T32n1632_方便心論
大正藏第 32 冊 No. 1632 方便心論
No. 1632
方便心論一卷
後魏西域三藏吉迦夜譯
明造論品第一
若能解此論 則達諸論法 如是深遠義 今當廣宣說
問曰。不應造論。所以者何。凡造論者。多起恚恨憍逸貢高。自擾亂心少柔和意。顯現他惡自嘆己善。如斯眾過智者所呵。是故一切諸賢聖人。無量方便斷諍論者。常樂遠離如舍毒器。又造論者。內實調柔外觀多過。是以若欲自利利人。應當舍此諍論之法。答曰不然。今造此論不為勝負利養名聞。但欲顯示善惡諸相故造此論。世若無論迷惑者眾。則為世間邪智巧辯。所共誑惑起不善業。輪迴惡趣失真實利。若達論者則自分別善惡空相。眾魔外道邪見之人。無能惱壞作障礙也。故我為欲利益眾生。造此正論。又欲令正法流佈於世。如為修治庵婆羅果。而外廣植荊棘之林。為防果故。今我造論亦復如是。欲護正法不求名聞故。汝前說長諍論者。是事不然。為護法故故應造論。問曰。汝先言解此論者。達諸論法當說其相。答曰。此論分別有八種義。若有能通達解其義趣。則能廣為其餘諸論。如種稻麥以水溉灌則嘉苗滋茂。不去稊稗善谷不生。若人雖聞此八不解其義。則于諸論皆生疑惑。設有明
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本
大正藏第 32 冊 No. 1632 方便心論
No. 1632
方便心論一卷
後魏西域三藏吉迦夜譯
明造論品第一
若能解此論，則達諸論法。 如是深遠義，今當廣宣說。
問：不應該造論。為什麼呢？凡是造論的人，大多會生起嗔恨、驕縱放逸、貢高我慢之心，自己擾亂內心，很少有柔和之意。總是顯現他人的過失，讚歎自己的優點。像這樣的種種過錯，都是有智慧的人所呵斥的。所以一切賢聖之人，用無量方便來斷除爭論，常常喜歡遠離爭論，就像捨棄有毒的器皿一樣。而且造論的人，內心實際上並不調柔，外表上卻有過多的表現。因此，如果想要自利利人，就應當捨棄這種爭論之法。
答：不是這樣的。我現在造這部論，不是爲了爭勝負、求利養、求名聞，只是想要顯示善惡的種種相狀，所以才造這部論。世上如果沒有論，迷惑的人就會很多，就會被世間的邪知邪見和巧妙的辯論所共同迷惑，從而造作不善之業，在惡道中輪迴，失去真實的利益。如果通達論的人，就能自己分辨善惡空相，眾魔（Mara，佛教中指障礙修行的惡魔）、外道（Tirthika，指不信奉佛教的修行者）和邪見之人，就不能夠惱亂和破壞他們，製造障礙。所以我爲了利益眾生，才造這部正論。而且想要讓正法流佈於世，就像爲了修治庵婆羅果（Amra fruit，一種水果），而在外面廣泛種植荊棘之林，爲了防止他人盜取果實。現在我造論也是這樣，爲了守護正法，不求名聞。你前面所說的增長爭論，這件事是不對的。爲了守護正法，所以才應該造論。
問：你先前說，理解這部論的人，就能通達各種論法，應當說說其中的相狀。
答：這部論分別有八種義理。如果有人能夠通達理解其中的義趣，就能廣泛地運用到其他的論中，就像種植稻麥，用水澆灌，那麼好的苗就會生長茂盛。如果不去除稊稗（Tihina，一種雜草），好的穀物就不會生長。如果有人雖然聽聞了這八種義理，卻不理解其中的含義，那麼對於各種論都會產生疑惑。即使有聰明
【English Translation】 English version
T 32, No. 1632 Discourse on the Expedient Mind
No. 1632
Discourse on the Expedient Mind, one fascicle
Translated by Tripiṭaka Jijiaye of the Western Regions of the Later Wei Dynasty
Chapter 1: Explaining the Composition of the Treatise
If one can understand this treatise, then one will comprehend the methods of all treatises. Such profound and far-reaching meanings, I will now extensively proclaim.
Question: One should not compose treatises. Why is that? Those who compose treatises often give rise to anger, arrogance, indulgence, and conceit. They disturb their own minds and have little gentleness. They reveal the faults of others and praise their own virtues. Such faults are condemned by the wise. Therefore, all virtuous and holy people, with immeasurable skillful means to cut off disputes, always delight in staying away from them, as if discarding poisonous vessels. Moreover, those who compose treatises are inwardly not truly tamed, but outwardly have excessive displays. Therefore, if one wishes to benefit oneself and others, one should abandon this method of disputation.
Answer: That is not so. I am now composing this treatise not for the sake of victory or defeat, profit, or fame, but only to reveal the various characteristics of good and evil. Therefore, I compose this treatise. If there were no treatises in the world, many would be deluded, and they would be jointly deceived by the world's heretical wisdom and clever arguments, thus creating unwholesome karma, transmigrating in evil realms, and losing true benefit. If one understands treatises, then one can distinguish between the empty characteristics of good and evil. The various Maras (Mara, demons that obstruct practice in Buddhism), Tirthikas (Tirthika, non-Buddhist practitioners), and those with heretical views will not be able to disturb or harm them, creating obstacles. Therefore, I compose this correct treatise for the benefit of sentient beings. Moreover, I wish to let the correct Dharma flow and spread in the world, just as one widely plants a forest of thorns outside to cultivate Amra fruit (Amra fruit, a type of fruit), in order to prevent others from stealing the fruit. Now, my composing this treatise is also like this, to protect the correct Dharma, not seeking fame. What you said earlier about increasing disputes is not correct. For the sake of protecting the Dharma, one should compose treatises.
Question: You said earlier that those who understand this treatise will comprehend all treatise methods; you should explain their characteristics.
Answer: This treatise distinguishes eight kinds of meanings. If someone can thoroughly understand the meaning and purpose of these, then they can widely apply them to other treatises, just as planting rice and wheat, and irrigating them with water, then the good seedlings will grow luxuriantly. If one does not remove the Tihina (Tihina, a type of weed), good grains will not grow. If someone hears these eight meanings but does not understand their meaning, then they will have doubts about all treatises. Even if there are intelligent
解斯八義者。決定能達一切論法。問曰。汝言解此論者決了論法。今諸外道有論法不耶。答曰有。如衛世師有六諦。所謂陀羅驃求那總諦別諦作諦不作諦。如斯等比皆名論法。雖善通達猶不了別諸餘經論。如此八種深妙論法我當略說。為開諸論門。為斷戲論故。一曰譬喻。二隨所執。三曰語善。四曰言失。五曰知因。六應時語。七似因非因。八隨語難。喻有二種。一具足喻。二少分喻。隨所執者名究竟義。語善者謂語順於義。言失者謂言乖于理。知因者能知二因。一生因。二了因。語應時者若先說界入后說五陰。名不應時。若善通達言語次第。是則名曰應時語也。似因者如焰似水而實非水。若有論者嚴飾言辭以為水者是名似因。隨言難者如言新衣。即便難曰。衣非是時云何名新。如是等名隨言難也。我已略說此八種義。今當次第廣明其相。問曰。汝前言喻今立喻者作何方便。答曰。若說喻者。凡聖同解然後可說。如言是心動發猶如迅風。一切凡夫知風動故。便得決了心為輕躁。若不知者不得為喻。問曰。何故不但說正義而說喻耶。答曰。凡說喻者為明正義。問曰。汝先言凡聖同解方得為喻。何者名同云何為異。答曰。如前風喻名之為同。聖得涅槃而凡不得。是名為異。問曰。已說喻相。執相云何。答曰。隨其所執廣引
因緣立義堅固。名為執相。問曰。執法有幾。答曰有四。一一切同。二一切異。三初同后異。四初異后同。問曰。汝今應當說此四相。答曰。凡欲立義。當依四種知見。何等為四。一者現見。二者比知。三以喻知。四隨經書。一切同者。如說者言無我我所。問者亦說無我我所。名一切同。一切異者。說者言異問則說一。是名俱異。初同后異者。如說者曰現法皆有。神非現見亦復是有。問者或言現見之法可名為有。神若非現何得有耶。若言比知而有神者。要先現見后乃可比。神非現法雲何得比。若復以喻明神有者。有相似法然後得喻。神類何等而為喻乎。若隨經書證有神者。是事不可。經書意亦難解。或時言有或時言無。云何取信。是名初同后異。初異后同者。如說者言無我無所。而問者曰有我有人。此二論者俱信涅槃。是名初異后同。複次執法隨義有無量相。如十二因緣苦習滅道三十七品四沙門果。如是等法名佛正義。如說晨朝禮敬殺生祭祠。然眾香木獻諸油燈。如是四種名事火外道。六十三字四句之義。是音聲外道。明藥有六。一藥名。二藥德。三藥味。四藥勢力。五和合。六成熟。是名醫法。如六諦等衛世師有。冥初一義多我異解。是僧伽有八微。所謂四大空意明無明八自在。一能小。二為大。三輕舉。四遠到。
五隨所欲。六分身。七尊勝。八隱沒。是名逾伽外道。有命無命罪福漏無漏差戒具足縛解。五智聞智思智自覺智慧智義智。六障不見障苦受障愚癡障命盡障性障名障。四濁瞋慢貪諂。是皆名為尼乾陀法。又有說言。一切諸法儘是有故當知是一。又一切法盡有求那亦名為一。又一切法從冥初生。根本一故當知是一。又頭足等成身與身為一。又依者是空當知是一。如是等名計一外道。又言一切法異。所以者何。如頭足等與身為異。又眾相差別如牛非馬等故知法異。如是等名計異外道。若言一切法有故一者。有法二種。一有覺二無覺。云何為一。因不同故。如是等法皆已總破。論者言。若有人說苦習滅道十二因緣有無等法。為一異者。皆非正因。所以者何。若言一者則墮苦邊。若言異者則墮樂邊。是故有說。若一若異必墮二邊。非佛法義。複次如有說言。涅槃之性無苦無樂。何以知之。凡一切法以有覺故故有苦樂。涅槃無覺云何言樂。復有說者而言有樂。所以者何。樂有三種。一樂受樂。二無惱害。三無希求。涅槃之中無所求故。是故得名涅槃為樂。又有問言。我先已知涅槃是常。今與諸行為異不耶。答曰。汝若先知涅槃常者。云何謂為同諸行耶。諸行之性流轉敗壞。涅槃之體是常是樂。誰有智者言同於行。復有問言。神我
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 五、隨所欲（可以隨心所欲）。六、分身（可以分身）。七、尊勝（具有尊貴殊勝的地位）。八、隱沒（可以隱身）。這些被稱為逾伽外道（Yogacara）。 他們還討論有命無命、罪福、有漏無漏、戒律的差別、具足與否、束縛與解脫。他們認為有五種智慧：聞智（通過聽聞獲得的智慧）、思智（通過思考獲得的智慧）、自覺智慧（通過自我覺悟獲得的智慧）、智慧智（根本的智慧）、義智（理解意義的智慧）。他們認為有六種障礙：不見障（無法看見真理的障礙）、苦受障（被痛苦感受所障礙）、愚癡障（被愚昧無知所障礙）、命盡障（壽命終結的障礙）、性障（本性的障礙）、名障（名相的障礙）。他們認為有四種濁：瞋（嗔恨）、慢（傲慢）、貪（貪婪）、諂（諂媚）。這些都被稱為尼乾陀法（Nigantha）。 還有人說，一切諸法都是『有』，所以應當知道是一。又一切法都具有功德（求那，guna），所以也稱為一。又一切法從冥（黑暗）初生，根本是一，所以應當知道是一。又頭、足等組成身體，身體本身是一。又所依賴的是空，所以應當知道是一。這些被稱為計一外道（Ekātmatāvādins）。 又有人說，一切法都是『異』。為什麼呢？因為頭、足等與身體不同。又眾相差別，如牛不是馬等，所以知道法是不同的。這些被稱為計異外道（Nānātmatāvādins）。 如果說一切法因為『有』所以是一，那麼『有』法有兩種：一是有覺，二是無覺。怎麼能說是一呢？因為因不同。像這樣的法都已經全部破斥。 論者說，如果有人說苦、習、滅、道（四聖諦，Four Noble Truths）、十二因緣（Twelve links of dependent origination）等法是一還是異，都不是正確的理由。為什麼呢？如果說是一，就墮入苦邊；如果說是異，就墮入樂邊。所以有人說，若一若異，必定墮入二邊，不是佛法的意義。 再次，如果有人說，涅槃（Nirvana）的性質沒有苦也沒有樂。憑什麼知道呢？凡是一切法，因為有覺知，所以有苦樂。涅槃沒有覺知，怎麼能說是樂呢？ 又有人說，涅槃是有樂的。為什麼呢？樂有三種：一是樂受樂（感受快樂的快樂），二是無惱害（沒有煩惱和傷害），三是無希求（沒有希望和追求）。涅槃之中沒有所求，所以得名涅槃為樂。 又有人問，我先前已經知道涅槃是常，現在涅槃與諸行（Saṃskāra）是相同還是不同呢？回答說，你如果先前知道涅槃是常，怎麼會認為是與諸行相同呢？諸行的性質是流轉敗壞，涅槃的本體是常是樂。誰有智慧會說涅槃與諸行相同呢？ 又有人問，神我（Atman）...
