T31n1624_觀所緣緣論
大正藏第 31 冊 No. 1624 觀所緣緣論
No. 1624 [cf. No. 1625]
觀所緣緣論
陳那菩薩造
三藏法師玄奘奉 詔譯
諸有欲令眼等五識。以外色作所緣緣者。或執極微許有實體。能生識故或執和合。以識生時帶彼相故。二俱非理。所以者何。
極微於五識 設緣非所緣 彼相識無故 猶如眼根等
所緣緣者。謂能緣識帶彼相起及有實體。令能緣識托彼而生色等極微。設有實體能生五識容有緣義。然非所緣。如眼根等於眼等識無彼相故。如是極微于眼等識。無所緣義。
和合於五識 設所緣非緣 彼體實無故 猶如第二月
色等和合于眼識等有彼相故。設作所緣然無緣義。如眼錯亂見第二月。彼無實體不能生故。如是和合于眼等識無有緣義故。外二事于所緣緣互闕一支。俱不應理。有執色等各有多相。于中一分是現量境故。諸極微相資各有一和集相。此相實有各能發生。似己相識故與五識作所緣緣。此亦非理。所以者何。
和集如堅等 設於眼等識 是緣非所緣 許極微相故
如堅等相雖是實有。于眼等識容有緣義。而非所緣。眼等識上無彼相故。色等極微諸和集相。理亦應爾。彼
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本
大正藏第 31 冊 No. 1624 觀所緣緣論
No. 1624 [cf. No. 1625]
觀所緣緣論
陳那菩薩造
三藏法師玄奘奉 詔譯
那些想要讓眼等五識以外色作為所緣緣（ālambana-pratyaya，產生認知的客觀條件）的人，或者執著于極微（paramāṇu，物質的最小單位），認為它有實體，能夠產生意識；或者執著于和合（saṃghāta，組合），認為意識產生時帶有極微的相狀。這兩種觀點都不合理。為什麼呢？
極微對於五識 假設是緣而非所緣 彼相識中無 猶如眼根等
所謂所緣緣，是指能緣識（vijñāna，意識）帶有它的相狀而生起，並且具有實體，使能緣識依靠它而產生。色等極微，即使有實體，能夠產生五識，容許它具有緣的作用，但不是所緣。就像眼根（cakṣurindriya，視覺器官）對於眼識（cakṣurvijñāna，視覺意識）一樣，沒有它的相狀。因此，極微對於眼等識，沒有所緣的意義。
和合對於五識 假設是所緣而非緣 彼體實無故 猶如第二月
色等的和合，對於眼識等，有它的相狀，假設它可以作為所緣，但沒有緣的作用。就像眼睛錯亂時看到第二個月亮一樣，它沒有實體，不能產生意識。因此，和合對於眼等識，沒有緣的作用。所以，外在的兩種事物，在所緣緣中都缺少一個要素，都不合理。有人執著於色等各自具有多種相狀，其中一部分是現量境（pratyakṣa-viṣaya，直接感知的對象），因此，諸極微相互資助，各自具有一種和集相（samudāya-lakṣaṇa，集合的相狀）。這種相狀是真實存在的，各自能夠發生類似於自己相狀的意識，因此可以作為五識的所緣緣。這種觀點也不合理。為什麼呢？
和集如堅等 假設對於眼等識 是緣而非所緣 許極微相故
就像堅硬等相，雖然是真實存在的，對於眼等識，容許它具有緣的作用，但不是所緣。因為眼等識上沒有它的相狀。色等極微的各種和集相，道理也應該如此。它們
【English Translation】 English version
T 31, No. 1624 Treatise on the Object Conditioned (Guan Suo Yuan Yuan Lun)
No. 1624 [cf. No. 1625]
Treatise on the Object Conditioned
By Bodhisattva Dignāga (Chenna Pusa)
Translated under imperial order by Tripiṭaka Master Xuanzang
Those who wish to assert that the five consciousnesses, such as eye-consciousness, take external colors as their object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya), either clinging to the idea of ultimate particles (paramāṇu) as having substantial reality and being able to generate consciousness, or clinging to the idea of aggregates (saṃghāta) because consciousness arises with their appearance, are both unreasonable. Why?
