T32n1628_因明正理門論本

大正藏第 32 冊 No. 1628 因明正理門論本

No. 1628 [No. 1629]

因明正理門論本

大域龍菩薩造

大唐三藏法師玄奘奉　詔譯

為欲簡持能立能破義中真實故造斯論。

宗等多言說能立　　是中唯隨自意樂　為所成立說名宗　　非彼相違義能遣

宗等多言說能立者。由宗因喻多言辯說他未了義故。此多言于論式等說名能立。又以一言說能立者為顯總成一能立性。由此應知。隨有所闕名能立過。言是中者。起論端義。或簡持義。是宗等中故名是中。所言唯者。是簡別義。隨自意顯不顧論宗隨自意立。樂為所立。謂不樂為能成立性。若異此者。說所成立。似因似喻應亦名宗。為顯離余立宗過失故。言非彼相違義能遣。若非違義言聲所遣。如立一切言皆是妄。或先所立宗義相違。如獯狐子立聲為常。又若於中由不共故無有比量為極成言相違義遣。如說懷兔非月有故。又于有法即彼所立為此極成現量比量相違義遣。如有成立聲非所聞瓶是常等。諸有說言。宗因相違名宗違者。此非宗過。以於此中立聲為常。一切皆是無常故者。是喻方便惡立異法。由合喻顯非一切故。此因非有。以聲攝在一切中故。或是所立一分義故。此義不成名因過

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本

《因明正理門論本》

大域龍菩薩造

大唐三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯

爲了想要簡要地把握能成立和能破斥的意義中的真實性，所以造作這部論。

宗（命題）等多種言說是能成立的，其中只是隨順自己的意願，爲了所要成立的而說，稱為宗（命題），不是與那（所要成立的）意義相違背的才能排除。

『宗等多言說能立者』：因為宗（命題）、因（理由）、喻（比喻）多種言辭辯論陳述他人不瞭解的意義的緣故，這多種言辭在論式等中稱為能成立。又用一種言辭說能成立，是爲了顯示總括成為一個能成立的性質。由此應該知道，凡是有所欠缺的，就叫做能成立的過失。『言是中者』：是開啟論端的意思，或是簡要把握的意思，是在宗（命題）等之中，所以叫做『是中』。所說的『唯』字，是簡別意義。隨順自己的意願顯示，不顧論宗（命題），隨順自己的意願而立。樂於成為所要成立的，說不是樂於成為能成立的性質。如果與此不同，那麼所要成立的，相似因（似因），相似喻（似喻）也應該叫做宗（命題）了。爲了顯示離開其餘立宗（命題）的過失，所以說『非彼相違義能遣』。如果不是違背意義的言辭所排除的，例如立論說一切言語都是虛妄的。或者與先前所立的宗（命題）意義相違背，例如獯狐子立論說聲音是常。又如果在其中，因為不共同的緣故，沒有比量，與極成之言相違背的意義排除，例如說懷有兔子的不是月亮所有的緣故。又對於有法，就是他所立的，與此極成現量、比量相違背的意義排除，例如有人成立聲音不是所聽聞的，瓶子是常等等。諸位有人說，宗（命題）與因（理由）相違背，叫做宗（命題）違背，這不是宗（命題）的過失。因為在此中立論說聲音是常，一切都是無常的緣故，這是比喻方便惡劣地建立不同的法，因為合喻顯示不是一切的緣故，這個因（理由）不是有的，因為聲音包含在一切之中。或者是因為所要成立的一部分意義的緣故，這個意義不成立，叫做因（理由）的過失。

【English Translation】 English version

Nyayamukha-sastra

Composed by Bodhisattva Dayilong

Translated under Imperial Order by the Tang Dynasty Tripiṭaka Master Xuanzang

This treatise is composed in order to briefly grasp the truth in the meaning of establishing and refuting.

The proposition (宗, zong) and other multiple statements are capable of establishing; among them, only following one's own inclination, speaking for what is to be established, is called a proposition (宗, zong); it is not that which contradicts that (which is to be established) that can be excluded.

'The proposition and other multiple statements are capable of establishing': Because the proposition (宗, zong), reason (因, yin), and example (喻, yu) are multiple words that debate and state meanings that others do not understand, these multiple words are called capable of establishing in the argument form, etc. Also, using one word to say capable of establishing is to show that the summary becomes a nature of being capable of establishing. From this, it should be known that whatever is lacking is called a fault of being capable of establishing. 'The words 'is among them'' mean to start the topic of the treatise, or to briefly grasp the meaning; it is among the proposition (宗, zong), etc., so it is called 'is among them'. The word 'only' is the meaning of distinguishing. Following one's own inclination to show, regardless of the proposition (宗, zong) of the treatise, establishing according to one's own inclination. Being happy to become what is to be established means not being happy to become the nature of being capable of establishing. If it is different from this, then what is to be established, the pseudo-reason (似因, si yin), the pseudo-example (似喻, si yu) should also be called a proposition (宗, zong). In order to show the faults of establishing a proposition (宗, zong) apart from the rest, it is said 'it is not that which contradicts that can be excluded'. If it is not excluded by words that contradict the meaning, such as establishing the theory that all words are false. Or it contradicts the meaning of the previously established proposition (宗, zong), such as Xunhuzi establishing the theory that sound is permanent. Also, if in it, because of being uncommon, there is no inference, the meaning that contradicts the extremely established words is excluded, such as saying that what has a rabbit is not because the moon has it. Also, regarding the subject (有法, you fa), that is, what he established, the meaning that contradicts this extremely established perception and inference is excluded, such as someone establishing that sound is not what is heard, and that a bottle is permanent, etc. Some people say that the proposition (宗, zong) contradicts the reason (因, yin), which is called the contradiction of the proposition (宗, zong); this is not a fault of the proposition (宗, zong). Because in this, establishing the theory that sound is permanent, because everything is impermanent, this is a metaphor, a convenient and bad way to establish different dharmas, because the combined metaphor shows that it is not everything, so this reason (因, yin) does not exist, because sound is included in everything. Or because it is a part of the meaning of what is to be established, this meaning is not established, which is called a fault of the reason (因, yin).

失。喻亦有過。由異法喻先顯宗無後說因無。應如是言。無常一切。是謂非非一切義故。然此倒說一切無常。是故此中喻亦有過。

如是已說宗及似宗。因與似因多是宗法。此差別相今當顯示。

宗法于同品　　謂有非有俱　于異品各三　　有非有及二

豈不總以樂所成立合說為宗。云何此中乃言宗者唯取有法。此無有失。以其總聲于別亦轉。如言燒衣。或有宗聲唯詮於法。此中宗法唯取立論及敵論者決定同許。于同品中有非有等亦復如是。何以故。今此唯依證了因故。但由智力了所說義。非如生因由能起用。若爾既取智爲了因。是言便失能成立義。此亦不然。令彼憶念本極成故。是故此中唯取彼此俱定許義。即為善說。由是。若有彼此不同許。定非宗法。如有成立聲是無常。眼所見故。又若敵論不同許者。如對顯論所作性故。又若猶豫如依煙等起疑惑時。成立大種和合火有。以現煙故。或於是處有法不成。如成立我其體周遍於一切處。生樂等故。如是所說一切品類所有言詞皆非能立。于其同品有非有等。亦隨所應當如是說。于當所說因與相違及不定中。唯有共許決定言詞。說名能立。或名能破。非互不成猶豫言詞復待成故。夫立宗法理應更以余法為因成立此法。若即成立有法為有。或立為無。如

有成立最勝為有。現見別物有總類故。或立為無。不可得故。其義云何。此中但立別物定有一因為宗。不立最勝故。無此失。若立為無。亦假安立不可得法。是故亦無有有法過。若以有法立余有法。或立其法。如以煙立火。或以火立觸。其義云何。今於此中非以成立火觸為宗。但為成立此相應物。若不爾者。依煙立火依火立觸。應成宗義一分為因。又於此中非欲成立火觸有性。共知有故。又於此中觀所成故。立法有法。非德有德故。無有過。重說頌言。

有法非成於有法　　及法此非成有法　但由法故成其法　　如是成立於有法

若有成立聲非是常。業等應常故。常應可得故。如是云何名為宗法。此說彼過由宗因門以有所立說應言故。以先立常無形礙故。后但立宗斥彼因過。若如是立聲是無常。所作非常故。常非所作故。此復云何。是喻方便同法異法如其次第宣說其因宗定隨逐及宗無處定無因故。以於此中由合顯示所作性因。如是此聲定是所作非非所作。此所作性定是宗法。重說頌言。

說因宗所隨　　宗無因不有　依第五顯喻　　由合故知因

由此已釋反破方便。以所作性于無常見故。于常不見故。如是成立聲非是常。應非作故。是故順成反破方便非別解因。如破數論我已廣辯故。應且止

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果主張『最勝』（Paramatman，至上我）存在，理由是現見不同的事物有共同的類別。或者主張『最勝』不存在，理由是不可得。這兩種主張的意義是什麼呢？在此，只是確立不同的事物必定有一個原因作為宗（Paksha，論題），而不是確立『最勝』，所以沒有這個過失。如果主張『最勝』不存在，也只是假立不可得法。因此，也沒有有法（Dharmin，具有屬性的事物）的過失。如果以有法確立其他的有法，或者確立其法（Dharma，屬性），例如以煙確立火，或者以火確立觸，這其中的意義是什麼呢？現在，在這裡，不是以成立火觸作為宗，而是爲了成立與此相應的物體。如果不是這樣，依據煙確立火，依據火確立觸，就應該成為宗義的一部分作為因（Hetu，理由）。而且，在這裡，不是想要成立火觸的自性，因為這是共知的。而且，在這裡，是觀察所要成立的，所以確立有法和法，而不是德（Guna，性質）和有德（Gunin，具有性質的事物），所以沒有過失。再次用偈頌來說明：『有法不能成立有法，以及法不能成立有法，但由於法才能成立其法，這樣才能確立有法。』如果有人主張聲音不是常（Nitya，永恒）的，因為業（Karma，行為）等應該是常的，常應該是可以得到的。像這樣，什麼叫做宗法（Paksha-dharma，論題的屬性）呢？這種說法的過失在於，從宗和因的角度來說，因為有所要確立的，所以應該這樣說。因為先前已經確立了常是無形礙的。之後只是確立宗，駁斥他的因的過失。如果像這樣主張：聲音是無常（Anitya，非永恒）的，因為是所作（Kritaka，被製造的），常不是所作的。這又是什麼意思呢？這是比喻（Udaharanam，例子）的方便，同法（Sadharmya，相似性）和異法（Vaidharmya，差異性）按照次第宣說其因，宗的確定隨逐，以及宗不存在的地方必定沒有因。因此，在這裡，通過結合顯示所作性是因。像這樣，這個聲音一定是所作的，不是非所作的。這個所作性一定是宗法。再次用偈頌來說明：『說明因隨逐于宗，宗不存在的地方因也不存在，依據第五種比喻，通過結合就知道因。』由此已經解釋了反破（Pratishedha，反駁）的方便。因為在無常的事物中能見到所作性，在常的事物中見不到所作性。如果這樣確立聲音不是常的，應該不是所作的。因此，順成（Anumana，推論）和反破的方便不是分別解釋因。因為我已經廣泛地駁斥了數論（Samkhya）的觀點，所以應該停止。

