T32n1633_如實論

大正藏第 32 冊 No. 1633 如實論

No. 1633

如實論反質難品一卷

陳天竺三藏真諦譯

反質難品中無道理難品第一

論曰。汝稱我言說無道理。若如此者。汝言說亦無道理。若汝言說無道理。我言說則有道理。若汝言說有道理。稱我言說無道理者。是義不然。複次無道理者自體中有道理。是故無有無道理。若自體中無道理者。無道理亦應無。是故汝說我無道理。是義不然。又若汝稱我言說無道理。自顯汝無智。何以故。無道理者則無所有。言說者。與無道理為一為異。若一者言說亦無。汝云何稱我言說無道理。若異者言說有道理。汝復何故稱我言說無道理耶。複次言說自相破故。汝難言說共我言說。為同時為不同時。同時者。則不能破我言說。譬如牛角馬耳同時生故不能相破。若不同者。汝難在前我言在後。我言未出汝何所難。是故不成難。若我言在前汝難在後。我言已成復何所難。若同時者。我言汝難是難是可難不可分別。譬如江水海水同時和合不可分別。又汝難為難自義為不難自義。若難自義。自義自壞我言自成。若不難自義難則不成就。何以故。于自義中不成就難故。若成就者。自義則壞他義則成。複次汝稱我言說無道理者。非是言說。若是言

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本大正藏第 32 冊 No. 1633 如實論

No. 1633

如實論反質難品一卷

陳天竺三藏真諦譯

反質難品中無道理難品第一

論曰：汝稱我言說沒有道理。如果這樣說，你的言說也沒有道理。如果你的言說沒有道理，我的言說就有道理。如果你的言說有道理，卻說我的言說沒有道理，這是不合道理的。再者，沒有道理本身就包含道理，所以不存在完全沒有道理的情況。如果本身沒有道理，那麼『沒有道理』這個概念也就不存在了。因此，你說我的言說沒有道理，這是不對的。還有，如果你說我的言說沒有道理，就顯示出你沒有智慧。為什麼呢？因為沒有道理的東西就等於什麼都沒有。那麼，『言說』和『沒有道理』是一體的還是不同的？如果是一體的，那麼言說也就不存在了，你又怎麼能說我的言說沒有道理呢？如果是不同的，那麼言說本身是有道理的，你又為什麼要說我的言說沒有道理呢？再者，言說本身就存在自相矛盾。你所提出的質疑和我的言說，是同時發生的還是不同時發生的？如果是同時發生的，那麼就不能駁倒我的言說，就像牛角和馬耳同時生長，無法互相駁倒一樣。如果是不同時發生的，你的質疑在前，我的言說在後，我的言說還沒有出現，你又質疑什麼呢？所以這個質疑不成立。如果我的言說在前，你的質疑在後，我的言說已經成立，你又質疑什麼呢？如果是同時發生的，那麼我的言說和你的質疑，這個質疑是可質疑的還是不可質疑的，無法分辨，就像江水和海水同時混合在一起，無法分辨一樣。還有，你的質疑是爲了駁倒你自己的觀點，還是不爲了駁倒你自己的觀點？如果是爲了駁倒你自己的觀點，那麼你自己的觀點就會被推翻，而我的言說就成立了。如果不是爲了駁倒你自己的觀點，那麼這個質疑就不會成立。為什麼呢？因為在自己的觀點中，無法成立質疑。如果成立，那麼自己的觀點就會被推翻，而他人的觀點就會成立。再者，你說我的言說沒有道理，那就不是言說。如果是言

【English Translation】 English version Taisho Tripitaka Volume 32, No. 1633, The Treatise on Reality

No. 1633

The Treatise on Reality, Chapter on Counter-Objections, One Volume

Translated by Tripitaka Master Paramārtha of India in the Chen Dynasty

Chapter One: Objections Based on Lack of Reason

Treatise: You claim that my speech lacks reason. If that is the case, then your speech also lacks reason. If your speech lacks reason, then my speech has reason. If your speech has reason, but you claim my speech lacks reason, then this is not reasonable. Furthermore, that which lacks reason contains reason within itself. Therefore, there is no such thing as complete lack of reason. If there is no reason within itself, then 'lack of reason' should also not exist. Therefore, your saying that my speech lacks reason is not reasonable. Moreover, if you claim my speech lacks reason, it reveals your lack of wisdom. Why is that? Because that which lacks reason is equivalent to nothing. Is 'speech' one with or different from 'lack of reason'? If they are one, then speech also does not exist. How can you then claim that my speech lacks reason? If they are different, then speech has reason. Why then do you claim that my speech lacks reason? Furthermore, speech contradicts itself. Is your objection to my speech simultaneous or not simultaneous? If simultaneous, then it cannot refute my speech, just as a cow's horn and a horse's ear are born simultaneously and cannot refute each other. If not simultaneous, and your objection comes before my speech, then what are you objecting to since my speech has not yet been uttered? Therefore, the objection is not established. If my speech comes before your objection, then what are you objecting to since my speech is already established? If they are simultaneous, then it is impossible to distinguish whether my speech and your objection are objectionable or not. It is like river water and seawater merging simultaneously and being indistinguishable. Furthermore, is your objection objecting to your own meaning or not objecting to your own meaning? If it is objecting to your own meaning, then your own meaning is destroyed and my speech is established. If it is not objecting to your own meaning, then the objection is not established. Why is that? Because the objection is not established within your own meaning. If it is established, then your own meaning is destroyed and the meaning of others is established. Furthermore, your saying that my speech lacks reason is not speech. If it is speech,

說不得無道理。有言說無道理。此二相違。譬如童女有兒。若是童女不得有兒。若有兒則非童女。童女有兒此二相違。是故稱有言說無道理。是義不然。複次與證智相違故。汝聞我言說而稱無道理者。若汝已聞則為證智所成就。證智力大。汝言則壞。譬如有人說聲不為耳識得。耳識既得聲為證智所成就。證智力大。此言則壞。複次與比智相違故。若汝稱我有言說比智所得則知有道理。若無道理言說亦無。若有言說知有道理。譬如有人說聲常住從因生故。一切從因生者則無常住。譬如瓦器從因生故不得常住。聲若從因生不得常住。若常住者不得從因生。無常住者比智所成就。比智力大常住則壞。有道理者。若有言說則有道理。有道理者比智所成就。無道理者則壞。複次與世間相違故。汝稱我言說無道理。是語與世間相違。何以故。於世間中立四種道理。一因果道理。二相待道理。三成就道理。四如如道理。因果道理者。如種子與芽。相待道理者。如長短父子。成就道理者。如五分言成就義。如如道理者。有三種。一無我如如。二無常如如。三寂靜如如。於世間中言說為果道理為因。世間中若見果則知有因。若見言說則知有道理。汝稱我言說無道理。是義與世間相違。若有言說無道理者。無有是處。汝稱我言說異不相應故

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：說沒有道理是不合理的。說有言語表達卻沒有道理，這兩種說法是相互矛盾的。就像一個處女卻生了孩子一樣。如果是處女，就不應該有孩子；如果有孩子，那就不是處女了。處女有孩子這兩種情況是相互矛盾的。所以說有言語表達卻沒有道理，這種說法是不對的。再者，這種說法與通過驗證獲得的智慧（證智）相違背。你聽了我的言語表達卻說沒有道理，如果你已經聽到了，那就是被驗證的智慧所證實的。驗證的智慧力量強大，你的說法就會被推翻。就像有人說聲音不能被耳識所感知一樣。既然耳識能夠感知聲音，那就是被驗證的智慧所證實的。驗證的智慧力量強大，這種說法就會被推翻。再者，這種說法與通過比較獲得的智慧（比智）相違背。如果你說我的言語表達是通過比較獲得的智慧所理解的，那麼就應該知道其中有道理。如果沒有道理，就不會有言語表達；如果有言語表達，就知道其中有道理。就像有人說聲音是常住的，因為它是由因緣產生的。一切由因緣產生的都是無常的，就像瓦器由因緣產生所以不是常住的。聲音如果由因緣產生，就不是常住的；如果常住，就不是由因緣產生的。無常住是被比較的智慧所證實的，比較的智慧力量強大，常住的說法就會被推翻。有道理的說法是，如果有言語表達，那麼其中就有道理。有道理的說法是被比較的智慧所證實的，沒有道理的說法就會被推翻。再者，這種說法與世俗的認知相違背。你說我的言語表達沒有道理，這種說法與世俗的認知相違背。為什麼呢？在世俗中，有四種道理：一是因果道理，二是相待道理，三是成就道理，四是如如道理。因果道理，比如種子和芽。相待道理，比如長和短、父親和兒子。成就道理，比如通過五種要素的組合來成就意義。如如道理有三種：一是無我如如（Anatta-tathata），二是無常如如（Anicca-tathata），三是寂靜如如（Santa-tathata）。在世俗中，言語表達是果，道理是因。世俗中如果看到果，就知道有因；如果看到言語表達，就知道有道理。你說我的言語表達沒有道理，這種說法與世俗的認知相違背。如果有言語表達卻沒有道理，這是不可能的。你說我的言語表達是不同的，因為它們不相應。

【English Translation】 English version: It is unreasonable to say there is no reason. To say there is speech but no reason, these two are contradictory. It's like a virgin having a child. If she is a virgin, she should not have a child; if she has a child, then she is not a virgin. A virgin having a child, these two are contradictory. Therefore, to say there is speech but no reason is incorrect. Furthermore, it contradicts the wisdom attained through verification (Pratyaksha-jnana). You hear my speech and say it has no reason; if you have heard it, then it is confirmed by verified wisdom. The power of verified wisdom is great, and your statement will be refuted. It's like someone saying that sound cannot be perceived by ear-consciousness. Since ear-consciousness can perceive sound, it is confirmed by verified wisdom. The power of verified wisdom is great, and this statement will be refuted. Furthermore, it contradicts the wisdom attained through comparison (Anumana-jnana). If you say my speech is understood through wisdom attained by comparison, then you should know there is reason in it. If there is no reason, there would be no speech; if there is speech, you know there is reason. It's like someone saying that sound is permanent because it arises from causes. Everything that arises from causes is impermanent, like a clay pot arises from causes and therefore is not permanent. If sound arises from causes, it is not permanent; if it is permanent, it does not arise from causes. Impermanence is confirmed by comparative wisdom, and the power of comparative wisdom is great, and the statement of permanence will be refuted. The statement of having reason is that if there is speech, then there is reason. The statement of having reason is confirmed by comparative wisdom, and the statement of having no reason will be refuted. Furthermore, it contradicts worldly understanding. You say my speech has no reason, this statement contradicts worldly understanding. Why? In the world, there are four kinds of reasons: first, the reason of cause and effect; second, the reason of interdependence; third, the reason of accomplishment; fourth, the reason of suchness. The reason of cause and effect is like a seed and a sprout. The reason of interdependence is like long and short, father and son. The reason of accomplishment is like the accomplishment of meaning through the combination of five elements. The reason of suchness has three aspects: first, the suchness of no-self (Anatta-tathata); second, the suchness of impermanence (Anicca-tathata); third, the suchness of tranquility (Santa-tathata). In the world, speech is the effect, and reason is the cause. If you see the effect in the world, you know there is a cause; if you see speech, you know there is reason. You say my speech has no reason, this statement contradicts worldly understanding. If there is speech but no reason, that is impossible. You say my speech is different because they are not corresponding.

。我今共汝辯決是處。若人說異則有過失。汝自立義與我義異。則是自說。則是異說。是故汝得過失。若汝義異我自說則異過失在汝。不關於我。若不異汝則同我則無有異。汝說我異此是邪語。複次異與異無異。是故無異。若異與異異則不是異。譬如人與牛異。人不是牛。若異與異無異則是一。若一則無有異。汝何故說我為異。複次是道理者。我于汝道理中共諍故。我說有異。若汝與我不異者。則不與汝共諍。我說汝義故。若一切所說異者。汝亦有所說。是故汝說異。過失在汝。若汝說不說異者我亦說不說異。汝言我說異是義不然。汝是邪語。余義如前說。汝稱我說義不成就。我今共汝辯決是處。若說不成就者。是說不成就說。若所說不成就則不得說。若不得說者。汝云何說。我所說不成就。若得說所說則應成就。汝說不成就。是義不然。若一切所說不成就者。汝說難難我。是難則不成就。若汝說難非不成就者。我說亦如是非不成就。汝說我不成就。是義不然。不成就者于自體中成就。是故無不成就。若不成就於自體中無有成就者。亦應無有不成就者。若有成就則無有不成就。是故汝說我不成就無有是處。若汝說不誦我難則不得我意。若不得我意則不得難我。我今共汝辯決是處。若未誦我難則不得說汝難。汝為誦難能

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：我現在和你一起辨明這個道理。如果有人說的和事實不符，那就是過錯。你所堅持的義理和我的不同，那就是你在自說自話，那就是不同的說法。所以你有過錯。如果你的義理和我的不同，而我只是在陳述事實，那麼過錯就在你，與我無關。如果你的義理和我的沒有不同，那麼就和我的相同，也就沒有不同了。你說我和你不同，這是邪語。再者，不同和不同之間沒有不同，所以就是沒有不同。如果不同和不同之間有不同，那就不是不同了。比如人和牛不同，人不是牛。如果不同和不同之間沒有不同，那就是相同。如果相同，那就沒有不同。你為什麼說我和你不同呢？再者，按照道理來說，我和你因為道理而爭辯，所以我說有不同。如果你和我不存在不同，我就不會和你爭辯。我說的是你的義理。如果一切所說都是不同的，你也有所說，所以你說不同，過錯在你。如果你說沒有不同，我也說沒有不同。你說我說不同，這個道理是不成立的。你說的是邪語。其餘的道理如前面所說。你說我說義理不成就，我現在和你一起辨明這個道理。如果說不成就，那就是說不成就的說法。如果所說的不成就，那就不得說。如果不得說，你又怎麼說我所說的不成就呢？如果能說，所說的就應該成就。你說不成就，這個道理是不成立的。如果一切所說都不成就，你用來詰難我的詰難也是不成就的。如果你說你的詰難並非不成就，那麼我說我的說法也同樣並非不成就。你說我不成就，這個道理是不成立的。不成就本身就包含了成就，所以沒有不成就。如果不成就本身沒有成就，那麼也就不應該有不成就。如果有成就，就沒有不成就。所以你說我不成就，是沒有道理的。如果你說不理解我的詰難就不能理解我的意思，如果不能理解我的意思就不能詰難我。我現在和你一起辨明這個道理。如果還沒有理解我的詰難，就不能說你理解了詰難。

【English Translation】 English version: I will now discuss and resolve this matter with you. If someone speaks differently from the truth, then there is a fault. If the meaning you uphold is different from mine, then you are speaking for yourself, that is a different statement. Therefore, you have a fault. If your meaning is different from mine, and I am merely stating the facts, then the fault lies with you, and it is not related to me. If your meaning is not different from mine, then it is the same as mine, and there is no difference. You say I am different, this is false speech. Furthermore, there is no difference between different and different, so there is no difference. If there is a difference between different and different, then it is not different. For example, a person and a cow are different, a person is not a cow. If there is no difference between different and different, then it is the same. If it is the same, then there is no difference. Why do you say I am different? Furthermore, according to reason, I argue with you because of reason, so I say there is a difference. If there is no difference between you and me, I would not argue with you. I am speaking of your meaning. If everything said is different, you also have something to say, so you say it is different, the fault is with you. If you say there is no difference, I also say there is no difference. You say I say it is different, this principle is not established. What you say is false speech. The remaining principles are as previously stated. You say that my statement of meaning is not accomplished, I will now discuss and resolve this matter with you. If you say it is not accomplished, then that is saying the statement of not accomplished. If what is said is not accomplished, then it cannot be said. If it cannot be said, then how do you say that what I said is not accomplished? If it can be said, then what is said should be accomplished. You say it is not accomplished, this principle is not established. If everything said is not accomplished, then the challenge you use to challenge me is also not accomplished. If you say your challenge is not unaccomplished, then I say my statement is also not unaccomplished. You say I am not accomplished, this principle is not established. Unaccomplishment itself contains accomplishment, so there is no unaccomplishment. If unaccomplishment itself has no accomplishment, then there should also be no unaccomplishment. If there is accomplishment, there is no unaccomplishment. Therefore, what you say that I am not accomplished is unreasonable. If you say that you cannot understand my meaning if you do not understand my challenge, and if you cannot understand my meaning, you cannot challenge me. I will now discuss and resolve this matter with you. If you have not yet understood my challenge, then you cannot say that you understand the challenge.

