T32n1630_因明入正理論
大正藏第 32 冊 No. 1630 因明入正理論
No. 1630
因明入正理論一卷
商羯羅主菩薩造
三藏法師玄奘奉 詔譯
能立與能破 及似唯悟他 現量與比量 及似唯自悟
如是總攝諸論要義。此中宗等多言名為能立。由宗因喻多言。開示諸有問者未了義故。此中宗者。謂極成有法極成能別差別為性。隨自樂為所成立性。是名為宗。如有成立聲是無常。
因有三相。何等為三。謂遍是宗法性。同品定有性。異品遍無性。云何名為同品異品。謂所立法均等義品。說名同品。如立無常瓶等無常。是名同品。異品者。謂於是處無其所立。若有是常見非所作。如虛空等。此中所作性或勤勇無間所發性遍是宗法性。同品定有性。異品遍無性。是無常等因。
喻有二種。一者同法。二者異法。同法者若於是處顯因同品決定有性。謂若所作見彼無常。譬如瓶等。異法者若於是處說所立無。因遍非有。謂若是常見。非所作如虛空等。此中常言表非無常。非所作言表無所作。如有非有說名非有。
已說宗等如是多言。開悟他時。說名能立。如說聲無常者是立宗言。所作性故者是宗法言。若是所作見彼無常。如瓶等者是隨同品言。若是其常見非所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 大正藏第 32 冊 No. 1630 《因明入正理論》
No. 1630
《因明入正理論》一卷
商羯羅主菩薩 造
三藏法師玄奘 奉 詔譯
能立與能破，及似唯悟他； 現量與比量，及似唯自悟。
如是總攝諸論要義。此中宗等多言名為能立。由宗、因、喻多言，開示諸有問者未了義故。此中宗者，謂極成有法、極成能別差別為性，隨自樂為所成立性，是名為宗。如有成立聲是無常。
因有三相。何等為三？謂遍是宗法性、同品定有性、異品遍無性。云何名為同品異品？謂所立法均等義品，說名同品。如立無常，瓶等無常，是名同品。異品者，謂於是處無其所立。若有是常見非所作，如虛空等。此中所作性或勤勇無間所發性遍是宗法性、同品定有性、異品遍無性，是無常等因。
喻有二種。一者同法，二者異法。同法者，若於是處顯因同品決定有性，謂若所作見彼無常，譬如瓶等。異法者，若於是處說所立無，因遍非有，謂若是常見，非所作，如虛空等。此中常言表非無常，非所作言表無所作。如有非有，說名非有。
已說宗等如是多言，開悟他時，說名能立。如說『聲無常』者是立宗言，『所作性故』者是宗法言，『若是所作見彼無常，如瓶等』者是隨同品言，『若是其常見非所作』
【English Translation】 English version T32 No. 1630 Nyāyapraveśa
No. 1630
Nyāyapraveśa (Introduction to Logic) in one fascicle
Composed by Bodhisattva Śaṅkarasvāmin (商羯羅主)
Translated under imperial order by Tripiṭaka Master Xuanzang (玄奘)
Establishing and refuting, and seeming [reasoning] only enlighten others; Perception and inference, and seeming [knowledge] only enlighten oneself.
Thus, [this text] summarizes the essential meanings of various treatises. Here, 'thesis' (宗) and other statements are called 'establishing' (能立). Because the thesis, reason (因), and example (喻) are stated, they reveal the uncomprehended meaning to those who ask. Here, 'thesis' refers to the nature of being established as having a property that is extremely well-known to the possessor of the property and is extremely well-known as distinguishing. It is the nature of being established according to one's own preference. This is called 'thesis.' For example, establishing that sound is impermanent.
A reason has three characteristics. What are the three? They are: pervading the property of the thesis, definitely existing in similar instances, and being entirely absent in dissimilar instances. What are called 'similar instances' (同品) and 'dissimilar instances' (異品)? 'Similar instances' are those instances where the property to be established is equally present. For example, establishing impermanence, impermanence is present in things like a pot; this is called a 'similar instance.' 'Dissimilar instances' are those places where the property to be established is absent. If something is permanent and not produced, like space (虛空). Here, being produced (所作性) or being produced immediately by effort (勤勇無間所發性) pervades the property of the thesis, definitely exists in similar instances, and is entirely absent in dissimilar instances; this is the reason for impermanence and so on.
