T31n1622_取因假設論
大正藏第 31 冊 No. 1622 取因假設論
No. 1622
取因假設論一卷
陳那菩薩造
三藏法師義凈奉 制譯
論曰。為遮一性異性非有邊故。大師但依假施設事。而宣法要。欲令有情方便趣入。如理作意。遠離邪宗。永斷煩惱。如是三邊。皆有過故。我當開釋。此中取因假設。略有三種。一者總聚。二者相續。三者分位差別。言總聚者。謂於一時有多法聚。隨順世間。以一性說。如身林等。言相續者。謂于異時因果不絕。以一性說。如羯羅羅等位。名之為人。芽等轉異。名之為谷。言分位差別者。謂於一事有其多性。異不異時。而為建立。如色生位異無常性。有見有對。業具性故等。由此三義。密意說有補嗢揭羅。及證圓寂。然此三義。但是假設。不可說為一性異性。及總無性。有過失故。此中且辨總聚有聚。無異性言。事唯二種。為當許有。此二自性。遮其性別。謂于有聚。總聚不別。名無異耶。為但無餘。說名無異。此有何過。頌曰。
若無異性體無別 有聚更互成無異 或於總聚別事殊 此復便成多種體
論曰。若許手等自性與身是一名無異者。此即于身無別性故。手等更互成無差別。手便成足。違世間故。或復說彼別別支分非身
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 大正藏第 31 冊 No. 1622 《取因假設論》
No. 1622
《取因假設論》一卷
陳那菩薩造
三藏法師義凈奉 制譯
論曰：爲了遮止一性、異性以及非有邊這三種錯誤的觀點，大師只是依據假施設的事物，來宣說佛法的要義，想要讓有情眾生方便地趣入，如理作意，遠離邪宗，永遠斷除煩惱。像這樣的一性、異性、非有邊三種觀點，都有過失。我應當開解闡釋。這裡所說的取因假設，大致有三種：第一種是總聚，第二種是相續，第三種是分位差別。所說的總聚，是指在同一時間有很多法聚集在一起，隨順世間的說法，以一性來說，例如身體、樹林等。所說的相續，是指在不同時間，因果相續不斷絕，以一性來說，例如羯羅羅（Kalala，受精卵）等階段，稱之為人；種子、幼芽等轉變不同，稱之為穀物。所說的分位差別，是指在同一事物上有多種性質，在不同或相同的時間，而建立不同的概念，例如色（Rupa，物質）的生位有異於無常的性質，因為有見、有對，具有業的性質等等。由於這三種意義，密意地說有補特伽羅（Pudgala，補特伽羅，意為『人』或『有情』），以及證得圓寂。然而這三種意義，都只是假設，不可以說是單一的性質，或是相異的性質，以及完全沒有自性，因為這樣會有過失。這裡且辨別總聚有聚集，沒有異性的說法。事物只有兩種，應當許有這兩種自性，遮止其性別。對於有聚集的事物，總聚沒有差別，稱之為沒有差異嗎？還是僅僅是沒有剩餘，就說成沒有差異？這有什麼過失呢？頌曰：
若無異性體無別，有聚更互成無異，或於總聚別事殊，此復便成多種體。
論曰：如果承認手等自性與身體是一個名稱，沒有差異，那麼這就表示對於身體沒有分別的性質，手等互相之間就成了沒有差別。手就變成了腳，這違背了世間的常識。或者又說那些個別的支分不是身體。
【English Translation】 English version: Taisho Tripitaka Volume 31, No. 1622: The Treatise on the Assumption of Taking Cause
No. 1622
The Treatise on the Assumption of Taking Cause, One Volume
Composed by Bodhisattva Dignāga (Chenna)
Translated by Tripitaka Master Yijing under Imperial Decree
Treatise says: In order to prevent the three kinds of wrong views of oneness, otherness, and non-existence, the great master only relies on the assumed and established things to proclaim the essentials of the Dharma, wanting to make sentient beings conveniently enter, properly focus their minds, stay away from heretical sects, and permanently cut off afflictions. These three views, such as oneness, otherness, and non-existence, all have faults. I should explain and elucidate. The assumption of taking cause here roughly has three kinds: the first is the aggregate, the second is the continuum, and the third is the difference in divisions. The so-called aggregate refers to many dharmas gathering together at the same time, following the worldly saying, speaking of oneness, such as the body, forest, etc. The so-called continuum refers to the continuous succession of cause and effect at different times, speaking of oneness, such as the Kalala (fertilized egg) stage, which is called a person; seeds, sprouts, etc., change differently, which are called grains. The so-called difference in divisions refers to one thing having multiple natures, establishing different concepts at different or the same times, such as the birth position of Rupa (form, matter) being different from the nature of impermanence, because it has visibility, resistance, and the nature of karma, etc. Due to these three meanings, it is secretly said that there is Pudgala (person, sentient being), and the attainment of Nirvana. However, these three meanings are only assumptions, and cannot be said to be a single nature, or different natures, and completely without self-nature, because there will be faults. Here, let's distinguish the saying that the aggregate has gathering, and there is no otherness. There are only two kinds of things, and it should be admitted that there are these two kinds of self-natures, preventing their gender. For things that have gathered, the aggregate has no difference, is it called no difference? Or is it just that there is no remainder, and it is said to be no difference? What is the fault in this? Verse says:
If there is no otherness, the substance has no difference, the aggregates mutually become non-different, or in the aggregate, the separate things are different, then this again becomes multiple substances.
Treatise says: If it is admitted that the self-nature of the hand, etc., and the body are one name, without difference, then this means that there is no separate nature for the body, and the hands, etc., become non-different from each other. The hand becomes the foot, which violates worldly common sense. Or it is said that those individual parts are not the body.
