T31n1591_成唯識寶生論

大正藏第 31 冊 No. 1591 成唯識寶生論

No. 1591 [cf. Nos. 1588-1590]

成唯識寶生論卷第一(一名二十唯識順釋論)

護法菩薩造

大唐三藏法師義凈奉　制譯

有情恒為眾苦逼　　熾燃猛火燒內心　善士意樂起慈悲　　譬如自身皆自受　敬禮善慧諸佛種　　于眾煩惱皆除滅　與無依者作歸依　　能令極怖心安隱　微笑降伏大魔軍　　明智覺了除眾欲　於此大乘能善住　　深識愛源唯自心

論曰。謂依大乘成立三界但唯是識。

釋曰。此復何意。輒名大乘。本契弘心。堅持禁戒。遍諸生品。拔濟有情。普令出離。獲得難勝。無罪之行。極妙吉祥。是諸善逝。去而隨去。無邊大路。並所獲果。圓滿尊極。余不能知。由此義故。名為大乘。如經所說。言大乘者。謂是菩提薩埵所行之路。及佛勝果。為得此故。修唯識觀。是無過失。方便正路。為此類故。顯彼方便。于諸經中。種種行相。而廣宣說。如地水火風並所持物品類難悉方處無邊。由此審知自心相現。遂于諸處。舍其外相。遠離欣戚。復觀有海。諠靜無差。棄彼小途。絕大乘望。及於諸有。耽著之類。觀若險崖。深生怖畏。正趣中道。若知但是自心所

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本大正藏第 31 冊 No. 1591 成唯識寶生論

No. 1591 [cf. Nos. 1588-1590]

成唯識寶生論卷第一(一名二十唯識順釋論)

護法菩薩造

大唐三藏法師義凈奉　制譯

有情恒為眾苦逼，熾燃猛火燒內心。善士意樂起慈悲，譬如自身皆自受。敬禮善慧諸佛種，于眾煩惱皆除滅。與無依者作歸依，能令極怖心安隱。微笑降伏大魔軍，明智覺了除眾欲。於此大乘能善住，深識愛源唯自心。

論曰：謂依大乘成立三界但唯是識。

釋曰：此復何意？輒名大乘（Mahāyāna，偉大的交通工具，象徵可以將眾生從苦海中運送到解脫的彼岸）。本契弘心，堅持禁戒，遍諸生品，拔濟有情，普令出離，獲得難勝，無罪之行，極妙吉祥。是諸善逝（Sugata，如來或佛的稱號），去而隨去，無邊大路，並所獲果，圓滿尊極，余不能知。由此義故，名為大乘。如經所說，言大乘者，謂是菩提薩埵（Bodhisattva，為救度眾生而發願成佛的人）所行之路，及佛勝果。為得此故，修唯識觀，是無過失，方便正路。為此類故，顯彼方便，于諸經中，種種行相，而廣宣說。如地水火風並所持物品類難悉方處無邊。由此審知自心相現。遂于諸處，舍其外相，遠離欣戚。復觀有海，諠靜無差。棄彼小途，絕大乘望。及於諸有，耽著之類。觀若險崖，深生怖畏。正趣中道。若知但是自心所

【English Translation】 English version Taisho Tripitaka Volume 31, No. 1591, Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only: Jewel-Birth

No. 1591 [cf. Nos. 1588-1590]

Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only: Jewel-Birth, Volume 1 (also known as the Commentary on the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-only)

Composed by Bodhisattva Dharmapala (Guardian of the Dharma)

Translated under Imperial Decree by Tripitaka Master Yijing of the Great Tang Dynasty

Sentient beings are constantly oppressed by various sufferings, their inner minds burned by blazing, fierce fires. Virtuous individuals, with intentions of joy, arise with loving-kindness and compassion, as if all sufferings were personally experienced. We reverently pay homage to the seeds of the Buddhas of Good Wisdom, who eliminate all afflictions. They offer refuge to the helpless, bringing peace and tranquility to hearts filled with extreme fear. With a smile, they subdue the great armies of Mara (demon), with clear wisdom, they awaken and eliminate all desires. In this Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle), they dwell skillfully, deeply recognizing that the source of love is only one's own mind.

Treatise says: Based on the Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle), it is established that the Three Realms are nothing but consciousness.

Commentary says: What is the meaning of this? Why is it readily called Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle)? It fundamentally accords with a grand aspiration, firmly upholds precepts, pervades all classes of beings, rescues sentient beings, universally enables them to be liberated, attains unsurpassable, faultless conduct, and supreme auspiciousness. These are the Sugatas (Thus Gone Ones, an epithet of the Buddha), who go and follow, on an boundless great path, along with the fruits obtained, perfectly supreme, which others cannot know. Because of this meaning, it is called Mahāyāna. As the sutra says, 'The Great Vehicle is the path traveled by Bodhisattvas (Enlightenment Beings, those who vow to become Buddhas to save all beings), and the supreme fruit of Buddhahood.' To obtain this, cultivating the view of Consciousness-only is faultless and a correct path of skillful means. For this reason, these skillful means are revealed and widely proclaimed in various forms in the sutras. Like earth, water, fire, wind, and the categories of objects they support, which are difficult to enumerate, and whose locations are boundless. From this, it is clearly known that the appearances are manifestations of one's own mind. Consequently, in all places, one abandons external appearances, and distances oneself from joy and sorrow. Furthermore, one observes the ocean of existence, where noise and stillness are undifferentiated. Abandoning the small path, one cuts off the hope of the Great Vehicle, and views those who are attached to all existences as dangerous cliffs, generating deep fear. One correctly proceeds on the Middle Way. If one knows that it is only what is

作。無邊資糧易為積集。不待多時。如少用功。能成大事。善逝行處。猶若掌中。由斯理故。所有愿求。當能圓滿。隨意而轉。縱如所許有其外事。然由內心意樂殷重弘誓力故。能到無邊六度之岸。若異此者。所舍之物盡持行施。及所遺生。何能總遍令其歡喜。愜順求心。此即便成無邊際境。所為施事。無有竟期。又復所有廣為利益有情戒等。于諸無障有情之類。隨彼樂欲悉能稱意。赴彼希望正行施等。速便收集正覺資糧。由斯但自心。復何須外境。若許外事。復與正理義有相違。故知境無斯成勝妙。如仗自心妄生分別。作色等解。起身見等。無實不待外諸有情。而作所緣因生離染然于施等。各隨其事。而能獲果。實不假藉識外境事。

若其識外有別境者。遂便依彼起諸煩惱。既被執取隨轉而住。見此過已心舍離生。深懷厭棄不悕大覺。既舍有情界如何欲弘益。由非攝取諸有生類。小心自度大行難成。然諸覺情依斯而轉。方能長養菩提資糧。謂于客塵有為之事厭背心故證無為法。由無為法體不生長故。希余小寂偏證一邊。無上覺山遂便淪退。若無外境愛厭俱亡。正覺之處斯成易得。豈非大悲常存於念。菩提薩埵極果方成。唯識之言。便為違害。然而大悲要托他身為緣性故。既除外境。但緣自識。此則便成憐自身

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因此，無邊的資糧可以很容易地積累，不需要很長時間。就像用很少的努力，就能成就大事一樣。善逝（Sugata，佛陀的稱號）的行處，就像在掌中一樣。因為這個道理，所有的願望和祈求，都能夠圓滿，隨意而行。縱然像所說的那樣有外在的事情，但由於內心意樂的殷重和弘大的誓願力，能夠到達無邊的六度（paramita，佈施、持戒、忍辱、精進、禪定、智慧）之岸。如果不是這樣，所捨棄的財物全部用來佈施，以及所遺留的生命，怎麼能夠普遍地令他們歡喜，滿足他們的願望呢？這樣就能成就無邊際的境界，所做的佈施之事，沒有窮盡的期限。又所有廣泛利益有情（sattva，眾生）的戒律等等，對於沒有障礙的有情之類，隨著他們的喜好，都能稱心如意，滿足他們的希望，正確地進行佈施等等，迅速地收集正覺（samyak-sambodhi，完全覺悟）的資糧。因為這樣，只需要自己的心，又何須外在的境界呢？如果承認有外在的事情，又與正確的道理相違背。所以知道境界沒有這樣成就殊勝的。就像憑藉自己的心妄生分別，作色（rupa，物質）等等的理解，起身見（satkayadristi，認為五蘊和合的身體是真實的我）等等，沒有真實，不需要外在的諸有情，而作為所緣的因，產生離染。然而對於佈施等等，各自隨著其事，而能夠獲得結果，實在不需要藉助識之外的境界之事。如果識之外有別的境界，就會依靠它而生起各種煩惱，既然被執取，就隨著它而轉動。見到這個過失后，心就舍離而生，深深地懷著厭棄，不希望得到大覺（mahabodhi，偉大的覺悟）。既然捨棄了有情界，又怎麼想要弘揚利益呢？由於不攝取諸有生類的緣故，小心地自度，大的行為難以成就。然而諸覺情依靠它而轉動，才能長養菩提（bodhi，覺悟）的資糧。說對於客塵有為之事厭背心，所以證得無為法（asamskrta-dharma，不生不滅的法）。由於無為法的體不生長的緣故，希望其餘的小寂靜，偏頗地證得一邊，無上的覺悟之山，就淪落衰退了。如果沒有外在的境界，愛和厭惡都消失，正覺之處就容易成就。難道不是大悲（mahakaruna，偉大的慈悲）常常存在於念頭中，菩提薩埵（bodhisattva，立志成佛的眾生）的極果才能成就嗎？唯識（vijnanavada，佛教的一個哲學流派，認為一切皆是識的顯現）的言論，就違背了這個道理。然而大悲要依託他身為緣性，既然除去了外在的境界，只緣于自己的識，這就變成了憐憫自身。

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, boundless accumulations of merit are easily gathered, not requiring much time. Just as with little effort, great things can be accomplished. The path of the Sugata (Buddha's title) is as if in the palm of one's hand. Because of this principle, all wishes and aspirations can be fulfilled, proceeding at will. Even if, as stated, there are external matters, due to the earnestness of inner intention and the power of vast vows, one can reach the shore of the boundless Six Perfections (paramita, generosity, morality, patience, diligence, concentration, and wisdom). If it were otherwise, how could all the possessions given away in charity, and the lives relinquished, universally please and satisfy the minds of all beings? Thus, an infinite realm is accomplished, and the act of giving has no end. Furthermore, all the precepts and other practices that broadly benefit sentient beings (sattva, beings), for those sentient beings without obstacles, can fulfill their desires and meet their hopes, rightly practicing generosity and so forth, quickly gathering the accumulations for perfect enlightenment (samyak-sambodhi, complete enlightenment). Because of this, only one's own mind is needed; what need is there for external objects? If external matters are admitted, it contradicts right reason. Therefore, know that the realm does not achieve excellence in this way. Just as relying on one's own mind, one falsely generates discriminations, understanding things as color (rupa, form) and so on, giving rise to the view of self (satkayadristi, the view that the aggregates of body and mind constitute a real self), which is unreal and does not depend on external sentient beings, but arises as a condition for detachment. However, with respect to generosity and other practices, each according to its nature, can yield results, truly not requiring reliance on objects external to consciousness. If there were a separate realm external to consciousness, one would then rely on it and generate various afflictions. Having been grasped, one would abide following it. Having seen this fault, the mind would arise with renunciation, deeply harboring aversion, not hoping for great enlightenment (mahabodhi, great awakening). Having abandoned the realm of sentient beings, how would one wish to propagate benefit? Because one does not embrace all living beings, one cautiously saves oneself, and great deeds are difficult to accomplish. However, the emotions of enlightenment rely on this and turn, so that the accumulations for bodhi (bodhi, enlightenment) can be nourished. It is said that because of aversion to adventitious and conditioned things, one realizes the unconditioned dharma (asamskrta-dharma, unconditioned dharma). Because the nature of the unconditioned dharma does not grow, one hopes for other small quietudes, partially realizing one side, and the mountain of supreme enlightenment then declines and falls. If there were no external realm, love and aversion would both vanish, and the place of perfect enlightenment would be easily achieved. Is it not the case that great compassion (mahakaruna, great compassion) constantly exists in thought, and the ultimate fruit of a bodhisattva (bodhisattva, being who aspires to enlightenment) is then accomplished? The words of the Vijnanavada (Buddhism philosophical school, all is mind) contradict this principle. However, great compassion must rely on the body of another as its inherent nature. Since external realms are removed, and one only relies on one's own consciousness, this then becomes pity for oneself.

故。利他為意大行方豎。唯顧己身寔乖弘度。雖陳雅責因斯無過。藉外相續為增上緣。于自識中現有情相。緣此為境起大悲心。于有情處而作弘益。此無相違。決定如是。應起信心。假令于彼色聲等處一一推求彼無其我。設使和集我亦不成。然而本性不可舍故。既同所許無我為宗。當於何處欲興悲念。於世共許當情妄執為所緣相以為有情。亦不應言。情所執事即是外境。由此應知。假令不樂理必許然。但于自識現有情相。依仗斯事色相生焉。是故定知無其外境。若離於識必不可得。是顛倒故。何謂顛倒本無外境見為實物。非妄執故。終能獲得無上之處。可為應理唯識之見。是真實故。為彼方便深成稱理。

如何得知斯為實見。三界唯心是詮說故。凡有諍事欲求決定。須藉二門。一順阿笈摩。二符正理。謂欲為彼信證聖人無倒宣說。所有傳教引阿笈摩。若為此余不信之者。應申正理。或可為彼二人俱陳兩事。如所信事令安住故。陳其正理。又為顯其所論正理。有依仗處說阿笈摩。由其正理不依傳教。未見真者所有言說。無非謬故名強思構。是故應知。阿笈摩者便成正理所託之處。或於自部有力用故。為此先陳阿笈摩教。爾來據義依大乘說。即第七聲目其所為。謂欲證得彼大乘理說唯識觀。是真實故。此不虛性。以

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因此，以利他為目的才能真正建立起偉大的事業。只顧自己的利益，實在違背了弘揚佛法的宗旨。即使提出高雅的指責，因為這個原因也沒有過錯。憑藉外在的相續作為增上的因緣，在自己的意識中顯現有情眾生的形象，以此為境界生起大悲心，在有情眾生之處施行利益。這沒有相互違背，一定是這樣的，應該生起信心。假設對於那些色、聲等處一一推求，它們沒有『我』。即使聚合起來，『我』也不能成立。然而本性不可捨棄，既然共同承認以『無我』為宗旨，應當在何處生起悲憫之念呢？在世俗共許的、隨順情感妄加執著的事物上，作為所緣的形象，認為是『有情』。也不應該說，情感所執著的事物就是外在的境界。由此應該知道，即使不樂意，從道理上來說也必定是這樣。只是在自己的意識中顯現有情眾生的形象，依靠這件事，色相才產生。所以一定知道沒有外在的境界，如果離開了意識，必定不能得到，這是顛倒的緣故。什麼是顛倒呢？本來沒有外在的境界，卻見為真實的事物。不是虛妄的執著，最終能夠獲得無上的境界。可以作為合理的唯識之見，這是真實的緣故，爲了那個方便，深入地成就稱合理性。如何得知這是真實的見解呢？因為『三界唯心』是這樣詮釋說明的。凡是有爭論的事情，想要尋求決斷，必須憑藉兩個途徑：一是順應阿笈摩（Agama，聖教），二是符合正理。所謂想要為那些相信聖人無倒宣說的人提供證據，就引用阿笈摩。如果為那些不相信的人，就應該陳述正理。或者可以為那兩個人同時陳述這兩件事，爲了使他們安住在所相信的事情上，陳述其中的正理。又爲了顯示所論述的正理有依據之處，就說阿笈摩。由於正理不依據傳教，沒有見到真理的人所說的話，沒有不是謬誤的，所以稱為強行思構。因此應該知道，阿笈摩就成為正理所依託之處，或者在自己的宗派中有力量的緣故，為此先陳述阿笈摩的教義。然後根據義理，依據大乘的說法，用第七識來標明它的作用。所謂想要證得那個大乘的道理，說唯識觀是真實的緣故，這個不是虛假的性質，以...

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, only with the intention of benefiting others can a great undertaking truly be established. Focusing solely on one's own benefit truly goes against the purpose of propagating the Dharma. Even if elegant criticisms are made, there is no fault because of this reason. Relying on external continuity as a contributing condition, the image of sentient beings appears in one's own consciousness. Taking this as the object, great compassion arises, and benefits are bestowed upon sentient beings. There is no contradiction in this; it is definitely so, and faith should arise. Suppose that for those forms, sounds, etc., one investigates each one individually, they do not have a 'self' (Atman). Even if they are assembled, a 'self' cannot be established. However, the fundamental nature cannot be abandoned. Since it is commonly acknowledged that 'no-self' (Anatta) is the principle, where should the thought of compassion arise? On things that are commonly accepted in the world, to which emotions are attached and falsely clung, taking them as the object of perception, considering them as 'sentient beings'. Nor should it be said that the things to which emotions are attached are external realms. From this, it should be known that even if one is unwilling, it must be so in terms of reason. It is only that the image of sentient beings appears in one's own consciousness, and relying on this matter, forms arise. Therefore, it is definitely known that there is no external realm; if it is separated from consciousness, it definitely cannot be obtained, and this is because of delusion. What is delusion? Originally, there is no external realm, but it is seen as a real thing. It is not a false clinging, and ultimately, one can obtain the supreme state. It can be taken as a reasonable view of Consciousness-only (Vijnanavada), and this is because it is real. For that convenience, deeply accomplish the appropriate rationality. How can it be known that this is a true view? Because 'The Three Realms are Mind-only' is explained in this way. Whenever there are disputed matters and one wants to seek a decision, one must rely on two paths: first, to accord with the Agama (Agama, sacred teachings), and second, to conform to correct reasoning. The so-called wanting to provide evidence for those who believe in the infallible teachings of the saints, one quotes the Agama. If it is for those who do not believe, one should state the correct reasoning. Or one can state both of these matters to both people at the same time, in order to make them dwell in what they believe, stating the correct reasoning within it. Also, in order to show that the reasoning being discussed has a basis, one speaks of the Agama. Since correct reasoning does not rely on transmitted teachings, the words of those who have not seen the truth are all erroneous, so they are called forced constructions. Therefore, it should be known that the Agama becomes the place where correct reasoning is entrusted, or because it has power in one's own sect. For this reason, the teachings of the Agama are stated first. Then, according to the meaning, based on the teachings of the Mahayana, the seventh consciousness is used to mark its function. The so-called wanting to attain that Mahayana principle, saying that the Consciousness-only view is real, this is not a false nature, with...

阿笈摩善成立故。又若唯據言說大乘。猶如於義。假名乘者。依第七聲所說聲也。謂即依託大乘言教聚集之處。真實句義而成立之。但唯是識為欲明其所立宗義。于大乘教而引一隅。顯所立宗。不于自教有相違背。

此復何故名阿笈摩。輒自引證說斯言耶。謂從能說如理教者。假彼相續為增上緣。此教方生。于其聽者識之差別。體有功能現前而住。或是親聞或復傳說。于所詮事當情相狀。次第而生猶如筆畫。章句形段昞然明現。從他來故名阿笈摩。若復有時自生憶念隨順本相識方生者。從彼生故得阿笈摩名。猶如自說名為佛語。德者義相。為智因故名智資糧豈非一切但唯有識。此違所許故。及自語相違。理固不然。非由於色有別異故。依識差別而為建立。如無色界所有差別。如無色界實無其色。但依于識分為四種立空處等。余界亦然。設復說三。于識何妨。猶若有情雖無差異然而安立欲色界殊。據其所繫色差別故。色雖無異別立無過。

豈不詮教言唯有心。今此立宗言唯有識。說違本教諒在憑虛義有所歸。誠無斯過由其先許心意識了。是名差別。由同體事名不俱陳。故以異名而宣其義。即此唯了之言非眾共許。欲令解義取共知聲。更陳余號。復更顯與經不相違。重說意識二聲。況彼二義知體不別。即是其

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因為阿笈摩（Agama，聖傳）善於成立。又如果僅僅根據言說的大乘，就好像對於義理，假名為乘，是依據第七識所說的聲音。也就是說，依託大乘的言教聚集之處，真實的句義而成立。但僅僅是識爲了闡明其所立的宗義，從大乘教義中引用一部分，來顯示所立的宗義，不與自己的教義相違背。

那麼，為什麼稱其為阿笈摩呢？竟然自己引用證據來說這些話呢？這是因為從能夠如理說法的人那裡，憑藉他們的相續作為增上緣，這個教法才產生。對於聽法者的識的差別，其體性具有功能，現前而住。或者親自聽聞，或者輾轉傳說，對於所詮釋的事物的當情相狀，次第產生，猶如筆畫、章節、形段一樣清晰明瞭。因為是從他人那裡來的，所以叫做阿笈摩。如果有時自己生起憶念，隨順本來的相狀，識才產生，因為是從那裡產生的，所以也得到阿笈摩的名字，猶如自己所說的話被稱為佛語。德，是義理的相狀。因為是智慧的原因，所以叫做智資糧。難道不是一切都僅僅是識嗎？這違反了所許諾的，以及自己的言語相違背，道理當然不是這樣。不是因為色有差別，才依據識的差別而建立。如同沒有所有差別，如同沒有所有，實際上沒有其色。但依據識分為四種，建立空處等，其餘的界也是這樣。假設說三種，對於識有什麼妨礙呢？就像有情雖然沒有差異，然而安立欲界、色界的差別，根據其所繫屬的色的差別。色雖然沒有差別，分別建立也沒有過失。

難道不是詮釋教義的言語唯有心嗎？現在這裡立宗說唯有識，說與本來的教義相違背，恐怕是在憑空捏造，義理上有所歸屬。確實沒有這樣的過失，因為先前已經允許心、意識了，這是名稱上的差別。因為是同一個體性的事物，所以名稱不一起陳述。所以用不同的名稱來宣說其義理。即使這個『唯了』的說法不是大眾共同認可的，爲了讓理解義理的人取用共同知道的聲音，再陳述其他的名稱。再次顯示與經文不相違背，重複說意識這兩個聲音。況且那兩個義理，知道體性沒有差別，就是那個。

【English Translation】 English version: Because Agama (Sacred Tradition) is good at establishing. Furthermore, if one only relies on the spoken Mahayana, it is like, with regard to meaning, nominally calling it a vehicle, which is based on the sound spoken by the seventh consciousness. That is to say, it is established by relying on the place where the teachings of the Mahayana are gathered, the true meaning of the sentences. But it is only consciousness that, in order to clarify the tenets it establishes, quotes a portion from the Mahayana teachings to show the tenets it establishes, without contradicting its own teachings.

Then, why is it called Agama? Why does it cite evidence to say these words? This is because from those who can teach the Dharma properly, relying on their continuum as a contributing condition, this teaching arises. For the difference in the consciousness of the listeners, its nature has the function of being present. Either hearing it personally or through hearsay, the state of affairs of the things being explained arises in sequence, like strokes, chapters, shapes, and segments, clearly and distinctly. Because it comes from others, it is called Agama. If sometimes one's own recollection arises, following the original state, then consciousness arises. Because it arises from there, it also gets the name Agama, just like one's own words are called the Buddha's words. Virtue is the aspect of meaning. Because it is the cause of wisdom, it is called the accumulation of wisdom. Isn't everything just consciousness? This violates what was promised and contradicts one's own words, so the reasoning is certainly not like that. It is not because there is a difference in form that it is established based on the difference in consciousness. Just like there is no difference in possession, just like there is no possession, in reality there is no form. But based on consciousness, it is divided into four types, establishing the space of emptiness, etc., and the other realms are also like this. Suppose one speaks of three, what harm does it do to consciousness? Just like sentient beings, although there is no difference, yet the differences of the desire realm and the form realm are established, based on the difference in the forms to which they are bound. Although form has no difference, there is no fault in establishing them separately.

Isn't it the case that the words that explain the teachings are only mind? Now, here, it is established that it is only consciousness, saying that it contradicts the original teachings, I am afraid it is fabricating out of thin air, and the meaning has something to which it belongs. There is indeed no such fault, because it has already been allowed that there is mind, consciousness, and awareness, and these are differences in name. Because they are things of the same nature, the names are not stated together. Therefore, different names are used to proclaim their meaning. Even if this statement of 'only awareness' is not commonly recognized by the masses, in order to allow those who understand the meaning to take the commonly known sound, other names are stated again. It is shown again that it does not contradict the scriptures, and the two sounds of consciousness and awareness are repeated. Moreover, those two meanings, knowing that the nature is not different, are that.

果。若欲要明不違經者。心了二聲同其一義。明不違教。釋妨已周。何須更說意與識耶。若說了聲心異名者。心望心所是別有體猶如於境同生之類。念昔睡等便成是無。此則前後理相違背。實無此過。有所由故。此中心言許有相應。即是了言兼攝於彼。若如是者。識外之境心意詮故。于其心處更置唯聲。意有取遮以為其果。境若無者遂成無用。唯聲不遮。可如來責。現遮所緣境。如何言無用。若如斯解。由同生法及所緣境俱是離心別有其體。一便遮止。一乃見留。豈得事無由緒而空談。自愛若無別意。誠如所詰。然由於境心聚共緣決斷等事同類性故。於心所處假說心聲。復為遮其非所許事。故於心處更置唯聲。縱有所談此還非理便成。亦是不取心言非一處顯真假二事俱能彰顯有力用故。如牛等聲於心所處置此心言說心聲時真事便舍。如於邊鄙假說為牛。垂胡等事理定應棄。有言本意二事俱說。亦應更作一種異聲。用表斯義或可攝聲。撮略而顯依俗論法。猶如欲聲而為辯釋。非唯自意能為巧釋。元其緒系生決定耶。亦復不由有染等言。蘇呾啰中有染等說。于其遮遣無有力用。于彼亦有有境言故。境亦不遮所說唯聲。便成無用。若言外境非理須遮。無阿笈摩摩呾啰聲。二處同故。隨遮一事無決定因。是故須依異宗之見。心

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果想要明白『不違經』的含義，就要理解『心』(citta，意)和『了』(vijñāna，識)這兩個詞，雖然名稱不同，但本質上指的是同一件事，這樣才能明白『不違教』的含義。如果已經解釋清楚了妨礙理解的地方，又何必再討論『意』(manas，意)和『識』(vijñāna，識)呢？如果說『了』(vijñāna，識)這個詞指的是與『心』(citta，意)不同的東西，那麼『心』(citta，意)和『心所』(caitta，心所法)就成了不同的實體，就像『境』(viṣaya，對像)和『心』(citta，意)同時產生一樣。這樣一來，回憶過去睡眠等事情就變得不可能了，因為沒有了能回憶的主體。這就會導致前後理論相互矛盾，但實際上並沒有這種過失，因為有其原因。在這裡，『心』(citta，意)這個詞可以理解為包含『相應』(saṃprayukta，相應)的意思，也就是『了』(vijñāna，識)這個詞也包含了『相應』(saṃprayukta，相應)的意思。如果這樣理解，那麼在『識』(vijñāna，識)之外的『境』(viṣaya，對像)就可以用心和意來解釋，而在『心』(citta，意)的地方再額外加上一個『唯聲』(mātra-śabda，唯聲)的說法，意在通過取捨來達到某種目的，如果『境』(viṣaya，對像)不存在，那麼『唯聲』(mātra-śabda，唯聲)就變得毫無用處，如來(Tathāgata，如來)就會責備這種說法。既然現在要遮止所緣之境，又怎麼能說『唯聲』(mātra-śabda，唯聲)沒有用處呢？如果這樣解釋，由於『同生法』(sahabhūta-dharma，俱生法)和『所緣境』(ālambana-viṣaya，所緣境)都是獨立於『心』(citta，意)之外的實體，那麼一個遮止，一個保留，豈不是毫無根據地空談？如果『自愛』(ātmasneha，自愛)沒有其他含義，那麼正如你所詰問的那樣，然而，由於『境』(viṣaya，對像)、『心聚』(citta-samūha，心聚)共同緣取、決斷等事情具有相似的性質，所以在『心所』(caitta，心所法)的地方假借使用『心』(citta，意)這個詞。爲了遮止那些不被允許的事情，所以在『心』(citta，意)的地方額外加上一個『唯聲』(mātra-śabda，唯聲)的說法。即使有所討論，這種說法仍然是不合理的，因為這也會導致不接受『心』(citta，意)這個詞，因為『心』(citta，意)這個詞並非只能在一個地方顯現，它既能彰顯真實的事情，也能彰顯虛假的事情，具有強大的作用。就像『牛』(go，牛)等聲音一樣，如果在『心所』(caitta，心所法)的地方使用『心』(citta，意)這個詞，那麼真實的事情就會被捨棄，就像在邊遠地區假借說成是『牛』(go，牛)一樣，垂下的鬍鬚等特徵理應被拋棄。有人說，本意是要同時說明兩件事，那麼就應該再創造一種不同的聲音，用來表達這個意思，或者可以採用概括性的聲音，簡略地顯現出來，這是依據世俗的論法，就像用『欲』(kāma，欲)這個聲音來辯論解釋一樣。難道僅僅憑藉自己的想法就能巧妙地解釋嗎？難道它的開端和體系是天生就決定的嗎？或者說，它不是由『有染』(sarāga，有染)等詞語決定的嗎？蘇呾啰(sūtra，經)中有『有染』(sarāga，有染)等的說法，對於遮遣並沒有強大的作用，因為在那裡也有『有境』(saviṣaya，有境)的說法，『境』(viṣaya，對像)也沒有被遮止，所以所說的『唯聲』(mātra-śabda，唯聲)就變得毫無用處。如果說外境是不合理的，需要遮止，那麼就沒有阿笈摩(āgama，阿笈摩)和摩呾啰(mātrā，摩呾啰)的聲音，因為兩處相同，無論遮止哪一件事都沒有確定的原因，所以必須依據其他宗派的觀點，即『心』(citta，意)。現代漢語譯本：現代漢語譯本：現代漢語譯本：

【English Translation】 English version: If you want to understand the meaning of 'not contradicting the scriptures,' you must understand that the words 'citta' (mind) and 'vijñāna' (consciousness), although different in name, essentially refer to the same thing. Only then can you understand the meaning of 'not contradicting the teachings.' If the obstacles to understanding have already been explained clearly, why discuss 'manas' (mind) and 'vijñāna' (consciousness) further? If it is said that the word 'vijñāna' (consciousness) refers to something different from 'citta' (mind), then 'citta' (mind) and 'caitta' (mental factors) become different entities, just like 'viṣaya' (object) and 'citta' (mind) arise simultaneously. In that case, recalling past sleep and other things becomes impossible, because there is no subject to recall. This would lead to contradictions between earlier and later theories, but in reality, there is no such fault, because there is a reason for it. Here, the word 'citta' (mind) can be understood as including the meaning of 'saṃprayukta' (associated), which means that the word 'vijñāna' (consciousness) also includes the meaning of 'saṃprayukta' (associated). If understood in this way, then the 'viṣaya' (object) outside of 'vijñāna' (consciousness) can be explained by mind and intention, and adding the term 'mātra-śabda' (mere sound) to the place of 'citta' (mind) is intended to achieve a certain purpose through acceptance and rejection. If the 'viṣaya' (object) does not exist, then 'mātra-śabda' (mere sound) becomes useless, and the Tathāgata (Thus Come One) would criticize this statement. Since the object of perception is now being rejected, how can it be said that 'mātra-śabda' (mere sound) is useless? If explained in this way, since 'sahabhūta-dharma' (co-arisen dharmas) and 'ālambana-viṣaya' (object of perception) are both entities independent of 'citta' (mind), then one is rejected and one is retained, wouldn't that be empty talk without any basis? If 'ātmasneha' (self-love) has no other meaning, then as you have questioned, however, because 'viṣaya' (object), 'citta-samūha' (mind aggregate), and the common grasping and decision-making of things have similar natures, the word 'citta' (mind) is used figuratively in the place of 'caitta' (mental factors). In order to prevent those things that are not allowed, the term 'mātra-śabda' (mere sound) is added to the place of 'citta' (mind). Even if there is some discussion, this statement is still unreasonable, because it would also lead to not accepting the word 'citta' (mind), because the word 'citta' (mind) cannot only appear in one place, it can manifest both true and false things, and has a powerful function. Just like the sound of 'go' (cow), if the word 'citta' (mind) is used in the place of 'caitta' (mental factors), then the true thing will be abandoned, just like in remote areas it is falsely said to be 'go' (cow), and the drooping beard and other characteristics should be discarded. Some say that the original intention is to explain two things at the same time, then another different sound should be created to express this meaning, or a general sound can be used to briefly manifest it, which is based on the worldly theory, just like using the sound of 'kāma' (desire) to argue and explain. Can it be skillfully explained only by one's own ideas? Is its beginning and system determined by nature? Or is it not determined by words such as 'sarāga' (with attachment)? There are statements such as 'sarāga' (with attachment) in the sūtra (thread), which do not have a strong effect on rejection, because there are also statements of 'saviṣaya' (with object) there, and the 'viṣaya' (object) is not rejected, so the 'mātra-śabda' (mere sound) becomes useless. If it is said that the external object is unreasonable and needs to be rejected, then there is no sound of āgama (tradition) and mātrā (measure), because the two places are the same, and there is no definite reason to reject either one, so it is necessary to rely on the views of other schools, that is, 'citta' (mind). English version: English version: English version:

心所法體不相離。但位有別。即此唯聲能遮外事。同生之法。無不遮故。凡總相聲所有詮名。于其自事必不差別。非為決定而並現前。由其不遮理便總攝。為欲述曉如斯道理。故說心言許有相應。若離心所獨心非有。故不應難。亦遣同遮。作是釋時。唯遮外境。實有功能。述已義成。故說唯言以理準余但遮境事豈非所引有此中言。明知于余有除心所。復是容有如六識身。名為識聚若言此中說識蘊時兼攝心所。理定不然。想受及思。諸心所法。余蘊無故。若言猶如於色蘊者。由如取其仳喏那分立為色蘊。想等同然非相似故。若言許取由色差別。便以識聲說其識蘊。非色等法是心位差。猶如於想。若以位差簡有差時。隨其色類為簡別已。以色等聲于識而立。此亦非理。斯乃便成。撥其識聚。由彼被斯色受等聲割其分故。非位差外別可得故。離仳喏那位差之外。別有色位。猶如樂等所現相狀。憂愁苦惱。於斯相處安置識聲。隨牛[爿*賣]理。若如是者。識六識身為其識蘊。義乃相違眼等諸識色等相現。故由其並是色聚所收。復更有餘雜亂之過。若其青等相現之時。或違或順。色行二蘊便成雜亂。如是覆成於樂等位。受等相雜準斯道理。亦是破其總別之義。有說識能遍故是總相。聲猶如初相。此之別相。謂是色等彼乃是其現

相位差之因性故。此亦如前受等。便有雜亂之過。是故除其心所性言。猶如成立所有色聚。唯心之聲表唯識耳。此亦不能于其心所及以所緣令疑斷絕。言唯字者。有何所遮。雖言心所不離於心。此成虛言。由其相狀體各別故所言識者。唯觀現境雜染等性。但是愛著體非照察。如何能見。此即于彼體成殊別。及以更互。上來所述道理既多。然于本宗未為的要。且息傍論應辯正宗。心及心所設令體別。以其心字亦得相收。應知此義共成已久。若於其處諸心所法。不以自名而顯說者。應知此中即是總目。所有心聚如調心等。但道其心。此謂共成。故知唯聲但遮其境。若無境者。如何于青及甜味等。而了別之。由理不能撥現見故。誰言撥其現見之境。但于自識境相生焉。由自識相領受之時。遂即計執所有青等。如外而住。但為是其邪妄之解。猶如眩目見發蠅等。斯乃但是識之相別。現其蠅相即便妄執為有蠅耶。然而在外曾無蠅等自性可得。如何作境令識別生。此若無境。如何得之識似於彼相狀生耶。要有本相似彼相生。可於此時得言似彼。如斯之事世皆共許。如於陽炎謂言似水。非無其境。亦能見故。如於薩埵有覺相生。而非離於色等體外有別薩埵實事可得。亦非色等或總或別。有其自性變壞等性而簡別故。於心實事亦復不能

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：相位差的原因在於它們的性質不同。這就像前面所說的感受等等，會有混雜錯亂的過失。因此，如果排除心所的性質，就像成立所有色聚一樣，『唯心』這個詞只是表明唯識而已。但這也不能使人對心所及其所緣產生懷疑並消除疑惑。『唯』這個字，有什麼要遮止的呢？雖然說心所不離於心，但這成了虛妄之言，因為它們的相狀和體性各自不同。所說的『識』，只是觀察顯現的境界，以及雜染等等的性質，只是愛著的本體，而不是照察。如何能夠看見呢？這就在本體上與它們形成了差別，以及相互作用。上面所說的道理已經很多了，但對於本宗來說，還不是最關鍵的。暫且停止旁論，應該辯論正宗。心和心所，即使體性不同，因為有『心』這個字，也可以相互包含。應該知道這個意義已經共同成立很久了。如果在某個地方，各種心所法，不以它們自己的名稱來顯明地說，就應該知道這裡是總括地稱呼。所有心的集合，比如調伏心等等，只說『心』，這就是共同成立的。所以知道『唯』這個詞只是遮止外境。如果沒有外境，如何能了別青色和甜味等等呢？因為道理上不能否定現見的緣故。誰說要否定現見的境界？只是在自己的識中，境界的相狀生起而已。由於自己的識相領受的時候，就執著所有青色等等，好像在外存在一樣。這只是邪妄的理解，就像眼睛昏花時看見頭髮和蒼蠅等等。這只是識的相狀差別，顯現出蒼蠅的相狀，就妄執為有蒼蠅嗎？然而在外並沒有蒼蠅等等的自性可以得到，如何作為境界讓識別生起呢？如果沒有境界，如何能得到識，使它生起類似於那個相狀呢？要有原本相似於那個相狀的東西生起，才能在這個時候說它類似於那個東西。這樣的事情世人都共同認可。就像對於陽焰，說它類似於水，並非沒有它的境界，也能看見的緣故。就像對於薩埵（有情），有覺相生起，但並非脫離色等等的本體之外，有別的薩埵實事可以得到。也不是色等等，或者總的，或者別的，有它們自己的自性，變壞等等的性質而簡別的緣故。對於心的實事也是不能這樣理解的。

【English Translation】 English version: The reason for the phase difference lies in their different natures. This is like the aforementioned feelings, etc., which would lead to the fault of being mixed up and confused. Therefore, if we exclude the nature of mental factors (citta-vrtti), just as we establish all aggregates of form (rupa-skandha), the word 'only mind' (citta-matra) merely indicates 'only consciousness' (vijnana-matra). But this also cannot cause doubt about mental factors and their objects to cease and eliminate doubts. What does the word 'only' (matra) negate? Although it is said that mental factors are not separate from the mind, this becomes a false statement because their characteristics and entities are each different. What is meant by 'consciousness' (vijnana) is only observing the appearing realm, and the nature of defilements (klesha) etc.; it is only the essence of attachment (raga), not discernment (prajna). How can it see? This forms a distinction in essence from them, as well as in interaction. The reasons stated above are already numerous, but for our own school (svatantra), they are not yet the most crucial. Let us cease digressing and discuss the true doctrine (samyak-drishti). Even if the mind (citta) and mental factors (citta-vrtti) are different in essence, because of the word 'mind' (citta), they can also be mutually inclusive. It should be known that this meaning has been commonly established for a long time. If, in a certain place, the various mental factors (citta-vrtti) are not explicitly stated by their own names, it should be known that this is a general term. All collections of mind, such as taming the mind, etc., only say 'mind' (citta); this is what is commonly established. Therefore, know that the word 'only' (matra) only negates external objects (bahya-artha). If there were no external objects, how could one distinguish between blue color and sweet taste, etc.? Because, in principle, one cannot deny direct perception (pratyaksha). Who says that we are denying the realm of direct perception? It is only that in one's own consciousness (svacitta), the appearance of the realm arises. Because one's own consciousness-aspect (svacitta-akara) perceives it, one then clings to all blue colors, etc., as if they exist externally. This is merely a false understanding, like seeing hairs and flies, etc., when one's eyes are blurred. These are merely differences in the aspects of consciousness (vijnana-akara); does the appearance of a fly cause one to falsely believe that there is a fly? However, there is no nature of flies, etc., to be found externally; how can it serve as an object (alambana) for consciousness (vijnana) to arise? If there were no object (alambana), how could one obtain consciousness (vijnana) that arises similar to that appearance? There must be something originally similar to that appearance for it to arise, so that one can say at this time that it is similar to that thing. Such things are commonly accepted by the world. Just as with a mirage (marici), one says that it is similar to water; it is not that there is no realm of it, because it can also be seen. Just as with a sentient being (sattva), a perception arises, but it is not that apart from the essence of form (rupa), etc., there is a separate real entity of a sentient being to be obtained. Nor is it that form (rupa), etc., either collectively or separately, have their own nature, such as change and destruction, by which they are distinguished. One cannot understand the reality of the mind (citta) in this way either.