There are two types of examples: one is 'similarity example' (同法), and the other is 'dissimilarity example' (異法). A 'similarity example' is where the reason is shown to definitely exist in similar instances. For example, 'Whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent, like a pot.' A 'dissimilarity example' is where it is stated that where the property to be established is absent, the reason is entirely absent. For example, 'Whatever is permanent is not produced, like space.' Here, 'permanent' indicates 'not impermanent,' and 'not produced' indicates 'without production.' If there is non-existence, it is called 'non-existence.'
Having explained the thesis and other such statements, when enlightening others, it is called 'establishing.' For example, saying 'sound is impermanent' is a statement of the thesis; 'because it is produced' is a statement of the property of the thesis; 'whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent, like a pot' is a statement following similar instances; 'whatever is permanent is not produced.'
作。如虛空者是遠離言。唯此三分說名能立。
雖樂成立由與現量等相違故。名似立宗。謂現量相違。比量相違。自教相違。世間相違。自語相違。能別不極成。所別不極成。俱不極成。相符極成。此中現量相違者。如說聲非所聞。比量相違者。如說瓶等是常。自教相違者。如勝論師立聲為常。世間相違者。如說懷兔非月有故。又如說言人頂骨凈。眾生分故。猶如螺貝。自語相違者。如言我母是其石女。能別不極成者。如佛弟子對數論師立聲滅壞。所別不極成者。如數論師對佛弟子說我是思。俱不極成者。如勝論師對佛弟子立我以為和合因緣。相符極成者。如說聲是所聞。如是多言。是遣諸法自相門故。不容成故。立無果故。名似立宗過已說似宗。當說似因。不成不定及與相違。是名似因。
不成有四。一兩俱不成。二隨一不成。三猶豫不成。四所依不成。如成立聲為無常等若言是眼所見性故。兩俱不成。所作性故對聲顯論。隨一不成。于霧等性起疑惑時。為成大種和合火有而有所說。猶豫不成。虛空實有。德所依故。對無空論所依不成。
不定有六。一共。二不共。三同品一分轉異品遍轉。四異品一分轉同品遍轉。五俱品一分轉。六相違決定。此中共者。如言聲常所量性故。常無常品皆共此因。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：就像虛空一樣，是遠離言語的。只有這三個部分可以被稱為能立（sādhanā，論證）。
雖然樂於成立，但由於與現量（pratyakṣa，直接感知）等相違背，所以被稱為似立宗（siddhānta，錯誤的論證）。例如，與現量相違背，如說聲音不是所聞。與比量（anumāna，推論）相違背，如說瓶子等是常。與自教相違背，如勝論師（Vaiśeṣika，印度哲學流派）立聲音為常。與世間相違背，如說懷有兔子的不是月亮。又如說人的頭頂骨是清凈的，因為是眾生的一部分，就像螺貝一樣。與自語相違背，如說『我的母親是石女』。能別不極成，如佛弟子對數論師（Sāṃkhya，印度哲學流派）立聲音滅壞。所別不極成，如數論師對佛弟子說『我是思』。俱不極成，如勝論師對佛弟子立『我』以為和合因緣。相符極成，如說聲音是所聞。像這樣多說，是爲了遣除諸法自相的緣故，不容許成立的緣故，立了也沒有結果的緣故，被稱為似立宗的過失。已經說了似宗，接下來應當說似因（hetu，錯誤的理由）。不成（asiddha，未確立），不定（anaikāntika，不確定）以及相違（viruddha，矛盾），這些被稱為似因。
不成有四種：一、兩俱不成，二、隨一不成，三、猶豫不成，四、所依不成。例如，成立聲音為無常等，如果說『因為是眼睛所見之性』，這就是兩俱不成。因為是所作性，對聲顯論（Śabdavāda，關於聲音的論述）來說，這就是隨一不成。在對霧等性質產生疑惑時，爲了成立大種（mahābhūta，基本元素）和合而有火，而有所說，這就是猶豫不成。虛空是真實存在的，因為是德（guṇa，性質）所依，對無空論來說，這就是所依不成。
不定有六種：一、共（sādhāraṇa，共通），二、不共（asādhāraṇa，不共通），三、同品（sapakṣa，相似例子）一分轉異品（vipakṣa，相異例子）遍轉，四、異品一分轉同品遍轉，五、俱品一分轉，六、相違決定（viruddhāvyabhicārin，矛盾的確定）。這裡所說的共，例如說『聲音是常，因為是所量性』，常和無常的品類都共同具有這個因。
【English Translation】 English version: Like the void, it is remote from words. Only these three parts are called sādhanā (establishment).