【English Translation】 English version Five, following one's desires (being able to do as one pleases). Six, dividing the body (being able to multiply one's form). Seven, being supremely victorious (having a noble and victorious status). Eight, disappearing (being able to become invisible). These are called Yogācāra heretics (Yogacara). They also discuss whether there is life or no life, merit and demerit, with outflows or without outflows, the differences in precepts, whether complete or incomplete, bondage and liberation. They believe there are five kinds of wisdom: the wisdom of hearing (wisdom gained through listening), the wisdom of thinking (wisdom gained through contemplation), self-awakened wisdom (wisdom gained through self-realization), wisdom-wisdom (fundamental wisdom), and the wisdom of meaning (wisdom of understanding meaning). They believe there are six obstacles: the obstacle of not seeing (the obstacle of not seeing the truth), the obstacle of suffering (being obstructed by painful feelings), the obstacle of ignorance (being obstructed by ignorance), the obstacle of the end of life (the obstacle of the end of lifespan), the obstacle of nature (the obstacle of inherent nature), and the obstacle of name (the obstacle of names and forms). They believe there are four impurities: anger (hatred), pride (arrogance), greed (greed), and flattery (deceit). These are all called Nigantha (Nigantha). Furthermore, some say that all dharmas are 'existent,' so it should be known as one. Also, all dharmas possess virtues (guna), so it is also called one. Also, all dharmas arise from the beginning of darkness, the root is one, so it should be known as one. Also, the head, feet, etc., form the body, and the body itself is one. Also, what is relied upon is emptiness, so it should be known as one. These are called Ekātmatāvādins (Ekātmatāvādins). Furthermore, some say that all dharmas are 'different.' Why? Because the head, feet, etc., are different from the body. Also, the characteristics are different, such as a cow is not a horse, so it is known that dharmas are different. These are called Nānātmatāvādins (Nānātmatāvādins). If it is said that all dharmas are one because they 'exist,' then there are two kinds of 'existent' dharmas: one is with awareness, and the other is without awareness. How can they be said to be one? Because the causes are different. Such dharmas have all been completely refuted. The debater says, 'If someone says that suffering, accumulation, cessation, and the path (Four Noble Truths), the twelve links of dependent origination (Twelve links of dependent origination), etc., are one or different, these are not correct reasons. Why? If it is said to be one, then one falls into the side of suffering; if it is said to be different, then one falls into the side of pleasure. Therefore, some say that whether one or different, one inevitably falls into two extremes, which is not the meaning of the Buddha's Dharma.' Furthermore, if someone says that the nature of Nirvana (Nirvana) has neither suffering nor pleasure. How is it known? All dharmas, because they have awareness, therefore have suffering and pleasure. Nirvana has no awareness, how can it be said to be pleasure? Furthermore, some say that Nirvana has pleasure. Why? There are three kinds of pleasure: first, the pleasure of feeling pleasure (the pleasure of experiencing happiness), second, without annoyance or harm (without vexation and harm), and third, without seeking (without hope and pursuit). In Nirvana, there is nothing to seek, so it is named Nirvana as pleasure. Furthermore, someone asks, 'I already knew that Nirvana is permanent, is Nirvana the same as or different from all conditioned things (Saṃskāra) now?' The answer is, 'If you already knew that Nirvana is permanent, how could you think it is the same as all conditioned things? The nature of conditioned things is flowing and decaying, the essence of Nirvana is permanent and blissful. Who with wisdom would say that Nirvana is the same as conditioned things?' Furthermore, someone asks, 'The self (Atman)...'
之性雖有形色。而未分別常與無常。答曰若一切法有對礙者皆悉無常。如瓶有礙則可破壞。我若如是必亦無常。然我有形非經所載無有道理。如取沙礫名為珍寶。汝亦如是言多虛妄。問曰。汝何故言我無形耶。答曰。我先已說瓶有形礙故可毀壞。我若如是亦應磨滅。云何復問何故而說我無形耶。複次復有不定執相。如或問言。以物為聲常無常乎。答曰。為分成者皆悉無常。聲亦分成豈獨常也。問曰。何名聲物。答曰。若未分別云何為問。問曰。我身與命。于未來世獨受苦樂。共身受耶。答曰。此身滅已我余身受。問曰。何者是我。于未來世受苦樂乎。答曰。汝前言我。云何復問有我不耶。此非道理。問曰。已說執義。云何名為語善相耶。答曰。不違于理不增不減。善解章句應相說法。所演譬喻而無違背。無能輕訶。以是因緣名為語善。問曰。不違于理。其事云何。答曰。有人計識是我。以諸行空無我故。非一切行皆是于識此非道理。行是識因。因無我故識云何我。問曰。一切諸法皆悉無常。聲非一切是故為常。答曰。汝言一切聲有何義非一切耶此說非因。又一切法有造作者。皆悉無常。如火傳等聲亦如是。是故無常。是則名為不相違相。
問曰。云何名為言不增減。答曰。我當先說增減之相。減有三種。一因減
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 之性雖然有形色，但還沒有分別常與無常。回答說：如果一切法有對礙的，都一定是無常的。比如瓶子有阻礙，就容易被破壞。如果我像瓶子一樣，那我也一定是無常的。然而我有形體，並非經典所記載，沒有道理。就像把沙礫當作珍寶一樣。你也是這樣，說了很多虛妄的話。 問：你為什麼說我沒有形體呢？答：我先前已經說過，瓶子有形體的阻礙，所以容易被毀壞。如果我像瓶子一樣，也應該磨滅。為什麼還要問我為什麼說我沒有形體呢？ 再次，還有不確定的執著相。比如有人問：以物質為基礎的聲音是常還是無常呢？回答說：被分成部分的，都一定是無常的。聲音也被分成部分，難道唯獨它是常的嗎？ 問：什麼叫做聲音的物質基礎？答：如果還沒有分別，怎麼能問呢？ 問：我的身體和生命，在未來世是獨自承受苦樂，還是和身體一起承受呢？答：這個身體滅亡后，我的其他身體承受。 問：哪個是我，在未來世承受苦樂呢？答：你先前說『我』，為什麼又問有沒有『我』呢？這沒有道理。 問：已經說了執著的意義，什麼叫做語言的善相呢？答：不違背道理，不增加也不減少，善於理解文章的章句，應該相應地說法。所引用的譬喻沒有違背，沒有人能夠輕視和呵斥。因為這些因緣，叫做語言的善相。 問：不違背道理，這件事是怎麼樣的呢？答：有人認為識是我，因為諸行是空無我的緣故。並非一切行都是識，這沒有道理。行是識的因，因為因是無我的緣故，識怎麼會是我呢？ 問：一切諸法都一定是無常的，聲音不是一切，所以是常的。答：你說一切聲音有什麼意義不是一切呢？這種說法不是理由。而且一切法有造作者，都一定是無常的，比如火的傳遞等等，聲音也是這樣。所以是無常的。這就叫做不相違背的相。 問：什麼叫做言語不增不減？答：我應當先說增加和減少的相。減少有三種，第一是因的減少。
【English Translation】 English version Although the nature of 'it' has form and color, it has not yet distinguished between permanence and impermanence. The answer is: If all dharmas (phenomena, teachings) have opposition and obstruction, then they are all impermanent. For example, a bottle has obstruction and can be easily broken. If I were like that, I would also be impermanent. However, I have form, which is not recorded in the scriptures, and there is no reason for it. It's like taking sand and gravel and calling it treasure. You are also like that, saying many false things. Question: Why do you say that I have no form? Answer: I have already said that a bottle has form and obstruction, so it can be easily destroyed. If I were like a bottle, I should also be annihilated. Why do you ask again why I say I have no form? Furthermore, there is also an uncertain attachment to appearances. For example, someone asks: Is sound based on matter permanent or impermanent? The answer is: Those that are divided into parts are all impermanent. Sound is also divided into parts, is it the only one that is permanent? Question: What is called the material basis of sound? Answer: If it has not yet been distinguished, how can you ask? Question: My body and life, in the future life, will I alone bear suffering and joy, or will I bear it together with the body? Answer: After this body is destroyed, my other body will bear it. Question: Which 'I' will bear suffering and joy in the future life? Answer: You said 'I' before, why do you ask again if there is an 'I'? This is unreasonable. Question: The meaning of attachment has already been explained, what is called the good aspect of language? Answer: It does not violate reason, it does not increase or decrease, it is good at understanding the chapters and sentences of the text, and one should speak accordingly. The metaphors used are not contradictory, and no one can despise or rebuke them. Because of these causes and conditions, it is called the good aspect of language. Question: Not violating reason, what is this matter like? Answer: Some people think that consciousness (識, shì) is 'I', because all actions (行, xíng) are empty and without self (無我, wú wǒ). It is not that all actions are consciousness, this is unreasonable. Action is the cause of consciousness, because the cause is without self, how can consciousness be 'I'? Question: All dharmas (諸法, zhū fǎ) are certainly impermanent, sound is not everything, so it is permanent. Answer: What do you mean by saying that all sounds are not everything? This statement is not a reason. Moreover, all dharmas that have creators are certainly impermanent, such as the transmission of fire, etc., and sound is also like that. Therefore, it is impermanent. This is called the aspect of not contradicting each other. Question: What is called speech that neither increases nor decreases? Answer: I should first talk about the aspects of increase and decrease. There are three kinds of decrease, the first is the decrease of cause.
。二言減。三喻減。若言六識無常猶如瓶等。不說因緣。是名因減。若言是身無我眾緣成故。聲亦無我從緣而有。是名喻減。若言四大無常如瓶造作。是名言減。與上相違。名為具足。又具足者。若人言我。應當問言。汝所說我為常無常。若無常者則同諸行便是斷滅。若令常者即是涅槃更何須求。是則名為具足之相。問曰。何名言增。答曰。增亦三種。一因增。二喻增。三言增。若言聲法無常和合成故。如瓶造作則為無常。又言聲是空之求那。空非對礙聲是色法。云何相依。是名因增。若言五根無常如呼聲響造作法故聲亦如是。何以知之。為唇口等之所出故。是名喻增。如言微塵細小虛空遍大。如此二法則名為常。聲不如是故曰無常。是名喻增。又說聲是無常眾緣成故。若言常者是事不然。所以者何。有二種因。一從形出。二為根了。云何言常。又同異法皆無常故。是名言增。問曰。何語能令世人信受。答曰。若為愚者分別深義。所謂諸法皆悉空寂。無我無人如幻如化無有真實。如斯深義智者乃解。凡夫若聞迷沒墮落。是則不名應時語也。若言諸法有業有報。及縛解等作者受者。淺智若聞即便信受。如鉆燧和合則火得生。若所演說應前眾生則皆信樂。如是名為隨時而語。問曰。何名言證。答曰。雖多所說善能憶念。若
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 二言減：如果只說事物是無常的，而沒有說明其原因，就叫做『言減』。三喻減：如果說六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）是無常的，就像瓶子一樣，卻沒有說明其因緣，這就叫做『因減』。如果說這個身體是無我的，由各種因緣和合而成，聲音也是無我的，由因緣而產生，這就叫做『喻減』。如果說四大（地、水、火、風）是無常的，就像瓶子被製造出來一樣，這就叫做『言減』。與上述情況相反，就叫做『具足』。另外，所謂『具足』，如果有人說『我』，就應當問他說：『你所說的『我』是常還是無常？』如果是無常的，那就和各種行（現象）一樣，最終會斷滅。如果說是常的，那就是涅槃，又何必再去追求呢？這就叫做『具足』之相。
問：什麼叫做『言增』？
答：『增』也有三種：一是『因增』，二是『喻增』，三是『言增』。如果說聲音的法是無常的，因為是和合而成的，就像瓶子被製造出來一樣，所以是無常的。又說聲音是空的『求那』(guna， गुण，屬性)，空不是對立和阻礙的，聲音是色法，怎麼能相互依存呢？這就叫做『因增』。如果說五根（眼根、耳根、鼻根、舌根、身根）是無常的，就像呼喊的聲音和響聲一樣，因為是造作之法，聲音也是如此。憑什麼知道呢？因為是從嘴唇和口等發出來的。這就叫做『喻增』。比如，說微塵非常細小，虛空廣大無邊，這兩種法是常的。聲音不是這樣，所以說是無常的，這就叫做『喻增』。又說聲音是無常的，由各種因緣和合而成。如果說是常的，這是不對的。為什麼呢？有兩種原因：一是通過形狀產生，二是通過根來了解。怎麼能說是常的呢？又因為相同和不同的法都是無常的，這就叫做『言增』。
問：說什麼樣的話能夠讓世人信服接受呢？
答：如果為愚笨的人分別講解深刻的道理，比如諸法都是空寂的，沒有我，沒有人，像幻象一樣，沒有真實性。這種深刻的道理只有智者才能理解，凡夫如果聽了就會迷惑墮落。這就不叫做應時而語。如果說諸法有業有報，以及束縛和解脫，有作者和受者，淺薄智慧的人聽了就會相信接受，就像鉆木取火，和合就能生火。如果所演說的內容適合聽眾，他們都會信樂。這就叫做隨時而語。
問：什麼叫做『言證』？
答：雖然說了很多，但能夠很好地記住。
【English Translation】 English version Diminishment in Speech (二言減): If one only states that things are impermanent without explaining the reason, it is called 'Diminishment in Speech'. Three Analogies Diminishment (三喻減): If one says that the six consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mind consciousness) are impermanent, like a pot, but does not explain the causes and conditions, it is called 'Diminishment in Cause'. If one says that this body is without self, formed by various causes and conditions, and sound is also without self, arising from causes and conditions, it is called 'Diminishment in Analogy'. If one says that the four great elements (earth, water, fire, and wind) are impermanent, like a pot being made, it is called 'Diminishment in Speech'. The opposite of the above is called 'Completeness'. Furthermore, regarding 'Completeness', if someone says 'I', one should ask them: 'Is the 'I' you speak of permanent or impermanent?' If it is impermanent, then it is the same as all phenomena, ultimately ceasing to exist. If it is permanent, then it is Nirvana, so why seek further? This is called the aspect of 'Completeness'.