自性。于聚集時說為身者。此即全無總聚自體少分可得。為異前義故置或言。若於別事非是總聚自性者。即是自性差別由別性故。于聚集時云何與彼無別自性得成應理。不由總聚舍自性故。此復便成多種體性。總聚于多無異性故。若別若總是無異性。由非總別舍自性故。若頓若漸皆成多性。望彼諸事無異性故。如是且辨二計過失。頌曰。
若言唯遮余有性 二種非有汝成過 若一有性是所遮 非無別故兩相似
論曰。若言唯遮余有性。二種非有汝成過者。若於有聚無別總聚名無異者。此即更互相待成無異性。若於一處有無異義。第二亦爾。云何汝得免斯過失。如無總聚。有聚亦無。若異此者。無異之言便成無用。若一有性是所遮者。縱許如是於他所執有分實事。唯遮於此名無異者。此亦不然。事無別故。兩處相似由無異言。一處既爾于余亦然。如初無異言故。汝不應但遮一處若言意許唯遮彼者。應可但言無其有分。勿言無異。彼之有性是不樂故。若其許彼體性是有不許異者。說無異言方成應理。又有異義。非無別故。兩相似者。如離手等更無別身。是有分故。如是手等亦待指等成。其有分手等。如身亦成。非有如是。乃至極微待于聲等。聲等復待薩埵等。薩埵等復待喜等。待異功能。此即分與有分同
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 自性（Sva-bhāva，自有的本性）。在聚集時被稱為身（Kāya，身體）的東西，實際上完全沒有總體的、聚集的自體，甚至連少部分都不可得。爲了區別於之前的意義，所以設定了『或』這個詞。如果在其他事物中，不是總體聚集的自性，那就是自性的差別，因為有不同的性質。在聚集的時候，怎麼能和那個沒有差別的自性成立呢？因為總體聚集沒有捨棄自性。這又變成了多種體性。總體聚集對於多種事物沒有不同的性質。如果區別或者總體沒有不同的性質，因為不是總體和區別捨棄了自性。如果同時或者逐漸地成為多種性質，期望那些事物沒有不同的性質。像這樣暫且辨別兩種計較的過失。頌文說： 『如果說只是遮止其餘的有性，兩種非有，你就有了過失。如果一種有性是被遮止的，因為沒有區別，所以兩者相似。』 論述：如果說只是遮止其餘的有性，兩種非有，你就有了過失。如果對於有聚集沒有區別的總體聚集，名為沒有差異，這就是互相等待成為沒有差異的性質。如果在一處有無差異的意義，第二處也是這樣。你怎麼能免除這個過失呢？就像沒有總體聚集一樣，有聚集也沒有。如果不是這樣，沒有差異的言語就變得沒有用處。如果一種有性是被遮止的，縱然允許這樣，對於其他人所執著的有分真實事物，只是遮止這個，名為沒有差異，這也是不對的，因為事物沒有區別。兩處相似，因為沒有差異的言語。一處既然這樣，其餘也是這樣。就像最初沒有差異的言語一樣。你不應該只是遮止一處，如果說意許只是遮止那個，應該只說沒有那個有分，不要說沒有差異。那個有性是不喜歡的。如果允許那個體性是有，不允許差異，說沒有差異的言語才能成立。又有差異的意義，因為沒有區別，所以兩者相似。就像離開手等，沒有其他的身體，是有分的原因。像這樣，手等也等待指等成立。那個有分的手等，就像身體也成立。沒有像這樣，乃至極微（Paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）等待聲音等，聲音等又等待薩埵（Sattva，純粹的本質）等，薩埵等又等待喜等，等待不同的功能。這就是部分和有分相同。
【English Translation】 English version Sva-bhāva (self-nature). What is called Kāya (body) when assembled, in reality, there is absolutely no overall, assembled self-nature, not even a small part can be obtained. To distinguish it from the previous meaning, the word 'or' is set. If, in other things, it is not the self-nature of the overall gathering, then it is the difference of self-nature because of different properties. When gathering, how can it be established with that self-nature that has no difference? Because the overall gathering has not abandoned self-nature. This again becomes multiple natures. The overall gathering has no different nature for multiple things. If the distinction or the whole has no different nature, it is because neither the whole nor the distinction has abandoned self-nature. If simultaneously or gradually becoming multiple natures, expecting those things to have no different nature. In this way, let's temporarily distinguish the faults of the two calculations. The verse says: 'If you say that you only block the remaining existence, you have the fault of two non-existences. If one existence is blocked, because there is no difference, the two are similar.' Discussion: If you say that you only block the remaining existence, you have the fault of two non-existences. If there is no different overall gathering for the gathering of existence, it is called no difference, which means they wait for each other to become no different in nature. If there is a meaning of no difference in one place, the second place is also like this. How can you avoid this fault? Just like there is no overall gathering, there is also no gathering of existence. If it is not like this, the words of no difference become useless. If one existence is blocked, even if it is allowed, for the real things with parts held by others, only blocking this is called no difference, which is also wrong, because things have no difference. The two places are similar because there are no words of difference. Since one place is like this, the rest are also like this. Just like there were no words of difference at the beginning. You should not just block one place. If you say that you only intend to block that, you should only say that there is no that part of existence, do not say there is no difference. That existence is not liked. If it is allowed that the nature is existence and difference is not allowed, then saying the words of no difference can be established. There is also a meaning of difference, because there is no distinction, so the two are similar. Just like leaving the hand, etc., there is no other body, which is the reason for having parts. In this way, the hand, etc., also wait for the finger, etc., to be established. That hand, etc., with parts, is like the body is also established. There is no such thing, even the Paramāṇu (smallest unit of matter) waits for sounds, etc., sounds, etc., wait for Sattva (pure essence), etc., Sattva, etc., wait for joy, etc., waiting for different functions. This is the same for the part and the part-having.