舍其本性。或可薩埵是覆俗有。如斯道理。我亦同然。於色等處謂從於識。生差別性是覆俗故。如依色處執為車等。然而但由情所計執。于其色等覆障實性。于眾緣處作自相狀。而安置之。如在於外。即於是處見車等故。未審覆俗是何義耶。是覆障義。順俗情故。由彼于其車乘等處計執自性。是覆俗有。覆其實體。生余執故。故彼妄情施設其相。先於斯事而執取之。雖無實相妄生境想。又如常等情所現相。何有本相而隨順之。是故雖無識外實境。識所現相。其理善成。或可此中言似相者。乃是隨順顛倒事義。如陽炎處翻作水解。便作水想。識亦于其色等相處生起倒情。故言現相。此不相違。有說其顛倒境亦依實事方始生心。此亦同前。悉皆徴責。

復有外律。作斯異執。離色等外別有我體。此復依何而生於倒。經云。依內。此亦無違。謂于俱生所起身見密而說故。故云於我正可用心。當見現見。如其親近惡友等人。即云於我故作是說。然彼凡小妄生其識。遂起顛倒為外境相。或可隨順他共成事。而為言說。即如世間所共許事將為境者。即于其事唯識生起。是故由斯似境相故。緣色等識不取外境。如眩翳人見發蠅等。此外境空但唯有識。是其宗義。即由此義而為難曰。此喻不成。于光明分妄生髮想。斯由其眼根虧

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：捨棄其本性。或者菩薩是覆蓋世俗而存在的。這樣的道理，我也是一樣的。在色等處所認為的，是從識而生起的差別性，這是因為覆蓋了世俗的緣故。就像依據色處執著為車等。然而只是由於情識的計執，對於色等的真實體性加以覆蓋和障礙，在眾緣和合之處，虛構出自相，並且安立它。就像在外境中，就在那個地方見到車等一樣。不知道覆蓋世俗是什麼意思呢？就是覆蓋和障礙的意思，順應世俗的情感。由於他們對於車乘等處計執為自性，這是覆蓋世俗而存在的，覆蓋了它的實體，產生了其他的執著。所以那些虛妄的情識施設出它的相狀，先於這些事物而執取它。雖然沒有真實的相狀，卻虛妄地產生境的想像。又如常等情識所顯現的相狀，哪裡有本來的相狀而可以隨順呢？所以，即使沒有識外的真實境，識所顯現的相狀，這個道理也是可以成立的。或者，這裡所說的『似相』，乃是隨順顛倒事義。就像在陽炎之處，錯誤地理解為水，就產生水的想法。識也在色等相處生起顛倒的情識，所以說是顯現相狀。這並不矛盾。有人說，顛倒的境也是依據真實的事物才開始產生心識。這個說法也和前面一樣，都可以進行責難。又有外道，作這樣的不同執著：離開色等外境，另外有我的存在。這種執著又是依據什麼而產生顛倒的呢？經中說：『依據內在。』這也沒有矛盾，是說對於俱生所起身見秘密地說的緣故。所以說對於我正可以用心，應當見現見。就像親近惡友等人，就說對於我故意這樣做。然而那些凡夫和小人虛妄地產生他們的識，於是生起顛倒，認為是外境的相狀。或者可以隨順他人共同成就的事情，而作為言說。就像世間所共同認可的事情作為境，就在那個事情上唯識生起。所以，由於這種相似境的相狀，緣色等的識不取外境。就像眩暈的人看到頭髮和蒼蠅等。此外境是空的，只有識，這是他們的宗義。就由此義而進行反駁說：這個比喻不成立。在光明的部分虛妄地產生頭髮的想法，這是由於他的眼根虧損。

【English Translation】 English version: Abandoning its own nature. Or perhaps a Bodhisattva is one who exists by covering up the mundane. This principle applies to me as well. Regarding the perception of form, etc., the arising of differentiation is due to the covering up of the mundane. It's like clinging to the notion of a 'cart' based on the perception of form. However, it's merely due to the conceptual grasping of consciousness, which covers and obscures the true nature of form, etc. At the convergence of various conditions, it fabricates its own characteristics and establishes them. Just as one sees a cart in an external object. What does 'covering up the mundane' mean? It means covering up and obscuring, conforming to mundane sentiments. Because they cling to the notion of inherent existence in things like carts, this is existing by covering up the mundane, obscuring its true essence and giving rise to other attachments. Therefore, those deluded emotions fabricate its appearance, first grasping onto these things. Although there is no real appearance, a false imagination of objects arises. Furthermore, like the appearances presented by notions of permanence, etc., where is the original appearance to conform to? Therefore, even if there is no real object outside of consciousness, the appearance manifested by consciousness can be established. Or perhaps, the term 'semblance' here refers to conforming to the meaning of inverted matters. Just as in the heat haze, it is mistakenly understood as water, and the thought of water arises. Consciousness also gives rise to inverted emotions in the appearances of form, etc., hence the term 'manifested appearance.' This is not contradictory. Some say that the inverted object also relies on a real thing to begin with in order for consciousness to arise. This statement is the same as before and can be refuted. Furthermore, there are externalists who hold different views, asserting that there is a separate 'self' apart from external objects like form. Upon what does this inversion arise? The sutra says, 'Based on the internal.' This is also not contradictory, as it refers to the secret teaching regarding the view of self arising from co-emergence. Therefore, it is said that one should apply the mind to the 'self' and see it directly. Just as one says to close evil friends, 'You did this to me on purpose.' However, those ordinary and petty people falsely generate their consciousness, thus giving rise to inversion, considering it to be the appearance of an external object. Or perhaps, it is conforming to things commonly accomplished by others and using them as speech. Just as worldly matters commonly accepted are taken as objects, consciousness arises solely in relation to that matter. Therefore, due to this semblance of an object, the consciousness that cognizes form, etc., does not grasp an external object. Just as a person with dizziness sees hairs and flies, etc. This external object is empty, and only consciousness exists; this is their doctrine. Based on this meaning, they are refuted by saying: This analogy is not valid. The false idea of hairs arising in the part of light is due to the deficiency of his eye faculty.

力故。有說有別大種生而可見。遂令情執為其發等。若如是立似境相現。但唯識者處時等定便成非理。如其所有色等諸境離識別有。即於色等定其方所所現形量分局之處。其識于彼形量決斷。方隅決定似彼相生。斯成應理。若如所許不由外境。但唯內識起妄所執色相生者。于余無處。如何不隨形量決定處時現識相耶。隨於方處見其處定。如隨處有非一切處。境既無定。即于余處亦應可見。或不可見。然彼所立定不取其外境生識。于非有境所生之覺。曾無決定處時可得。有其實事。說境空故。決定時處所現之相。便成非有。然不如是。此既無定見色等心與彼乃是不相離性。是故不應執境空無。既無重執有有分者。此顯立宗有相違過。若言其喻有成理者。身不定屬理有相違。相應時處。和會共觀。不偏屬一。由覿斯境。此不應理。許境無故。此既境無。或復異類。言異類者。見異相時。此是根壞為其緣故。如眩翳人。亦不應有諸能觀者咸皆患翳。然於時處現相應者。于諸身處不定而生。並於色等能見識生。準此應知。外境無故。于所量事在不定身不見生故。此則同前難斥宗過。又諸事用亦不應理。諸實發等現見。能為磨鏡等用。何不用此識之發相。雖無真實事。而作用轉生。此亦非理。無功能故。若其識分有功能者。眩目

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因為力量的緣故。有一種說法是大種（mahābhūta，四大元素）所生之物是可見的，因此導致人們對頭髮等產生執著。如果這樣認為，似乎是境相顯現，但如果只有唯識，那麼在特定地點和時間等情況下就會變得不合理。如果所有色等境（rūpa，色）都獨立於識而存在，那麼對於色等的固定位置、所呈現的形狀大小以及分割之處，識對於這些形狀大小的判斷，以及方位上的確定，都應該與這些外境的相狀相似，這樣才合理。如果像他們所認為的那樣，不是由於外境，而是僅僅由於內在的識產生虛妄的執著，從而產生色相，那麼在其他地方，為什麼不會隨著形狀大小而確定地點和時間，從而顯現識相呢？隨著在某個地方看到，就確定那個地方，就像在某個地方存在，而不是在所有地方存在一樣。既然境沒有固定，那麼在其他地方也應該可見，或者不可見。然而，他們所主張的，不認為是從外境產生識。對於在沒有境的情況下所產生的覺知，從來沒有確定的地點和時間可以獲得。因為實際上境是空無的，所以所顯現的確定時間和地點之相，就變成了非有。然而，事實並非如此。既然沒有固定的見色等心，那麼它與外境就是不可分離的。因此，不應該執著于境是空無的。既然沒有重複執著于有有分（bhāga，部分）的人，這就顯示了立宗存在自相矛盾的過失。如果說這個比喻是合理的，那麼身體不固定屬於理有相違，相應的時間和地點，共同觀看，不偏向於一方，因為看到了這個境。這不合理，因為承認境是空無的。既然境是空無的，或者說是異類。所說的異類，是指看到不同相的時候，這是根（indriya，感覺器官）壞了，是它的緣故，就像眩暈的人一樣。也不應該所有能觀看的人都患有眼翳。然而，在時間和地點上顯現相應的，在各個身體部位不固定地產生，並且對於色等產生能見的識，應該依此來理解。因為外境是空無的，所以在所量的事物上，在不固定的身體上看不到產生，這就像前面一樣，可以用難題來駁斥宗義的過失。而且，各種事物的作用也不合理。實際的頭髮等顯現出來，能夠用來磨鏡子等，為什麼不用這個識的頭髮相呢？即使沒有真實的事物，作用也能轉化產生，這也是不合理的，因為沒有功能。如果識分有功能，那麼眩目（timira，眼翳）。 English version: Because of the power. There is a saying that things born from the mahābhūta (the four great elements) are visible, thus leading to attachment to things like hair. If this is the case, it seems that the appearance of objects is manifested, but if there is only consciousness-only (Vijñānavāda), then it becomes unreasonable in specific places and times, etc. If all objects such as rūpa (form) exist independently of consciousness, then for the fixed location of rūpa, the size of the shape presented, and the places of division, the consciousness's judgment of these shapes and sizes, and the determination of the directions, should be similar to the characteristics of these external objects, which would be reasonable. If, as they believe, it is not due to external objects, but merely due to the internal consciousness producing false attachments, thereby producing form, then in other places, why wouldn't the location and time be determined according to the size of the shape, thereby manifesting the appearance of consciousness? As one sees in a certain place, one determines that place, just as it exists in a certain place, but not in all places. Since the object is not fixed, it should be visible or invisible in other places as well. However, what they advocate is not that consciousness arises from external objects. For the perception that arises in the absence of an object, there has never been a definite place and time that can be obtained. Because the object is actually empty, the appearance of the definite time and place that is manifested becomes non-existent. However, this is not the case. Since there is no fixed mind that sees form, it is inseparable from external objects. Therefore, one should not be attached to the idea that the object is empty. Since there is no one who repeatedly clings to the existence of bhāga (parts), this shows that there is a contradiction in establishing the thesis. If it is said that this analogy is reasonable, then the unfixed body belongs to the contradiction of reason, the corresponding time and place, watching together, not biased towards one side, because one sees this object. This is unreasonable because it is admitted that the object is empty. Since the object is empty, or it is a different kind. The so-called different kind refers to when seeing a different appearance, this is because the indriya (sense organs) are broken, it is its cause, just like a dizzy person. Nor should all those who can see suffer from cataracts. However, those who manifest corresponding in time and place, arise unfixed in various parts of the body, and for the consciousness that produces the ability to see form, etc., one should understand accordingly. Because external objects are empty, on the measured things, one cannot see the production on the unfixed body, this is like before, one can use difficult questions to refute the fault of the thesis. Moreover, the functions of various things are also unreasonable. Actual hair, etc., appear and can be used to polish mirrors, etc. Why not use this hair appearance of consciousness? Even if there is no real thing, the function can be transformed and produced, which is also unreasonable because there is no function. If the consciousness part has a function, then timira (cataracts).

【English Translation】 English version: Because of the power. There is a saying that things born from the mahābhūta (the four great elements) are visible, thus leading to attachment to things like hair. If this is the case, it seems that the appearance of objects is manifested, but if there is only consciousness-only (Vijñānavāda), then it becomes unreasonable in specific places and times, etc. If all objects such as rūpa (form) exist independently of consciousness, then for the fixed location of rūpa, the size of the shape presented, and the places of division, the consciousness's judgment of these shapes and sizes, and the determination of the directions, should be similar to the characteristics of these external objects, which would be reasonable. If, as they believe, it is not due to external objects, but merely due to the internal consciousness producing false attachments, thereby producing form, then in other places, why wouldn't the location and time be determined according to the size of the shape, thereby manifesting the appearance of consciousness? As one sees in a certain place, one determines that place, just as it exists in a certain place, but not in all places. Since the object is not fixed, it should be visible or invisible in other places as well. However, what they advocate is not that consciousness arises from external objects. For the perception that arises in the absence of an object, there has never been a definite place and time that can be obtained. Because the object is actually empty, the appearance of the definite time and place that is manifested becomes non-existent. However, this is not the case. Since there is no fixed mind that sees form, it is inseparable from external objects. Therefore, one should not be attached to the idea that the object is empty. Since there is no one who repeatedly clings to the existence of bhāga (parts), this shows that there is a contradiction in establishing the thesis. If it is said that this analogy is reasonable, then the unfixed body belongs to the contradiction of reason, the corresponding time and place, watching together, not biased towards one side, because one sees this object. This is unreasonable because it is admitted that the object is empty. Since the object is empty, or it is a different kind. The so-called different kind refers to when seeing a different appearance, this is because the indriya (sense organs) are broken, it is its cause, just like a dizzy person. Nor should all those who can see suffer from cataracts. However, those who manifest corresponding in time and place, arise unfixed in various parts of the body, and for the consciousness that produces the ability to see form, etc., one should understand accordingly. Because external objects are empty, on the measured things, one cannot see the production on the unfixed body, this is like before, one can use difficult questions to refute the fault of the thesis. Moreover, the functions of various things are also unreasonable. Actual hair, etc., appear and can be used to polish mirrors, etc. Why not use this hair appearance of consciousness? Even if there is no real thing, the function can be transformed and produced, which is also unreasonable because there is no function. If the consciousness part has a function, then timira (cataracts).

所覿何無發用。此之同有似發相故。斯亦同前。所量之境作用功能。不可見故。出其宗過。三喻為依。三事不同。于不實境而作三喻。由依根境功能差別。應知根有二種。一是色根。二非色根。即此初根由闇損故妄見其事。故為初喻。次第二根。于彼夢中見有差別。述第二喻。由其彼境有功力故。能生倒見引第三喻。此則是其一家異釋。有餘復言。處時決定。故緣色等心心是依託。非內現事而為其境。猶如緣彼章句之心。然於心內據最初起。隨現有事而執取故。又且諸覺容有定時。然而於心如何定處。非無方處物有方處定及不定。故此據境上所有之法。于其心處而假說之。斯亦無過。此處能作現相事故。說為定處。凡由彼事心得生者。即名為境。此謂成立別有外境。取共許者將以為喻。于其相應時處住者。咸共生其無異相故。緣色等心以外一事而為其因。如同學類依教者。心依增上識。此得生起隨其自相作用生故。故知離識別有色等。此不應有更應成立無發等用彼相之覺。猶如夢覺是覺性故。上來所述眾多成立相違道理。意欲障他不定之過。有餘復言。謂即於斯時處二種有其實義。即於此處時處決定應成非有。仁既不許有其境事。依彼差別亦不許故。何勞為他作便成過。此若非有便即相符。如賊被捉唱瘡痛言。強作前

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：所觀察到的（現象）為何沒有實際作用？因為這種『同有』（共同存在）類似於頭髮的表象，所以也和之前的情況一樣（是虛假的）。所度量的境界，其作用和功能是不可見的，因此提出了宗過（過失）。以三種比喻作為依據，這三件事是不同的。在不真實的境界中作三種比喻，是因為依賴於根、境的功能差別。應該知道根有兩種：一是色根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五根，能感知色、聲、香、味、觸五種外境），二是非色根（意根，即意識）。這最初的色根因為昏暗受損，所以錯誤地看到事物，因此作為第一個比喻。其次，第二個根（意根），在夢中看到有差別（的景象），描述了第二個比喻。因為那境界有功力，能產生顛倒的見解，引出了第三個比喻。這是一家不同的解釋。還有人說，處所和時間是決定的，所以緣於色等（外境）的心和心所是依託于外境的，不是內在顯現的事物作為其境界，就像緣于那些章句的心一樣。然而在內心，根據最初生起的，隨著現有事物而執取，而且各種感覺容許有一定的時間。然而，對於心來說，如何在（外境）確定處所呢？不是沒有方位的物體有方位的確定和不確定。因此這是根據境界上所有的法，在心中假說處所。這也沒有過失。此處能作為顯現事物的因緣，所以說是確定的處所。凡是由那件事物使心生起的，就叫做境界。這是爲了成立別有外境，取共同認可的事物作為比喻。在相應的時處居住的人，都共同產生沒有差異的表象。緣於色等的心，以外在的事物作為其原因，如同學習同一類教義的人。心依賴於增上識（第六意識），這才能生起，隨著其自身的表象和作用而生起。所以知道離開識別，別有色等（外境）。這不應該有，更應該成立沒有頭髮等作用的表象，就像夢中的感覺一樣，是感覺的本性。上面所說的眾多成立相違的道理，意圖阻止他人（指出）不確定的過失。還有人說，正是在此時處兩種（條件）有其實義。正是在此處時處決定，應該成為非有。既然你不允許有境界的事物，也不允許依賴於那些差別，何必為他人制造方便而造成過失？如果這（外境）不是有，那就相符了，就像小偷被抓住后喊傷痛一樣，強作姿態。

【English Translation】 English version: Why does what is perceived have no actual function? Because this 'co-existence' is similar to the appearance of hair, so it is the same as before (false). The measured realm, its function and capabilities are invisible, thus presenting a fallacy. Using three metaphors as a basis, these three things are different. Making three metaphors in an unreal realm is because it relies on the differences in the functions of the root and the object. It should be known that there are two types of roots: one is the rupa-indriya (sense organs, namely eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, which can perceive the five external objects of form, sound, smell, taste, and touch), and the other is the non-rupa-indriya (manas-indriya, i.e., consciousness). This initial rupa-indriya is impaired by darkness, so it mistakenly sees things, thus serving as the first metaphor. Secondly, the second root (manas-indriya), seeing differences (in scenes) in dreams, describes the second metaphor. Because that realm has power, it can produce inverted views, leading to the third metaphor. This is a different interpretation from one school. Others say that the place and time are fixed, so the mind and mental states that arise from objects such as form rely on external objects, not internal manifestations as their realm, just like the mind that arises from those verses. However, in the mind, according to what initially arises, it grasps according to existing things, and various feelings allow for a certain time. However, for the mind, how is the location determined (in the external object)? It is not that objects without direction have a fixed or unfixed direction. Therefore, this is based on all the dharmas that exist in the realm, and the location is falsely stated in the mind. This is also not a fault. This place can serve as the cause for the manifestation of things, so it is said to be a fixed place. Whatever thing causes the mind to arise is called the realm. This is to establish that there is a separate external realm, taking commonly recognized things as metaphors. Those who live in the corresponding time and place all commonly produce appearances without difference. The mind that arises from objects such as form takes external things as its cause, just like those who study the same type of teachings. The mind relies on the adhipati-vijnana (the sixth consciousness), so that it can arise, arising according to its own appearance and function. Therefore, it is known that apart from discrimination, there are separate objects such as form. This should not be, and it should be established that there is no appearance of the function of hair, just like the feeling in a dream, which is the nature of feeling. The many reasons for establishing contradictions mentioned above are intended to prevent others from (pointing out) the fault of uncertainty. Others say that it is precisely in these two (conditions) of time and place that there is actual meaning. It is precisely in this fixed time and place that it should become non-existent. Since you do not allow the existence of objects in the realm, nor do you allow reliance on those differences, why create convenience for others and cause faults? If this (external object) is not existent, then it is consistent, just like a thief shouting about pain after being caught, putting on a strong front.

宗誠為粗淺。不應理故。若言于識所現相狀為所許者不應道理。雖呈雅思不異前釋。或復隨於時處差別所有之事。即於此處見其時處許為決定。縱于所許有實外境。然而色等永為定者。此亦非理異時異處有時見故。設令於此常時見有。然他不許如何於他不共許境。此之能別決定道理可遣許耶。故但于識而現其相。復有別作相違因難而為詰責。猶如成立境是空無我。還成立時處決定令非有故。若其時處是共許者。便成共許而遮遣之。由其無違方可得作相違之言。若言不是眾所共許。斯乃全無我所不愛。由斯理故成無力難。

復有自許。但用遮遣。于無境處。緣空之識無定時處故。彼之決定於色等處共見有故。成立外境是其實有。此亦應知離彼隨成。但有遮遣不應理故。但用此一不能令他生其正解。斯非真實。且如前宗所立之義。由底蜜攞之所損故。于眼睛上有其疏膜。如羅網目外觀白色。于彼隙中明相斯顯。便生妄解將為發等。即此之喻于其所立。隨成理闕。今應問彼。若光明相發等形狀。此不應理。此光明相有見為黃。或見為赤。然于發等見為純黑。或見眾彩。如鑠羯羅弓等。然其明目總能見者。于彼光邊不觀異相。如事見之。能作斯語。在隙光處倒為發解。此即便成。見發等心境空無性。光明支分非發相性故

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：宗誠的觀點過於粗淺，因為不合邏輯。如果說在意識中所顯現的相狀是被認可的，那也是不合道理的。即使呈現出精妙的思考，也與之前的解釋沒有區別。或者，隨著時間和地點的不同而存在的事物，就在這裡看到其時間和地點，並認為它是確定的。即使在所認可的事物中有真實的外境，然而顏色等永遠是確定的，這也是不合理的，因為在不同的時間和地點有時會看到不同的顏色。假設在這種情況下總是能看到，但其他人不認可，又如何能對其他人不共同認可的境，施加能區分的決定性道理並加以否定呢？所以，僅僅在意識中顯現其相狀。此外，還有另外製造相違的理由來責難，就像成立境是空無我一樣，反過來又成立時間和地點是確定的，從而使其不存在。如果時間和地點是共同認可的，那就變成了認可之後又遮遣它。只有在沒有矛盾的情況下，才能說出相違的話。如果說不是大眾所共同認可的，那麼這完全不是我所喜歡的。因為這個原因，就成了無力的責難。還有一種自許，僅僅使用遮遣。在沒有境的地方，緣于空的意識沒有固定的時間和地點。因此，對顏色等處共同見到的確定性，成立外境是真實存在的。這也應該知道，離開了它就隨之成立。僅僅有遮遣是不合理的，僅僅用這一個不能讓別人產生正確的理解，這不是真實的。比如之前的宗派所立的意義，由於底蜜攞（timmila，眼翳）的損害，在眼睛上有疏膜，像羅網的網眼一樣，外觀是白色的。在那些縫隙中，光明顯現，於是產生錯誤的理解，認為是頭髮等。這個比喻對於其所立的觀點來說，隨之成立了道理上的缺失。現在應該問他們，如果光明相是頭髮等的形狀，這是不合理的。這種光明相有時看到是黃色的，有時看到是紅色的，然而頭髮等看到的是純黑色的，或者看到各種顏色，像鑠羯羅弓（sakkara-dhanu，彩虹）等。然而，明亮的眼睛總能看到，在光線旁邊不觀察不同的相狀，就像看到事物一樣。能說出這樣的話，在縫隙的光線處倒過來理解為頭髮。這樣就成立了，看到頭髮等的心境是空無自性的，光明的組成部分不是頭髮的相狀。

【English Translation】 English version: Zongcheng's view is too superficial because it is illogical. If it is said that the appearances manifested in consciousness are accepted, that is also unreasonable. Even if subtle thoughts are presented, they are no different from the previous explanations. Or, things that exist differently depending on time and place, see their time and place here, and consider them to be fixed. Even if there are real external objects in what is accepted, it is unreasonable for colors, etc., to be forever fixed, because different colors are sometimes seen at different times and places. Suppose one always sees this, but others do not accept it, how can one impose a distinguishing and decisive reason on the realm that others do not jointly accept and deny it? Therefore, it is only in consciousness that its appearance is manifested. In addition, there are other conflicting reasons to blame, just like establishing that the realm is empty of self, and conversely establishing that time and place are fixed, thereby making it non-existent. If time and place are commonly accepted, then it becomes accepting and then rejecting it. Only when there is no contradiction can conflicting words be spoken. If it is said that it is not commonly accepted by the public, then this is not what I like at all. For this reason, it becomes a weak accusation. There is also a self-assertion that only uses negation. In a place where there is no realm, the consciousness that arises from emptiness has no fixed time and place. Therefore, the certainty of seeing together in places such as colors establishes that the external realm is real. It should also be known that it follows from leaving it. It is unreasonable to only have negation, and using only this one cannot make others produce correct understanding, which is not true. For example, the meaning established by the previous sect, due to the damage of timmila (eye disease), there is a sparse membrane on the eye, like the mesh of a net, and the appearance is white. In those gaps, light appears, and then a wrong understanding arises, thinking it is hair, etc. This metaphor, for the view it establishes, consequently establishes a lack of reason. Now they should be asked, if the appearance of light is the shape of hair, etc., this is unreasonable. This appearance of light is sometimes seen as yellow, sometimes seen as red, but hair, etc., is seen as pure black, or seen as various colors, like sakkara-dhanu (rainbow), etc. However, bright eyes can always see, and do not observe different appearances next to the light, just like seeing things. Being able to say such words, understanding the light in the gaps as hair in reverse. In this way, it is established that the state of mind seeing hair, etc., is empty of self-nature, and the components of light are not the appearance of hair.

。及此似發等相現故。非但為因能為生者。遂令作其所緣性故。勿令緣其色等諸識便成緣彼眼等諸根因義同故。或可更有如斯別意。托實事因方生顛倒。余則不爾。斯言是實此亦便依。在內安布種子成就。不待外境。凡論境者。要須自相安布在心。然後方得成所緣性。其光明分起不關心。如何得作所緣之性。此亦未堪發生歡悅。次有計云。其患目人大種失度。睛生翳眩損其眼分。由彼損力便生異相。令于外境別大種生。依損根識便能見彼。是故定知羝蜜梨迦。所有覺慧緣實外境。如斯計者有大過失。凡邪倒事所起覺心。皆來設難。於樂等倒托誰為緣。而生是相作其境耶。雖無外境然有妄見。此則顛倒。便成非有。若言世俗不共許事。我即將此以為邪倒。還有大過。苦空等見緣薩帝時。是彼類故。此則不勞功力能見非倒。諸具縛者咸是悟真。如來出世宣揚正法。此即便成空無果利。何處得有如是定判。偏令翳目獨受邪迷。又復于彼情有相狀。見其有情飛行往還。令諸覺者觀其搖飏。此諸薩埵許大種生。何不計命。設復百千群翳同聚。遂於一處各觀別形。此時如何有對礙物。而不更相共為排擯。若言此亦由其翳力。則底蜜攞多用其功。于所學門善修幻術。能令諸法自性遷移。或應見許彼非質礙。非質礙故。如無貪等。便非

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：以及因為這種類似於毛髮等的虛幻景象顯現的緣故。不僅是因為作為因能夠產生事物，才使得它成為所緣的自性。不要讓緣于顏色等事物的各種意識，變成緣于眼等諸根，因為這樣它們的因的意義就相同了。或許還有其他的特殊含義，即依託真實的事物作為因，才會產生顛倒的認知，否則就不會。這種說法是真實的，並且也符合以下觀點：種子在內在安立併成就，不依賴於外在的境界。凡是討論境界的，必須是自相在心中安立，然後才能成為所緣的自性。如果光明的部分生起與心無關，又如何能作為所緣的自性呢？這也不足以產生歡悅。其次有人認為，患眼病的人四大失調，眼睛生出翳障，損傷了眼的功能。由於這種損傷的力量，便產生了奇異的景象，使得對外在境界的別大種產生認知。依靠受損的根識，便能看到這些景象。因此可以確定地說，底蜜梨迦（有眼病者）的所有覺知都是緣于真實的外在境界。持有這種觀點的人有很大的過失。凡是由邪倒之事所產生的覺知，都可以用來提出質疑。對於快樂等顛倒的認知，依託什麼作為所緣，而產生這種景象，作為它的境界呢？即使沒有外在的境界，仍然有虛妄的見解，這就是顛倒，便成為非真實的存在。如果說世俗不共同認可的事情，我就將它視為邪倒，這還有很大的過失。苦、空等見緣于薩帝（真諦）時，因為是同類，所以不費力氣就能見到，不是顛倒。那麼所有被束縛的人都成了覺悟真理的人，如來出世宣揚正法，這就會變得空無果利。哪裡會有這樣的定論，偏偏讓翳眼的人獨自承受邪迷呢？又在那些情境中，有情（眾生）的相狀，看到有情飛行往來，讓那些覺悟者觀察他們的搖曳。這些薩埵（有情）允許別大種產生，為什麼不計算壽命呢？假設成百上千的翳障聚集在一起，於是在同一個地方各自看到不同的形狀，這時如何會有對礙之物，而不互相排斥呢？如果說這也是由於翳障的力量，那麼底蜜攞（眼病）就過多地使用了它的功能，在所學的法門中，善於修習幻術，能夠使諸法的自性轉移。或者應該允許他們不是質礙，因為不是質礙，就像沒有貪慾等一樣，便不是...

【English Translation】 English version: And because of the appearance of these illusory phenomena like hair, etc. It is not only because being a cause can produce things, that it becomes the self-nature of what is cognized. Do not let the various consciousnesses that arise from colors, etc., become causes of the eye and other senses, because then their meaning as causes would be the same. Perhaps there is another special meaning, that only by relying on real things as a cause, will inverted cognition arise, otherwise it will not. This statement is true, and it also agrees with the following view: seeds are established and accomplished internally, without relying on external realms. Whenever discussing realms, it is necessary for the self-nature to be established in the mind, and then it can become the self-nature of what is cognized. If the part of light arises without concerning the mind, how can it be the self-nature of what is cognized? This is also not sufficient to produce joy. Secondly, some people think that the four elements of people with eye diseases are imbalanced, and a film grows in the eyes, damaging the function of the eyes. Due to the power of this damage, strange phenomena arise, causing the cognition of separate great elements in the external realm. Relying on the damaged sense consciousness, one can see these phenomena. Therefore, it can be determined that all the perceptions of Timira (one with eye disease) are based on real external realms. Those who hold this view have great faults. All perceptions arising from perverse matters can be used to raise questions. For inverted cognitions such as happiness, what is relied upon as the object, and what produces this phenomenon, as its realm? Even if there is no external realm, there are still false views, which is inversion, and becomes a non-real existence. If I say that things not commonly recognized by the world, I will regard it as perverse, this still has great faults. When suffering, emptiness, etc., are based on Satya (truth), because they are of the same kind, they can be seen without effort, and are not inverted. Then all those who are bound become enlightened to the truth, and the Tathagata's appearance in the world to proclaim the Dharma would become empty and fruitless. Where would there be such a conclusion, that only those with cataracts alone suffer from perverse delusion? Also, in those situations, the appearance of sentient beings, seeing sentient beings flying back and forth, allows those who are enlightened to observe their swaying. These Sattvas (sentient beings) allow separate great elements to arise, why not calculate lifespan? Suppose hundreds or thousands of cataracts gather together, and thus each sees different shapes in the same place, how can there be obstructive objects at this time, without repelling each other? If it is said that this is also due to the power of cataracts, then Timira (eye disease) has used its function too much, and is good at practicing illusion in the learned Dharma, and can transfer the self-nature of all dharmas. Or it should be allowed that they are not obstructive, because they are not obstructive, just like without greed, etc., then they are not...

色性。斯乃何殊唯識論者。

又復何勞非處呈力。彼許大種。于其一一非青等性。但由種合因緣力故。眼等諸識緣彼相生。此本宗義凡是聚合非實物有。即此之識緣非實物。不勞深構。無違諍故。詎煩辛苦而為成立。

成唯識寶生論卷第一

大唐景龍四年歲次庚戌四月壬午朔十五日景申三藏法師大德沙門義凈宣釋梵本並綴文正字

翻經沙門吐火羅大德達秣磨證梵義

翻經沙門中天竺國大德拔努證梵義

翻經沙門罽賓國大德達摩難陀證梵文

翻經沙門淄州大云寺大德惠沼證義

翻經沙門洛州崇光寺大德律師道[田*林]證義

翻經沙門福壽寺寺主大德利明證義

翻經沙門洛州太平寺大德律師道恪證義

翻經沙門大薦福寺大德大勝莊證義

翻經沙門相州禪河寺大德玄傘證義筆受

翻經沙門大薦福寺大德律師智積證義正字

翻經沙門德州大云寺寺主惠傘證義

翻經沙門西涼州伯塔寺大德惠積讀梵本

翻經婆羅門右驍衛翊府中郎將員外接宿衛臣李釋迦讀梵本

翻經婆羅門東天竺國左衛翊府中郎將員外接同正員臣瞿金剛證譯

翻經婆羅門東天竺國大首領臣伊舍羅證梵本

翻經婆羅門左領軍衛中郎將迦濕

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本色性（rūpa-svabhāva）：這與唯識論者的觀點有何不同？又何必多此一舉，在非處所展現力量呢？唯識論者承認『大種』（mahābhūta，四大元素：地、水、火、風）各自並非青色等性質，而是由於各種元素組合的因緣力量，才使得眼識等能夠緣取這些現象而生起。這本來就是本宗的觀點：凡是聚合之物都不是真實存在的。既然如此，眼識所緣取的也不是真實存在的物體，無需深入構建理論，因為沒有爭議。又何必費盡心思去論證這一點呢？《成唯識寶生論》卷第一大唐景龍四年，歲次庚戌四月壬午朔十五日庚申，三藏法師大德沙門義凈宣釋梵本並綴文正字翻經沙門吐火羅大德達秣磨證梵義翻經沙門中天竺國大德拔努證梵義翻經沙門罽賓國大德達摩難陀證梵文翻經沙門淄州大云寺大德惠沼證義翻經沙門洛州崇光寺大德律師道[田*林]證義翻經沙門福壽寺寺主大德利明證義翻經沙門洛州太平寺大德律師道恪證義翻經沙門大薦福寺大德大勝莊證義翻經沙門相州禪河寺大德玄傘證義筆受翻經沙門大薦福寺大德律師智積證義正字翻經沙門德州大云寺寺主惠傘證義翻經沙門西涼州伯塔寺大德惠積讀梵本翻經婆羅門右驍衛翊府中郎將員外接宿衛臣李釋迦讀梵本翻經婆羅門東天竺國左衛翊府中郎將員外接同正員臣瞿金剛證譯翻經婆羅門東天竺國大首領臣伊舍羅證梵本翻經婆羅門左領軍衛中郎將迦濕

【English Translation】 English version What is the difference in the nature of rūpa (form) according to the Vijñānavāda (Consciousness-only) school? And why bother exerting effort where it's unnecessary? They (the Vijñānavādins) acknowledge that the 'mahābhūtas' (the great elements: earth, water, fire, and wind) each do not inherently possess qualities like blueness, but it is through the causal power of the combination of these elements that the eye-consciousness and other consciousnesses arise, perceiving these phenomena. This is the fundamental principle of our school: all aggregates are not truly existent. Therefore, since the objects perceived by consciousness are not truly existent, there is no need for elaborate theoretical constructions, as there is no dispute. Why go through the trouble of establishing this? Treatise on the Treasure of Establishing Consciousness-only, Volume 1 Declared and explained from the Sanskrit text, with appended text and corrected characters, by the Tripiṭaka Master, the virtuous śrāmaṇa Yijing, on the 15th day, Gengshen, of the 4th month, Renwu, of the year Gengxu, the fourth year of the Jinglong era of the Great Tang Dynasty. The śrāmaṇa translator of scriptures, the virtuous Dharmama from Tokhara, verified the Sanskrit meaning. The śrāmaṇa translator of scriptures, the virtuous Banu from Central India, verified the Sanskrit meaning. The śrāmaṇa translator of scriptures, the virtuous Dharmananda from Kashmir, verified the Sanskrit text. The śrāmaṇa translator of scriptures, the virtuous Huizhao from Dayun Temple in Zizhou, verified the meaning. The śrāmaṇa translator of scriptures, the virtuous Vinaya Master Dao[田*林] from Chongguang Temple in Luoyang, verified the meaning. The śrāmaṇa translator of scriptures, the virtuous Liming, abbot of Fushou Temple, verified the meaning. The śrāmaṇa translator of scriptures, the virtuous Vinaya Master Daoge from Taiping Temple in Luoyang, verified the meaning. The śrāmaṇa translator of scriptures, the virtuous Dashengzhuang from Dajianfu Temple, verified the meaning. The śrāmaṇa translator of scriptures, the virtuous Xuansan from Chanhe Temple in Xiangzhou, received the text and took notes. The śrāmaṇa translator of scriptures, the virtuous Vinaya Master Zhiji from Dajianfu Temple, verified the meaning and corrected the characters. The śrāmaṇa translator of scriptures, the virtuous Huisan, abbot of Dayun Temple in Dezhou, verified the meaning. The śrāmaṇa translator of scriptures, the virtuous Huiji from Bota Temple in Xiliangzhou, read the Sanskrit text. The Brahmin translator of scriptures, Li Shijia, a supernumerary palace guard of the Right Xiao Wei Yifu, read the Sanskrit text. The Brahmin translator of scriptures, Qu Jingang, a supernumerary concurrent official of the Left Wei Yifu in East India, verified the translation. The Brahmin translator of scriptures, Isvara, a great leader from East India, verified the Sanskrit text. The Brahmin translator of scriptures, Kash

彌羅國王子臣阿順證譯

翻經婆羅門東天竺國左執戟直中書省臣度頗具讀梵本

翻經婆羅門龍播國大達官準五品臣李輸羅證譯

金紫光祿大夫守尚書左僕射同中書門下三品上柱國史館國公臣匡臣源等及修文館學士三十三人同監

判官朝散大夫行著作佐郎臣劉令植

使金紫光祿大夫行秘書監檢校殿中監兼知內外閑廄隴右三使上柱國嗣號王臣邑大正藏第 31 冊 No. 1591 成唯識寶生論

成唯識寶生論卷第二(一名二十唯識順釋論)

護法菩薩造

大唐三藏法師義凈奉　制譯

論曰。復言處時定如夢者。謂如諸覺雖無其境共許有定。若時決定而有方處。見村園等復有定時。現前可得。然非彼有。斯言為顯雖有決定時處之覺而無境故。彼於他成因無用故。即彼因云諸無境者。便成時處不決定故。由斯道理既有其定。故知所言彼之決定。非顯有言。欲令成彼境無非有。不應道理。此即全無宗之過也。又成立時能有功能。有功能說。所立既無能立非有。能遍無故所遍亦無。方能與他出其宗過。猶如於秤無其重故。無別有分。此既共許。說無重故便舍別物。然非於此翻彼便成。時處定故能得成立。令境是有無隨成故。猶如耳識所聽聞性。不能成立聲是其

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本彌羅國王子阿順（Prince Ashun of the Mi Luo Kingdom）翻譯翻譯佛經的婆羅門，東天竺國（East India）左執戟直中書省臣度頗具（Du Po Ju），閱讀梵文原本翻譯佛經的婆羅門，龍播國（Long Bo Kingdom）大達官準五品臣李輸羅（Li Shu Luo）校正翻譯金紫光祿大夫、守尚書左僕射、同中書門下三品、上柱國史館國公臣匡臣源（Kuang Chen Yuan）等，以及修文館學士三十三人共同監督判官朝散大夫、行著作佐郎臣劉令植（Liu Ling Zhi）使金紫光祿大夫、行秘書監、檢校殿中監、兼知內外閑廄隴右三使、上柱國嗣號王臣邑（Yi）大正藏第 31 冊 No. 1591 成唯識寶生論成唯識寶生論卷第二（又名二十唯識順釋論）護法菩薩（Bodhisattva Dharmapala）造大唐三藏法師義凈（Yijing）奉旨翻譯論曰：再次說處所和時間的確定性如同夢境一樣，意思是說，就像各種覺知，即使沒有實際的境界，也普遍承認有其確定性。如果時間是確定的，並且有方位和處所，看到村莊、園林等，並且有特定的時間，在眼前可以得到，但那些並非真實存在。這句話是爲了表明，即使有確定的時間和處所的覺知，也沒有真實的境界。因為對於他人來說，這個因（hetu）沒有作用。就像那個因所說的『所有沒有境界的事物，就會變成時間和處所不確定』。由於這個道理，既然有了確定性，所以要知道所說的那個確定性，並不是爲了顯示有言語，想要使那個境界成立為『無而非有』，這是不應道理的。這完全是『無宗』的過失。而且，成立的時候能夠有功能，有功能的說法。所要成立的既然沒有，能成立的也就沒有。能遍沒有了，所遍也就沒有了。才能向他人指出其宗派的過失。就像秤沒有重量一樣，沒有別的區分。這既然是普遍承認的，說沒有重量，就捨棄了別的物體。然而並非在此處推翻彼處就能成立。因為時間和處所是確定的，所以能夠成立，使得境界是有還是無，都隨之成立。就像耳識所聽聞的性質，不能成立聲音是它的...

【English Translation】 English version Translated by Prince Ashun of the Mi Luo Kingdom. The Brahmana who translated the scriptures, Du Po Ju, a minister of the Left Halberd of the Secretariat of the Eastern India, read the Sanskrit original. The Brahmana who translated the scriptures, Li Shu Luo, a high-ranking official of the Long Bo Kingdom, an official of the fifth rank, proofread the translation. Kuang Chen Yuan, Grand Master of Gold and Purple, Minister of the Left of the Ministry of Works, holding the same rank as the Three Dukes, Pillar of the State, Duke of the State Archives, and thirty-three scholars of the Institute for the Advancement of Literature jointly supervised. Liu Ling Zhi, Judge, Grand Master of Court, Acting Assistant Compiler of the Bureau of Compilation. Yi, Envoy, Grand Master of Gold and Purple, Acting Director of the Secretariat, concurrently Director of the Palace Affairs, also in charge of the Inner and Outer Stables and the Three Commissioners of Longyou, Pillar of the State, Successor King. Taisho Tripitaka Volume 31, No. 1591, Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only and the Jewel-producing. Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only and the Jewel-producing, Volume 2 (also known as the Commentary on the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only). Composed by Bodhisattva Dharmapala. Translated under imperial decree by the Tang Dynasty Tripitaka Master Yijing. The treatise says: To say again that the definiteness of place and time is like a dream means that, like all perceptions, even if there is no actual realm, it is universally acknowledged that there is definiteness. If the time is definite, and there are directions and places, seeing villages, gardens, etc., and there is a specific time, it can be obtained in front of you, but those are not actually there. This statement is to show that even if there is a perception of definite time and place, there is no real realm. Because for others, this cause (hetu) is useless. Just like that cause says, 'All things without a realm will become indefinite in time and place.' Because of this reasoning, since there is definiteness, it should be known that the definiteness that is spoken of is not to show that there are words, wanting to make that realm established as 'non-existent but not non-existent,' which is unreasonable. This is completely the fault of 'no doctrine'. Moreover, at the time of establishment, there can be function, and there is a saying of function. Since what is to be established does not exist, what can establish also does not exist. Since what pervades does not exist, what is pervaded also does not exist. Only then can one point out the faults of their doctrine to others. Just like a scale has no weight, there is no other distinction. Since this is universally acknowledged, saying there is no weight abandons other objects. However, it is not the case that overturning it here can establish it. Because time and place are definite, it can be established, making the realm existent or non-existent, which follows accordingly. Just like the nature of what is heard by the ear-consciousness, it cannot establish that sound is its...

常。雖無不聞性。然不遮無常。他所成立外境是有。今欲顯其是不定因。縱非外事于情亦復見其時處有決定義。有說由心惑亂。遂乃便生時處定解。然于夢中無其實境決定可得。故世共許。如何將此比余定事。為作過耶。若此夢想欲同覺者。理應夢心便是錯解。斯則但是判在自應。而為嚼咽實不能知他之本意。非是他不許事。於此更令置其差別而難於他。成正理故。此已於前善為通訖。由此所有時處定心外境非有。不應致難。心帶相生。何不合理。又向所說。應言惑亂為定解者。許離識外無定時處曾無非假遂令簡彼。安能別言望所餘事。斯為應理。然許如斯色類咸非外境。何須非處令安能別為出其過。爾者于彼夢中。實亦無其處時決定。相狀在心由何得知。如有頌言。

若眠于夜裡　　見日北方生　參差夢時處　　如何有定心

此但不委前後所述。朋黨旨趣空愛巧詞。由於時處不許。但言唯於此處。故不應詰處時決定。於他所許不相應故。如前已述。復有立言。夢心有境。是其念故。準知處等是其決定。此即緣彼曾境起故。于其夢中多有所見。設在空中見其流水。或於宏海都大火然。此亦是其昔時曾見。若水若空。或炎或海。各于別處觀斷事物。夢中起念為一處解執為空河。若不爾者。應許生盲憶青等故

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：常。雖說具有無所不知的本性，但並不能阻止無常的變化。他們所認為成立的外境是存在的。現在想要說明這是一種不確定的原因。即使不是外在事物，對於情感來說，也能夠看到在時間和地點上有確定的意義。有人說這是由於內心的迷惑混亂，於是就產生了對於時間和地點的確定理解。然而在夢中，實際上並沒有真實的外境可以確定地獲得。所以世人都普遍認可這一點。如何將夢中的情況與其餘確定的事情相比呢？這難道不是一種過失嗎？如果想要將夢中的情況與清醒時的情況等同起來，那麼按照道理來說，夢中的心識就應該是錯誤的理解。這只不過是在自說自話，實際上並不能理解他人的本意。並不是他不認可這件事，而是在此基礎上進一步設定差別來為難他人，以成就自己的理論。這一點已經在前面充分地解釋清楚了。由此可見，所有對於時間和地點的確定認知，外境並非真實存在，不應該以此來提出質疑。心識帶著表象產生，為什麼不合理呢？

又像之前所說的，應該說迷惑混亂是確定理解的原因。如果承認在意識之外沒有確定的時間和地點，從來沒有不是虛假的，那麼又怎麼能夠簡化它們呢？又怎麼能夠區別于其餘的事情呢？這才是合理的。然而，如果承認像這樣的色法都不是外在的境界，又何必在非處所來加以區別，從而指出其中的過失呢？如果這樣的話，那麼在夢中，實際上也沒有時間和地點的確定。表象存在於心中，又怎麼能夠得知呢？

正如頌文所說：

『如果在夜裡睡覺，看到太陽從北方升起，夢中的時間和地點錯亂，又怎麼會有確定的心呢？』

這只是不瞭解前後所說的內容，朋黨的意圖只是空愛巧言。由於不認可時間和地點，只是說唯獨在此處，所以不應該詰難時間和地點的確定。因為與他人所認可的不相應。正如前面已經說過的。又有人立論說，夢中的心識是有境界的，這是因為有念頭。因此可以推知處所等是確定的。這是因為緣于曾經經歷過的境界而產生的。在夢中經常會看到很多事物。即使在空中看到流水，或者在廣闊的大海中看到大火燃燒。這也是過去曾經見過的。無論是水還是天空，無論是火焰還是大海，各自在不同的地方觀察和判斷事物。夢中產生念頭，認為是在同一個地方，執著地認為是空中的河流。如果不是這樣的話，就應該承認盲人能夠回憶起青色等事物。

【English Translation】 English version: Constancy. Although it possesses the nature of hearing everything, it does not prevent impermanence. The external world that they establish as existing is indeed real. Now, I want to show that this is an uncertain cause. Even if it is not an external matter, in terms of emotions, one can see that there is a definite meaning in time and place. Some say that it is due to the confusion and disorder of the mind, which then gives rise to a definite understanding of time and place. However, in dreams, there is actually no real external world that can be definitely obtained. Therefore, the world generally accepts this. How can one compare the situation in dreams with other definite matters? Is this not a mistake?

