T31n1625_觀所緣論釋

大正藏第 31 冊 No. 1625 觀所緣論釋

No. 1625 [cf. No. 1624]

觀所緣論釋

護法菩薩造

大唐三藏法師義凈奉　制譯

若言能令毒智人　　為令其慧極明瞭　及為消除于罪惡　　稽首敬已觀其義

論曰。諸許眼等識者。于所棄事。及所收事。或舍或取。是觀察果故。所舍事體。及顛倒因。是所顯示。此中等言。謂攝他許。依其色根五種之識。由他于彼一向執為緣實事故。意識不然。非一向故。許世俗有緣車等故。縱許意識緣實事境。有其片分。亦能將識相似之相。離無其境。于眼等識。境不相離。得成就已。方為成立。是故於此不致慇勤。又復于串修果。智所了色。誠非呾迦所行境故。及如所見。而安立故。今此但觀聞思生得智之境也。如斯意識所緣之境。全成非有。此于自聚。不能緣故。復緣過未。非實事故。猶若無為。為此等言。攝五識身。若爾根識引生所有意識。斯乃如何。非此共其根識同時。或復無間。皆滅色等為所緣故。或緣現在。此非根識。曾所領故。斯乃意識自能親緣外境體性。此則遂成無聾盲等。復違比量。知有別根。此遮增色。是所欲故。然于意識。不復存懷。眼等諸識。色為依緣。而方有故。無表但是

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：若有人說，爲了使那些具有毒智的人的智慧變得極其明瞭，並且爲了消除他們的罪惡，我（護法菩薩）恭敬地頂禮，然後觀察此論的意義。

論曰：那些承認眼識等存在的人，對於應該捨棄的事物和應該接受的事物，或者捨棄或者接受，這是觀察的結果。因此，應該捨棄的事物的本體以及產生顛倒的根源，是需要顯示的。這裡的『等』字，包括了其他人所承認的。根據色根而產生的五種識，因為其他人總是認為它們所緣的境是真實的。但意識並非如此，因為它不是總是緣真實的境。因為人們承認世俗中有緣于車等的意識。即使承認意識緣于真實事物的境，也只有一部分，而且意識能夠將與識相似的相狀，在沒有外境的情況下顯現出來。而眼識等則不同，它們必須在境不相離的情況下才能成立。因此，對於意識，這裡不必過於強調。此外，對於通過串習而獲得的智慧所認識的色，它確實不是呾迦（Tarka，邏輯學家）所能認識的境，而且是如實所見而安立的。現在這裡只觀察通過聽聞和思惟而獲得的智慧所認識的境。像這樣的意識所緣的境，完全不是真實存在的。因為它不能緣于自身的集合，而且緣於過去和未來，都不是真實的事物，就像無為法一樣。這裡的『等』字，包括了五識身。如果這樣，那麼根識所引發的意識又是如何產生的呢？它不是與根識同時，也不是在根識無間之後產生，因為根識所緣的是已經滅去的色等。或者意識緣于現在，但這也不是根識曾經領受過的。這說明意識能夠親自緣于外境的體性。這樣就會出現沒有聾盲等情況，而且也違反了通過比量所獲得的『存在其他根』的認知。這是爲了遮止增加色法，是所希望的。然而，對於意識，不再過多考慮，因為眼識等諸識，必須以色為所依之緣才能產生。無表色只是……

【English Translation】 English version: If someone says that in order to make the wisdom of those with toxic intellect extremely clear, and to eliminate their sins, I (Bodhisattva Dharmapala) respectfully prostrate and then observe the meaning of this treatise.

Treatise says: Those who acknowledge the existence of eye-consciousness, etc., either abandon or accept things that should be abandoned and things that should be accepted; this is the result of observation. Therefore, the essence of things to be abandoned and the root causes of delusion are what need to be revealed. The word 'etc.' here includes what others acknowledge. The five types of consciousness arising from the color-faculty (rupa-indriya), because others always consider their objects to be real. But consciousness (manovijnana) is not like that, because it does not always cognize real objects. Because people acknowledge that in conventional truth there is consciousness cognizing carts, etc. Even if it is acknowledged that consciousness cognizes real objects, it is only a portion, and consciousness can manifest appearances similar to consciousness without an external object. Eye-consciousness, etc., are different; they must be established when the object is not separate. Therefore, there is no need to emphasize consciousness too much here. Furthermore, the color perceived by wisdom obtained through practice is indeed not an object that a Tarka (logician) can perceive, and it is established as seen. Now, this only observes the objects perceived by wisdom obtained through hearing and contemplation. The objects cognized by such consciousness are completely non-existent. Because it cannot cognize its own aggregate, and it cognizes the past and future, which are not real things, just like unconditioned dharmas (asamskrta). The word 'etc.' here includes the five aggregates of consciousness (vijnanakaya). If so, then how does the consciousness generated by the root-consciousness arise? It is not simultaneous with the root-consciousness, nor does it arise immediately after the root-consciousness, because the root-consciousness cognizes colors, etc., that have already ceased. Or consciousness cognizes the present, but this is not what the root-consciousness has ever perceived. This shows that consciousness can personally cognize the nature of external objects. In this way, there would be no deaf or blind, etc., and it also contradicts the cognition obtained through inference that 'there are other faculties.' This is to prevent the addition of color-dharmas (rupa), which is what is desired. However, for consciousness, no more consideration is given, because eye-consciousness, etc., must have color as their dependent condition in order to arise. Unmanifested color is only...