【English Translation】 English version: If it is asserted that 'Paramatman' (the Supreme Self) exists because different things are seen to have a common category, or if it is asserted that 'Paramatman' does not exist because it is not attainable, what is the meaning of these two assertions? Here, only the establishment of a definite cause for different things is taken as the Paksha (thesis), not the establishment of 'Paramatman,' so there is no such fault. If it is asserted that 'Paramatman' does not exist, it is merely a hypothetical establishment of an unattainable Dharma (quality). Therefore, there is no fault of Dharmin (subject possessing qualities) either. If one Dharma (quality) is used to establish another Dharma, or to establish its Dharma, such as using smoke to establish fire, or using fire to establish touch, what is the meaning of this? Now, here, it is not the establishment of fire and touch as the Paksha, but rather to establish the object corresponding to it. If it were not so, establishing fire based on smoke and establishing touch based on fire would become a part of the Paksha as the Hetu (reason). Moreover, here, it is not intended to establish the nature of fire and touch, because it is commonly known. Furthermore, here, it is observing what is to be established, so establishing Dharma and Dharmin, not Guna (attribute) and Gunin (possessor of attribute), so there is no fault. Again, it is explained with a verse: 'Dharma cannot establish Dharma, nor can Dharma establish Dharma; but only through Dharma can its Dharma be established; in this way, Dharma is established.' If someone asserts that sound is not Nitya (eternal) because Karma (action) etc. should be eternal, and the eternal should be attainable, then what is called Paksha-dharma (property of the thesis) in this case? The fault in this statement lies in that, from the perspective of Paksha and Hetu, because there is something to be established, it should be said in this way. Because it has been previously established that the eternal is without form or obstruction. Afterwards, only the Paksha is established, refuting the fault of his Hetu. If it is asserted like this: sound is Anitya (non-eternal) because it is Kritaka (produced), and the eternal is not produced, what does this mean? This is the means of Udaharanam (example), with Sadharmya (similarity) and Vaidharmya (difference) explaining the Hetu in order, the certainty of the Paksha follows, and where the Paksha does not exist, the Hetu certainly does not exist. Therefore, here, by combining, the nature of being produced is shown as the Hetu. In this way, this sound must be produced, not non-produced. This nature of being produced must be the Paksha-dharma. Again, it is explained with a verse: 'Explaining that the Hetu follows the Paksha, where the Paksha does not exist, the Hetu also does not exist, based on the fifth example, the Hetu is known through combination.' From this, the means of Pratishedha (refutation) has already been explained. Because the nature of being produced can be seen in non-eternal things, and the nature of being produced cannot be seen in eternal things. If it is established in this way that sound is not eternal, it should not be produced. Therefore, Anumana (inference) and the means of refutation are not separate explanations of the Hetu. Because I have already extensively refuted the views of Samkhya, it should be stopped for now.

廣諍傍論。

如是宗法三種差別。謂同品有。非有。及俱。先除及字。此中。若品與所立法鄰近均等。說名同品。以一切義皆名品故。若所立無。說名異品。非與同品相違。或異。若相違者。應唯簡別。若別異者。應無有因。由此道理。所作性故能成無常及無我等不相違故。若法能成相違所立。是相違過。即名似因。如無違法。相違亦爾。所成法無。定無有故。非如瓶等因成猶豫于彼展轉無中有故。以所作性現見離瓶于衣等有。非離無常于無我等此因有故。云何別法于別處轉。由彼相似。不說異名。言即是此故。無有失若不說異。云何此因說名宗法。此中但說定是宗法不欲說言唯是宗法。若爾。同品應亦名宗。不然。別處說所成故。因必無異。方成比量故。不相似。又此一一各有三種。謂於一切同品有中。于其異品。或有。非有。及有非有。于其同品非有及俱。各有如是三種差別。若無常宗。全無異品。對不立有虛空等論。云何得說彼處此無。若彼無有。于彼不轉。全無有疑故。無此過。如是合成九種宗法。隨其次第略辨其相。謂立聲常所量性故。或立無常。所作性故。或立勤勇無間所發。無常性故。或立為常。所作性故。或立為常。所聞性故。或立為常。勤勇無間所發性故。或非勤勇無間所發。無常性故。或

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本廣諍傍論。

如是宗法三種差別。謂同品有（與所立法鄰近均等的品類中有此性質），非有（與所立法不同的品類中沒有此性質），及俱（既有此性質，又沒有此性質）。先除去『及』字。此中，若品與所立法鄰近均等，說名同品。以一切義皆名品故。若所立無，說名異品。非與同品相違。或異。若相違者，應唯簡別。若別異者，應無有因。由此道理，所作性故能成無常及無我等不相違故。若法能成相違所立，是相違過，即名似因。如無違法，相違亦爾。所成法無，定無有故。非如瓶等因成猶豫于彼展轉無中有故。以所作性現見離瓶于衣等有，非離無常于無我等此因有故。云何別法于別處轉？由彼相似。不說異名。言即是此故。無有失。若不說異，云何此因說名宗法？此中但說定是宗法，不欲說言唯是宗法。若爾，同品應亦名宗？不然。別處說所成故。因必無異，方成比量故。不相似。又此一一各有三種。謂於一切同品有中，于其異品，或有，非有，及有非有。于其同品非有及俱，各有如是三種差別。若無常宗，全無異品，對不立有虛空等論。云何得說彼處此無？若彼無有，于彼不轉，全無有疑故。無此過。如是合成九種宗法。隨其次第略辨其相。謂立聲常所量性故，或立無常所作性故，或立勤勇無間所發無常性故，或立為常所作性故，或立為常所聞性故，或立為常勤勇無間所發性故，或非勤勇無間所發無常性故，或

【English Translation】 English version Broad Debate and Subsidiary Arguments.

Thus, there are three distinctions in the nature of the subject (Paksha-dharma). Namely, 'present in the similar instance (Sapaksha)' (having this property in categories similar and equal to the established proposition), 'not present' (not having this property in categories different from the established proposition), and 'both' (having and not having this property). First, remove the word 'and'. Here, if a category is close and equal to the established proposition, it is called a 'similar instance'. Because all meanings are called categories. If the established proposition is absent, it is called a 'dissimilar instance'. It is neither contradictory nor different from the similar instance. If it were contradictory, it should only be distinguished. If it were different, there should be no cause. For this reason, 'being produced' can establish impermanence and non-self, etc., because they are not contradictory. If a dharma can establish a contradictory proposition, it is a contradictory fault, and it is called a 'pseudo-cause' (Hetvabhasa). Just as there is no violation of the law, contradiction is also the same. If the established dharma is absent, it is definitely absent. It is not like a pot, where the cause creates doubt because there is no mutual absence in it. Because 'being produced' is seen to exist in clothes, etc., apart from pots, and this cause exists in impermanence and non-self, etc., apart from them. How can a different dharma transform in a different place? Because they are similar. Different names are not used. Saying 'it is this' is without fault. If different names are not used, how can this cause be called a 'subject property'? Here, it is only said that it is definitely a subject property, not intending to say that it is only a subject property. If so, should the similar instance also be called the subject? No. Because the established proposition is stated in a different place. The cause must be without difference in order to form an inference. It is not dissimilar. Moreover, each of these has three types. Namely, in all similar instances, in their dissimilar instances, there are 'present', 'not present', and 'present and not present'. In their similar instances, 'not present' and 'both' each have these three distinctions. If the proposition is impermanence, and there are no dissimilar instances at all, how can it be said that this is absent in that place when arguing against those who do not establish existence, such as space? If it is absent there, it does not transform there, and there is no doubt at all. There is no such fault. Thus, nine types of subject properties are formed. Briefly explain their characteristics in order. Namely, establishing sound as permanent because of its measurability, or establishing impermanence because of its being produced, or establishing impermanence because of its being produced without interruption by effort, or establishing it as permanent because of its being produced, or establishing it as permanent because of its being heard, or establishing it as permanent because of its being produced without interruption by effort, or establishing impermanence as not being produced without interruption by effort, or

立無常。勤勇無間所發性故。或立為常。無觸對故。如是九種二頌所攝。

常無常勤勇　　恒住堅牢性　非勤遷不變　　由所量等九　所量作無常　　作性聞勇發　無常勇無觸　　依常性等九

如是分別。說名為因相違不定。故本頌言。

于同有及二　　在異無是因　翻此名相違　　所餘皆不定

此中。唯有二種名因。謂于同品一切遍有。異品遍無。及於同品通有非有。異品遍無。于初后三各取中一。復唯二種說名相違。能倒立故。謂于異品有及二種。于其同品一切遍無。第二三中取初后二。所餘五種因。及相違。皆不決定。是疑因義。又於一切因等相中皆說所說一數同類。勿說二相更互相違共集一處猶為因等。或於一相同作事故。成不遍因。理應四種名不定因。二俱有故。所聞云何。由不共故。以若不共所成立法所有差別遍攝一切皆是疑因。唯彼有性彼所攝故。一向離故。諸有皆共無簡別因。此唯于彼俱不相違。是疑因性。若於其中俱分是有亦是定因簡別余故。是名差別。若對許有聲性是常此應成因。若於爾時無有顯示所作性等是無常因。容有此義。然俱可得一義相違。不容有故。是猶豫因。又於此中現教力勝故。應依此思求決定。攝上頌言。

若法是不共　　共決定相違　遍

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：立為無常（anitya，impermanence）。因為是勤奮努力、持續不斷所引發的性質。或者立為常（nitya，permanence）。因為沒有觸對（sparsha，contact），即沒有相互作用。以上九種情況包含在這兩頌之中。

常無常勤勇，恒住堅牢性；非勤遷不變，由所量等九；所量作無常，作性聞勇發；無常勇無觸，依常性等九。

像這樣分別，被稱為因相違（hetu-viruddha，contradictory reason）和不定（anaikantika，uncertain）。所以本頌說：

于同有及二，在異無是因；翻此名相違，所餘皆不定。

這裡，只有兩種情況可以稱為因（hetu，reason）：在同品（sapaksha，similar instances）中一切遍有，在異品（vipaksha，dissimilar instances）中遍無；以及在同品中通有非有，在異品中遍無。在前三種和后三種情況中，各取中間一種。又有兩種情況被稱為相違（viruddha，contradictory），因為能顛倒所立的宗義。即在異品中有以及有兩種情況，在其同品中一切遍無。在第二種和第三種情況中，取最初和最後兩種。其餘五種因以及相違，都不決定，是懷疑之因的含義。又在一切因等相中，都說所說的一個數量與同類相同。不要說兩種相更互相違，共同聚集在一處仍然是因等。或者在一種相同的事情上，造成不遍因（avyapaka hetu，non-pervasive reason）。理應有四種情況被稱為不定因（anaikantika hetu，uncertain reason），因為二者都有可能。所聞是什麼呢？因為是不共（asadharana，unique）。如果是不共，那麼所成立的法的所有差別遍攝一切，都是懷疑之因。因為唯有彼性，唯有彼所攝故，一向遠離故。諸有都是共同的，沒有簡別之因。這唯有對於彼，都不相違，是懷疑之因的性質。如果在其中，二者都有部分是有，也是定因（vyatireki hetu，distinctive reason），簡別其餘的緣故。這叫做差別。如果對於許有聲性是常（nitya，permanent），這應該成為因。如果在那個時候，沒有顯示所作性等是無常（anitya，impermanence）之因，容許有這個意義。然而二者都可以得到，一個意義相違，不容許有，是猶豫之因。又在這裡，現量（pratyaksha，perception）和教量（agama，scripture）的力量更勝，所以應該依靠這個來思考尋求決定。總結上面的頌說：

若法是不共，共決定相違，遍

【English Translation】 English version: It is established as impermanent (anitya, impermanence) because it is a nature arising from diligent effort and continuous exertion. Or, it is established as permanent (nitya, permanence) because there is no contact (sparsha, contact), meaning no interaction. These nine types of cases are encompassed within these two verses.