If one wants to equate the situation in dreams with the situation when awake, then, according to reason, the mind in dreams should be a wrong understanding. This is just talking to oneself, and in reality, one cannot understand the original intention of others. It is not that he does not recognize this matter, but he further sets up differences on this basis to make things difficult for others, in order to achieve his own theory. This point has already been fully explained earlier. From this, it can be seen that all definite cognitions of time and place, the external world is not real, and one should not raise questions based on this. The mind arises with appearances, why is it unreasonable?

Also, as mentioned earlier, it should be said that confusion is the cause of definite understanding. If one admits that there is no definite time and place outside of consciousness, and there has never been anything that is not false, then how can one simplify them? How can one distinguish them from other things? This is reasonable. However, if one admits that such forms are not external realms, why bother to distinguish them in a non-place, so as to point out the faults in them? If so, then in dreams, there is actually no certainty of time and place. Appearances exist in the mind, how can one know them?

As the verse says:

'If one sleeps at night, And sees the sun rising in the north, The time and place in dreams are disordered, How can there be a definite mind?'

This is just not understanding what was said before and after, and the intention of the party is just empty love of clever words. Because one does not recognize time and place, but only says that it is only in this place, one should not question the certainty of time and place. Because it does not correspond to what others recognize. As has been said before. Again, someone argues that the mind in dreams has a realm, because there are thoughts. Therefore, it can be inferred that places, etc., are definite. This is because it arises from the realm that has been experienced. In dreams, one often sees many things. Even if one sees flowing water in the sky, or sees a great fire burning in the vast sea. This is also what one has seen in the past. Whether it is water or sky, whether it is flame or sea, each observes and judges things in different places. Thoughts arise in dreams, thinking that they are in the same place, clinging to the idea that it is a river in the sky. If not, then one should admit that blind people can recall things like blue.

。若不許此。于其夢中是憶念者。生盲之人應憶青茜。凡為憶念是曾受故。此輩于青不能生想。應成道理。又復夢中自觀斬首。此亦是念合其餘事而有功能如向陳說。或中有位親見自身被他斫截。觀彼前身作自心解。曾受而舍今時尚憶。此固無違。豈不如先所經之物名為憶念。彼便夢中生其異見。非同昔時所觀之物。非不定故。非唯一向曾所領事生憶念耶。即如多年曾所學業所有書疏。後起憶時。或倒次第。或復增言。或於其文而有忘失。若爾此之憶念便成非有。憶念之境遂是空無。非余實物別事相屬。于其決定實事想心而為施設。如於馬首曾不觀角。然于憶時見其境事。如曾領受為自解相。于其念處生其異解。不緣外境。然于夢中見馬有角如牛角者。準此應知。于寤所見。遂在夢中起顛倒想。成立空河生其憶念。此亦如是。縱有非倒之見。于彼夢內相續識中而生其執。所見之相固非識外。是故當知。夢中憶念有真實境。道理不成。然復夢者所見之事。如在目前睹江山等。然非寤時所有憶念能得如斯分明顯著。既無異相何意不。同於其夢內被睡亂心所生憶。念于境分明見在目前。然非於夢覺寤之後。平善心中得有斯見。由如是故。而於夢中分明顯現。彼此決斷猶如覺時見境明白準彼夢心所見之物非關憶念。先於夢中曾

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果不同意這種說法，那麼在夢中回憶起事物的人，就像天生的盲人應該能夠回憶起青色和茜色一樣（青色和茜色：兩種顏色）。凡是回憶，都是因為曾經經歷過。但盲人無法想像青色，這應該成為一個道理。此外，夢中自己看到自己被斬首，這也是一種回憶，與其他事情結合而產生作用，就像前面所說的那樣。或者有人親眼看到自己被別人砍斷，將前世的經歷理解為自己的心念。曾經經歷過，現在仍然記得，這當然沒有矛盾。難道不像先前經歷過的事物被稱為回憶嗎？但他在夢中產生了不同的見解，與過去所看到的事物不同。這並非不確定，難道只有曾經經歷過的事情才能產生回憶嗎？就像多年以前所學的學業和書籍，後來回憶起來時，或者顛倒了順序，或者增加了言語，或者忘記了其中的文字。如果這樣，那麼這種回憶就變得不存在了，回憶的對象也變成了空無，而不是與真實的事物相關聯。對於確定的真實事物，產生了一種想像，就像從未見過馬頭上長角，但在回憶時卻看到了這種情況。就像曾經經歷過的事情，被理解為自己的樣子，在回憶的地方產生了不同的理解，而不是緣于外在的境界。然而在夢中看到馬長著像牛一樣的角，按照這個道理，應該知道在清醒時所看到的事物，在夢中產生了顛倒的想像，從而產生了虛幻的河流，並回憶起它。這也一樣。即使有不顛倒的見解，在夢中的相續識中也會產生執著。所看到的景像當然不是在意識之外。所以應該知道，夢中的回憶有真實的境界，這種說法是不成立的。然而夢中所見的事物，就像在眼前看到江山一樣。但清醒時的回憶卻無法如此清晰明顯。既然沒有不同的景象，為什麼不同於夢中被睡眠擾亂的心所產生的回憶，在境界中清晰地看到事物就在眼前？然而在夢醒之後，平靜的心中卻無法看到這種情況。正因為如此，所以在夢中清晰地顯現出來，彼此的判斷就像清醒時看到境界一樣明白。按照夢中所見的事物，與回憶無關。先前在夢中曾經... English version: If this is not allowed, then those who recall things in their dreams, like the congenitally blind should be able to recall blue and madder (blue and madder: two colors). All recollection is because of past experience. But the blind cannot imagine blue, which should become a principle. Furthermore, in a dream, one sees oneself beheaded; this is also a recollection, combined with other things to produce an effect, as mentioned before. Or someone personally sees themselves being cut off by others, understanding the experiences of a past life as their own thoughts. Having experienced it before, and still remembering it now, there is certainly no contradiction. Is it not like things previously experienced are called recollection? But in the dream, they produce different views, different from what was seen in the past. This is not uncertain; is it only things that have been experienced that can produce recollection? Just like the studies and books learned many years ago, when recalled later, either the order is reversed, or words are added, or the text is forgotten. If so, then this recollection becomes non-existent, and the object of recollection becomes empty, rather than being related to real things. For certain real things, an imagination arises, like never having seen a horn on a horse's head, but seeing this situation when recalling it. Just like things that have been experienced, being understood as one's own appearance, different understandings arise in the place of recollection, not arising from external realms. However, in a dream, seeing a horse with horns like a cow's horns, according to this principle, it should be known that what is seen in a waking state produces inverted imaginations in a dream, thus producing an illusory river and recalling it. It is the same. Even if there are non-inverted views, attachment will arise in the continuous consciousness in the dream. The scenes seen are certainly not outside of consciousness. Therefore, it should be known that the statement that recollection in dreams has a real realm is not valid. However, the things seen in a dream are like seeing rivers and mountains before one's eyes. But recollection in a waking state cannot be so clear and obvious. Since there are no different scenes, why is it not the same as the recollection produced by a mind disturbed by sleep in a dream, clearly seeing things in the realm right before one's eyes? However, after waking from a dream, this situation cannot be seen in a calm mind. Because of this, it appears clearly in the dream, and the judgments are as clear as seeing realms in a waking state. According to the things seen in the dream, it is not related to recollection. Previously in the dream, there was...

【English Translation】 English version: If this is not allowed, then those who recall things in their dreams, like the congenitally blind should be able to recall blue and madder (blue and madder: two colors). All recollection is because of past experience. But the blind cannot imagine blue, which should become a principle. Furthermore, in a dream, one sees oneself beheaded; this is also a recollection, combined with other things to produce an effect, as mentioned before. Or someone personally sees themselves being cut off by others, understanding the experiences of a past life as their own thoughts. Having experienced it before, and still remembering it now, there is certainly no contradiction. Is it not like things previously experienced are called recollection? But in the dream, they produce different views, different from what was seen in the past. This is not uncertain; is it only things that have been experienced that can produce recollection? Just like the studies and books learned many years ago, when recalled later, either the order is reversed, or words are added, or the text is forgotten. If so, then this recollection becomes non-existent, and the object of recollection becomes empty, rather than being related to real things. For certain real things, an imagination arises, like never having seen a horn on a horse's head, but seeing this situation when recalling it. Just like things that have been experienced, being understood as one's own appearance, different understandings arise in the place of recollection, not arising from external realms. However, in a dream, seeing a horse with horns like a cow's horns, according to this principle, it should be known that what is seen in a waking state produces inverted imaginations in a dream, thus producing an illusory river and recalling it. It is the same. Even if there are non-inverted views, attachment will arise in the continuous consciousness in the dream. The scenes seen are certainly not outside of consciousness. Therefore, it should be known that the statement that recollection in dreams has a real realm is not valid. However, the things seen in a dream are like seeing rivers and mountains before one's eyes. But recollection in a waking state cannot be so clear and obvious. Since there are no different scenes, why is it not the same as the recollection produced by a mind disturbed by sleep in a dream, clearly seeing things in the realm right before one's eyes? However, after waking from a dream, this situation cannot be seen in a calm mind. Because of this, it appears clearly in the dream, and the judgments are as clear as seeing realms in a waking state. According to the things seen in the dream, it is not related to recollection. Previously in the dream, there was...

見有物。后時夢內憶前夢事。然斯夢憶如彼覺人。雖念其境狀似障隔。處遙遠時不能顯著觀其色等。又如所言。生盲之類于其夢中無所睹見。雖有巧詞。理應不成。此亦隨其自種功能。至成就位。遂於心上夢觀青等。然此未曾而作計會。如余流類雖夢青等遂令言說啓發無由。又夢所見多是今生不曾經事而現在前。是故夢心不關憶念。縱令是念緣過境故。此則成立念境空無。過去未來非現在故。猶如非有。據實事故此中意言。其能緣覺境雖非有。然而時處決定可得。故知所許以境為先。方能見者。未能於我作無利事有餘復言。由夢障心有力用故。于其別事暫時生起。識體清凈無礙現前。猶如定者三摩地力。清凈光明觀無礙故。如於小室夢覿象群。及睹諸餘廣大之物。又夢見自身于別界趣等。在彼託生。然不能言于彼余體。非執受身為我身解。如非夢時受用之體。然非不捨此趣之身更執余處。得有斯理。復非此時。有其生死。便成見有亡尸之過。

又復縱許有其生死。然于重生有其違害。后時覺寤其舊體。曾無毫釐虧損處。又于臥時。傍人不曾見身有異。然此漸頓于受生時有相違失。由此應知。但唯是識于彼熏習功能。現時即便觀見種種相貌分明在心。斯為應理。又復縱于平田廣石藤蔓虛懸。寢臥於斯觀大境此亦非

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本見到有東西。之後在夢中回憶起之前的夢境。然而這種夢境的回憶就像清醒的人一樣，雖然能回憶起夢境的狀態，但好像被阻礙隔開，因為時間遙遠而不能清晰地看到它的顏色等。又比如所說，天生盲人（生盲之類）在他的夢中什麼也看不到。即使有巧妙的言辭，道理上也不應該成立。這同樣是隨著各自的種子功能，到達成就的地位，於是在心中夢見青色等。然而這是從未經歷過的而進行的推測。就像其他流類，即使夢見青色等，也不能通過言語來啓發。而且夢中所見大多是今生不曾經歷過的事情而現在顯現。所以夢心與憶念無關。縱然是憶念，也是因為緣於過去的境，因此這成立了憶念的境是空無的，因為過去未來不是現在，就像不存在一樣。根據真實的事情，這裡的意思是說，它所能緣的覺境雖然不是真實存在，然而時間地點是確定可以得到的。所以知道所允許的，是以境為先，才能有見者。未能對我作出無利的事情，還有其他話說，因為夢的障礙心有力量，對於其他的事情暫時生起，識體清凈沒有阻礙地顯現，就像入定的人，因為三摩地（Samadhi）的力量，清凈光明地觀照沒有阻礙。就像在小房間里夢見大象群，以及看到其他各種廣大的事物。又夢見自身在別的世界（別界趣）等，在那裡投生。然而不能說在那裡的其他身體，不是執取受用的身體作為我的身體來理解，就像不是在夢中的時候受用的身體。然而不是不捨棄這個世界的身體而執取其他地方，能有這樣的道理。又不是在這個時候，有他的生死，便會造成見到有死亡屍體的過失。又縱然允許有他的生死，然而對於重生有違背損害。之後醒來，他原來的身體，沒有絲毫的虧損。又在睡覺的時候，旁邊的人不曾看見身體有什麼不同。然而這種漸次或頓時的受生，有相互違背的缺失。由此應該知道，只不過是識在那裡的熏習功能，現在立刻觀見到種種相貌分明地在心中。這才是應理的。又縱然在平坦的田地、廣闊的石頭、藤蔓懸掛的地方，睡在這些地方觀看大的境界，這也是非...

【English Translation】 English version Seeing that there are things. Afterwards, in a dream, recalling the events of a previous dream. However, this recollection of a dream is like that of an awakened person, although one can recall the state of the dream, it seems to be obstructed and separated, because the time is distant and one cannot clearly see its colors, etc. Also, as it is said, a person born blind (生盲之類) sees nothing in his dreams. Even if there are clever words, it should not be established in principle. This is also according to the function of each person's own seeds, reaching the state of accomplishment, and then dreaming of blue, etc., in the mind. However, this is a conjecture made without ever having experienced it. Like other streams, even if they dream of blue, etc., they cannot be enlightened through speech. Moreover, what is seen in dreams is mostly things that have not been experienced in this life but now appear. Therefore, the dream mind is not related to recollection. Even if it is recollection, it is because it is related to past realms, therefore it is established that the realm of recollection is empty, because the past and future are not the present, just like non-existence. According to the real events, the meaning here is that although the realm of awareness that it can relate to is not real, the time and place are definitely obtainable. Therefore, it is known that what is allowed is that the realm comes first, and then there can be a seer. Unable to do unprofitable things to me, there are other words, because the obstructing mind of the dream has power, and other things arise temporarily, the consciousness body is pure and appears without obstruction, just like a person in Samadhi (三摩地), because of the power of Samadhi, pure light illuminates without obstruction. Just like dreaming of a herd of elephants in a small room, and seeing various other vast things. Also dreaming of oneself in other realms (別界趣), etc., being reborn there. However, it cannot be said that the other body there is not understood as taking the body of enjoyment as my body, just like the body of enjoyment is not in a dream. However, it is not that one abandons the body of this realm and grasps other places, there can be such a reason. Also, it is not at this time that there is his birth and death, which would lead to the fault of seeing a dead corpse. Moreover, even if it is allowed that there is his birth and death, there is contradiction and harm to rebirth. Afterwards, when he wakes up, his original body has not suffered the slightest damage. Also, when sleeping, the people next to him have never seen any difference in his body. However, this gradual or sudden rebirth has mutually contradictory defects. From this, it should be known that it is only the function of the seeds of consciousness there, and now immediately one sees all kinds of appearances clearly in the mind. This is what is reasonable. Moreover, even if one sleeps in flat fields, wide stones, and hanging vines, watching great realms in these places, this is also non...

色。無質礙故。猶如受等。又此所許。于地水等是其色性體應質礙。若不許者。失對礙性復非無表。有不定過。由斯與彼道理同故。此之夢心有何奇異。營大功業不假外形。而能巧利構茲壯麗。或見崇墉九仞飛甍十丈。碧條𧆑蘼紅花璀璨。匠人極思亦未能雕。若言於他同斯難者。彼無此過。不假外色功力起故。但由種熟仗識為緣。即於此時意識便現。又未曾見有經論說于彼夢中生其別色。是故定知畏難巧說於己所宗。蓋其穴隙縱為方便。終亦不能令其夢中有別色起。是故理善成。處時定如夢。

身不定如鬼者。實是清河無外異境。然諸餓鬼悉皆同見膿滿而流。非唯一睹。然於此處實無片許膿血可得。何容得有溢岸而流。雖無實境決定屬一。理定不成。此即應知。觀色等心雖無外境不決定性。于身非有遮卻境無。即彼成立有境之因。有不定過。于無境處亦有多身。共觀不定。如何實無膿流之事。而諸餓鬼不別觀之。由其同業咸於此位。俱見膿流慳吝業熟同見此苦。由昔同業各熏自體。此時異熟皆並現前。彼多有情同見斯事。實無外境為恩益故。準其道理仁亦於斯共同造作。所有熏習成熟之時。便無別相色等相分從識而生。是故定知不由外境識方得起。豈非許此同一趣生。然非決定彼情同業。由現見有良家賤室貧富

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本色（Rūpa，物質）。因為它沒有質礙的緣故，就像受（Vedanā，感受）等等一樣。而且你所允許的，對於地、水等等，是它的色性本體，應該有質礙。如果不允許這樣，就失去了對礙的性質，又不是無表色（Avijñapti-rūpa，無表色，一種不可見的物質形態），有不確定的過失。由於這個原因，和他們（指其他學派）的道理相同，這個夢中的心有什麼奇異之處呢？營造大的功業不需要外在的形體，而能夠巧妙地構建這壯麗的景象。或者看見高大的城墻有九仞高，飛檐有十丈長，綠色的枝條茂盛，紅色的花朵璀璨，即使是工匠極盡心思也不能雕刻出來。如果說對於其他人來說，這和夢境一樣困難，他們沒有這個過失，因為他們不依賴外在的色法，而是通過功力產生的。只是由於種子成熟，憑藉識作為因緣，就在這個時候，意識便顯現出來。而且從未見過有經典論述在夢中產生其他的色法。所以一定知道，這是因為害怕困難而巧妙地為自己的宗派辯解。即使他們的穴隙（指某種方便之說）縱然是方便，最終也不能使他們的夢中有其他的色法產生。所以道理很好地成立了，處所和時間是確定的，就像夢境一樣。

身體不確定，就像餓鬼一樣。實際上是清河（河流名）沒有外在的異境。然而，所有的餓鬼都共同看到膿液滿溢而流，不是隻有一個人看到。然而，在這個地方實際上沒有一點點的膿血可以得到，怎麼可能有溢出河岸而流的情況呢？雖然沒有真實的境界，但一定是屬於同一個（業力）。道理一定不能成立。這應該知道，觀察色等等的心，雖然沒有外在的境界，但沒有不確定性。對於身體來說，沒有遮卻境界的缺失，也就是成立有境界的原因，有不確定的過失。在沒有境界的地方，也有多個身體共同觀看的不確定性。如果實際上沒有膿液流動的事情，為什麼餓鬼們不能分別地觀看呢？由於他們共同的業力，都在這個位置，共同看到膿液流動，因為慳吝的業力成熟，共同看到這個痛苦。由於過去共同的業力各自熏習自身，這個時候不同的果報都一起顯現出來。那些眾多的有情共同看到這件事，實際上沒有外在的境界作為恩惠和利益的緣故。按照這個道理，你也在這裡共同造作，所有熏習成熟的時候，就沒有不同的色等相分從識而生。所以一定知道，不是由於外在的境界，識才能夠生起。難道不是允許這同一趣（Gati，趣，指輪迴的去處）的眾生，然而不是決定他們的情識和業力相同。因為現在看到有良家和賤室，貧窮和富裕。

【English Translation】 English version Rūpa (Form). Because it has no material obstruction, just like Vedanā (Feeling) and so on. Moreover, what you allow, for earth, water, etc., is its essence of form, which should have material obstruction. If you do not allow this, you lose the nature of opposing obstruction and are not Avijñapti-rūpa (Unmanifested Form, a type of invisible matter), having the fault of being indefinite. Because of this reason, and because the reasoning is the same as theirs (referring to other schools), what is so strange about the mind in this dream? Constructing great achievements does not require external forms, yet it can skillfully build this magnificent scene. Or one sees tall walls nine 'ren' high and flying eaves ten 'zhang' long, with green branches flourishing and red flowers dazzling, which even the most thoughtful craftsman could not carve. If you say that for others, this is as difficult as a dream, they do not have this fault, because they do not rely on external form but arise through effort. It is only because the seeds are ripe, relying on consciousness as a condition, that consciousness manifests at this time. Moreover, it has never been seen that any sutra or treatise says that other forms arise in dreams. Therefore, it is certain that this is cleverly arguing for one's own doctrine out of fear of difficulty. Even if their loophole (referring to a certain expedient explanation) is indeed an expedient, it ultimately cannot cause other forms to arise in their dreams. Therefore, the reasoning is well-established: the place and time are fixed, just like in a dream.

The body is indefinite, like that of a preta (hungry ghost). In reality, the Qing River (river name) has no external, different realm. However, all pretas commonly see pus overflowing and flowing, not just one person. However, in this place, there is actually not a single bit of pus and blood to be found, so how could there be overflowing banks and flowing? Although there is no real realm, it must belong to the same (karma). The reasoning certainly cannot be established. This should be known: observing the mind of form, etc., although there is no external realm, there is no indefiniteness. For the body, there is no blocking of the absence of a realm, which is the reason for establishing the existence of a realm, having the fault of being indefinite. In places without a realm, there is also the indefiniteness of multiple bodies viewing together. If there is actually no pus flowing, why can't the pretas view it separately? Because of their common karma, they are all in this position, commonly seeing pus flowing, because the karma of stinginess is ripe, commonly seeing this suffering. Because of the past common karma, each has perfumed their own body, and at this time, different retributions all manifest together. Those many sentient beings commonly see this matter, but there is actually no external realm as a cause of grace and benefit. According to this reasoning, you also jointly create here, and when all the perfuming is ripe, there will be no different aspects of form, etc., arising from consciousness. Therefore, it is certain that consciousness does not arise because of the external realm. Isn't it allowed that these beings of the same Gati (course, referring to the destination of reincarnation), but it is not certain that their emotions and karma are the same. Because now we see that there are good families and humble dwellings, poverty and wealth.

等異。如是便成見其色等。應有差別。同彼異類見成非等。故知斯類與彼不同。彼亦不由外境力故。生色等境然諸餓鬼雖同一趣。見亦差別。由業異相所見亦然。彼或有見大熱鐵團融煮迸濽。或時見有屎尿橫流非相似故。雖同人趣。薄福之人。金帶現時見為鐵鎖赫熱難近。或見是蛇吐其毒火。是故定知雖在人趣。亦非同見。若如是類無別見性。由其皆有同類之業。然由彼類有同分業生同分趣。復有別業各別而見。此二功能隨其力故。令彼諸人有同異見。彼以此義亦答余言。有說別趣有情鬼傍生等。應非一處有不別見。由別作業異熟性故。此雖成趣業有差別。同觀之業還有不異即諸有情自相續中有其別異。業種隨故。彼任其緣各得生起。

有餘復言。諸餓鬼等同見事時。非無外境。由此器界是諸有情共增上業之所生故。要假現有河水澄流。方於此處見膿流等。由其薄福慳貪垢故。遂見如此不可愛事。若其彼類不見水者。即諸有情同增上力感得共果。理便闕失故。知此類有其實境。膿血等識要假其事此方有故。如於相續身邪倒執。執為我解由。無別事同見膿等。是故不定屬一身生者。此由不能善了所緣故有斯見要待心心所了前境相故。說為所緣。然非餓鬼見其流水。如何不見得作所緣。若以別相即於水處睹膿流者。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本等同和差異。如果這樣，就會變成看到顏色等事物時，應該存在差別。如同那些不同種類看到的事物，並非完全相同。因此可知，這類事物與彼類不同。它們也不是因為外境的力量而產生顏色等境界。然而，即使是同一道的餓鬼，所見也各不相同，由於業的不同，所見也不同。他們有時會看到熾熱的鐵球融化迸濺，有時會看到屎尿橫流，並非完全相似。即使同爲人道，福薄之人看到金帶時，會覺得那是鐵鎖，熾熱難近，或者看到的是蛇，吐著毒火。因此可以確定，即使在人道，所見也並非相同。如果像這樣沒有不同的見性，那是因為他們都有同類的業。然而，由於他們有共同的業而生於共同的趣，又有各自不同的業而有各自不同的見解。這兩種功能隨著各自的力量，使那些人有相同和不同的見解。他們也用這個道理來回答其他說法。有人說，其他道的有情，如鬼、傍生等，不應該在同一處沒有不同的見解，因為不同的作業導致不同的異熟果報。即使趣相同，業也有差別，共同觀看的業還是有相同的，即是說，諸有情自身的相續中有其差別，業的種子隨之而生，憑藉各自的因緣而生起。

還有人說，當餓鬼等共同看到某件事物時，並非沒有外境。因為這個器世界是諸有情共同增上業所生的。必須要有河水澄澈流動，才能在此處看到膿液流動等。由於他們福薄，有慳貪的污垢，所以才會看到如此不可愛的事物。如果他們看不到水，那就是諸有情共同增上力感得的共同果報，這個道理就缺失了。因此可知，這類事物有其實際的境界，膿血等識需要憑藉這些事物才能產生。如同在相續身中產生邪倒的執著，執著為我，這可以通過沒有其他事物而共同看到膿液來解釋。因此，不能確定這是由一個身體所生。這是由於不能很好地瞭解所緣境而產生的見解，需要等待心和心所瞭解之前的境界相，才能說它是所緣。然而，如果餓鬼看到的是流水，為什麼不能看到並將其作為所緣呢？如果以不同的相，即在水的地方看到膿液流動，那又該如何解釋呢？

【English Translation】 English version equality and difference. If so, it would mean that when seeing colors and other things, there should be differences. Like those different kinds seeing things, not completely the same. Therefore, it can be known that this kind of thing is different from that kind. They are also not produced by the power of external environment to produce color and other realms. However, even the same hungry ghosts of the same path, what they see is also different, due to the difference of karma, what they see is also different. They sometimes see hot iron balls melting and splashing, and sometimes see feces and urine flowing horizontally, not completely similar. Even in the same human path, people with little fortune, when seeing the golden belt, will feel that it is an iron lock, hot and difficult to approach, or see a snake spitting poisonous fire. Therefore, it can be determined that even in the human path, what is seen is not the same. If there is no different nature of seeing like this, it is because they all have the same kind of karma. However, because they have the same karma and are born in the same path, and each has different karma and has different views. These two functions, with their respective strengths, make those people have the same and different views. They also use this reason to answer other statements. Some people say that sentient beings of other paths, such as ghosts, animals, etc., should not have different views in the same place, because different operations lead to different results of different ripening. Even if the paths are the same, the karma is different, and the karma of common viewing is still the same, that is, the sentient beings themselves have differences in their own continuity, and the seeds of karma follow, and arise by their respective causes.

Some people also say that when hungry ghosts and others see something together, it is not without an external environment. Because this world is produced by the common increasing karma of all sentient beings. There must be clear flowing river water to see pus flowing here. Because they have little fortune and have the dirt of stinginess, they will see such unpleasant things. If they cannot see the water, it is the common result of the common increasing power of all sentient beings, and this reason is missing. Therefore, it can be known that this kind of thing has its actual realm, and the consciousness of pus and blood needs to rely on these things to be produced. Just like the evil and inverted attachment in the continuous body, the attachment is me, which can be explained by seeing pus together without other things. Therefore, it cannot be determined that this is born from one body. This is the view caused by not being able to understand the object of perception well, and it needs to wait for the mind and mind to understand the previous realm to say that it is the object of perception. However, if the hungry ghost sees the flowing water, why can't he see it and take it as the object of perception? If you see pus flowing in the place of water with a different phase, how should you explain it?

何處得有如斯定判觀其本水。然於水相曾無片許為所觀察。但睹其相而為境界。有說由似相狀識許。此名為境。膿血之識無彼相故。方知不緣水等為境猶如軍覺亦非為因成所緣性有大過失。前已申述。然此外境。于所緣心曾無恩益。若但為因亦大過失。前已說故。又如所言。由共相業之所感故必須見者。此亦不然。未生失眼及以遠方不能觀故。生無色者亦應得見。若言非彼業力生者。轉向餘生亦應不見。若言后時是所須者。我亦同然如無色界趣餘生時。非無益故。然于餓鬼理亦同然。又復緣我所生邪見。即如次前所引道理。不緣色等有為之事。不緣彼相故如無為覺。是故定知自不曉了。必不令他能為解悟。然諸論文極分明故。如有頌云。

縱使河流鬼不見　　設有所見別為形　明知彼皆由故業　　業障瞳人壞明睛

境雖非有。由業過故而令眼見體。是現有。而不能見斯即自許。故所見物便有別形。由此應知。實無膿血便有妄見。有餘復言。然諸餓鬼由其非愛惡業力故。遂令其眼見如是相。雖同一時。余有福類所不見物。此遂諦觀可厭之境。由此故知。諸餓鬼心緣其實境。今應問彼。為由眼根作斯妄見。雖無前境見非愛事。為目前境實有斯事。眼識依此生了別耶初且非理。許不愛境無妄心成故。若言此見由

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如何才能確定地判斷並觀察水的本來面目呢？然而，對於水的表象，卻從未真正地觀察過，只是看到了它的外在形態，並將其作為一種境界。有人說，這是通過相似的表象來識別的。這種表象被稱為『境』（境：境界，此處指認識的對象）。膿血的認知沒有這種表象，因此可以知道它不是以水等作為認識的對象。就像軍隊的警覺，也不是構成所緣性的原因，存在很大的過失，之前已經詳細闡述過了。而且，這種外在的境界，對於所緣的心識沒有任何幫助。如果僅僅作為原因，也存在很大的過失，之前已經說過了。又比如有人說，由於共同的業力所感，所以必須見到，這也是不對的。因為沒有出生、失去眼睛以及在遙遠地方的人都不能看到。出生在無色界的人也應該能夠看到。如果說不是由他們的業力所生，那麼轉向其他生命時也應該看不見。如果說以後是需要的，我也是一樣的，就像沒有趣（趣：此處原文缺失，指某種狀態或行為）餘生時，並非沒有益處。然而，對於餓鬼道的眾生，道理也是一樣的。又因為緣于『我』所產生的邪見，就像之前所引用的道理一樣，不緣於色等有為之事，不緣于那些表象，就像無為的覺悟一樣。因此可以確定，自己不明白，一定不能讓別人理解。然而，各種論文都非常明確，就像頌文所說：『縱使河流鬼不見，設有所見別為形，明知彼皆由故業，業障瞳人壞明睛。』即使河流中的餓鬼看不見水，即使看見了，也是不同的形態，很明顯，這都是由於過去的業力，業力的障礙使眼睛的瞳孔損壞而看不清。境界即使不是真實存在的，由於業力的緣故，而使眼睛看到實體，這是現在存在的，卻不能看見，這就是自己承認的。所以看見的東西便有了不同的形態。由此應該知道，實際上沒有膿血，卻產生了虛妄的見解。還有人說，那些餓鬼由於非愛和惡業的力量，才使他們的眼睛看到這樣的景象。即使在同一時間，其他有福報的人看不到的東西，他們卻仔細地觀察著令人厭惡的境界。由此可知，餓鬼的心緣于真實存在的境界。現在應該問他們，是由眼根產生這種虛妄的見解，即使沒有前面的境界，也能看到非喜愛的事物，還是目前的境界確實存在這樣的事物，眼識依據這個產生了別呢？首先，這不合道理，因為承認沒有喜愛的境界，卻產生了虛妄的心識。如果說這種見解是由...

【English Translation】 English version: How can one definitively judge and observe the original nature of water? Yet, regarding the appearance of water, there has never been a true observation, only seeing its external form and taking it as a 'realm' (境: realm, here referring to the object of cognition). Some say this is recognized through similar appearances. This appearance is called '境' (境: realm). The cognition of pus and blood does not have this appearance, so it can be known that it does not take water, etc., as its object. Just like the vigilance of an army, it is also not the cause of constituting the object of cognition, and there is a great fault, which has been explained in detail before. Moreover, this external realm does not provide any benefit to the mind that cognizes it. If it is merely taken as a cause, there is also a great fault, as mentioned before. Furthermore, if someone says that it is necessary to see due to the influence of shared karma, this is also incorrect. Because those who are not yet born, have lost their eyes, or are in distant places cannot see. Those born in the Formless Realm should also be able to see. If it is said that it is not born from their karma, then they should also not be able to see when turning to other lives. If it is said that it is needed later, I am the same, just like when there is no 趣 (趣: the original text is missing here, referring to a certain state or behavior) in other lives, it is not without benefit. However, for beings in the realm of hungry ghosts, the principle is the same. Also, because of the wrong views arising from attachment to 'self', just like the principles cited before, it does not depend on conditioned things like form, nor does it depend on those appearances, just like unconditioned enlightenment. Therefore, it can be determined that if one does not understand oneself, one will certainly not be able to make others understand. However, various treatises are very clear, just like the verse says: 'Even if the hungry ghosts in the river do not see it, if they see something, it is in a different form, it is clear that this is all due to past karma, the obstacles of karma damage the pupils of the eyes and make it unclear.' Even if the hungry ghosts in the river do not see water, even if they see it, it is in a different form. It is clear that this is all due to past karma. The obstacles of karma damage the pupils of the eyes and make it unclear. Even if the realm is not real, due to the cause of karma, the eyes see the entity, which exists now, but cannot be seen, which is what one admits. Therefore, the things seen have different forms. From this, it should be known that there is actually no pus and blood, but false views arise. Others say that those hungry ghosts, due to the power of non-loving and evil karma, cause their eyes to see such scenes. Even at the same time, things that other blessed people cannot see, they carefully observe the disgusting realm. From this, it can be known that the minds of hungry ghosts are attached to the real realm. Now they should be asked, is it the eye faculty that produces this false view, even if there is no previous realm, they can see non-loving things, or does the current realm really exist such things, and the eye consciousness relies on this to produce discrimination? First of all, this is unreasonable, because it admits that there is no loving realm, but false consciousness arises. If it is said that this view is due to...

想差別實不相違前境空無。是所許故。其第二計如何彼境能現此形。若言由其惡業生者。如何一處眾多同類得共居耶。不許礙物此得共余同一處故。如石與瓦許有同居。故知膿水體是別。方令同處見。是其應理。質礙性故。猶如樂等成非礙性。若言膿等是質礙性。不應一處可見如石。由此故知。一處見者。與理相違。若言聚物多有間隙。于彼空處共相涉入多者映余。設令相似不可別見。猶如水乳遍皆合故。又極堅硬金剛石等。火分入中是相違故。又復定者業力眼藥所發眼根。決定能觀前境之事遠近粗細。不論可意及不可意。隨其力用悉能見之。應有誠說。由此不能作如是說。于彼隙中更相涉入。雖在一處除可念水見非愛膿。此則許有外境實事。餘人所觀曾無緣礙及其睹水應見余形。鬼亦同然。俱瞻於水。如煮香油。咸皆共嗅。若言雖彼無別因緣但由其業不能于境水膿俱見。斯固是其暫違共許。非理愛膿。然仗自識一類同業自種熟時隨緣現前起諸相貌。斯之妙理何不信耶。又復更有諸防護者。容像可畏。懾膽摧心。拔利刀執罥索。見便驅逐不令得近。縱使此時遭其巨難。亦不能得強作分疏言。此生類由彼惡業為勝緣故雖復先無忽然而有。此即便成扶助。唯識共立真宗。由此道理識所現相固無違害。如是應知不定屬身雖無

外境在識成就。

如夢有損用。雖無外境。理亦得成。由於夢內男女兩交。各以自根更互相觸。雖無外境觸而有作用成現流不凈。但是識相自與合會為其動作。此既如是。于余亦然。惡毒刀兵霜雹傷害。雖無外境但依其識有毒刀等。何理不成此作用事。既無外境成共許故。寧容得有宗之過耶。彼定不能成作用者。此亦于其相離之處差別之觸。于識分上現斯相狀。便於自宗有不定過。然唯于識精流事成。復有說云。憶如斯位諸有生類。於一切時不見有故。然此所述不能成因。有不定過。覺情於事作用亦成。流泄之因於識轉故。又復彼定不成作用之因。為當但據總相之識。言不能成。為識差別。此之初見即無同喻。由此所云識能為用。其增上識亦能生故。若第二計。其識能為所有作用。便與不能成事之因。有不定過。若爾何處得有如斯定事同無有境。或時有緣能為事用。非一切耶。功能別故。由彼諸緣功能各異。隨其功能而為作用。又復與汝執外境師。其理相似境既同有。何不諸事一切時成。是故應許。于別別事各有功能作用之時呈其異相。此即便同唯識者見。

有餘復言。理實不由觸著女形能生不凈。覺時亦爾。然由極重染愛現前。便致如斯流溢之相。由於夢有等無間緣差別力故。遂便引起非理作意。以此

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：外境在意識中成就。

比如夢境中會有性行為。即使沒有真實的外在環境，這種事情在邏輯上也是可以成立的。在夢中，男女雙方互相接觸，各自的性器官互相觸碰。雖然沒有外在的真實環境，但觸碰和性行為確實發生了，並且產生了不凈之物。這僅僅是意識的顯現，意識自身結合併產生動作。既然如此，其他情況也是一樣。比如惡毒的傷害、刀兵、霜雹等，即使沒有外在環境，僅僅依靠意識，也能產生毒害、刀劍等。為什麼不能成立這種作用呢？既然沒有外在環境，這已經是共識，怎麼能說這是宗派的過失呢？如果他們認為意識一定不能產生作用，那麼這種在意識分離之處產生的觸碰，在意識層面顯現出這種狀態，對於他們自己的宗派來說，就存在不確定的過失。然而，只有在意識的精微流動中，事情才能成立。還有人說，回憶就像這樣，在這樣的狀態下，各種有情眾生在任何時候都看不到外境的存在。然而，這種說法不能作為論證的理由，因為存在不確定的過失。覺知的情感也能產生作用，因為流泄的原因在於意識的轉變。而且，他們認為意識一定不能產生作用的原因，是根據總相的意識來說的，還是根據意識的差別來說的？如果是前者，就沒有可以類比的例子。因此，他們所說的意識能夠產生作用，是因為增上意識也能產生。如果是後者，意識能夠產生所有作用，那麼就與不能成立事情的原因存在不確定的過失。如果這樣，在哪裡才能找到像這樣確定的事情，既沒有外在環境，有時又有因緣能夠產生作用，而不是所有時候都能產生作用呢？這是因為功能不同。由於各種因緣的功能各不相同，所以根據其功能而產生作用。而且，這與你們這些執著外境的論師的道理相似，外境既然共同存在，為什麼所有事情不是在所有時候都能發生呢？所以應該承認，在不同的事情中，各有其功能作用的時候，才會呈現出不同的狀態。這也就等同於唯識宗的觀點。

還有人說，實際上並不是因為接觸女性的身體才能產生不凈之物，清醒的時候也是這樣。而是因為極重的染愛現前，才導致了這種流溢的現象。由於夢境具有等無間緣的差別力，所以才會引起非理作意。以此為基礎，才會產生後續的事情。

【English Translation】 English version: External reality is accomplished in consciousness.

For example, in dreams there can be sexual intercourse. Even without a real external environment, this can logically be established. In a dream, a man and a woman interact, their sexual organs touching each other. Although there is no external reality, the touching and the sexual act do occur, and impure substances are produced. This is merely a manifestation of consciousness, consciousness itself combining and producing actions. Since this is the case, other situations are the same. For example, malicious harm, weapons, frost, and hail, even without an external environment, can produce poison, swords, etc., based solely on consciousness. Why can't this action be established? Since there is no external environment, this is already a consensus, how can it be said that this is a fault of the school? If they believe that consciousness definitely cannot produce action, then this touching that arises in the separation of consciousness, manifesting this state on the level of consciousness, has an uncertain fault for their own school. However, things can only be established in the subtle flow of consciousness. Some also say that recollection is like this, in such a state, various sentient beings do not see the existence of an external environment at any time. However, this statement cannot be used as a reason for argument, because there is an uncertain fault. The emotion of awareness can also produce action, because the reason for the discharge lies in the transformation of consciousness. Moreover, the reason why they believe that consciousness definitely cannot produce action is based on the consciousness of the general aspect, or on the difference of consciousness? If it is the former, there is no example that can be compared. Therefore, what they say that consciousness can produce action is because the Adhipati-citta (增上意識, dominant consciousness) can also produce it. If it is the latter, consciousness can produce all actions, then there is an uncertain fault with the reason for not being able to establish things. If so, where can one find such a definite thing, which has neither an external environment, and sometimes has conditions that can produce action, but not all the time? This is because the functions are different. Because the functions of various conditions are different, they produce actions according to their functions. Moreover, this is similar to the reasoning of you teachers who cling to external reality, since the external environment exists together, why don't all things happen at all times? Therefore, it should be admitted that in different things, each has its functional action at the time, and then presents a different state. This is equivalent to the view of the Yogacara (唯識宗, Consciousness-only school).

There are others who say that in reality, it is not because of touching a woman's body that impure substances are produced, and it is the same when awake. It is because extremely heavy attachment and love appear, that this phenomenon of discharge occurs. Because dreams have the differential power of contiguity (等無間緣, immediately preceding condition), they cause irrational ideation. Based on this, subsequent things will arise.