難。為未誦難而難。若汝不誦而得說難者。我亦不誦而得說難。若汝誦難得說難者則恒誦難。何以故。難中復生難。難則無窮。無有不誦難時。無有得說難時。複次從難名更有難名。若誦此難名故得說難名。不誦不得說難名者。但得后誦前難名。次難名未得誦。第三方得誦第二難名。第四方得誦第三難名。如是則恒誦無盡。若汝今不誦而得說難名者。初難名亦應不誦而得說難名。若初難名不誦不得說難名者。第二亦應不誦難名得說難名。第二不誦難名得說難名者。初亦應不誦難名得說難名。而今初難名必須誦方得說難名。第二難名亦應必須誦方得說難名。不應不誦而說。複次若不誦難而說。難則墮負處。汝不誦自難。汝說難亦墮負處。若汝不誦難而說難。說難不墮負處者。我亦不誦難而說難亦不墮負處。複次若汝言說難我。我皆當誦。我難難汝。汝皆當誦。唯得互相領誦則不得別立難。若恒相領誦則失正義。譬如兩船相系大水若至相牽去來。複次汝言。皆是音聲出口則失滅。云何得誦我語。音聲既是失滅之法。不得重還故。不得重誦。若音聲在則不能誦。以其常聲故。若言失滅則無所誦。以其無故。若音聲已失滅。汝令我誦。稱是汝言。是邪思惟。汝說我語前破后。我今共汝辯決是處。若我說前破后是道理。何以故。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：難：為未誦（尚未背誦）的『難』而『難』（提出詰難）。如果因為你沒有背誦而能夠提出『難』，那麼我也應該在沒有背誦的情況下也能提出『難』。如果因為你背誦了『難』才能提出『難』，那麼你將永遠背誦『難』。為什麼呢？因為在『難』中又產生了『難』，『難』就會無窮無盡，沒有不背誦『難』的時候，也沒有能夠提出『難』的時候。再者，從一個『難』的名目又產生另一個『難』的名目。如果背誦了這個『難』的名目才能提出『難』的名目，不背誦就不能提出『難』的名目，那麼你只是背誦了先前的『難』的名目。下一個『難』的名目還沒有背誦，第三方才能背誦第二個『難』的名目，第四方才能背誦第三個『難』的名目。這樣的話，就永遠背誦不完了。如果你現在不背誦就能提出『難』的名目，那麼最初的『難』的名目也應該不背誦就能提出『難』的名目。如果最初的『難』的名目不背誦就不能提出『難』的名目，那麼第二個也應該不背誦『難』的名目就能提出『難』的名目。如果第二個不背誦『難』的名目就能提出『難』的名目，那麼最初的也應該不背誦『難』的名目就能提出『難』的名目。但是現在最初的『難』的名目必須背誦才能提出『難』的名目，第二個『難』的名目也應該必須背誦才能提出『難』的名目，不應該不背誦就能提出。再者，如果不背誦『難』而提出『難』，那就陷入了失敗的境地。你不背誦你自己的『難』，你提出『難』也同樣陷入了失敗的境地。如果你不背誦『難』而提出『難』，提出『難』卻沒有陷入失敗的境地，那麼我也應該不背誦『難』而提出『難』，也不會陷入失敗的境地。再者，如果你說我提出『難』，我都應當背誦；我提出『難』難住你，你也應當背誦。只能互相領誦，不能另外設立『難』。如果總是互相領誦，就會失去正義。譬如兩艘船互相繫在一起，大水如果來了，就會互相牽引著一起漂走。再者，你說：『所有的聲音出口后就消失了，怎麼能夠背誦我的話呢？』聲音既然是消失磨滅的法，就不能重新回來，所以不能重新背誦。如果聲音還在，就不能背誦，因為它始終是那個聲音。如果說聲音已經消失磨滅了，那就沒有什麼可以背誦的了，因為它已經不存在了。如果聲音已經消失磨滅了，你卻讓我背誦，還說是你的話，這是邪惡的思惟。你說我的話語前後矛盾，我現在和你一起辯論解決這個問題。如果我說的話語前後矛盾是正確的道理，那又是為什麼呢？

【English Translation】 English version: 『Nanda』 (Difficulty): To 『nanda』 (raise difficulties) for the 『nanda』 (difficulty) that has not been recited (memorized). If you can raise 『nanda』 (difficulties) without reciting, then I should also be able to raise 『nanda』 (difficulties) without reciting. If you can raise 『nanda』 (difficulties) because you have recited 『nanda』 (difficulty), then you will always be reciting 『nanda』 (difficulty). Why? Because within 『nanda』 (difficulty), another 『nanda』 (difficulty) arises, and 『nanda』 (difficulty) becomes endless. There is no time when one is not reciting 『nanda』 (difficulty), and no time when one can raise 『nanda』 (difficulty). Furthermore, from one 『nanda』 (difficulty) name, another 『nanda』 (difficulty) name arises. If reciting this 『nanda』 (difficulty) name allows one to raise the 『nanda』 (difficulty) name, and not reciting it does not allow one to raise the 『nanda』 (difficulty) name, then you are only reciting the previous 『nanda』 (difficulty) name. The next 『nanda』 (difficulty) name has not been recited yet, and only a third party can recite the second 『nanda』 (difficulty) name, and a fourth party can recite the third 『nanda』 (difficulty) name. In this way, the recitation will never end. If you can raise the 『nanda』 (difficulty) name without reciting now, then the initial 『nanda』 (difficulty) name should also be able to be raised without reciting. If the initial 『nanda』 (difficulty) name cannot be raised without reciting, then the second one should also be able to raise the 『nanda』 (difficulty) name without reciting. If the second one can raise the 『nanda』 (difficulty) name without reciting, then the initial one should also be able to raise the 『nanda』 (difficulty) name without reciting. But now the initial 『nanda』 (difficulty) name must be recited to raise the 『nanda』 (difficulty) name, and the second 『nanda』 (difficulty) name should also be recited to raise the 『nanda』 (difficulty) name. One should not be able to raise it without reciting. Furthermore, if one raises 『nanda』 (difficulty) without reciting, then one falls into a losing position. You do not recite your own 『nanda』 (difficulty), and your raising 『nanda』 (difficulty) also puts you in a losing position. If you raise 『nanda』 (difficulty) without reciting, and raising 『nanda』 (difficulty) does not put you in a losing position, then I should also be able to raise 『nanda』 (difficulty) without reciting, and I would not be in a losing position. Furthermore, if you say that I raise 『nanda』 (difficulty), I should recite it; if I raise 『nanda』 (difficulty) and stump you, you should also recite it. We can only recite together, and we cannot establish 『nanda』 (difficulty) separately. If we always recite together, we will lose the correct meaning. It is like two boats tied together; if a great flood comes, they will pull each other and drift away. Furthermore, you say: 『All sounds disappear after they are uttered, how can you recite my words?』 Since sound is a dharma (law, phenomenon) of disappearance and extinction, it cannot return, so it cannot be recited again. If the sound is still there, it cannot be recited, because it is always that sound. If you say that the sound has disappeared and become extinct, then there is nothing to recite, because it no longer exists. If the sound has disappeared and become extinct, but you ask me to recite it, and say it is your words, this is evil thinking. You say that my words are contradictory, and I will now debate with you to resolve this issue. If what I say is contradictory is the correct reason, then why is that?

我語前汝語后。若我語破后語。我義則勝。汝語則壞。複次若汝說一切語前破后。汝亦出語前應破后。若汝語前不破后。我出語前亦不破后。複次前破後者于自體無前破后。若於自體有前破后。則前後俱無。是故汝說前破后。是語不然。若於自體無前破后。無有因故。前破后亦是無。汝說我語前破后。是邪思惟。汝說我說別因。我今共汝辯決是處。若人舍前因立別因墮負處者。汝則墮負處。

何以故汝亦舍前因立別因故。若汝立別因不墮負處。我亦如是。複次我所說因與汝所說因異。若我說異因則是我道理。若不說異因。我則說汝因。非是對治相違。便同汝說。汝說我說異因是邪思惟。若我同汝立因。汝破我因則破汝自因。複次若一切語是別因。汝亦出語則是別因。是故汝墮負處。若汝出語不墮負處。汝說我立因墮負處。是義不然。若汝說我說別義。今共汝辯決是處。我所立義與汝義異。即是道理。我今與汝對治相違。是故說別義。若汝思惟我義與汝義不異。我義則不與汝義對治相違。若汝破我義則是自破。複次異義于自體中無異義。異義則是無。若異義于自體中有異義。異義亦是無。是故汝稱我說異義。是義不然。複次若一切所說是異義。汝有所說亦應是異義。若汝有所說不說是異義。汝說一切所說是異義。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：我說的話在前，你說的話在後。如果我說的話能駁倒你後面的話，那麼我的道理就成立，你的話就被推翻。反過來說，如果你認為所有的話語都能先駁倒後來的話，那麼你在說話之前就應該先駁倒後面的話。如果你說的話不能駁倒後面的話，那麼我說的話也不能駁倒後面的話。進一步說，所謂『先駁倒后』，就其自身而言，並不存在『先』和『后』的駁倒關係。如果就其自身而言存在『先』和『后』的駁倒關係，那麼『先』和『后』就都不存在了。因此，你說『先駁倒后』，這種說法是不對的。如果就其自身而言不存在『先』和『后』的駁倒關係，那麼因為沒有原因，『先駁倒后』也是不存在的。你說我的話能『先駁倒后』，這是錯誤的思考。你說我提出了不同的原因，我現在和你辯論解決這個問題。如果有人捨棄了之前的因，而提出了另外的因，那麼這個人就處於失敗的境地，你就是處於失敗的境地。為什麼呢？因為你也捨棄了之前的因，而提出了另外的因。如果你提出另外的因，卻沒有處於失敗的境地，那麼我也是一樣。進一步說，我所說的因和你所說的因是不同的。如果我說的是不同的因，那麼這就是我的道理。如果我說的不是不同的因，那麼我說的就是你的因，而不是對立相違背的，就和你所說的一樣。你說我提出了不同的因，這是錯誤的思考。如果我和你提出了相同的因，你駁倒了我的因，那麼就是駁倒了你自己的因。進一步說，如果所有的話語都是不同的因，那麼你說的話也是不同的因。因此，你就處於失敗的境地。如果你說的話沒有處於失敗的境地，那麼你說我提出因就處於失敗的境地，這種說法是不對的。如果你說我提出了不同的意義，我現在和你辯論解決這個問題。我所提出的意義和你的意義不同，這就是道理。我現在和你對立相違背，所以提出了不同的意義。如果你認為我的意義和你的意義沒有不同，那麼我的意義就不會和你的意義對立相違背。如果你駁倒了我的意義，那麼就是自己駁倒了自己。進一步說，不同的意義就其自身而言，不存在不同的意義，不同的意義就是沒有意義。如果不同的意義就其自身而言存在不同的意義，那麼不同的意義也是沒有意義。因此，你說我提出了不同的意義，這種說法是不對的。進一步說，如果所有說出的都是不同的意義，那麼你所說出的也應該是不同的意義。如果你所說出的不是不同的意義，那麼你說所有說出的都是不同的意義，這種說法就不成立。 English version: I speak before you, you speak after me. If my words can refute your later words, then my argument prevails, and your words are overturned. Conversely, if you say that all words can refute later words, then before you speak, you should first refute the words that will come after. If your words cannot refute later words, then my words also cannot refute later words. Furthermore, the so-called 'refuting the later' does not, in itself, have a 'before' and 'after' relationship of refutation. If, in itself, there is a 'before' and 'after' relationship of refutation, then both 'before' and 'after' cease to exist. Therefore, your statement of 'refuting the later' is incorrect. If, in itself, there is no 'before' and 'after' relationship of refutation, then because there is no cause, 'refuting the later' also does not exist. Your statement that my words can 'refute the later' is a wrong thought. You say that I have proposed a different cause; I will now debate with you to resolve this issue. If someone abandons the previous cause and proposes another cause, then that person is in a losing position; you are in a losing position. Why? Because you also abandoned the previous cause and proposed another cause. If you propose another cause and are not in a losing position, then neither am I. Furthermore, the cause I speak of is different from the cause you speak of. If I speak of a different cause, then that is my argument. If I do not speak of a different cause, then I am speaking of your cause, and it is not an opposing contradiction, just as you say. You say that I have proposed a different cause; this is a wrong thought. If you and I propose the same cause, and you refute my cause, then you are refuting your own cause. Furthermore, if all words are different causes, then your words are also a different cause. Therefore, you are in a losing position. If your words do not put you in a losing position, then your statement that my proposing a cause puts me in a losing position is incorrect. If you say that I have proposed a different meaning, I will now debate with you to resolve this issue. The meaning I propose is different from your meaning; this is the argument. I am now in opposition to you, so I propose a different meaning. If you think that my meaning is not different from your meaning, then my meaning will not be in opposition to your meaning. If you refute my meaning, then you are refuting yourself. Furthermore, different meanings, in themselves, do not have different meanings; different meanings are meaningless. If different meanings, in themselves, have different meanings, then different meanings are also meaningless. Therefore, your statement that I have proposed a different meaning is incorrect. Furthermore, if everything spoken is a different meaning, then what you speak should also be a different meaning. If what you speak is not a different meaning, then your statement that everything spoken is a different meaning is not valid.

【English Translation】 Modern Chinese translation: I speak before you, you speak after me. If my words can refute your later words, then my argument prevails, and your words are overturned. Conversely, if you think that all words can refute later words, then before you speak, you should first refute the words that will come after. If your words cannot refute later words, then my words also cannot refute later words. Furthermore, the so-called 'refuting the later' does not, in itself, have a 'before' and 'after' relationship of refutation. If, in itself, there is a 'before' and 'after' relationship of refutation, then both 'before' and 'after' cease to exist. Therefore, your statement of 'refuting the later' is incorrect. If, in itself, there is no 'before' and 'after' relationship of refutation, then because there is no cause, 'refuting the later' also does not exist. Your statement that my words can 'refute the later' is a wrong thought. You say that I have proposed a different cause; I will now debate with you to resolve this issue. If someone abandons the previous cause and proposes another cause, then that person is in a losing position; you are in a losing position. Why? Because you also abandoned the previous cause and proposed another cause. If you propose another cause and are not in a losing position, then neither am I. Furthermore, the cause I speak of is different from the cause you speak of. If I speak of a different cause, then that is my argument. If I do not speak of a different cause, then I am speaking of your cause, and it is not an opposing contradiction, just as you say. You say that I have proposed a different cause; this is a wrong thought. If you and I propose the same cause, and you refute my cause, then you are refuting your own cause. Furthermore, if all words are different causes, then your words are also a different cause. Therefore, you are in a losing position. If your words do not put you in a losing position, then your statement that my proposing a cause puts me in a losing position is incorrect. If you say that I have proposed a different meaning, I will now debate with you to resolve this issue. The meaning I propose is different from your meaning; this is the argument. I am now in opposition to you, so I propose a different meaning. If you think that my meaning is not different from your meaning, then my meaning will not be in opposition to your meaning. If you refute my meaning, then you are refuting yourself. Furthermore, different meanings, in themselves, do not have different meanings; different meanings are meaningless. If different meanings, in themselves, have different meanings, then different meanings are also meaningless. Therefore, your statement that I have proposed a different meaning is incorrect. Furthermore, if everything spoken is a different meaning, then what you speak should also be a different meaning. If what you speak is not a different meaning, then your statement that everything spoken is a different meaning is not valid.

是義不然。汝說我今語猶是前語無異語者。我今共汝辯決是處。我立義與汝立義對治相違。若我說自立義對治汝義。是正道理。何以故。我一切處說為破汝義。是故我說無有異。若我應說異義者。汝立義與我義異。若我說異義則說汝義。則不共汝相違。汝難我則是難自義。

複次如我前說聲無常此語自滅自盡。今更別出語。汝說我說前語。是邪思惟。複次若汝說我所說無異。若我說異則是異。若我說無異則是不異。若我說是不得成是汝說我無異。是義不然。若汝言一切所說我皆不許。我今共汝辯決是處。汝說不許一切。此說為入一切數。為不入一切數。若入一切數汝則自不許汝所說。若自不許者我義則是汝所許。我義自成。汝言便壞。若不入一切數者。則無一切。若無一切汝不許一切。若不許一切。我義便非汝不許。我義亦成。汝言終壞。

反質難品中道理難品第二

論曰。難有三種過失。一顛倒難。二不實義難。三相違難。若難有此三種過失則墮負處。一顛倒難者。立難不與正義相應。是名顛倒難。顛倒難有十種。一同相難。二異相難。三長相難。四無異難。五至不至難。六無因難。七顯別因難。八疑難。九未說難。十事異難。一同相難者。對物同相立難。是名同相難。論曰。聲無常因功力生。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：這種說法是不對的。你說我現在說的話和之前說的話沒有區別。我現在要和你辯論清楚這個問題。我所堅持的觀點和你的觀點是相互對立、相互違背的。如果我說我所堅持的觀點是爲了反駁你的觀點，這是正確的道理。為什麼呢？因為我所說的任何話都是爲了駁倒你的觀點。因此，我說的話並沒有不同。如果我應該說不同的話，那麼你所堅持的觀點就和我的觀點不同了。如果我說不同的話，那就是在說你的觀點，那就不是和你相互違背了。你反駁我，實際上就是在反駁你自己的觀點。

再者，就像我之前說的『聲音是無常的』這句話，它自己會消滅、自己會消失。現在我再說別的話。你說我說之前的話，這是錯誤的思考。再者，如果你說我所說的話沒有不同，那麼我說有不同，那就是有不同；我說沒有不同，那就是沒有不同。如果我說有不同，就不能成立『你說我沒有不同』的說法，這種說法是不對的。如果你說我所說的一切你都不認可，我現在要和你辯論清楚這個問題。你說不認可一切，這個『一切』是包括在你所說的一切之中，還是不包括在你所說的一切之中？如果包括在你所說的一切之中，那麼你就是自己不認可自己所說的話。如果你自己不認可自己所說的話，那麼我的觀點就是你所認可的，我的觀點就成立了，你的說法就站不住腳了。如果不包括在你所說的一切之中，那麼就沒有『一切』這個說法了。如果沒有『一切』這個說法，那麼你就不應該說不認可一切。如果你不認可一切，那麼我的觀點就不是你不認可的，我的觀點也就成立了，你的說法最終會站不住腳。

《反質難品》中的道理，《難品》第二

論曰：反駁有三種過失：一是顛倒反駁，二是不實義反駁，三是相違反駁。如果反駁有這三種過失，就會處於失敗的境地。一是顛倒反駁，指的是提出的反駁與正確的道理不相應，這叫做顛倒反駁。顛倒反駁有十種：一是同相難，二是異相難，三是長相難，四是無異難，五是至不至難，六是無因難，七是顯別因難，八是疑難，九是未說難，十是事異難。一是同相難，指的是針對事物相同的方面提出反駁，這叫做同相難。論曰：聲音是無常的，因為是由功力產生的。

【English Translation】 English version: That is not the case. You say that what I am saying now is no different from what I said before. I will now debate this point with you clearly. The view I hold and your view are mutually opposed and contradictory. If I say that the view I hold is to refute your view, that is the correct principle. Why? Because everything I say is to refute your view. Therefore, what I say is not different. If I should say something different, then the view you hold is different from my view. If I say something different, then I am talking about your view, and then it is not contradicting you. You refute me, but in reality, you are refuting your own view.

Furthermore, just like the sentence 'sound is impermanent' that I said before, it will extinguish itself and disappear by itself. Now I say something else. You say that I am saying the previous words, this is wrong thinking. Furthermore, if you say that what I say is no different, then if I say there is a difference, then there is a difference; if I say there is no difference, then there is no difference. If I say there is a difference, then the statement 'you say I have no difference' cannot be established, this statement is incorrect. If you say that you do not accept everything I say, I will now debate this point with you clearly. You say you do not accept everything, does this 'everything' include everything you say, or does it not include everything you say? If it includes everything you say, then you are not accepting what you say yourself. If you do not accept what you say yourself, then my view is what you accept, my view is established, and your statement is untenable. If it does not include everything you say, then there is no such thing as 'everything'. If there is no such thing as 'everything', then you should not say that you do not accept everything. If you do not accept everything, then my view is not what you do not accept, my view is also established, and your statement will ultimately be untenable.

The Principle in the 'Counter-Questioning Chapter', 'Chapter on Refutation' Second

Treatise says: There are three kinds of faults in refutation: first, inverted refutation; second, unreal refutation; and third, contradictory refutation. If a refutation has these three kinds of faults, it will be in a losing position. First, inverted refutation refers to a refutation that is not in accordance with the correct principle, this is called inverted refutation. There are ten kinds of inverted refutation: first, the same characteristic refutation; second, the different characteristic refutation; third, the long characteristic refutation; fourth, the no difference refutation; fifth, the arriving or not arriving refutation; sixth, the no cause refutation; seventh, the revealing different cause refutation; eighth, the doubt refutation; ninth, the unsaid refutation; tenth, the different matter refutation. First, the same characteristic refutation refers to raising a refutation based on the same aspects of things, this is called the same characteristic refutation. Treatise says: Sound is impermanent because it is produced by effort.

