等性。說名為空。眼等亦爾。無他性故。立為空者便有宗過。立已成故。彼難不然。咒術藥力加被華果塊磚等物。眾緣所生象馬等相。像等性空。說為喻故。所立義成。若汝復謂。幻術所作象馬等事。雖無他實像馬等性。然不可說彼性空故此性亦空。豈非如彼相狀顯現即有如是諸物自性。如汝所許華果等物。若爾即應幻術所作象馬等事實有如是象馬等性。然實無有。故知一切幻術所作象馬等事自性皆空。是故實有。如所說喻。所立義成。亦無成立。已成過失。就自性空成立眼等有為空故。

復有諸餘異空慧者。別顯喻過。雖諸幻士非實士故說名為空。然彼幻士。自性不空。有虛妄現士相

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因為無常所造的緣故。主張聲音是常住不變的人，會說這個論點有過失。因為『分別因』的意義在於咽喉等的運作，或者棍杖等的敲擊。像這樣，『分別因』的意義就不能成立。如同數論者主張能聽聞等的五種有情根，不是被造作的色法，因為它們是根的自性。就像意根、眼根等五根一樣。主張色法是被造作的人，會說這個論點有過失。因為『根的自性』這個因，如果具有『大的造作性』，或者『快樂等的自性』，那麼對於自身對於他人，像這樣『分別因』的意義就不能成立。他們兩種說法，好像是不成立的過失，但並非真正的不成立。所以不應該這樣說。這個例子也是這樣。還有其他的老師，因為聰明、傲慢、貪婪和對自身宗派的偏愛，矇蔽了智慧的眼睛，不能觀察善說的珍寶和自身理論的鄙陋之處的得失差別，胡亂地顯示所立的譬喻有過失。比如咒術、藥物的力量加持在花果、土塊、磚頭等物品上，使它們顯現出種種的象、馬、兔等色相，我的宗派不承認這些，因為它們自性是空的，所以同喻就缺失了，所立的論點也就沒有了根據。如果說，就像幻化的象、馬等形象，沒有其他的真實的象、馬等的自性，所以才說它們是空的，那麼眼根等也是這樣，因為沒有其他的自性，所以才立為空性，這樣就有宗派的過失了，因為所立的論點已經是成立的了。這樣的責難是不成立的。咒術、藥物的力量加持在花果、土塊、磚頭等物品上，由眾多因緣所生的象、馬等形象，它們的象等自性是空的，所以才用它們作為比喻，所立的意義就成立了。如果你們又說，幻術所作的象、馬等事物，雖然沒有其他的真實的象、馬等的自性，但也不能說它們的自性是空的，因為這個自性也是空的。難道不是像它們顯現的相狀那樣，就具有像這樣的諸物的自性嗎？就像你們所承認的花果等物品一樣。如果這樣，那麼就應該幻術所作的象、馬等事物，確實具有像這樣的象、馬等自性，但實際上並沒有。所以要知道一切幻術所作的象、馬等事物的自性都是空的。因此，實際上是有的。就像所說的比喻一樣，所立的意義就成立了。也沒有成立已經成立的過失，因為是就自性空來成立眼根等是有為法是空性的。\n\n還有其他的異於空性的智慧者，特別地顯示比喻有過失。雖然那些幻術師不是真實的士夫，所以才說他們是空的。但是那些幻術師，自性不是空的，有虛妄顯現的士夫相。

【English Translation】 English version: Because of being produced by impermanence. Those who argue for the permanence of sound would say that this argument has a fault. Because the meaning of 'distinguishing cause' lies in the operation of the throat, etc., or the striking of sticks, etc. Thus, the meaning of 'distinguishing cause' cannot be established. Just as the Samkhyas (Samkhya, a school of Indian philosophy) assert that the five sentient roots such as the ability to hear are not created form, because they are the nature of roots. Just like the mind-root, the eye-root, and the other five roots. Those who argue that form is created would say that this argument has a fault. Because the cause of 'the nature of roots,' if it has 'the nature of great creation,' or 'the nature of pleasure, etc.,' then for oneself and for others, the meaning of 'distinguishing cause' cannot be established in this way. These two kinds of statements seem to be faults of non-establishment, but they are not truly non-establishment. Therefore, it should not be said like this. This example is also like that. Furthermore, there are other teachers who, blinded by cleverness, arrogance, greed, and love for their own school, cannot observe the differences between the merits and demerits of well-spoken jewels and the baseness of their own theories, and recklessly display the faults of the established analogies. For example, the power of mantras and medicines blesses flowers, fruits, clods of earth, bricks, and other objects, causing them to manifest various appearances of elephants, horses, rabbits, etc. My school does not accept these, because their nature is empty (svabhava-sunya), so the similar example is lacking, and the established argument has no basis. If you say that, like the illusory appearances of elephants, horses, etc., there is no other real nature of elephants, horses, etc., so they are said to be empty, then the eye-root, etc., are also like that, because there is no other nature, so establishing them as empty would have the fault of the school, because the established argument is already established. Such a refutation is not valid. The appearances of elephants, horses, etc., produced by the power of mantras and medicines blessing flowers, fruits, clods of earth, bricks, and other objects, which arise from numerous causes and conditions, are empty of the nature of elephants, etc., so they are used as metaphors, and the established meaning is established. If you further say that the things made by illusion, such as elephants and horses, although they do not have other real natures of elephants and horses, it cannot be said that their nature is empty, because this nature is also empty. Is it not the case that, like the appearances they manifest, they have the nature of such things? Just like the flowers, fruits, and other objects that you accept. If so, then the things made by illusion, such as elephants and horses, should indeed have such natures of elephants and horses, but in reality, they do not. Therefore, know that the nature of all things made by illusion, such as elephants and horses, is empty. Therefore, they are actually existent. Just like the metaphor that was spoken, the established meaning is established. There is also no fault of establishing what has already been established, because it is establishing that the eye-root, etc., are conditioned phenomena (samskrta) and are therefore empty, based on the emptiness of inherent existence (svabhava-sunyata).\n\nFurthermore, there are other wise ones who differ on emptiness, who specifically point out the fault of the analogy. Although those illusionists are not real men, so they are said to be empty. However, those illusionists are not empty of their own nature, they have the appearance of men that is falsely manifested.

體故。由此道理。如先所立句義不成。喻不成故。今應詰彼。此虛妄現幻士相體從緣生不。彼作是答。此從緣生。若爾何故複名虛妄。以如所顯現不如是有故。豈非眼等亦從緣生。如所顯現不如是有。同喻成故。性空義成。汝應信受。彼作是言。不應信受。以諸幻士非如實士。堪審觀察待彼實士。此虛妄故說名為空。非汝等立離前所說眼等有為別有眼等。堪審觀察待彼說此。眼等性空可令信受。雖無離此所說眼等別有眼等。然有如是性空緣生。所立能立二法成就。但由此喻足能證成所喻義故。汝今分別法喻別故。便成分別相似過類。顯敵論者自慧輕微。如勝論者說聲無常所作性故。譬如瓶等。不應難言。瓶等泥團輪等所成。可燒可見棒所擊破。可是無常。聲既不爾。應非無常。此亦分別法喻別故。故成分別相似過類故應信受。眼等性空。性空不離緣生因故。又如相現即有。自性先已破故。此亦應爾。故汝等言。不能解雪自宗過難。

有數論師作如是難。我立大等諸轉變聚。是所顯性緣生故因。有不成過。一切皆有。一切體故。諸根遍在一切處故。彼幻士中亦有此體。立此性空無同法喻。此中且依色覺觀察。謂諸色覺非緣所顯。隨彼別緣有轉異故。如隨泥團輪杖陶師心欲樂等差別眾緣有瓶盆等。或大或小。如是眼

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因為這個緣故，根據這個道理，就像先前所建立的句義不能成立，譬如說比喻不能成立。現在應該詰難他們：『這個虛妄顯現的幻士形象，它的體性是從因緣生起的嗎？』他們會這樣回答：『這是從因緣生起的。』如果這樣，為什麼又說它是虛妄的呢？因為它的顯現和實際情況不符。難道不是眼等（眼根等）也是從因緣生起的，而它們的顯現也和實際情況不符嗎？這樣，相同的比喻就成立了，性空的道理也就成立了，你們應該信受。他們會這樣說：『不應該信受。因為那些幻士不是真實的士夫，可以審察觀察，等待真實的士夫出現。這個是虛妄的，所以才說它是空。不是你們所立的，離開前面所說的眼等有為法，另外有眼等，可以審察觀察，等待它出現，然後說這個眼等是性空的，可以令人信受。』雖然沒有離開前面所說的眼等，另外有眼等，但是有這樣的性空緣生。所立和能立兩種法都成就了。僅僅憑藉這個比喻，就足以證明所比喻的意義。你們現在分別法和比喻的不同，就成了分別相似的過失。這顯示了敵論者的智慧輕微。就像勝論者說聲音是無常的，因為它是被製造出來的，譬如瓶子等。不應該反駁說：『瓶子等是由泥團、輪子等製成的，可以燒，可以見，可以用棒子擊破，所以是無常的。聲音不是這樣，所以應該不是無常的。』這也是分別法和比喻的不同，所以成了分別相似的過失。所以應該信受眼等是性空的，因為性空不離開因緣生起。又如現象的顯現即有，自性先前已經被破斥了，這裡也應該是這樣。所以你們說不能解釋清楚自己宗派的過失和困難。有數論師這樣提出難題：我所立的大等（大種等）諸轉變聚合，是所顯現的，因為是緣生之因，有不成過的過失，一切都有，因為一切都是一個整體。諸根遍在於一切處，在幻士中也有這個整體。建立這個性空，沒有相同的法作為比喻。這裡且依據色覺來觀察，所謂的色覺不是因緣所顯現的，隨著不同的因緣有轉變差異的緣故，就像隨著泥團、輪子、木杖、陶師的心意和喜好等不同的眾多因緣，有瓶子、盆子等，或大或小。就像眼（眼根）

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, based on this reasoning, just as the previously established statement and its meaning cannot stand, because the analogy cannot stand. Now, one should challenge them: 'Is the nature of this illusory appearing magician arising from conditions?' They would answer: 'It arises from conditions.' If so, why is it called illusory? Because its appearance does not correspond to reality. Are not the eye and so on (eye faculty, etc.) also arising from conditions, and their appearance does not correspond to reality? Thus, the same analogy is established, and the principle of emptiness of inherent existence is established, and you should accept it. They would say: 'It should not be accepted. Because those magicians are not real individuals who can be scrutinized and observed, awaiting the appearance of real individuals. This is illusory, so it is called empty. It is not that you establish, apart from the aforementioned conditioned phenomena such as the eye, another eye, etc., that can be scrutinized and observed, awaiting its appearance, and then say that this eye, etc., is empty of inherent existence, which can be accepted.' Although there is no eye, etc., apart from the aforementioned eye, etc., there is such emptiness of inherent existence arising from conditions. Both the thesis and the reason are accomplished. Merely relying on this analogy is sufficient to prove the meaning of the exemplified. Now, you distinguish between the subject and the example, which becomes the fault of distinguishing similarity. This shows the opponent's wisdom is slight. Just as the Vaisheshika (Vaiśeṣika) school says that sound is impermanent because it is produced, like a pot, etc. One should not object: 'Pots, etc., are made of clay, wheels, etc., can be burned, can be seen, can be broken by a stick, so they are impermanent. Sound is not like this, so it should not be impermanent.' This is also distinguishing between the subject and the example, so it becomes the fault of distinguishing similarity. Therefore, one should accept that the eye, etc., is empty of inherent existence, because emptiness of inherent existence does not depart from the cause of arising from conditions. Furthermore, just as the appearance of phenomena exists, its self-nature has already been refuted, and it should be the same here. Therefore, you say that you cannot clearly explain the faults and difficulties of your own school. A Samkhya (Sāṃkhya) philosopher raises the following difficulty: My established aggregates of transformations such as the Great (Mahat, etc.) are what is manifested, because it is the cause of arising from conditions, there is the fault of the unestablished reason, everything has it, because everything is a whole. The faculties are present everywhere, and the magician also has this whole. Establishing this emptiness of inherent existence, there is no similar dharma as an analogy. Here, let us observe based on color perception, the so-called color perception is not manifested by conditions, because it has transformative differences according to different conditions, just like with different numerous conditions such as clay, wheels, sticks, the potter's intention and preferences, there are pots, basins, etc., large or small. Just like the eye (eye faculty)

等眾緣差別色覺。隨彼種種轉異。隨眼明昧覺利鈍故。隨青等色境界差別。覺似青等顯現異故。世間現見是所顯物。不隨彼緣差別轉變。猶如明燈藥珠日等。所顯種種環釧等物。色覺不爾。如觀色覺眼等亦然。此義成實世間共了。故所說因無不成過。又汝所言一切皆有一切體等為據顯事為據隱用。若據顯事執一切有一切體者。如於瓶處有瓶顯事。于盆等處亦應遍有。此瓶顯事遍有體故。如是一瓶即應遍滿無量百千逾膳那處。于瓶等處亦應具有。盆等顯事非瓶顯事。被隱映故。盆等顯事。亦被隱映。形量大故。形量大者應為轉大形量隱映。瓶等顯事盆等顯事所隱映故。一切處時應不可得。是故汝宗據其顯事一切皆有一切體者不應道理。若據隱用執一切有一切體者。如是所執要廣觀察。方可正知。是實非實。恐文煩過不廣觀察。汝宗亦許。幻士顯處實士顯空。我所立喻無不成過。是故所立性空義成。汝數論師非處投寄。亦非諸根遍一切處。有所因故。如根依處。如是能為樂苦癡覺生因故等。多種證因亦應廣說。由破諸根遍一切處故。幻士中無諸根體。非所立空。無同法喻。是故汝成虛妄分別。魍魎所魅作如是計。

相應論師有作是說。汝就真性立有為空緣生故者。若此義言。諸有為法從眾緣生非自然有。就生無性立

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：各種因緣導致了不同的顏色感覺。這些感覺隨著各種因緣而變化，也隨著眼睛的明亮程度和感覺的敏銳程度而變化。由於對青色等顏色的感知因境界的差異而不同，感覺上所顯現的青色等顏色也會有所不同。世間常見的現象是，被顯現的物體不會隨著因緣的差異而改變，比如明燈、藥珠、太陽等所照亮的各種手鐲等物品。但顏色感覺並非如此。正如觀察顏色感覺一樣，眼睛等也是如此。這個道理是真實存在的，世間普遍認可的。因此，你所說的理由並沒有不成立的過失。此外，你所說的一切事物都具有一切事物的本體，這是根據顯現的事物還是根據隱藏的作用來判斷的呢？如果根據顯現的事物，認為一切事物都具有一切事物的本體，那麼，在瓶子所在的地方有瓶子的顯現，在盆子等地方也應該普遍存在。因為這個瓶子的顯現具有普遍存在的本體。這樣一來，一個瓶子就應該遍佈無量百千由旬的地方，並且在瓶子等地方也應該具有盆子等的顯現，只是因為瓶子的顯現被盆子的顯現所遮蔽。盆子等的顯現也會被遮蔽，因為它們的形狀和大小更大。形狀和大小更大的事物應該被更大的形狀和大小的事物所遮蔽。瓶子等的顯現因為被盆子等的顯現所遮蔽，所以在任何時間任何地點都應該無法被觀察到。因此，你們宗派根據顯現的事物認為一切事物都具有一切事物的本體是不合理的。如果根據隱藏的作用，認為一切事物都具有一切事物的本體，那麼，這種觀點需要廣泛地觀察才能正確地認識到它是真實還是虛假的。恐怕文字過於繁瑣，所以不進行廣泛的觀察。你們宗派也承認，幻術師所顯現的地方，在真實的人看來是空無一物的。我所立的比喻並沒有不成立的過失。因此，我所立的自性本空的道理是成立的。你們數論師的觀點是投寄在錯誤的地方。而且，諸根並非遍佈一切地方，因為它們有其存在的原因，比如諸根所依賴的地方。諸根能夠產生快樂、痛苦和愚癡的感覺等等，多種證據也應該廣泛地說明。由於破斥了諸根遍佈一切地方的觀點，所以在幻術師所變幻的事物中沒有諸根的本體，因此，我所立的空性並沒有相同的比喻。因此，你們的觀點是虛妄的分別，是被鬼魅所迷惑而產生的想法。相應論師有人這樣說：你根據真性而立的有為法是因緣所生的觀點。如果這個觀點是指，所有的有為法都是從各種因緣產生的，而不是自然存在的，那麼，就應該根據生無自性的觀點來立論。

【English Translation】 English version: Various conditions give rise to different color perceptions. These perceptions change according to the various conditions, and also according to the brightness of the eyes and the sharpness of perception. Because the perception of colors such as blue differs due to differences in the realm of objects, the blue color, etc., that appears in perception will also be different. It is a common phenomenon in the world that the objects that are revealed do not change with the differences in conditions, such as the various bracelets, etc., illuminated by bright lamps, medicinal pearls, the sun, etc. But color perception is not like this. Just as observing color perception, the eyes, etc., are also like this. This principle is real and universally recognized in the world. Therefore, the reason you stated does not have the fault of being untenable. Furthermore, you say that all things have the essence of all things, is this judged according to the manifested things or according to the hidden functions? If according to the manifested things, believing that all things have the essence of all things, then, where there is a pot, the manifestation of the pot should be present, and it should also be universally present in places such as basins, etc. Because this manifestation of the pot has a universally present essence. In this way, one pot should pervade countless hundreds of thousands of yojanas, and it should also have the manifestation of basins, etc., in places such as pots, etc., only because the manifestation of the pot is obscured by the manifestation of the basin. The manifestation of basins, etc., will also be obscured because their shape and size are larger. Things with larger shapes and sizes should be obscured by things with even larger shapes and sizes. Because the manifestation of pots, etc., is obscured by the manifestation of basins, etc., it should not be observable at any time or place. Therefore, it is unreasonable for your school to believe that all things have the essence of all things based on the manifested things. If according to the hidden functions, believing that all things have the essence of all things, then this view needs to be widely observed in order to correctly recognize whether it is real or false. Fearing that the text would be too cumbersome, I will not conduct a wide observation. Your school also admits that the place manifested by illusionists is empty in the eyes of real people. The analogy I have established does not have the fault of being untenable. Therefore, the principle of self-nature being empty that I have established is valid. The views of you Samkhya (Samkhya) philosophers are placed in the wrong place. Moreover, the sense organs (Indriya) are not pervasive in all places, because they have their reasons for existence, such as the place where the sense organs rely. The sense organs can produce feelings of pleasure, pain, and ignorance, etc., and various evidences should also be widely explained. Because the view that the sense organs are pervasive in all places has been refuted, there is no essence of the sense organs in the things transformed by illusionists, therefore, the emptiness that I have established does not have the same analogy. Therefore, your views are false discriminations, and are ideas produced by being bewitched by demons (Pisaca). Some scholars of the corresponding school (Samprayukta) say this: You establish the view that conditioned phenomena (Samskrta) are produced by causes and conditions based on true nature (Satya). If this view means that all conditioned phenomena are produced from various causes and conditions, and are not naturally existing, then it should be established based on the view of non-self-nature of birth (anutpada).