Although delighting in establishing, because it contradicts direct perception (pratyakṣa) and so on, it is called a fallacious thesis (siddhānta). For example, contradicting direct perception, such as saying that sound is not heard. Contradicting inference (anumāna), such as saying that pots and so on are permanent. Contradicting one's own doctrine, such as the Vaiśeṣika (Indian philosophical school) asserting that sound is permanent. Contradicting the world, such as saying that the moon does not have a rabbit. Also, such as saying that the human skull is pure because it is a part of a living being, like a conch shell. Contradicting one's own words, such as saying 'My mother is a barren woman.' The qualifier is not established for both, such as a Buddhist disciple asserting to a Sāṃkhya (Indian philosophical school) that sound is destructible. The qualified is not established for both, such as a Sāṃkhya saying to a Buddhist disciple 'I am thought.' Neither is established for both, such as a Vaiśeṣika asserting to a Buddhist disciple that 'I' is the cause of combination. The congruent is established for both, such as saying that sound is heard. Speaking in this way is for the sake of eliminating the self-characteristics of all dharmas, because it is not permissible to establish, and because establishing it is fruitless, it is called the fault of a fallacious thesis. Having spoken of fallacious theses, we should now speak of fallacious reasons (hetu). Unestablished (asiddha), uncertain (anaikāntika), and contradictory (viruddha) are called fallacious reasons.
There are four types of unestablished reasons: 1. Unestablished for both, 2. Unestablished for either one, 3. Uncertain due to doubt, 4. The substratum is unestablished. For example, in establishing that sound is impermanent, if one says 'Because it is the nature of being seen by the eye,' this is unestablished for both. Because it is the nature of being produced, for the Śabdavāda (doctrine of sound), this is unestablished for either one. When doubt arises about the nature of mist and so on, in order to establish that fire exists due to the combination of the great elements (mahābhūta), if something is said, this is uncertain due to doubt. Space is truly existent, because it is the substratum of qualities (guṇa), for the doctrine of non-space, this is the substratum being unestablished.
There are six types of uncertain reasons: 1. Common (sādhāraṇa), 2. Uncommon (asādhāraṇa), 3. Present in a part of the similar instances (sapakṣa) and pervasive in the dissimilar instances (vipakṣa), 4. Present in a part of the dissimilar instances and pervasive in the similar instances, 5. Present in a part of both instances, 6. Contradictory determination (viruddhāvyabhicārin). Here, the common is, for example, saying 'Sound is permanent because it is measurable,' both permanent and impermanent categories share this reason.
是故不定。為如瓶等所量性故聲是無常。為如空等所量性故聲是其常。言不共者。如說聲常。所聞性故。常無常品皆離此因。常無常外余非有故。是猶豫因。此所聞性其猶何等。同品一分轉異品遍轉者。如說聲非勤勇無間所發無常性故。此中非勤勇無間所發宗。以電空等為其同品。此無常性于電等有。于空等無。非勤勇無間所發宗。以瓶等為異品。于彼遍有。此因以電瓶等為同法故。亦是不定。為如瓶等無常性故。彼是勤勇無間所發。為如電等無常性故。彼非勤勇無間所發。異品一分轉同品遍轉者。如立宗言聲是勤勇無間所發。無常性故。勤勇無間所發宗。以瓶等為同品。其無常性於此遍有。以電空等為異品。于彼一分電等是有。空等是無。是故如前亦為不定。俱品一分轉者。如說聲常。無質礙故。此中常宗。以虛空極微等為同品。無質礙性于虛空等有。于極微等無。以瓶樂等為異品。於樂等有。于瓶等無。是故此因以樂以空為同法故。亦名不定。相違決定者。如立宗言聲是無常。所作性故。譬如瓶等。有立聲常。所聞性故。譬如聲性。此二皆是猶豫因。故俱名不定。
相違有四。謂法自性相違因。法差別相違因。有法自相相違因。有法差別相違因等。此中。法自相相違因者。如說聲常。所作性故。或勤勇無間