無中間生故。譬如瓦器因功力生。生已破滅。聲亦如是故聲無常。是義已立。外曰。若聲無常與器同相者。聲即常住。與空同相故。是故如空聲亦常住。同相者同無身故。論曰。

複次聲無常因功力生。無中間生故。若物常住不因功力生。譬如虛空常住不因功力生。聲不如此。是故聲無常。此義已立。外曰。若聲與常住空不同相故。是故聲無常則何所至。若與空同相。聲即是常。同相者是無身。是故常。論曰。此兩難悉是顛倒不成難。何以故。決定一味法立為因。顯一切物因功力生故無常。是顯無常因決定一味。是故無常不動。欲顯其同類故說瓦器等譬。外依不決定一味立難云。若汝依同相立聲無常義。我亦依同相立聲常義。若汝義成就我義亦成就。論曰。汝難不如。何以故。汝立因不決定常無常遍顯故。我立因三種相是根本法。同類所攝異類相離。是故立因成就不動。汝因不如。是故汝難顛倒。若汝立因同我因者。汝難則成正難。若無常立義難常義。是難成就。何以故。立常因難。立無常因。極不能顯無常顛倒過失。常因不決定一味故。無常因決定一味故。二異相難者。對物不同相立難。是名異相難。論曰。聲無常。何以故。因緣所生故。若有物依因緣生即是無常。譬如虛空。虛空者常住。不依因緣生。聲不

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因為沒有中間產生的階段。比如瓦器是依靠功力產生的，產生之後就會破滅。聲音也是如此，所以聲音是無常的。這個道理已經成立。外道說：如果聲音的無常和瓦器的性質相同，那麼聲音就是常住的，因為它和虛空的性質相同。所以，像虛空一樣，聲音也是常住的。性質相同是因為都沒有形體。論師說：

再次說明，聲音是無常的，因為它依靠功力產生，沒有中間產生的階段。如果事物是常住的，就不會依靠功力產生，比如虛空是常住的，不依靠功力產生。聲音不是這樣，所以聲音是無常的。這個道理已經成立。外道說：如果聲音和常住的虛空性質不同，那麼聲音無常的結論又會走向哪裡呢？如果和虛空性質相同，聲音就是常住的。性質相同是因為沒有形體，所以是常住的。論師說：這兩種詰難都是顛倒的，不能成立。為什麼呢？因為確定唯一不變的法可以作為因，來顯示一切事物都是依靠功力產生的，所以是無常的。這是爲了顯示無常的因是確定唯一不變的。所以無常是不可動搖的。爲了顯示其同類，所以說了瓦器等的比喻。外道依靠不確定唯一不變的道理來提出詰難說：如果你依靠性質相同來確立聲音無常的道理，我也依靠性質相同來確立聲音常住的道理。如果你的道理成立，我的道理也成立。論師說：你的詰難是不成立的。為什麼呢？因為你所確立的因是不確定的，常與無常普遍顯現。我所確立的因具有三種相，是根本的法，被同類所包含，與異類相分離。所以確立的因是成立且不可動搖的。你的因是不成立的，所以你的詰難是顛倒的。如果你確立的因和我的因相同，那麼你的詰難就可以成為正確的詰難。如果用確立常的道理來詰難確立無常的道理，這個詰難是可以成立的。為什麼呢？因為用確立常的因來詰難確立無常的因，是極難顯示無常的顛倒過失的，因為常的因是不確定唯一不變的，而無常的因是確定唯一不變的。用兩種不同性質的事物來提出詰難，就是針對性質不同的事物來確立詰難，這叫做異相難。論師說：聲音是無常的。為什麼呢？因為是因緣所生的。如果有什麼事物是依靠因緣產生的，那就是無常的，比如虛空。虛空是常住的，不依靠因緣產生，聲音不是這樣。

【English Translation】 English version: Because there is no intermediate arising. For example, a clay pot arises due to effort. Once arisen, it is subject to destruction. Sound is also like this, therefore sound is impermanent. This principle has already been established. The outsider says: If the impermanence of sound is of the same nature as a pot, then sound is permanent, because it is of the same nature as space (akasa). Therefore, like space, sound is also permanent. Being of the same nature means being without a body. The treatise says:

Furthermore, sound is impermanent because it arises from effort, without an intermediate arising. If something is permanent, it does not arise from effort, like space (akasa), which is permanent and does not arise from effort. Sound is not like this, therefore sound is impermanent. This principle has already been established. The outsider says: If sound is not of the same nature as permanent space, then where does the conclusion that sound is impermanent lead? If it is of the same nature as space, then sound is permanent. Being of the same nature means being without a body, therefore it is permanent. The treatise says: Both of these challenges are inverted and cannot be established. Why? Because establishing a definitive, single-flavored (ekarasam) dharma as the cause reveals that all things arise from effort, therefore they are impermanent. This reveals that the cause of impermanence is definitive and single-flavored. Therefore, impermanence is unshakeable. To show its similarity, examples such as clay pots are given. The outsider relies on an indefinite, single-flavored principle to raise a challenge, saying: If you rely on similarity to establish the meaning of sound being impermanent, I also rely on similarity to establish the meaning of sound being permanent. If your argument is established, my argument is also established. The treatise says: Your challenge is not valid. Why? Because the cause you establish is indefinite, manifesting both permanence and impermanence universally. The cause I establish has three characteristics, it is a fundamental dharma, included in the same class, and separated from different classes. Therefore, the established cause is valid and unshakeable. Your cause is not valid, therefore your challenge is inverted. If the cause you establish is the same as my cause, then your challenge can become a correct challenge. If you use the establishment of permanence to challenge the establishment of impermanence, this challenge can be established. Why? Because using the cause of establishing permanence to challenge the cause of establishing impermanence is extremely difficult to reveal the inverted fault of impermanence, because the cause of permanence is indefinite and single-flavored, while the cause of impermanence is definitive and single-flavored. Using two things of different natures to raise a challenge is called a dissimilar challenge, which is to establish a challenge against things of different natures. The treatise says: Sound is impermanent. Why? Because it is produced by conditions (hetupratyaya). If something arises dependent on conditions, then it is impermanent, like space (akasa). Space is permanent and does not arise dependent on conditions, sound is not like this.

如是。是故聲無常。外曰。若聲與常住空不同相故。無常復何所至。若與瓦器不同相聲即常住。不同相者。聲無身瓦器有身。是故瓦器無常聲則是常。

論曰。聲無常依因緣生故。譬如瓦器依因緣生故無常。聲亦如是。外曰。若汝立聲無常與瓦器同相者。復何所至。聲即常住與瓦器不同相故。不同相者。聲無身瓦器有身故。論曰。此兩難悉顛倒。何以故。我立無常因決定一味故。汝立常因不決定一味。常無常遍顯故。是故不定因不能難決定因。我立因者。是依因緣生故聲無常。是因是根本法。同類所攝異類相離。具足三相故不可動。汝立因者是無身故聲常住。是因根本法同類異類所攝。是故不成因。三長相難者。于同相顯別相是名長相難。論曰。聲無常因功力生故。譬如瓦器。是故聲無常。外曰。汝立聲與瓦器同相因功力生故。別有所以。一可燒熟不可燒熟。二為眼所見不為眼所見等。如是別聲與瓦器各有所以。聲因功力生常住。瓦器因功力生無常。是故聲常住。論曰。是難顛倒。何以故。我立因與無常不相離與常相離。顯此因為無常比智。譬如為火比智顯煙。煙者與火不相離。是故我立因成就不可動。汝顯別聲不可燒熟。是故常者。欲瞋苦樂風等不可燒熟而是無常。是故不可燒熟不可立為常因。不為眼所見者

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如是。因此，聲音是無常的。（外道）說：如果聲音與常住的空性不同相，那麼無常又從何而來呢？如果聲音與瓦器不同相，聲音就是常住的。不同相之處在於，聲音沒有形體，而瓦器有形體。因此，瓦器是無常的，聲音則是常住的。

論曰：聲音是無常的，因為它依賴因緣而生。譬如瓦器，因為它依賴因緣而生，所以是無常的。聲音也是如此。（外道）說：如果你認為聲音的無常與瓦器相同，那麼又有什麼意義呢？聲音就是常住的，因為它與瓦器不同相。不同相之處在於，聲音沒有形體，而瓦器有形體。論曰：這兩種詰難都是顛倒的。為什麼呢？因為我所立的無常之因是決定且唯一的。你所立的常住之因是不決定且不唯一的。常與無常普遍顯現。因此，不決定的因不能駁倒決定的因。我所立的因是：因為依賴因緣而生，所以聲音是無常的。這個因是根本法，同類包含，異類相離，具足三相，所以不可動搖。你所立的因是：因為沒有形體，所以聲音是常住的。這個因不是根本法，同類異類都包含，所以不能成立為因。用三種長相來詰難，在同相中顯示差別相，這叫做長相難。

論曰：聲音是無常的，因為它是功力所生。譬如瓦器。因此，聲音是無常的。（外道）說：你認為聲音與瓦器同相，都是功力所生，但卻有區別。一是可燒熟，不可燒熟；二是為眼睛所見，不為眼睛所見等等。像這樣，聲音與瓦器各有不同之處。聲音因為功力而生，是常住的。瓦器因為功力而生，是無常的。因此，聲音是常住的。論曰：這種詰難是顛倒的。為什麼呢？因為我所立的因與無常不相離，與常相離。顯示這個因是無常的比智。譬如為火的比智顯示煙。煙與火不相離。因此，我所立的因是成就的，不可動搖。你顯示聲音不可燒熟，所以是常住的。但是，慾望、嗔恨、苦、樂、風等都不可燒熟，卻是無常的。因此，不可燒熟不能作為常住的因。不為眼睛所見者...

【English Translation】 English version: Thus it is. Therefore, sound is impermanent. The outsider says: If sound is different in nature from the permanent emptiness, then where does impermanence come from? If sound is different in nature from a clay pot, then sound is permanent. The difference in nature is that sound has no body, while a clay pot has a body. Therefore, a clay pot is impermanent, while sound is permanent.

The treatise says: Sound is impermanent because it arises from conditions. Just like a clay pot, it is impermanent because it arises from conditions. Sound is also like that. The outsider says: If you establish that the impermanence of sound is the same as that of a clay pot, then what is the point? Sound is permanent because it is different in nature from a clay pot. The difference in nature is that sound has no body, while a clay pot has a body. The treatise says: These two challenges are both inverted. Why? Because the cause of impermanence that I establish is definite and singular. The cause of permanence that you establish is indefinite and not singular. Permanence and impermanence are universally manifested. Therefore, an indefinite cause cannot refute a definite cause. The cause that I establish is: because it arises from conditions, sound is impermanent. This cause is the fundamental dharma, included in the same category, separated from different categories, possessing the three characteristics, so it cannot be shaken. The cause that you establish is: because it has no body, sound is permanent. This cause is not the fundamental dharma, included in both the same and different categories, so it cannot be established as a cause. Using the three long characteristics to challenge, showing the difference in characteristics within the same characteristics, this is called the challenge of long characteristics.

The treatise says: Sound is impermanent because it is produced by effort. Just like a clay pot. Therefore, sound is impermanent. The outsider says: You establish that sound and a clay pot are the same in nature, both produced by effort, but there are differences. One is that it can be fired, and the other cannot be fired; one is visible to the eye, and the other is not visible to the eye, and so on. Like this, sound and a clay pot each have their own differences. Sound is permanent because it is produced by effort. A clay pot is impermanent because it is produced by effort. Therefore, sound is permanent. The treatise says: This challenge is inverted. Why? Because the cause that I establish is inseparable from impermanence and separate from permanence. Showing that this cause is the inferential knowledge of impermanence. Just like showing smoke for the inferential knowledge of fire. Smoke is inseparable from fire. Therefore, the cause that I establish is accomplished and cannot be shaken. You show that sound cannot be fired, so it is permanent. However, desire, anger, suffering, joy, wind, etc., cannot be fired, but they are impermanent. Therefore, not being able to be fired cannot be established as a cause of permanence. Those not visible to the eye...

亦不可立為常因。何以故。欲瞋苦樂風等亦不為眼所見而是無常。汝因同類異類所攝。是故不成。若汝因與我因同能難我立義。我立義者依三種相因。是故不同。不同者汝說同。是故汝難顛倒。四無異難者。顯一同相故立一切無所以。是名無異難。論曰。聲無常依因緣異故聲即異。譬如燈若炷大明大炷小明小。是義已立。外曰。若依同相瓦器等無常聲亦如是者。則一切物與一切物無異。何以故。一切物與異物有同相故。何者同相。有一可知等。是名同相。若有同相一切物與別物異者。聲亦如是。與瓦器等有同相。聲是常瓦器等無常。何以故。一切于有等同相中有自性異故。如燈聲人馬若依同相比知則不成就。論曰。是難顛倒。何以故。於一切物有等同相。我亦不捨。我檢有別。同相具足三相者立無常義。說此為無常因不取唯同相。若不如是思擇道理則無別有道理。何以故。無有一物與異物不同不別。是故若有同相則同類所攝。一切異類相離。若取此立因。是因成就。唯同相立因則不成就。是故顛倒。複次論曰。聲無常依因緣生故。譬如瓦器等。是故聲無常。外曰。因與立義二無無異。何以故。依因生是何義。因未和合聲未生。未生故無有是其義。聲無常是何義。聲未生得生。生已即滅。滅故無有。是其義。因與立義同

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本亦不可立為常因。為什麼呢？因為嗔怒、苦樂、風等，眼睛都看不見，而且是無常的。你所說的『因』，無論是同類還是異類所包含，因此不能成立。如果你的『因』和我所立的『因』一樣，都能反駁我所立的義理，但我所立的義理是依據三種相因（ हेतु traya ）而成立的，所以不同。你說我們相同，所以你的反駁是顛倒的。四、無異難（ अनन्यत्वोपदर्शन दोष ）：因為顯示了相同的相狀，所以立論說一切事物都沒有差別。這叫做無異難。論曰：聲音是無常的，因為它依賴因緣而變化。譬如燈，燈芯大則光明大，燈芯小則光明小。這個道理已經成立。外曰：如果依據相同的相狀，瓦器等是無常的，聲音也應該如此，那麼一切事物與一切事物就沒有差別了。為什麼呢？因為一切事物與不同的事物有相同的相狀。什麼是相同的相狀呢？比如，都具有『存在』、『可知』等特性。這叫做相同的相狀。如果因為有相同的相狀，一切事物就與別的事物沒有差別，那麼聲音也應該如此，與瓦器等有相同的相狀。聲音是常，瓦器等是無常。為什麼呢？因為一切事物在具有相同相狀的同時，也有各自的自性差別。比如燈、聲音、人、馬，如果依據相同的相狀來認知，那就不能成立。論曰：這是顛倒的反駁。為什麼呢？因為對於一切事物都具有『存在』等相同的相狀，我並不否認。我考察的是它們之間的差別。只有當同相（ सामान्य lakṣaṇa ）具足三種相（ त्रिलक्षण trailakṣaṇya ）時，才能成立無常的義理。我們說這是無常的『因』，並不是只取其相同的相狀。如果不如是思擇道理，那就沒有其他的道理了。為什麼呢？因為沒有一樣事物與不同的事物完全相同，也沒有完全不同。所以，如果有相同的相狀，那就是同類所包含的。一切異類都是相互分離的。如果取此來立『因』，這個『因』才能成立。只用相同的相狀來立『因』，則不能成立。所以這是顛倒的。複次，論曰：聲音是無常的，因為它依賴因緣而生起，譬如瓦器等。所以聲音是無常的。外曰：『因』與所立的義理（立義 साध्य ）之間沒有差別。為什麼呢？『依因生』是什麼意思？意思是因未和合，聲音未生。未生，所以沒有，就是這個意思。『聲音無常』是什麼意思？意思是聲音未生而能夠生，生起之後立即滅亡。滅亡，所以沒有，就是這個意思。『因』與所立的義理相同。

【English Translation】 English version Also, it cannot be established as a permanent cause. Why? Because anger, suffering, joy, wind, etc., are not seen by the eye and are impermanent. Your 'cause,' whether included in the same category or a different category, therefore cannot be established. If your 'cause' and my established 'cause' are the same and can refute my established principle, but my established principle is based on three aspects of cause (hetu traya), then they are different. You say we are the same, so your refutation is inverted. Fourth, the 'no difference' refutation (ananyatvopadarśana doṣa): Because it shows the same characteristics, it establishes the argument that all things have no difference. This is called the 'no difference' refutation. The Treatise says: Sound is impermanent because it depends on conditions and changes. For example, a lamp; if the wick is large, the light is large; if the wick is small, the light is small. This principle has already been established. The Outsider says: If, according to the same characteristics, earthenware etc. are impermanent, and sound should also be like that, then all things would have no difference from all things. Why? Because all things have the same characteristics as different things. What are the same characteristics? For example, they all have 'existence,' 'knowability,' etc. This is called the same characteristic. If, because of having the same characteristics, all things have no difference from other things, then sound should also be like that, having the same characteristics as earthenware etc. Sound is permanent, earthenware etc. are impermanent. Why? Because all things, while having the same characteristics, also have their own distinct nature. For example, lamps, sounds, people, horses; if we recognize them based on the same characteristics, then it cannot be established. The Treatise says: This is an inverted refutation. Why? Because I do not deny that all things have the same characteristics such as 'existence.' What I examine is the difference between them. Only when the common characteristic (sāmānya lakṣaṇa) possesses three aspects (trilakṣaṇa trailakṣaṇya), can the meaning of impermanence be established. We say this is the 'cause' of impermanence, not only taking its same characteristics. If we do not consider the reasons in this way, then there is no other reason. Why? Because there is no one thing that is completely the same as different things, nor completely different. Therefore, if there are the same characteristics, then it is included in the same category. All different categories are separated from each other. If we take this to establish the 'cause,' then this 'cause' can be established. Establishing the 'cause' only with the same characteristics cannot be established. Therefore, this is inverted. Furthermore, the Treatise says: Sound is impermanent because it arises depending on conditions, like earthenware etc. Therefore, sound is impermanent. The Outsider says: There is no difference between the 'cause' and the established principle (sādhya). Why? What does 'arising depending on cause' mean? It means that if the cause is not combined, the sound is not produced. Not produced, so it does not exist, that is the meaning. What does 'sound is impermanent' mean? It means that sound is not produced but can be produced, and after being produced, it immediately ceases. Ceasing, so it does not exist, that is the meaning. The 'cause' and the established principle are the same.