有分性故。汝所執便成非有。如是且辨許無異性。有二種過。頌曰。
異性亦爾以一邊 于支分處別別轉 一邊便有無窮過 或非是一及全無
論曰。異性亦爾者有二過。言流至於此由彼于自支分轉時。或別別轉。或復遍轉。此中且辨別別轉義。若以一邊。于手等處。有分轉時。彼亦一邊。猶如手等。復更應有一邊隨起。如是展轉。有無窮過。或非是一者。異無窮過故置或言。若言身份一邊更不轉者。此即應無一有分義便成有分唯有一邊。若爾應許唯有手等。何煩黨執於己支分。有分轉耶。及全無者。一邊無窮。及更有過故置及言。以此一邊。于分轉時。此即全無有分可得。由非有分如手足等。有其一邊。若言有分離手等時。無別支分。有分體一故若如是者。便成於彼別支分處各各遍轉。唯此二計更無第三分別執故。頌曰。
若遍彼成多種性 及於手等互無差 或此非彼故便成 諸事皆同一微性
論曰。若言遍者。所許有分與支份量同。於一一處皆周遍故。彼即便成多種體性。更有異義故置及言。由於一處遍皆有故。由不許彼別處性故。及余支分更互無差。由彼和合。同一處時。事無別故。此則手處應許有足。便違世間共許道理。或此非彼者。更有異計故置或言。為避前過云有分體
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為有分性（avayavin）的緣故，你所執著的『有分』便成為『非有』。像這樣，姑且辨析承認『無異性』（ananyatva）有兩種過失。偈頌說： 『異性也是如此，因為一邊在支分處個別地運轉， 一邊便有無窮的過失，或者不是一個以及完全沒有。』 論述說：『異性也是如此』有兩種過失。言論流傳到這裡，由於它在自己的支分運轉時，或者個別地運轉，或者普遍地運轉。這裡姑且辨析個別運轉的意義。如果以一邊在手等處有分地運轉時，它也是一邊，猶如手等，又更應該有一邊隨之生起。像這樣輾轉下去，有無窮的過失。『或者不是一個』，因為異性有無窮的過失，所以設定『或』字。如果說身份的一邊不再運轉，這也就是應該沒有『有分』的意義，便成為『有分』只有一邊。如果這樣，應該承認只有手等，何必偏執于自己的支分有分地運轉呢？『以及完全沒有』，因為一邊無窮，以及更有過失，所以設定『及』字。以這一邊在分運轉時，這就完全沒有『有分』可以得到。由於不是『有分』，如手足等，有它的一邊。如果說有分離手等時，沒有別的支分，『有分』的體性是一個，如果像這樣，便成為在那別的支分處各自普遍地運轉。只有這兩種計度，更沒有第三種分別執著，所以偈頌說： 『如果普遍，它便成為多種體性，以及對於手等互相沒有差別， 或者這個不是那個，因此便成為諸事都同一微性。』 論述說：如果說普遍，所承認的『有分』與支分的量相同，在每一個地方都周遍的緣故，它便成為多種體性。更有不同的意義，所以設定『及』字。由於在一個地方普遍都有的緣故，由於不承認那別的處所的體性，以及其餘的支分更加互相沒有差別。由於它們和合，在同一個地方時，事物沒有差別。這樣，手處應該承認有足，便違背世間的共同承認的道理。『或者這個不是那個』，更有不同的計度，所以設定『或』字。爲了避免前面的過失，說『有分』的體性
【English Translation】 English version: Because of the nature of having parts (avayavin), what you adhere to as 'having parts' becomes 'non-existent'. Thus, let's analyze the acceptance of 'non-difference' (ananyatva), which has two flaws. The verse says: 'Difference is also the same, because one side separately operates in the parts, One side then has infinite flaws, or it is not one and completely non-existent.' The treatise says: 'Difference is also the same' has two flaws. The argument flows to this point because when it operates in its own parts, it either operates separately or universally. Here, let's analyze the meaning of separate operation. If one side operates with parts in places like the hand, it is also one side, like the hand, and another side should arise accordingly. In this way, going on and on, there are infinite flaws. 'Or it is not one,' because difference has infinite flaws, so the word 'or' is used. If it is said that one side of the body part no longer operates, then there should be no meaning of 'having parts', and it becomes 'having parts' with only one side. If so, it should be admitted that there are only hands, etc. Why be biased towards one's own parts operating with parts? 'And completely non-existent,' because one side is infinite, and there are more flaws, so the word 'and' is used. When this one side operates in parts, then there is completely no 'having parts' to be obtained. Because it is not 'having parts', like hands and feet, having its one side. If it is said that when separating hands, etc., there are no other parts, and the nature of 'having parts' is one, if it is like this, then it becomes universally operating in those other parts separately. There are only these two calculations, and there is no third separate attachment, so the verse says: 'If it is universal, it becomes multiple natures, and there is no difference between hands, etc., Or this is not that, therefore it becomes all things having the same subtle nature.' The treatise says: If it is said to be universal, the 'having parts' that is admitted is the same in quantity as the parts, because it is pervasive in every place, it becomes multiple natures. There is a different meaning, so the word 'and' is used. Because it is universally present in one place, because it does not admit the nature of that other place, and the remaining parts are even more without difference from each other. Because they are combined, when in the same place, things have no difference. In this way, the hand should admit having a foot, which violates the common sense of the world. 'Or this is not that,' there is a different calculation, so the word 'or' is used. In order to avoid the previous flaws, it is said that the nature of 'having parts'
。于足轉時非於手等有分別轉此則無有。于余支分同處過者。此同捺癭反出眼睛。若如是者。一切有分成一實事。是故諸事成一極微。由彼有分。于自支分。展轉起時。乃至唯有一實極微。住處可得。此一支分。便與有分。同一極微。此有分執理成無用。及違自宗。若言離於色等。別有極微。即無如前所說之過。由彼不於色等處轉故無此失。理亦不然。於此亦有二執過故。故應許此。有別方分。或無方分。若爾何過。頌曰。
有方分性非極微 為遮一性異性故 或無方分多不聚 或復眾同於一微
論曰。由非如是所執極微。理得成就。有方分故。由此方分。更成轉細。又復彼遮一異性故。由此于彼自支分處。或同或異。唯此二種。無第三計。已斥其過。非諸極微。有方分故。既無方分。假令共聚。亦不和雜。設許同處。皆同一微。然此極微。不得和聚。一與諸微。相障礙故即諸微體。共成於一。由同處故。如是已說總聚有聚一異之過。頌曰。
相續若一舍嬰孩 漸次乃至童年位 應失自身非不異 若言不失便相雜
論曰。若許相續。于有續事。無異性者應許自性。有其二種。由此說為相續自性。或但遮余。此之二種同前總聚。已斥其過。于中別者。今更抉擇。若別別位領受之時。為
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：當足部轉動時，手等其他肢體並沒有分別的轉動，因此這裡不存在（有方分）。如果其他肢體在同一位置上發生移動，比如像捺癭（一種病癥）一樣，眼睛會突出。如果像這樣，一切有分就變成了一個實在的事物。因此，所有事物都變成了一個極微（最小的物質單位），因為它們具有有分。當有分在自身的各個部分之間依次產生時，最終只有一個實在的極微可以存在。這個肢體就與有分是同一個極微。因此，執著于有分在理論上變得毫無用處，並且違背了自己的宗派。如果說離開色等（色蘊等）之外，另有極微存在，那麼就不會有前面所說的過失，因為它們不在色等處轉動，所以沒有這個過失。但這種說法在理上也是不成立的，因為這裡也存在兩種執著的過失。所以應該承認，這個（極微）有不同的方位部分，或者沒有方位部分。如果這樣，會有什麼過失呢？頌文說： 『具有方位部分就不是極微，這是爲了遮止同一性和異性的緣故；或者沒有方位部分，多個極微就不能聚集，或者眾多極微都相同於一個極微。』 論述說：由於並非像所執著的極微那樣，道理才能成立，因為它具有方位部分。由於這個方位部分，會變得更加細微。又因為它遮止了同一性和異性，因此對於它自身各個部分的位置，或者相同或者相異，只有這兩種情況，沒有第三種說法。已經駁斥了它的過失，因為各個極微沒有方位部分。既然沒有方位部分，即使共同聚集，也不會混合。假設允許在同一位置，都相同於一個極微，然而這個極微不能和合聚集，因為一個極微與其他的極微相互障礙，即各個極微的本體，共同成為一個，因為在同一位置的緣故。像這樣已經說了總聚有聚集、同一性和異性的過失。頌文說： 『相續如果是一，捨棄嬰兒時期，逐漸直到童年時期，應該失去自身，而不是不異；如果說不失去，那就互相混雜。』 論述說：如果允許相續，對於有連續的事物，沒有異性，就應該允許自性有兩種。因此說為相續自性，或者只是遮止其餘的。這兩種情況與前面的總聚相同，已經駁斥了它的過失。在其中不同的地方，現在進一步抉擇。如果在不同的階段領受的時候，為...