不作性故。自許是無本意如此。此于所緣將為現量。是所取性故。深履邪途故。為此正意遮所緣性。因便方遮斯所依性。同時之根。功能之色。將設許之。言外境者。彼執離斯。而有別境。此顯其倒。顯彼執有異事可取故言境也。如何當說。或緣總聚。由非總聚。實事應理。誠如來難彼自前後道理相違。余復何失。緣其實事。及緣總聚。是所許故。將欲敘其別過。為此且放斯愆。或許極微。雖復極微唯共聚已而見生滅。然而實體。一一皆緣不緣總聚。猶如色等。設自諸根悉皆現前。境不雜亂。彼根功能。各決定故。而於實事。斷割有能。一一極微成所緣境。彼因性故。彼眼等識之因性故。是彼生起親支分義。然而有說。其所緣境是識生因在諸緣故。或復于彼為總聚者。彼諸論者執眾極微所有合聚為此所緣相識生故。由於總聚而生其智。是故定知。彼為所緣。如有說云。若識有彼相。彼是此之境。此二論者。咸言彼相應斯理故。若不言因。此因無喻。猶如因等。成因等性極微總相。是所緣性而成立之。又若自許不于識外緣其實事。應有有法自相違過。然法稱不許。斯乃於他亦皆共許。即以為喻。若但如所說應于所立義而屬當之。前量意云。論本二因但是明因所以不即是因以無共成之喻。為此須出彼相應因。何以如此。

次復顯己所論之理。是無謬妄。明他共許置第五聲。設許為因。猶如共許。諸非有事。非有性故。非因極微。而且縱許。諸極微體是其因性。但說不合是所緣性。由非彼相極微相故。此雲根識極塵非境。如根者言。猶如於根。縱實是識。親依之因無根相故。非彼之境極微亦爾。諸無其相彼非斯境者何謂也。為此說其名境者等言自性者。謂自共相了者。定也如何。此複名爲了耶。如彼相生故。此言意者。同彼相貌而識生起。由隨彼體故。此則說名了彼境也。而實離識無別所了。可與其識為因性耶。然而但有前境相狀。于其自己。猶如映象而安布之。共許名斯爲了其境。然非極微一一自體識隨彼狀。由此極微而為境體。縱有因性。由非因義。所緣如根。雖是因性。不為所緣。若由因性許作所緣。根亦同斯。應成彼也。斯言前說彼相應理。故因有不成過。然而意顯非唯因性。即是其根所緣之相。若如所說因將為能立者。則彼因性。故為所緣性耶。于根亦有成不定過。若如是者。由非彼相。其義何也。為明成立自己之宗。由非但述他宗過故。已義便成。此言為彰非即能生自識相故。境非極微。猶如眼等。若其是彼因性之言。將為論主前立他宗。明他共許。此時意在遮他顯己。能破義成。置斯言矣。宗許定彼不定他宗。恐

其不許。曏者與他出不定成。即是能破。何假自宗更由比量。凡言不定。未必決定。不成恐致疑惑。是故更須立量。或可由斯非彼相者。于諸極微非定了性。如相識生。是謂決了。既彼非故。明知決了。此亦無由。應可說非決了性故。惟出此因不是所緣。如根極微。有餘復作諸識差別。顯其成立。眼識不能了極微色。無彼相故。如余根識。如是余識。翻此應言。如根之言誠為乘也。其喻別須義準而出。

又復縱是因性之言。為無用矣。彼雖因用非所緣性。此亦如是實為有用。然非聲等所有極微。可是余根之識生因。有說于識自體無聚現故。非是所緣如根眾微。由境相狀安佈於識。是彼相性。此非有故。理即說其無有聚現。如是且述。缽啰摩怒不是所緣。彼之能立不相應故。及非境性量善成故。若爾總聚是境。然由所說諸有能立。若望謨阿宗。皆有不成性。理實如此。然而總聚實有彼相。可是所緣無因性。故由彼相識不能生其總聚相識。總聚不生。彼既不生。此識如何。令此緣彼所緣之相不相應故非所緣義。由此前云。彼相應理斯乃不成。若爾何謂所緣之相。凡是境者。理鬚生其似自相識。隨境之識。彼是能生。彼是所緣。有說凡為境者。理必須是心及心生起之因也。此既生已。隨境領受而與言論。於時名此為所

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：他們不答應。先前與他們一起提出的不定（anitya，無常）之論證已經能夠破斥對方的觀點，何必再借用自己的宗派，更通過比量（anumana，推論）來證明呢？凡是說『不定』，未必是『決定』。不成（asiddha，不成立）恐怕會導致疑惑，所以更需要建立量（pramana， प्रमाण，有效的認知手段）。或許可以根據『由此非彼相者』，對於諸極微（paramanu， परमाणु，最小的物質單位）並非是決定的性質，如同相識（samjna， संज्ञा，概念）的產生，這叫做決了（niscaya， निश्चय，確定）。既然彼非故，明顯知道是決了。此也無由，應該說不是決了性故。唯獨由此因不是所緣（alambana， आलम्बन，認識的對象），如同根（indriya， इंद्रिय，感官）的極微。還有其餘產生諸識（vijnana， विज्ञान，意識）的差別，顯示其成立。眼識（caksur-vijnana， चक्षुर्विज्ञान，視覺意識）不能了知極微色（rupa， रूप，色），因為沒有那個相（laksana， लक्षण，特徵）的緣故，如同其餘根識。像這樣其餘的識，反過來說應該是這樣。如同根的說法確實是正確的。那個比喻需要另外根據意義來推出。又，即使是因性（hetu-svabhava， हेतुस्वभाव，原因的性質）的說法，也是沒有用的。彼雖然是因用，但不是所緣性，此也如此，實際上是有用的。然而並非聲音等所有的極微，可以是其餘根的識的生起之因。有人說，對於識的自體沒有聚集顯現的緣故，不是所緣，如同根的眾微。由於境（visaya， विषय，對像）的相狀安佈於識，那是彼相的性質，此沒有的緣故，道理上就說其沒有聚集顯現。像這樣且敘述，缽啰摩怒（paramanu， परमाणु，極微）不是所緣，因為那個能立（sadhana， साधन，論證）不相應故，以及非境性量善成立故。如果這樣，總聚（samudaya， समुदाय，集合體）是境。然而由於所說的諸有能立，如果望謨阿（mUa， मूळ，根本）宗，都有不成性。道理上確實如此。然而總聚實際上有那個相，可是所緣沒有因性故，由於那個相識不能生起其總聚相識。總聚不生，彼既然不生，此識如何？令此緣彼所緣的相不相應故，非所緣義。由此前面說，彼相應理，這乃是不成。如果這樣，什麼叫做所緣的相？凡是境者，道理上必須生起與其相似的自相識（svalaksana-vijnana， स्वलक्षणविज्ञान，具有自身特徵的意識）。隨境的識，那是能生，那是所緣。有人說，凡是作為境者，道理上必須是心（citta， चित्त，心）以及心生起之因。此既然生起，隨著境領受而與言論，於時稱此為所緣。

