T42n1827_百論疏

大正藏第 42 冊 No. 1827 百論疏

No. 1827 [cf. No. 1569]

百論序疏

大業四年十月因講次直疏出不事訪也。肇公是京兆郡人。家貧常以傭書為業。因是歷觀經史。每讀老子莊周之書。喟然嘆曰。美則美矣。然期神冥累之方猶未盡矣。末見古維摩經觀喜頂戴謂親友曰。吾知所歸極矣。羅什至京師因從請業。著不真空等四論。著注凈名及諸經論序。什嘆曰。秦人解空第一者僧肇其人也。若肇公名肇可謂玄宗之始。年三十一亡。但百論有二序。一睿師所制。二肇公所作。興皇和上每講常讀肇師序。正為其人言巧意玄妙符論旨。親睹時事。所以稟承。又睿師序是弘始四年前翻。什師初至方言未融為此作序。猶未中詣。肇師序即是此文六年重翻。文義既正。作序亦好。所以恒讀肇公序也。餘年十四虛心玩之。登乎弱冠于寺覆述。生起此次第者。論即是教。以教化物前須嘆教。雖復嘆教但未知何時造。故第二明時節。雖明時節未知何人所造。故第三明能造之人。雖明能造之人未知何故造論。故第四明造論意為緣。雖明能造之論所為之緣竟未知名字何等。故第五釋論名題。雖識名目未知是誰註釋。故第六齣注論婆數。註釋雖竟未知旨趣如何。故第七明論大宗。

{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本：", "《百論序疏》", "", "No. 1827 [cf. No. 1569]", "", "《百論序疏》", "", "大業四年十月，因為講習的緣故，直接疏解，沒有經過諮詢。", "肇公（僧肇）是京兆郡人。家境貧寒，常以替人抄書為生。因此得以廣泛閱讀經史。每當讀到老子、莊周的書，總是感嘆道：『文辭華美是華美啊，然而探求精神擺脫束縛的方法，還是沒有窮盡啊。』後來見到鳩摩羅什翻譯的《維摩詰經》，觀看了『觀喜』這一品后，對親友說：『我知道我最終的歸宿在哪裡了。』", "鳩摩羅什到達京師后，僧肇就跟隨他學習。著有《不真空論》等四論，併爲《維摩詰經》及其他經論作序。鳩摩羅什讚歎道：『秦地理解空性第一人，就是僧肇這個人啊。』", "如果說肇公名為『肇』，真可謂是玄學之始。三十一歲去世。但是《百論》有兩篇序，一篇是睿師（慧睿）所作，一篇是肇公所作。興皇和上（法朗）每次講習時，常讀僧肇的序。正是因為他的言辭巧妙，意境玄妙，符合論的宗旨，親身經歷了當時的事件，所以稟承了他的思想。", "而且睿師的序是在弘始四年（402年）前翻譯的。鳩摩羅什初到，語言還不通暢，為此作序，還未達到精妙。僧肇的序就是六年（404年）重譯此文時所作，文辭和義理都已正確，作序也很好。所以總是讀僧肇的序啊。我十四歲時虛心研讀，到了二十歲在寺廟裡複述。產生這樣的次第，是因為論就是教，用教化導眾生，首先要讚歎教。雖然讚歎教，但不知道是什麼時候造的，所以第二點說明時節。雖然說明時節，但不知道是什麼人造的，所以第三點說明能造之人。雖然說明能造之人，但不知道因為什麼緣故造論，所以第四點說明造論的因緣。雖然說明能造之論所為的因緣，最終還是不知道名字是什麼，所以第五點解釋論的題目。雖然認識了名目，但不知道是誰註釋的，所以第六點說明註釋論的婆數（Vasubandhu，世親）。註釋雖然完畢，但不知道宗旨趣味如何，所以第七點說明論的大宗。", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", 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"", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "english_translations": [ "English version:", "Bailun Preface Commentary", "", "No. 1827 [cf. No. 1569]", "", "Bailun Preface Commentary", "", "In the tenth month of the fourth year of the Daye era (608 CE), due to lecturing, I directly commented without consulting others.", "Master Zhao (僧肇, Sengzhao) was from the Jingzhao commandery. His family was poor, and he often made a living by copying books for others. Because of this, he was able to extensively read the classics and histories. Whenever he read the books of Laozi and Zhuangzi, he would sigh and say, 'The words are beautiful, but the methods for seeking spiritual liberation are not exhaustive.' Later, when he saw the Vimalakirti Sutra translated by Kumarajiva (鳩摩羅什), and after viewing the 'Joyful Observation' chapter, he said to his friends, 'I know where my ultimate refuge lies.'", "After Kumarajiva arrived in the capital, Sengzhao followed him to study. He wrote four treatises, including the 'Discourse on Not Truly Empty' (不真空論), and wrote prefaces for the Vimalakirti Sutra and other sutras and treatises. Kumarajiva praised him, saying, 'The foremost person in Qin who understands emptiness is this person, Sengzhao.'", "If Master Zhao's name 'Zhao' (肇) can be said to be the beginning of metaphysics. He died at the age of thirty-one. However, the Śata-śāstra (百論, Bailun, One Hundred Treatises) has two prefaces, one written by Master Rui (慧睿, Huirui), and one written by Master Zhao. Each time Master Fa Lang (法朗), the abbot of Xinghuang Temple, lectured, he would often read Master Zhao's preface. This was precisely because his words were skillful, his ideas profound and subtle, in accordance with the treatise's purpose, and he personally experienced the events of the time, so he inherited his thought.", "Moreover, Master Rui's preface was translated before the fourth year of the Hongshi era (402 CE). When Kumarajiva first arrived, his language was not yet fluent, so the preface written at that time had not yet reached perfection. Master Zhao's preface was written when this text was re-translated six years later (404 CE). The words and meanings were already correct, and the preface was also very good. Therefore, Master Zhao's preface is always read. When I was fourteen years old, I studied it with an open mind, and when I reached twenty, I repeated it in the temple. The reason for this sequence is that the treatise is the teaching. To transform beings with the teaching, one must first praise the teaching. Although the teaching is praised, it is not known when it was created, so the second point explains the time. Although the time is explained, it is not known who created it, so the third point explains the person who created it. Although the person who created it is explained, it is not known for what reason the treatise was created, so the fourth point explains the cause and condition for creating the treatise. Although the cause and condition for which the treatise was created are explained, the name is still not known, so the fifth point explains the title of the treatise. Although the name is known, it is not known who commented on it, so the sixth point explains Vasubandhu (婆數, 世親), who commented on the treatise. Although the commentary is completed, it is not known what the purpose and interest are, so the seventh point explains the main principle of the treatise." ] }

此之七章並化行天竺益天竺之緣。從第八已去傳流震旦益於此土。故有第八什師遠赍梵本來此翻譯。雖有解法弟子必須有篤信檀越。故第九明檀越姚嵩。雖有此九條猶未知論偈多少。故有第十定品偈多小也。開此一序以為十章。一嘆論功能。二明造論時節。三嘆造論之人。四陳外道興世。即是造論意。五釋論題目。六述注論婆數。七敘論大宗。八明翻論羅什。九辨檀越姚嵩。十定品偈多少。章雖有十不出人法二義。開人為五。辨法亦然。故成十矣。人五者。一造論人。二所為人。三注論人。四翻論人。五請譯人。四為內弘。終一為外護。涅槃經云。有二因緣佛法久住。謂解法弟子及篤信檀越即其事也。法五者。一嘆論功能。二造論時節。三釋論名題。四敘論大宗。五定品偈多小。就初嘆論功能凡有四義。一境智。二智諦。三人法。四法喻。言境智者通聖心謂正觀也。開真諦謂正境也。非正境無以發正觀。非正觀無以鑒正境。故略題斯二則義無不含。問應前明正境后因境發觀。今何故前辨正觀后明正境。答因緣境智非前後一時。但大士出世為令眾生得於正觀。正觀要因正境故后明正境也。如法華十方三世諸佛為開示悟入諸佛智見。諸佛智見即正觀也。在佛既爾。菩薩亦然。問此論云何明正境及正觀耶。答如始舍罪福終破

于空。橫凈十條豎窮四句。即一實諦為正境也。如斯而悟稱為聖心。問為通眾生聖心。為通佛菩薩聖心耶。答具有三義。一令眾生得悟正觀。名通眾生聖心。二邪教既除正經便顯暢悅佛心。名通佛聖心。三眾生病息大士患除。故通菩薩聖心也。問云何能通所通能壅所壅。答以斷常為能壅。正觀為所壅。百論為能通。聖心為所通也。以邪教為能䨱。正教為所覆。百論為能開。正教為所開也。第二智諦一雙者。通聖心明二智。開真諦辨二諦。二諦是三世佛祖父母。二智為三世佛父母。如凈名云。智度菩薩母。方便以為父。一切眾導師無不由是生。若無智諦則世出世並壞。斯二若成則一切皆成。既為大事故論明之。問既是申二諦。何故偏言真諦。答二義。一者雖具明二諦意在於真。如涅槃云。欲令深識第一義故說世諦耳。二者對外道諸諦皆偽故。佛二諦俱真也。問智諦與境智何異而更明耶。答境智取其發照。智諦明其說行。說行者。如說而行名為二智。如行而說稱為二諦。稟二諦教發生二智則教轉名境。如境而照故稱為智。約義不同故分兩也。問與中論題何異。答開真諦要論即中道也。通聖心謂正觀。問若爾便是一。何名為兩。答一切論通明中道明正觀。故一切論皆是一論。一切經亦通明中道通明正觀。則一切經是一經。又

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本于空（指一切皆空）。橫凈十條豎窮四句（指空間和時間上的無限）。即一實諦（指唯一的真實）為正境（指正確的境界）。如此而悟稱為聖心（指覺悟的心）。問：是通達眾生的聖心，還是通達佛菩薩的聖心呢？答：具有三種意義。一、令眾生得以覺悟正觀（指正確的觀察），名為通眾生聖心。二、邪教既然消除，正經便顯現，暢悅佛心（指佛的心），名為通佛聖心。三、眾生的病患止息，大士（指菩薩）的憂患消除，所以通達菩薩聖心。問：如何能通達所通達的，能壅塞所壅塞的？答：以斷常（指斷見和常見）為能壅塞的，正觀為所壅塞的。《百論》（一部佛教論著）為能通達的，聖心為所通達的。以邪教為能覆蓋的，正教為所覆蓋的，《百論》為能開啟的，正教為所開啟的。第二，智諦一雙（指智慧和真諦的結合）：通達聖心，闡明二智（指兩種智慧）；開啟真諦，辨別二諦（指真諦和俗諦）。二諦是三世（指過去、現在、未來）佛祖的父母，二智為三世佛的父母。如《維摩詰經》所說：『智度菩薩母，方便以為父。一切眾導師，無不由是生。』若沒有智諦，則世間和出世間都會壞滅。這兩者如果成就，則一切都會成就。既然是大事，所以論述闡明它。問：既然是闡述二諦，為何偏重於真諦？答：有兩種意義。一者，雖然具足闡明二諦，但意在於真諦。如《涅槃經》所說：『欲令深識第一義故說世諦耳。』（爲了讓人深刻認識第一義諦才說世俗諦。）二者，對外道（指佛教以外的宗教）的諸諦都是虛偽的，所以佛的二諦都是真實的。問：智諦與境智（指境界和智慧）有何不同而要另外闡明呢？答：境智取其發照（指境界和智慧的顯現和照耀），智諦闡明其說行（指智慧和真諦的解說和實踐）。說行是指，如所說而行名為二智，如所行而說稱為二諦。稟受二諦的教導而發生二智，則教導轉變而名為境。如境界而照耀，所以稱為智。因為意義不同，所以分為兩方面。問：與《中論》的題目有何不同？答：開啟真諦的要論即是中道（指不落兩邊的中正之道）。通達聖心就是正觀。問：如果這樣便是一回事，為何稱為兩方面？答：一切論都通達闡明中道，闡明正觀。所以一切論都是一論。一切經也通達闡明中道，通達闡明正觀。則一切經是一經。又

【English Translation】 English version In emptiness (referring to the emptiness of all things). 'Horizontal purity ten strips, vertical exhaustion four phrases' (referring to the infinity of space and time). That is, the One Real Truth (referring to the sole reality) is the correct realm (referring to the correct state of being). Such enlightenment is called the Holy Mind (referring to the enlightened mind). Question: Is it to understand the Holy Mind of sentient beings, or to understand the Holy Mind of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas? Answer: It has three meanings. First, to enable sentient beings to awaken to Right View (referring to correct observation), is called understanding the Holy Mind of sentient beings. Second, since heretical teachings are eliminated, the correct scriptures are revealed, delighting the Buddha's Mind (referring to the mind of the Buddha), is called understanding the Holy Mind of the Buddha. Third, the illnesses of sentient beings cease, and the worries of the Great Beings (referring to Bodhisattvas) are eliminated, therefore it understands the Holy Mind of Bodhisattvas. Question: How can one penetrate what is to be penetrated, and obstruct what is to be obstructed? Answer: With annihilationism and eternalism (referring to the views of annihilation and permanence) as what can obstruct, Right View as what is obstructed. The Śataśāstra (a Buddhist treatise) as what can penetrate, the Holy Mind as what is to be penetrated. With heretical teachings as what can cover, the correct teachings as what is covered. The Śataśāstra as what can open, the correct teachings as what is to be opened. Second, the pair of Wisdom and Truth (referring to the combination of wisdom and truth): Understanding the Holy Mind clarifies the Two Wisdoms (referring to two kinds of wisdom); opening the True Truth distinguishes the Two Truths (referring to the conventional truth and the ultimate truth). The Two Truths are the parents of the Buddhas of the Three Times (referring to the past, present, and future), and the Two Wisdoms are the parents of the Buddhas of the Three Times. As the Vimalakīrti Sūtra says: 'Wisdom is the mother of Bodhisattvas, and skillful means is the father. All leaders of beings are born from this.' If there is no Wisdom and Truth, then both the mundane and supramundane will be destroyed. If these two are accomplished, then everything will be accomplished. Since it is a great matter, it is discussed and clarified. Question: Since it is expounding the Two Truths, why does it emphasize the Ultimate Truth? Answer: There are two meanings. First, although it fully explains the Two Truths, the intention is on the Ultimate Truth. As the Nirvana Sutra says: 'To enable a deep understanding of the First Principle, the Conventional Truth is spoken.' Second, the truths of other religions (referring to religions other than Buddhism) are all false, so the Buddha's Two Truths are both true. Question: How are Wisdom and Truth different from Realm and Wisdom (referring to the manifestation and illumination of realm and wisdom) that they need to be explained separately? Answer: Realm and Wisdom take their manifestation and illumination, while Wisdom and Truth clarify their explanation and practice. Explanation and practice mean that practicing as explained is called the Two Wisdoms, and explaining as practiced is called the Two Truths. Receiving the teachings of the Two Truths and generating the Two Wisdoms, then the teachings transform and are called Realm. As the realm illuminates, it is called Wisdom. Because the meanings are different, they are divided into two aspects. Question: How is it different from the title of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā? Answer: The essential treatise on opening the Ultimate Truth is the Middle Way (referring to the path of non-attachment to extremes). Understanding the Holy Mind is Right View. Question: If this is the case, then it is one thing, why is it called two aspects? Answer: All treatises thoroughly explain the Middle Way and clarify Right View. Therefore, all treatises are one treatise. All sutras also thoroughly explain the Middle Way and clarify Right View. Then all sutras are one sutra. Also

一切經猶是一切論。以經論皆為顯道。道既無二。豈有經論異哉。然本有於二可言有一。竟未曾二何有一耶。如是亦一亦二非一非二。故言亡慮寂矣。問一切經皆是一經。何故有多經多論耶。答蓋是諸佛為緣轉勢說法故有多經。四依轉勢說法故有多論。猶如一食將適病人回變食味也。次明人法一雙者通聖心明人。開真諦辨法。於時九十六道各稱世尊。故是人亂。各謂己道為實則法亂。提婆今欲正於人法故。唯佛為聖人。余非聖人。佛法為真法。余非真法也。問此依何文耶。答論首三番問答諍人。佛說何等善法相去竟論諍法。即其證也。四就法喻釋者。通聖心之津途者喻也。百論為聖心之玄津正觀之幽路。開真諦要論者法說也。佛泥曰后第二明造論時節。問提婆與龍樹相見不。答經傳不同。睿師成實論序是什師去世後作之。述什師語云。佛滅后三百五十年馬鳴出世。五百三十年龍樹出世。又云。馬鳴興正法之末。龍樹起像法之初。梁武帝發菩提心因緣中雲。敬禮興正法馬鳴菩薩。歸命興像法龍樹菩薩。肇睿並云。提婆出八百餘年。則理不相見。依三文分明相見。一提婆傳云。提婆出天眼竟將伏外道詣龍樹所受出家法。故應相見。二摩耶經明七百年龍樹出。今明八百年提婆出。亦得相見。三付法藏經分明相見。龍樹將去世

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：一切經書實際上就是一切論著。因為經書和論著都是爲了闡明真理。真理既然沒有分別，哪裡會有經書和論著的差異呢？然而，原本在二元對立中可以談論統一，但實際上從未存在過二元對立，又哪裡來的統一呢？像這樣，既可以認為是一，也可以認為是二，也可以認為既不是一也不是二。所以說，語言文字消失，思慮也就寂靜了。問：一切經書實際上就是一部經書，為什麼會有眾多的經書和論著呢？答：這大概是諸佛爲了適應不同的因緣和趨勢而說法，所以才有了眾多的經書。四依（比丘、比丘尼、優婆塞、優婆夷）爲了適應不同的趨勢而說法，所以才有了眾多的論著。就像一份食物，爲了適應病人的情況而改變味道一樣。其次闡明人法一雙，是通過聖人的心來闡明人，開啟真諦來辨別法。當時九十六種外道各自聲稱自己是世尊，所以是人的混亂。各自認為自己的道是真實的，這就是法的混亂。提婆現在想要匡正人法，所以說只有佛才是聖人，其餘都不是聖人。只有佛法才是真法，其餘都不是真法。問：這依據的是什麼經典呢？答：論著開頭三次問答，爭論的人，佛說什麼是善法，相互辯論爭執法，這就是證據。四、就法譬喻來解釋，貫通聖人心靈的途徑是譬喻。百論是聖人心靈的玄妙途徑，是正確觀察的幽深道路。開啟真諦的重要論述是法說。佛陀涅槃后，第二部分闡明造論的時間。問：提婆和龍樹見過面嗎？答：經典記載不同。《成實論序》是鳩摩羅什去世后所作。敘述鳩摩羅什的話說，佛滅后三百年五十年馬鳴出世，五百三十年龍樹出世。又說，馬鳴興盛正法之末，龍樹興起像法之初。《梁武帝發菩提心因緣》中說，敬禮興盛正法的馬鳴菩薩，歸命興起像法的龍樹菩薩。鳩摩羅什和僧肇都說，提婆出現在八百多年後，那麼理論上他們沒有見過面。依據這三段文字，他們分明見過面。一提婆傳記載，提婆獲得天眼后，將要降伏外道，前往龍樹那裡接受出家法。所以應該見過面。二、《摩耶經》說明七百年龍樹出世，現在說明八百年提婆出世，也可能見過面。三、《付法藏經》分明記載他們見過面。龍樹將要去世。

【English Translation】 English version: All Sutras are essentially all Treatises, because both Sutras and Treatises serve to reveal the Truth (道). Since the Truth is without duality, how can there be differences between Sutras and Treatises? However, originally, within duality, one can speak of unity, but since duality has never truly existed, where does unity come from? Thus, it can be considered both one and two, or neither one nor two. Therefore, when language ceases, thoughts become still. Question: If all Sutras are essentially one Sutra, why are there so many Sutras and Treatises? Answer: This is probably because the Buddhas expound the Dharma (說法) according to different conditions (緣) and trends (勢), hence the many Sutras. The Four Reliances (四依) [Bhikshus (比丘), Bhikshunis (比丘尼), Upasakas (優婆塞), Upasikas (優婆夷)] expound the Dharma according to different trends, hence the many Treatises. It's like adjusting the flavor of a meal to suit the condition of a patient. Next, clarifying the unity of person and Dharma (人法一雙) means clarifying the person through the mind of a sage, and distinguishing the Dharma by revealing the True Meaning (真諦). At that time, the ninety-six heretical paths (九十六道) each claimed to be the World Honored One (世尊), hence the confusion regarding persons. Each claimed their own path to be the truth, hence the confusion regarding the Dharma. Deva (提婆) now wants to rectify the person and the Dharma, so he says that only the Buddha is a sage, and the rest are not. Only the Buddha's Dharma is the true Dharma, and the rest are not. Question: What scripture is this based on? Answer: The three rounds of questions and answers at the beginning of the treatise, where people argue, the Buddha speaks of what is good Dharma, and they debate and argue about the Dharma, that is the evidence. Fourth, explaining through analogies of the Dharma, the path that connects to the mind of a sage is an analogy. The Śataśāstra (百論) is the profound path to the mind of a sage, the deep road to correct observation. The essential discourse on revealing the True Meaning is a Dharma teaching. After the Buddha's Nirvana (泥曰), the second part clarifies the time of writing the treatise. Question: Did Deva and Nāgārjuna (龍樹) meet? Answer: The scriptures differ. The preface to the Tattvasiddhi Śāstra (成實論序) by Master Rui (睿師) was written after the death of Master Kumārajīva (什師). It narrates Master Kumārajīva's words, saying that Mañjuśrī (馬鳴) appeared 350 years after the Buddha's Nirvana, and Nāgārjuna appeared 530 years after. It also says that Mañjuśrī flourished at the end of the Correct Dharma (正法), and Nāgārjuna arose at the beginning of the Semblance Dharma (像法). Emperor Wu of Liang (梁武帝) said in the Causes and Conditions for Arousing Bodhicitta (發菩提心因緣), 'I respectfully bow to Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī who flourished the Correct Dharma, and I take refuge in Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna who arose in the Semblance Dharma.' Both Kumārajīva and Sengzhao (肇睿) said that Deva appeared more than 800 years later, so theoretically they did not meet. According to these three texts, they clearly met. One, the biography of Deva says that after Deva obtained the divine eye (天眼), he was about to subdue the heretics and went to Nāgārjuna to receive the Dharma of ordination (出家法). So they should have met. Two, the Māyā Sutra (摩耶經) states that Nāgārjuna appeared 700 years later, and now it states that Deva appeared 800 years later, so they may have met. Three, the Fu Fa Zang Jing (付法藏經) clearly records that they met. Nāgārjuna was about to pass away.

告大弟子加那提婆。善男子聽。婆伽婆以無上正法付屬迦葉。乃至次第付囑於我。我今去世以付屬汝。汝當興慈悲云注甘露法。提婆長跪答曰。敬如尊教。故知相見也。問諸菩薩何故出世。答大明二義。一破小執。二破邪迷。如智度論云。三百餘年有迦旃延出世造八健度。馬鳴於此而出世。即知迦旃延執小為病。馬鳴破小病故出世弘大。亦可旃延逗於時小緣而明小。令凡學小即回凡取聖。次馬鳴出世破小。令回小悟大教。故二人俱弘道利物也。六百年初五百羅漢于北天竺罽賓國釋八健度造毗婆沙。龍樹於此時而出。具前二義。爾時五百部盛興執小違拒大乘。故智度論云。五百部各執諸法有決定相。聞畢竟空如刀傷心。龍樹欲破此小迷申乎大教。二者諸部弘小令凡入小。龍樹破小令回小悟大也。次八百年時有法勝等弘小。提婆申大。亦具二義。但提婆出世正為外道盛興故出世破斥。而兼除小迷及大乘有所得見也。文稱泥曰者肇公云。泥曰泥洹涅槃並外國音不同。而以涅槃為正。又相傳云。涅槃通余無餘。泥曰正是無餘之稱也。有出家大士第三嘆造論人。文有四。初出家簡在家。二大士異小乘。三標名。四贊德。出家者。四依出世實大小兼弘道俗俱化。必須出家。出家有四。一出形家不出心家凡夫出家人也。二出心家不出

形家在家聖人也。三俱出家出家聖人。四俱不出在家凡夫也。今是第三也。大士者。前雖出家恐濫小道。故明大士。又前明出家形同小乘。今辨大士謂心是菩薩。問何故不明心形俱是菩薩。答釋迦法中無別出家菩薩僧。皆入聲聞眾攝故。文殊彌勒住在祇洹依聲聞高下次第也。又形是聲聞得弘小教引小義。便心為菩薩宣揚大乘。厥名提婆者第三齣名簡異餘人。厥者其也。提婆者天也。故金光明雲。摩訶提婆名為大天。大品云。恒河提婆品亦云河天品。恒河者河也。提婆天也。蓋是其本名。末稱加那提婆。伽那者小一目。以一目施天神故以為名。復傳云。提婆曾乞食。有女人應發道心。于提婆眼生愛。提婆出眼示之但是不凈。因以發心故小一目也。玄心獨悟下第四贊德。有三嘆。一嘆天然德。二嘆稟教德。三嘆護法德。此三次第由有天然德故解教。由解教故護法也。玄心者玄妙之心即正觀也。獨悟二義。一八百年時群生皆迷。而提婆獨悟。二龍樹多有門人。而提婆最為標領。故睿師云。提婆是龍樹上足弟子。德與知機諍行。才將玄師並照。道映當時者。照蓋於當時亦現當時也。神超世表者。世以有所得為懷。提婆以無所得為悟。莊子雖超世表終日域中。與今何異。釋云。彼意聖人雖居無為不捨域中。如佛雖超四流之外恒在

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本形家（風水先生）在家是聖人。身、口、意三者都出家才是出家的聖人。三者都不出家就是在家的凡夫。現在這位是第三種情況。『大士』，是因為前面雖然說了出家，但恐怕混同于小乘道，所以特別說明是『大士』。又因為前面說明了出家的外形類似小乘，現在辨明這位大士的心是菩薩心。問：為什麼不明說身和心都是菩薩呢？答：因為釋迦牟尼佛的教法中沒有另外出家的菩薩僧，都歸入聲聞眾中。所以文殊菩薩、彌勒菩薩住在祇洹精舍，也按照聲聞的資歷高低排列。而且外形是聲聞，可以弘揚小乘教義，引導小乘根機的人；內心是菩薩，可以宣揚大乘佛法。他的名字叫提婆，這是第三個方面，用來說明他和其餘的人不同。『厥』，就是『其』的意思。『提婆』，是『天』的意思。所以《金光明經》說：『摩訶提婆』，名為『大天』。《大品般若經》說：『恒河提婆品』，也叫『河天品』。『恒河』是河，『提婆』是天。這大概是他的本名。後來稱他為加那提婆，『伽那』是『小一目』的意思，因為他把一隻眼睛施捨給了天神，所以用這個名字。另一種傳說是：提婆曾經乞食，有一個女人因此生起了道心，但卻對提婆的眼睛產生了愛慕之情。提婆就把自己的眼睛挖出來給她看，讓她明白這只是不凈之物。因此，這個女人才真正發起了道心，所以叫『小一目』。『玄心獨悟』以下是第四個方面，讚歎他的德行。有三個方面的讚歎：一是讚歎他天然的德行，二是讚歎他稟承教法的德行，三是讚歎他護持佛法的德行。這三個方面是依次遞進的，因為有天然的德行，所以才能理解教法；因為理解教法，所以才能護持佛法。『玄心』，就是玄妙的心，也就是正觀。『獨悟』有兩個含義：一是八百年間，眾生都迷惑不解，只有提婆獨自領悟；二是龍樹菩薩有很多門人，而提婆是最傑出的。所以睿法師說：提婆是龍樹菩薩最優秀的弟子，他的德行和智慧足以和知機菩薩爭辯，他的才能可以和玄師相媲美。『道映當時』，就是他的道行照耀當時，也影響著當時。『神超世表』，世俗之人以有所得為懷，而提婆以無所得為悟。莊子雖然也超脫世俗，但終究還是在世俗之中，這和現在有什麼區別呢？解釋說：莊子的意思是，聖人雖然處於無為的境界，但並不捨棄世俗。就像佛陀雖然超越了四流之外，但始終都在其中。

【English Translation】 English version The 'form expert' (feng shui master) at home is a sage. Only when body, speech, and mind all renounce the world is one a renunciate sage. If all three do not renounce, one is an ordinary person at home. This one is the third case. 'Great being' (Mahasattva) is mentioned because the previous statement about renunciation might be confused with the lesser paths, so it's clarified that this is a 'Great Being'. Also, because the previous description of renunciation resembles the Hinayana, it's now distinguished that this Great Being's mind is a Bodhisattva mind. Question: Why not explicitly state that both body and mind are Bodhisattva? Answer: Because in Shakyamuni Buddha's teachings, there are no separate renunciate Bodhisattva Sangha; they are all included within the Sravaka assembly. Therefore, Manjushri Bodhisattva and Maitreya Bodhisattva reside in Jetavana Monastery, also arranged according to the seniority of Sravakas. Furthermore, the form is that of a Sravaka, which can propagate the lesser teachings and guide those with Hinayana inclinations; the mind is that of a Bodhisattva, which can proclaim the Mahayana Dharma. His name is Deva, this is the third aspect, used to explain that he is different from others. 'Jue' means 'his'. 'Deva' means 'heaven'. Therefore, the Suvarnaprabhasa Sutra says: 'Mahadeva' is called 'Great Heaven'. The Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra says: 'Ganga Deva Chapter' is also called 'River Heaven Chapter'. 'Ganga' is river, 'Deva' is heaven. This is probably his original name. Later he was called Kanadeva, 'Kana' means 'small one eye', because he gave one of his eyes to a heavenly deity, hence the name. Another legend says: Deva once begged for food, and a woman developed the aspiration for enlightenment, but also developed affection for Deva's eyes. Deva took out his eye and showed it to her, letting her understand that it was merely an impure object. Therefore, this woman truly developed the aspiration for enlightenment, hence the name 'small one eye'. 'Profound mind, solitary enlightenment' below is the fourth aspect, praising his virtues. There are three aspects of praise: first, praising his natural virtues; second, praising his virtues of receiving teachings; third, praising his virtues of protecting the Dharma. These three aspects are progressive, because he has natural virtues, he can understand the teachings; because he understands the teachings, he can protect the Dharma. 'Profound mind' is the profound and subtle mind, which is right contemplation. 'Solitary enlightenment' has two meanings: first, during the eight hundred years, all beings were confused and did not understand, only Deva alone realized; second, Nagarjuna Bodhisattva had many disciples, but Deva was the most outstanding. Therefore, Dharma Master Rui said: Deva is Nagarjuna Bodhisattva's most excellent disciple, his virtue and wisdom are sufficient to argue with Jñanakeya Bodhisattva, his talent can be compared to a profound teacher. 'The Way illuminates the time', that is, his conduct illuminates the time and also influences the time. 'Spirit transcends the world', worldly people cherish what they can gain, while Deva takes non-attainment as enlightenment. Although Zhuangzi also transcends the world, he is ultimately still within the world, what is the difference from now? The explanation says: Zhuangzi's meaning is that although a sage is in a state of non-action, he does not abandon the world. Just like the Buddha, although he transcends the four streams, he is always within them.