【English Translation】 English version: When the foot rotates, the hand and other limbs do not rotate separately, so there is no (directional division) here. If other limbs move in the same position, such as with a 'nāḍī-granthi' (a type of disease), the eyes will protrude. If it is like this, all 'avayava' (parts) become a single real entity. Therefore, all things become a 'paramāṇu' (smallest unit of matter) because they have 'avayava'. When 'avayava' arise sequentially among their own parts, eventually only one real 'paramāṇu' can exist. This limb is then the same 'paramāṇu' as the 'avayava'. Therefore, clinging to 'avayava' becomes theoretically useless and contradicts one's own school. If it is said that apart from 'rūpa' (form) etc., there are other 'paramāṇu', then there will be no faults as mentioned earlier, because they do not rotate in the place of 'rūpa' etc., so there is no such fault. But this statement is also not logically valid, because there are also two clinging faults here. Therefore, it should be admitted that this ('paramāṇu') has different directional parts, or no directional parts. If so, what fault will there be? The verse says: 'Having directional parts is not a 'paramāṇu', this is to prevent oneness and otherness; or without directional parts, multiple 'paramāṇu' cannot gather, or many 'paramāṇu' are the same as one 'paramāṇu'.' The treatise says: Because it is not like the 'paramāṇu' that is clung to, the principle can be established, because it has directional parts. Because of this directional part, it will become more subtle. Also, because it prevents oneness and otherness, therefore for the position of its own parts, either the same or different, there are only these two situations, there is no third statement. Its fault has been refuted, because the various 'paramāṇu' do not have directional parts. Since there are no directional parts, even if they gather together, they will not mix. Assuming that it is allowed in the same position, they are all the same as one 'paramāṇu', but this 'paramāṇu' cannot gather together harmoniously, because one 'paramāṇu' obstructs the other 'paramāṇu', that is, the essence of each 'paramāṇu' together becomes one, because they are in the same position. In this way, the faults of aggregation, oneness, and otherness of the total aggregation have been discussed. The verse says: 'If the 'saṃtāna' (continuity) is one, abandoning infancy, gradually until childhood, one should lose oneself, rather than not being different; if it is said that one does not lose oneself, then they are mixed together.' The treatise says: If it is allowed that the 'saṃtāna', for things that have continuity, has no otherness, then it should be allowed that the 'svabhāva' (self-nature) has two kinds. Therefore, it is said to be the 'saṃtāna' 'svabhāva', or it just prevents the rest. These two situations are the same as the previous total aggregation, and its faults have been refuted. In the different places among them, further discernment is now made. When receiving at different stages, for...
舍前位。而領於後。為當不捨。斯有何過。若舍嬰孩。至童年位。應失自身。汝若許此。于嬰兒位。是不異者。彼移易時。自體應失。於此位中。無異性故。故汝宗云。凡諸實事。有別法起。有別法生。為轉變者。無如是理。然非不異。移轉位別。安危異故。言不異者。此即是彼如是且論轉舍之過若不失者。法相和雜。不捨嬰孩。領童年位。孩童等位。體相和雜。應成無別。然不見有如斯之事。已說不異性過。頌曰。
若是異性身不安 為欲求安勞妄設 轉不相應及生滅 若言體別成實事
論曰。相續有續。體若異者。諸有先病。后時求差。所有劬勞。皆成妄設。流轉之理。不相應故。曾不見有別體之物。如牛馬等。得相續故。若言不可說事亦不見者。此難非理。是所成立故。由離二邊。於世間事。因果之處。見有斯事非於余處。又如酸酒。欲轉成美。心散亂人。修令寂定。所設劬勞。並應無益。由體異故。若異性者。生滅之理。亦不相應。諸有生滅。相續起者。應于現在。支分處轉過未現在。云何轉耶。一分全遍。並如前破。又性異者。相續體殊。不應生滅。此復何過。若言別者。有為相異。所許相續成實事有。此不應理。次後當說相續一異。已彰其過。複次分位差別。于果性等。其事云何。頌曰
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 捨棄前一階段的狀態，而進入后一階段的狀態。如果說不捨棄，那會有什麼過失呢？如果捨棄了嬰兒階段，進入童年階段，就應該失去自身。如果你認可這種說法，那麼在嬰兒階段，自身與童年階段的自身沒有區別。當發生轉變時，自身就應該消失，因為在這個階段中，沒有不同的自性。所以你們宗派說，凡是真實的事物，有不同的法生起，有不同的法產生，對於轉變來說，沒有這樣的道理。然而並非沒有不同，只是轉變的狀態不同，安穩與危險也不同。如果說沒有不同，那麼這就是它。像這樣且先討論轉變捨棄的過失。如果不失去，那麼法的體相就會混合雜亂。如果不捨棄嬰兒階段，而進入童年階段，那麼嬰兒、孩童等階段的體相就會混合雜亂，應該變成沒有區別。然而沒有看到有這樣的事情發生。已經說了不異性的過失。偈頌說： 『如果是異性，身體不安穩，爲了尋求安穩而白費力氣。轉變不相應，以及生滅不相應。如果說本體不同，就成了真實的事物。』 論述說：相續是有延續的。如果本體不同，那麼先前生病，後來求得痊癒，所有的努力都成了白費力氣，因為流轉的道理不相應。從未見過有不同本體的事物，如牛和馬等，能夠得到相續。如果說不可說的事物也看不見，這種責難沒有道理，因為這是所要成立的。由於遠離二邊，在世間事物中，因果之處，可以看到這樣的事情，而不是在其他地方。又如酸酒，想要轉變成美酒；心散亂的人，想要通過修行使其寂靜安定，所做的努力都應該沒有益處，因為本體不同。如果是異性，那麼生滅的道理也不相應。凡是有生滅，相續生起的事物，應該在現在的支分處轉變，過去、未來、現在，如何轉變呢？一部分全部遍及，都如前面所破斥的。又如果自性不同，相續的本體就不同，不應該有生滅。這又有什麼過失呢？如果說不同，有為法的體相就不同，所認可的相續就成了真實的事物。這不應該成立。接下來將要說相續的一異，已經彰顯了其中的過失。再次，分位的差別，對於果的自性等，這件事怎麼樣呢？偈頌說：