Question: What is called 'Increase in Speech'?
Answer: 'Increase' also has three types: first, 'Increase in Cause'; second, 'Increase in Analogy'; and third, 'Increase in Speech'. If one says that the dharma of sound is impermanent because it is a composite, like a pot being made, therefore it is impermanent. And also says that sound is a 'guna' (求那) of emptiness, emptiness is not opposed or obstructive, and sound is a form, how can they depend on each other? This is called 'Increase in Cause'. If one says that the five roots (eye root, ear root, nose root, tongue root, and body root) are impermanent, like a shout and its echo, because they are fabricated phenomena, sound is also like that. How do we know this? Because it comes from the lips and mouth, etc. This is called 'Increase in Analogy'. For example, saying that dust particles are very small and space is vast and boundless, these two dharmas are permanent. Sound is not like this, so it is said to be impermanent. This is called 'Increase in Analogy'. Also, saying that sound is impermanent, formed by various causes and conditions. If one says it is permanent, that is not correct. Why? There are two reasons: first, it arises from form; second, it is understood through the roots. How can it be said to be permanent? Also, because similar and different dharmas are all impermanent, this is called 'Increase in Speech'.
Question: What kind of speech can make people believe and accept it?
Answer: If one explains profound meanings to foolish people, such as all dharmas are empty and still, without self, without person, like illusions, without reality. Such profound meanings can only be understood by the wise. If ordinary people hear them, they will become confused and fall. This is not called speaking at the right time. If one says that all dharmas have karma and retribution, as well as bondage and liberation, with actors and receivers, people of shallow wisdom will believe and accept it upon hearing it, like drilling wood to make fire, combination produces fire. If what is spoken is suitable for the audience, they will all rejoice and believe. This is called speaking at the right time.
Question: What is called 'Evidence in Speech'?
Answer: Although much is said, one is able to remember it well.
宣諸義深得其相。所立堅固令人愛樂。如言諸法皆空無主。現見萬物眾緣成故。是名言證。問曰。何名言失。答曰。與上相違名為言失。又二種語亦名為失。何等為二。一義無異而重分別。二辭無異而重分別。云何一義而重分別。如言憍尸迦。亦言天帝釋。亦言富蘭陀那。是名義一名異而重分別。名義同者如言因陀羅。又言因陀羅。是名義無異而重分別。複次凡所言說。但飾文辭無有義趣。皆名為失。又雖有義理而無次第。亦名言失。如偈說。
如人讚嘆 天帝釋女 名曰金色 足手殊勝 而便說于 釋提桓因 壞阿修羅 三種之城 如是名為 無次第語
問曰。何名知因。答曰。知因有四。一現見。二比知。三喻知。四隨經書。此四知中現見為上。問曰。何因緣故現見上耶。答曰。后三種知由現見故。名之為上。如見火有煙。后時見煙便知有火。是故現見為勝。又如見焰便得喻水。故知先現見故然後得喻。后現見時始知真實。問曰。已知三事由現故知。今此現見何者最實。答曰。五根所知有時虛偽。唯有智慧正觀諸法。名為最上。又如見熱時焰旋火輪乾闥婆城。此雖名現而非真實。又相不明瞭故見錯謬如夜見杌疑謂是人。以指按目則睹二月。若得空智名為實見。問曰。已知現相。比相
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：宣講諸法的意義深刻地與其真實相狀相符，所建立的教義堅固，令人喜愛信服。例如說諸法皆是空性，沒有主宰，親眼見到萬物都是由眾多因緣和合而成，這叫做『言證』（通過言語來證明真理）。
問：什麼叫做『言失』（言語的過失）？
答：與上述情況相反就叫做『言失』。還有兩種說話方式也叫做『言失』。哪兩種呢？一是意義沒有差別卻重複分別，二是詞語沒有差別卻重複分別。
問：什麼是『意義沒有差別卻重複分別』？
答：例如說『憍尸迦』（Kaushika，帝釋天的別名），也說『天帝釋』（Devendra，眾天之主），也說『富蘭陀那』（Purandara，摧毀堡壘者，帝釋天的別名），這叫做意義相同而名稱不同，卻重複分別。名稱和意義都相同的情況，例如說『因陀羅』（Indra，帝釋天的名字），又說『因陀羅』，這叫做意義沒有差別卻重複分別。
此外，凡是所說的話，只是爲了修飾文辭而沒有實際意義，都叫做『言失』。還有，即使有意義，但沒有條理次第，也叫做『言失』。如偈頌所說：
『如同有人讚嘆天帝釋的女兒，名叫金色，她的足和手非常殊勝，卻接著說釋提桓因（Shakra Devanam Indra，帝釋天的另一個名字）摧毀阿修羅的三種城池，這叫做沒有條理的說話。』
問：什麼叫做『知因』（認識原因）？
答：認識原因有四種：一是現見（親眼所見），二是比知（通過比較推理得知），三是喻知（通過比喻得知），四是隨經書（根據經典得知）。這四種認識方式中，現見最為重要。
問：因為什麼緣故說現見最為重要呢？
答：因為后三種認識方式都是以現見為基礎的。所以說現見最為重要。例如，看到火有煙，之後再看到煙就知道有火，所以現見最為重要。又如，看到火焰就能比喻水，因此知道是先有現見然後才能有比喻。在後來現見的時候，才知道真實情況。
問：已經知道三種認識方式都是通過現見而得知，那麼現在這個現見，哪一種才是最真實的呢？
答：五根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身）所認識到的有時是虛假的，只有通過智慧正確地觀察諸法，才叫做最真實的。又如，看到熱的時候出現的熱焰、旋轉的火輪、乾闥婆城（Gandharva-nagara，海市蜃樓），這些雖然名為現見，但並非真實。還有，因為現象不明顯，所以會產生錯誤的判斷，例如夜晚看到樹樁，懷疑是人。用手指按壓眼睛，就會看到兩個月亮。如果證得空性智慧，才叫做真實的見解。
問：已經知道了現相和比相。
【English Translation】 English version: Explaining the meaning of the profound Dharmas in accordance with their true nature, establishing doctrines that are firm and inspire love and faith. For example, stating that all Dharmas are empty and without a master, and directly witnessing that all things arise from the aggregation of numerous causes and conditions, this is called 'Verbal Proof' (proving the truth through speech).
Question: What is called 'Verbal Error'?
Answer: The opposite of the above is called 'Verbal Error'. Also, two kinds of speech are called 'Errors'. What are the two? First, repeating distinctions when the meaning is the same. Second, repeating distinctions when the words are the same.
Question: What is 'repeating distinctions when the meaning is the same'?
Answer: For example, saying 'Kaushika' (Kaushika, another name for Indra), also saying 'Devendra' (Devendra, Lord of the Gods), also saying 'Purandara' (Purandara, destroyer of fortresses, another name for Indra), this is called having the same meaning but different names, and repeating distinctions. When the name and meaning are the same, for example, saying 'Indra' (Indra, the name of Indra), and again saying 'Indra', this is called repeating distinctions when the meaning is the same.
Furthermore, all speech that is merely for embellishing words without actual meaning is called 'Verbal Error'. Also, even if there is meaning, but it lacks order and sequence, it is also called 'Verbal Error'. As the verse says:
'Like someone praising the daughter of Shakra Devanam Indra (Shakra Devanam Indra, another name for Indra), named Golden, her feet and hands are very excellent, but then speaks of Shakra Devanam Indra destroying the three cities of the Asuras, this is called speech without order.'
Question: What is called 'Knowing the Cause'?
Answer: There are four kinds of knowing the cause: first, direct perception (seeing with one's own eyes), second, inferential knowledge (knowing through comparison and reasoning), third, analogical knowledge (knowing through analogy), and fourth, following the scriptures (knowing according to the scriptures). Among these four kinds of knowledge, direct perception is the most important.
Question: For what reason is it said that direct perception is the most important?
Answer: Because the latter three kinds of knowledge are based on direct perception. Therefore, it is said that direct perception is the most important. For example, seeing smoke with fire, and later seeing smoke and knowing there is fire, therefore direct perception is the most important. Also, like seeing flames and being able to analogize water, therefore knowing that there is first direct perception and then analogy. Only when directly perceiving later does one know the truth.
Question: It is already known that the three kinds of knowledge are known through direct perception, so now, which of these direct perceptions is the most real?
Answer: What is perceived by the five senses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body) is sometimes false, only through wisdom correctly observing all Dharmas is called the most real. Also, like seeing heat haze, rotating fire wheels, Gandharva-nagara (Gandharva-nagara, mirage) when it is hot, these are called direct perception but are not real. Also, because the phenomena are not clear, errors in judgment arise, such as seeing a tree stump at night and suspecting it is a person. Pressing the eyes with fingers will cause one to see two moons. If one attains the wisdom of emptiness, it is called true seeing.
Question: Already knowing the appearance of direct perception and inferential appearance.