【English Translation】 English version: They do not agree. The previously presented argument of 'anitya' (impermanence) along with them is already capable of refuting the opponent's view. Why borrow from one's own school and further prove it through 'anumana' (inference)? Whatever is said to be 'anitya' is not necessarily 'niscaya' (certain). 'Asiddha' (unestablished) might lead to doubt, therefore it is necessary to establish 'pramana' (valid means of cognition). Perhaps based on 'that which is not the aspect of this', for the 'paramanu' (atom), it is not a determined nature, just like the arising of 'samjna' (concept), which is called 'niscaya' (determination). Since that is not the case, it is clearly known to be 'niscaya'. This also has no basis, it should be said that it is not of the nature of 'niscaya'. Only this cause is not the 'alambana' (object of cognition), like the 'indriya' (sense organ)'s 'paramanu'. Furthermore, there are other differences in the arising of 'vijnana' (consciousness), showing its establishment. 'Caksur-vijnana' (visual consciousness) cannot know the 'rupa' (form) of 'paramanu' because it does not have that 'laksana' (characteristic), like other sense consciousnesses. Like this, the other consciousnesses, conversely, should be said like this. Like the saying of the sense organ, it is indeed correct. That metaphor needs to be derived separately according to the meaning. Furthermore, even the statement of 'hetu-svabhava' (nature of cause) is useless. Although that is the function of a cause, it is not the nature of 'alambana'. This is also the case, it is actually useful. However, not all 'paramanu' of sound etc. can be the cause of the arising of other sense consciousnesses. Some say that because there is no aggregated manifestation of the self-nature of consciousness, it is not the 'alambana', like the multitude of 'paramanu' of the sense organ. Because the aspect of the 'visaya' (object) is arranged in the consciousness, that is the nature of that aspect. Because this does not exist, it is logically said that it does not have aggregated manifestation. Like this, let's describe, 'paramanu' is not the 'alambana', because that 'sadhana' (proof) is not corresponding, and because the measure of non-object nature is well established. If so, the 'samudaya' (aggregate) is the object. However, due to the mentioned proofs, if looking at the 'mUa' (root) school, they all have the nature of being unestablished. Logically, it is indeed like this. However, the 'samudaya' actually has that aspect, but because the 'alambana' does not have the nature of a cause, because that aspect consciousness cannot generate its 'samudaya' consciousness. The 'samudaya' does not arise, since that does not arise, how is this consciousness? Causing this to connect with that 'alambana' aspect is not corresponding, hence it is not the meaning of 'alambana'. Therefore, it was said earlier, that the corresponding principle is not established. If so, what is called the aspect of 'alambana'? Whatever is an object, logically it must generate a 'svalaksana-vijnana' (consciousness with its own characteristics) similar to it. The consciousness that follows the object, that is the generator, that is the 'alambana'. Some say that whatever is an object, logically it must be the 'citta' (mind) and the cause of the arising of the mind. Since this arises, following the object, it receives and speaks, at that time this is called 'alambana'.

緣境。若義具斯二種相者。此乃方合名為所緣。是能生性所緣之境。引阿笈摩。此即便是說生緣性。由是生因彼識生緣。共許是其所緣之境。自體相現。此中無益。故不言之。能非總聚。是能生者。非實事故。由其總聚不是實事。此于有聚一異二性不可說故。又復無有不實之事。能有生起果用功能。猶如二月。如第二月。不能生識第二月相。若爾何因有斯相現。根損害故。若時眼根由翳等害損其明德。遂即從斯損害根處。見二月生。非實境故。由此二月。縱有彼相。然非斯境。如第二月。縱令此識有彼相狀。由不生故不名斯境。此由非實事有性等。總聚不是識之生因。非實性故如第二月。由斯方立非因性故。不是所緣。還如二月。又復將此第二月喻。于彼相因。應知說其不定之過。復由識義理成就故。過是相違。

復緣眼識不緣青等聚集極微。為由彼體非生性故。如余根識。此喻共許。故不別言。第二月喻非實事故。應知此是于非因性而成立之。如所說之。縱有相性。然非彼境。斯言復是非彼因義。若言無有第二月者。如何現見有二相生。謂從內布功能差別。均其次已。似相之識而便轉生。猶如夢時見有境起。由此令似妄作斯解。于其月處乘更睹余。諸有說云。而於眼識雙現之時。此二次第難印定故。將作同時