三界之內今正嘆獨出物外。與彼為異。故能辟三藏下第二嘆解教德。初嘆解小乘三藏。次美通方等十二。而三藏亦有十二。但明九部故直云三藏也。三藏教關節難了。提婆並照達之故云辟。辟者開通之義也。又佛說三藏。為明不三而方便說三。說三明不三。明權以開實。不三而明三。從實以起權。提婆並開達此二義。故云重關。小乘人聞三作三解。不知三不三。亦不知不三三。故失三藏意也。又於時有二種關於三藏。一外道邪言。二小乘性執。今破此二執申明三藏。故開二關也。又小乘人二關三藏。一得語失意。二語義俱失。今除此二執故開兩關也。又三藏幽隱難明即是三關故云重也。十二幽路者。於時外道邪言小乘異執及有所得大迷三種隱覆方等。今並坦蕩之也。又十二文言皆是入理所由。故路也。而十二文言幽隱難了。今悉悟之故云坦也。有人言。辟三藏破聲聞坦十二除緣覺。為弘一乘故也。今不同此釋。如嚮明之。檀步迦夷下第三嘆護法德也。內由明達大小故外能弘護。檀者獨也。謂獨步迦夷羅。迦夷羅者云赤澤國也。所以作此嘆者。佛處中天竺降天魔伏外道。提婆爾。作如佛而嘆也。為法城塹者二義。一佛大小乘法如城。提婆出世降邪護正。與城為深塹也。二者大小乘教法也。提婆為法作于高城深塹。又二義

。一令天魔外道不能𨶳逾。二令大法弘顯如城塹。又二義。一防外難。二安王民。於時外道紛然下第四明邪興。即提婆所為緣。有邪故有正。邪去正不留。生死涅槃真妄等皆例也。就文為二。初明邪興。二破邪造論。問邪障于正。云何能感提婆。答此等外道凡有三時。一過去本習大乘正道。二中途忘正學邪。今第三舍邪從正時。以此邪將傾正觀將發故感提婆出世。以大乘法破彼邪見。令回邪悟入大道。若非此邪不感正。惡感佛亦爾。具此三義也。邪辯逼真者二義。一逼斥真道。二逼似之逼。故下文云。殆亂正法。如精石亂于白玉好鍮似於黃金。故外道立三寶。內教亦然。外道立二十五諦六七諦十六諦。內法亦然也。乃仰慨下第二提婆出世破邪顯正。前敘內壞。次以外吐言造論。慕上曰仰。臨下為府。言縱惑者。外道內無正觀以制邪心。外闕善師以遮其惡。故縱起此邪惑之心也。遠極沉淪者第二吐言作論。論主運懷曠遠。極救外道沉沒苦海迴流惡趣也。所以防正閑邪者。防正者護正法也。閑邪者閑或訓解。今用訓靜。令外道紛然悉靜息也。是以正化以之隆。隆興也。邪道以之而替。替廢也。非夫領括眾妙者。結嘆論主也。老子云。玄之又玄眾妙之門。今藉此語嘆論主體悟重玄妙道。故能顯正摧邪也。論有百偈第五釋論名

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本一、爲了使天魔外道不能侵犯超越。二、爲了使大法弘揚顯現，如同堅固的城墻。又有兩種意義：一是爲了防禦外來的災難，二是爲了安定國王和人民。當時，外道紛紛興起，以下是第四部分，說明邪說的興起，即提婆（Deva，天）所為的因緣。因為有邪說，所以有正法。邪說去除后，正法也不停留。生死、涅槃、真、妄等都是如此。就文義而言，分為兩部分：首先說明邪說的興起，其次是破斥邪說，造立正論。問：邪說障礙正法，為什麼能感得提婆（Deva）出現？答：這些外道大致有三種時期：一是過去本來學習大乘正道，二是中途忘記正道而學習邪說，現在是第三個時期，捨棄邪說而歸從正道的時候。因此，當邪說將要傾覆，正觀將要發起的時候，所以感得提婆（Deva）出世，用大乘佛法破斥他們的邪見，使他們迴轉邪念，悟入大道。如果不是因為這些邪說，就不能感得正法。惡能感佛也是同樣的道理，具備這三種意義。邪辯逼真有兩種意義：一是逼迫排斥真道，二是逼近相似於真道。所以下文說：『幾乎擾亂正法，如同不純的石頭混淆白玉，劣質的黃銅冒充黃金。』所以外道也設立三寶，內教也是如此。外道設立二十五諦、六七諦、十六諦，內法也是如此。『乃仰慨下』是第二部分，提婆（Deva）出世破斥邪說，顯揚正法。前面敘述內部的破壞，接著以外道的言論來闡述造論的緣由。『慕上』稱為『仰』，『臨下』稱為『府』。說到『言縱惑者』，外道內心沒有正觀來制止邪心，外在缺乏善知識來遮止他們的惡行，所以放縱生起這種邪惑之心。『遠極沉淪者』是第二部分，闡述言論和著作。論主懷抱曠遠的志向，極力拯救外道沉沒于苦海，迴轉到惡趣之中。『所以防正閑邪者』，『防正』是守護正法，『閑邪』，『閑』或訓為『解』，現在用『訓靜』，使外道紛紛擾擾的言論全部靜止下來。『是以正化以之隆』，『隆』是興盛的意思，邪道因此而衰敗，『替』是廢棄的意思。『非夫領括眾妙者』，這是總結讚歎論主。老子說：『玄之又玄，眾妙之門』，現在借用這句話來讚歎論主體悟重玄妙道，所以能夠顯揚正法，摧伏邪說。『論有百偈』是第五部分，解釋論的名稱。

【English Translation】 English version 1. To prevent heavenly demons and external paths from transgressing. 2. To make the Great Dharma flourish and manifest like a strong fortress. There are also two meanings: 1. To defend against external difficulties. 2. To pacify the king and the people. At that time, external paths arose in great numbers. The following is the fourth part, explaining the rise of heterodoxy, which is due to Deva's (Deva, meaning 'god' or 'heavenly being') actions. Because there is heterodoxy, there is orthodox Dharma. When heterodoxy is removed, the orthodox Dharma does not remain either. Samsara, Nirvana, truth, falsehood, and so on, are all examples of this. In terms of the text, it is divided into two parts: first, explaining the rise of heterodoxy; second, refuting heterodoxy and establishing correct treatises. Question: Heterodoxy obstructs the orthodox Dharma, so how can it induce Deva to appear? Answer: These externalists generally have three periods: first, in the past, they originally studied the orthodox path of Mahayana; second, midway, they forgot the orthodox and learned heterodoxy; now is the third period, when they abandon heterodoxy and follow the orthodox. Therefore, when heterodoxy is about to collapse and correct views are about to arise, Deva is induced to appear, using the Mahayana Dharma to refute their heterodox views, causing them to turn away from heterodoxy and awaken to the Great Path. If it were not for this heterodoxy, the orthodox Dharma could not be induced. Evil inducing the Buddha is also the same principle, possessing these three meanings. Heterodox arguments closely resemble the truth in two ways: 1. They force and reject the true path. 2. They closely resemble it. Therefore, the following text says: 'Almost disturbing the orthodox Dharma, like impure stones confusing white jade, and inferior brass imitating gold.' Therefore, externalists also establish the Three Jewels, and so does the inner teaching. Externalists establish twenty-five Tattvas, six or seven Tattvas, and sixteen Tattvas, and so does the inner Dharma. 'Nai yang kai xia' is the second part, Deva appearing to refute heterodoxy and manifest the orthodox Dharma. The previous section describes the internal destruction, followed by the externalists' words to explain the reasons for creating treatises. 'Mu shang' is called 'yang,' and 'lin xia' is called 'fu.' Speaking of 'yan zong huo zhe,' externalists have no correct views within to restrain their heterodox minds, and they lack good teachers externally to prevent their evil deeds, so they indulge in these heterodox and deluded minds. 'Yuan ji chen lun zhe' is the second part, elaborating on speeches and writings. The author of the treatise holds vast aspirations, striving to save externalists from sinking into the sea of suffering and returning to evil realms. 'Suo yi fang zheng xian xie zhe,' 'fang zheng' is to protect the orthodox Dharma, 'xian xie,' 'xian' can be interpreted as 'jie' (to explain), but now it is used as 'xun jing' (to quiet), causing all the externalists' tumultuous words to cease. 'Shi yi zheng hua yi zhi long,' 'long' means flourishing, and heterodox paths therefore decline, 'ti' means to abandon. 'Fei fu ling kuo zhong miao zhe,' this is a concluding praise of the author of the treatise. Lao Tzu said: 'Profound and again profound, the gate of all mysteries,' now borrowing this phrase to praise the author of the treatise for understanding the profound and subtle path, so he can manifest the orthodox Dharma and subdue heterodoxy. 'Lun you bai ji' is the fifth part, explaining the name of the treatise.

也。為三。初釋名。次嘆理。三嘆文。偈有二。一通偈即首盧偈。有三十二字。釋道安云。胡人數經法也。莫問長行偈但令三十二字滿。便是一偈。龍樹傳亦爾。故云。龍樹乳哺之中誦四違陀。四違陀十萬偈。偈有三十二字。智度論云。摩訶波若十萬偈。三百二十萬言。故知定三十二字為一偈也。今從百偈得名者。正言由此百偈無邪不摧無正不顯。故以偈數為目也。理致下第二嘆理。淵玄深也。統群籍之要。要者大也。可謂窮深極大也。攝一切理盡也。文旨下第三嘆文。此論或一字論義。二字三字乃至十字或默然論義。或動眼論義。或閉眼論義。或舉手論義。或鳥眼疾轉。或師子反擲。巧難萬端妙通千勢。非可逆陳。至文當現。故言窮製作之美也。然至趣幽簡下第六述注論人也。前發起稱歎。次正明注人。至趣者謂理也。幽深也。簡略也。其理窮深其文極略。故鮮得其門戶。鮮即小也。古疏傳云。注百論眾人非一。合集論之有十餘家也。有二人注最行於世。一波數。二僧佉斯那次天親也。有婆藪下第二正出注人。外國亦名和順。付法藏經云。婆數槃陀善解一切修多羅義。婆數雲天親。天親者本是天帝弟。遣其生閻浮提伏修羅也。其是割那舍阇人。云丈夫國也。開士者。天親本小乘學造五百部小乘論。方等遂沒翳而不傳

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本也。分為三部分。首先是解釋名稱，其次是讚歎其理，最後是讚歎其文。偈頌有兩種，一種是通偈，也就是首盧偈（śloka，梵語，指詩頌），有三十二個字。釋道安說，這是胡人計算經文的方法。不論長行文還是偈頌，只要滿足三十二個字，就算是一偈。龍樹（Nāgārjuna）的傳記也是這樣記載的。所以說，龍樹在哺乳期間就能背誦四《違陀》（Veda，印度古代經典），四《違陀》有十萬偈，每偈三十二字。《智度論》（Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa）中說，《摩訶般若》（Mahāprajñā）有十萬偈，三百二十萬字。由此可知，確定三十二字為一偈。現在用『百偈』來命名，正是因為這百偈能摧毀一切邪說，顯揚一切正理，所以用偈的數量作為名稱。『理致下』第二部分是讚歎其理，淵玄深奧，統攝群籍的要義。『要』就是大的意思，可以說是窮盡深奧到了極點，囊括了一切道理。『文旨下』第三部分是讚歎其文，此論或者用一個字來論義，或者用兩個字、三個字乃至十個字，或者默然不語來論義，或者轉動眼睛來論義，或者閉上眼睛來論義，或者舉起手來論義，或者像鳥眼一樣快速轉動，或者像獅子一樣反身擲物。巧妙難測，變化萬端，精妙通達，千姿百態，難以逆向陳述，只有到了文辭之處才能顯現，所以說窮盡了製作之美。然而，『然至趣幽簡下』第六部分是敘述註釋論的人。前面是發起稱歎，接下來是正式說明註釋的人。『至趣』指的是理，幽深而簡略。其理窮深，其文極簡，所以很少有人能得到它的門徑。『鮮』就是少的意思。古疏中記載，註釋《百論》的人不止一個，合集論的有十幾家。其中有兩人的註釋最為流行於世，一是波數（Vasubandhu），二是僧佉斯那（Saṃghasena），其次是天親（Vasubandhu）。『有婆藪下』第二部分是正式指出註釋的人。外國也叫『和順』。《付法藏經》中說，婆數槃陀（Vasubandhu）善於理解一切修多羅（sūtra，經）的含義。婆數（Vasubandhu）就是天親（Vasubandhu）。天親（Vasubandhu）本是天帝的弟弟，被派遣到閻浮提（Jambudvīpa，指我們所居住的這個世界）來降伏修羅（asura，惡神）。他是割那舍阇（Gandarsha）人，也就是丈夫國。『開士』指的是天親（Vasubandhu）本來學習小乘，造了五百部小乘論，後來方等（Vaipulya，大乘經典）衰落而不傳。

【English Translation】 English version Also. Divided into three parts. First, explaining the name; second, praising the principle; and third, praising the text. There are two types of verses: one is the general verse, which is the śloka (Sanskrit, meaning a poetic verse), consisting of thirty-two characters. Śramaṇa Dao'an said that this is the method used by the 'Hu' people (ancient term for people from Central Asia) to count scriptures. Whether it is prose or verse, as long as it has thirty-two characters, it is considered a verse. The biography of Nāgārjuna also records this. Therefore, it is said that Nāgārjuna could recite the four Vedas (ancient Indian scriptures), which contain one hundred thousand verses, each with thirty-two characters, while being breastfed. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa states that the Mahāprajñā contains one hundred thousand verses, totaling three million two hundred thousand words. From this, it can be known that thirty-two characters are defined as one verse. The reason for naming it 'Hundred Verses' is precisely because these hundred verses can destroy all heresies and reveal all correct principles, so the number of verses is used as the title. The second part, 'The principle below,' praises the principle, which is profound and abstruse, encompassing the essence of all scriptures. 'Essence' means great, and it can be said to exhaust the profound to the extreme, encompassing all principles. The third part, 'The meaning of the text below,' praises the text. This treatise either discusses the meaning with one character, or with two, three, or even ten characters, or discusses the meaning in silence, or discusses the meaning by moving the eyes, or discusses the meaning by closing the eyes, or discusses the meaning by raising the hand, or rotates quickly like a bird's eye, or throws back like a lion. Its ingenuity is unpredictable, with myriad changes, and its subtlety is thorough, with thousands of forms. It is difficult to describe in reverse; it can only be revealed when one reaches the text. Therefore, it is said to exhaust the beauty of creation. However, the sixth part, 'However, to the subtle and simple interest below,' describes the people who annotated the treatise. The preceding part initiates praise, and the following part formally explains the annotators. 'Subtle interest' refers to the principle, which is profound and simple. Its principle is exhaustively profound, and its text is extremely simple, so few people can find its entrance. 'Few' means small. Ancient commentaries record that there is more than one person who annotated the Śata-śāstra (Treatise of One Hundred Verses), with more than ten families compiling the treatise. Among them, the annotations of two people are the most popular in the world: one is Vasubandhu, and the other is Saṃghasena, followed by Vasubandhu. The second part, 'There is Vasu below,' formally points out the annotators. In foreign countries, it is also called 'Harmony.' The Fu Fa Zang Jing (Record of the Transmission of the Dharma Treasury) states that Vasubandhu is good at understanding the meaning of all sūtras. Vasu is Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu was originally the younger brother of the heavenly emperor, who was sent to Jambudvīpa (the world we live in) to subdue the asuras (evil spirits). He was from Gandarsha, which is the country of husbands. 'Enlightened one' refers to Vasubandhu, who originally studied Hīnayāna (Small Vehicle) and created five hundred Hīnayāna treatises. Later, the Vaipulya (Mahāyāna scriptures) declined and were not transmitted.

。兄阿僧伽是大乘人。見弟盛弘小乘。恐覆障大道欲引誘化之。故為之現病。弟聞兄有病來參慰之。弟問兄曰。何故病哉。答云。為汝故病。弟問曰。何故爾耶。答汝弘小乘障覆大道。罪過深重故為汝病也。弟曰。若爾此是舌過。當斷其舌。兄曰。不須。汝可更造大乘論令大道宣流。於是造大乘五百部論。時人呼為千部論主。開士之稱從后時得名也。彰于徽翰者。古人以雞毛為筆故稱翰也。其為論也言而無當破而不執下第七敘論大宗。問何故至此方敘大宗。答天親未注。論宗未顯。訓釋既竟論宗始彰。故就此而釋也。就文為二。初明論宗。次辨利益。初中二句。可就二義釋之。一者初句明論主申教意異餘論之申。次句明論主破病異餘論之破。二者初明學此論者能無難而不通。次明學此論者能無通而不難。斯之兩對雖是一章之方言。實為天下之要用也。言而無當者。明此論之中異餘論申教也。論主言教也。無當者是無住。無著之異名。無依無得之別秤也。問云何是言而無當異餘論耶。答今略舉眾家義釋之。一者外道略論四宗。廣九十六術。皆是言有所當。為論主所屈不能通論主之難。略四宗者。僧佉當一。世師當異。勒沙婆當亦一亦異。若提子當非一非異。以定住一解也。就一中便難破之。彼不能答。餘三例爾。四宗既

{ "translations": [ '阿僧伽（Asanga，一位大乘佛教徒）見他的弟弟婆藪盤豆（Vasubandhu，一位小乘佛教徒）弘揚小乘佛法，擔心這會遮蔽大道，所以想引導和勸化他，因此示現生病。婆藪盤豆聽說哥哥生病了，前去探望。他問哥哥：『你為什麼生病呢？』阿僧伽回答說：『爲了你而生病。』婆藪盤豆問：『為什麼這樣說呢？』阿僧伽回答說：『你弘揚小乘佛法，障礙遮蔽大道，罪過深重，所以我為你而生病。』婆藪盤豆說：『如果這樣，這是舌頭的過錯，應當割斷我的舌頭。』阿僧伽說：『不必這樣。你可以再造大乘論典，使大道宣揚流佈。』於是婆藪盤豆造了大乘論五百部。當時的人稱他為『千部論主』。『開士』（菩薩）的稱呼是從後世才得名的。『彰于徽翰』，古人以雞毛為筆，所以稱筆為『翰』。他所作的論典，『言而無當』，『破而不執』。下面第七部分敘述論典的大宗。問：為什麼到這裡才敘述大宗呢？答：天親（Vasubandhu）沒有註釋，論典的宗旨沒有顯現。訓釋完畢后，論典的宗旨才彰顯，所以就在這裡解釋。就文義來說分為兩部分。首先闡明論典的宗旨，其次辨明利益。首先的部分有兩句，可以就兩種意義來解釋。一是第一句說明論主闡述教義的方式不同於其他論典的闡述，第二句說明論主破除謬誤的方式不同於其他論典的破除。二是首先說明學習這部論典的人能夠沒有困難而不通達，其次說明學習這部論典的人能夠沒有通達而不困難。這兩種對仗雖然只是一章的方言，實際上是天下的重要用法。『言而無當』，說明這部論典不同於其他論典闡述教義的方式。論主所說的教義，『無當』是『無住』、『無著』的異名，是『無依』、『無得』的別稱。問：什麼是『言而無當』，不同於其他論典呢？答：現在簡略地舉出各家的義理解釋。一是外道簡略地論述四宗，廣泛地論述九十六術，都是『言有所當』，被論主駁倒而不能通達論主的詰難。簡略的四宗是：僧佉（Samkhya）宗主張『當一』，世主（Vaisheshika）宗主張『當異』，勒沙婆（Rishabha）宗主張『亦一亦異』，若提子（Ajivika）宗主張『非一非異』，以定住一種解釋。就『一』中便可以駁倒它，他們不能回答。其餘三種也是如此。四宗既然', '現代漢語譯本' ], "english_translations": [ 'Asanga (a Mahayana Buddhist) saw his younger brother Vasubandhu (a Hinayana Buddhist) promoting Hinayana Buddhism, and worried that this would obscure the Great Path, so he wanted to guide and persuade him. Therefore, he manifested illness. Vasubandhu heard that his brother was ill and went to visit him. He asked his brother: \'Why are you ill?\' Asanga replied: \'I am ill for your sake.\' Vasubandhu asked: \'Why do you say that?\' Asanga replied: \'You are promoting Hinayana Buddhism, obstructing and obscuring the Great Path, and your sins are profound, so I am ill for your sake.\' Vasubandhu said: \'If that is the case, it is the fault of my tongue, and I should cut off my tongue.\' Asanga said: \'There is no need for that. You can create Mahayana treatises to spread and propagate the Great Path.\' Thereupon, Vasubandhu created five hundred Mahayana treatises. People at that time called him the \'Lord of a Thousand Treatises\'. The title \'Bodhisattva\' was given later. \'Manifested in the emblem\' refers to the fact that in ancient times, people used chicken feathers as pens, so pens were called \'emblems\'. The treatises he wrote were \'words without attachment\' and \'refuting without clinging\'. The seventh part below narrates the main tenets of the treatise. Question: Why is the main tenet narrated here? Answer: Because Vasubandhu had not annotated it, the purpose of the treatise had not been revealed. After the exegesis was completed, the purpose of the treatise became clear, so it is explained here. In terms of the meaning of the text, it is divided into two parts. First, it clarifies the purpose of the treatise, and second, it distinguishes the benefits. The first part has two sentences, which can be interpreted in two ways. One is that the first sentence explains that the way the author expounds the teachings is different from the way other treatises expound them, and the second sentence explains that the way the author refutes fallacies is different from the way other treatises refute them. Second, the first explains that those who study this treatise can understand it without difficulty, and the second explains that those who study this treatise can understand it without being confused. These two antitheses, although only a local expression of a chapter, are actually important usages in the world. \'Words without attachment\' explains that this treatise is different from other treatises in the way it expounds the teachings. The teachings spoken by the author, \'without attachment\' is another name for \'non-abiding\' and \'non-attachment\', and is a different name for \'non-reliance\' and \'non-attainment\'. Question: What is \'words without attachment\' that is different from other treatises? Answer: Now, let me briefly cite the interpretations of various schools. One is that the heretics briefly discuss the four schools and extensively discuss the ninety-six arts, all of which are \'words with attachment\', and are refuted by the author and cannot understand the author\'s questions. The four brief schools are: Samkhya claims \'to be one\', Vaisheshika claims \'to be different\', Rishabha claims \'to be both one and different\', and Ajivika claims \'to be neither one nor different\', with a fixed interpretation. It can be refuted in \'one\', and they cannot answer. The other three are the same. Since the four schools are', 'English version' ] }

爾。九十六術亦然也。二就小乘略明數論。廣五百部。數論者。毗曇定見有得道。成實睹空成聖。並定住空有不能通他難也。問云何定住空有。答毗曇決不信人法並空。成實定無見有得道。即定住也。廣五百部者。智度論云。佛滅度後有五百部。各執諸法有決定相。不知佛意為解脫故。聞大乘法說畢竟空如刀傷心。即是言有所當。三就南方大乘義略明佛果內外。廣例一切相違。略明佛果內外者。開善師佛果定為二諦攝定不得出外。莊嚴定二諦外不得在內。即言有所當也。廣一切相違者。莊嚴假有體。開善假無體。開善無礙定伏。莊嚴定斷。一切相違義。皆是言有當也。四北土略論當現二常。廣論滅不滅等。略論二常者。一云定現常。一云定當常。廣論滅不滅者。一云聞薰習滅。一云定不滅。等如此皆言有當也。問佛果內外當現兩常言有當有何過耶。答略明二過。一進不冥乎實相。二退失無方之用。傷此體用二義也。問此事云何。答實相何曾當現亦當亦現非當非現四句耶。內外等亦爾。退失無方者。諸大乘論皆明一切諸法無決定相。佛有無量方便或說一切實一切不實亦實亦不實非實非不實。適緣利物。豈可秉執規矩以局大方耶。次言破而不執明論主破異余破者。還例前內外大小。余有所得內外大小破他義自立義。如僧佉