云何。
答曰。前已分別今當更說。比知有三。一曰前比。二曰后比。三曰同比。前比者。如見小兒有六指頭上有瘡。后見長大聞提婆達。即便憶念本六指者。是今所見。是名前比。后比者。如飲海水得其鹹味。知后水者皆悉同咸。是名后比。同比者。如即此人行至於彼。天上日月東出西沒。雖不見其動。而知必行。是名同比。
問曰。聞見云何。答曰。若見真實耆舊長宿諸佛菩薩。從諸賢聖聽受經法。能生知見。是名聞見。譬如良醫善知方藥慈心教授是名善聞。又諸賢聖證一切法有大智慧。從其聞者是名善聞。問曰。喻相云何。
答曰。若一切法皆空寂滅如幻如化。想如野馬。行如芭蕉。貪慾之相如瘡如毒。是名為喻。如是四事名之為因。能通達者名為知因。問曰。何名似因。答曰。凡似因者。是論法中之大過也。應當覺知而速舍離。如此似因我當宣說。似因隨相有無量義。略則唯八。一隨其言橫為生過。二就同異而為生過。三疑似因。四過時語。五曰類同。六曰說同。七名言異。八曰相違。
問曰。如此八法當廣分別。
答曰。言那婆者凡有四名。一名新。二名九。三名非汝所有。四名不著。如有人言。我所服者是那婆衣。難曰。今汝所著唯是一衣。云何言九。
答曰。我
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：什麼是『云何』（yun he，如何）？
答：之前已經分別解釋過，現在應當再次說明。『比』（bi，比量）有三種：一是『前比』（qian bi，根據先前的經驗進行比較），二是『后比』（hou bi，根據後來的經驗進行比較），三是『同比』（tong bi，根據相似的情況進行比較）。『前比』是說，比如見到一個小孩有六個手指，頭上長瘡，後來長大后聽到提婆達多（Ti Po Da Duo，人名），就回憶起以前那個六指的人，就是現在所見到的這個人，這叫做『前比』。『后比』是說，比如喝海水，知道它是鹹的，就知道之後的海水也都是鹹的，這叫做『后比』。『同比』是說，比如這個人從這裡走到那裡，天上的太陽和月亮從東邊升起西邊落下，雖然沒有親眼看到它們移動，但知道它們一定在執行，這叫做『同比』。
問：什麼是『聞見』（wen jian，聽聞和見解）？ 答：如果見到真實的、年長的、德高望重的諸佛菩薩（zhu fo pu sa，Buddhas and Bodhisattvas），從諸位賢聖那裡聽受經法，能夠產生知見，這叫做『聞見』。譬如好的醫生，善於了解藥方，慈悲地教授他人，這叫做『善聞』。還有諸位賢聖證悟一切法，具有大智慧，從他們那裡聽聞，這叫做『善聞』。 問：什麼是『喻相』（yu xiang，比喻的相）？
答：如果一切法都是空寂滅的，如夢幻泡影，想像如同野馬奔騰，行為如同芭蕉樹一樣空心，貪慾的相狀如同瘡和毒藥，這叫做『喻』。像這樣的四件事，叫做『因』（yin，原因）。能夠通達這些的人，叫做『知因』（zhi yin，瞭解原因）。 問：什麼叫做『似因』（si yin，虛假的因）？ 答：凡是『似因』，是辯論佛法中的大過失，應當覺察並且迅速捨棄。這些『似因』我將要宣說。『似因』隨著不同的情況有無量的意義，概括來說只有八種：一是隨意歪曲對方的言論而產生過失，二是就相同或相異之處而產生過失，三是使用模棱兩可的因，四是使用過時的言語，五是類別相同，六是說法相同，七是名稱不同，八是互相違背。
問：這八種法應當詳細地分別解釋。
答：『言那婆』（yan na po）有四個含義：一是『新』，二是『九』，三是『非你所有』，四是『不執著』。比如有人說：『我所穿的衣服是那婆衣。』反駁說：『現在你所穿的只有一件衣服，怎麼說是九件呢？』
答：我...
【English Translation】 English version: Question: What is 『Yun He』 (云何, How)?
Answer: I have already explained it separately before, and now I should explain it again. There are three types of 『inference』 (比, bi): first, 『prior inference』 (前比, qian bi, inference based on previous experience); second, 『posterior inference』 (后比, hou bi, inference based on later experience); and third, 『similar inference』 (同比, tong bi, inference based on similar situations). 『Prior inference』 is like seeing a child with six fingers and sores on his head. Later, when he grows up and hears about Devadatta (提婆達多, Ti Po Da Duo, a person's name), he remembers that the person with six fingers is the one he sees now. This is called 『prior inference.』 『Posterior inference』 is like drinking seawater and knowing it is salty, so you know that all subsequent seawater will also be salty. This is called 『posterior inference.』 『Similar inference』 is like a person walking from here to there, and the sun and moon rising in the east and setting in the west. Although you don't see them moving, you know they must be moving. This is called 『similar inference.』
Question: What is 『Hearing and Seeing』 (聞見, wen jian)? Answer: If you see true, elderly, and virtuous Buddhas and Bodhisattvas (諸佛菩薩, zhu fo pu sa), and hear the sutras from the wise and holy, and are able to generate knowledge and insight, this is called 『Hearing and Seeing.』 For example, a good doctor who knows prescriptions well and teaches others with compassion is called 『Good Hearing.』 Also, the wise and holy who have realized all dharmas and have great wisdom, hearing from them is called 『Good Hearing.』 Question: What is 『Metaphorical Appearance』 (喻相, yu xiang)?
Answer: If all dharmas are empty and still, like illusions and transformations, imagination is like a wild horse running, and actions are like a banana tree, which is hollow, and the appearance of greed is like a sore or poison, this is called 『Metaphor.』 These four things are called 『Cause』 (因, yin). Those who can understand these are called 『Knowing the Cause』 (知因, zhi yin). Question: What is called 『Pseudo-Cause』 (似因, si yin)? Answer: All 『Pseudo-Causes』 are great faults in debating the Dharma, and should be noticed and quickly abandoned. I will now proclaim these 『Pseudo-Causes.』 『Pseudo-Causes』 have countless meanings depending on the situation, but in summary, there are only eight types: first, arbitrarily distorting the other party's words to create a fault; second, creating a fault based on similarities or differences; third, using ambiguous causes; fourth, using outdated language; fifth, same category; sixth, same statement; seventh, different names; eighth, mutual contradiction.
Question: These eight dharmas should be explained in detail.
Answer: 『Yan Na Po』 (言那婆) has four meanings: first, 『new』; second, 『nine』; third, 『not yours』; fourth, 『non-attachment.』 For example, someone says, 『The clothes I am wearing are Yan Na Po clothes.』 The rebuttal says, 『You are only wearing one piece of clothing now, how can you say it is nine pieces?』
Answer: I...
言那婆乃新衣耳。非謂九也。難曰。何名為新。
答曰。以那婆毛作故名新。
問曰。實無量毛。云何而言那婆毛耶。
答曰。我先已說新名。那婆非是數也。難曰。今知此衣是汝所有。云何乃言非我衣乎。
答曰。我言新衣。不言此物非汝所有。難曰。今現見汝身著此衣。云何而言不著衣耶。
答曰。我言新衣不言不著。是名似因。亦名隨言而為生過。又復隨言而生過者。如說燒山。難曰。實焚草木。云何燒山。是名隨言生過。乃至諸法皆亦如是。複次隨言生過。凡有二種。一如前說。二于同異而為生過。如言有為諸法皆空寂滅猶如虛空。難曰。若爾二者皆是空無。無性之法便同虛空。如是名為同異生過。
問曰。何故名生。
答曰。有故名生。如泥有瓶性故得生瓶。難曰。若泥有瓶性。泥即是瓶。不應假于陶師輪繩和合而有。若泥是有故生瓶者。水亦是有應當生瓶。若水是有不生瓶者。泥云何得獨生瓶耶。是名同異尋言生過。
問曰。生疑似因其相云何。
答曰。如有樹杌似於人故。若夜見之便作是念。杌耶人耶。是則名為生疑似因。問曰。云何名為過時似因。
答曰。如言聲常。韋陀經典從聲出故。亦名為常。難曰。汝今未立聲常因緣。云何便
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：你說的『言那婆乃新衣耳』（言那婆乃新衣耳：一種說法，指新衣服），這裡的『新』不是指數字『九』吧？ 答：不是。 問：那什麼叫做『新』呢？ 答：因為是用那婆毛製作的，所以叫做『新』。 問：實際上毛的數量是無限的，為什麼只說是『那婆毛』呢？ 答：我先前已經說了，『新』只是一個名稱，『那婆』不是指數量。 問：現在我知道這件衣服是你的，為什麼你說不是你的衣服呢？ 答：我說的是『新衣』，並沒有說這個東西不是你的。 問：現在明明看到你身上穿著這件衣服，為什麼你說沒有穿衣服呢？ 答：我說的是『新衣』，並沒有說沒有穿衣服。這叫做『似因』（似因：表面上是理由，實際上不能成立的理由）。也叫做『隨言而為生過』（隨言而為生過：抓住對方話語中的某個字眼，進行歪曲理解，從而產生謬誤）。還有一種『隨言而生過』的情況，比如你說『燒山』。 問：實際上只是焚燒了草木，怎麼能說是燒山呢？這叫做『隨言生過』。乃至一切諸法都是這樣。還有一種『隨言生過』，總共有兩種：一種就像前面所說的，另一種是抓住『同』和『異』的概念來產生謬誤。比如你說『有為諸法』（有為諸法：由因緣和合而成的，會變化的事物）都是空寂滅的，就像虛空一樣。 問：如果這樣，那麼『有為』和『虛空』都是空無，沒有自性的法，那就和虛空一樣了。這就叫做『同異生過』（同異生過：混淆相同和不同的概念，從而產生謬誤）。 問：為什麼叫做『生』呢？ 答：因為『有』所以叫做『生』。比如泥土具有瓶子的性質，所以能夠產生瓶子。 問：如果泥土具有瓶子的性質，那麼泥土就是瓶子，不應該藉助陶師、輪子、繩子的和合才能產生。如果泥土因為『有』而產生瓶子，那麼水也是『有』，也應該產生瓶子。如果水是『有』卻不能產生瓶子，那麼泥土怎麼能獨自產生瓶子呢？這叫做『同異尋言生過』（同異尋言生過：抓住『同』和『異』的概念，進行歪曲理解，從而產生謬誤）。 問：『生疑似因』（生疑似因：由於條件不充分而產生的錯誤推論）的相狀是怎樣的？ 答：比如有一個樹樁，形狀像人，如果在晚上看到，就會想：是樹樁呢？還是人呢？這就叫做『生疑似因』。 問：什麼叫做『過時似因』（過時似因：提出的理由已經過時，不能成立）？ 答：比如你說『聲音是常』（常：永恒不變），因為《韋陀經》（韋陀經典：古印度婆羅門教的根本經典）是從聲音中產生的，所以也是常的。 問：你現在還沒有確立聲音是常的因緣，怎麼就……
【English Translation】 English version: Question: When you say 'Yannapo is a new garment,' (Yannapo is a new garment: a saying, referring to new clothes) the 'new' here doesn't refer to the number 'nine,' right? Answer: No. Question: Then what is called 'new'? Answer: Because it is made of Yannapo wool, it is called 'new'. Question: Actually, the number of wool fibers is infinite, why do you only say 'Yannapo wool'? Answer: I have already said before that 'new' is just a name, 'Yannapo' does not refer to a quantity. Question: Now I know that this garment is yours, why do you say it is not your garment? Answer: I said 'new garment,' I didn't say that this thing is not yours. Question: Now I clearly see that you are wearing this garment, why do you say you are not wearing clothes? Answer: I said 'new garment,' I didn't say I wasn't wearing clothes. This is called 'fallacious reason' (fallacious reason: seemingly a reason, but actually untenable). It is also called 'fault arising from following words' (fault arising from following words: grasping a certain word in the other party's words, distorting the understanding, and thus producing fallacies). There is also a kind of 'fault arising from following words,' such as when you say 'burning a mountain'. Question: Actually, only the grass and trees are burned, how can you say burning a mountain? This is called 'fault arising from following words.' Even all dharmas are like this. There is also a kind of 'fault arising from following words,' there are two kinds in total: one is as mentioned before, and the other is grasping the concepts of 'same' and 'different' to produce fallacies. For example, you say that 'conditioned dharmas' (conditioned dharmas: things that are formed by the combination of causes and conditions, and will change) are all empty and extinguished, just like space. Question: If so, then 'conditioned' and 'space' are both empty, dharmas without self-nature, then they are the same as space. This is called 'fault arising from sameness and difference' (fault arising from sameness and difference: confusing the concepts of same and different, thereby producing fallacies). Question: Why is it called 'arising'? Answer: Because of 'existence' it is called 'arising.' For example, clay has the nature of a pot, so it can produce a pot. Question: If clay has the nature of a pot, then clay is a pot, it should not need the combination of a potter, wheel, and rope to produce it. If clay produces a pot because of 'existence,' then water is also 'existence,' it should also produce a pot. If water is 'existence' but cannot produce a pot, then how can clay produce a pot alone? This is called 'fault arising from seeking words in sameness and difference' (fault arising from seeking words in sameness and difference: grasping the concepts of 'same' and 'different', distorting the understanding, and thus producing fallacies). Question: What is the appearance of 'fallacious reason of arising doubt' (fallacious reason of arising doubt: a wrong inference due to insufficient conditions)? Answer: For example, there is a tree stump that looks like a person. If you see it at night, you will think: Is it a tree stump? Or a person? This is called 'fallacious reason of arising doubt'. Question: What is called 'fallacious reason of being out of time' (fallacious reason of being out of time: the reason given is outdated and untenable)? Answer: For example, you say 'sound is permanent' (permanent: eternal and unchanging), because the 'Vedas' (Vedas: the fundamental scriptures of ancient Indian Brahmanism) come from sound, so they are also permanent. Question: You have not yet established the cause and condition of sound being permanent, how can you...