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本所緣（Alambana，意為對像）。如果意義具備這兩種特性，那麼才能真正稱之為所緣，是能產生自性的所緣之境。引用《阿笈摩》（Agama，意為聖典）的說法，這便是說明生緣性。因此，生因是彼識（Vijnana，意為意識）產生的緣，共同認可它是所緣之境。自體相的顯現，在這裡沒有幫助，所以不提及。能非總聚，是能產生者，因為它不是真實的事物。因為總聚不是真實的事物，所以對於有聚的單一性或差異性，二者都不可說。而且，沒有不真實的事物能夠產生果用的功能，就像第二個月亮一樣。如同第二個月亮，不能產生識別第二個月亮形象的意識。如果這樣，為什麼會有這種形象顯現呢？因為根（Indriya，意為感官）受到了損害。如果眼根由於翳（Timira，意為眼翳）等損害而喪失了它的明亮，那麼就會從這個受損的根處，看到第二個月亮的產生，因為它不是真實的境。因此，即使第二個月亮有那種形象，也不是這個境，就像第二個月亮一樣。即使這個意識有那種形象，因為它不能產生，所以不被稱為這個境。這是因為非真實的事物具有自性等，總聚不是意識產生的原因，因為它不是真實的，就像第二個月亮一樣。因此，才確立了它不是原因的性質，所以不是所緣，就像第二個月亮一樣。而且，將第二個月亮的比喻，用於那個形象的原因，應該知道這是說明不確定的過失。又因為意識的意義和道理已經成就，所以過失是相互矛盾的。又，眼識所緣的不是青色等聚集的極微（Paramanu，意為最小的物質單位），因為它們的體性不是能產生的，就像其他的根識一樣。這個比喻是共同認可的，所以不再贅述。第二個月亮的比喻是非真實的事物，應該知道這是在非原因的性質上成立的，就像所說的那樣。即使有形象的性質，也不是那個境，這句話又是不作為那個原因的意思。如果說沒有第二個月亮，那麼如何能看到有兩個月亮形象的產生呢？這是因為從內在分佈的功能差別，依次地，相似的形象的意識便會產生，就像做夢時看到有境產生一樣。因此，使人產生虛妄的理解，在月亮的地方又看到了其他的。有些人說，在眼識同時顯現的時候，這二次第難以確定，所以認為是同時的。

【English Translation】 English version Alambana (object). If the meaning possesses these two characteristics, then it can truly be called Alambana, the object of that which can generate its own nature. Quoting the Agama (scriptures), this explains the nature of origination. Therefore, the cause of origination is the condition for the arising of that Vijnana (consciousness), which is commonly acknowledged as its Alambana. The manifestation of its own nature is not helpful here, so it is not mentioned. The 'able' is not the totality, because it is not a real thing. Because the totality is not a real thing, its oneness or difference from the aggregate cannot be spoken of. Moreover, no unreal thing can have the function of producing effects, like the second moon. Like the second moon, it cannot generate the consciousness of perceiving the image of the second moon. If so, why does this image appear? Because the Indriya (sense organ) is damaged. If the eye organ loses its brightness due to Timira (cataracts) or other damages, then from this damaged organ, the second moon will be seen to arise, because it is not a real object. Therefore, even if the second moon has that image, it is not this object, like the second moon. Even if this consciousness has that image, it is not called this object because it cannot produce. This is because unreal things have self-nature, etc. The totality is not the cause of the arising of consciousness, because it is not real, like the second moon. Therefore, it is established that it is not the nature of a cause, so it is not an Alambana, like the second moon. Moreover, using the analogy of the second moon for the cause of that image, it should be understood that this is explaining the fault of uncertainty. Furthermore, because the meaning and reason of consciousness have been accomplished, the fault is contradictory. Moreover, what eye-consciousness perceives is not the aggregate of blue, etc., of Paramāṇu (the smallest unit of matter), because their nature is not generative, like other sense-consciousnesses. This analogy is commonly accepted, so it is not repeated. The analogy of the second moon is an unreal thing, it should be understood that this is established on the nature of non-cause, as it was said. Even if there is the nature of an image, it is not that object, this statement again means not being that cause. If it is said that there is no second moon, then how can the arising of the image of two moons be seen? This is because from the differences in the functions of the internal distribution, in sequence, the consciousness of a similar image will arise, just as when dreaming, one sees an object arise. Therefore, it causes people to have a false understanding, seeing others in the place of the moon. Some say that when eye-consciousness manifests simultaneously, this sequence is difficult to determine, so it is considered simultaneous.

於斯二種相貌之後意識。便云我見月之第二月也。或復有云。于共許曰數有錯亂。由根損故。若望不許外境之宗。如斯眾見但是妄執。由非眼識所緣無間引生意識。能於一時。雙緣兩相。作如斯解見二月耶。又于聲等緣彼之識。不知其次應有二聲等見同時起耶。好眼之人意識次第尚多難解。何況依於色根之識測其差別。便成多有二相等見一旃達羅。若時離識許實有者。斯乃何勞妄增二月而言于數有其錯亂離識之外執有二種極微總聚。此皆闕其一分義故。又如所說能立能斥道理力故。以之為境。成不相應。闕一分故。自體相現。及能生性。具斯二分。方是所緣。于極微處。即闕初支。于第二邊。便亡第二。若如是者。如向所論。二種過失。重更收攝。令使無差。有說集相者。于諸極微處。各有集相。即此集塵而有相現。隨其所有多少極微。此皆實有在極微處。有總聚相生自相識。實有性故。應是所緣。斯乃雙支。皆是有故。此即於前所有成立。求進無由。為聚集相即是極微。為不爾耶。由諸境義有眾多相。即此諸微許有微狀。亦有集相。如何得令兩相共居一事。為應理乎。有眾多相。凡諸有色合聚之物。皆以地等四大為性。彼皆自性有勝功能。青黃等相隨事隨根而爲了別。即此于其眾多相處極微之處。有總集相。即將此

