T31n1590_唯識二十論

大正藏第 31 冊 No. 1590 唯識二十論

No. 1590 [Nos. 1588, 1589; cf. No. 1591]

唯識二十論一卷

世親菩薩造

大唐三藏法師玄奘奉　詔譯

安立大乘三界唯識。以契經說三界唯心。心意識了名之差別。此中說心意兼心所。唯遮外境不遣相應。內識生時似外境現。如有眩翳見發蠅等。此中都無少分實義。即於此義有設難言。頌曰。

若識無實境　　則處時決定　相續不決定　　作用不應成

論曰。此說何義。若離識實有色等外法。色等識生不緣色等。何因此識有處得生非一切處。何故此處有時識起非一切時。同一處時有多相續。何不決定隨一識生。如眩翳人見發蠅等。非無眩翳有此識生。復有何因。諸眩翳者所見發等無發等用。夢中所得飲食刀杖毒藥衣等無飲等用。尋香城等無城等用。余發等物其用非無。若實同無色等外境。唯有內識。似外境生。定處定時不定相續有作用物皆不應成。非皆不成。頌曰。

處時定如夢　　身不定如鬼　同見膿河等　　如夢損有用

論曰。如夢意說如夢所見。謂如夢中雖無實境。而或有處見有村園男女等物非一切處。即於是處或時見有彼村園等非一切時

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本《唯識二十論》一卷世親菩薩造大唐三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯

安立大乘三界唯識的道理，依據的是契經上所說的『三界唯心』。心、意、識只是名稱上的差別。這裡所說的心和意，包括了心和心所法。只是爲了遮止外境，並不是要否定心識的相互關聯。內在的識產生時，會顯現出類似外境的現象，就像有眼花的人看到頭髮和蒼蠅等。這些現象中，沒有絲毫真實的意義。對於這個道理，有人提出疑問，說：

『如果識沒有真實的境界，那麼處所和時間就不能決定，相續也不能決定，作用也不應該能夠成立。』

論曰：這段話是什麼意思呢？如果離開識，有真實的色等外法，那麼色等生起時，識不緣於色等，為什麼這個識只能在某個處所產生，而不是在所有處所都能產生呢？為什麼這個識只能在某個時間生起，而不是在所有時間都能產生呢？在同一個處所和時間，有很多相續的識，為什麼不能決定地隨著其中一個識產生呢？就像眼花的人看到頭髮和蒼蠅等，沒有眼花的人就不會產生這種識。又有什麼原因，使得眼花的人所見到的頭髮等沒有頭髮等的作用，夢中所得到的飲食、刀杖、毒藥、衣服等沒有飲食等的作用，尋香城（Gandharva-nagara）等沒有城等的作用，而其他的頭髮等事物，它們的作用並非沒有呢？如果真實地像沒有色等外境一樣，只有內在的識，顯現出類似外境的現象，那麼處所和時間的決定性，相續的不確定性，以及有作用的事物，都不應該能夠成立。

並非都不能成立。頌曰：

『處所和時間的決定性，就像夢境一樣；相續的不確定性，就像鬼道眾生一樣；共同看到膿河等，就像夢中受到損害一樣，但還是有作用的。』

論曰：就像夢境所見一樣。意思是說，就像夢中雖然沒有真實的境界，但在某個處所，會看到有村莊、園林、男女等事物，而不是在所有處所都能看到。即使在同一個處所，也只是在某個時間，才能看到那些村莊、園林等，而不是在所有時間都能看到。

【English Translation】 English version Verses on Representation-Only (Vijnaptimatrata-vimsatika) By Vasubandhu (世親) Translated by the Tripitaka Master Xuanzang (玄奘) of the Great Tang Dynasty under Imperial Decree

The establishment of the doctrine of Representation-Only (唯識) in the Great Vehicle (大乘) is based on the sutras which state that the Three Realms (三界) are Representation-Only. The terms 『mind』 (心), 『thought』 (意), and 『consciousness』 (識) are merely different names. Here, 『mind』 and 『thought』 include mental functions (心所). This only serves to negate external objects, not to deny the corresponding relationships. When internal consciousness arises, it appears as if external objects are present, like seeing hairs and flies due to blurred vision. There is no real meaning in any of this. Regarding this meaning, someone raises a difficulty, saying:

『If consciousness has no real object, then the determination of place and time, the continuity, and the accomplishment of function should not be possible.』

The Treatise says: What is the meaning of this? If, apart from consciousness, there are real external objects such as form (色), then when form and so on arise, consciousness does not depend on form and so on. Why does this consciousness only arise in certain places and not everywhere? Why does it only arise at certain times and not all the time? In the same place and time, there are many continuous consciousnesses. Why is it not determined to arise with just one of them? Like a person with blurred vision seeing hairs and flies, this consciousness does not arise without blurred vision. Furthermore, what is the reason that the hairs and so on seen by those with blurred vision have no function of hairs and so on, and the food, weapons, poison, clothing, and so on obtained in dreams have no function of eating and so on, and Gandharva-nagara (尋香城) has no function of a city and so on, while other things like hairs do have their functions? If it is truly like the absence of external objects such as form, and there is only internal consciousness appearing as if external objects are present, then the determination of place and time, the indeterminacy of continuity, and the existence of functional things should not be possible.

Not all are impossible. The verse says:

『The determination of place and time is like a dream; the indeterminacy of the body is like a ghost; seeing a river of pus together is like suffering harm in a dream, but it still has a function.』

The Treatise says: It is like what is seen in a dream. That is to say, although there are no real objects in a dream, in a certain place, one might see villages, gardens, men, women, and so on, but not everywhere. Even in the same place, one can only see those villages, gardens, and so on at certain times, but not all the time.

。由此雖無離識實境。而處時定非不得成。說如鬼言。顯如餓鬼。河中膿滿故名膿河。如說酥瓶其中酥滿。謂如餓鬼同業異熟。多身共集皆見膿河。非於此中定唯一見。等言顯示或見糞等。及見有情執持刀杖遮捍守護不令得食。由此雖無離識實境。而多相續不定義成。又如夢中境雖無實而有損失精血等用。由此雖無離識實境。而有虛妄作用義成。如是且依別別譬喻。顯處定等四義得成。複次頌曰。

一切如地獄　　同見獄卒等　能為逼害事　　故四義皆成

論曰。應知此中一地獄喻。顯處定等一切皆成。如地獄言。顯在地獄受逼害苦諸有情類。謂地獄中雖無真實。有情數攝獄卒等事。而彼有情同業異熟增上力故。同處同時眾多相續。皆共見有獄卒狗烏鐵山物等來至其所為逼害事。由此雖無離識實境。而處定等四義皆成。何緣不許獄卒等類是實有情。不應理故。且此不應那落迦攝。不受如彼所受苦故。互相逼害應不可立彼那落迦。此獄卒等。形量力既等。應不極相怖。應自不能忍受鐵地炎熱猛焰恒燒然苦。云何于彼能逼害他。非那落迦不應生彼。如何天上現有傍生。地獄亦然。有傍生鬼為獄卒等。此救不然。頌曰。

