T32n1629_因明正理門論
大正藏第 32 冊 No. 1629 因明正理門論
No. 1629 [No. 1628]
因明正理門論一卷
大域龍菩薩造
大唐三藏法師義凈奉 制譯
論曰。為欲簡持能立能破義中真實故造斯論。頌曰。
宗等多言說能立 是中唯隨自意樂 為所成立說名宗 非彼相違義能遣
論曰。能立過義印真實義。此論今作宗等多言說能立。如是等此言為顯由緒所詮所為。言由緒者。為由利益諸有情等。為緣緒故。言所詮者。謂所詮義即宗等也。所為事者。為欲印定實義故也。若其為顯由緒等果。於此論初置斯言者。由於余處已顯此義故。猶如現量。何謂余顯解論后時由此于初不應說故。若爾非論分故。猶若余言由於余處已顯此義。此因不成。解論后時方曉義者。覺慧先聞于由緒等。若不了知初便不轉。由斯解故方契后時非論分故。此亦不成。設如斯意既非經故復非其釋必非支分。誰釋此經誰經此釋。是故當知。如天授語非其支分。諸論由緒亦成分故。此因有故遠離非成。余復難言勿造斯論無由緒等故。如狂人言為顯此因不成。答曰。所謂能立能過義等。若言如是勿造斯論。述已顯義故。如第二理門惡叉波拖已說宗等相。此因彼言顯不成故。豈非能立等
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 大正藏第 32 冊 No. 1629 因明正理門論
No. 1629 [No. 1628]
因明正理門論一卷
大域龍菩薩（Aryadeva）造
大唐三藏法師義凈（Yijing）奉 制譯
論曰：爲了簡別並把握能立（sādhanā，證明）和能破（dūṣaṇa，反駁）的真實意義，所以撰寫此論。頌曰：
宗（pakṣa，論題）等多言說能立，是中唯隨自意樂； 為所成立說名宗，非彼相違義能遣。
論曰：能立過義印真實義。此論今作宗等多言說能立。如是等此言為顯由緒所詮所為。言由緒者，為由利益諸有情等，為緣緒故。言所詮者，謂所詮義即宗等也。所為事者，為欲印定實義故也。若其為顯由緒等果，於此論初置斯言者，由於余處已顯此義故，猶如現量（pratyakṣa，現量）。何謂余顯解論后時由此于初不應說故。若爾非論分故。猶若余言由於余處已顯此義。此因不成。解論后時方曉義者，覺慧先聞于由緒等。若不了知初便不轉。由斯解故方契后時非論分故。此亦不成。設如斯意既非經故復非其釋必非支分。誰釋此經誰經此釋。是故當知，如天授語非其支分。諸論由緒亦成分故。此因有故遠離非成。余復難言勿造斯論無由緒等故。如狂人言為顯此因不成。答曰：所謂能立能過義等。若言如是勿造斯論。述已顯義故。如第二理門惡叉波拖（Akṣapāda）已說宗等相。此因彼言顯不成故。豈非能立等
【English Translation】 English version T32 No. 1629 Nyayamukha-sastra
No. 1629 [No. 1628]
Nyayamukha-sastra (The Gate to Reasoning)
Composed by Aryadeva (大域龍菩薩)
Translated under Imperial Order by the Tripitaka Master Yijing (義凈) of the Great Tang Dynasty
Treatise: In order to simplify and uphold the true meaning within the establishment (sādhanā) and refutation (dūṣaṇa), this treatise is written. The verse says:
'The proposition (pakṣa) and other statements constitute the establishment, wherein one solely follows one's own inclination; The subject to be established is called the proposition, which cannot be dismissed by meanings contradictory to it.'
Treatise: The establishment surpasses the meaning of validity and embodies true meaning. This treatise now takes the proposition and other statements as the establishment. The phrase 'such as' is used to reveal the cause, the signified, and the purpose. The cause refers to benefiting all sentient beings, serving as the reason. The signified refers to the meaning signified, namely the proposition and so on. The purpose is to ascertain the true meaning. If the cause and other results are to be revealed, placing these words at the beginning of this treatise is because this meaning has already been revealed elsewhere, like direct perception (pratyakṣa). Why should it not be said at the beginning since it is revealed later when explaining the treatise? If so, it is not part of the treatise. Just as other words have already revealed this meaning elsewhere, this cause is not established. Those who understand the meaning only after explaining the treatise have already heard about the cause and so on with their wisdom. If they do not understand, they will not proceed from the beginning. Because of this explanation, it corresponds to the later time, but it is not part of the treatise. This is also not established. Suppose this intention is neither a sutra nor its explanation, it is certainly not a component. Who explains this sutra, and which sutra explains this? Therefore, it should be known that, like the words of the gods, it is not a component. The cause of the treatises is also a component. Because this cause exists, it is far from being unestablished. Others further argue, 'Do not create this treatise because there is no cause and so on.' Like the words of a madman, this is to show that this cause is not established. The answer is: 'The so-called establishment and the meaning of validity and so on.' If it is said, 'Do not create this treatise,' it is because it describes the already revealed meaning. Like the second chapter of logic by Akṣapāda (惡叉波拖), the characteristics of the proposition and so on have already been explained. This cause is shown to be unestablished by those words. Is it not the establishment, etc.?
有印實義。然此論等不印實義故不成過。上來已辯論主標宗。自下本文隨次當釋。宗等多言說能立者。由宗因喻多言辯說。他未了義為開示故。此之多言于論式等說名能立。又以一言說能立者。為顯總成一能立性。由此應知。隨有所闕名能立過。言是中者起論端義或簡持義。是宗等中故名是中。所言唯者。是簡別義。隨自意顯。不顧論宗隨自意立。樂為所立。謂不樂為能成立性。若異此者。說所成立。似因似喻應亦名宗。為顯離余立宗過失故。言非彼相違義能遣。若非違義言聲所遣。如立一切言皆是妄。或先所立宗義相違。如獯狐子立聲為常。又若於中由不共故無有比量為極成言相違義遣。如說懷兔非月有故。又于有法即彼所立為此極成現量比量相違義遣。如有成立聲非所聞瓶是常等。諸有說言。宗因相違名宗違者。此非宗過。以於此中立聲為常。一切皆是無常故者。是喻方便惡立異法由合喻顯非一切故。此因非有。以聲攝在一切中故。或是所立一分義故。此義不成。名因過失。喻亦有過。由異法喻先顯宗無後說因無。應如是言無常一切。是謂非非一切故義。然此倒說一切無常。是故此中喻亦有過。如是已說宗及似宗因與似因多是宗法。此差別相今當顯示。頌曰。
宗法于同品 謂有非有俱 于異品各三
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：有印證真實意義的。然而這些論述等，因為沒有印證真實意義，所以不能構成過失。上面已經辯論了論主的標宗。從下面開始，本文將依次解釋。宗等多種言說是爲了能成立論點，因為通過宗、因、喻多種言辭來辯論說明，是爲了開示他人尚未了解的意義。這些多種言辭在論式等中被稱為『能立』。又用一種言辭來說明能成立論點，是爲了顯示總括起來成為一個能成立的性質。由此應該知道，凡是有所欠缺的，就叫做『能立過』。『是中』的意思是發起論端的意義，或者簡要把握意義。因為在宗等之中，所以叫做『是中』。所說的『唯』字，是簡別意義。隨順自己的意願來顯示，不顧論宗，隨順自己的意願來立論，喜歡作為所要成立的論點，就是不喜歡作為能成立的性質。如果與此不同，就說是所要成立的論點。相似的因、相似的喻，也應該叫做宗。爲了顯示遠離其餘立宗的過失，所以說『非彼相違義能遣』。如果不是違背意義的言辭所排除的，比如立論說『一切言語都是虛妄的』，或者與先前所立的宗義相違背，比如獯狐子立論說『聲音是常住的』。又如果在其中，因為不共同的緣故，沒有比量，與極成之言相違背的意義被排除，比如所說『懷有兔子的不是月亮，因為沒有的緣故』。又對於有法，就是他所立的，與此極成的現量、比量相違背的意義被排除，比如有人成立『聲音不是所聽聞的』，『瓶子是常住的』等等。那些說『宗與因相違背，叫做宗違』的人，這不是宗的過失。因為在此之中，立論說『聲音是常住的』，『一切都是無常的』，這是用比喻來方便地錯誤地設立異法，通過合喻來顯示並非一切。這個因不是有的，因為聲音包含在一切之中。或者因為是所立論點的一部分意義，這個意義不能成立，叫做因的過失。比喻也有過失，因為異法比喻先顯示宗沒有，後來說因沒有，應該這樣說『無常不是一切，這就是不是非一切的意義』。然而這裡顛倒地說『一切無常』，因此這裡比喻也有過失。像這樣已經說了宗和相似宗，因和相似因，大多是宗法。這些差別相，現在應當顯示。頌說： 『宗法于同品，謂有非有俱。于異品各三』
【English Translation】 English version: There are those that seal the true meaning. However, these treatises, etc., do not seal the true meaning, so they do not constitute a fault. The proponent's thesis has already been debated above. From below, this text will explain them in order. The multiple statements of the thesis, etc., are for establishing the argument, because through the multiple words of the thesis, reason, and example, the meaning not yet understood by others is revealed. These multiple words are called 'establishment' in the argument form, etc. Also, using one word to state the establishment is to show that, in summary, it becomes one establishing nature. From this, it should be known that whatever is lacking is called a 'fault of establishment'. 'Is in' means the meaning of initiating the argument, or briefly grasping the meaning. Because it is in the thesis, etc., it is called 'is in'. The word 'only' is for distinguishing meaning. Displaying according to one's own intention, disregarding the thesis, establishing according to one's own intention, liking to be the point to be established, means not liking to be the establishing nature. If it is different from this, it is said to be the point to be established. Similar reasons and similar examples should also be called theses. To show the faults of establishing a thesis apart from the rest, it is said, 'The meaning of non-contradiction can dispel'. If it is not dispelled by words that do not contradict the meaning, such as establishing the thesis that 'all words are false', or contradicting the previously established thesis, such as the Xunhu son establishing the thesis that 'sound is permanent'. Also, if in it, because of being non-common, there is no inference, the meaning contradicting the extremely established words is dispelled, such as saying 'The one with a rabbit is not the moon, because it does not have it'. Also, regarding the subject, that which he establishes, the meaning contradicting this extremely established perception and inference is dispelled, such as someone establishing 'sound is not heard', 'the pot is permanent', and so on. Those who say 'The thesis contradicting the reason is called thesis contradiction', this is not a fault of the thesis. Because in this, establishing the thesis that 'sound is permanent', 'everything is impermanent', this is using an analogy to conveniently and wrongly establish a different dharma, using a concluding analogy to show that it is not everything. This reason does not exist, because sound is included in everything. Or because it is a part of the meaning of the established thesis, this meaning cannot be established, and it is called a fault of the reason. The example also has a fault, because the dissimilar example first shows that the thesis does not exist, and then says that the reason does not exist, it should be said like this: 'Impermanent is not everything, this is the meaning of not being non-everything'. However, here it is reversed and said 'everything is impermanent', therefore here the example also has a fault. Like this, the thesis and similar thesis, the reason and similar reason, have already been spoken of, and most are thesis dharmas. These differences will now be shown. The verse says: 'The thesis dharma in the similar class, means having, not having, and both. In the dissimilar class, each has three.'