彼為空。是則述成相應師義符會正理。又如是說。由彼故空彼實是無。依此故空此實是有。如是空性是天人師如實所說。此教意言。遍計所執依他起上。自性本無非彼性故。以非如能詮有所詮性。亦非如所詮有能詮性故。依他起自性有上遍計所執自性本無。由彼故空即妄計事。彼自性無。依此故空。即緣生事此自性有。此若無者則為斷滅。於何事上說誰為空。此緣生事即說名為依他起性。依此得有色受想等自性差別假立性轉。此若無者假法亦無。便成無見。不應與言。不應共住。自墮惡趣亦令他墮。如是成立遍計所執。自性為空。及依他起自性為有。契當正理。若此義言。依他起性亦無所有故立為空。汝便墮落如上所說。過失深坑亦覆成就誹謗世尊聖教過失。此中尚與發趣余乘及諸外道。欣求善說離慳嫉者。廣興諍論。何況同趣一乘諸師。論時至故少共抉擇此事。廣如入真甘露已具分別。故不重辯。怖廣文者不欣樂故。言有為法從眾緣生非自然有。就生無性說彼為空。此有何義。若此義言。眼等有為依他起上不從因生常無滅壞。眼等自性畢竟無故。說名為空。便立已成。同類數論勝論等宗。皆共許故。然說眼等非所作宗。自性空故。應言無生。無性故空。不應說言就生無性說彼為空。若彼起時就勝義諦有自性生。云何

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：彼為空（那個是空性的）。這便闡述了與相應師的意義相符的正理。又如是說：『由於那個的緣故是空，那個實際上是沒有的；依靠這個的緣故是空，這個實際上是有的。』這樣的空性是天人導師如實所說的。這個教義的意思是：遍計所執（parikalpita，遍計所執性，三種自性之一，指由虛妄分別所執著的自性）在依他起（paratantra，依他起性，三種自性之一，指由因緣和合而生的現象）上，其自性本來就沒有，因為它不是依他起的自性。不像能詮（表達者）具有所詮（被表達者）的自性，也不像所詮具有能詮的自性。依他起的自性存在，而遍計所執的自性本來就沒有。由於那個的緣故是空，即虛妄計度的事物，它的自性是沒有的；依靠這個的緣故是空，即緣起的事物，它的自性是有的。如果這個沒有，那就成了斷滅。在什麼事物上說誰是空呢？這個緣起的事物就被稱為依他起性。依靠這個才能有色、受、想等自性的差別，假立的自性才能運轉。如果這個沒有，假法也就沒有了，那就成了無見（虛無主義）。不應該與這樣的人交談，不應該與這樣的人同住，自己墮入惡趣，也令他人墮入惡趣。這樣才能成立遍計所執的自性是空，以及依他起的自性是有的，這與正理相契合。如果這個意義是說，依他起性也是沒有的，所以立為空，那麼你就墮落到如上所說的過失深坑中，也成就了誹謗世尊聖教的過失。在這種情況下，尚且要與發趣于其他乘以及那些外道，欣求善說、遠離慳吝嫉妒的人，廣泛地興起爭論，更何況是與同趣於一乘的諸位法師呢？現在討論的時機到了，稍微共同抉擇這件事。詳細的內容已經在《入真甘露》中完整地分別過了，所以不再重複辯論。害怕長篇大論的人是不喜歡聽的。說有為法（saṃskṛta，由因緣和合而成的法）從眾多因緣而生，不是自然而有的，就生無自性來說它是空。這有什麼意義呢？如果這個意義是說，眼等有為法在依他起上，不是從因產生的，常常沒有滅壞，眼等的自性畢竟是沒有的，所以說名為空，那就成立了與數論、勝論等宗派相同的觀點，因為他們都共同承認這一點。然而，說眼等不是所作的宗派，因為自性是空的，應該說無生，因為無自性所以是空，不應該說就生無自性來說它是空。如果它生起的時候，就勝義諦（paramārtha-satya，勝義諦，二諦之一，指究竟真實的道理）而言有自性生，那又怎麼樣呢？現代漢語譯本：現代漢語譯本：

【English Translation】 English version: It is empty (that is emptiness). This then elucidates the correct reasoning that accords with the meaning of the corresponding teacher. Moreover, it is said thus: 'Because of that, it is empty; that is actually non-existent. Relying on this, it is empty; this is actually existent.' Such emptiness is what the teacher of gods and humans has truly spoken. The meaning of this teaching is: the parikalpita (the completely imagined nature, one of the three natures, referring to the self-nature grasped by false discrimination) on the paratantra (the dependent nature, one of the three natures, referring to phenomena arising from the aggregation of causes and conditions), its self-nature is originally non-existent, because it is not the nature of the paratantra. It is not like the expresser having the nature of the expressed, nor like the expressed having the nature of the expresser. The self-nature of the paratantra exists, while the self-nature of the parikalpita is originally non-existent. Because of that, it is empty, that is, the falsely conceived thing; its self-nature is non-existent. Relying on this, it is empty, that is, the dependently arisen thing; its self-nature is existent. If this does not exist, then it becomes annihilation. On what thing is it said who is empty? This dependently arisen thing is called the paratantra nature. Relying on this, there can be differences in the self-nature of form, feeling, thought, etc., and the falsely established self-nature can operate. If this does not exist, then the false dharma also does not exist, and it becomes nihilism. One should not converse with such a person, one should not live with such a person, one falls into evil destinies oneself, and also causes others to fall. In this way, it can be established that the self-nature of the parikalpita is empty, and the self-nature of the paratantra is existent, which accords with correct reasoning. If this meaning is that the paratantra nature is also non-existent, so it is established as empty, then you fall into the deep pit of faults as mentioned above, and also accomplish the fault of slandering the Holy Teachings of the World Honored One. In this situation, one should still extensively engage in debates with those who are inclined towards other vehicles and those non-Buddhists who seek good teachings and are free from stinginess and jealousy, let alone with those teachers who are inclined towards the One Vehicle? Now that the time for discussion has arrived, let us briefly jointly decide on this matter. The detailed content has already been completely distinguished in 'Entering the True Nectar', so there is no need to repeat the debate. Those who are afraid of lengthy texts do not like to listen. Saying that conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta, dharmas that arise from the aggregation of causes and conditions) arise from numerous causes and conditions, and are not naturally existent, and saying that they are empty in terms of the absence of inherent existence. What is the meaning of this? If this meaning is that the conditioned dharmas such as the eye, etc., on the paratantra, do not arise from causes, and are always without destruction, and the self-nature of the eye, etc., is ultimately non-existent, so it is said to be empty, then it establishes the same view as the Samkhya, Vaisheshika, and other schools, because they all commonly acknowledge this point. However, saying that the school of the eye, etc., is not created, because the self-nature is empty, it should be said to be unborn, because it is without self-nature, so it is empty, and it should not be said that it is empty in terms of the absence of inherent existence. If it arises, then how about it having self-nature in terms of the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya, the ultimate truth, one of the two truths, referring to the ultimate and true principle)?

說為生無自性。若實無生此體無故。不應說有唯識實性。若爾則有違自宗過。若依他起自然生性。空無有故說之為空。是則還有立已成過。既許依他眾緣而生。實不空故應不名空。我則不爾。云何迷成相應師義。又如所說。由彼故空彼實是無。依此故空此實有等。若因緣力所生眼等一切世間共許實有。是諸愚夫覺慧所行。世俗似有自性顯現。以勝義諦覺慧尋求。猶如幻士都無實性。是故說言。由彼故空彼實是無。為欲遮墮常邊過故。如為棄捨墮常邊過說彼為無。亦為棄捨墮斷邊過。說此為有。謂因緣力所生眼等世俗諦攝。自性是有。不同空華全無有物。但就真性立之為空。是故說言。依此故空此實是有。如是空性是天人師。如實所說。若就此義說依他起自性是有則為善說。如是自性我亦許故。隨順世間言說所攝。福德智慧二資糧故。世俗假立所依有故。假法亦有。然復說言。此若無者假法亦無。便成無見。不應與語。如是等過皆不成就。又若建立依他起性世俗故有。便立已成。若立此性勝義諦有。無同法喻。如已遮遣執定有性。亦當遮遣執定無性。是故不應謗言增益損減所說依他起性。若言我宗立有幻等離言實性。同喻無故非能立者。離言實性道理不成。故無有過。若爾外道所執離言實性。我等誰能遮破。彼亦說有實

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：你說萬法生起沒有自性。如果確實沒有生起，那麼這個『體』（自性）就不存在，不應該說有唯識的真實自性。如果這樣說，就犯了違背自己宗派的過失。如果說依他起性是自然生起的，因為是空無所有的，所以說是空。那麼就還有重複建立已成立的觀點的過失。既然承認依他起性是依靠眾多因緣而生起的，實際上不是空無，就不應該稱之為空。我不是這樣認為的。怎麼會迷惑于相應師的觀點呢？又如你所說，『因為那個（條件）的緣故是空，那個（自性）實際上是沒有的；依靠這個（條件）的緣故是空，這個（現象）實際上是有的』等等。如果因緣力量所生起的眼等，一切世間都公認是真實存在的，這是那些愚夫的覺慧所能理解的，在世俗層面看起來好像有自性顯現。用勝義諦的覺慧去尋求，就像幻術變出的東西一樣，根本沒有真實自性。所以說，『因為那個（條件）的緣故是空，那個（自性）實際上是沒有的』，是爲了遮止墮入常邊的過失。就像爲了捨棄墮入常邊的過失而說那個（自性）是沒有的，也爲了捨棄墮入斷邊的過失，而說這個（現象）是有的。也就是說，因緣力量所生起的眼等，屬於世俗諦所攝，自性是存在的，不同於虛空中的花朵，完全沒有實體。只是就真性而言，才說它是空。所以說，『依靠這個（條件）的緣故是空，這個（現象）實際上是有的』。這樣的空性是天人導師如實所說的。如果就這個意義來說，依他起自性是存在的，那就是正確的說法。這樣的自性我也是承認的。隨順世間的言語表達，依靠福德和智慧兩種資糧，因為世俗假立的所依是存在的，所以假法也是存在的。然而又說，『如果這個（所依）不存在，那麼假法也不存在』，那就變成了斷滅見，不應該與這樣的人交談。像這樣的過失都不會成立。此外，如果建立依他起性在世俗層面是存在的，那就成了重複建立已成立的觀點。如果說這個自性在勝義諦層面是存在的，那就沒有相同的比喻。就像已經遮止了執著于固定存在的自性一樣，也應當遮止執著于固定不存在的自性。所以不應該誹謗說我增益或損減了所說的依他起性。如果說我宗建立有如幻如化的離言實性，因為沒有相同的比喻，所以不能成立。離言實性的道理不能成立，所以沒有過失。如果這樣，外道所執著的離言實性，我們誰能遮破呢？他們也說有真實存在。

【English Translation】 English version: You say that things are without inherent existence (Skt: svabhāva). If there is truly no arising, then this 'entity' (svabhāva) does not exist, and it should not be said that there is a real nature of Vijñānavāda (Consciousness-only school). If that is the case, then there is the fault of contradicting your own tenets. If dependent arising (Skt: pratītyasamutpāda) arises naturally, it is said to be empty because it is empty and without substance. Then there is still the fault of re-establishing what has already been established. Since you admit that dependent arising arises from many causes and conditions, it is actually not empty, so it should not be called empty. I do not think so. How can you be confused by the meaning of the corresponding teacher? Moreover, as you said, 'Because of that (condition), it is empty; that (svabhāva) is actually non-existent; relying on this (condition), it is empty; this (phenomenon) is actually existent,' and so on. If the eyes and so on, which are produced by the power of causes and conditions, are universally recognized by all the world as real, this is what the wisdom of those fools can understand, and it seems that there is an inherent nature appearing on the conventional level. Seeking with the wisdom of ultimate truth (Skt: paramārtha-satya), it is like something conjured up by a magician, without any real nature at all. Therefore, it is said, 'Because of that (condition), it is empty; that (svabhāva) is actually non-existent,' in order to prevent falling into the extreme of permanence. Just as it is said that that (svabhāva) is non-existent in order to abandon falling into the extreme of permanence, it is also said that this (phenomenon) is existent in order to abandon falling into the extreme of annihilation. That is to say, the eyes and so on, which are produced by the power of causes and conditions, are included in the conventional truth (Skt: saṃvṛti-satya), and their nature is existent, unlike flowers in the sky, which have no substance at all. It is only in terms of the true nature that it is said to be empty. Therefore, it is said, 'Relying on this (condition), it is empty; this (phenomenon) is actually existent.' Such emptiness is what the teacher of gods and humans (Buddha) truly said. If, in this sense, it is said that the nature of dependent arising is existent, then that is a correct statement. I also admit such a nature. Following the worldly expressions, relying on the two accumulations of merit and wisdom, because the basis of conventional imputation exists, so the imputed phenomena also exist. However, it is also said, 'If this (basis) does not exist, then the imputed phenomena also do not exist,' then it becomes a nihilistic view, and one should not talk to such a person. Such faults will not be established. Furthermore, if it is established that dependent arising exists on the conventional level, then it becomes a repetition of establishing what has already been established. If it is said that this nature exists on the ultimate level, then there is no similar analogy. Just as the clinging to a fixedly existent nature has been refuted, so should the clinging to a fixedly non-existent nature be refuted. Therefore, one should not slander by saying that I have increased or decreased the dependent arising that has been spoken of. If it is said that my school establishes a reality beyond words (Skt: anabhilāpya) like an illusion, because there is no similar analogy, it cannot be established. The reasoning of a reality beyond words cannot be established, so there is no fault. If so, who can refute the reality beyond words clung to by the non-Buddhists? They also say that there is a real existence.

性。我等非慧非言之所行故。若眾緣力所生一切依他起性就勝義諦有自性者。幻士應有實士自性。若有他性亦不應理。牛上不應有驢性故。作非作性實有實無。有性無性二俱攝受。如此所立無同法喻。或立已成二過所染。故不應理。又從緣生諸有為法。就勝義諦若許有性。所作故因。證彼性空遣彼性有。故所立宗違比量過。諸從緣生皆共了知。世俗有性若有定執。勝義諦有應以此理遮破彼宗。又彼不應攝受此論。就勝義諦二種分別不應理故。又如所說非如能詮有所詮性非如所詮有能詮性。諸敵論者於此無疑。故遮止言。立已成過。又如所說。故依他起自性有上。遍計所執自性本無此亦他論。於是無疑。故遮止言。立已成過。若言由執能詮所詮遍計所執自性有力生諸煩惱故須遮止。此亦不然。諸禽獸等不了能詮所詮相應。亦于境界不如理執生煩惱故。具有種種堪能意樂。亦有種種微妙聖言。遍計所執自性空教。唯益少分不遍一切故。我不獨立之為空。且止傍論應辯正論。

如是如前所說道理已具成立眼自性空。復有餘師作如是難此能遮破有自性言。若是實有失所立宗。因成不定。若非實有即無自性不成能破。此亦不然。如世尊說。梵志當知。一切所說實非實言。我皆說為非實非妄。由此聖教及諸已說。當說道理。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本性（自性）。我等（我們）非慧非言之所行故（因為不是智慧和言語所能達到的境界）。若眾緣力所生一切依他起性（依因緣而生的一切現象），就勝義諦（究竟真理）有自性者（如果說在勝義諦中具有自性），幻士（魔術師）應有實士（真實的人）自性。若有他性（如果具有其他的自性）亦不應理（也是不合理的），牛上不應有驢性故（因為牛身上不應該有驢的自性）。作非作性（能作和不能作的自性），實有實無（真實存在和真實不存在），有性無性（有自性和無自性）二俱攝受（兩種都接受），如此所立無同法喻（這樣所建立的觀點沒有相同的例子可以比喻），或立已成二過所染（或者陷入了『立已成』的兩種過失）。故不應理（所以是不合理的）。又從緣生諸有為法（又從因緣所生的各種有為法），就勝義諦若許有性（如果承認在勝義諦中具有自性），所作故因（因為是所作的緣故），證彼性空遣彼性有（證明它的自性是空，遣除它的自性是有的觀點），故所立宗違比量過（所以所建立的宗義違反了比量的過失）。諸從緣生皆共了知（各種從因緣所生的事物大家都共同瞭解），世俗有性若有定執（在世俗諦中具有自性如果對此有固定的執著），勝義諦有應以此理遮破彼宗（在勝義諦中具有自性，應該用這個道理來遮破他們的宗義）。又彼不應攝受此論（而且他們不應該接受這個論點），就勝義諦二種分別不應理故（因為在勝義諦中進行兩種分別是不合理的）。又如所說非如能詮有所詮性（又如所說，不是像能詮（語言）具有所詮（意義）的自性），非如所詮有能詮性（也不是像所詮（意義）具有能詮（語言）的自性），諸敵論者於此無疑（各種敵對的論者對此沒有疑問），故遮止言（所以阻止他們說），立已成過（『立已成』的過失）。又如所說（又如所說），故依他起自性有上（所以依他起的自性在…之上），遍計所執自性本無（遍計所執的自性本來就沒有），此亦他論（這也是其他的論點），於是無疑（對此沒有疑問），故遮止言（所以阻止他們說），立已成過（『立已成』的過失）。若言由執能詮所詮遍計所執自性有力生諸煩惱故須遮止（如果說因為執著能詮和所詮，遍計所執的自性有力，產生各種煩惱，所以需要阻止），此亦不然（這也是不對的），諸禽獸等不了能詮所詮相應（各種禽獸等不瞭解能詮和所詮的相應關係），亦于境界不如理執生煩惱故（也因為對境界不如理的執著而產生煩惱）。具有種種堪能意樂（具有各種各樣的能力和意樂），亦有種種微妙聖言（也有各種各樣微妙的聖言），遍計所執自性空教（遍計所執的自性是空的教義），唯益少分不遍一切故（只對少部分人有益，不能普及到所有人），我不獨立之為空（我不單獨建立空性）。且止傍論應辯正論（暫且停止旁論，應該辯論正論）。如是如前所說道理已具成立眼自性空（像這樣，像前面所說的道理已經完全成立了眼睛的自性是空）。復有餘師作如是難（又有其他的論師提出這樣的疑問）：此能遮破有自性言（這個能夠遮破有自性的說法），若是實有失所立宗（如果是真實存在的，就失去了所建立的宗義），因成不定（原因就變得不確定）。若非實有即無自性不成能破（如果不是真實存在的，就沒有自性，就不能成立能破）。此亦不然（這也是不對的）。如世尊說（就像世尊所說）：梵志當知（梵志，你應該知道），一切所說實非實言（一切所說的真實和不真實的話），我皆說為非實非妄（我都說是非真實也非虛妄）。由此聖教及諸已說（通過這個聖教以及各種已經說過的），當說道理（應該說的道理）。

【English Translation】 English version 性 (Svabhava, self-nature). We are not within the realm of wisdom or words, hence (because it is beyond the reach of wisdom and language). If all phenomena arising from the power of various conditions, the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhava), possess self-nature (svabhava) in the ultimate truth (paramartha-satya), then a magician (mayavi) should possess the self-nature of a real person. If it possesses other-nature (para-svabhava), that is also unreasonable, as a donkey's nature should not exist on a cow. The nature of doing and not doing, real existence and real non-existence, both existence and non-existence are accepted. Such a proposition has no similar example, or it is tainted by the two faults of 'already established'. Therefore, it is unreasonable. Furthermore, if phenomena arising from conditions, conditioned phenomena (samskrta-dharma), are admitted to have self-nature in the ultimate truth, then because they are created, this reason proves their emptiness of self-nature and refutes their existence of self-nature. Therefore, the established thesis violates the fallacy of contradiction in inference. All phenomena arising from conditions are commonly known. If there is a fixed attachment to their existence in conventional truth (samvriti-satya), then their existence in ultimate truth should be refuted by this reasoning. Moreover, they should not accept this argument, as the two kinds of distinctions in ultimate truth are unreasonable. Furthermore, as it is said that the expressed (artha) does not possess the nature of the expressing (vyanjana), nor does the expressing possess the nature of the expressed, all opposing debaters have no doubt about this. Therefore, the statement is prevented, and the fallacy of 'already established' is committed. Furthermore, as it is said that the dependent nature has existence, while the imputed nature (parikalpita-svabhava) is fundamentally non-existent, this is also another's argument. There is no doubt about this. Therefore, the statement is prevented, and the fallacy of 'already established' is committed. If it is said that because attachment to the expressing and the expressed, the imputed nature, has the power to generate afflictions (klesha), it must be prevented, this is also not correct. Various animals and birds do not understand the correspondence between the expressing and the expressed, yet they also generate afflictions due to their irrational attachment to objects. Possessing various abilities and intentions, and also having various subtle sacred words, the teaching of the emptiness of the imputed nature only benefits a small portion and does not pervade all. I do not independently establish emptiness. Let us stop the side discussions and debate the main topic. Thus, as the previously stated reasoning has fully established the emptiness of the eye's self-nature. Again, other teachers raise such a difficulty: This statement that can refute the existence of self-nature, if it is truly existent, loses the established thesis, and the reason becomes uncertain. If it is not truly existent, then it has no self-nature and cannot establish the refutation. This is also not correct. As the World-Honored One said: 'Brahmin, know that all statements of reality and unreality, I say are neither real nor false.' Through this sacred teaching and all that has been said, the reasoning that should be spoken.