為因便見流泄。如於夢中雖無實境。能流不凈服毒嚴食觸女形等。身體煩疼根充足力生男女等。于其夢中事應成有。是故定知。如於夢泄無境有用。覺之如是雖用無境非為應理。雖無其境識用成者。若於覺時縱境非有。許是唯識作用得成。此即豈非善符唯識。無境論者有何不愛。若言別有如斯意趣。諸有觸等咸仗外事方成作用。但唯有識理不能成。如栴檀木磨作香泥用涂身體能除熱悶使得清涼。然此流泄但依識生。此還於理未為的當。依觸等境而有作用。非所許故。由非不許有外觸者。而欲令他依斯觸事作用起故。由此不應與他作用。便成非有之過也。由其成立唯有識者。但是事物所有作用差別。皆從識處生故。於此乍可作如斯難。既無外境。如何離識能有作用而成事耶。既有此徴。便申雅喻。由如夢內損害事成。此于唯識能有作用。並已如前頗具申述。若爾夢餐毒等。應成身病。此亦由其唯識有用。猶如於境而有定屬。還將后答用杜先疑。或復有時見其毒等。雖無實境而有作用。由見不被蛇之所螫。然有疑毒能令悶絕流汗心迷。若遭蛇螫亦于夢中由咒天等增上力故。遂令飽食氣力充強。又復聞乎。為求子息事隱床人。夢見有人共為交集便得其子。如何得知于彼夢內被毒等傷。是為非有。睡覺之後不睹見故。今此所論

還同彼類。于現覺時將為實事。見毒藥等執為非謬。真智覺時便不見故。同彼夢中體非是實。然于夢中許實色者。彼亦獲斯非所愛事。毒等果用便成實有。若言無者。但有毒相毒等用無。此云毒狀便成違害。許毒相等固成無益。于其識上藥體無故。是故定知。實無外境。但于覺心生其作用。猶如於夢覺亦同然。斯乃真成稱契道理。上來且隨如所說事。將別夢喻及別鬼等。如彼所陳四種之難。各為喻訖。今更復以㮈洛迦喻。答彼諸難。其事善成。由極惡情極惡卒等有定處時不定皆見。咸不離識而有別形。並狗烏等所生墋害猛利之苦。隨捶栲事至受罪終。可將斯喻隨言難詰。凡諸釋答。如上應思。

複次理實無有極惡卒等。如所說事。有定不定。因何得生。然亦于彼起作用心。生此之因當時有用。獲得生故。即此所觀眾多相異。假藉功能。並由內心相續隨轉業力差別。而為正因。復更假于取等順緣。共相助故。隨事而起見等轉成。異熟等果悉皆顯現。由此雖無實有獄卒。然于彼中要藉相似自造惡業增上力故。共於此中見處定等。亦復于彼生作用心。此等即是于彼色等非外實有顯從識生。為明此義作斯成立。然由不待離識之境。是能遍故。出相違過。若觸等境是色自性。即是所立。若言但是實事定執謂立已成。由將出

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：還和他們一樣。在清醒的時候，將（所見）視為真實的事情。見到毒藥等，就認為是真的，不是虛假的。因為當真正智慧覺悟的時候，就看不見這些了。如同夢中的事物本體不是真實的，然而在夢中卻認為顏色等是真實的。他們也會因此遭受不喜愛的事情。毒藥等的效果和作用就變成了真實存在。如果說毒藥等不存在，只有毒藥的表象，而沒有毒藥的作用，那麼這種說法就自相矛盾了。承認毒藥的表象存在，實際上是沒有意義的，因為在意識上並沒有藥的實體。所以可以確定，實際上沒有外在的境界，只是在清醒的心中產生作用，就像在夢中一樣。這才是真正符合道理的。上面只是按照他們所說的事情，用夢的例子和鬼的例子，來回答他們提出的四種困難。現在再用㮈洛迦（Naraka，地獄）的例子來回答他們提出的各種困難，這樣就能很好地解決問題。由於極端的惡念和極端的獄卒等，有的有固定的處所，有的沒有固定的處所，但都能被看見，而且都不離意識而有不同的形狀，還有狗、烏鴉等帶來的痛苦和傷害，以及各種拷打，直到受罪結束。可以用這個例子來回答他們提出的各種問題。所有的解釋和回答，都應該像上面所說的那樣去思考。

進一步說，實際上並沒有極端的獄卒等，像他們所說的那樣，有的有固定的處所，有的沒有固定的處所，那麼這些東西是怎麼產生的呢？實際上，也是在他們的心中產生了作用。產生這些東西的原因，在當時是有用的，因為獲得了產生。這就是所看到的眾多不同的景象，都是藉助功能，並且由內心相續不斷的業力差別，作為主要原因。再借助取等順緣，共同幫助，隨著事情的發生，見等就轉變而成，異熟等果都顯現出來。因此，雖然沒有真實的獄卒，但是他們需要憑藉相似的、自己所造的惡業的增上力，共同在這個地方看到固定的處所等。也因此在他們的心中產生作用。這些都是在色等境界上，不是外在真實存在的，而是從意識中產生的。爲了說明這個道理，才這樣成立。然而，由於不需要離開意識的境界，所以是普遍的，會產生相反的過失。如果觸等境界是色的自性，那就是所要建立的。如果說這只是真實的事情，一定要執著，那就是認為已經成立了，因為要提出

【English Translation】 English version: It's the same as them. In the state of being awake, they take (what they see) as real things. When they see poison, etc., they consider it real and not false. Because when true wisdom and enlightenment arise, they no longer see these things. It's like the substance of things in a dream is not real, yet in the dream, they consider colors, etc., to be real. They will also suffer things they don't like because of this. The effects and functions of poison, etc., then become real. If they say that poison, etc., doesn't exist, that there is only the appearance of poison but no function of poison, then this statement contradicts itself. Admitting that the appearance of poison exists is actually meaningless because there is no substance of medicine in consciousness. Therefore, it can be determined that there is actually no external realm, but only the mind that is awake produces functions, just like in a dream. This is truly in accordance with reason. The above is just following what they said, using the example of dreams and the example of ghosts to answer the four difficulties they raised. Now, I will use the example of Naraka (地獄, hell) to answer the various difficulties they raised, so that the problem can be solved well. Because of extreme evil thoughts and extreme hell guards, etc., some have fixed places, and some do not have fixed places, but they can all be seen, and they are all inseparable from consciousness and have different shapes, as well as the pain and harm caused by dogs, crows, etc., and various tortures, until the end of the punishment. This example can be used to answer the various questions they raised. All explanations and answers should be thought about as mentioned above.

Furthermore, in reality, there are no extreme hell guards, etc., as they say, some with fixed places and some without fixed places, so how are these things produced? In reality, it is also that functions are produced in their minds. The reason for producing these things is useful at that time because it is obtained. This is what is seen in the many different scenes, all of which are borrowed from functions, and the differences in karma that are continuously transformed by the inner mind are the main cause. Then, with the help of favorable conditions such as grasping, together, as things happen, seeing, etc., transforms, and the results of different ripening, etc., all appear. Therefore, although there are no real hell guards, they need to rely on the similar, increasing power of their own evil karma to jointly see fixed places, etc., in this place. Therefore, functions are also produced in their minds. These are all in the realm of color, etc., not externally real, but produced from consciousness. In order to explain this principle, this is established. However, since it does not need to leave the realm of consciousness, it is universal and will produce the opposite fault. If the realm of touch, etc., is the nature of color, then that is what is to be established. If you say that this is just a real thing, and you must insist on it, then that is thinking that it has already been established, because you want to put forward

彼過失之言為方便故。應知即是顯己自宗成立之相。于中所立隨順之因。以夢等識為其喻故。即此執言。顯如斯義決定處時所有事體。當情顯現諸相貌故。如於夢內遍昧其心。既夢覺後分明之想睹色等時。實亦不緣非識之色。未必要須色等境現。然由同業異熟所感共受用時。于自相續不定屬一而生起故。猶如飢渴諸餓鬼輩。有同惡業見膿河等。或復如於極惡之處。皆見猛卒。於此宜應兩皆成立。如現見境有其作用而顯現故。如於夢中但唯識相。見與女人為交涉事。如獄卒等。皆共睹其苦害之事。並可述之。豈非要須極惡卒等成非有已方可將為能立之事。此既不成。便成無有。同喻之過。固無如是便成之失。由斯等物亦復將為有情。猶如無說。離於執受非受事故。然此亦非是執受事。猶如瓦木。亦如蟻封。由其不是有情數故。有何意故不許獄卒及狗烏等是有情數。然此同見有情形勢及有動搖。亦不假藉外緣力故。如余薩埵。若爾斯乃便為諸因不成。此難非理。諸那洛迦所有動作不待外緣。彼那洛迦先罪惡業為任持者作搖動故。如木影舞同眾生相。

復由彼定不是有情。於五趣中所不攝故。猶如木石。由此故知。彼定不應同惡生類。如余惡生生於此處。同受於此所有共苦。然彼不受此之苦故。彼趣有情所有共苦不同

受故。如持鬘等非那洛迦。而諸惡生同受斯苦。由彼共業俱生此處。若異此者。生尚難得。況受害耶。雖有斯理。其獄卒等不受彼苦。不是共成。此非正說。彼生不受同害苦故。由非能害者還如彼害生。一種焦然同受于苦。若也轉計道為更互。共相害惱。故許彼生有時受苦。此亦非理。由其展轉相害之時。此是那洛迦。此是波羅者。此之行伍便為亡失。以其能害可有作用為緣由故。說為獄卒。如一既爾。余亦應然。此則兩皆成獄卒性。即那洛迦體性不離。遂成乖失。由此非是獄卒性故。如三十三天。意欲顯說其那洛迦非被害者。若許更互。為害理齊。彼此相陵知己有力形量壯等更互相欺。不應生怖。設令見彼極大形軀。忖己驍勇便生勝想。如是知已寧容有怖。豈如那洛迦見於獄卒等。何況形量氣力不殊。見彼之時令興怯念。又復俱為獄典。形量是同。身力既齊。此無強弱。理應別有形量不等勇健墋列見便生怖。如是計時。那洛迦類正受苦時。見彼卒來便生大怖。憂火內發胸臆全燒。相續苦生形骸戰越。惡業生類受如斯惱。縱令善巧明智之徒。亦復未能總知其事。此之階位理固相違。由於世間亦見斯事。有生惡意懷鴆毒心。欲害於他令生怯畏。雖即在於極重可畏怖懼之處。被拘頓時。不同怯者。生其怖畏。然而彼類懷堅

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本受業力所致。例如持鬘等眾生並非生於地獄（那洛迦，Naraka，受苦之處），但與作惡者一同承受這些痛苦，是因為他們共同的業力導致他們一起出生在這裡。如果不是這樣，能夠出生尚且困難，更何況是受苦呢？雖然有這個道理，但那些獄卒等並不承受這些痛苦，因為這不是共同業力所致。這種說法是不正確的，因為他們出生后並不承受同樣的痛苦。由於他們不是施害者，所以就像那些受害者一樣。同一種焦灼的痛苦一同承受。如果轉而認為這是相互的，互相傷害惱怒，所以允許他們有時承受痛苦，這也是不合理的。因為在他們互相傷害的時候，誰是地獄眾生，誰是獄卒（波羅者，Parajita，失敗者），這樣的區分就消失了。因為能施害者可以憑藉其作用而被稱為獄卒。如果一個如此，其餘的也應該如此。那麼兩者都成了獄卒的性質，即地獄眾生的體性沒有區別，這就造成了混亂。因此，他們不是獄卒的性質，就像三十三天（Trayastrimsa，佛教神話中的一個天界）的天人一樣。意在說明地獄眾生不是受害者。如果允許互相傷害，那麼傷害的理由就相同了，彼此互相侵犯，認為自己有力氣，體型壯大等，互相欺負，不應該產生恐懼。假設看到他們巨大的身軀，認為自己驍勇善戰，便產生勝利的想法。像這樣瞭解之後，怎麼會容許產生恐懼呢？難道像地獄眾生看到獄卒等一樣嗎？更何況體型和力氣沒有差別，看到他們的時候卻產生膽怯的念頭。而且都是獄典，體型相同，身力也一樣，這裡沒有強弱之分，理應有體型不等、勇健兇猛的獄卒出現，看到他們才會產生恐懼。像這樣計算，地獄眾生正在受苦的時候，看到獄卒來臨便產生巨大的恐懼，憂愁的火焰從內心燃起，胸膛完全被燒灼，接連不斷的痛苦產生，身體戰慄。惡業所生的眾生承受這樣的惱害。即使是善於思考、聰明睿智的人，也無法完全瞭解這件事。這樣的階位在道理上是相違背的。因為在世間也看到這樣的事情，有人心懷惡意，懷著鴆毒之心，想要傷害他人，使他人產生膽怯和畏懼。即使身處極其可怕、令人恐懼的地方，被拘禁的時候，也不同於膽怯的人，產生恐懼。然而，那些心懷堅定

【English Translation】 English version It is due to past karma. For example, beings like Holder of Garlands (持鬘, Chi Man) are not born in Naraka (那洛迦, Naraka, a place of suffering), but they suffer the same pain as the evildoers because their shared karma caused them to be born here together. If it were not so, it would be difficult even to be born, let alone suffer? Although this makes sense, the prison guards and others do not suffer these pains because it is not caused by shared karma. This statement is incorrect because they are not subject to the same suffering after birth. Because they are not the inflictors of harm, they are like those who are harmed. The same kind of burning pain is endured together. If it is argued that it is mutual, harming and annoying each other, so they are allowed to suffer sometimes, this is also unreasonable. Because when they harm each other, the distinction between who is a Naraka being and who is a prison guard (波羅者, Parajita, the defeated) disappears. Because the inflictor can be called a prison guard by virtue of his function. If one is like this, the rest should be the same. Then both become the nature of prison guards, that is, the nature of Naraka beings is no different, which causes confusion. Therefore, they are not of the nature of prison guards, like the gods of the Trayastrimsa Heaven (三十三天, Trayastrimsa, a heavenly realm in Buddhist mythology). The intention is to show that Naraka beings are not victims. If mutual harm is allowed, then the reason for harm is the same, they infringe on each other, thinking that they have strength, large size, etc., bully each other, and should not be afraid. Suppose they see their huge bodies, think they are brave and good at fighting, and have a sense of victory. Knowing this, how can fear be allowed to arise? Is it like Naraka beings seeing prison guards, etc.? Moreover, the size and strength are no different, but they feel timid when they see them. Moreover, they are all prison wardens, the same size, and the same strength, there is no strength or weakness here, there should be prison guards of unequal size, brave and fierce, and they will be afraid when they see them. Calculating like this, when Naraka beings are suffering, they will be greatly frightened when they see the prison guards coming, the fire of sorrow burns from the heart, the chest is completely burned, and continuous pain arises, and the body trembles. Beings born of evil karma suffer such annoyance. Even those who are good at thinking and intelligent cannot fully understand this matter. Such a hierarchy is contrary to reason. Because we also see such things in the world, some people harbor malice, harbor the heart of poison, want to harm others, and make others feel timid and fearful. Even if they are in an extremely terrible and frightening place, when they are detained, they are different from timid people and feel fear. However, those who have a firm

硬心多見有故。彼那洛迦受苦之類。多懷恐怖身若镕銷。故此那洛迦非為能害者。由如屠所繫柱之獸。然此是彼生怖因故。非受彼苦。

成唯識寶生論卷第二大正藏第 31 冊 No. 1591 成唯識寶生論

成唯識寶生論卷第三(一名二十唯識順釋論)

護法菩薩造

大唐三藏法師義凈奉　制譯

論曰。㮈洛迦波羅如獵鹿者。如是應知。非但不受相害之苦。然于器處共相之苦。亦復不受此之獄卒能害彼故。若異此者。彼在熱鐵融沸地上受燒然苦不能忍時。如何此際能逼害他。於此熱地身動轉時。那洛迦類自身支節。尚不能持。豈況更能有所為作。然而但可於熱鐵中洋沸騰涌。身由他制無片自在。然彼獄卒勇健害他。是故定知不受彼苦。猶若廚人遙執鐵鏟于熱油內轉彼煎魚。或將獄卒為那洛迦。以其相害無功能故。爾者便成違獄卒義。然由那洛迦類受燒害時不能相害。若爾便成不是獄卒。言那洛迦㮈洛迦波羅立為宗者。有違宗過。又復若言。受彼熱鐵極苦觸故。諸那洛迦不能害彼。如以生命置炎炭中。或可斯類不沾此苦。如睹史天。此顯獄卒。非那洛迦。即於此見外人別釋。引經為證。極成乖失。然而暫為少慧之輩。顯其僻見略舉疏條。彼便難曰。于地獄處。獄卒之流不受

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：心腸剛硬的人常常會遇到事故。那些在那洛迦（Naraka，地獄）受苦的眾生，大多心懷恐懼，身體好像要被熔化一樣。因此，那洛迦（Naraka，地獄）並非真的能加害於他們。就像屠宰場里被拴著的牲畜一樣，那洛迦（Naraka，地獄）只是他們產生恐懼的原因，而不是他們遭受痛苦的原因。

《成唯識寶生論》卷第二

現代漢語譯本：《成唯識寶生論》卷第三（又名《二十唯識順釋論》）

護法菩薩造

大唐三藏法師義凈奉　制譯

論曰：那洛迦波羅（Naraka-pala，地獄卒）就像獵鹿人一樣。應當這樣理解：那洛迦（Naraka，地獄）的眾生不僅不受互相傷害的痛苦，而且也不受器世界（指地獄環境）共同造成的痛苦。因為這些獄卒能夠傷害他們。如果不是這樣，那麼當他們在熾熱的鐵地和沸騰的地面上忍受燃燒的痛苦時，怎麼可能還有能力去逼迫和傷害他人呢？當他們在這種熾熱的地面上移動身體時，那洛迦（Naraka，地獄）的眾生連自己的肢體都難以支撐，更何況還能有所作為呢？然而，他們只能在熾熱的鐵地中翻滾沸騰，身體被他人控制，沒有絲毫的自由。然而，那些獄卒卻勇猛健壯，能夠傷害他人。因此，可以肯定地說，那洛迦（Naraka，地獄）的眾生不受獄卒的痛苦。就像廚師遙遠地拿著鐵鏟，在熱油中翻動煎魚一樣。或者將獄卒視為那洛迦（Naraka，地獄）的眾生，因為他們互相傷害，沒有其他功能。如果是這樣，那就違背了獄卒的定義。然而，由於那洛迦（Naraka，地獄）的眾生在遭受燒害時不能互相傷害，如果這樣，那就不能稱他們為獄卒。如果將那洛迦（Naraka，地獄）和那洛迦波羅（Naraka-pala，地獄卒）並列作為論點，就會有違背論點的過失。此外，如果說，由於承受熾熱鐵地的極度痛苦，所以那洛迦（Naraka，地獄）的眾生不能互相傷害，就像將生命置於燃燒的炭火中一樣，或者說這類眾生不會沾染這種痛苦，就像兜率天（Tushita Heaven）的眾生一樣。這表明獄卒不是那洛迦（Naraka，地獄）的眾生。即使在此處看到外人的其他解釋，並引用經典作為證據，也完全是錯誤的。然而，只是爲了給那些智慧淺薄的人，揭示他們片面的見解，略微舉出一些粗略的條目。他們便會反駁說：在地獄中，獄卒之流不會遭受痛苦。

【English Translation】 English version: Hard-hearted people often encounter accidents. Those beings suffering in Naraka (hell), mostly harbor fear, their bodies seeming to melt away. Therefore, Naraka (hell) is not truly capable of harming them. Like animals tied in a slaughterhouse, Naraka (hell) is merely the cause of their fear, not the cause of their suffering.

Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only - Jewel Production, Volume 2

English version: Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only - Jewel Production, Volume 3 (also known as Commentary on Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only)

Composed by Bodhisattva Dharmapala

Translated under Imperial Order by the Tripitaka Master Yijing of the Great Tang Dynasty

Treatise: Naraka-pala (hell-wardens) are like deer hunters. It should be understood that beings in Naraka (hell) not only do not suffer from harming each other, but also do not suffer from the shared suffering of the container world (referring to the hellish environment). This is because these hell-wardens are able to harm them. If it were otherwise, when they endure the burning pain on the hot iron ground and boiling surfaces, how could they still have the ability to compel and harm others? When they move their bodies on this scorching ground, the beings in Naraka (hell) can barely support their own limbs, let alone do anything else. However, they can only roll and boil in the hot iron ground, their bodies controlled by others, without any freedom. However, those hell-wardens are brave and strong, able to harm others. Therefore, it can be definitively said that beings in Naraka (hell) do not suffer from the hell-wardens' suffering. It's like a cook remotely holding an iron spatula, turning fried fish in hot oil. Or consider the hell-wardens as beings in Naraka (hell), because they harm each other and have no other function. If this were the case, it would contradict the definition of hell-wardens. However, since beings in Naraka (hell) cannot harm each other when suffering from burning, if this is the case, they cannot be called hell-wardens. If Naraka (hell) and Naraka-pala (hell-wardens) are juxtaposed as arguments, there will be a fault of contradicting the argument. Furthermore, if it is said that because they endure the extreme pain of the scorching iron ground, the beings in Naraka (hell) cannot harm each other, like placing life in burning coals, or that such beings do not experience this suffering, like the beings in Tushita Heaven. This shows that hell-wardens are not beings in Naraka (hell). Even if other explanations from outsiders are seen here, and scriptures are cited as evidence, it is completely wrong. However, it is only to reveal the one-sided views of those with shallow wisdom, briefly mentioning some rough points. They would then retort: In hell, the hell-wardens do not suffer.

苦者。我不許故。如經說云。汝等苾芻。有㮈洛迦名六觸處。若諸有情生在彼中。彼若以眼視諸色時。咸悉了見不可愛事。實彼有情有如斯事。獄卒非情何所觀見。對執不許有情論者。便是共聚咀嚼虛空。彼設難云。諸那洛迦受彼苦時。有其差別得異身故。如一無間多無間罪。此亦未能閑他意趣。如前所云。生㮈洛迦有情之類受苦切時。簡于余趣所有苦毒。然彼獄中所有共苦咸悉同受。然于彼處由重業風驚飆猛烈。身遭極苦一無間者。則不受之。望彼多種無間猛苦。不同受故便成不定。為顯斯事除彼獄卒。諸那洛迦無斯差別。彼趣同苦咸悉受故。即所立宗無異宗處。轉生道理何成不定。然一無間受同苦故。有外難云。由其獄卒不受苦者。斯非正答。有不定故。然且不應作斯定判。見一受苦。令余亦然。現見世間共睹斯事。如羊駱駝被蝎蜇時。遂便致死。鳥之一分將以為食。且據傍生有斯差異。於人趣中亦復見有一不受苦。如患塊者。醫人遂便蹈熱鐵上。即以熱腳蹋于病處。病人雖受極苦。醫足曾無痛處。然而有情實無差別。此亦由其㮈洛迦趣俱生苦法以不見故。遂不名此為那洛迦。見蜇毒等能斷命根。此亦但是呈其廣見。巧識俗途非關所論。契理之事。若云但據趣之相似。是彼趣收於斯宗處。即彼趣中見有不受彼趣之

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本苦的方面。我不允許這種說法。正如經中所說：『諸位比丘，有一種叫做那洛迦（Naraka，地獄）的地方，有六種觸處（六根接觸六塵的場所）。如果眾生生在那裡，當他們用眼睛看各種事物時，都會看到不可愛的事物。』實際上，那些眾生確實有這樣的遭遇。獄卒（Naraka guard）並非有情眾生，他們看到了什麼？對於堅持認為獄卒不是有情眾生的人，這就像是聚在一起咀嚼虛空一樣毫無意義。他們可能會提出異議說：『當那洛迦的眾生承受痛苦時，因為他們獲得了不同的身體，所以會有差別。例如，一個無間地獄（Avici hell）的眾生和多個無間地獄的眾生所受的罪不同。』但這仍然沒有理解我的意思。正如之前所說，生在那洛迦的眾生所承受的痛苦，比其他趣（道）的痛苦更加劇烈。然而，在那地獄中的所有共同的痛苦，他們都共同承受。然而，在那地獄中，由於沉重的業力之風，驚濤駭浪般猛烈，身體遭受極大的痛苦，一個無間地獄的眾生不會承受多種無間地獄的猛烈痛苦。因為他們承受的痛苦不同，所以就變得不確定。爲了顯示這一點，除了獄卒之外，那洛迦的眾生沒有這種差別。因為他們共同承受同樣的痛苦。因此，所建立的宗義（論點）沒有不同的地方。轉生的道理怎麼會變得不確定呢？然而，一個無間地獄的眾生承受同樣的痛苦。有人提出異議說：『因為獄卒不承受痛苦，所以這不是正確的回答，因為有不確定性。』然而，不應該做出這樣的判斷，因為看到一個眾生受苦，就認為其他眾生也是如此。現在看到世間共同看到的事情，例如綿羊和駱駝被蝎子蜇傷時，就會死亡。鳥類的一部分會把它們當作食物。且不說傍生（動物）有這種差異，在人道中也看到有人不承受痛苦，例如患有腫塊的人。醫生會踩在熱鐵上，然後用熱腳踩在病人的患處。病人雖然承受極大的痛苦，但醫生的腳卻沒有疼痛。然而，有情眾生實際上沒有差別。這也是因為沒有看到那洛迦趣（地獄道）俱生的苦法，所以不稱其為那洛迦。看到蜇傷、毒藥等能夠斷絕生命，這只是呈現了他們廣闊的見識，巧妙地認識了世俗的道路，與所討論的契合真理的事情無關。如果說只是根據趣（道）的相似性，那麼這個趣（道）就被包含在這個宗義（論點）中。即使在那個趣（道）中看到有不承受那個趣（道）的

【English Translation】 English version Regarding suffering. I do not allow this assertion. As the sutra says: 'Bhikkhus (Buddhist monks), there is a place called Naraka (hell), with six sense-fields (the places where the six senses contact the six objects). If sentient beings are born there, when they see various forms with their eyes, they all see unpleasant things.' In reality, those sentient beings do indeed experience such things. What do the Naraka guards (hell wardens), who are not sentient beings, see? To those who insist that the Naraka guards are not sentient beings, it is like gathering together to chew on empty space, which is meaningless. They might object, saying: 'When the beings in Naraka endure suffering, there are differences because they have obtained different bodies. For example, the sins endured by a being in one Avici hell (uninterrupted hell) are different from those in multiple Avici hells.' But this still does not grasp my meaning. As mentioned before, the suffering endured by beings born in Naraka is more intense than the suffering in other realms. However, all the common suffering in that hell is endured together. However, in that hell, due to the heavy winds of karma, like violent storms, the body suffers extreme pain, and a being in one Avici hell will not endure the intense suffering of multiple Avici hells. Because the suffering they endure is different, it becomes uncertain. To show this, apart from the Naraka guards, there is no such difference among the beings in Naraka. Because they all endure the same common suffering. Therefore, the established thesis (argument) has no different points. How can the principle of rebirth become uncertain? However, a being in one Avici hell endures the same suffering. Someone might object, saying: 'Because the Naraka guards do not endure suffering, this is not a correct answer, because there is uncertainty.' However, one should not make such a judgment, because seeing one being suffer, one assumes that other beings do as well. Now, we see things that the world commonly sees, such as when sheep and camels are stung by scorpions, they die. A portion of the birds will take them as food. Not to mention that there are such differences among animals, in the human realm, we also see people who do not endure suffering, such as those with tumors. The doctor will step on hot iron and then step on the patient's affected area with the hot foot. Although the patient endures extreme pain, the doctor's foot does not feel any pain. However, sentient beings are actually no different. This is also because the co-born suffering of the Naraka realm (hell realm) is not seen, so it is not called Naraka. Seeing stings, poisons, etc., that can sever the root of life, this only presents their broad knowledge, skillfully recognizing worldly paths, which is irrelevant to the truth that is being discussed. If it is said that it is only based on the similarity of the realms, then this realm is included in this thesis (argument). Even in that realm, seeing that there are those who do not endure that realm's

苦。顯他宗有不定過者。此亦未解我成立義。當趣所有決定之苦。彼不共受是前作用能立義故。然非人畜在彼趣生。準彼法式須定受者。而不受之。所云羊等遭蝎毒時。有斷命苦。或被熱足所生之痛。若全不受彼趣苦故。非彼趣性可有斯愆。有異執云。然而獄卒由自他業增上所生不被害故。互相苦刻。他不許也。我今謂汝。而於自見樂著昏心。設在虛空步步顛蹶。㮈洛迦波羅非他所害故。他逼所生所有苦痛必定不受。是其所許。然而執云不受彼處形害苦者。與誰助力。此轉難曰。雖復有斯更互相害。由作用別緻使位殊。猶如所縛能縛之異。爾者還將自語返破己宗。由匪同時能縛所縛。更互容為繫絆之事。若言彼二次第而為。此亦非理。由非受系名為被縛。及其縛彼為能縛者。然而此二縱令苦次。于那洛迦亦不能立。若受墋毒極苦之時非那洛迦。若被他害。遭彼惱時是那洛迦。是不應許。一相續形有生有死。成大過故。同在一時更互相害。不容成故。由非一念是卒還非能為此計。若救轉計雖同一趣。由作用別名號便異。一名那洛迦。一號獄卒。猶如人趣非典獄者有被枷者。此亦非理。不託彼故。由非仗托作用差別說那洛迦如被縛者。然此但由趣為因故。斯乃如何舍其獄卒。是故定知位有差別。由非趣同作斯緣緒。能所縛

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本苦。如果說這顯示了其他宗派有不確定的過失，那也未能理解我所成立的意義。應當針對所有確定的苦難。他們不能共同承受，這是之前的作用能夠成立意義的原因。然而，非人和畜生在那一趣中出生，按照他們的法則，必須確定承受苦難，卻不承受。所說的羊等遭受蝎子毒刺時，有斷命的痛苦，或者被熱足所產生的疼痛。如果完全不承受那一趣的苦難，就不能說那一趣的性質會有這樣的過失。有一種不同的觀點認為，獄卒由於自己和他人的業力增強所生，不會被傷害，所以互相折磨。他人不認可這種說法。我現在對你說，你執著于自己的見解，心智昏聵，即使在虛空中行走也會步步顛倒。那洛迦（地獄）的眾生不是被他人所害，所以他人逼迫所產生的所有苦痛必定不承受，這是他們所認可的。然而，如果執著于不承受那裡的形體傷害之苦，又能幫助誰呢？這反而更難解釋。即使有這樣的互相傷害，由於作用不同導致地位不同，就像被束縛者和能夠束縛者的區別。如果是這樣，那就等於是用自己的話反駁了自己的宗派。由於不是同時的能夠束縛和被束縛，互相容納成為束縛的事情。如果說他們是按照二次第來進行的，這也是不合理的。由於不受束縛不能稱為被縛，以及束縛他們不能稱為能夠束縛者。然而，即使這兩個苦難有次第，也不能在那洛迦（地獄）中成立。如果承受極度痛苦的時候不是那洛迦（地獄），如果被他人傷害，遭受他人惱害的時候才是那洛迦（地獄），這是不應該允許的。一個相續的形體有生有死，會造成很大的過失。因為同時互相傷害是不可能成立的。由於不是一念之間，獄卒也不能完成這個計劃。如果想要挽救，就說雖然在同一趣，由於作用不同，名稱就不同。一個叫那洛迦（地獄），一個叫獄卒。就像人趣中，不是典獄官的人也有被枷鎖束縛的。這也是不合理的，因為沒有依託于那個原因。由於不是憑藉作用的差別來說那洛迦（地獄）像被束縛者。然而，這僅僅是因為趣為原因。這又如何捨棄獄卒呢？所以可以確定地位是有差別的，由於不是同一趣而產生這樣的因緣，能夠束縛和被束縛。

【English Translation】 English version Suffering. If it is said that this shows that other schools have uncertain faults, then it has not understood the meaning of what I have established. It should be directed at all definite sufferings. They cannot jointly bear it, which is why the previous action can establish meaning. However, non-humans and animals are born in that realm, and according to their rules, they must definitely endure suffering, but they do not. When sheep and the like suffer from scorpion stings, there is the pain of losing their lives, or the pain caused by hot feet. If they do not fully endure the suffering of that realm, then it cannot be said that the nature of that realm would have such faults. There is a different view that the prison guards are born from the increase of their own and others' karma, and they are not harmed, so they torture each other. Others do not agree with this view. I now say to you, you are attached to your own views, and your mind is confused, even if you walk in the void, you will stumble step by step. The beings of Naraka (hell) are not harmed by others, so all the pain caused by others' coercion is definitely not endured, which is what they acknowledge. However, if you are attached to not enduring the suffering of physical harm there, who can you help? This is even more difficult to explain. Even if there is such mutual harm, the status is different due to different functions, just like the difference between the bound and the binder. If this is the case, then it is equivalent to refuting your own school with your own words. Since the binder and the bound are not simultaneous, they mutually accommodate each other to become the matter of binding. If it is said that they are done in a secondary order, this is also unreasonable. Since not being bound cannot be called being bound, and binding them cannot be called the binder. However, even if these two sufferings have an order, they cannot be established in Naraka (hell). If the time of enduring extreme suffering is not Naraka (hell), if being harmed by others, suffering from others' annoyance is Naraka (hell), this should not be allowed. A continuous form has birth and death, which will cause great faults. Because it is impossible to establish mutual harm at the same time. Since it is not in one thought, the prison guard cannot complete this plan. If you want to save it, you can say that although they are in the same realm, the names are different due to different functions. One is called Naraka (hell), and the other is called prison guard. Just like in the human realm, there are also those who are not prison officers who are bound by shackles. This is also unreasonable, because it does not rely on that reason. Since it is not by relying on the difference in function that Naraka (hell) is said to be like the bound. However, this is only because the realm is the cause. How can this abandon the prison guard? Therefore, it can be determined that the status is different, and it is not because of the same realm that such conditions arise, the binder and the bound.

殊由作用別之所為故。理應隨彼而作分位。誠無有違。若時許樂階位別者。應須共許諸那洛迦非獄卒也。於我所宗唯爾是要。由此與前能立之義。善符順故。若許實有那洛迦性。由作用別。有時名作掌獄者故。斯之執見所有階位便。成無失然。則許有階級殊途如。有頌云。

多瞋為墋業　　好行罪惡事　見苦心歡悅　　當生琰摩卒

由非此相那洛迦有。若此伽他是實義者。如何輒爾作如是言。其獄卒等非有情數。隨那洛迦所見之相。作如斯說。理復何違。諸近見者。由睹於他舉動差別。為所量故測度彼心。然本在識種子熟時。隨有如是相狀差別。而起分別。隨彼所見佛作斯說。欲令波跛惡業有情斷除罪見。于㮈洛迦極惡之處。彰顯惡業所生苦報。隨彼情見。于其識外說非愛事。礭論實理咸是內緣似相而現。固無違也。

有異執云。雖復更相俱為苦害。此等階級不越常途。由非此時有其定位。被害之者名那洛迦。能害之人號波羅矣。是故定知。諸那洛迦正被害時。無有便成獄卒之過。

執此計時於我所成獄卒事用。曾無片許令愛樂耶。有說此由業力有斯異狀。隨逐有情還非一準。由此先曾更相惱害。復于獄處共為刑戮。彼此逼害遭諸痛苦。若有生命自無身力。能害於他但知忍苦。更無餘暇。由

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因為作用不同而產生差別，理應根據這些差別來劃分位階，這並沒有什麼不妥。如果允許階位有所不同，那麼就應該承認所有的那洛迦（Naraka，地獄）並非都是獄卒。在我所堅持的觀點中，這才是關鍵。因為這與之前的論證意義相符。如果承認確實存在那洛迦的性質，由於作用不同，有時被稱為掌獄者，那麼這種觀點的所有階位劃分就不會有錯失。這樣就允許存在階級上的差別，正如頌文所說：

『多瞋為墋業，好行罪惡事，見苦心歡悅，當生琰摩卒。』（Yama's guards，閻摩的獄卒）

由於那洛迦並非如此，如果這首伽他（Gatha，偈頌）是真實的，為什麼輕易地說獄卒等不是有情眾生呢？根據那洛迦所見到的景象而這樣說，又有什麼不合理呢？那些親眼所見的人，因為看到他人的舉動差別，以此作為衡量標準來推測他們的內心。然而，根本上是在意識種子成熟時，隨著這些相狀的差別而產生分別。佛陀根據他們所見到的景象而這樣說，是爲了讓作惡的有情眾生斷除罪惡的見解，在㮈洛迦（Naraka，地獄）極其惡劣的地方，彰顯惡業所產生的苦報。根據他們的情見，在他們的意識之外說一些不悅的事情。但實際上，這些都是內在因緣所顯現的相似景象，並沒有什麼矛盾。

有一種不同的觀點認為，即使互相造成傷害，這些階級也不會超出常規。因為此時並沒有明確的定位，受害者被稱為那洛迦，施害者被稱為波羅矣（Paraloka，彼世）。因此可以確定，當那洛迦正在遭受傷害時，並不會因此變成獄卒。

如果堅持這種說法，那麼在我看來，獄卒的作用又有什麼值得稱道的呢？有人說這是由於業力的不同而產生的差異，並非所有有情眾生都一樣。因此，先前互相惱害，又在地獄中共同遭受刑罰，彼此逼迫傷害，遭受各種痛苦。如果生命本身沒有力量，無法傷害他人，只能忍受痛苦，沒有其他空閑。

【English Translation】 English version: Because of the differences in their functions, distinctions arise, and it is reasonable to allocate positions according to these differences. There is no contradiction in this. If different ranks are allowed, then it should be acknowledged that not all Narakas (hell beings) are prison guards. In my view, this is the key point, as it aligns well with the preceding arguments. If it is admitted that the nature of Narakas truly exists, and due to differences in function, they are sometimes called jailers, then all the distinctions in this view would be without error. This allows for differences in rank, as the verse says:

'Much anger leads to defilement, a fondness for evil deeds, joy at the sight of suffering; one will be born as a Yama's guard (Yama's guards，閻摩的獄卒).'

Since Narakas are not like this, if this Gatha (Gatha，偈頌) is true, why readily say that prison guards and others are not sentient beings? To speak in this way according to what the Narakas see, what contradiction is there? Those who have seen it firsthand, because they see the differences in others' actions, use this as a measure to infer their minds. Fundamentally, however, it is when the seeds of consciousness mature that distinctions arise along with these differences in appearances. The Buddha speaks in this way according to what they see, in order to lead sentient beings who commit evil to abandon their sinful views, and in the extremely evil places of Naraka (Naraka，地獄), to reveal the suffering that arises from evil karma. According to their feelings and views, he speaks of unpleasant things outside of their consciousness. But in reality, all of these are internal causes that manifest as similar appearances, and there is no contradiction.

There is a different view that, even if they cause harm to each other, these ranks do not exceed the norm. Because there is no clear positioning at this time, the victim is called Naraka, and the perpetrator is called Paraloka (Paraloka，彼世). Therefore, it can be determined that when a Naraka is being harmed, they do not become a prison guard as a result.

If this view is insisted upon, then in my opinion, what is there to commend in the function of a prison guard? Some say that this is due to differences in karma, and not all sentient beings are the same. Therefore, having previously harmed each other, they jointly suffer punishment in hell, forcing and harming each other, and enduring various sufferings. If life itself has no strength and cannot harm others, it can only endure suffering and has no other time.

彼有情先共為怨。故使今時更相苦害。彼皆是此那洛迦者。而彼展轉共相害事。非他所許。隨其自業識相生故。而云非是獄卒性故。彼非能害此出過言。全無意況。若被害者許是那洛迦。然能害者即不受。斯苦有說于同一趣諸獄卒類未必要須同形量等然與彼卒墋毒可畏。見便生怖。高大形軀非常威壯。設有形量可容相似。然彼身形含毒可畏。如篾戾車。見便悚懼。是能害者。設使此類軀貌矬[坐*委]。由其稟性是猛利故。縱令敵者形狀偉大。情不比數事同草芥。陵篾彼徒力有容裕。此亦未能閑他意趣幽邃深義。然彼疏失。我且恕之。諸那洛迦更互相害事亦不殊。形量力等必須相似。有時雖復作如斯說。乘茲語勢遂即難言。未必要須形量相似。此欲共誰而為擊難。諸有忖度自身勇力。於他決勝便無怖心。如是許時。由其墋害或復威嚴者。斯乃誠為無義言也。由切逼迫生極怖故。非能害者。作成立時道其極怖。作便成過。方便顯斯差別之相。仁今更復成立墋害。及以威嚴。此則便成大為恩造。能為善伴增我光輝。如上所言。得差別體。地獄器苦不同受之。或諸猛火由業力故便無燒苦。斯則自非。善友誰能輒作斯說。凡是密友性善之人。不論夷險常為恩益。為欲顯其不受燒苦故致斯言。然於此時助成立義。即是顯出善友之

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本那些有情眾生先前互為仇敵，所以導致現在互相苦害。他們都是這那洛迦（地獄）中的眾生，他們之間互相殘害的事情，並非由他人允許，而是隨著各自的業識顯現而生。因此說並非獄卒的本性所致。說他們不能加害於人，這是過分的言論，完全沒有道理。如果被害者被認為是那洛迦（地獄眾生），那麼加害者就不受苦。有人說，在同一趣（道）的獄卒中，不一定需要形體大小相同，但那些獄卒兇狠毒辣，令人畏懼，見到就心生恐懼，身形高大，非常威猛。即使形體大小可能相似，但他們的身形包含毒害，令人畏懼，如同篾戾車（邊地野蠻人），見到就感到恐懼，他們是能加害者。即使這類人的身軀矮小，由於其本性兇猛，即使敵人形狀偉大，也不放在眼裡，如同對待草芥一樣，欺凌他們綽綽有餘。這也不能理解他人意趣幽深之義，但我且寬恕他。諸那洛迦（地獄眾生）互相殘害的事情，也不一定形體大小、力量等必須相似。有時即使這樣說，憑藉這種語氣就難以說，不一定需要形體大小相似。這是想和誰爭論呢？那些衡量自身勇力，認為一定能戰勝他人，便沒有恐懼心的人，如果允許這樣說，那麼由於兇狠殘害或者威嚴，這實在是毫無意義的言論。由於切身逼迫而產生極度恐懼，並非能加害者，如果這樣成立，就成了過錯。方便地顯示這種差別之相。現在你又成立兇狠殘害以及威嚴，這就會變成大恩大德，能成為良伴，增加我的光輝。如上所言，得到差別的本體，地獄的器物之苦不同，或者諸猛火由於業力而沒有燒灼之苦，這實在是不對的。善友誰能輕易說出這種話？凡是密友，性情善良的人，不論安危，常常帶來恩惠和利益。爲了顯示他們不受燒灼之苦才這樣說，然而此時幫助成立這種觀點，就是顯出善友的...

【English Translation】 English version Those sentient beings were enemies in the past, which causes them to harm each other now. They are all beings in this Naraka (hell), and their mutual harm is not permitted by others, but arises from their own karmic consciousness. Therefore, it is said that it is not caused by the nature of the prison guards. To say that they cannot harm others is an excessive statement, completely unreasonable. If the victim is considered a Naraka (hell being), then the perpetrator does not suffer. Some say that among the prison guards in the same gati (realm), it is not necessary for the body size to be the same, but those prison guards are fierce and venomous, causing fear, and one is terrified upon seeing them, with tall bodies and great power. Even if the body size may be similar, their bodies contain poison and are terrifying, like Mlecchas (barbarians), one feels fear upon seeing them, they are the perpetrators. Even if this type of person is short in stature, because of their fierce nature, even if the enemy is great in shape, they are not taken seriously, like treating grass, and it is more than enough to bully them. This also cannot understand the profound meaning of others' intentions, but I will forgive him. The mutual harm of the Narakas (hell beings) does not necessarily require the same body size, strength, etc. Sometimes even if it is said like this, it is difficult to say with this tone, it is not necessary for the body size to be similar. Who is this trying to argue with? Those who measure their own courage and think that they will definitely defeat others, and have no fear, if it is allowed to say this, then because of fierceness and harm or majesty, this is really meaningless speech. Because of the intense pressure, extreme fear arises, not the perpetrator, if this is established, it becomes a mistake. Conveniently show this difference. Now you are establishing fierce harm and majesty, which will become a great kindness, can become a good companion, and increase my glory. As mentioned above, obtaining the essence of difference, the suffering of hell's instruments is different, or the fierce fires do not have the suffering of burning due to karmic power, this is really wrong. Who can easily say such a thing? All close friends, people of good nature, often bring kindness and benefit, regardless of safety. To show that they do not suffer from burning, they say this, but at this time, helping to establish this view is to show the good friend's...