【現代漢語翻譯】爾。九十六術亦然也。（九十六術：指九十六種外道法術）二就小乘略明數論。廣五百部。數論者。毗曇定見有得道。成實睹空成聖。並定住空有不能通他難也。問：云何定住空有？答：毗曇決不信人法並空。成實定無見有得道。即定住也。廣五百部者。智度論云。佛滅度後有五百部。各執諸法有決定相。不知佛意為解脫故。聞大乘法說畢竟空如刀傷心。即是言有所當。三就南方大乘義略明佛果內外。廣例一切相違。略明佛果內外者。開善師佛果定為二諦攝定不得出外。莊嚴定二諦外不得在內。即言有所當也。廣一切相違者。莊嚴假有體。開善假無體。開善無礙定伏。莊嚴定斷。一切相違義。皆是言有當也。四北土略論當現二常。廣論滅不滅等。略論二常者。一云定現常。一云定當常。廣論滅不滅者。一云聞薰習滅。一云定不滅。等如此皆言有當也。問：佛果內外當現兩常言有當有何過耶？答：略明二過。一進不冥乎實相。二退失無方之用。傷此體用二義也。問：此事云何？答：實相何曾當現亦當亦現非當非現四句耶。內外等亦爾。退失無方者。諸大乘論皆明一切諸法無決定相。佛有無量方便或說一切實一切不實亦實亦不實非實非不實。適緣利物。豈可秉執規矩以局大方耶。次言破而不執明論主破異余破者。還例前內外大小。余有所得內外大小破他義自立義。如僧佉（僧佉：古印度數論派哲學）。

【English Translation】 Thus it is with the ninety-six arts. (ninety-six arts: referring to ninety-six types of heretical practices) Secondly, concerning the Hinayana, briefly explaining Samkhya, extensively discussing five hundred schools. Those who adhere to Samkhya, the Sarvastivadins, firmly believe in the existence of phenomena and attain enlightenment. The Satyasiddhi school perceives emptiness and achieves sainthood. Both are fixated on emptiness or existence, unable to communicate with or refute each other. Question: How do they become fixated on emptiness or existence? Answer: The Sarvastivadins absolutely do not believe that both persons and dharmas are empty. The Satyasiddhi school firmly believes that one cannot attain enlightenment by seeing existence. This is fixation. The 'five hundred schools' mentioned in the Mahaprajnaparamita Sastra, after the Buddha's Nirvana, each clung to the definite characteristics of all dharmas, not understanding the Buddha's intention for liberation. Hearing the Mahayana Dharma speak of ultimate emptiness is like a knife wound to the heart. This is 'words having a target'. Thirdly, concerning the Southern Mahayana teachings, briefly explaining the internal and external aspects of Buddhahood, extensively illustrating all contradictions. Briefly explaining the internal and external aspects of Buddhahood: Master Kaisan defined Buddhahood as being contained within the Two Truths and not allowed to go outside. The Zhuangyan school defined that it cannot be inside if it is outside the Two Truths. This is 'words having a target'. Extensively illustrating all contradictions: The Zhuangyan school posits a substance for provisional existence, while the Kaisan school posits no substance for provisional existence. Kaisan defines unimpededness as subduing, while Zhuangyan defines it as severing. All contradictory meanings are 'words having a target'. Fourthly, in the Northern lands, briefly discussing the two constants of 'present' and 'future', extensively discussing extinction and non-extinction, etc. Briefly discussing the two constants: one says it is definitely constant in the present, and the other says it is definitely constant in the future. Extensively discussing extinction and non-extinction: one says that extinction occurs through hearing and conditioning, and the other says that it is definitely not extinguished. All such statements are 'words having a target'. Question: What is the fault in saying that the internal and external aspects of Buddhahood and the two constants of 'present' and 'future' are 'words having a target'? Answer: Briefly explaining two faults: First, one does not advance to accord with the true nature of reality. Second, one loses the use of boundless expedient means, harming both the essence and function. Question: How is this so? Answer: Has the true nature of reality ever been described by the four phrases of 'present', 'future', 'both present and future', or 'neither present nor future'? The same applies to internal and external aspects. Losing boundless expedient means means that all Mahayana treatises explain that all dharmas have no definite characteristics. The Buddha has limitless expedient means, sometimes saying that everything is real, everything is unreal, both real and unreal, or neither real nor unreal, adapting to benefit beings. How can one cling to rules and regulations to confine the vast and boundless? Next, 'destroying without clinging' means that the arguments of the main commentator differ from other refutations, as in the previous examples of internal and external, large and small. Others, with something to gain, refute others' views and establish their own, like the Samkhya (Samkhya: an ancient school of Indian philosophy).

破他異自立一。謂破有所執。成實破他有自立空。乃至大乘破他佛果二諦攝自立云出二諦外。皆是破有所執也。問自執破他有何過。答中論五陰品出此過。明內道執瓶無常破外道常。外道反難內無常。若執瓶無常有二種過。一者泥既滅前。誰生瓶果。則失因果。二者眼既無常。誰能見色。色唸唸滅。云何為眼所見。故反著外道難也。余空有內外當現滅不滅亦反著他破。又大小內外有所得人破他立而反存有破。今且寄長爪梵志一人論之。長爪至佛所云。一切語可破。一切執可轉。故云一切不忍。佛反質之。汝言一切不忍者。是見忍不。此凡有粗細兩負。言粗負者。若一切不忍遂有不忍之見。則違一切不忍之言也。違理負者。若一切不忍是見亦不忍。為細負。細負者。一切法不忍一切被破。是見亦不忍則不忍之見亦被破。一切被破則眾人被破。不忍之智亦被破。則長爪亦被破。又不忍之智既被破則無長爪智。以何故破他便受屈也。提婆則不爾。所破既除能破亦舍。故言破如可破。破可破既去亦破可破非破可破四句內外一切不依。亦不見無依。故軌跡不可尋得也。故能言無所住則無難而不通。若破而不執則無通而不難也。若言而無當則解一切佛教立意。若破而不立則解一切佛教破意。儻然靡據事不失真者第二結嘆上二句意。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『破他異自立一』，指的是破除有所執著的觀點。成實論通過破斥他宗的『有』，來樹立自己『空』的觀點。乃至大乘佛教破斥他宗認為佛果超出二諦（Satya-dvaya）的觀點，而主張佛果包含在二諦之內，這些都是爲了破除有所執著的見解。問：如果自己執著某種觀點，然後用它來破斥他人的觀點，會有什麼過失呢？答：中論的五陰品中闡述了這種過失。例如，內道（佛教）認為瓶子是無常的，以此來破斥外道（非佛教）認為瓶子是常的觀點。外道反過來詰難內道說，如果瓶子是無常的，那麼泥土滅去之後，是誰產生了瓶子的果實呢？這樣就失去了因果關係。再比如，如果眼睛是無常的，那麼誰能夠看見東西呢？因為每一念都在生滅，怎麼能說是眼睛所見呢？所以，反過來就落入了外道的詰難之中。其餘關於空有、內外、當現、滅不滅等方面的辯論，也會因為反過來執著于自己所破斥的觀點而陷入困境。另外，大小乘、內外道中，那些有所得的人，在破斥他人的觀點時，反而保留了自己所破斥的觀點。現在暫且以長爪梵志（Dirghanakha）一個人的論點來討論這個問題。長爪梵志來到佛陀面前說：『一切言語都可以被破斥，一切執著都可以被轉變。』所以說『一切不忍』。佛陀反過來質問他：『你說一切不忍，那麼你是否認為這個「一切不忍」是一種見解呢？』這裡面包含著粗細兩種過失。粗的過失是，如果一切都不忍，那麼就會產生『不忍』的見解，這就違背了『一切不忍』的說法。違背道理的過失是，如果一切不忍，那麼『不忍』這種見解也是不忍的，這就屬於細的過失。細的過失是，一切法都不忍，一切都被破斥，那麼『不忍』這種見解也被破斥。一切都被破斥，那麼眾人也被破斥，『不忍』的智慧也被破斥，那麼長爪梵志也被破斥。而且，『不忍』的智慧既然被破斥，那麼就沒有長爪梵志的智慧了。用什麼來破斥他人呢？這樣就只能受屈辱了。提婆（Aryadeva）則不是這樣，他所破斥的觀點既然已經去除，那麼能破斥的觀點也捨棄了。所以說，破斥就像是可以被破斥的一樣。破斥了可以被破斥的觀點之後，也破斥了『可破』、『非破』、『可破』、『非可破』這四句，內外一切都不依賴，也不認為沒有依賴，所以軌跡是無法尋找到的。所以能夠做到言語沒有執著，那麼就沒有難以通達的地方。如果破斥而不執著，那麼就沒有通達不了的地方。如果言語沒有執著，那麼就能理解一切佛教的立意。如果破斥而不樹立，那麼就能理解一切佛教的破斥之意。倘若沒有依據，事情就不會失去真實性。第二段總結讚歎了上面兩句的意思。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Breaking others and establishing oneself differently' refers to breaking views that are clung to. The Satyasiddhi school breaks the 'existence' of others to establish its own view of 'emptiness'. Even the Mahayana school breaks the view of other schools that the Buddha-fruit is beyond the two truths (Satya-dvaya), while asserting that it is within the two truths. All of these are to break views that are clung to. Question: What is the fault of clinging to one's own view and then using it to refute others' views? Answer: The Skandha chapter of the Madhyamaka-karika explains this fault. For example, the inner path (Buddhism) considers a pot to be impermanent, thereby refuting the outer path (non-Buddhism) which considers a pot to be permanent. The outer path retorts to the inner path, saying, 'If the pot is impermanent, then after the clay is destroyed, who produces the fruit of the pot?' Thus, the cause-and-effect relationship is lost. Furthermore, if the eye is impermanent, then who can see? Since each moment is arising and ceasing, how can it be said that it is seen by the eye?' Therefore, one falls into the refutation of the outer path. Other debates concerning emptiness and existence, internal and external, present, and annihilation or non-annihilation, will also fall into difficulties by clinging to the views that one is refuting. Moreover, among the Great and Small Vehicles, and internal and external paths, those who have attainments, while refuting others' views, retain the views they are refuting. Now, let's discuss this issue based on the argument of Dirghanakha (Dirghanakha) alone. Dirghanakha came to the Buddha and said, 'All words can be refuted, and all attachments can be transformed.' Therefore, he said 'everything is unendurable'. The Buddha questioned him in return, 'You say everything is unendurable, then do you consider this "everything is unendurable" to be a view?' This contains two kinds of faults, coarse and subtle. The coarse fault is that if everything is unendurable, then the view of 'unendurable' will arise, which contradicts the statement 'everything is unendurable'. The fault of contradicting reason is that if everything is unendurable, then the view of 'unendurable' is also unendurable, which is the subtle fault. The subtle fault is that all dharmas are unendurable, and everything is refuted, then the view of 'unendurable' is also refuted. Everything is refuted, then the multitude is also refuted, and the wisdom of 'unendurable' is also refuted, then Dirghanakha is also refuted. Moreover, since the wisdom of 'unendurable' is refuted, then there is no wisdom of Dirghanakha. What is used to refute others? Thus, one can only suffer humiliation. Aryadeva (Aryadeva) is not like this. Since the view he refutes has been removed, the view that can refute is also abandoned. Therefore, it is said that refutation is like that which can be refuted. After refuting what can be refuted, he also refutes the four sentences of 'refutable', 'non-refutable', 'refutable', and 'non-refutable', and does not rely on anything internal or external, nor does he think there is no reliance, so the traces cannot be found. Therefore, one can achieve speech without attachment, then there is no place that is difficult to understand. If one refutes without clinging, then there is no place that cannot be understood. If speech has no attachment, then one can understand the intention of all Buddhist teachings. If one refutes without establishing, then one can understand the intention of all Buddhist refutations. If there is no basis, then things will not lose their truth. The second paragraph summarizes and praises the meaning of the above two sentences.

儻者惕儻也。靡者無也。據者著。心無所著義耳。以能心無依則觸事恒不失真道也。次句明所以。蕭然無寄猶是不住之名。以無不住與理玄會。前辨事符于真。今明與理冥會也。下句明事理既會能還原反本。著者顯也。明無當無執能令六道還原三乘反本也。有天竺沙門第八敘翻論人。自上但化流天竺。今明傳來震旦。是什師之功也。羅什父本是天竺人。為彼國相。國破遠投龜茲。龜茲者亦云丘茲國也。丘茲國王以妹妻什父而生什。什即丘茲王之外孫也。今還考本處故云天竺也。什姓天竺。即長安猶有其孫也。沙門者云乏道亦云息心。乏道者。以道斷于貧乏也。息心者。經云息心達本原。故云沙門也。雜心明有沙門沙門果。沙門正是無礙道。沙門果有二種。有為果即解脫道。次無為果也。鳩摩羅什者。父名鳩摩羅炎。母曰耆婆。耆婆云壽。鳩摩羅炎云童。即童壽也。合取父母兩秤為兒一名者風俗異也。正言父母兩秤並是美名。欲令兒好故合字之。此方達士張融為兒立名亦云融。人問之其故。答云。父融子融。融融融不絕。亦是美其子也。鉆仰累年轉不可測者。孔子門人嘆孔子云。仰之彌高鉆之彌堅。瞻之在前忽焉在後。今什公門人用之以美什也。問什是何名。答什者父什。此間之美名。故以嘆其人也。問肇值什得幾年而

【現代漢語翻譯】儻（tǎng）：就是惕儻（tì tǎng），意為灑脫。靡（mí）：就是無。據：執著。意思是心中沒有執著。因為能夠做到心中沒有依賴，那麼接觸任何事物都不會失去真道。下一句說明原因。蕭然無寄，仍然是不住（bù zhù）的另一種說法。以無所住與真理玄妙地契合。前面辨別事相符合于真理，現在說明與真理暗合。下一句說明事理既然會合，就能還原到根本。著：顯現。說明沒有執著，能夠使六道眾生還原，三乘聖人迴歸本源。有位來自天竺（tiān zhú，古印度）的沙門（shā mén，出家修道的人）在第八次敘述中翻譯了這部論著。從前只在天竺流傳，現在說明傳到了震旦（zhèn dàn，中國），這是鳩摩羅什（Jūmóluóshí）大師的功勞。羅什的父親本來是天竺人，是那裡的國相。國家滅亡后，遠投到龜茲（qiū cí，古國名）。龜茲也叫丘茲國。丘茲國王把妹妹嫁給羅什的父親，生下了羅什。羅什就是丘茲國王的外孫。現在追溯到他的本處，所以說是天竺。羅什姓天竺，長安還有他的後代。沙門的意思是乏道，也說是息心。乏道，是因為道在貧乏中被斷絕。息心，經書上說『息心達本源』，所以說是沙門。雜心經中說明有沙門、沙門果。沙門正是無礙之道。沙門果有兩種，有為果就是解脫道，其次是無為果。鳩摩羅什，父親名叫鳩摩羅炎（Jūmóluóyán），母親名叫耆婆（qí pó），耆婆的意思是壽，鳩摩羅炎的意思是童，也就是童壽。合取父母兩人的美名給兒子起名字，這是風俗不同。正確地說，父母兩人的名字都是美名，想要兒子好，所以合在一起用。此地的達士張融給兒子起名字也叫融，別人問他原因，他回答說：『父融子融，融融融不絕。』也是讚美他的兒子。鉆仰多年，更加不可測度，孔子的門人讚嘆孔子說：『仰望他，越仰望越高；鉆研他，越鉆研越堅硬。看著他在前面，忽然又在後面。』現在鳩摩羅什的門人也用這句話來讚美鳩摩羅什。問：什是什麼意思？回答：什是父親的名字，是這裡的美名，所以用它來讚美這個人。問：道肇（dào zhào）跟隨鳩摩羅什多少年了？

【English Translation】 'Tang' (儻) means 'ti tang' (惕儻), signifying unrestrained and free. 'Mi' (靡) means 'nothing'. 'Ju' (據) means attachment. It means that the mind has no attachments. Because one can achieve a state where the mind is without reliance, then encountering any matter will not cause one to lose the true path. The next sentence explains the reason. 'Xiao ran wu ji' (蕭然無寄), still another way of saying 'wu zhu' (不住, non-abiding). Using non-abiding to subtly align with the truth. The previous part distinguished matters conforming to the truth, now explaining the alignment with the truth. The next sentence explains that since matters and principles have converged, one can return to the origin. 'Zhu' (著) means manifestation. It explains that without attachment, one can enable the six realms of beings to return to their original state, and the three vehicles of sages to return to their source. There was a Shramana (沙門, Buddhist monk) from Tianzhu (天竺, ancient India) who translated this treatise in the eighth narration. Previously, it only circulated in Tianzhu, now it is explained that it has been transmitted to Zhendan (震旦, China), which is due to the merit of Master Kumarajiva (Jūmóluóshí). Kumarajiva's father was originally from Tianzhu, and was the prime minister there. After the country was destroyed, he fled to Qiuci (龜茲, ancient kingdom). Qiuci is also called Qiuzi. The king of Qiuzi married his sister to Kumarajiva's father, and Kumarajiva was born. Kumarajiva is the grandson of the king of Qiuzi. Now tracing back to his origin, it is said to be Tianzhu. Kumarajiva's surname is Tianzhu, and there are still his descendants in Chang'an. Shramana means lacking the path, and also means resting the mind. Lacking the path, because the path is cut off in poverty. Resting the mind, the scriptures say 'resting the mind reaches the origin', so it is called Shramana. The Miscellaneous Abhidharma Heart Shastra explains that there are Shramanas and Shramana fruits. Shramana is precisely the unobstructed path. There are two kinds of Shramana fruits, the conditioned fruit is the path of liberation, and the second is the unconditioned fruit. Kumarajiva, his father's name was Kumarayana (Jūmóluóyán), his mother's name was Jiva (qí pó), Jiva means longevity, Kumarayana means child, which is child longevity. Combining the beautiful names of both parents to name the son, this is a different custom. Correctly speaking, both parents' names are beautiful names, wanting the son to be good, so they are combined. The scholar Zhang Rong in this place also named his son Rong, and when asked the reason, he replied: 'Father Rong, son Rong, Rong Rong Rong without end.' Also praising his son. Drilling and looking up for many years, becoming even more immeasurable, Confucius' disciples praised Confucius saying: 'Looking up to him, the more you look up, the higher he is; studying him, the more you study, the harder he is. Seeing him in front, suddenly he is behind.' Now Kumarajiva's disciples also use this to praise Kumarajiva. Question: What does 'Shi' mean? Answer: 'Shi' is the father's name, it is a beautiful name here, so it is used to praise this person. Question: How many years did Dao Zhao (dào zhào) follow Kumarajiva?

秤累年。答什以弘始三年十二月至長安。弘始七年十二月亡。首尾五年。而肇公涅槃論云。在什公門下十有餘年。亦云十有二年者。正言十二年是一紀之員數。故用之耳。莊子外篇云。庖丁十二年不見全牛。亦用十二年事。不見全牛者。不見四支百體外別有總牛。此勝天竺四外道。並計有總牛。但總與別一異。故成四家耳。常味詠斯論以為心要者。什本小乘學。而丘茲王子名沙車。是大乘學。二人深相欽味。但恨學業不同不得從就。王子欲化什公。故一時來其並房高聲誦阿耨達經明色空乃至一切法空。什遙聞之明旦問曰。此是何經而破壞一切法。答曰。是大乘經。又問此經以何為義。答曰。畢竟空為義。什曰。眼現是有。云何言空。王子問云。眼是有者以何為性。答以見為性。難曰。若眼以見為性。應自見眼。又難曰。眼一微成耶多微成耶。若一微成則一微能見。不假多也。若一微不見多亦不見。如一盲不見多盲亦爾。又問。若有極微色則有十方分。有十方分不名極微。若無十方分則不名色。於是什無以對之。王子因授中百二論與什。大重之。故云常味詠斯論為心要也。先雖親譯而方言未融者此第九敘翻論旦越。翻論檀越有二人二處二時。初是天子姚興為旦越。次是姚嵩。初在逍遙園西明閣上。次是草堂寺。初是弘始

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本鳩摩羅什（Kumārajīva）在位時間有多久？答：從弘始三年（公元401年）十二月到達長安（Cháng'ān），到弘始七年（公元405年）十二月去世，前後五年。而僧肇（Sēngzhào）的《涅槃論》（Nièpán Lùn）中說，他在鳩摩羅什門下十多年，也有說十二年的，這只是說十二年是一個紀年的整數，所以這樣用罷了。《莊子·外篇》（Zhuāngzǐ Wàipiān）中說，庖丁十二年沒見到完整的牛，也是用了十二年的說法。沒見到完整的牛，是指沒見到四肢百體之外另有一個總體的牛。這勝過天竺（Tiānzhú，印度）的四種外道，他們都認為有一個總體的牛，只是總體和個別是否同一的問題，所以形成了四家。常味（Chángwèi）吟詠這部論著，認為它是心要。鳩摩羅什本來學習小乘佛教，而丘茲（Qiūzī，龜茲）王子，名叫沙車（Shāchē），是學習大乘佛教的。兩人互相欽佩欣賞，只是遺憾學業不同，不能跟隨。王子想要教化鳩摩羅什，所以一時來到他的隔壁房間，高聲誦讀《阿耨達經》（Ānòudá Jīng），闡明色空乃至一切法空的道理。鳩摩羅什遙遙聽到，第二天問道：『這是什麼經，竟然破壞一切法？』回答說：『是大乘經。』又問：『這部經以什麼為義？』回答說：『以畢竟空為義。』鳩摩羅什說：『眼睛明明看到是有，怎麼說是空呢？』王子反問道：『眼睛如果是有，以什麼為自性？』回答說：『以見為自性。』王子反駁說：『如果眼睛以見為自性，應該能自己看到自己。』又反駁說：『眼睛是由一個極微組成的呢，還是由多個極微組成的呢？如果由一個極微組成，那麼一個極微就能見，不需要多個極微。如果一個極微不能見，那麼多個極微也不能見，就像一個瞎子不能見，多個瞎子也不能見一樣。』又問：『如果有極微的色，那麼就有十方分。有十方分就不叫極微。如果沒有十方分，就不叫色。』於是鳩摩羅什無言以對。王子因此把《中論》（Zhōng Lùn）、《百論》（Bǎi Lùn）、《十二門論》（Shí'èrmén Lùn）交給鳩摩羅什，鳩摩羅什非常重視它們。所以說常味吟詠這部論著，認為它是心要啊。先前雖然親自翻譯，但方言還沒有融會貫通，這是第九段敘述翻譯論著的施主。翻譯論著的施主有兩人，兩個地方，兩個時間。最初是天子姚興（Yáo Xīng）為施主，其次是姚嵩（Yáo Sōng）。最初在逍遙園（Xiāoyáo Yuán）西明閣（Xīmíng Gé）上，其次是草堂寺（Cǎotáng Sì）。最初是弘始

【English Translation】 English version How long did Kumārajīva reign? Answer: From the twelfth month of the third year of Hongshi (401 AD) when he arrived in Chang'an, to the twelfth month of the seventh year of Hongshi (405 AD) when he passed away, it was five years in total. However, in Sēngzhào's 'Nirvana Treatise' (Nièpán Lùn), it is said that he was under Kumārajīva for more than ten years, and some say twelve years. This simply means that twelve years is a complete cycle of years, so it is used in this way. In the 'Outer Chapters' of Zhuangzi (Zhuāngzǐ Wàipiān), it is said that Cook Ding did not see a whole ox for twelve years, which also uses the concept of twelve years. Not seeing a whole ox means not seeing a general ox separate from the four limbs and hundreds of parts. This surpasses the four non-Buddhist schools of India (Tiānzhú), who all believe in a general ox, but the question is whether the general and the particular are the same or different, thus forming the four schools. Chángwèi often chanted this treatise, considering it the essence of his heart. Kumārajīva originally studied Hinayana Buddhism, while the prince of Qiuci (Qiūzī), named Shāchē, studied Mahayana Buddhism. The two admired each other deeply, but regretted that their studies were different and they could not follow each other. The prince wanted to convert Kumārajīva, so he came to the room next to him and loudly recited the 'Anavatapta Sutra' (Ānòudá Jīng), explaining the principle of emptiness of form and even the emptiness of all dharmas. Kumārajīva heard it from afar and asked the next day, 'What sutra is this that destroys all dharmas?' He replied, 'It is the Mahayana Sutra.' He asked again, 'What is the meaning of this sutra?' He replied, 'The meaning is ultimate emptiness.' Kumārajīva said, 'The eye clearly sees that there is existence, how can you say it is empty?' The prince retorted, 'If the eye exists, what is its nature?' He replied, 'Its nature is seeing.' The prince retorted, 'If the eye's nature is seeing, it should be able to see itself.' He further retorted, 'Is the eye composed of one ultimate particle or multiple ultimate particles? If it is composed of one ultimate particle, then one ultimate particle can see, and multiple ultimate particles are not needed. If one ultimate particle cannot see, then multiple ultimate particles cannot see either, just as one blind person cannot see, and multiple blind people cannot see either.' He also asked, 'If there is an ultimate particle of color, then it has ten directional parts. If it has ten directional parts, it is not called an ultimate particle. If it does not have ten directional parts, it is not called color.' Thereupon, Kumārajīva was speechless. The prince then gave the 'Mūlamadhyamakakārikā' (Zhōng Lùn), 'Śataśāstra' (Bǎi Lùn), and 'Dvādaśanikāyaśāstra' (Shí'èrmén Lùn) to Kumārajīva, who valued them greatly. Therefore, it is said that Chángwèi often chanted this treatise, considering it the essence of his heart. Although he had personally translated before, the dialects were not yet fully integrated. This is the ninth section describing the patrons of the translation of the treatises. There were two patrons, two places, and two times for the translation of the treatises. Initially, Emperor Yáo Xīng was the patron, and then Yáo Sōng. Initially, it was in the West Bright Pavilion (Xīmíng Gé) of Xiaoyao Garden (Xiāoyáo Yuán), and then in the Caotang Temple (Cǎotáng Sì). Initially, it was during the Hongshi

四季四月。后是六年也。就文三。初敘什方言未融。次述旦越重請。后明什重翻。什從丘茲來西涼州首尾十八年。弘始三年來長安。四年正月即就翻譯。但識一往之言未通達言盡。故云未融也。思尋者以下出其兩失。一文謬。二理失。文謬故令思惟尋究之人多有進退。進退者如似解復似不解。躊躇即進退也。標位者下明理謬也。標位謂總標綱領作起盡也。乖謂與理乖也。迕失也。歸致即旨歸理致也。大秦下第二敘旦越也。大秦處也。司隸者官也。安成侯位也。姚姓也嵩名也。下嘆德可知。每撫茲文者。撫執捉之辭也。所慨良多者。慨嘆也。以文謬理乖所以傷嘆。問姚嵩云何能知其失。答其人俗中精解義。曾著啟問天子姚興涅槃無名義。興答啟云。夫眾生所以流轉生死者。皆由著欲故也。若欲止於心則無復生死。與空合其德。乃曰涅槃。豈容名數于其間哉。肇公述興涅槃無名義。故作涅槃論有九折十演也。以弘始六年歲次壽星者。爾雅云。東方七星。謂角亢兩星星中之長。故云壽星。今歲次之。故以為名也。集理味沙門者第三正重翻。理味沙門即解義之流。凡五百餘人。于草堂寺重翻也。質而不野者。莊周云。言隱榮華故除其文飾。所以云質。復剪于拙樸故云不野也。簡而必詣者。刪其煩文為簡。狹文必秤理為詣也。論