Ultimate particles, in relation to the five consciousnesses, If considered a condition, are not the object-condition. Because their appearance is not in consciousness, Like the eye-organ, etc.
The object-condition is that which the consciousness that cognizes arises with its appearance and has substantial reality, causing the cognizing consciousness to arise relying on it. Ultimate particles of color, etc., even if they have substantial reality and can generate the five consciousnesses, may have the meaning of a condition, but are not the object-condition. Just like the eye-organ (cakṣurindriya) in relation to eye-consciousness (cakṣurvijñāna), it does not have its appearance. Thus, ultimate particles do not have the meaning of an object-condition in relation to eye-consciousness, etc.
Aggregates, in relation to the five consciousnesses, If considered the object-condition, are not a condition. Because their substance is not real, Like a second moon.
The aggregates of color, etc., have their appearance in relation to eye-consciousness, etc. If they are considered as the object-condition, they do not have the meaning of a condition. Just like seeing a second moon due to eye delusion, it has no substance and cannot generate consciousness. Thus, aggregates do not have the meaning of a condition in relation to eye-consciousness, etc. Therefore, these two external things both lack one element in the object-condition and are both unreasonable. Some cling to the idea that colors, etc., each have multiple appearances, a portion of which is the object of direct perception (pratyakṣa-viṣaya). Therefore, the ultimate particles mutually support each other, each having an aggregate appearance (samudāya-lakṣaṇa). This appearance is real and can each generate consciousness similar to its own appearance, thus serving as the object-condition for the five consciousnesses. This view is also unreasonable. Why?
Aggregates, like hardness, etc., If considered in relation to eye-consciousness, etc., Are a condition but not the object-condition, Because ultimate particles are posited.
Just like the appearance of hardness, etc., although it is real, it may have the meaning of a condition in relation to eye-consciousness, etc., but it is not the object-condition. Because eye-consciousness, etc., does not have its appearance. The various aggregate appearances of the ultimate particles of color, etc., should also be the same in principle. They
俱執為極微相故。執眼等識能緣極微。諸和集相復有別失。
瓶甌等覺相 彼執應無別 非形別故別 形別非實故
瓶甌等物大小等者。能成極微多少同故。緣彼覺相應無差別。若謂彼物形相別故覺相別者。理亦不然。頂等別形唯在瓶等假法上有。非極微故彼不應執。極微亦有差別形相所以者何。
極微量等故 形別惟在假 析彼至極微 彼覺定舍故
非瓶甌等能成極微有形量別。舍微圓相故。知別形在假非實。又形別物析至極微。彼覺定舍非青等物。析至極微彼覺可舍。由此形別唯世俗有。非如青等亦在實物。是故五識所緣緣體非外色等其理極成。彼所緣緣豈全不有。非全不有。若爾云何。
內色如外現 為識所緣緣 許彼相在識 及能生識故
外境雖無。而有內色似外境現。為所緣緣。許眼等識帶彼相起及從彼生。具二義故。此內境相既不離識。如何俱起。能作識緣。
決定相隨故 俱時亦作緣 或前為後緣 引彼功能故
境相與識定相隨故。雖俱時起亦作識緣。因明者說。若此與彼有無相隨。雖俱時生而亦得有因果相故。或前識相為后識緣。引本識中生似自果功能令起不違理故。若五識生唯緣內色。如何亦說眼等為緣。
識上色功能
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因為他們堅持認為一切事物都是由極微（paramāṇu）組成的。他們認為眼識等能夠認知極微。但是，如果將這些極微組合起來，又會出現其他問題。
如果瓶子（bhiṅga）和碗（oṇa）的感知沒有區別， 按照他們的觀點，這二者應該沒有區別。 如果說因為形狀不同而有區別， 但形狀的差別並非真實存在。
瓶子、碗等物體，如果大小相同，那麼構成它們的極微的數量也應該相同。因此，對它們的感知也應該沒有差別。如果說因為這些物體的形狀不同，所以感知也不同，這個理由也是不成立的。頂等不同的形狀只存在於瓶子等假法（prajñapti-dharma）之上，而不是存在於極微之上，所以他們不應該堅持認為極微也有差別。為什麼呢？
因為極微的量是相等的， 形狀的差別只存在於假法之中。 將這些物體分解到極微， 對它們的感知一定會消失。