意。由其不受彼之苦故。意欲成立非那洛迦。今復更云。由其業力說有大火。言不燒者。斯則真成立唯識義。由無實火但唯業力能壞自性。既定不受如斯苦故。便成此火自性元無。然有實性。是宗所許。若也許其是識現相事體元無。此由業力故無實火。斯成應理。由其先業為限齊故。若異此者。彼增上業所招之果既現在。彼如何不見。如無智者欲求火滅更復澆酥。令唯識宗轉益光熾。由斯眾理。證此非成那洛迦類。

設爾不成。那洛迦類是鬼是畜。理亦何傷。爾者既非那洛迦。如何生惡處。由非得余趣生於㮈洛迦。若爾既生彼處已應同那洛迦。又復如何而許彼處得有生理。若生於彼當趣同分。彼初生時必應非有。有情數性非所許故。復由於彼同趣有情。無不定故。若執此見名為生者。諸大威神亦有于茲㮈洛迦處為救有情應濟之苦。此則雖非那洛迦類。亦見有故便成不定。非即據斯恒決定見作斯說故。此意欲論。唯于惡趣㮈洛迦中而見有故。當爾之時諸琰摩王侍從使者。王若出行此必隨逐。是時彼王並及侍從不出于界。若其彼界無差別類。云何天上亦有傍生。如天象等雖非天趣而生彼故。如是琰摩王界諸獄卒類。及狗烏等然非彼類亦生其中。由此道理同那洛迦。諸獄卒等生地獄時。即彼趣攝。何以故。同處生故。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因為他們不受那些痛苦的影響。意圖成立非那洛迦（naraka，地獄）。現在進一步說，因為他們的業力說有大火，說不燃燒，這才是真正成立唯識的意義。因為沒有真實的火，只有業力能夠破壞自性。既然已經確定不受這樣的痛苦，就成了這火的自性原本沒有。然而有真實自性，是宗派所允許的。如果也允許它是識的顯現，事物的本體原本沒有，這由於業力的緣故就沒有真實的火，這就成了合理的。因為先前的業力是有限度的。如果不是這樣，那麼由增上業所招感的果報既然已經顯現，他們怎麼會看不見呢？就像沒有智慧的人想要滅火反而澆油，使得唯識宗更加興盛。因為這些道理，證明這不能成立那洛迦（naraka，地獄）的種類。

假設這樣不能成立，那洛迦（naraka，地獄）的種類是鬼是畜生，道理又有什麼損害呢？如果說他們不是那洛迦（naraka，地獄），怎麼會生在惡處呢？因為他們不是通過其他趣道而生於那洛迦（naraka，地獄）。如果這樣，既然生在那處就應該和那洛迦（naraka，地獄）相同。又怎麼允許在那處可以有生理呢？如果生在那處，應當趨向同類。他們最初生的時候必定不應該有有情數目的性質，因為這是不被允許的。而且在那處，同趣的有情不是固定的。如果執著這種見解叫做生，那麼諸大威神也有在那洛迦（naraka，地獄）處爲了拯救有情而救濟他們的痛苦。這樣，即使他們不是那洛迦（naraka，地獄）的種類，也能夠看見他們，這就成了不確定的。不是根據恒常決定的見解而這樣說。這意思是說，只是在惡趣那洛迦（naraka，地獄）中看見他們。當那時，諸琰摩王（Yama，閻摩）的侍從使者，國王如果出行，他們必定跟隨。那時，國王以及侍從不出于界限。如果那個界限沒有差別種類，為什麼天上也有傍生，如天象等，雖然不是天趣而生在那裡。就像這樣，琰摩王（Yama，閻摩）界的諸獄卒類，以及狗烏等，然而不是他們的種類也生在其中。因為這個道理，和那洛迦（naraka，地獄）相同，諸獄卒等生地獄時，就是那個趣道的攝屬。為什麼呢？因為在同一個地方出生。

【English Translation】 English version: Because they do not experience those sufferings. The intention is to establish that it is not a Naraka (naraka, hell). Now, further, because their karma is said to have great fire, saying it does not burn, this truly establishes the meaning of Vijnanavada (唯識, Consciousness-only). Because there is no real fire, only karma can destroy self-nature. Since it is determined that they do not experience such suffering, it becomes that the self-nature of this fire originally does not exist. However, having a real self-nature is what the school allows. If it is also allowed that it is a manifestation of consciousness, the substance of things originally does not exist, then due to karma, there is no real fire, which becomes reasonable. Because the previous karma has a limit. If it were not so, then since the result of the augmented karma has already manifested, how could they not see it? It is like a person without wisdom trying to extinguish a fire by pouring ghee on it, making the Vijnanavada (唯識, Consciousness-only) even more prosperous. Because of these reasons, it proves that this cannot establish the category of Naraka (naraka, hell).

Suppose this cannot be established, what harm is there if the category of Naraka (naraka, hell) is a ghost or an animal? If they are not Naraka (naraka, hell), how can they be born in an evil realm? Because they are not born in Naraka (naraka, hell) through other destinies. If so, since they are born in that place, they should be the same as Naraka (naraka, hell). How can it be allowed that there can be physiology in that place? If they are born in that place, they should tend towards the same category. When they are first born, they should not have the nature of sentient beings, because this is not allowed. Moreover, in that place, sentient beings of the same destiny are not fixed. If holding this view is called birth, then the great powerful deities also have the suffering of saving sentient beings in the Naraka (naraka, hell) place. In this way, even if they are not the category of Naraka (naraka, hell), they can be seen, which becomes uncertain. It is not based on a constant and definite view that this is said. The meaning is that they are only seen in the evil realm Naraka (naraka, hell). At that time, the attendants and messengers of Yama (Yama, 閻摩), if the king travels, they must follow. At that time, the king and his attendants do not leave the boundary. If that boundary has no different categories, why are there also animals in the heavens, such as celestial elephants, although they are not of the heavenly realm but are born there. In this way, the jailers of Yama's (Yama, 閻摩) realm, as well as dogs and crows, are not of their category but are also born there. Because of this reason, similar to Naraka (naraka, hell), when the jailers are born in hell, they are included in that destiny. Why? Because they are born in the same place.

即由斯理能成決定。應受彼苦。此救不然。雖生地獄非那洛迦。何以故。不同受故。如天上傍生地獄中不爾者。諸有傍生及諸天等處不差別。如那洛迦等自業能感差別不同。彼所作業隨自業力而受彼苦。是故定知天上傍生必有能感天上樂業。方乃生天同受彼樂。由順樂業之所生故。

所執傍生鬼不受彼苦故者。諸有傍生及餓鬼等。彼所生趣受種種苦。不爾云何諸獄卒等不受彼苦。由是故知。那洛迦苦非生報。業趣所受故。由如那剌陀等。若爾非無業者而生彼故。此亦如前已廣分別。如彼業力之所感者。而於中現。此非同喻。然彼所立決定不成。非我所許。然於此中如鐵山等乍離乍合。有所作故。有餘師說。彼獄卒等亦受彼苦。然則所說因喻不同。前後相違故。應更說所依別故。或由增上火異業力而不受苦。何以故。如不受時。斯言有失。有餘復說。猶如無色界苦受樂受亦有受處。然彼受者有所受故。此亦如是。斯見非理。然無色界有情生者。非是器故。彼界無處受等及行。云何方界攝取彼等。方分為因。有方分者。以為因故。如是應知實無方分。但唯有生欲色二界有情生者。有因積集。是故彼生應有方分。猶如色界有方分故。欲界亦然。彼界因故。不爾以無色故無住處故。猶如不和合者。此不如理。若爾應許彼

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本因此，這種理由能夠得出確定的結論：應該承受那些痛苦。但這種救贖並非如此。即使生於地獄，也不是那洛迦（Naraka，地獄）。為什麼呢？因為感受不同。例如，天上、傍生（animals）和地獄中的情況並非如此。所有的傍生和諸天等處境並沒有差別。如同那洛迦等地獄，各自的業力所感召的差別不同。他們所造作的，隨著各自業力的力量而承受那些痛苦。所以可以確定地知道，天上和傍生必定有能夠感召天上快樂的善業，才能生到天上共同享受那些快樂，因為是順應快樂的善業所生。

如果認為傍生和餓鬼不受那些痛苦，那麼所有的傍生和餓鬼等，他們所生的趣向會承受各種各樣的痛苦。否則，為什麼那些獄卒等不受那些痛苦呢？因此可知，那洛迦的痛苦並非是生報，而是業趣所承受的。就像那剌陀（Narada，印度教聖人）等。如果這樣，並非沒有業力的人會生到那裡，這就像前面已經廣泛分別過的。就像那些業力所感召的，而在其中顯現。這不是相同的比喻。然而他們所立的決定不能成立，因為我並不認可。然而在此中，就像鐵山等時而分開時而合攏，有所作為。有其他論師說，那些獄卒等也承受那些痛苦。然而這樣，所說的因和比喻就不同了，前後互相矛盾。應該進一步說明所依據的差別。或者因為增上的火焰異業的力量而不受痛苦。為什麼呢？就像不受痛苦的時候。這種說法有缺失。還有人說，就像沒有性別的苦受和樂受也有感受之處。然而那些感受者有所感受，這裡也是這樣。這種見解沒有道理。然而沒有性別的有情眾生，不是容器的緣故。那個界沒有感受等和行為。怎麼能用方界來攝取他們呢？方分是原因，有方分的人，以此為原因。應該知道實際上沒有方分。只有生於欲界和色界的有情眾生，有原因的積聚。所以他們所生之處應該有方分，就像**有方分一樣。欲界也是這樣，因為那個界是原因。否則，因為沒有色，沒有住處，就像不和合一樣。這不合道理。如果這樣，應該允許他們。

【English Translation】 English version Therefore, this reasoning can lead to a definite conclusion: one should endure those sufferings. But this salvation is not like that. Even if born in hell, it is not Naraka (hell). Why? Because the experience is different. For example, the situations in the heavens, among animals, and in hell are not the same. All beings in the animal realm and the heavens do not have the same circumstances. Like the hells of Naraka and others, the differences are due to the different karmic forces they experience. What they create, they endure those sufferings according to the power of their own karma. Therefore, it can be definitely known that those in the heavens and the animal realm must have good karma that can attract the happiness of the heavens, in order to be born in the heavens and jointly enjoy those pleasures, because they are born from good karma that accords with happiness.

If it is thought that animals and hungry ghosts do not experience those sufferings, then all animals and hungry ghosts, the realms they are born into, will endure various kinds of suffering. Otherwise, why would those hell wardens not endure those sufferings? Therefore, it can be known that the suffering of Naraka is not a result of birth, but is endured by the karmic realm. Like Narada (a Hindu sage) and others. If so, it is not that those without karma are born there, which is like what has been extensively discussed earlier. Like those who are influenced by karmic forces, and appear in it. This is not the same analogy. However, the determination they have established cannot be established, because I do not agree with it. However, in this, like the iron mountains that sometimes separate and sometimes come together, there is something being done. Some other teachers say that those hell wardens also endure those sufferings. However, in this case, the cause and analogy are different, and they contradict each other. The difference in what is relied upon should be further explained. Or, due to the power of the increased fire and different karma, they do not endure suffering. Why? Like when they do not endure suffering. This statement is flawed. There are also those who say that, like the suffering and pleasure that have no gender, there are also places to experience them. However, those who experience them have something to experience, and this is also the case here. This view is unreasonable. However, sentient beings without gender are not born because they are not containers. That realm has no experience or action. How can they be included in the spatial realm? Spatial division is the cause, and those with spatial division take this as the cause. It should be known that there is actually no spatial division. Only sentient beings born in the desire realm and the form realm have an accumulation of causes. Therefore, the places where they are born should have spatial division, just like ** has spatial division. The desire realm is also like this, because that realm is the cause. Otherwise, because there is no form, there is no dwelling place, like those who are not in harmony. This is unreasonable. If so, they should be allowed.

那洛迦業增上力生異大種。非是有情之所攝故。地等大種于地獄中起別形顯量力差別。如有情像顏色等異手。足身份量力差別。長短大小。于彼作用方名卒等。若爾非有情者云何卒等不待外緣手足身份種種作用。欲令彼等生大怖畏。變現種種增勝威力動手足等。此由風界令動手足。種種作用別別示現。彼之風力如人意樂。隨念所作諸那洛迦。亦復如是。才見此時便生怖畏。彼地獄中那洛迦等。由業力故生大怖畏。猶如木人能有所作。種種示現大種和合。雖無思覺。業力因緣。遂見如是動手足等相狀有異示現所作。諸無情等道理許成。彼之地處諸那洛迦業增上力。便令自見羝羊山等乍來乍去。斯非有情而亦見有。此則住處地等差別及獄卒等非是有情。理得成立。無勞致惑。爾者非無所緣。是獄卒等意樂生故。彼諸卒等及以地等處所不同形相表示那洛迦等。許由業力于地獄中地等大種生是形色差別變異手足動等處及大種。或有無斯諸繫縛等。以業力故。理應不成。何緣不許。識由業力如是轉變。如夢所見色等和合。外有影生種種相現。理應共許。轉變作用。識由業力如是轉變。與處相違。若許由業力何用異大種者。諸獄卒等由四大種種種轉變動手足等作用別故。如夢所見色等處故。彼等形狀無體用故。或非地等差別相故。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本那洛迦（naraka，地獄眾生）的業力增長導致四大種（地、水、火、風）產生特殊變化。因為它們不是有情眾生所攝持的。地等四大種在地獄中呈現出不同的形狀、顯現、大小和力量的差別，就像有情眾生的形象、顏色等不同，手、足、身體部分的大小和力量也不同，有長有短有大有小。在那洛迦的作用方面，才被稱為獄卒等。如果這樣，那麼非有情眾生如何能像獄卒那樣，不需要外在的因緣，就能像手、足、身體部分那樣進行各種作用呢？這是爲了讓那洛迦產生巨大的恐懼，變現出各種增強的威力，做出動手、動腳等動作。這是由風界（vayu-dhatu）的作用使手腳動起來，各種作用分別顯現。這種風的力量就像人的意樂一樣，隨念而作。那些那洛迦也是如此，才看到這些景象就產生恐懼。那些地獄中的那洛迦等，由於業力的緣故產生巨大的恐懼，就像木偶人能夠有所動作一樣。各種顯現都是四大種和合而成，雖然沒有思覺，但由於業力的因緣，就看到像動手、動腳等不同的相狀顯現出所作的事情。這些無情之物等道理上是可以成立的。那些地方的那些那洛迦，由於業力的增長，便讓自己看到羝羊山（dhyang-shan，山名）等忽來忽去。這些不是有情眾生，但也看到了有情眾生的景象。這說明住處、地等差別以及獄卒等不是有情眾生，這個道理是可以成立的，不需要疑惑。如果這樣，那麼並非沒有所緣，是因為獄卒等的意樂所生。那些獄卒等以及地等處所的不同形狀，都表示著那洛迦等。可以認為，由於業力，在地獄中的地等四大種產生了形狀、顏色等差別變異，手足的動作等，以及四大種的有無，諸如繫縛等，由於業力的緣故，理應不能成立。為什麼不允許呢？識（vijnana）由於業力的作用而這樣轉變，就像夢中所見的顏色等和合，外在有影子產生，呈現出各種景象，這是理應共同認可的轉變作用。識由於業力的作用而這樣轉變，與處所相違背。如果承認是由業力所致，那又何必需要不同的四大種呢？那些獄卒等由四大種的種種轉變而做出動手、動腳等不同的作用，就像夢中所見的顏色等處所一樣。它們的形狀沒有實體作用，或者不是地等差別的相狀。

【English Translation】 English version The increased power of karma of the Naraka (hell beings) causes the great elements (earth, water, fire, wind) to produce special changes. Because they are not governed by sentient beings. The great elements such as earth manifest different shapes, appearances, sizes, and strengths in hell, just as the images and colors of sentient beings are different, and the sizes and strengths of hands, feet, and body parts are also different, some are long, some are short, some are big, and some are small. In terms of the function of the Naraka, they are then called prison guards, etc. If so, how can non-sentient beings, like prison guards, perform various functions like hands, feet, and body parts without external causes? This is to cause great fear in the Naraka, manifesting various enhanced powers, and making movements such as moving hands and feet. This is caused by the action of the wind element (vayu-dhatu), which makes the hands and feet move, and various functions are manifested separately. The power of this wind is like the intention of a person, acting according to thought. The Narakas are also like this, and they become frightened when they see these scenes. Those Narakas in hell, etc., experience great fear due to the power of karma, just like a wooden puppet can make movements. All kinds of manifestations are formed by the combination of the four great elements, although there is no thought or awareness, due to the cause of karma, one sees different appearances such as moving hands and feet manifesting what is done. These inanimate things can be established in principle. Those Narakas in those places, due to the increase of the power of karma, make themselves see things like Dhyang-shan (mountain name) coming and going suddenly. These are not sentient beings, but they also see the appearances of sentient beings. This shows that the differences in dwelling places, earth, etc., and prison guards, etc., are not sentient beings, and this principle can be established without doubt. If so, then it is not without an object of perception, because it is born from the intention of the prison guards, etc. The different shapes of those prison guards, etc., and the places such as earth, all represent the Narakas, etc. It can be considered that, due to karma, the great elements such as earth in hell produce differences and changes in shape, color, etc., the movements of hands and feet, etc., and the presence or absence of the great elements, such as bondage, etc., should not be established due to the power of karma. Why is it not allowed? Consciousness (vijnana) transforms in this way due to the action of karma, just like the combination of colors, etc., seen in a dream, where external shadows are produced, and various scenes appear, which is a transformation that should be commonly recognized. Consciousness transforms in this way due to the action of karma, which is contrary to the place. If it is admitted that it is caused by the power of karma, then why do we need different great elements? Those prison guards, etc., perform different functions such as moving hands and feet due to the various transformations of the four great elements, just like the places of colors, etc., seen in a dream. Their shapes have no substantial function, or they are not the appearances of differences in earth, etc.

如前所說羝羊山等。他不許成色相變故。變化亦然。形狀等異由他力故。此由識變種種異相轉轉形儀差別不同。離識之外更無一物而有可見。此中外難。若但由識轉變別異種種形儀獄卒等想。自識變故。同苦因故。諸那洛迦非獄卒等。此四大種由增上果同業生故。于受苦時不同受故。是故方須說四大種。如是所說不善他宗。云何不善。但說有情自識變現見獄卒等能為墋毒。由自識現各見卒等。諸苦害具互不相違。然如自識見苦害等同類影現。彼因同故。苦受用俱。師與弟子所作事業有同不同。于不同事而強說同。及孤地獄互不相見。苦不同故。所立大種。理謂不成。

業熏習余處者。謂有執那洛迦由自業力差別因生。彼業熏習。理應許在識相續中。彼由業力不在余處積集力故。唯地等處業所作時。合因果故。此乃是為彼習果處卒等影像識緣差別和合得生。種種色類如應分別。不爾是諸大種和合積集因業力故。由業相續差別果成。如是應知。自身相續得定果故。習之憶念緣于種子。亦無殊異有情相續。如是知已。所以取少分一人等。顯示所取相續內熏心及心所相差異果五趣所攝。自業熏習之所成故。如無色界熏習之果。離心心所無別不相應行。此中唯說名言差別體事無異。故是密意。或不離心心所體事不同及以生

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如前面所說的羝羊山等（Dīaṅga Mountain，地名）。他不允許成色相發生改變。變化也是如此。形狀等差異是由於其他力量造成的。這（獄卒等）是由識的變化，種種不同的相，不斷地轉變，形體儀態差別不同。離開識之外，再沒有一樣東西是可以被看見的。這裡有內外的辯難。如果僅僅是由識轉變出種種不同的形儀，如獄卒等的想法，是由於自己的識變化所致。因為痛苦的原因相同，所以各個那洛迦（Naraka，地獄）並非獄卒等所變。這四大種（catvāri mahābhūtāni，地、水、火、風）由於增上果（adhipati-phala，增上果）和共同的業力而產生，在承受痛苦的時候感受不同。因此才需要說明四大種。像這樣所說的不善於其他宗派。為什麼說不善呢？僅僅說有情（sattva，眾生）自己的識變現出獄卒等，能夠施加毒害。由於自己的識顯現，各自看見獄卒等，各種痛苦的刑具互相不違背。然而就像自己的識看見痛苦刑具等同類的影像顯現，因為原因相同，所以痛苦的感受和使用是共同的。師父和弟子所做的事業有相同也有不同，對於不同的事情卻強行說成相同。以及孤地獄（ekaka-naraka，孤地獄）互相不能看見，痛苦不同。所建立的四大種，道理上說不成立。

業熏習在其他地方，是指有人認為那洛迦（Naraka，地獄）是由各自的業力差別因所生。這種業的熏習，理應允許存在於識的相續中。這是由於業力不在其他地方積聚力量的緣故。只有在地等處，業所造作的時候，因果結合的緣故。這才是作為那些習果之處，獄卒等影像，識的緣和差別和合而生。種種顏色種類應該根據情況分別。否則，是各種大種（mahābhūta，地、水、火、風）和合積聚，因為業力的緣故，由業的相續差別而成就果報。應該這樣理解。自身相續得到確定的果報，熏習的憶念緣于種子。也沒有什麼不同於有情（sattva，眾生）的相續。像這樣瞭解之後，所以取少部分一個人等，顯示所取的相續內部熏習的心及心所（citta-caitta，心和心所）的相，差異的果報，五趣（pañca-gati，地獄、餓鬼、畜生、人、天）所攝。由自己的業熏習所成就的緣故。就像沒有**熏習的果報。離開心和心所，沒有其他的非相應行（viprayukta-saṃskāra，不相應行法）。這裡僅僅是說名言的差別，體性事物沒有差異。所以這是密意。或者不離開心心所，體性事物不同，以及生。

【English Translation】 English version: As previously mentioned, Dīaṅga Mountain (a place name), etc. It does not allow the nature of form to change. Transformation is also the same. Differences in shape, etc., are caused by other forces. These (hell guardians, etc.) are due to the changes in consciousness, various different appearances, constantly transforming, with different forms and appearances. Apart from consciousness, there is nothing else that can be seen. Here there are internal and external debates. If it is only due to the transformation of consciousness into various different forms and appearances, such as the thought of hell guardians, it is due to the change of one's own consciousness. Because the causes of suffering are the same, therefore the various Narakas (Naraka, hells) are not transformed by hell guardians, etc. These four great elements (catvāri mahābhūtāni, earth, water, fire, wind) are produced by the adhipati-phala (adhipati-phala, dominant result) and shared karma, and they experience suffering differently when enduring it. Therefore, it is necessary to explain the four great elements. What is said in this way is not good for other schools. Why is it said to be not good? It only says that sentient beings' (sattva, beings) own consciousness manifests hell guardians, etc., who can inflict harm. Due to the manifestation of one's own consciousness, each sees hell guardians, etc., and the various instruments of torture do not contradict each other. However, just as one's own consciousness sees the appearance of similar images of painful instruments, because the causes are the same, the experience and use of suffering are shared. The actions of the teacher and the disciple are the same and different, but for different things, they are forced to be the same. And the solitary hells (ekaka-naraka, solitary hells) cannot see each other, and the suffering is different. The established four great elements are not established in principle.

The karmic imprints in other places refer to those who believe that Naraka (Naraka, hell) is produced by the different causes of each person's karmic power. The imprints of this karma should be allowed to exist in the continuum of consciousness. This is because the power of karma does not accumulate in other places. Only in places such as earth, when karma is created, is it because of the combination of cause and effect. This is the place for the results of those habits, the images of hell guardians, etc., the conditions of consciousness, and the combination of differences that arise. Various colors and types should be distinguished as appropriate. Otherwise, the various great elements (mahābhūta, earth, water, fire, wind) are combined and accumulated, because of the power of karma, the result is achieved by the difference in the continuum of karma. It should be understood in this way. Because one's own continuum receives a definite result, the memory of the habit is based on the seed. There is also no difference from the continuum of sentient beings (sattva, beings). After understanding this way, therefore, taking a small part of one person, etc., shows the internal imprints of the taken continuum, the characteristics of the mind and mental factors (citta-caitta, mind and mental factors), the different results, and the five destinies (pañca-gati, hell, hungry ghosts, animals, humans, gods) included. Because it is achieved by the imprints of one's own karma. It's like there is no result of ** imprints. Apart from the mind and mental factors, there are no other non-associated formations (viprayukta-saṃskāra, non-associated formations). Here, it is only said that there is a difference in names, and the nature of things is no different. So this is a secret meaning. Or not apart from the mind and mental factors, the nature of things is different, and birth.

處。未離欲者。色之熏習。如如自力生處得生。行安立故。如無色界熏習之業。或心心所不離色處。大種所生業力和合。方能生故。或識相續住熏習果。故如念愛。憎等亦復如是。大所造色影像識變亦不離識。彼之形狀差別所說執余處有果所熏識有果者。彼所習果此為因故。有餘師說。唯自體力變為果也。欲色界生。業力熏習識依止故。如無色界。積集生業所熏習故。彼說無記識所依止熏習及余識聚俱相應果此不應有。是故說依止者。遍於一切有情所攝。或不用力便應得之。復有餘說。自身業果於一身上而有因果。故如異熟識所安置。業是差別。故說身大種別別安布。果不應有。彼若如是。餘人身識能依所依。同一作業亦無差別。有情施設。故同一流注俱異熟識。爾者非卒等想差別大種和合建立。地獄有情。是故相續有其差別。爾者若時相續無間之識。增上因故能生別識種種異類。此時應有相續別異因果轉生。不爾云何此即欲說因差別故。如心相續和合種子是安立因。此中所說唯因能立。不說識增上緣是依止故。從斯種子無間相續識之差別。然由種子自體相續方得轉生。言增上者。如彼地等唯能為緣。能造四大亦應如是。此亦不然。從自種子生時。說此唯緣。不爾從識相續別有四大種子。猶如無色界沒生色界時。彼增

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本處。未離欲者，色（rupa, 物質）的熏習，如其自身的力量在產生之處而生。行為安立的緣故。如沒有熏習的業（karma, 行為），或者心和心所（citta-caitta, 心理活動）不離色處，四大種（maha-bhuta, 地、水、火、風）所生的業力和合，才能產生。或者識（vijnana, 意識）相續（santana, 相續不斷）住于熏習的果報。所以如念、愛、憎等也是這樣。四大所造的色影像識變也不離識。那些形狀差別所說的執著于其他地方有果報，被果報所熏習的識有果報，是因為他們所習得的果報以此為因。有其他老師說，唯有自體力變為果報。欲（kama, 慾望）生，業力熏習識依止的緣故。如沒有欲，積集產生業所熏習的緣故。他們說無記識（avyakrta-vijnana, 非善非惡的意識）所依止的熏習以及其他識聚共同相應的果報，這不應該有。所以說依止，是普遍於一切有情（sattva, 眾生）所攝。或者不用力便應該得到。又有其他說法，自身業果在一個身上而有因果。所以如異熟識（vipaka-vijnana, 果報識）所安置，業是差別。所以說身四大種別別安布，果報不應該有。他們如果這樣說，其他人身識能依所依，同一作業也沒有差別。有情施設的緣故，同一流注共同異熟識。那麼就不是突然等想差別，四大種和合建立。地獄有情，所以相續有其差別。那麼如果相續無間之識，增上因的緣故能生別識種種異類。此時應該有相續別異因果轉生。不然怎麼說，這就要說因差別了。如心相續和合種子是安立因。這裡所說唯有因能成立，不說識增上緣是依止的緣故。從這些種子無間相續識的差別。然而由種子自體相續才能轉生。說增上，如那些地等只能為緣。能造四大也應該是這樣。這也不對。從自種子生時，說這只是緣。不然從識相續別有四大種子，猶如沒有欲沒生欲時，他們增上。

【English Translation】 English version Here. For those who have not detached from desire, the imprinting of form (rupa) is such that it arises from its own power in the place where it is produced. Because of the establishment of action. It is like the absence of karma (action) that has been imprinted, or when the mind and mental factors (citta-caitta) are not separate from the realm of form, the combined force of karma produced by the four great elements (maha-bhuta) is necessary for it to arise. Or it is because consciousness (vijnana) continues to abide in the fruit of imprinting, just like thoughts, love, hatred, and so on. The transformation of the image consciousness of form created by the four great elements is also inseparable from consciousness. Those who speak of the differences in form, clinging to the idea that there are fruits in other places, and that consciousness imprinted with fruits has fruits, it is because the fruits they have practiced have this as their cause. Some other teachers say that only the power of the self transforms into fruit. Desire (kama) arises because the power of karma imprints and relies on consciousness. It is like the absence of desire, because of the accumulation and production of karma that has been imprinted. They say that the imprinting relied upon by indeterminate consciousness (avykrta-vijnana), as well as the fruits that correspond to other aggregates of consciousness, should not exist. Therefore, it is said that reliance is universal to all sentient beings (sattva). Or it should be obtained without effort. There are also other views that the fruits of one's own karma have cause and effect on one body. Therefore, as the resultant consciousness (vipaka-vijnana) is established, karma is the difference. Therefore, it is said that the four great elements of the body are arranged separately, and there should be no fruit. If they say so, then the support and supported of other people's body consciousness, and the same action, would also be no different. Because of the establishment of sentient beings, the same stream shares the same resultant consciousness. Then it is not the sudden differences in thought, etc., that the four great elements combine to establish. Sentient beings in hell, therefore, have differences in continuity. Then, if the consciousness that is continuous without interruption, due to the condition of the dominant cause, can produce different kinds of consciousness, at this time there should be the transformation of cause and effect with different continuities. If not, how can it be said that this is to speak of the difference in cause? Like the combined seeds of the mind's continuity are the establishing cause. What is said here is that only the cause can establish, and it is not said that the dominant condition of consciousness is the reason for reliance. From these seeds, there is a difference in the uninterrupted continuity of consciousness. However, it is only through the continuity of the self-nature of the seeds that transformation can occur. Saying 'dominant' is like those lands, etc., can only be conditions. The ability to create the four great elements should also be like this. This is also not right. When arising from one's own seeds, it is said that this is only a condition. Otherwise, from the continuity of consciousness, there are separate seeds of the four great elements, just like when there is no desire and desire arises, they increase.

上果。是異熟業之所感。得受用資具猶如異熟果。此可愛樂自業相續所感。此之正理順阿笈摩識所變果。

何因不許者。此由自見非理僻執。強思構畫誰能輒說。唯識之果違阿笈摩。因何爾許。阿笈摩經不立唯識。離唯識外更無色等。不應別說有十二處。雖爾不離其識並十二處立善等法。如是應知有色等處。是佛說故。若離色等所立不成。違佛語故。或色等處體實有故。猶如意處。是佛說故。識與色等亦非別有。猶如法處。斯理不應。此中所說不遮唯識。何以故。

依彼所化生。世尊密意趣。說有色等處。如化生有情者。如佛世尊說有化生有情。但唯依心相續不斷能往後世。是其密意。不說實有化生有情。此言密意。謂欲調伏一類有情。是故佛言有化生有情。是密意說也。謂彼斷見所害有情。隨自樂為者。無後世者。無善惡因果者。為欲洗除此之惡見。是故說心相續不斷。心相續言顯當生故。此死彼生猶斯理故。相續不斷說有化生。是為密意。離識之外更無別我。云何知然。如契經說。無我無眾生。但有法因故。契經不爾。彼經不說有情亦有亦無。是故契經不相違故。心相續言顯其不斷能往後世。如是應知如色等處。此為成熟一類有情。說斯密意。是故所立亦無自教相違之過。如斯所立。因亦不定。何以

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：上果（superior result）是由異熟業（vipāka-karma，導致不同體驗的業力）所感得的。獲得受用資具，猶如異熟果（vipāka-phala，異熟的果報）。這可愛樂的果報是由自業相續所感得。此處的正理符合阿笈摩（āgama，聖傳、經）所認識轉變的果。

為何不允許這種說法呢？這是由於他們自己的見解不合理，偏頗固執，強行思考構畫，誰又能隨便說唯識（vijñānavāda，唯識宗）的果違反了阿笈摩呢？因為什麼原因這樣認為呢？阿笈摩經沒有確立唯識，離開了唯識之外，就沒有色（rūpa，物質）等。不應該另外說有十二處（dvādaśāyatana，十二感官處）。即使如此，也不離於識以及十二處而建立善等法。因此，應當知道有色等處，是因為佛陀所說。如果離開了色等，所建立的法就不成立，違背了佛陀的教誨。或者說，色等處的體性是真實存在的，猶如意處（mana-āyatana，意根）。是因為佛陀所說。識與色等也不是分別存在的，猶如法處（dharma-āyatana，法處）。這個道理不應該成立。這裡所說的並沒有遮止唯識。為什麼呢？

依據那些被教化眾生的根器，世尊（Śākyamuni，釋迦牟尼）以隱秘的意趣，說有色等處，就像化生有情（upapāduka-sattva，化生眾生）一樣。就像佛陀世尊說有化生有情，但只是依靠心（citta，心）的相續不斷，能夠前往後世，這是他的隱秘意趣。並不是說真實存在化生有情。這個說法是隱秘的意趣，是爲了調伏一類有情。因此，佛陀說有化生有情，是隱秘的說法。針對那些被斷見（uccheda-dṛṣṭi，斷滅見）所害的有情，隨心所欲，認為沒有後世，沒有善惡因果。爲了洗除這種惡見，所以說心相續不斷。心相續的說法顯示了當來生，因為此死彼生也是這個道理。相續不斷，所以說有化生，這是隱秘的意趣。離開了識之外，就沒有別的我（ātman，神我）。怎麼知道是這樣呢？就像契經（sūtra，佛經）所說，無我無眾生，但有法因的緣故。契經不是這樣說的。那部經沒有說有情既有又沒有。因此，契經並不相違。心相續的說法顯示了它的不斷，能夠前往後世。因此，應當知道色等處也是這樣。這是爲了成熟一類有情，說了這個隱秘的意趣。因此，所建立的法也沒有和自己的教義相違背的過失。像這樣所建立的法，因也不確定。為什麼呢？

【English Translation】 English version: The superior result (uttara-phala) is felt by the ripening karma (vipāka-karma). Obtaining the resources for enjoyment is like the ripening fruit (vipāka-phala). This lovable result is felt by the continuous stream of one's own karma. The correct principle here accords with the fruit transformed by the consciousness recognized by the Āgama (āgama, sacred tradition, scripture).

Why is this not permitted? It is due to their own unreasonable views, biased clinging, and forced speculation. Who can casually say that the fruit of Consciousness-only (vijñānavāda, Yogācāra) contradicts the Āgama? For what reason is it thought so? The Āgama scriptures do not establish Consciousness-only; apart from Consciousness-only, there is no form (rūpa, matter) etc. It should not be separately said that there are twelve sense bases (dvādaśāyatana, twelve sense spheres). Even so, good dharmas etc. are established without being separate from consciousness and the twelve sense bases. Therefore, it should be known that the existence of form etc. is because the Buddha said so. If separated from form etc., the established dharma cannot be established, contradicting the Buddha's teachings. Or, the nature of form etc. is truly existent, like the mind base (mana-āyatana, mind base). It is because the Buddha said so. Consciousness and form etc. are also not separately existent, like the dharma base (dharma-āyatana, dharma base). This principle should not be established. What is said here does not negate Consciousness-only. Why?

Based on the capacity of those beings being taught, the World Honored One (Śākyamuni, Shakyamuni Buddha) with a hidden intention, spoke of the existence of form etc., just like spontaneously born beings (upapāduka-sattva, beings born by transformation). Just as the World Honored One Buddha said that there are spontaneously born beings, but only relying on the continuous stream of mind (citta, mind) can one go to the next life; this is his hidden intention. It is not saying that spontaneously born beings truly exist. This statement is a hidden intention, intended to tame a certain type of being. Therefore, the Buddha said that there are spontaneously born beings, which is a hidden statement. It is directed at those beings harmed by annihilationism (uccheda-dṛṣṭi, annihilation view), who act as they please, thinking there is no next life, no cause and effect of good and evil. To wash away this evil view, it is said that the stream of mind continues uninterrupted. The statement 'stream of mind' indicates the coming life, because death here and birth there is also this principle. The continuous stream is why it is said that there is spontaneous birth; this is the hidden intention. Apart from consciousness, there is no separate self (ātman, soul). How is it known to be so? Just as the sutra (sūtra, Buddhist scripture) says, there is no self, no sentient being, but only the cause of dharma. The sutra does not say it that way. That sutra does not say that sentient beings both exist and do not exist. Therefore, the sutra is not contradictory. The statement 'stream of mind' indicates its continuity, enabling one to go to the next life. Therefore, it should be known that form etc. are also like this. This is to mature a certain type of being, speaking with this hidden intention. Therefore, the established dharma also does not have the fault of contradicting one's own teachings. Like this established dharma, the cause is also uncertain. Why?

故。依世。俗諦。佛說別有化生有情。元亦不說離識蘊已有善不善及彼果等。別有有情。是因不定。是故佛說。為除斷見無後世者。如來世心相續不斷。于其識蘊假立有情。于略詮中而說有故。離心無境。有其四意。何謂為四。一者密意。二者境界。三者顯果。四者密意義。分別所縛如是因緣說十二處。此之一切當應建立。次第發起如理問答。云何密意說十二處。而有眾生如心相續。相續不斷。說有情能詮所詮於心安立執形像事。此中如是色等聲境當應分別。

識從自種生似境相。而轉為成內外處。佛說彼為十者。從彼眼等處生彼色等處。如理應知。于彼二處說斯種子相及彼識。如世尊說。為成處等說共許聲眼等差別此欲成立。說其青等分明顯現。彼同類色從彼識。起未離欲者識之種子殊勝安立故得出生彼等種子。雖且安立果未現受。乃至未得相應緣力無間生滅。剎那剎那相續等中。獲得微細體性巧妙差別轉變得殊勝者。如穀麥等地等為緣和合增長。體性不同轉轉安立芽等出現。如斯法性外之種子。內亦如是。此之內心相續現前相對無間剎那之頃能生青等體性差別。然此種子說為眼界。如次現為彼彼果性。心及心所安立此色為其眼處。彼亦如是。若如是色差別顯現。識體和合。警覺青等種子在阿賴耶識。由未顯

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因此，依據世俗諦（Samvriti-satya，相對真理），佛陀說有別於卵生、胎生、濕生的化生有情（Opapatika-sattva，無父母直接出生的眾生）。最初也沒有說離開識蘊（Vijnana-skandha，意識之集合）之外，另有善與不善以及它們的果報等。如果說離開識蘊之外，另有有情存在，這是沒有確切依據的。所以佛陀說，爲了消除斷見（Uccheda-ditthi，認為人死後一切皆無的邪見），即認為沒有後世的錯誤觀念，如來（Tathagata，佛陀的稱號）的世俗心（Lokika-citta，指凡夫之心）是相續不斷的，只是在識蘊的基礎上假立為有情（Sattva，眾生）。在簡略的解釋中這樣說，是因為心外無境，這其中有四種含義。哪四種呢？一是密意（Abhipraya，隱藏的意圖），二是境界（Gocara，所緣的對象），三是顯果（Phala，明顯的結果），四是密意義（Abhiprayartha，密意的含義）。由於分別唸的束縛，因為這樣的因緣，所以說十二處（Dvadashayatana，六根和六塵）。這一切都應當建立起來，按照次第發起如理的問答。什麼是用密意來說十二處，而有眾生如心相續，相續不斷呢？就是說有情能詮釋和所詮釋的，都是在心上安立，執著于形像之事。這裡，像色等聲境，應當分別說明。識從自己的種子生起，呈現出類似外境的相狀，然後轉變成為內外處（Ayatana，感覺的來源）。佛陀說其中的十處，是從眼等處（眼根等）生起色等處（色塵等）。應當如理地瞭解。在這兩處中，說明了種子相以及識。正如世尊（Bhagavan，佛陀的稱號）所說，爲了成就處等，說明了共許的聲、眼等差別，這是爲了成立青色等分明顯現。與它們同類的色，是從識中產生的。對於那些沒有脫離慾望的人來說，識的種子殊勝地安立，所以能夠出生這些種子。雖然暫時安立了種子，但果報還沒有顯現和接受。乃至沒有得到相應的因緣之力，無間斷地生滅，在剎那剎那的相續中，獲得微細的體性，巧妙的差別，轉變而變得殊勝。就像穀麥等以地等為因緣和合增長，體性不同，轉變安立，芽等出現一樣。像這樣的法性，外在的種子是這樣，內在也是這樣。這樣的內心相續現前，相對無間，在剎那之間，能夠生起青色等體性的差別。然而，這個種子被稱為眼界（Chakshur-dhatu，視覺的元素）。依次顯現為各種果性。心及心所（Citta-caitta，心理活動及其附屬物）安立這個色為眼處（Chakshur-ayatana，視覺的場所）。其他也是這樣。如果這樣的色差別顯現，識體和合，警覺青色等種子在阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijnana，根本識）中，因為沒有顯現……

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, according to Samvriti-satya (conventional truth), the Buddha said that there are Opapatika-sattva (beings born without parents) different from those born from eggs, wombs, or moisture. Initially, it was not said that apart from the Vijnana-skandha (aggregate of consciousness), there are good and bad deeds and their consequences. If it is said that there are sentient beings apart from the Vijnana-skandha, this is not based on definite reasons. Therefore, the Buddha said that in order to eliminate Uccheda-ditthi (the view of annihilation), which is the mistaken notion that there is nothing after death, the Tathagata's (Buddha's title) Lokika-citta (mundane mind) is continuously flowing, and it is only based on the Vijnana-skandha that Sattva (sentient beings) are hypothetically established. Saying so in a brief explanation is because there is no realm outside the mind, and there are four meanings in this. What are the four? First, Abhipraya (hidden intention), second, Gocara (object of perception), third, Phala (obvious result), and fourth, Abhiprayartha (meaning of hidden intention). Due to the bondage of discrimination, because of such causes and conditions, the Dvadashayatana (twelve sources of sense) are spoken of. All of this should be established, and rational questions and answers should be initiated in order. What is the meaning of using hidden intention to speak of the twelve sources of sense, and that sentient beings are like the continuous flow of the mind, without interruption? It means that what sentient beings can express and what is expressed are all established in the mind, clinging to the matter of form and image. Here, like the realms of color and sound, etc., should be explained separately. Consciousness arises from its own seed, presenting an appearance similar to the external realm, and then transforms into the inner and outer Ayatana (sources of sensation). The Buddha said that ten of them arise from the eye, etc. (eye faculty, etc.) to the color, etc. (color objects, etc.). It should be understood rationally. In these two places, the seed aspect and consciousness are explained. Just as the Bhagavan (Buddha's title) said, in order to accomplish the sources of sensation, etc., the commonly accepted differences of sound, eye, etc. are explained, which is to establish the distinct manifestation of blue color, etc. Colors of the same kind as them arise from consciousness. For those who have not detached from desire, the seeds of consciousness are supremely established, so these seeds can be born. Although the seeds are temporarily established, the results have not yet manifested and been received. Until the power of corresponding conditions is obtained, they arise and cease without interruption, and in the continuous flow of moment after moment, subtle nature, subtle differences are obtained, and they are transformed and become superior. Just as grains and wheat, etc., grow together with the earth, etc. as conditions, their nature is different, and through transformation and establishment, sprouts, etc. appear. Like this Dharma nature, the external seeds are like this, and the internal is also like this. Such a continuous flow of the mind manifests, relatively uninterrupted, and in an instant, it can generate differences in the nature of blue color, etc. However, this seed is called Chakshur-dhatu (element of vision). It manifests in various fruit natures in sequence. Citta-caitta (mind and mental factors) establish this color as Chakshur-ayatana (source of vision). The same is true for others. If such differences in color manifest, the consciousness body combines, alerting the seeds of blue color, etc. in the Alaya-vijnana (store consciousness), because it has not manifested...