凡二十品下第十定品偈少多。文疏已釋。依提婆梵本品皆五偈無多少也。而有多少者三義。一注人釋有廣略。二翻論人復重增減。三方言不同。故多少者不定也。有人不解斯意。遂不用肇公品各五偈之言。蓋是未見論意耳。破塵品要觀。吉藏息慈之歲已重此文。西垂之年玩味彌篤。然十章雖並精巧。但破塵一品除患偏要。又長安盛弘唯識。亦宜辨其同異。故因講次疏而出之。先論于塵然後辨破。釋塵三師。一外道。二毗曇。三成實。外道計三塵。一總塵。如外瓶為眼所見。內身亦爾。故云眼見於瓶亦見人也。既為眼所見亦為耳所聞。如是一切。二別塵。五塵成瓶今見瓶色即名見瓶。見人色亦名見人。眼見既爾。耳聞例然。三鄰虛塵。圓而是常亦為眼所見。此三攝塵盡矣。毗曇塵凡有二種。一者五塵。二者法塵。五識所取名為五塵。意識所緣目為法塵。然過去未來五塵雖為意識所取亦五塵也。問現在五塵上有生住異滅苦無常等。為是何塵。答屬法塵也。次成實明塵者。論師云。法塵有二。一別體法塵。但為意識所得。二同體法塵。即過去未來五塵。以為意識所得復為五識所緣故名同體。次論同異。成實明。總瓶是假屬法塵。為想心所得之。識但得瓶上青黃實色耳。故與外道異。智度論云。九十六術不說意。以難解故。若

爾亦應不說法塵。是故見破情品及以此章但說五塵耳。毗曇明。無有假瓶體用但有其名。名屬行陰為法塵攝之。次論色塵同異。毗曇明。可見色有二十一。謂青黃長短等。成實明。青黃是實為眼所見。長短為假屬法塵。想心得之。次鄰虛塵同異者。外道計。鄰虛無十方分圓而是常。非眼所見。故下文云。汝經言微塵非現見。云何成現見。前云鄰虛圓而是常一切現見。此是外道自秤。后云非現見者。論主徴彼經明非現見也。毗曇明。亦有鄰虛塵無十方分。具二緣生故是無常。一因緣二增上緣。因緣中過去業報得是報因。前後相生是自分因。四相扶起是共有因。成實師有二釋。一開善師云。鄰虛塵就有中折之不盡。故細更復細。二莊嚴師。折之則盡而無復十方分。與外道異者。彼云。義論十方。在東望則塵居西。在西望則塵為東。亦為四相所切。與毗曇大同。次明破者。但破塵想實不破塵。故下文云。愚人見炎為水。但破水想實無水可破。此想之亦名妄想。以實無外境妄作境想故云妄想。亦名無明。以不得正觀明故見有外塵。亦名分別。實無塵境橫生分別言有塵境。問既是破想。應名破想品。云何名破塵品耶。答破彼想謂有塵故言破塵耳。實是破想。是故但除其病而不除法。以無法可除故也。問見有外塵有何過患。答想謂

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本你也應該不說『法塵』（dharma-dhātu，指意識的對象）。因此，『見破情品』以及本章只討論了『五塵』（pañca-viṣaya，色、聲、香、味、觸）。《毗曇》（Abhidharma）認為，沒有真實的瓶子實體和作用，只有它的名稱。名稱屬於『行陰』（saṃskāra-skandha，行蘊），被『法塵』所攝。接下來討論『色塵』（rūpa-dhātu，可見之物）的同異。《毗曇》認為，可見之色有二十一種，如青、黃、長、短等。《成實論》（Satyasiddhi-śāstra）認為，青、黃是真實的，為眼睛所見；長、短是虛假的，屬於『法塵』，由思想領會。接下來討論『鄰虛塵』（paramāṇu，極微塵）的同異。外道認為，『鄰虛塵』沒有十方分，是圓的，並且是常住的，非眼睛所見。因此下文說：『你的經典說微塵不是現見，如何成為現見？』前面說『鄰虛是圓的而且是常住的，一切都是現見』，這是外道自己衡量。後面說『非現見』，是論主引用他們的經典來證明它不是現見。《毗曇》認為，也有『鄰虛塵』，沒有十方分，具備兩種緣而生，所以是無常的。一是因緣，二是增上緣。因緣中，過去業報是報因，前後相生是自分因，四相扶起是共有因。《成實論》的論師有兩種解釋。一，開善師認為，『鄰虛塵』有可以分割但不盡的部分，所以可以無限細分。二，莊嚴師認為，分割到最後就沒有十方分了。與外道不同的是，外道認為，從義理上說有十方，在東邊看，塵在西邊；在西邊看，塵在東邊。『鄰虛塵』也被四相所切割，與《毗曇》大同小異。接下來闡明破除的是什麼。只是破除對塵的『想』（saṃjñā，想蘊），而不是破除塵本身。所以下文說：『愚人見火焰為水，只是破除對水的想，實際上沒有水可以破除。』這種『想』也叫做『妄想』（viparyāsa，顛倒想），因為實際上沒有外境，卻錯誤地產生外境的『想』，所以叫做『妄想』。也叫做『無明』（avidyā，無知），因為沒有得到正確的觀察，所以認為有外塵。也叫做『分別』（vikalpa，分別），實際上沒有塵境，卻橫生分別說有塵境。問：既然是破除『想』，應該叫做『破想品』，為什麼叫做『破塵品』呢？答：破除他們認為有塵的『想』，所以叫做『破塵』，實際上是破除『想』。因此只是去除其病，而不去除法，因為沒有法可以去除。問：認為有外塵有什麼過患？答：認為...

【English Translation】 English version You should also not speak of 'dharma-dhātu' (the objects of consciousness). Therefore, the 'Chapter on Breaking Affection' and this chapter only discuss the 'five sense objects' (pañca-viṣaya, form, sound, smell, taste, and touch). The Abhidharma states that there is no real entity or function of a pot, only its name. The name belongs to the 'saṃskāra-skandha' (aggregate of mental formations) and is included in the 'dharma-dhātu'. Next, the similarities and differences of 'rūpa-dhātu' (form element, visible objects) are discussed. The Abhidharma states that there are twenty-one kinds of visible forms, such as blue, yellow, long, short, etc. The Satyasiddhi-śāstra states that blue and yellow are real and seen by the eye; long and short are false, belonging to the 'dharma-dhātu' and understood by thought. Next, the similarities and differences of 'paramāṇu' (ultimate particle) are discussed. Non-Buddhists believe that the 'paramāṇu' has no directional parts, is round, permanent, and not seen by the eye. Therefore, the following text says: 'Your scripture says that the subtle particle is not directly seen, how can it be directly seen?' The previous text says 'The ultimate particle is round and permanent, and everything is directly seen,' which is the non-Buddhist's own assessment. The later text says 'not directly seen,' which is the author quoting their scripture to prove that it is not directly seen. The Abhidharma states that there are also 'paramāṇu' that have no directional parts and arise from two conditions, so they are impermanent. One is the causal condition, and the other is the enabling condition. Among the causal conditions, the past karmic retribution is the resultant cause, the successive arising is the self-cause, and the mutual support of the four characteristics is the common cause. The teachers of the Satyasiddhi-śāstra have two explanations. First, Master Kaisan believes that the 'paramāṇu' has parts that can be divided but not completely, so it can be infinitely subdivided. Second, Master Zhuangyan believes that when it is divided to the end, there are no directional parts. Unlike the non-Buddhists, who believe that, in terms of meaning, there are ten directions; when viewed from the east, the particle is in the west; when viewed from the west, the particle is in the east. The 'paramāṇu' is also cut by the four characteristics, which is largely the same as the Abhidharma. Next, it is clarified what is being broken. It is only breaking the 'saṃjñā' (perception, aggregate of perception) of the particle, not the particle itself. Therefore, the following text says: 'A fool sees flames as water, only breaking the perception of water, but there is actually no water to break.' This 'saṃjñā' is also called 'viparyāsa' (perversion, distorted perception), because there is actually no external object, but a false 'saṃjñā' of an external object arises, so it is called 'viparyāsa'. It is also called 'avidyā' (ignorance), because one has not obtained correct observation, so one thinks there are external particles. It is also called 'vikalpa' (discrimination), because there is actually no particle realm, but one falsely generates discrimination, saying there is a particle realm. Question: Since it is breaking 'saṃjñā', it should be called the 'Chapter on Breaking Saṃjñā', why is it called the 'Chapter on Breaking Particles'? Answer: It is called 'breaking particles' because it breaks their 'saṃjñā' of thinking there are particles, but it is actually breaking 'saṃjñā'. Therefore, it only removes the disease and does not remove the dharma, because there is no dharma to remove. Question: What are the faults of thinking there are external particles? Answer: Thinking...

有塵即是無明。以見有塵便見塵有凈不凈。故於塵起凈不凈倒。即是從無明生於顛倒。以生凈倒是故起貪。生不凈倒即便起瞋。貪瞋因緣是故起業。起業故感二生死苦。名苦集諦。是故由塵有一切過患也。悟塵本空則無明滅。故不起凈不凈倒則顛倒滅。凈不凈滅故不起貪瞋。貪瞋無故不起業苦。便得解脫。名滅道諦。故具得四諦觀。次明二諦觀者。知塵本無。而凡夫謂有名為世諦耳。謂有非有名第一義。即二諦觀也。次一諦觀者。了塵想本不生故不苦不集。今無所滅故不滅不道。即一實諦也。次無諦觀者。本對於四是故有一。竟不曾四何有一耶。此是從四諦至二諦。二諦歸一諦歸無諦。次從無諦故有一諦。一諦故有二諦。二諦故有四諦。故舒之彌淪法界。卷之泯無軌跡。此並是空中種樹虛里織羅。雖舒而不開。雖合而不卷。肇公云。近而不可知者其唯物性乎。言動而靜。似去而留。可以神會。不可以事求。次論同異。問無塵無識淺深云何。答攝論云。無塵淺位無識位深。今明若別約借識破塵。一往階位可得然矣。依百論及眾經論大意。無塵無識位無淺深。故百論云。但破水想實不破水。即是但破塵想實不破塵。以此詳之。塵想若無塵即無。塵若無塵想即無。更無異時。又例如我見及以法見。倒心計有我。我若無倒情即

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本有塵即是無明。（有塵：指感官接觸到的外在事物；無明：佛教術語，指對事物真相的迷惑和不瞭解）因為見到有塵，就認為塵有乾淨和不乾淨的區別。因此，對於塵產生了乾淨和不乾淨的顛倒認知。這就是從無明產生了顛倒。因為產生了乾淨的顛倒認知，所以產生了貪慾。產生不乾淨的顛倒認知，就產生了嗔恨。貪慾和嗔恨的因緣，因此產生了業。（業：指行為，包括身、口、意三方面的活動，這些活動會帶來相應的果報）因為產生了業，所以感受到了生和死的痛苦，這叫做苦集諦。（苦集諦：佛教四聖諦之一，指痛苦的根源在於慾望和執著）因此，由於塵，才有一切的過患。領悟到塵的本質是空性的，那麼無明就消滅了。因此，就不會產生乾淨和不乾淨的顛倒認知，那麼顛倒也就消滅了。乾淨和不乾淨的認知消滅了，所以就不會產生貪慾和嗔恨。貪慾和嗔恨沒有了，就不會產生業的痛苦，就能得到解脫，這叫做滅道諦。（滅道諦：佛教四聖諦之一，指通過修行達到解脫的道路和境界）因此，就完整地獲得了四諦的觀察。接下來闡明二諦觀。（二諦：佛教用語，指世俗諦和勝義諦，即真俗二諦）知道塵的本質是空性的，但是凡夫認為塵是存在的，這叫做世俗諦。認為塵不存在，才是真正的第一義諦，這就是二諦觀。接下來闡明一諦觀。（一諦：佛教用語，指超越二諦的絕對真理）瞭解塵的念頭本來就沒有產生，所以沒有痛苦，也沒有集聚。現在沒有什麼可以消滅的，所以沒有消滅，也沒有道路，這就是一實諦。接下來闡明無諦觀。（無諦：佛教用語，指超越一切概念和分別的境界）本來是相對於四諦而言，所以才有一個。最終不曾有四，哪裡有一個呢？這是從四諦到二諦，二諦歸於一諦，一諦歸於無諦。接下來從無諦，所以有一諦。有一諦，所以有二諦。有二諦，所以有四諦。所以舒展開來就瀰漫於法界，收攏起來就泯滅得沒有軌跡。這些都是在空中種樹，在虛空中織羅。雖然舒展開來卻不能打開，雖然合攏起來卻不能捲起。鳩摩羅什（Kumārajīva）說，『近在眼前卻無法瞭解的，大概只有物性了吧。』言語是動的，而物性是靜的，看似離去卻又停留。可以用精神去領會，卻不能用事物去尋求。接下來討論同異。問：沒有塵和沒有識，哪個更深？答：攝論（瑜伽師地論的略稱）說，沒有塵是淺的層次，沒有識是深的層次。現在說明，如果分別憑藉識來破除塵，那麼勉強可以得到一個階位。依照百論（中論的異名）以及眾多經論的大意，沒有塵和沒有識，沒有深淺的差別。所以百論說，『只是破除對水的錯誤認知，並不是真的破除水。』這就是隻是破除對塵的錯誤認知，並不是真的破除塵。用這個來詳細考察，塵的念頭如果沒有了，塵也就沒有了。塵如果沒有了，塵的念頭也就沒有了，更沒有不同的時間。又例如我見以及法見。顛倒的心認為有我，我如果沒有了顛倒的情感就

【English Translation】 English version The presence of dust is ignorance. (Dust: refers to external objects perceived by the senses; Ignorance: a Buddhist term referring to delusion and lack of understanding of the true nature of things) Because seeing dust, one perceives that dust has distinctions of clean and unclean. Therefore, regarding dust, one generates inverted perceptions of clean and unclean. This is arising from ignorance into inversion. Because of generating the inverted perception of cleanliness, greed arises. Because of generating the inverted perception of uncleanness, anger arises. The causes and conditions of greed and anger are why karma arises. (Karma: refers to actions, including activities of body, speech, and mind, which bring corresponding consequences) Because karma arises, one experiences the suffering of birth and death, which is called the suffering of the origin of suffering (Dukkha-samudaya satya). Therefore, due to dust, there are all kinds of faults. Realizing that the essence of dust is emptiness, then ignorance is extinguished. Therefore, one will not generate inverted perceptions of clean and unclean, and then inversion is extinguished. When the perceptions of clean and unclean are extinguished, then greed and anger will not arise. When greed and anger are absent, the suffering of karma will not arise, and one can attain liberation, which is called the truth of the cessation of suffering and the path to its cessation (Dukkha-nirodha-marga satya). Therefore, one fully obtains the observation of the Four Noble Truths. Next, explaining the Two Truths. (Two Truths: a Buddhist term referring to conventional truth and ultimate truth) Knowing that the essence of dust is emptiness, but ordinary people believe that dust exists, this is called conventional truth. Believing that dust does not exist is the true ultimate truth, which is the observation of the Two Truths. Next, explaining the One Truth. (One Truth: a Buddhist term referring to the absolute truth that transcends the Two Truths) Understanding that the thought of dust has never arisen, so there is no suffering, and no accumulation. Now there is nothing to extinguish, so there is no extinction, and no path, this is the One Real Truth. Next, explaining the No Truth. (No Truth: a Buddhist term referring to the state that transcends all concepts and distinctions) Originally, it is relative to the Four Truths, so there is one. Ultimately, there have never been four, where is one? This is from the Four Truths to the Two Truths, the Two Truths return to the One Truth, and the One Truth returns to the No Truth. Next, from the No Truth, so there is the One Truth. With the One Truth, so there are the Two Truths. With the Two Truths, so there are the Four Truths. Therefore, when unfolded, it permeates the Dharma Realm, and when gathered, it disappears without a trace. These are all planting trees in the air, weaving silk in the void. Although unfolded, it cannot be opened, and although gathered, it cannot be rolled up. Kumārajīva said, 'What is near at hand but cannot be understood is probably only the nature of things.' Speech is moving, while the nature of things is still, seemingly leaving but remaining. It can be understood with the spirit, but cannot be sought with things. Next, discussing similarities and differences. Question: Which is deeper, no dust or no consciousness? Answer: The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that no dust is a shallow level, and no consciousness is a deep level. Now explaining, if one separately relies on consciousness to eliminate dust, then one can barely obtain a stage. According to the general meaning of the Śata-śāstra and many sutras and treatises, there is no difference in depth between no dust and no consciousness. Therefore, the Śata-śāstra says, 'It only eliminates the wrong perception of water, it does not really eliminate water.' This is only eliminating the wrong perception of dust, it does not really eliminate dust. Examining this in detail, if the thought of dust is gone, then dust is gone. If dust is gone, then the thought of dust is gone, and there is no different time. Also, for example, the view of self and the view of Dharma. The inverted mind thinks there is a self, if the self has no inverted feelings then

無。倒情無故我亦無。倒心見有諸法。諸法若無倒心即無。倒心無故諸法即無。又例如眼病見空華。空華無故眼病即無。眼病無故空華即無。故知更無異時也。二者攝論云。塵畢竟無非是世諦。而存有于識。以識為世諦。今明此亦一往之言。借識破塵故云塵無識有耳。然塵與識凡有二種。一者性塵性識世諦並無。二因緣塵識世諦俱有。就本末言之。實由心計塵而心外無塵。以心為本以塵為末。則明塵無則識有。此是一往之言。然就理言之。塵識俱無。約請辨之。塵識俱有也。問攝論云四識義。一似根識。二似塵識。三似識識。四似我識。一切皆是識實無塵。今云何言約理俱無就情俱有耶。答此是借識破塵之言耳。但是四識實無別塵。此云識者詺倒想為識。想謂有根。想外實無有根。乃至想謂有識。想外實無有識。然所想既無能想寧有。如上釋之。是故於情皆有。望理並無也。問三論不明唯識義。今云何用之。答三論正明此義。中論成壞品云。若謂以現見而有生滅者。則為是癡妄而見有生滅。故知無生滅之境。皆是癡妄謂見之耳。觀顛倒品云。色未與心和合時空無所有。當知是心想謂有色耳。心外實無有色。百論破塵如上引之。想謂有水實無水可破。又三論大宗明二于諦。中論釋世諦云。一切法性空。而世人顛倒分別為

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：沒有顛倒的情感，沒有無緣無故的『我』。因為顛倒的心，所以見到諸法（一切事物）。如果諸法不存在，顛倒的心也就不存在。因為顛倒的心不存在，所以諸法也不存在。又例如，眼睛有病時會看到空中的花朵。如果空中沒有花朵，眼病也就不存在。如果眼病不存在，空中的花朵也就不存在。所以要知道，它們之間沒有不同的時間關係。其次，《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）說，『塵』（感官對像）畢竟不存在，只是世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）的顯現，而『識』（意識）是存在的，將『識』作為世俗諦。現在說明，這只是一種方便的說法，是藉助『識』來破除『塵』，所以說『塵』不存在而『識』存在。然而，『塵』和『識』有兩種情況：一是自性『塵』和自性『識』，在世俗諦中都不存在；二是因緣『塵』和『識』，在世俗諦中都存在。從根本和末端來說，實際上是由於心去計較『塵』，而心外沒有『塵』。以心為根本，以『塵』為末端，那麼說明『塵』不存在則『識』存在，這是一種方便的說法。然而，從真理上來說，『塵』和『識』都不存在。如果從情識上辨別，『塵』和『識』都存在。問：《攝大乘論》中說的四識義（四種意識）：一、相似於根識（感覺器官的意識）；二、相似於塵識（感官對象的意識）；三、相似於識識（意識本身的意識）；四、相似於我識（自我意識）。一切都是『識』，實際上沒有『塵』。現在為什麼說從真理上來說都不存在，而從情識上來說都存在呢？答：這只是藉助『識』來破除『塵』的說法。這四識實際上沒有別的『塵』。這裡說的『識』，是將顛倒的妄想稱為『識』。妄想認為有根（感覺器官），實際上在妄想之外沒有根。乃至妄想認為有『識』，實際上在妄想之外沒有『識』。然而，所妄想的東西既然不存在，能妄想的東西怎麼會存在呢？就像上面解釋的那樣。所以，在情識上都存在，從真理上來說都不存在。問：《三論》（Sanlun）沒有明確說明唯識義（Vijñānavāda），現在為什麼用它呢？答：《三論》正是說明這個道理。《中論》（Mūlamadhyamakakārikā）的《成壞品》說：『如果認為通過現見的緣故而有生滅，那就是愚癡妄想而見到有生滅。』所以要知道，沒有生滅的境界，都是愚癡妄想認為見到的。《觀顛倒品》說：『色（物質現象）未與心和合時，空無所有。』應當知道是心妄想認為有色。心外實際上沒有色。《百論》（Śataśāstra）破除『塵』就像上面引用的那樣，妄想認為有水，實際上沒有水可以破除。而且《三論》的大宗明確說明二諦（二種真理）。《中論》解釋世俗諦說：『一切法的自性是空，而世人顛倒分別。』

【English Translation】 English version: Without inverted emotions, there is no 'I' without a cause. Because of the inverted mind, all dharmas (things, phenomena) are seen. If dharmas do not exist, the inverted mind will not exist either. Because the inverted mind does not exist, dharmas do not exist either. For example, when the eyes are diseased, one sees flowers in the sky. If there are no flowers in the sky, the eye disease will not exist. If the eye disease does not exist, the flowers in the sky will not exist either. Therefore, know that there is no different temporal relationship between them. Secondly, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium on the Great Vehicle) says, 'Dust' (sensory objects) ultimately does not exist, it is merely an appearance of saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth, relative truth), while 'consciousness' (vijñāna) exists, taking 'consciousness' as saṃvṛti-satya. Now, it is explained that this is just a convenient way of speaking, using 'consciousness' to dispel 'dust', so it is said that 'dust' does not exist while 'consciousness' exists. However, there are two kinds of 'dust' and 'consciousness': one is self-natured 'dust' and self-natured 'consciousness', which do not exist in saṃvṛti-satya; the other is conditioned 'dust' and 'consciousness', which both exist in saṃvṛti-satya. From the perspective of root and branch, it is actually because the mind calculates 'dust', and there is no 'dust' outside the mind. Taking the mind as the root and 'dust' as the branch, then it is clear that if 'dust' does not exist, then 'consciousness' exists, which is a convenient way of speaking. However, from the perspective of truth, both 'dust' and 'consciousness' do not exist. If distinguished from the perspective of emotions, both 'dust' and 'consciousness' exist. Question: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says the meaning of the four consciousnesses (four kinds of consciousness): first, similar to root consciousness (consciousness of sensory organs); second, similar to dust consciousness (consciousness of sensory objects); third, similar to consciousness consciousness (consciousness of consciousness itself); fourth, similar to self-consciousness (ego consciousness). Everything is 'consciousness', and there is actually no 'dust'. Why is it now said that from the perspective of truth, neither exists, while from the perspective of emotions, both exist? Answer: This is just a way of speaking to dispel 'dust' by means of 'consciousness'. These four consciousnesses actually have no other 'dust'. The 'consciousness' mentioned here refers to calling inverted delusion 'consciousness'. Delusion thinks there are roots (sensory organs), but in reality, there are no roots outside of delusion. Even delusion thinks there is 'consciousness', but in reality, there is no 'consciousness' outside of delusion. However, since what is deluded does not exist, how can what is capable of deluding exist? It is like the explanation above. Therefore, they all exist in emotions, but do not exist from the perspective of truth. Question: The Sanlun (Three Treatise School) does not explicitly explain Vijñānavāda (Yogācāra), why is it used now? Answer: The Sanlun precisely explains this principle. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way) in the chapter on 'Formation and Destruction' says: 'If it is thought that birth and death exist because of present seeing, then it is foolish delusion to see birth and death.' Therefore, know that there is no realm of birth and death, and it is all foolish delusion to think that it is seen. The chapter on 'Observing Inversions' says: 'When form (material phenomena) has not yet combined with the mind, it is empty and without anything.' It should be known that it is the mind's delusion that there is form. In reality, there is no form outside the mind. The Śataśāstra (Hundred Treatise) refutes 'dust' as quoted above, delusion thinks there is water, but in reality, there is no water to be refuted. Moreover, the great principle of the Sanlun clearly explains the two truths (two kinds of truth). The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā explains saṃvṛti-satya by saying: 'The self-nature of all dharmas is empty, but worldly people invertedly discriminate.'