無有故。論曰。是難顛倒。何以故。我立義無有。是壞滅無有。我立因無有。是未生無有。未生無有者。一切世間多信故成就立為無常因。滅壞無有者。僧佉等不信故不成就。為令成就故立為義。若取成就立義。不成就為因。汝難則勝不顛倒。我說一切物前世未有後世見無。是故聲前世是無後世亦無。若前世無汝不信者。汝自思惟。若前世有聲而無礙者。何故耳不聞耶。是故汝知前世無。猶如蛇足。有人競勝心不能成就義意。欲成就而無道理。是義應舍。五至不至難者。因為至所立義為不至所立義若因至。所立義則不成因。因若不至所立義亦不成因。是名至不至難。外曰。若因至所立義共。所立義雜則不成立義。譬如江水入海水無復江水因亦如是故不成因。若所立義未成就因不能至。若至所立義已成就用因何為。是故因不成就。若因不至所立義者。則同餘物不能成因。是故因不成就。若因不至則無所能。譬如火不至不能燒刀不至不能斫。論曰是難顛倒。因有二種。一生因。二顯不相離因。汝難若依生因則成難。若依顯因則是顛倒。何以故。我說因不為生。所立義為他得信。能顯所立義。不相離故。立義已有。于立義中如義智未起。何以故。愚癡故。是故說能顯因。譬如已有色用燈顯之不為生之。是故難生因。于顯因中

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本無有故（沒有原因）。論曰（論師說）：這是顛倒的詰難。何以故（為什麼）？我所立的義是『無有』，是指壞滅的『無有』。我所立的因是『無有』，是指未生的『無有』。未生的『無有』，因為一切世間多數人相信，所以成就並立為無常的因。滅壞的『無有』，僧佉（Samkhya，數論派）等人不相信，所以不成就。爲了令其成就，所以立為義。如果取成就來立義，不成就作為因，你的詰難就勝過我，不是顛倒。我說一切事物前世未有，後世見無，所以聲音前世是無，後世也是無。如果前世無，你不相信，你自己思考。如果前世有聲音而沒有障礙，為什麼耳朵聽不到呢？所以你知道前世無，猶如蛇足（比喻虛妄不實）。有人爭強好勝，心不能成就義理，想要成就卻沒有道理，這樣的義理應該捨棄。五至不至難（五種到達與不到達的詰難）：因為到達所立的義，或者因為不到達所立的義。如果因到達，所立的義則不成因。因如果不到達，所立的義也不成因。這叫做到達與不到達的詰難。外曰（外道說）：如果因到達所立的義，共同的所立的義混雜，則不能成立義。譬如江水流入海水，不再是江水，因也是這樣，所以不成因。如果所立的義未成就，因不能到達。如果到達，所立的義已經成就，用因做什麼呢？所以因不成就。如果因不到達所立的義，則如同其他事物，不能成為因。所以因不成就。如果因不到達，則無所能，譬如火不到達不能燃燒，刀不到達不能砍削。論曰（論師說）：這是顛倒的詰難。因有兩種：一生因，二顯不相離因。你的詰難如果依據生因則成立，如果依據顯因則是顛倒。何以故（為什麼）？我說因不是爲了生，所立的義是爲了他人得到信服，能夠顯示所立的義，因為不相離。立義已經有了，在立義中，如義智未生起。何以故（為什麼）？因為愚癡的緣故。所以說能顯的因。譬如已經有的顏色，用燈來顯示它，不是爲了生它。所以詰難生因，在顯因中。

【English Translation】 English version There is no reason. The Shastra says: This is a reversed refutation. Why? The meaning I establish is 'non-existence,' referring to the non-existence of destruction. The cause I establish is 'non-existence,' referring to the non-existence of non-arising. The non-existence of non-arising is established as the cause of impermanence because most people in the world believe in it. The non-existence of destruction is not believed by the Samkhyas (Samkhya, a school of Indian philosophy) and others, so it is not established. To make it established, it is established as the meaning. If you take accomplishment to establish the meaning, and non-accomplishment as the cause, your refutation surpasses mine and is not reversed. I say that all things did not exist in the past and are seen to be non-existent in the future, so sound is non-existent in the past and also non-existent in the future. If you do not believe that it is non-existent in the past, think for yourself. If sound existed in the past and there was no obstruction, why couldn't the ear hear it? Therefore, you know that it did not exist in the past, like a snake's foot (an analogy for something false and unreal). Some people are competitive and their minds cannot accomplish the meaning, wanting to accomplish it but without reason, such a meaning should be abandoned. The five difficulties of reaching and not reaching: because the cause reaches the established meaning, or because it does not reach the established meaning. If the cause reaches, the established meaning does not become the cause. If the cause does not reach, the established meaning also does not become the cause. This is called the difficulty of reaching and not reaching. The outsider says: If the cause reaches the established meaning, the common established meaning is mixed, then the meaning cannot be established. For example, if river water flows into the sea, it is no longer river water, and the cause is the same, so it does not become the cause. If the established meaning is not accomplished, the cause cannot reach it. If it reaches, the established meaning has already been accomplished, what is the use of the cause? Therefore, the cause is not accomplished. If the cause does not reach the established meaning, then it is like other things and cannot become the cause. Therefore, the cause is not accomplished. If the cause does not reach, then it cannot do anything, for example, if fire does not reach, it cannot burn, if a knife does not reach, it cannot cut. The Shastra says: This is a reversed refutation. There are two kinds of causes: a cause of arising and a cause of manifestation that is not separate. If your refutation is based on the cause of arising, it is established, but if it is based on the cause of manifestation, it is reversed. Why? I say that the cause is not for arising, the established meaning is for others to gain faith, able to manifest the established meaning, because it is not separate. The established meaning already exists, in the established meaning, like the wisdom of meaning has not arisen. Why? Because of ignorance. Therefore, it is said that the cause can manifest. For example, the color that already exists is manifested by a lamp, not to cause it to arise. Therefore, refute the cause of arising, in the cause of manifestation.

是難顛倒。六無因難者。於三世說無因。是名無因難。外曰。因為在所立義前世為在後世為同世耶。若因在前世立義在後世者。立義未有因何所因。若在後世立義在前世者。立義已成就復何用因為。若同世俱生則非是因。譬如牛角種芽等一時而有不得言左右相生。是故是同時則無有因。論曰。是難顛倒。何以故。前世已生依因為生。譬如然燈為顯已有物。不為生未有物。汝以生因難我顯因。是難顛倒不成就。若汝難言。是因若是顯因智慧未有是因。是因是誰因。是故不成顯因。若作如此難者。未得因名。乃至事未有。若事成有即得因名。是能顯事。是時得因名。是言在前未得因名。在後方得因名。若說因前事後則無過失。有人難言。若如此者事不從因生。此亦不成難。何以故。是前物於後得因名。若物已滅後事生者此難成就。既不如此前有未得名。後有方得名。是故果從因生。七顯別因難者。依別因無常法顯故此則非因。是名顯別因難。外曰。若依功力聲無常者。若無功力處即應是常。如電光風等不依功力生亦為無常所攝。是故立無常不須依功力。功力非因故。若是因者離功力。余處應無無常。譬如離火立煙煙是火正因。煙與火不相離故。功力則不如此。是故不成因。複次功力不能立無常義。何以故。不遍故依功力生

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本是難顛倒。六、無因難（認為一切事物沒有原因）者。於三世（過去、現在、未來）說無因，是名無因難。外道曰：『因為在所立義（所要證明的觀點）之前、之後還是同時？若因在前世，立義在後世，則立義未有因，又因何而生？若在後世，立義在前世，則立義已成就，又何用因為？若同世俱生，則非是因。譬如牛角、種芽等一時而有，不得言左右相生。是故是同時則無有因。』論曰：『是難顛倒。何以故？前世已生，依因為生。譬如然燈為顯已有物，不為生未有物。汝以生因難我顯因，是難顛倒不成就。若汝難言：是因若是顯因，智慧未有是因，是因是誰因？是故不成顯因。』『若作如此難者，未得因名，乃至事未有。若事成有，即得因名，是能顯事。是時得因名。是言在前未得因名，在後方得因名。若說因前事後，則無過失。』有人難言：『若如此者，事不從因生。』此亦不成難。何以故？是前物於後得因名。若物已滅後事生者，此難成就。既不如此，前有未得名，後有方得名。是故果從因生。七、顯別因難（認為某種特定的原因是無效的）者。依別因無常法顯故，此則非因。是名顯別因難。外道曰：『若依功力（努力或作用）聲無常者，若無功力處，即應是常。如電光、風等不依功力生，亦為無常所攝。是故立無常不須依功力，功力非因故。若是因者，離功力，余處應無無常。譬如離火立煙，煙是火正因。煙與火不相離故。功力則不如此。是故不成因。』複次，功力不能立無常義。何以故？不遍故。依功力生。

【English Translation】 English version This is a reversed difficulty. Six, the difficulty of no cause (arguing that everything has no cause). To say there is no cause in the three times (past, present, and future) is called the difficulty of no cause. The outsider says: 'Is the cause before, after, or at the same time as the established meaning (the point to be proven)? If the cause is in the past and the established meaning is in the future, then the established meaning has no cause, so what is it caused by? If it is in the future and the established meaning is in the past, then the established meaning is already accomplished, so what is the cause for? If they arise at the same time, then it is not a cause. For example, horns of a cow, sprouts of seeds, etc., exist at the same time, and it cannot be said that the left and right produce each other. Therefore, if they are simultaneous, there is no cause.' The treatise says: 'This is a reversed difficulty. Why? Because the past has already arisen, relying on the cause to arise. For example, lighting a lamp is to illuminate something that already exists, not to create something that does not yet exist. You use the cause of arising to challenge my cause of manifestation, this is a reversed difficulty and is not accomplished. If you argue: If the cause is a cause of manifestation, and wisdom does not yet have this cause, then whose cause is this cause? Therefore, it does not become a cause of manifestation.' 'If you make such a difficulty, you have not yet obtained the name of cause, until the matter does not yet exist. If the matter is accomplished and exists, then you obtain the name of cause, which is to manifest the matter. At that time, you obtain the name of cause. The statement is before and does not yet obtain the name of cause, and after it obtains the name of cause. If you say that the cause is before and the matter is after, then there is no fault.' Someone argues: 'If this is the case, then the matter does not arise from the cause.' This is also not a valid difficulty. Why? Because the previous thing obtains the name of cause later. If the thing has already ceased and the later matter arises, then this difficulty is accomplished. Since it is not like this, the previous exists but does not yet have a name, and the later exists and then has a name. Therefore, the effect arises from the cause. Seven, the difficulty of manifesting a specific cause (arguing that a certain specific cause is invalid). Because the impermanent dharma is manifested by relying on a specific cause, this is not a cause. This is called the difficulty of manifesting a specific cause. The outsider says: 'If impermanence of sound relies on effort (exertion or action), then if there is no effort, it should be permanent. Like lightning, wind, etc., which do not arise relying on effort, are also included in impermanence. Therefore, establishing impermanence does not need to rely on effort, because effort is not a cause. If it is a cause, then apart from effort, there should be no impermanence elsewhere. For example, establishing smoke apart from fire, smoke is the direct cause of fire. Smoke and fire are inseparable. Effort is not like this. Therefore, it does not become a cause.' Furthermore, effort cannot establish the meaning of impermanence. Why? Because it is not pervasive. It arises relying on effort.

。若遍者得立無常。若不遍者則不得立無常。譬如有人立義一切樹有神識。何以故。樹能眠故。譬如尸利沙樹。有人難言。樹神識不成就。何以故。因不遍故。一尸利沙樹眠余樹不眠。是眠不遍一切樹。是故眠不能立一切樹有神識。依功力生亦如是。不遍一切無常故。是故不能立無常。

論曰。是難顛倒。我說不如此。不說依功力生是因能顯一切無常余因不能。若有別因能顯無常。我則歡喜。我事成故。我立因亦能顯。余因亦能顯。我立義成就。譬如依煙知火。若言見光火亦成就。我義亦如是。依功力生能顯無常。若別有因能顯無常。無常義亦成就。是故汝難顛倒。不如我意難故。若我說一切無常依功力生者。汝可難言。依功力生是因不遍故不成就。此難則勝。我說聲等有依功力生者悉是無常。不說一切無常皆依功力生。是故汝難顛倒。八疑難者。于異類同相而說疑難。論曰。聲無常依功力生故。若有物依功力生是物無常。譬如瓦器是義已立。外曰。已生依功力得顯。譬如根水等依功力得顯。非依功力得生。聲亦如是。是故立依功力因不定未生已生中有故。故依此因於聲起疑。此聲定如何。為如瓦器未生得生。為如根水已有得顯故非決定。若依此生因起疑。當知非是立義因。何以故。能生能顯故。論曰。是難顛

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果『遍』（普遍存在）可以確立無常，那麼如果『不遍』（不普遍存在）就不能確立無常。例如，有人立論說一切樹都有神識（靈魂）。為什麼呢？因為樹會睡眠。例如尸利沙樹（合歡樹）。有人反駁說，樹的神識不能成立。為什麼呢？因為原因不普遍。只有尸利沙樹睡眠，其他樹不睡眠。這種睡眠並不普遍存在於一切樹，所以睡眠不能確立一切樹都有神識。依賴功力而生也是如此，因為不普遍存在於一切無常事物中，所以不能確立無常。

論曰：這種反駁是顛倒的。我不是這樣說的。我沒有說依賴功力而生這個原因是唯一能顯示一切無常的，其他原因不能。如果還有其他原因能顯示無常，我則很高興，因為我的論點就成立了。我所立的因也能顯示無常，其他因也能顯示。我的立論就成就了。例如，依靠煙來知道有火，如果說看到光也能知道有火，我的論點也是如此。依靠功力而生能顯示無常，如果另外有原因能顯示無常，無常的意義也同樣成立。所以你的反駁是顛倒的，不符合我的本意。如果我說一切無常都依賴功力而生，你就可以反駁說，依賴功力而生這個原因不普遍，所以不能成立。這種反駁就更有力。我說聲音等有依賴功力而生的，都是無常的，我沒有說一切無常都依賴功力而生。所以你的反駁是顛倒的。八種疑難中的一種，是在不同類的事物中找到相似之處而提出疑難。

論曰：聲音是無常的，因為它依賴功力而生。如果有什麼東西依賴功力而生，那麼這個東西就是無常的，例如瓦器，這個論點已經成立。外人說：已經存在的事物可以通過功力來顯現，例如根、水等，可以通過功力來顯現，但不是通過功力而產生。聲音也是如此。所以，建立依賴功力這個原因是不確定的，因為它可能是在未生、已生、或正在產生的狀態中。所以，依靠這個原因，對於聲音產生疑問。這個聲音到底是什麼樣的呢？是像瓦器一樣，未生而生？還是像根、水一樣，已經存在而被顯現？所以不能確定。如果依靠這種能生能顯的原因而產生疑問，應當知道這不是成立論點的原因。為什麼呢？因為它既能產生，又能顯現。論曰：這種反駁是顛倒的。

【English Translation】 English version: If 'pervasion' (universality) can establish impermanence, then if 'non-pervasion' (non-universality) cannot establish impermanence. For example, someone argues that all trees have consciousness (soul). Why? Because trees can sleep. For example, the Shirisha tree (Albizia julibrissin). Someone refutes, saying that the consciousness of trees cannot be established. Why? Because the cause is not pervasive. Only the Shirisha tree sleeps, other trees do not. This sleep is not pervasive in all trees, so sleep cannot establish that all trees have consciousness. Dependence on effort for arising is also the same, because it is not pervasive in all impermanent things, so it cannot establish impermanence.

Treatise says: This refutation is inverted. I do not say it this way. I do not say that dependence on effort for arising is the only cause that can reveal all impermanence, and that other causes cannot. If there are other causes that can reveal impermanence, I would be very happy, because my argument would be established. The cause I have established can also reveal impermanence, and other causes can also reveal it. My argument is accomplished. For example, relying on smoke to know there is fire, if it is said that seeing light can also know there is fire, my argument is also like that. Dependence on effort for arising can reveal impermanence, if there is another cause that can reveal impermanence, the meaning of impermanence is also established. Therefore, your refutation is inverted, and does not conform to my intention. If I said that all impermanence depends on effort for arising, you could refute by saying that dependence on effort for arising is not a pervasive cause, so it cannot be established. This refutation would be more powerful. I say that sounds, etc., which depend on effort for arising, are all impermanent. I do not say that all impermanence depends on effort for arising. Therefore, your refutation is inverted. One of the eight types of difficulties is to find similarities in different types of things and raise difficulties.

Treatise says: Sound is impermanent because it depends on effort for arising. If something depends on effort for arising, then that thing is impermanent, such as a clay pot. This argument has already been established. An outsider says: Things that already exist can be revealed through effort, such as roots, water, etc., can be revealed through effort, but are not produced through effort. Sound is also like that. Therefore, establishing dependence on effort as a cause is uncertain, because it may be in a state of not yet arisen, already arisen, or in the process of arising. Therefore, relying on this cause, doubt arises about sound. What is this sound like? Is it like a clay pot, not yet arisen but arising? Or is it like roots, water, already existing and being revealed? So it cannot be determined. If doubt arises relying on this cause that can both produce and reveal, it should be known that this is not a cause for establishing an argument. Why? Because it can both produce and reveal. Treatise says: This refutation is inverted.