'Permanent, impermanent, diligent effort, abiding, firm nature; Non-diligent, changing, unchanging, by what is measured, and so on, nine; What is measured, made, impermanent, made nature, heard, effort arises; Impermanent, effort, no contact, relying on permanent nature, and so on, nine.'

Distinguishing in this way, it is called contradictory reason (hetu-viruddha, contradictory reason) and uncertain (anaikantika, uncertain). Therefore, this verse says:

'In the same, having and two, in the different, not having is the reason; Reversing this is called contradictory, the rest are all uncertain.'

Here, only two cases can be called reason (hetu, reason): in the similar instances (sapaksha, similar instances), everything is universally present, and in the dissimilar instances (vipaksha, dissimilar instances), everything is universally absent; and in the similar instances, it is sometimes present and sometimes not, and in the dissimilar instances, everything is universally absent. In the first three and the last three cases, take the middle one in each. Also, two cases are called contradictory (viruddha, contradictory) because they can reverse the established thesis. That is, in the dissimilar instances, there is having and two cases, and in the similar instances, everything is universally absent. In the second and third cases, take the first and last two. The remaining five types of reasons and contradictions are all uncertain, which is the meaning of a reason for doubt. Also, in all aspects of reasons and so on, it is said that the stated quantity is the same as the similar kind. Do not say that two aspects contradict each other, and gathering together in one place is still a reason and so on. Or, in one same thing, it causes a non-pervasive reason (avyapaka hetu, non-pervasive reason). There should be four cases called uncertain reason (anaikantika hetu, uncertain reason) because both are possible. What is heard? Because it is unique (asadharana, unique). If it is unique, then all the differences of the established dharma universally encompass everything, and all are reasons for doubt. Because only that nature, only that which is encompassed by it, is always far away. All that exists is common, without a distinguishing reason. This only for that, does not contradict, is the nature of a reason for doubt. If in it, both have a part that is present, it is also a distinctive reason (vyatireki hetu, distinctive reason), distinguishing the rest. This is called difference. If for those who accept that the nature of sound is permanent (nitya, permanent), this should become a reason. If at that time, there is no display of being made and so on as a reason for impermanence (anitya, impermanence), it is permissible to have this meaning. However, both can be obtained, one meaning contradicts, it is not permissible to have, it is a reason for hesitation. Also, here, the power of perception (pratyaksha, perception) and scripture (agama, scripture) is more powerful, so one should rely on this to think and seek a decision. Summarizing the above verse says:

'If a dharma is unique, common, decisive, contradictory, Universally'

一切于彼　　皆是疑因性　邪證法有法　　自性或差別　此成相違因　　若無所違害　觀宗法審察　　若所樂違害　成躊躇顛倒　　異此無似因

如是已辨因及似因。喻及似喻今我當說。

說因宗所隨　　宗無因不有　此二名譬喻　　余皆此相似

喻有二種。同法異法。同法者謂立聲無常。勤勇無間所發性故。以諸勤勇無間所發皆見無常。猶如瓶等。異法者謂諸有常住見非勤勇無間所發。如虛空等。前是遮詮。后唯止濫。由合及離比度義故。由是雖對不立實有太虛空等而得顯示無有宗處無因義成。復以何緣第一說因宗所隨逐。第二說宗無因不有。不說因無宗不有耶。由如是說。能顯示因同品定有。異品遍無非顛倒說。又說頌言。

應以非作證其常　　或以無常成所作　若爾應成非所說　　不遍非樂等合離

如是已說二法合離順反兩喻。余此相似。是似喻義。何謂此余。謂於是處所立能立及不同品雖有合離而顛倒說。或於是處不作合離。唯現所立能立俱有。異品俱無。如是二法。或有隨一不成不遣。或有二俱不成不遣。如立聲常無觸對故。同法喻言諸無觸對見彼皆常。如業。如極微。如瓶等。異法喻言。謂諸無常見有觸對。如極微。如業。如虛空等。由此已說同法喻中有法不成

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：一切事物對他們來說，都是疑惑的根源，無論是錯誤的證明、有法的法，還是自性或差別。這些都構成相互矛盾的原因，如果沒有任何衝突，觀察宗的法並仔細審查，如果所喜歡的與此衝突，就會形成猶豫不決的顛倒，除此之外沒有相似的原因。

像這樣已經辨別了原因和相似的原因。現在我將要說譬喻和相似的譬喻。

說明原因與宗派相隨，宗派沒有原因就不會存在，這兩者被稱為譬喻，其餘的都與此相似。

譬喻有兩種：同法和異法。同法是指主張聲音是無常的，因為它是通過勤奮努力沒有間斷而產生的。所有通過勤奮努力沒有間斷而產生的，都被認為是無常的，例如瓶子等。異法是指所有被認為是常住的，都不是通過勤奮努力沒有間斷而產生的，例如虛空等。前者是排除性的解釋，後者只是爲了防止氾濫。由於結合和分離的比度意義，因此即使針對不建立實際存在的太虛空等，也能顯示沒有宗派之處，沒有原因的意義成立。又因為什麼緣故，第一句說原因與宗派相隨，第二句說宗派沒有原因就不會存在，而不說原因沒有宗派就不會存在呢？因為這樣說，能夠顯示原因在同品中必定存在，在異品中普遍不存在，而不是顛倒的說法。又說了頌詞：

應該用非所作來證明它是常住的，或者用無常來證明它是所作的，如果這樣，就應該成為非所說的，不普遍，與非樂等結合或分離。

像這樣已經說了兩種法的結合和分離，順向和反向的兩種譬喻。其餘與此相似，是相似譬喻的意義。什麼是其餘的呢？就是在所建立的能立和不同品中，雖然有結合和分離，但卻是顛倒的說法。或者在不作結合和分離的地方，只呈現所立和能立都存在，異品都缺失。像這樣的兩種法，或者有隨一不成不遣，或者有二者都不成不遣。例如主張聲音是常住的，因為它沒有觸對。同法譬喻說，所有沒有觸對的，都被認為是常住的，例如業（karma），例如極微（paramāṇu），例如瓶子等。異法譬喻說，所有被認為是無常的，都有觸對，例如極微，例如業，例如虛空等。由此已經說了同法譬喻中有法不成。

【English Translation】 English version: Everything, to them, Is a cause of doubt; Whether it's a false proof, a dharma with property, self-nature, or difference. These constitute contradictory reasons; if there is no contradiction, Observe the tenets of the school and examine carefully; if what is liked contradicts, It leads to hesitant inversion; other than this, there is no similar reason.

Thus, causes and pseudo-causes have been distinguished. Now I shall speak of examples and pseudo-examples.

Stating that the reason accompanies the thesis, the thesis does not exist without the reason, These two are called examples; the rest are similar to these.

There are two types of examples: positive and negative. A positive example is asserting that sound is impermanent because it is produced by effort without interruption. Whatever is produced by effort without interruption is seen to be impermanent, like a pot. A negative example is that whatever is seen as permanent is not produced by effort without interruption, like space. The former is an exclusive explanation, the latter merely prevents overextension. Because of the meaning of comparison through combination and separation, even though it is directed against not establishing actually existing empty space, it can show that where there is no thesis, the meaning of no reason is established. Furthermore, for what reason does the first statement say that the reason accompanies the thesis, and the second statement say that the thesis does not exist without the reason, rather than saying that the reason does not exist without the thesis? Because saying it this way can show that the reason is definitely present in similar instances and universally absent in dissimilar instances, rather than the reverse. Also, the verse says:

One should prove its permanence with non-production, or prove production with impermanence; If so, it should become unstated, not pervasive, combined or separated with non-pleasure, etc.

Thus, the combination and separation of two dharmas, both direct and reverse examples, have been stated. The rest similar to this are the meanings of pseudo-examples. What is 'the rest'? It is where the established proof and dissimilar instances, though having combination and separation, are stated in a reversed manner. Or where combination and separation are not made, only the established thesis and proof are presented as both existing, and both are absent in dissimilar instances. Such two dharmas, either one may be unaccomplished and unrejected, or both may be unaccomplished and unrejected. For example, asserting that sound is permanent because it has no contact. The positive example says that whatever has no contact is seen as permanent, like karma (karma), like atoms (paramāṇu), like pots. The negative example says that whatever is seen as impermanent has contact, like atoms, like karma, like space. Thus, it has been stated that in the positive example, the dharma is unaccomplished.