有。於世人是實名為諦。百論破空品亦爾。俗於世人為實故秤諦。俗于聖人不實故非諦。當知實無諸法。于情謂有。于情即是橫謂。橫謂即是識也。問塵識既無淺深。菩薩從何位作無塵觀。何位習無識觀。答從初發心至於佛地皆作無塵識觀。所以然者。橫論萬法豎辨四句皆是想心所見起四句絕百非是名諸法實相。菩薩從初發心即學實相觀。是故大品云。菩薩從初發心即學無所得。無所得不得於塵識故名無所得。從初發心信一切法皆是想心所謂。所想既本來畢竟不生。能想即本來不生。作如此信名為十信。得此悟解觀心位立名為十住。是故經云。入理三昧名為十住。依此起行秤為十行。知塵想不生唸唸常起無無生不向塵想。亦回塵想之心向無塵想名為十回向。無塵無想觀行現前名為十地。塵想結習都凈秤為佛地。問何處云從初心至佛地皆無塵想耶。答涅槃經云。發心畢竟二不別。如是二心先心難。華嚴經云。初發心時即是佛故。約觀行明昧不同故有諸位差別耳。問塵識位既無淺深。我空法空亦無淺深。何故攝論等云十解菩薩得人空。未得法空。答須深識此義。我之與法皆是想謂。並秤為塵。于塵內破之自有難易。人塵五情取之不得故易除十住得人無我。法塵五情取之並得故難破故未得法無我。則與前義不類。論本始義云

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本有。對於世人來說，『實名』就是真諦（諦：真實不虛的道理）。《百論·破空品》也是這樣說的。對於世人來說，俗諦（俗諦：世俗諦，指符合世俗認識的真理）是真實的，所以可以作為衡量真理的標準。但對於聖人來說，俗諦是不真實的，所以不能作為真諦。應當明白，實際上並沒有諸法（諸法：一切事物和現象）。只是在情識的認知中，才認為有諸法。在情識的認知中，就是橫向的分別。橫向的分別就是識（識：意識）。問：既然塵（塵：指感官對像）和識（識：意識）沒有淺深之分，那麼菩薩從哪個位階開始修習無塵觀？又從哪個位階開始修習無識觀？答：從初發心（初發心：最初發起菩提心）到成佛的階段，都在修習無塵識觀。為什麼這樣說呢？橫向地論述萬法，縱向地辨析四句（四句：佛教邏輯中的四種可能性，即『是』、『非』、『亦是亦非』、『非是亦非』），都是想心（想心：虛妄分別的心）所見。超越四句，斷絕百非（百非：一切錯誤的觀點），這才是諸法實相（諸法實相：一切事物真實的樣子）。菩薩從初發心就開始學習實相觀。所以《大品般若經》說，菩薩從初發心就開始學習無所得（無所得：不執著于任何事物）。無所得就是不執著于塵和識，所以稱為無所得。從初發心就相信一切法都是想心所產生的，所想之物本來就畢竟不生，能想之心也本來不生。如此信解，稱為十信（十信：修行的十個信心階段）。獲得這種悟解，觀心到位，就立名為十住（十住：菩薩修行的十個住位）。所以經中說，進入理的三昧（三昧：禪定），就稱為十住。依據這種理解而起行，稱為十行（十行：菩薩修行的十個行位）。知道塵想不生，唸唸常起，沒有無生，不向塵想，並且迴轉塵想之心，趨向無塵想，稱為十回向（十回向：菩薩修行的十個迴向位）。無塵無想的觀行現前，稱為十地（十地：菩薩修行的十個地）。塵想的結習完全清凈，稱為佛地（佛地：佛的境界）。問：哪裡說從初心到佛地都沒有塵想呢？答：《涅槃經》說，發心和畢竟（畢竟：最終的證悟）二者沒有分別。像這樣的兩種心，最初的發心最為難得。《華嚴經》說，初發心時就是佛。只是因為觀行的明昧不同，所以才有各個位階的差別。問：既然塵識的位階沒有淺深之分，那麼我空（我空：證悟沒有獨立的自我）和法空（法空：證悟一切事物沒有自性）也沒有淺深之分。為什麼《攝大乘論》等經論說，十解（十解：對佛法的十種理解）菩薩證得人空（人空：對自我的空性認知），而未證得法空？答：需要深刻理解這個道理。我和法都是想心所產生的，都可以稱為塵。在塵的範圍內破除它們，自然有難易之分。人塵（人塵：對自我的執著）用五情（五情：五種感官）去執取而不可得，所以容易去除，十住菩薩就能證得人無我（人無我：對自我空性的證悟）。法塵（法塵：對事物現象的執著）用五情去執取卻可以得到，所以難以破除，因此未證得法無我。這與前面的意義並不矛盾。論述本始義（本始義：事物本來的意義）說。

【English Translation】 English version Yes. For worldly people, 'real name' is the ultimate truth (諦, satya: the true and unfailing principle). The 'Destruction of Emptiness' chapter in the Śataśāstra also says the same. For worldly people, conventional truth (俗諦, saṃvṛti-satya: the truth that conforms to worldly understanding) is real, so it can be used as a standard for measuring truth. But for sages, conventional truth is not real, so it cannot be used as the ultimate truth. It should be understood that in reality, there are no dharmas (諸法, dharmas: all things and phenomena). It is only in the cognition of consciousness that dharmas are considered to exist. In the cognition of consciousness, there is horizontal discrimination. Horizontal discrimination is consciousness (識, vijñāna: consciousness). Question: Since dust (塵, dust: sensory objects) and consciousness (識, vijñāna: consciousness) have no shallow or deep distinctions, from which stage does a Bodhisattva practice the contemplation of no-dust? And from which stage does one practice the contemplation of no-consciousness? Answer: From the initial aspiration (初發心, prathama-citta-utpāda: the initial arising of the Bodhi-mind) to the stage of Buddhahood, one is practicing the contemplation of no-dust and no-consciousness. Why is this so? Horizontally discussing the myriad dharmas and vertically analyzing the four possibilities (四句, catuṣkoṭi: the four possibilities in Buddhist logic, namely 'is', 'is not', 'both is and is not', 'neither is nor is not') are all seen by the mind of thought (想心, saṃjñā-citta: the mind of delusive discrimination). Transcending the four possibilities and cutting off the hundred negations (百非, śata-pratiṣedha: all erroneous views), this is the true nature of all dharmas (諸法實相, dharma-lakṣaṇa: the true nature of all things). From the initial aspiration, a Bodhisattva begins to learn the contemplation of reality. Therefore, the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra says that from the initial aspiration, a Bodhisattva begins to learn non-attainment (無所得, aprāpti: non-attachment to anything). Non-attainment means not being attached to dust and consciousness, so it is called non-attainment. From the initial aspiration, one believes that all dharmas are produced by the mind of thought, and that what is thought is originally and ultimately unborn, and that the mind that thinks is also originally unborn. Such faith and understanding are called the Ten Faiths (十信, daśa-śraddhā: the ten stages of faith in practice). Gaining this understanding and the contemplation of the mind reaching its position is established as the Ten Dwellings (十住, daśa-vihāra: the ten dwelling stages of a Bodhisattva's practice). Therefore, the sutra says that entering the samādhi (三昧, samādhi: meditative concentration) of principle is called the Ten Dwellings. Based on this understanding, one arises in practice, which is called the Ten Practices (十行, daśa-caryā: the ten practice stages of a Bodhisattva's practice). Knowing that dust-thoughts do not arise, thoughts constantly arise, there is no non-arising, not turning towards dust-thoughts, and turning the mind of dust-thoughts towards no-dust-thoughts is called the Ten Dedications (十回向, daśa-pariṇāmanā: the ten dedication stages of a Bodhisattva's practice). The contemplation and practice of no-dust and no-thought manifesting is called the Ten Grounds (十地, daśa-bhūmi: the ten grounds of a Bodhisattva's practice). The complete purification of the habitual tendencies of dust-thoughts is called the Buddha Ground (佛地, buddha-bhūmi: the state of Buddhahood). Question: Where does it say that from the initial aspiration to the Buddha Ground there are no dust-thoughts? Answer: The Nirvana Sutra says that the initial aspiration and the ultimate (畢竟, niṣṭhā: final enlightenment) are not different. Of these two minds, the initial aspiration is the most difficult to attain. The Avataṃsaka Sūtra says that the initial aspiration is the Buddha. It is only because the clarity of contemplation and practice differs that there are differences in the various stages. Question: Since the stages of dust and consciousness have no shallow or deep distinctions, then the emptiness of self (我空, pudgala-śūnyatā: the realization of no independent self) and the emptiness of dharmas (法空, dharma-śūnyatā: the realization that all things have no inherent existence) also have no shallow or deep distinctions. Why do the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other sutras and treatises say that the Bodhisattva of the Ten Understandings (十解, daśa-parijñā: ten kinds of understanding of the Dharma) attains the emptiness of self (人空, pudgala-śūnyatā: the realization of the emptiness of self) but has not attained the emptiness of dharmas? Answer: It is necessary to deeply understand this principle. Self and dharmas are both produced by the mind of thought and can both be called dust. Within the scope of dust, breaking them naturally has easy and difficult aspects. The dust of self (人塵, pudgala-dust: attachment to self) cannot be obtained by grasping with the five senses (五情, pañca-indriya: five senses), so it is easy to remove, and the Bodhisattva of the Ten Dwellings can attain the non-self of persons (人無我, pudgala-nairātmya: the realization of the emptiness of self). The dust of dharmas (法塵, dharma-dust: attachment to phenomena) can be obtained by grasping with the five senses, so it is difficult to break, and therefore the emptiness of dharmas has not been attained. This is not contradictory to the previous meaning. Discussing the meaning of the origin (本始義, mūla-artha: the original meaning of things) says.

。大品云。一切法不生故波若生。所言一切法本不生者。通而言之。所謂之境能謂之心皆本不生。別而言之。實無塵生想謂言生。今所謂境既本不生。能謂之心即無生。如所想炎水既本不生。能想之心即亦無生。然能謂所謂顛倒既本不生。對此而明波若即是本生。故顛倒本不生波若本生。此二本相對也。于顛倒本見是諸法生。于顛倒即波若本不生。此亦二本相對也。約緣今顛倒生。亦約緣今波若不生。亦就佛今顛倒不生。今波若生。此二今相對也。顛倒本不生於緣今生。波若本生於緣今不生。約佛顛倒本不生今不生。波若本生今生。此文略論本末。此可釋本有今無偈。及通一切迷悟宜熟思之。三種畢竟空義。問成實等亦明假實空。即辨塵空與今何異。答一切佛法明三種無生畢竟空。一者諸法實相本清凈無塵及想。二者眾生橫謂言有。此謂亦無。如無炎水橫謂言有亦無水生。是以六道本來不起。三者十方諸佛隨倒情說有塵亦無塵想法起。如隨渴人說有炎水實無水起可用。以為深觀行意也。外道之人都不知此三。毗曇但知瓶人等塵無亦不了此三無。成實雖知無人法塵不知三本性無。故與大乘為異也。

百論序疏(畢)

百論疏捲上

釋吉藏撰

釋舍罪福品第一

此論玄義已入大科。今釋品

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：《大品般若經》中說：『一切法不生，所以般若生。』所說的一切法本來不生，從普遍意義上講，是指作為對象的『境』和能認識的『心』，都本來不生。從個別意義上講，實際上沒有『塵』的產生，卻錯誤地認為有『想』的產生，並用語言表達出來，就叫做『生』。現在所說的『境』既然本來不生，能認識的『心』也就無生。比如所想像的海市蜃樓（炎水）既然本來不生，能想像的心也就無生。然而，能認識和所認識的顛倒既然本來不生，對此而顯明的般若就是本生。所以，顛倒本不生，般若本生，這是二者本來的相對。在顛倒中，錯誤地見諸法生；在顛倒中，般若本來不生，這也是二者本來的相對。就因緣來說，現在顛倒生；也就因緣來說，現在般若不生。就佛來說，現在顛倒不生，現在般若生，這是二者現在的相對。顛倒本來不生，因緣和合現在生；般若本來生，因緣和合現在不生。就佛來說，顛倒本來不生，現在也不生；般若本來生，現在也生。這段文字簡略地論述了本和末的關係。這可以用來解釋『本有今無』的偈頌，並且貫通一切迷和悟，應該仔細思考。三種畢竟空的意義是：有人問，成實宗等也闡明假和實空，這和辨析『塵』的空有什麼不同？回答是，一切佛法闡明三種無生畢竟空：第一，諸法的實相本來清凈，沒有『塵』和『想』；第二，眾生錯誤地認為有，這種認為也是沒有的。比如沒有海市蜃樓，卻錯誤地認為有，實際上也沒有水的產生，所以六道輪迴本來不起。第三，十方諸佛隨順眾生的顛倒之情，說有『塵』，實際上既沒有『塵』，也沒有『想』的產生。比如隨順口渴的人，說有海市蜃樓，實際上沒有水產生，可以用它來作為深觀修行的意趣。外道之人完全不知道這三種空。毗曇宗只知道瓶子、人等『塵』的空，也不瞭解這三種無。成實宗雖然知道無人和法『塵』，但不知道三種本性無，所以和大乘不同。百論序疏（結束）百論疏捲上釋吉藏撰釋舍罪福品第一這部論的玄義已經進入大科，現在解釋品。

【English Translation】 English version: The Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra says: 'All dharmas (phenomena, laws) do not arise, therefore prajna (wisdom) arises.' What is meant by all dharmas originally not arising, generally speaking, refers to both the 'objects' (境) of perception and the 'mind' (心) that cognizes them, both of which originally do not arise. Specifically speaking, there is actually no arising of 'dust' (塵), but the mistaken thought that 'thought' (想) arises, and expressing it in language, is called 'arising.' Now, since the so-called 'objects' originally do not arise, the 'mind' that cognizes them is also without arising. For example, since the imagined mirage (heat haze, 炎水) originally does not arise, the mind that imagines it is also without arising. However, since the 'inversion' (顛倒) of what is cognized and what cognizes originally does not arise, the prajna that clarifies this is originally arising. Therefore, inversion originally does not arise, prajna originally arises; these two are originally relative. In inversion, one mistakenly sees the arising of all dharmas; in inversion, prajna originally does not arise; these two are also originally relative. In terms of conditions, inversion arises now; also in terms of conditions, prajna does not arise now. In terms of the Buddha, inversion does not arise now, prajna arises now; these two are presently relative. Inversion originally does not arise, but arises now due to conditions; prajna originally arises, but does not arise now due to conditions. In terms of the Buddha, inversion originally does not arise, and does not arise now; prajna originally arises, and arises now. This passage briefly discusses the relationship between the original and the derivative. This can be used to explain the verse 'originally existing, now non-existent,' and to connect all delusion and enlightenment; it should be carefully considered. The meaning of the three kinds of ultimate emptiness is: Someone asks, the Satyasiddhi school, etc., also explain the emptiness of the false and the real; how is this different from analyzing the emptiness of 'dust'? The answer is, all Buddhist teachings explain the three kinds of non-arising ultimate emptiness: first, the true nature of all dharmas is originally pure, without 'dust' and 'thought'; second, sentient beings mistakenly think there is, but this thinking is also non-existent. For example, there is no mirage, but one mistakenly thinks there is; in reality, no water arises, so the six realms of existence originally do not arise. Third, the Buddhas of the ten directions, in accordance with the inverted feelings of sentient beings, say there is 'dust,' but in reality, neither 'dust' nor the arising of 'thought' exists. For example, in accordance with a thirsty person, one says there is a mirage, but in reality, no water arises; this can be used as the intention for profound contemplation and practice. Those of non-Buddhist paths completely do not understand these three emptinesses. The Abhidharma school only knows the emptiness of 'dust' such as pots and people, and does not understand these three non-existences. Although the Satyasiddhi school knows the 'dust' of no person and no dharma, it does not know the non-existence of the three original natures, so it is different from the Mahayana. End of Commentary on the Introduction to the Hundred Treatise (Bai Lun). Commentary on the Hundred Treatise, Volume 1 Composed by Shi Jizang Explanation of the First Chapter: Relinquishing Merit and Demerit The profound meaning of this treatise has already entered the main outline. Now, I will explain the chapter.

名開為六意。明品偈第一。釋偈義第二。辦多少第三。釋相生第四。釋品名第五。簡舍破第六。此論梵本有于百偈。肇師云。后五十偈於此土無益。故闕而不傳。依其本名猶稱百也。問今所存者為是前之五十。為是后之五十。為擇其精要取五十耶。答肇公既云后五十偈於此土無益。故知今之所翻是前五十矣。問前之五十明義為不盡。答始舍罪福終辨破空邪無不破正無不顯。則義無不備也。釋偈義第二。總談設教凡有三門。一但有長行無有偈頌。如大品之類。二但有偈頌無有長行。如法句之流。三具存二說。如法華經等。在經既爾。論亦例之。一但有偈無有長行。如中論也。二但長行無有偈頌。即是斯文。三具二種。如十二門論。問何故經論辨此三耶。答蓋是適化不同應機而作。故龍樹十住毗婆沙云。或有樂長行。或有樂偈頌。或有樂雜說莊嚴章句者。所好各不同。我隨而不捨。問斯論既是長行。何故云論有百偈從偈立名。答偈有二種。一者通偈二者別偈。言別偈者。謂四言五言六言七言皆以四句而成。目之為偈。謂別偈也。二者通偈謂首盧偈。釋道安云。蓋是胡人數經法也。莫問長行與偈但令三十二字滿即便名偈。謂通偈也。中論十二門即是別偈。斯論謂通偈也。婆沙列四種偈。一者以八字為一句。三十二字為一偈。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『名開為六意』，指本論分為六個部分來闡述其意義：第一，闡明品題偈頌的含義；第二，解釋偈頌的意義；第三，辨析多少；第四，解釋相生關係；第五，解釋品名；第六，簡要地捨棄和破除錯誤的觀點。這部論的梵文字來有一百首偈頌。鳩摩羅什（Kumarajiva）大師說，後面的五十首偈頌對這個地方（指中國）沒有益處，所以就省略而不翻譯了。但依據原本的名稱，仍然稱為《百論》。問：現在所儲存的是前面的五十首，還是後面的五十首？還是選擇其中的精華，取五十首呢？答：鳩摩羅什（Kumarajiva）大師既然說後面的五十首偈頌對這個地方沒有益處，所以可以知道現在所翻譯的是前面的五十首。問：前面的五十首偈頌闡明的意義是否不完整？答：從開始捨棄罪福的觀念，到最終辨析破除空性的邪見，沒有不破除的，沒有不顯明的，那麼意義就完備了。『釋偈義第二』，總的來說，設立教法有三種方式：第一種只有長行文，沒有偈頌，如《大品般若經》（Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra）之類；第二種只有偈頌，沒有長行文，如《法句經》（Dharmapada）之類；第三種長行文和偈頌都具備，如《法華經》（Lotus Sutra）等。經典是這樣，論典也是如此。第一種只有偈頌，沒有長行文，如《中論》（Mulamadhyamakakarika）；第二種只有長行文，沒有偈頌，就是這部論；第三種兩種都有，如《十二門論》（Dvadasanikaya-sastra）。問：為什麼經典和論典要區分這三種形式呢？答：大概是因為適應不同的教化對象，應合不同的根機而創作的。所以龍樹（Nagarjuna）在《十住毗婆沙論》（Dasabhumika-vibhasa）中說：『有的人喜歡長行文，有的人喜歡偈頌，有的人喜歡用各種說法來莊嚴文章語句。』每個人的喜好不同，我隨順而不捨棄。問：這部論既然是長行文，為什麼說論有百偈，並且從偈頌來立名呢？答：偈頌有兩種：一種是通偈，一種是別偈。所謂的別偈，是指四言、五言、六言、七言，都是由四句組成的，稱之為偈，這是指別偈。第二種是通偈，指的是首盧偈（śloka）。釋道安（Shi Dao'an）說：『大概是胡人計算經典的方法。』不論是長行文還是偈頌，只要三十二個字滿了，就稱為偈，這是指通偈。《中論》（Mulamadhyamakakarika）和《十二門論》（Dvadasanikaya-sastra）是別偈，這部論指的是通偈。《婆沙論》（Vibhasa）列舉了四種偈：第一種是以八個字為一句，三十二個字為一偈。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Names are opened into six meanings.' The first explains the meaning of the verses in the chapter titles. The second explains the meaning of the verses. The third discusses quantity. The fourth explains dependent origination. The fifth explains the chapter names. The sixth briefly discards and refutes. The original Sanskrit text of this treatise had one hundred verses. Master Kumarajiva (Kumarajiva) said that the last fifty verses were not beneficial in this land (referring to China), so they were omitted and not translated. However, according to the original name, it is still called the 'Treatise on One Hundred Verses'. Question: Is what is preserved now the first fifty, or the last fifty? Or is it a selection of the essence, taking fifty verses? Answer: Since Master Kumarajiva (Kumarajiva) said that the last fifty verses were not beneficial in this land, it is known that what is translated now is the first fifty. Question: Is the meaning explained by the first fifty verses incomplete? Answer: From the beginning of discarding the concept of merit and demerit to the final analysis of refuting the wrong views of emptiness, there is nothing that is not refuted, nothing that is not made clear, so the meaning is complete. 'Explaining the Meaning of the Verses, Second.' Generally speaking, there are three ways to establish teachings: the first has only prose, without verses, such as the 'Large Perfection of Wisdom Sutra' (Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra); the second has only verses, without prose, such as the 'Dharmapada'; the third has both prose and verses, such as the 'Lotus Sutra'. As it is in the sutras, so it is in the treatises. The first has only verses, without prose, such as the 'Middle Treatise' (Mulamadhyamakakarika); the second has only prose, without verses, which is this treatise; the third has both, such as the 'Twelve Gate Treatise' (Dvadasanikaya-sastra). Question: Why do the sutras and treatises distinguish these three forms? Answer: It is probably because they are created to adapt to different audiences and to suit different capacities. Therefore, Nagarjuna (Nagarjuna) said in the 'Ten Stages Vibhasa' (Dasabhumika-vibhasa): 'Some people like prose, some people like verses, and some people like to adorn the text with various expressions.' Everyone has different preferences, and I follow them without abandoning them. Question: Since this treatise is prose, why is it said that the treatise has one hundred verses, and the name is based on the verses? Answer: There are two kinds of verses: one is general verses, and the other is specific verses. The so-called specific verses refer to four-character, five-character, six-character, and seven-character verses, all of which are composed of four lines, and are called verses, which refers to specific verses. The second is general verses, which refers to śloka verses. Shi Dao'an (Shi Dao'an) said: 'It is probably the method of counting scriptures by the Hu people.' Whether it is prose or verses, as long as thirty-two characters are full, it is called a verse, which refers to general verses. The 'Middle Treatise' (Mulamadhyamakakarika) and the 'Twelve Gate Treatise' (Dvadasanikaya-sastra) are specific verses, and this treatise refers to general verses. The 'Vibhasa' lists four kinds of verses: the first is with eight characters per line and thirty-two characters per verse.

此是結偈法。名阿莬吒闡提。是經論數法。亦是計書寫數法。二者或六字為句名初偈。三者二十六字為句者是后偈。此偈名摩羅。四者減六字為句。此偈名周利荼。今謂四種中百論偈是最初偈也。所言偈者。外國稱為祇夜亦云竭夜。今略其煩故但云偈。此土翻之句也頌也。有人言。偈是此門之名。訓之為竭。以其明義竭盡故稱為偈。辨多小第三。什師云。論凡二十品。品各五偈。故合有百偈。問觀此論文長短不定。初舍罪福將及半卷。一異等章唯有數紙。若品各五偈則並應百六十字。云何少多不同。答據彼梵文。提婆本論則品各四偈字無少多。而今有長短者凡有三義。一者天親注論有其少多。難解者則廣釋。易見者則略明。故文成豐約也。二者注論之人觀品形勢。若起盡難明則義生問答鉤瑣蟬聯。故品則長。若始末易明直釋而已。在文則短。三者羅什翻論詳察機宜。有益者則廣翻。無利者則略譯。是以品文有其長短。諸講匠不體斯意故謬釋紛綸。相生第四。言十品者。一舍罪福。二破神。三破一。四破異。五破情。六破塵。七破因。中有果。八破因中無果。九破常。十破空。問斯論十品何因緣故初舍罪福。答九十六術但知起罪感彼三塗。未悟著福迴流六趣。今欲示其出要之津。是故建篇明舍罪福。舍罪福則義無不員。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：這是結偈的方法，名為阿莬吒闡提（一種偈的名稱）。這是經論中計算偈頌數量的方法，也是記錄書寫數量的方法。其中，每六個字為一句的稱為初偈。每二十六個字為一句的稱為后偈，此偈名為摩羅。每句減少六個字的偈，此偈名為周利荼。現在所說的四種偈中，《百論》中的偈是最初的偈。所說的偈，在外國被稱為祇夜（Geya，應頌）或竭夜（Gatha，頌），現在省略其繁瑣的說法，只稱為偈。在漢地，翻譯為『句』或『頌』。有人說，偈是此門（指偈頌）的名稱，訓釋為『竭』，因為其意義闡述詳盡，所以稱為偈。辨別多少第三。鳩摩羅什法師說，《百論》共有二十品，每品各有五偈，所以總共有百偈。問：觀察此論文，長短不定。最初的《舍罪福品》將近半卷，而《一異品》等章節只有幾頁。如果每品各有五偈，那麼總共應該有一百六十字，為什麼會有多少不同的情況？答：根據梵文字的提婆（Aryadeva）本論，每品各有四偈，字數沒有多少的差別。而現在有長短不同的情況，總共有三種原因。一是天親（Vasubandhu）的註釋論有少有多的情況，難解的地方就詳細解釋，容易理解的地方就簡略說明，所以文章就顯得豐滿或簡略。二是註釋論的人觀察品的形勢，如果起始和結尾難以明確，那麼就產生義理上的問答，鉤鎖蟬聯，所以品就顯得長。如果起始和結尾容易明確，就直接解釋，文章就顯得短。三是鳩摩羅什（Kumarajiva）翻譯論時，詳細考察時機和適宜性，有益的地方就廣泛翻譯，沒有利益的地方就簡略翻譯。因此，品的文章有長短之分。各位講經的法師不瞭解這個意思，所以謬誤的解釋紛繁雜亂。相生第四。所說的十品是：一、《舍罪福品》，二、《破神品》，三、《破一品》，四、《破異品》，五、《破情品》，六、《破塵品》，七、《破因中有果品》，八、《破因中無果品》，九、《破常品》，十、《破空品》。問：這部論的十品，因為什麼因緣首先講述《舍罪福品》？答：九十六種外道（指當時印度流行的各種外道思想）只知道造罪會感得三惡道（地獄、餓鬼、畜生），沒有領悟到執著于福報也會迴流於六道（天、人、阿修羅、地獄、餓鬼、畜生）。現在想要指示他們超出輪迴的關鍵，所以建立此篇來闡明捨棄罪福。捨棄罪福，那麼義理就沒有不圓滿的。

【English Translation】 English version: This is the method of concluding verses, named 'Amoṭā Chandi' (name of a type of verse). This is the method of counting verses in scriptures and treatises, and also the method of recording the number of writings. Among them, that which has six characters per line is called the 'initial verse'. That which has twenty-six characters per line is called the 'latter verse', and this verse is named 'Mala'. The verse that reduces six characters per line is called 'Zhouli Tu'. Now, among the four types of verses mentioned, the verses in the 'Śataśāstra' (Treatise in One Hundred Verses) are the initial verses. What is called 'verse' is called 'Geya' (to be sung) or 'Gatha' (hymn) in foreign countries. Now, omitting its cumbersome expression, it is simply called 'verse'. In the Han region, it is translated as 'line' or 'ode'. Some say that 'verse' is the name of this door (referring to verses), interpreted as 'exhaust', because its meaning is explained exhaustively, so it is called 'verse'. Discriminating Many and Few, the Third. The Dharma Master Kumarajiva said that the 'Śataśāstra' has a total of twenty chapters, each chapter having five verses, so there are a total of one hundred verses. Question: Observing this treatise, the length is not fixed. The initial 'Abandoning Sin and Merit Chapter' is nearly half a scroll, while the 'One and Different Chapter' and other chapters are only a few pages. If each chapter has five verses, then there should be a total of one hundred and sixty characters, why are there different situations of more or less? Answer: According to the Sanskrit text of the Aryadeva's original treatise, each chapter has four verses, and there is no difference in the number of characters. Now, there are different lengths, there are three reasons in total. First, Vasubandhu's commentary has more or less, difficult places are explained in detail, and easy places are explained briefly, so the article appears full or concise. Second, the person who comments on the treatise observes the form of the chapter, if the beginning and end are difficult to clarify, then questions and answers arise in the meaning, interlocked and connected, so the chapter appears long. If the beginning and end are easy to clarify, it is directly explained, and the article appears short. Third, when Kumarajiva translated the treatise, he carefully examined the timing and suitability, beneficial places were widely translated, and unprofitable places were briefly translated. Therefore, the articles of the chapters have different lengths. The Dharma masters who lecture on the scriptures do not understand this meaning, so the erroneous explanations are chaotic and complicated. Mutual Arising, the Fourth. The ten chapters mentioned are: 1. 'Abandoning Sin and Merit Chapter', 2. 'Refuting God Chapter', 3. 'Refuting One Chapter', 4. 'Refuting Different Chapter', 5. 'Refuting Sentiment Chapter', 6. 'Refuting Dust Chapter', 7. 'Refuting Cause with Effect Chapter', 8. 'Refuting Cause without Effect Chapter', 9. 'Refuting Permanence Chapter', 10. 'Refuting Emptiness Chapter'. Question: Why does this treatise first discuss the 'Abandoning Sin and Merit Chapter'? Answer: The ninety-six heretical paths (referring to various heretical thoughts popular in India at that time) only know that creating sin will lead to the three evil realms (hell, hungry ghosts, animals), and have not realized that attachment to merit will also flow back into the six realms (heaven, humans, asuras, hell, hungry ghosts, animals). Now, wanting to show them the key to transcending reincarnation, this chapter is established to clarify the abandonment of sin and merit. Abandoning sin and merit, then the meaning is complete.