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，這（所聞性）是不確定的。因為聲音可以像瓶子一樣被衡量，所以說聲音是無常的。因為聲音可以像虛空一樣被衡量，所以說聲音是常。說到『不共』，例如說聲音是常，因為它是『所聞性』。常和無常的範疇都脫離了這個原因（所聞性），因為除了常和無常之外沒有其他可能。所以這是一個猶豫因。這個『所聞性』到底像什麼呢？ 同品（與宗相同的事物）一部分有，異品（與宗不同的事物）普遍有，例如說聲音不是由努力和不間斷的行為產生的，所以是無常的。這裡，『非勤勇無間所發』作為宗，以閃電和虛空等作為同品。這個『無常性』在閃電等事物上有，在虛空等事物上沒有。『非勤勇無間所發』作為宗，以瓶子等作為異品，在瓶子等事物上普遍存在。這個原因（無常性）因為閃電和瓶子等具有相同的屬性，所以也是不確定的。因為聲音可以像瓶子一樣是無常的，所以它是努力和不間斷的行為產生的；因為聲音可以像閃電一樣是無常的，所以它不是努力和不間斷的行為產生的。 異品一部分有，同品普遍有，例如立宗說聲音是由努力和不間斷的行為產生的，因為它是無常的。『勤勇無間所發』作為宗，以瓶子等作為同品，其『無常性』在瓶子等事物上普遍存在。以閃電和虛空等作為異品，其『無常性』在閃電等事物上存在，在虛空等事物上不存在。因此，像前面一樣，這也是不確定的。 同品和異品一部分有，例如說聲音是常，因為它沒有物質阻礙。這裡，『常』作為宗，以虛空和極微等作為同品，『無質礙性』在虛空等事物上有，在極微等事物上沒有。以瓶子和快樂等作為異品，『無質礙性』在快樂等事物上有，在瓶子等事物上沒有。因此，這個原因（無質礙性）因為快樂和虛空具有相同的屬性，所以也稱為不確定。 相違決定，例如立宗說聲音是無常的，因為它是『所作性』，就像瓶子一樣。有人立宗說聲音是常的，因為它是『所聞性』，就像聲音的本質一樣。這兩種都是猶豫因，所以都稱為不確定。 相違有四種，即法自性相違因、法差別相違因、有法自相相違因、有法差別相違因等。這裡，法自相相違因，例如說聲音是常，因為它是『所作性』，或者是由努力和不間斷的行為產生的。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, it (the quality of being heard) is uncertain. Because sound can be measured like a pot, it is said that sound is impermanent. Because sound can be measured like space, it is said that sound is permanent. Regarding 'non-common', for example, saying that sound is permanent because it is 'audible'. Both the categories of permanent and impermanent are separate from this reason (audibility), because there is nothing else besides permanent and impermanent. Therefore, this is a reason for doubt. What exactly is this 'audibility' like? That which exists in a portion of the similar class (things that are the same as the thesis) and exists universally in the dissimilar class (things that are different from the thesis), for example, saying that sound is not produced by effort and uninterrupted action, therefore it is impermanent. Here, 'not produced by effort and uninterrupted action' is the thesis, with lightning and space etc. as the similar class. This 'impermanence' exists in lightning etc., but does not exist in space etc. 'Not produced by effort and uninterrupted action' is the thesis, with pots etc. as the dissimilar class, and it exists universally in pots etc. This reason (impermanence), because lightning and pots etc. have the same attribute, is also uncertain. Because sound can be impermanent like a pot, it is produced by effort and uninterrupted action; because sound can be impermanent like lightning, it is not produced by effort and uninterrupted action. That which exists in a portion of the dissimilar class and exists universally in the similar class, for example, establishing the thesis that sound is produced by effort and uninterrupted action because it is impermanent. 'Produced by effort and uninterrupted action' is the thesis, with pots etc. as the similar class, and its 'impermanence' exists universally in pots etc. With lightning and space etc. as the dissimilar class, its 'impermanence' exists in a portion of them, such as lightning, but does not exist in space etc. Therefore, as before, this is also uncertain. That which exists in a portion of both the similar and dissimilar classes, for example, saying that sound is permanent because it has no material obstruction. Here, 'permanent' is the thesis, with space (虛空) and atoms (極微) etc. as the similar class, and 'the quality of having no material obstruction' exists in space etc., but does not exist in atoms etc. With pots and pleasure etc. as the dissimilar class, 'the quality of having no material obstruction' exists in pleasure etc., but does not exist in pots etc. Therefore, this reason (the quality of having no material obstruction), because pleasure and space have the same attribute, is also called uncertain. Contradictory determination, for example, establishing the thesis that sound is impermanent because it is 'produced', like a pot. Someone establishes the thesis that sound is permanent because it is 'audible', like the essence of sound. Both of these are reasons for doubt, so both are called uncertain. There are four kinds of contradiction, namely, the contradictory reason of the nature of the dharma (法), the contradictory reason of the difference of the dharma, the contradictory reason of the self-nature of the subject (有法), the contradictory reason of the difference of the subject, etc. Here, the contradictory reason of the self-nature of the dharma, for example, saying that sound is permanent because it is 'produced', or because it is produced by effort and uninterrupted action.