有非有及二
論曰。豈不總以樂所成立合說為宗。云何此中乃言宗者唯取有法。此無有失。以其總聲于別亦轉。如言燒衣。或有宗聲唯詮於法。此中宗法。唯取立論及敵論者決定同許。于同品中有非有等亦復如是。何以故。今此唯依證了因故。但由智力了所說義。非如生因由能起用。若爾既取智爲了因。是言便失能成立義。此亦不然。令彼憶念本極成故。是故此中唯取彼此俱定許義。即為善說。由是若有彼此不同許。定非宗法。如有成立聲是無常眼所見故。又若敵論不同許者。如對顯論所作性故。又若猶豫。如依煙等起疑惑時。成立大種和合火有。以現煙故。或於是處有法不成。如成立我其體周遍於一切處。生樂等故。如是所說。一切品類所有言詞皆非能立。于其同品有非有等。亦隨所應當如是說。于當所說因與相違及不定中。唯有共許決定言詞。說名能立。或名能破。非互不成。猶豫言詞復待成故。夫立宗法。理應更以余法為因成立此法。若即成立有法為有。或立為無。如有成立最勝為有。現見別物有總類故。或立為無。不可得故。其義云何。此中但立別物定有。一因為宗不立最勝。故無此失。若立為無。亦假安立不可得法。是故亦無有有法過。若以有法立余有法。或立其法。如以煙立火。或以火立觸。其義
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有非有及二
論曰：難道不是總以樂所成立的合說作為宗旨嗎？為什麼這裡卻說宗旨只取有法呢？這沒有過失，因為總稱也可以用於個別事物。例如說『燒衣』。或者宗旨之聲只詮釋法。這裡的宗法，只取立論者和敵論者都確定認可的。在同品中，有非有等等也是如此。為什麼呢？因為現在這裡只依據證了因的緣故，只是通過智慧的力量了解所說的意義，不像生因那樣通過能起作用。如果這樣，既然取智作爲了因，那麼這句話就失去了能成立的意義。這也不對，是爲了讓他們回憶起原本已經成立的緣故。所以這裡只取彼此都確定認可的意義，就是善說。因此，如果有彼此不同意的地方，一定不是宗法。例如，成立『聲是無常的，因為眼睛所見』。又如果敵論者不同意，例如對勝論者說『因為是所作性』。又如果猶豫不定，例如依據煙等產生疑惑時，成立『大種和合的火存在，因為現在有煙』。或者在那個地方，有法不能成立，例如成立『我』的本體周遍於一切處，因為產生快樂等等。像這樣所說的一切品類，所有的言詞都不能成立。對於同品中的有非有等等，也應當像這樣說。對於將要說的因與相違和不定的情況，只有共同認可的確定言詞，才稱為能成立，或者稱為能破斥，而不是互相不能成立。猶豫不定的言詞還需要進一步成立。建立宗法，理應再用其他法作為因來成立這個法。如果用有法來成立有法，或者成立為無，例如用『現見別物有總類』來成立『最勝』為有，或者用『不可得』來成立為無。這是什麼意思呢？這裡只是成立別物一定存在，一個因作為宗旨，不成立『最勝』，所以沒有這個過失。如果成立為無，也假借安立不可得法，所以也沒有有有法的過失。如果用有法來成立其他的有法，或者成立那個法，例如用煙來成立火，或者用火來成立觸，這是什麼意思呢？
【English Translation】 English version Existence, Non-existence, and Both
Treatise: Shouldn't the combined statement established by pleasure be taken as the overall tenet? Why is it said here that the tenet only takes the existent dharma? There is no fault in this, because the general term can also apply to specific instances, such as saying 'burning clothes.' Or the term 'tenet' only explains the dharma. The 'tenet-dharma' here only takes what is definitively agreed upon by both the proponent and the opponent. In the similar class, existence, non-existence, and so on are also the same. Why? Because here we rely solely on the reason that proves understanding; it is only through the power of wisdom that the meaning of what is said is understood, not like a productive cause that functions by initiating action. If that is the case, since wisdom is taken as the proving reason, then this statement loses the meaning of being able to establish. This is also not the case, because it is to make them recall the originally established fact. Therefore, here we only take the meaning that is definitively agreed upon by both sides, which is a good explanation. Therefore, if there is disagreement between the two sides, it is definitely not a tenet-dharma. For example, establishing 'sound is impermanent because it is seen by the eye.' Also, if the opponent does not agree, such as saying to a Vaisheshika (a school of Indian philosophy) 'because it is produced.' Also, if there is hesitation, such as when doubt arises based on smoke, establishing 'fire exists in the combination of the great elements because there is smoke now.' Or in that place, the existent dharma cannot be established, such as establishing 'the self's essence pervades all places because it produces pleasure, etc.' As such, all categories of statements mentioned are unable to establish. Regarding existence, non-existence, etc., in the similar class, it should be stated accordingly. Regarding the reason that contradicts and is uncertain, which will be discussed later, only the definitively agreed-upon statements are called able to establish or able to refute, not mutually unable to establish. Hesitant statements still need further establishment. Establishing a tenet-dharma should logically use another dharma as a reason to establish this dharma. If an existent dharma is used to establish an existent dharma, or to establish it as non-existent, such as using 'seeing different objects having a general category' to establish 'the Supreme (Ishvara)' as existent, or using 'unobtainable' to establish it as non-existent. What does this mean? Here, only the definite existence of different objects is established, with one reason as the tenet, not establishing 'the Supreme,' so there is no fault. If it is established as non-existent, the unobtainable dharma is also hypothetically established, so there is no fault of having an existent dharma. If an existent dharma is used to establish another existent dharma, or to establish that dharma, such as using smoke to establish fire, or using fire to establish touch, what does this mean?
云何。今於此中非以成立火觸為宗。但為成立此相應物。若不爾者。依煙立火依火立觸。應成宗義一分為因。又於此中非欲成立。火觸有性共知有故。又於此中觀所成故。立法有法非德有德故無有過。重說頌言。
有法非成於有法 及法此非成有法 但由法故成其法 如是成立於有法
論曰。若有成立聲非是常。業等應常故。常應可得故如是云何名為宗法。此說彼過由因宗門。以有所立說應言故。以先立常無形礙故。后但立宗斥彼因過。若如是立聲是無常。所作非常故。常非所作故。此復云何。是喻方便同法異法如其次第宣說其因。宗定隨逐及宗無處定無因故。以於此中由合顯示所作性因。如是此聲定是所作。非非所作。此所作性定是宗法。重說頌言。
說因宗所隨 宗無因不有 依第五顯喻 由合故知因
論曰。由此已釋反破方便以所作性于無常見故。于常不見故。如是成立聲非是常。應非作故。是故順成反破方便非別解因。如破數論我已廣辯。故應且止廣諍傍論。
如是宗法三種差別謂同品。有非有及俱先除及字此中若品與所立法鄰近均等說名同品以一切義皆名品故若所立無說立異品。非與同品相違。或異若相違者。應唯簡別。若別異者應無有因。由此道理所作性故能成
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如何理解？現在在這裡，並非以成立火的觸覺為宗旨，而是爲了成立與此相應的物體。如果不是這樣，根據煙來確立火，根據火來確立觸覺，就應該成為宗義的一部分作為原因。而且在這裡，並非想要成立火的觸覺具有自性，因為這是共知的。而且在這裡，因為觀察所成立的，所以立法有法，非法有法，因此沒有過失。再次用偈頌來說： 『有法不成於有法，以及法，此非成有法，但由法故成其法，如是成立於有法。』 論曰：如果有人成立聲音不是常，那麼業等應該常，常應該可以被感知，像這樣如何稱之為宗法？這是說他的過失，因為因宗門，因為有所立說應該說。因為先立常無形礙，所以後來隻立宗來駁斥他的因的過失。如果像這樣立論，聲音是無常的，因為是所作的，不是常的，所以常不是所作的。這又如何呢？這是比喻的方便，同法異法按照次第宣說其原因。宗的確定跟隨，以及宗沒有的地方一定沒有原因。因為在這裡，通過結合來顯示所作性這個原因。像這樣，這個聲音一定是所作的，不是非所作的。這個所作性一定是宗法。再次用偈頌來說： 『說因宗所隨，宗無因不有，依第五顯喻，由合故知因。』 論曰：由此已經解釋了反駁的方便，因為所作性在無常中可以見到，在常中見不到。像這樣成立聲音不是常的，應該不是所作的。因此，順成反破的方便不是別的解釋原因。如同我破斥數論我已經廣泛辯論過，所以應該停止廣泛爭論旁論。 像這樣，宗法有三種差別，即同品有、非有以及俱有。先去除『及』字，在這裡，如果品與所立法鄰近均等，就叫做同品，因為一切義都叫做品。如果所立無，就說立異品。不是與同品相違。或者不同。如果相違，就應該只是簡別。如果別異，就應該沒有原因。由此道理，所作效能夠成立。
【English Translation】 English version: How to understand? Now, here, it is not to establish the sensation of fire as the main point, but to establish the object corresponding to it. If not, according to smoke to establish fire, according to fire to establish sensation, it should become a part of the thesis as the reason. Moreover, here, it is not intended to establish that the sensation of fire has its own nature, because this is commonly known. Moreover, here, because of observing what is established, therefore establishing the law has the property, not having the property, therefore there is no fault. Again, use a verse to say: 'The property does not establish in the property, as well as the law, this does not establish the property, but because of the law, it establishes its law, thus establishing in the property.' Treatise says: If someone establishes that sound is not permanent, then action etc. should be permanent, permanence should be perceivable, like this, how is it called the thesis property? This is saying his fault, because of the reason and thesis gate, because what is established should be said. Because first establishing permanence has no form or obstruction, so later only establishing the thesis to refute his fault of reason. If establishing like this, sound is impermanent, because it is produced, not permanent, so permanence is not produced. How is this again? This is the convenience of analogy, similar and dissimilar examples explain the reason in order. The determination of the thesis follows, and where the thesis is not, there is certainly no reason. Because here, through combination to show the reason of being produced. Like this, this sound must be produced, not non-produced. This being produced must be the thesis property. Again, use a verse to say: 'Saying the reason follows the thesis, where there is no thesis, there is no reason, relying on the fifth showing analogy, because of combination, knowing the reason.' Treatise says: From this, the convenience of refutation has already been explained, because the being produced can be seen in impermanence, and cannot be seen in permanence. Like this, establishing that sound is not permanent, should not be produced. Therefore, the convenience of conforming and refuting is not another explanation of the reason. Just like I have widely debated refuting Samkhya, so it should stop widely arguing about side topics. Like this, the thesis property has three kinds of differences, namely, similar class existing, non-existing, and both existing. First remove the word 'and', here, if the class is close and equal to the established law, it is called similar class, because all meanings are called class. If what is established is not, then say establishing dissimilar class. It is not contrary to the similar class. Or different. If contrary, then it should only be distinguishing. If different, then there should be no reason. From this principle, the being produced is able to establish.