如天上傍生　　地獄中不爾　所執傍生鬼　　不受彼苦故

論曰。諸有傍生生

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：由此，雖然沒有脫離意識的真實外境，但處所和時間的確定並非不能成立。比如『鬼』的說法，顯現如同餓鬼所見。河中充滿膿液，因此稱為『膿河』。就像說酥油瓶里裝滿了酥油一樣。這是說餓鬼因共同的業力而產生不同的果報，許多餓鬼聚集在一起，都看到膿河。並非在此處就一定只能看到膿河，『等』字表明他們或許還會看到糞便等物。以及看到有情手持刀杖，遮擋守護，不讓他們得到食物。由此，雖然沒有脫離意識的真實外境，但多種相續不斷，處所和時間的確定是可以成立的。又比如夢中的境界雖然不是真實的，但會有損失精血等作用。由此，雖然沒有脫離意識的真實外境，但有虛妄的作用是可以成立的。像這樣，且依據個別的比喻，顯示處所、時間確定等四種意義是可以成立的。再次，頌文說：『一切如地獄，同見獄卒等，能為逼害事，故四義皆成。』論曰：應當知道，這裡用地獄的比喻，顯示處所、時間確定等一切都可以成立。如『地獄』所說，顯示在地獄中遭受逼迫和苦難的各類有情。地獄中雖然沒有真實的有情，如獄卒等事物，但那些有情因為共同的業力所產生的不同果報，以及增上力的緣故，在同一處所、同一時間，許多相續不斷的有情，都共同看到有獄卒、狗、烏鴉、鐵山等事物來到他們那裡，對他們進行逼迫和傷害。由此，雖然沒有脫離意識的真實外境，但處所、時間確定等四種意義都可以成立。為什麼不允許獄卒等是真實的有情呢？因為這不合道理。而且，這不應該被那落迦（Naraka，地獄）所包含，因為他們沒有像那落迦眾生那樣遭受痛苦。互相逼迫傷害，不應該建立他們是那落迦眾生。這些獄卒等，形體大小和力量既然相等，就不應該極度互相恐懼。他們自己應該無法忍受鐵地的炎熱和猛烈的火焰持續燃燒的痛苦，怎麼能對他人進行逼迫和傷害呢？如果不是那落迦眾生，就不應該生在那裡。如何解釋天上也有傍生（animals，畜生）呢？地獄也是一樣，有傍生鬼作為獄卒等。這種解釋是不對的。頌文說：『如天上傍生，地獄中不爾，所執傍生鬼，不受彼苦故。』論曰：那些傍生生

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, although there is no real external world apart from consciousness, the determination of place and time is not impossible to establish. For example, the saying of 'ghosts' manifests as what hungry ghosts see. The river is full of pus, hence it is called 'Pus River'. It's like saying a ghee bottle is full of ghee. This means that hungry ghosts, due to shared karma, experience different retributions, and many hungry ghosts gather together and all see the Pus River. It's not that they can only see the Pus River in this place; the word 'etc.' indicates that they may also see feces and other things. And they see sentient beings holding knives and staffs, blocking and guarding, not allowing them to get food. Therefore, although there is no real external world apart from consciousness, the continuous succession of many, and the determination of place and time, can be established. Furthermore, although the realm in a dream is not real, there are effects such as the loss of essence and blood. Therefore, although there is no real external world apart from consciousness, the existence of illusory effects can be established. In this way, based on individual metaphors, the four meanings of the determination of place, time, etc., can be established. Furthermore, the verse says: 'Everything is like hell, all seeing hell wardens, able to inflict harm, therefore all four meanings are established.' Commentary: It should be known that the metaphor of hell here shows that everything, including the determination of place and time, can be established. As 'hell' says, it shows all kinds of sentient beings in hell suffering from persecution and torment. Although there are no real sentient beings in hell, such as hell wardens, etc., those sentient beings, due to the different retributions produced by shared karma, and the power of the Adhipati-pratyaya (增上緣, dominant condition), in the same place and at the same time, many continuous sentient beings all commonly see hell wardens, dogs, crows, iron mountains, and other things coming to them to persecute and harm them. Therefore, although there is no real external world apart from consciousness, the four meanings of the determination of place, time, etc., can be established. Why is it not allowed that hell wardens, etc., are real sentient beings? Because it is unreasonable. Moreover, this should not be included in Naraka (那落迦, hell), because they do not suffer like the beings in Naraka. Mutual persecution and harm should not establish them as Naraka beings. Since these hell wardens, etc., are equal in size and strength, they should not be extremely afraid of each other. They themselves should not be able to endure the heat of the iron ground and the continuous burning pain of the fierce flames, how can they persecute and harm others? If they are not Naraka beings, they should not be born there. How to explain that there are also Tiryagyoni (傍生, animals) in the heavens? Hell is the same, with animal ghosts as hell wardens, etc. This explanation is not correct. The verse says: 'Like animals in the heavens, it is not so in hell, the animal ghosts held, do not suffer that pain.' Commentary: Those animals born

天上者。必有能感彼器樂業生彼定受器所生樂。非獄卒等受地獄中器所生苦。故不應許傍生鬼趣生那落迦。若爾應許彼那落迦業增上力生異大種。起勝形顯量力差別。于彼施設獄卒等名。為生彼怖。變現種種動手足等差別作用。如羝羊山乍離乍合。剛鐵林刺或低或昂。非事全無然不應理。頌曰。

若許由業力　　有異大種生　起如是轉變　　于識何不許

論曰。何緣不許識由業力如是轉變而執大種。複次頌曰。

業熏習余處　　執余處有果　所熏識有果　　不許有何因

論曰。執那落迦由自業力生差別大種起形等轉變。彼業熏習理應許在識相續中不在余處。有熏習識汝便不許有果轉變。無熏習處翻執有果。此有何因。有教為因。謂若唯識似色等現無別色等。佛不應說有色等處。此教非因有別意故。頌曰。

依彼所化生　　世尊密意趣　說有色等處　　如化生有情

論曰。如佛說有化生有情。彼但依心相續不斷能往後世密意趣說。不說實有化生有情。說無有情我但有法因故。說色等處契經亦爾。依所化生宜受彼教。密意趣說非別害有。依何密意說色等十。頌曰。