所發性故。此因唯于異品中有。是故相違。法差別相違因者。如說眼等必為他用。積聚性故。如臥具等。此因如能成立眼等必為他用。如是亦能成立所立法差別相違積聚他用。諸臥具等為積聚他所受用故。有法自相相違因者。如說有性非實非德非業。有一實故。有德業故。如同異性。此因如能成遮實等。如是亦能成遮有性。俱決定故。有法差別相違因者。如即此因即於前宗有法差別作有緣性。亦能成立與此相違作非有緣性。如遮實等。俱決定故。已說似因。當說似喻。
似同法喻有其五種。一能立法不成。二所立法不成。三俱不成。四無合。五倒合。似異法喻亦有五種。一所立不遣。二能立不遣。三俱不遣。四不離。五倒離。能立法不成者。如說聲常。無質礙故。諸無質礙見。彼是常猶如極微。然彼極微所成立法常性是有。能成立法無質礙無。以諸極微質礙性故。所立法不成者。謂說如覺。然一切覺能成立法無質礙有。所成立法常住性無。以一切覺皆無常故。俱不成者。復有二種。有及非有。若言如瓶。有俱不成。若說如空。對無空論。無俱不成。無合者。謂於是處無有配合。但于瓶等。雙現能立所立二法。如言于瓶見所作性及無常性。倒合者。謂應說言諸所作者皆是無常。而倒說言諸無常者皆是所作。如是名
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因為這是所發之性。這個『因』只在不同的類別中存在。因此，這是相違的。『法差別相違因』的例子是，比如我們說眼睛等必然是被其他事物所使用的，因為它們是積聚性的，就像臥具等一樣。這個『因』既能成立眼睛等必然是被其他事物所使用，也能成立與所立法不同的相違之處，即積聚性的事物是被其他事物所使用的。因為臥具等是被積聚起來供他人使用的。『有法自相相違因』的例子是，比如我們說『有性』不是『實』（dravya，實體），不是『德』（guna，性質），也不是『業』（karma，活動），因為它具有『一實』的屬性，具有『德』和『業』的屬性，就像『同異性』一樣。這個『因』既能成立遮止『實』等，也能成立遮止『有性』，因為兩者都是確定的。『有法差別相違因』的例子是，比如這個『因』在之前的宗派中，對於『有法』的差別，可以作為『有緣性』，也能成立與此相違的『非有緣性』，就像遮止『實』等一樣，因為兩者都是確定的。以上已經說明了『似因』，下面將要說明『似喻』。 『似同法喻』有五種：一、能立法不成；二、所立法不成；三、俱不成；四、無合；五、倒合。『似異法喻』也有五種：一、所立不遣；二、能立不遣；三、俱不遣；四、不離；五、倒離。『能立法不成』的例子是，比如我們說聲音是常住的，因為它沒有質礙。那些沒有質礙的東西，我們看到它們是常住的，就像極微（paramanu，最小的物質單位）一樣。然而，那個極微所成立的法，即常住性是存在的，但是能成立的法，即沒有質礙是不存在的，因為所有的極微都具有質礙性。『所立法不成』的例子是，比如我們說就像感覺（覺，jnana）一樣。然而，一切感覺所成立的法，即沒有質礙是存在的，但是所成立的法，即常住性是不存在的，因為一切感覺都是無常的。『俱不成』有兩種：有和非有。如果說就像瓶子一樣，那麼就是『有俱不成』。如果說就像虛空一樣，那麼就是針對『無空論』的『無俱不成』。『無合』是指在某個地方沒有配合，只是在瓶子等事物上，同時顯現了能立和所立兩種法。比如我們說在瓶子上看到了所作性和無常性。『倒合』是指應該說『凡是所作的都是無常的』，卻倒過來說『凡是無常的都是所作的』，這就是所謂的倒合。
【English Translation】 English version Because this is the nature of being produced. This 'reason' exists only in different categories. Therefore, it is contradictory. An example of 'contradictory reason due to difference in property' is, for example, we say that eyes, etc., must be used by other things because they are accumulative, like bedding, etc. This 'reason' can both establish that eyes, etc., must be used by other things, and also establish the contradiction different from the property to be established, that is, accumulative things are used by other things. Because bedding, etc., are accumulated for others to use. An example of 'contradictory reason due to the self-nature of the subject' is, for example, we say that 'existence' is not 'substance' (dravya), not 'quality' (guna), and not 'action' (karma), because it has the attribute of 'one substance', and has the attributes of 'quality' and 'action', just like 'sameness and difference'. This 'reason' can both establish the negation of 'substance', etc., and also establish the negation of 'existence', because both are definite. An example of 'contradictory reason due to the difference in the subject' is, for example, this 'reason', in the previous school, for the difference in 'subject', can be taken as 'having a connection', and can also establish the 'not having a connection' that contradicts this, just like negating 'substance', etc., because both are definite. The 'fallacious reason' has been explained above, and the 