言韋陀常乎。
答曰。如虛空無形色故常。聲亦無形是故為常。言雖后說義亦成就。
難曰。此語過時。如舍燒已盡方以水救。汝亦如是。是名過時。問曰。類同云何。答曰。我與身異故我是常。如瓶異虛空故瓶無常。是名類同。
難曰。若我異身而名常者。瓶亦異身。瓶應名為常。若瓶異身猶無常者。我雖異身云何常乎。是名同類。
問曰說同云何。
答曰。如言虛空是常無有觸故。意識亦爾。是名說同。問曰。何名言異。答曰。如言五塵無常為根覺故。四大亦爾。是故無常。難曰。龜毛鹽香是無所有。而為意識所得豈無常耶。是名言異。問曰。相違云何。
答曰。相違二種。一喻相違。二理相違。如言我常無形礙故如牛。是名喻違。理違者。如婆羅門統理王業作屠獵等教。剎利種坐禪念定。是名理違。如此二法。愚者不解謂為真實。是名相違。問曰。何者名為不相違耶。
答曰。異上二法名不相違。是名似因。
明負處品第二
論者言。已說如上八種論法。復有眾多負法。今當宣說。問曰。何名語法。
答曰。如言四大是假名。所以者何。為色等法之所成故。復有人言四大實有。何以知之。堅是地性。乃至動是風性故知為實。更相違返便生諍訟。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：韋陀（Veda，古印度經典）是常住不變的嗎？ 答：如同虛空沒有形狀和顏色，所以是常住的。聲音也沒有形狀，所以是常住的。雖然是後來才說的，但道理也是成立的。 難：這種說法已經過時了。就像房子燒完了才用水去救火一樣，你說的也是這樣，這叫做過時。 問：類同（相似）是什麼意思？ 答：我和身體不同，所以我是常住的。如同瓶子和虛空不同，所以瓶子是無常的。這叫做類同。 難：如果我和身體不同，就可以說是常住的，那麼瓶子也和身體不同，瓶子也應該說是常住的。如果瓶子和身體不同仍然是無常的，那麼我雖然和身體不同，為什麼是常住的呢？這叫做同類。 問：說同（相同）是什麼意思？ 答：比如，說虛空是常住的，因為它沒有觸覺。意識也是這樣。這叫做說同。 問：什麼叫做言異（不同）？ 答：比如，說五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸）是無常的，因為它們是根覺（感官的覺知）的來源。四大（地、水、火、風）也是這樣，所以是無常的。難：龜毛、鹽的味道是不存在的，但是意識可以感知到，難道不是無常的嗎？這叫做言異。 問：相違（矛盾）是什麼意思？ 答：相違有兩種：一是比喻相違，二是理相違。比如，說我是常住的，因為我沒有形體障礙，就像牛一樣。這叫做比喻相違。理相違是說，婆羅門（Brahmana，印度教祭司）管理國家政務，從事屠宰狩獵等行業，剎利（Kshatriya，古印度武士階層）種姓的人卻在坐禪入定。這叫做理相違。像這兩種情況，愚笨的人不明白，認為是真的。這叫做相違。 問：什麼叫做不相違呢？ 答：和上面兩種情況不同的，叫做不相違。這叫做似因（似乎是原因）。 明負處品第二 論者說：已經說了上面八種論辯方法，還有很多種失敗的情況，現在應當說明。問：什麼叫做語法（言語規則）？ 答：比如，說四大是假名（只是一個名稱），為什麼呢？因為是由色等法組成的。又有人說，四大是真實存在的，為什麼知道呢？堅硬是地性，乃至運動是風性，所以知道是真實存在的。這樣互相違背，就會產生爭論。
【English Translation】 English version Question: Is Veda (Veda, ancient Indian scriptures) permanent? Answer: Like the void, which has no form or color, it is permanent. Sound also has no form, therefore it is permanent. Although it is said later, the principle is also established. Objection: This statement is outdated. It's like trying to put out a fire with water after the house has already burned down. What you're saying is the same, and it's called outdated. Question: What does 'similarity' (類同) mean? Answer: I am different from the body, therefore I am permanent. Like a bottle is different from the void, therefore a bottle is impermanent. This is called 'similarity'. Objection: If I am different from the body and can be said to be permanent, then the bottle is also different from the body, and the bottle should also be said to be permanent. If the bottle is different from the body and is still impermanent, then although I am different from the body, why am I permanent? This is called 'same kind'. Question: What does 'sameness in statement' (說同) mean? Answer: For example, saying that the void is permanent because it has no touch. Consciousness is also like this. This is called 'sameness in statement'. Question: What is called 'difference in statement' (言異)? Answer: For example, saying that the five skandhas (色、聲、香、味、觸) are impermanent because they are the source of root awareness (感官的覺知). The four great elements (地、水、火、風) are also like this, so they are impermanent. Objection: Turtle hair and the taste of salt do not exist, but consciousness can perceive them, isn't that impermanent? This is called 'difference in statement'. Question: What does 'contradiction' (相違) mean? Answer: There are two kinds of contradictions: one is contradiction in metaphor, and the other is contradiction in principle. For example, saying that I am permanent because I have no physical obstacles, like a cow. This is called contradiction in metaphor. Contradiction in principle is saying that a Brahmana (Brahmana, Hindu priest) manages state affairs and engages in slaughtering and hunting, while a Kshatriya (Kshatriya, ancient Indian warrior class) is meditating and entering samadhi. This is called contradiction in principle. Like these two situations, foolish people do not understand and think they are real. This is called contradiction. Question: What is called 'non-contradiction'? Answer: What is different from the above two situations is called non-contradiction. This is called 'seeming cause' (似乎是原因). Chapter Two on Demonstrating Defeated Positions The debater says: The above eight methods of debate have been explained, and there are many kinds of failures, which should now be explained. Question: What is called 'grammar' (言語規則)? Answer: For example, saying that the four great elements are nominal (只是一個名稱). Why? Because they are composed of form and other dharmas. Someone else says that the four great elements are real. How do you know? Hardness is the nature of earth, and movement is the nature of wind, so you know they are real. If they contradict each other, disputes will arise.
如有言地是成身因緣。余大亦爾。
難曰。地等亦能成一切物。云何而言唯成身乎。是名非語。若不如是是名是語。問曰。何為名負。
答曰。如言聲常無形色故如空。
難曰。聲雖無形而為根覺。有對有礙如瓶造作。而虛空性非是作法。何得為喻。此名負義立曰。瓶是有形可為無常。聲無形法何得為喻。
難曰。聲雖異瓶而為根覺為耳所聞。是故無常。問曰。何等之義不墮負處。
答曰。諸行與識作故無常。涅槃非作故常。如此之言句味真正。名非負處。問曰。何者之言而可難耶。
答曰。若語顛倒立因不正引喻不同。此則可難。如言想能斷結。問者曰。云何以想便斷結耶。以不先言智從想發直言想故。此語顛倒則為可難。
問曰。何因緣故重說此語。
答曰。欲令人知立無執義必墮負處故說。複次應問不問。應答不答。三說法要不令他解。自三說法而不別知。皆名負處。又共他論彼義短闕而不覺知。餘人語曰。此義錯謬汝不知乎。即墮負處。又他正義而為生過。亦墮負處。又有說者。眾人悉解而獨不悟。亦墮負處。問亦如是。如此負處。是議論之大棘刺為深過患。應當覺知速宜遠離。
問曰。問有幾種。
答曰。有三種。一說同。二義同。三因同
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果說地是構成身體的因緣（hetupratyaya，根本原因和條件），其他大的元素也是如此。
提問：地等元素也能構成一切事物，為什麼只說是構成身體呢？這是不正確的說法。如果不是這樣說，那就是正確的說法。提問：什麼是被稱為『負』（parajaya，失敗）的情況？
回答：例如說聲音是常住的，因為它沒有形狀和顏色，就像虛空一樣。
反駁：聲音雖然沒有形狀，但它是根識（indriyavijnana，感官意識）的覺知對象，有對立和阻礙，就像瓶子是被製造出來的一樣。而虛空的性質不是被製造出來的。怎麼能用虛空來比喻聲音呢？這叫做『負』。進一步說，瓶子是有形狀的，可以被認為是無常的。聲音沒有形狀，怎麼能用瓶子來比喻呢？
反駁：聲音雖然不同於瓶子，但它是根識的覺知對象，能被耳朵聽到，所以是無常的。提問：什麼樣的說法不會落入『負』的境地？
回答：諸行（samskara，一切有為法）與識（vijnana，意識）是造作出來的，所以是無常的。涅槃（nirvana，寂滅）不是造作出來的，所以是常住的。這樣的話語意義純正，不屬於『負』的境地。提問：什麼樣的言論是可以被反駁的呢？
回答：如果言語顛倒，所立的因（hetu，理由）不正確，引用的比喻不同，這些都是可以被反駁的。例如說，『想』（samjna，表象）能夠斷除煩惱結（klesabandhana，煩惱的束縛）。提問者會問：『怎麼能用想來斷除煩惱結呢？』因為沒有事先說明智慧是從想產生的，而是直接說想能斷除煩惱結，這種言語顛倒就是可以被反駁的。
提問：因為什麼因緣要重複說這些話呢？
回答：想要讓人知道，確立沒有執著的意義必然會落入『負』的境地，所以才這樣說。此外，應該問的不問，應該答的不答；用三種說法要點（trayasiksa，戒定慧三學）卻不讓別人理解；自己用三種說法要點卻不能分別瞭解，這些都叫做『負』。還有，與他人辯論，對方的義理有缺點卻不察覺，別人說：『這個義理是錯誤的，你不知道嗎？』就落入了『負』的境地。還有，把他人正確的義理說成是過失，也落入『負』的境地。還有，有的人說，眾人都理解了，唯獨自己不明白，也落入『負』的境地。提問也是如此。這些『負』的境地，是議論中的大荊棘，是深刻的過患，應當覺知，迅速遠離。
提問：提問有幾種？
回答：有三種。一是說法相同，二是義理相同，三是因相同。
【English Translation】 English version: If it is said that earth is the cause and condition (hetupratyaya) for the formation of the body, then the other great elements are also the same.
Objection: Earth and other elements can also form all things. Why is it said that they only form the body? This is an incorrect statement. If it is not said in this way, then it is a correct statement. Question: What is called 'defeat' (parajaya)?
Answer: For example, saying that sound is permanent because it has no shape or color, like space.
Rebuttal: Although sound has no shape, it is an object of perception for the sense consciousness (indriyavijnana), having opposition and obstruction, like a pot that is made. But the nature of space is not made. How can space be used as a metaphor for sound? This is called 'defeat'. Furthermore, a pot has shape and can be considered impermanent. Sound has no shape, so how can a pot be used as a metaphor?
Rebuttal: Although sound is different from a pot, it is an object of perception for the sense consciousness, heard by the ear, and therefore impermanent. Question: What kind of statement does not fall into the state of 'defeat'?
Answer: All conditioned phenomena (samskara) and consciousness (vijnana) are made, so they are impermanent. Nirvana (nirvana) is not made, so it is permanent. Such words have pure meaning and do not belong to the state of 'defeat'. Question: What kind of statements can be refuted?
Answer: If the words are inverted, the established reason (hetu) is incorrect, and the metaphors used are different, these can be refuted. For example, saying that 'perception' (samjna) can cut off the bonds of affliction (klesabandhana). The questioner would ask: 'How can perception cut off the bonds of affliction?' Because it was not first stated that wisdom arises from perception, but directly said that perception can cut off the bonds of affliction, this inverted statement can be refuted.
Question: For what reason are these words repeated?
Answer: Wanting to let people know that establishing the meaning of non-attachment will inevitably fall into the state of 'defeat', that's why it is said. Furthermore, not asking what should be asked, not answering what should be answered; using the three trainings (trayasiksa) but not letting others understand; using the three trainings oneself but not being able to understand them separately, these are all called 'defeat'. Also, debating with others, not noticing the shortcomings in the other's reasoning, and then someone says, 'This reasoning is wrong, don't you know?' then one falls into the state of 'defeat'. Also, turning the other's correct reasoning into a fault also falls into the state of 'defeat'. Also, if someone says that everyone understands, but only oneself does not understand, one also falls into the state of 'defeat'. Questioning is also like this. These states of 'defeat' are the great thorns in debate, deep faults, and should be known and quickly avoided.
Question: How many kinds of questions are there?
Answer: There are three kinds. First, the statement is the same; second, the meaning is the same; third, the cause is the same.