識從自種生　　似境相而轉　為成內外處　　佛說彼為十

論曰。此說何義。似色現識從自種子緣合轉變

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：天上的眾生，必定有能夠感受天上器樂之業，從而生於彼處，並領受器樂所生之樂。不像地獄獄卒等，感受地獄中器物所生的痛苦。因此，不應允許傍生（動物）、鬼趣眾生生於那落迦（地獄）。如果這樣，就應該允許由那落迦之業增上力，產生不同的大種（組成物質世界的元素），從而生起殊勝的形、顯、量、力等差別，並於彼處施設獄卒等名稱，爲了使眾生生起怖畏，變現種種動手足等差別作用，如同羝羊山（地獄中的山名）乍離乍合，剛鐵林刺或低或昂。並非完全沒有這些事，但這種說法不應道理。頌曰：『若許由業力，有異大種生，起如是轉變，于識何不許？』論曰：為什麼不允許識由業力如此轉變，而執著于大種呢？複次頌曰：『業熏習余處，執余處有果，所熏識有果，不許有何因？』論曰：執著那落迦由自身業力產生差別大種，從而生起形等轉變。此業熏習理應允許存在於識相續中，而不是在其他地方。有熏習的識，你卻不允許有果報轉變；沒有熏習的地方，反而執著有果報。這有什麼原因呢？有人說：『有教為因。』意思是，如果只有識顯現出類似色等現象，而沒有別的色等，佛陀就不應該說有色等處。此教並非原因，因為有別的密意。頌曰：『依彼所化生，世尊密意趣，說有色等處，如化生有情。』論曰：如同佛陀說有化生有情，這只是依據心相續不斷，能夠往後世的密意趣而說，並不是說真的有化生有情。佛陀說沒有有情，只有法因，所以說色等處契經也是如此。依據所化眾生適合接受的教法，以密意趣而說，並非另有損害。依據什麼密意說色等十處呢？頌曰：『識從自種生，似境相而轉，為成內外處，佛說彼為十。』論曰：這是說什麼意思呢？類似色顯現的識，是從自身種子因緣和合而轉變的。

【English Translation】 English version: Those in the heavens must have the karma of appreciating heavenly musical instruments, thus being born there and experiencing the pleasure derived from those instruments. Unlike the prison guards of hell, who experience the suffering caused by the instruments in hell. Therefore, it should not be allowed that paryavasita (animals) and preta (ghosts) beings are born in naraka (hell). If so, it should be allowed that the increased power of naraka karma produces different mahabhuta (great elements, the elements that make up the material world), thus giving rise to differences in shape, appearance, quantity, and force, and that the names of prison guards, etc., are assigned to those places in order to instill fear in beings, manifesting various actions such as moving hands and feet, like the Dhumraka mountains (mountains in hell) that separate and join, and the Asipatravana forest (forest of swords) with its thorns sometimes low and sometimes high. It is not that these things are completely non-existent, but this explanation is unreasonable. The verse says: 'If it is allowed that different mahabhuta are produced by the power of karma, giving rise to such transformations, why is it not allowed for consciousness?' The treatise says: Why is it not allowed that consciousness transforms in this way due to the power of karma, while clinging to the mahabhuta? Furthermore, the verse says: 'Karma is imprinted elsewhere, yet one clings to the idea that the result is elsewhere. The consciousness that is imprinted has a result, but why is it not allowed?' The treatise says: One clings to the idea that naraka produces different mahabhuta due to one's own karma, thus giving rise to transformations in shape, etc. This karma imprint should be allowed to exist in the stream of consciousness, not elsewhere. You do not allow the consciousness that is imprinted to have a result transformation; instead, you cling to the idea that there is a result in a place where there is no imprint. What is the reason for this? Someone says: 'The teaching is the reason.' That is, if only consciousness manifests phenomena similar to form, etc., and there are no other forms, etc., the Buddha should not have said that there are places of form, etc. This teaching is not the reason, because there is another hidden meaning. The verse says: 'Depending on those who are to be transformed, the World Honored One's hidden intention is to say that there are places of form, etc., like beings born by transformation.' The treatise says: Just as the Buddha said that there are beings born by transformation, this is only said based on the continuous stream of consciousness that can go to future lives, with a hidden intention, not saying that there are truly beings born by transformation. The Buddha said that there are no sentient beings, only the cause of phenomena, so the sutras that speak of places of form, etc., are also like this. Based on the teachings that are suitable for the beings to be transformed, it is said with a hidden intention, not causing any other harm. Based on what hidden intention are the ten places of form, etc., spoken of? The verse says: 'Consciousness arises from its own seed, transforming into an appearance similar to an object. In order to establish the internal and external places, the Buddha said that they are ten.' The treatise says: What does this mean? The consciousness that appears similar to form transforms from the combination of its own seed and conditions.

差別而生。佛依彼種及所現色。如次說為眼處色處。如是乃至似觸現識從自種子緣合轉變差別而生。佛依彼種及所現觸。如次說為身處觸處。依斯密意說色等十。此密意說有何勝利。頌曰。

依此教能入　　數取趣無我　所執法無我　　復依余教入

論曰。依此所說十二處教受化者能入數取趣無我。謂若了知從六二法有六識轉。都無見者乃至知者。應受有情無我教者。便能悟入有情無我。復依此余說唯識教。受化者能入所執法無我。謂若了知唯識現似色等法起。此中都無色等相法。應受諸法無我教者。便能悟入諸法無我。若知諸法一切種無。入法無我。是則唯識亦畢竟無何所安立。非知諸法一切種無乃得名為入法無我。然達愚夫遍計所執自性差別諸法無我。如是乃名入法無我。非諸佛境離言法性亦都無故名法無我。余識所執此唯識性其體亦無。名法無我。不爾余識所執境有。則唯識理應不得成。許諸餘識有實境故。由此道理。說立唯識教。普令悟入一切法無我。非一切種撥有性故。復云何知佛依如是密意趣說有色等處。非別實有色等外法為色等識各別境耶。頌曰。

以彼境非一　　亦非多極微　又非和合等　　極微不成故

論曰。此何所說。謂若實有外色等處。與色等識各別為境。如是外境

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：差別而生。佛陀依據那些種子以及所顯現的色法，依次說為眼處和色處。像這樣，乃至相似的觸所顯現的識，也是從自身的種子、因緣和合、轉變差別而生。佛陀依據那些種子以及所顯現的觸，依次說為身處和觸處。依據這個秘密的意圖說色等十處。這個秘密的意圖有什麼殊勝的利益呢？頌曰：『依靠此教法，能證入數取趣無我（Pudgala-nairatmya，人無我），所執法無我（Dharma-nairatmya，法無我），又依靠其他教法證入。』論曰：依靠這個所說的十二處教法，被教化者能夠證入數取趣無我。也就是說，如果瞭解從六根、六境這十二法有六識的生起和運轉，根本沒有能見者乃至能知者，那麼應該接受有情無我教法的人，便能領悟有情無我。又依靠這個之外所說的唯識教法，被教化者能夠證入所執法無我。也就是說，如果瞭解唯有識顯現出類似色等法的現象，這其中根本沒有色等相狀的法，那麼應該接受諸法無我教法的人，便能領悟諸法無我。如果認為諸法在一切方面都不存在，而證入法無我，那麼唯識也將畢竟不存在，又如何安立呢？不是說了解諸法在一切方面都不存在，才叫做證入法無我。而是通達愚夫所普遍計度的、執著的自性差別諸法是無我的，這樣才叫做證入法無我。不是說諸佛的境界、離言語的法性也都不存在，才叫做法無我。其他識所執著的這個唯識的自性，它的本體也是不存在的，才叫做法無我。如果不是這樣，其他識所執著的境是存在的，那麼唯識的道理就應該不能成立，因為已經允許了其他識有真實的境。由於這個道理，才說建立唯識教法，普遍地使人領悟一切法無我，而不是在一切方面都否定事物的存在。又怎麼知道佛陀是依據這樣的秘密意圖而說有色等處，而不是另外真實地存在色等外法作為色等識各自的境呢？頌曰：『因為那些境不是單一的，也不是眾多的極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位），又不是和合等，因為極微不能成立。』論曰：這是說的什麼呢？如果真實地存在外在的色等處，與色等識各自作為境，那麼外境