如果構成瓶子、碗等的極微有形狀和大小的差別，那麼就會捨棄極微的圓形狀態。因此，可以知道形狀的差別存在於假法之中，而不是真實存在的。此外，將形狀不同的物體分解到極微，對它們的感知一定會消失，就像對青色等物體的感知一樣。將青色等物體分解到極微，對它們的感知是可以捨棄的。由此可見，形狀的差別只存在於世俗層面，不像青色等顏色也存在於真實物體之中。因此，五識所緣的緣體不是外在的色等，這個道理非常明確。那麼，五識所緣的緣體難道完全不存在嗎？並非完全不存在。如果不是完全不存在，那又是什麼呢？
內在的色法（antar-rūpa）像外境一樣顯現， 作為識所緣的緣。 允許這些相存在於識中， 並且能夠產生識。
雖然外境不存在，但是有內在的色法像外境一樣顯現，作為所緣緣。允許眼識等帶著這些相而生起，並且從這些相中產生，具備這兩種含義。這種內在的境相既然不離識，如何能夠同時生起，作為識的緣呢？
因為決定的相隨關係， 即使同時生起也能作為緣。 或者前一識作為后一識的緣， 引發本識（mūla-vijñāna）中產生類似自身果的功能。
境相與識之間存在決定的相隨關係，所以即使同時生起，也能作為識的緣。因明（hetu-vidyā）學者說，如果此與彼之間存在有無相隨的關係，即使同時產生，也可能存在因果關係。或者，前一識的相作為后一識的緣，引發本識中產生類似自身果的功能，這並不違背道理。如果五識的產生僅僅緣于內在的色法，那麼為什麼又說眼等也是緣呢？
識上的色法功能，
【English Translation】 English version Because they insist that everything is composed of ultimate particles (paramāṇu). They hold that eye-consciousness, etc., can cognize these ultimate particles. However, if these aggregates are combined, other problems arise.
If the perception of a pot (bhiṅga) and a bowl (oṇa) are not distinct, According to their view, there should be no difference between the two. If they say that the difference lies in their different shapes, But the difference in shape is not real.
If objects like pots and bowls are the same size, then the number of ultimate particles that constitute them should also be the same. Therefore, the perception of them should be no different. If they say that the perception is different because these objects have different shapes, this reason is also untenable. The different shapes, such as the rim, etc., exist only on conventional entities (prajñapti-dharma) like pots, and not on ultimate particles, so they should not insist that ultimate particles also have differences. Why is that?
Because the quantity of ultimate particles is equal, The difference in shape exists only in conventional entities. When these objects are analyzed down to ultimate particles, The perception of them will definitely disappear.
If the ultimate particles that constitute pots, bowls, etc., have differences in shape and size, then the roundness of the ultimate particles would be abandoned. Therefore, it can be known that the difference in shape exists in conventional entities, and is not real. Furthermore, when objects with different shapes are analyzed down to ultimate particles, the perception of them will definitely disappear, just like the perception of blue objects. When blue objects are analyzed down to ultimate particles, the perception of them can be abandoned. From this, it can be seen that the difference in shape exists only on the conventional level, unlike colors like blue, which also exist in real objects. Therefore, the object of the five consciousnesses is not external form, etc.; this principle is very clear. Then, does the object of the five consciousnesses not exist at all? It is not that it does not exist at all. If it does not not exist, then what is it?
Internal form (antar-rūpa) appears like an external object, As the object-condition of consciousness. It is accepted that these appearances exist in consciousness, And are able to produce consciousness.
Although external objects do not exist, there is internal form that appears like an external object, serving as the object-condition. It is accepted that eye-consciousness, etc., arise with these appearances, and arise from these appearances, possessing both meanings. Since this internal object-appearance is not separate from consciousness, how can it arise simultaneously and serve as a condition for consciousness?