。若諸論者。不以此三為問答者。名為違錯。此三答中若少其一則不具足。若言我不廣通如此三問。隨我所解便當相問。是亦無過。說同者。如言無我。還依此語後方為問。是名語同。義同者。但取其意是名義同。因同者。知他意趣之所因起。是名因同。若能如是名非負處。若言輕疾聽者不悟亦墮負處。問曰唯有此等更有餘耶。答曰有。所謂語少語多。無義語非時語。義重捨本宗等。悉名負處。若以此等為前人說。亦墮負處。
問曰。云何名為違本宗耶。
答曰。如言識是常法。所以者何。識體二種。一識體生。二識體用。瓶亦二種。一瓶體生。二瓶體用。然識生時即有用故。故名為常。瓶體生已後方有用。故是無常。
難曰。若以生便有用名為常者。燈生時即用應當是常。
答曰。燈為眼見聲為耳聞。云何為喻。是捨本宗名墮負處。複次有說神常。何以知之。非根覺故如虛空。不為根覺故常。
難曰。微塵不為根得而是無常。
答曰。神非作故常。微塵造作故無常。難曰。汝前言非覺今言不作。是違本宗。答曰。汝言我違。汝乖我言豈不違乎。難曰如此之相可有斯理。我言違者。汝之所說自乖前義故言違耳。又汝前言。不大分別故我生疑。非我違汝。如是以疑為違。亦墮負處
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果那些論辯者，不以這三種方式進行問答，就叫做違背了規則。這三種回答中缺少任何一種都不完整。如果說我不廣泛通達這三種提問方式，就按照我所理解的來進行問答，這也是沒有過錯的。所說相同，比如說了『無我』，還依據這句話之後才提問，這叫做語言相同。意義相同，只是取其意思，這叫做意義相同。原因相同，知道他人意圖的原因，這叫做原因相同。如果能夠這樣，就不算失敗。如果說話輕率快速，聽者不明白，也算失敗。提問：只有這些嗎？還有其他的嗎？回答：有。所謂話少、話多、沒有意義的話、不合時宜的話、意義重大卻捨棄根本宗旨等等，都叫做失敗。如果用這些來對前人說，也算失敗。
提問：什麼叫做違背根本宗旨呢？
回答：比如，說『識』是常法（永恒不變的法則）。為什麼呢？因為識的本體有兩種：一是識的本體產生，二是識的本體作用。瓶子也有兩種：一是瓶子的本體產生，二是瓶子的本體作用。然而，識產生的時候就有作用，所以叫做常。瓶子的本體產生之後才有作用，所以是無常。
反駁：如果以產生就有作用就叫做常，那麼燈產生的時候就有作用，應當是常。
回答：燈被眼睛看到，聲音被耳朵聽到，怎麼能作為比喻呢？這是捨棄根本宗旨，叫做失敗。再次，有人說神（靈魂）是常。憑什麼知道呢？因為它不是根（感官）所能覺察的，就像虛空一樣。不被根覺察，所以是常。
反駁：微塵（極小的粒子）不被根所感知，但是無常。
回答：神不是被製造出來的，所以是常。微塵是被製造出來的，所以是無常。反駁：你前面說不是覺察，現在說不是製造，這是違背根本宗旨。回答：你說我違背，你歪曲我的話，難道不是違背嗎？反駁：像這樣的話，可能有這種道理嗎？我說違背，是因為你所說的話自己違背了前面的意思，所以說違背。而且你前面說，沒有大的分別，所以我產生懷疑，不是我違揹你。像這樣以懷疑為違背，也算失敗。
【English Translation】 English version: If those debaters do not use these three methods for questioning and answering, it is called a violation. Lacking any one of these three answers is incomplete. If one says, 'I am not widely versed in these three ways of questioning, I will question and answer according to my understanding,' that is also without fault. Saying the same, for example, saying 'no-self' (anatta), and then questioning based on that statement, is called the same in language. The same in meaning, simply taking the meaning, is called the same in meaning. The same in cause, knowing the cause of another's intention, is called the same in cause. If one can do this, it is not considered a defeat. If speaking lightly and quickly, the listener does not understand, it is also considered a defeat. Question: Are there only these? Are there others? Answer: Yes. So-called few words, many words, meaningless words, untimely words, important meaning but abandoning the fundamental principle, etc., are all called defeats. If using these to speak to the person in front, it is also considered a defeat.
Question: What is called violating the fundamental principle?
Answer: For example, saying 'consciousness' (識) is a permanent dharma (常法 - eternal law). Why? Because the essence of consciousness has two types: one is the arising of the essence of consciousness, and the other is the function of the essence of consciousness. A jar also has two types: one is the arising of the essence of the jar, and the other is the function of the essence of the jar. However, when consciousness arises, it has function, so it is called permanent. After the essence of the jar arises, it then has function, so it is impermanent.
Objection: If having function upon arising is called permanent, then when a lamp arises, it has function, it should be permanent.
Answer: A lamp is seen by the eye, sound is heard by the ear, how can it be used as a metaphor? This is abandoning the fundamental principle, called a defeat. Furthermore, some say the spirit (神 - soul) is permanent. How is it known? Because it is not perceived by the root (非根覺 - not perceived by the senses), like space. Not being perceived by the root, therefore it is permanent.
Objection: A fine dust particle (微塵 - tiny particle) is not perceived by the root, but it is impermanent.
Answer: The spirit is not made, therefore it is permanent. A fine dust particle is made, therefore it is impermanent. Objection: You said earlier not perceived, now you say not made, this is violating the fundamental principle. Answer: You say I violate, you distort my words, is that not a violation? Objection: In this way, can there be such a reason? I say violation, because what you say contradicts the previous meaning, therefore I say violation. Moreover, you said earlier, there is no great distinction, therefore I have doubts, it is not I who violate you. Like this, taking doubt as violation, is also considered a defeat.
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辯正論品第三
論者言。若人說有眾生乃至亦有壽者命者。何以知之。為根覺故。如無餘涅槃不為根覺故無。眾生不爾故知是有。神是常法。何以故。如阿羅漢果。唯當時有而前後無故知為無。如第二頭第三手等。本無今有故知前無。有已還滅故知后無。神不如是。是以為常。
難曰。如樹根地下水。不見言無。阿羅漢者亦復如是。非是無法。汝自不證。立曰不然。水以地障是故不見。今阿羅漢有何障礙而不見乎。是以知無。難曰。汝以第二頭第三手不可見故。明無羅漢。是事不然。雖無二頭非無第一。言無羅漢乃是悉無。何得為喻。又汝言以無覺知無涅槃者。是亦不然。如大海水不知幾渧。可言無耶。若不知渧數而猶有海。涅槃亦然。雖不可覺實自有之。而言無者應說因緣。若不能說。汝義自壞。是則名為如法論也。
複次若以無覺明無涅槃。他則生疑。如夜見樹心便生疑。杌耶人耶。當知此樹非定人因非定杌因。若令無覺定與涅槃為無因者。不應生疑。又諸業報不可毀滅故有涅槃。所以者何。譬如大火焚燒山林故火是滅因。今此業報是何滅因而得滅耶。若得涅槃則便散壞。立曰。實有滅因。障故不見。難曰。亦有涅槃。但以癡障故不見耳。複次汝今若不分別諸業有滅因者。汝義自壞
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
辯正論品第三
論者說：『如果有人說有眾生，乃至也有壽者（jīvaka，有生命者），命者（jīva，靈魂）。』憑什麼知道呢？因為有根（hetu，原因）和覺（pratyaksa，感覺）的緣故。比如無餘涅槃（nirupadhisesa-nirvana，沒有任何剩餘的涅槃狀態）不被感知，所以認為它不存在。眾生不是這樣，所以知道眾生是存在的。神（atman，靈魂）是常法（nitya-dharma，永恒的法則）。為什麼呢？比如阿羅漢果（arhat-phala，阿羅漢的果位），只有當時有，而前後都沒有，所以認為它不存在。比如第二頭、第三手等，本來沒有現在有，所以知道之前沒有。有了之後又會消滅，所以知道之後也沒有。神不是這樣，所以是永恒的。
反駁說：『如同樹根在地下的水，因為看不見就說沒有，阿羅漢也是這樣，並非沒有，只是你沒有證得。』立論者說：『不是這樣的，水因為有土地的阻礙所以看不見。現在阿羅漢有什麼障礙而看不見呢？因此知道阿羅漢是不存在的。』反駁說：『你用第二頭、第三手不可見，來證明沒有阿羅漢，這是不對的。雖然沒有兩個頭，但並非沒有一個頭。說沒有阿羅漢，那是完全沒有。怎麼能用這個來比喻呢？』又你說因為沒有感覺，所以沒有涅槃，這也是不對的。如同大海水，不知道有多少滴，就可以說沒有大海嗎？如果不知道滴數，但海仍然存在，涅槃也是這樣，雖然不可感知，但確實存在。如果說沒有，應該說明原因。如果不能說明，你的理論就站不住腳。』這就是如法的辯論。
進一步說，如果因為沒有感覺就說沒有涅槃，他人就會產生懷疑。如同夜晚看見樹木，心中就會懷疑，是樹樁呢還是人呢？應當知道這棵樹不是一定是人，也不是一定是樹樁。如果認為沒有感覺就一定與涅槃沒有因果關係，就不應該產生懷疑。而且，諸業報（karma-vipaka，行為的果報）不可毀滅，所以有涅槃。為什麼呢？譬如大火焚燒山林，所以火是滅的原因。現在這些業報是什麼滅的原因才能滅除呢？如果得到涅槃，就會散壞。』立論者說：『確實有滅的原因，因為有障礙所以看不見。』反駁說：『也有涅槃，只是因為愚癡的障礙所以看不見罷了。』進一步說，如果你現在不能分別諸業有滅的原因，你的理論就站不住腳了。
【English Translation】 English version:
Chapter 3: Refuting Erroneous Views
The proponent says: 'If someone says there are sentient beings, even those who have life (jīvaka, living beings) and souls (jīva, soul), how do we know this? Because of root (hetu, cause) and perception (pratyaksa, sensation). For example, nirupadhisesa-nirvana (nirupadhisesa-nirvana, the state of nirvana without remainder) is not perceived, so it is considered non-existent. Sentient beings are not like this, so we know they exist. The self (atman, soul) is an eternal principle (nitya-dharma, eternal law). Why? For example, the fruit of an Arhat (arhat-phala, the fruit of an Arhat) exists only at that time, but not before or after, so it is considered non-existent. Like a second head or a third hand, which originally did not exist but now do, so we know they did not exist before. Having existed, they then cease, so we know they do not exist after. The self is not like this, so it is eternal.'
The refuter says: 'Like the roots of a tree and the water underground, we do not say they do not exist because we cannot see them. Arhats are also like this; they are not non-existent, but you have not realized them.' The proponent says: 'It is not like that. Water is not visible because of the obstruction of the earth. What obstructs us from seeing Arhats now? Therefore, we know Arhats do not exist.' The refuter says: 'You use the invisibility of a second head or a third hand to prove that Arhats do not exist, but this is not correct. Although there is no second head, it does not mean there is no first head. To say that Arhats do not exist is to say that they do not exist at all. How can you use this as a metaphor?' Furthermore, you say that because there is no sensation, there is no nirvana, but this is also incorrect. Like the water in the ocean, we do not know how many drops there are, but can we say that there is no ocean? If we do not know the number of drops, but the ocean still exists, nirvana is also like this. Although it is imperceptible, it truly exists. If you say it does not exist, you should explain the reason. If you cannot explain it, your theory is untenable.' This is a proper debate.
Furthermore, if you say that because there is no sensation, there is no nirvana, others will have doubts. Like seeing a tree at night, one will doubt whether it is a stump or a person. One should know that this tree is not definitely a person, nor is it definitely a stump. If you believe that the absence of sensation necessarily means that nirvana has no cause, then there should be no doubt. Moreover, the retribution of karma (karma-vipaka, the consequences of actions) cannot be destroyed, so there is nirvana. Why? For example, a great fire burns down a forest, so fire is the cause of destruction. What is the cause of destruction that can destroy these karmic retributions now? If one attains nirvana, they will be scattered and destroyed.' The proponent says: 'There is indeed a cause of destruction, but it is not visible because of obstruction.' The refuter says: 'There is also nirvana, but it is not visible because of the obstruction of ignorance.' Furthermore, if you cannot now distinguish that all karmas have a cause of destruction, your theory is untenable.