【English Translation】 English version: arise from differences. The Buddha, based on those seeds and the manifested forms, sequentially speaks of them as the eye-sphere and the form-sphere. Similarly, even the consciousness manifested as seeming contact arises from the transformation and differentiation of its own seeds, conditions, and combinations. The Buddha, based on those seeds and the manifested contact, sequentially speaks of them as the body-sphere and the touch-sphere. Based on this secret intention, the ten spheres of form, etc., are spoken of. What are the special benefits of this secret intention? The verse says: 『Relying on this teaching, one can enter into the absence of self of the individual (Pudgala-nairatmya, no-self of person), the absence of self of phenomena (Dharma-nairatmya, no-self of phenomena), and also enter through other teachings.』 Commentary: Relying on this teaching of the twelve spheres, those who are taught can enter into the absence of self of the individual. That is, if one understands that from the twelve dharmas of the six sense organs and six sense objects, the six consciousnesses arise and operate, and there is fundamentally no seer or knower, then those who should receive the teaching of the absence of self of sentient beings can realize the absence of self of sentient beings. Furthermore, relying on the teaching of Consciousness-Only (唯識, Vijnanavada) that is spoken of in addition to this, those who are taught can enter into the absence of self of phenomena. That is, if one understands that only consciousness manifests phenomena resembling forms, etc., and there are fundamentally no phenomena with characteristics such as forms within this, then those who should receive the teaching of the absence of self of phenomena can realize the absence of self of phenomena. If one thinks that all phenomena do not exist in any way and enters into the absence of self of phenomena, then Consciousness-Only will also ultimately not exist, and how can it be established? It is not that understanding that all phenomena do not exist in any way is called entering into the absence of self of phenomena. Rather, it is understanding that the selflessness of the differentiated phenomena of nature that are universally conceived and clung to by foolish people is called entering into the absence of self of phenomena. It is not that the realm of the Buddhas, the nature of dharma beyond words, also does not exist, and is called the absence of self of phenomena. The nature of this Consciousness-Only that is clung to by other consciousnesses, its essence also does not exist, and is called the absence of self of phenomena. If it is not like this, and the objects clung to by other consciousnesses exist, then the principle of Consciousness-Only should not be able to be established, because it has already been allowed that other consciousnesses have real objects. Because of this reason, it is said that the teaching of Consciousness-Only is established to universally enable people to realize the absence of self of all phenomena, and not to deny the existence of things in every way. Furthermore, how do we know that the Buddha spoke of the spheres of form, etc., based on such a secret intention, and not that external dharmas such as form exist separately and truly as the respective objects of the consciousnesses of form, etc.? The verse says: 『Because those objects are not singular, nor are they many ultimate particles (paramāṇu, the smallest unit of matter), nor are they combinations, etc., because ultimate particles cannot be established.』 Commentary: What is this saying? If external spheres such as form truly exist, and each serves as the object of the consciousnesses of form, etc., then the external object

或應是一。如勝論者執有分色。或應是多。如執實有眾多極微各別為境。或應多極微和合及和集。如執實有眾多極微皆共和合和集為境。且彼外境理應非一。有分色體異諸分色不可取故。理亦非多。極微各別不可取故。又理非和合或和集為境。一實極微理不成故。云何不成。頌曰。

極微與六合　　一應成六分　若與六同處　　聚應如極微

論曰。若一極微六方各與一極微合。應成六分。一處無容有餘處故。一極微處若有六微。應諸聚色如極微量。展轉相望不過量故。則應聚色亦不可見。加濕彌羅國毗婆沙師言。非諸極微有相合義。無方分故離如前失。但諸聚色有相合理有方分故此亦不然。頌曰。

極微既無合　　聚有合者誰　或相合不成　　不由無方分

論曰。今應詰彼所說理趣。既異極微無別聚色。極微無合聚合者誰。若轉救言聚色展轉亦無合義。則不應言極微無合無方分故。聚有方分亦不許合故。極微無合不由無方分。是故一實極微不成。又許極微合與不合。其過且爾。若許極微有分無分。俱為大失。所以者何。頌曰。

極微有方分　　理不應成一　無應影障無　　聚不異無二

論曰。以一極微六方分異。多分為體。云何成一。若一極微無異方分。日輪才舉光照觸時云何

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：或者外境應該是一個。就像勝論派（Vaisheshika，印度哲學流派，主張宇宙由原子構成）認為有分割的顏色。或者外境應該是多個。就像他們認為真實存在眾多極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位，不可再分）各自為境。或者應該是多個極微的和合（samāgama，聚集）及和集（samuccaya，組合）。就像他們認為真實存在眾多極微都共和合和集為境。而且，那個外境理應不是一個。因為有分割的顏色與各個部分的顏色不同，所以不可取。道理上也不是多個。因為各個極微不可取。又道理上不是和合或和集為境。因為一個真實的極微在道理上不能成立。為什麼不能成立？頌文說：『極微與六合，一應成六分；若與六同處，聚應如極微。』論述說：如果一個極微在六個方向上各自與一個極微結合，應該成為六個部分。因為一個地方沒有容納其他地方的空間。如果一個極微的地方有六個極微，那麼所有的聚集色（聚合物）應該像極微一樣小。因為輾轉相望不超過極微的量。那麼，聚集色也應該不可見。加濕彌羅國（Kashmir）的毗婆沙師（Vaibhāṣika，說一切有部論師）說：不是所有的極微都有相互結合的意義。因為沒有方位，所以如同之前的過失。但是所有的聚集色有相互結合的道理，因為有方位。這種說法也不對。頌文說：『極微既無合，聚有合者誰？或相合不成，不由無方分。』論述說：現在應該詰難他們所說的道理。既然不同的極微沒有別的聚集色，極微沒有結合，那麼聚合的是誰？如果轉而辯解說聚集色輾轉也沒有結合的意義。那麼就不應該說極微沒有結合是因為沒有方位。聚集色有方位也不允許結合。極微沒有結合不是因為沒有方位。因此，一個真實的極微不能成立。又允許極微結合與不允許極微結合，其過失且是這樣。如果允許極微有分割或沒有分割，都是大的過失。為什麼呢？頌文說：『極微有方分，理不應成一；無應影障無，聚不異無二。』論述說：因為一個極微的六個方向的分割不同，以多個分割為本體。怎麼能成為一個？如果一個極微沒有不同的方位分割，太陽輪才升起，光照觸的時候，怎麼會……