無常及無我等不相違故。若法能成相違所立。是相違過即名似因。如無違法相違亦爾。所成法無定無有故。非如瓶等因成猶豫于彼展轉無中有故。以所作性現見離瓶于衣等有非離無常于無我等此因有故。云何別法于別處轉。由彼相似不說異名言即是此故無有失。若不說異云何此因說名宗法。此中但說定是宗法。不欲說言唯是宗法。若爾同品應亦名宗。不然別處說所成故因必無異方成比量故不相似。又此一一各有三種。謂於一切同品有中。于其異品或有非有及有非有。于其同品非有及俱。各有如是三種差別。若無常宗全無異品對不立有虛空等論。云何得說彼處此無。若彼無有于彼不轉全無有疑故無此過。如是合成九種宗法。隨其次第略辯其相。謂立聲常所量性故。或立無常所作性故。或立勤勇無間所發無常性故。或立為常所作性故。或立為常所聞性故。或立為常勤勇無間所發性故。或非勤勇無間所發無常性故。或立無常勤勇無間所發性故。或立為常無觸對故。如是九種二頌所攝。頌曰。
常無常勤勇 恒住堅牢性 非勤遷不變 由所量等九 所量作無常 作性聞勇發 無常勇無觸 依常性等九
論曰。如是分別。說名為因。相違不定。故本頌言。
于同有及二 在異無是因 翻此名相
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 無常（anitya，impermanence）和無我（anatma，non-self）等並不互相違背。如果一個法能夠成立與所立的相違，這就是相違過失，也叫做似因。如果沒有違法相違的情況，也是如此。因為所要成立的法沒有確定性，所以沒有這種過失。不像瓶子等，因為因成立了猶豫，在瓶子上輾轉沒有中間狀態。因為所作性（krtakatva，being produced）明顯可見，離開瓶子，在衣服等事物上有，而不是離開無常（anitya，impermanence）在無我（anatma，non-self）等上有，所以這個因是成立的。 如何一個別法在別處起作用？因為它們相似，不說不同的名稱，就認為它們是同一個，所以沒有過失。如果不說不同，那麼這個因如何被稱為宗法（dharma of the subject）？這裡只是說確定是宗法，不是想要說只有是宗法。如果這樣，同品（sapaksha，similar instances）也應該被稱為宗。不是這樣的，因為在別處說了所要成立的法，所以因一定沒有不同的方面，才能成立比量（anumana，inference），所以不相似。而且這每一個都有三種情況，即在一切同品（sapaksha，similar instances）中有，在異品（vipaksha，dissimilar instances）中或者有或者沒有，以及有和沒有。在同品（sapaksha，similar instances）中沒有以及俱有。各有這樣的三種差別。如果無常（anitya，impermanence）作為宗，完全沒有異品（vipaksha，dissimilar instances）可以用來對立，例如虛空等，就無法建立論點。如何能說在那個地方這個沒有？如果那個地方沒有，在那個地方不起作用，完全沒有懷疑，所以沒有這個過失。 這樣合成了九種宗法（dharma of the subject）。按照次序簡略地辨別它們的相狀。即立聲是常，因為是所量性（prameyatva，measurability）；或者立聲是無常（anitya，impermanence），因為是所作性（krtakatva，being produced）；或者立勤勇無間所發是無常性（anitya，impermanence）；或者立為常，因為是所作性（krtakatva，being produced）；或者立為常，因為是所聞性（shravanatva，audibility）；或者立為常，因為是勤勇無間所發性；或者立為非勤勇無間所發是無常性（anitya，impermanence）；或者立為無常（anitya，impermanence），因為是勤勇無間所發性；或者立為常，因為沒有觸對（apratighata，non-resistance）。這九種情況被兩首偈頌概括。 偈頌說： 常無常勤勇，恒住堅牢性 非勤遷不變，由所量等九 所量作無常，作性聞勇發 無常勇無觸，依常性等九 論曰：像這樣分別，說名為因，相違不定。所以本頌說： 于同有及二，在異無是因 翻此名相
【English Translation】 English version Impermanence (anitya) and non-self (atman) are not mutually contradictory. If a dharma can establish something contradictory to what is being established, that is a contradictory fallacy, also called a pseudo-reason. If there is no violation of contradiction, it is the same. Because the dharma to be established has no certainty, there is no such fault. It is not like a pot, etc., because the reason establishes doubt, and there is no middle ground in the pot's existence. Because being produced (krtakatva) is clearly visible, it exists apart from the pot, in things like clothes, etc., and not apart from impermanence (anitya) in non-self (atman), etc., so this reason is valid. How does a separate dharma operate in a separate place? Because they are similar, not calling them by different names, it is assumed that they are the same, so there is no fault. If they are not called different, how can this reason be called a property of the subject (dharma of the subject)? Here it is only said that it is definitely a property of the subject, not that it is only a property of the subject. If so, similar instances (sapaksha) should also be called properties. It is not like that, because the dharma to be established is spoken of in a separate place, so the reason must not have different aspects in order to establish inference (anumana), so it is not similar. Moreover, each of these has three situations, namely, existing in all similar instances (sapaksha), existing or not existing in dissimilar instances (vipaksha), and both existing and not existing. There are three such differences in similar instances (sapaksha). If impermanence (anitya) is the subject, and there are no dissimilar instances (vipaksha) to oppose it, such as space, etc., then the argument cannot be established. How can it be said that this does not exist in that place? If it does not exist in that place, it does not operate in that place, and there is no doubt at all, so there is no fault. Thus, nine kinds of properties of the subject (dharma of the subject) are synthesized. Briefly distinguish their characteristics in order. That is, sound is established as permanent because it is measurable (prameyatva); or sound is established as impermanent (anitya) because it is produced (krtakatva); or what is produced without interruption by effort is established as impermanent (anitya); or it is established as permanent because it is produced (krtakatva); or it is established as permanent because it is audible (shravanatva); or it is established as permanent because it is produced without interruption by effort; or what is not produced without interruption by effort is established as impermanent (anitya); or it is established as impermanent (anitya) because it is produced without interruption by effort; or it is established as permanent because it has no resistance (apratighata). These nine situations are summarized in two verses. The verses say: 'Permanent, impermanent, effort, constant, firm nature' 'Non-effort, changing, unchanging, by measurability, etc., nine' 'Measurable, produced, impermanent, produced nature, audible, effort-produced' 'Impermanent, effort, non-resistance, based on permanent nature, etc., nine' Treatise says: Such distinctions are called reasons, contradictory and uncertain. Therefore, the original verse says: 'Existing in the same and two, absent in the different is the reason' 'Reversing this is the characteristic'
違 所餘皆不定
此中唯有二種名因。謂于同品一切遍有異品遍無。及於同品通有非有。異品遍無。于初后三各取中一。復唯二種說名相違。能倒立故。謂于異品有及二種。于其同品一切遍無。第二三中取初后二。所餘五種因及相違皆不決定。是疑因義。又於一切因等相中。皆說所說一數同類勿說二相。更互相違共集一處猶為因等。或於一相同作事故成不遍因。理應四種。名不定因二俱有故。所聞云何由不共故。以若不共所成立法。所有差別遍攝一切。皆是疑因。唯彼有性彼所攝故。一向離故。諸有皆共無簡別因。此唯于彼俱不相違是疑因性。若於其中俱分是有亦是定因。簡別余故。是名差別。若對許有聲性是常此應成因。若於爾時無有顯示。所作性等是無常因。容有此義。然俱可得一義相違不容有故是猶豫因。又於此中現教力勝故。應依此思求決定攝上。頌言。
若法是不共 共決定相違 遍一切于彼 皆是疑因性 邪證法有法 自性或差別 此成相違因 若無所違害 觀宗法審察 若所樂違害 成躊躇顛倒 異此無似因
諭曰。如是已辯因及似因。喻及似喻我今當說。頌曰。
說因宗所隨 宗無因不有 此二名譬喻 余皆此相似
論曰。喻有二種。同
法異法。同法者。謂立聲無常勤勇無間所發性故。以諸勤勇無間所發皆見無常猶如瓶等。異法者。謂諸有常住見。非勤勇無間所發。如虛空等。前是遮詮后唯止濫。由合及離比度義故。由是雖對不立實有。太虛空等而得顯示。無有宗處無因義成。復以何緣第一說因宗所隨逐。第二說宗無因不有。不說因無宗不有耶。由如是說。能顯示因同品定有異品遍無非顛倒說。又說頌言。
應以非作證其常 或以無常成所作 若爾應成非所說 不遍非樂等合離
論曰。如是已說。二法合離順反兩喻。余此相似是似喻義。何謂此余。謂於是處所立能立及不同品雖有合離而顛倒說。或於是處不作合離。唯現所立能立俱有異品俱無。如是二法。或有隨一不成不遣。或有二俱不成不遣。如立聲常無觸對故。同法喻言。諸無觸對見彼皆常。如業如極微如瓶等。異法喻言。謂諸無常見有觸對。如極微如業如虛空等。由此已說同法喻中有法不成。謂對不許常虛空等為要具二。譬喻言詞方成能立。為如其因但隨說一。若就正理應具說二。由是具足顯示所立不離其因。以具顯示同品定有異品遍無。能正對治相違不定。若有於此一分已成。隨說一分亦成能立。若如其聲兩義同許俱不須說。或由義準一能顯二。又比量中唯見此理。若所比
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『法異法』（不同之法）。『同法者』（相同之法），是指建立聲音是無常的，因為它是通過努力和不間斷的因緣所產生的。所有通過努力和不間斷的因緣所產生的，都被認為是無常的，就像瓶子等事物一樣。『異法者』（相異之法），是指那些認為事物是常住不變的觀點，它們不是通過努力和不間斷的因緣所產生的，比如虛空等。前者是遮詮（通過否定來表達），後者只是爲了防止混淆。這是因為通過組合和分離來進行比較和推論。因此，雖然針對的是太虛空等事物，但並沒有確立它們是真實存在的，而是爲了顯示沒有宗（主題），沒有因（理由）的意義。那麼，又是什麼原因導致首先說因（hetu，理由）是宗（paksa，主題）所隨逐的，其次說宗沒有因就不成立，而不是說因沒有宗就不成立呢？因為這樣說，能夠顯示因在同品（sapaksa，相似例子）中是確定的，在異品（vipaksa，相異例子）中是普遍不存在的，而不是顛倒的說法。還有頌文說：