就勝義諦實與不實皆不建立。是故無有如所說過。又如汝意。所說道理所遮無故能遮亦無。非能遮無所遮便有。但由所遮本性無故能遮亦無。能遮唯能辯了所遮。本無自性。非能破壞所遮自性。如說菩薩不能以空空一切法。然一切法本性自空。乃至廣說。又如能照照所照時。不應說言。瓶衣等物所照無故能照亦無。亦不應言所照物性本無今有。又我所立能遮所遮能立能破有倒無倒皆世俗有。若汝遮破所立能立即違自宗。此能遮言應非能立。性非實故。如石女兒所發音聲。汝既許有。能立比量。我亦應爾。世俗有故。如前已說。但止廣諍諸有厭怖。廣文義者難受持故。如是如前所說比量無諸障難故所立宗。謂就真性眼處性空道理成就。又所立因緣生故者。略舉名相。為遮所說眼等自性。復有餘因。謂可壞故。隨緣別故。可生起故。有時能起邪正智故。由此等因如其所應。隨所對治應正遮破。復有說言。眼實有性。彼相因果皆現有故。非實性空現有相等現見眼等相等現有。是故眼等非實性空。

此就勝義無同喻故。有性不成。若就世俗共知實性。便立已成。又依同喻因成相違。同喻唯有世俗性故。

如就真性眼處性空。如是耳鼻舌身與意色聲香味觸處法處性空亦爾。修觀行者。亦應如是悟入性空。又應總別就

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：就勝義諦（paramārtha-satya，最終真理）而言，無論『實』還是『不實』都不成立。因此，不存在像你所說的那樣的情況。而且，按照你的意思，因為所要遮遣的道理不存在，所以能遮遣的道理也不存在。並非能遮遣的不存在，所要遮遣的就存在。只是因為所要遮遣的本性不存在，所以能遮遣的也不存在。能遮遣的僅僅能夠辨明所要遮遣的，其本性沒有自性，並非能夠破壞所要遮遣的自性。正如所說，菩薩不能用空性來使一切法變空，而是一切法的本性本來就是空性，乃至廣說。又如能照亮的光照亮所照之物時，不應說，因為瓶子、衣服等物這些被照亮的東西不存在，所以能照亮的光也不存在。也不應說，被照亮之物的性質本來沒有，現在才有的。而且，我所建立的能遮、所遮、能立、能破，有顛倒、無顛倒，這些都是世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）中才有的。如果你遮破我所建立的能立，那就違背了你自己的宗派。這個能遮的言論應該不是能立，因為它的性質不是真實的，就像石女兒所發出的聲音一樣。既然你承認有能立的比量，我也應該如此，因為它們在世俗諦中是存在的，正如前面已經說過的。只是停止廣泛的爭論，因為很多人都厭煩爭論，而且廣泛的文義難以受持。像這樣，就像前面所說的比量，沒有各種障礙，因此所立的宗，也就是就真性而言，眼處（cakṣu-āyatana，視覺器官）的自性是空的，這個道理是成立的。而且，所立的因『緣生故』，只是簡略地舉出名相，是爲了遮遣所說的眼等自性。還有其他的因，比如『可壞故』（因為可以被破壞），『隨緣別故』（因為隨因緣而改變），『可生起故』（因為可以被生起），『有時能生起邪正智故』（因為有時能生起錯誤的或正確的智慧）。通過這些因，根據所要對治的對象，應該正確地遮破。又有人說，眼睛具有真實的自性，因為它的相、因、果都是現在存在的。如果真實的自性是空的，那麼現在存在的相等等就不應該存在。現在可以現見眼睛的相等等是存在的，所以眼睛等等不是真實的自性是空的。就勝義諦而言，因為沒有相同的比喻，所以『有性』不能成立。如果就世俗諦而言，大家都知道有真實的自性，那麼這就成了已經成立的觀點。而且，依靠相同的比喻，因就成了相違的。因為相同的比喻只有世俗的自性。就像就真性而言，眼處的自性是空的，耳朵（śrotra，聽覺器官）、鼻子（ghrāṇa，嗅覺器官）、舌頭（jihvā，味覺器官）、身體（kāya，觸覺器官）和意識（manas，思維器官），以及色（rūpa，顏色和形狀）、聲（śabda，聲音）、香（gandha，氣味）、味（rasa，味道）、觸（spraṣṭavya，觸感）和法處（dharma-āyatana，心理現象）的自性是空的，也是一樣的。修觀行的人，也應該這樣悟入自性空。而且應該總體和分別地就……

【English Translation】 English version: With regard to ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), neither 'real' nor 'unreal' is established. Therefore, there is nothing as you have said. Moreover, according to your intention, because what is to be refuted does not exist, the refuter also does not exist. It is not the case that if the refuter does not exist, what is to be refuted exists. It is only because the very nature of what is to be refuted does not exist that the refuter also does not exist. The refuter can only discern what is to be refuted, which inherently lacks intrinsic existence (svabhāva). It cannot destroy the intrinsic existence of what is to be refuted. As it is said, a Bodhisattva cannot empty all phenomena with emptiness, but rather all phenomena are inherently empty by nature, and so on, extensively. Furthermore, just as when illuminating light illuminates what is to be illuminated, it should not be said that because the illuminated objects such as pots and clothes do not exist, the illuminating light also does not exist. Nor should it be said that the nature of the illuminated objects originally did not exist but exists now. Moreover, what I establish as the refuter, the refuted, the establisher, and the refuted, whether inverted or not inverted, all exist within conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya). If you refute what I have established as the establisher, you contradict your own tenets. This statement of refutation should not be an establishment because its nature is not real, like the sound produced by the child of a barren woman. Since you admit that there is an establishing inference, so should I, because they exist in conventional truth, as has been said before. Let us just stop the extensive debate, as many are weary of it, and the extensive meaning is difficult to grasp. Thus, as the inference mentioned before has no obstacles, the established thesis, which is that concerning true nature, the eye-base (cakṣu-āyatana) is empty of inherent existence, is accomplished. Moreover, the established reason 'because it arises dependently' is merely a brief mention of names and characteristics, in order to refute the asserted inherent existence of the eye, etc. There are other reasons as well, such as 'because it is destructible,' 'because it varies according to conditions,' 'because it can arise,' 'because it sometimes gives rise to wrong or right knowledge.' Through these reasons, according to what is to be countered, one should correctly refute. Furthermore, some say that the eye has a real nature because its signs, causes, and results are presently existing. If the real nature were empty, then the presently existing signs, etc., should not exist. Now, it is evident that the signs of the eye, etc., are presently existing; therefore, the eye, etc., are not empty of real nature. With regard to ultimate truth, 'having a nature' cannot be established because there is no similar example. If, with regard to conventional truth, everyone knows that there is a real nature, then this becomes an already established view. Moreover, relying on a similar example, the reason becomes contradictory because the similar example only has a conventional nature. Just as, with regard to true nature, the eye-base is empty of inherent existence, so too are the ear (śrotra), nose (ghrāṇa), tongue (jihvā), body (kāya), and mind (manas), as well as form (rūpa), sound (śabda), smell (gandha), taste (rasa), touch (spraṣṭavya), and the mental phenomena (dharma-āyatana) empty of inherent existence. Those who practice contemplation should also realize emptiness in this way. And one should generally and specifically...

其真性成立蘊界。緣起念住正斷神足根力覺支波羅蜜多諸三摩地陀羅尼門諸無礙解十力無畏不共法等一切智智皆自性空。修觀行者。亦應如是悟入性空。又諸外道遍計所執大及我執。唯量根大。實德業等有為句義。悉皆攝在十二處中。是彼相故。修觀行者。亦應如是悟入性空。

如是雖由思擇力故悟入性空闕修習力。譬如眾鳥翅羽初生未能作用。故復精勤習修習力。如眩翳者餌能遣除眩翳藥故眼得清凈。離諸粗大。發蚊蠅等明見境界。如是勤習修習力故除遣執取。有為相垢疑惑邪智。修真觀行初現前時。不由他緣受妙喜樂。不取一切有為相故。不取一切施物施者及受者故。不取一切施者受者及施果故。二種三輪皆得清凈。乃能正勤攝受無量福智資糧。二種重擔終不貪求。現非現果亦不愛樂。現事當果親近供養。所愛有德種種天神。亦不妄執。德為作者我為作者。大自在天極微性等。常修大舍。如是等事皆由已說當說正理證得一切有為無為所破能破。法性空故。如世尊言。菩薩不應安住諸事行於佈施。都無所住應行佈施。乃至廣說。又世尊言。若諸菩薩有情想轉。不應說名真實菩薩。又世尊言。無有少法名能發趣菩薩乘者。是諸菩薩尚不希求般涅槃故勤修梵行。況復欣樂三界生死。如是正修一切有為性空觀已。復

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：其真實自性成立的蘊（skandha，構成要素）、界（āyatana，感官領域）緣起（pratītyasamutpāda， dependent origination）、念住（smṛti-upasthāna，mindfulness）、正斷（samyak-prahāṇa，right exertion）、神足（ṛddhi-pāda，bases of magical power）、根（indriya，faculty）、力（bala，power）、覺支（bodhyaṅga，factors of enlightenment）、波羅蜜多（pāramitā，perfections）、諸三摩地（samādhi，concentration）、陀羅尼門（dhāraṇī-mukha，memorization device）、諸無礙解（pratisaṃvidā， analytical understanding）、十力（daśa-bala，ten powers of a Buddha）、無畏（vaiśāradya，fearlessness）、不共法（āveṇika-dharma，unique qualities of a Buddha）等一切智智（sarvākāra-jñatā，knowledge of all aspects）皆自性空。修觀行者，也應當這樣悟入性空。此外，那些外道所普遍計度的我（ātman，self）以及我執，唯有量根大，實際的功德事業等有為的句義，全部都包含在十二處（dvādaśa-āyatana，twelve sense bases）中，因為那是它們的相。修觀行者，也應當這樣悟入性空。像這樣，即使由於思擇的力量而悟入了性空，但缺少修習的力量，就像鳥的翅膀剛長出來還不能發揮作用一樣。所以要更加精勤地修習修習的力量。就像有眩暈病的人，服用了能夠去除眩暈的藥物，眼睛就變得清凈，遠離各種粗大的東西，能夠清楚地看到蚊子、蒼蠅等細微的境界。像這樣，勤奮地修習修習的力量，就能去除執取有為相的垢染、疑惑和邪見。修習真實觀行最初顯現的時候，不由其他因緣而感受到美妙的喜樂，因為不執取一切有為相，不執取一切施物、施者以及受者，不執取一切施者、受者以及施果。兩種三輪（施者、受者、施物）都得到清凈，才能真正勤奮地攝受無量的福德和智慧資糧。兩種重擔（貪求現世和來世的果報）始終不貪求，對於現世和未來的果報也不愛樂。對於現世的事情和未來的果報，親近供養所喜愛的有德行的各種天神，也不妄加執著，認為功德是作者，我是作者，大自在天（Maheśvara，great lord）極微性等。常常修習大舍（mahātyāga，great renunciation）。像這些事情，都是由於已經說過和將要說的正理，證明了一切有為和無為的所破和能破，法性是空性的緣故。就像世尊所說：『菩薩不應該安住在諸事上而行佈施，完全不住于任何事物而應當行佈施。』乃至廣說。又世尊說：『如果諸菩薩有情想轉，不應說名為真實菩薩。』又世尊說：『沒有絲毫的法可以稱為能發起趣入菩薩乘的人。』這些菩薩尚且不希求般涅槃（parinirvāṇa，complete nirvana），所以勤奮地修習梵行（brahmacarya，holy life），更何況是欣樂三界（triloka，three realms）的生死。像這樣正確地修習一切有為的性空觀之後，又

【English Translation】 English version: The true nature of the skandhas (aggregates), āyatanas (sense fields), pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination), smṛti-upasthānas (foundations of mindfulness), samyak-prahāṇas (right exertions), ṛddhi-pādas (bases of magical power), indriyas (faculties), balas (powers), bodhyaṅgas (factors of enlightenment), pāramitās (perfections), all samādhis (concentration), dhāraṇī-mukhas (gates of memorization), all pratisaṃvidās (analytical understandings), daśa-balas (ten powers of a Buddha), vaiśāradyas (fearlessnesses), āveṇika-dharmas (unique qualities of a Buddha), and sarvākāra-jñatā (knowledge of all aspects) are all empty of inherent existence. Those who practice contemplation should also realize emptiness in this way. Furthermore, the ātman (self) and self-grasping that are universally conceived by externalists, only the measure of the root is great, and the actual meritorious deeds and other conditioned meanings are all included in the twelve āyatanas (twelve sense bases), because that is their characteristic. Those who practice contemplation should also realize emptiness in this way. In this way, even though one realizes emptiness through the power of reflection, one lacks the power of cultivation, just as the wings of a bird have just grown and cannot function. Therefore, one should diligently cultivate the power of cultivation. Just as a person with dizziness takes medicine that can remove dizziness, and the eyes become clear, free from all coarse things, and can clearly see subtle realms such as mosquitoes and flies. In this way, by diligently cultivating the power of cultivation, one can remove the defilements of grasping at conditioned appearances, doubts, and wrong views. When the true contemplation first manifests, one experiences wonderful joy and happiness without relying on other conditions, because one does not grasp at all conditioned appearances, does not grasp at all objects of giving, the giver, and the receiver, and does not grasp at all givers, receivers, and the results of giving. Both of the three wheels (giver, receiver, and object of giving) are purified, and one can truly diligently gather immeasurable accumulations of merit and wisdom. One never craves the two heavy burdens (desire for present and future rewards), and one does not delight in present and future results. Regarding present matters and future results, one does not falsely cling to the various beloved and virtuous deities that one approaches and makes offerings to, thinking that merit is the creator, I am the creator, Maheśvara (great lord), subtle nature, etc. One constantly practices mahātyāga (great renunciation). These things are all due to the correct reasoning that has been and will be explained, proving that all conditioned and unconditioned things, the object to be refuted and the refuter, are empty of inherent existence. Just as the World Honored One said: 'A Bodhisattva should not abide in things when giving, but should give without abiding in anything.' And so on. Furthermore, the World Honored One said: 'If Bodhisattvas have thoughts of beings, they should not be called true Bodhisattvas.' Furthermore, the World Honored One said: 'There is not a single dharma that can be called the one who initiates and enters the Bodhisattva vehicle.' These Bodhisattvas do not even seek parinirvāṇa (complete nirvana), so they diligently practice brahmacarya (holy life), let alone delight in the saṃsāra (cycle of rebirth) of the triloka (three realms). After correctly cultivating the contemplation of the emptiness of all conditioned things in this way, then

應正觀若自性空即無有生。若無有生即無過去未來現在。于其三世無有掛礙。正觀三世皆清凈相。依前所說無顛倒理。三輪清凈趣大菩提。如有問言。曼殊室利云何菩薩趣大菩提。答言。梵志。應如菩提。復問。云何名為菩提。答曰。梵志。此非過去亦非未來及以現在。是故菩薩應觀三世皆清凈相。三輪清凈趣大菩提。

大乘掌珍論捲上大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1578 大乘掌珍論

大乘掌珍論卷下

清辯菩薩造

大唐三藏法師玄奘奉　詔譯

如是已說修觀行者總相悟入。有為性空。而未悟入無為性空。若不開示無由悟入。若不悟入無分別慧。謂趣入行終不得成。為開示故復說是言。無為無有實不起似空花。此中簡別立宗言詞。即上真性須簡別意。如前應知。就真性故立無為空。非就世俗。非有為故說名無為。翻對有為是無為義。即是虛空擇非擇滅及真如性。謂前所除法處一分先顯悟入。虛空性空易開示故。唯就空無有質礙物。世間共立名虛空故。由此為門悟入所餘無為空性。即此世間所知虛空。就真性故空無有實。是名立宗。即此所立就真性故無實虛空。二宗皆許為不起故。或假立為不起法故。說名為因。空花無實亦不起故。立為同喻。不說遮止異品立為不同法喻。如

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果以正確的觀察方式認識到自性本空，那麼就不會有產生。如果沒有產生，那麼就不會有過去、未來和現在。對於這三世沒有任何掛礙。正確地觀察三世都是清凈的相。依照前面所說的沒有顛倒的道理，三輪（施者、受者、施物）清凈，趨向偉大的菩提（覺悟）。如果有人問：『曼殊室利（文殊菩薩），菩薩如何趨向偉大的菩提？』回答說：『婆羅門，應該像菩提一樣。』又問：『什麼叫做菩提？』回答說：『婆羅門，菩提不是過去，也不是未來，也不是現在。』所以菩薩應該觀察三世都是清凈的相，三輪清凈，趨向偉大的菩提。

《大乘掌珍論》捲上大正藏第 30 冊 No. 1578 《大乘掌珍論》

《大乘掌珍論》卷下

清辯菩薩造

大唐三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯

像這樣已經說了修習觀行的人，總體上悟入了有為法的自性是空。但是還沒有悟入無為法的自性是空。如果不開示，就沒有辦法悟入。如果不悟入，就沒有無分別的智慧。如果這樣，那麼趨向菩提的修行終究不能成就。爲了開示的緣故，再次說：無為法沒有真實的體性，就像虛空中生出花朵一樣。這裡簡別地建立宗（論點）和言詞，就像上面的真性需要簡別的意義一樣，應該像前面所說的那樣理解。就真性而言，建立無為空的觀點，而不是就世俗諦而言。因為不是有為法，所以叫做無為法。與有為法相對立，就是無為法的意義。也就是虛空、擇滅、非擇滅以及真如的體性。也就是前面所排除的法處的一部分，先顯示悟入。因為虛空的體性是空，容易開示。只就空而言，沒有質礙的物體，世間共同建立名稱為虛空。因此以此為門，悟入其餘的無為空性。也就是世間所知道的虛空，就真性而言，空沒有真實的體性，這叫做立宗。也就是所建立的，就真性而言，沒有真實的虛空。兩個宗派都允許它是不生起的。或者假立為不生起的法，所以叫做因（理由）。空中的花朵沒有真實的體性，也是不生起的，所以立為同喻。不說遮止異品，立為不同法喻，例如...