。謂對不許常虛空等為要具二譬喻言詞方成能立。為如其因但隨說一。若就正理應具說二。由是具足顯示所立不離其因。以具顯示同品定有異品遍無。能正對治相違不定。若有於此一分已成。隨說一分亦成能立。若如其聲兩義同許。俱不須說。或由義準一能顯二。

又比量中唯見此理。若所比處此相審定於余同類。念此定有。于彼無處念此遍無。是故由此生決定解。故本頌言。

如自決定已　　悕他決定生　說宗法相應　　所立余遠離

為于所比顯宗法性故。說因言。為顯於此不相離性故。說喻言。為顯所比故。說宗言。于所比中除此更無其餘支分。由是遮遣余審察等及與合結。若爾喻言應非異分。顯因義故。事雖實爾。然此因言唯為顯了是宗法性。非為顯了同品異品有性無性故。須別說同異喻言。若唯因言所詮表義。說名為因。斯有何失。復有何德。別說喻分。是名為德。應如世間所說方便與其因義都不相應。若爾何失。此說但應類所立義無有功能非能立義。由彼但說所作性故所類同法。不說能立所成立義。又因喻別此有所立同法異法。終不能顯因與所立不相離性。是故但有類所立義。然無功能。何故無能。以同喻中不必宗法。宗義相類。此復余譬所成立故。應成無窮。又不必定有諸品類。非異

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：意思是說，如果不允許常、虛空等作為必要的工具，那麼兩個譬喻的言辭才能構成能立（有效的論證）。如果只是像因那樣只說一個，那麼按照正理應該完整地說出兩個。這是因為完整地顯示了所立（要證明的結論）不離開其因（理由）。通過完整地顯示同品（相似的例子）中一定有，異品（不同的例子）中普遍沒有，就能正確地對治相違和不定。如果有人對其中的一部分已經理解，那麼只說一部分也能構成能立。如果像聲音那樣，兩種含義都被認可，那麼都不需要說。或者通過意義的推斷，一個就能顯示兩個。

此外，在比量（推理）中只看到這個道理。如果在所比之處，這個相狀被確定在其餘同類事物中，就認為它一定有；在沒有這個相狀的地方，就認為它普遍沒有。因此，由此產生決定的理解。所以本頌說：

『如自決定已，悕他決定生，說宗法相應，所立余遠離。』

爲了在所比的事物中顯示宗法性（主題的性質），所以說因（理由）。爲了顯示在這種事物中不相離的性質，所以說喻（例子）。爲了顯示所比的事物，所以說宗（結論）。在所比的事物中，除了這些之外，沒有其餘的支分。因此，這是爲了遮遣其餘的審察等等以及合和結。如果這樣，那麼喻的言辭應該不是不同的部分，因為它顯示了因的意義。事情雖然確實如此，然而這個因的言辭只是爲了清楚地表明是宗法性，而不是爲了清楚地表明在同品和異品中存在或不存在的性質，所以需要分別說同喻和異喻的言辭。如果只是因的言辭所詮釋的意義，被稱為因，這有什麼缺失？又有什麼優點？分別說喻的部分，這被稱為優點。應該像世間所說的方便那樣，與它的因的意義都不相應。如果這樣，有什麼缺失？這種說法只應該類似於所立的意義，沒有功能，不能成為能立的意義。因為它們只是說了所作性，所以類似於相同的法，沒有說能立和所成立的意義。而且，因和喻的區別在於，這裡有所立的同法和異法，最終不能顯示因與所立不相離的性質。因此，只有類似於所立的意義，然而沒有功能。為什麼沒有功能？因為在同喻中不一定有宗法，宗的意義相似。這又因為其餘的譬喻所成立，應該成為無窮。而且不一定確定有各種品類，不是不同的。

【English Translation】 English version: This means that if things like permanence and emptiness are not allowed as necessary tools, then the words of the two analogies can form a valid argument (hetu). If only one is stated like the reason (hetu), then according to correct reasoning, both should be stated completely. This is because it fully shows that the thesis (what is to be proven) is inseparable from its reason. By fully showing that it is definitely present in similar instances (sapaksha) and universally absent in dissimilar instances (vipaksha), it can correctly counteract contradiction and uncertainty. If someone has already understood a part of this, then stating only that part can also constitute a valid argument. If, like sound, both meanings are accepted, then neither needs to be stated. Or, through inference of meaning, one can reveal both.

Furthermore, in inference (anumana), only this principle is seen. If, in the place being inferred, this characteristic is determined in the remaining similar things, then it is considered to be definitely present; in places where this characteristic is absent, it is considered to be universally absent. Therefore, a definite understanding arises from this. Hence, the original verse says:

'As self-determination is complete, the desire for others' determination arises, stating the subject-property correspondence, the thesis is separate from the rest.'

To show the subject-property (dharma) in the thing being inferred, the reason (hetu) is stated. To show the inseparable nature in this thing, the example (udaharana) is stated. To show the thing being inferred, the thesis (paksha) is stated. In the thing being inferred, there are no other parts besides these. Therefore, this is to reject the remaining examinations, etc., and the combination and conclusion. If so, then the words of the example should not be a different part, because it shows the meaning of the reason. Although this is indeed the case, the word 'reason' is only to clearly indicate that it is the subject-property, not to clearly indicate the nature of existence or non-existence in similar and dissimilar instances, so it is necessary to separately state the words of the similar and dissimilar examples. If only the meaning explained by the word 'reason' is called the reason, what is the deficiency in this? And what is the merit? Separately stating the part of the example is called a merit. It should be like the skillful means spoken of in the world, which does not correspond to its meaning of reason. If so, what is the deficiency? This statement should only be similar to the meaning of the thesis, without function, and cannot become the meaning of a valid argument. Because they only speak of the nature of being produced, so it is similar to the same dharma, without speaking of the meaning of the valid argument and the thing being established. Moreover, the difference between the reason and the example is that here there are similar and dissimilar dharmas of the thesis, which ultimately cannot show the inseparable nature of the reason and the thesis. Therefore, there is only similarity to the meaning of the thesis, but without function. Why is there no function? Because in the similar example, there is not necessarily the subject-property, the meaning of the thesis is similar. This is again because the remaining examples are established, it should become infinite. And it is not necessarily certain that there are various categories, it is not different.

品中不顯無性。有所簡別能為譬喻。故說頌言。

若因唯所立　　或差別相類　譬喻應無窮　　及遮遣異品

世間但顯宗因異品同處有性為異法喻。非宗無處因不有性。故定無能。若唯宗法是因性者。其有不定。應亦成因。云何具有所立能立及異品法二種譬喻而有此失。若於爾時所立異品非一種類。便有此失。如初后三各最後喻。故定三相唯為顯因。由是道理雖一切分皆能為因顯了所立。然唯一分且說為因。如是略說宗等及似。即此多言說名能立及似能立。隨其所應為開悟他說此能立及似能立。

為自開悟唯有現量及與比量。彼聲喻等攝在此中。故唯二量。由此能了自共相故。非離此二別有所量爲了知彼更立餘量。故本頌言。

現量除分別　　余所說因生

此中現量除分別者。謂若有智於色等境遠離一切種類名言。假立無異諸門分別。由不共緣現現別轉。故名現量。故說頌言。

有法非一相　　根非一切行　唯內證離言　　是色根境界

意地亦有離諸分別唯證行轉。又于貪等諸自證分。諸修定者離教分別皆是現量。又於此中無別量果。以即此體似義生故。似有用故假說為量。若於貪等諸自證分亦是現量。何故此中除分別智。不遮此中自證。現量無分別故。但於此中了余境分

不名現量。由此即說。憶念比度悕求疑智惑亂智等於粗愛等皆非現量。隨先所受分別轉故。如是一切世俗有中瓶等數等舉等有性瓶性等智。皆似現量。于實有中作余行相假合余義分別轉故。

已說現量當說比量。余所說因生者謂智是前智。余從如所說能立因生是緣彼義。此有二種。謂于所比審觀察智。從現量生。或比量生。及憶此因與所立宗不相離念。由是成前舉所說力念因同品定有等故。是近及遠比度因故。俱名比量。此依作具作者而說。如是應知。悟他比量亦不離此得成能立。故說頌言。

一事有多法　　相非一切行　唯由簡別余　　表定能隨逐　如是能相者　　亦有眾多法　唯不越所相　　能表示非余

何故此中與前現量。別異建立。為現二門。此處亦應于其比果說為比量。彼處亦應于其現因說為現量。俱不遮止。已說能立及似能立。當說能破及似能破。頌曰。

能破闕等言　　似破謂諸類

此中能破闕等言者謂前所說闕等言詞。諸分過失。彼一一言皆名能破。由彼一一能顯前宗非善說故。

所言似破謂諸類者。謂同法等相似過類名似能破。由彼多分于善比量。為迷惑他而施設故。不能顯示前宗不善。由彼非理而破斥故。及能破處而施設故。是彼類故。說名過類。若於

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

非名符順的現量（Pratyaksha，直接認知）。因此可以說，憶念、比度（Anumana，推論）、希求、疑智、惑亂智等等，以及粗重的愛慾等等，都不是現量，因為它們都隨著先前所接受的分別而運轉。就像這樣，一切世俗有中，瓶子、數量、舉動、有瓶子的性質等等的認知，都類似於現量，因為它們在真實存在的事物中，以其他的行相，假合其他的意義，進行分別運轉。

已經說了現量，下面應當說比量。『余所說因生者謂智是前智』，意思是說，從如所說的能立因（Hetu，理由、因）所生的，是緣于那個意義的。這有二種：一是對所比量的事物進行審慎觀察的智慧，從現量生，或者從比量生；二是憶念這個因與所立的宗（Paksha，論題）不相分離的念頭。由於這樣，成就了前面所說的力量，憶念因在同品中必定存在等等。因為是近及遠的推度之因，所以都叫做比量。這是依據作具和作者而說的，應當這樣理解。領悟他人的比量，也不離開這些才能成就能立，所以說了這首偈頌：

『一事有多法，相非一切行，唯由簡別余，表定能隨逐。如是能相者，亦有眾多法，唯不越所相，能表示非余。』

為什麼這裡要與前面的現量，分別建立為現量和比量二門呢？這裡也應該把比量的結果說成是比量，那裡也應該把現量的原因說成是現量，兩者都不禁止。已經說了能立和似能立，下面應當說能破和似能破。偈頌說：

『能破闕等言，似破謂諸類。』

這裡所說的『能破闕等言』，指的是前面所說的闕等言詞，各種部分的過失，那每一個言詞都叫做能破，因為那每一個都能顯示前面的宗不是善說的。

所說的『似破謂諸類』，指的是與同法等相似的過類，叫做似能破，因為它們大部分是爲了迷惑他人，而對善的比量進行施設，不能顯示前面的宗是不善的，因為它們是非理性的破斥，以及在能破之處進行施設，是那類過失，所以叫做過類。如果在

【English Translation】 English version:

That which is not named is immediate perception (Pratyaksha). Hence it is said that memory, inference (Anumana), desire, doubt, confused knowledge, and so on, as well as gross desires, are not immediate perception, because they all operate according to previously received distinctions. Likewise, in all worldly existences, cognitions of things like jars, numbers, actions, the nature of jars, and so on, resemble immediate perception, because they operate in real existences by falsely combining other aspects and distinguishing other meanings.

Having discussed immediate perception, we should now discuss inference. 'That which is produced by the stated reason is the prior knowledge,' meaning that what arises from the stated valid reason (Hetu) is related to that meaning. This is of two kinds: first, the wisdom that carefully observes the inferred object, arising from immediate perception or from inference; second, the recollection that this reason is inseparable from the established thesis (Paksha). Because of this, the previously mentioned power is achieved, remembering that the reason necessarily exists in similar instances, and so on. Because it is the cause of near and far inference, both are called inference. This is spoken in terms of the instrument and the agent, and should be understood accordingly. Understanding another's inference cannot be separated from these to achieve a valid proof. Therefore, the verse says:

'One thing has many qualities, aspects are not all actions, only by distinguishing the rest, it definitely shows what follows. Likewise, the characteristic also has many qualities, only not exceeding what is characterized, it can indicate what is not the rest.'