『應該用非所作來證明其常住，或者用無常來證明所作。如果這樣，就應該成為非所說，不普遍，與非樂等組合和分離。』
論曰：像這樣已經說了，兩種法的組合和分離，以及順向和反向的兩種比喻。其餘與此相似的，是相似比喻的意義。什麼是『此余』呢？是指在所建立的能立（sadhana，論證）以及不同品中，雖然有組合和分離，但卻是顛倒的說法。或者在沒有進行組合和分離的地方，只呈現所立和能立都存在，或者異品都不存在。像這樣的兩種法，或者有隨一不成（asiddha，未證成）或不遣（anaikantika，不定），或者有兩者都不成或不遣。比如，立論聲音是常住的，因為它是沒有觸對的。同法喻（sapaksa-drstanta，同品例）說：凡是沒有觸對的，都被認為是常住的，比如業（karma），比如極微（paramanu），比如瓶子等。異法喻（vipaksa-drstanta，異品例）說：凡是無常的，都被認為是有觸對的，比如極微，比如業，比如虛空等。由此已經說明，在同法喻中，有法不成。也就是說，對於不承認常住的虛空等，需要具備兩種要素。譬喻的言詞才能構成能立。是像其因那樣，只隨著說一種嗎？如果就正理而言，應該完整地說兩種。因此，完整地顯示了所立不離其因，因為完整地顯示了在同品中是確定的，在異品中是普遍不存在的，能夠正確地對治相違和不定。如果有人在此一部分已經成立，隨著說一部分也能構成能立。如果像其聲音那樣，兩種意義都認可，那麼兩者都不需要說。或者通過意義的準則，一個能夠顯示兩個。而且在比量（anumana，推論）中只看到這個道理。如果所比
【English Translation】 English version '法異法' (Different dharmas). '同法者' (Same dharmas) refers to establishing that sound is impermanent because it is produced by effort and uninterrupted causes and conditions. All that is produced by effort and uninterrupted causes and conditions is seen to be impermanent, like a pot and other things. '異法者' (Different dharmas) refers to those views that hold things to be permanent and unchanging, which are not produced by effort and uninterrupted causes and conditions, such as space. The former is apoha (expressed through negation), while the latter is only to prevent confusion. This is because comparison and inference are made through combination and separation. Therefore, although it is directed at things like great empty space, it does not establish that they are truly existent, but rather to show that there is no paksa (subject), no hetu (reason). Then, what is the reason that the hetu (reason) is said to be followed by the paksa (subject) first, and secondly that the paksa cannot be established without the hetu, rather than saying that the hetu cannot be established without the paksa? Because saying it this way can show that the hetu is definitely present in the sapaksa (similar instances) and universally absent in the vipaksa (dissimilar instances), rather than a reversed statement. There is also a verse that says:
'One should prove its permanence with the unmade, or prove the made with impermanence. If so, it should become the unsaid, not pervasive, combined and separated with non-pleasure, etc.'
The treatise says: As has been said, the combination and separation of two dharmas, and the two metaphors of direct and reverse. The rest similar to this are the meanings of similar metaphors. What is 'the rest'? It refers to the established sadhana (proof) and different classes where, although there is combination and separation, the statements are reversed. Or in places where there is no combination and separation, only the paksa and sadhana are presented as both existing, or both non-existent. Such two dharmas, either one may be asiddha (unproven) or anaikantika (uncertain), or both may be unproven or uncertain. For example, the proposition that sound is permanent because it is without contact. The sapaksa-drstanta (example in similar instances) says: Whatever is without contact is considered permanent, such as karma, such as paramanu (atoms), such as pots, etc. The vipaksa-drstanta (example in dissimilar instances) says: Whatever is impermanent is considered to have contact, such as paramanu, such as karma, such as space, etc. From this, it has been explained that in the sapaksa-drstanta, there is a dharma that is unproven. That is to say, for those who do not acknowledge permanent space, etc., it is necessary to have both elements. The words of the metaphor can then constitute the sadhana. Is it like its hetu, only following and saying one? If according to proper reasoning, both should be said completely. Therefore, it completely shows that the paksa does not depart from its hetu, because it completely shows that it is definite in the sapaksa and universally absent in the vipaksa, which can correctly counteract the contradictory and uncertain. If someone has already established a part of this, following and saying a part can also constitute the sadhana. If, like its sound, both meanings are acknowledged, then both do not need to be said. Or through the principle of meaning, one can show two. Moreover, only this principle is seen in anumana (inference). If what is compared
處此相審定。于余同類念此定有。于彼無處念此遍無。是故由此生決定解。故本頌言。
如自決定已 悕他決定生 說宗法相應 所立余遠離
論曰。為于所比顯宗法性故說因言。為顯於此不相離性故說喻言。為顯所比故說宗言。于所比中除此更無其餘支分。由是遮遣余審察等及與合結。若爾喻言應非異分。顯因義故。事雖實爾。然此因言唯為顯了是宗法性。非為顯了同品異品有性無性。故須別說同異喻言。若唯因言所詮表義說名為因。斯有何失。復有何得。別說喻分是名為得。應如世間所說方便。與其因義都不相應。若爾何失。此說但應類所立義無有功能非能立義。由彼但說所作性故。所類同法不說能立所成立義。又因喻別此有所立。同法異法終不能顯。因與所立不相離性。是故但有類所立義然無功能。何故無能。以同喻中不必宗法宗義相類。此復余譬所成立故。應成無窮。又不必定有諸品類。非異品中不顯無性。有所簡別能為譬喻。故說頌言。
若因唯所立 或差別相類 譬喻應無窮 及遮遣異品
論曰。世間但顯宗因異品。同處有性為異法喻。非宗無處因不有性故定無能。若唯宗法是因性者。其有不定應亦成因。云何具有所立能立及異品法二種譬喻而有此失。若於爾時所立異
品非一種類便有此失。如初后三各最後喻故定三相唯為顯因。由是道理雖一切分皆能為因顯了所立。然唯一分且說為因。如是略說宗等及似。即此多言說名能立及似能立。隨其所應為開悟他。說此能立及似能立。為自開悟唯有現量及與比量。彼聲喻等攝在此中故唯二量由此能了自共相故。非離此二別有所量爲了知彼更立餘量。故本頌言。
現量除分別 余所說因生
論曰。此中現量除分別者。謂若有智於色等境。遠離一切種類名言。假立無異諸門分別。由不共緣現現別轉故名現量。故說頌言。
有法非一相 根非一切行 唯內證離言 是色根境界
論曰。意地亦有離諸分別唯證行轉。又于貪等諸自證分。諸修定者離教分別。皆是現量。又於此中無別量果。以即此體似義生故。似有用故。假說為量。若於貪等諸自證分亦是現量。何故此中除分別智。不遮此中自證現量。無分別故。但於此中了余境分不名現量。由此即說憶念比度悕求疑智惑亂智等。于鹿愛等皆非現量。隨先所受分別轉故。如是一切世俗有中瓶等數等舉等有性瓶性等智。皆似現量。于實有中作余行相。假合余義分別轉故。
已說現量。當說比量。余所說因生者。謂智是前智。余從如所說能立因生。是緣彼義。此有二種。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 品類不同也會有這種過失。例如，初、中、后三個階段各自的最後一個比喻，都是爲了確定三相（tri-lakshana，因明的三個條件）僅僅是爲了顯示『因』（hetu，理由、原因）。由於這個道理，雖然一切部分都能作為『因』來顯現所要成立的『宗』（paksha，論題），但只說其中一部分作為『因』。簡略地說，『宗』等以及相似的『宗』等就是這樣。用很多言辭來說明，就叫做『能立』（sadhana，論證）以及相似的『能立』。爲了啓發他人，應根據具體情況說明『能立』和相似的『能立』。爲了自我開悟，只有現量（pratyaksha，直接認知）和比量（anumana，推論認知）。聲音、比喻等都包含在其中，所以只有這兩種量。因為它們能夠了解自相（svalakshana，事物自身獨特的性質）和共相（samanya-lakshana，事物共有的性質）。除了這兩種量之外，沒有其他的量。爲了瞭解它們，再建立其他的量是沒有必要的。所以本頌（karika，偈頌）說：
『現量排除分別，其餘由所說的因產生。』
論曰：這裡所說的『現量排除分別』，是指有智慧的人對於色等境界，遠離一切種類、名言，以及虛假的、沒有差別的各種分別。由於不與其他事物共同作為條件，各自獨立地發生作用，所以叫做『現量』。所以頌（karika，偈頌）中說：
『有法不是單一的相，根不是一切行，唯有內在的證悟遠離言語，才是色根的境界。』
論曰：意地（manodhatu，意識界）也有遠離各種分別，唯有證悟才能發生作用的情況。此外，對於貪等各種自證分（sva-samvedana，自我意識），修習禪定的人遠離教義的分別，這些都是現量。而且，這裡沒有其他的量果（pramana-phala，量所產生的結果），因為它的本體就類似於義（artha，對像），並且類似於有用之物，所以姑且說它是量。如果對於貪等各種自證分也是現量，為什麼這裡要排除分別智（vikalpa-jnana，分別性的智慧）？因為這裡沒有遮止自證現量，因為它沒有分別。只是在這裡，對於其他境界的部分，不稱為現量。因此，憶念（smriti，回憶）、比度（upama，類比）、希求（prarthana，希望）、疑智（vichikitsa-jnana，懷疑的智慧）、惑亂智（bhrama-jnana，迷惑的智慧）等，對於鹿的愛戀等，都不是現量，因為它們是隨著先前所接受的分別而產生的。像這樣，一切世俗存在中的瓶子等數量等，以及舉起等動作所具有的性質，瓶子的性質等智慧，都類似於現量。因為它們在真實存在中，以其他的行相（akara，形式）發生作用，虛假地結合其他的意義，進行分別。
已經說了現量，下面應當說比量。『其餘由所說的因產生』，是指智慧是前一智慧的延續，從如所說的能立因產生，是緣于那個意義。這有兩種。