【English Translation】 English version: If one correctly observes that self-nature is empty, then there is no arising. If there is no arising, then there is no past, future, or present. There is no attachment to these three times. Correctly observing, the three times are all pure appearances. According to the previously stated principle of non-reversal, the three wheels (giver, receiver, and gift) are pure, and one proceeds towards great Bodhi (enlightenment). If someone asks: 'Manjushri (Bodhisattva Manjushri), how does a Bodhisattva proceed towards great Bodhi?' The answer is: 'Brahmin, it should be like Bodhi.' Again, one asks: 'What is called Bodhi?' The answer is: 'Brahmin, Bodhi is not past, nor future, nor present.' Therefore, a Bodhisattva should observe that the three times are all pure appearances, the three wheels are pure, and one proceeds towards great Bodhi.

Mahayana-hastaratna-sastra Volume 1 Taisho Tripitaka Volume 30 No. 1578 Mahayana-hastaratna-sastra

Mahayana-hastaratna-sastra Volume 2

Composed by Bodhisattva Qingbian

Translated by Tripitaka Master Xuanzang of the Great Tang Dynasty under Imperial Order

In this way, it has been said that those who cultivate contemplation generally realize that the self-nature of conditioned dharmas is empty. However, they have not yet realized that the self-nature of unconditioned dharmas is empty. If it is not revealed, there is no way to realize it. If one does not realize it, there is no non-discriminating wisdom. If this is the case, then the practice of proceeding towards Bodhi will ultimately not be accomplished. For the sake of revealing this, it is said again: Unconditioned dharmas have no real substance, just like flowers arising in the sky. Here, the thesis and words are established with distinction, just like the true nature above needs to be distinguished in meaning, which should be understood as previously stated. Regarding true nature, the view of emptiness of unconditioned dharmas is established, not regarding conventional truth. Because it is not a conditioned dharma, it is called an unconditioned dharma. Being opposite to conditioned dharmas, it is the meaning of unconditioned dharmas. That is, space, selective cessation, non-selective cessation, and the nature of Suchness. That is, a portion of the dharma realm that was previously excluded is first shown to be realized. Because the nature of space is empty, it is easy to reveal. Only regarding space, there is no object with substance or obstruction, and the world commonly establishes the name as space. Therefore, using this as a gateway, one realizes the remaining emptiness of unconditioned dharmas. That is, the space known by the world, regarding true nature, space has no real substance, this is called establishing the thesis. That is, what is established, regarding true nature, there is no real space. Both schools allow that it does not arise. Or it is falsely established as a dharma that does not arise, therefore it is called a reason. Flowers in the sky have no real substance and also do not arise, therefore it is established as a similar example. It is not said to prevent dissimilar examples, and it is established as a dissimilar dharma example, such as...

前應知。云何此中建立比量。謂就真性虛空無實以不起故。諸不起者愚智同知。其性無實猶如空花。此所立因不起故者。略舉名相。復有餘因。非所作故。非能作故。無滅壞故。如是等因能遮所說無為空性。是故如應皆得為因。如說汝當守掌此酥勿令烏近。為令所守無損污故。亦應遮彼貓鼠等類。

毗婆沙師咸作是難。若所立宗無為無實。是無有義。空處等至即無所緣。云何得有。然無障礙是虛空相。此若方便立比量言。空處等至實有所緣。或境實有。是等至故。如是等至所緣境故。如余等至。或如彼緣。其餘等至及彼所緣。是有為故。已辯性空則無同喻。此就勝義辯虛空相。若就世俗所立虛空亦非實有。以不起故。猶如空花。由此比量彼所建立實有不成。又即由此我所說因。汝言等至所緣境故。因有決定相違過失。是故我先所立義成無障難故。

自部他部有作是言。若就真性虛空無實。以不起故。此言義準。起者皆實。若言起者。亦無有實是則此因。不遍同品因性不成。此是義準。相似過類似不成過。此審定言。諸不起者皆無有實。非審定言。諸無實者悉皆不起。雖復勤勇無間所發。不遍同品亦許為因。故此無過。

有餘難言。虛空有性世共知故。花亦有性。嗢缽羅等世現見故。空花二種雖不相

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：先前應該知曉。如何在此處建立比量（anumana，推理）？就是說，就真性（paramartha，終極實相）而言，虛空（akasa，空間）沒有實體，因為它不生起。凡是不生起的，愚者和智者都知道它的自性沒有實體，就像空中的花朵一樣。這裡所立的因——『因為不生起』，只是簡略地舉出名相。還有其他的因，例如『非所作故』（不是被製造的），『非能作故』（不能製造），『無滅壞故』（不會被毀滅）。像這樣的因能夠遮止所說的『無為（asamskrta，非造作）的空性』。因此，根據情況，都可以作為因。就像說『你要守護這酥油，不要讓烏鴉靠近』，爲了讓所守護的東西沒有損壞和污穢，也應該遮止貓、老鼠等。毗婆沙師（Vaibhasika，一種佛教宗派）都這樣提出詰難：如果所立的宗（paksa，論題）——『無為無實』，是沒有意義的，那麼空處等至（akasa-anantyayatana-samapatti，空無邊處定）就沒有所緣（alambana，對像），怎麼可能存在？然而，沒有障礙是虛空的相。如果用這種方便來建立比量，就可以說空處等至實際上是有所緣的，或者境（visaya，對像）是真實存在的，因為它是一種等至。就像其他的等至有所緣境一樣，或者像它所緣的其餘等至一樣。其餘的等至和它們所緣的對象，都是有為（samskrta，造作）的。已經辯論過自性空（svabhava-sunyata，自性空性），就沒有相同的比喻。這是就勝義（paramartha，終極意義）來辯論虛空的相。如果就世俗（samvrti，世俗意義）而言，所立的虛空也不是真實存在的，因為它不生起，就像空中的花朵一樣。通過這個比量，他們所建立的『實有』就不能成立。而且，通過我所說的因，你說『等至有所緣境』，這個因有決定相違的過失。因此，我先前所立的義成立，沒有障礙。自部和他部有人這樣說：如果就真性而言，虛空沒有實體，因為它不生起。這句話的意思是，凡是生起的，都是真實的。如果說生起的也沒有實體，那麼這個因就不普遍，因性不能成立。這是義準（arthapatti，從果推因）。相似的過失類似於不成立的過失。這是審定地說，凡是不生起的，都沒有實體。不是審定地說，凡是沒有實體的，都不生起。即使非常努力，沒有間斷地發出，不普遍也允許作為因。所以這沒有過失。有其他人提出詰難：虛空有自性，世人都知道。花也有自性，睡蓮等世人都看見。空花兩種雖然不相...

【English Translation】 English version: It should be known beforehand. How is inference (anumana) established here? That is to say, with respect to the ultimate reality (paramartha), space (akasa) has no substance because it does not arise. Whatever does not arise, both the foolish and the wise know that its nature is without substance, like a flower in the sky. The reason established here—'because it does not arise'—is only a brief mention of the name and form. There are other reasons, such as 'because it is not made (asamskrta),' 'because it cannot make,' 'because it is not destroyed.' Such reasons can prevent the assertion of 'unconditioned (asamskrta) emptiness.' Therefore, as appropriate, all can be taken as reasons. It is like saying, 'You should guard this ghee and not let crows near it,' in order to prevent the guarded thing from being damaged and defiled, one should also prevent cats, mice, and the like. The Vaibhasikas (a Buddhist school) all raise this objection: If the thesis (paksa) established—'unconditioned is without substance'—is meaningless, then the sphere of infinite space (akasa-anantyayatana-samapatti) has no object (alambana), how can it exist? However, the absence of obstruction is the characteristic of space. If one uses this expedient to establish inference, one can say that the sphere of infinite space actually has an object, or that the object (visaya) is truly existent, because it is a samapatti (attainment). Just as other samapattis have objects, or like the other samapattis that it is the object of. The other samapattis and their objects are conditioned (samskrta). Having already debated the emptiness of inherent existence (svabhava-sunyata), there is no similar example. This is debating the characteristic of space with respect to the ultimate meaning (paramartha). If, with respect to the conventional truth (samvrti), the space established is also not truly existent, because it does not arise, like a flower in the sky. Through this inference, their established 'real existence' cannot be established. Moreover, through the reason I stated, you say 'samapatti has an object,' this reason has the fault of being definitely contradictory. Therefore, the meaning I previously established is established, without obstruction. Some from our own school and other schools say this: If, with respect to the ultimate reality, space has no substance because it does not arise, the meaning of this statement is that whatever arises is real. If one says that what arises also has no substance, then this reason is not pervasive, and the nature of the reason cannot be established. This is implication (arthapatti). A similar fault is similar to an unestablished fault. This is definitively saying that whatever does not arise has no substance. It is not definitively saying that whatever has no substance does not arise. Even if one exerts great effort without interruption, being non-pervasive is also allowed as a reason. Therefore, there is no fault here. Others raise the objection: Space has a nature, which the world knows. Flowers also have a nature, water lilies and others are seen by the world. Although the two kinds of sky-flowers are not...

應非無自性。故空花喻所立不成。此難不然。此空花喻就第六轉依士訓釋。空之花故說名空花。此既非有故喻非無。

由此道理修觀行者應正悟入虛空性空。于擇滅等三種無為性空道理亦當悟入。

毗婆沙師不忍遮破擇滅無為。復作是難。佛說擇滅對治有為故名出離。若謗言無。汝等便有違宗過失。又世尊說。喜貪俱行諸受盡滅。名為涅槃寂靜微妙。云何言無。此中世尊欲令所化于有為境勤修厭離於無為境隨順欣樂故。就世俗說有擇滅出離涅槃寂靜微妙。如佛說有化生有情。說有無為涅槃亦爾。許此有故無違宗過。但就真性遮破擇滅。故世尊言。諸有尋求涅槃有性。我說癡人外道弟子。乃至廣說。又言。如來不見生死及以涅槃。言涅槃者如來假立。此中都無涅槃自性。乃至廣說。亦無誹謗聖諦過失。以就世俗說有愛苦畢竟不生出離涅槃寂靜微妙無顛倒故。非就勝義說有愛苦畢竟不生本性寂滅名為滅諦。由此聖教及所說理。就真性故說無擇滅無此過失。

有餘不善正理論者作如是難。所立宗言無為無實。無為既無。所立不成。所依不成。空花無故有法不成。立宗因喻皆有過失。此難不然。想施設力于唯無有有質礙物。立為虛空。由慧簡擇于唯無有煩惱生起。立為擇滅。由闕眾緣于唯無有諸法生起。立

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：不應認為（無為法）沒有自性。因此，用空花的比喻來建立（無為法是空性的）是不成立的。這種責難是不對的。這個空花的比喻是就第六識的轉依（轉舍）來解釋的。因為是空的『花』，所以叫做空花。既然它不是真實存在的，所以用它來比喻（無為法）並非不存在。由此道理，修習觀行的人應該正確地領悟到虛空的自性是空性的。對於擇滅等三種無為法的自性是空性的道理，也應當領悟。毗婆沙師不忍心遮破擇滅無為，又提出這樣的責難：佛說擇滅是對治有為的，所以叫做『出離』。如果誹謗說沒有擇滅，你們就有了違背宗義的過失。而且世尊說：『喜貪一起生起的諸受的止息滅盡，叫做涅槃，是寂靜微妙的。』怎麼能說沒有擇滅呢？這裡，世尊是爲了讓所教化的人對於有為的境界勤奮地修習厭離，對於無為的境界隨順地欣樂，所以就世俗諦的層面來說有擇滅、出離、涅槃、寂靜、微妙。如同佛說有化生有情一樣，說有無為涅槃也是這樣。允許有這些（世俗諦的）存在，就沒有違背宗義的過失。只是就真性（勝義諦）的層面遮破擇滅。所以世尊說：『凡是尋求涅槃的實有自性的，我說他是愚癡的人，是外道弟子。』乃至廣說。又說：『如來不見生死以及涅槃。』所說的涅槃，是如來假立的。其中根本沒有涅槃的自性。乃至廣說。也沒有誹謗聖諦的過失。因為就世俗諦的層面來說，有愛和苦的畢竟不生，有出離、涅槃、寂靜、微妙，沒有顛倒的緣故。不是就勝義諦的層面來說，有愛和苦的畢竟不生，（而是）本性寂滅叫做滅諦。由於這些聖教以及所說的道理，就真性的層面來說沒有擇滅，所以沒有這些過失。有其他不善於正確論證的人提出這樣的責難：所立的宗義說無為法沒有實體。無為法既然沒有，所立的宗義就不成立，所依據的（法）也不成立。因為空花沒有，有法（指無為法）也不成立。立宗、因、喻都有過失。這種責難是不對的。憑藉想的施設力量，對於僅僅是沒有有質礙的物體，建立為虛空。通過智慧的簡擇，對於僅僅是沒有煩惱生起，建立為擇滅。由於缺少各種因緣，對於僅僅是沒有諸法生起，建立為...

【English Translation】 English version: It should not be thought that [the unconditioned] lacks inherent existence (svabhāva). Therefore, the analogy of the empty flower, which is used to establish [that the unconditioned is empty], is not valid. This objection is incorrect. This analogy of the empty flower is explained in terms of the transformation of the sixth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna). Because it is an 'empty' flower, it is called an empty flower. Since it is not truly existent, using it as an analogy [for the unconditioned] does not mean that [the unconditioned] is non-existent. Therefore, practitioners of contemplation should correctly realize that the nature of space is emptiness (śūnyatā). They should also realize the principle that the nature of the three unconditioned dharmas, such as cessation through discrimination (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha), is emptiness. The Vaibhāṣika masters, unwilling to refute cessation through discrimination as unconditioned, raise this objection: The Buddha said that cessation through discrimination is the antidote to the conditioned (saṃskṛta), and therefore it is called 'liberation' (niḥsaraṇa). If you slander it by saying it does not exist, you will have the fault of contradicting your own tenets. Moreover, the World-Honored One (Bhagavān) said: 'The cessation and extinction of feelings accompanied by joy and craving is called nirvāṇa, which is peaceful and subtle.' How can you say it does not exist? Here, the World-Honored One, in order to encourage those being taught to diligently cultivate aversion towards conditioned realms and to joyfully embrace unconditioned realms, speaks of cessation through discrimination, liberation, nirvāṇa, peace, and subtlety in terms of conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya). Just as the Buddha speaks of beings born through transformation (upapāduka), so too does he speak of unconditioned nirvāṇa. By accepting the existence of these [conventional truths], there is no fault of contradicting our own tenets. We only refute cessation through discrimination in terms of ultimate reality (paramārtha-satya). Therefore, the World-Honored One said: 'Those who seek nirvāṇa as having inherent existence, I say are foolish people, disciples of externalists,' and so on. He also said: 'The Tathāgata (Tathāgata) does not see birth and death, nor nirvāṇa.' What is called nirvāṇa is provisionally established by the Tathāgata. There is fundamentally no inherent existence of nirvāṇa in it, and so on. There is also no fault of slandering the noble truths (ārya-satya), because in terms of conventional truth, there is the complete non-arising of love and suffering, and there is liberation, nirvāṇa, peace, and subtlety, without any inversion. It is not in terms of ultimate truth that there is the complete non-arising of love and suffering, [but rather] the inherently peaceful nature is called the truth of cessation (nirodha-satya). Due to these sacred teachings and the principles explained, there is no fault in saying that there is no cessation through discrimination in terms of ultimate reality. Some other theorists who are not skilled in correct reasoning raise this objection: The established thesis states that the unconditioned is unreal. Since the unconditioned does not exist, the established thesis is not established, and the basis [of the thesis] is not established. Because the empty flower does not exist, the subject (dharmin) [i.e., the unconditioned] is not established. The establishment of the thesis, the reason, and the analogy all have faults. This objection is incorrect. By the power of conceptual imputation, we establish as space (ākāśa) that which is merely the absence of tangible objects. Through the discernment of wisdom, we establish as cessation through discrimination (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha) that which is merely the absence of the arising of afflictions (kleśa). Due to the lack of various conditions, we establish as...