Why here are immediate perception and inference established separately as two doors? Here, the result of inference should also be called inference, and there, the cause of immediate perception should also be called immediate perception; neither is prohibited. Having discussed valid proof and pseudo-proof, we should now discuss refutation and pseudo-refutation. The verse says:

'Refutation is the lack of words like 'etcetera,' pseudo-refutation is called fallacies.'

Here, 'refutation is the lack of words like 'etcetera'' refers to the previously mentioned lack of words like 'etcetera,' the faults of various parts; each of those words is called refutation, because each of them can show that the previous thesis is not well-stated.

What is said, 'pseudo-refutation is called fallacies,' refers to fallacies similar to the same property, and so on, called pseudo-refutation, because most of them are established to confuse others regarding valid inference, and cannot show that the previous thesis is not good, because they are irrational refutations, and are established in the place of refutation, being that kind of fault, therefore called fallacies. If in

非理立比量中如是施設。或不了知比量過失。或即為顯彼過失門。不名過類。

示現異品故　　由同法異立　同法相似余　　由異法分別　差別名分別　　應一成無異　顯所立余因　　名可得相似　難義別疑因　　故說名猶豫　說異品義故　　非愛名義準

此中示現異品故。由同法異立。同法相似者顛倒成立故名異立。此依作具作者而說同法。即是相似故名同法相似。一切攝立中相似過類故。言相似者是不男聲。能破相應故。或隨結頌故。云何同法相似能破。于所作中說能作故。轉生起故。作如是說后隨所應亦如是說。今於此中由同法喻顛倒成立。是故說名同法相似。如有成立聲是無常。勤勇無間所發性故。此以虛空為異法喻。有顯虛空為同法喻。無質等故。立聲為常。如是即此所說因中瓶應為同法。而異品虛空說為同法。由是說為同法相似。

余由異法者謂異法相似。是前同法相似之餘示現異品由異法喻顛倒而立二種喻中如前安立。瓶為異法。是故說為異法相似。

分別差別名分別者前說示現等故。今說分別差別故。應知。分別同法差別。謂如前說瓶為同法。于彼同法有可燒等差別義故。是則瓶應無常非聲。聲應是常不可燒等。有差別故。由此分別顛倒所立。是故說名分別相似。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：在非理性的比量中，就是這樣進行設定的。或者是不瞭解比量的過失，或者就是爲了顯示那些過失的門徑，這些都不能稱為過失的類別。

『示現異品故，由同法異立，同法相似余，由異法分別，差別名分別，應一成無異，顯所立余因，名可得相似，難義別疑因，故說名猶豫，說異品義故，非愛名義準。』

這裡說的是『示現異品故』。由於用相同的屬性來建立不同的論點，因此，與相同屬性相似的事物，由於顛倒地建立，所以被稱為『異立』。這是根據作用的工具和作用者來說的相同屬性。也就是相似，所以稱為『同法相似』。在一切攝立中，都是相似的過失類別。所以說『相似』是不男之聲，能夠破除相應的論點。或者，是跟隨偈頌的結論。那麼，『同法相似』如何能夠破除論點呢？在所作的事物中，說能作的事物。因為會轉變生起。像這樣說了之後，隨後所應說的也像這樣說。現在在這裡，由於用相同的屬性比喻來顛倒地建立論點，所以稱為『同法相似』。例如，有人建立『聲音是無常的，因為是勤奮努力且無間斷地產生的』。這裡用虛空作為異法（Vaitarika）的比喻。有人顯示虛空作為同法（Samana）的比喻，因為沒有實體等等。從而建立聲音是常的。像這樣，在此所說的因中，瓶子應該作為同法，而異品（Vaitarika）虛空卻被說成是同法。因此，這被稱為『同法相似』。

『其餘由異法者』，指的是『異法相似』。是前面『同法相似』之外的，顯示不同的類別，通過顛倒地建立異法（Vaitarika）比喻。在兩種比喻中，像前面那樣安立。瓶子作為異法（Vaitarika）。因此，這被稱為『異法相似』。

『分別差別名分別者』，前面說了『示現』等等，現在說『分別差別』。應該知道，分別相同的屬性的差別。比如前面說的瓶子作為同法（Samana）。在那個同法（Samana）中有可以燃燒等等的差別意義。那麼，瓶子應該是無常的，而不是聲音。聲音應該是常的，因為不可以燃燒等等，有差別的原因。由此，通過分別顛倒地建立論點。因此，這被稱為『分別相似』。

【English Translation】 English version: In an irrational inference, it is thus that arrangements are made. Either one does not understand the faults of the inference, or it is precisely to reveal the gateways to those faults; these are not called categories of faults.

'Because of showing dissimilar instances, different positions are established by similar properties; the remainder similar to similar properties, are distinguished by dissimilar properties; distinction is called distinction, it should be one and become non-different; revealing the remaining cause of what is to be established, is called attainable similarity; difficult meaning, different doubtful cause, therefore it is said to be hesitation; because of speaking of the meaning of dissimilar instances, non-love is called the standard of meaning.'

Here it speaks of 'because of showing dissimilar instances'. Because different arguments are established by the same attribute, therefore, things similar to the same attribute are called 'different establishments' because they are established in a reversed manner. This is based on the tool of action and the actor to speak of the same attribute. That is, it is similar, so it is called 'similarity of the same attribute'. In all inclusive establishments, they are similar categories of faults. Therefore, saying 'similarity' is a non-male voice, which can break the corresponding arguments. Or, it follows the conclusion of the verse. So, how can 'similarity of the same attribute' break the argument? In the things that are made, it speaks of the things that can make. Because it will transform and arise. After saying it like this, what should be said later is also said like this. Now here, because the argument is established in a reversed manner by the same attribute metaphor, it is called 'similarity of the same attribute'. For example, someone establishes 'sound is impermanent, because it is produced diligently and uninterruptedly'. Here, emptiness is used as a metaphor for dissimilar property (Vaitarika). Someone shows emptiness as a metaphor for similar property (Samana), because there is no substance, etc. Thus, it establishes that sound is permanent. Like this, in the cause mentioned here, the pot should be the similar property (Samana), but the dissimilar instance (Vaitarika) emptiness is said to be the similar property (Samana). Therefore, this is called 'similarity of the same attribute'.

'The remainder by dissimilar property' refers to 'similarity of dissimilar property'. It is the remainder of the previous 'similarity of the same attribute', showing different categories, establishing dissimilar property (Vaitarika) metaphors in a reversed manner. In the two metaphors, it is established as before. The pot is the dissimilar property (Vaitarika). Therefore, this is called 'similarity of dissimilar property'.

'Distinguishing difference is called distinction', the previous said 'showing' etc., now it says 'distinguishing difference'. It should be known that distinguishing the difference of the same attribute. For example, the pot mentioned earlier is the similar property (Samana). In that similar property (Samana), there are different meanings such as being able to be burned. Then, the pot should be impermanent, not sound. Sound should be permanent, because it cannot be burned, etc., there is a reason for the difference. Therefore, the argument is established in a reversed manner by distinguishing. Therefore, this is called 'distinction similarity'.

所言應一成無異者示現同法前已說故。由此與彼應成一故。彼者是誰。以更不聞異方便故。相鄰近故。應知。是宗成無異者成無異過。即由此言義可知。故不說其名。是誰與誰共成無異。不別說。故即此一切與彼一切。如有說言。若見瓶等有同法故。即令余法亦無別異。一切瓶法聲應皆有。是則一切更互法同應成一性。此中抑成無別異過。亦為顯示瓶聲差別。不甚異前分別相似故。應別說。若以勤勇無間所發。成立無常。欲顯俱是非畢竟性。則成宗因無別異過。抑此令成無別異性。是故說名無異相似。有說。此因如能成立所成立法亦能成立此相違法。由無別異。是故說名無異相似。

顯所立余因名可得相似者。謂若顯示所立宗法余因可得。是則說名可得相似。謂有說言。如前成立聲是無常。此非正因。于電光等由現見等余因可得無常成故。以若離此而得有彼。此非彼因。有餘於此別作方便。謂此非彼無常正因由不遍故。如說叢林皆有思慮有睡眠故。

難義別疑因故說名猶豫者過類相應故。女聲說。此中分別宗義別異因成不定。是故說名猶豫相似。或復分別因義別異故。名猶豫相似過類。謂有說言。如前成立聲是無常。勤勇無間所發性故。現見勤勇無間所發或顯或生故。成猶豫。今所成立為顯為生。是故不

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：所說的『應完全相同』是指示現相同法，因為之前已經說過了。因此，這個和那個應該成為一體。『那個』是誰？因為沒有聽到其他不同的方便法門，而且彼此相鄰近，所以應該知道。如果主張『完全相同』，就會犯『完全相同』的過失。這個意思可以從這句話中理解，所以沒有說出它的名字。是誰和誰共同構成『完全相同』呢？因為沒有分別說明，所以就是『這個一切』和『那個一切』。例如有人說，如果看到瓶子等有相同的性質，就認為其他法也沒有差別，那麼一切瓶子的性質和聲音應該都一樣。這樣，一切相互作用的法都應該成為一個性質。這裡強調的是『沒有差別』的過失，同時也爲了顯示瓶子和聲音的差別。因為和之前的分別相似性沒有太大差別，所以應該另外說明。如果用『勤奮努力不間斷地產生』來成立『無常』，想要顯示兩者都不是畢竟不變的性質，就會犯『宗』和『因』沒有差別的過失。或者說，這樣做會使兩者成為『沒有差別』的性質。所以叫做『無異相似』。有人說，這個『因』如果能成立所要成立的法，也能成立與此相反的法，因為沒有差別，所以叫做『無異相似』。

顯示所立宗的其餘『因』可以得到，叫做『可得相似』。意思是說，如果顯示所要成立的宗法的其餘『因』可以得到，就叫做『可得相似』。例如有人說，像之前成立聲音是無常，這不是正確的『因』，因為在閃電等現象中，通過現見等其餘『因』可以成立無常。如果離開這個『因』而能得到那個結果，這個『因』就不是那個結果的『因』。有些人對此另外採取方法，認為這不是『無常』的正確『因』，因為它不普遍。例如說叢林都有思考，因為有睡眠。

因為難以理解意義，產生不同的懷疑，所以說叫做『猶豫』，這是過失和類別相應。女聲說，這裡分別宗義的差別，『因』成為不確定，所以叫做『猶豫相似』。或者說，分別『因』的意義差別，所以叫做『猶豫相似』的過失類別。例如有人說，像之前成立聲音是無常，因為是勤奮努力不間斷地產生的性質。現在看到勤奮努力不間斷地產生，或者顯現或者產生，就產生猶豫。現在所要成立的是顯現還是產生，所以不確定。

【English Translation】 English version: 'What is said to be exactly the same' refers to demonstrating the same dharma, as it has been said before. Therefore, 'this' and 'that' should become one. Who is 'that'? Because no other different expedient means are heard, and they are adjacent to each other, it should be known. If one asserts 'exactly the same,' one commits the fault of 'exactly the same.' This meaning can be understood from this statement, so its name is not mentioned. Who and who together constitute 'exactly the same'? Because it is not separately explained, it is 'this everything' and 'that everything.' For example, if someone says that if they see bottles, etc., having the same nature, they think that other dharmas have no difference either, then all the nature and sound of bottles should be the same. In this way, all interacting dharmas should become one nature. Here, the fault of 'no difference' is emphasized, and at the same time, the difference between bottle and sound is shown. Because it is not very different from the previous distinction of similarity, it should be explained separately. If one uses 'diligently and continuously produced' to establish 'impermanence,' wanting to show that neither is an ultimately unchanging nature, one commits the fault of 'thesis' and 'reason' having no difference. Or, doing so makes the two become 'no difference' in nature. Therefore, it is called 'similar without difference.' Some say that if this 'reason' can establish the dharma to be established, it can also establish the dharma contrary to it, because there is no difference, so it is called 'similar without difference.'