'fallacious example' will be explained below. There are five types of 'fallacious example of similarity': 1. The probans is unestablished; 2. The probandum is unestablished; 3. Both are unestablished; 4. No concomitance; 5. Inverted concomitance. There are also five types of 'fallacious example of dissimilarity': 1. The probandum is not excluded; 2. The probans is not excluded; 3. Both are not excluded; 4. No exclusion; 5. Inverted exclusion. An example of 'the probans is unestablished' is, for example, we say that sound is permanent because it has no obstruction. Those things that have no obstruction, we see that they are permanent, like atoms (paramanu). However, the property established by that atom, that is, permanence, exists, but the probans, that is, having no obstruction, does not exist, because all atoms have obstruction. An example of 'the probandum is unestablished' is, for example, we say like sensation (jnana). However, the probans established by all sensations, that is, having no obstruction, exists, but the probandum, that is, permanence, does not exist, because all sensations are impermanent. There are two types of 'both are unestablished': existence and non-existence. If we say like a pot, then it is 'existence both are unestablished'. If we say like space, then it is 'non-existence both are unestablished' in response to the 'theory of no space'. 'No concomitance' refers to a place where there is no coordination, only the probans and the probandum both appear simultaneously in things like pots. For example, we say that we see the property of being produced and the property of being impermanent in a pot. 'Inverted concomitance' refers to saying 'whatever is produced is impermanent' should be said, but instead it is said 'whatever is impermanent is produced', this is what is called inverted concomitance.
似同法喻品。
似異法中。所立不遣者。且如有言諸無常者見彼質礙。譬如極微。由於極微所成立法常性不遣。彼立極微是常性故。能成立法無質礙無。能立不遣者。謂說如業。但遣所立。不遣能立。彼說諸業無質礙故。俱不遣者。對彼有論。說如虛空。由彼虛空不遣常性無質礙性。以說虛空是常性故。無質礙故。不離者。謂說如瓶見無常性。有質礙性。倒離者。謂如說言諸質礙者皆是無常。如是等似宗因喻言。非正能立。
複次為自開悟。當知唯有現比二量。此中。現量謂無分別。若有正智於色等義離名種等所有分別。現現別轉。故名現量。言比量者。謂藉眾相而觀于義。相有三種。如前已說。由彼為因。于所比義有正智生。了知有火或無常等。是名比量。於二量中即智名果。是證相故。如有作用而顯現故。亦名為量。
有分別智。于義異轉。名似現量。謂諸有智了瓶衣等分別而生。由彼于義不以自相為境界故。名似現量。若似因智為先所起諸似義智。名似比量。似因多種。如先已說。用彼為因。于似所比諸有智生。不能正解名似比量。
複次若正顯示能立過失。說名能破。謂初能立缺減過性。立宗過性。不成立性。不定因性。相違因性及喻過性。顯示此言開曉問者。故名能破。若不實顯
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『似同法喻品』。
在『似異法』中，對於所建立的論點不予否定的情況：例如，如果有人說一切『無常』的事物都具有『質礙』（可以理解為物理阻礙或侷限性），就像『極微』（物質的最小單位）。由於『極微』所成立的法的『常性』（永恒不變的性質）不被否定，因為他們認為『極微』是『常性』的，所以能夠成立的法是『無質礙』的。對於能夠成立的論點不予否定的情況，比如談論『業』（karma）。只是否定所要建立的論點，而不否定能夠成立論點。他們說諸『業』沒有『質礙』的緣故。對於兩者都不否定的情況，針對那些論點，比如談論『虛空』。由於他們不否定『虛空』的『常性』和『無質礙性』，因為他們說『虛空』是『常性』的，並且沒有『質礙』。不相離的情況，比如談論『瓶子』，認為它具有『無常性』和『有質礙性』。倒離的情況，比如這樣說：凡是有『質礙』的事物都是『無常』的。像這些『似宗』、『似因』、『似喻』的言論，都不是真正的能成立的論證。
其次，爲了自我開悟，應當知道只有『現量』（perception）和『比量』（inference）這兩種量（pramana，認識的工具）。這裡，『現量』指的是沒有分別的認知。如果具有正確的智慧，對於色等事物，遠離名稱、種類等所有的分別，直接而清晰地顯現，因此稱為『現量』。所謂『比量』，指的是通過各種相（特徵、標誌）來觀察事物的意義。相有三種，如前所述。通過這些相作為原因（因），對於所要比較的事物產生正確的智慧，從而瞭解有火或者無常等等，這稱為『比量』。在這兩種量中，智慧本身就是結果（果），因為它能夠證明事物的真相。就像具有作用而顯現一樣，因此也稱為『量』。