現識能警覺。影像變異自體差別。如頗胝迦琉璃雲母等。以薄物裹隨其本色影現識生。此乃世尊如理分析。說為色處。然自教中說彼意識形狀不同。住利益故。所以此色說為色處。如是乃至堅濕暖等識之影像。所依所緣力用最勝。是異熟識之所生事。種子相狀出生影現。聲及名等變異差別之所取故。如是應成色之分段功能不同之所安立阿賴耶識。諸有智者分分覺了。而分別之說內外處。安布差別。是密意也。如安立界。此立識界依止意界依六出生。如是意界自性差異。然亦說彼十八界耶。如異熟識與眼等識次第為種名眼等處別別顯現。何故名種。由能出生芽等眾物。別異體性。如能造大及所造色。共許出生自類芽等。生差別故。猶如稻麥等諸種子。世間共許。彼之體性異類非一。乃能出生眼及眼識。並與第二剎那相應。從此二界生得彼緣隨順所立警覺之性。非為一事一時能生。如一心所別別能生無量色性故。此亦如是。異熟之識于眼等處或同或異。識所生時自體別故。異熟之識為眼等處。彼色微細。眼等諸根識。生種種功能。不同極難見故。亦不如此。有別眼等。或緣色等清凈四大。爾者別阿笈摩。佛說肉眼等處清凈四大所造色有見有對如是。乃至身等亦復如是。此不如理識之影像。密意說故。由是四大不離識之相分

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本現識能夠警覺。影像的變異在於其自身的差別。比如頗胝迦（水晶）、琉璃、雲母等，用薄物包裹，隨著其本色而顯現影像，從而產生識。這是世尊如理分析，將其說為色處（產生色法的場所）。然而，在自教中說彼意識形狀不同，是爲了住于利益的緣故。所以此色被稱為色處。像這樣乃至堅、濕、暖等識的影像，所依、所緣、力用最為殊勝，是異熟識（果報識）所產生的事物。種子相狀出生影現，聲及名等變異差別的所取故。像這樣應該成為色的分段功能不同的所安立的阿賴耶識（藏識）。諸有智慧的人分分覺了，而分別地說內外處，安布差別，這是密意啊。如同安立界（構成要素），此立識界依止意界依六出生。像這樣意界自性差異，然而也說彼十八界嗎？如異熟識與眼等識次第為種，名眼等處別別顯現。為什麼名叫種？由於能夠出生芽等眾物，別異體性。如能造大（四大元素）及所造色，共許出生自類芽等，生差別故。猶如稻麥等諸種子，世間共許。彼之體性異類非一，乃能出生眼及眼識，並與第二剎那相應。從此二界生得彼緣隨順所立警覺之性。非為一事一時能生。如一心所別別能生無量色性故。此亦如是，異熟之識于眼等處或同或異。識所生時自體別故。異熟之識為眼等處。彼色微細，眼等諸根識，生種種功能，不同極難見故。也不如此，有別眼等，或緣色等清凈四大。如果是這樣，那麼別阿笈摩（經藏）中，佛說肉眼等處清凈四大所造色有見有對，像這樣，乃至身等也是如此。這不如理，識的影像，是密意所說。由於四大不離識的相分。

【English Translation】 English version The present consciousness is capable of awareness. The variations in images lie in their own differences. For example, sphatika (crystal), vaidurya (lapis lazuli), mica, etc., when wrapped in thin materials, manifest images according to their inherent colors, thus giving rise to consciousness. This is how the Tathagata (the thus-gone one) analyzes it reasonably, referring to it as rupa-ayatana (sense-sphere of form). However, in our own teachings, it is said that the shapes of these consciousnesses differ because they abide for the sake of benefit. Therefore, this rupa (form) is called rupa-ayatana. Likewise, even the images of solidity, moisture, warmth, etc., their support, object, and function are most excellent, being things produced by vipaka-vijnana (resultant consciousness). The seed-aspects are born, and images appear, because of the variations and differences in sound, name, etc., which are apprehended. Thus, it should become the alaya-vijnana (storehouse consciousness) established by the different sectional functions of rupa. Those with wisdom understand it part by part, and separately speak of the internal and external ayatanas (sense-fields), arranging the differences; this is the hidden meaning. Just as the dhatus (elements) are established, this establishment of the vijnana-dhatu (consciousness-element) relies on the mano-dhatu (mind-element) and depends on the six births. In this way, the nature of the mano-dhatu differs, yet are the eighteen dhatus also spoken of? As the vipaka-vijnana and the eye-consciousness, etc., are successively seeds, the names of the eye, etc., appear separately as ayatanas. Why are they called seeds? Because they are able to produce sprouts and other things, with different natures. Like the maha-bhutas (great elements) and the bhuta-rupa (derived form), it is commonly accepted that they produce sprouts of their own kind, giving rise to differences. Just as seeds like rice and wheat are commonly accepted in the world, their natures are different and not uniform, but they are able to produce the eye and eye-consciousness, and are associated with the second ksana (moment). From these two dhatus, the nature of awareness, which is established in accordance with the conditions, is born. It is not that one thing can produce it at one time. Just as one mind can separately produce countless aspects of rupa, so it is here as well. The vipaka-vijnana is either the same as or different from the eye, etc., in the ayatanas. Because the self is different when consciousness is born. The vipaka-vijnana is the eye, etc., in the ayatanas. Those rupa are subtle, and the eye, etc., the sense organs, produce various functions, which are different and extremely difficult to see. It is also not the case that there are separate eyes, etc., or that they are conditioned by the pure four great elements such as rupa. If that were the case, then in the separate Agama (scriptures), the Buddha said that the flesh eye, etc., the ayatanas, are made of pure four great elements, and that rupa has visibility and resistance; likewise, even the body, etc., are the same. This is not reasonable; the images of consciousness are spoken of with hidden meaning. Because the four great elements are inseparable from the aspect-division of consciousness.

。斯亦不取緣青等識而為種子。以熏習識執著相故。識之種子由彼熏習。是異熟識之所持故。此亦不然。有清凈色有見有對。不爾若有對等識之顯現。非眼等識所熏習故。然爛壞種依止所緣。安立表示此亦不了。阿笈摩中安布分析。由是阿賴耶識。無始時來因果展轉無量功力能含藏故。別別發起體色相待。彼彼界處生等別現。非一切時一時總生。如是廣說眼等差別。乃至身相亦復如是。彼識種子欲示現力體性殊勝。此契經中。佛說安立阿陀那識。即如地等影像所現緣等相應。彼所安立種種芽性。體無損壞。然彼形狀芽等顯現和合力故。堅等體性隨緣現生。以阿賴耶識所有因果色處和合。或由地等影現變異不同。能造四大。在於色處。然此假立語業所詮。于無色界語業雖轉言詮不及。于彼界中色不現故。或色斷故。不作是說。雖有色之種子。非眼境故。此之色種影緣力故。建立果色故。由此因故。質礙不成。諸有眼根映所損者。非此所取種之清凈。方堪所用。如是乃至身不雜亂。所依所緣他所安立。如彼斷壞及爛性等。彼之所立理應合有。是故此中若隨色類。一一分別轉轉無窮。

有餘復言。說十二處。為欲成熟一類有情此說無力。亦無義故。人無性理。極妙甚深難解難入。亦令悟入。由是佛說立唯識義。復令如

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：斯亦不取緣青等識而為種子。因為熏習識會執著于表象。識的種子是由那些熏習產生的，並且由異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna）所持有。但這種說法是不對的，因為有清凈的色（rūpa），有見（darśana），有對（pratigha）。如果不是這樣，那麼有對等識的顯現，就不是眼等識所熏習的緣故。然而，腐爛的種子依賴於所緣（ālambana），安立表示，這也並不清楚。阿笈摩（Āgama）中安布分析。因此，阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna）從無始以來，因果輾轉，具有無量的功力，能夠含藏一切。別別發起體色相待，彼彼界處生等別現，並非一切時一時總生。像這樣廣泛地說明眼等差別，乃至身相也是如此。那個識的種子想要顯示其力量和體性的殊勝。這部契經中，佛說安立阿陀那識（Ādāna-vijñāna），就像大地等影像所顯現的緣等相應。它所安立的種種芽性，體無損壞。然而，那些形狀芽等顯現的和合力，堅等體性隨緣現生。以阿賴耶識所有因果色處和合，或者由於大地等影現變異不同，能夠造作四大。在於色處。然而，這只是假立的語業所詮釋的。對於無色，語業雖然運轉，但言詮不及，因為在那個界中，色不顯現的緣故，或者色斷滅的緣故。不作如是說，即使有色的種子，也不是眼境的緣故。這色的種子由於影緣的力量，建立果色。由於這個原因，質礙不成。那些眼根被映所損害的人，不是取這種子的清凈，才堪能使用。像這樣乃至身體不雜亂，所依所緣，他所安立。像那些斷壞以及腐爛性等，那些所立的道理應該合有。所以，這裡如果隨色類，一一分別，轉轉無窮。

有其他人又說，說十二處（dvādaśāyatana），是爲了成熟一類有情，這種說法無力，也沒有意義。人的無性理，極其微妙甚深，難以理解和進入，也令人悟入。因此，佛說立唯識義（Vijñānavāda），又令如是。

【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, it is not accepted that consciousness associated with blue, etc., is taken as a seed, because the perfuming consciousness clings to appearances. The seeds of consciousness arise from those perfumings and are held by the Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness). But this is not correct, because there are pure rūpa (form), darśana (seeing), and pratigha (resistance). If it were not so, then the manifestation of consciousness associated with resistance, etc., would not be perfumed by eye consciousness, etc. However, the establishment and indication of a decaying seed relying on its object (ālambana) is also unclear. The Āgama contains detailed analysis. Therefore, the Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness), from beginningless time, through the revolving of cause and effect, possesses immeasurable power and can contain everything. It separately initiates the dependence of substance and form, and the distinct manifestations of various realms and places, such as birth, etc., do not all arise simultaneously at one time. Thus, the distinctions of eye consciousness, etc., are extensively explained, and the same applies to the physical body. That seed of consciousness desires to demonstrate the superiority of its power and nature. In this scripture, the Buddha establishes the Ādāna-vijñāna (grasping consciousness), which corresponds to the conditions manifested by images such as the earth. The various seed natures established by it are undamaged in essence. However, the combined power of those shapes, sprouts, etc., manifests, and the nature of solidity, etc., arises according to conditions. The combination of cause and effect, form, and place in the Ālaya-vijñāna, or the different transformations due to the manifestation of images such as the earth, can create the four great elements. This is in the realm of form. However, this is merely a provisional explanation by verbal karma. Although verbal karma operates in the formless realm, verbal expression cannot reach it, because form does not appear in that realm, or because form is extinguished. It is not said that even if there are seeds of form, they are not objects of eye consciousness. These seeds of form, due to the power of image conditions, establish resultant form. For this reason, obstruction does not occur. Those whose eye faculties are damaged by reflection do not take the purity of this seed to be usable. Thus, even the body is not disordered, and the support and object are established by others. Like those broken and decayed natures, the principles established by them should be consistent. Therefore, if one analyzes each category of form here, it will lead to endless proliferation.

Others say that the teaching of the twelve āyatana (sense bases) is for the purpose of maturing a certain type of sentient being, but this statement is weak and meaningless. The non-substantial nature of beings is extremely subtle, profound, difficult to understand and enter, and also enables enlightenment. Therefore, the Buddha established the meaning of Vijñānavāda (consciousness-only), and also makes it so.

是無力之人。亦令易入于其色處。無量過失。是故此門執我之者。令舍離故。如說苦諦身之苦故。如是說處色等狂亂增上愛著所住種子之密意者。因立果名。

成唯識寶生論卷第三大正藏第 31 冊 No. 1591 成唯識寶生論

成唯識寶生論卷第四(一名二十唯識順釋論)

護法菩薩造

大唐三藏法師義凈奉　制譯

論曰。識從自種生者。以因性同故。非有質礙。所依所緣五識身境識之相故。猶如意識。或不離心心所體性。彼眼等識同共作業。能生因故。猶如意處法處。此說表示蘇呾羅意。經但說意。不立宗故。彼所破者亦不成立斯之所立。唯少分義若立此義。不應更說廣造眾論。此云何知。猶密意等說成立果及以境界。入人無性說十二處亦復如是。若離眼等色自性已。即能趣入人無我性。何以故。此從二六內外差別。謂即眼等色等六境。如是轉生。亦不從彼差別見者。乃至眼觸眼等作用。離此自性不應別更有其作者。若依眼等而作事業。自在受用斯說為我我執所縛。今於此中唯內外處和合自在。眼等作用有生滅故。斯亦非我眼等為因。無觸對故。常與有情不相舍離但說為因。然能作者。于眼等處義亦如前。是故從彼別類不生。由是能悟人無性理。若人無效能調伏者。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：是沒有能力的人。也容易陷入對色處的執著，產生無量的過失。因此，這個法門是讓執著于『我』（ātman）的人捨棄這種執著。就像宣說苦諦時，提到身體的痛苦一樣。這樣說，是爲了揭示那些因對色等事物產生狂亂的、不斷增長的愛著，而將種子安住其中的秘密含義。這是因為以結果之名來命名原因。

《成唯識寶生論》卷第三大正藏第 31 冊 No. 1591 《成唯識寶生論》

《成唯識寶生論》卷第四（又名《二十唯識順釋論》）

護法（Dharmapāla）菩薩造

大唐三藏法師義凈（Yijing）奉旨譯

論曰：識從自己的種子生起，是因為因的性質相同。它沒有物質的障礙，是五識身（包括眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）所依的根源和所緣的對象，就像意識一樣。或者說，它不離心和心所的體性。這些眼等識共同運作，能夠產生原因，就像意處（manāyatana）和法處（dharmāyatana）一樣。這裡所說的是爲了表示蘇呾羅（sūtra，經）的含義。經中只說了意，沒有建立宗義。那些被它破斥的觀點，也不能成立它所建立的觀點。即使只成立少部分的意義，也不應該再廣泛地造作眾多的論著。這是如何知道的呢？就像密意等說法，成立了結果以及境界。進入人無性（pudgalanairātmya）的說法，十二處（dvādaśa āyatana）也是如此。如果離開了眼等色（rūpa）的自性，就能進入人無我性。為什麼呢？這是因為從內外二六的差別而來，也就是眼等六根和色等六境。像這樣轉變生起，也不從那些差別的見者而來，乃至眼觸（cakṣuḥsparśa）、眼等的作用。離開了這些自性，不應該另外有作者。如果依靠眼等來做事業，自在地受用，這就是被『我』（ātman）和『我執』（ātmagraha）所束縛。現在在這裡，只有內外處和合自在。眼等的作用有生滅，所以也不是『我』（ātman）。眼等是原因，因為沒有觸對。它經常與有情（sattva）不相舍離，只是說它是原因，但它能夠作為作者。在眼等處，意義也像前面所說的那樣。因此，它不是從其他類別產生。由此能夠領悟人無性的道理。如果人無效能夠調伏（煩惱），

【English Translation】 English version: are powerless people. They are also easily drawn into attachment to the sphere of form (rūpa-āyatana), leading to countless faults. Therefore, this Dharma gate is to make those who cling to 'self' (ātman) abandon this clinging. Just as when explaining the truth of suffering (duḥkha-satya), the suffering of the body is mentioned. Saying this is to reveal the secret meaning of those who, due to the increasing and chaotic attachment to form and other things, establish the seed in them. This is because the cause is named after the result.

Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only - Jewel-producing, Volume 3 Taisho Tripitaka Volume 31 No. 1591 Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only - Jewel-producing

Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only - Jewel-producing, Volume 4 (Also named Commentary on Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only)

Composed by Bodhisattva Dharmapāla

Translated under Imperial Order by Tripitaka Master Yijing of the Great Tang Dynasty

The Treatise says: Consciousness arises from its own seed because the nature of the cause is the same. It has no material obstruction, and it is the basis and object of the five consciousnesses (including eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, and body-consciousness), just like mind-consciousness. Or, it is inseparable from the nature of mind and mental factors. These eye-consciousnesses and others work together and can produce causes, just like the mind-base (manāyatana) and the dharma-base (dharmāyatana). What is said here is to express the meaning of the Sutra (sūtra). The Sutra only speaks of mind and does not establish a doctrine. Those views that it refutes cannot establish the views it establishes. Even if only a small part of the meaning is established, it is not necessary to create many treatises extensively. How is this known? Just like the sayings of secret meanings, which establish the result and the realm. The saying of entering into the non-self of persons (pudgalanairātmya), the twelve bases (dvādaśa āyatana) are also like this. If one leaves the self-nature of the eye and other forms (rūpa), one can enter into the non-self of persons. Why? This is because it comes from the difference between the inner and outer two sixes, which are the six sense organs such as the eye and the six sense objects such as form. Like this, transforming and arising does not come from those who see the differences, even to eye-contact (cakṣuḥsparśa) and the functions of the eye and so on. Apart from these self-natures, there should be no other agent. If one relies on the eye and so on to do things and freely enjoys them, this is being bound by 'self' (ātman) and 'self-grasping' (ātmagraha). Now, in this, only the inner and outer bases are combined and free. The functions of the eye and so on have arising and ceasing, so it is not 'self' (ātman). The eye and so on are the cause because there is no contact. It is always inseparable from sentient beings (sattva), but it is only said to be the cause, but it can act as the agent. In the eye and other places, the meaning is also as mentioned before. Therefore, it does not arise from other categories. From this, one can realize the principle of the non-self of persons. If the non-self of persons can subdue (afflictions),

趣寂之人此亦能入。何以故。由於生死見眾苦逼。以苦無常。于生死中心生厭離。無我見力頓能棄捨。怖我斷者。次第因盡故。猶如薪盡火即滅故。是故佛言。為斯等類說十二處。有說是中不為人無性理說十二處。此之二相等無差別。有物性故。我見顛倒。以對治故。此說如理。如以顛倒對治顛倒。此非所許亦不善了。我之所立此之處等。寧無差別。心及心所體相差別。若此志樂心心所時。然彼眼處非耳等處。由是此說相差別故。此亦如是同時非一識生於彼。是眼等處自性樂欲。然而色等住金性時。非銀等性。相無差別。此之金等離色等已。不能異說有其別物。如是道理。此無差別。不于體性說有色等。若如所說相顛倒故。不能對治。此與前執有情性同。如彼有情于無我處而見我者。是顛倒性。斯見顛倒。此能除遣如色等處。除我倒故。若心相續不斷無顛倒者。此亦非理。是中自性樂欲相似不顛倒者。斯亦不善了前後故。若有說云。方便悟入人無自性。說色等處有其體性。猶如意處法處。若心心所我之自性。彼愛樂者。便無諍論。若離心心所別有我體實無有喻。此之言論如所分別。總相類故。非第一義。若說方便趣我無性。是亦不然。如應觀察。安立此之巧妙方便。說色等處。然佛所說。但有如斯所應作事。謂欲令入

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本對於那些追求寂靜的人來說，也能由此進入（涅槃）。為什麼呢？因為他們看到生死輪迴中的種種痛苦逼迫，認識到痛苦是無常的，因此對於生死輪迴從內心深處產生厭惡和遠離。憑藉無我見的強大力量，他們能夠立刻捨棄（對自我的執著）。他們害怕『我』被斷滅，因為（他們明白）次第因緣終將滅盡，就像柴火燒盡，火焰自然熄滅一樣。因此，佛陀說，爲了這類人宣說十二處（十二處，即六根和六塵）。有些人說，在（佛陀）宣說十二處時，並不是爲了沒有自性的人宣說的。這兩種觀點實際上沒有差別，因為（十二處）具有物性。『我見』是一種顛倒，需要對治。這種說法是合理的，就像用一種顛倒來對治另一種顛倒一樣。如果認為（十二處）不是爲了對治『我見』的顛倒，那就是沒有理解佛陀的意圖，也是不善巧的。我所建立的『處』等等，難道沒有差別嗎？心和心所（心所，即伴隨心識生起的各種心理活動）在體性和現象上有差別。如果（有人）執著於心和心所，那麼眼處就不是耳處等等，因為它們在現象上有差別。這種說法也是如此。雖然同時並非只有一個識生起，但眼等處有其自性的喜好。然而，當黃金具有黃金的性質時，它就不具有白銀的性質，即使它們在現象上沒有差別。如果將黃金等從顏色等中分離出來，就不能說它們是不同的事物。同樣的道理，（十二處）也沒有差別。並不是在體性上說有顏色等。如果像（某些人）所說的那樣，因為現象顛倒，所以不能對治（我見），這與之前執著于有情自性的觀點相同。就像那些有情在無我的地方卻看到『我』一樣，這是一種顛倒的性質。這種見解是顛倒的，能夠被去除，就像顏色等處能夠去除『我』的顛倒一樣。如果心的相續不斷，沒有顛倒，這也是不合理的。如果（有人）說，自性的喜好相似，沒有顛倒，這也是不善巧的，因為沒有理解前後（因果關係）。如果有人說，爲了方便悟入人無自性，所以說顏色等處具有其體性，就像意處和法處一樣。如果心和心所是我（自性）的自性，那些喜愛它們的人，就沒有爭論了。如果離開心和心所，另外存在一個『我』的實體，那就沒有比喻可以說明了。這種言論就像所分別的總相一樣，不是第一義諦。如果說爲了方便趣入『我』的無自性，這也是不對的。應該如實觀察，安立這種巧妙的方便，宣說顏色等處。然而，佛陀所說，只有像這樣應該做的事情，就是想要讓（眾生）進入（涅槃）。

【English Translation】 English version Even those who seek solitude can enter this (Nirvana). Why? Because they see the suffering that oppresses them in the cycle of birth and death, and they recognize that suffering is impermanent. Therefore, they develop a deep aversion to and detachment from the cycle of birth and death. With the powerful force of the non-self view (Anatta), they can immediately abandon (attachment to the self). They fear the annihilation of the 'self' because (they understand) that the causal conditions will eventually be exhausted, just as a fire goes out when the firewood is consumed. Therefore, the Buddha said that the twelve sense bases (Ayatana, i.e., the six sense organs and the six sense objects) are taught for such people. Some say that the twelve sense bases are not taught for those who have no inherent nature (Svabhava). These two views are actually no different, because (the twelve sense bases) have materiality. The 'self-view' (Atma-drishti) is a delusion that needs to be countered. This statement is reasonable, just as one delusion is used to counter another delusion. If it is thought that (the twelve sense bases) are not for countering the delusion of 'self-view,' then the Buddha's intention has not been understood, and it is not skillful. Are the 'bases' (Ayatana) that I establish not different? There is a difference in the nature and appearance of the mind (Citta) and mental factors (Caitasika, i.e., the various mental activities that arise with consciousness). If (someone) clings to the mind and mental factors, then the eye-base is not the ear-base, etc., because they differ in appearance. This statement is also true. Although not only one consciousness arises at the same time, the eye-base, etc., have their own inherent preferences. However, when gold has the nature of gold, it does not have the nature of silver, even if they do not differ in appearance. If gold, etc., are separated from color, etc., it cannot be said that they are different things. In the same way, (the twelve sense bases) are no different. It is not said that there are colors, etc., in nature. If, as (some) say, it is because of the delusion of appearance that (the self-view) cannot be countered, this is the same as the previous view of clinging to the inherent nature of sentient beings. Just as those sentient beings see a 'self' where there is no self, this is a deluded nature. This view is deluded and can be removed, just as the delusion of 'self' can be removed by the color, etc., bases. If the continuity of the mind is unbroken and without delusion, this is also unreasonable. If (someone) says that the preferences of nature are similar and without delusion, this is also not skillful, because the (causal) relationship between before and after has not been understood. If someone says that in order to facilitate the realization of the non-inherent nature of persons, it is said that the color, etc., bases have their own nature, just like the mind-base and the dharma-base. If the mind and mental factors are the nature of the 'self' (Atman), then those who love them will have no dispute. If there is a separate entity of the 'self' apart from the mind and mental factors, then there is no analogy to explain it. This statement is like the general appearance that is distinguished, and it is not the ultimate truth (Paramartha). If it is said that it is to facilitate the approach to the non-inherent nature of the 'self,' this is also incorrect. One should observe truthfully and establish this skillful means of teaching the color, etc., bases. However, what the Buddha said is only what should be done in this way, which is to want to allow (sentient beings) to enter (Nirvana).

我無自性。何煩更別說唯有心。此既非有。如何得云說十二處是密意耶。此亦非理。由其更說法無自性。是極重事欲令悟入。世尊遂說色等諸法而無自性。欲使諸餘諸大菩薩得彼如來殊勝妙位。周遍生界為大勝益。此如何作。謂色等諸法相似現前。但唯是心。除識已外曾無片物為色等性。是可見事。由是故知。色等諸法無有自性。斯言意顯諸事自性由自識力變現生起。理成決定。隨其所知所有諸事。並皆離識無別可取。但唯是此而現相狀。是以故知。實無自性。便能悟入法無性理。

有說若為悟入法無性者。此據能勝作是說耶。所見之境唯是錯亂。據勝義理本性空無。作此宣揚善符中觀。所見境無識非有故。斯固未閑。作何意趣。且說如是心心所法所見之境不稱其事。妄為領納取不實相。名為錯亂。豈非但說而唯有識。若言諸法一亦無者。爾復如何有所宣說。境既是無。識非有故。將夢等喻善為曉之。如上所陳。無勞致惑。不得外境。但唯識現。此復云何。識義非理。若是具義。由於業邊親益果故。即以此言便成答難。亦復不由體有別故。能成方異有說能持自體。此中復云是自性義。此亦同前已分析訖。此義不然。離其作具要有別事。方為作用。猶如自己。還持自身。故不應也。為欲令生悟法無性。說唯有識。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：我說萬法沒有自性，何必再多說唯有心識呢？既然心識也不是實有，又怎麼能說十二處（ayatana，指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六根，以及色、聲、香、味、觸、法六塵）是密意呢？這種說法也不合理。因為進一步闡述法無自性，是非常重要的事，爲了使人領悟，世尊才說色等諸法沒有自性，使其他大菩薩能夠獲得如來殊勝的地位，周遍于眾生界，成就巨大的利益。這是如何做到的呢？就是說色等諸法相似地顯現於前，但僅僅是心識的作用。除了心識之外，從來沒有片刻的實物作為色等的自性，這是顯而易見的事實。因此可知，色等諸法沒有自性。這句話的意思是說，諸事的自性是由自己的識力變現而生起的，這個道理是確定的。無論所知的事物是什麼，都與識分離，沒有其他可以把握的。僅僅是這個識，才顯現出各種相狀。因此可知，萬法實際上沒有自性，這樣就能領悟法無自性的道理。

有人說，爲了領悟法無自性，這是根據能勝（paramārtha，勝義）的觀點這樣說的嗎？所見之境僅僅是錯亂的顯現，根據勝義的道理，其本性是空無的。這樣宣揚很符合中觀的觀點。所見之境沒有，識也不是實有，這種說法恐怕沒有理解我的意趣。且說這些心和心所法所見之境，與實際情況不符，虛妄地領納，取不真實的相，這叫做錯亂。難道不是僅僅說有識嗎？如果說諸法連一法也不存在，那麼你又如何有所宣說呢？境既然是無，識也不是實有，用夢等比喻來好好地開導他們，如上所說，不必再疑惑了。得不到外境，僅僅是識的顯現，這又是什麼意思呢？識的意義不合理。如果是具有意義的，由於在業的方面能夠親近並利益結果，那麼用這句話就可以作為回答和詰難了。而且也不是因為本體有差別，才能成就方方面面的不同。有人說能夠保持自體，這裡又說是自性的意義，這和前面已經分析過的一樣。這個意義是不成立的。離開其作用的工具，要有別的事物，才能產生作用，就像自己不能還持自身一樣，所以是不應該的。爲了使眾生領悟法無自性，才說唯有識。

【English Translation】 English version: I say that all dharmas are without self-nature (svabhāva). Why further discuss only mind (citta)? Since this mind is also not truly existent, how can one say that the twelve āyatanas (sense bases, i.e., the six senses and their corresponding objects) are a secret meaning? This statement is also unreasonable. Because further explaining the absence of self-nature in dharmas is a very important matter, in order to enable people to realize it, the World-Honored One (Bhagavan) spoke of forms (rūpa) and other dharmas as being without self-nature, so that other great Bodhisattvas could attain the supreme position of the Tathāgata, pervading the realms of sentient beings, and achieving great benefits. How is this done? It is said that forms and other dharmas appear similarly before us, but they are merely the function of mind. Apart from consciousness (vijñāna), there has never been a moment when a real object exists as the self-nature of form, etc. This is an obvious fact. Therefore, it can be known that forms and other dharmas have no self-nature. The meaning of this statement is that the self-nature of all things is manifested and arises from the power of one's own consciousness. This principle is certain. No matter what is known, it is separate from consciousness, and there is nothing else that can be grasped. It is only this consciousness that manifests various appearances. Therefore, it can be known that all dharmas are actually without self-nature, and thus one can realize the principle of the absence of self-nature in dharmas.

Someone says, 'Is this spoken from the perspective of the ultimate truth (paramārtha) in order to realize the absence of self-nature in dharmas? The perceived objects are merely confused manifestations, and according to the principle of ultimate truth, their nature is empty.' Such a proclamation is very much in line with the view of the Madhyamaka (Middle Way). The perceived objects do not exist, and consciousness is also not truly existent. I am afraid this statement does not understand my intention. Let's say that the objects seen by these minds and mental factors do not match the actual situation. They are falsely accepted, and unreal appearances are taken. This is called confusion. Isn't it just saying that there is only consciousness? If you say that not even one dharma exists, then how can you say anything? Since the object is non-existent and consciousness is also not truly existent, use metaphors such as dreams to enlighten them well. As mentioned above, there is no need to be confused anymore. One cannot obtain external objects, only the manifestation of consciousness. What does this mean? The meaning of consciousness is unreasonable. If it has meaning, because it can be close to and benefit the result in terms of karma, then this statement can be used as an answer and a question. Moreover, it is not because the substance is different that it can achieve differences in all aspects. Some say that it can maintain its own substance, and here it is said to be the meaning of self-nature, which is the same as what has been analyzed before. This meaning is not valid. Apart from the tools of its function, there must be other things to produce the function, just as one cannot hold oneself, so it should not be. In order to enable sentient beings to realize the absence of self-nature in dharmas, it is said that there is only consciousness.

將為契當。若言總無一切諸法。皆無有我。由此名為我無自性。斯即共許我之自性。悉皆非有。如是便成法無自性。諸法非有。由是故知。識亦同爾。性既非有。如何於此欲為安立為彼諸法並非有者。猶如假我更連趣性。無自體者。此是所許。更連趣體全無性也。此則便成法無性者。謂一切法皆無性故。是故應知。識亦同爾。此既非有。如何依此欲使迷人入法無性。由無有我遂令證入諸法無性。共許如斯為善方便。爾者如何欲為建立。成彼方便說十二處。證人無性。實非全無一切諸法。方始名為法無自性。是故應知。法無性聲非詮。諸法皆無自體。更連趣言。亦同於此。不欲總詮一切非有。然而意說。諸緣生法無有我性。彼即是有。此我無性。其相云何。謂喚我作無自性故。是故名為人無自性。非是全無諸法自性。色等諸法隨據一分。說無自性非謂全無。是故應知。言法無性非全無體。若言諸法事皆無者。即不應名法無自性。理應云說諸法總無。爾者但由所執法無自性緣有功能獲得差別。離他自性簡別彼之實我自體。恒時不有所詮之相。此謂諸法無自性義非是豁脫總撥為空。然所執者是何言耶。所謂無明倒見迷執。從其自心種子成熟。由他而轉現相不同。執于外境有別自性。由如倒見作外相解。于自所見生定執時此則

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本若有人說完全不存在一切諸法，並且說沒有『我』（ātman），因此稱之為『我無自性』（anātman）。這實際上是共同承認了『我』的自性根本不存在。如果這樣，就會變成『法無自性』（dharma-anātman），即一切諸法都不存在。因此可知，識（vijñāna）也是如此，其自性並不存在。既然自性不存在，又如何能在此基礎上安立那些並非存在的諸法呢？就像虛假的『我』（假我）與『趣性』（性質）相連，本身沒有自體（svabhāva），這是被認可的。如果與『趣體』相連的事物完全沒有自性，那麼就變成了『法無性』，意思是說一切法都沒有自性。因此應該知道，識也是如此。既然識不存在，又如何依靠它來使迷惑的人進入『法無性』的境界呢？通過沒有『我』，從而證入諸法無自性，這被共同認為是好的方便法門。如果這樣，又如何建立十二處（dvādaśāyatana），來證明人無自性呢？實際上並非完全沒有一切諸法，才叫做『法無自性』。因此應該知道，『法無性』這個詞並非詮釋諸法都沒有自體。『更連趣』這個詞也與此類似，並非想要完全詮釋一切都不存在，而是意在說明，諸緣生法（pratītyasamutpāda）沒有『我』的自性，但它們是存在的。這種『我無性』（nairātmyatā）的相狀是什麼樣的呢？就是把『我』稱為『無自性』。所以叫做『人無自性』（pudgala-nairātmyatā），而不是完全沒有諸法的自性。色等諸法，只是根據其中的一部分來說沒有自性，而不是說完全沒有。因此應該知道，說『法無性』並非指完全沒有實體。如果說諸法的事物都不存在，就不應該叫做『法無自性』，而應該說諸法完全不存在。如果這樣，只是因為所執著的法沒有自性，才使得緣起的功能獲得差別，從而與他者的自性區分開來，簡別出真實的『我』的自體，而恒常時沒有所詮釋的相狀。這所說的諸法無自性的意義，並非是完全否定一切，將其視為空無，而是指所執著的事物是什麼呢？就是指無明（avidyā）的顛倒見（viparyāsa），迷惑執著（ābhiniveśa），從其自心的種子成熟，由他力而轉變，顯現出不同的相狀，執著于外境有不同的自性。就像顛倒見對外相進行錯誤的理解，對於自己所見的事物產生固定的執著時，這...

【English Translation】 English version If someone says that all dharmas (phenomena) do not exist at all, and that there is no 'self' (ātman), hence it is called 'selflessness' (anātman). This is actually a common acknowledgement that the nature of 'self' does not exist at all. If so, it would become 'dharma-anātman' (the selflessness of phenomena), meaning that all dharmas do not exist. Therefore, it can be known that consciousness (vijñāna) is also the same, its nature does not exist. Since the nature does not exist, how can one establish those dharmas that do not exist on this basis? It is like a false 'self' (假我) connected to 'properties' (趣性), which itself has no inherent existence (svabhāva), this is acknowledged. If something connected to 'nature' (趣體) has no inherent existence at all, then it becomes 'dharma-anātman', meaning that all dharmas have no inherent existence. Therefore, it should be known that consciousness is also the same. Since consciousness does not exist, how can one rely on it to lead confused people into the realm of 'dharma-anātman'? Through the absence of 'self', one attains the realization of the selflessness of all dharmas, which is commonly regarded as a good expedient method. If so, how can one establish the twelve sources (dvādaśāyatana) to prove the selflessness of a person? In reality, it is not that all dharmas are completely non-existent that it is called 'dharma-anātman'. Therefore, it should be known that the term 'dharma-anātman' does not explain that dharmas have no inherent existence. The term 'connected properties' (更連趣) is similar to this, it does not intend to completely explain that everything does not exist, but rather intends to explain that conditioned dharmas (pratītyasamutpāda) do not have the nature of 'self', but they do exist. What is the nature of this 'selflessness' (nairātmyatā)? It is to call 'self' as 'without inherent existence'. Therefore, it is called 'personal selflessness' (pudgala-nairātmyatā), not that there is completely no inherent existence of dharmas. Dharmas such as form (色), etc., only according to a part of them, it is said that there is no inherent existence, not that there is completely nothing. Therefore, it should be known that saying 'dharma-anātman' does not mean that there is completely no entity. If it is said that the things of dharmas do not exist, it should not be called 'dharma-anātman', but it should be said that dharmas do not exist at all. If so, it is only because the dharma that is clung to has no inherent existence that the function of dependent origination (緣起) obtains differentiation, thereby distinguishing it from the nature of others, distinguishing the true inherent existence of 'self', and there is constantly no aspect of what is explained. The meaning of the selflessness of dharmas that is spoken of here is not to completely negate everything and regard it as emptiness, but what is it that is clung to? It refers to the inverted view (viparyāsa) of ignorance (avidyā), delusion and attachment (ābhiniveśa), which matures from the seeds of one's own mind, transforms by the power of others, manifests different aspects, and clings to the external environment as having different inherent existences. It is like an inverted view making a wrong understanding of external appearances, and when a fixed attachment arises to what one sees, this...

名為所執之事。

此復云何。謂無一物。如何無物名所執耶。由此故然。

若於此執有片實物體不虛者。即不應名是情所執。然由於此義有相應。由其計執實事自體不相忓故。若有實物不名計執。由此分齊近見之境。此則悉皆說為所執。假使用識以為斯境。作所量時。此亦還成所執之義。是故應知所執之識。亦是無性。即唯識性。是能悟入所有諸法。皆無自體微妙方便。但是本識隨處現相。然無外境少許可得。從色至識悉皆如是。非是能現相分之識。體亦無也。若言異此。但遣遮色。說此唯聲唯識之言。便不成就緣識之識。有其境故。復更便成緣色之識。是為有境。何者是其體離於彼不可說事。諸佛世尊方能了察。云何了察此義。后時我當宣釋。此即是其心心生法有真實事。越言詮道是有性故。亦不便成一切諸法悉皆非有同豁脫空。是故應知證悟真理。善入方便說唯識教。斯為稱理。由其次第漸能攫烈諸分別網所有正緣。為生因性故。爾者若許安立。離言詮處。是實有事。此即還成。于彼色等亦同荷負。有真自性。猶如於識。若爾還應問彼何處得有如斯道理。見他許有非所詮識。亦令色等同遣如斯未曾見有如是之事。以由愛蜜酪亦令貪。若復轉計。言彼有斯不相離性事同芽者。能有隨生果之因用。彼若言

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：名為所執之事（Parigrahya，被執著的事物）。

這是什麼意思呢？意思是說沒有一樣東西是真實存在的。如果什麼都沒有，又怎麼會有被執著的事物呢？正是因為這個原因。

如果有人執著于某個事物，認為它具有真實不變的實體，那麼這種執著就不應該被稱為『情所執』（Citta-parigrahya，心所執著）。然而，由於這種觀念與『義』（Artha，意義）相符，因為他們認為真實事物的自性互不干擾。如果存在真實的事物，那就不叫執著。因此，這種區分接近於直接可見的境界。這些都被稱為『所執』。即使使用『識』（Vijñāna，意識）作為這種境界，並將其作為所量度的對象，它仍然會變成『所執』的意義。所以，應該知道被執著的『識』也是無自性的，即唯有『識性』（Vijñāna-tā，意識的本性）才能領悟到一切諸法皆無自性的微妙方便，而這僅僅是本識（Ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）隨處顯現的現象，實際上並沒有外境可以獲得，從色（Rūpa，色蘊）到識（Vijñāna，識蘊）都是如此。能顯現相分的『識』，其本體也是不存在的。如果有人說不是這樣，只是爲了否定遮蔽『色』，說這只是『唯聲唯識』的說法，那麼就不能成立緣識之『識』，因為它有其境界。反而會變成緣色之『識』，因為它是有境界的。什麼是其本體，是離於彼不可說的事物呢？只有諸佛世尊才能了察。如何了察這個意義呢？以後我會解釋。這就是心心所法（Citta-caitta，心和心所）有真實存在的事物，超越了語言文字的描述，具有自性。但也不能因此就認為一切諸法都是空無，如同虛空一樣。所以，應該知道證悟真理，善於運用方便，宣說唯識教義，這才是符合道理的。通過這樣的次第，逐漸能夠摧毀各種分別網，因為它是產生正緣的因性。如果允許安立一個離於語言文字描述的真實存在的事物，那麼這就等於承認色等也同樣具有真實的自性，就像『識』一樣。如果這樣，就應該反問他們，從哪裡得到這樣的道理？看到他們允許存在非語言文字所能詮釋的『識』，也讓『色』等同樣被否定，從未見過這樣的事情。因為如果用愛、蜜、酪來比喻，也會引起貪慾。如果又轉而認為，它們具有不可分離的自性，就像種子和芽一樣，能夠產生隨之而來的果的因用，那麼他們如果說……

【English Translation】 English version: It is called that which is grasped (Parigrahya, the thing grasped).

What is this again? It means there is not a single thing. How can there be something grasped if there is nothing? It is because of this reason.

If one grasps onto something here, thinking it has a real and solid substance that is not false, then it should not be called 'grasped by the mind' (Citta-parigrahya). However, because this idea corresponds to 'meaning' (Artha), because they believe that the self-nature of real things does not interfere with each other. If there are real things, it is not called grasping. Therefore, this distinction is close to the realm of direct vision. All of these are said to be 'grasped'. Even if 'consciousness' (Vijñāna) is used as this realm and made the object of measurement, it will still become the meaning of 'grasped'. Therefore, it should be known that the 'consciousness' that is grasped is also without self-nature, that is, only the 'nature of consciousness' (Vijñāna-tā) can realize the subtle expedient that all dharmas are without self-nature, and this is merely the phenomena manifested everywhere by the storehouse consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna), but in reality, there is no external realm that can be obtained, from form (Rūpa) to consciousness (Vijñāna), it is all like this. The 'consciousness' that can manifest the aspect-image, its substance is also non-existent. If someone says it is not like this, but only to negate and obscure 'form', saying that this is only the statement of 'only sound, only consciousness', then it cannot establish the 'consciousness' that conditions consciousness, because it has its realm. On the contrary, it will become the 'consciousness' that conditions form, because it has a realm. What is its substance, the thing that cannot be spoken of apart from it? Only the Buddhas, the World Honored Ones, can discern it. How do they discern this meaning? I will explain it later. This is the real existence of mental states (Citta-caitta), which transcends the description of language and has self-nature. But it cannot be concluded that all dharmas are empty and non-existent, like empty space. Therefore, it should be known that realizing the truth, being skilled in using expedients, and proclaiming the doctrine of only consciousness, this is in accordance with reason. Through this sequence, one can gradually destroy the various nets of discrimination, because it is the causal nature for generating right conditions. If it is allowed to establish a real thing that is apart from the description of language, then this is equivalent to admitting that form, etc., also have a real self-nature, just like 'consciousness'. If so, they should be asked in return, where did they get such a reason? Seeing that they allow the existence of 'consciousness' that cannot be explained by language, and also let 'form', etc., be negated in the same way, such a thing has never been seen. Because if love, honey, and cheese are used as metaphors, they will also arouse greed. If they further turn around and think that they have an inseparable self-nature, like seeds and sprouts, which can produce the causal function of the fruit that follows, then if they say...