但外道不受三空而立有神我。故第二破神。神義不立舉法來救。但一異為萬化大宗。宜前破洗。故有破一異二品。一異理隱容可應無。情塵顯現必當是有。仍復破之。故有情塵二品。外云。若無情塵則壞因果。因果不壞則情塵不無。故次因中有果無果二品。自上已來並破無常。五種常法獨未除之。故須破常。常與無常皆是有法。有法被破則墮于空。故次破空也。釋品名第五。罪以摧拆為義。造不善業感彼三塗。得於苦報摧拆行人。目之為罪。福是富饒為義。起于善業招人天樂果。故稱為福。舍者入實相觀心無所依。故稱為舍。問罪招苦報可得云舍。福感樂果云何亦棄。答罪住時苦。福滅時苦。以二時並苦故宜須雙棄。問罪福為是因名為是果稱。答罪福是因而受果稱。所以然者。就果彰罪福其義則顯。故舍義方成。如罪報是苦故不應起罪。福報滅苦不應著福。以果既有過患故宜應舍因。因受果名意在於此。問福滅時苦。云何得依福舍罪。答福有二時成兩舍義。福報生時樂故依之舍罪。福報滅時苦故依空以舍福也。問罪若可舍故不造罪者。福既可舍亦應不修福耶。答有所得心而起罪福者。菩薩從初發心皆不起也。今為始行之人入道次第。三義論之。罪但舍不取。空無相但取不捨。福則亦取亦舍。為欲依福舍罪故須修福。為

欲入空是以舍之。問經云取捨是斷常戲論。今云何明取捨義耶。答今明舍者非取捨之舍。下云舍名心不著。以無得無依故名為舍。即是舍除取捨故名為舍。又為對眾生兩取故明二舍。兩取病若除則無所舍。問既罪福二舍亦應邪正兩除。云何破邪而申于正。答若以罪為邪以福為正。即是邪正兩舍。但今明二取墮二邊故名之為邪。兩舍是中道名之為正。故非類也。問舍罪福為何等人。答為始行人則依福舍罪。為久行人則依空舍福。此二人攝一切人盡。故為二人明二教也。又外道有二。一者起有見。二起無見。修善舍惡破于無見。罪福俱棄破于有見。即是非有非無中道之義。故明兩舍。又為凡夫明兩舍。為二乘辨罪福。以凡夫著有故有六道罪福。今明罪福性空不應著有。二乘滯空。證空之時不能即知罪福宛然。故明雖畢竟空而罪福宛然。兩舍即是波若。罪福即為方便。欲令一切凡夫二乘具波若方便故明兩舍。即是法華度五百由旬義也。又佛法有二。一世間教二出世法。若明五戒招人十善感天故誡惡勸善此世間教也。若明法尚應舍何況非法故依彼三空舍於二善得三乘聖道謂出世教也。今明舍罪謂世間教。次明舍福辨出世教。故建篇。兩舍則總攝五乘。良以外道邪言障五乘教。故偏破邪言遍申佛教。又佛法有二。一小乘教二大乘

法。舍惡修善棄生死而取涅槃謂小乘教也。無惡可舍無善可取。涅槃非寂靜生死不雜亂謂大乘教也。故明此兩舍則攝大小乘。以外道雙障世出世教故論主雙破雙申。又智度論云。無生法忍有二種障。一殺盜等名為粗障。二取捨心行於施戒稱為細障。今明舍罪則除其粗。次明舍福以息其細。粗細既泯則無生觀現前。三世佛菩薩出世大意令離二障得無生也。又佛法有二諦。為世諦故明依福舍罪。為第一義則依空舍福。以諸佛說法常依二諦。今欲破邪迷申乎二諦。故建言兩舍。亦總破眾迷總申眾教。提婆一期出世如佛不異也。又言舍者蓋是中道之異名佛性之別目。如涅槃云。明與無明愚者謂二。智者了建知其無二。無二之性即是實性。實性者諸中道佛性也。又云。十善十惡亦復如是。故知明於兩舍即辨中道佛性。凈名不二法門品明罪福無二為入不二法門。故知兩舍猶是正觀之異名不二之殊稱也。又欲對小乘取捨之論今建章明兩舍之論。小乘明取捨則是生滅教。故法華云。分別說諸法五眾之生滅。申小乘生滅經即小乘生滅論。大乘是無生滅經。故云為諸菩薩說十二因緣不生滅。申無生滅經即是無生滅論。故中論發旨唱不生不滅。此論命初標于兩舍。故知為簡異小乘取捨論明大乘兩舍論也。問舍有幾種。答略明有二。一者為始學

之人明於漸舍。故初則依福舍罪后則依空舍福。如波若四攝品云。菩薩見眾生起于空倒。欲令其悟于倒空。故漸漸拔之。初于慳法拔出令行佈施。次於施拔之教令持戒。次於戒拔之令修禪。乃至於二乘地拔出令住大乘。此漸舍也。次為大福德深種善根人發旨即明頓舍。謂從初發心即習不二正觀。故不慳不施名為檀那。乃至不智不愚目為波若。

百論疏卷之上(上畢)

百論疏捲上之餘

釋吉藏撰

問罪福有幾種。答泛論罪福凡有六種。一者外道內有邪見故外殺生祀天。蓋是以罪為福判入罪門。若不殺佈施十善之法稱之為福。二者凡夫為三有修善名之為罪。二乘所行出離三界謂之為福。三者二乘所行目之為罪。菩薩所行稱之為福。故涅槃云。求二乘者名為不善。求大乘者名之為善。四者大乘之中行有所得名之為罪。無所得者目之為福。五者得無得二稱之為罪。了達不二名之為福。六者二與不二生心動念。一豪依著悉是乖道。故名之為罪。若非二不二無所依著。則是符理。稱之為福。問此六階罪福悉舍不耶。答一往前之五階就罪中自開福罪。是故舍之。后之一義既符會正道。不明舍也。又此之六義猶涉名言緣觀未寂。故宜並須舍。問竺道生云。善不受報一向鐘佛。成實師云。一念之善有於二義。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本之人明白逐漸捨棄的道理。所以開始時依靠福德捨棄罪業，之後則依靠空性捨棄福德。如《波若四攝品》所說：菩薩見到眾生生起對空性的顛倒執著，想要讓他們領悟顛倒的空性，所以逐漸引導他們。最初從慳吝的法中拔出，讓他們行佈施；其次從佈施中拔出，教導他們持戒；再次從持戒中拔出，讓他們修習禪定；乃至從二乘的境界中拔出，讓他們安住于大乘。這就是逐漸捨棄。其次，對於有大福德、深種善根的人，直接闡明宗旨，讓他們明白頓然捨棄。即從最初發心就修習不二的正觀，所以不慳吝、不佈施，名為檀那（佈施）；乃至不智、不愚，稱為般若（智慧）。

《百論疏》卷之上（完）

《百論疏》捲上之餘

釋吉藏撰

問：罪和福有幾種？答：泛泛而論，罪和福總共有六種。第一種，外道內心有邪見，所以表面上殺生祭祀天神，這是以罪為福，判入罪業之門。如果不殺生，行佈施、十善之法，就稱之為福。第二種，凡夫為三有（欲界、色界、無色界）修善，名為罪；二乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘）所行出離三界，謂之為福。第三種，二乘所行，視之為罪；菩薩所行，稱之為福。所以《涅槃經》說：『求二乘者，名為不善；求大乘者，名之為善。』第四種，大乘之中，行有所得，名之為罪；無所得者，視之為福。第五種，執著有得和無得兩種觀念，稱之為罪；了達不二之理，名之為福。第六種，對於二與不二，生起心念，一毫的依著，都是背離正道，所以名之為罪；如果非二非不二，無所依著，就是符合真理，稱之為福。問：這六個階段的罪福都要捨棄嗎？答：前面五個階段，都是在罪中自己開出福和罪，所以要捨棄。最後一個意義，既然符合正道，就不說捨棄。又，這六個意義，還涉及到名言，緣于觀想，尚未寂滅，所以都應該捨棄。問：竺道生說，善不受報，一向歸於佛；成實師說，一念之善，有於二義。

【English Translation】 English version One who is clear about the gradual abandonment. Therefore, initially, one relies on merit to abandon sins, and later, one relies on emptiness to abandon merit. As the 'Perfection of Wisdom's Four Embracing Dharmas' states: When a Bodhisattva sees sentient beings arising with inverted attachments to emptiness, wishing to awaken them to the emptiness of inversion, they gradually extract them. Initially, they extract them from the Dharma of stinginess, causing them to practice giving. Next, they extract them from giving, teaching them to uphold precepts. Next, they extract them from precepts, causing them to cultivate meditation. Even from the stage of the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna), they extract them, causing them to abide in the Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle). This is gradual abandonment. Secondly, for those with great merit and deeply planted roots of goodness, the essential meaning is directly elucidated, making them understand sudden abandonment. That is, from the initial arising of the mind, they cultivate the correct view of non-duality, so not being stingy and not giving is called Dāna (giving); even not being wise and not being foolish is called Prajñā (wisdom).

Commentary on the Hundred Treatises, Volume One (End)

Remaining of Commentary on the Hundred Treatises, Volume One

Composed by Śīlaskandha (Jizang)

Question: How many kinds of sins and merits are there? Answer: Generally speaking, there are six kinds of sins and merits. First, externalists have wrong views internally, so they outwardly kill living beings to worship gods. This is taking sins as merits, and it is judged to enter the gate of sins. If one does not kill living beings, practices giving, and the ten wholesome dharmas, it is called merit. Second, ordinary people cultivate goodness for the Three Realms (Desire Realm, Form Realm, Formless Realm), which is called sin; what the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) practice to escape the Three Realms is called merit. Third, what the Two Vehicles practice is regarded as sin; what the Bodhisattvas practice is called merit. Therefore, the Nirvana Sutra says: 'Seeking the Two Vehicles is called unwholesome; seeking the Mahāyāna is called wholesome.' Fourth, within the Mahāyāna, practicing with attainment is called sin; those without attainment are regarded as merit. Fifth, clinging to the two concepts of attainment and non-attainment is called sin; understanding the principle of non-duality is called merit. Sixth, for duality and non-duality, arising thoughts and clinging to even a hair's breadth is deviating from the path, so it is called sin; if it is neither duality nor non-duality, without any clinging, then it is in accordance with the truth, and it is called merit. Question: Should the sins and merits of these six stages all be abandoned? Answer: The first five stages are all opening up merit and sin within sin itself, so they should be abandoned. The last meaning, since it is in accordance with the right path, it is not said to be abandoned. Also, these six meanings still involve conceptual language, are based on contemplation, and have not yet become tranquil, so they should all be abandoned. Question: Zhu Daosheng said that good deeds do not receive retribution and always belong to the Buddha; the Satyasiddhi school says that a single thought of goodness has two meanings.

一者報因感人天之果。二者習因相生得佛。今云舍福為同此二義。為異彼兩師。答今所明者有二種善。一有所得二無所得。此之二善具有受報不受報義。若有所得善不動不出。但受有所得報不受無所得報。無所得善能動能出。不受有所得報而受無所得報也。問若有所得之善不受無得報者。何得法華明一念善根皆成佛道。答有得之善是無得初門。因人天善根值佛菩薩。破有得心習無得觀。方乃成佛。非起有得之善而成佛也。問實有三性。何故但舍罪福。答罪福是業能感生死。宜應舍之。無記不爾故不須舍。又如大眾部等明唯有善惡無有無記。故但明舍罪福也。簡舍破第六。論雖十品立名有二。初品云舍。九品名破。通而言之。即破為舍即舍名破。故後文云。如是舍我名得解脫。故知破猶舍矣。而立舍破二名者。罪福報應理不可差故不得云破。但起惡報感三塗。著福不免生死。以明其過是故稱舍。外道橫計常遍之神一異等法二諦不攝。但無而謂有。宜須洗之。故后章名破。又斯論雖有十品。破邪顯正為其大宗。舍罪福品申如來漸舍之教。謂顯正也。自破神已下破諸外道橫存人法。即破邪也。義宗唯二故立名但兩。問若爾則前章不破邪。後段不顯正。答初門顯正正顯則邪破。後門破邪邪破便正顯。但義有傍正故開破顯二章。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本一者，報因感人天之果。（報因：因果報應，感：招致，人天之果：人道和天道的果報）二者，習因相生得佛。（習因：熏習的因，相生：相互作用，得佛：證得佛果）今云舍福為同此二義。為異彼兩師？（舍福：捨棄福報，此二義：指前述兩種因果，彼兩師：指持不同觀點的兩位導師）答：今所明者有二種善。一有所得，二無所得。（有所得：執著于功德的善行，無所得：不執著于功德的善行）此之二善具有受報不受報義。若有所得善不動不出。但受有所得報，不受無所得報。無所得善能動能出。不受有所得報而受無所得報也。（動：能動搖生死，出：能超出輪迴）問：若有所得之善不受無得報者。何得《法華經》明一念善根皆成佛道？（一念善根：一個善念）答：有得之善是無得初門。因人天善根值佛菩薩。破有得心習無得觀。方乃成佛。非起有得之善而成佛也。（破有得心：破除執著于功德的心，習無得觀：修習不執著的觀行）問：實有三性。何故但舍罪福？（三性：指遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性，罪福：罪業和福報）答：罪福是業能感生死。宜應舍之。無記不爾故不須舍。（無記：非善非惡的狀態）又如大眾部等明唯有善惡無有無記。故但明舍罪福也。（大眾部：佛教部派之一）簡舍破第六。論雖十品立名有二。初品云舍。九品名破。通而言之。即破為舍即舍名破。故後文云：『如是舍我名得解脫。』故知破猶舍矣。（舍我：捨棄對自我的執著）而立舍破二名者，罪福報應理不可差故不得云破。但起惡報感三塗。著福不免生死。以明其過是故稱舍。（三塗：地獄、餓鬼、畜生三惡道）外道橫計常遍之神一異等法二諦不攝。但無而謂有。宜須洗之。故后章名破。（外道：佛教以外的宗教，常遍之神：常見於外道典籍中，恒常存在且無所不在的神，二諦：世俗諦和勝義諦）又斯論雖有十品。破邪顯正為其大宗。舍罪福品申如來漸舍之教。謂顯正也。自破神已下破諸外道橫存人法。即破邪也。義宗唯二故立名但兩。問：若爾則前章不破邪。後段不顯正？答：初門顯正正顯則邪破。後門破邪邪破便正顯。但義有傍正故開破顯二章。

【English Translation】 English version Firstly, it is to reap the fruits of humans and devas through causal retribution. (報因: causal retribution, 感: to induce, 人天之果: the fruits of human and deva realms) Secondly, it is to attain Buddhahood through the mutual arising of habitual causes. (習因: habitual causes, 相生: mutual arising, 得佛: to attain Buddhahood) Now, is the 'abandoning of blessings' (舍福: abandoning blessings) the same as these two meanings, or different from those two teachers? (此二義: these two meanings, 彼兩師: those two teachers, referring to teachers holding different views) Answer: What is being explained now are two kinds of good. One is 'with attainment,' and the other is 'without attainment.' (有所得: with attainment, referring to meritorious deeds done with attachment, 無所得: without attainment, referring to meritorious deeds done without attachment) These two kinds of good have the meaning of receiving retribution and not receiving retribution. If it is good 'with attainment,' it does not move or go out. It only receives the retribution of 'with attainment' and does not receive the retribution of 'without attainment.' Good 'without attainment' can move and go out. It does not receive the retribution of 'with attainment' but receives the retribution of 'without attainment.' (動: to move, meaning to shake the cycle of birth and death, 出: to go out, meaning to transcend reincarnation) Question: If good 'with attainment' does not receive the retribution of 'without attainment,' how does the Lotus Sutra state that a single thought of good root can attain Buddhahood? (一念善根: a single thought of good root) Answer: Good 'with attainment' is the initial gateway to 'without attainment.' Because of the good roots of humans and devas, one encounters Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, destroys the mind of 'with attainment,' and practices the contemplation of 'without attainment.' Only then can one attain Buddhahood. It is not by arising good 'with attainment' that one attains Buddhahood. (破有得心: to destroy the mind of 'with attainment,' 習無得觀: to practice the contemplation of 'without attainment') Question: There are truly three natures. Why only abandon sin and blessings? (三性: the three natures, referring to the parikalpita, paratantra, and parinispanna natures, 罪福: sin and blessings) Answer: Sin and blessings are karma that can induce birth and death. It is appropriate to abandon them. 'Non-definitive' is not like this, so there is no need to abandon it. (無記: non-definitive, referring to a state that is neither good nor evil) Furthermore, the Mahasanghika school and others state that there are only good and evil, and no 'non-definitive.' Therefore, they only explain the abandoning of sin and blessings. (大眾部: Mahasanghika, one of the early Buddhist schools) The sixth section briefly discusses abandoning and destroying. Although the treatise has ten chapters, the names established are two. The first chapter is called 'Abandoning,' and the nine chapters are called 'Destroying.' Generally speaking, destroying is abandoning, and abandoning is destroying. Therefore, the later text says, 'Thus, abandoning the self is called attaining liberation.' Therefore, it is known that destroying is the same as abandoning. (舍我: abandoning the self) The reason for establishing the two names of abandoning and destroying is that the retribution of sin and blessings cannot be different in principle, so it cannot be called destroying. However, arising evil retribution induces the three evil realms, and attachment to blessings does not avoid birth and death. To clarify this fault, it is called abandoning. (三塗: the three evil realms, referring to the hell, hungry ghost, and animal realms) Externalists falsely calculate a constant and pervasive god, and the one-ness and other-ness of phenomena are not included in the two truths. They claim existence where there is none, so it is necessary to wash it away. Therefore, the later chapters are called destroying. (外道: externalists, referring to religions other than Buddhism, 常遍之神: a constant and pervasive god, commonly found in externalist texts, 二諦: the two truths, referring to conventional truth and ultimate truth) Furthermore, although this treatise has ten chapters, destroying the heterodox and revealing the orthodox is its main purpose. The chapter on abandoning sin and blessings explains the gradual teaching of abandoning by the Tathagata, which is called revealing the orthodox. From the chapter on destroying the god onwards, it destroys the externalists' false existence of persons and phenomena, which is called destroying the heterodox. The meaning and purpose are only two, so the names established are only two. Question: If that is the case, then the previous chapter does not destroy the heterodox, and the later section does not reveal the orthodox? Answer: The initial gateway reveals the orthodox, and when the orthodox is revealed, the heterodox is destroyed. The later gateway destroys the heterodox, and when the heterodox is destroyed, the orthodox is revealed. However, the meaning has both direct and indirect aspects, so the two chapters of destroying and revealing are opened.

又初門申正破邪。謂對緣假。后就邪。即就緣假。又初門中假正破邪名為對緣。後門借邪破邪亦是對緣。故百論多用對緣。中論多用就緣也。此論二卷文有十品。古舊但明百偈蟬聯十章鉤鎖偈偈顯道章章破邪。故不別科文。斯實妙得論意深見聖心也。但天親釋破空品大明此論凡有三門。初舍罪福。中則破神。后洗一切法。所以分此三者。初示始學之方明生道次第故前舍罪福。但神為眾累之主故次破之。法為障道之根故後方洗也。既是聖者自開。宜應頂受。但此三唯撮提婆之中心。猶未領一部之始末。故今更裁之分為三段。初頂禮佛足終竟是皆邪見。將欲顯正破邪故敬贊三寶請威靈加護。發起論端為緣起分。二從外白佛說何等善法竟破空品來。與外道交言論義。顯正破邪明於論體。三從外曰若如是破有何等利。明論義既竟外道理屈辭窮回邪入正請求利益為論餘勢。三文各二。初文二者。一敬贊三寶請威靈加護髮起論端。二與外道交言諍三寶真偽。次文二者。初舍罪福序如來漸舍教門辨于顯正。破神品已去洗外道人法明乎破邪。後文二者。初明利益。次辨益相。釋歸敬開五門。一明歸敬意。二明歸敬不同。三辨歸敬時節。四明論所歸敬。五明歸敬次第。一明歸敬意。問論初何故歸敬三寶。答凡有十義。一者欲簡經論不同。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本又，最初的門徑是申明正理以破除邪見，這叫做『對緣假』（duì yuán jiǎ，針對因緣和合的假象）。之後針對邪見，就是『就緣假』（jiù yuán jiǎ，順應因緣和合的假象）。最初的門徑中，闡明正理以破除邪見，稱為『對緣』。後面的門徑，借用邪見來破除邪見，也屬於『對緣』。所以《百論》（Bǎi Lùn）多用『對緣』，而《中論》（Zhōng Lùn）多用『就緣』。這部論著分為上下兩卷，共有十品。古時的註疏只說明一百首偈頌前後相連，十章像鎖鏈一樣環環相扣，每首偈頌都闡明真理，每章都破除邪見，因此沒有另外劃分科文。這實在是巧妙地領會了論著的意旨，深刻地洞見了聖人的心意。但是天親（Tiān Qīn，Vasubandhu）在解釋《破空品》（Pò Kōng Pǐn）時，明確指出這部論著總共有三個門徑：最初是捨棄罪福，中間是破斥神我，最後是洗滌一切法。之所以要區分這三者，是因為最初是爲了指示初學者的方法，闡明證道的次第，所以首先捨棄罪福。神我是各種煩惱的根源，所以其次破斥它。法是障礙修道的根本，所以最後才洗滌它。既然是聖者自己開示的，就應該頂戴奉受。但這三點只是提婆（Tí Pó，Deva）論著的中心思想，還沒有領會整部論著的始末。所以現在重新加以裁定，分為三個段落。最初從『頂禮佛足』到『竟是皆邪見』，是爲了闡明正理、破除邪見，所以敬贊三寶，祈請威靈加護，發起論端，作為緣起分。第二部分從『外白佛說何等善法』到『破空品來』，是與外道辯論，闡明正理、破除邪見，明確論著的主體。第三部分從『外曰若如是破有何等利』，是說明論義結束后，外道的道理已經窮盡，辭屈理虧，回邪歸正，請求利益，作為論著的餘勢。這三個部分又各有兩層含義。第一部分的兩層含義是：一是敬贊三寶，祈請威靈加護，發起論端；二是與外道辯論三寶的真偽。第二部分的兩層含義是：一是捨棄罪福，闡述如來逐漸引導的教門，辨明顯正；二是破斥神我，洗滌外道的人法，闡明破邪。第三部分的兩層含義是：一是說明利益；二是辨別利益的相狀。解釋歸敬，分為五個方面：一是說明歸敬的意義；二是說明歸敬的不同；三是辨別歸敬的時節；四是說明論著所歸敬的對象；五是說明歸敬的次第。一是說明歸敬的意義。問：論著的開頭為什麼要歸敬三寶？答：總共有十個方面的意義。一是想要區分經和論的不同。

【English Translation】 English version Furthermore, the initial approach is to declare the correct principle to refute erroneous views, which is called 'dependent origination as a provisional means' (duì yuán jiǎ, targeting the false appearance of conditioned arising). Subsequently, targeting the erroneous views is 'following origination as a provisional means' (jiù yuán jiǎ, according with the false appearance of conditioned arising). In the initial approach, elucidating the correct principle to refute erroneous views is called 'dependent origination'. The subsequent approach, using erroneous views to refute erroneous views, also belongs to 'dependent origination'. Therefore, the Śataśāstra (Bǎi Lùn) mostly uses 'dependent origination', while the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Zhōng Lùn) mostly uses 'following origination'. This treatise is divided into two volumes, comprising ten chapters. Ancient commentaries only explained that the hundred verses are connected sequentially, and the ten chapters are interlinked like a chain, with each verse elucidating the truth and each chapter refuting erroneous views, thus not dividing it into separate sections. This truly grasps the essence of the treatise and deeply perceives the mind of the sages. However, Vasubandhu (Tiān Qīn) in explaining the Examination of Emptiness (Pò Kōng Pǐn) clearly pointed out that this treatise has three approaches: initially, abandoning demerit and merit; in the middle, refuting the self; and finally, washing away all dharmas. The reason for distinguishing these three is that the initial one is to instruct the method for beginners, elucidating the order of attaining the path, so first abandon demerit and merit. The self is the source of all afflictions, so it is refuted next. Dharmas are the root of obstructing the path, so they are washed away last. Since it is the sage's own instruction, it should be respectfully received. But these three points only capture the central thought of Deva (Tí Pó)'s treatise, and have not yet grasped the beginning and end of the entire treatise. Therefore, it is now re-evaluated and divided into three sections. Initially, from 'prostrating at the Buddha's feet' to 'ultimately, all are erroneous views', it is to elucidate the correct principle and refute erroneous views, so praise the Three Jewels, pray for the protection of spiritual power, and initiate the treatise, as the causal origination section. The second part, from 'the outsider asks the Buddha, what are wholesome dharmas' to 'the Examination of Emptiness', is to debate with outsiders, elucidate the correct principle, and refute erroneous views, clarifying the main body of the treatise. The third part, from 'the outsider says, if it is refuted in this way, what benefit is there', is to explain that after the treatise is concluded, the outsider's reasoning is exhausted, their arguments are defeated, they turn from erroneous to correct, and request benefits, as the remaining force of the treatise. Each of these three parts has two layers of meaning. The two layers of meaning of the first part are: first, praising the Three Jewels, praying for the protection of spiritual power, and initiating the treatise; second, debating with outsiders about the truth of the Three Jewels. The two layers of meaning of the second part are: first, abandoning demerit and merit, explaining the teachings gradually guided by the Tathagata, distinguishing the manifestation of correctness; second, refuting the self, washing away the outsider's human dharmas, elucidating the refutation of erroneous views. The two layers of meaning of the third part are: first, explaining the benefits; second, distinguishing the characteristics of the benefits. Explaining the refuge, it is divided into five aspects: first, explaining the meaning of refuge; second, explaining the differences in refuge; third, distinguishing the time of refuge; fourth, explaining the object of refuge in the treatise; fifth, explaining the order of refuge. First, explaining the meaning of refuge. Question: Why does the treatise begin by taking refuge in the Three Jewels? Answer: There are a total of ten aspects of meaning. First, it is to distinguish the difference between sutras and treatises.