【English Translation】 English version This error also occurs due to differences in categories. For example, the last analogy in each of the initial, middle, and final stages serves to establish that the three characteristics (tri-lakshana, the three conditions of inference) are solely for revealing the 'hetu' (reason, cause). Because of this principle, although all parts can serve as a 'hetu' to manifest the 'paksha' (thesis) to be established, only one part is spoken of as the 'hetu'. Briefly speaking, 'paksha' and similar 'pakshas' are like this. Elaborating with many words is called 'sadhana' (proof) and similar 'sadhanas'. To enlighten others, one should explain 'sadhana' and similar 'sadhanas' according to the situation. For self-enlightenment, there are only direct perception (pratyaksha) and inference (anumana). Sound, analogies, etc., are included within these, so there are only these two means of valid cognition. Because they can understand the unique characteristics (svalakshana, the unique properties of things themselves) and the common characteristics (samanya-lakshana, the shared properties of things). There is no other means of valid cognition besides these two. To understand them, it is unnecessary to establish other means of valid cognition. Therefore, the verse (karika) says:
'Direct perception excludes conceptualization; the rest arises from the stated reason.'
Commentary: 'Direct perception excludes conceptualization' means that a wise person, regarding objects such as form, is free from all kinds of categories, names, and falsely established, undifferentiated conceptualizations. Because it operates independently, not jointly with other things as a condition, it is called 'direct perception'. Therefore, the verse (karika) says:
'The object is not a single aspect, the sense faculty is not all-acting, only inner realization, free from words, is the realm of the form faculty.'
Commentary: The mind element (manodhatu, the realm of consciousness) also has instances where it operates without various conceptualizations, only through realization. Furthermore, regarding the self-cognized aspects (sva-samvedana, self-awareness) of things like greed, those who practice meditation are free from doctrinal conceptualizations; these are all direct perception. Moreover, there is no separate result of valid cognition (pramana-phala, the result produced by valid cognition) here, because its essence is similar to the object (artha), and similar to something useful, so it is tentatively called a means of valid cognition. If the self-cognized aspects of things like greed are also direct perception, why is conceptual wisdom (vikalpa-jnana, conceptual wisdom) excluded here? Because it does not negate self-cognized direct perception, as it is without conceptualization. It is just that here, regarding the parts of other realms, it is not called direct perception. Therefore, recollection (smriti, memory), comparison (upama, analogy), desire (prarthana, hope), doubting wisdom (vichikitsa-jnana, wisdom of doubt), deluded wisdom (bhrama-jnana, wisdom of delusion), etc., regarding the love for deer, etc., are not direct perception, because they arise following previously accepted conceptualizations. Like this, everything in mundane existence, such as the number of bottles, etc., and the properties possessed by actions like lifting, the wisdom of the nature of the bottle, etc., are similar to direct perception. Because they operate with other forms (akara, forms) in real existence, falsely combining other meanings, and conceptualizing.
Having discussed direct perception, we should now discuss inference. 'The rest arises from the stated reason' means that wisdom is a continuation of the previous wisdom, arising from the stated proof, and is related to that meaning. This has two types.
謂于所比審觀察智。從現量生或比量生。及憶此因與所立宗不相離念。由是成前舉所說力念因同品定有等故。是近及遠比度因故俱名比量。此依作具作者而說。如是應知。悟他比量亦不離此得成能立。故說頌言。
一事有多法 相非一切行 唯由簡別余 表定能隨逐 如是能相者 亦有眾多法 唯不越所相 能表示非余
論曰。何故此中與前現量。別異建立為現二門。此處亦應于其比果說為比量。彼處亦應于其現因說為現量。俱不遮止。已說能立及似能立。當說能破及似能破。頌曰。
能破闕等言 似破謂諸類
論曰。此中能破闕等言者。謂前所說闕等言詞諸分過失。彼一一言皆名能破。由彼一一能顯前宗非善說故。所言似破謂諸類者。諸同法等相似過類名似能破。由彼多分于善比量。為迷惑他而施設故。不能顯示前宗不善。由彼非理而破斥故。及能破處而施設故。是彼類故說名過類。若於非理立比量中如是施設。或不了知比量過失。或即為顯彼過失門。不名過類。頌曰。
示現異品故 由同法異立 同法相似余 由異法分別 差別名分別 應一成無異 顯所立余因 名可得相似 難義別疑因 故說名猶豫 說異品義故 非愛名義準
論曰。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 所謂對於所比較的事物進行審慎觀察的智慧，是從現量（Pratyaksha，直接認知）產生，還是從比量（Anumana，推論認知）產生？以及憶念此原因與所立的宗（Paksha，論題）不相分離的念頭。由於這樣才能成就前面所說的力量，即憶念原因在同品（Sapaksha，相似實例）中必定存在等等。這是近距離和遠距離推度的原因，所以都叫做比量。這是依據作用的工具和作用者來說的，應當這樣理解。領悟他人的比量，也不能離開這些才能成就有效的論證。所以說偈頌： 『一件事物有多種屬性，這些屬性並非全部相關。只有通過區分其餘屬性，才能確定其必然伴隨性。』 『同樣，能相（Lakshana，特徵）也有眾多屬性，只有不超出所相（Lakshya，被定義的事物），才能表示它而非其他。』 論曰：為什麼這裡將比量與前面的現量區別開來，建立為現量和比量兩個門類？這裡也應該將比量的結果說成是比量，那裡也應該將現量的原因說成是現量，這樣做都是可以的。前面已經說了能立（Sadhana，論證）和似能立（Sadhanabhasa，偽論證），下面將要說能破（Dushana，反駁）和似能破（Dushanabhasa，偽反駁）。偈頌說： 『能破是指闕等言，似破是指諸類。』 論曰：這裡所說的能破，是指前面所說的闕等言詞的各種過失。這些言詞都叫做能破，因為它們能夠顯示前面的宗不是善說的。所說的似破，是指諸如同法等相似的過失類別，叫做似能破。因為它們大多是爲了迷惑他人而施設的，不能顯示前面的宗是不善的。由於它們並非合理地進行反駁，並且在能夠進行反駁的地方施設，所以是那些過失的類別，因此叫做過類。如果在非理性的論證中這樣施設，或者不瞭解論證的過失，或者正是爲了顯示那些過失的途徑，就不叫做過類。偈頌說： 『由於顯示異品（Vipaksha，相異實例），通過同法（Sadharmya，相似屬性）和異法（Vaidharmya，相異屬性）建立。同法相似的其餘，通過異法來區分。差別叫做分別，應該一致而沒有差異。顯示所立之外的原因，叫做可得相似。』 『難以理解的意義，以及不同的懷疑原因，所以叫做猶豫。說明異品的意義，因為不喜愛，所以叫做義準。』 論曰：
【English Translation】 English version: That which is called discerning wisdom, which carefully observes what is being compared, arises from direct perception (Pratyaksha) or from inference (Anumana)? And the recollection of this reason being inseparable from the thesis (Paksha) being established. It is because of this that the aforementioned power is achieved, namely, the recollection that the reason is definitely present in similar instances (Sapaksha), and so on. This is the reason for both near and far inferences, hence both are called inference. This is spoken of in terms of the instrument and the agent of action; thus, it should be understood. Understanding another's inference cannot be achieved without these, thus establishing a valid argument. Therefore, it is said in verse: 'A thing has many attributes; not all of these attributes are relevant. Only by distinguishing the remaining attributes can one determine its necessary concomitance.' 