【English Translation】 English version To abandon a previous state and enter a subsequent one. If it is said that one does not abandon, what fault is there? If one abandons the infant stage and enters childhood, one should lose oneself. If you accept this, then in the infant stage, oneself is no different from oneself in childhood. When transformation occurs, oneself should disappear, because in this stage, there is no different self-nature. Therefore, your school says that for all real things, different dharmas arise, and different dharmas are produced; for transformation, there is no such principle. However, it is not that there is no difference, but that the state of transformation is different, and stability and danger are also different. If it is said that there is no difference, then this is it. Like this, let's first discuss the fault of transformation and abandonment. If one does not lose, then the characteristics of the dharmas will be mixed and confused. If one does not abandon the infant stage and enters childhood, then the characteristics of the infant, child, and other stages will be mixed and confused, and should become indistinguishable. However, one has not seen such a thing happen. The fault of non-difference has already been discussed. The verse says: 'If it is a different nature, the body is not stable; to seek stability is to labor in vain. Transformation is not corresponding, and neither is arising and ceasing. If it is said that the essence is different, it becomes a real thing.' The treatise says: Continuity has continuation. If the essence is different, then those who were previously sick and later seek recovery, all their efforts become futile, because the principle of flowing is not corresponding. One has never seen things with different essences, such as cows and horses, being able to obtain continuity. If it is said that unspeakable things are also not seen, this criticism is unreasonable, because this is what is to be established. Because of being away from the two extremes, in worldly matters, in the place of cause and effect, one can see such things, but not in other places. Also, like sour wine, wanting to transform into fine wine; a person with a scattered mind, wanting to make it tranquil and stable through practice, all the efforts made should be of no benefit, because the essence is different. If it is a different nature, then the principle of arising and ceasing is also not corresponding. All things that have arising and ceasing, arising continuously, should transform in the present branches, past, future, and present. How does it transform? A part is completely pervasive, all as refuted before. Also, if the self-nature is different, the essence of continuity is different, and there should be no arising and ceasing. What fault is there in this? If it is said that it is different, the characteristics of conditioned dharmas are different, and the continuity that is accepted becomes a real thing. This should not be established. Next, the one and the different of continuity will be discussed, and the faults therein have already been revealed. Again, the difference in stages, for the nature of the fruit, etc., what is the matter? The verse says:
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于果性等分位處 取彼事已施言說 若異彼者事無體 不異二過辨如前
論曰。于果性等。分位之處。取彼事已。而興言說。異彼無體。謂於色等。說為因果。一異性。自他性。有見有對性等。若言彼事異於此者。此即便成非因果等。亦無自體由無一事。不待于德。于自體處可成言說。此不異性。有二種失。如前總聚已彰其過。于隨有處。應可思之。若於有法。說無異性。舍不捨性。亦如前辨。或此于身相續轉時。有差別性。譬如牛味。于熱病者。能為止息。復能於此。為發動因。已說三種假設之事。異不異性所有過失。總撥無者。次當辨釋。頌曰。
若不許身是實有 無倒說法應無益 又復應無邪見人 亦無差別作用事
論曰。如於身處。顛倒說為常樂我凈。無倒為說四念住法。若無身者。應成無用。又若不許有相續者。能治所治便成差別。如於余身執以為常為對治彼。便於余身為說無常。此成無用。複次若無分位差別者。說無常等法。亦為無用。又邪見人。說無施無受等。及諸總聚所有福事。應非邪見。然衣食等所有施物。皆是總聚。如有說言。風不能吹。河不流等。言無相續。亦非邪見。然非佛教。許彼風等有實業用。雖有風吹等用。然而不許彼能向余方相續生起。若無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 于果性等分位處（在果的自性等不同階段），取彼事已施言說（選取那些事物之後才進行描述）。 若異彼者事無體（如果說事物與那些階段不同，那麼事物本身就沒有實體），不異二過辨如前（如果說事物與那些階段沒有不同，那麼就會犯下前面已經辨析過的兩種過失）。
論曰：于果性等分位之處（在果的自性等不同階段），取彼事已（選取那些事物之後），而興言說（才進行描述）。異彼無體（如果說事物與那些階段不同，那麼事物本身就沒有實體），謂於色等（例如對於色等），說為因果（說它們是因果關係），一異性（同一性與差異性），自他性（自身與他身），有見有對性等（可見性與有對性等）。若言彼事異於此者（如果說那些事物與這些階段不同），此即便成非因果等（那麼這些事物就不能成為因果等關係），亦無自體由無一事（也沒有自身的實體，因為沒有任何事物），不待于德（不依賴於屬性），于自體處可成言說（可以在自身實體上進行描述）。此不異性（這種沒有差異性），有二種失（有兩種過失），如前總聚已彰其過（就像前面討論總和時已經闡明的那樣）。于隨有處（在任何存在的地方），應可思之（都應該思考這些問題）。若於有法（如果對於存在的事物），說無異性（說它們沒有差異性），舍不捨性（放棄與不放棄的性質），亦如前辨（也像前面那樣進行辨析）。或此于身相續轉時（或者當身體在相續流轉時），有差別性（會有差別性），譬如牛味（例如牛奶的味道），于熱病者（對於患有熱病的人），能為止息（能夠止息病情），復能於此（又能夠對於這些人），為發動因（成為病情發動的因素）。已說三種假設之事（已經說了三種假設的情況），異不異性所有過失（差異性與非差異性所具有的過失）。總撥無者（如果完全否定這些），次當辨釋（接下來應當辨析）。頌曰：
若不許身是實有（如果不承認身體是真實存在的），無倒說法應無益（那麼正確的說法應該沒有益處）。 又復應無邪見人（而且應該沒有持邪見的人），亦無差別作用事（也沒有不同的作用和行為）。
論曰：如於身處（例如對於身體），顛倒說為常樂我凈（顛倒地說成常、樂、我、凈），無倒為說四念住法（正確地說是四念住的修行方法）。若無身者（如果沒有身體），應成無用（那麼這些說法就應該沒有用處）。又若不許有相續者（又如果否認有相續存在），能治所治便成差別（能治療的和所治療的就會變得不同）。如於余身執以為常為對治彼（例如對於其他的身體執著認為是常，爲了對治這種執著），便於余身為說無常（就對其他的身體說無常）。此成無用（這就會變得沒有用處）。複次若無分位差別者（再次，如果沒有階段性的差別），說無常等法（說無常等法），亦為無用（也會變得沒有用處）。又邪見人（而且持邪見的人），說無施無受等（說沒有佈施，沒有接受佈施等），及諸總聚所有福事（以及所有關於總和的福德之事），應非邪見（應該不是邪見）。然衣食等所有施物（然而衣服食物等所有佈施之物），皆是總聚（都是總和）。如有說言（例如有人說），風不能吹（風不能吹動），河不流等（河流不會流動等）。言無相續（說沒有相續），亦非邪見（也不是邪見）。然非佛教（然而佛教不），許彼風等有實業用（承認風等有實際的作用）。雖有風吹等用（雖然有風吹等作用），然而不許彼能向余方相續生起（然而不承認它們能夠向其他方向相續生起）。若無
【English Translation】 English version: At the stage of fruit-nature and so on, having taken those things, speech is uttered. If it is different from those, the thing has no substance; if not different, the two faults are discerned as before.