非擇滅。于唯無有一切所執。立為真如。想施設力許有假立。虛空等故不顯差別。由共許力總立有法。差別遮遣非所共知。立為宗法。彼不起等共所了知。立為因法。是故無有立宗因過。所說空花雖無有事。是不起等法之有法無性性故。由是能成所成立義。故無有法不成過失。

毗婆沙師復作是說。此亦不然。擇滅實有。道所緣故。違煩惱故。非無實法可有是事。此言唯有遮異品故。如遮虛空實有性故。前已具破不應重執。

經部諸師咸作是說。立虛空等皆非實有。如是比量立已成過。若此義言。有礙色等無性為體。非立已成辯彼無故。所立宗言。無為無實。此言正遣執實有性。亦復傍遣執實無性。銅鐷部師復作是說。諸間隙色說名虛空。我宗立彼是有為故。汝遣無為立已成過。有為自性如前已遣。故亦不然。毗婆沙師與犢子部。所執多同。應如彼破。

相應論師有作是說。于勝義上更無勝義。真如即是諸法勝義。故就勝義說真如空。此言稱理。而言真如非實有者。此不稱理。云何出世無分別智及此後得清凈世智。緣無為境是應正理。實不應理。如說世智緣無為境。不應正理。如是此智緣有為境亦不應理。非執真如實有應理。此實有性難成立故。緣真如智非真出世無分別智。有所緣故及有為故。如

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：非擇滅（非通過修行斷滅煩惱而證得的涅槃）。對於完全沒有任何執著的狀態，我們將其設立為真如（Tathata，事物的真實如是）。由於想像施設的力量，我們承認有假立的虛空等，因此它們不顯示差別。由於共同認可的力量，總的設立有法（dharmin，具有某種性質的事物）。差別遮遣不是共同知道的，所以被設立為宗法（paksa-dharma，論題的性質）。彼不起等是共同瞭解的，所以被設立為因法（hetu-dharma，理由的性質）。因此，沒有立宗因的過失。所說的空花雖然沒有實體，但由於是不起等法的有法無自性性，因此能夠成立所要成立的意義，所以沒有有法不成（dharmi-asiddha，主體不成）的過失。毗婆沙師（Vaibhashika，說一切有部論師）又這樣說：這也是不對的。擇滅是真實存在的，因為它是道的所緣，因為它違背煩惱。如果沒有真實的法，不可能有這樣的事情。此言只是爲了遮遣異品，就像遮遣虛空有實性一樣。之前已經詳細破斥過，不應該重複執著。經部諸師（Sautrantika，經量部論師）都這樣說：設立虛空等都不是真實存在的。像這樣的比量（anumana，推理）是立已成過（siddha-sadhana，所立已成）。如果這個意義是指有礙色等沒有自性為體，那就不是立已成，因為辯論的不是這個。所立的宗言（paksa-vacana，論題陳述）是無為（asamskrita，非造作的）無實。這句話正是爲了遣除執著實有的性質，也順便遣除執著實無的性質。銅鐷部師（Sammitiya，正量部論師）又這樣說：諸間隙色被稱為虛空。我宗認為它是有為（samskrita，造作的），所以你遣除無為是立已成過。有為的自性之前已經遣除過，所以也是不對的。毗婆沙師與犢子部（Vatsiputriya，犢子部）所執著的很多相同，應該像破斥他們一樣破斥。相應論師（Samghabhadra，僧伽跋陀羅）有人這樣說：在勝義（paramartha，究竟真實）之上沒有更高的勝義。真如就是諸法的勝義，所以就勝義而言，真如是空。這句話是合理的。但如果說真如不是真實存在的，那就不合理了。為什麼出世無分別智（nirvikalpa-jnana，無分別智）以及此後得清凈世智（lokiya-jnana，世間智）緣無為境是合理的呢？實際上是不合理的。如果說世智緣無為境是不合理的，那麼此智緣有為境也是不合理的。執著真如實有是不合理的，因為這種實有性難以成立。緣真如的智慧不是真正的出世無分別智，因為它有所緣，而且是有為的。

【English Translation】 English version: Non-selective cessation (Nirodha-samapatti, Nirvana attained not through the destruction of afflictions through practice). Regarding the state where there is absolutely no clinging, we establish it as Suchness (Tathata, the true nature of things). Due to the power of imaginative construction, we acknowledge the hypothetical existence of space, etc., therefore they do not exhibit distinctions. Due to the power of common agreement, we generally establish a subject (dharmin, something possessing a certain property). The negation of distinctions is not commonly known, so it is established as the property of the subject (paksa-dharma, the property of the thesis). 'Non-arising' etc. are commonly understood, so they are established as the reason (hetu-dharma, the property of the reason). Therefore, there is no fault of establishing the subject and the reason. Although the so-called 'flowers in the sky' have no substance, because the subject of 'non-arising' etc. is without inherent existence, it is able to establish the meaning to be established, so there is no fault of the subject being unestablished (dharmi-asiddha, the subject is unestablished). The Vaibhashika (Vaibhashika, Sarvastivada school) further says: This is also not correct. Selective cessation is truly existent, because it is the object of the path, because it opposes afflictions. If there were no real dharma, such a thing would be impossible. This statement is only to negate dissimilar instances, just as negating that space has real existence. It has already been thoroughly refuted before, and should not be clung to again. The Sautrantikas (Sautrantika, Sutra school) all say: Establishing space, etc., are not truly existent. Such an inference (anumana, reasoning) is a case of 'proving what is already proven' (siddha-sadhana, the established is to be established). If this meaning refers to obstructive form, etc., having no self-nature as its essence, then it is not 'proving what is already proven', because that is not what is being debated. The statement of the thesis (paksa-vacana, thesis statement) is that the unconditioned (asamskrita, unconditioned) is unreal. This statement precisely eliminates the clinging to real existence, and also incidentally eliminates the clinging to real non-existence. The Sammitiya (Sammitiya, Personalist school) further says: Interstitial colors are called space. Our school believes that it is conditioned (samskrita, conditioned), so your eliminating the unconditioned is a case of 'proving what is already proven'. The nature of the conditioned has been eliminated before, so it is also not correct. The Vaibhashika and the Vatsiputriya (Vatsiputriya, Pudgalavada school) hold many of the same views, and should be refuted in the same way as they are refuted. Some Samghabhadra (Samghabhadra) of the corresponding treatise school say: There is no higher ultimate truth (paramartha, ultimate truth) than the ultimate truth. Suchness is the ultimate truth of all dharmas, so in terms of ultimate truth, Suchness is empty. This statement is reasonable. But if it is said that Suchness is not truly existent, then it is not reasonable. Why is it reasonable for the supramundane non-discriminating wisdom (nirvikalpa-jnana, non-discriminating wisdom) and the subsequent pure worldly wisdom (lokiya-jnana, worldly wisdom) to cognize the unconditioned? In reality, it is not reasonable. If it is said that worldly wisdom cognizing the unconditioned is not reasonable, then this wisdom cognizing the conditioned is also not reasonable. Clinging to Suchness as truly existent is not reasonable, because this real existence is difficult to establish. The wisdom that cognizes Suchness is not true supramundane non-discriminating wisdom, because it has an object of cognition and is conditioned.

世緣智。是故經言。曼殊室利。慧眼何見。答言。慧眼都無所見。又說。云何名勝義諦。答言。此中智尚不行。況諸名字。又說。梵志。如來菩提非能現觀。又契經言。曼殊室利。云何見諦。答言。此中無法可見憶持。此等諸契經者。不應許此無分別智是能現觀及緣真如。又彼真如非真勝義。是所緣故。猶如色等。又汝所說于勝義上更無勝義。如是等言。若於此上空無此故說名為空。諸衣絹上更無衣絹。牧羊人等亦共了知。彼亦應名見真理者。又為對治諸惡見故說如是空。于勝義上更有勝義。此類惡見曾未有故。不應遮彼說如是空。又彼真如非實有性。違如前說。比量理故。如說如來不見生死及以涅槃。已正了知。非有顛倒所起煩惱。本性畢竟無生自性。如是正知本性畢竟。非是正知非不正知。由此聖教應知真如唯是一切分別永滅。非實有性非離非有。實性真如轉依為相。法身成就。由得觀空真對治道。一切分別遍計所執種子所依異熟識中分別等種無餘永斷。因緣無故畢竟不生。本性無生本性常住。是名如來轉依法身。如契經說。曼殊室利。言如來者即是畢竟本無生句。常無生法是名如來。乃至廣說。若言真如雖離言說而是實有。即外道我名想差別說為真如。如彼真如雖是實有。而就勝義有非有等分別不成。我亦如是

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本世俗的智慧（世緣智）就是這樣。所以經中說：『曼殊室利（Manjushri，文殊菩薩）。慧眼看見了什麼？』回答說：『慧眼什麼也沒看見。』又說：『什麼叫做勝義諦（Paramārtha-satya，最高真理）？』回答說：『在這種境界中，智慧都無法執行，更何況是名字。』又說：『梵志（Brahmin，婆羅門）。如來的菩提（Bodhi，覺悟）不是能通過現觀獲得的。』又有契經說：『曼殊室利。如何見諦（Satya，真理）？』回答說：『在這種境界中，沒有什麼法可以看見或憶持。』這些契經，不應允許這種無分別智是能現觀以及緣于真如（Tathātā，如實）。而且那個真如不是真正的勝義，因為它是一個所緣，就像色等一樣。而且你所說的在勝義之上沒有更高的勝義，像這樣的話，如果在此之上空無一物，因此稱之為空，就像衣服的絲綢上沒有其他的絲綢一樣，牧羊人等也都知道。他們也應該被稱為見到真理的人。而且爲了對治各種錯誤的見解，才說這種空。在勝義之上還有更高的勝義，這類錯誤的見解從未有過，不應該遮止這種說法。而且那個真如不是真實存在的，這與前面所說的相違背，因為有比量推理的緣故。如經中所說，如來沒有看見生死和涅槃（Nirvana，寂滅），已經正確地了知，沒有由顛倒所產生的煩惱，本性畢竟是無生的自性。像這樣正確地了知本性畢竟，不是正確地了知也不是不正確地了知。由此聖教應該知道真如只是一切分別永遠滅除，不是真實存在的，也不是既不離也不有。實性真如以轉依為相，法身成就。由於獲得觀空的真正對治道，一切分別遍計所執的種子所依的異熟識中，分別等種子完全永遠斷除，因為因緣的緣故，畢竟不會產生。本性無生，本性常住，這叫做如來的轉依法身。如契經所說：『曼殊室利。所說的如來就是畢竟本無生的語句。常無生的法叫做如來。』乃至廣說。如果說真如雖然離開了言說，但是真實存在的，那就是外道（Tirthika，佛教以外的修行者）的我（Atman，靈魂）名想的差別，說為真如。就像他們的真如雖然是真實存在的，但是就勝義而言，有非有等的分別不能成立，我的情況也是這樣。

【English Translation】 English version Worldly wisdom (世緣智) is like this. Therefore, the sutra says: 'Manjushri (曼殊室利). What does the wisdom eye see?' The answer is: 'The wisdom eye sees nothing.' It also says: 'What is called the ultimate truth (勝義諦)?' The answer is: 'In this state, even wisdom cannot operate, let alone names.' It also says: 'Brahmin (梵志). The Bodhi (菩提) of the Tathagata (如來) cannot be attained through direct perception.' There is also a sutra that says: 'Manjushri. How does one see the truth (諦)?' The answer is: 'In this state, there is no dharma (法) that can be seen or remembered.' These sutras should not allow this non-discriminating wisdom to be the one that can directly perceive and be related to Suchness (真如). Moreover, that Suchness is not the real ultimate truth, because it is an object of perception, just like form, etc. And what you said, that there is no higher ultimate truth above the ultimate truth, such words, if there is nothing above it, therefore it is called emptiness, just like there is no other silk on the silk of clothes, even shepherds know it. They should also be called those who see the truth. Moreover, it is to counteract various wrong views that this emptiness is spoken of. Above the ultimate truth, there is a higher ultimate truth, and such wrong views have never existed, so this statement should not be prevented. Moreover, that Suchness is not truly existent, which contradicts what was said earlier, because of the reason of inference. As it is said in the sutra, the Tathagata does not see birth and death and Nirvana (涅槃), and has correctly understood that there are no afflictions arising from inversion, and the nature is ultimately unborn. Like this, correctly knowing the nature is ultimately, it is neither correctly knowing nor incorrectly knowing. From this holy teaching, it should be known that Suchness is only the eternal cessation of all discriminations, it is not truly existent, nor is it neither separate nor existent. The true nature of Suchness takes transformation as its characteristic, and the Dharmakaya (法身) is accomplished. Because of obtaining the true antidote of contemplating emptiness, all seeds of discrimination, conceptualization, and attachment, which are the basis of the Alaya-consciousness (異熟識), are completely and eternally cut off, and because of the absence of causes and conditions, they will ultimately not arise. The nature is unborn, and the nature is permanent, this is called the transformed Dharmakaya of the Tathagata. As the sutra says: 'Manjushri. What is called the Tathagata is ultimately the statement of no birth. The dharma of constant non-birth is called the Tathagata.' And so on. If it is said that Suchness, although beyond words, is truly existent, then that is the difference between the self (我) name and thought of the non-Buddhist (外道), which is said to be Suchness. Just like their Suchness, although truly existent, but in terms of the ultimate truth, the distinctions of existence and non-existence cannot be established, and my situation is also like this.

彼亦計我。雖是實有周遍常住。作者受者而離分別。以非語言所行處故。分別覺慧所不緣故名離分別。彼教中說。言說不行心意不證。故名為我。我相既爾。而復說言。緣真如智慧得解脫。非緣我智。此有何別。並無言說。有實性故。唯執朋黨。說如是言。故我不能信受如是似我真如實有非有。且止廣諍諸有厭怖。廣文義者難受持故。入真甘露已具分別。復有同類乘劣乘者。作如是言。十二處攝有為無為定有自性。以有苦等十六聖行觀四聖諦。精勤修習見修二道。能滅見修所斷一切三界所攝煩惱熾火。及令三界眾苦息故。若不開示諸法性空。誰當能捨如是過失。誰復能修如是功德。三乘雖有資糧根性勝解差別。現觀聖道應無差別。如是一切我皆信受。為欲斷除煩惱障故。依世俗理彼道差別。若離證入法無我性。不能永斷所知障故。大師應成少分解脫。為不說言解脫解脫無差別耶。實有此說。皆同解脫煩惱障故。作如是言。非一切種。譬如毛孔與其太虛空性雖同非無差別。若不爾者。應不能發勝果作用如意神通。所證應非真實究竟。且止傍論應辯正論。

修觀行者。如已悟入自宗所計虛空等空。亦當悟入他宗所計自性士夫極微自在時方命等諸句義空。

此中自性士夫論者作是難言。我宗三界一切皆似空花轉

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：他們也執著于『我』（Atman）的觀念。雖然『我』實際上是周遍常住的，是作者也是受者，並且超越了分別。之所以說超越分別，是因為它不是語言所能描述的，也不是分別覺慧所能認識的，因此稱為『離分別』。他們的教義中說，言語無法表達，心意無法證明，所以稱之為『我』。既然『我』的真相如此，卻又說依靠對真如（Tathata）的智慧才能得到解脫，而不是依靠對『我』的智慧。這有什麼區別呢？因為沒有任何言語可以描述它，因為它具有真實的自性。這只是執著于自己的宗派，才會說這樣的話。所以我不能相信和接受這種類似於『我』的真如，既說是實有，又說非有。還是停止這種無益的爭論吧，因為很多人會感到厭煩。廣博的文義難以受持。已經進入真甘露（Amrita），卻又生出分別。還有一些修習小乘和大乘的人，他們這樣說：十二處（Ayatana）所包含的有為法（Samskrta）和無為法（Asamskrta）都有其固有的自性。通過苦等十六聖行來觀察四聖諦（Arya Satya），精勤地修習見道和修道，就能滅除見道和修道所斷除的一切三界（Trailokya）所包含的煩惱之火，並且平息三界的所有痛苦。如果不開示諸法性空（Sarvadharmah sunyata），誰能夠捨棄這樣的過失？誰又能夠修習這樣的功德？三乘（Triyana）雖然在資糧、根性和勝解上有所差別，但現觀（Abhisamaya）聖道應該沒有差別。所有這些我都相信和接受。爲了斷除煩惱障（Klesavarana），依據世俗的道理，這些道有差別。如果不能證入法無我性（Dharmanairatmya），就不能永遠斷除所知障（Jneyavarana）。大師（指佛陀）應該只能成就少分解脫，因為他沒有說解脫和解脫之間沒有差別嗎？實際上有這種說法，因為它們都同樣解脫了煩惱障。他們這樣說，但並非完全相同。比如毛孔和太虛空，雖然在空性上相同，但並非沒有差別。如果不是這樣，就應該不能夠產生殊勝的果報作用，比如如意神通（Rddhi）。所證悟的應該不是真實究竟的。還是停止這些旁論，應該辯論正論。修觀行的人，如果已經領悟了自己宗派所認為的虛空等空，也應該領悟其他宗派所認為的自性（Prakrti）、士夫（Purusha）、極微（Paramanu）、自在天（Isvara）、時間和命運等各種句義的空性。這裡，自性士夫論者提出這樣的詰難：我宗的三界一切都像是空花一樣流轉。

【English Translation】 English version: They also cling to the notion of 'Atman' (self). Although 'Atman' is truly pervasive, permanent, the agent and the recipient, and beyond all distinctions. It is called 'beyond distinctions' because it is not accessible to language, nor is it an object of discriminative wisdom; hence, it is called 'non-discrimination'. Their teachings say that speech cannot express it, and the mind cannot prove it, therefore it is called 'Atman'. Since the truth of 'Atman' is such, yet they say that liberation is attained through wisdom of Suchness (Tathata), not through wisdom of 'Atman'. What is the difference? Because no speech can describe it, as it possesses a real nature. It is only clinging to one's own sect that leads to such statements. Therefore, I cannot believe and accept this Suchness that resembles 'Atman', which is said to be both real and unreal. Let us stop this pointless debate, as many will find it tiresome. The vastness of the text is difficult to grasp. Having already entered the true nectar (Amrita), distinctions arise again. There are also those who practice the Lesser Vehicle and the Great Vehicle, who say this: The conditioned (Samskrta) and unconditioned (Asamskrta) dharmas contained within the twelve sources (Ayatana) each have their own inherent nature. By observing the Four Noble Truths (Arya Satya) through the sixteen aspects of suffering, etc., and diligently practicing the paths of seeing and cultivation, one can extinguish the fire of afflictions contained within all three realms (Trailokya) that are severed by the paths of seeing and cultivation, and pacify all the sufferings of the three realms. If the emptiness of all phenomena (Sarvadharmah sunyata) is not revealed, who can abandon such faults? Who can cultivate such merits? Although the Three Vehicles (Triyana) differ in accumulation, faculties, and superior intention, the path of realization (Abhisamaya) should be the same. All of this I believe and accept. In order to eliminate the obscuration of afflictions (Klesavarana), according to conventional truth, these paths differ. If one cannot realize the selflessness of phenomena (Dharmanairatmya), one cannot permanently eliminate the obscuration of knowledge (Jneyavarana). The master (referring to the Buddha) should only attain partial liberation, because he did not say that there is no difference between liberation and liberation? In reality, there is such a statement, because they all equally liberate from the obscuration of afflictions. They say this, but it is not entirely the same. For example, pores and the vastness of space, although the same in emptiness, are not without difference. If it were not so, one should not be able to produce excellent results, such as miraculous powers (Rddhi). What is realized should not be truly ultimate. Let us stop these side arguments and debate the correct arguments. Those who practice contemplation, if they have already realized the emptiness of space, etc., as conceived by their own school, should also realize the emptiness of the various meanings of nature (Prakrti), person (Purusha), atoms (Paramanu), Isvara, time, and fate, etc., as conceived by other schools. Here, the proponents of nature and person raise this objection: Everything in the three realms of my school revolves like flowers in the sky.