Showing that the remaining 'reason' of the established thesis can be obtained is called 'obtainable similarity.' It means that if it is shown that the remaining 'reason' of the dharma to be established can be obtained, it is called 'obtainable similarity.' For example, if someone says that, like previously establishing that sound is impermanent, this is not a correct 'reason,' because in phenomena such as lightning, impermanence can be established through other 'reasons' such as direct observation. If that result can be obtained without this 'reason,' this 'reason' is not the 'reason' for that result. Some people take other methods for this, thinking that this is not the correct 'reason' for 'impermanence' because it is not universal. For example, saying that forests all have thought because they have sleep.

Because it is difficult to understand the meaning and different doubts arise, it is said to be called 'hesitation,' which is a fault corresponding to the category. The female voice says that here, distinguishing the difference in the meaning of the thesis, the 'reason' becomes uncertain, so it is called 'similar to hesitation.' Or, distinguishing the difference in the meaning of the 'reason,' so it is called the category of the fault of 'similar to hesitation.' For example, if someone says that, like previously establishing that sound is impermanent, because it is the nature of being diligently and continuously produced. Now seeing that diligently and continuously produced, either manifests or produces, hesitation arises. What is to be established now is whether it manifests or produces, so it is uncertain.

應以如是因證無常義。

說異品義故。非愛名義準者。謂有說言。若以勤勇無間所發說無常者。義準則應若非勤勇無間所發。諸電光等皆應是常。如是名為義準相似應知。此中略去後句。是故但名猶豫義準。復由何義此同法等相似過類異因明師所說次第。似破同故。

由此同法等　　多疑故似彼

多言為顯或有異難。及為顯似不成因過。此中前四與我所說譬喻方便都不相應。且隨世間譬喻方便。雖不顯因是決定性然攝其體故。作是說。由用不定同法等因成立自宗。方便說他亦有此法。由是便成似共不定。或覆成似相違決定。若言唯為成立自宗。云何不定得名能破。非即說此以為能破。難不定言說名不定。于能詮中說所詮故。無有此過。余處亦應如是安立。若所立量有不定過。或複決定同法等因有所成立。即名能破。是等難故。若現見力比量不能遮遣其性。如有成立聲非所聞。猶如瓶等。以現見聲是所聞故。不應以其是所聞性遮遣無常。非唯不見能遮遣故。若不爾者。亦應遣常。第二無異相似是似不成因過。彼以本無而生。增益所立。為作宗因成一過故。此以本無而生極成因法證滅后無。若即立彼可成能破。第三無異相似成立違害所立難故。成似由可燒等不決定故。若是決定可成相違。可得相似所立不

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：應該像這樣通過因來證明無常的意義。

因為說了異品（與所證相反的事物）的意義。關於『非愛名義準』，有些人說，如果用持續不斷的努力所引發的事物來說明無常，那麼按照『義準』，那些不是由持續不斷的努力所引發的事物，如閃電等，都應該是常。這種被稱為相似的『義準』應該知道。這裡省略了後半句，所以只稱為猶豫的『義準』。又因為什麼原因，這個『同法』等相似之處，與因明師所說的次第相似而破斥『同法』呢？

由此『同法』等，因為有很多疑惑，所以類似那些（真正的『同法』）。

說『多』是爲了顯示或許有不同的責難，以及爲了顯示類似不成立的因的過失。這裡的前四種（『同法』等）與我所說的譬喻方便都不相應。暫且按照世間的譬喻方便，雖然不能明顯地說明因是決定性的，但因為它包含了它的本體，所以這樣說。由於使用不定的『同法』等因來成立自己的宗派，方便地說他人也有這種『法』，因此就變成了類似共同不定的因，或者變成了類似相違決定的因。如果說僅僅是爲了成立自己的宗派，那麼不定的因怎麼能被稱為能破呢？不是說直接用這個不定的因作為能破，而是說責難不定，所以說它是不定的。在能詮（能表達的）中說所詮（所表達的），所以沒有這個過失。其他地方也應該這樣安立。如果所立的量有不定的過失，或者決定的『同法』等因有所成立，就稱為能破，因為有這些責難。

如果現見的效力，比量不能遮遣它的性質，例如有人成立『聲音不是所聞』，就像瓶子等一樣。因為現見聲音是所聞的，所以不應該用它是所聞的性質來遮遣它的無常。不是僅僅因為沒有看見就能遮遣。如果不是這樣，也應該遮遣常。第二種無異相似，是類似不成立的因的過失。它以本來沒有的事物而生起，增益所立，作為宗因，成為一種過失。這裡以本來沒有的事物而生起，用極成（大家都認可）的因法來證明滅后沒有。如果直接立彼（滅后沒有），就可以成為能破。第三種無異相似，成立違害所立的責難。成為相似是因為可燒等不決定。如果是決定的，就可以成為相違。可得相似所立不（成立）。

專有名詞解釋：異品 (Vipaksha): 與所證相反的事物義準 (Arthapatti): 一種推理方式，通過假設某事物的存在來解釋另一事物的存在同法 (Sadharmya): 相似的性質或特徵因明師 (Hetuvidya): 邏輯學家能詮 (Vachaka): 能表達的所詮 (Vachya): 所表達的比量 (Anumana): 推理宗 (Paksha): 論題因 (Hetu): 理由，原因

【English Translation】 English version: One should prove the meaning of impermanence by such a cause.

Because the meaning of 'vipaksha' (opposite of what is to be proven) is stated. Regarding 'non-love name arthapatti' (non-desire named implication), some say that if impermanence is explained by what is produced by continuous effort, then according to 'arthapatti', those things not produced by continuous effort, such as lightning, should all be permanent. This is called a similar 'arthapatti' and should be known. The latter half of the sentence is omitted here, so it is only called a hesitant 'arthapatti'. Furthermore, for what reason is this similarity of 'sadharmya' (common property), etc., similar to and refuting the order stated by the logicians?

Because there are many doubts about this 'sadharmya', etc., it is similar to those (real 'sadharmyas').

Saying 'many' is to show that there may be different criticisms, and to show the fault of a cause that is similar to being unestablished. The first four here (sadharmya, etc.) are not consistent with the analogy methods I have stated. For the time being, according to worldly analogy methods, although it cannot clearly explain that the cause is definitive, it is said this way because it includes its essence. Because of using uncertain 'sadharmya' etc. as the cause to establish one's own tenet, it is convenient to say that others also have this 'dharma' (property), and thus it becomes a cause that is similar to being commonly uncertain, or it becomes a cause that is similar to being contradictory and definitive. If it is said that it is only for establishing one's own tenet, then how can an uncertain cause be called a refutation? It is not said that this uncertain cause is directly used as a refutation, but it is said that the criticism is uncertain, so it is said to be uncertain. There is no fault in saying what is meant in what can express (the meaning). Other places should also be established in this way. If the established measure has the fault of being uncertain, or if a definitive 'sadharmya' etc. is established, it is called a refutation, because there are these criticisms.

If the power of direct perception cannot refute its nature by inference, such as someone establishing that 'sound is not audible', like a pot, etc. Because it is directly perceived that sound is audible, one should not use the nature of being audible to refute its impermanence. It is not only because it is not seen that it can be refuted. If it is not so, then permanence should also be refuted. The second 'no difference' similarity is the fault of a cause that is similar to being unestablished. It arises from something that originally did not exist, increasing what is to be established, and becomes a fault as the subject and cause. Here, it arises from something that originally did not exist, and uses the extremely established cause to prove that there is nothing after extinction. If that (nothing after extinction) is directly established, it can become a refutation. The third 'no difference' similarity establishes the criticism of contradicting what is to be established. It becomes similar because what can be burned, etc., is uncertain. If it is definitive, it can become contradictory. The established (thesis) is not (established) with obtainable similarity.

Explanation of proper nouns: Vipaksha: Opposite of what is to be proven Arthapatti: A mode of reasoning, explaining the existence of one thing by assuming the existence of another Sadharmya: Similar properties or characteristics Hetuvidya: Logician Vachaka: That which can express Vachya: That which is expressed Anumana: Inference Paksha: Thesis Hetu: Reason, cause

定故。成其似。若所立因於常亦有可成能破。第二可得雖是不遍。余類無故。似不成過。若所立無可名能破。非於此中欲立一切皆是無常。猶豫相似。謂以勤勇無間所發得成立滅壞。若以生起增益所立。作不定過。此似不定。若於所立不起分別。但簡別因生起為難。此似不成。由於此中不欲唯產生立滅壞。若生若顯悉皆滅壞。非不定故。義準相似。謂以顛倒不定為難故。似不定。若非勤勇無間所發立常無常。或唯勤勇無間所發無常非余可成能破。

若因至不至　　三時非愛言　至非至無因　　是名似因闕

若因至不至三時非愛言至非至無因者。于至不至作非愛言。若能立因至所立宗而成立者。無差別故。應非所立。如池海水相合無異。又若不成應非相至。所立若成此是誰因。若能立因不至所立。不至非因。無差別故。應不成因。是名為至非至相似。又於三時作非愛言。若能立因在所立前。未有所立。此是誰因。若言在後。所立已成。復何須因。若俱時者。因與有因皆不成就。如牛兩角。如是名為無因相似。此中如前次第異者由俱說名似因闕故。所以者何。非理誹撥一切因故。此中何理唯不至同故雖因相相應。亦不名因。如是何理唯在所立前不得因名故。即非能立。又於此中有自害過。遮遣同故。如是且於