'Likewise, a characteristic (Lakshana) also has many attributes; only by not exceeding the characterized (Lakshya) can it indicate it and not others.' Commentary: Why is inference established here as a separate category from the preceding direct perception, establishing two categories of direct perception and inference? Here, too, the result of inference should be called inference, and there, too, the cause of direct perception should be called direct perception; both are not prohibited. Having already spoken of valid arguments (Sadhana) and pseudo-arguments (Sadhanabhasa), we will now speak of refutations (Dushana) and pseudo-refutations (Dushanabhasa). The verse says: 'Refutations refer to deficiencies, and pseudo-refutations refer to fallacies.' Commentary: Here, refutations refer to the various faults of deficient statements mentioned earlier. Each of these statements is called a refutation because each of them can show that the preceding thesis is not well-stated. Pseudo-refutations refer to similar types of faults, such as similar properties, and are called pseudo-refutations because they are mostly employed to confuse others and cannot show that the preceding thesis is not well-stated. Because they do not refute reasonably and are employed where refutation is possible, they are types of those faults and are therefore called fallacies. If they are employed in an irrational argument, or if the faults of the argument are not understood, or if they are used to reveal those faults, they are not called fallacies. The verse says: 'Because it shows dissimilar instances (Vipaksha), it is established through similarity (Sadharmya) and dissimilarity (Vaidharmya). The remaining similar properties are distinguished by dissimilarity. Difference is called distinction; it should be consistent and without difference.' 'Showing a reason other than what is being established is called obtainable similarity. Difficult to understand meanings, and different reasons for doubt, are therefore called hesitation. Explaining the meaning of dissimilar instances, because of dislike, is called implication.' Commentary:
此中示現異品故由同法異立同法相似者。顛倒成立故名異立。此依作具作者而說。同法即是相似故名同法相似。一切攝立中相似過類故。言相似者是不男聲。能破相應故。或隨結頌故。云何同法相似。能破于所作中說能作故。傳生起故。作如是說。后隨所應亦如是說。今於此中由同法喻顛倒成立。是故說名同法相似。如有成立聲是無常勤勇無間所發性故。此以虛空為異法喻。有顯虛空為同法喻。無質等故立聲為常。如是即此所說因中瓶應為同法。而異品虛空說為同法。由是說為同法相似。余由異法者。謂異法相似。是前同法相似之餘。示現異品由異法喻顛倒而立。二種喻中如前安立瓶為異法。是故說為異法相似。分別差別名分別者。前說示現等故。今說分別差別故。應知分別同法差別。謂如前說瓶為同法。于彼同法有可燒等差別義故。是則瓶應無常非聲。聲應是常不可燒等有差別故。由此分別顛倒所立。是故說名分別相似所言應一成無異者。示現同法前已說故。由此與彼應成一故。彼者是誰。以更不聞異方便故。相鄰近故。應知是宗成無異者成無異過。即由此言義可知故不說其名。是誰與誰共成無異不別說故。即此一切與彼一切。如有說言。若見瓶等有同法故。即合余法亦無別異。一切瓶法聲應皆有。是則一切更互法
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 由於其中顯示了不同的類別，因此通過相同的屬性但不同的方式建立，這種相同的屬性相似的情況，是因為顛倒的成立而被稱為『異立』（不同方式的建立）。這是根據工具（作具）和作者（作者）來說的。『同法』（相同屬性）就是相似的，所以被稱為『同法相似』（相同屬性的相似）。在一切攝立中，這是一種相似的錯誤類別。所說的『相似』是指不確定的聲音，因為它能夠破壞相應的關係。或者，它也可以是跟隨結論的頌歌。什麼是『同法相似』呢？它能夠破壞在所作中說能作的情況，因為它傳遞了生起。像這樣說，之後也應該根據情況這樣說。現在，在這裡，由於通過相同的屬性比喻顛倒地成立，所以被稱為『同法相似』。例如，有人成立『聲音是無常的，因為它是通過勤奮努力無間斷地產生的』（聲是無常勤勇無間所發性故）。這裡以虛空作為『異法喻』（不同屬性的比喻）。有人卻顯示虛空作為『同法喻』（相同屬性的比喻），因為虛空沒有實體等等，從而成立『聲音是常』。像這樣，這裡所說的因中，瓶子應該作為『同法』（相同屬性），而異類的虛空卻被說成是『同法』（相同屬性）。因此，這被稱為『同法相似』（相同屬性的相似）。 其餘的通過『異法』（不同屬性）來建立的情況，被稱為『異法相似』（不同屬性的相似）。這是前面『同法相似』（相同屬性的相似）的剩餘情況。顯示不同的類別，是通過『異法喻』（不同屬性的比喻）顛倒地建立。在兩種比喻中，像前面那樣安立瓶子作為『異法』（不同屬性），因此被稱為『異法相似』（不同屬性的相似）。 『分別差別』（區分不同）被稱為『分別』（區分），是因為前面說了顯示等等，現在說區分不同，所以應該知道區分相同的屬性的差別。例如，像前面所說，瓶子作為『同法』（相同屬性），在那個相同的屬性中，有可燃燒等等不同的意義。那麼，瓶子應該是無常的，而不是聲音。聲音應該是常的，因為有不可燃燒等等的差別。由此，通過區分顛倒地建立，所以被稱為『分別相似』（區分的相似）。 所說的『應該成為一個，沒有不同』，是因為顯示相同的屬性在前面已經說過了。由此，與那個應該成為一個。那個是誰呢？因為不再聽到其他方便，因為相鄰近，所以應該知道這是宗派成為沒有不同的情況，即成為沒有不同的過失。因為可以通過這個言語的意義知道，所以不說它的名字。是誰與誰共同成為沒有不同，沒有分別說明。即這個一切與那個一切。例如，有人說，如果看到瓶子等等有相同的屬性，那麼，結合其他的屬性也沒有區別。一切瓶子的屬性，聲音應該都有。那麼，一切相互的屬性。
【English Translation】 English version Because different categories are shown within this, it is established through the same property but in a different way. This similarity of the same property, due to the inverted establishment, is called 'Vaidharmya-sthāpana-hetu' (establishment through different means). This is spoken according to the instrument (cause) and the agent (author). 'Sādharmya' (same property) is the same as similarity, so it is called 'Sādharmya-samāna' (similarity of the same property). In all comprehensions, this is a similar type of error. What is called 'similarity' refers to an uncertain sound, because it can destroy the corresponding relationship. Or, it can also be a verse that follows the conclusion. What is 'Sādharmya-samāna'? It can destroy the statement of the agent in the action, because it transmits the arising. Say it like this, and afterwards it should also be said according to the situation. Now, here, because it is established through the same property metaphor in an inverted way, it is called 'Sādharmya-samāna'. For example, someone establishes that 'sound is impermanent because it is produced continuously through diligent effort' (Śabdaḥ anityaḥ prayatnāntarīyakatvāt). Here, space is used as a 'Vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta' (metaphor of different property). Someone shows space as a 'Sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta' (metaphor of the same property), because space has no substance, etc., thereby establishing that 'sound is permanent'. Like this, in the cause mentioned here, the pot should be the 'Sādharmya' (same property), but the different category of space is said to be the 'Sādharmya' (same property). Therefore, this is called 'Sādharmya-samāna' (similarity of the same property). The rest of the cases established through 'Vaidharmya' (different property) are called 'Vaidharmya-samāna' (similarity of different property). This is the remaining case of the previous 'Sādharmya-samāna' (similarity of the same property). Showing different categories is established in an inverted way through the 'Vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta' (metaphor of different property). In the two metaphors, like before, establishing the pot as 'Vaidharmya' (different property), therefore it is called 'Vaidharmya-samāna' (similarity of different property). 'Distinguishing differences' is called 'distinguishing' because it was said before to show, etc., and now it is said to distinguish differences, so it should be known to distinguish the differences of the same property. For example, as said before, the pot is the 'Sādharmya' (same property), and in that same property, there are different meanings such as being burnable. Then, the pot should be impermanent, not sound. Sound should be permanent because there are differences such as being unburnable. Therefore, it is established in an inverted way through distinction, so it is called 'Vikalpa-samāna' (similarity of distinction). What is said 'should become one, without difference' is because showing the same property has already been said before. Therefore, it should become one with that. Who is that? Because no other means are heard, because they are adjacent, so it should be known that this is the situation where the sect becomes without difference, that is, the fault of becoming without difference. Because it can be known through the meaning of this speech, its name is not mentioned. Who becomes without difference with whom is not explained separately. That is, this everything with that everything. For example, someone says that if you see that pots, etc., have the same properties, then combining other properties there is no difference. All the properties of the pot, sound should have. Then, all mutual properties.