【English Translation】 English version: Or the external object should be one. Like the Vaisheshikas (an Indian philosophical school that argues the universe is constituted by atoms) who hold that there are divisible colors. Or the external object should be multiple. Like they hold that truly existent numerous paramāṇus (the smallest unit of matter, indivisible) each are an object. Or it should be the samāgama (gathering) and samuccaya (combination) of multiple paramāṇus. Like they hold that truly existent numerous paramāṇus all together gather and combine as an object. Moreover, that external object should not be one. Because divisible colors are different from the colors of each part, therefore it is not acceptable. It is also not logically multiple. Because each paramāṇu is not acceptable. Also, it is not logically a samāgama or samuccaya as an object. Because a real paramāṇu cannot be established logically. Why cannot it be established? The verse says: 『If a paramāṇu combines with six, it should become six parts; if it is in the same place as six, the aggregate should be like a paramāṇu.』 The treatise says: If one paramāṇu combines with one paramāṇu in each of the six directions, it should become six parts. Because one place has no space to accommodate other places. If there are six paramāṇus in the place of one paramāṇu, then all aggregate colors (polymers) should be as small as a paramāṇu. Because looking at each other in turn does not exceed the amount of a paramāṇu. Then, the aggregate color should also be invisible. The Vaibhāṣika (Sarvāstivāda school master) of Kashmir said: Not all paramāṇus have the meaning of combining with each other. Because there is no direction, it is like the previous fault. But all aggregate colors have the reason to combine with each other, because there is direction. This statement is also incorrect. The verse says: 『Since paramāṇus have no combination, who has the combination in the aggregate? Or the combination is not established, not because there is no direction.』 The treatise says: Now we should question the reasoning they said. Since different paramāṇus have no other aggregate color, and paramāṇus have no combination, then who is aggregating? If they turn to argue that the aggregate color has no meaning of combination in turn. Then it should not be said that paramāṇus have no combination because there is no direction. Aggregate colors have direction and do not allow combination. Paramāṇus have no combination not because there is no direction. Therefore, a real paramāṇu cannot be established. Also, allowing paramāṇus to combine and not allowing paramāṇus to combine, the fault is like this. If you allow paramāṇus to have division or no division, it is a big fault. Why? 『If a paramāṇu has direction, it should not become one; if there is no shadow or obstruction, the aggregate is not different and not two.』 The treatise says: Because the division of the six directions of one paramāṇu is different, taking multiple divisions as the body. How can it become one? If one paramāṇu has no different directional divisions, when the sun rises and the light touches, how can it...

余邊得有影現。以無餘分光所不及。又執極微無方分者。云何此彼展輪相障。以無餘分他所不行。可說此彼展轉相礙。既不相礙。應諸極微展轉處同。則諸色聚同一極微量。過如前說。云何不許影障屬聚不屬極微。豈異極微許有聚色發影為障。不爾。若爾聚應無二。謂若聚色不異極微。影障應成不屬聚色。安布差別立為極微。或立為聚俱非一實。何用思擇極微聚為。猶未能遮外色等相。此復何相。謂眼等境亦是青等實色等性。應共審思。此眼等境青等實性。為一為多。設爾何失。二俱有過。多過如前。一亦非理。頌曰。

一應無次行　　俱時至未至　及多有間事　　並難見細物

論曰。若無隔別所有青等。眼所行境執為一物。應無漸次行大地理。若下一足至一切故。又應俱時於此于彼無至未至。一物一時。理不應有得未得故。又一方處。應不得有多象馬等有間隙事。若處有一亦即有餘。云何此彼可辯差別。或二如何可於一處有至不至中間見空。又亦應無小水蟲等難見細物。彼與粗物同一處所量應等故。若謂由相此彼差別即成別物不由余義。則定應許此差別物。展轉分析成多極微。已辯極微非一實物。是則離識眼等色等。若根若境皆不得成。由此善成唯有識義。諸法由量刊定有無。一切量中現量為勝。若無

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

如果邊緣有陰影出現，那是因為還有光線無法完全照射到的地方。如果有人堅持認為極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）沒有方向和部分，那麼如何解釋它們彼此阻擋光線呢？如果極微沒有剩餘的部分，其他東西就無法穿過，那麼可以說它們彼此阻礙。既然它們不互相阻礙，那麼所有的極微應該在同一個地方。這樣，所有的色聚（rupa-skandha，色蘊）就只有一個極微的大小，這和之前說的過失一樣。為什麼不允許陰影的阻礙屬於色聚而不屬於極微呢？難道你認為色聚不同於極微，並且色聚可以產生陰影作為阻礙嗎？如果不是這樣，那麼色聚應該沒有差異。如果色聚不異於極微，那麼陰影的阻礙就不應該屬於色聚。將不同的排列方式視為極微，或者視為色聚，都不是真實的。為什麼要思考極微和色聚呢？這仍然不能阻止外在的顏色等現象。這是什麼現象呢？也就是說，眼等（cakṣu，眼睛）的對境也是青色等真實的顏色等性質。應該一起思考，這眼等的對境，青色等真實性質，是一還是多？如果這樣問，會有什麼問題？兩種情況都有問題。多的過失如前所述。一也不合理。偈頌說：

『一應無次行，俱時至未至，及多有間事，並難見細物。』

論曰：如果沒有間隔，所有的青色等，眼睛所看到的對境被認為是一個東西，那麼應該沒有漸次行走廣闊的土地。如果下一步就到達所有的地方。又應該同時在此處和彼處，沒有到達和未到達。一個東西在一個時間，不應該有得到和未得到。又在一個地方，不應該有多頭大象和馬等有間隔的事物。如果一個地方有一個，那麼其他地方也有，怎麼能區分彼此的差別呢？或者兩個東西怎麼能在同一個地方有到達和未到達，中間看到空隙呢？又應該沒有小水蟲等難以看到的小東西。它們和粗大的東西在同一個地方，大小應該相等。如果說通過現象來區分彼此的差別，那就變成了不同的東西，而不是因為其他原因。那麼就應該承認這些不同的東西，逐漸分析成多個極微。已經辯論過極微不是真實的東西。這樣，離開意識，眼睛等色等，無論是根還是境，都不能成立。因此，很好地證明了唯有識的道理。諸法的存在與否由量來決定，一切量中，現量（pratyakṣa，現量）最為殊勝。如果沒有現量，

【English Translation】 English version:

If there is a shadow appearing at the edge, it is because there are places where the light cannot fully reach. If someone insists that the paramāṇu (ultimate particle, smallest unit of matter) has no direction or parts, then how can they obstruct each other's light? If the paramāṇu has no remaining parts, other things cannot pass through it, then it can be said that they obstruct each other. Since they do not obstruct each other, all paramāṇus should be in the same place. In this way, all rupa-skandhas (aggregates of form) would be the size of one paramāṇu, which is the same fault as mentioned before. Why not allow the obstruction of shadows to belong to the rupa-skandha and not to the paramāṇu? Do you think that the rupa-skandha is different from the paramāṇu, and that the rupa-skandha can produce shadows as an obstruction? If not, then the rupa-skandha should have no differences. If the rupa-skandha is not different from the paramāṇu, then the obstruction of shadows should not belong to the rupa-skandha. Considering different arrangements as paramāṇus, or as rupa-skandhas, neither is real. Why think about paramāṇus and rupa-skandhas? This still cannot prevent external phenomena such as colors. What is this phenomenon? That is, the objects of the eyes (cakṣu) are also real properties such as blue colors. It should be considered together, whether the objects of these eyes, the real properties such as blue colors, are one or many? If you ask this, what problems will there be? Both situations have problems. The faults of many are as mentioned before. One is also unreasonable. The verse says:

'If one, there should be no successive movement, simultaneous arrival and non-arrival, and many things with intervals, and difficult-to-see small objects.'

The treatise says: If there is no separation, and all the blue colors, etc., the objects seen by the eyes are considered as one thing, then there should be no gradual walking across the vast land. If the next step reaches all places. Also, there should be simultaneous arrival and non-arrival here and there. One thing at one time should not have both attainment and non-attainment. Also, in one place, there should not be many elephants and horses, etc., with intervals. If there is one in one place, then there are others in other places, how can the differences between them be distinguished? Or how can two things have arrival and non-arrival in the same place, seeing gaps in between? Also, there should be no small, difficult-to-see objects such as small aquatic insects. They are in the same place as large objects, and their sizes should be equal. If it is said that the differences between them are distinguished by phenomena, then they become different things, not because of other reasons. Then it should be admitted that these different things are gradually analyzed into multiple paramāṇus. It has already been argued that paramāṇus are not real things. In this way, apart from consciousness, the eyes, etc., and colors, etc., neither the sense organs nor the objects can be established. Therefore, the principle that only consciousness exists is well proven. The existence or non-existence of dharmas is determined by measurement, and among all measurements, direct perception (pratyakṣa) is the most excellent. Without direct perception,

外境寧有此覺。我今現證如是境耶。此證不成。頌曰。

現覺如夢等　　已起現覺時　見及境已無　　寧許有現量

論曰。如夢等時雖無外境。而亦得有如是現覺。余時現覺應知亦爾。故彼引此為證不成。又若爾時有此現覺。我今現證如是色等。爾時于境能見已無。要在意識能分別故。時眼等識必已謝故。剎那論者有此覺時。色等現境亦皆已滅。如何此時許有現量。要曾現受意識能憶。是故決定有曾受境。見此境者許為現量。由斯外境實有義成。如是要由先受后憶。證有外境理亦不成。何以故。頌曰。

如說似境識　　從此生憶念

論曰。如前所說雖無外境。而眼識等似外境現。從此後位與念相應。分別意識似前境現。即說此為憶曾所受。故以後憶。證先所見實有外境。其理不成。若如夢中雖無實境。而識得起覺時亦然。如世自知夢境非有。覺時既爾何不自知。既不自知覺境非有。寧如夢識實境皆無。此亦非證。頌曰。

未覺不能知　　夢所見非有

論曰。如未覺位。不知夢境非外實有。覺時乃知。如是世間虛妄分別串習惛熟如在夢中。諸有所見皆非實有。未得真覺不能自知。若時得彼出世對治無分別智。乃名真覺。此後所得世間凈智現在前位。如實了知彼境非實。其義平等。若諸

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：問：外在的境界難道會有這樣的感覺嗎？我現在親身驗證了這樣的境界嗎？答：這個驗證是不成立的。頌詞說：『現在的感覺就像夢境等一樣，當已經生起現在的感覺時，能見和所見的境界都已經消失了，怎麼能允許有現量（直接的認知）呢？』論述：就像在夢境等時候，即使沒有外在的境界，也仍然可以有這樣的現在的感覺。其他時候的現在的感覺也應該知道是這樣的。所以，用這個來作為證據是不成立的。而且，如果那個時候有這樣的現在的感覺，我現在親身驗證了這樣的色等。那個時候對於境界的能見已經沒有了，因為一定要有意識才能分別。當時眼識等必然已經消逝了。剎那論者認為，有這種感覺的時候，色等現在的境界也全都已經滅盡了。怎麼能在這個時候允許有現量呢？一定要曾經親身感受過，意識才能回憶。所以，可以確定有曾經感受過的境界。允許見到這個境界的是現量。因此，外在境界真實存在的意思成立。像這樣要通過先感受后回憶，來證明有外在境界的道理也是不成立的。為什麼呢？頌詞說：『就像所說的相似於境界的識，從此產生回憶。』論述：就像前面所說的，即使沒有外在的境界，而眼識等也呈現出相似於外在境界的樣子。從此以後的階段，與念頭相應，分別意識呈現出相似於先前境界的樣子。就說這是回憶曾經感受過的。所以，用以後的回憶，來證明先前所見真實存在外在境界，這個道理是不成立的。如果像在夢中一樣，即使沒有真實的境界，而識也可以生起，那麼在清醒的時候也是這樣。就像世人自己知道夢中的境界不是真實的。清醒的時候既然是這樣，為什麼不能自己知道呢？既然不能自己知道清醒時的境界不是真實的，怎麼能像夢中的識一樣，認為真實的境界都不存在呢？這個也不能作為證據。頌詞說：『沒有覺悟的時候不能知道，夢中所見不是真實的。』論述：就像沒有覺悟的時候，不知道夢中的境界不是外在真實存在的。覺悟的時候才知道。像這樣，世間的虛妄分別串習純熟，就像在夢中一樣。所有見到的都不是真實存在的。沒有得到真正的覺悟就不能自己知道。如果得到那出世的對治無分別智，才叫做真正的覺悟。此後所得到的世間清凈智慧現在面前的時候，如實地了知那個境界不是真實的。這個意義是相同的。如果各種