佛所說經初明六事。弟子作論首敬三寶。二者今欲如實破邪如實顯正。欲請威靈加護。故敬三寶。三者推功有在。顯無自樹之失。四者初明三寶欲發起後代令于論生信。五者為欲翻邪令識歸宗有地。六者顯示三寶最為吉祥。初標吉祥即吉祥論矣。七者為欲發起論端破邪顯正。八者欲代外阿漚在初故以三寶居首。九者為欲益物。如雜心云開示眾生佛法僧念故敬三寶。十為報恩。由三寶得解。今造論申明即報恩也。二明眾論歸敬廣略有五。一者廣說凡明五事。一者敬佛。二者敬法。三者敬僧。四者敬說經之主。如智度論初贊三寶。次別敬經主之人。五造論意。二者有四。初敬三寶。次明造論意。三者但敬三寶。即如此論。四者敬二。如地論但敬人法。人法者敬三寶不盡。作人法名則總談一切。五者唯敬于佛。如地持論也。此論但敬三寶者。為欲翻邪令識歸依之地亦遍請加護。既非釋經故不別敬經主。既是當時往復亦無造論之意。三明歸敬時節。問提婆何時有此歸敬耶。答提婆初在王廷擊于論鼓。八方論士一時雲集。故先登高座立於三寶。謂一切諸聖中佛聖最第一。一切諸法中佛法最第一。一切諸眾中佛僧最第一。若能屈我此言斬首相謝。破邪已后還於閑林撰以為論。方有此歸敬也。四明所歸敬。問此論為敬一體三寶為敬別

體耶。答為此一問故提婆出興。所以然者。僧佉計一。衛世師執異。既稱外道。今存一異。寧是內人。故不應問也。問外道計邪一異。三寶為正一異。豈可同口而言並皆破斥耶。答雖稱邪正不同而同是一異。一異同故則同是邪。所以同破。問若三寶一異並皆破者。眾生何所依歸。答必謂有人能歸有三寶所歸名為有見。乃是歸有非歸佛也。謂有三可歸即是三見。所以經云。佛見法見及以僧見乃至我人眾生斷常等。見皆可一類也。問若爾應無能歸所歸。答若言無三可歸。則是歸無。復是無見。亦有亦無非有非無非三不三皆是諸見。非歸三也。所以然者。歸三本令息見。今遂于歸生見。豈是歸耶。問若爾今云何歸三寶耶。答此論言而無當破而不執。若能蕭焉無寄。事不失真。即是識三。名歸三矣。問若三寶非一異者。昔何故說三今說一耶。答無名相中為眾生故說於一異。昔為破外道邪三故說三異。今為破內學三異故明不異。欲令內異不異悟非異非不異無言之道耳。問今說一佛指何為一耶。答大意而言。道既無二三寶體寧異耶。今正因一道清凈故名為一。但此一道隨處目之。若依涅槃義。則三寶皆以涅槃為體。是以經云。菩薩思惟。云何三事與我一體。佛自釋言。我說三事即涅槃故名一體。若依佛性義。則三寶皆以佛性為體。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：問：是『一』還是『異』呢？答：正因為有此一問，所以提婆（Deva，論師名）才出世弘法。為什麼這麼說呢？因為僧佉派（Samkhya，古印度數論派）執著于『一』，衛世師派（Vaisheshika，古印度勝論派）執著于『異』，既然他們被稱為外道，現在如果也執著于『一』或『異』，那又怎能算是內道之人呢？所以不應該問這樣的問題。問：外道執著于邪『一』邪『異』，而三寶（Buddha, Dharma, Sangha，佛、法、僧）是正『一』正『異』，難道可以用同樣的言辭來一併破斥嗎？答：雖然稱之為邪正不同，但他們同樣執著于『一』或『異』。因為執著于『一』或『異』是相同的，所以同樣是邪見，因此一同破斥。問：如果三寶的『一』和『異』都要破斥，那麼眾生依靠什麼呢？答：如果一定要說有人能依靠，並認為依靠三寶就是『有見』，那實際上是依靠『有』，而不是依靠佛。認為有三寶可以依靠，那就是三種見解。所以經中說，『佛見、法見以及僧見，乃至我見、人見、眾生見、斷見、常見等等，各種見解都可以歸為一類。』問：如果這樣，那就應該既沒有能依靠的，也沒有所依靠的了？答：如果說沒有三寶可以依靠，那就是歸於『無』，這又是『無見』。亦有亦無，非有非無，非三非不三，這些都是各種見解，都不是真正的依靠三寶。為什麼這麼說呢？依靠三寶本來是爲了止息各種見解，現在反而因為依靠而產生見解，這怎麼能算是真正的依靠呢？問：如果這樣，現在應該如何依靠三寶呢？答：此論的宗旨是言語上不作執著，破除一切而不固守。如果能夠做到內心空寂，無所寄託，事情的真相就不會失真，這就是認識了三寶，可以稱之為依靠三寶了。問：如果三寶既非『一』也非『異』，那麼過去為什麼說『三』，現在又說『一』呢？答：在沒有名相的境界中，爲了眾生的緣故才說『一』或『異』。過去爲了破斥外道的邪『三』，所以說『三異』。現在爲了破斥內道學者執著于『三異』，所以闡明『不異』，想要讓內道學者明白，『異』與『不異』都是戲論，從而領悟那不可言說的真道。問：現在說『一佛』，是指什麼為『一』呢？答：從大意上來說，道既然沒有二，三寶的本體又怎麼會有差異呢？現在正是因為『一道』清凈，所以稱之為『一』。但這『一道』隨處都可以稱呼它。如果依據涅槃（Nirvana，佛教術語，指解脫）的意義，那麼三寶都以涅槃為本體。因此經中說：『菩薩思惟，如何使三事與我成為一體？』佛自己解釋說：『我說三事即是涅槃，所以名為一體。』如果依據佛性（Buddha-nature，佛教術語，指一切眾生皆具成佛的可能性）的意義，那麼三寶都以佛性為本體。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: Is it 'one' or 'different'? Answer: It is precisely because of this question that Deva (name of a commentator) appeared in the world to propagate the Dharma. Why is that? Because the Samkhya (an ancient Indian school of thought) clings to 'one,' and the Vaisheshika (another ancient Indian school of thought) clings to 'different.' Since they are called external paths, if one also clings to 'one' or 'different' now, how can one be considered a follower of the internal path? Therefore, such a question should not be asked. Question: External paths cling to the wrong 'one' or 'different,' while the Three Jewels (Buddha, Dharma, Sangha) are the right 'one' or 'different.' Can they be refuted together with the same words? Answer: Although they are called different as right and wrong, they both cling to 'one' or 'different.' Because clinging to 'one' or 'different' is the same, they are both wrong views, and therefore refuted together. Question: If the 'one' and 'different' of the Three Jewels are both to be refuted, then what do sentient beings rely on? Answer: If one insists that there is something to rely on and believes that relying on the Three Jewels is 'having views,' then one is actually relying on 'existence' rather than relying on the Buddha. Believing that there are Three Jewels to rely on is having three kinds of views. Therefore, the sutra says, 'The view of the Buddha, the view of the Dharma, and the view of the Sangha, even the view of self, the view of person, the view of sentient beings, the view of permanence, the view of impermanence, etc., all kinds of views can be classified as one type.' Question: If that's the case, then there should be neither the one who relies nor the one who is relied upon? Answer: If one says that there are no Three Jewels to rely on, then one is returning to 'non-existence,' which is again 'no view.' Existing and not existing, neither existing nor not existing, neither three nor not three, these are all kinds of views, and none of them are truly relying on the Three Jewels. Why is that? Relying on the Three Jewels is originally meant to cease all kinds of views, but now, because of relying, views are produced. How can this be considered true reliance? Question: If that's the case, how should one rely on the Three Jewels now? Answer: The purpose of this treatise is to not be attached to words, to refute everything without clinging. If one can achieve inner emptiness, without any attachment, the truth of things will not be distorted. This is recognizing the Three Jewels, and it can be called relying on the Three Jewels. Question: If the Three Jewels are neither 'one' nor 'different,' then why were they called 'three' in the past, and now they are called 'one'? Answer: In the realm where there are no names and forms, 'one' or 'different' is spoken for the sake of sentient beings. In the past, in order to refute the wrong 'three' of external paths, 'three different' was spoken. Now, in order to refute the internal path scholars' clinging to 'three different,' 'not different' is explained, wanting to make internal path scholars understand that 'different' and 'not different' are both plays, thereby realizing the unspeakable true path. Question: Now that 'one Buddha' is spoken of, what is meant by 'one'? Answer: Generally speaking, since the path has no two, how can the essence of the Three Jewels be different? Now, it is precisely because the 'one path' is pure that it is called 'one.' But this 'one path' can be called anywhere. If based on the meaning of Nirvana (a Buddhist term referring to liberation), then the Three Jewels all take Nirvana as their essence. Therefore, the sutra says, 'The Bodhisattva contemplates, how can the three things become one with me?' The Buddha himself explained, 'I say that the three things are Nirvana, so they are called one.' If based on the meaning of Buddha-nature (a Buddhist term referring to the potential for all beings to become Buddhas), then the Three Jewels all take Buddha-nature as their essence.

所以經云。如是三歸性即是我之性。若就真諦明三寶。三寶今同用真諦為體。是以經云。若能觀三寶常住同真諦。若就常義明三寶。同用常為體。是故經云。我亦不說佛法眾僧無有差別。唯說常住無差別耳。若依凈名入不二法門明三寶。皆無為相與虛空等。即以無為為體。此皆隨義說之無相違背。問經云名一義異名異義異。何者是一體異體耶。答同一常名而有三義。謂一體三寶也。名義俱異此是異體三寶也。問已知一異俱是假名。今論何所歸耶。答考而言之。實不歸於一異。據方便用。一異雙歸。欲申正三破彼邪三。故歸於異三。今因異三悟于無異。故歸不異三。問雙歸一體異體。應雙是大小乘論。答今正以雙含一異乃是大乘。又雖明大小意。正明大故是大乘。又一體為實異體為權。如法華是大乘經。具有權實。今是大乘論。亦具有權實。問佛昔破外道邪三。既是異體。提婆亦破外道邪三申于正三。寧一體耶。答佛昔依小乘破故辨小三。今依大破故辨大三。又若言同破外道邪三同明異體三者。涅槃經亦破外道。可明異體三耶。三寶義中自當委說。問異體三有幾種。答略明有二。一翻邪三明於正三。二治病三。一切眾生皆是病人。佛為良醫法為妙藥僧看病人。故眾生病癒。五釋三寶次第者。就歸三寶即為三別。但三寶次

第有三。一修行次第。前法次僧后佛。以前有所行之法。次修行未滿為僧。行滿具足名佛。二應跡次第。前僧次佛后法。初厭世出家名僧。行行已滿成佛。得佛竟方轉法輪故有法。三化儀次第。前明成佛次明說法後方有僧。今依化儀次第故敬贊三寶。就敬佛之中為二。一總標能禮之儀容所禮之尊貴。二別嘆佛德釋成敬贊。頂禮者此標能禮之儀容也。禮有三種。一者下禮。所謂揖也。二者中禮。四支著地頂不戴足。三者上禮。一身之中頭尊足卑。今以己之尊禮彼之卑。蓋是敬情之至。故是上禮。又有三禮。一形禮而心不禮。如調達禮佛。外形雖禮內欲毀傷。二心禮而形不禮。如善吉端坐觀佛法身佛嘆名真禮佛。三形心俱禮。即是提婆形有府仰名為形禮。達尊卑不二即心禮也。問今云何禮佛。答雖有府仰而實無屈申。即生四智稱順佛心。如雖有府仰而實無屈申即如來智。雖無屈申而有府仰即佛智。任運現前為自然智。不從師得為無師智。作此禮者非唯是禮佛。亦即是佛。以四智名佛。既生四智。寧非佛耶。禮佛既爾。六根運用皆然。則恒入佛知見是三世佛之本意也。佛哀世尊者。此標所禮之尊號。所以標此三號凡有三種。一略說。謂如來應供正遍知。多依梵語呼之。二處中說。即是十號。多以此土之名也。三無量號。如智

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本共有三種次第。第一種是修行次第：先是法，然後是僧，最後是佛。因為先有可以修行的法，其次是修行尚未圓滿的僧，修行圓滿具足才稱為佛。第二種是應跡次第：先是僧，然後是佛，最後是法。最初厭惡世俗而出家稱為僧，修行圓滿成就佛，成就佛之後才開始轉法輪，所以有法。第三種是化儀次第：先說明成就佛，然後說明說法，最後才有僧。現在依照化儀次第，所以恭敬讚歎三寶。在恭敬佛的部分分為兩點：一是總標明能禮拜的儀容和所禮拜的尊貴，二是分別讚歎佛的功德，解釋成就恭敬讚歎的意義。「頂禮」是標明能禮拜的儀容。禮有三種：一是下禮，就是揖；二是中禮，四肢著地，頭不接觸腳；三是上禮，一身之中頭最尊貴，腳最卑賤，現在用自己的尊貴去禮拜對方的卑賤，這是敬意的極致，所以是上禮。又有三種禮：一是形體禮拜而內心不禮拜，如調達（Devadatta）禮拜佛陀，外表雖然禮拜，內心卻想毀壞傷害；二是內心禮拜而形體不禮拜，如善吉（Śubhakīrti）端坐觀想佛的法身，佛讚歎這是真正的禮佛；三是形體和內心都禮拜，就是提婆（Deva）形體上有俯仰，這是形禮，通達尊卑不二，這就是心禮。問：現在應該如何禮佛？答：雖然有俯仰的動作，但實際上沒有屈伸，這就能生出四智，稱合順應佛心。比如，雖然有俯仰的動作，但實際上沒有屈伸，這就是如來智（Tathāgata-jñāna）；雖然沒有屈伸的動作，但有俯仰的姿態，這就是佛智（Buddha-jñāna）。任運自然地顯現，這是自然智（Sahaja-jñāna）；不是從老師那裡學來的，這是無師智（Anācārya-jñāna）。行此禮者，不僅僅是禮佛，也就是佛。因為四智名為佛，既然生出四智，難道不是佛嗎？禮佛既然如此，六根的運用也都是這樣，就能恒常進入佛的知見，這是三世諸佛的本意。「佛哀世尊」是標明所禮拜的尊號。所以標明這三個尊號，總共有三種方式：一是略說，即如來（Tathāgata）、應供（Arhat）、正遍知（Samyak-saṃbuddha），多依梵語稱呼；二是處中說，即是十號，多用此土的名稱；三是無量號，如智

【English Translation】 English version There are three kinds of order. The first is the order of practice: first Dharma, then Saṅgha, and finally Buddha. Because first there is the Dharma that can be practiced, then the Saṅgha whose practice is not yet complete, and only when the practice is complete and perfect is one called Buddha. The second is the order of manifestation: first Saṅgha, then Buddha, and finally Dharma. Initially, renouncing the world and becoming a monk is called Saṅgha, practicing until one attains Buddhahood. Only after attaining Buddhahood does one turn the wheel of Dharma, hence there is Dharma. The third is the order of teaching: first explaining the attainment of Buddhahood, then explaining the Dharma, and only then is there Saṅgha. Now, according to the order of teaching, we respectfully praise the Three Jewels. The respect for the Buddha is divided into two points: first, generally indicating the demeanor of the one who prostrates and the nobility of the one who is prostrated to; second, separately praising the virtues of the Buddha and explaining the meaning of accomplishing respectful praise. 'Prostration' indicates the demeanor of the one who prostrates. There are three kinds of prostration: first, the lower prostration, which is bowing; second, the middle prostration, with four limbs touching the ground and the head not touching the feet; third, the upper prostration, in which the head is the most noble and the feet are the most humble part of the body. Now, using one's own nobility to prostrate to the other's humility is the ultimate expression of respect, so it is the upper prostration. There are also three kinds of prostration: first, physical prostration without mental prostration, like Devadatta's prostration to the Buddha, outwardly prostrating but inwardly wanting to destroy and harm; second, mental prostration without physical prostration, like Śubhakīrti sitting upright and contemplating the Dharma body of the Buddha, the Buddha praised this as true prostration; third, both physical and mental prostration, which is that Deva's body has bowing and raising, this is physical prostration, understanding that nobility and humility are not different, this is mental prostration. Question: How should one prostrate to the Buddha now? Answer: Although there is the action of bowing and raising, there is actually no bending or stretching, this can generate the four wisdoms, conforming and according with the Buddha's mind. For example, although there is the action of bowing and raising, there is actually no bending or stretching, this is Tathāgata-jñāna (Tathāgata wisdom); although there is no bending or stretching, there is the posture of bowing and raising, this is Buddha-jñāna (Buddha wisdom). Manifesting naturally and spontaneously, this is Sahaja-jñāna (innate wisdom); not learned from a teacher, this is Anācārya-jñāna (wisdom without a teacher). One who performs this prostration is not only prostrating to the Buddha, but is also the Buddha. Because the four wisdoms are called Buddha, since the four wisdoms are generated, is one not the Buddha? Since prostration to the Buddha is like this, the functioning of the six senses is also like this, then one can constantly enter the Buddha's knowledge and vision, this is the original intention of the Buddhas of the three times. 'Buddha, the World Honored One' indicates the honorable title of the one who is prostrated to. Therefore, there are three ways to indicate these three titles: first, briefly, as Tathāgata (Thus Come One), Arhat (Worthy of Offerings), Samyak-saṃbuddha (Perfectly Enlightened One), mostly called in Sanskrit; second, moderately, which are the ten titles, mostly using the names of this land; third, countless titles, such as wisdom.

度論明十號外復有諸號。謂度彼岸等。亦如華嚴名號品說。今此中但標三號者凡有二義。一者攝德略周。佛名為覺。所謂智慧。哀是慈悲。謂功德也。福慧既具故為物所尊。略舉此三則德號修攝。二者標佛。此則攝十號。哀與世尊則十號外無量號也。故智度論列於十號始自如來終竟於佛。故知舉佛則攝十號。哀與世尊則十號外無量號也。問何故舉佛攝十號耶。答一欲舉終攝始。二佛號無三寶之初。余號不爾。三佛為智慧。哀為功德。欲下對大哀稱歎福慧俱備。問何故偏以哀為福對上慧耶。答佛是波若。哀為大悲。波若不著有。以超凡故。大悲不染空。以越聖故。為六道之父三聖之尊。是以偏舉也。又今欲破邪顯正。請如來大悲哀愍威靈加護。三者八百年時諸外道等沒邪見海甚可哀傷。亦愿加護使回邪入正也。于無量劫下第二稱歎佛德釋上三號。今就此文八義釋之。第一直嘆佛德。初句嘆大悲外被。次句美結習內除。以具內外二德故天龍咸敬。二者初句嘆功德業。次結習內除嘆智慧業。以福慧既圓為世所尊故天龍咸敬。三者一一句中皆嘆因果。上辨大哀嘆果地功德。于無量劫能拔物苦嘆因中功德也。煩惱已盡嘆因中智斷。習亦除嘆果地智斷。以功德智慧因果既圓為物所尊故天龍咸敬。四者嘆佛三德釋上三號。于無量劫能

拔物苦者釋上哀號。結習已除釋上佛號。天龍咸敬釋世尊號。五者為異外道。外道不能荷物苦故無有大哀。具有結習不得稱佛。尚尊于釋梵。豈為釋梵所尊。故無世尊號。六者能拔物苦異二乘無有慈悲。結習併除異彼菩薩余殘煩惱。故智度論云。為菩薩時斷煩惱。得佛時除習氣。故知明習已除異於菩薩。天龍咸敬異於外道。七者此文鉤瑣次第相釋。初嘆佛大悲能拔物苦者。眾生所患唯畏於苦。故初嘆佛能救之。若自有患何能拔他。故嘆結習內除自無有患能拔物苦。故以後釋前。內自無患外能濟他。此可崇重。故明天龍咸敬。八者初拔物苦明能拔他果患。結習內除自無因累。自無因累即知無果累。拔他苦果即斷物苦因。自他因果患累都亡甚可尊重。故天龍咸敬。亦禮無上下第二敬法寶亦開為二。初標能禮之儀容所禮之尊法。次兩句嘆釋法寶。亦禮者禮佛於前。今次敬法故云亦禮也。然敬三寶凡有三種。一者敬而不嘆。二嘆而不敬。三亦敬亦嘆。即是提婆也。無上照世法者出所禮之法也。言無上者。一切九十六術經書記論既是邪說稱為有上。佛法正說名為無上。就佛法內人天是世間教名為有上。三乘出世之法名為無上。就出世中二乘是方便法名為有上。大乘之法名為無上。若依攝論明三乘義。一者小乘。二者大乘。三者一

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本能拔除眾生痛苦的人，配得上『釋』（Sakya，釋迦）之上的哀號（大悲）。已經斷除煩惱習氣的人，配得上『釋』之上的佛號。天龍都敬仰的人，配得上『釋』世尊的稱號。第五點，這與外道不同。外道不能承擔眾生的痛苦，所以沒有大悲。因為具有煩惱習氣，所以不能被稱為佛。他們尚且尊敬釋梵（帝釋天和梵天），怎麼會被釋梵所尊敬呢？所以沒有世尊的稱號。第六點，能夠拔除眾生痛苦，這與沒有慈悲的二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）不同。煩惱習氣全部斷除，這與還有殘餘煩惱的菩薩不同。所以《智度論》說：『作為菩薩時斷除煩惱，成佛時去除習氣。』因此知道，明白習氣已經斷除，這與菩薩不同。天龍都敬仰，這與外道不同。第七點，這段文字鉤玄提要，次第解釋。首先讚歎佛的大悲，能夠拔除眾生的痛苦，因為眾生所擔憂的只是畏懼痛苦，所以首先讚歎佛能夠救度他們。如果自己還有憂患，怎麼能拔除他人的痛苦呢？所以讚歎佛斷除內在的煩惱習氣，自身沒有憂患，才能拔除眾生的痛苦。所以用後面的話來解釋前面的話。內在自身沒有憂患，外在能夠救濟他人，這值得崇敬尊重，所以說明天龍都敬仰。第八點，首先說拔除眾生的痛苦，說明能夠拔除他人的果報之患。斷除內在的煩惱習氣，自身沒有業因的牽累。自身沒有業因的牽累，就知道沒有果報的牽累。拔除他人痛苦的果報，就是斷除眾生痛苦的業因。自身和他人的因果之患都消亡，非常值得尊重，所以天龍都敬仰。接下來是禮敬，沒有上下之分。第二是敬法寶，也分為兩部分。首先標明禮敬的儀容和所禮敬的尊法。其次兩句讚歎解釋法寶。『亦禮者』，因為前面已經禮敬了佛，現在接著敬法，所以說『亦禮』。然而敬三寶，大致有三種：一是敬而不讚，二是贊而不敬，三是既敬又贊，這就是提婆（Deva，天人）。『無上照世法者』，指出所禮敬的法。說到『無上』，一切九十六種外道的經書記錄和理論，既然是邪說，就稱為『有上』。佛法是正說，稱為『無上』。在佛法內，人天是世間教法，稱為『有上』。三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）是出世間的法，稱為『無上』。在出世間法中，二乘是方便法，稱為『有上』。大乘的法稱為『無上』。如果依據《攝大乘論》說明三乘的意義，一是小乘，二是大乘，三是一乘。

【English Translation】 English version He who removes the suffering of beings deserves the lamentation (great compassion) above 'Sakya' (釋, Śākya). He who has eradicated the bonds of habit deserves the Buddha-name above 'Sakya'. He who is revered by gods and dragons deserves the title of 'Sakya' World-Honored One. Fifthly, this differs from external paths (外道, Waidō). External paths cannot bear the suffering of beings, hence they have no great compassion. Possessing the bonds of habit, they cannot be called Buddhas. They revere even Śakra (釋, Śakra) and Brahmā (梵, Brahmā). How could they be revered by Śakra and Brahmā? Hence, they do not have the title of World-Honored One. Sixthly, being able to remove the suffering of beings differs from the Two Vehicles (二乘, Ershèng) who have no compassion. Completely eradicating the bonds of habit differs from those Bodhisattvas who have remaining afflictions. Therefore, the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra (智度論, Zhìdù Lùn) says: 'When one is a Bodhisattva, one cuts off afflictions; when one becomes a Buddha, one removes habits.' Hence, it is known that clearly eradicating habits differs from Bodhisattvas. Being revered by gods and dragons differs from external paths. Seventhly, this passage is subtle and explains in sequential order. Firstly, it praises the Buddha's great compassion, being able to remove the suffering of beings, because what beings worry about is only fearing suffering, hence it firstly praises the Buddha's ability to save them. If one still has worries, how can one remove the suffering of others? Hence, it praises the Buddha for eradicating internal bonds of habit; one's self has no worries, then one can remove the suffering of beings. Therefore, it uses the latter words to explain the former words. Internally, one's self has no worries; externally, one can aid others. This is worthy of reverence and respect, hence it explains that gods and dragons all revere. Eighthly, firstly, removing the suffering of beings explains the ability to remove the suffering of others' karmic results. Eradicating internal bonds of habit means one's self has no karmic entanglements. If one's self has no karmic entanglements, then one knows there are no karmic results entangling. Removing the karmic results of others' suffering is cutting off the karmic cause of beings' suffering. One's own and others' karmic causes and results of suffering all disappear, which is extremely worthy of respect, hence gods and dragons all revere. Next is reverence, without high or low. Secondly is revering the Dharma Jewel, also divided into two parts. Firstly, it indicates the demeanor of reverence and the revered Dharma. Secondly, the two sentences praise and explain the Dharma Jewel. 'Also revering' (亦禮者, Yì lǐ zhě) is because one has already revered the Buddha, now continuing to revere the Dharma, hence it says 'also revering'. However, revering the Three Jewels generally has three types: one is revering without praising, two is praising without revering, three is both revering and praising, this is Deva (提婆, Dípó). 'The unsurpassed Dharma illuminating the world' (無上照世法者, Wúshàng zhào shì fǎ zhě) points out the Dharma being revered. Speaking of 'unsurpassed' (無上, Wúshàng), all ninety-six types of external paths' scriptures, records, and theories, since they are heterodox teachings, are called 'surpassed' (有上, Yǒushàng). The Buddha-dharma is the correct teaching, called 'unsurpassed'. Within the Buddha-dharma, humans and gods are worldly teachings, called 'surpassed'. The Three Vehicles (三乘, Sānshèng) are transcendent dharmas, called 'unsurpassed'. Within the transcendent dharmas, the Two Vehicles are expedient dharmas, called 'surpassed'. The Mahayana dharma is called 'unsurpassed'. If according to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論, Shè Dàchéng Lùn) explaining the meaning of the Three Vehicles, one is the Small Vehicle, two is the Great Vehicle, three is the One Vehicle.