。若滅因無故而不說者亦無障礙。何須說耶。以是等緣知業不滅。是則名為如法論也。立者曰。汝若以海水有故成有涅槃。豈復能令二頭有耶。若設二頭不可為有。涅槃云何獨得有耶。汝海水喻尚不能立。涅槃為有。何能成於二頭有乎。難曰。汝意若謂涅槃無者。為有是無。為當無無。若無無者。云何覺知無涅槃耶。若有此無。云何而言都無所有。若言雖有是無涅槃之法。猶自無者尚有是無。何故不得有涅槃耶。當說因緣。若不能說。當知涅槃決定實有。是亦名為如法論也。
問曰。神為是常為無常乎。立曰。神非造作故常。瓶等作法故是無常。難曰。若以無作明神常者。是事不然。何以知之。生人疑故。若非造作神即常者。不應生疑為常無常。以生疑故當知有過。立曰。此過非但唯獨我有。一切論者皆有斯過。如言聲常無形色故。有過去身以宿命智知故。如是立義如前生疑。故一切處皆有是過。難曰。喻者決疑。汝所引喻令我生疑。是不成喻。喻不成者義則自壞。即墮負處。而汝乃言一切有過非獨我有。斯則自咎非余過也。所以者何。如人被誣而不自明。而言一切皆悉是盜。當知此人即自為盜。汝亦如是故墮負處。今汝若欲自宣明者。理極于先。必欲復說則墮多過。汝第一立第二已破。第三之義我又為難。欲
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果滅因不存在，那麼不說滅也是沒有障礙的，又何必說呢？通過這些因緣可知業不會滅。這就可以稱為如法的論述。立論者說：你如果因為海水存在而成立有涅槃，難道還能讓兩個頭存在嗎？如果假設兩個頭不可能存在，那麼涅槃又憑什麼獨自存在呢？你用海水作比喻尚且不能成立涅槃是存在的，又怎麼能成立兩個頭是存在的呢？反駁者說：你的意思是說涅槃不存在，那麼是有這個『無』，還是沒有『無』呢？如果沒有『無』，又怎麼能覺知沒有涅槃呢？如果有這個『無』，又怎麼能說完全沒有所有呢？如果說雖然有這個『無』，涅槃的法仍然是『無』，尚且有這個『無』，為什麼就不能有涅槃呢？應當說明因緣。如果不能說明，應當知道涅槃決定是真實存在的。這也可以稱為如法的論述。 問：神是常還是無常呢？立論者說：神不是造作的，所以是常；瓶子等是造作的，所以是無常。反駁者說：如果用不是造作來證明神是常，這是不對的。為什麼知道不對呢？因為人們會懷疑。如果不是造作，神就是常，那麼不應該懷疑是常還是無常。因為產生了懷疑，應當知道這裡有錯誤。立論者說：這個錯誤不僅僅是我有，所有的論者都有這個錯誤。比如，說聲音是常，因為沒有形色；有過去的身，因為有宿命智。像這樣立論，像前面一樣產生懷疑。所以，所有的地方都有這個錯誤。反駁者說：比喻是爲了解決疑惑。你所引用的比喻讓我產生懷疑，這是不成立的比喻。比喻不成立，論證的意義就自己瓦解了，就陷入了失敗的境地。而你卻說一切都有錯誤，不僅僅是你自己有。這實際上是責備自己，而不是別人的錯誤。為什麼這麼說呢？就像一個人被誣陷，不為自己辯解，卻說所有的人都是盜賊。應當知道這個人就是盜賊。你也像這樣，所以陷入了失敗的境地。現在你如果想要為自己辯解清楚，道理在於先前的論證。如果一定要重複說，就會陷入更多的錯誤。你第一次立論，第二次已經被我駁倒，第三次的意義我又提出了疑問，想要
【English Translation】 English version: If the cause of cessation does not exist, then not speaking of cessation is also without obstruction. Why is it necessary to speak of it? Through these conditions, it is known that karma does not cease. This is called a 'Dharma-like' discussion. The proponent says: If you establish the existence of Nirvana because the ocean exists, can you also make two heads exist? If it is assumed that two heads cannot exist, then how can Nirvana exist alone? Your analogy of the ocean cannot even establish the existence of Nirvana. How can it establish the existence of two heads? The opponent says: If you mean that Nirvana does not exist, is there this 'non-existence,' or is there no 'non-existence'? If there is no 'non-existence,' how can one be aware of the absence of Nirvana? If there is this 'non-existence,' how can you say that there is absolutely nothing? If you say that although there is this 'non-existence,' the Dharma of Nirvana is still 'non-existent,' and there is still this 'non-existence,' why can't there be Nirvana? The causes and conditions should be explained. If you cannot explain them, you should know that Nirvana definitely exists in reality. This is also called a 'Dharma-like' discussion. Question: Is the Atman (soul/self) eternal or impermanent? The proponent says: The Atman is not created, therefore it is eternal; pots and the like are created, therefore they are impermanent. The opponent says: If you use 'not created' to prove that the Atman is eternal, this is not correct. How do we know it is not correct? Because people have doubts. If the Atman is eternal because it is not created, then there should be no doubt about whether it is eternal or impermanent. Because doubt arises, it should be known that there is a flaw here. The proponent says: This flaw is not only mine; all debaters have this flaw. For example, saying that sound is eternal because it has no form or color; having a past life because of knowing past lives through supernatural powers. Establishing arguments like this, like before, gives rise to doubt. Therefore, this flaw exists everywhere. The opponent says: An analogy is meant to resolve doubts. The analogy you cited makes me doubt; it is not a valid analogy. If the analogy is not valid, the meaning of the argument collapses on its own, and one falls into a losing position. But you say that everyone has flaws, not just you. This is actually blaming yourself, not the flaws of others. Why do I say this? It is like a person who is falsely accused and does not defend himself, but says that everyone is a thief. It should be known that this person is the thief. You are like this, so you fall into a losing position. Now, if you want to clarify yourself, the principle lies in the previous argument. If you insist on repeating yourself, you will fall into more flaws. You established your first argument, and I have already refuted the second. I have raised questions about the meaning of the third, wanting to
以第五而止過者。不出于初及汝后義。是則為重。若有重過即墮負處。
問曰。設第六人更可問乎。
答曰。第五之人已成於過。何有第六得為問耶。若必說之則同前過。問既有過。答應默然。複次第六人過。而第五者不得詰之。所以者何。由第五故是第六人便得為問。既自有過何由過彼。如是等名正法論也。
相應品第四
問曰。汝已分別如法正論。云何名為相應義耶。
答曰。問答相應有二十種。若人能以此二十義助發正理。是人則名解真實論。若不如是。不名通達議論之法。此二十種。要則有二。一異二同。以同顯義名同。以異顯義名異。凡為義者必依此二故。此二者通二十法。云何名同。如言煩惱盡處是無所有。虛空之性亦無所有。是名為同。云何名異。如說涅槃非作故常。則知諸行作故無常。是名為異。
問曰。此同異義云何為難。
答曰。欲難同者。作如是言。色以眼見聲為耳聞。云何言同。若色異聲色自無常聲應是常。若難異者。以色根覺故無常。我非根覺故常。瓶我俱有有。若同者。瓶既無常。我亦應爾。若說瓶有異我有者。可言我常而瓶無常。常有既同我應無常。如斯難者。有二十種。一曰增多。二曰損減。三說同異。四問多答少。五答多問少。六曰
因同。七曰果同。八曰遍同。九不遍同。十曰時同。十一不到。十二名到。十三相違。十四不違。十五疑。十六不疑。十七喻破。十八聞同。十九聞異。二十不生。是名二十問答之法。
問曰。此二十法應分別說。
答曰。增多者。如言我常非根覺故。虛空非覺是故為常。一切不為根所覺者盡皆是常。而我非覺得非常乎。難曰。虛空無知故常。我有知故云何言常。若空有知則非道理。若我無知可同於虛空。如其知者必為無常。是名增多。損減者。若空無知而我有知。云何以空喻於我乎。是名損減。同異者。如立我常引空為喻。空我一者一法何得以空喻我。若其異者不得相喻。是名同異。複次汝立我常言非根覺。如虛空非根覺故常。然非根覺不必盡常。何得為證。是名問多答少。複次汝立我常言非根覺。非根覺法凡有二種。微塵非覺而是無常。虛空非覺而是常法。汝何得言非覺故常。是名第五問少答多。複次汝以非覺為因故知我常者。空與我異。云何俱以非覺為因。是名因同。複次五大成者皆悉無常。虛空與我亦五大成。云何言常。是名果同。複次汝以虛空非覺故常。然虛空者遍一切處。一切處物豈非覺也。是名遍同。複次微塵非遍。而非根覺是無常法。我非根覺云何為常。是不遍同。複次汝立我常言非根
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 七是果同。八是遍同。九是不遍同。十是時同。十一是不及。十二是名及。十三是相違。十四是不違。十五是懷疑。十六是不懷疑。十七是比喻被破斥。十八是聞相同。十九是聞相異。二十是不生。這被稱為二十種問答的方法。
問：這二十種方法應當分別解說。
答：『增多』是指，例如說『我是常，因為不是根所覺知的』。虛空不是覺知，所以是常。一切不是根所覺知的都應該是常。而我不是根所覺知的，難道就不是常嗎？』反駁說：『虛空沒有知覺所以是常，我有知覺，怎麼能說是常呢？如果虛空有知覺，那就沒有道理了。如果我沒有知覺，可以和虛空一樣。如果我有知覺，必定是無常的。』這叫做『增多』。
『損減』是指，如果虛空沒有知覺而我有知覺，怎麼能用虛空來比喻我呢？這叫做『損減』。
『同異』是指，如果立論說我是常，引用虛空作為比喻。如果虛空和我是一樣的，那麼用一個法，怎麼能用虛空來比喻我？如果虛空和我不同，就不能互相作為比喻。這叫做『同異』。
再次，你立論說我是常，說因為不是根所覺知的。如同虛空不是根所覺知的所以是常。然而，不是根所覺知的，不一定都是常，怎麼能作為證據呢？這叫做『問多答少』。
再次，你立論說我是常，說因為不是根所覺知的。不是根所覺知的法，有兩種。微塵不是覺知的，但是無常。虛空不是覺知的，但是常法。你怎麼能說因為不是覺知的，所以是常呢？這叫做第五種『問少答多』。
再次，你用不是覺知作為原因，所以知道我是常。虛空和我不同，怎麼能都用不是覺知作為原因呢？這叫做『因同』。
再次，五大（地、水、火、風、空）所成的都是無常的。虛空和我也是五大所成的，怎麼能說是常呢？這叫做『果同』。
再次，你用虛空不是覺知所以是常。然而，虛空遍一切處，一切處的事物難道不是覺知的嗎？這叫做『遍同』。
再次，微塵不是遍一切處的，也不是根所覺知的，是無常法。我不是根所覺知的，怎麼能是常呢？這叫做『不遍同』。
再次，你立論說我是常，說因為不是根
【English Translation】 English version: Seven is 'similarity in result'. Eight is 'similarity in pervasiveness'. Nine is 'dissimilarity in pervasiveness'. Ten is 'similarity in time'. Eleven is 'not reaching'. Twelve is 'name reaching'. Thirteen is 'contradiction'. Fourteen is 'non-contradiction'. Fifteen is 'doubt'. Sixteen is 'non-doubt'. Seventeen is 'the analogy is refuted'. Eighteen is 'similarity in hearing'. Nineteen is 'difference in hearing'. Twenty is 'non-arising'. These are called the twenty methods of questions and answers.
Question: These twenty methods should be explained separately.
Answer: 'Increase' refers to, for example, saying 'I am permanent because I am not perceived by the senses (根, root senses)'. Space (虛空, xū kōng) is not perceived, therefore it is permanent. Everything that is not perceived by the senses should be permanent. And I am not perceived by the senses, so am I not permanent?' The rebuttal says: 'Space has no consciousness, therefore it is permanent. I have consciousness, how can you say I am permanent? If space had consciousness, that would be unreasonable. If I had no consciousness, I could be like space. If I have consciousness, I must be impermanent.' This is called 'increase'.
'Decrease' refers to, if space has no consciousness and I have consciousness, how can you use space to compare me? This is called 'decrease'.
'Similarity and difference' refers to, if you posit that I am permanent, citing space as an analogy. If space and I are the same, then using one dharma (法, dharma), how can you use space to compare me? If space and I are different, then you cannot use each other as analogies. This is called 'similarity and difference'.
Furthermore, you posit that I am permanent, saying it is because I am not perceived by the senses. Like space is not perceived by the senses, therefore it is permanent. However, not being perceived by the senses does not necessarily mean everything is permanent, how can you use that as proof? This is called 'asking much, answering little'.
Furthermore, you posit that I am permanent, saying it is because I am not perceived by the senses. There are two kinds of dharmas that are not perceived by the senses. Dust particles are not perceived, but are impermanent. Space is not perceived, but is a permanent dharma. How can you say that because it is not perceived, therefore it is permanent? This is called the fifth kind of 'asking little, answering much'.
Furthermore, you use not being perceived as the reason, therefore you know I am permanent. Space and I are different, how can you both use not being perceived as the reason? This is called 'similarity in cause'.
Furthermore, everything made of the five great elements (五大, wǔ dà - earth, water, fire, wind, space) is impermanent. Space and I are also made of the five great elements, how can you say it is permanent? This is called 'similarity in result'.
Furthermore, you use space not being perceived, therefore it is permanent. However, space pervades everywhere, are the things in every place not perceived? This is called 'similarity in pervasiveness'.
Furthermore, dust particles are not pervasive, and are not perceived by the senses, and are impermanent dharmas. I am not perceived by the senses, how can I be permanent? This is called 'dissimilarity in pervasiveness'.