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本在這些兩種表象之後，意識便會說：『我看到了第二個月亮。』或者又有人說，在共同認可的計數中出現了錯亂，這是由於感官受損的緣故。如果希望不認可外境的宗派，那麼這些眾多的見解都只是虛妄的執著。由於並非眼識所緣，沒有直接引發意識，能夠在同一時間，同時緣取兩種表象，從而作出這種『看到兩個月亮』的解釋嗎？又對於聲音等，緣取它們的意識，不知道按照順序是否應該有同時生起的兩種聲音等見解呢？好眼睛的人，意識的次第尚且難以理解，更何況是依靠色根的意識來推測其中的差別，便會形成多種『有兩個月亮』等見解，就像一個旃達羅（賤民）。如果有時離開識而認可實有，那麼又何必徒勞地增加『第二個月亮』，而說在計數上出現了錯亂呢？離開識之外，執著于兩種極微的總聚，這都缺少其中的一部分意義。又如所說，憑藉能成立和能駁斥的道理的力量，將它作為所緣境，這並不相應，因為缺少一部分。自體相的顯現，以及能產生自性的能力，具備這兩種部分，才是所緣。在極微之處，就缺少了最初的部分；在第二種情況中，便喪失了第二部分。如果像這樣，就像先前所說的，兩種過失，重新被收攝，使得沒有差別。有人說集相，在各個極微之處，都有集相，就是這些聚集的塵埃而有表象顯現。隨著所有極微的數量多少，這些都是真實存在於極微之處的。有總聚相產生自相識，因為具有實有性，應該成為所緣。這兩種部分都是存在的。這對於先前所有的成立，尋求進步沒有途徑。因為聚集相就是極微，或者不是這樣呢？由於各種境的意義有眾多表象，就是這些極微，認可有微小的狀態，也有聚集相，如何能夠讓兩種表象共同存在於一件事物中，這應該合理嗎？有眾多表象，凡是所有有色、聚合的物體，都以地、水、火、風四大為性質。它們都自性具有殊勝的功能，青色、黃色等表象隨著事物和感官而爲了別。就是在這眾多表象之處，極微之處，有總的聚集相，即將此作為...

【English Translation】 English version After these two kinds of appearances, consciousness then says: 'I see a second moon.' Or again, some say that there is confusion in the commonly accepted counting, due to the damage of the senses. If one wishes to not acknowledge the sect that accepts external objects, then these many views are merely false attachments. Since it is not what the eye-consciousness perceives, without directly giving rise to consciousness, can it at the same time, simultaneously grasp two appearances, thereby making this explanation of 'seeing two moons'? Furthermore, regarding sounds, etc., the consciousness that grasps them, I wonder if, in sequence, there should be two sounds, etc., arising simultaneously? For a person with good eyes, the sequence of consciousness is already difficult to understand, let alone relying on the consciousness of the color-sense to speculate on the differences, which would then form multiple views such as 'there are two moons,' like a Candala (outcaste). If sometimes one acknowledges reality apart from consciousness, then why bother to add 'a second moon' and say that there is confusion in counting? Apart from consciousness, clinging to the total aggregate of two kinds of ultimate particles, this all lacks one part of the meaning. Moreover, as it is said, relying on the power of the reasons that can establish and refute, taking it as the object of perception, this is not corresponding, because it lacks one part. The manifestation of the self-nature appearance, and the ability to produce self-nature, possessing these two parts, is what is perceived. In the place of the ultimate particle, the initial part is lacking; in the second case, the second part is lost. If it is like this, just as previously said, the two kinds of faults are re-collected, making them without difference. Some say the aggregate appearance, in each ultimate particle, there is an aggregate appearance, that is, these gathered dusts have appearances manifested. According to the number of ultimate particles, these are all truly existing in the place of the ultimate particles. There is a total aggregate appearance that produces self-nature consciousness, because it has real existence, it should become what is perceived. These two parts are both existing. This, for all previous establishments, has no way to seek progress. Because the aggregate appearance is the ultimate particle, or is it not so? Because the meaning of various objects has many appearances, that is, these ultimate particles, acknowledge that there is a minute state, and also an aggregate appearance, how can two appearances coexist in one thing, should this be reasonable? There are many appearances, all colored, aggregated objects are by nature the four great elements of earth, water, fire, and wind. They all inherently have superior functions, blue, yellow, and other appearances are distinguished according to things and senses. That is, in this place of many appearances, in the place of the ultimate particle, there is a total aggregate appearance, and this is taken as...

相為眼等識所行境故。是現量性。若如是者。于諸微處。識有聚相。何不言之。塵有聚相。何不言識有聚相耶。所以復云。然于微處有總聚相。即以此言為其方便。亦顯識有極微總相。若爾一一極微有此相者。何故復云總集相也。色聚眾多極微分別。是論所許。此即是其總聚性故。不是實有。如前已陳。何勞重述。有別意趣。縱令實事。別別體殊。然此相狀。但于集處。更相藉故。而可了知。說觀集相。更無餘矣。又復設使諸有極微合聚為性。然而一事。有其勝劣。隨事觀之。且如蒼色。是其地界。如是等說。誠為應理。縱許如是如極赤物初生起時。多事皆強。遂無容矣。依容有處作此诪議。若爾如何說諸極微非根所見。又復如何唯有如知能見極微由其塵相。非是識義非是依根識之境界。故曰非根非根之義。獨是如知之所觀察。復如何理現見極微塵形不睹。如堅性等。如堅潤等。于彼青等。縱有其事。非是眼等。識之境界。根之功能。各決定故。塵亦如是無違共許豈非顯微。無其堅性由別體故。此對宗法許共十處。但是大種斯言無過。然此已陳。汝瓨甌等覺者。汝如是證者。于瓨及甌便成根覺。相似而觀于其自境。識不差故。復由根覺。隨現有境而相生故。識境不別。如何得知。由匪于其瓨甌等處眾微有別。而此言說