倒。何以故。我不說聲依功力得顯。我說聲依功力得生。是故聲無常。汝何所難。若汝言。功力事有二種。一生二顯。生者。瓦器等。顯者。根水等。聲是功力事。是故於中起常無常疑。是義不然。何以故。根水等非是功力事故。若汝言根水顯了功力事。是亦不難我義。何以故。顯了未生依功力得生。是故功力事一種同是無常故。汝難不然。若汝又顯功力事有二種無常。瓦器生是無常。瓦器滅是常。聲亦如是。是疑亦不然。何以故。不成就故。若汝瓦器滅。是有于滅中有。有故滅義則無有。若滅中無有。即是滅無有。何以故。無體故。若汝說如闇。闇中無光故有闇。滅亦如是。滅中無有故有滅。是義不然。空華石女兒兔角等中無有。是則應有。若汝不許空華等有。瓦器滅亦如是。不可說有。是故功力事一種同是無常故。汝疑不然。汝不信為。汝得信故我說了因聲無常。何以故。前世無障依功力得顯生故。是故知聲無有。譬如瓦器。汝立依功力所得功力所造二義有異。是義不然。何者為義。一切依功力所得即是無常。何以故。未生得生已生滅故。是故根水等亦如是無常。何用汝立顯了為常。九未說難者。未說之前未有無常。是名未說難。論曰。義本如前。外曰。若說依功力言語為因聲無常者。則何所至。未說依功力言語

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：駁斥：為什麼這麼說呢？我不是說聲音依靠功力而顯現，我說聲音依靠功力而產生。因此，聲音是無常的。你有什麼疑問呢？如果你說，功力的作用有兩種：一是生，二是顯。生，比如瓦器等；顯，比如根、水等。聲音是功力的作用，因此，對於聲音是常還是無常產生疑問。這種說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為根、水等不是功力的作用。如果你說根、水顯現了功力的作用，這也不能駁倒我的觀點。為什麼呢？因為顯現的是未生的，依靠功力而產生。因此，功力的作用只有一種，都是無常的。你的疑問是不成立的。如果你又說，功力的作用有兩種無常：瓦器的產生是無常，瓦器的滅亡是常。聲音也是這樣。這種疑問也是不對的。為什麼呢？因為不成立。如果你說瓦器滅亡，滅亡中有存在。因為有存在，所以滅亡的意義就不存在。如果滅亡中沒有存在，那就是滅亡不存在。為什麼呢？因為沒有實體。如果你說像黑暗一樣，黑暗中沒有光，所以有黑暗。滅亡也是這樣，滅亡中沒有存在，所以有滅亡。這種說法是不對的。虛空中的花、石女的兒子、兔角等中都沒有存在，那麼就應該有。如果你不承認虛空中的花等存在，瓦器的滅亡也是這樣，不能說有。因此，功力的作用只有一種，都是無常的。你的疑問是不成立的。你不相信，爲了讓你相信，我說了因聲無常。為什麼呢？因為前世沒有障礙，依靠功力而顯現產生。因此，要知道聲音是沒有的，譬如瓦器。你認為依靠功力所得和功力所造兩種意義有區別，這種說法是不對的。哪種意義是對的呢？一切依靠功力所得都是無常的。為什麼呢？因為未生可以產生，已生的會滅亡。因此，根、水等也是這樣無常。何必你認為顯現是常呢？九、未說難者：在沒有說之前，沒有無常。這叫做未說難。論曰：義理的根本和前面一樣。外曰：如果說依靠功力的言語為因，聲音是無常的，那麼會得出什麼結論呢？未說依靠功力的言語

【English Translation】 English version: Objection refuted: Why is that? I do not say that sound appears due to effort (gongli, 功力 - effort, power), I say that sound arises due to effort. Therefore, sound is impermanent. What difficulty do you have? If you say that the function of effort has two aspects: one is arising, and the other is manifestation. Arising, such as pottery, etc.; manifestation, such as roots, water, etc. Sound is a function of effort, therefore, doubt arises as to whether sound is permanent or impermanent. This statement is not correct. Why is that? Because roots, water, etc., are not functions of effort. If you say that roots and water manifest the function of effort, this also cannot refute my point. Why is that? Because what is manifested is what has not yet arisen, and it arises due to effort. Therefore, the function of effort is only of one kind, all are impermanent. Your doubt is not valid. If you further say that the function of effort has two kinds of impermanence: the arising of pottery is impermanent, the destruction of pottery is permanent. Sound is also like this. This doubt is also not correct. Why is that? Because it is not established. If you say that when pottery is destroyed, there is existence within the destruction. Because there is existence, the meaning of destruction does not exist. If there is no existence in destruction, then that is destruction does not exist. Why is that? Because there is no substance. If you say it is like darkness, in darkness there is no light, therefore there is darkness. Destruction is also like this, in destruction there is no existence, therefore there is destruction. This statement is not correct. In empty flowers, the son of a barren woman, rabbit horns, etc., there is no existence, then there should be. If you do not acknowledge that empty flowers, etc., exist, the destruction of pottery is also like this, it cannot be said to exist. Therefore, the function of effort is only of one kind, all are impermanent. Your doubt is not valid. You do not believe, in order to make you believe, I said that the cause of sound is impermanent. Why is that? Because in previous lives there were no obstacles, and it appears and arises due to effort. Therefore, know that sound does not exist, like pottery. You establish that there is a difference between the two meanings of what is obtained by effort and what is made by effort, this statement is not correct. Which meaning is correct? Everything obtained by effort is impermanent. Why is that? Because what has not arisen can arise, and what has arisen will perish. Therefore, roots, water, etc., are also impermanent like this. Why must you consider manifestation to be permanent? Nine, the difficulty of what has not been said: before it is said, there is no impermanence. This is called the difficulty of what has not been said. Treatise says: The fundamental meaning is the same as before. Outsider says: If it is said that relying on the words of effort as the cause, sound is impermanent, then what conclusion will be reached? The words of effort not yet spoken.

。前聲是常是義得至。前世聲已常。云何今無常。論曰。是難顛倒。何以故。我立因為顯義。不為生不為滅。若我立因壞滅。汝難則勝。若汝難我未說前未了聲無常。是難相似。若以壞滅因難我是難顛倒。十事異難者。事異故。如瓦器聲。不如是。是名事異難。論曰。聲無常依因緣生故。譬如瓦器是義已立。外曰。聲事異瓦器事異。在事既異。不得同是無常。論曰。是難顛倒。何以故。我不說與器同事故聲無常。我說一切物同依因得生故無常。不關同事。譬如瓦器故聲無常。煙是異物而能顯火。瓦器亦如是。能顯聲無常。複次他人說事異難有別所以說聲常住依空故空是常住。若別有物依空。物即常住。譬如鄰虛圓。鄰虛常住圓依鄰虛圓即常住。聲亦如是。依空故常住。複次聲常住。何以故。耳所聞故。譬如聲同異性耳所執故常住。聲亦如是。是故常住。是異立義。鞞世師曰。若常住由因得立。因事故即無常。是故聲無常。論曰。是難顛倒。何以故。我不說因生無常。我說因顯無常。他人未知為他得知。我立因是了因。非是生因。汝依生因難。是難顛倒。複次論曰。汝所說是立義亦是難於我不許。何以故。我等不信樂常住義。是故我說是義。此十種名同相等顛倒難故。以顛倒立其過失。若有難與此相似。即墮顛倒難中。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：問：先前的聲音是常還是因為某種意義才得以產生？如果前世的聲音已經是常，為什麼現在又說它是無常呢？答：這是難點顛倒。為什麼這麼說呢？我建立『因』是爲了顯明道理，不是爲了產生或消滅什麼。如果我建立的『因』是會壞滅的，那麼你的詰難就成立了。如果你詰難我，說在我未說明之前，未了知聲音是無常的，這是相似的詰難。如果用壞滅的『因』來詰難我，這就是難點顛倒。十事異難：因為事物不同。例如瓦器和聲音不同。所以不能這樣說。這叫做事異難。答：聲音是無常的，因為它依因緣而生，就像瓦器一樣。這個道理已經成立。外道說：聲音和瓦器是不同的事物。既然事物不同，就不能同樣地說是無常的。答：這是難點顛倒。為什麼這麼說呢？我不是說聲音和瓦器是同一件事物，所以聲音是無常的。我說一切事物都同樣依靠因緣才能產生，所以是無常的。這與是否是同一件事物無關。就像瓦器一樣，所以聲音是無常的。煙是不同的事物，但能顯示火。瓦器也是如此，能顯示聲音是無常的。進一步說，其他人說事異難，還有別的理由。他們說聲音是常住的，因為它依靠空間，而空間是常住的。如果別的事物依靠空間，那麼這個事物就是常住的。例如鄰虛圓（paramāṇu-cakra，極微之圓），鄰虛是常住的，圓依靠鄰虛，所以圓就是常住的。聲音也是如此，因為它依靠空間，所以是常住的。進一步說，聲音是常住的。為什麼這麼說呢？因為它能被耳朵聽到。例如聲音和異性（viṣama-jāti，不同種類）的耳朵所執取，所以是常住的。聲音也是如此，所以是常住的。這是異立義（artha-antara-sthāpana，以不同意義來建立論點）。鞞世師（Vaiśeṣika，勝論派）說：如果常住是由『因』得以成立的，那麼因為『因』的緣故，它就是無常的。所以聲音是無常的。答：這是難點顛倒。為什麼這麼說呢？我不是說『因』產生無常，我說『因』顯示無常。他人不知道，我讓他人知道。我建立的『因』是了因（jñāpaka-hetu，能使人瞭解的因），不是生因（utpādaka-hetu，能產生事物的因）。你依靠生因來詰難，這是難點顛倒。進一步說，你所說的立義，也是對我的詰難，我不允許。為什麼這麼說呢？我們不信樂常住的道理。所以我說這個道理。這十種名稱，是由於同等、相等、顛倒的詰難，以顛倒來建立它的過失。如果有詰難與此相似，就屬於顛倒難之中。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: Is the preceding sound permanent or does it arise due to some meaning? If the sound of the previous life was already permanent, why is it now said to be impermanent? Answer: This is a difficulty of inversion (nānārtha-viparyāsa). Why is that? I establish 'cause' (hetu) to clarify the meaning, not to generate or destroy anything. If the 'cause' I establish is destructible, then your challenge would be valid. If you challenge me by saying that before I explain it, the sound that is not yet understood is impermanent, this is a similar challenge. If you challenge me with a destructive 'cause', this is a difficulty of inversion. Ten difficulties of difference in things (artha-antara): Because things are different. For example, a clay pot and sound are different. So it cannot be said like that. This is called a difficulty of difference in things. Answer: Sound is impermanent because it arises dependent on conditions (hetu-pratyaya), just like a clay pot. This principle has already been established. An outsider says: Sound and clay pots are different things. Since things are different, they cannot both be said to be impermanent. Answer: This is a difficulty of inversion. Why is that? I am not saying that sound and clay pots are the same thing, therefore sound is impermanent. I say that all things arise dependent on conditions, therefore they are impermanent. This is not related to whether they are the same thing. Just like a clay pot, therefore sound is impermanent. Smoke is a different thing, but it can reveal fire. The clay pot is also like that, it can reveal that sound is impermanent. Furthermore, others say that the difficulty of difference in things has another reason. They say that sound is permanent because it relies on space (ākāśa), and space is permanent. If other things rely on space, then that thing is permanent. For example, the atom-circle (paramāṇu-cakra), the atom is permanent, the circle relies on the atom, so the circle is permanent. Sound is also like that, because it relies on space, so it is permanent. Furthermore, sound is permanent. Why is that? Because it can be heard by the ear. For example, sound and the ear of different kinds (viṣama-jāti) are apprehended, so it is permanent. Sound is also like that, so it is permanent. This is establishing a different meaning (artha-antara-sthāpana). The Vaiśeṣika (鞞世師) says: If permanence is established by 'cause', then because of the 'cause', it is impermanent. Therefore, sound is impermanent. Answer: This is a difficulty of inversion. Why is that? I am not saying that 'cause' generates impermanence, I say that 'cause' reveals impermanence. Others do not know, I let others know. The 'cause' I establish is a revealing cause (jñāpaka-hetu), not a generating cause (utpādaka-hetu). You challenge based on a generating cause, this is a difficulty of inversion. Furthermore, what you say is establishing a meaning is also a challenge to me, which I do not allow. Why is that? We do not believe in the principle of permanence. So I say this principle. These ten names are due to equal, similar, and inverted challenges, establishing its faults with inversion. If there is a challenge similar to this, it belongs to the difficulty of inversion.

二不實義難者。妄語故不實。妄語者不如義無有義。是名不實義難。不實義難有三種。一顯不許義難。二顯義至難。三顯對譬義難。一顯不許義難者。于證見處更覓因。是名顯不許義難。論曰。聲無常。何以故。依因緣生故。譬如瓦器。是義已立。外曰。我見瓦器依因緣生。何因令其無常。若無因立瓦器無常者。聲亦應不依常因得常。論曰。是難不實。何以故。已了知不須更以因成就。現見瓦器有因非恒。有何須更覓無常因。是故此難不實。二顯義至難者。于所對義。此義義至。是名義至難。論曰無我。何以故。不可顯故。譬如石女兒。此義已立。外曰。是義義至。若可顯定有不可顯定無者。可顯或有或無。不可顯亦應如是。譬如火輪陽焰乾闥婆城。是可顯而不能立有。若可顯不能定立有。則不可顯不能定立無。論曰。是難不實。有何道理是義義至。不可顯物。畢竟不有。是義不至。可顯物者有二種。有義至有非義至有。義至者。若有雨必有云。若有云則不定或有雨或無雨。由煙知火。於此中不必有義至。若見煙知有火。無煙知無火。是義不至。何以故。于赤鐵赤炭見有火無煙。是故顯物義至難不實。複次唯有色名火輪名陽焰名乾闥婆城。以根迷心倒故。于現世有後世無。惟色實有。根迷心倒。或時見有。汝說可顯物

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：二、不實義難（asatya-artha-nāma）：因為虛妄的言語所以不真實。虛妄的言語是不如實且沒有意義的。這被稱為不實義難。不實義難有三種：一、顯不許義難，二、顯義至難，三、顯對譬義難。一、顯不許義難：在已經證明的地方，更進一步去尋找原因，這被稱為顯不許義難。論曰：聲音是無常的。為什麼呢？因為它依賴因緣而生。比如瓦器。這個道理已經成立。外曰：我看到瓦器依賴因緣而生，什麼原因使它是無常的呢？如果沒有原因來證明瓦器是無常的，那麼聲音也應該不依賴常因而是常的。論曰：這個詰難是不真實的。為什麼呢？因為已經瞭解了，不需要再用原因來成就。現在看到瓦器有非恒常的原因，為什麼還需要尋找無常的原因呢？因此，這個詰難是不真實的。二、顯義至難：對於所針對的意義，這個意義是必然的，這被稱為義至難。論曰：沒有我（anātman）。為什麼呢？因為不可顯現。比如石女兒。外曰：這個意義是必然的。如果可顯現的就一定存在，不可顯現的就一定不存在，那麼可顯現的可能存在也可能不存在，不可顯現的也應該如此。比如火輪、陽焰、乾闥婆城（gandharva-nagara）。這些是可顯現的，但不能確定它們存在。如果可顯現的不能確定它們存在，那麼不可顯現的就不能確定它們不存在。論曰：這個詰難是不真實的。有什麼道理說這個意義是必然的呢？不可顯現的事物，畢竟是不存在的，這個意義不是必然的。可顯現的事物有兩種：有意義必然的和沒有意義必然的。意義必然的是，如果下雨就一定有云，如果有云則不一定下雨。通過煙來知道有火，這裡面不一定有意義必然。如果看到煙就知道有火，沒有煙就知道沒有火，這個意義不是必然的。為什麼呢？在燒紅的鐵和燒紅的炭上，看到有火但沒有煙。因此，顯現的事物意義必然的詰難是不真實的。再次，只有色（rūpa）的名字，火輪的名字，陽焰的名字，乾闥婆城的名字。因為根（indriya）的迷惑和心的顛倒，所以在現世有，在後世沒有。只有色是真實存在的。根的迷惑和心的顛倒，有時會看到它們存在。你說可顯現的事物...

【English Translation】 English version: Two, the Difficulty of Unreal Meaning (asatya-artha-nāma): Because of false speech, it is unreal. False speech is not in accordance with meaning and has no meaning. This is called the Difficulty of Unreal Meaning. There are three types of the Difficulty of Unreal Meaning: One, the Difficulty of Manifesting Non-acceptance; Two, the Difficulty of Manifesting Necessary Meaning; Three, the Difficulty of Manifesting Counter-example. One, the Difficulty of Manifesting Non-acceptance: In a place where something has been proven, to further seek a cause is called the Difficulty of Manifesting Non-acceptance. Treatise says: Sound is impermanent. Why? Because it arises dependent on conditions. For example, a clay pot. This principle has already been established. The outsider says: I see that a clay pot arises dependent on conditions, but what cause makes it impermanent? If there is no cause to prove that a clay pot is impermanent, then sound should also be permanent without relying on a permanent cause. Treatise says: This refutation is unreal. Why? Because it is already understood, and there is no need to further establish it with a cause. Now we see that a clay pot has a non-constant cause, so why is it necessary to seek a cause for impermanence? Therefore, this refutation is unreal. Two, the Difficulty of Manifesting Necessary Meaning: Regarding the meaning being addressed, this meaning is necessary. This is called the Difficulty of Necessary Meaning. Treatise says: There is no self (anātman). Why? Because it cannot be manifested. For example, the son of a barren woman. The outsider says: This meaning is necessary. If what can be manifested certainly exists, and what cannot be manifested certainly does not exist, then what can be manifested may or may not exist, and what cannot be manifested should also be the same. For example, a fire wheel, a mirage, a Gandharva city (gandharva-nagara). These can be manifested, but their existence cannot be determined. If what can be manifested cannot certainly establish existence, then what cannot be manifested cannot certainly establish non-existence. Treatise says: This refutation is unreal. What reason is there to say that this meaning is necessary? Things that cannot be manifested ultimately do not exist; this meaning is not necessary. There are two types of things that can be manifested: those with necessary meaning and those without necessary meaning. Necessary meaning is like this: if it rains, there must be clouds; if there are clouds, it does not necessarily rain. Knowing there is fire from smoke, there is no necessary meaning in this. If you see smoke and know there is fire, and no smoke and know there is no fire, this meaning is not necessary. Why? Because on red-hot iron and red-hot charcoal, you see fire but no smoke. Therefore, the difficulty of necessary meaning for manifested things is unreal. Furthermore, there are only the names of form (rūpa), the name of a fire wheel, the name of a mirage, and the name of a Gandharva city. Because of the delusion of the senses (indriya) and the inversion of the mind, they exist in this life but not in the afterlife. Only form truly exists. The delusion of the senses and the inversion of the mind sometimes cause them to be seen. You say things that can be manifested...