Because of the determined co-occurrence, Even if they arise simultaneously, they can still serve as a condition. Or the preceding consciousness serves as a condition for the subsequent consciousness, Evoking the potential in the fundamental consciousness (mūla-vijñāna) to produce a result similar to itself.
There is a determined co-occurrence between the object-appearance and consciousness, so even if they arise simultaneously, they can still serve as a condition for consciousness. Scholars of logic (hetu-vidyā) say that if there is a relationship of co-occurrence between this and that, even if they arise simultaneously, there may still be a cause-and-effect relationship. Alternatively, the appearance of the preceding consciousness serves as a condition for the subsequent consciousness, evoking the potential in the fundamental consciousness to produce a result similar to itself, which is not contrary to reason. If the arising of the five consciousnesses is only conditioned by internal form, then why is it also said that the eye, etc., are conditions?
The potential of form on consciousness,
名五根應理 功能與境色 無始互為因
以能發識比知有根。此但功能非外所造故。本識上五色功能名眼等根。亦不違理。功能發識理無別故。在識在余雖不可說。而外諸法理非有故。定應許此在識非余。此根功能與前境色。從無始際展轉為因。謂此功能至成熟位。生現識上五內境色。此內境色復能引起異熟識上五根功能。根境二色與識一異或非一異。隨樂應說。如是諸識。惟內境相為所緣緣。理善成立。
觀所緣緣論
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
五根（panchindriya，指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感覺器官）的命名依據是其應有的道理：
五根的功能和作為其對象的色（rupa，指可見的形態），從無始以來就互相作為因。
通過能夠生起識（vijnana，指意識）這一點，可以推知五根的存在。這僅僅是功能，不是外在事物所創造的。因此，在阿賴耶識（alayavijnana，根本識）上的五種色法的功能，可以稱為眼根等，這並不違背道理。因為功能生起識的道理沒有差別。無論說它在識中還是在其他地方，雖然都不可說，但是外在的諸法在道理上是不存在的，所以必定應該承認它在識中而不是在其他地方。這五根的功能與之前的境色（visaya-rupa，作為對象的色法），從無始以來輾轉作為因。意思是說，這功能到了成熟的階段，就會在現識上產生五種內在的境色。這內在的境色又能夠引起異熟識（vipakavijnana，果報識）上的五根功能。根和境這兩種色法與識是一體、異體，還是非一體非異體？可以根據自己的意願來解釋。像這樣，各種識僅僅以內在的境相作為所緣緣（alambana-pratyaya，生起識的條件），這個道理能夠很好地成立。
出自《觀所緣緣論》
【English Translation】 English version:
The naming of the five indriyas (panchindriya, referring to the five sense organs: eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body) is based on their appropriate rationale:
The functions of the five indriyas and the rupa (rupa, referring to visible forms) that serve as their objects have been mutually causal since beginningless time.
The existence of the indriyas can be inferred from their ability to generate vijnana (vijnana, referring to consciousness). This is merely a function, not created by external things. Therefore, the functions of the five types of rupa on the alayavijnana (alayavijnana, the fundamental consciousness) can be called eye-indriya, etc., which is not contrary to reason. Because there is no difference in the principle of function generating consciousness. Although it is unspeakable whether it is in consciousness or elsewhere, since external dharmas do not exist in principle, it must be admitted that it is in consciousness and not elsewhere. The function of these five indriyas and the previous visaya-rupa (visaya-rupa, rupa as objects) have been mutually causal since beginningless time. This means that when this function reaches the stage of maturity, it will produce five internal visaya-rupa on the present consciousness. These internal visaya-rupa can in turn cause the functions of the five indriyas on the vipakavijnana (vipakavijnana, resultant consciousness). Are the two types of rupa, indriya and visaya, one with consciousness, different from consciousness, or neither one nor different? It can be explained according to one's own preference. In this way, the various consciousnesses only take the internal visaya-rupa as alambana-pratyaya (alambana-pratyaya, the condition for the arising of consciousness), and this principle can be well established.
From the Treatise on Conditions for Cognition