Treatise says: At the stage of fruit-nature and so on, having taken those things, speech arises. If it is different from those, it has no substance, meaning that with regard to form and so on, it is spoken of as cause and effect, identity and difference, self-nature and other-nature, visible and obstructive nature, and so on. If it is said that those things are different from these stages, then these things will not become cause and effect, and so on, and will also have no self-nature because there is no single thing. Without relying on attributes, speech can be made about the self-nature. This non-difference has two kinds of faults, as the faults have already been revealed in the previous discussion of aggregates. In any place where there is existence, these questions should be considered. If it is said that there is no difference in things that exist, the nature of abandoning and not abandoning is also discerned as before. Or, when this body is continuously transforming, there is a difference, like the taste of milk, which can stop the illness of those with fever, and can also be a cause for the onset of the illness in these people. The faults of difference and non-difference have been spoken of in the three hypothetical situations. If all of these are completely denied, then the following should be discerned. The verse says:
If it is not admitted that the body is truly existent, then the correct teachings should be of no benefit. Moreover, there should be no people with wrong views, and there should be no different actions and functions.
Treatise says: For example, with regard to the body, it is wrongly said to be permanent, pleasurable, self, and pure; the correct teaching is the practice of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness (Sati Patthana). If there is no body, then these teachings should be useless. Furthermore, if it is denied that there is continuity, then what can be cured and what needs to be cured will become different. For example, clinging to other bodies as permanent in order to counteract this clinging, then saying impermanence to other bodies. This becomes useless. Furthermore, if there are no differences in stages, then teaching impermanence and so on will also be useless. Moreover, people with wrong views, saying that there is no giving, no receiving, and so on, and all the meritorious deeds related to aggregates, should not be wrong views. However, all the things given, such as clothing and food, are aggregates. For example, if someone says that the wind cannot blow, the river does not flow, and so on. Saying that there is no continuity is also not a wrong view. However, Buddhism does not admit that the wind and so on have real functions. Although there are functions such as the wind blowing, it is not admitted that they can continuously arise in other directions. If there is no
相續。皆無如是邪見之事。若無分位差別者。於一色處苦集二相撥無之時邪見差別應成非有色無別故。亦無差別作業之事。又若不許有總聚者。于毗訶羅窣堵波等。福德差殊。應皆非有。又相續別故。其福亦殊。如世尊告勇健長者曰。若有苾芻。受食食已。入無量意定。正念而住。于如是等福德差別。應成非有。若不許有分位差別者。此差別故。業用差別亦成非有。事雖不殊勢力有異。其用亦別。是共許故。猶如毒藥。和余物時。便為害命。療病用故。如是等類。撥無其事。皆有過失。若有如是眾過失者。何不許彼是實物有。此不應理。有過失故。何者是耶。頌曰。
由遮一性異性故 非是展轉藉因成 自體亦是可說故 似境唯從於識起
論曰。由於色等。是實有故。更互相望一異之性。是可說故。其總聚等。是不可說。若如是者。身望余身。云何名異。此由非是更互相因。凡諸事物。若舍于彼。而心取此者。斯則不名取因假設。由不取彼以為因故。然于身等。更互相待。若舍彼時。意不取此。此乃方名取因假設。若舍色等。無其總聚。是故應知。但于自事一異之性。是不可說。非於一切然分位差別。于異性等。更互名異。說之為假。若如是者。於色等處。亦不取故。說為異性。應非實有。理不應爾
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 相續。都沒有像這樣邪見的事情。如果沒有分位差別，那麼在同一個色處，否定苦集二相的時候，邪見的差別就應該不存在，因為色沒有差別。也沒有差別作業的事情。又如果認為沒有總聚，那麼對於毗訶羅（Vihara，精舍）、窣堵波（Stupa，佛塔）等，福德的差別，應該都不存在。又因為相續不同，所以福德也不同。例如世尊告訴勇健長者說：『如果有比丘，接受食物后，進入無量意定，以正念安住。』像這樣的福德差別，應該不存在。如果不承認有分位差別，那麼因為這種差別，業用的差別也就不存在。事情雖然沒有不同，但勢力有差異，其作用也不同，這是大家公認的。就像毒藥，和其它東西混合時，就會害命；用於治療疾病。像這些情況，否定它們，都是有錯誤的。如果有這麼多過失，為什麼不承認它們是真實存在的呢？這不合理，因為有這些過失。那是什麼呢？頌說： 『由於遮止一性和異性，不是輾轉依靠因緣而成，自體也是可以說的，（所以總聚等）類似外境，只是從識產生的。』 論說：因為色等是真實存在的，所以互相觀待的一異之性，是可以說的。而總聚等，是不可說的。如果這樣，身體相對於其他身體，為什麼稱為不同呢？這是因為不是互相作為因緣。凡是事物，如果捨棄了那個，而心取這個，這就不能稱為取因假設。因為不取那個作為原因。然而對於身體等，互相依賴，如果捨棄了那個，意識不取這個，這才能稱為取因假設。如果捨棄了色等，就沒有總聚。所以應該知道，只是對於自身的一異之性，是不可說的，不是對於一切。然而分位差別，對於異性等，互相稱為不同，說是假立的。如果這樣，對於色等處，也不取，所以說為異性，應該不是真實存在的。道理不應該是這樣。
【English Translation】 English version Continuity. There are no such things as wrong views. If there were no distinctions in phases, then when denying the two aspects of suffering and its origin in a single realm of form, the difference in wrong views should not exist, because there is no difference in form. There would also be no differentiated actions. Furthermore, if one does not accept the existence of aggregates, then the differences in merit for Viharas (Vihara, monasteries), Stupas (Stupa, Buddhist monuments), etc., should not exist. Also, because continuities are different, their merits are also different. For example, the World Honored One told the Elder Daksasura: 'If there is a Bhiksu (Bhiksu, monk) who, after receiving food, enters the Samadhi (Samadhi, meditative state) of Immeasurable Intent, abiding in mindfulness.' Such differences in merit should not exist. If one does not acknowledge the distinctions in phases, then because of this distinction, the differences in the functions of actions would also not exist. Although things are not different, their power is different, and their functions are also different, which is commonly accepted. Just like poison, when mixed with other things, it becomes deadly; when used for healing diseases. Denying such things is a mistake. If there are so many faults, why not admit that they are real? This is