不定有。是難不實。複次我以石女兒為喻定判此義。處不可顯畢竟不動。是物決定無有。譬如石女兒處不可顯動非是我譬。不可顯者于鄰虛等處。或顯或不顯。對汝義至我說義至處可顯畢竟不動是物定有。於火輪等異唯輪不定。輪不定者。轉時有住時無。是故非是義至。汝取非義至作義至難。是難不實。複次有餘人說義至難。若聲與瓦器同相故聲無常。以義至故。若不同相則應是常。不同者。聲耳所執無身。瓦器眼所執有身。既不同相故聲是常。論曰。若如此難同相難義至難無別體故我不許。三顯對譬義難者。對譬力故成就義。是名對譬義難。外曰。若無常器同相故聲無常者。我亦顯常住。譬常住空同相故聲常住。若常同相不得常者。無常同相。何故無常。論曰。是難不實。何以故。唯無有物名空。若有物常住此譬則成難亦是實。既無有物常住。空無有物不可說常不可說無常。此難不成譬。非譬為譬故。此難不實。若人信有物名空即是常住。是顛倒難非實義難。何以故。無身不定故。空無身常住。心苦樂欲等無身而是無常。聲既無身為如空是常為如心等是無常耶。無身不定不得成因故此難顛倒。複次聲無常有因故。若物有因即知無常。譬如瓦器等。是義已立。外曰。是義可疑。何以故。器生有因是無常。器滅有因是常

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本不定有。這是不真實的難題。再次，我用石女兒（沒有生育能力的女子）為比喻來判定這個道理。『處不可顯畢竟不動』（位置不可顯示，最終也不會移動），這種東西肯定是根本不存在的。譬如石女兒，她的位置不可顯示，移動也不是我所比喻的。『不可顯』指的是在鄰虛等處，或者顯示或者不顯示。針對你的觀點，我說『位置可以顯示，最終也不會移動』，這種東西肯定是存在的。對於火輪等現象，只有輪子是不確定的。輪子不確定，指的是轉動的時候有，停止的時候就沒有。因此，這不是正確的觀點。你用不正確的觀點來作為正確的觀點進行詰難，這個難題是不成立的。再次，有人用『義至難』（根據意義推導出的難題）來詰難。如果聲音和瓦器有相同的屬性，那麼聲音就是無常的，因為這是根據意義推導出來的。如果不同相，那麼聲音就應該是常的。不同相指的是，聲音是耳朵所感知的，沒有形體；瓦器是眼睛所感知的，有形體。既然不同相，那麼聲音就是常的。論曰：如果這樣詰難，那麼『同相難』（基於相同屬性的難題）和『義至難』就沒有區別了，因為它們本質上是一樣的，所以我不認可。『三顯對譬義難』（通過三種方式來顯示、對比、比喻的難題），是通過對比和比喻的力量來成就道理，這叫做『對譬義難』。外曰：如果無常的器物有相同的屬性，所以聲音是無常的，那麼我也要顯示常住。譬如常住的空和聲音有相同的屬性，所以聲音是常住的。如果常住的屬性相同，卻不能得出常住的結論，那麼無常的屬性相同，為什麼就一定是無常的呢？論曰：這個難題是不成立的。為什麼呢？因為只有不存在的東西才叫做空。如果有東西是常住的，那麼這個比喻才能成立，這個難題才是真實的。既然沒有東西是常住的，空是沒有東西的，不能說它是常，也不能說它是無常。這個難題不能成立比喻，用不是比喻的東西來作為比喻，所以這個難題是不成立的。如果有人相信有東西叫做空，並且認為它是常住的，這是顛倒的難題，不是真實的難題。為什麼呢？因為沒有形體是不確定的。空沒有形體，是常住的；而心、苦、樂、慾望等沒有形體，卻是無常的。聲音既然沒有形體，那麼它就像空一樣是常的，還是像心等一樣是無常的呢？沒有形體是不確定的，不能構成原因，所以這個難題是顛倒的。再次，聲音是無常的，因為它有產生的原因。如果東西有產生的原因，那麼就知道它是無常的，譬如瓦器等。這個道理已經成立了。外曰：這個道理是可疑的。為什麼呢？器物產生有原因，所以是無常的；器物滅亡有原因，所以是常的。

【English Translation】 English version It is not necessarily so. This is an unreal difficulty. Furthermore, I use the analogy of a barren woman's son (Shinu'er) to definitively judge this meaning. 'A place that cannot be shown and is ultimately unmoving' (chu bu ke xian bi jing bu dong) – such a thing is definitely non-existent. For example, the barren woman's son, whose location cannot be shown, and movement is not what I am comparing. 'Cannot be shown' refers to places like the adjacent void, where it may or may not be shown. Addressing your argument, I say 'a place that can be shown and is ultimately unmoving' – such a thing definitely exists. Regarding phenomena like fire wheels, only the wheel is uncertain. The wheel is uncertain because it exists when rotating but not when stationary. Therefore, this is not a correct argument. You are using an incorrect argument as a correct one to challenge, and this difficulty is not valid. Furthermore, some people use the 'difficulty of meaning' (yi zhi nan) to challenge. If sound and earthenware have the same characteristics, then sound is impermanent, because this is derived from meaning. If they do not have the same characteristics, then sound should be permanent. 'Not the same' means that sound is perceived by the ear and has no body; earthenware is perceived by the eye and has a body. Since they are not the same, then sound is permanent. The treatise says: If you challenge in this way, then there is no difference between the 'difficulty of same characteristics' (tong xiang nan) and the 'difficulty of meaning', because they are essentially the same, so I do not accept it. The 'difficulty of three manifestations, comparisons, and analogies' (san xian dui pi yi nan) is to achieve the truth through the power of comparison and analogy, which is called the 'difficulty of comparison and analogy' (dui pi yi nan). The outsider says: If impermanent objects have the same characteristics, so sound is impermanent, then I will also show permanence. For example, permanent emptiness and sound have the same characteristics, so sound is permanent. If the same permanent characteristics cannot lead to the conclusion of permanence, then why must the same impermanent characteristics lead to impermanence? The treatise says: This difficulty is not valid. Why? Because only non-existent things are called emptiness. If something is permanent, then this analogy can be established, and this difficulty is real. Since nothing is permanent, emptiness is nothing, and it cannot be said to be permanent or impermanent. This difficulty cannot establish an analogy, using something that is not an analogy as an analogy, so this difficulty is not valid. If someone believes that there is something called emptiness and considers it permanent, this is a reversed difficulty, not a real difficulty. Why? Because having no body is uncertain. Emptiness has no body and is permanent; while mind, suffering, joy, desire, etc., have no body but are impermanent. Since sound has no body, is it permanent like emptiness, or is it impermanent like mind, etc.? Having no body is uncertain and cannot constitute a cause, so this difficulty is reversed. Furthermore, sound is impermanent because it has a cause of arising. If something has a cause of arising, then it is known to be impermanent, like earthenware, etc. This principle has already been established. The outsider says: This principle is doubtful. Why? Because the arising of an object has a cause, so it is impermanent; the destruction of an object has a cause, so it is permanent.

。聲既有因故於聲起疑。為同器生有因無常。為同器滅有因是常。論曰。是難不實。何以故。無有實物而名滅者。皆從杖等打物壞滅故得常名。複次聲無常。何以故。根所執故。譬如瓦器。是義已立。外曰。此亦可疑。根所執如同異性則應是常。聲根所執如同異性。聲應是常。若如同異性非是常者。若如瓦器不應無常。論曰。是難不實。何以故。牛等同異性。若實有離牛等應有別體可執可見。離牛同異性不可執不可見無別體。故知無常。複次無我。何以故。不可顯故。譬如蛇耳。是義已立。外曰。海水滴量雪山斤兩。是有而不可顯。我亦如是。是有而不可顯。是故不可顯因。不得立無我。論曰。數量與聚無別體。是可數量聚次第而現有若干。若干是數量。為攝持念故作一十百千萬等名。水滴量山斤兩既無別體故非實有。若有別難與此難同相者。立其過失名不實義難。三相違難者。義不併立。名為相違。譬如明闇坐起等不併立。是名相違難。相違難有三種。一未生難。二常難。三自義相違難。一未生難者。前世未生時不關功力則應是常。是未生難。外曰。若依功力聲無常者。未生時未依功力聲應是常。

論曰。是難相違。何以故。未生時聲未有。未有云何常。若有人說。石女男兒黑女兒白。此義亦應成就。若不有

不得常。若常不得不有。不有而常。則自相違此難與義至難不實難相似。何以故。非是實難故。依功力聲無常。是義已立。是義義至得。若不依功力則應是常。此義不實。何以故。不依功力者有三種常無常不有。常者如虛空。無常者如雷電等。不有者如空華等。此三種悉不依功力。而汝偏用一種為常。是故不實。二常難者。常無常故是聲常。是名常難。外曰。于無常處常有無常。一切法不捨性故。無常中有常。依無常故得常。

論曰。是義相違。何以故。若已無常云何得常。若有人說闇中有光。此語亦應成就。若不爾汝難則相違不實。何以故。無有別法名無常。于無常處相應。更立為常。無常者無別體。若物未生得生。已生而滅名為無常。若無常不實。依無常立常。常亦不實。三自義相違難者。若難他義而自義壞。是名自義相違難。論曰。聲無常依因緣生故。譬如芽等。是義已立。外曰。若因至無常則同無常。若不至無常。不能成就無常。此因則不成因。論曰。汝難若至我立義。與我立義同。則不能破我義。若不至我立義亦不能破我義。汝難則還破汝義。複次外曰。若因在前。立義在後。立義未有。此是何因。若立義在前因在後。立義已成。因何所用。此亦不成因。論曰。若汝難在前我立義在後。我義未有。汝

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本不得為常。如果為常，則不得不存在。如果不存在而為常，那麼就自相矛盾。這種詰難與真義相去甚遠，既不真實，也只是表面相似。為什麼呢？因為它不是真實的詰難。依據功力所生的聲音是無常的，這個道理已經成立。這個道理是真實可信的。如果不依據功力，那麼就應該是常。這個觀點是不真實的。為什麼呢？不依據功力的事物有三種情況：常、無常、不存在。常的事物如虛空。無常的事物如雷電等。不存在的事物如空中的花朵等。這三種情況都不依賴於功力。而你卻偏偏用其中一種來定義為常，所以是不真實的。第二種詰難是：因為常和無常的緣故，所以聲音是常的。這叫做常難。外道說：在無常之處，常有無常。一切法都不捨棄其本性，所以在無常之中有常。依靠無常才能得到常。論師反駁說：這種說法是自相矛盾的。為什麼呢？如果已經是無常，怎麼能得到常呢？如果有人說黑暗中有光明，這種說法也應該成立。如果不是這樣，你的詰難就是自相矛盾，不真實的。為什麼呢？沒有一種獨立的法叫做無常，在無常之處相應，再建立為常。無常沒有獨立的本體。如果事物未生而生，已生而滅，就叫做無常。如果無常不真實，那麼依靠無常而建立的常，也是不真實的。第三種詰難是：自義相違難。如果詰難他人的觀點，而自己的觀點卻被破壞，這就叫做自義相違難。論師說：聲音是無常的，因為它依靠因緣而生，就像草芽等。這個道理已經成立。外道說：如果因到達無常，就和無常相同。如果因沒有到達無常，就不能成就無常。那麼這個因就不能成為因。論師反駁說：你的詰難如果到達我所建立的義理，與我所建立的義理相同，就不能駁倒我的義理。如果你的詰難沒有到達我所建立的義理，也不能駁倒我的義理。你的詰難反而會駁倒你自己的義理。此外，外道說：如果因在前，立義在後，立義還沒有產生，那麼這是什麼因？如果立義在前，因在後，立義已經成立，因還有什麼用？這也不能成為因。論師反駁說：如果你的詰難在前，我

【English Translation】 English version It cannot be permanent. If it were permanent, it would necessarily have to exist. If it does not exist and is permanent, then it is self-contradictory. This refutation is far from the true meaning, neither real nor similar. Why? Because it is not a real refutation. Sound, arising from effort, is impermanent; this principle has already been established. This principle is true and reliable. If it does not depend on effort, then it should be permanent. This view is not real. Why? Things that do not depend on effort have three possibilities: permanent, impermanent, and non-existent. Permanent things are like space (Akasha). Impermanent things are like thunder and lightning. Non-existent things are like flowers in the sky (Khây Pu). All three of these do not depend on effort. But you insist on using one of them to define permanence, so it is not real. The second refutation is: because of permanence and impermanence, sound is permanent. This is called the 'permanence refutation'. The outsider says: in the place of impermanence, there is always impermanence. All dharmas do not abandon their nature, so there is permanence in impermanence. One obtains permanence by relying on impermanence. The debater refutes: This statement is contradictory. Why? If it is already impermanent, how can one obtain permanence? If someone says there is light in the darkness, this statement should also be valid. If not, your refutation is contradictory and unreal. Why? There is no separate dharma called impermanence, corresponding to the place of impermanence, and then establishing it as permanence. Impermanence has no independent entity. If a thing is not yet born and is born, and having been born, it perishes, it is called impermanence. If impermanence is not real, then the permanence established by relying on impermanence is also not real. The third refutation is: the self-contradictory refutation. If one refutes the views of others, but one's own views are destroyed, this is called the self-contradictory refutation. The debater says: Sound is impermanent because it arises from causes and conditions, like sprouts, etc. This principle has already been established. The outsider says: If the cause reaches impermanence, it is the same as impermanence. If the cause does not reach impermanence, it cannot accomplish impermanence. Then this cause cannot become a cause. The debater refutes: If your refutation reaches the principle I have established, and is the same as the principle I have established, it cannot refute my principle. If your refutation does not reach the principle I have established, it also cannot refute my principle. Your refutation will instead refute your own principle. Furthermore, the outsider says: If the cause is in front, and the established principle is behind, and the established principle has not yet arisen, then what is this cause? If the established principle is in front, and the cause is behind, and the established principle has already been established, what is the use of the cause? This also cannot become a cause. The debater refutes: If your refutation is in front, I

何所難。若我立義在前汝難在後。我義已立。汝難復何用若汝言汝已信我難故取我難更難我。若作此說。是亦不然。何以故。我顯汝難還破汝義。不依汝難以立我義。若有別難與此難同相者。立其過失名相違難。論曰。正難有五種。一破所樂義。二顯不樂義。三顯倒義。四顯不同義。五顯一切無道理得成就義。外曰。有我。何以故。聚集為他故。譬如臥具等為他聚集。眼等根亦如是為他聚集。他者我故知有我。論曰。無我。何以故。定不可顯故。若有物定不可顯。是物則無。譬如非自在人第二頭。第二頭者。於色香等頭相貌中不可思惟分別。是故定無。我亦如是。于眼等根中分別不顯。是故定無。汝說我有。是義不然。是名破所樂義。複次若汝說我相不可分別而是有者。第二頭不可分別亦應是有。若汝不信第二頭是有。我亦如是。汝不應信。是名顯不樂義。複次若汝意謂二種同不可分別。不依道理說我是有。不說第二頭是有者。我亦不依道理。說第二頭是有。不說我是有。是義應成。若我義不成。汝義亦不成。是名顯倒義。複次若汝言。我與第二頭同不可分別而不同。無不同過失墮汝頂上。譬如有人說如是言。石女兒有莊嚴具。石女兒無莊嚴具。此語亦應成就。若作此說墮不同過失中。汝亦如是。是名顯不同義。複次

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：有什麼困難的呢？如果我先立論，你后提出反駁，我的論點已經成立，你的反駁又有什麼用呢？如果你說你已經相信我的論點，因為反駁的緣故，又用我的反駁來反駁我，如果這樣說，也是不對的。為什麼呢？我揭示你的反駁，反而破斥了你的論點。我不依賴你的反駁來確立我的論點。如果還有其他的反駁與這個反駁有相同的特徵，就把它成立的過失稱為相違難。論中說：正確的反駁有五種：一是破斥對方所喜歡的論點；二是揭示對方不喜歡的論點；三是揭示顛倒的論點；四是揭示不同的論點；五是揭示一切沒有道理可以成就的論點。外道說：有『我』（Ātman，靈魂）。為什麼呢？因為聚集是爲了其他的緣故。比如臥具等是爲了其他而聚集的。眼等根（感官）也是這樣，爲了其他而聚集。這個『他』就是『我』，所以知道有『我』。論中說：沒有『我』。為什麼呢？因為確定了卻無法顯示的緣故。如果有一個東西確定了卻無法顯示，這個東西就是沒有的。比如非自在人（A-svatantra，不自由的人）的第二個頭。這個第二個頭，在顏色、香味等頭的相貌中無法思惟分別，所以確定是沒有的。『我』也是這樣，在眼等根中分別卻無法顯示，所以確定是沒有的。你說有『我』，這個說法是不對的。這叫做破斥對方所喜歡的論點。再次，如果你說『我』的相狀無法分別，但是存在的，那麼第二個頭無法分別也應該是存在的。如果你不相信第二個頭是存在的，『我』也應該是這樣，你不應該相信。這叫做揭示對方不喜歡的論點。再次，如果你認為兩種（『我』和第二個頭）同樣無法分別，不依據道理說『我』是存在的，卻不說第二個頭是存在的，那麼『我』也不依據道理，說第二個頭是存在的，卻不說『我』是存在的，這個道理應該成立。如果我的論點不成立，你的論點也不成立。這叫做揭示顛倒的論點。再次，如果你說，『我』和第二個頭同樣無法分別，但是不同，沒有不同的過失會落在你的頭上。比如有人這樣說：石女兒（Śila-putra，石頭做的女兒）有莊嚴具，石女兒沒有莊嚴具，這句話也應該成立。如果這樣說，就落入了不同的過失中。你也像這樣。這叫做揭示不同的論點。再次

【English Translation】 English version: What difficulty is there? If I establish a thesis first and you refute it later, my thesis is already established. What use is your refutation then? If you say that you already believe my thesis, and because of the refutation, you use my refutation to refute me again, if you say this, it is also incorrect. Why? I reveal your refutation, and instead, it refutes your thesis. I do not rely on your refutation to establish my thesis. If there are other refutations that share the same characteristics as this refutation, the fault of its establishment is called contradictory refutation (相違難, xiāng wéi nán). The treatise says: There are five types of correct refutations: first, refuting the opponent's cherished thesis; second, revealing the opponent's uncherished thesis; third, revealing a reversed thesis; fourth, revealing a different thesis; fifth, revealing a thesis that cannot be accomplished by any reason. An outsider says: There is an 'I' (Ātman, soul). Why? Because gathering is for the sake of others. For example, bedding is gathered for the sake of others. The sense organs such as eyes are also gathered for the sake of others. This 'other' is the 'I', so we know there is an 'I'. The treatise says: There is no 'I'. Why? Because it is determined but cannot be shown. If there is something that is determined but cannot be shown, then that thing does not exist. For example, the second head of a non-independent person (A-svatantra, not free). This second head cannot be conceived or distinguished in the appearance of colors, smells, etc., so it is determined to be non-existent. The 'I' is also like this, it cannot be shown when distinguished among the sense organs such as eyes, so it is determined to be non-existent. You say there is an 'I', this statement is incorrect. This is called refuting the opponent's cherished thesis. Furthermore, if you say that the characteristic of the 'I' cannot be distinguished, but it exists, then the second head, which cannot be distinguished, should also exist. If you do not believe that the second head exists, the 'I' should also be like that, you should not believe it. This is called revealing the opponent's uncherished thesis. Furthermore, if you think that the two ('I' and the second head) are equally indistinguishable, and without reason, you say that the 'I' exists, but you do not say that the second head exists, then 'I' also, without reason, say that the second head exists, but do not say that the 'I' exists, this reasoning should be established. If my thesis is not established, your thesis is also not established. This is called revealing a reversed thesis. Furthermore, if you say that the 'I' and the second head are equally indistinguishable, but different, the fault of being different will fall on your head. For example, if someone says: the daughter of a stone (Śila-putra, stone-made daughter) has ornaments, the daughter of a stone does not have ornaments, this statement should also be established. If you say this, you fall into the fault of being different. You are also like this. This is called revealing a different thesis. Furthermore