【English Translation】 English version: Question: Could external realms have such a feeling? Am I now directly experiencing such a realm? Answer: This verification is not valid. The verse says: 'Present feelings are like dreams, etc.; when present feelings have arisen, both the seer and the seen realm have disappeared. How can we allow for direct perception (pratyaksha)?' Treatise: Just as in dreams, etc., even without external realms, there can still be such present feelings. Present feelings at other times should also be understood in the same way. Therefore, using this as evidence is not valid. Moreover, if there were such present feelings at that time, and I am now directly experiencing such forms, etc., then the ability to see the realm would have already ceased, because it requires consciousness to discriminate. At that time, eye consciousness, etc., must have already passed away. Those who advocate momentariness believe that when this feeling arises, the present realms of forms, etc., have all perished. How can we allow for direct perception at this time? It is necessary to have personally experienced it before, so that consciousness can recall it. Therefore, it can be determined that there was a realm that was once experienced. Allowing the seeing of this realm is direct perception. Therefore, the meaning of the real existence of external realms is established. Like this, to prove the existence of external realms through first experiencing and then recalling is also not valid. Why? The verse says: 'Like the consciousness that appears similar to a realm, from this arises recollection.' Treatise: As mentioned earlier, even without external realms, eye consciousness, etc., appear similar to external realms. From this subsequent stage, corresponding to thought, discriminating consciousness appears similar to the previous realm. This is said to be the recollection of what was once experienced. Therefore, using subsequent recollection to prove that the previously seen external realm truly exists is not valid. If, like in a dream, even without a real realm, consciousness can arise, then it is the same when awake. Just as people know that the realms in dreams are not real, since it is like this when awake, why can't they know it themselves? Since they cannot know that the realms when awake are not real, how can they think, like consciousness in a dream, that real realms do not exist at all? This also cannot be used as evidence. The verse says: 'Without awakening, one cannot know that what is seen in a dream is not real.' Treatise: Just as when not awakened, one does not know that the realms in a dream are not real, but only knows it when awakened. Like this, the habitual practice of worldly false discriminations is so ripe that it is like being in a dream. All that is seen is not real. Without attaining true awakening, one cannot know it oneself. If one attains that transcendental antidote, non-discriminating wisdom (nirvikalpa-jnana), then it is called true awakening. When the worldly pure wisdom obtained after this is present, one truly knows that realm is not real. The meaning is the same. If various

有情。由自相續轉變差別。似境識起。不由外境為所緣生。彼諸有情。近善惡友聞正邪法。二識決定。既無友教此云何成。非不得成。頌曰。

展轉增上力　　二識成決定

論曰。以諸有情自他相續諸識展轉為增上緣。隨其所應二識決定。謂余相續識差別故。令余相續差別識生各成決定不由外境。若如夢中境雖無實而識得起。覺識亦然。何緣夢覺造善惡行。愛非愛果當受不同。頌曰。

心由睡眠壞　　夢覺果不同

論曰。在夢位。心由睡眠壞勢力羸劣。覺心不爾。故所造行當受異熟。勝劣不同非由外境。若唯有識無身語等。羊等云何為他所殺。若羊等死不由他害。屠者云何得殺生罪。頌曰。

由他識轉變　　有殺害事業　如鬼等意力　　令他失念等

論曰。如由鬼等意念勢力。令他有情失念得夢。或著魅等變異事成。具神通者意念勢力。令他夢中見種種事。如大迦多衍那意願勢力。令娑剌拏王等夢見異事。又如阿練若仙人意憤勢力。令吠摩質呾利王夢見異事。如是由他識轉變故。令他違害命根事起。應知死者謂眾同分。由識變異相續斷滅。複次頌曰。

彈咤迦等空　　云何由仙忿　意罰為大罪　　此復云何成

論曰。若不許由他識轉變增上力故他有情死。云何世尊

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

有情（yǒuqíng）：由於自身相續的轉變差別，生起類似於外境的識，但不是由外境作為所緣而生。這些有情，親近善友或惡友，聽聞正法或邪法，兩種識就此決定。如果既沒有善友的教導也沒有惡友的引誘，這又如何成立呢？並非不能成立。頌文說：

『展轉增上力，二識成決定。』

論述：以諸有情自身和他人的相續諸識，輾轉作為增上緣，隨著各自的情況，兩種識就此決定。意思是由於其他相續的識的差別，使得其他相續的差別識生起，各自成為決定，不是由外境所決定。如果像夢中一樣，境雖然沒有實體，而識卻能夠生起，那麼覺醒時的識也是如此。那麼為什麼夢中和覺醒時造作善惡行為，所受的可愛和不可愛果報會有所不同呢？頌文說：

『心由睡眠壞，夢覺果不同。』

論述：在夢中的時候，心由於睡眠而損壞，勢力衰弱。覺醒時的心則不是這樣。因此，夢中和覺醒時所造作的行為，所受的異熟果報，勝劣不同，不是由於外境造成的。如果只有識而沒有身語等，那麼羊等動物為什麼會被他人所殺害呢？如果羊等的死亡不是由於他人殺害，那麼屠夫又怎麼會得到殺生的罪過呢？頌文說：

『由他識轉變，有殺害事業，如鬼等意力，令他失念等。』

論述：就像由於鬼等的意念勢力，使其他有情失去正念而做夢，或者被迷惑等變異事情發生。具有神通的人的意念勢力，使他人夢中見到種種事情。例如大迦多衍那（Mahākātyāyana）的意願勢力，使娑剌拏王（Saraṇa）等夢見奇異的事情。又如阿練若（āraṇyaka）仙人的憤怒勢力，使吠摩質呾利王（Vemacitrin）夢見奇異的事情。像這樣，由於其他識的轉變，使他人違害命根的事情發生。應當知道，死者是指眾同分（nikāya-sabhāga），由於識的變異，相續斷滅。再次，頌文說：

『彈咤迦（Daṇḍaka）等空，云何由仙忿？意罰為大罪，此復云何成？』

論述：如果不承認由於其他識轉變的增上力，導致其他有情死亡，那麼世尊（Śākyamuni Buddha）

【English Translation】 English version:

Sentient beings (yǒuqíng): Due to the transformation and differentiation of their own mental continuum, consciousness arises that resembles external objects, but it is not produced by external objects as its object-condition. These sentient beings, associating with good or bad friends, hearing the correct or incorrect Dharma, the two types of consciousness are thus determined. If there is neither the teaching of good friends nor the enticement of bad friends, how can this be established? It is not that it cannot be established. The verse says:

'Through the power of mutual influence, the two consciousnesses become determined.'

Treatise: With the consciousnesses of sentient beings' own and others' mental continuums mutually acting as contributing conditions, according to their respective situations, the two types of consciousness become determined. This means that due to the difference in the consciousness of other mental continuums, the differentiated consciousness of other mental continuums arises, each becoming determined, not determined by external objects. If, like in a dream, the object has no substance, yet consciousness can arise, then the consciousness in the waking state is also like that. Then why is it that performing good and bad deeds in dreams and in the waking state results in different agreeable and disagreeable consequences? The verse says:

'The mind is damaged by sleep; the results of dreams and waking differ.'

Treatise: In the dream state, the mind is damaged by sleep, and its power is weak. The mind in the waking state is not like this. Therefore, the actions performed in dreams and in the waking state result in different ripening consequences, with varying degrees of superiority or inferiority, not caused by external objects. If there is only consciousness and no body, speech, etc., then why are sheep and other animals killed by others? If the death of sheep and others is not due to others killing them, then how can butchers incur the sin of killing? The verse says:

'Due to the transformation of others' consciousness, there is the act of killing; like the mental power of ghosts, causing others to lose mindfulness, etc.'