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本因為眼等識所認識的對境，所以極微是現量（直接經驗）的性質。如果這樣說，對於極微細之處，識具有聚集的相狀，為什麼不說塵埃有聚集的相狀，而說識有聚集的相狀呢？所以又說：『然而在極微細之處有總的聚集相狀』，就是用這句話作為方便，也顯示了識有極微的總相。如果這樣，每一個極微都有這種相狀，為什麼又說總集相呢？色聚是眾多極微分別的集合，這是論中所允許的，這就是它的總聚性，不是真實存在的，如前面已經陳述的，何必重複呢？有別的意趣。縱然是真實的事物，各個體性不同，然而這種相狀，只是在聚集之處，互相借用，才可以瞭解。說觀察聚集相，沒有其他的了。又假設諸極微的自性是合聚的，然而一件事物，有其勝劣，隨著事物來觀察。比如蒼色，是地界的性質，等等說法，確實是合理的。縱然允許像極紅的物體初生起時那樣，很多事物都很強烈，沒有容納的空間。依據容納的空間來作這樣的討論。如果這樣，為什麼說諸極微不是根所能見的呢？又為什麼只有如知（如實智）才能看見極微，因為它是塵埃的相狀，不是識的意義，不是依根識的境界，所以說『非根』，非根的意義，只有如知才能觀察。又有什麼道理能現見極微塵的形狀卻看不到呢？比如堅硬的性質等等，比如堅硬、潤滑等等，對於那些青色等等，縱然有那些事物，不是眼等識的境界，根的功能，各自決定。塵埃也是這樣，沒有違背共同的認可，難道不是顯示了極微沒有堅硬的性質，因為體性不同嗎？這是對宗法的認可，共有十處，但是大種（四大元素）的說法沒有錯。然而這已經陳述過了。你認為瓦罐等是覺者，你這樣證明，對於瓦罐和水甌就成了根覺（感官認知）。相似地觀察它的自境，識沒有差別。又因為根覺，隨著現有的對境而相互產生，識的對境沒有差別。如何得知呢？因為在瓦罐等處，眾多極微沒有差別，而有這種說法。

【English Translation】 English version Because the objects perceived by eye consciousness and other consciousnesses, the ultimate particles are of the nature of direct perception (pratyaksa). If so, regarding extremely subtle things, consciousness has an aggregate appearance. Why not say that dust has an aggregate appearance, and instead say that consciousness has an aggregate appearance? Therefore, it is also said: 'However, in extremely subtle places, there is a general aggregate appearance,' which is used as a convenient way to also show that consciousness has the general appearance of ultimate particles. If so, if each ultimate particle has this appearance, why is it also said to be a general aggregate appearance? A color aggregate is a collection of many distinct ultimate particles, which is allowed in the treatise. This is its general aggregate nature, not truly existent, as has been stated before, so why repeat it? There is a different intention. Even if they are real things, with different individual natures, this appearance is only understood in places of aggregation, by borrowing from each other. To speak of observing the aggregate appearance, there is nothing else. Furthermore, suppose the nature of all ultimate particles is aggregation, but a thing has its strengths and weaknesses, which are observed according to the thing. For example, cyan is the nature of the earth element, and so on, which is indeed reasonable. Even if it is allowed, like when an extremely red object first arises, many things are strong, leaving no room for accommodation. This discussion is based on the space for accommodation. If so, why is it said that ultimate particles are not seen by the senses? And why can only 'yathajñana' (knowledge of reality) see ultimate particles, because it is the appearance of dust, not the meaning of consciousness, not the realm of consciousness dependent on the senses, so it is said 'non-sensory.' The meaning of non-sensory is that only 'yathajñana' can observe it. Furthermore, what reason is there to see the shape of ultimate dust particles but not see it? Like the nature of hardness, etc., like hardness, smoothness, etc., for those blue colors, etc., even if those things exist, they are not the realm of eye consciousness, etc., the functions of the senses are each determined. Dust is also like this, without violating common acceptance. Doesn't it show that ultimate particles do not have the nature of hardness because their natures are different? This is the acceptance of the doctrine, there are ten places in common, but the statement of 'mahabhuta' (the four great elements) is not wrong. However, this has already been stated. You think that earthenware pots, etc., are perceivers, and you prove it in this way, so earthenware pots and water vessels become sensory perception. Similarly observing its own object, consciousness is no different. Also, because sensory perception arises mutually with the existing object, the object of consciousness is no different. How is it known? Because in earthenware pots, etc., there is no difference in the many ultimate particles, and there is this statement.