同應成一性。彼中抑成無別異過。亦為顯示瓶聲差別。不甚異前分別相似故應別說。若以勤勇無間所發成立無常。欲顯俱是非畢竟性。則成宗因無別異過。抑此令成無別異性。是故說名無異。相似有說此因如能成立。所成立法亦能成立。此相違法由無別異。是故說名無異相似。顯所立余因名可得相似者。謂若顯示所立宗法余因可得。是則說名可得相似。謂有說言。如前成立聲是無常。此非正因。于電光等由現見等余因可得無常成故。以若離此而得有彼此非彼因。有餘於此別作方便。謂此非彼無常正因由不遍故。如說叢林。皆有思慮有睡眠故。難義別疑因故說名猶豫者。過類相應故女聲說。此中分別宗義別異因成不定。是故說名猶豫相似。或復分別因義別異故。名猶豫相似過類。謂有說言。如前成立聲是無常。勤勇無間所發性故。現見勤勇無間所發。或顯或生故成猶豫。今所成立為顯為生。是故不應以如是因證無常義。說異品義故非愛名義準者。謂有說言。若以勤勇無間所發說無常者。義準則應若非勤勇無間所發。諸電光等皆應是常。如是名為義準相似。應知此中略去後句是故但名猶豫義準。復由何義。此同法等相似過類。異因明師所說次第。似破同故。頌曰。
由此同法等 多疑故似彼
論曰。多言為顯
或有異難。及為顯似不成因過。此中前四與我所說譬喻方便都不相應。且隨世間譬喻方便。雖不顯因是決定性。然攝其體故作是說。由用不定同法等因。成立自宗方便說他。亦有此法。由是便成似共不定。或覆成似相違決定。若言唯為成立自宗。云何不定得名能破。非即說此以為能破。難不定言說名不定。于能詮中說所詮故。無有此過。余處亦應如是安立。若所立量有不定過。或複決定同法等因有所成立。即名能破。是等難故。若現見力比量不能遮遣其性。如有成立聲非所聞猶如瓶等。以現見聲是所聞故。不應以其是所聞性遮遣無常。非唯不見能遮遣故若不爾者亦應遣常。第二無異相似。是似不成因過。彼以本無而生增益所立。為作宗因成一過故。此以本無而生極成因法證滅后無。若即立彼可成能破。第三無異相似。成立違害所立難故。成似由可燒等不決定故。若是決定可成相違可得相似。所立不定故成其似。若所立因於常亦有可成能破第二可得。雖是不遍余類無故似不成過。若所立無可名能破。非於此中欲立一切皆是無常。猶豫相似。謂以勤勇無間所發。得成立滅壞。若以生起增益所立。作不定過。此似不定。若於所立不起分別。但簡別因生起為難。此似不成。由於此中不欲唯生。成立滅壞。若生若顯悉皆滅壞。非
不定故。義準相似。謂以顛倒不定為難故似不定。若非勤勇無間所發立常無常。或唯勤勇無間所發無常。非余可成能破。頌曰。
若因至不至 三時非愛言 至非至無因 是名似因闕
論曰。若因至不至三時非愛言至非至無因者。于至不至作非愛言。若能立因至所立宗而成立者。無差別故應非所立。如池海水相合無異。又若不成應非相至。所立若成此是誰因。若能立因不至所立不至非因。無差別故應不成因。是名為至非至相似。又於三時作非愛言。若能立因在所立前未有所立。此是誰因。若言在後。所立已成復何須因。若俱時者。因與有因皆不成就。如牛兩角。如是名為無因相似。此中如前次第異者。由俱說名似因闕故。所以者何。非理誹撥一切因故。此中何理唯不至同。故雖因相相應亦不名因。如是何理唯在所立前不得因名故即非能立。又於此中有自害過。遮遣同故。如是且於言因及慧所成立中有似因闕。于義因中有似不成。非理誹撥諸法因故。如前二因。于義所立俱非所作。能作性故。不應正理。若以正理而誹撥時。可名能破。頌曰。
說前無因故 應無有所立 名無說相似 生無生亦然 所作異少分 顯所立不成 名所作相似 多如似宗說
論曰。說前因無故應
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 不定故。義準相似。謂以顛倒不定為難故似不定。若非勤勇無間所發立常無常。或唯勤勇無間所發無常。非余可成能破。頌曰： 『若因至不至，三時非愛言；至非至無因，是名似因闕。』 論曰：若因至不至三時非愛言至非至無因者。于至不至作非愛言。若能立因至所立宗而成立者。無差別故應非所立。如池海水相合無異。又若不成應非相至。所立若成此是誰因。若能立因不至所立不至非因。無差別故應不成因。是名為至非至相似。又於三時作非愛言。若能立因在所立前未有所立。此是誰因。若言在後。所立已成復何須因。若俱時者。因與有因皆不成就。如牛兩角。如是名為無因相似。此中如前次第異者。由俱說名似因闕故。所以者何。非理誹撥一切因故。此中何理唯不至同。故雖因相相應亦不名因。如是何理唯在所立前不得因名故即非能立。又於此中有自害過。遮遣同故。如是且於言因及慧所成立中有似因闕。于義因中有似不成。非理誹撥諸法因故。如前二因。于義所立俱非所作。能作性故。不應正理。若以正理而誹撥時。可名能破。頌曰： 『說前無因故，應無有所立；名無說相似，生無生亦然；所作異少分，顯所立不成；名所作相似，多如似宗說。』 論曰：說前因無故應
【English Translation】 English version: Because of uncertainty. The meaning is similar. It is called 'similar to uncertain' because it is difficult to argue against the reversed uncertainty. If it is not constant or impermanent established by diligent effort without interruption, or only impermanent established by diligent effort without interruption, others cannot accomplish the refutation. The verse says: 『If the cause reaches or does not reach, the three times are not agreeable; reaching or not reaching has no cause, this is called a deficiency similar to a cause.』 Explanation: If the cause reaches or does not reach, the three times are not agreeable, reaching or not reaching has no cause. Making disagreeable statements about reaching or not reaching. If the proponent's cause reaches the established thesis and establishes it, it should not be the established thesis because there is no difference. Just like the seawater in a pond merging without distinction. Also, if it is not accomplished, it should not reach each other. If the established thesis is accomplished, what is the cause for? If the proponent's cause does not reach the established thesis, it is not a cause. It should not be a cause because there is no difference. This is called 'similar to reaching and not reaching'. Also, making disagreeable statements about the three times. If the proponent's cause is before the established thesis, there is no established thesis yet. What is the cause for? If it is said to be after, the established thesis is already accomplished, what need is there for a cause? If they are simultaneous, the cause and the caused are both not accomplished, like the two horns of a cow. This is called 'similar to no cause'. The difference in order here compared to the previous ones is because both are called deficiencies similar to a cause. Why is that? Because it unreasonably slanders all causes. What reason is there here that only not reaching is the same? Therefore, even if the characteristics of the cause correspond, it is not called a cause. Likewise, for what reason is it that only being before the established thesis does not obtain the name of a cause, therefore it is not capable of establishing. Also, there is a self-harming fault here, rejecting the same. Thus, there are deficiencies similar to a cause in the establishment of verbal causes and wisdom. There is a similarity to non-accomplishment in the cause of meaning. Because it unreasonably slanders the causes of all dharmas. Like the previous two causes, the established thesis in meaning is not created, because of the nature of being able to create. It should not be reasonable. If slandering with reason, it can be called refutation. The verse says: 『Saying there is no cause before, there should be nothing established; it is called similar to no saying, arising and not arising are also so; the created is different in a small part, showing the established thesis is not accomplished; it is called similar to the created, much like the similar thesis.』 Explanation: Saying there is no cause before, there should be
無有所立名無說相似者。謂有說言。如前所立若由此因證無常性此未說前都無所有。因無有故。應非無常。如是名為無說相似。生無生亦然者。生前無因故無所立。亦即說名無生相似。言亦然者。類例聲前因無有故應無所立。今於此中如無所立。應知亦有所立相違。謂有說言。如前所立若如是聲未生已前。無有勤勇無間所發。應非無常。又非勤勇無間所發故應是常。如是名為無生相似。所作異少分顯所立不成名所作相似者。謂所成立所作性故猶如瓶等。聲無常者若瓶有異所作性故可是無常何豫聲事。如是名為所作相似。多如似宗說者。如是無說相似等多分如似所立說。謂如不成因過多言為顯。或如似余。今於此中無說相似增益比量。謂于論者所說言詞立無常性。難未說前因無有故。此似不成。或似因闕。謂未說前益能立故。若於此中顯義無有。又立量時若無言說可成能破。無生相似。聲未生前。增益所立難因無故。即名似破。若成立時顯此是無可成能破。若未生前以非勤勇無間所發。難令是常義準分故。亦似不定所作相似乃有三種。若難瓶等所作性于聲上無。此似不成。若難聲所作性于瓶等無。此似相違。若難即此常上亦無是不共故。便似不定。或似喻過引同法故。何以故。唯取總法建立比量。不取別故。若取別義決
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『無有所立名無說相似者』，是指有人這樣說：『如果像前面所建立的論點那樣，由此原因來證明無常性，那麼在未說出這個論點之前，一切都不存在。因為原因不存在，所以應該不是無常的。』像這樣就叫做『無說相似』。 『生無生亦然者』，是指在產生之前沒有原因，所以沒有所要建立的論點。也可以說這叫做『無生相似』。『言亦然者』，是說可以類比聲音，在聲音產生之前沒有原因，所以不應該有所要建立的論點。現在在這裡，就像沒有所要建立的論點一樣，應該知道也有與所要建立的論點相反的情況。有人這樣說：『如果像前面所建立的論點那樣，如果這個聲音在未產生之前，沒有勤奮努力的無間斷的引發，那麼應該不是無常的。』又因為不是勤奮努力的無間斷的引發，所以應該是常。像這樣就叫做『無生相似』。 『所作異少分顯所立不成名所作相似者』，是指所要成立的論點是因為所作的性質，就像瓶子等一樣。如果聲音是無常的，那麼如果瓶子因為具有不同的所作性質所以是無常的，這和聲音有什麼關係呢？像這樣就叫做『所作相似』。 『多如似宗說者』，像『無說相似』等大部分都像相似的所立論點。就像爲了顯示不成的原因而說了很多話一樣，或者像其他的相似之處。現在在這裡，『無說相似』增加了比量，就是對於論者所說的言詞，建立無常性，反駁說在未說出之前原因不存在，這就像不成立一樣，或者像原因缺失一樣，因為在未說出之前增加了能立。如果在這裡顯示意義不存在，又在建立量的時候如果沒有言說可以成立能破，『無生相似』，在聲音未產生之前，增加了所要建立的論點，反駁說原因不存在，這就叫做相似的破斥。如果在成立的時候顯示這是無可成立能破的，如果在未產生之前用不是勤奮努力的無間斷的引發來反駁，使得是常，意義是相同的。也像不確定。『所作相似』有三種。如果反駁說瓶子等所作的性質在聲音上沒有，這就像不成立。如果反駁說聲音所作的性質在瓶子等上沒有，這就像相反。如果反駁說即使在這個常上也沒有，因為是不共的，就像不確定，或者像比喻的過失，因為引用了相同的法。為什麼呢？因為只取總的法來建立比量，不取特別的法。如果取特別的意義，就...