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因此，如果所建立的論點依賴於常法，那麼就有可能成立，也可能被駁倒。第二種情況是，即使不普遍，但由於沒有其他類別的原因，這也不構成不成立的過失。如果所建立的論點無法命名，也無法被駁倒，那麼就不是要在此處建立一切都是無常的觀點，而是猶豫不決，模棱兩可。如果以勤奮努力、不間斷地發起而獲得的（事物）的成立和滅壞來建立論點，那麼就會產生不定過失。這類似於不定。如果在所建立的論點中沒有產生分別，只是簡單地區分原因的生起，這很難做到。這類似於不成立。因為在此處，我們不只是想建立產生、成立和滅壞，而是想建立無論是生起還是顯現，一切都會滅壞，所以不是不定。意義上相似，指的是以顛倒、不定來反駁，所以類似於不定。如果不是通過勤奮努力、不間斷地發起而建立常或無常，或者只是通過勤奮努力、不間斷地發起而建立無常而非其他，那麼就有可能成立，也可能被駁倒。

『如果原因到達或不到達，在三個時間段內沒有明確的說明，到達或不到達沒有原因，這被稱為類似於原因的缺失。』

如果原因到達或不到達，在三個時間段內沒有明確的說明，到達或不到達沒有原因，那麼就是在到達或不到達的問題上沒有明確的說明。如果能立因到達所立宗而成立，由於沒有差別，應該不是所立。就像池水和海水混合在一起沒有區別一樣。而且，如果不成立，就不應該到達。如果所立成立，那麼這是誰的原因呢？如果能立因不到達所立，不到達就不是原因。由於沒有差別，應該不成為原因。這被稱為到達或不到達的相似之處。又在三個時間段內沒有明確的說明。如果能立因在所立之前，還沒有所立，這是誰的原因呢？如果說在之後，所立已經成立，又何須原因呢？如果同時，原因和有因都不能成就，就像牛的兩角一樣。這被稱為無因的相似之處。這裡像前面一樣，次第不同，是因為都說了名稱，所以類似於原因的缺失。為什麼呢？因為不合邏輯地誹謗一切原因。這裡有什麼道理只說不到達相同呢？所以即使原因的相狀相應，也不能稱為原因。同樣，有什麼道理只在所立之前不能得到原因的名稱呢？所以就不是能立。而且，這裡有自害的過失，因為遮遣了相同。就像這樣，暫且對於...

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, if the established argument relies on permanence, then it is possible to be established and also possible to be refuted. The second case is that even if it is not universal, but because there is no other category of reason, this does not constitute the fault of being unestablished. If the established argument cannot be named and cannot be refuted, then it is not to establish the view that everything is impermanent here, but rather hesitation and ambiguity. If the establishment and destruction (of things) obtained by diligently and continuously initiating (efforts) are used to establish the argument, then an uncertain fault will arise. This is similar to being uncertain. If no distinction arises in the established argument, but simply distinguishing the arising of the cause is difficult. This is similar to being unestablished. Because here, we do not just want to establish generation, establishment, and destruction, but we want to establish that whether it arises or manifests, everything will be destroyed, so it is not uncertain. The meaning is similar, referring to refuting with inversion and uncertainty, so it is similar to uncertainty. If permanence or impermanence is not established through diligent and continuous initiation, or if only impermanence is established through diligent and continuous initiation and not others, then it is possible to be established and also possible to be refuted.

'If the cause arrives or does not arrive, there is no clear statement in the three time periods, and there is no cause for arriving or not arriving, this is called a deficiency similar to a cause.'

If the cause arrives or does not arrive, there is no clear statement in the three time periods, and there is no cause for arriving or not arriving, then there is no clear statement on the issue of arriving or not arriving. If the establishing cause arrives at the established thesis and is established, since there is no difference, it should not be the established thesis. Just like pond water and seawater mixed together are no different. Moreover, if it is not established, it should not arrive. If the established thesis is established, then whose cause is this? If the establishing cause does not arrive at the established thesis, not arriving is not a cause. Since there is no difference, it should not become a cause. This is called the similarity of arriving or not arriving. Also, there is no clear statement in the three time periods. If the establishing cause is before the established thesis, and there is no established thesis yet, whose cause is this? If it is said to be after, the established thesis has already been established, so what need is there for a cause? If they are simultaneous, the cause and the caused cannot be accomplished, just like the two horns of a cow. This is called the similarity of having no cause. Here, like before, the order is different because the names are all said, so it is similar to the deficiency of a cause. Why? Because it illogically slanders all causes. What reason is there here to only say that not arriving is the same? Therefore, even if the characteristics of the cause correspond, it cannot be called a cause. Similarly, what reason is there to only not be able to obtain the name of a cause before the established thesis? Therefore, it is not the establishing cause. Moreover, there is a fault of self-harm here because it rejects the same. Like this, for the time being, regarding...

言因及慧所成立中有似因闕。于義因中有似不成。非理誹撥諸法因故。如前二因於義所立俱非所作能作性故。不應正理。若以正理而誹撥時。可名能破。

說前無因故　　應無有所立　名無說相似　　生無生亦然　所作異少分　　顯所立不成　名所作相似　　多如似宗說

說前因無故應無有所立名無說相似者。謂有說言。如前所立。若由此因證無常性。此未說前都無所有。因無有故。應非無常。如是名為無說相似。

生無生亦然者生前無因故。無所立。亦即說名無生相似。言亦然者類例聲。前因無有故。應無所立。今於此中如無所立。應知。亦有所立相違。謂有說言。如前所立。若如是聲未生已前無有勤勇無間所發。應非無常。又非勤勇無間所發故。應是常。如是名為無生相似。所作異少分顯所立不成名所作相似者。謂所成立所作性故。猶如瓶等。聲無常者若瓶有異所作性故。可是無常。何豫聲事。如是名為所作相似。

多如似宗說者如是無說相似等多分如似所立說。謂如不成因過。多言為顯或如似余。今於此中無說相似增益比量。謂于論者所說言詞立無常性。難未說前因無有故。此似不成。或似因闕。謂未說前益能立故。若於此中顯義無有。又立量時。若無言說可成能破。無生相似聲

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果因為言論和智慧所成立的理由不充分，就像缺少原因一樣。在義理的原因中，就像沒有成立一樣。因為不合道理地誹謗和否定諸法的因緣。就像前面的兩個原因，在義理上所成立的，都不是所作性和能作性，所以不應是正確的道理。如果用正確的道理來誹謗和否定，才可以稱為能破。

『說前無因故，應無有所立，名無說相似，生無生亦然，所作異少分，顯所立不成，名所作相似，多如似宗說。』

『說前因無故應無有所立名無說相似』，是指有人說，就像前面所立的，如果用這個原因來證明無常性，在這個沒有說之前，都沒有任何東西。因為原因沒有，所以應該不是無常。像這樣就叫做『無說相似』。

『生無生亦然者』，是指在產生之前沒有原因，所以沒有所立。也就叫做『無生相似』。『亦然』的意思是類似於聲音。因為前面的原因沒有，所以應該沒有所立。現在在這裡，就像沒有所立一樣，應該知道，也有所立的相反情況。有人說，就像前面所立的，如果這個聲音在沒有產生之前，沒有勤奮努力的作為，就應該不是無常。又因為不是勤奮努力的作為，所以應該是常。像這樣就叫做『無生相似』。『所作異少分顯所立不成名所作相似者』，是指因為所成立的是所作性，就像瓶子等等。聲音是無常的，如果瓶子有不同的所作性，所以可能是無常的，這和聲音有什麼關係呢？像這樣就叫做『所作相似』。

『多如似宗說者』，像這樣『無說相似』等等，大部分都像所立的說法。就像不成立的原因的過失。『多』字是爲了顯示或者像其餘的。現在在這裡，『無說相似』增加了比量。對於論者所說的言詞，成立無常性，責難在沒有說之前，原因沒有，這就像不成立。或者像原因缺少，因為在沒有說之前，增加了能立。如果在這裡顯示義理沒有，又在立量的時候，如果沒有言說，就可以成立能破。『無生相似』的聲音。

【English Translation】 English version: If the reason established by speech and wisdom is insufficient, it is like lacking a cause. In the reason of meaning, it is like not being established. Because it unreasonably slanders and denies the causes and conditions of all dharmas. Like the previous two reasons, what is established in meaning is neither the nature of being made nor the nature of being able to make, so it should not be correct reasoning. If one slanders and denies with correct reasoning, then it can be called 'able to refute'.

'Saying there is no prior cause, there should be nothing established, named 'resemblance to no speech'; 'birth and no-birth are also thus'; 'the made differs in small part, showing the established is not accomplished, named 'resemblance to the made'; much like the semblance to the proposition'.

'Saying there is no prior cause, therefore there should be nothing established, named 'resemblance to no speech'', refers to someone saying, like what was previously established, if this reason is used to prove impermanence, before this is said, there is nothing at all. Because there is no cause, it should not be impermanent. This is called 'resemblance to no speech'.

'Birth and no-birth are also thus' refers to before birth there is no cause, so there is nothing established. This is called 'resemblance to no birth'. 'Also thus' means similar to sound. Because the previous cause does not exist, there should be nothing established. Now here, just as there is nothing established, it should be known that there is also the opposite of what is established. Someone says, like what was previously established, if this sound before it is produced, there is no diligent effort, it should not be impermanent. Also, because it is not the result of diligent effort, it should be permanent. This is called 'resemblance to no birth'. 'The made differs in small part, showing the established is not accomplished, named 'resemblance to the made'' refers to because what is established is the nature of being made, like a bottle and so on. Sound is impermanent, if the bottle has a different nature of being made, so it may be impermanent, what does this have to do with sound? This is called 'resemblance to the made'.

'Much like the semblance to the proposition' like this 'resemblance to no speech' and so on, most are like the statement of what is established. Like the fault of the reason not being established. 'Much' is to show or like the rest. Now here, 'resemblance to no speech' increases the inference. Regarding the words spoken by the debater, establishing impermanence, criticizing that before it is said, there is no cause, this is like not being established. Or like the cause is lacking, because before it is said, it increases the ability to establish. If here the meaning is not shown, and when establishing the measure, if there is no speech, then it can establish the refutation. The sound of 'resemblance to no birth'.