若汝言。不依道理定有我。不依道理定無第二頭。此言得成就者。一切顛狂小兒無道理語亦應成就。譬如虛空可見火冷風可執等。並是顛狂之言不依道理。如汝所立亦得成就。若不成就汝義亦如是。是名顯一切無道理得成就義。

反質難品中墮負處品第三

論曰。墮負處有二十二種。一壞自立義。二取異義。三因與立義相違。四舍自立義。五立異因義。六異義。七無義。八有義不可解。九無道理義。十不至時。十一不具足分。十二長分。十三重說。十四不能誦。十五不解義。十六不能難。十七立方便避難。十八信許他難。十九于墮負處不顯墮負。二十非處說墮負。二十一為悉檀多所違。二十二似因。是名二十二種墮負處。若人墮一一負處則不須復與論義。一壞自立義者。于自立義許對義。是名壞自立義。外曰。聲常。何以故。無身故。譬如虛空。是義已立。論曰。若聲與空同相故是常者。若不同相則應無常。不同相者。聲有因空無因。聲根所執空非根所執。是故聲無常。外曰。若同相若不同相。我悉不撿。我說常同相。若有常同相則是常。論曰。常同相者。不定無身物。亦有無常。如苦樂心等。是故汝因不成就。不同相者。定顯一切無常與常相離。是故能立無常。外曰。我亦信無常有因常無因。是名壞自

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果你說，不依據道理就斷定有『我』（Atman，靈魂），不依據道理就斷定沒有第二個頭，這種說法如果能成立，那麼所有瘋癲小孩沒有道理的話也應該成立。譬如說虛空可以看見，火是冷的，風可以抓住等等，這些都是瘋癲之言，不依據道理。像你所建立的論點如果也能成立，如果不成立，你的論點也是一樣。這叫做顯示一切沒有道理的說法都能成立的意義。

反駁詰難品中的墮負處品第三

論曰：墮負處有二十二種：一、壞自立義；二、取異義；三、因與立義相違；四、舍自立義；五、立異因義；六、異義；七、無義；八、有義不可解；九、無道理義；十、不至時；十一、不具足分；十二、長分；十三、重說；十四、不能誦；十五、不解義；十六、不能難；十七、立方便避難；十八、信許他難；十九、于墮負處不顯墮負；二十、非處說墮負；二十一、為悉檀多所違；二十二、似因。是名二十二種墮負處。如果有人墮入其中任何一種墮負處，就不需要再與他辯論了。

一、壞自立義：對於自己所立的論點，認可對方的論點，這叫做壞自立義。外道說：『聲音是常住的。為什麼呢？因為它沒有身體。譬如虛空。』這個論點已經成立。論者說：如果聲音與虛空相同，所以是常住的，如果不同，就應該是無常的。如果不同，聲音有因，虛空沒有因；聲音是根所執取的，虛空不是根所執取的。所以聲音是無常的。外道說：『無論相同還是不同，我都不採納。我說常住是相同的。如果有常住的相同之處，那就是常住的。』論者說：『常住的相同之處，不確定的沒有身體的事物，也有無常的，比如苦樂的心等等。』所以你的因不成立。如果不同，就一定顯示一切無常與常住是相離的。所以能成立無常。外道說：『我也相信無常有因，常住沒有因。』這叫做壞自立

【English Translation】 English version: If you say that, without relying on reason, you definitively assert the existence of 'Atman' (soul), and without relying on reason, you definitively assert the non-existence of a second head, if this statement could be established, then all the nonsensical words of mad children should also be established. For example, saying that emptiness can be seen, fire is cold, and wind can be grasped, etc., are all mad statements that do not rely on reason. If the argument you establish could also be established, and if it cannot be established, your argument is the same. This is called showing that all unreasonable statements can be established.

Chapter Three on Falling into Defeat in Counter-Questioning

Treatise says: There are twenty-two types of situations leading to defeat: 1. Destroying one's own established thesis; 2. Adopting a different thesis; 3. The reason contradicting the established thesis; 4. Abandoning one's own established thesis; 5. Establishing a different reason; 6. Different meaning; 7. No meaning; 8. Meaningful but incomprehensible; 9. Unreasonable meaning; 10. Not timely; 11. Incomplete parts; 12. Lengthy parts; 13. Repetition; 14. Inability to recite; 15. Not understanding the meaning; 16. Inability to refute; 17. Establishing expedient to avoid refutation; 18. Believing and accepting others' refutation; 19. Not pointing out defeat when it occurs; 20. Asserting defeat in an inappropriate situation; 21. Contradicted by many established doctrines (Siddhanta); 22. Pseudo-reason. These are the twenty-two types of situations leading to defeat. If someone falls into any one of these situations, there is no need to argue with them further.

Destroying one's own established thesis: Affirming the opponent's thesis regarding one's own established thesis is called destroying one's own established thesis. The outsider says: 'Sound is permanent. Why? Because it has no body. Like space.' This thesis has already been established. The debater says: If sound is the same as space, therefore it is permanent; if it is different, then it should be impermanent. If it is different, sound has a cause, space has no cause; sound is grasped by the senses, space is not grasped by the senses. Therefore, sound is impermanent. The outsider says: 'Whether it is the same or different, I do not accept it. I say permanence is the same. If there is the same aspect of permanence, then it is permanent.' The debater says: 'The same aspect of permanence, uncertain things without a body, also have impermanence, such as the mind of suffering and joy, etc.' Therefore, your reason is not established. If it is different, it definitely shows that all impermanence is separate from permanence. Therefore, it can establish impermanence. The outsider says: 'I also believe that impermanence has a cause, and permanence has no cause.' This is called destroying one's own established thesis.

立義墮負處。二取異自立義者。自義已為他所破。更思惟立異法為義。是名取異自立義。外曰。聲常。何以故。無觸故。譬如虛空。是義已立。論曰。若汝立聲常依無觸因。無觸因者不定。心欲瞋等並無觸而是無常。聲亦無觸。是故不可定。如虛空等常不如心等無常無觸。既不定汝因則不成就。因若不成就立義亦不成就。是義已破。外曰。聲及常並非我義。我所立義常與聲相攝。聲與常相攝。我所說聲為除色等。我所說常為除無常等。常不離聲離色等。聲不離常離耳所執等。不相離名相攝。是我立義。不立聲亦不立常。汝難聲難常並不難我義。是名取異自立義墮負處。三因與立義相違者。因與立義不得同。是名因與立義相違。外曰。聲常住。何以故。一切無常故。譬如虛空。是義已立。論曰。汝說一切無常。是故聲常者。聲為是一切所攝。為非一切所攝。若是一切所攝。一切無常。聲應無常。若非一切所攝。一切則不成就。何以故。不攝聲故。若汝說因立義則壞。若說立義因則壞。是故汝義不成就。是名因與立義相違墮負處。四舍自立義者。他已破自所立義。舍而不救。是名舍自立義。外曰。聲常住。何以故。根所執故。譬如同異性者根所執故常。聲亦根所執是故常住。是義已立。論曰。汝說聲根所執故常住。根所執

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本立義墮負處（指在辯論中因提出不成立的論點而導致的失敗）。二、取異自立義者（指改變自己最初的論點）：當自己的論點已經被對方駁倒后，重新思考並提出不同的論點作為自己的觀點，這被稱為『取異自立義』。外道說：『聲音是常住的。』為什麼呢？『因為它沒有觸覺。』就像虛空一樣。這個論點已經成立。論者反駁：『如果你認為聲音是常住的，依據是沒有觸覺這個原因，那麼沒有觸覺這個原因是不確定的。』因為像心裡的嗔恨等念頭，也是沒有觸覺的，但卻是無常的。聲音也沒有觸覺，所以不能確定聲音就是常住的。就像虛空等是常住的，但心念等無常的東西也是沒有觸覺的。既然你的原因是不確定的，那麼你的論點就不能成立。論點如果不能成立，那麼你的主張也就不能成立。這個論點已經被駁倒了。外道說：『聲音和常住，並非我所要表達的完整含義。我所要表達的含義是常住與聲音相互包含。聲音與常住相互包含。我所說的聲音是爲了排除色等，我所說的常住是爲了排除無常等。常住不離開聲音，也離開色等。聲音不離開常住，也離開耳朵所執著的等等。不相分離叫做相攝，這是我所要表達的含義。我不是單獨說聲音，也不是單獨說常住。你駁斥聲音，駁斥常住，並沒有駁斥我的真正含義。』這被稱為『取異自立義』，屬於辯論失敗的情況。三、因與立義相違者（指提出的理由與所要證明的觀點相互矛盾）：提出的理由與所要證明的觀點不能一致，這被稱為『因與立義相違』。外道說：『聲音是常住的。』為什麼呢？『因為一切都是無常的。』就像虛空一樣。這個論點已經成立。論者反駁：『你說一切都是無常的，所以聲音是常住的。』那麼聲音是被包含在一切之中，還是不被包含在一切之中呢？如果聲音被包含在一切之中，那麼一切都是無常的，聲音也應該是無常的。如果聲音不被包含在一切之中，那麼『一切』這個概念就不成立，因為沒有包含聲音。如果你用理由來證明觀點，那麼觀點就會被破壞；如果用觀點來證明理由，那麼理由就會被破壞。所以你的論點不能成立。這被稱為『因與立義相違』，屬於辯論失敗的情況。四、舍自立義者（指放棄自己最初的論點）：當自己提出的論點已經被對方駁倒后，放棄這個論點而不加以辯護，這被稱為『舍自立義』。外道說：『聲音是常住的。』為什麼呢？『因為它是根所執取的。』就像同異性（Samanantara-pratyaya，指等無間緣，一種因果關係）一樣，根所執取的都是常住的，聲音也是根所執取的，所以是常住的。這個論點已經成立。論者反駁：『你說聲音是根所執取的，所以是常住的。根所執取的……』

【English Translation】 English version Defeated positions due to flawed arguments. Two, 'Adopting a different position after establishing one' (taking a different stance after establishing a position): When one's own argument has been refuted by the opponent, reconsidering and establishing a different dharma as one's argument is called 'adopting a different position after establishing one'. The outsider says: 'Sound is permanent.' Why? 'Because it is without touch.' Like space. This argument has been established. The debater replies: 'If you establish that sound is permanent based on the cause of being without touch, then the cause of being without touch is uncertain.' Because mental states like anger are also without touch, but they are impermanent. Sound is also without touch, so it cannot be determined that it is permanent. Like space, which is permanent, but mental states, which are impermanent, are also without touch. Since your cause is uncertain, your argument is not established. If the cause is not established, then your proposition is not established. This argument has been refuted. The outsider says: 'Sound and permanence are not my complete meaning. My intended meaning is that permanence and sound are mutually inclusive. Sound and permanence are mutually inclusive. What I mean by sound is to exclude form (rupa) etc., and what I mean by permanence is to exclude impermanence etc. Permanence does not leave sound, and also leaves form etc. Sound does not leave permanence, and also leaves what is grasped by the ear etc. Not being separate is called mutual inclusion. This is my established argument. I am not establishing sound alone, nor am I establishing permanence alone. Your refutation of sound and permanence does not refute my true meaning.' This is called 'adopting a different position after establishing one', which is a situation of defeat. Three, 'The cause contradicts the established argument' (the reason given contradicts the point being made): The cause and the established argument cannot be the same. This is called 'the cause contradicts the established argument'. The outsider says: 'Sound is permanent.' Why? 'Because everything is impermanent.' Like space. This argument has been established. The debater replies: 'You say that everything is impermanent, therefore sound is permanent.' Then is sound included in everything, or is it not included in everything? If sound is included in everything, then everything is impermanent, and sound should also be impermanent. If sound is not included in everything, then the concept of 'everything' is not established, because it does not include sound. If you use the cause to establish the argument, then the argument will be destroyed; if you use the argument to establish the cause, then the cause will be destroyed. Therefore, your argument is not established. This is called 'the cause contradicts the established argument', which is a situation of defeat. Four, 'Abandoning one's own established argument' (giving up one's initial position): When one's own established argument has been refuted by the opponent, abandoning the argument without defending it is called 'abandoning one's own established argument'. The outsider says: 'Sound is permanent.' Why? 'Because it is apprehended by the senses.' Like simultaneity (Samanantara-pratyaya), what is apprehended by the senses is permanent, and sound is also apprehended by the senses, therefore it is permanent. This argument has been established. The debater replies: 'You say that sound is permanent because it is apprehended by the senses. What is apprehended by the senses...'

者與無常相攝。譬如瓦器等。瓦器等根所執故無常。聲應無常。汝說如同異性常。是義不然。何以故。牛等同異性。為與牛一。為與牛異。若一牛是實。同異性不實。若異離牛同異性自體應可顯。離牛既不見同異性。不成常住譬。汝立義不得成就。是義已破。外曰。誰立此義。是名舍自立義墮負處。五立異因義者。已立同相因義。后時說異因。是名立異因義。外曰。聲常住。何以故。不兩時顯故。一切常住。皆一時顯。譬如虛空等。聲亦如是。是義已立。論曰。汝說聲常住不兩時顯。譬如虛空等。是因不然。何以故。不兩時顯者不定常住。譬如風與觸一時顯而風無常。聲亦如是。外曰。聲與風不同相。風身根所執。聲耳根所執。是故聲與風不同相。論曰。汝前說不兩時顯故聲常住。汝今說聲與風不同相。別根所執故。汝舍前因立異因。是故汝因不得成就。是名立異因義墮負處。六異義者。說證義與立義不相關。是名異義。外曰。聲常住。何以故。色等五陰十因緣。是名異義。七無義者。欲論義時誦咒。是名無義。八有義不可解者。若三說聽眾及對人不解。是名有義不可解。若人說法。聽眾及對人慾得解。三說而悉不解。譬如有人。說塵無身。生歡喜生憂惱。不至而有損益。舍彌多。不捨則滅。聲常住。何以故。無常常

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『者』與『無常』互相包含。例如瓦器等。瓦器等被根識所執取，所以是無常的。聲音也應是無常的。你說聲音如同異性是常住的，這個說法不對。為什麼呢？牛等同異性，是與牛相同，還是與牛相異？如果相同，那麼牛是真實的，同異性就是不真實的。如果相異，離開牛，同異性本身就應該可以顯現。既然離開牛就看不見同異性，那麼用它來比喻常住就不成立。你所立的義不能成立，這個義已經被破斥了。外道說：『誰立了這個義？』這就是捨棄自己所立的義，屬於墮負之處。五、立異因義：已經立了同相因義，後來又說異因，這叫做立異因義。外道說：『聲音是常住的。為什麼呢？因為它不會在兩個時間同時顯現。一切常住的事物，都是一時顯現的，例如虛空等。聲音也是這樣。』這個義已經成立了。論主說：『你說聲音常住，不會在兩個時間同時顯現，例如虛空等。』這個因是不成立的。為什麼呢？不會在兩個時間同時顯現的事物，不一定是常住的。例如風與觸，一時顯現，但風是無常的。聲音也是這樣。外道說：『聲音與風不同相。風是被身根所執取的，聲音是被耳根所執取的。所以聲音與風不同相。』論主說：『你先前說不會在兩個時間同時顯現，所以聲音是常住的。你現在又說聲音與風不同相，因為是被不同的根所執取的。』你捨棄了先前的因，而立了不同的因。所以你的因不能成立。這叫做立異因義，屬於墮負之處。六、異義：所說的證義與立義不相關聯，這叫做異義。外道說：『聲音是常住的。為什麼呢？因為色等五陰十因緣。』這叫做異義。七、無義：在辯論義理的時候誦咒，這叫做無義。八、有義不可解：如果說了三次，聽眾和辯論的對方都不理解，這叫做有義不可解。如果有人說法，聽眾和辯論的對方想要理解，說了三次卻都不能理解。例如有人說塵土沒有身體，卻能產生歡喜和憂惱，沒有接觸卻有損益。捨棄彌多，不捨棄就會滅亡。聲音是常住的。為什麼呢？因為無常常常……』

【English Translation】 English version: 'That' and 'impermanence' are mutually inclusive. For example, earthenware, etc. Earthenware, etc., are impermanent because they are grasped by the root consciousness. Sound should also be impermanent. You say that sound is permanent like a different nature, but this is not correct. Why? The same and different natures of cows, etc., are they the same as the cow or different from the cow? If they are the same, then the cow is real, and the same and different natures are unreal. If they are different, then apart from the cow, the same and different natures themselves should be able to be manifested. Since the same and different natures are not seen apart from the cow, it is not valid to use them as a metaphor for permanence. The thesis you have established cannot be established; this thesis has been refuted. The outsider says: 'Who established this thesis?' This is abandoning one's own established thesis and falling into a place of defeat. 5. The meaning of establishing a different cause: Having already established the cause of the same characteristic, later speaking of a different cause is called establishing the meaning of a different cause. The outsider says: 'Sound is permanent. Why? Because it does not appear at two times simultaneously. All permanent things appear at one time, like space, etc. Sound is also like that.' This meaning has been established. The proponent says: 'You say that sound is permanent and does not appear at two times simultaneously, like space, etc.' This cause is not valid. Why? What does not appear at two times simultaneously is not necessarily permanent. For example, wind and touch appear at one time, but wind is impermanent. Sound is also like that. The outsider says: 'Sound and wind are not of the same nature. Wind is grasped by the body root, and sound is grasped by the ear root. Therefore, sound and wind are not of the same nature.' The proponent says: 'You said earlier that sound is permanent because it does not appear at two times simultaneously. Now you say that sound and wind are not of the same nature because they are grasped by different roots.' You have abandoned the previous cause and established a different cause. Therefore, your cause cannot be established. This is called establishing the meaning of a different cause and falling into a place of defeat. 6. Different meaning: The proof that is spoken of is not related to the established meaning; this is called different meaning. The outsider says: 'Sound is permanent. Why? Because of the five aggregates and ten causes and conditions, such as form.' This is called different meaning. 7. No meaning: Reciting mantras when discussing the meaning is called no meaning. 8. Meaning that cannot be understood: If, after speaking three times, the audience and the opponent in the debate do not understand, this is called meaning that cannot be understood. If someone teaches the Dharma, and the audience and the opponent in the debate want to understand, but after speaking three times, they still cannot understand. For example, someone says that dust has no body, yet it can produce joy and sorrow, and without contact, there is benefit and harm. Abandoning Mita, if not abandoned, it will perish. Sound is permanent. Why? Because impermanence often...'