有分別的智慧，對於事物的意義產生不同的認知，這稱為『似現量』（fallacious perception）。比如，那些通過分別瓶子、衣服等而產生的智慧。由於它們對於事物的認知不是以事物自身的真實相狀為境界，因此稱為『似現量』。如果以『似因』（fallacious reason）的智慧為先導而產生的各種『似義』（fallacious meaning）的智慧，就稱為『似比量』（fallacious inference）。『似因』有很多種，如前所述。用這些『似因』作為原因，對於『似所比』（fallacious object of inference）的事物產生各種智慧，但不能正確理解，這稱為『似比量』。
其次，如果能夠正確地揭示能成立的論證的過失，就稱為『能破』（refutation）。也就是揭示最初的能立論證的『缺減過性』（deficient property）、『立宗過性』（thesis fallacy）、『不成立性』（unestablished property）、『不定因性』（uncertain reason）、『相違因性』（contradictory reason）以及『喻過性』（example fallacy）。揭示這些過失能夠啓發和開導提問者，因此稱為『能破』。如果不真實地揭示過失，
【English Translation】 English version: 『Similar in Example and Dharma』.
In 『Similar but Different Dharma』, what is established without being rejected: For example, if someone says that all 『impermanent』 things have 『obstruction』 (physical hindrance or limitation), like 『atoms』 (the smallest units of matter). Because the 『permanence』 (eternal and unchanging nature) of the dharma established by 『atoms』 is not rejected, since they consider 『atoms』 to be 『permanent』, the dharma that can be established is 『without obstruction』. What is not rejected in what can be established is like talking about 『karma』. Only the point to be established is rejected, not what can establish it. They say that all 『karmas』 are without 『obstruction』. Regarding cases where neither is rejected, in response to those arguments, like talking about 『space』. Because they do not reject the 『permanence』 and 『non-obstruction』 of 『space』, since they say that 『space』 is 『permanent』 and without 『obstruction』. Not separate, like talking about a 『jar』, considering it to have 『impermanence』 and 『obstruction』. Inverted separation, like saying: all things with 『obstruction』 are 『impermanent』. Such statements like 『pseudo-thesis』, 『pseudo-reason』, and 『pseudo-example』 are not truly valid arguments.
Furthermore, for self-enlightenment, it should be known that there are only two valid means of cognition (pramana): 『Perception』 (Pratyaksha) and 『Inference』 (Anumana). Here, 『Perception』 refers to non-conceptual cognition. If one possesses correct wisdom, and regarding objects like form, is free from all conceptualizations such as names and categories, appearing directly and clearly, it is therefore called 『Perception』. 『Inference』 refers to observing the meaning of things through various characteristics (signs, marks). There are three types of characteristics, as mentioned earlier. Through these characteristics as the cause (hetu), correct wisdom arises regarding the object to be inferred, thus understanding that there is fire or impermanence, etc. This is called 『Inference』. In these two means of cognition, wisdom itself is the result (phala), because it can prove the truth of things. Just as it has a function and manifests, it is therefore also called a 『means of cognition』.