未生前增益所立難因無故。即名似破。若成立時顯此是無。可成能破。若未生前以非勤勇無間所發。難令是常。義準分故。亦似不定。所作相似乃有三種。若難瓶等所作性于聲上無此似不成。若難聲所作性于瓶等無此似相違。若難即此常上亦無是不共故。便似不定。或似喻過。引同法故。何以故。唯取總法建立比量。不取別故。若取別義。決定異故。比量應無。

俱許而求因　　名生過相似　此于喻設難　　名如似喻說

俱許而求因名生過相似者。謂有難言。如前所立。瓶等無常。復何因證。此于喻設難名如似喻說者謂瓶等無常俱許成就而言不成。似喻難故。如似喻說。

無常性恒隨　　名常住相似　此成常性過　　名如宗過說

謂有難言如前所立。聲是無常。此應常與無常性合。諸法自性恒不捨故。亦應是常。此即名為常住相似。是似宗過。增益所立無常性故。以於此中都無有別實無常性依此常轉。即此自性本無今有暫有還無故。名無常。即此分位由自性緣。名無常性。如果性等。

如是過類足目所說多分說為似能破。性最極成故。餘論所說亦應如是分別成立。即此過類但由少分方便異故。建立無邊差別過類。是故不說。如即此中諸有所說增益。損減。有顯。無顯。生理。別喻。品

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本未產生之前，增益所立的『難因』（hetu-sādhanābhāsa，似因），沒有正當理由，就被稱為『似破』（sādhanābhāsa，似能破）。如果成立之時，顯現出這個『難因』是虛無的，就可以成為真正的『能破』（sādhana）。如果在未產生之前，以非勤奮努力且無間斷所引發的『難』，難以使之成為常法，因為義理上已經區分了。這也類似於『不定』（anaikāntika，不決定）。與『所作性』（kṛtakatva，被造性）相似的情況有三種。如果以瓶子等的『所作性』來為難，而聲音上沒有這種『所作性』，這類似於『不成』（asiddha，未證成）。如果以聲音的『所作性』來為難，而瓶子等沒有這種『所作性』，這類似於『相違』（viruddha，相違）。如果以『所作性』來為難常法，常法上也沒有『所作性』，因為這是不共的，因此類似於『不定』。或者類似於『喻過』（dṛṣṭāntābhāsa，似喻），因為引用了共同的法。為什麼呢？因為只取總法來建立比量（anumāna，推論），不取別法。如果取別義，就決定是不同的，比量就應該不存在。『俱許而求因』，名為『生過相似』（utpatti-sādhanābhāsa，生因過）。『此于喻設難』，名為『如似喻說』（dṛṣṭānta-sādhanābhāsa，似喻難）。『俱許而求因』，名為『生過相似』，是指有人提出詰難說：如前面所立的，瓶子等是無常的，還需要什麼原因來證明？『此于喻設難』，名為『如似喻說』，是指瓶子等是無常的，這是雙方都認可的，卻說不能成立，這類似於『似喻難』。『無常性恒隨』，名為『常住相似』（nityasthāyi-sādhanābhāsa，常住似因）。『此成常性過』，名為『如宗過說』（pakṣa-sādhanābhāsa，似宗過）。有人提出詰難說：如前面所立的，聲音是無常的，那麼聲音應該與常性和無常性結合。因為諸法的自性恒常不捨棄，所以聲音也應該是常的。這就叫做『常住相似』，是類似於『似宗過』。這是因為增益了所立的無常性。因為在此之中，根本沒有別的真實的無常性依附於常性而轉變。就是這個自性，本來沒有現在有，暫時有然後又沒有，所以叫做無常。就是這個分位，由自性因緣，叫做無常性，如果性等。像這樣的過失類別，足目（Akṣapāda，印度正理派創始人）所說的大部分都說是類似於『能破』。因為『性』是最極成就的。其他論典所說的也應該這樣分別成立。就是這些過失類別，只是由於少部分方便不同，就建立了無邊的差別過失類別。所以不說了。比如這裡所說的增益、損減、有顯、無顯、生理、別喻、品等。

【English Translation】 English version Before arising, the 'hetu-sādhanābhāsa' (fallacious reason) established by augmentation, without a valid reason, is called 'sādhanābhāsa' (fallacious refutation). If, at the time of establishment, it is revealed that this 'hetu-sādhanābhāsa' is non-existent, it can become a true 'sādhana' (valid proof). If, before arising, a 'difficulty' is raised that is not caused by diligent effort and is uninterrupted, it is difficult to make it permanent, because it is distinguished in meaning. This is also similar to 'anaikāntika' (indecisive). There are three kinds of situations similar to 'kṛtakatva' (createdness). If one raises a difficulty based on the 'createdness' of pots, etc., and this 'createdness' is not present in sound, this is similar to 'asiddha' (unproven). If one raises a difficulty based on the 'createdness' of sound, and this 'createdness' is not present in pots, etc., this is similar to 'viruddha' (contradictory). If one raises a difficulty based on 'createdness' with respect to permanence, permanence also does not have 'createdness', because it is uncommon, and therefore it is similar to 'anaikāntika'. Or it is similar to 'dṛṣṭāntābhāsa' (fallacious example), because a common property is cited. Why? Because only the general property is taken to establish inference (anumāna), not the specific property. If the specific meaning is taken, it is definitely different, and the inference should not exist. 'To seek a reason for what is mutually admitted' is called 'utpatti-sādhanābhāsa' (fallacious reason of origination). 'To raise a difficulty regarding the example' is called 'dṛṣṭānta-sādhanābhāsa' (fallacious example). 'To seek a reason for what is mutually admitted' is called 'utpatti-sādhanābhāsa', which refers to someone raising a difficulty, saying: As previously established, pots, etc., are impermanent, what further reason is needed to prove it? 'To raise a difficulty regarding the example' is called 'dṛṣṭānta-sādhanābhāsa', which refers to the fact that pots, etc., are impermanent, which is mutually admitted, but it is said that it cannot be established, which is similar to a 'fallacious example'. 'Impermanence constantly accompanies' is called 'nityasthāyi-sādhanābhāsa' (fallacious reason of permanence). 'This becomes a fault of permanence' is called 'pakṣa-sādhanābhāsa' (fallacious subject). Someone raises a difficulty, saying: As previously established, sound is impermanent, then sound should combine with both permanence and impermanence. Because the self-nature of all dharmas is constantly unabandoning, sound should also be permanent. This is called 'nityasthāyi-sādhanābhāsa', which is similar to 'pakṣa-sādhanābhāsa'. This is because the established impermanence is augmented. Because in this, there is fundamentally no other real impermanence that relies on permanence and transforms. It is this self-nature that originally did not exist but now exists, temporarily exists and then ceases to exist, so it is called impermanent. It is this aspect that, due to the condition of self-nature, is called impermanence, like fruit-nature, etc. Fault categories like these, mostly described by Akṣapāda (founder of Nyaya school) are similar to 'refutations'. Because 'nature' is the most extremely established. What is said in other treatises should also be established in this way. These fault categories, only due to slight differences in means, establish boundless different fault categories. Therefore, they are not discussed. For example, the augmentation, reduction, explicit, implicit, origination, different example, and qualities mentioned here.

類相似等由此方隅皆應諦察。及應遮遣諸有不善比量方便。作如是說展轉流漫。此于餘論所說無窮故。不更說。又于負處舊因明師諸有所說。或有墮在能破中攝。或有極粗。或有非理。如詭語類故。此不錄。余師宗等所有句義亦應如是分別建立。如是遍計所執分等皆不應理。違所說相。皆名無智。理極遠故。又此類過失言詞我自朋屬論式等中多已制伏。又此方隅我于破古因明論中已具分別。故應且止。

為開智人慧毒藥　　啟斯妙義正理門　諸有外量所迷者　　令越邪途契真義

因明正理門論本

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：對於相似之處等等，所有這些方面都應該仔細審查。並且應該阻止所有不好的比量方法，像這樣說，輾轉流傳。因為這在其他論述中所說的無窮無盡，所以不再多說。還有，對於失敗之處，舊因明（Hetuvidya，古印度邏輯學）的老師們所說的，有些屬於能破（nigrahasthāna，論辯失敗之處）之中，有些非常粗糙，有些不合道理，比如詭辯之類，因此這裡不收錄。其他老師的宗派等所有的語句意義也應該這樣分別建立。像這樣普遍計算的所執分等等，都不合道理，違背所說的相（lakṣaṇa，特徵），都叫做無智，因為道理極其遙遠。而且這類過失言詞，我在自己的朋屬論式等等中，大多已經制伏。而且這些方面，我在破斥古代因明論中已經詳細分別，所以應該暫且停止。

爲了開啟有智慧的人的智慧之毒藥，開啟這美妙意義的正理之門，讓那些被外量（bāhya-pramāṇa，外部的認知方式）所迷惑的人，超越邪途，契合真義。

《因明正理門論本》 English version: All these aspects, such as similarities, etc., should be carefully examined in all these directions. And all unfavorable means of inference should be prevented, saying things like this, spreading around and around. Because what is said about this in other treatises is endless, I will not say more. Also, regarding the points of defeat, what the old Hetuvidya (Hetuvidya, ancient Indian logic) teachers have said, some belong to the nigrahasthāna (nigrahasthāna, points of defeat in debate), some are very crude, and some are unreasonable, such as sophistry. Therefore, these are not included here. All the meanings of the sentences of other teachers' schools, etc., should also be established separately in this way. Like this, the universally calculated apprehended divisions, etc., are all unreasonable and violate the stated lakṣaṇa (lakṣaṇa, characteristic), and are all called ignorance because the reasoning is extremely far-fetched. Moreover, I have mostly subdued these kinds of faulty words in my own affiliated arguments, etc. Furthermore, I have already thoroughly distinguished these aspects in refuting the ancient Hetuvidya treatises, so I should stop here for now.

To open the wisdom-poison for wise people, to open the gate of right reasoning for this wonderful meaning, to enable those who are deluded by bāhya-pramāṇa (bāhya-pramāṇa, external means of cognition) to transcend the wrong path and accord with the true meaning.

The Treatise on the Entrance into the Correct Reasoning of Hetuvidya

【English Translation】 English version: All these aspects, such as similarities, etc., should be carefully examined in all these directions. And all unfavorable means of inference should be prevented, saying things like this, spreading around and around. Because what is said about this in other treatises is endless, I will not say more. Also, regarding the points of defeat, what the old Hetuvidya (Hetuvidya, ancient Indian logic) teachers have said, some belong to the nigrahasthāna (nigrahasthāna, points of defeat in debate), some are very crude, and some are unreasonable, such as sophistry. Therefore, these are not included here. All the meanings of the sentences of other teachers' schools, etc., should also be established separately in this way. Like this, the universally calculated apprehended divisions, etc., are all unreasonable and violate the stated lakṣaṇa (lakṣaṇa, characteristic), and are all called ignorance because the reasoning is extremely far-fetched. Moreover, I have mostly subdued these kinds of faulty words in my own affiliated arguments, etc. Furthermore, I have already thoroughly distinguished these aspects in refuting the ancient Hetuvidya treatises, so I should stop here for now.

To open the 'wisdom-poison' for wise people, to open the gate of right reasoning for this wonderful meaning, to enable those who are deluded by bāhya-pramāṇa (bāhya-pramāṇa, external means of cognition) to transcend the wrong path and accord with the true meaning.

The Treatise on the Entrance into the Correct Reasoning of Hetuvidya