故。是名有義不可解墮負處。九無道理義者。有義前後不攝。是名無道理義。譬如有人。說言食十種果三種氈一種飲食。是名無道理。十不至時者。立義已被破后時立因。是名不至時。外曰。聲常住。何以故。譬如鄰虛圓依常住故圓常住。聲亦如是。論曰。汝立常義不說因。立五分言不具足。汝義則不成就。此義已破。外曰。我有因但不說名。何者為因。依常住空故。論曰。譬如屋被燒竟更求水救之。非時立因救義亦如是。是名不至時。十一不具足分者。五分義中一分不具。是名不具足分。五分者。一立義言。二因言。三譬如言。四合譬言。五決定言。譬如有人言聲無常。是第一分。何以故。依因生故。是第二分。若有物依因生是物無常。譬如瓦器依因生故無常。是第三分。聲亦如是。是第四分。是故聲無常。是第五分。是五分若不具一分。是名不具足墮負處。十二長分者。說因多說譬多。是名長分。譬如有人說聲無常。何以故。依功力生無中間生故。根所執故。生滅故。作言語故。是名長因。複次聲無常依因生故。譬如瓦器。譬如衣服。譬如屋舍。譬如業。是名長譬。論曰。汝說多因多譬。若一因不能證義。何用說一因。若能證義何用說多因。多譬亦如是。多說則無用。是名長分。十三重說者。有三種重說。一重聲

【現代漢語翻譯】故，這被稱為『有義不可解墮負處』（由於意義含糊不清而導致的失敗）。九、無道理義：指前後不連貫的論證，這被稱為『無道理義』。例如，有人說：『吃十種水果、三種氈和一種飲食』，這被稱為『無道理』。十、不至時：在論點已經被駁倒之後才提出理由，這被稱為『不至時』。外道說：『聲音是常住的。為什麼呢？因為它像鄰虛圓（空間）一樣，依靠常住之物，所以圓是常住的，聲音也是如此。』論者說：『你提出常住的論點，卻沒有說明原因。你提出的五分論證不完整，所以你的論點不成立。』這個論點已經被駁倒。外道說：『我有原因，只是沒有說出來。什麼是原因呢？因為它依靠常住的空（空間）。』論者說：『這就像房子已經被燒燬了才去求水救火一樣，不合時宜地提出理由來挽救論點也是如此。』這被稱為『不至時』。十一、不具足分：五分論證中缺少一個部分，這被稱為『不具足分』。五分是：一、立義言（論題）；二、因言（理由）；三、譬如言（例子）；四、合譬言（類比）；五、決定言（結論）。例如，有人說：『聲音是無常的』，這是第一分。『為什麼呢？因為它依因緣而生』，這是第二分。『如果有什麼東西依因緣而生，那麼這個東西就是無常的，比如瓦器，它依因緣而生，所以是無常的』，這是第三分。『聲音也是如此』，這是第四分。『所以聲音是無常的』，這是第五分。如果這五分中缺少一個部分，就稱為『不具足墮負處』。十二、長分：過多地陳述理由或例子，這被稱為『長分』。例如，有人說：『聲音是無常的。為什麼呢？因為它依功力而生，不是無因而生，是根所執取的，是生滅的，是作語言的。』這被稱為『長因』。進一步說，『聲音是無常的，因為它依因緣而生，比如瓦器，比如衣服，比如屋舍，比如業』，這被稱為『長譬』。論者說：『你說了很多理由和例子，如果一個理由不能證明論點，為什麼要說一個理由？如果能證明論點，為什麼要說很多理由？』過多的例子也是如此，說多了就沒有用，這被稱為『長分』。十三、重說：有三種重複。

【English Translation】 Therefore, this is called 'a place of defeat due to an indefinable and incomprehensible meaning'. 9. Meaning without Reason: An argument that is inconsistent from beginning to end is called 'meaning without reason'. For example, if someone says, 'Eat ten kinds of fruits, three kinds of felt, and one kind of food,' this is called 'without reason'. 10. Untimely: Proposing a reason after the argument has already been refuted is called 'untimely'. An outsider says, 'Sound is permanent. Why? Because it is like the adjacent empty circle (space), relying on permanent things, so the circle is permanent, and so is sound.' The debater says, 'You propose the argument of permanence but do not state the reason. Your five-part argument is incomplete, so your argument is not established.' This argument has already been refuted. The outsider says, 'I have a reason, but I did not state it. What is the reason? Because it relies on permanent emptiness (space).' The debater says, 'This is like seeking water to put out a fire after the house has already been burned down. Proposing a reason to save the argument out of time is also like that.' This is called 'untimely'. 11. Incomplete Parts: Lacking one part of the five-part argument is called 'incomplete parts'. The five parts are: 1. Statement of the proposition; 2. Statement of the reason; 3. Statement of the example; 4. Application of the example; 5. Statement of the conclusion. For example, someone says, 'Sound is impermanent,' this is the first part. 'Why? Because it arises from conditions,' this is the second part. 'If something arises from conditions, then that thing is impermanent, like a clay pot, which arises from conditions, so it is impermanent,' this is the third part. 'Sound is also like that,' this is the fourth part. 'Therefore, sound is impermanent,' this is the fifth part. If one part is missing from these five parts, it is called 'a place of defeat due to incomplete parts'. 12. Lengthy Parts: Stating too many reasons or examples is called 'lengthy parts'. For example, someone says, 'Sound is impermanent. Why? Because it arises from effort, not without cause, is grasped by the senses, is subject to arising and ceasing, and is used to make language.' This is called 'lengthy reason'. Furthermore, 'Sound is impermanent because it arises from conditions, like a clay pot, like clothes, like a house, like karma,' this is called 'lengthy example'. The debater says, 'You state many reasons and examples. If one reason cannot prove the argument, why state one reason? If it can prove the argument, why state many reasons?' The same is true for too many examples. Saying too much is useless. This is called 'lengthy parts'. 13. Repetition: There are three kinds of repetition.

二重義。三重義至。重聲者。如說帝釋帝釋。重義者。如說眼目。重義至者。如說生死實苦涅槃實樂。初語應說。第二語不須說。何以故。前語已顯義故。若前語已顯義。后語何所顯。若無所顯。后語則無用。是名重說。十四不能誦者。若說立義大眾已領解。三說有人不能誦持。是名不能誦。十五不解義者。若說立義大眾已領解。三說有人不解義。是名不解義。十六不能難者。見他如理立義不能破。是名不能難。論曰。不解義不能難。是二種非墮負處。何以故。若人不解義不能難。不應與其論義。論曰。是二種極惡墮負處。何以故。于余墮負處。若言說有過失。可以別方便救之。此二種非方便能救。是人前時起聰明慢。后時不能顯聰明相。是愚夫可恥。是名不能難。十七立方便避難者。知自立義有過失。方便隱避說餘事相。或言我自有疾。或言欲看他疾。此時不去事則不辦遮他立難。何以故。畏失親善愛念故。是名立方便避難墮負處。十八信許他難者。於他立難中信許自義過失。是名信許他難。若有人已信許自義過失。信許他難如我過失。汝過失亦如是。是名信許他難。十九于墮負處不顯墮負者。若有人已墮負處。而不顯其墮負。更立難欲難之。彼義已壞。何用難為。此難不成就。是名于墮負處不顯墮負。二十非處說

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本二重義：指一個詞語有兩種含義。三重義至：指一個詞語有三種含義。重聲者：指重複聲音，例如說『帝釋（Indra，天神之王）帝釋』。重義者：指重複意義，例如說『眼目』。重義至者：指重複意義且強調，例如說『生死實苦，涅槃實樂』。初語應說：第一句話應該說。第二語不須說：第二句話就不需要說了。何以故：為什麼呢？前語已顯義故：因為前一句話已經顯明瞭意義。若前語已顯義：如果前一句話已經顯明瞭意義。后語何所顯：后一句話還顯明什麼呢？若無所顯：如果沒有顯明什麼。后語則無用：后一句話就沒有用了。是名重說：這叫做重複說。十四不能誦者：如果有人說出立論，大眾已經理解領會，但說了三遍還有人不能背誦，這叫做不能誦。十五不解義者：如果有人說出立論，大眾已經理解領會，但說了三遍還有人不理解含義，這叫做不解義。十六不能難者：看到別人如理如法地建立論點，卻不能駁倒，這叫做不能難。論曰：論中說。不解義不能難：不理解含義就不能駁難。是二種非墮負處：這兩種情況不是失敗的地方。何以故：為什麼呢？若人不解義不能難：如果有人不理解含義就不能駁難。不應與其論義：就不應該和他辯論。論曰：論中說。是二種極惡墮負處：這兩種情況是非常惡劣的失敗之處。何以故：為什麼呢？于余墮負處：在其他的失敗之處。若言說有過失：如果言語表達有錯誤。可以別方便救之：可以用其他方法補救。此二種非方便能救：這兩種情況不是任何方法可以補救的。是人前時起聰明慢：這種人之前生起聰明的傲慢。后時不能顯聰明相：之後卻不能顯現出聰明的樣子。是愚夫可恥：這種愚蠢的人是可恥的。是名不能難：這叫做不能駁難。十七立方便避難者：知道自己建立的論點有錯誤，就用其他方法來隱藏迴避，說其他的事情。或言我自有疾：或者說我自己有病。或言欲看他疾：或者說想去看別人的病。此時不去事則不辦遮他立難：這個時候不去處理事情，就不能阻止別人提出駁難。何以故：為什麼呢？畏失親善愛念故：因為害怕失去親近友善的感情。是名立方便避難墮負處：這叫做用方便法來逃避駁難，是失敗之處。十八信許他難者：在別人提出駁難的時候，承認自己的論點有錯誤，這叫做信許他難。若有人已信許自義過失：如果有人已經承認自己的論點有錯誤。信許他難如我過失：相信別人的駁難就像我的錯誤一樣。汝過失亦如是：你的錯誤也是這樣。是名信許他難：這叫做信許他難。十九于墮負處不顯墮負者：如果有人已經處於失敗的境地，卻不承認自己失敗，還想繼續提出駁難。更立難欲難之：重新建立論點想要駁倒對方。彼義已壞：他的論點已經壞了。何用難為：還用駁難做什麼呢？此難不成就：這個駁難不能成立。是名于墮負處不顯墮負：這叫做在已經失敗的情況下不承認失敗。二十非處說：在不適當的場合說話。

【English Translation】 English version Twofold meaning: Refers to a word or phrase having two meanings. Threefold meaning: Refers to a word or phrase having three meanings. Repetition of sound: Refers to repeating the sound, such as saying '帝釋 (Dìshì, Indra, the king of gods) 帝釋'. Repetition of meaning: Refers to repeating the meaning, such as saying '眼目 (yǎnmù, eyes)'. Repetition of meaning with emphasis: Refers to repeating the meaning with emphasis, such as saying '生死實苦，涅槃實樂 (shēngsǐ shí kǔ, nièpán shí lè, Samsara is truly suffering, Nirvana is truly bliss)'. 'The first statement should be said': The first statement should be made. 'The second statement is unnecessary': The second statement is not needed. 'Why is that?': Why is that? 'Because the previous statement has already revealed the meaning': Because the previous statement has already made the meaning clear. 'If the previous statement has already revealed the meaning': If the previous statement has already revealed the meaning. 'What does the latter statement reveal?': What does the latter statement reveal? 'If it reveals nothing': If it reveals nothing. 'The latter statement is useless': The latter statement is useless. 'This is called repetition': This is called repetition. 'Fourteenth, one who cannot recite': If someone states a proposition and the assembly has understood it, but after saying it three times, someone still cannot recite it, this is called 'cannot recite'. 'Fifteenth, one who does not understand the meaning': If someone states a proposition and the assembly has understood it, but after saying it three times, someone still does not understand the meaning, this is called 'does not understand the meaning'. 'Sixteenth, one who cannot refute': Seeing that others establish a proposition reasonably and correctly, but being unable to refute it, this is called 'cannot refute'. 'Treatise says': The treatise says. 'Not understanding the meaning, one cannot refute': If one does not understand the meaning, one cannot refute. 'These two are not places of defeat': These two situations are not places of defeat. 'Why is that?': Why is that? 'If a person does not understand the meaning, one cannot refute': If a person does not understand the meaning, one cannot refute. 'One should not debate with them': One should not debate with them. 'Treatise says': The treatise says. 'These two are extremely bad places of defeat': These two situations are extremely bad places of defeat. 'Why is that?': Why is that? 'In other places of defeat': In other places of defeat. 'If there is a fault in speech': If there is a fault in speech. 'One can save it with other means': One can save it with other means. 'These two cannot be saved by any means': These two situations cannot be saved by any means. 'This person previously arose with arrogant pride in their intelligence': This person previously arose with arrogant pride in their intelligence. 'Later, they cannot show the appearance of intelligence': Later, they cannot show the appearance of intelligence. 'This foolish person is shameful': This foolish person is shameful. 'This is called cannot refute': This is called 'cannot refute'. 'Seventeenth, one who establishes a means to avoid refutation': Knowing that the proposition they have established has a fault, they use other means to hide and avoid it, speaking of other matters. 'Or saying, I myself have an illness': Or saying, 'I myself have an illness'. 'Or saying, wanting to see another's illness': Or saying, 'wanting to see another's illness'. 'At this time, not going to handle the matter prevents them from establishing a refutation': At this time, not going to handle the matter prevents them from establishing a refutation. 'Why is that?': Why is that? 'Fearing the loss of friendly affection': Fearing the loss of friendly affection. 'This is called establishing a means to avoid refutation, a place of defeat': This is called establishing a means to avoid refutation, a place of defeat. 'Eighteenth, one who believes and accepts another's refutation': When others raise a refutation, admitting that one's own proposition has a fault, this is called 'believing and accepting another's refutation'. 'If someone has already believed and accepted the fault of their own proposition': If someone has already believed and accepted the fault of their own proposition. 'Believing and accepting another's refutation is like my fault': Believing and accepting another's refutation is like my fault. 'Your fault is also like this': Your fault is also like this. 'This is called believing and accepting another's refutation': This is called 'believing and accepting another's refutation'. 'Nineteenth, one who does not reveal defeat in a place of defeat': If someone is already in a state of defeat, but does not admit their defeat, and still wants to continue to raise a refutation. 'Establishing a new proposition wanting to refute them': Establishing a new proposition wanting to refute the other party. 'Their proposition is already ruined': Their proposition is already ruined. 'What is the use of refuting?': What is the use of refuting? 'This refutation cannot be established': This refutation cannot be established. 'This is called not revealing defeat in a place of defeat': This is called 'not revealing defeat in a place of defeat'. 'Twentieth, speaking in an inappropriate place': Speaking in an inappropriate place.

墮負者。他不墮負處說言墮負。是名非處說墮負。複次他墮壞自立義處。若取自立異義顯他墮負而非其處。是名非處說墮負處。二十一為悉檀多所違者。先已共攝持四種悉檀多。后不如悉檀多理而說。是名為悉檀多所違。若自攝持明巧書射與生因律沙門悉檀多不如理說。是名為悉檀多所違墮負處。二十二似因者。如前說有三種。一不成就。二不定。三相違。是名似因。一不成就者。譬如有人立馬來。何以故。見有角故。馬無角。角為因不成就。不能立馬來。二不定者。譬如有人立秦牛來。何以故。見有角故。有角不定牛。羊鹿等亦有角。角為因不定。不能立秦牛來。三相違者。譬如有人立晝時是夜。何以故。日新出故。日新出與夜相違。日出為因不能立夜。若人立此三種為因。是名似因墮負處。

如實論反質難品一卷

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本墮負者：如果對方沒有失敗的地方，卻說他失敗了，這就是在不該說失敗的地方說失敗。還有，對方已經確立了正確的觀點，如果爲了顯示對方失敗，而採取與對方觀點不同的其他觀點，但實際上對方並沒有失敗，這就是在不該說失敗的地方說失敗。第二十一條：違背了公認的理論體系（悉檀多，Siddhanta，意為已建立的結論、公認的理論體系）：先前已經共同接受並遵循四種公認的理論體系，之後卻不按照這些理論體系的道理來說，這就是違背了公認的理論體系。如果自己接受並精通如明巧書寫、射箭、關於生命起源的因果律、沙門（Sramana，意為出家修行者）的理論體系，卻不按照這些道理來說，這就是違背了公認的理論體系而導致失敗。第二十二條：似因（Hetvabhasa，意為虛假的理由、不成立的理由）：就像前面所說的有三種，一是不成就（Asiddha，意為未確立的），二是不定（Anaikantika，意為不確定的），三是相違（Viruddha，意為矛盾的）。這就是所謂的似因。一是不成就：比如有人說『這匹馬會立刻來，為什麼呢？因為我看到它有角。』但馬沒有角，所以『有角』這個理由是不成立的，不能證明馬會立刻來。二是不定：比如有人說『這頭秦牛會立刻來，為什麼呢？因為我看到它有角。』有角是不確定的，牛、羊、鹿等也都有角，所以『有角』這個理由是不確定的，不能證明這頭秦牛會立刻來。三是相違：比如有人說『現在是白天，但實際上是夜晚，為什麼呢？因為太陽剛剛升起。』太陽剛剛升起與夜晚是相矛盾的，太陽升起這個理由不能證明現在是夜晚。如果有人用這三種理由作為論證的依據，這就是使用了似因而導致失敗。《如實論反質難品》一卷

【English Translation】 English version The defeated: If one says that another is defeated when they are not in a state of defeat, this is called declaring defeat where it is not appropriate. Furthermore, if another has established a valid point, and one takes a different stance to show their defeat, but they are not actually defeated, this is called declaring defeat where it is not appropriate. Twenty-first: Contradicting established tenets (Siddhanta): Having previously accepted and adhered to the four types of established tenets (Siddhanta), if one later speaks contrary to the principles of these tenets, this is called contradicting established tenets. If one accepts and is skilled in areas such as clever writing, archery, the law of causality regarding the origin of life, or the tenets of ascetics (Sramana), but speaks contrary to these principles, this is called being defeated by contradicting established tenets. Twenty-second: Fallacious reasons (Hetvabhasa): As mentioned before, there are three types: one, unestablished (Asiddha); two, uncertain (Anaikantika); three, contradictory (Viruddha). These are called fallacious reasons. One, unestablished: For example, someone says, 'This horse will come immediately, why? Because I see it has horns.' But horses do not have horns, so the reason 'having horns' is unestablished and cannot prove that the horse will come immediately. Two, uncertain: For example, someone says, 'This Qin cow will come immediately, why? Because I see it has horns.' Having horns is uncertain; cows, sheep, deer, etc., also have horns, so the reason 'having horns' is uncertain and cannot prove that this Qin cow will come immediately. Three, contradictory: For example, someone says, 'It is daytime now, but actually it is night, why? Because the sun has just risen.' The sun having just risen contradicts the idea of night; the reason 'the sun has risen' cannot prove that it is night. If someone uses these three types of reasons as the basis for their argument, this is called being defeated by using fallacious reasons. One volume of 'Refutation of Objections' from the Tattvasiddhi-sastra.