變非無空花。由彼是有同喻不成違所立故。今應詰問。汝言三界一切皆似空花轉變。如是三界為是空花為非空花。若言三界皆是空花。違害自宗及共知故不應道理。若言三界非是空花。是則為無同喻成就失汝本宗。若言不失空花無聲所說三界有性故者。且應審察。汝為謂我說空花無為同法喻為說空花為同法喻。若汝謂我說空花無為同法喻。是惡審察。我說空花為同法喻故。若說空花為同法喻。即非三界。不應說言。三界有故彼亦是有。此言顯汝自慧輕微。又遮詮言。遮止為勝。遮所遮已。功能即盡。無能更表所遮差別。如是難辭前已具釋。故非智者心所信受。

諸數論師復作是說。我雖不能親現成立最勝士夫。然就共知諸變異聚方便成立。彼體實有。謂諸顯事。有性為因。有種類故。諸有種類一切皆見。有性為因。如檀片等。顯事既是有種類故。有性為因。如是顯事有能受者。所受用故。諸所受用一切皆見有能受者。如婆羅門所受飲食。顯事既是所受用故有能受者。前說比量便為敵量之所違害。此就世俗。若以總相立諸顯事。有性為因。不辯差別便立已成。若立顯事樂等為因。即無同喻因亦不成。樂等種類非共許故。若以比量成立因言。四蘊皆是苦樂癡性。是蘊性故。如受蘊者此所說癡。非受蘊攝。同喻不成。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本空花並非全無作用。因為『空花』的存在與『有』是相同的，所以不能作為反例來否定所要證明的觀點。現在應該反問：你說三界一切都像是空花轉變而來，那麼這個三界是空花，還是不是空花？如果說三界都是空花，那就違背了你自己的宗義，也違背了普遍的認知，這是不合理的。如果說三界不是空花，那就沒有了相同的例子來支援你的觀點，你就失去了你原本的主張。如果說這並沒有失去，因為空花沒有聲音，所以你所說的三界是存在的，那麼就應該仔細考察一下。你是認為我說空花『無』是同法喻，還是說空花是同法喻？如果你認為我說空花『無』是同法喻，那就是錯誤的理解，因為我說空花是同法喻。如果說空花是同法喻，那就不是三界。不應該說因為三界存在，所以空花也存在。這種說法顯示出你的智慧淺薄。而且，遮詮的意義在於遮止，遮止了所要遮止的對象后，其功能就結束了，不能再進一步表達所遮止對象的差別。這樣的辯難之前已經解釋過了，所以不是智者所能接受的。

有些數論師又這樣說：我雖然不能直接證明最勝士夫（Purusha）的存在，但可以藉助普遍認知的變異集合來方便地證明他的存在。他的本體是真實存在的。例如，各種顯現的事物，以『有性』為原因，因為它們有種類。凡是有種類的事物，都可以看到以『有性』為原因，比如檀香木片等。顯現的事物既然是有種類，所以以『有性』為原因。像這樣，顯現的事物是有能接受者，因為它們被接受和使用。凡是被接受和使用的，都可以看到有能接受者，比如婆羅門所接受的飲食。前面所說的比量，會被敵方的比量所否定。這是就世俗層面而言。如果以總相來建立各種顯現的事物，以『有性』為原因，不區分差別，那就是在重複已經成立的觀點。如果以顯現的事物的快樂等為原因，那就沒有了相同的例子，而且原因也不成立，因為快樂等的種類不是普遍認可的。如果用比量來證明原因，說四蘊（Skandha）都是苦、樂、癡的性質，因為它們是蘊的性質，就像受蘊（Vedana Skandha）一樣，那麼這裡所說的『癡』，不是受蘊所包含的，所以同喻不成立。

【English Translation】 English version The 'empty flower' is not entirely without function. Because the existence of the 'empty flower' is the same as 'existence', it cannot be used as a counter-example to negate the point to be proven. Now, one should ask in return: You say that everything in the Three Realms (Triloka) is like a transformation of the 'empty flower', then is this Three Realms an 'empty flower' or not? If you say that the Three Realms are all 'empty flowers', then you are violating your own doctrine and common knowledge, which is unreasonable. If you say that the Three Realms are not 'empty flowers', then there is no similar example to support your point of view, and you lose your original argument. If you say that this is not lost, because the 'empty flower' has no sound, so the Three Realms you speak of exist, then it should be carefully examined. Do you mean that I say the 'non-existence' of the 'empty flower' is a similar example, or do you say that the 'empty flower' is a similar example? If you think that I say the 'non-existence' of the 'empty flower' is a similar example, then that is a wrong understanding, because I say the 'empty flower' is a similar example. If the 'empty flower' is said to be a similar example, then it is not the Three Realms. It should not be said that because the Three Realms exist, so the 'empty flower' also exists. This statement shows your shallow wisdom. Moreover, the meaning of negative qualification lies in stopping, and after stopping what is to be stopped, its function ends, and it can no longer further express the difference of what is stopped. Such difficulties have been explained before, so they are not accepted by the wise.

Some Samkhya (Samkhya) philosophers say again: Although I cannot directly prove the existence of the Supreme Person (Purusha), I can conveniently prove his existence by means of the commonly known collection of variations. His essence is real. For example, various manifested things, with 'existence' as the cause, because they have kinds. All things that have kinds can be seen to have 'existence' as the cause, such as sandalwood chips. Since manifested things have kinds, they have 'existence' as the cause. In this way, manifested things have receivers, because they are received and used. All that are received and used can be seen to have receivers, such as the food received by Brahmins. The analogy mentioned earlier will be negated by the opponent's analogy. This is in terms of the mundane. If the various manifested things are established by the general aspect, with 'existence' as the cause, without distinguishing the differences, then it is repeating an already established point of view. If the pleasure, etc. of manifested things are taken as the cause, then there is no similar example, and the cause is not established, because the kinds of pleasure, etc. are not universally recognized. If an analogy is used to prove the cause, saying that the four aggregates (Skandha) are all of the nature of suffering, pleasure, and ignorance, because they are of the nature of aggregates, like the feeling aggregate (Vedana Skandha), then the 'ignorance' mentioned here is not included in the feeling aggregate, so the analogy is not established.

又汝士夫多體相遍有積聚義。即是蘊義。由此士夫因成不定。又汝樂等各別無能一一立宗。是蘊性故因義不成。若就勝義有實檀片。有性為因。非共許故同喻不成。又就世俗。若以總相立諸顯事。有能受者。不辯差別。便立已成。世所共知。受者有故。若立顯事有實受者常住周遍。思為自性同喻不成。如是體相諸婆羅門非共許故。若就勝義同喻不成。受者飲食皆實有性。非共許故。前說比量。無有敵量能為違害。

諸勝論師復作是說。諸入出息閉目開目。令意行動。根變等相定有所相。是能相故。如見煙等。此就世俗。若以總相立彼諸相定有所相不辯差別便立已成。世俗共知我非無故。若立彼相有所相我常住周遍。樂等所依便無同喻。違所立故。若就勝義亦有如是喻不成過。時方空等由此道理亦應遮破。

諸勝論師復作是難。極微與意我立無為成立空因不起故者。自不成因。若謂此二是有為攝成立空因緣生故者。他不成因。應成少分悟入空性。若意極微世俗亦許是無為者。可有此難。然所立意且非無為智生因故。猶如色等。如是句義同異性故。念生因故。此等余因如應當說。又諸極微亦非無為。能成因故。猶如縷等。如是其餘有合離數同異等因。隨應當說。或二極微所成粗物。非常為因。是所成故。猶如

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：此外，你們這些士夫（指人）認為體相是普遍存在的，具有積聚的含義，這就是蘊（skandha）的含義。因此，以士夫作為原因來論證是不確定的。而且，你們所說的樂等感受，各自不同，無法一一確立為宗（paksha，論題）。因為它們是蘊的性質，所以因（hetu，理由）的意義不成立。如果就勝義（paramārtha，究竟真實）而言，存在真實的檀片，以『有自性』作為因，但這不是共許的，所以同喻（sādṛśya-dṛṣṭānta，相似例證）不成立。如果就世俗（saṃvṛti，世俗諦）而言，如果以總相來確立諸顯現的事物，存在能感受者，不區分差別，就確立了已成立的事實，這是世俗所共知的，因為感受者是存在的。如果確立顯現的事物存在真實的、常住的、周遍的感受者，並認為思是其自性，那麼同喻就不成立。像這樣的體相，諸婆羅門並不共許，所以如果就勝義而言，同喻不成立。感受者所感受的飲食都是真實存在的，這不是共許的。前面所說的比量（anumāna，推理），沒有敵對的比量能夠違害它。諸勝論師（Vaiśeṣika，勝論派）又這樣說：諸如入息（prāṇa，吸氣）、出息（apāna，呼氣）、閉目、開目、令意行動、根（indriya，感官）的變化等現象，必定有所相（lakṣaṇa，特徵）之物，因為它們是能相（liṅga，記號）。就像見到煙等一樣。這是就世俗而言。如果以總相來確立這些現象必定有所相之物，不區分差別，就確立了已成立的事實，世俗共知『我』並非不存在。如果確立這些現象有所相之『我』是常住的、周遍的，是樂等感受的所依，那麼就沒有同喻，因為這違背了所要確立的觀點。如果就勝義而言，也有像這樣同喻不成立的過失。時間和空間等，也應該用同樣的道理來遮破。諸勝論師又提出這樣的詰難：極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）和意（manas，心）『我』是無為（asaṃskṛta，非造作）的，成立空性的因（hetu，理由）不起作用，因為這是自不成因（svarūpāsiddha-hetu，因本身不成立）。如果說這二者是有為（saṃskṛta，造作）所攝，成立空性的因是緣生（pratītyasamutpāda，緣起）的，那麼這就是他不成因（asiddha-hetu，對方不承認的因），應該承認少分悟入空性。如果意和極微在世俗中也被認為是無為的，那麼才會有這樣的詰難。然而，所要確立的意並非無為，因為它是智慧產生的因，就像色等一樣。像這樣的語句意義相同或不同，因為它是念頭產生的因。這些其他的因，應該根據情況來說明。而且，諸極微也並非無為，因為它們是能成之因，就像線等一樣。像這樣，其他的有合、離、數、同異等因，也應該根據情況來說明。或者，兩個極微所形成的粗物，不是常住的因，因為它是被形成的，就像...

【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, you Sūtrakāras (those who affirm the self) consider that the nature of entities is universally present and has the meaning of accumulation, which is the meaning of skandhas (aggregates). Therefore, the establishment based on the Sūtrakāra as a cause is uncertain. Moreover, your feelings such as pleasure are distinct and cannot be individually established as a paksha (thesis). Because they are of the nature of skandhas, the meaning of hetu (reason) is not established. If, in terms of paramārtha (ultimate truth), there exists a real piece of sandalwood, using 'having own-nature' as the cause, it is not mutually accepted, so the sādṛśya-dṛṣṭānta (example of similarity) is not established. If, in terms of saṃvṛti (conventional truth), if you establish all manifest phenomena with a general characteristic, there exists a perceiver, without distinguishing differences, you establish what is already established, which is commonly known in the world, because the perceiver exists. If you establish that manifest phenomena have a real, permanent, and pervasive perceiver, and consider thought as its own-nature, then the sādṛśya-dṛṣṭānta is not established. Such a nature of entities is not mutually accepted by the Brahmins, so if in terms of paramārtha, the sādṛśya-dṛṣṭānta is not established. The food and drink perceived by the perceiver are all truly existent, which is not mutually accepted. The anumāna (inference) mentioned earlier has no opposing anumāna that can refute it. The Vaiśeṣikas (followers of the Vaiśeṣika school) further state: Phenomena such as inhalation (prāṇa), exhalation (apāna), closing the eyes, opening the eyes, causing the mind to move, and changes in the indriyas (senses), must have something that is their lakṣaṇa (characteristic), because they are liṅga (signs). Just like seeing smoke, etc. This is in terms of saṃvṛti. If you establish that these phenomena must have something that is their lakṣaṇa with a general characteristic, without distinguishing differences, you establish what is already established, the world commonly knows that 'I' is not non-existent. If you establish that these phenomena have a permanent and pervasive 'I' as their lakṣaṇa, which is the basis of feelings such as pleasure, then there is no sādṛśya-dṛṣṭānta, because it contradicts what is to be established. If in terms of paramārtha, there is also the fault of the sādṛśya-dṛṣṭānta not being established in this way. Time, space, etc., should also be refuted using the same reasoning. The Vaiśeṣikas further raise this objection: The paramāṇu (atom) and manas (mind) 'I' are asaṃskṛta (unconditioned), the hetu (reason) for establishing emptiness does not arise, because it is a svarūpāsiddha-hetu (the reason itself is unestablished). If you say that these two are included in saṃskṛta (conditioned), the hetu for establishing emptiness is pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination), then it is an asiddha-hetu (unaccepted reason), and one should acknowledge a partial realization of emptiness. If the mind and atom are also considered asaṃskṛta in saṃvṛti, then there would be such an objection. However, the mind to be established is not asaṃskṛta, because it is the cause of the arising of wisdom, just like form, etc. Such statements have the same or different meanings, because it is the cause of the arising of memory. These other causes should be explained according to the circumstances. Moreover, the atoms are also not asaṃskṛta, because they are the cause of what can be accomplished, just like threads, etc. In this way, other causes such as conjunction, disjunction, number, similarity, and difference should also be explained according to the circumstances. Or, the gross object formed by two atoms is not a permanent cause, because it is formed, just like...

瓶等。如是其餘是所作故。可滅壞故。是有因故。此等諸因。隨應當說。由此道理他所妄執。意與極微皆自性空。是故無有如所說過。

如上所說遮破數論勝論句義種種道理。無衣等論所執句義。亦隨所應當立為空。

如是遣除諸過難已。修觀行者。正比量力悟入自他二宗所執無為性空。雖聞所成智階梯力已入性空。闕勝修力未能永斷所應除障。故復精勤習勝修力。若於此中隨有一種為無為相有間無間。復現行時即應如理觀彼性空。遣除彼相令不顯現悟入諸法。離自性故。其性本空。由性空故相不成實。則是無相。由無相故無所愿求。則是無愿。由離相垢故成遠離。又離性故緣彼煩惱畢竟不生。故成寂靜。自性無起故成無生。由無生故則無無常。亦無有苦。亦無無我。又無生故則無有相。由無相故能以無相一相之行。觀一切法悟入無二。由此行相勤習勝修。增長如是勝修力故。遣除粗相令不顯現。由此令無所行行相。謂取有為無為行相。如眩翳者離粗眩翳眼得清凈。不見先來所取諸相。雖於此中已得無住。然由空等分別現行。有功用心猶相續住。未得無動了知空等分別現行。障礙出世無分別慧。為欲棄捨勇猛正勤如是觀察。就勝義故空性境上空等分別亦非實有。從緣生故。猶如幻等。如是勤修復能除遣空

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：例如瓶子等等。像這樣，其餘的事物也是因為是造作的，可以被破壞的，是有原因的。這些原因，應當根據情況說明。根據這個道理，其他人所錯誤執著的意和極微，都是自性空的。所以沒有像上面所說的那樣。如上所說，遮破了數論（Samkhya，古印度哲學流派，認為世界由自性和神我構成）和勝論（Vaisheshika，古印度哲學流派，主張實在論和原子論）的句義的種種道理。對於無衣外道（裸形外道，指耆那教）等論所執著的句義，也應當根據情況確立為空性。像這樣，在排除了各種過失和責難之後，修習觀行的修行者，通過正確的比量，領悟到自宗和他宗所執著的無為法也是性空的。雖然已經通過聽聞所獲得的智慧階梯的力量進入了性空，但由於缺乏殊勝的修習力量，還不能永遠斷除應該斷除的障礙。所以再次精勤地修習殊勝的修習力量。如果在這其中，無論是有為相還是無為相，有間斷還是無間斷，再次顯現的時候，就應該如理地觀察它們的性空，排除這些相，使它們不顯現，從而領悟到諸法都是遠離自性的。它們的本性本來就是空性的。由於性空，所以相不是真實的，就是無相。由於無相，所以沒有所愿求，就是無愿。由於遠離了相的垢染，所以成就了遠離。又因為遠離了自性，所以緣於它們的煩惱畢竟不會產生，所以成就了寂靜。自性沒有生起，所以成就了無生。由於無生，所以就沒有無常，也沒有苦，也沒有無我。又因為無生，所以就沒有相。由於無相，所以能夠以無相一相的修行，觀察一切法，領悟到無二。通過這樣的行相，勤奮地修習殊勝的修習，增長這樣的殊勝修習力量，排除粗大的相，使它們不顯現。由此使得沒有所行之行相，也就是取有為和無為的行相。就像眼睛有眩暈的人，離開了粗大的眩暈，眼睛就變得清凈，看不見先前所取的各種相。雖然在這其中已經獲得了無住，但是由於空等等的分別念仍然在顯現，有功用的用心仍然在相續存在，還沒有獲得無動，了知空等等的分別念仍然在顯現，障礙了出世間的無分別智慧。爲了想要捨棄這些，勇猛地精勤地這樣觀察，就勝義諦而言，空性的境界上的空等等的分別念也不是真實存在的，因為是從因緣而生的，就像幻化等等。像這樣勤奮地修習，能夠排除空。

【English Translation】 English version: For example, a pot and so on. Likewise, other things are also because they are fabricated, destructible, and have causes. These causes should be explained as appropriate. According to this reasoning, what others mistakenly cling to, namely, the mind and the ultimate particles, are all empty of inherent existence. Therefore, there is nothing as described above. As mentioned above, the various reasons for refuting the tenets of the Samkhya (an ancient Indian philosophical school that believes the world consists of primordial nature and the spirit) and Vaisheshika (an ancient Indian philosophical school that advocates realism and atomism) schools. The tenets held by the Nirgrantha (naked ascetics, referring to Jainism) and other schools should also be established as empty as appropriate. In this way, after eliminating various faults and objections, a practitioner who cultivates contemplation, through correct inference, realizes that the unconditioned (Nirvana) as held by both his own and other schools is also empty of inherent existence. Although one has entered emptiness through the power of the wisdom acquired through hearing, due to the lack of superior cultivation power, one cannot permanently eliminate the obstacles that should be eliminated. Therefore, one diligently cultivates superior cultivation power again. If, in this process, whether it is a conditioned or unconditioned phenomenon, intermittent or continuous, appears again, one should observe its emptiness as it truly is, eliminate these appearances, so that they do not manifest, and thereby realize that all phenomena are devoid of inherent existence. Their nature is originally empty. Because of emptiness, appearances are not real, which is no-appearance. Because of no-appearance, there is no desire, which is no-aspiration. Because of being free from the defilements of appearances, one achieves detachment. Furthermore, because of being devoid of inherent existence, the afflictions arising from them will ultimately not arise, thus achieving tranquility. Inherent existence does not arise, thus achieving no-arising. Because of no-arising, there is no impermanence, no suffering, and no selflessness. Also, because of no-arising, there is no appearance. Because of no-appearance, one can observe all phenomena with the practice of one appearance of no-appearance, realizing non-duality. Through such practice, diligently cultivate superior cultivation, increasing such superior cultivation power, eliminating coarse appearances, so that they do not manifest. This leads to the state of no-action, which is the grasping of conditioned and unconditioned phenomena. Just as a person with dizziness, after the coarse dizziness is gone, the eyes become clear, and one does not see the various appearances that were previously grasped. Although one has attained non-abiding in this process, due to the continued manifestation of discriminations such as emptiness, the effortful mind still continues to exist, and one has not attained non-movement, knowing that the discriminations such as emptiness still manifest, obstructing the transcendental non-conceptual wisdom. In order to abandon these, one diligently and vigorously observes in this way, that in terms of ultimate truth, the discriminations such as emptiness in the realm of emptiness are also not truly existent, because they arise from conditions, like illusions and so on. Diligently cultivating in this way can eliminate emptiness.