。然諸極微以總聚相而為其境。固非於彼瓨等自體了別之時。于眾多聚體有片別彼之實事。相貌之外無別積聚體可得。故緣彼根識便成相狀。無有差殊。由此方成於塵自體。是所緣性。復非於彼無別相處覆審之緣。異解性故。如緣青等。若相殊故。所言殊者。相謂形狀佈置有殊。于其瓨甌咽腹底等珠異狀故。由境有別覺乃遂殊。誠為應理。無如是事。非於根識所觀境處極微有殊。然此總聚是三佛栗底。而此總聚非根識境。此已㡰破復非非境有別而令識相有殊可為應理。復如何知。諸極微處別狀。非有極微形相。無別異故。凡諸事物有支分者。必有別狀。于方處轉。然諸極微體無方分。至窮極處。斯即何曾得有形別。于瓨甌等縱令事別。而極圓性曾無有殊。斯乃一體無增減故。是故定知。于總聚處非實物有。凡有方隅佈列形狀。皆非根識所行之境。上來如此。眾多詰責。意欲顯其有別相故。瓨甌等覺非以別事為所緣境。猶若蘇佉毒佉情矣。然而極微是不別境。即是彰其非彼境性。若相殊故。方言殊者。此言意顯。向云非以不別之事而為境者。是立已成。彼意說言。極微為境。其實無殊。然為形相別故別也。極微無殊我亦共許。是立已成。由諸極微量無別故。此顯殊事。是其別境。答非已成。或可此明諸根之識。于瓨甌等

。無有極微相狀性故。非是所緣。猶如余識。余識謂意或余根識。但緣青時。無黃相故。于諸極微雖體眾多。無差別故。而諸根識差別相故。斯乃共成。非塵狀性頌于極微。差別之言同前問答。若其總聚許覆相已。形非實境理方可成。如斯勝理。是應成立。若言離極微如是等如離彼者。彼覺便無故。猶如軍等。此言瓨等是非實義。由非實事。此顯余宗諸非不實皆非舍彼相違事也。如於聲等。青覺非有。此形相別。是覆相有。以其瓨等為境性故。雖引眾多異見道理。而竟不能顯其極微實事之體有其差別。據內境體。謂立自宗所緣之事。若也總撥無所緣境。便有違世。自許宗過。四種緣性于經說故。此中內聲為顯不離。于識而有所緣。言境體者。是所取分。是識變為境相之義。然在識外別分而住。將以為境違世之過。如前尚在。由諸世俗共許于境在外而住。應云如外。此不離識其所取分。如外而現。云我見境。生其慢想。寔此為因。如於眼識現其發等外境雖無謂實。無其在外之境非了性故。以理究尋不可了其自體定在於外。縱令許彼實有外相。然非識緣。非彼相性故。非極微相現。如似外相顯現之時。此即是其所緣緣也。彼相相應故。由若與相理相應故者。此即是此如因性等。由與自相理相應故。復顯所緣差別體相。如雲

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因為沒有最小微粒的形狀和性質，極微不是所緣（所認識的對象）。就像其他的識（意識），其他的識指的是意識或者其他的根識（眼識、耳識等）。當只緣于青色時，沒有黃色的形狀。對於極微來說，雖然個體眾多，但沒有差別。而諸根識有差別的形狀，這才能共同形成（認識）。『非塵狀性頌于極微』，差別之言和前面的問答相同。如果總聚（總體聚集）被允許覆蓋形狀，那麼形狀不是真實存在的境界的道理才能成立。像這樣殊勝的道理，是應該成立的。如果說離開極微就像離開彼者一樣，那麼彼覺（對彼者的感覺）就會消失，就像軍隊等。這裡說的『瓨等』（瓦罐等）不是真實存在的意義，因為不是真實的事物。這顯示了其他宗派的諸非不實（並非不真實）都不是捨棄彼相違的事物。就像對於聲音等，青色的感覺不存在。這種形狀的差別，是覆蓋形狀而存在的，因為它以瓦罐等為境界。雖然引用了眾多不同的見解和道理，但最終不能顯示極微的真實本體有差別。根據內境的本體，就是建立自宗所緣的事物。如果完全否定沒有所緣的境界，就會違背世俗的認知，並且有自相矛盾的過失，因為四種緣性在經中有所說明。這裡面的內聲是爲了顯示不離開識而有所緣。『境體』指的是所取分（被意識所取的部分），是識變現為境界相的意義。然而，如果在識外單獨存在，將其作為境界，就違背了世俗的認知，就像前面說的那樣。因為世俗普遍認為境界存在於外。應該說就像外境一樣，這種不離識的所取分，就像外境一樣顯現。說『我見境』，產生傲慢的想法，實際上就是因為這個原因。就像在眼識中顯現頭髮等外境，雖然沒有認為是真實的，但沒有在外的境界就不能了知其性質。用道理來探究，不能了知其自體一定在外。縱然允許彼（外境）真實存在外相，但不是識所緣的，因為不是彼相的性質，所以不是極微相顯現。就像外相顯現的時候，這就是所緣緣（產生認識的條件）。因為彼相相應，如果和相的道理相應，這就是像因性等一樣。因為和自相的道理相應，再次顯示所緣的差別體相，比如雲。 English version: Because there is no shape or nature of the smallest atom, the atom is not the object of cognition (所緣). Like other consciousnesses (識), other consciousnesses refer to consciousness or other root consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, etc.). When only cognizing blue, there is no yellow shape. For atoms, although there are many individuals, there is no difference. However, the root consciousnesses have different shapes, which can jointly form (cognition). 'Non-dust-like verse on atoms', the words of difference are the same as the previous question and answer. If the total aggregation (總聚) is allowed to cover the shape, then the principle that the shape is not a real realm can be established. Such a supreme principle should be established. If it is said that leaving the atom is like leaving that one, then the perception of that one (彼覺) will disappear, like an army, etc. The '瓨等' (瓦罐等, earthenware pots, etc.) mentioned here is not a real meaning, because it is not a real thing. This shows that the non-unrealities (並非不真實) of other schools are not things that abandon that contradictory thing. Just like for sounds, the feeling of blue does not exist. This difference in shape exists by covering the shape, because it takes earthenware pots, etc., as its realm. Although many different views and principles are cited, they cannot ultimately show that the real essence of the atom has differences. According to the essence of the inner realm, it is to establish the object of cognition of one's own school. If the realm of cognition is completely denied, it will violate worldly cognition and have the fault of self-contradiction, because the four kinds of conditions (緣性) are explained in the scriptures. The inner sound here is to show that it does not leave consciousness and has an object of cognition. '境體' refers to the taken part (所取分, the part taken by consciousness), which is the meaning of consciousness transforming into the appearance of the realm. However, if it exists separately outside of consciousness and is taken as the realm, it violates worldly cognition, just as mentioned earlier. Because worldly people generally believe that the realm exists outside. It should be said that like the external realm, this taken part that does not leave consciousness appears like the external realm. Saying 'I see the realm' and generating arrogant thoughts is actually because of this reason. Just like in eye consciousness, external realms such as hair appear, although they are not considered real, without the external realm, one cannot know its nature. Investigating with reason, one cannot know that its own essence is definitely outside. Even if it is allowed that it (the external realm) really has an external appearance, it is not what consciousness cognizes, because it is not the nature of that appearance, so it is not the appearance of the atom that appears. Just like when the external appearance appears, this is the objective condition (所緣緣, the condition for generating cognition). Because that appearance corresponds, if it corresponds to the principle of appearance, this is like the nature of cause, etc. Because it corresponds to the principle of its own appearance, it once again shows the different characteristics of the object of cognition, such as clouds.