Conceptual wisdom, which produces different cognitions about the meaning of things, is called 『Fallacious Perception』 (Pseudo-Perception). For example, the wisdom that arises through distinguishing between jars, clothes, etc. Because their cognition of things does not take the true nature of things themselves as the object, it is called 『Fallacious Perception』. If various wisdoms of 『fallacious meaning』 (pseudo-meaning) arise, preceded by the wisdom of 『fallacious reason』 (pseudo-reason), it is called 『Fallacious Inference』 (Pseudo-Inference). There are many types of 『fallacious reasons』, as mentioned earlier. Using these 『fallacious reasons』 as the cause, various wisdoms arise regarding 『fallacious objects of inference』 (pseudo-object of inference), but they cannot be correctly understood, and this is called 『Fallacious Inference』.
Furthermore, if one can correctly reveal the faults of a valid argument, it is called 『Refutation』 (Nigrahasthana). That is, revealing the 『deficient property』 (nyuna), 『thesis fallacy』 (paksa-bhasa), 『unestablished property』 (asiddha), 『uncertain reason』 (anaikantika), 『contradictory reason』 (viruddha), and 『example fallacy』 (drstanta-bhasa) of the initial argument. Revealing these faults can inspire and enlighten the questioner, and therefore it is called 『Refutation』. If the faults are not revealed truthfully,
能立過言名似能破。謂于圓滿能立顯示缺減性言。于無過宗有過宗言。于成就因不成因言。于決定因不定因言。于不相違因相違因言。于無過喻有過喻言。如是言說名似能破。以不能顯他宗過失。彼無過故。且止斯事。
已宣少句義 為始立方隅 其間理非理 妙辯于余處
因明入正理論一卷
◎因明入正理論後序
因明入正理論者蓋乃抗辯標宗摧邪顯正之悶閾也因談照實。明彰顯理入言趣本。正以離邪。論之者。較言旨歸。審明要會也。昔應符道樹茲義備焉。登庸鹿林斯風扇矣。六師稽顙而捲舌。十仙請命以知歸。非天靈曜寢光邪津鼓浪。同惡孔熾。寔繁有徒。所以世親弘盛烈於前。陳那纂遺芳於後。揚真殄謬夷難解紛。至矣。神功備詳餘論。粵有天主菩薩亞聖挺生。博綜研詳。聿修前緒。撰略精秘。逗適時機。啟以八門通其二益。芟夷五分取定三支。其義簡而彰。其文約而顯。西方時彥鉆仰彌深。自非履此通規。未足預其高論。大唐皇帝乘時啟聖。闡金鏡而運金輪。納錄嗣明。振玉鼓而調玉燭。洞敷玄化。載緝彝章。爇慧炬而鑒昏城。艤智舟而濟苦海。我三藏法師玄奘。神悟爽𢪛峻節冠群。行四勤如不及。瞻三宗而好問。漢地先達各擅專門。寓目必察其微。納心並殫其妙。嗟乎聖蹟
綿遠。像教陵夷。未嘗不臨訛文以喟然。撫疑義而太息。望蔥山而高視。期鷲峰而遠遊。既而冒險乘危。詢師訪道。行達北印度迦濕彌羅國。屬大論師僧伽耶舍。稽疑八藏考決五乘。論師以大義磐根嘉其素蓄。唯因明妙術誨其未喻。梵音覯止冰釋於懷。後於中印度摩竭陀國。遇尸羅跋陀羅菩薩。更廣其例。觸類而長。優而柔之。於是遍謁遺靈備訊餘烈。雖遇鍱腹縱辯無前。風偃邪徒抑兼茲論。旋弘周化景福會昌。粵以貞觀二十一年秋八月六日。于弘福寺。承詔譯訖。弘福寺沙門明浚筆受證文。弘福寺沙門玄謨證梵語。大總持寺沙門玄應正字。大總持寺沙門道洪。實際寺沙門明琰。羅漢寺沙門慧貴。寶昌寺沙門法祥。弘福寺沙門文備。廓州法講寺沙門道深。蒲州棲巖寺沙門神泰。詳證大義。銀青光祿大夫行左庶子高陽縣開國男臣許敬宗奉詔監譯。三藏法師以虛已應物辟此幽關。義海淼其無源。詞峰峻而難仰。異方秀杰同稟親承筆記玄章並行於世。余以不敏妄忝吹噓。受旨證文偶茲嘉會。敢錄時事貽諸后毗。勝范鴻因無泯來際。