有不相離性。幸示方隅。以理推徴定無共許。若言如識將為境時。由所執體名為所執。實事相貌作彼生因。色亦同斯。是執性故。亦應合有緣生之事。與作因緣猶如識者。此乃便成無片非愛。于彼五聚皆依他起。是所許故。遍計分別法性之義。可由於此理同於彼。現有如斯正教言故。若言其色亦有離識。實依他起。猶如受等。如斯意趣有不定𠎝所執之分亦有識故。即此受等緣生之分。斯則是為四聚體性。然此現其影相之分。即是依於心心生聚而施設故。由斯道理其喻必成。而於所立無隨合義。亦復更有立已成過。緣起之色亦是受等自性性故。因此遂令而於因處置差別言。冀蠲其過而云于識。現所執相差別生故。此即除其不定之過。仍在相中然共所許。受等自體是自證性。境無有故。既有斯理。實可依憑。然色別有無別因由。以義推尋。固非齊致。若爾一切諸識皆悉無有所知境者。此如何知。又云若有餘識得與余識而為境耶。亦如有云。諸佛境界其法是有並余識境。若於佛境不以自心取為境者。斯即無容能有宣說。如此說者。併成妄設。如有思度發言詮故。由其言義所表之相。即是唯識現多種相。雖無外境似觸其事而識得生。此即是為言論因也。如雲生已即滅之聲。假令息教博士絕聲應聽其響。固非於彼情有所得。然即

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本具有不可分離的性質。希望您能指示方向和角落。以理推斷，確定沒有共同認可之處。如果說如同意識將某物作為對像時，由於所執著的實體被稱為『所執著』，真實的事件相貌是產生它的原因，色法（Rupa, 物質現象）也與此相同。因為它是被執著的性質，也應該具有緣起（Pratītyasamutpāda, dependent origination）的事件，並作為產生的原因，就像意識一樣。這樣就沒有任何不喜愛之處了。對於那五蘊（Skandha, the five aggregates）都依他起（Paratantra, dependently arisen），這是所認可的。遍計所執（Parikalpita, completely imputed）的法性（Dharmata, the nature of phenomena）的意義，可以由此推論，道理與彼相同。因為現在有這樣的正確教言。如果說色法也有離開意識，真實依他起，就像受（Vedanā, feeling）等一樣。這樣的意趣有不確定的過失，因為所執著的部分也有意識。即此受等緣起的部分，這就是四蘊（Skandha, aggregates）的體性。然而，這呈現其影相的部分，是依於心和心所（Citta-caitta, mind and mental factors）的聚合而施設的。由於這個道理，這個比喻必然成立，而對於所立的論點沒有隨順符合的意義。又存在『已成立』的過失，因為緣起的色法也是受等自性。因此，就使得在因處設定差別之言。希望消除這個過失，而說在意識中，呈現所執著的相的差別而生起。這即是消除不確定的過失，仍然在相中，然而這是共同認可的。受等的自體是自證性（Svasamvedana, self-awareness），因為沒有作為對象的境界。既然有這個道理，實在可以依憑。然而，色法另外存在，沒有另外的原因，以義理推尋，確實並非一致。如果這樣，一切諸識都完全沒有所知的境界，這如何得知？又說，如果有其他的意識可以作為其他意識的境界嗎？也如同所說，諸佛的境界，其法是存在並作為其他意識的境界。如果對於佛的境界不以自己的心取為境界，這就無法能夠宣說。如此說來，就成為虛妄的設定。如同有思度而發言詮釋的緣故。由於其言語的意義所表達的相，就是唯識（Vijñānavāda, Consciousness-only）所現的多種相。雖然沒有外境，但類似接觸到那個事物而意識得以產生。這即是作為言論的原因。如同說生起后立即滅亡的聲音，假設息教博士停止聲音，應該聽其響。確實並非對於那個聲音的情感有所得，然而……

【English Translation】 English version It possesses inseparable nature. I hope you can indicate the directions and corners. Reasoning through logic, it is determined that there is no common agreement. If it is said that when consciousness takes something as an object, because the entity that is clung to is called 'what is clung to,' the real appearance of events is the cause of its arising, form (Rupa, material phenomena) is also the same as this. Because it is the nature of being clung to, it should also have the events of dependent origination (Pratītyasamutpāda), and act as the cause of arising, just like consciousness. In this way, there is nothing that is not liked. For those five aggregates (Skandha, the five aggregates) are all dependently arisen (Paratantra), which is what is acknowledged. The meaning of the nature of phenomena (Dharmata) that is completely imputed (Parikalpita) can be inferred from this, and the reasoning is the same as that. Because there are now such correct teachings. If it is said that form also exists apart from consciousness, truly dependently arisen, just like feeling (Vedanā) and so on. Such an intention has uncertain faults, because the part that is clung to also has consciousness. That is, this part of feeling and so on that arises from conditions, this is the nature of the four aggregates (Skandha). However, this part that presents its image is established based on the aggregation of mind and mental factors (Citta-caitta). Because of this reasoning, this analogy must be established, and there is no meaning of conforming to the established argument. There is also the fault of 'already established,' because the form that arises from conditions is also the nature of feeling and so on. Therefore, it leads to setting up different words in the place of cause. Hoping to eliminate this fault, it is said that in consciousness, the difference of the appearance that is clung to arises. This is to eliminate the uncertain fault, which is still in the appearance, but this is commonly acknowledged. The self-nature of feeling and so on is self-awareness (Svasamvedana), because there is no object as a realm. Since there is this reasoning, it can indeed be relied upon. However, form exists separately, without another reason, and reasoning through meaning, it is indeed not consistent. If so, all consciousnesses completely have no knowable realm, how is this known? It is also said, if there are other consciousnesses that can be the realm of other consciousnesses? It is also as said, the realm of the Buddhas, its Dharma exists and acts as the realm of other consciousnesses. If the realm of the Buddhas is not taken as the realm by one's own mind, then it is impossible to be able to proclaim it. Saying it this way becomes a false setting. It is like having deliberation and expressing it through words. Because of the meaning of the words expressing the appearance, it is the various appearances manifested by Consciousness-only (Vijñānavāda). Although there is no external realm, it is similar to touching that thing and consciousness is able to arise. This is the reason for the argument. It is like saying that the sound that arises and immediately ceases, assuming that the doctor of cessation of teaching stops the sound, one should listen to its echo. Indeed, there is no emotional gain from that sound, however...

于中共申言論。但可許業能為造作。領納是受。彼即便成。許有實我。豈復當時別有真我而可得耶。不許同時二識生者。余識無間體是滅壞。如斯切難亦不相應。余識領此不相應故。亦以此言兼遮后難。如彼說云。如知境有。何以得知。此亦于其共相之境而為構畫。說之為知。復亦與彼同招詰責。如彼所說。詮表如來有諸勝德。汝亦應成證知勝德。由此便非是佛之境。固亦不同如食米齋。此之共相是實有物。是故定知。不由外境現前力故。方能了察。此中但由心聚構畫而便生起。既有斯理。于佛境界為難不成。此則因論生論傍義且周。然密意果其因應說。此之密意有其二因。一謂余教相違。二于正理有害。說唯識教即是相違。此阿笈摩不言成故。又復于彼幻網經中。如佛為於色。等境處生分別者。作如是說。即此眼識所知之色。不見實有及以定住。但于妄情起邪分別。作決定解而生言論。唯斯是實。余義成非。如是廣陳。乃至於法次第說云。多聞聖弟子應如是學。我觀過去未來現在眼識觀彼所有諸色。然于彼處無有常定。無妄無異實事可得。或如所有。或無倒性。悉皆非有。唯除聖者。出過世間斯成真實。世尊。說此皆虛妄等。違阿笈摩。正理相違。宜且為說方興問緒發起疑情。如何復知如是說者。此非是實。猶如說

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：在中共的場合申明言論。但是可以允許行業的能力來進行創造。領納就是接受。那樣它就立即完成。如果允許有實在的『我』（ātman），難道當時還會有另外一個真實的『我』（ātman）可以獲得嗎？如果不允許同時產生兩個意識（vijñāna），那麼其餘的意識（vijñāna）在無間斷的情況下就是滅壞的。像這樣嚴厲的責難也是不相應的。因為其餘的意識（vijñāna）領納這個是不相應的。也可以用這句話同時遮止後面的責難。就像他們所說的，如果知道境是存在的，那麼如何得知呢？這也是對於共同相的境進行構畫，說之為知。又會和他們一樣招致詰責。就像他們所說的，詮釋和表達如來具有各種殊勝的功德，你們也應該成為證知殊勝功德的人。由此就不是佛的境界了。本來也不同於吃米飯的齋戒。這個共同相是真實存在的物體，因此一定知道，不是由於外境現前的力量，才能瞭解和觀察。這裡僅僅是由心識的聚合構畫而產生。既然有這樣的道理，那麼對於佛的境界進行責難就不能成立。這就像因為討論而引發了其他的論點，並且論述得很周全。然而，密意（saṃdhi-nirvacana）的果，其原因應該說明。這個密意（saṃdhi-nirvacana）有兩個原因：一是說與其他的教義相違背，二是對正理有害。說唯識的教義就是相違背。因為這個阿笈摩（āgama，聖傳）沒有說明這一點。而且在《幻網經》（Guhyasamāja Tantra）中，如來爲了對色（rūpa）等境處產生分別的人，這樣說：『就是這個眼識所知的色（rūpa），看不到真實存在以及恒定不變，只是在虛妄的情感中產生邪惡的分別，作出決定的理解而產生言論，只有這個是真實的，其餘的意義都是錯誤的。』像這樣廣泛地陳述，乃至對於法（dharma）的次第說：『多聞的聖弟子應該這樣學習，我觀察過去、未來、現在的眼識，觀察它們所有的色（rūpa），但是在那裡沒有常定不變，沒有虛妄沒有差異的真實事物可以獲得，或者像它所有的一樣，或者沒有顛倒的性質，全部都沒有，只有聖者，超越了世間，這才是真實的。』世尊說這些都是虛妄等等，違背了阿笈摩（āgama，聖傳）。與正理相違背，應該先說明，才能引發提問，發起疑情。如何知道這樣說的人，說的不是真實的，就像說...

【English Translation】 English version: To declare opinions in the context of the CCP. However, the ability of the industry can be permitted for creation. '領納' (lǐngnà) means acceptance. Then it is immediately completed. If it is permissible to have a real 'self' (ātman), would there be another real 'self' (ātman) available at that time? If it is not permissible for two consciousnesses (vijñāna) to arise simultaneously, then the remaining consciousnesses (vijñāna) are destroyed without interruption. Such a severe criticism is also inappropriate because the remaining consciousness (vijñāna) accepting this is inappropriate. This statement can also be used to simultaneously prevent subsequent criticisms. Just as they say, if you know that the object exists, how do you know it? This is also a depiction of the common object, which is said to be knowledge. It will also incur the same accusations as them. Just as they say, interpreting and expressing that the Tathagata has various superior merits, you should also become those who know the superior merits. Therefore, it is not the realm of the Buddha. Originally, it is also different from fasting by eating rice. This common aspect is a real object, so it must be known that it is not possible to understand and observe due to the power of the external environment. Here, it is only generated by the aggregation and depiction of consciousness. Since there is such a reason, then it is not possible to establish criticism of the Buddha's realm. This is like other arguments that are triggered by discussion and are discussed in detail. However, the result of '密意' (mìyì, saṃdhi-nirvacana), its cause should be explained. This '密意' (mìyì, saṃdhi-nirvacana) has two reasons: one is that it contradicts other doctrines, and the other is harmful to correct reasoning. Saying that the doctrine of '唯識' (wéishí, Consciousness-only) is contradictory because this '阿笈摩' (āgama, sacred tradition) does not state this. Moreover, in the '幻網經' (Huànwǎng jīng, Guhyasamāja Tantra), the Tathagata said this for those who have distinctions in the realm of form (rūpa) and other realms: 'That is, the form (rūpa) known by this eye consciousness cannot see the real existence and constant immutability, but only produces evil distinctions in false emotions, makes a decisive understanding and produces opinions, only this is real, and the rest of the meaning is wrong.' Such a broad statement, even to the order of the Dharma (dharma) says: 'The well-learned holy disciples should learn like this. I observe the past, future, and present eye consciousness, and observe all their forms (rūpa), but there is no constant immutability, no false and no different real things can be obtained, or like all of it, or without inverted nature, all of them do not have, only the saints, beyond the world, this is the truth.' The World Honored One said that these are all false, etc., which violates the '阿笈摩' (āgama, sacred tradition). It contradicts correct reasoning and should be explained first before questions can be raised and doubts can be initiated. How do you know that the person who said this is not real, just like saying...

識。是如言義。說十二處。由其一性及非一性。思察之時。將以為境。無堪能故。是故定知。不如所說。即是其義故於今者試作商量。此色聲等所應生處。各隨自體。由於其識作生相貌。色等事相是識之境。色識名色。聲識名聲。余皆準此。此色聲等應無支分。體是其一。如有分色。由此便於自所依處無支分性故。然此色等是有事物。體是質礙。有所斷割。于其同類多處性故。能生識等不同處故。(此中闕極微義)由量力故。決斷有無。于諸量中現量為勝。若無外境如何能起如是覺情。此事是我別根之所知也。

別根如夢等。雖無外境。然亦得有。此已如前。細為分別。

此若後緣時所見境已亡。如何許現量。于諸量為最者。若其當時生現量覺。此是我之別根所了。爾時于境遂無所見。唯是意識所刊定故眼識當時已謝滅故。義既如是。如何彼境許成現量耶。況復是為殊異論者。許一切法剎那不住。此覺起時。色等諸境亦皆已滅。現量之理。斯何得成。雖復如前善開釋已。仍為於斯甚深法義不能窺測。更設難言。由量力故斷為有者。或復此由違比量故。於色等處遮使成無。縱實由量。刊定有無。然由於彼別根比知及正教等諸量之中別根最勝。由親證境是果性故。要於此處無違害已。方于餘量而成立之。此即

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『識』，就像所說的那樣理解其含義。談到十二處（Ayatana，指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六根，以及色、聲、香、味、觸、法六塵），是因為它們具有單一性或非單一性。當進行思索觀察時，會將它們作為對象。因為它們沒有能力（獨立存在），所以可以確定，它們並不像所說的那樣。這就是其含義。現在我們來嘗試討論一下，這些色、聲等所應產生的處所，各自隨著其自身性質，在識中產生相應的相貌。色等事物是識的境界。色與識結合稱為色，聲與識結合稱為聲，其餘情況依此類推。這些色、聲等應該沒有分支部分，其本體是單一的。如果色有分支，那麼它在其自身所依賴之處就沒有分支性。然而，這些色等是有事物，其本體是物質性的，可以被分割，因為它們在同類事物中具有多處性，並且能夠產生與識等不同的處所。（這裡缺少極微的定義）通過衡量的力量，來判斷其存在與否。在各種衡量方法中，現量（Pratyaksha，直接感知）最為殊勝。如果沒有外在的境界，如何能夠產生這樣的感覺情緒？這件事是我通過特殊的根（Indriya，感官）所瞭解的。

別根（感官）就像夢等，即使沒有外在的境界，也可能存在。這一點之前已經詳細地解釋過了。

如果後來的因緣出現時，所見的境界已經消失，如何能允許現量（直接感知）成為各種衡量方法中最殊勝的呢？如果在當時產生了現量的感覺，這是我通過特殊的根（感官）所瞭解的。那時對於境界就沒有所見，只是意識（Vijnana，了別作用）所確定的。眼識（Chaksu-vijnana，視覺意識）當時已經消滅了。如果道理是這樣，如何能允許那個境界成為現量呢？更何況那些持殊異論者，認為一切法都是剎那不住的。當這種感覺產生時，色等各種境界也已經滅亡。現量的道理，又如何能夠成立呢？雖然像之前那樣善巧地解釋過了，但仍然不能窺測這甚深的法義，所以進一步提出疑問：通過衡量的力量來判斷其存在，或者通過違背比量（Anumana，推理）的緣故，在色等處進行遮止使其成為不存在。縱然確實通過衡量來判斷其存在與否，但是在那些通過特殊的根（感官）進行比知以及正教等各種衡量方法中，特殊的根（感官）最為殊勝，因為它親身驗證了境界是果的性質。只有在這裡沒有違背之後，才能在其他的衡量方法中成立。這就是……

【English Translation】 English version: 『Cognition』 (識, Vijnana), is understood in accordance with what is said. Speaking of the twelve sources (十二處, Ayatana, referring to the six sense organs - eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, mind - and the six sense objects - form, sound, smell, taste, touch, dharma) is because they possess either a singular or non-singular nature. When contemplating and observing, they are taken as objects. Because they lack the capacity (to exist independently), it can be determined that they are not as they are said to be. This is its meaning. Now, let's try to discuss where these forms, sounds, etc., should arise. Each, according to its own nature, produces corresponding appearances in cognition. Forms, etc., are the realm of cognition. Form combined with cognition is called form, sound combined with cognition is called sound, and so on. These forms, sounds, etc., should have no divisions; their essence is singular. If form has divisions, then it lacks divisibility in its own place of reliance. However, these forms, etc., are existing things; their essence is material, capable of being divided, because they possess multiplicity in similar things and can produce different places from cognition, etc. (The definition of ultimate particles is missing here.) Through the power of measurement, existence or non-existence is determined. Among all measurements, direct perception (現量, Pratyaksha) is the most superior. If there were no external realm, how could such feelings and emotions arise? This is something I know through my special sense organ (根, Indriya).

Special sense organs, like dreams, can exist even without an external realm. This has already been explained in detail before.

If, when later conditions arise, the seen realm has already vanished, how can direct perception (現量, Pratyaksha) be allowed to be the most superior among all measurements? If a direct perception feeling arises at that time, this is what I know through my special sense organ. At that time, there is no seeing of the realm, only what is determined by consciousness (意識, Vijnana, the function of discernment). The eye-consciousness (眼識, Chaksu-vijnana, visual consciousness) has already ceased at that time. If the principle is like this, how can that realm be allowed to become direct perception? Moreover, those who hold different views believe that all dharmas are momentary and do not abide. When this feeling arises, all realms such as forms have also perished. How can the principle of direct perception be established? Although it has been skillfully explained as before, one still cannot fathom this profound Dharma meaning, so further questions are raised: existence is determined by the power of measurement, or because of contradicting inference (比量, Anumana), prohibition is made in places such as forms to make them non-existent. Even if existence or non-existence is indeed determined through measurement, among those various measurements such as inference through special sense organs and correct teachings, the special sense organ is the most superior because it personally verifies that the realm is the nature of the result. Only after there is no contradiction here can it be established in other measurements. This is...

別根於色等處既親證會。豈能令彼比量相違。輒欲遮其色等有性。如何外色成別根境。由若無境不能於此生如是覺。此事是我別根知也。此言意道。各別自證領受相生。重起心緣而宣說故。猶如曾領苦樂染等。此固不然。于余亦爾。別根如夢等見有如斯前已具說。于夢等位。亦有現見色等諸境。即如所言。覆察之心是有故者。顯此立因有不定過。然由夢翳及罪逆心之所損故。如似別根現前明見。雖無實境而有見事。復亦不越識之體性。于所領事現前納受。為斷割故。由斯道理意欲成立色等實境是離識者。有相違過。徒事慢心。此復更有因不成過。此覺後緣時。所見境已亡。如何許現量。眼等諸識見色等時。彼實不能生斯斷割。此但由其各別內證相分性故。因此為先意識隨後取其定相。總集思構方能決斷。又復當時識不俱起。設爾有其色等諸境眼等識滅后何能見。能見非有。所鑒豈成。正於此時何所悕望。從其滅識寧能有見。況於色等共識同亡。是故應知。此不能見色等諸境。藉彼見力重審之心。觀於色等。如何許成別根量性。復于彼時意識斷割。不共許為現量性故。由無能見及俱謝故。有餘師云。於此最初領受其境。非分別垢之所染故。彼定緣于外色實境。此亦非理。是不成故。由非他許離於言詮。色等外境是識所知

。然由內有自證之事。當爾之時不起思構。便緣諸境相貌差別。彼但許有如斯內緣。此亦隨其相貌現時。但依于識。猶如共成。苦樂染等。然由將彼色等外境為別根量。此但是為虛妄情執。猶如彼此數量業等。還將此難用拓余疑。于夢見事。從夢覺已后覆緣想。雖復當時無境。然有上心之知。現量亦爾。由因此故。后時意識決了非無。彼亦尤無撥別根量。于自內證心心所生。不離自證而有現量。是所許故。然于外境將為現量斯妄增益。即是所遮。如前為出不成之過。未見解詞。但事空言。寔無的當。彼全不許有外色等。更欲仗之明有現量。然所成立。不能遠離所斥之過。故若也不曾領受前境意識。不能生憶念也。決定應許。于彼外境曾領受之。由斯能見於色等境許別根性。斯乃不成。曾領受境方能憶者。所以云何。由有理故。

已說如相識者。雖無外境如境相現。眼等諸識遂得生起。如前已說。次復云何從此生憶念者。從此識后與念相應。即於此相分別意識而生起也。由領其境念方起故。其義不成。若爾於色等處。以現量性決定了知。所有相貌生憶念性故。猶如樂等。于憶念上安置形像而領取之。決斷前相內自證解。然非不領。猶如石等。有其焰等。生意識時。亦不能生此之憶念。由斯決定依比量力於色等境。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：然而，這是因為內心有自證（sva-samvedana，自我感知）的緣故。當那個時候，不起任何思慮構想，便會攀緣于各種境的相貌差別。他們只承認有這樣的內在因緣。這也隨著境的相貌顯現之時，僅僅依賴於識（vijnana，意識），猶如共同形成一般，包括苦、樂、染污等等。然而，他們將那些色（rupa，形態）等外境視為由不同的根（indriya，感官）來衡量。這僅僅是虛妄的情感執著，猶如彼此的數量、業（karma，行為）等等。還可以用這個難題來推及其他的疑問，比如夢中所見之事。從夢中醒來之後，又會回憶起夢中的情景。雖然當時並沒有真實的境，但卻有上心（adhicitta，卓越之心）的知覺。現量（pratyaksha，現量）也是如此。因為這個緣故，後來的意識能夠決斷，並非是無中生有。他們也尤其不能否定不同的根的衡量作用。對於自內心證的心心所（citta-caitasika，心和心所）的生起，不離自證而有現量，這是他們所承認的。然而，對於外境，將其視為現量，這是一種虛妄的增益，正是應該遮止的。如前所述，是爲了避免不成（asiddha，未證實）的過失，沒有見到對詞語的解釋，只是空洞的言語，實際上並沒有確切的依據。他們完全不承認有外在的色等，還想依靠它來證明有現量。然而，所要成立的，不能遠離被駁斥的過失。所以，如果從未領受過前境的意識，就不能產生憶念。必須承認，對於那些外境，曾經領受過。因此，認為能夠見到色等境，並認為有不同的根的性質，這是不能成立的。曾經領受過的境才能憶念，這是為什麼呢？因為有道理的緣故。已經說了，就像相識的人一樣，即使沒有外境，也能像有境一樣顯現，眼等諸識（vijnana，意識）因此得以生起，如前所述。接下來又如何從此產生憶念呢？從此識之後，與念（smriti，憶念）相應，就在這個相上，分別意識（vikalpa-vijnana，分別意識）就生起了。因為領受了那個境，念才能生起，這個說法是不成立的。如果這樣，對於色等處，以現量的性質決定了知，所有相貌才能產生憶念的性質，猶如樂等。在憶念上安置形像而領取它，決斷之前的相，內心自證理解，然而並非沒有領受，猶如石頭等。有火焰等，生起意識的時候，也不能生起這種憶念。因此，可以確定，依靠比量（anumana，比量）的力量，對於色等境。

【English Translation】 English version: However, this is because there is self-awareness (sva-samvedana) within. At that time, without arising any thoughts or constructs, one clings to the differences in the appearances of various objects. They only admit to such an internal cause. This also, as the appearance of the object manifests, relies solely on consciousness (vijnana), as if jointly formed, including suffering, pleasure, defilement, and so on. However, they regard those external objects such as form (rupa) as being measured by different senses (indriya). This is merely a false emotional attachment, like the quantities, actions (karma), and so on of each other. This difficulty can also be used to extend to other questions, such as the things seen in dreams. After waking up from a dream, one recalls the scenes in the dream. Although there was no real object at that time, there was the perception of higher mind (adhicitta). Direct perception (pratyaksha) is also like this. Because of this reason, later consciousness can determine that it is not created out of nothing. They also especially cannot deny the measuring function of different senses. For the arising of mental states (citta-caitasika) that are self-aware, there is direct perception without being separate from self-awareness, which is what they admit. However, regarding external objects as direct perception is a false addition, which should be prevented. As mentioned earlier, it is to avoid the fault of being unproven (asiddha), without seeing the explanation of the words, only empty words, and there is actually no definite basis. They completely do not admit that there are external forms, etc., and want to rely on it to prove that there is direct perception. However, what is to be established cannot be separated from the fault of being refuted. Therefore, if the consciousness of the previous object has never been received, then memory cannot be produced. It must be admitted that those external objects have been received. Therefore, it is untenable to think that one can see objects such as form and think that there are different sensory natures. Why is it that only objects that have been received can be remembered? Because there is reason. It has been said that, like acquaintances, even if there is no external object, it can appear as if there is an object, and the consciousnesses (vijnana) of the eyes, etc., can arise as a result, as mentioned earlier. Next, how does memory arise from this? After this consciousness, corresponding to memory (smriti), on this appearance, the discriminating consciousness (vikalpa-vijnana) arises. Because the object is received, memory can arise, this statement is untenable. If so, for places such as form, with the nature of direct perception, it is determined that all appearances can produce the nature of memory, like pleasure, etc. Placing the image on the memory and receiving it, deciding on the previous appearance, the inner self-awareness understands, but it is not that there is no reception, like stones, etc. When flames, etc., arise, the consciousness cannot produce this memory either. Therefore, it can be determined that, relying on the power of inference (anumana), for objects such as form.

應必定有親領受之。若異此者。所許憶念便成非有。復由於此受領之境成現量故。世間言論。名之為見。若於色等是憶念性。如共成者。可有斯過。即由於此外色等處領受憶念。理不許成。由有理故。如離於境得有其見。憶念同然。為其能立。不共成故。宗及於喻欲曉悟他。于境領受全無力用。

成唯識寶生論卷第四大正藏第 31 冊 No. 1591 成唯識寶生論

成唯識寶生論卷第五(一名二十唯識順釋論)

護法菩薩造

大唐三藏法師義凈奉　制譯

論曰。如何不與色等諸境而相關涉名作見耶。若遣斯難。此不勞言。由斯識體自現形相。雖無色等而境得成。此前已說。夢獄翳等為能喻事。隨其所應廣陳比量。

從此生憶念者。不待外境而現前故。見之自性方始得生。雖無實義。念與意俱由現見識所有功能安置力故。隨其次第假藉余緣為能牽引覺想方生。當爾之時名為憶念。如何復知見之與憶兩體差殊。若此見憶俱並不藉外境有故能生自體。由似境者。為性邪疑。說分別識見之為用。不生計度前境相狀。但有自證體性生起念之相也。取其言相安布之差了相不明分別生也。以見為先熏習所遣。即此自性由他故生。見不然也。見之與念條然別故。為此定須許如斯理。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：必定有親自領受它的（境）。如果不是這樣，所說的憶念就成了不存在的。又因為這個受領的境是現量（pratyaksa，直接感知）的緣故，世間的言論，稱之為『見』（darsana，視覺）。如果對於色等是憶念的性質，如同共同成就者一樣，可能會有這種過失。就是因為對於外面的色等處領受憶念，道理上不允許成立。因為有道理的緣故，如同離開境而能有見一樣，憶念也是一樣。因為它是能立（sadhanas，論證）的，不是共同成就的緣故。宗（paksa，論題）以及比喻（drstanta，例子）想要曉悟他人，對於境的領受完全沒有作用。

《成唯識寶生論》卷第四大正藏第 31 冊 No. 1591 《成唯識寶生論》

《成唯識寶生論》卷第五 (一名《二十唯識順釋論》)

護法菩薩造

大唐三藏法師義凈奉　制譯

論曰：如果不與色等諸境相關涉，怎麼能叫做『見』呢？如果想要消除這個疑問，這就不需要多說了。因為這個識體（vijnana，意識）自己顯現形相，即使沒有色等，境也能成立。這之前已經說過了，夢、地獄、眼翳等可以作為能比喻的事例。根據情況，廣泛陳述比量（anumana，推論）。

從此產生的憶念，不等待外境而顯現的緣故，見的自性才開始產生。即使沒有真實的意義，念與意（manas，意根）一起，由於現見識（pratyaksa-vijnana，現量意識）所有的功能安置的力量，按照次第，假借其他的因緣作為能牽引，覺想才產生。在這個時候叫做憶念。怎麼知道見和憶念兩者本體不同呢？如果這個見和憶念都不憑藉外境而有，能夠產生自體，因為類似境的緣故，是性質邪惡的疑惑。說分別識（vikalpa-vijnana，分別意識）的見是作用。不產生計度前境的相狀，只有自證（svasamvedana，自我認知）的體性生起唸的相。取其言語相狀安立的差別，了相不明顯，分別產生。以見為先的熏習所遣，就是這個自性由他（para，其他）的緣故產生，見不是這樣。見和念條理分明地不同。為此一定要允許這樣的道理。

【English Translation】 English version: It must be personally received. If it is different from this, the so-called recollection becomes non-existent. Moreover, because this realm of reception is a direct perception (pratyaksa), worldly speech calls it 'seeing' (darsana). If, with regard to form, etc., it is the nature of recollection, like those who are jointly accomplished, there may be this fault. That is, because of receiving recollection at external form, etc., it is not allowed to be established in principle. Because there is reason, just as there can be seeing apart from the object, recollection is the same. Because it is the establisher (sadhanas), not jointly accomplished. The thesis (paksa) and the example (drstanta) want to enlighten others, but the reception of the object has no effect at all.

Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness: Jewel-Producing (Cheng Weishi Baosheng Lun), Volume 4 Taisho Tripitaka, Volume 31, No. 1591, Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness: Jewel-Producing

Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness: Jewel-Producing, Volume 5 (also known as Commentary on Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only)

Composed by Bodhisattva Dharmapala

Translated under Imperial Order by Tripitaka Master Yijing of the Great Tang Dynasty

Treatise: How can it be called 'seeing' if it is not related to form and other objects? If you want to eliminate this doubt, there is no need to say more. Because this consciousness (vijnana) itself manifests its form, even without form, etc., the object can be established. It has been said before that dreams, hells, eye diseases, etc., can be used as examples. According to the situation, widely state the inference (anumana).

The recollection that arises from this does not wait for the external object to appear, so the nature of seeing begins to arise. Even without real meaning, recollection and mind (manas) together, due to the power of all the functions of direct perception consciousness (pratyaksa-vijnana), in order, borrowing other causes as the attractor, awareness arises. At this time, it is called recollection. How do we know that seeing and recollection are different in substance? If this seeing and recollection do not rely on external objects and can produce themselves, because they resemble objects, they are evil doubts in nature. It is said that the seeing of discriminating consciousness (vikalpa-vijnana) is a function. It does not produce the appearance of measuring the previous object, but only the self-awareness (svasamvedana) nature arises as the appearance of recollection. Taking the difference in the arrangement of the language appearance, the clear appearance is not obvious, and discrimination arises. What is eliminated by the influence of seeing first is that this nature arises from others (para), seeing is not like this. Seeing and recollection are clearly different. For this reason, such a principle must be allowed.

假令雖復有其外境。二皆有境。緣相不殊。見之與憶自體不同。如有異途幸應為說。彼設雖緣現在之境。名之為見。如緣過去。說之爲念。由無境者。彼雖境異有無之相。所緣別故。斯之異相。緣亦不能而於見念為片思也。宜應說為自體別故。斯成異相。爾者此境是其識所現相。若為決定知如是耶。由於前境決知見已與彼相似所起之識分明不忘。取彼事時。即名斯事而為似相。猶如決了丈夫相貌。方名此作似丈夫耶。似相了知非不曾見。然非曾見能有如斯決斷之理。為由不許有外境故。斯亦非理。由彼自證心心所生解相不同是所許故。斯固於他全不成難。汝既分別於事善巧。我聊致問。理復如何同時自證。既不許有如何此見能決定耶。非過去事能有憶念。由彼非是自證性故。又非自證。如所說事違道理故。先當援己后乃擊他。所有陳謀方能獲勝。斯即念托境生。不共成也。復于夢處領納外境。令共成托后時自可道彼元無成非理故。猶如樂等領受樂事。若其外境元有可領。但有似相錯亂現前。當爾之時外境非有。自然決斷。猶如夢者。覺乃知非。

夢者見非有。覺已乃知非。若也覺時亦不領境。猶如夢中。彼是非有。世人自知。然不如是。是故定知于正覺時。然色等境有真領受不同夢中識無力用。此亦不能而為曉

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：假設即使有外境存在，兩者都有所緣之境，所緣之相沒有差別，但見（見識）和憶（回憶）的自體是不同的。如果有什麼不同的途徑，希望能夠說明。他們假設即使是緣于現在的境，也稱之為『見』；如果緣於過去，就稱之為『念』。因為沒有境，即使境不同，有無之相也不同，所緣不同，這種差異也不能使見和念成為片面的思考。應該說是因為自體不同，才造成這種差異。如果是這樣，那麼這個境就是識所顯現的相。如何才能確定地知道是這樣呢？因為對於之前的境，已經確定地知道見與它相似，由此產生的識分明不忘。取彼事時，就稱此事為相似之相。就像確定了丈夫的相貌，才稱這個為像丈夫一樣。相似之相的了知，並非不曾見過，然而並非曾見過就能有如此決斷的道理。因為不承認有外境，所以這也是不合理的。因為他們自己證明心和心所生的理解之相是不同的，這是他們所承認的。所以這對於他人來說完全不成問題。你既然分別事物如此巧妙，我姑且問一下，道理又如何能同時自證呢？既然不承認有，那麼這種見如何能確定呢？過去的的事情不能有憶念，因為它不是自證的性質。又不是自證，就像所說的事情違背道理一樣。應該先幫助自己，然後才能攻擊他人，所有陳述的謀略才能獲勝。這就是念依託境而生，不是共同成就的。又在夢中領納外境，使共同成就依託，之後自然可以說道它原本沒有成就，不是沒有道理的。就像快樂等領受快樂的事情一樣。如果外境原本有可以領受的，但只有相似之相錯亂地顯現，當這個時候外境是沒有的，自然可以決斷，就像做夢的人，醒來才知道不是真的。

做夢的人見到不是真的，醒來才知道不是真的。如果醒來的時候也不領受境，就像在夢中一樣，那個是非有，世人自己知道。然而不是這樣的。所以一定知道在正覺的時候，色等境有真實的領受，不同於夢中識沒有力量。這也不能使人明白。

【English Translation】 English version: Suppose even if there is an external object (外境, waijing: external environment), both have objects to be perceived, and the perceived appearances are not different. However, seeing (見, jian: perception) and remembering (憶, yi: recollection) are different in their own nature. If there is a different path, I hope it can be explained. They assume that even if it is related to the present object, it is called 'seeing'; if it is related to the past, it is called 'remembering'. Because there is no object, even if the objects are different, the appearances of existence and non-existence are also different, and the perceived objects are different, this difference cannot make seeing and remembering a one-sided thought. It should be said that it is because the nature of the self is different that this difference is created. If this is the case, then this object is the appearance manifested by consciousness. How can we be sure that this is the case? Because for the previous object, it has been determined that seeing is similar to it, and the consciousness arising from this is clearly unforgettable. When taking that matter, it is called a similar appearance. Just like determining the appearance of a husband, then calling this like a husband. The knowledge of similar appearances is not that one has never seen it, but it is not that one has ever seen it that can have such a reason for determination. Because it is not admitted that there is an external object, this is also unreasonable. Because they themselves prove that the appearances of understanding arising from the mind and mental states are different, this is what they admit. So this is not a problem for others at all. Since you are so skillful in distinguishing things, let me ask, how can reason be self-evident at the same time? Since it is not admitted that there is, how can this view be determined? Past events cannot be remembered because it is not the nature of self-evidence. It is also not self-evident, just like what is said violates the truth. One should help oneself first, and then attack others, and all stated strategies can be victorious. This is the thought relying on the object to arise, not jointly achieved. Also, in dreams, one receives external objects, making joint achievement rely on it, and later one can naturally say that it was originally not achieved, which is not unreasonable. Just like happiness, etc., receiving happy things. If the external object originally has something that can be received, but only similar appearances appear in confusion, at this time the external object is not there, and one can naturally decide, just like a dreamer, who wakes up and realizes it is not real.

The dreamer sees what is not real, and wakes up to realize it is not real. If one does not receive the object when awake, just like in a dream, that non-existence, the world knows for itself. However, it is not like this. Therefore, it is certain that at the time of true enlightenment, the objects such as form have true reception, which is different from the lack of power of consciousness in dreams. This also cannot make people understand.

喻。令於色等領受義成。由作夢者處夢中時不能了境。是為非有。若由遠離於睡闇時得分明慧。隨其所有別別曾緣熏成念種。然于夢位所領之境。憶令上心方生決斷。此事非有。彼既如是。此亦還然。雖非外色可為領受。便即翻作見外色心。起妄分別。重重現前數數緣慮。生此類性所有功能熏習成種令其上心。即此熏習。更欲彰其不實事故。後起余緣彰見真義。由有睡眠相似法故。雖于覺位亦曰睡也。為此熏習恒隨逐故。世間睡眠猶如余睡。但有妄情離識別見。色聲等境。而被纏縛極受艱辛。漂泊生津淪回慾海。由未正得熏習斷故。猶如夢中不能覺了色等境無。未能稱事于非起故。不了是無。為境所誑。縱有聞思所生之智。為由分別熏習隨故。未現證真不能正起。亦名誑妄。當爾之時。名為不覺。及由於彼熏習種子對治已生。畢竟拔除深有力用。于創起時非世先有。由此名為出世間智。正斷一切分別性故。無分別智獲得現行。能除熏習無知睡故。證悟真覺於時藉此。無分別智以為因故。由此之力方便起故。決能截除色等諸義。固執熏習。名為清凈。由涉計度諸境相故。號曰世間。彼智現已。但唯是識隨其色類緣會力故。生起之時。唯于自識現其相分。妄執諸境而作生因。然非離識有自性故。色聲等境而生了知。其所立

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：比喻來說，就像在色等（Rupa，物質現象）的領受上成就了意義。因為做夢的人在夢中不能瞭解境界的真相，所以說它是『非有』（不真實）。如果因為遠離了睡眠的黑暗，而得到分明的智慧，那麼隨其所有，過去所經歷的種種因緣熏習成爲念頭的種子。然而在夢境中所領受的境界，回憶起來讓上心（較高層次的心識）產生決斷：這件事是不真實的。既然夢境是這樣，那麼現實也是一樣。雖然沒有外在的色法可以被領受，卻立刻顛倒過來，認為有外在的色法，心因此生起虛妄的分別。重重地顯現，屢屢地緣慮，產生這種類別的性質，所有功能熏習成為種子，讓上心受到影響。這種熏習，爲了更加彰顯其不真實，後來又生起其他的因緣，彰顯見到的真實意義。因為有和睡眠相似的法，所以在覺醒的狀態也叫做『睡』。因為這種熏習恒常跟隨著，世間的睡眠就像其他的睡眠一樣，只是有虛妄的情感，遠離了識別，見到色聲等境界，因此被纏縛，極度地承受艱辛，漂泊在生死之中，沉淪在慾望的海洋里。因為沒有真正地斷除熏習，就像在夢中不能覺察色等境界的虛無，不能恰當地處理非真實的事情，不瞭解這些是虛無的，因此被境界所欺騙。縱然有通過聽聞和思考所產生的智慧，因為受到分別熏習的影響，沒有現證真實，不能正確地生起作用，也叫做虛妄。當那個時候，叫做『不覺』。以及因為對於那些熏習種子，對治已經產生，最終拔除了深厚的有力作用，在最初生起的時候，不是世間原先就有的，因此叫做『出世間智』（Lokottara-jnana，超越世俗的智慧）。因為它正確地斷除了一切分別的性質，無分別智（Nirvikalpa-jnana）獲得顯現，能夠去除熏習的無知睡眠，證悟真實的覺醒。在那個時候，憑藉這種無分別智作為原因，因為這種力量方便生起，一定能夠截斷對於色等諸義的固執熏習，這叫做『清凈』。因為涉及到計度諸境的相狀，所以叫做『世間』。當這種智慧顯現以後，只不過是識（Vijnana，意識）隨著色類的因緣聚合的力量，在生起的時候，只是在自己的識中顯現其相分，虛妄地執著諸境，而作為生起的原因。然而因為色聲等境界並非脫離識而有自性，所以產生了知覺。其所建立的……

【English Translation】 English version: For example, it is like the meaning being accomplished in the reception of Rupa (form, material phenomena). Because the dreamer cannot understand the reality of the objects in the dream, it is said to be 'non-existent' (unreal). If, by being away from the darkness of sleep, one obtains clear wisdom, then according to what one has, the various conditions experienced in the past are imprinted as seeds of thought. However, regarding the objects perceived in the dream, recalling them allows the higher mind (higher level of consciousness) to make a judgment: this matter is not real. Since dreams are like this, so is reality. Although there are no external forms to be received, one immediately reverses it, thinking there are external forms, and the mind thus gives rise to false discriminations. Manifesting repeatedly, contemplating again and again, producing this kind of nature, all functions are imprinted as seeds, influencing the higher mind. This imprinting, in order to further highlight its unreality, later gives rise to other conditions, highlighting the true meaning of what is seen. Because there is a dharma similar to sleep, the awakened state is also called 'sleep'. Because this imprinting constantly follows, worldly sleep is like other sleep, only with false emotions, away from discernment, seeing forms, sounds, and other objects, and thus being bound, enduring extreme hardship, drifting in birth and death, sinking in the ocean of desires. Because one has not truly cut off the imprinting, just like in a dream one cannot perceive the emptiness of forms and other objects, unable to properly deal with unreal things, not understanding that these are empty, and thus being deceived by the objects. Even if there is wisdom arising from hearing and thinking, because of the influence of discriminatory imprinting, without directly realizing the truth, one cannot correctly arise, and it is also called false. At that time, it is called 'non-awakening'. And because for those imprinted seeds, the antidote has already arisen, ultimately uprooting the deep and powerful effects, at the time of initial arising, it is not something that originally existed in the world, therefore it is called 'Lokottara-jnana' (transcendental wisdom). Because it correctly cuts off the nature of all discriminations, Nirvikalpa-jnana (non-discriminatory wisdom) is manifested, able to remove the ignorant sleep of imprinting, realizing true awakening. At that time, relying on this non-discriminatory wisdom as the cause, because this power arises conveniently, it will certainly be able to cut off the stubborn imprinting on the meanings of forms and other objects, this is called 'purity'. Because it involves measuring the appearances of various objects, it is called 'worldly'. When this wisdom has manifested, it is only Vijnana (consciousness) following the power of the aggregation of conditions of the form category, at the time of arising, it only manifests its aspect within its own consciousness, falsely clinging to the various objects as the cause of arising. However, because the realms of form, sound, etc., do not have self-nature apart from consciousness, knowledge arises. What is established...