【English Translation】 Because there is no shape or nature of the smallest atom, the atom is not the object of cognition (所緣, so yuan). Like other consciousnesses (識, shi), other consciousnesses refer to consciousness or other root consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, etc.). When only cognizing blue, there is no yellow shape. For atoms, although there are many individuals, there is no difference. However, the root consciousnesses have different shapes, which can jointly form (cognition). 'Non-dust-like verse on atoms', the words of difference are the same as the previous question and answer. If the total aggregation (總聚, zong ju) is allowed to cover the shape, then the principle that the shape is not a real realm can be established. Such a supreme principle should be established. If it is said that leaving the atom is like leaving that one, then the perception of that one (彼覺, bi jue) will disappear, like an army, etc. The '瓨等' (瓦罐等, wang deng, earthenware pots, etc.) mentioned here is not a real meaning, because it is not a real thing. This shows that the non-unrealities (並非不真實, bing fei bu zhen shi) of other schools are not things that abandon that contradictory thing. Just like for sounds, the feeling of blue does not exist. This difference in shape exists by covering the shape, because it takes earthenware pots, etc., as its realm. Although many different views and principles are cited, they cannot ultimately show that the real essence of the atom has differences. According to the essence of the inner realm, it is to establish the object of cognition of one's own school. If the realm of cognition is completely denied, it will violate worldly cognition and have the fault of self-contradiction, because the four kinds of conditions (緣性, yuan xing) are explained in the scriptures. The inner sound here is to show that it does not leave consciousness and has an object of cognition. '境體' refers to the taken part (所取分, suo qu fen, the part taken by consciousness), which is the meaning of consciousness transforming into the appearance of the realm. However, if it exists separately outside of consciousness and is taken as the realm, it violates worldly cognition, just as mentioned earlier. Because worldly people generally believe that the realm exists outside. It should be said that like the external realm, this taken part that does not leave consciousness appears like the external realm. Saying 'I see the realm' and generating arrogant thoughts is actually because of this reason. Just like in eye consciousness, external realms such as hair appear, although they are not considered real, without the external realm, one cannot know its nature. Investigating with reason, one cannot know that its own essence is definitely outside. Even if it is allowed that it (the external realm) really has an external appearance, it is not what consciousness cognizes, because it is not the nature of that appearance, so it is not the appearance of the atom that appears. Just like when the external appearance appears, this is the objective condition (所緣緣, suo yuan yuan, the condition for generating cognition). Because that appearance corresponds, if it corresponds to the principle of appearance, this is like the nature of cause, etc. Because it corresponds to the principle of its own appearance, it once again shows the different characteristics of the object of cognition, such as clouds.

識有彼相故等明不假藉外事為境。如情所計。境相隨生。又情所計。若離於識非外有故。此之境相元不離識。由此名為內境相也。此中內聲。言不離識。本無其外。望誰為內。及從此生有此方生。或可從此。由第七五義有別故。由非離境得有其識。是故有此方乃識生。不言第五。二法合故。明其所緣。道理合故。顯能立也。此即但以共相之境為其能立。若差別者。其仳若南不緣外事。于其夢位以為顯示。如說二種為一能立。識有彼相。復是識生。緣此二用方成一量。且復縱許有其內相。但觀外境妄有相故。言無地相。如情計境。生其領受境之相狀。列在於內。將為應理。如何是彼一分得作同生之緣。其所取分離識無故。斯之一分復還生識。便成自體相違之過。復還是彼一分性故。如能取分斯乃便成。匪能生性。但由外相染識而生。此即相分與識同起。非二同時有因果性。如牛兩角。又匪于其不異之事。同在一時以同伴聲而合說之。亦非於識別說有境。斯乃如何名同伴性。理實如是。然由相狀差別力故。猜卜為異而表宣之。由有見分相分之殊。遂將此識而有差別。若如是者。緣性亦應但是所執。非分別事。有自性體。斯乃應成。非真緣性。此因相違由其緣義。于余所執差別之境。亦共許之。如等無間滅同分之識。為斷割

時。此識亦以四種多緣而為緣也。

觀所緣論釋一卷

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：當時，這個『識』（vijñāna，意識）也是以四種增上緣作為生起的條件。

《觀所緣論釋》一卷

【English Translation】 English version: At that time, this 『consciousness』 (vijñāna) also arises dependent on four kinds of dominant conditions.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Object of Observation, one fascicle.