unreasonable because of these faults. What is it? The verse says: 'Because of denying oneness and otherness, it is not formed by relying on causes in a roundabout way; the self-nature is also speakable, (so aggregates, etc.) are like external objects, arising only from consciousness.' The treatise says: Because form, etc., are real, the nature of oneness and otherness in relation to each other is speakable. But aggregates, etc., are unspeakable. If so, why is one body called different in relation to another body? This is because they are not mutually causal. In general, if one abandons that thing and the mind takes this thing, then it cannot be called a causal assumption. Because it does not take that as the cause. However, for bodies, etc., they depend on each other; if one abandons that and the mind does not take this, then it can be called a causal assumption. If one abandons form, etc., there are no aggregates. Therefore, it should be known that only the nature of oneness and otherness in itself is unspeakable, not for everything. However, the distinctions in phases, in terms of otherness, are mutually called different, and said to be hypothetical. If so, for form, etc., one does not take them, so saying they are otherness should not be real. It should not be so.
。由彼自體。是可說故。亦是可得體相別故。非於餘事不棄捨故。然此似境。亦從識起。于彼所有一切境相。若離識者。即不能知所有自性。亦是假設。故無有過。如有頌言。
鬼傍生人天 各隨其所應 同處心異故 許境非實有
又總聚等非實物有。非是有為無為性故。一切諸法。皆是有為無為性攝。此且非是有為之相。頌曰。
相不相應非有為 若言有說是密意 于數取趣亦見說 若是無為應不壞
論曰。若是有為。應如識等。有生住等有為之相。此不如是。于總聚等。二微聚時。相乃無邊。有無窮過。亦非假事。有如是相。一事便有。無邊相故。然于現有假施設事。聚集等時。便有生滅。可了知故。若言有說者。實有此言。說總聚等有為之相。如有頌曰。
積聚皆消散 崇高必墮落 合會終別離 有命皆歸死
此謂三謨訶等。說有滅相。于毗訶羅等。說有生相。雖有此說。皆是密意。非於勝義有如是相。此生等相。世人皆知。于假處有。即如其事。而為說法。此由隨順離欲事故。雖非勝義。順清凈故。為欲利益諸有情故。作如是說。佛告諸苾芻。若見女人。與母狀同者。應為母想。如是等言。皆是假說。寧知生等。是密意說。非勝義耶。于補嗢揭羅。說有生
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為它們可以通過自身來描述，並且可以獲得不同的體相，而且不會捨棄其他事物。然而，這些看似外境的事物，實際上也是從識（vijñāna）產生的。如果離開了識，就無法瞭解它們所具有的一切境相的自性，這些境相也只是假設的，所以沒有過失。正如頌文所說： 『鬼、傍生、人、天，各自隨其所應，同處心異故，許境非實有。』 此外，總聚等並非真實存在的實物，因為它們不具有有為（saṃskṛta）和無為（asaṃskṛta）的性質。一切諸法都包含在有為和無為的性質中。而總聚等不具有有為的相狀。頌文說： 『相不相應非有為，若言有說是密意，于數取趣亦見說，若是無為應不壞。』 論曰：如果是有為法，應該像識等一樣，具有生、住等有為的相狀。但總聚等並非如此。當兩個微塵聚集時，相狀是無邊的，有無窮的過失。也不是假的事物，具有這樣的相狀。因為一件事物便有無邊的相狀。然而，在現有的假施設的事物，如聚集等發生時，便有生滅，可以瞭解。如果有人說總聚等具有有為的相狀，這確實有這樣的說法，但這是密意。如有頌文說： 『積聚皆消散，崇高必墮落，合會終別離，有命皆歸死。』 這是指三謨訶（tri-moha）等，說有滅相；對於毗訶羅（vihara）等，說有生相。雖然有這樣的說法，但都是密意，在勝義諦（paramārtha-satya）中沒有這樣的相狀。這些生等相，世人都知道，在假立之處有，就如實地為此說法。這是因為隨順離欲的緣故，雖然不是勝義諦，但順應清凈的緣故，爲了利益一切有情，才這樣說。佛告訴諸位比丘（bhikṣu）：如果見到女人，與母親的形貌相似，應該作母親想。像這樣的言語，都是假說。憑什麼知道生等是密意說，而不是勝義諦呢？因為對於補特伽羅（pudgala），也說有生。
【English Translation】 English version: Because they can be described by themselves, and different characteristics can be obtained, and they do not abandon other things. However, these seemingly external objects actually arise from consciousness (vijñāna). If separated from consciousness, one cannot know the nature of all the characteristics of these objects, and these characteristics are merely assumptions, so there is no fault. As the verse says: 『Ghosts, sentient beings, humans, and gods, each according to their respective circumstances, dwell in the same place but with different minds, therefore, it is admitted that the external world is not truly existent.』 Furthermore, aggregates (samūha) and the like are not truly existing entities because they do not possess the nature of conditioned (saṃskṛta) and unconditioned (asaṃskṛta). All dharmas are included in the nature of conditioned and unconditioned. And aggregates do not have the characteristics of the conditioned. The verse says: 『Characteristics that are not corresponding are not conditioned; if it is said that they are, it is a hidden meaning; it is also said of individuals (pudgala); if it were unconditioned, it should not decay.』 The treatise says: If it were conditioned, it should, like consciousness and the like, have the characteristics of arising, abiding, and so on. But aggregates are not like this. When two atoms gather, the characteristics are boundless, and there are infinite faults. Nor is it a false thing that has such characteristics. Because one thing has boundless characteristics. However, in existing falsely designated things, such as gatherings, there is arising and ceasing, which can be understood. If someone says that aggregates have the characteristics of the conditioned, there is indeed such a saying, but it is a hidden meaning. As the verse says: 『Accumulations all dissipate, the lofty must fall, unions eventually separate, all lives return to death.』 This refers to the three delusions (tri-moha), which say there is the characteristic of cessation; for monasteries (vihara) and the like, it is said there is the characteristic of arising. Although there are such sayings, they are all hidden meanings, and there are no such characteristics in the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). These characteristics of arising and the like are known to the world, and they are spoken of as they are in the place of false establishment. This is because it accords with detachment, and although it is not the ultimate truth, it accords with purity, and it is said in this way for the benefit of all sentient beings. The Buddha told the monks (bhikṣu): If you see a woman who resembles your mother, you should think of her as your mother. Such words are all false. How do you know that arising and the like are hidden meanings and not the ultimate truth? Because it is also said that there is birth for the individual (pudgala).