量。若據總相不知彼境。是為無者。許能立因有不成過。若言差別覺時不知。還有不成與前相似。覺悟之位了境元無。宗所許故。既有斯過。理固不能以斯能立成其前境有可領納。或有於此不成之過。申述解詞猶若元來。不為境解此無之智。理不應成。要先知境方於此事能生此心。說為非有若爾的知前境是有。如何能得更復言無觀相是有。復乃云無現是相違。若為通釋。彼諸宗等撥為非有。固不相違。如諸外論。謂為常等。生前滅后悉並非無。或於方所或此非余。有境無餘。何過之有。若時於我將為無者。由非不了可撥為無。于無起知非所許故。此不如文于茲色等說我為無。然於色等造作之處。無真實我非據我也。若爾於色等聚乍可無𠎝。說識我無。如何免難。由不許有第二之識。于余識處了我為無。亦非不領於前而能憶念於後。設令生念境已亡故。是故應許但唯有識。而現於相。即如所許。然于識處知我是無。撥無其我。識若生時。此智爾時知無我體。然由離境了唯有識。隨此相貌。緣若生時解境為無。豈非齊致。然於色等了無我時。於色等處是為共相。非是自相。由此各依以為定性。自體異故。然非相似所有相貌是實事有。欲令于余而作簡別。有其異相附識而生。猶如實事有集心分。于識自體轉起現前。世俗言論

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本量。如果根據總體相狀不能瞭解那個境界，就認為是『無』，那麼就允許了能成立的原因有不成立的過失。如果說在覺察差別的時候不能瞭解，還有不成立，和前面相似。覺悟的地位瞭解境界原本是『無』，這是宗派所允許的。既然有這樣的過失，道理上就不能用這個能成立的原因來成就前面境界是可以領納的。或者有人在這裡對不成立的過失，申述解釋詞語好像原本一樣，不為境界解釋這個『無』的智慧，道理上不應該成立。要先知道境界，才能對這件事產生這個心，說為『非有』。如果這樣，確實知道前面的境界是『有』，怎麼能再說『無』呢？觀察相是『有』，又說是『無』，這顯然是互相矛盾的。如果爲了解釋，那些宗派等撥為『非有』，本來就不矛盾，就像那些外道理論，認為是『常』等等，生前滅后都不是『無』。或者在方位上，或者這個不是其他的，有境界沒有剩餘，有什麼過失呢？如果有時對我認為是『無』，因為不是不瞭解就可以撥為『無』，對於『無』產生知覺是不允許的。這不如經文在這裡對色等說我是『無』，然而在色等造作之處，沒有真實的我，不是根據我。如果這樣，對於色等聚集或許可以沒有差錯，說識是我『無』，如何避免責難呢？因為不允許有第二種識，在其他的識處瞭解我為『無』，也不是不領會前面而能憶念後面。即使產生念頭，境界已經消亡了，所以應該允許只有識，而顯現為相，就像所允許的那樣。然而在識處知道我是『無』，撥除其我。識產生的時候，這個智慧那時知道沒有我的自體。然而由於離開境界瞭解只有識，隨著這個相貌，因緣產生的時候瞭解境界為『無』，難道不是一樣嗎？然而在色等處瞭解沒有我的時候，對於色等處是共同的相狀，不是自體的相狀。因此各自依靠以為是確定的性質，自體不同的緣故。然而不是相似的所有相貌是真實的事物存在，想要對於其他的而作簡別，有不同的相狀附著在識上而產生，好像真實的事物有聚集的心分，在識的自體上轉變而顯現，這是世俗的言論。

【English Translation】 English version Quantity. If, according to the general characteristics, one does not understand that realm and considers it 'non-existent,' then it is admitting that the reason for establishing it has the fault of being unestablished. If it is said that one does not understand when perceiving differences, there is still non-establishment, similar to before. The state of enlightenment understands that the realm is originally 'non-existent,' which is what the school allows. Since there is such a fault, it is logically impossible to use this establishing reason to prove that the previous realm is acceptable. Or someone here, regarding the fault of non-establishment, elaborates on the explanation of the words as if they were originally, not explaining this wisdom of 'non-existence' for the realm, which logically should not be established. One must first know the realm in order to generate this mind about this matter, saying it is 'non-existent.' If so, truly knowing that the previous realm is 'existent,' how can one say 'non-existent' again? Observing the characteristics as 'existent' and then saying 'non-existent' is clearly contradictory. If it is to be explained, those schools, etc., deny it as 'non-existent,' which is not contradictory in the first place, just like those external theories, considering it 'permanent,' etc., neither before birth nor after death is 'non-existent.' Or in terms of location, or this is not the other, having a realm without remainder, what fault is there? If sometimes one considers me as 'non-existent,' because it is not without understanding that one can deny it as 'non-existent,' it is not allowed to generate perception of 'non-existence.' This is not like the sutra saying that I am 'non-existent' in relation to form, etc. However, in the place where form, etc., are created, there is no real self, not based on me. If so, perhaps there is no mistake in the aggregation of form, etc., saying that consciousness is me 'non-existent,' how to avoid the difficulty? Because it is not allowed to have a second consciousness, in other consciousnesses understanding me as 'non-existent,' it is also not not understanding the former and being able to remember the latter. Even if a thought arises, the realm has already vanished, so it should be allowed that there is only consciousness, and it appears as a characteristic, just as allowed. However, in the place of consciousness knowing that I am 'non-existent,' denying that self. When consciousness arises, this wisdom then knows that there is no self-essence. However, due to understanding that there is only consciousness apart from the realm, following this appearance, when conditions arise, understanding the realm as 'non-existent,' is it not the same? However, when understanding that there is no self in form, etc., for form, etc., it is a common characteristic, not a self-characteristic. Therefore, each relies on it as a definite nature, because the self-essence is different. However, not all similar appearances are real things that exist, wanting to make distinctions for others, there are different appearances attached to consciousness and arising, just like real things have aggregated mental components, transforming and manifesting on the self-essence of consciousness, this is secular speech.

因斯生起。了知外境。但是自心所生領受。本非居外。斯乃是為最勝修習。所獲性故。此由無明蓋覆于慧。如在外轉觀斯共相。即如所見時俗言成。隨世俗情于言說路令得明解。于諸論處似事而轉。別以形相而宣說之。于所餘事作其遮遣。於此事中應有形段。若總相是實即是總相。應如色等自體各異。而於別事體不相應。此則色等成非異體。如色似聲。又復如彼一異非言所許共相。此但覆俗當情顯現無所諍也。此既不許將為實事。斯乃便成於色聲等成非異體。又複色等一一便成有多體故。共相之狀體無邊故。此則合有多種體性。便成諸事皆為一體。如隨自緣所帶相像。斷割前境此之體相。亦是假立眾多相貌。為俗言論而分別之。由此便成於色聲等。無我之智亦是共相。斷割性故。取其無境更成光顯唯識之宗。然於色等無我解時。有別相分。復由前後分段本無故。斯乃是為先取別相分明決斷。于異決了隨而攝取。事境性故。若青蓮也簡去其白。識緣蓮體。決斷是青。言無我者。理亦同然凡起決斷。謂即於他所執我相仗此思構。方生決斷無別我體。縱雖無境而智得生。理既齊衡何有乖諍。

若諸有情由自相續者。若言於此自相體中。各有無量功能不同。于自識中變現別故。至成熟時。由自種力識現在前。不由外境而

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因（無明）生起，了知外境，但這些都是自心所生，並非真實存在於外。這是最殊勝的修習所獲得的體悟，因為無明遮蔽了智慧，所以我們如同在外境中觀察事物的共相。就像我們所見到的那樣，世俗的語言形成了，爲了讓人們在世俗的情感中理解語言，於是在各種論述中，事物似乎是真實存在的，並以各種形狀和特徵來描述它們，同時否定其他可能性。在此事中，事物應該有形狀和部分。如果總相是真實的，那麼它就是總相，應該像顏色等一樣，自體各異，並且在不同的事物中不相互對應。這樣，顏色等就不是不同的個體，就像顏色類似於聲音。此外，就像那『一』和『異』無法用語言來描述的共相一樣，這只是遮蔽了世俗的表象，顯現出來，沒有什麼可爭論的。既然不承認它是真實的事物，那麼顏色、聲音等就不是不同的個體。而且，顏色等每一個都變成了多個個體，因為共相的狀態是無限的。這樣，就包含了多種體性，導致所有事物都成為一體，就像隨著各自的因緣所呈現的形象一樣。分割之前的境界，這種體相也是假立的眾多相貌，爲了世俗的言論而分別它們。因此，顏色、聲音等就變成了無我的智慧，也是一種共相，因為它們具有分割的性質。去除其無境的特性，更能彰顯唯識宗的觀點。然而，在理解顏色等無我的時候，存在著不同的相分。又因為前後分段本來就不存在，所以這是先取不同的相分，明確決斷，然後在不同的決斷中隨之攝取，因為這是事境的性質。如果像青蓮花一樣，去除其白色，意識緣于蓮花的整體，決斷它是青色的，那麼說『無我』的道理也是一樣的。凡是產生決斷，都是憑藉他人所執著的我相，依靠這種思考和構造，才產生決斷，並沒有其他的我體。即使沒有外境，智慧也能產生，道理既然相同，又有什麼矛盾和爭論呢？如果諸有情是由自相續產生的，如果說在這個自相的本體中，各自有無量不同的功能，因為在自己的識中變現出不同的事物，到成熟的時候，由自己的種子力量，識顯現在前，而不是由外境引起的。

【English Translation】 English version: When ignorance arises, one perceives external objects, but these are all generated from one's own mind and do not truly exist outside. This is the realization gained from the most excellent practice, because ignorance obscures wisdom, so we observe the common characteristics of things as if they were external. Just as we see them, worldly language is formed, and in order to make people understand language in worldly emotions, things seem to be real in various discourses, and they are described with various shapes and characteristics, while denying other possibilities. In this matter, things should have shapes and parts. If the general characteristic is real, then it is the general characteristic, and it should be like colors, etc., with different entities, and not correspond to each other in different things. In this way, colors, etc., are not different individuals, just as color is similar to sound. Moreover, just like that common characteristic of 'one' and 'different' that cannot be described by language, this only obscures the worldly appearance and reveals itself, and there is nothing to argue about. Since it is not admitted that it is a real thing, then colors, sounds, etc., are not different individuals. Moreover, each of the colors, etc., becomes multiple individuals, because the state of the common characteristic is infinite. In this way, it contains multiple natures, causing all things to become one, just like the image presented according to their respective conditions. Dividing the previous realm, this physical appearance is also a false establishment of numerous appearances, and they are distinguished for the sake of worldly discourse. Therefore, colors, sounds, etc., become the wisdom of no-self, which is also a common characteristic, because they have the nature of division. Removing its characteristic of being without an object can better highlight the viewpoint of the Consciousness-Only school. However, when understanding the no-self of colors, etc., there are different aspect-divisions. Moreover, because the previous and subsequent divisions do not exist in the first place, this is to first take different aspect-divisions, make a clear decision, and then take them in different decisions, because this is the nature of the object-realm. If, like a blue lotus, the white color is removed, and consciousness is related to the whole of the lotus, deciding that it is blue, then the principle of saying 'no-self' is also the same. Whenever a decision is made, it is based on the self-image clung to by others, and it is only by relying on this kind of thinking and construction that a decision is made, and there is no other self-body. Even if there is no external object, wisdom can arise, and since the principles are the same, what contradictions and disputes are there? If sentient beings are produced from their own continuums, if it is said that in this self-nature body, each has countless different functions, because different things are transformed in one's own consciousness, when it matures, the consciousness manifests itself by the power of its own seeds, and not caused by external objects.

得興起。非離自識從外境生。然由親近善惡友故。為益及損。此不得成。由於真妄損益之中但以言聲說為境故。既緣聲義兩種皆無。於斯斷割便成非有。由彼有其理非理行。可令善惡逐彼而行。彼行既無可取隨學。寧容有故。此則曾不依託外境。而識得生。違所許過。必定依託。外色等境。緣色等心。猶如有事。無事聲心復如觀他所有行跡。是能于境決斷性故。亦復由如色等諸識定緣外境。如聖量言。但是于內似相現故。此固無力。破唯識義。由展轉增上識互決定成者。由其展轉識相假故。即此二識更互相依。本不待聲及於色等。由所立喻不順於宗。亦復全無違教之失。有他相續為別識故。他識為因自識生故。善惡二友作用理成。外境引夢撥使成無。目擊友人。何不同睡而遣為非。有何勞強立展轉相。因夢聞善惡。非由別識生。如何現在隨他識行。復如何知但由余識分別得生。於他言事隨順情起。此識生時。更有餘識功能差別。為因現故。且聞者識。如結契時。唯聲現相有差別體。識乃得生。不依外境。方能了事仗自功能。所有差別托己內緣為聲相解。即於前境而有了知。此時但是自識熟位功能轉起。但有聲相共識俱生。詳觀斯理。又復聖者威神至極。無其文字離取聲相。為間隙時成說方便。然則但由勝差別故。能作

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本能夠興起。並非離開自身的認識而從外在環境產生。然而由於親近善友或惡友的緣故，會帶來利益或損害。這（種說法）不能成立。因為在真實與虛妄、損害與利益之中，僅僅以言語聲音來描述作為對象。既然所緣的聲音和意義兩種都不存在，那麼在這種情況下斷除（外境），就成為非有。由於他們（善惡友）有其合理或不合理的行為，可以使善或惡跟隨他們而行。他們的行為既然無可取之處，又如何跟隨學習呢？哪裡容許有（外境）的緣故呢？這（種說法）就從未依託外在環境，而認識得以產生，違背了所允許的過失，必定要依託外在的色等環境。緣於色等的心，就像有事一樣。無事的聲音和心，又像觀察他人所有的行為軌跡，是因為能夠對環境進行決斷的緣故。也像色等諸識必定緣于外在環境一樣，如聖量所說。只是因為在內在顯現相似的形象的緣故，這本來就沒有力量破除唯識的意義。由輾轉增上，識互相決定而成就的說法，是因為輾轉的識相是虛假的緣故。即這兩種識互相依賴，本來不依賴聲音以及色等。由於所建立的比喻不順應于宗義，也完全沒有違背教義的過失。因為有他人的相續作為不同的識的緣故，他人的識作為原因，自己的識才得以產生。善惡二友的作用的道理才能成立。外在環境引導夢境，否定（外境）而使其成為沒有。親眼看到朋友，為什麼不同時睡覺而遣除（夢境），又何必費力地建立輾轉相呢？在夢中聽到善惡，不是由別的識產生的。現在又如何跟隨他人的識而行呢？又如何知道僅僅由其他的識分別而產生呢？對於他人言語的事情，隨順情感而生起。這個識產生的時候，更有其他的識的功能差別，作為原因而顯現的緣故。暫且說聽者的識，如結盟約的時候，只有聲音顯現的形象有差別的體性，識才得以產生，不依賴外在環境，才能瞭解事情，憑藉自身的功能，所有差別依託自己的內在因緣，作為聲音形象的理解，即對於之前的環境而有了知。此時只是自己的識成熟的階段，功能運轉生起，只有聲音形象和共識一同產生。詳細觀察這個道理，而且聖者的威神達到極致，沒有文字離開獲取聲音形象，作為間隙的時候成為說話的方便。那麼只是由於殊勝的差別，能夠作為（…）

【English Translation】 English version Can arise. It is not that it arises from external environments apart from one's own consciousness. However, due to associating with good or bad friends, benefit or harm may occur. This (statement) cannot be established. Because in truth and falsehood, harm and benefit, only verbal sounds are used to describe the object. Since both the sound and meaning of what is cognized do not exist, then in this case, cutting off (external environments) becomes non-existent. Because they (good and bad friends) have their reasonable or unreasonable actions, which can cause good or evil to follow them. Since their actions have nothing to take from, how can one follow and learn? Where is it permissible to have (external environments)? This (statement) has never relied on external environments, and consciousness arises, violating the admitted fault, it must rely on external environments such as form. The mind that cognizes form, etc., is like having something to do. The sound and mind of having nothing to do are like observing the traces of others' actions, because it is possible to make judgments about the environment. It is also like the consciousnesses of form, etc., that must cognize external environments, as the holy measure says. It is only because similar images appear internally that this inherently lacks the power to refute the meaning of Consciousness-Only. The statement that consciousnesses mutually determine and accomplish each other through transformation and increase is because the transformed consciousnesses are false. That is, these two consciousnesses rely on each other, originally not relying on sound and form, etc. Because the established analogy does not conform to the doctrine, there is also no fault of violating the teachings. Because there is the continuum of others as a different consciousness, the consciousness of others is the cause, and one's own consciousness arises. The principle of the function of good and bad friends can be established. External environments guide dreams, denying (external environments) and making them non-existent. Seeing a friend with one's own eyes, why not sleep at the same time and dispel (the dream), and why bother to establish transformation? Hearing good and evil in a dream is not produced by other consciousnesses. How can one now follow the consciousness of others? And how does one know that it is produced only by the discrimination of other consciousnesses? For the affairs of others' words, arising in accordance with emotions. When this consciousness arises, there are other functional differences of consciousness, which appear as the cause. Let's say that the consciousness of the listener, such as when making a covenant, only the appearance of sound manifests a different nature, and consciousness can arise, not relying on external environments, to understand things, relying on its own function, all differences rely on one's own internal causes, as the understanding of sound images, that is, for the previous environment, there is knowledge. At this time, it is only the stage of maturity of one's own consciousness, the function is operating and arising, only the sound image and common consciousness arise together. Examining this principle in detail, and the majestic power of the sages reaches its extreme, there are no words that leave the acquisition of sound images, and when it is used as a gap, it becomes a convenient way to speak. Then, only because of the supreme difference, it can act as (...)

斯事。遂令余識殊別相生。是共許故。斯即是為唯識功力。然則曾無聲之自相能至余識。是他共許。以將為喻。縱許如是。但依他識聲覺得生。斯乃便成恒常聽響。此之聲覺總被生津。雖住遠方及耳根壞。並應聞說。無有廢時。若其許覺由外聲起。有時聞聽耳識方行。分別因起。仍須處在相應。耳根復無損壞。方能于境覺察是非。由此全無便成並見。總聽之過非獨如此。識待有能差別性故。事判于聲。猶如於聲自性各異。能生此覺。非余相心。亦如於聲非聞一切。緣此聲相但返緣斯。唯生此覺。于覺有時。但生如此差別之緣。有力用故。為因非余。即如於聲在相應處於自相續生其相像。且如此事種子現前。隨自用果方能生起如是便成無相似過。複次諸字咸有支分。分析至窮非根取性。猶若極微非同時生。不合聚故。既不和聚有其決斷計一常聲。處虛空者。不應是理。緣此聲心不可得故。又彼許其所有細分。體相似故。及是非根所行性故。然非功能有其差別及以造作容有安置。勢力道理。復如外聲。隨所依緣差別之響。有其自相為緣之因。識亦如是。何有非愛。豈非所云。由展轉增上者。即是許其取余識故。此識便成有于外境如不取境。喻分便違。斯難非理。此識由其餘識現相為所緣故。喻乃共成。如余宗立。猶如於彼

非現在聲隨以一相而為成立。但有彼相識生而已。其宗許成。我喻亦然何成有過。何故如來之識差別。于余分別之境併除。不異相續而轉。無邊差別所化有情。在彼多心相若為起。如彼一聲體無差異。隨自樂相識從生起。但由如來威神之力。極修所致令彼得生於別功能非一之境。不同色類多而無雜。一時興用分別事成猶如燈寶鏡等現相。復以如來諸化用事。難思威力超尋思境。是共學故。強為斯難。非成妙說。若言夢覺兩位不差。由並許其無實境性。隨其差別咸引于果。夢中所見或善或惡。是總標也。及於覺位心亦無境。此亦便應俱時獲果。或應如夢亦皆無果。無境性故。或復翻此斯難不然。由有理故。

心由睡眠壞夢覺果不同者。然則夢心由睡壞故。性不分明。即此善惡能招劣果。如於覺時。或緣別事。不為恭敬。或時餘思亂心。于彼惠施雖行果不增。大識雖無境果亦同。然隨種差別。能招當果愛非愛事。由斯夢覺體有差殊。得果不同。非乖道理。復非由境善等體殊。所作業用招勝劣果。然由自性及相應等自體增故。及以相違。此即夢等有其差別。以此為緣非關有境。或時生已。便於斯境能起害心造于極惡。復於此處能招勝報。種下中上善不善業。以此而言實不藉其外境有故。植果差殊。或時有緣。過去羅漢

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本非現在的聲音隨著一個相而成立。只是因為對那個相的認識而產生而已。他們的宗義允許成立。我的比喻也是這樣，有什麼過失呢？為什麼如來的意識能夠區分，而對於其他分別的境界都能夠去除，不以不同的相續而流轉呢？無邊差別的被教化眾生，在他們那裡，多個心識好像同時生起，就像一個聲音的本體沒有差異，隨著各自喜歡的相，認識就從中生起。只是由於如來的威神之力，以及極度的修行所致，使得他們能夠在不同的功能而非單一的境界中產生。不像顏色種類繁多而沒有混雜，一時之間興起作用，分別事情得以完成，就像燈、寶鏡等顯現形象。而且如來的各種化用之事，難以思議，超越了尋思的境界。這是共同學習的緣故，勉強提出這樣的疑問，不是美妙的說法。如果說夢境和清醒時的狀態沒有差別，因為都承認它們沒有真實的境界自性，隨著它們的差別，都會引向結果。夢中所見，或是善或是惡，這是總的概括。以及在清醒的時候，心也沒有境界，這樣就應該同時獲得結果，或者應該像夢一樣，都沒有結果，因為沒有境界自性。或者反過來說，這個疑問是不成立的，因為有道理的緣故。心因為睡眠而壞，夢境和清醒時的結果不同，是因為夢中的心因為睡眠而受到損害，自性不分明。因此，夢中的善惡能夠招致較差的結果，就像在清醒的時候，或者因為其他事情，不恭敬，或者因為其他思緒擾亂心，對於那樣的佈施，即使做了，果報也不會增加。即使大的意識沒有境界，結果也是一樣的，但是隨著種子的差別，能夠招致相應的果報，愛或不愛的事情。因此，夢境和清醒時的本體有差別，得到的結果也不同，這並非不合道理。也不是因為境界的善等本體不同，所造的業的作用招致好的或壞的結果，而是因為自性以及相應的等自體增強的緣故，以及因為相反的情況，這就是夢等有差別的原因。以此為緣，與境界無關。或者有時產生之後，對於這個境界能夠生起害心，造作極惡，又在這個地方能夠招致好的果報，種下中上善不善業。以此而言，實在不需要外境的存在，果報的差別就產生了。或者有時有緣，過去是羅漢

【English Translation】 English version A non-present sound is established by a single characteristic. It arises only from the recognition of that characteristic. Their doctrine allows for this establishment. My analogy is the same, so what fault is there? Why is the Tathagata's (如來 - Thus Come One) consciousness able to differentiate and remove all other realms of discrimination, not flowing in different continuums? How do countless sentient beings transformed with endless differences, in their minds, have multiple consciousnesses arise as if simultaneously, like the essence of a single sound having no difference, with recognition arising from each's preferred characteristic? It is only due to the power of the Tathagata (如來 - Thus Come One), and the result of extreme practice, that they are able to arise in different functions and not in a single realm. Unlike colors, which are numerous and unmixed, actions arise at once, and the differentiation of things is accomplished, like lamps, precious mirrors, and other manifested images. Moreover, the various transformative actions of the Tathagata (如來 - Thus Come One) are inconceivable, surpassing the realm of thought. This is due to common learning, so to force such a question is not a wonderful statement. If it is said that there is no difference between the states of dreaming and waking, because both admit that they have no real nature of existence, then according to their differences, they will all lead to results. What is seen in dreams, whether good or bad, is a general summary. And in the waking state, the mind also has no realm, so it should obtain results simultaneously, or it should be like dreams, with no results, because it has no nature of existence. Or, conversely, this question is not valid, because there is reason. The mind is ruined by sleep, and the results of dreams and waking are different because the mind in dreams is damaged by sleep, and its nature is unclear. Therefore, the good and bad in dreams can lead to inferior results, just as in the waking state, either because of other things, there is no respect, or because other thoughts disturb the mind, and for such giving, even if done, the reward will not increase. Even if the great consciousness has no realm, the result is the same, but according to the difference in seeds, it can lead to corresponding results, things that are loved or not loved. Therefore, the essence of dreams and waking is different, and the results obtained are also different, which is not unreasonable. It is not because the essence of the good and other realms is different, and the actions of the karma created lead to good or bad results, but because the nature and corresponding self-essence are enhanced, and because of the opposite situation, this is the reason why dreams and other things are different. Taking this as a cause has nothing to do with the realm. Or sometimes, after arising, one can generate harmful thoughts towards this realm, creating extreme evil, and in this place, one can reap good rewards, planting middle and upper good and bad karma. In this regard, it is really not necessary for the external realm to exist, and the difference in rewards will arise. Or sometimes there is a connection, and in the past, it was an Arhat (羅漢 - one who is worthy)

身福等事。實無其境。猶如夢獲果不同。有不定過。後於夢中翹誠慶悅。如來出世雖無實境。大果當招。此喻便成。于宗不順。有餘師云。雖被夢損情斷前境而不闇昧如睡初覺。尚有餘昏。未足眠時強起情翳。身體沉重見不分明。即此之損於彼夢中相應之識誠固難有。由於夢內心心生法。當爾之時明白觀境。憂愁恐怖極思惟心。縱使覺時未能同此。由此要須是有情數。于共見境取相分故。然于夢中七色之業。不立業道由其夢色非見無對。是不共境不堪為世。言論事故。所云色業非業道者。斯乃便成。不察由緒。然此所論。于彼夢識見不分明獲果微劣。醒覺之位亦應如此。既有斯過。而便答曰。由夢損故獲其少果。如若不損與覺何殊。即如所云。夢識于境了事分明。便招勝果。此若為通由於夢中心明斷割。許其招得上妙果報七色業道不建立者。本為評章招果差別。遂論業道。由緒何從。由非招果要須假斯業道方就。于方便位被極重纏害斯意樂。遂令招得最惡之果。輕薄煩惱縱造根本。亦未能同極清凈心。于修善位方便根本。類此應知。

唯識論者。亦由於他相續興害。隨心所產生其業道。有餘師說。由他知故方成罪者。此非正答。何意要須待于共境方建立斯。非由他力始成業道。然藉堪為世言論事。由如苾芻斷青

流穢。犯斯等罪豈在情邊。及由共境假他知故。若於夢中實有青等為所了事。由大師制便成有罪。惑可翻余。非由其事。是有是無。此成應理。若也生界但唯識者。便成無有語身業耶。然由大種及從種生名為身也。語業即是從種生色。此二營為成殺妄等。兩種若無事便非有。諸屠獵者。但唯自識轉變顯現便招殺罪。豈不相違由非前生命根自斷。遂令他得殺生罪耶。此違所許身語二業。不爾云何。

死由他識別者。屠膾等識猶如屠者。既興方便彼遂分離。此亦如是。但由自識能有作用。差別現時。便與彼命為殺害因。爾乃但由自識功力妄現身相藉此勢故。立為業道。自餘業道準此應知。由斯道理。復有共許識之差別。遂與他身作壞因性。即如鬼神及健達縛等。其所嫌處惡念便生。由鬼等識變現為因。遂令前生得失念等。復由聖者專心念時。由他識力為勝緣故。遂于夢中屏除睡昧。便觀彼彼差異形儀。識于眾像而領納之。言命根者。謂是隨應。順彼趣業力所招引。異熟識流注時限齊如所攝引事。便轉變令彼一業所招連續同分之報。斷絕相違。非謂一切流皆斷絕。如他所許。于其六處據同分斷。說名為絕。識與命離假言其斷。但由自他兩識為緣。所有作用命根斷滅。

猶如於隱者獲得勝上定。及由作用力差別功

能成者令生變異。但是內心差別性故。如是雖無身語二業。殺盜等事理得善成。于彼經中定說隱者。意發嗔火緣斯力故。隨便殺彼無量有情。此亦由心令彼斷故。必如前理。應可推徴。決定須許成就隱者。意樂害力令無量生咸致命斷。若異此者。樂欲是其意害大罪。事乃不成。故知引證成意罪大。若也非人知彼意趣。當時為作殺害事者。此亦便成。明顯身業罪中最大。有時不假余相續識。便遭石墜煙炭雨等。損害有情。誰增上力令軀命斷。固非此識現如是相。還為殺害。便有自縛相違過故。此難非理。即由斯識相續無能與斯命斷隨順性故。猶如疑毒令心悶亂。但是隨順自內相續。識無力用更為連住。由此名為壽命斷也。然而許有石等相現。亦匪成違。但由增上識故令他命終者。鄰次之後。何不壽終。及其死時彼便非有。既不現前。如何成罪。及於斷命為因性耶。雖呈雅難應返問之。彼行殺時所招業道。若於當時結業道者。何不於時遂便卒命。若於緣時彼死方結。如何此得殺生過耶。若言相合得殺罪者。此二別時有無體異。如何能作共合事耶。然則此事作論尊者。已詳定斷于能害者。自相續中有其差別。業性流注。然我於斯有如是見。由能殺者增上識故。斷彼相續更互相因。決定由此不假別事。后致終亡。當被傷時。成

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本能成就隱身術的人可以使事物發生變異。但這都是由於內心的差別所致。即使沒有身體和語言的實際行為，殺人、盜竊等事情也能順利完成。在相關的經書中明確記載了隱身者的能力，他們內心燃起嗔恨之火，憑藉這種力量，可以隨意殺死無數眾生。這也是因為他們的心念導致了對方的死亡，道理與之前所說的一致，應該可以推斷證明。必須承認，成就隱身術的人，其意念所產生的危害力量，能夠使無數眾生喪命。如果不是這樣，那麼強烈的殺人意願就只是內心的重大罪過，而不會真正造成殺害行為。因此，可以得知，引經據典是爲了證明意念的罪過是巨大的。如果非人（指鬼神等）知道某人的意圖，並在當時幫助他實施殺害行為，那麼這也構成了明顯的身體行為所造成的最大罪過。有時，不需要其他眾生的參與，僅僅是石頭墜落、煙霧炭雨等，就能傷害有情眾生。那麼，是誰的力量導致了他們的死亡呢？當然不是這個正在顯現石頭墜落等現象的意識，如果說這個意識同時也是殺害者，那就陷入了自相矛盾的境地。這種質疑是不合理的。正是因為這個意識相續沒有導致對方死亡的直接能力，就像懷疑毒藥會使人心煩意亂一樣，但實際上只是順應了自身內在的相續，意識本身並沒有力量使其立即死亡。因此，這被稱為壽命的終結。然而，允許石頭等現象的出現，並不構成矛盾。僅僅是因為增上識（指強大的意識力量）導致他人死亡，那麼緊接著之後，為什麼不會立刻死亡呢？當他死亡的時候，那個增上識已經不存在了，既然已經不現前，又如何構成罪過，以及成為斷命的原因呢？雖然提出了精妙的疑問，但也應該反問一下：當他進行殺害行為時，所招感的業道，如果當時就結成業道，為什麼當時沒有立刻死亡呢？如果是在因緣成熟時才死亡，那麼這又如何能算是殺生之罪呢？如果說是因為（增上識和死亡）相結合才構成殺罪，那麼這兩個在不同時間存在的事物，其本體各不相同，又如何能夠共同完成結合的行為呢？然而，這件事，作論的尊者已經詳細地確定了，在能殺害者的自身相續中，存在著差別性的業力流動。然而，我對此有這樣的看法：由於能殺害者的增上識，斷絕了對方的相續，兩者相互作用，最終導致了死亡，不需要其他因素的介入。當被傷害時，就形成了（死亡的果報）。

【English Translation】 English version Those who can achieve invisibility can cause things to change. However, this is due to the differences in their inner minds. Even without physical or verbal actions, acts such as killing and stealing can be successfully accomplished. In the scriptures, it is clearly stated that the power of the invisible ones arises from the fire of anger in their hearts. With this power, they can kill countless sentient beings at will. This is also because their thoughts cause the death of others, and the principle is the same as previously stated, which should be inferred and proven. It must be acknowledged that the harmful power generated by the thoughts of those who have achieved invisibility can cause countless sentient beings to lose their lives. If this were not the case, then the strong desire to kill would only be a major sin in the mind, and would not actually cause harm. Therefore, it can be known that citing scriptures is to prove that the sin of intention is great. If non-humans (referring to ghosts, gods, etc.) know someone's intention and help them carry out the act of killing at that time, then this also constitutes the greatest sin caused by obvious physical actions. Sometimes, without the participation of other sentient beings, merely the falling of stones, smoke, charcoal rain, etc., can harm sentient beings. Then, whose power causes their death? Of course, it is not the consciousness that is currently manifesting the phenomena of falling stones, etc. If it is said that this consciousness is also the killer, then it falls into a self-contradictory situation. This question is unreasonable. It is precisely because this stream of consciousness does not have the direct ability to cause the other party's death, just as suspecting that poison will make people feel upset, but in reality, it only conforms to one's own inner stream of consciousness, and the consciousness itself does not have the power to make it die immediately. Therefore, this is called the end of life. However, allowing the appearance of phenomena such as stones does not constitute a contradiction. It is only because the Adhipati-citta (dominant consciousness) causes the death of others, then why does it not die immediately afterwards? When he dies, that Adhipati-citta no longer exists. Since it is no longer present, how can it constitute a sin and become the cause of death? Although a subtle question has been raised, it should also be asked in return: When he commits the act of killing, the karmic path that is evoked, if the karmic path is formed at that time, why did he not die immediately at that time? If death only occurs when the conditions are ripe, then how can this be considered the sin of killing? If it is said that the sin of killing is constituted by the combination (of Adhipati-citta and death), then these two things that exist at different times, their entities are different, how can they jointly complete the act of combination? However, this matter has been determined in detail by the venerable one who composed the treatise, that in the stream of consciousness of the killer, there is a differentiated flow of karmic force. However, I have this view on this: Due to the Adhipati-citta of the killer, the stream of consciousness of the other party is cut off, and the two interact with each other, ultimately leading to death, without the need for other factors to intervene. When injured, the (karmic retribution of death) is formed.

其殺業。由斷他命此有功能。決定由斯取亡沒故。然能害者但有此力。于斷彼命與作親因。或時即死。或復后終。由增上識能與他識展轉為害。令他后識剎那為障。更不相續。亦非害者。但唯以意便成殺業。由此有其退轉之義。于彼行害事乖離故。以理言之。他更不藉余緣致死。由斯必定而取命終。乘此為因命乃斷故。由斯即立殺生業道。此成無過。如是賊等隨事應知。若異此途彼能害者。于彼后時有何力用。他死之時方招殺罪。更復容成越理之失。不假能害。自身之中。有其差別。而但據彼被害者身有殊異故。后死之時方成罪者。由此加功彼命斷故。此即已言。當爾之時。何不死等。合以當時方便殺業。當時即得殺生之罪。死由彼故。然於後時更無異相。是可得故。還將此理用遣余疑。爾者猶如夢中能害所害。身等無故。斯乃便成無業道過。此由夢內識亦不能害他相續。是故於斯不成業道。翻此覺時便成於業。已廣成立但唯是心中無間事能成害業。

且縱如斯。廣陳異見。仍須執理更詰殊端。如唯有識。彼他心智。為知他心。為不了耶。若言不知者何謂了他心。此名由智了他心故。如其不了。便成誑妄。即此能詮於焉有失。如其知者。于離識境而領受故。所成唯識理致便乖。二事相違如何遣難。所以云何。有

深義故。他心智云何知境。不如實者。意取極深所證會處。彼曰他心。若有許識便傷他智。如無誠違自教。若他心智緣于外境。如觀心外有境為緣。斯難避咎。了境非實。固無𠎝尤。如何知境。不稱其實而得名作他心智耶。此中意言。如所證事前境不虛。由此方名是他心智。爾者知於前境既不如實。於此豈得名曰他心。理不如是。未閑本意。雖於他心不緣為境。似彼相狀識上現耶。是故離心無境可得生似彼相。然不如境斯成本意。立作他心。此中但是領彼似相。由此名為不如實性。雖不同彼似彼相生。離心無境。已共成故。能知之者。隨境相生。如知自心智者。二心同時不共聚故。固非現在。決定應許已滅未生。但可得一而為其境。體復是無。但唯自識還緣過現諸心聚法為彰顯相領納自心。於此事中世咸共許。了他心事理亦應知。爾者若於自心親能了別。如何復說不如實知。為由於境不實知故。名為不實。為是無事。將以為有。而得名為稱實知也。若爾如何得說不如。其境所有領納皆是其無。由彼不能了實境故。此亦不然。不知如佛境者。此他心智。他緣青等了彼所緣。即是稱實。何以便將佛知心體自性清凈而云不知凡云了他心。以他心為緣。了自心相。假說知他。即彼他心自性真體是何境界。此亦不然。不爾云何佛

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本甚深的意義在於，他人的心智如何瞭解境界？如果不如實，那是因為意念抓取了極深之處所證悟的境界。那被稱為『他心』（para-citta-jnana，知他人心智）。如果允許有『識』（vijnana，意識）的存在，就會損害『他智』（para-buddhi，他人的智慧）。如果沒有任何真實的違背，那就是違背了自己的教義。如果他心智緣于外在境界，就像觀察心外有境界作為所緣（alambana，認識對像），那麼就難以避免過失。瞭解境界並非真實，當然沒有過錯。如何瞭解境界，如果不符合真實情況，卻能被稱為『他心智』呢？這裡的意思是說，如果所證悟的事前境界不虛妄，由此才能被稱為『他心智』。如果這樣，瞭解前境既然不如實，那麼怎麼能被稱為『他心』呢？道理不是這樣的，這是不理解本意。即使對於他人的心識不緣為境界，但相似於彼心識的相狀在自己的意識上顯現嗎？因此，離開心識就沒有境界可以產生，而相似於彼境界。然而，不如實地瞭解境界，這才是本意，因此立名為『他心』。這裡只是領會了彼心識的相似相狀，因此被稱為不如實性。雖然不同於彼心識而生起相似的相狀，但離開心識就沒有境界，這已經是共識。能夠知曉的人，隨著境界的相狀而生起。就像瞭解自己的心智一樣，兩個心識同時不能聚集在一起，所以肯定不是現在。應該允許是已經滅去但尚未生起的心識，但只能得到一個作為其境界。本體又是空無，只是自己的意識還緣於過去和現在的各種心識聚合之法，作為彰顯的相狀，領納自己的心識。對於這件事，世人都普遍認可。瞭解他人的心識事理也應該這樣理解。如果這樣，如果對於自己的心識能夠親身瞭解分別，為什麼又說不如實知呢？是因為境界不真實，所以稱為不實知？還是因為沒有的事情，卻以為有，而被稱為稱實知呢？如果這樣，又怎麼能說不如實呢？其境界所有的領納都是空無，因為他不能瞭解真實的境界。這樣說也不對。不知道像佛陀的境界那樣，這種他心智，對於他人所緣的青色等境界，瞭解彼所緣，那就是稱實。為什麼要把佛陀知心的本體自性清凈說成不知呢？凡是說『了他心』，是以他人的心識為所緣，瞭解自己的心識相狀，假說知他。那麼，他人的心識自性真體是什麼境界呢？這樣說也不對。不然的話，佛陀又如何……

【English Translation】 English version The profound meaning lies in how another's mind knows the realm. If it is not in accordance with reality, it is because the mind grasps the extremely deep place of enlightenment. That is called 'para-citta-jnana' (knowledge of another's mind). If the existence of 'vijnana' (consciousness) is allowed, it will harm 'para-buddhi' (another's wisdom). If there is no real contradiction, then it is a violation of one's own teachings. If the other's mind-wisdom is related to the external realm, like observing an external realm as the object of cognition (alambana), then it is difficult to avoid fault. Understanding that the realm is not real, of course, there is no fault. How can one know the realm, if it does not conform to the truth, and yet be called 'para-citta-jnana'? The meaning here is that if the prior realm of enlightenment is not false, then it can be called 'para-citta-jnana'. If so, since understanding the prior realm is not in accordance with reality, how can it be called 'para-citta'? The reasoning is not like this; it is a misunderstanding of the original intention. Even if one's own mind does not relate to another's mind as an object, does a likeness of that mind appear on one's own consciousness? Therefore, apart from the mind, there is no realm that can arise, and it is similar to that realm. However, not understanding the realm in accordance with reality, that is the original intention, and therefore it is named 'para-citta'. Here, one only comprehends the likeness of that mind, and therefore it is called non-reality. Although a likeness arises that is different from that mind, apart from the mind, there is no realm, and this is already a consensus. The one who can know arises according to the likeness of the realm. Just like understanding one's own mind-wisdom, two minds cannot gather together at the same time, so it is definitely not the present. It should be allowed that it is a mind that has already ceased but has not yet arisen, but only one can be obtained as its realm. The substance is also empty, only one's own consciousness still relates to the various aggregates of past and present minds as a manifesting likeness, comprehending one's own mind. Regarding this matter, the world universally recognizes it. Understanding the affairs and principles of another's mind should also be understood in this way. If so, if one can personally understand and distinguish one's own mind, why is it said that one does not know in accordance with reality? Is it because the realm is not real, so it is called unreal knowledge? Or is it because something that does not exist is thought to exist, and therefore it is called knowing in accordance with reality? If so, how can it be said that it is not in accordance with reality? All the comprehension of its realm is empty, because he cannot understand the real realm. Saying this is also incorrect. Not knowing like the realm of the Buddha, this para-citta-jnana, regarding the blue and other realms that others are related to, understanding that which is related to, that is knowing in accordance with reality. Why should the pure nature of the essence of the Buddha's knowing mind be said to be unknown? Whenever it is said 'understood another's mind', it is taking another's mind as the object of cognition, understanding the likeness of one's own mind, falsely saying that one knows another. Then, what is the realm of the true essence of another's mind? Saying this is also incorrect. Otherwise, how would the Buddha...

知他心。自性即是離心知有。設有離心之色佛了。何傷此即心是實有。兩共許成。離心實色與理違背故不同也。若爾佛了他心。應不知境。由境妄故。佛依妄知。亦復何損。如人觀幻。豈不知虛。佛同虛知。何過之有。若爾諸佛境界有何相狀。諸佛境界非余所知。若佛不知心。何名一切智。即彼無倒所有自性。無知睡盡而得明覺。正曉了時。諸有覺了自他心者。彼之真性不能了故。故言彼智不稱境知。復云何通睡盡之智。能正了斯。由此覺知無言境性。超過語路。但自證知。是故不能以言詮及。然於此識所有自性。非是余識之所能知。既非所知。非言能及。彼但總相為其境故。然斯唯有妄構畫性。即此構畫于自證性。識之實相極遼遠故。唯于識處了不實相。此二皆成。不稱實境。所以者何。于非實事作實事解。而為決斷。由於彼識現虛妄相故。

成唯識寶生論卷第五

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本知他心（瞭解他人心識）。自性就是離開心識而知曉存在。假設有離開心識的色法，佛陀能夠了知。這又有什麼妨礙呢？這說明心識是真實存在的，兩者共同認可成立。離開心識的真實色法與道理相違背，因此不同。如果這樣，佛陀瞭解他人心識，應該就不能瞭解外境，因為外境是虛妄的。佛陀依靠虛妄來了解，又有什麼損害呢？如同人觀察幻象，難道不知道它是虛假的嗎？佛陀以同樣的方式虛妄地瞭解，有什麼過錯呢？如果這樣，諸佛的境界有什麼樣的相狀呢？諸佛的境界不是其他人所能瞭解的。如果佛陀不能瞭解心識，怎麼能稱為一切智（對一切事物都能瞭解的智慧）呢？就是那沒有顛倒的自性，沒有了無知和睡眠而得到明覺。正在曉了的時候，那些覺了自己和他人心識的人，不能瞭解它的真性，所以說那種智慧不符合真實的境界。又如何解釋睡眠結束后的智慧能夠正確地瞭解這些呢？因為這種覺知是無法用語言表達的境界，超越了語言的道路，只能自己證悟。因此不能用語言來詮釋和描述。然而對於這種識的自性，不是其他識所能瞭解的。既然不能被瞭解，就不能用語言來描述，它只能以總相作為它的境界。然而這僅僅是虛妄的構畫性，這種構畫對於自證的性質來說，識的實相非常遙遠。只有在識的層面瞭解不真實的一面，這兩方面都能成立，但不符合真實的境界。為什麼呢？因為對於非真實的事物，當作真實的事物來理解，並且作出決斷，因為在那識中顯現出虛妄的相狀。

【English Translation】 English version Knowing the minds of others (understanding the minds of others). Self-nature is knowing existence apart from the mind. Suppose there is form (rupa) apart from the mind, the Buddha understands it. What harm is there in this? This shows that the mind is truly existent, and both are jointly acknowledged to be established. Real form apart from the mind contradicts reason, so it is different. If so, if the Buddha understands the minds of others, he should not be able to understand the external world, because the external world is illusory. What harm is there if the Buddha relies on illusion to understand? Just as a person observes an illusion, doesn't he know it is false? What fault is there if the Buddha understands in the same illusory way? If so, what is the nature of the realms of the Buddhas? The realms of the Buddhas are not knowable by others. If the Buddha cannot understand the mind, how can he be called omniscient (wisdom that can understand everything)? It is that non-inverted self-nature, obtaining clear awareness without ignorance and sleep. At the very moment of understanding, those who are aware of their own and others' minds cannot understand its true nature, so it is said that that wisdom does not conform to the real realm. How else can the wisdom after the end of sleep be explained as being able to correctly understand these? Because this awareness is a realm that cannot be expressed in words, it transcends the path of language and can only be self-realized. Therefore, it cannot be interpreted and described in words. However, the self-nature of this consciousness is not knowable by other consciousnesses. Since it cannot be understood, it cannot be described in words, it can only take the general characteristic as its realm. However, this is merely the nature of illusory construction, and for this construction, the true nature of consciousness is extremely distant from the nature of self-realization. Only by understanding the unreal aspect at the level of consciousness can both of these be established, but it does not conform to the real realm. Why? Because one understands non-real things as real things and makes judgments, because a false appearance appears in that consciousness.