等分別。除遣彼故空不空等二邊遠離。不更以其空等行相觀察諸法。如說般若波羅蜜多。正現行時于其色上不觀為常不為無常不觀為樂亦不為苦。不觀為我亦非無我。不觀寂靜非不寂靜。不觀為空亦非不空。不觀為相亦非無相。不觀為愿亦非無愿。不觀遠離非不遠離。如是于其受想行識一切色聲香味觸法所有眼耳鼻舌身意佈施持戒忍辱精進靜慮般若波羅蜜多念住正斷。神足根力覺支道支靜慮無色等至神通十力無畏諸無礙解不共佛法諸三摩地陀羅尼門一切智上。不觀為常亦非無常。乃至廣說。

既能如是遠離二邊。即能生長處中妙行。此離二邊處中道理。由如上說二種比量有為無為色類無故說名無色。由無色故。亦無有等諸分別故。無有少法可相表示。言彼既然此亦如是。故名無示。由無性故所依能依皆不成就。無有住持。故名無住。若有為相或無為相。若所分別非所分別。若能分別非能分別。如是等相覺慧不行。故名無現。遠離一切有相無相。此境界識皆不生故。名無了別。由無色故。無形質故。方維幖幟皆無有故。名無幖幟。如世尊告迦葉波言。常為一邊無常第二。此二中間無色無示無住無現無所了別無有幖幟。是則名為處中妙行。如實觀察一切法性。廣說乃至有為一邊無為第二。乃至廣說。又如佛告迦葉波

言。明與無明皆無有二無二差別。此中正智是則名為處中妙行。既能如是遠離二邊。于能安住無二想上所起分別無二之想。亦能了知障礙出世無分別慧寂靜安住。如所說因速能永斷。永斷彼故即無如是如是分別。語意二言並皆止息。證得無動無現無相。離諸戲論。諸法實性于其所緣無動證入。自相妙智相續安住。雖勤修習無倒空觀。而於空性終不作證。如是名為勝義靜慮。如世尊言。雖修靜慮然不依色而修靜慮。如是不依受想行識而修靜慮。不依眼耳鼻舌身意而修靜慮。不依色聲香味觸法而修靜慮。不依于身份別安住而修靜慮。不依於心分別安住而修靜慮。不依于地水火與風而修靜慮。不依于空日月星宿而修靜慮。不依帝釋梵王世主而修靜慮。不依欲界色無色界而修靜慮。不依此世及以他世而修靜慮。不高不下證住無動而修靜慮。不依我見而修靜慮。如是不依有情命者養育士夫補特伽羅及以意生摩納婆見而修靜慮。不依斷常有無有見而修靜慮。不為漏盡而修靜慮。不為趣入正性離生而修靜慮。不為證果而修靜慮。不為畢竟無所造作而修靜慮。雖為修習無倒空觀而修靜慮。然于空性不為作證而修靜慮。

相應論者有定執言。一切所取能取分別悉皆遠離是出世間無分別智。即于其中起堅實想精勤修習。有餘於此正審

察言如是智生。雖無如上所說分別。而隨無相境相起故。自性分別所隨逐故。是有為故。如余現量有分別覺。不成出世無分別智。又彼所計離相離言真如勝義。是所緣故。如余所緣不成勝義。即由此因俱非最勝。如契經言。云何此中名勝義諦。謂于其中智亦不行。又如問言曼殊室利。言慧眼者當何所觀。答言。若有少所觀者即非慧眼。由此慧眼無分別故不觀有為。亦復不能觀于無為。以諸無為非此慧眼所應行故。由此理教彼亦應斷於此定執。複審察言。就勝義諦如是出世無分別智亦非實有。從緣生故。猶如幻士。于有所有妨難過失。如理觀見當正遣除。若智慧斷如是定執。此亦如彼有過失故。不復精勤審察開示。如是等執既滅除已。于所應知無相境性亦無行解。因緣闕故。余智不生由無行解。是故說名真實行解。如世尊言。云何名為真實行解。謂于諸法都無行解。是則名為真實行解。又如經言。如來菩提都無現觀。又如問言曼殊室利。諸見諦者當何所見。答言。無有少法可見。所以者何。凡有所見皆是虛妄。若無所見乃名見諦。又如問言。云何精勤應修現觀。答言。若知無有少法思惟分別。如是精勤應修現觀。復問云何已證現觀。答言。若能觀一切法皆平等性。復問。有能見一切法平等性耶。答言。無能見平等性。若

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本觀察言辭能生起智慧。即使沒有像上面所說的分別，但由於跟隨無相的境界顯現，並且被自性分別所跟隨，又因為是有為法，就像其他的現量一樣，是有分別的覺知，所以不能成為出世間的無分別智。而且，他們所認為的離相離言的真如勝義（paramārtha-satya，終極真理），是所緣境，就像其他的所緣境一樣，不能成為勝義。正因為這個原因，兩者都不是最殊勝的。正如契經所說：『什麼是勝義諦？』就是智慧也無法在其中執行的境界。又如曼殊室利（Mañjuśrī，文殊菩薩）被問到：『慧眼應當觀察什麼？』回答說：『如果有所觀察，那就不是慧眼。』因此，慧眼因為沒有分別，所以不觀察有為法，也不能觀察無為法，因為這些無為法不是慧眼所能觸及的。基於這個道理和教義，他們也應該斷除對這個的執著。進一步審察，就勝義諦而言，這種出世間的無分別智也不是真實存在的，因為它也是從因緣而生的，就像幻術師一樣。對於有和所有這些妨礙和過失，如果能如理觀察，就應當正確地去除。如果智慧能斷除這樣的執著，那麼它也像前面所說的幻術師一樣，有過失，所以不再需要精勤地審察和開示。當這些執著被滅除之後，對於所應知的無相境性，也就沒有了行解（abhisaṃskāra，造作）。因為缺乏因緣，其他的智慧也不會生起。由於沒有行解，所以被稱為真實行解。正如世尊所說：『什麼叫做真實行解？』就是對於諸法都沒有行解，這才能叫做真實行解。』又如經文所說：『如來的菩提（bodhi，覺悟）都沒有現觀（abhisamaya，現證）。』又如曼殊室利被問到：『見諦者（dṛṣṭi-satya，證悟真理者）應當見到什麼？』回答說：『沒有少許法可見。』為什麼呢？凡是所見到的都是虛妄的。如果沒有所見，才叫做見諦。』又如被問到：『應當如何精勤地修習現觀？』回答說：『如果知道沒有少許法可以思惟分別，這樣精勤地修習現觀。』又問：『如何是已經證得現觀？』回答說：『如果能觀察一切法都是平等性。』又問：『有人能見到一切法的平等性嗎？』回答說：『沒有人能見到平等性。』如果

【English Translation】 English version Observing words gives rise to wisdom. Even without the distinctions mentioned above, it arises because it follows the appearance of the signless realm and is accompanied by self-nature discrimination. Because it is conditioned, like other direct perceptions, it is a discriminating awareness and cannot become transcendental non-discriminating wisdom. Moreover, the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya) of Suchness (tathatā), which they conceive as being apart from signs and words, is an object of cognition. Like other objects of cognition, it cannot be the ultimate truth. For this very reason, neither is supreme. As the sutra says: 'What is called ultimate truth here?' It is the realm in which wisdom does not operate. Furthermore, as Mañjuśrī (文殊菩薩) was asked: 'What should the eye of wisdom observe?' He replied: 'If there is anything observed, it is not the eye of wisdom.' Therefore, because the eye of wisdom is non-discriminating, it does not observe conditioned phenomena, nor can it observe unconditioned phenomena, because these unconditioned phenomena are not within the scope of the eye of wisdom. Based on this reason and teaching, they should also abandon their attachment to this. Further examining, with regard to the ultimate truth, this transcendental non-discriminating wisdom is also not truly existent, because it arises from conditions, like an illusionist. If one rightly observes these hindrances and faults of existence and non-existence, one should properly eliminate them. If wisdom can sever such attachment, it also has faults like the aforementioned illusionist, so there is no further need for diligent examination and exposition. Once these attachments are eliminated, there is no longer any activity or understanding (abhisaṃskāra) regarding the signless nature of the object to be known. Because of the lack of conditions, other wisdoms do not arise. Because there is no activity or understanding, it is called true activity and understanding. As the World-Honored One said: 'What is called true activity and understanding?' It is having no activity or understanding regarding any phenomena; this is called true activity and understanding.' Moreover, as the sutra says: 'The enlightenment (bodhi) of the Tathagata (如來) has no direct realization (abhisamaya).' Furthermore, as Mañjuśrī was asked: 'What should those who have seen the truth (dṛṣṭi-satya) see?' He replied: 'There is not a single phenomenon to be seen.' Why? Because whatever is seen is false. If there is nothing seen, that is called seeing the truth.' Furthermore, as he was asked: 'How should one diligently cultivate direct realization?' He replied: 'If one knows that there is not a single phenomenon to be thought about or discriminated, one should diligently cultivate direct realization in this way.' Again, he was asked: 'What is it to have already attained direct realization?' He replied: 'If one can observe that all phenomena are of equal nature.' Again, he was asked: 'Is there anyone who can see the equal nature of all phenomena?' He replied: 'No one can see the equal nature.'

有所見是則應成不平等見。真實行解見諦現觀皆同一義。修觀行者。爾時心意識智不行。說名正行無分別慧。若能如是行無所行。則得如來應正等覺真實授記。如契經言。世尊。菩薩云何修行于其無上正等菩提得諸如來應正等覺真實授記。梵志。菩薩若於是時不行於生不行於滅。不行於善不行不善。不行世間不行出世。不行有漏。不行無漏。不行有罪不行無罪。不行有為不行無為。不行相應及不相應。不行於斷及以不斷。不行生死及以涅槃。不行於見及聞覺知。不行於施及以棄捨。不行於戒及以律儀。不行於忍不行精進。不行靜慮不行等持。不行於慧不行於解。不行於智不行於證。菩薩如是行無所行。于其無上正等菩提得諸如來應正等覺真實授記。

如是慧行名聖默然。如契經言。於三十七菩提分法。如佛所說如實開示。是名說法。復於是法雖以身證而不觀察離身有法。亦不觀察離法有身。如是觀察。謂觀無二亦無不二。如是觀時不隨觀察現量智見。不觀察故名聖默然。

由是理教審觀察時。一切有為無為自性。無有能為若心若慧若有分別若無分別境界自性。如是知已。明慧日光能除一切愚癡黑闇。

諸心慧境現　　智者由不取　慧行無分別　　無所行而行

此中能集諸行種子。或為諸行種

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果有所見，就會形成不平等的見解。真實的修行、理解、見諦（Dṛṣṭisatya，見真諦）和現觀（Abhisamaya，現證）都是同一個意思。修觀行的修行者，在那個時候，心、意識、智都不起作用，這被稱為正行無分別慧（nirvikalpa-jñāna，無分別智）。如果能夠這樣修行無所行，就能得到如來應正等覺（Tathāgata Arhat Samyaksaṃbuddha，如來阿羅漢正等覺）真實的授記。正如契經所說：『世尊，菩薩如何修行才能在無上正等菩提（anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi，無上正等覺悟）中得到諸如來應正等覺真實的授記？』梵志（Brāhmaṇa，婆羅門），菩薩如果在這個時候，不行於生，不行於滅，不行於善，不行不善，不行世間，不行出世，不行有漏，不行無漏，不行有罪，不行無罪，不行有為，不行無為，不行相應及不相應，不行於斷及以不斷，不行生死及以涅槃，不行於見及聞覺知，不行於施及以棄捨，不行於戒及以律儀，不行於忍，不行精進，不行靜慮，不行等持，不行於慧，不行於解，不行於智，不行於證。菩薩這樣修行無所行，就能在無上正等菩提中得到諸如來應正等覺真實的授記。這樣的慧行被稱為聖默然。正如契經所說：『對於三十七菩提分法（bodhipākṣika-dharmas，菩提分法），如佛所說如實開示，這叫做說法。』進一步說，即使以身證得此法，也不觀察離開身體之外有法，也不觀察離開法之外有身體。這樣的觀察，就是觀察無二，也沒有不二。這樣觀察時，不隨觀察現量智見。因為不觀察，所以稱為聖默然。由於這個道理和教義的審慎觀察，一切有為（saṃskṛta，有為法）和無為（asaṃskṛta，無為法）的自性，都沒有任何心、慧、有分別或無分別的境界自性可以作為。這樣知道之後，明慧的日光能夠去除一切愚癡的黑暗。諸心慧境現，智者由不取，慧行無分別，無所行而行。這裡能夠聚集諸行（saṃskāra，行）的種子，或者作為諸行的種子。

【English Translation】 English version: If there is something seen, it will become an unequal view. True practice, understanding, seeing the truth (Dṛṣṭisatya) and direct perception (Abhisamaya) are all the same meaning. When a practitioner cultivates contemplation, at that time, the mind, consciousness, and wisdom do not function. This is called right practice, non-discriminating wisdom (nirvikalpa-jñāna). If one can practice in this way, without any action, one will receive a true prediction of enlightenment from the Tathāgata Arhat Samyaksaṃbuddha (Tathāgata Arhat Samyaksaṃbuddha). As the sutra says: 'World Honored One, how does a Bodhisattva practice to obtain a true prediction of enlightenment from the Tathāgatas Arhat Samyaksaṃbuddha in unsurpassed complete and perfect enlightenment (anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi)?' Brahmin (Brāhmaṇa), if the Bodhisattva at this time does not act on birth, does not act on death, does not act on good, does not act on non-good, does not act on the world, does not act on transcendence, does not act on defilement, does not act on non-defilement, does not act on sin, does not act on non-sin, does not act on conditioned, does not act on unconditioned, does not act on correspondence and non-correspondence, does not act on cessation and non-cessation, does not act on birth and death and Nirvana, does not act on seeing and hearing and knowing, does not act on giving and abandoning, does not act on precepts and discipline, does not act on patience, does not act on diligence, does not act on meditation, does not act on equanimity, does not act on wisdom, does not act on understanding, does not act on knowledge, does not act on realization. If the Bodhisattva practices in this way, without any action, he will receive a true prediction of enlightenment from the Tathāgatas Arhat Samyaksaṃbuddha in unsurpassed complete and perfect enlightenment. Such practice of wisdom is called noble silence. As the sutra says: 'Regarding the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment (bodhipākṣika-dharmas), explaining them truthfully as the Buddha said is called teaching the Dharma.' Furthermore, even if one realizes this Dharma through the body, one does not observe the Dharma as separate from the body, nor does one observe the body as separate from the Dharma. Such observation is observing non-duality, and also non-non-duality. When observing in this way, one does not follow the directly perceived wisdom and views of observation. Because there is no observation, it is called noble silence. Due to careful observation of this principle and teaching, the nature of all conditioned (saṃskṛta) and unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) things does not have any nature of mind, wisdom, discriminating or non-discriminating realms that can be taken as its own. Having known this, the sunlight of clear wisdom can remove all the darkness of ignorance. All realms of mind and wisdom appear, the wise do not grasp them, the practice of wisdom is without discrimination, acting without acting. Here, one can gather the seeds of all actions (saṃskāra), or serve as the seeds of all actions.

子所集。故名為心。能持勝德或由彼持令不流散。故名為慧。心慧所行名心慧境。境地所行是名差別。心境即是有為無為所有諸相。慧境即是有為無為所有空性。如契經言。無相分別慧終不轉。現謂顯現。即似心慧。所行境界性相現義。諸謂地等。隨其一類或總或別。如是眼等及以色等。隨其一類或總或別。如是色受想行與識。隨其一類或總或別。如是念住及以正斷神足根力覺支道支。波羅蜜多一切神通。十力無畏不共佛法。諸三摩地陀羅尼門。預流一來及以不還。若阿羅漢所有道果。隨其一類或總或別。廣說乃至一切智智。於一切法能正了知無顛倒性。故名智者。由者謂說舍相因緣。言不取者無執無見。即是覺慧不計度義。由不取因為何所證。慧行無分別。無所行而行慧者即是無分別智。雖復永離一切分別覺慧增益。假名為智。以無影像無相無言境界起相自性分別亦無有故名無分別。雖無住者而就異位假名建立。如言燈滅阿羅漢滅。覺慧增益依俗言。說於此相續名無分別。如分別智名有分別。此中意取智無生行。說名為行。由此智行自他法性一切種相非所見故不名能見。即非能見說名真見。如所證故。非非所見作所見相。或有分別或無分別。真見得成。真如若是所見性者。不應說為非可見性。雖依世俗有平等見說名

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：這是您所收集的。因此被稱為『心』。能夠保持殊勝的功德，或者因為它能保持功德不流失，所以被稱為『慧』（智慧）。心和慧所執行的範圍，稱為『心慧境』。境界所執行的處所，就叫做差別。心境就是有為法和無為法所包含的一切現象。慧境就是有為法和無為法所包含的一切空性。正如契經所說：『沒有現象的分別慧，最終不會轉變。』『現』，指的是顯現，類似於心和慧所執行的境界的性質和現象的意義。『諸』，指的是地等，根據它們所屬的類別，或者總體，或者個別。就像眼等（眼根等）以及色等（色塵等），根據它們所屬的類別，或者總體，或者個別。就像色、受、想、行和識，根據它們所屬的類別，或者總體，或者個別。就像念住（四念住）以及正斷（四正勤）、神足（四神足）、根（五根）、力（五力）、覺支（七覺支）、道支（八正道），波羅蜜多（六波羅蜜或十波羅蜜），一切神通，十力（如來十力）、無畏（四無畏）、不共佛法（十八不共法），各種三摩地（禪定）和陀羅尼門（總持法門），預流（須陀洹）、一來（斯陀含）以及不還（阿那含），如果阿羅漢證得的道果，根據它們所屬的類別，或者總體，或者個別。廣泛地說，乃至一切智智（佛的智慧），對於一切法能夠正確地瞭解，沒有顛倒的性質，所以被稱為智者。『由』，指的是說明捨棄現象的因緣。『言不取者』，指的是沒有執著，沒有見解，這就是覺悟的智慧，不進行計度思量。因為不執取，所以證得什麼呢？智慧的執行是沒有分別的。沒有所行而行慧的人，就是沒有分別智。即使永遠脫離一切分別，覺悟的智慧仍然在增長。假名為『智』，因為它沒有影像，沒有現象，沒有語言，境界的生起相和自性分別也都沒有，所以稱為『無分別』。即使沒有住處，仍然就不同的位置假名建立。例如說燈滅了，阿羅漢滅度了。覺悟的智慧增長，依據世俗的語言來說，對於這種相續稱為無分別。就像分別智被稱為有分別一樣。這裡的意思是取智的無生之行，說它為行。由於這種智慧的執行，自己和他人的法性的一切種相都不是所能見到的，所以不稱為能見。即非能見，稱為真見。就像所證得的那樣，不是非所見，卻作為所見之相。或者有分別，或者沒有分別，真見才能成就。如果真如是所見的性質，就不應該說它是非可見的性質。即使依據世俗有平等見，也只是說說而已。