Furthermore, you posit that I am permanent, saying it is because I am not a root
覺。為是現在過去未來。若言過去過去已滅。若言未來未來未有。若言現在則不為因。如二角並生。則不得相因。是名時因。複次汝立我常以非根覺。到故為因。為不到乎。若不到則不成因。如火不到則不能燒。如刀不到則不能割。不到於我。云何為因。是名不到。複次若到因者。到便即是無有因義。是名為到。複次汝以一切無常。我非一切故常者。我即是有故應無常。如㲲少燒。以多不燒應名不燒。是名相違。複次汝以我非根覺同於虛空。虛空不覺我亦應爾。若我覺者虛空亦應覺于苦樂。虛空與我無有異故。是不相違。複次我同有故不定為常。容可生疑。為常無常。是名為疑。複次汝言有我非根所覺。則可生疑。有何障故非根覺耶。當說因緣。若無因緣。我義自壞。是名不疑。複次汝以我非根覺故為常者。樹根地下水亦非根覺而是無常。我云何常。是名喻破。複次汝以經說。我非覺故知是常者。經中亦說無我我所。尼干法中明我非常。我定常者。諸經不應有異有同。是名聞同。複次若汝信一經。以我為常。亦應信余經我為無常。若二信者。一我便應亦常無常。是名聞異。複次汝以有因知有我者。娑羅樹子既是有故應生多羅。若以無故而知無者。多羅子中無樹形相。不應得生。若有亦不生。無亦不生。我亦如是。若定
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 覺（覺知）。是爲了現在、過去、未來而設立的。如果說是過去，過去已經滅亡。如果說是未來，未來尚未產生。如果說是現在，現在則不能作為原因。如同兩個角同時生長，則不能互相作為原因。這叫做時因。 再次，你認為『我』是常，因為『我』不是根覺所能覺知的，所以到達『我』是作為原因。那麼是到達了呢，還是沒有到達呢？如果沒有到達，則不能成為原因。如同火沒有到達就不能燃燒，如同刀沒有到達就不能切割。沒有到達『我』，怎麼能作為原因呢？這叫做不到。 再次，如果到達是原因，那麼到達就意味著沒有原因的意義。這叫做到達。 再次，你認為一切都是無常的，而『我』不是一切，所以是常。那麼『我』就是存在的，所以應該是無常的。如同氈毯燒了一點點，因為大部分沒有燒，就應該叫做沒有燒。這叫做相違。 再次，你認為『我』不是根覺所能覺知的，如同虛空一樣。虛空不能覺知，『我』也應該如此。如果『我』能覺知，虛空也應該能覺知苦樂。因為虛空和『我』沒有區別。這叫做不相違。 再次，『我』和有相同，所以不能確定是常。容許產生懷疑，是常還是無常。這叫做疑。 再次，你說有『我』不是根所能覺知的，那麼可以產生懷疑，有什麼障礙導致根不能覺知『我』呢？應當說明原因。如果沒有原因，『我』的意義自然就破滅了。這叫做不疑。 再次，你認為『我』不是根覺所能覺知的，所以是常。那麼樹根在地下的水也不是根覺所能覺知的，但是卻是無常的。『我』怎麼能是常呢？這叫做比喻破。 再次，你認為經典上說，『我』不是覺知，所以知道是常。經典中也說沒有『我』和『我所』。尼干（Nigantha）的教法中說明『我』不是常。如果『我』一定是常，那麼諸經就不應該有不同和相同。這叫做聞同。 再次，如果你相信一部經典，認為『我』是常，也應該相信其他經典，認為『我』是無常。如果兩部都相信，那麼一個『我』就應該既是常又是無常。這叫做聞異。 再次，你認為因為有因而知道有『我』。那麼娑羅樹（Śāla）的種子既然是有的，就應該能生出多羅樹（Tāla）。如果因為沒有而知道沒有，那麼多羅樹的種子中沒有樹的形狀，就不應該能生長。如果有也不能生長，沒有也不能生長，『我』也是這樣。如果一定...
【English Translation】 English version Consciousness (覺, Jue, awareness). Is it established for the present, past, or future? If you say it is past, the past has already ceased. If you say it is future, the future has not yet arisen. If you say it is present, then it cannot be a cause. It is like two horns growing simultaneously, which cannot be the cause of each other. This is called the cause of time (時因, shí yīn). Furthermore, you assert that the 'self' (我, wǒ) is permanent because it is not perceived by the sense faculties (根覺, gēn jué), therefore, reaching the 'self' is considered a cause. Has it been reached or not? If it has not been reached, then it cannot be a cause. Just as fire cannot burn if it does not reach, just as a knife cannot cut if it does not reach. If it does not reach the 'self,' how can it be a cause? This is called non-reaching (不到, bù dào). Furthermore, if reaching is the cause, then reaching implies the absence of a cause. This is called reaching (到, dào). Furthermore, you assert that everything is impermanent, but the 'self' is not everything, therefore it is permanent. Then the 'self' is existent, so it should be impermanent. It is like a felt blanket that is slightly burned; because most of it is not burned, it should be called unburned. This is called contradiction (相違, xiāng wéi). Furthermore, you assert that the 'self' is not perceived by the sense faculties, just like space (虛空, xū kōng). Space cannot perceive, so the 'self' should also be like that. If the 'self' can perceive, then space should also be able to perceive suffering and happiness. Because space and the 'self' are not different. This is called non-contradiction (不相違, bù xiāng wéi). Furthermore, the 'self' is the same as existence, so it cannot be determined as permanent. Doubt may arise, whether it is permanent or impermanent. This is called doubt (疑, yí). Furthermore, you say that there is a 'self' that is not perceived by the sense faculties, then doubt can arise. What obstacle prevents the sense faculties from perceiving the 'self'? The cause should be explained. If there is no cause, the meaning of the 'self' will naturally be destroyed. This is called non-doubt (不疑, bù yí). Furthermore, you assert that the 'self' is permanent because it is not perceived by the sense faculties. Then the water under the ground near the roots of a tree is also not perceived by the sense faculties, but it is impermanent. How can the 'self' be permanent? This is called refutation by analogy (喻破, yù pò). Furthermore, you assert that the scriptures say that the 'self' is not awareness, so it is known to be permanent. The scriptures also say that there is no 'self' and no 'belonging to self' (我所, wǒ suǒ). The teachings of the Niganthas (尼干, Nigantha) explain that the 'self' is not permanent. If the 'self' is definitely permanent, then the scriptures should not have differences and similarities. This is called hearing the same (聞同, wén tóng). Furthermore, if you believe one scripture that says the 'self' is permanent, you should also believe other scriptures that say the 'self' is impermanent. If you believe both, then one 'self' should be both permanent and impermanent. This is called hearing differently (聞異, wén yì). Furthermore, you assert that because there is a cause, you know there is a 'self.' Then the seed of the Śāla tree (娑羅樹, Śāla) since it exists, should be able to produce a Tāla tree (多羅樹, Tāla). If you know there is nothing because there is no cause, then the seed of the Tāla tree does not have the shape of a tree, so it should not be able to grow. If it exists, it cannot grow; if it does not exist, it cannot grow. The 'self' is also like that. If definitely...
有者。不須以根不覺為因。我若定無。以根不覺不可令有。是名不生。若復有人立聲是常。亦以如上二十種法同異破之。
問曰。此二十種。更有因緣自解說耶。答曰自有。應當問言。由有我故汝破於我。若無我者汝何所破。以有能破故有所破。
難曰。理實無我。汝橫計為有故我難汝。汝言以有所破故有我者。以有能破故知無我。若言汝執我義以明無我。是事不然。非用汝義。今汝自用我所執耳。立曰。汝云何知我執汝義。應說因緣。難曰。我前已言。非執汝義汝執他立。何故復問。云何知我執汝義耶。汝言自違即墮負處。又汝初以根不覺故知實有我。后以眾法而為證明。立因不定違失義宗。亦墮負處。汝義已壞。我若更說不出于初。受言多過。凡問答者。答極至於五。過此更言皆名為過。若有智慧思惟深理。廣說譬喻能解于義。然其所論不出此法。論者言。已說如上諸說法要。此論要者。諸論之本。由此論故廣生問答增長智慧。譬如種子若遇良地根莖滋茂。若種惡田無有果實。此法亦爾。若有智慧能善思量。則廣生諸論。若愚癡人少於智慧。雖習此論不能通達。是則不名真善知見。是故諸有欲生實智分別善惡。當勤修習此正法論。
方便心論一卷
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：有些人認為，不需要以根的不覺作為原因。如果我確定沒有『我』，那麼就不能因為根的不覺而強行說有『我』。這叫做『不生』。如果又有人主張聲音是常存的，也可以用上面提到的二十種方法，從相同和不同的角度來駁斥他。
問：這二十種方法，還有其他的因緣可以自己解釋嗎？答：有。你應該這樣問：因為有『我』的緣故，你才來駁斥我。如果沒有『我』，你又駁斥什麼呢？因為有能駁斥的，所以才有被駁斥的。
反駁：實際上沒有『我』，是你自己錯誤地認為有『我』，所以我才反駁你。你說因為有被駁斥的，所以有『我』，那麼因為有能駁斥的，就知道沒有『我』。如果說你堅持『我』的意義來證明沒有『我』，這是不對的。我不是用你的意義，而是用我自己所堅持的。立論者說：你怎麼知道我堅持你的意義？應該說明原因。反駁：我前面已經說了，我不是堅持你的意義，而是堅持其他人所立的觀點。為什麼還要問，怎麼知道我堅持你的意義呢？你自己的話自相矛盾，已經處於失敗的境地。而且你一開始用根的不覺來證明確實有『我』，後來又用各種方法來證明。你所立的因不穩定，違背了你自己的宗旨，也已經處於失敗的境地。你的理論已經崩潰。我如果再說，也超不出你最初的說法，只會多說無益。一般來說，問答的次數最多到五次。超過這個次數再說，都叫做多餘。如果有智慧的人，能夠深入思考其中的道理，廣泛地運用比喻來理解其中的意義，那麼他所討論的內容也不會超出這些方法。論者說：我已經說了如上各種說法的要點。這些論述的要點，是各種論述的根本。通過這些論述，可以廣泛地產生問答，增長智慧。譬如種子如果遇到肥沃的土地，根莖就會茂盛。如果種在貧瘠的土地上，就不會有果實。這個法也是這樣。如果有智慧的人，能夠很好地思考，就能廣泛地產生各種論述。如果愚癡的人，缺少智慧，即使學習這些論述，也不能通達。這樣的人就不能稱為真正的好知識、好見解。所以，凡是想要產生真實的智慧，分辨善惡的人，都應當勤奮地修習這部正法論。
《方便心論》一卷
【English Translation】 English version: Some argue that the non-awareness of the root is not a necessary cause. If I am definitively non-existent, then the non-awareness of the root cannot force existence. This is called 'non-arising'. If someone asserts that sound is permanent, it can also be refuted using the twenty methods mentioned above, from the perspectives of similarity and difference.
Question: Are there other causes and conditions that can explain these twenty methods themselves? Answer: Yes. You should ask: Because of the existence of 'I', you refute me. If there is no 'I', what do you refute? Because there is a refuter, there is something to be refuted.
Objection: In reality, there is no 'I'. You wrongly assume there is an 'I', so I refute you. You say that because there is something to be refuted, there is an 'I'. Then, because there is a refuter, it is known that there is no 'I'. If you say that you insist on the meaning of 'I' to prove that there is no 'I', that is incorrect. I am not using your meaning, but my own insistence. The proponent says: How do you know that I insist on your meaning? You should explain the reason. Objection: I have already said that I am not insisting on your meaning, but on the views established by others. Why do you ask again, how do I know that I insist on your meaning? Your own words contradict themselves, and you are already in a losing position. Moreover, you initially used the non-awareness of the root to prove that there is indeed an 'I', and later used various methods to prove it. The cause you established is unstable, violates your own principles, and you are also in a losing position. Your theory has collapsed. If I say more, it will not go beyond your initial statement, and it will only be superfluous. Generally speaking, the number of questions and answers should be limited to five. Saying more than that is called redundant. If a wise person can deeply contemplate the principles, and widely use metaphors to understand the meaning, then what he discusses will not go beyond these methods. The commentator says: I have already stated the essentials of the various teachings above. The essentials of these discussions are the foundation of all discussions. Through these discussions, questions and answers can be widely generated, and wisdom can be increased. For example, if a seed encounters fertile soil, the roots and stems will flourish. If it is planted in barren soil, there will be no fruit. This Dharma is also like that. If a wise person can contemplate well, he can widely generate various discussions. If a foolish person lacks wisdom, even if he studies these discussions, he cannot understand them. Such a person cannot be called a true good knowledge or good view. Therefore, all those who want to generate true wisdom and distinguish between good and evil should diligently study this correct Dharma treatise.
The 'Upayahrdaya' (Convenient Heart) Treatise, one fascicle.