Treatise: Just as due to the mental power of ghosts, other sentient beings lose mindfulness and dream, or are deluded and other aberrant things happen. The mental power of those with supernatural abilities causes others to see various things in dreams. For example, the power of Mahākātyāyana's intention caused King Saraṇa and others to dream of strange things. Also, the power of the anger of the hermit āraṇyaka caused King Vemacitrin to dream of strange things. Like this, due to the transformation of others' consciousness, events that harm the life force of others occur. It should be known that the deceased refers to the commonality of beings (nikāya-sabhāga), and due to the transformation of consciousness, the mental continuum is severed. Again, the verse says:

'Daṇḍaka and other empty places, how are they due to the anger of a sage? Mental punishment is a great crime; how is this established?'

Treatise: If it is not admitted that the contributing power of the transformation of others' consciousness leads to the death of other sentient beings, then how did the World Honored One (Śākyamuni Buddha)

為成意罰是大罪故。返問長者鄔波離言。汝頗曾聞何因緣故。彈咤迦林。末蹬伽林。羯陵伽林。皆空閑寂。長者白佛言。喬答摩。我聞由仙意憤恚故。若執神鬼敬重仙人。知嫌為殺彼有情類。不但由仙意憤恚者。云何引彼。成立意罰為大罪性過於身語。由此應知。但由仙忿彼有情死理善成立。若唯有識。諸他心智知他心不。設爾何失。若不能知何謂他心智。若能知者。唯識應不成。雖知他心然不如實。頌曰。

他心智云何　　知境不如實　如知自心智　　不知如佛境

論曰。諸他心智云何于境不如實知。如自心智。此自心智云何于境不如實知。由無知故。二智于境各由無知所覆蔽故。不知如佛凈智所行不可言境。此二于境不如實知。由似外境虛妄顯現故。所取能取分別未斷故。唯識理趣無邊抉擇品類差別難度甚深。非佛誰能具廣抉擇。頌曰。

我已隨自能　　略成唯識義　此中一切種　　難思佛所行

論曰。唯識理趣品類無邊。我隨自能已略成立。餘一切種非所思議。超諸尋思所行境故。如是理趣唯佛所行。諸佛世尊於一切境及一切種智無礙故。

唯識二十論一卷

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因為成立意罰是很大的罪過。所以反過來問長者鄔波離（Upali，佛陀的弟子）說：『你可曾聽說過什麼因緣，導致彈咤迦林（Dandaka forest）、末蹬伽林（Matanga forest）、羯陵伽林（Kalinga forest）都空閑寂靜？』長者回答佛陀說：『喬答摩（Gautama，佛陀的姓），我聽說是因為仙人意念憤恨的緣故。如果執掌神鬼敬重仙人，知道（有人）冒犯（仙人）就殺害那些有情眾生。』如果不僅僅是因為仙人意念憤恨，又怎麼能以此來成立意罰是大罪的性質，超過身語（所造的罪業）呢？由此應該知道，僅僅因為仙人的忿恨，那些有情眾生死去的道理才能成立。如果只有識，那麼其他的心智慧否知道其他的心呢？如果這樣假設，會有什麼缺失？如果不能知道，那還叫什麼他心智？如果能知道，那麼唯識的道理就應該不能成立。即使能知道其他的心，但卻不能如實地瞭解。偈頌說：『他心智怎麼能知道境界，卻不能如實地瞭解？就像知道自己的心智，卻不能瞭解像佛陀境界那樣。』論述說：各種他心智怎麼能對境界不如實地瞭解呢？就像自己的心智一樣。這自己的心智又怎麼能對境界不如實地瞭解呢？因為沒有智慧的緣故。兩種智慧對於境界，各自因為被無知所覆蓋遮蔽的緣故，不能像佛陀清凈的智慧所行持的不可言說的境界那樣瞭解。這兩種智慧對於境界不能如實地瞭解，因為相似於外在境界的虛妄顯現的緣故，所取和能取的分別還沒有斷除的緣故。唯識的理趣，無邊的抉擇，品類的差別，難度非常深奧，不是佛陀誰能完全廣泛地抉擇呢？偈頌說：『我已經隨著自己的能力，略微地成就了唯識的意義。這其中一切的種類，都是難以思議的佛陀所行持的。』論述說：唯識的理趣，品類無邊。我隨著自己的能力已經略微地成立了。其餘一切的種類都不是所能思議的，超越了各種尋思所行持的境界的緣故。像這樣的理趣只有佛陀才能行持。諸佛世尊對於一切境界和一切種類的智慧都沒有障礙的緣故。《唯識二十論》一卷

【English Translation】 English version: Because establishing intentional karma (意罰) is a great offense, therefore, in turn, ask the elder Upali (鄔波離, a disciple of the Buddha): 'Have you ever heard of what causes the Dandaka forest (彈咤迦林), the Matanga forest (末蹬伽林), and the Kalinga forest (羯陵伽林) to be empty and desolate?' The elder replied to the Buddha: 'Gautama (喬答摩, Buddha's family name), I have heard that it is because of the resentment in the minds of the hermits. If the spirits and ghosts respect the hermits, knowing that (someone) offends (the hermits), they kill those sentient beings.' If it is not only because of the resentment in the minds of the hermits, how can this be used to establish that intentional karma is a great offense, exceeding (the offenses created by) body and speech? From this, it should be known that only because of the hermits' anger can the principle of those sentient beings dying be established. If there is only consciousness (識), can other minds know other minds? If this is assumed, what would be the deficiency? If they cannot know, then what is called other-minds wisdom (他心智)? If they can know, then the principle of consciousness-only (唯識) should not be established. Even if they can know other minds, they cannot understand them as they truly are. The verse says: 'How can other-minds wisdom know the realm, yet not understand it as it truly is? It is like knowing one's own mind, yet not understanding it like the realm of the Buddha.' The treatise says: How can the various other-minds wisdoms not truly understand the realm? It is like one's own mind. How can this own mind not truly understand the realm? It is because of the lack of wisdom. The two wisdoms, regarding the realm, are each covered and obscured by ignorance, so they cannot understand it like the unspeakable realm practiced by the Buddha's pure wisdom. These two wisdoms cannot truly understand the realm because of the false appearance of seeming external realms, and because the distinctions between what is taken and what takes have not been eliminated. The principles of consciousness-only, the boundless discriminations, the differences in categories, and the difficulty are very profound. Who other than the Buddha can fully and extensively discriminate them? The verse says: 'I have, according to my ability, briefly established the meaning of consciousness-only. All the kinds within this are the inconceivable practices of the Buddha.' The treatise says: The principles of consciousness-only are boundless in categories. I have briefly established them according to my ability. All the remaining kinds are not conceivable, because they transcend the realms practiced by various thoughts. Such principles can only be practiced by the Buddha. The Buddhas, World Honored Ones, have no obstacles to wisdom regarding all realms and all kinds of wisdom. 《Vijnaptimatrata-vimsatika》 (唯識二十論) One fascicle