【English Translation】 English version: This is what you have collected. Therefore, it is called 'mind'. It can maintain supreme merits, or because it can maintain merits from dissipating, it is called 'wisdom' (prajna). The scope in which the mind and wisdom operate is called the 'mind-wisdom realm'. The place where the realm operates is called difference. The mind realm is all the phenomena contained in conditioned and unconditioned dharmas. The wisdom realm is all the emptiness contained in conditioned and unconditioned dharmas. As the sutra says: 'The wisdom of non-phenomenal discrimination will never change.' 'Appearance' refers to manifestation, similar to the nature and phenomenal meaning of the realm in which the mind and wisdom operate. 'All' refers to earth, etc., according to their respective categories, either in general or individually. Just like the eye, etc. (eye faculty, etc.) and form, etc. (form dust, etc.), according to their respective categories, either in general or individually. Just like form, feeling, thought, volition, and consciousness, according to their respective categories, either in general or individually. Just like mindfulness (four mindfulnesses) and right effort (four right exertions), supernatural powers (four bases of supernatural power), roots (five roots), powers (five powers), enlightenment factors (seven factors of enlightenment), path factors (eightfold noble path), pāramitās (six or ten pāramitās), all supernatural powers, ten powers (ten powers of a Tathāgata), fearlessness (four fearlessnesses), unique Buddha dharmas (eighteen unique dharmas), various samādhis (meditative concentrations) and dhāraṇī gates (total retention), stream-enterer (Sotāpanna), once-returner (Sakadāgāmin), and non-returner (Anāgāmin), if the fruit of the path attained by an Arhat, according to their respective categories, either in general or individually. Broadly speaking, even the all-knowing wisdom (Buddha's wisdom), which can correctly understand all dharmas without inverted nature, is called a wise person. 'By' refers to explaining the causes and conditions for abandoning phenomena. 'Those who do not grasp' refers to having no attachment and no views, which is enlightened wisdom, not engaging in calculation and deliberation. Because of not grasping, what is attained? The operation of wisdom is without discrimination. Those who practice wisdom without anything to practice are without discriminating wisdom. Even if they are forever free from all discrimination, enlightened wisdom still increases. It is nominally called 'wisdom' because it has no images, no phenomena, no language, and the arising appearance and self-nature discrimination of the realm are also absent, so it is called 'non-discrimination'. Even if there is no dwelling place, it is still nominally established in different positions. For example, it is said that the lamp is extinguished, and the Arhat has passed away. Enlightened wisdom increases, and according to conventional language, this continuum is called non-discrimination. Just as discriminating wisdom is called discrimination. The meaning here is to take the non-arising practice of wisdom and call it practice. Because of the operation of this wisdom, all aspects of the dharma nature of oneself and others are not what can be seen, so it is not called seeing. That which is not seeing is called true seeing. Just like what is attained, it is not what is not seen, but it is taken as the appearance of what is seen. Either with discrimination or without discrimination, true seeing can be achieved. If Suchness is the nature of what is seen, it should not be said that it is the nature of what is not seen. Even if there is equal seeing according to convention, it is just talk.

真見。不應執此不平等見。說名真見。諸可見者皆非真實。起解因故。如陽焰水一切可見皆非真實。真如若是可見性者。可見相取不成真見。若非可見不應說言證見真如。見非可見豈名平等。又智有為真如無為性不平等。若見應成不平等見。又諸法性皆非能見。見亦應爾。俱以無生為自性故。如是非見假名為見。非不平等。又一剎那證一切法。皆無現觀名真現觀。不應難言。返照自體難成立故。智應不證智之實性。二種俱非可見境性。無差別故同時俱證。若就勝義。似境相智。本性無生。故無現觀亦無證得。如契經言。汝不應以現觀證得。觀于如來體是無為。出過一切眼所行故。如是梵志。如來安坐菩提座時。證一切法皆無所得。永斷一切虛妄顛倒所起煩惱。如是等經悉皆隨順。且止傍論應辯正論。游履名行。無游履故名無所行。是無行解無生起義無分別慧。以不行相而為行故。即無所行說名為行。此則略說。如前正勤所成立果。

修觀行者。如是慧行無分別故。不行而行行即不行。遠離一切所緣作意。於一切法都無所住。猶如虛空。棄捨一切遍計分別。淡泊寂然如入滅定觀諸法性。諸佛法身不可思議不可了別。無二無藏無相無見。不可表示。無生無滅無有起盡。淡泊寂然無有差別。無相無影離諸瑕穢。超過一

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：真正的見解，不應該執著于這種不平等的見解，而稱之為『真見』。所有能被看見的事物都不是真實的，因為它們是因緣和合而生起的。比如陽焰（yáng yàn，陽光照射在空氣中，因空氣密度不同而產生的虛幻景象，像水一樣）之水，一切可見之物都不是真實的。如果真如（zhēn rú，事物的真實本性）是可以被看見的，那麼執取可見之相就不能成為真見。如果真如不是可以被看見的，就不應該說證見了真如。見與非見，怎麼能稱之為平等呢？而且，智慧是有為法（yǒu wéi fǎ，通過努力才能產生的現象），而真如是無為法（wú wéi fǎ，不依賴任何條件，自然而然存在的現象），它們的性質是不平等的。如果真如可以被看見，那就應該成為不平等的見解。而且，諸法的本性都不是能見的，見解也應該是這樣。因為它們都以無生（wú shēng，不生不滅）為自性。像這樣，不是見，卻假名為見，這不是不平等。又，在一剎那間證悟一切法，都無現觀（xiàn guān，直接的、清晰的觀察），這叫做真正的現觀。不應該質疑說，『返照自體』（fǎn zhào zì tǐ，反過來觀照自身）難以成立。智慧應該不能證悟智慧的真實本性，因為這兩種都不是可見的境性，沒有差別，所以同時證悟。如果就勝義（shèng yì，最高的真理）而言，類似於境相的智慧，其本性是無生的，所以沒有現觀，也沒有證得。正如契經（qì jīng，佛經）所說：『你不應該以現觀證得，觀于如來（rú lái，佛的稱號之一）的體性是無為的，超出一切眼睛所能看到的範圍。』像這樣，梵志（fàn zhì，古印度婆羅門種姓的人），如來安坐在菩提座（pú tí zuò，佛陀成道時所坐的地方）時，證悟一切法都無所得，永遠斷除一切虛妄顛倒所產生的煩惱。像這樣的經典都隨順這個道理。暫且停止旁論，應該辯論正論。游履（yóu lǚ，行走）叫做行（xíng，行為），沒有游履，所以叫做無所行（wú suǒ xíng，沒有行為）。這是無行之解，是無生起之義，是無分別慧（wú fēn bié huì，沒有分別的智慧）。因為以不行之相作為行，所以說無所行叫做行。這只是簡略地說，如同前面正勤（zhèng qín，正確的努力）所成立的果。修觀行的人，像這樣的慧行（huì xíng，智慧的行為）沒有分別，所以不行而行，行即不行。遠離一切所緣作意（suǒ yuán zuò yì，對所觀對象的專注），對於一切法都沒有任何執著，猶如虛空。拋棄一切遍計分別（biàn jì fēn bié，普遍的、虛妄的分別），淡泊寂然，如同進入滅盡定（miè jìn dìng，一種高級禪定狀態），觀照諸法的本性。諸佛的法身（fǎ shēn，佛的真身）不可思議，不可了別，無二無藏，無相無見，不可表示，無生無滅，沒有起盡，淡泊寂然，沒有差別，無相無影，遠離一切瑕穢，超越一切。

【English Translation】 English version: True seeing should not cling to this unequal view and call it 'true seeing.' All that can be seen is not real because it arises from conditions. For example, the water of a mirage (yáng yàn, a shimmering optical illusion caused by atmospheric conditions), all that is visible is not real. If Suchness (zhēn rú, the true nature of things) were something that could be seen, then grasping onto visible appearances would not constitute true seeing. If Suchness is not something that can be seen, then one should not say that one has realized Suchness. How can seeing and non-seeing be called equal? Moreover, wisdom is conditioned (yǒu wéi fǎ, phenomena that arise through effort), while Suchness is unconditioned (wú wéi fǎ, phenomena that exist naturally, without dependence on conditions), and their natures are unequal. If Suchness could be seen, it would constitute an unequal view. Furthermore, the nature of all dharmas is not something that can be seen, and seeing should be the same. This is because they all have non-arising (wú shēng, neither arising nor ceasing) as their self-nature. In this way, it is not seeing, but it is falsely called seeing, and this is not unequal. Also, in a single instant, one realizes all dharmas, and there is no direct perception (xiàn guān, direct, clear observation); this is called true direct perception. One should not question, 'Reflecting back on oneself' (fǎn zhào zì tǐ, turning back to observe oneself) is difficult to establish. Wisdom should not be able to realize the true nature of wisdom, because neither of these is a visible object, and there is no difference, so they are realized simultaneously. If, in terms of ultimate truth (shèng yì, the highest truth), wisdom that resembles an object, its nature is non-arising, so there is no direct perception and no attainment. As the sutra (qì jīng, Buddhist scripture) says, 'You should not use direct perception to realize that the nature of the Tathagata (rú lái, one of the titles of the Buddha) is unconditioned, beyond the reach of all eyes.' In this way, Brahmin (fàn zhì, a person of the Brahmin caste in ancient India), when the Tathagata was sitting on the Bodhi seat (pú tí zuò, the place where the Buddha attained enlightenment), he realized that all dharmas were without attainment, and he forever cut off all afflictions arising from false and inverted views. Sutras like these all accord with this principle. Let us stop digressing and discuss the correct view. Traveling (yóu lǚ, walking) is called action (xíng, behavior), and without traveling, it is called non-action (wú suǒ xíng, no behavior). This is the understanding of non-action, the meaning of non-arising, and non-discriminating wisdom (wú fēn bié huì, wisdom without discrimination). Because taking the aspect of non-action as action, it is said that non-action is called action. This is just a brief explanation, like the fruit established by right effort (zhèng qín, correct effort) mentioned earlier. A practitioner of contemplation, because such wisdom-action (huì xíng, the action of wisdom) is without discrimination, therefore, not acting is acting, and acting is not acting. One is far from all objects of attention (suǒ yuán zuò yì, focus on the object of contemplation), and one has no attachment to any dharma, like empty space. Abandoning all conceptual proliferation (biàn jì fēn bié, universal, false discrimination), one is detached and silent, like entering cessation meditation (miè jìn dìng, an advanced state of meditation), contemplating the nature of all dharmas. The Dharmakaya (fǎ shēn, the body of the Dharma) of all Buddhas is inconceivable, cannot be distinguished, is non-dual, without concealment, without form, without seeing, cannot be expressed, without arising, without ceasing, without beginning or end, detached and silent, without difference, without form or shadow, free from all defilements, surpassing all.

切覺慧語言境界道路。雖如是觀而無所見。不見而見見即不見。如是妙見所攝受故。能正增長無量福聚。能感無邊微妙樂果。清凈一味能滅他苦。如藥樹王饒益一切正所求愿。如是正觀如來法身。不見諸法有無相故名為正見。以息一切遍計分別名正思惟。由證諸法離諸戲論一切語言悉皆靜息名為正語。由一切法非所作性不造彼因身語意業名為正業。以一切法皆是無增無減法性所有增減皆永不生名為正命。以一切法皆無發起無有造作勇猛方便名正精進。以于諸法畢竟不證境性有無無有憶念無所思惟名為正念。以一切種不取諸法無所依住名為正定。如是正觀能修如此八支聖道。此義廣如菩薩藏中處處宣說。

如是正觀非但能修八支聖道。亦能圓滿略說六種波羅蜜多。雖無加行而有是事。其義云何。謂能棄捨一切種相。及能棄捨一切煩惱。是名為施波羅蜜多。能息一切所緣作意修無所得。是名為戒波羅蜜多。于諸所緣能不忍受。是名為忍波羅蜜多。無取無舍離一切行。是名精進波羅蜜多。一切作意皆不現行都無所作。是名靜慮波羅蜜多。於一切法不起戲論遠離二相。是名般若波羅蜜多。此義廣如梵問經等處處宣說。

如是妙住有無量門。無量經中世尊廣說。有大義利多所饒益。諸有智者。應如實知離諸放逸當勤

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：徹悟覺慧的語言境界道路。雖然這樣觀察，卻沒有任何可見之物。不見而見，見即非見。因為被這樣微妙的見解所攝受，所以能夠真正增長無量的福德積聚，能夠感得無邊的微妙快樂果報。清凈而唯一，能夠滅除他人的痛苦，如同藥樹之王，饒益一切真正尋求願望的人。像這樣正確地觀察如來的法身，因為不見諸法有有相和無相，所以稱為正見（Samyag-dṛṣṭi，正確的見解）。以止息一切普遍計度的分別，名為正思惟（Samyak-saṃkalpa，正確的思維）。由於證悟諸法遠離各種戲論，一切語言都寂靜止息，名為正語（Samyag-vāc，正確的言語）。由於一切法並非被造作的性質，不造作那些因，身語意業都清凈，名為正業（Samyak-karmānta，正確的行為）。因為一切法都是無增無減的法性，所有的增減都永遠不會產生，名為正命（Samyag-ājīva，正確的謀生）。因為一切法都沒有發起，沒有造作，以勇猛的方便，名為正精進（Samyag-vyāyāma，正確的努力）。因為對於諸法，最終不證得境性的有無，沒有憶念，沒有思惟，名為正念（Samyak-smṛti，正確的正念）。以一切方式不執取諸法，沒有依靠和執著，名為正定（Samyak-samādhi，正確的禪定）。像這樣正確的觀察，能夠修習如此的八支聖道（Aṣṭāṅga-mārga）。這個意義廣泛地在《菩薩藏》中處處宣說。

像這樣正確的觀察，不僅能夠修習八支聖道，也能夠圓滿概括來說的六種波羅蜜多（Pāramitā，到彼岸）。雖然沒有額外的努力，卻有這樣的效果。它的意義是什麼呢？就是能夠捨棄一切種相，以及能夠捨棄一切煩惱，這稱為佈施波羅蜜多（Dāna-pāramitā，佈施到彼岸）。能夠止息一切所緣的作意，修習無所得，這稱為持戒波羅蜜多（Śīla-pāramitā，持戒到彼岸）。對於各種所緣能夠不忍受，這稱為忍辱波羅蜜多（Kṣānti-pāramitā，忍辱到彼岸）。沒有取捨，遠離一切行為，這稱為精進波羅蜜多（Vīrya-pāramitā，精進到彼岸）。一切作意都不顯現，完全沒有造作，這稱為靜慮波羅蜜多（Dhyāna-pāramitā，禪定到彼岸）。對於一切法不生起戲論，遠離二相，這稱為般若波羅蜜多（Prajñā-pāramitā，智慧到彼岸）。這個意義廣泛地在《梵問經》等處處宣說。

像這樣微妙的安住，有無量的門徑。無量的經典中，世尊廣泛地宣說。有巨大的意義和利益，多多饒益眾生。有智慧的人，應該如實地瞭解，遠離各種放逸，應當勤奮修行。

【English Translation】 English version: Penetrating the language realm of awakened wisdom, though observing in this way, there is nothing to be seen. Not seeing yet seeing, seeing is not seeing. Because of being embraced by such wondrous seeing, one can truly increase immeasurable accumulations of merit, and can experience boundless subtle joyful results. Pure and singular, it can extinguish the suffering of others, like the king of medicinal trees, benefiting all who truly seek their wishes. Observing the Dharmakāya (法身, Dharma Body) of the Tathāgata (如來, Thus Come One) in this way, because one does not see the existence or non-existence of phenomena, it is called Right View (Samyag-dṛṣṭi). Ceasing all pervasive conceptual discriminations is called Right Thought (Samyak-saṃkalpa). Because of realizing that all phenomena are free from all fabrications, all language is silent and ceases, it is called Right Speech (Samyag-vāc). Because all phenomena are not of a created nature, not creating those causes, the actions of body, speech, and mind are pure, it is called Right Action (Samyak-karmānta). Because all phenomena are of the nature of Dharma (法, Dharma) without increase or decrease, all increase and decrease never arise, it is called Right Livelihood (Samyag-ājīva). Because all phenomena have no arising, no creation, with courageous skillful means, it is called Right Effort (Samyag-vyāyāma). Because with regard to all phenomena, one ultimately does not realize the existence or non-existence of objective nature, without recollection, without thought, it is called Right Mindfulness (Samyak-smṛti). In every way, not grasping phenomena, without reliance or attachment, it is called Right Concentration (Samyak-samādhi). Such right observation can cultivate the Noble Eightfold Path (Aṣṭāṅga-mārga). This meaning is extensively proclaimed everywhere in the Bodhisattva Piṭaka.

Such right observation can not only cultivate the Noble Eightfold Path, but can also perfect the six Pāramitās (波羅蜜多, Perfections) in brief. Although there is no additional effort, there is such an effect. What is its meaning? It is that one can abandon all characteristics, and can abandon all afflictions, this is called Dāna-pāramitā (佈施波羅蜜多, Perfection of Giving). Being able to cease all attention to objects of focus, cultivating non-attainment, this is called Śīla-pāramitā (持戒波羅蜜多, Perfection of Morality). Being able to not endure with regard to various objects of focus, this is called Kṣānti-pāramitā (忍辱波羅蜜多, Perfection of Patience). Without taking or abandoning, being apart from all actions, this is called Vīrya-pāramitā (精進波羅蜜多, Perfection of Diligence). All attention does not manifest, completely without creation, this is called Dhyāna-pāramitā (靜慮波羅蜜多, Perfection of Meditation). With regard to all phenomena, not arising fabrications, being apart from dualistic appearances, this is called Prajñā-pāramitā (般若波羅蜜多, Perfection of Wisdom). This meaning is extensively proclaimed everywhere in the Brahma Questions Sutra and other places.

Such wondrous abiding has countless gateways. In countless sutras, the World Honored One extensively proclaims it. It has great meaning and benefit, greatly benefiting sentient beings. Those with wisdom should truly understand, stay away from all laxity, and should diligently practice.

修學。

大乘掌珍論卷下

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：修學。

《大乘掌珍論》卷下

問：如何修學大乘佛法？

答：修學大乘佛法，應以菩提心（Bodhicitta，覺悟之心）為根本，廣修六度（Paramita，佈施、持戒、忍辱、精進、禪定、智慧）等菩薩行（Bodhisattva practices），上求佛道（Buddhahood），下化眾生（Sentient beings）。應深入經藏（Sutras），明瞭諸法實相（Reality of all dharmas），斷除煩惱（Kleshas），證得涅槃（Nirvana）。

【English Translation】 English version: Cultivation and Learning.

Mahayana Adornment of the Hand Treatise, Volume 2

Question: How should one cultivate and learn Mahayana Buddhism?

Answer: To cultivate and learn Mahayana Buddhism, one should take Bodhicitta (the mind of enlightenment) as the foundation, extensively cultivate the six Paramitas (giving, morality, patience, diligence, concentration, and wisdom) and other Bodhisattva practices, seek Buddhahood above, and transform sentient beings below. One should delve deeply into the Sutras, understand the true nature of all dharmas, cut off Kleshas (afflictions), and attain Nirvana.