等故。如有一人出現世間能多利益等。又說一切有情皆依食住。又說吾今衰老。須供侍人。一切有情皆歸死等。然非於人有生等事。如是且辨。于總聚等。非有為性。若爾應許是無為性。若是無為。應不滅壞。由無為法無滅壞故。諸總聚等。應是常住。如虛空等。非總聚等。可成實事。有為無為。皆不應理。豈復世間于現事處一異性等有不可說耶。有如是說。現見世人。于衣等處。于絲縷等。不曾思量一異性等。而皆共為賣買等事。世尊為欲利益世間。方便宣說。亦不言其一性異性。頌曰。
世尊欲令斷煩惱 同彼世間可思事 不言一性及異性 方便說法化眾生
論曰。諸佛世尊。不壞世間。如其所有。離難思事。于諸眾生。隨其意樂差別之性。于被纏迫隨眠位中。為欲斷彼諸煩惱故。宣說法要。佛告諸苾芻。汝等勿同世人作無益思慮。我說能知能見盡諸有漏。非不知見。乃至如理作意。非不如理。如是應知。如理作意是斷煩惱之正因也。不如理思。能生眾苦。當遣邪思。宜順正念。頌曰。
一切義成由此本 易為方便極難遇 色命須臾不暫停 智者宜應速修習
取因假設論一卷
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為這樣的緣故。例如，如果有一個人出現在世間，能夠帶來許多利益等等。又說一切有情眾生都依靠食物才能生存。又說我現在已經衰老，需要有人來侍奉。一切有情眾生最終都將歸於死亡等等。然而，並非在人身上存在著生等等這樣的事情。像這樣姑且辨析，對於總聚等等，並非是有為的性質。如果這樣，就應該承認它是無為的性質。如果是無為的，就應該不會滅壞，因為無為法沒有滅壞的緣故。那麼，諸總聚等等，就應該是常住的，如同虛空等等。總聚等等，不能成為真實存在的事物。有為和無為，都不合乎道理。難道世間對於眼前的事物，其一異性等等，有什麼不可說的嗎？有人這樣說，現今見到世人，對於衣服等等，對於絲線等等，不曾思量其一異性等等，卻都一起進行買賣等等的事情。世尊爲了利益世間，方便宣說，也不說它們的一性或異性。偈頌說： 『世尊爲了斷煩惱，如同世間可思之事，不說一性及異性，方便說法化眾生。』 論述說：諸佛世尊，不破壞世間，如其所有，遠離難以思議的事情，對於諸有情眾生，隨其意樂差別的性質，在被纏縛、處於隨眠狀態中，爲了斷除他們的諸煩惱的緣故，宣說法的要義。佛告訴諸位比丘：你們不要像世人一樣，作無益的思慮。我說能夠知、能夠見，能夠斷盡諸有漏，並非不能知見。乃至如理作意，並非不如理。應當這樣知道，如理作意是斷煩惱的正因。不如理的思慮，能夠產生諸多的痛苦，應當去除邪思，適宜順從正念。偈頌說： 『一切義理成就由此根本，容易作為方便卻極難遇到，色身和壽命須臾不停留，智者應當迅速修習。』 《取因假設論》一卷
【English Translation】 English version: For such reasons. For example, if a person appears in the world and can bring many benefits, and so on. It is also said that all sentient beings depend on food to live. It is also said that I am now old and need someone to serve me. All sentient beings eventually return to death, and so on. However, it is not the case that there is birth, and so on, in humans. Thus, let us provisionally discern that, for aggregates and so on, there is no conditioned nature. If so, it should be admitted that it is unconditioned. If it is unconditioned, it should not be destroyed, because unconditioned dharmas do not have destruction. Therefore, aggregates and so on should be permanent, like space and so on. Aggregates and so on cannot become real things. Conditioned and unconditioned are both unreasonable. Is it that the world has something unspeakable about the oneness or otherness of things in the present? Some say that people today, when dealing with clothes and so on, with silk threads and so on, never consider their oneness or otherness, but all engage in buying and selling and so on together. The World-Honored One (Śākyamuni Buddha) spoke conveniently to benefit the world, and did not speak of their oneness or otherness. The verse says: 『The World-Honored One wants to cut off afflictions, like things that can be thought of in the world, does not speak of oneness or otherness, and conveniently teaches the Dharma to transform sentient beings.』 The treatise says: The Buddhas, the World-Honored Ones, do not destroy the world, as it is, away from difficult-to-think-about things, for all sentient beings, according to the nature of their different inclinations, in the state of being bound and in the state of latent tendencies, in order to cut off their afflictions, they proclaim the essentials of the Dharma. The Buddha told the Bhikshus (monks): Do not be like worldly people and engage in useless thoughts. I say that I can know and see, and can exhaust all outflows, not that I cannot know and see. Even to the point of appropriate attention, not inappropriate. It should be known that appropriate attention is the right cause for cutting off afflictions. Inappropriate thoughts can produce many sufferings, and evil thoughts should be removed, and one should follow right mindfulness. The verse says: 『The accomplishment of all meanings comes from this root, easy to use as a means but extremely difficult to encounter, the body and life do not stop for a moment, the wise should quickly cultivate.』 《Taking Cause Hypothetical Theory》, one volume