【English Translation】 English version 'Having nothing established is called 'resemblance to no statement'. This refers to someone saying: 'If, as in the previously established argument, impermanence is proven by this cause, then before this statement is made, nothing exists. Because the cause does not exist, it should not be impermanent.' This is called 'resemblance to no statement'. 'Birth and non-birth are also similar'. This refers to the fact that before birth, there is no cause, so there is no established argument. This can also be called 'resemblance to non-birth'. 'Saying it is also similar' means that it can be compared to sound. Before sound is produced, there is no cause, so there should be no established argument. Now, in this case, just as there is no established argument, it should be known that there are also situations contrary to the established argument. Someone says: 'If, as in the previously established argument, if this sound, before it is produced, is not caused by diligent and uninterrupted effort, then it should not be impermanent.' Also, because it is not caused by diligent and uninterrupted effort, it should be permanent. This is called 'resemblance to non-birth'. 'The difference in action shows that the established is not accomplished, which is called 'resemblance to action'. This refers to the fact that the argument to be established is due to the nature of action, just like a vase, etc. If sound is impermanent, then if a vase is impermanent because it has a different nature of action, what does this have to do with sound? This is called 'resemblance to action'. 'Mostly like the statement of a similar subject'. Most of the 'resemblance to no statement', etc., are like similar established arguments. Just like saying a lot to show the reason for non-accomplishment, or like other similarities. Now, in this case, 'resemblance to no statement' increases the inference, which is to establish impermanence for the words spoken by the debater, refuting that the cause does not exist before it is spoken, which is like non-establishment, or like the lack of a cause, because it increases the ability to establish before it is spoken. If it shows that there is no meaning here, and if there is no speech that can establish and break when establishing the measure, 'resemblance to non-birth', before the sound is produced, increases the argument to be established, refuting that the cause does not exist, which is called a similar refutation. If it shows that this cannot be established or broken when it is established, if it is refuted before it is produced by not being caused by diligent and uninterrupted effort, making it permanent, the meaning is the same. It is also like uncertainty. 'Resemblance to action' has three types. If it is refuted that the nature of action of a vase, etc., does not exist on sound, this is like non-establishment. If it is refuted that the nature of action of sound does not exist on a vase, etc., this is like the opposite. If it is refuted that even on this permanent thing there is nothing, because it is uncommon, it is like uncertainty, or like the fault of metaphor, because it cites the same Dharma (law, principle). Why? Because only the general Dharma is taken to establish the inference, not the special Dharma. If the special meaning is taken, then...
定異故。比量應無。頌曰。
俱許而求因 名生過相似 此于喻設難 名如似喻說
論曰。俱許而求因名生過相似者。謂有難言。如前所立瓶等無常。復何因證。此于喻設難名如似喻說者。謂瓶等無常俱許成就。而言不成似喻難故。如似喻說頌曰。
無常性恒隨 名常住相似 此成常性過 名如宗過說
論曰。謂有難言。如前所立聲是無常。此應常與無常性合。諸法自性恒不捨故。亦應是常。此即名為常住相似。是似宗過。增益所立無常住故。以於此中都無有別。實無常性依此常轉。即此自性本無今有暫有還無。故名無常。即此分位由自性緣名無常性。如果性等如是過類足目所說多分說為似能破。性最極成故。餘論所說亦應如是分別成立。即此過類但由少分方便異故。建立無邊差別過類。是故不說。如即此中諸有所說。增益損減有顯無顯。生理別喻品類相似等。由此方隅皆應諦察。及應遮遣諸有不善。比量方便作如是說展轉流漫。此于餘論所說無窮故不更說。又于負處。舊因明師諸有所說。或有墮在能破中攝。或有極粗。或有非理。如詭語類故此不錄。余師宗等所有句義。亦應如是分別建立。如是遍計所執分等皆不應理。違所說相皆名無智。理極遠故。又復此類過失言詞。我自朋屬
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 定異的緣故。比量應該不成立。頌文說： 『雙方都認可，卻還要尋求原因，這叫做『生過相似』。 這是在比喻上設定難題，叫做『如似喻說』。』 論述：『雙方都認可，卻還要尋求原因，這叫做『生過相似』』，是指有人提出詰難說：就像前面所建立的瓶子等是無常的，還需要什麼原因來證明呢？『這是在比喻上設定難題，叫做『如似喻說』』，是指瓶子等是無常的，雙方都認可成立，卻說不能成立，這是類似於比喻的難題。就像類似於比喻的頌文說： 『無常的性質恒常相隨，這叫做『常住相似』。 這是成立常性的過失，叫做『如宗過說』。』 論述：有人提出詰難說：就像前面所建立的聲音是無常的，這應該與常性和無常性結合。因為諸法的自性恒常不捨棄的緣故，也應該是常的。這就被稱為『常住相似』，是類似於宗的過失，因為增益了所立的無常住。因為在這其中都沒有差別。實在的無常性依靠這個常性而轉變。即這個自性本來沒有現在有，暫時有還會沒有，所以叫做無常。即這個分位由自性的因緣叫做無常性。如果性等，像這樣的過失種類，足目（Dignāga 陳那）所說的大部分都說是類似於能破。因為自性是最極成立的緣故。其他論著所說的也應該這樣分別成立。即這種過失種類，只是由於少部分方便不同，就建立了無邊的差別過失種類。所以不說。就像這其中所說的，增益損減，有顯無顯，生理差別，比喻品類相似等。由此方方面面都應該仔細觀察，並且應該遮止那些不善的比量方便，像這樣說來說去，展轉流漫。這在其他論著中所說的無窮無盡，所以不再多說。又在失敗之處，舊因明師（Purāṇā hetuvidyācārya）所說的，或者有落在能破之中，或者非常粗糙，或者不合道理，就像詭語之類，所以這裡不記錄。其他論師的宗等所有語句含義，也應該這樣分別建立。像這樣遍計所執的分等，都不合道理。違背所說之相，都叫做沒有智慧。因為道理極其遙遠的緣故。又像這類過失言詞，我自己的朋友眷屬
【English Translation】 English version because of the difference being fixed. The inference should be invalid. The verse says: 『Both parties agree, yet seek a cause, this is called 『similarity of arising fault』. This sets a difficulty on the analogy, called 『statement like a similar analogy』.』 Treatise: 『Both parties agree, yet seek a cause, this is called 『similarity of arising fault』』, which means someone raises a difficulty saying: Just like the previously established pot etc. are impermanent, what cause is needed to prove it again? 『This sets a difficulty on the analogy, called 『statement like a similar analogy』』, which means that the impermanence of pot etc. is agreed upon by both parties, yet it is said to be invalid, which is a difficulty similar to an analogy. Just like the verse of a similar analogy says: 『The nature of impermanence constantly follows, this is called 『similarity of permanence』. This is the fault of establishing permanence, called 『statement like a thesis fault』.』 Treatise: Someone raises a difficulty saying: Just like the previously established sound is impermanent, it should combine with the nature of permanence and impermanence. Because the self-nature of all dharmas is constant and does not abandon, it should also be permanent. This is called 『similarity of permanence』, which is a fault similar to the thesis, because it increases the established impermanent permanence. Because there is no difference in this. The real impermanence relies on this permanence to transform. That is, this self-nature originally did not exist, now exists, temporarily exists and will disappear again, so it is called impermanent. That is, this division is called the nature of impermanence due to the condition of self-nature. If nature etc., like this kind of fault, most of what Dignāga (足目) said is similar to refutation. Because self-nature is the most extremely established. What other treatises say should also be established separately like this. That is, this kind of fault, only due to a small difference in convenience, establishes boundless kinds of different faults. Therefore, it is not said. Just like what is said in this, increasing or decreasing, having manifestation or not, physiological differences, similarity of analogy categories, etc. All aspects of this should be carefully observed, and those unwholesome inferential conveniences should be stopped, saying this back and forth, spreading and overflowing. What is said in other treatises is endless, so I will not say more. Also, in the place of defeat, what the old teachers of logic (Purāṇā hetuvidyācārya) said, some fall into the category of refutation, some are very rough, or some are unreasonable, like sophistry, so it is not recorded here. The meaning of all sentences such as the thesis of other teachers should also be established separately like this. Like this, the divisions of what is universally conceived are all unreasonable. Contradicting the said characteristics is called without wisdom. Because the reason is extremely far away. Also, like this kind of faulty words, my own friends and relatives
論式等中多已制伏。又此方隅。我于破古因明論中已具分別。故應且止頌曰。
為開智人慧毒藥 啟斯妙義正理門 諸有外量所迷者 令越邪途契真義
因明正理門論一卷
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 在辯論等場合中，我已經多次制伏了對方。並且在這個地方，我已經在破斥古老的因明理論的論述中詳細地辨析過了。所以應該就此停止，用頌文來總結： 爲了開啟有智慧的人的智慧，這就像毒藥一樣（能以毒攻毒），開啟這些微妙意義的正理之門。 對於那些被外道衡量標準所迷惑的人，使他們超越邪途，契合真正的意義。 《因明正理門論》一卷
【English Translation】 English version: In debates and other situations, I have subdued opponents many times. Moreover, in this region, I have already fully distinguished in the discourse refuting the old Hetu-vidya (因明, logic) theories. Therefore, it should stop here, using a verse to summarize: To open the wisdom of the wise, this is like a poison (that can counteract poison), opening the gate of the correct reasoning of these subtle meanings. For those who are deluded by external standards of measurement, enabling them to transcend the wrong path and align with the true meaning. Hetu-vidya-nyaya-dvara-sastra (因明正理門論, The Gate of Logic) One Volume