乘。一乘最勝名為無上。余之二種稱為有上。一乘之內有因有果。因行未極名為有上。果德究竟名為無上。所言照世者。中道實相能生正觀明照世間故云照世。又照世者。由法寶能示邪正及以權實故名照世也。前明無上法寶之體。次云照世。法寶之用。所言法者即此實相體。可揩摸故名為法。問法寶有幾種。答數論師云有四種法寶。一境界法。二無為果。三善業。四文字。智度論五十卷解發趣品云。法有三種。一者無上法所謂涅槃。二涅槃方便謂八聖道。三者一切善語謂八萬法藏十二部經也。能凈瑕穢止戲論者第二嘆釋法寶。今以五番釋之。一者前明無上照世辨法寶之體。今嘆法寶之用。此之體用餘人所無。唯佛能說。故云諸佛世尊之所說。二者無上照世謂生善也。今明滅惡。滅惡生善餘人所無。唯佛能說。故舉人證成。三者照世法謂實相般若。由實相故能生正觀。故名照世也。能凈瑕穢者嘆觀智波若。正觀既生故能滅戲論。諸佛所說者嘆文字波若。非但波若有三種。法寶亦唯此三。謂境智教也。四者前標無上照世二義。此下以二句釋之。能凈瑕穢釋前照世。諸佛所說釋前無上。以能說之人既是世尊故所說之法名為無上。五者為譏外道。外道是邪見之法。不能除物垢。故不能凈于瑕穢。故不名照世人。非世尊所說不名

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：乘。一乘（Ekayana，唯一交通工具，此處指佛乘）最殊勝，名為無上（Anuttara，無與倫比）。其餘二種（指聲聞乘和緣覺乘）稱為有上（superior）。一乘之內有因有果。因行尚未達到極致，名為有上。果德達到究竟，名為無上。所說『照世』，是指中道實相（Madhyamika，事物真實不虛的性質）能產生正觀（Samyag-dṛṣṭi，正確的見解），光明照耀世間，所以稱為照世。又，照世是指，由於法寶（Dharma-ratna，佛法之珍貴）能夠揭示邪正以及權巧和真實，所以稱為照世。前面說明無上法寶的本體，接下來是照世，法寶的作用。所說法，就是指這實相本體，可以觸控和體驗，所以稱為法。問：法寶有幾種？答：數論師（Samkhya，古印度哲學流派）說有四種法寶：一、境界法（vishaya-dharma，感官對像之法），二、無為果（Asamskrta-phala，非因緣和合的果報），三、善業（kusala-karma，有益的行為），四、文字（akshara，書面文字）。《智度論》（Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa）第五十卷解發趣品中說，法有三種：一者，無上法，即涅槃（Nirvana，解脫）；二、涅槃的方便，即八聖道（Arya Ashtanga Marga，達到涅槃的八種正確方法）；三者，一切善語，即八萬法藏和十二部經（dvādaśāṅga-buddhavacana，佛陀教誨的十二個類別）。『能凈瑕穢止戲論』是第二重讚歎解釋法寶。現在用五種方式來解釋它。一者，前面說明無上照世，辨別法寶的本體。現在讚歎法寶的作用。這種本體和作用是其他人所沒有的，只有佛才能說，所以說『諸佛世尊之所說』。二者，無上照世是指產生善。現在說明滅除惡。滅惡生善是其他人所沒有的，只有佛才能說，所以舉出人來證明。三者，照世法是指實相般若（Prajna，智慧）。由於實相，所以能產生正觀，所以稱為照世。『能凈瑕穢』是讚歎觀智般若。正觀產生后，就能滅除戲論。『諸佛所說』是讚歎文字般若。不僅般若有三種，法寶也只有這三種，即境、智、教。四者，前面標出無上照世兩種含義，下面用兩句話來解釋它。『能凈瑕穢』解釋前面的照世，『諸佛所說』解釋前面的無上。因為能說之人是世尊，所以所說的法稱為無上。五者，是爲了譏諷外道。外道是邪見的法，不能去除物體上的污垢，所以不能凈化瑕疵，所以不稱為照世人。不是世尊所說的，不稱為無上。

【English Translation】 English version: Vehicle. The most supreme of the One Vehicle (Ekayana, the only vehicle, referring to the Buddha Vehicle here) is called unsurpassed (Anuttara, unparalleled). The remaining two (referring to the Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) are called superior. Within the One Vehicle, there are cause and effect. When the practice of the cause has not reached its limit, it is called superior. When the merit of the effect has reached its ultimate point, it is called unsurpassed. What is meant by 'illuminating the world' is that the Middle Way Reality (Madhyamika, the true and non-illusory nature of things) can generate right view (Samyag-dṛṣṭi, correct understanding), illuminating the world with light, so it is called illuminating the world. Furthermore, illuminating the world means that because the Dharma Jewel (Dharma-ratna, the preciousness of the Buddha's teachings) can reveal what is wrong and right, as well as expedient and true, it is called illuminating the world. The preceding explains the essence of the unsurpassed Dharma Jewel, and next is illuminating the world, the function of the Dharma Jewel. What is called Dharma refers to this essence of reality, which can be touched and experienced, so it is called Dharma. Question: How many kinds of Dharma Jewels are there? Answer: The Samkhya (an ancient Indian philosophical school) says there are four kinds of Dharma Jewels: first, the objects of sense (vishaya-dharma, the dharma of sensory objects); second, the unconditioned result (Asamskrta-phala, the result not arising from causes and conditions); third, wholesome actions (kusala-karma, beneficial actions); and fourth, written words (akshara, written language). The 50th volume of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, in the chapter on 'Explaining the Path', says that there are three kinds of Dharma: first, the unsurpassed Dharma, which is Nirvana (Nirvana, liberation); second, the expedient means to Nirvana, which are the Eight Noble Paths (Arya Ashtanga Marga, the eight correct ways to reach Nirvana); and third, all wholesome words, which are the eighty-four thousand Dharma treasures and the twelve divisions of scriptures (dvādaśāṅga-buddhavacana, the twelve categories of the Buddha's teachings). 'Able to purify flaws and stop frivolous discussions' is the second praise and explanation of the Dharma Jewel. Now, it is explained in five ways. First, the preceding explains the unsurpassed illuminating the world, distinguishing the essence of the Dharma Jewel. Now, it praises the function of the Dharma Jewel. This essence and function are not possessed by others, only the Buddha can speak of them, so it is said 'spoken by all Buddhas and World Honored Ones'. Second, unsurpassed illuminating the world refers to generating good. Now, it explains eliminating evil. Eliminating evil and generating good are not possessed by others, only the Buddha can speak of them, so people are cited to prove it. Third, the Dharma of illuminating the world refers to the reality of Prajna (Prajna, wisdom). Because of reality, it can generate right view, so it is called illuminating the world. 'Able to purify flaws' is praising the wisdom of contemplation, Prajna. After right view arises, it can eliminate frivolous discussions. 'Spoken by all Buddhas' is praising the Prajna of words. Not only does Prajna have three kinds, but the Dharma Jewel also only has these three, namely, object, wisdom, and teaching. Fourth, the preceding marks out the two meanings of unsurpassed illuminating the world, and the following uses two sentences to explain it. 'Able to purify flaws' explains the preceding illuminating the world, and 'spoken by all Buddhas' explains the preceding unsurpassed. Because the one who can speak is the World Honored One, the Dharma spoken is called unsurpassed. Fifth, it is to ridicule external paths. External paths are the Dharma of wrong views, which cannot remove dirt from objects, so they cannot purify flaws, so they are not called people who illuminate the world. What is not spoken by the World Honored One is not called unsurpassed.

無上。問凈瑕穢止戲論此有何異。答宋代道憑法師釋此論之元首也。瑤公等並探用為疏。其人云。嘆法寶即是論舍罪福品。無上照世此是能捨。謂無相智也。凈瑕穢謂舍罪也。取相之福名為戲論。止戲論即舍福也。大品云。凈修十善業道無諸瑕穢。故知凈瑕穢即舍罪。以此論初品云。舍名心不著。故知著福即是戲論。又瑕是瞋。穢即是貪。戲論為癡。嘆此法寶能滅三毒。又凈瑕穢就喻說門嘆。重者為穢。輕者為瑕。止戲論就法說門嘆。戲論有二。一者愛論。二者見論。如中論法品說。並及下第三次敬僧寶。然歸敬三寶凡有三意。敬佛則標三號三德為廣也。敬法則二號二德為中也。敬僧則一號一德為略。可互類也。然頂禮之言遍敬三寶。但作偈歸嘆。令辭章巧妙故敬佛稱為頂禮。敬法為亦禮。敬僧云並及。八輩者。上辨能禮之容儀。今出所禮之人也。四果四向名為八輩。初但是向非果。后但是果而非向。中間三人亦向亦果。故雜心云。以有五事故說有八人名。前後事各一。中間則有三。然數論及十八部異釋云亦並非正意。今但約虛妄重輕就觀解明昧。故無階級中作階級說。不如數論所定執。問今大乘之論。云何及敬聲聞僧耶。答八輩通於小大不偏局聲聞。故龍樹釋三乘共十地明。聲聞菩薩相配釋之。故知八輩亦通大小。

【現代漢語翻譯】無上。問：『凈瑕穢（凈化瑕疵和污穢）止戲論（停止虛妄的言論），此有何異？』答：宋代道憑法師解釋此論的開端。瑤公等人也採用此觀點來作疏。其人說：『讚歎法寶，即是論中『舍罪福品』。『無上照世』，這是能捨，指的是無相智（不執著于外相的智慧）。凈瑕穢，指的是舍罪。取相之福，名為戲論。止戲論，即是舍福。』《大品般若經》云：『凈修十善業道，無諸瑕穢。』故知凈瑕穢即舍罪。以此論初品云：『舍名心不著。』故知著福即是戲論。又，瑕是瞋（嗔恨），穢即是貪（貪婪），戲論為癡（愚癡）。讚歎此法寶能滅三毒（貪嗔癡）。又，凈瑕穢就譬喻來說，嘆其作用。重者為穢，輕者為瑕。止戲論就法來說，嘆其作用。戲論有二：一者愛論（對世俗的愛戀），二者見論（錯誤的見解）。如《中論·觀法品》所說。並及下第三次敬僧寶。然歸敬三寶凡有三意：敬佛則標三號三德為廣也，敬法則二號二德為中也，敬僧則一號一德為略。可互相類比。然頂禮之言遍敬三寶，但作偈歸嘆，令辭章巧妙，故敬佛稱為頂禮，敬法為亦禮，敬僧云並及。八輩者，上辨能禮之容儀，今出所禮之人也。四果（須陀洹果、斯陀含果、阿那含果、阿羅漢果）四向（須陀洹向、斯陀含向、阿那含向、阿羅漢向）名為八輩。初但是向非果，后但是果而非向，中間三人亦向亦果。故《雜心論》云：『以有五事故說有八人名，前後事各一，中間則有三。』然數論及十八部異釋云亦並非正意。今但約虛妄重輕就觀解明昧，故無階級中作階級說，不如數論所定執。問：『今大乘之論，云何及敬聲聞僧耶？』答：八輩通於小大不偏局聲聞。故龍樹菩薩解釋三乘共十地明，聲聞菩薩相配釋之。故知八輩亦通大小。

【English Translation】 Upādhyāya. Question: 『What is the difference between purifying blemishes and defilements (凈瑕穢) and ceasing frivolous discussions (止戲論)?』 Answer: The Dharma Master Daoping of the Song Dynasty explained the beginning of this treatise. Yao Gong and others also adopted this view to write commentaries. That person said: 『Praising the Dharma Jewel is the 『Abandoning Sin and Merit』 chapter in the treatise. 『Supreme illumination of the world』 refers to the ability to abandon, which is non-dual wisdom (無相智, wisdom without attachment to external forms). Purifying blemishes and defilements refers to abandoning sins. Merit with attachment to forms is called frivolous discussion. Ceasing frivolous discussions means abandoning merit.』 The Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: 『Purely cultivating the ten wholesome karmic paths is without any blemishes or defilements.』 Therefore, purifying blemishes and defilements is known to be abandoning sins. The first chapter of this treatise says: 『Abandoning the mind of name without attachment.』 Therefore, attachment to merit is known to be frivolous discussion. Furthermore, blemishes are anger (瞋, krodha), defilements are greed (貪, lobha), and frivolous discussion is ignorance (癡, moha). Praising this Dharma Jewel can extinguish the three poisons (貪嗔癡, greed, anger, and ignorance). Moreover, purifying blemishes and defilements is praised from the perspective of metaphor. The heavier ones are defilements, and the lighter ones are blemishes. Ceasing frivolous discussions is praised from the perspective of Dharma. There are two types of frivolous discussions: one is the discussion of love (愛論, attachment to worldly love), and the other is the discussion of views (見論, wrong views), as stated in the Madhyamakaśāstra (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā) Chapter on Dharma. And below, the third time, revering the Sangha Jewel. There are three meanings in taking refuge in the Three Jewels: revering the Buddha marks the three titles and three virtues as broad; revering the Dharma marks the two titles and two virtues as medium; revering the Sangha marks one title and one virtue as brief. They can be compared to each other. However, the words 『prostrating in reverence』 universally revere the Three Jewels, but making verses to return and praise makes the language skillful, so revering the Buddha is called prostrating in reverence, revering the Dharma is also reverence, and revering the Sangha is said to be together. The eight types of people, above, distinguish the demeanor of those who can pay homage, and now present the people who are being paid homage to. The four fruits (須陀洹果, Srotaāpanna; 斯陀含果, Sakṛdāgāmin; 阿那含果, Anāgāmin; 阿羅漢果, Arhat) and four paths (須陀洹向, path to Srotaāpanna; 斯陀含向, path to Sakṛdāgāmin; 阿那含向, path to Anāgāmin; 阿羅漢向, path to Arhat) are called the eight types. The first is only the path and not the fruit, the last is only the fruit and not the path, and the three in the middle are both the path and the fruit. Therefore, the Abhidharmasamuccaya says: 『Because of five reasons, it is said that there are eight types of people, one for the beginning and the end, and three in the middle.』 However, the Samkhya school and the different interpretations of the eighteen schools are not the correct meaning. Now, only based on the lightness and heaviness of falsehood, the clarity and obscurity of understanding, a hierarchy is made in the absence of a hierarchy, which is not as fixed as the Samkhya school. Question: 『Now, how does the treatise of the Great Vehicle also revere the Śrāvaka Sangha?』 Answer: The eight types are common to both the Lesser and Greater Vehicles and are not limited to the Śrāvakas. Therefore, Nāgārjuna explains the three vehicles sharing the ten grounds, explaining them in relation to the Śrāvakas and Bodhisattvas. Therefore, it is known that the eight types are also common to both the Lesser and Greater Vehicles.

問聲聞八輩其文易明。菩薩八輩請陳其相。答將智度論釋三乘共地配之亦可知矣。外曰下第二諍三寶之真偽。三番問答。次第相生。即為六意。第一外曰領偈定尊。第二內曰驚問反質。第三外曰出疑呵內。第四內曰對邪顯正。第五外曰敘德齊內。第六內曰懸非指后。總談諸論凡有二種。一稱問答。二名次標內外兩曰。稱問答者。賓主則定。問則賓。答便為主。內外兩曰者。為顯此論賓主不定。或提婆升座外道擊揚。或外道立宗而提婆論義。今標內外兩曰則顯更互為賓主。又餘論多對同學故稱問答。今對異學。宜名內外。問斯論既互為賓主。誰前升座。答如前所明。提婆前登高座稱三寶第一也。問有幾種外耶。答略明二種。一自樹外即僧佉之流。二學內成外即迷大小乘教者也。偈言世尊之所說者。此領上諸佛世尊之所說也。何等是世尊者正定尊也。八百年時所宗非一。是故生問。又論主前以半偈譏彼外人。明向法寶之妙唯是佛說餘人所無。外還領之即以譏于內。是故致問。又外道雖知提婆敬佛以為世尊。但論義之方必須前定也。內曰汝何故生如是疑者。第二驚問反質。凡定有四意。一理不應問。所以然者。天無兩日土無二王。三千世界唯有一佛。若問何等日照何等為尊。理不應問也。二呵外人不領前旨。我前云諸佛世尊

之所說。已稱佛為世尊。何得復問是何等尊。三者欲引出外人令彼廣述師宗為內破本。四者令其難勢萎折故反質之。故於四種答中用反質答也。外曰下第三齣疑呵內即二。前出疑次呵內。出疑之中前總后別。總出疑者。酬前四問。汝言理不應問者。今明道理應問。所以然者。九十六種各稱天無兩日。唯我為尊。二者汝言不領前旨。此亦不然。諸師既各稱世尊。亦各自樹為佛。佛者覺也。故涅槃云。六師云。一切世間不知見覺。唯我師一人獨知見覺。豈非佛耶。三者汝若引我令廣述師宗為汝破本。汝上已列三寶亦應為我破本。四者汝前反質令難舉萎折者。若無道理難可令萎折。既是有理之疑。得汝反質轉更顯明。有人言下第二別出疑事。又分為二。初明天為世尊。次辨人為世尊。所以初天次人者凡有二義。一天勝人劣以為次第。二久劫以來已有于天故天前出。從此劫初始有於人故后列人。所以但列人天者。凡稱世尊不出人天故。舉人天總攝一切。又外道不知有天中之天是於世尊。故但列人天。問中論智度論皆列此天與今何異。答若約人明者。中百二論皆是注論人列。智度論是龍樹自列。就義明者。中論所列舉人。為明法義。所以明法者。論主申佛八不無生。序諸外道有二種謬。一者不知因緣生義。二者不知本自無生。是

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本之所說。已經稱佛為世尊，為何還要再問『是什麼樣的世尊』？第三，想引誘外道之人，讓他們廣泛陳述自己宗派的理論，從而為你們內部瓦解其根本。第四，想讓對方的論難之勢衰弱折服，所以反過來質問。因此在四種回答方式中，採用了反質問的回答。外道說：下面第三部分是提出疑問並呵斥你們內部，分為兩部分。前面是提出疑問，後面是呵斥你們內部。提出疑問之中，又分為總的提出疑問和分別提出疑問。總的提出疑問是，回答前面的四個問題。你說道理上不應該問，現在說明道理上應該問。為什麼呢？九十六種外道各自都稱自己的天是獨一無二的，唯獨自己最為尊貴。第二，你說我不理解你前面的意思，這也不對。各個外道的老師都自稱世尊，也各自樹立自己為佛。佛的意思是覺悟。所以《涅槃經》說，六師說：『一切世間都不知道看見覺悟，只有我的老師一個人獨自知道看見覺悟。』這難道不是佛嗎？第三，你如果引誘我廣泛陳述自己宗派的理論，來為你們瓦解其根本，那麼你上面已經列出的三寶也應該為我瓦解其根本。第四，你前面反過來質問，想讓對方的論難之勢衰弱折服，如果沒有道理，很難讓對方衰弱折服。既然是有道理的疑問，得到你的反質問，反而更加顯明。有人說：下面第二部分是分別提出疑問，又分為兩部分。首先說明天是世尊，其次辨別人是世尊。為什麼先說天再說人呢？一般有兩種含義：一是天勝於人，人劣於天，所以按這個次序。二是久遠劫以來就已經有了天，所以先說天。從這個劫開始才有人，所以後列人。為什麼只列人天呢？凡是稱為世尊的，都離不開人天，所以舉人天就總括了一切。而且外道不知道有天中之天，才是真正的世尊，所以只列人天。問：《中論》、《智度論》都列舉了天，與現在有什麼不同？答：如果從人來解釋，《中論》、《百論》都是註釋論的人列舉的。《智度論》是龍樹菩薩自己列舉的。就意義來解釋，《中論》所列舉的人，是爲了闡明法義。所以闡明法義是，論主陳述佛的八不（不生不滅，不常不斷，不一不異，不來不去）中的無生，序述各個外道有兩種謬誤：一是不知道因緣生起的意義，二是不知道本來無生的道理。

【English Translation】 English version what was said. Having already called the Buddha 'World Honored One' (Shìzūn), why ask again 'What kind of World Honored One is it?' Third, it is intended to entice outsiders to extensively elaborate on their sect's doctrines, thereby undermining their foundation internally. Fourth, it is to weaken and subdue the force of their arguments, hence the counter-question. Therefore, among the four types of answers, the counter-question is used. The outsider says: The third part below raises doubts and rebukes your internal affairs, divided into two parts. The first is raising doubts, and the second is rebuking your internal affairs. Among raising doubts, there are general doubts and specific doubts. The general doubt is to answer the previous four questions. You say that it is unreasonable to ask, but now I clarify that it is reasonable to ask. Why? The ninety-six kinds of non-Buddhist schools each claim that their own god is unique, and only they are the most honorable. Second, you say that I do not understand your previous meaning, but that is not true. Each of the non-Buddhist teachers calls themselves 'World Honored One' and establishes themselves as a Buddha. Buddha means enlightenment. Therefore, the Nirvana Sutra says that the six heretical teachers say: 'All the world does not know seeing and enlightenment, only my teacher alone knows seeing and enlightenment.' Is this not a Buddha? Third, if you entice me to extensively elaborate on my sect's doctrines to undermine your foundation, then the Three Jewels (Triratna) that you listed above should also be undermined by me. Fourth, you previously counter-questioned, wanting to weaken and subdue the force of the argument, but without reason, it is difficult to weaken and subdue. Since it is a reasonable doubt, receiving your counter-question makes it even clearer. Someone says: The second part below raises specific doubts, divided into two parts. First, it explains that the Deva (heavenly being) is the World Honored One, and second, it distinguishes that the human is the World Honored One. Why is the Deva mentioned first and then the human? There are generally two meanings: first, the Deva is superior to the human, and the human is inferior to the Deva, so it follows this order. Second, Devas have existed since ancient kalpas, so the Deva is mentioned first. Humans only began in this kalpa, so humans are listed later. Why are only Devas and humans listed? All those who are called World Honored Ones cannot be separated from Devas and humans, so listing Devas and humans encompasses everything. Moreover, non-Buddhists do not know that the Deva among Devas is the true World Honored One, so only Devas and humans are listed. Question: The Madhyamaka-karika and the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra both list Devas, how is it different from now? Answer: If explained from the perspective of people, the Madhyamaka-karika and the Sata-sastra are both listed by the commentators. The Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra was listed by Nagarjuna (Longshu) himself. In terms of meaning, the people listed in the Madhyamaka-karika are to clarify the meaning of the Dharma. Therefore, clarifying the meaning of the Dharma is that the author states the Buddha's eight negations (neither arising nor ceasing, neither permanent nor impermanent, neither one nor different, neither coming nor going) of non-arising, and prefaces the two errors of the various non-Buddhist schools: first, they do not know the meaning of arising from conditions, and second, they do not know the principle of inherent non-arising.

故佛與外道為諍於法之是非故列彼二天。智度論及此論為諍人真偽。所以列之。問中論何故前列自在後列韋紐。今前列韋紐后列自在。答此之二天即是本跡。中論前本后跡。即是以本垂跡。百論前跡后本。以跡顯本。所以然者。中論為明生義。生為法本故前明於本。此論不為明本但明人尊。夫立人尊要須前示于跡后明於本。佛身亦然。問智度論何故列三。今但列二。答中論已明。一者梵天還在韋紐齊內。列韋紐則攝彼天。二者外道有二身三身之義。智度論具辨三身。此中但明於二。猶如佛法中或有三身或明於二身。別有提婆論云。韋紐名那羅延天。從齊生蓮華。蓮華生梵天。梵天為眾生祖。從梵天口生婆羅門。臂生剎利。脅生毗舍。腳生首陀。大地是其戒場。一切眾生於此場上殺生祀天皆生彼天。摩醯首羅者提婆論云。六道眾生天地之物。皆是自在天身。故自在天略明三身。一自在身。二那羅延身。三梵天身。自在天身總有八分。虛空為頭。日月為眼。地是身。河海為尿。山丘為糞。風為命。一切火為熱氣。一切眾生是身內蟲。迦毗羅者第二次列三仙以為世尊。迦毗羅此云黃頭仙亦云金頭。頭有金色故以名之。金七十論云。迦毗羅此云赤色仙。劫初時從空而出。自然有四德。一法二智慧三離欲四自在。總此四法以成其

身。如內法佛具常樂等四德。此四法是覺諦攝。故覺有八分。四即法等四分。次不凈覺翻此四分也。所言法者。外國名摩耶尼。此云法相。法相有五。一無嗔恚。二恭敬歸依。三內外清凈。四咸少飲食。五不放逸。又有五法。一不殺。二不盜。三梵行。四實語。五無諂曲。故名法也。二者智慧有二種。一外智二內智。外智者謂六種論。一式叉論。二毗伽羅論。三劫波論。四樹提論。五闡陀論。六尼祿多論。知此六論名為外智。內智者謂三德自性我及異智。次中間得解脫故名為智。第三離欲者有二種。一外。則是財物因緣外德。二內。離煩惱等名為解脫也。所言自在者有八種。一能作鄰虛細身。二輕微極妙心神無礙。三者遍滿虛空。四者得如意禪定。五者得三世帝主。六者隨用一切塵一時能用。七者不計屬他。八者去住自在無礙。具此四德以成己身也。迦毗羅見世間沉沒盲闇起大悲心。咄哉生死在盲闇中。遍觀世間見一婆羅門姓阿修利。千年一祀天。而迦毗羅在虛空中不現其身。唯其見赤色語阿修利。汝戲耶。答云戲。如是至千年已復來。過第三千年方語云。汝能修道以。不答云能。即為說三苦。一內苦謂風熱淡等。從臍下是為風處。從臍上至心名熱處。從心已上名為淡處。八分醫方能治此苦。二外苦謂虎狼等。三天苦

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本身。例如，內在的佛性具備常、樂、我、凈四種功德。這四種法屬於覺悟的真諦所包含的內容，所以覺悟有八個部分，即法等四種功德，以及與此相反的不凈覺。所謂『法』，在外國被稱為『摩耶尼』（Māyāni），這裡譯為『法相』。法相有五種：一是沒有嗔恨，二是恭敬歸依，三是內外清凈，四是適量飲食，五是不放逸。又有五種法：一是不殺生，二是不偷盜，三是守梵行，四是說實話，五是沒有諂媚。所以稱為『法』。第二是智慧，有外智和內智兩種。外智指的是六種論：一是式叉論（Śikṣā），二是毗伽羅論（Vyākaraṇa），三是劫波論（Kalpa），四是樹提論（Jyotiṣa），五是闡陀論（Chandas），六是尼祿多論（Nirukta）。瞭解這六種論被稱為外智。內智指的是三德（指常、樂、我）的自性，以及我與異智。其次，通過中間狀態獲得解脫，因此稱為『智』。第三是離欲，有兩種：一是外在的，即因財物等因緣而產生的外部功德；二是內在的，即遠離煩惱等，稱為解脫。所謂『自在』，有八種：一是能化作鄰虛細身，二是輕微極妙，心神無礙，三是遍滿虛空，四是獲得如意禪定，五是獲得三世帝主之位，六是能同時運用一切塵埃，七是不受他人支配，八是去住自在無礙。具備這四種功德，才能成就自身。迦毗羅（Kapila）看到世間沉沒在盲昧和黑暗之中，生起大悲心，感嘆道：『唉，生死沉溺在盲昧和黑暗中！』他遍觀世間，看到一位婆羅門，姓阿修利（Āsuri），每年祭祀天神一次。迦毗羅在虛空中顯現赤色，對阿修利說：『你在嬉戲嗎？』阿修利回答說：『是的，我在嬉戲。』這樣持續了一千年，迦毗羅再次出現。過了第三個千年，迦毗羅才說：『你能修道嗎？』阿修利回答說：『能。』迦毗羅就為他說了三種苦：一是內苦，即風、熱、淡等。從肚臍以下是風的區域，從肚臍以上到心是熱的區域，從心以上是淡的區域。八分醫方能治療這些苦。二是外苦，即虎狼等帶來的苦。三是天苦。

【English Translation】 English version Body. For example, the inner Dharma of the Buddha possesses the four virtues of permanence, bliss, self, and purity. These four Dharmas are included within the awakened truth, hence awakening has eight aspects: the four virtues such as Dharma, and the four aspects that negate them, which are impure perceptions. The term 'Dharma' is called 'Māyāni' in foreign lands, here translated as 'characteristics of Dharma'. There are five characteristics of Dharma: first, no anger; second, respectful refuge; third, inner and outer purity; fourth, moderate eating; and fifth, non-negligence. There are also five Dharmas: first, not killing; second, not stealing; third, practicing Brahmacharya (celibacy); fourth, speaking truthfully; and fifth, no flattery. Therefore, it is called 'Dharma'. Second is wisdom, which has two types: external wisdom and internal wisdom. External wisdom refers to the six treatises: first, Śikṣā (treatise on education); second, Vyākaraṇa (treatise on grammar); third, Kalpa (treatise on rituals); fourth, Jyotiṣa (treatise on astrology); fifth, Chandas (treatise on metrics); and sixth, Nirukta (treatise on etymology). Knowing these six treatises is called external wisdom. Internal wisdom refers to the self-nature of the three virtues (permanence, bliss, self), as well as the knowledge of self and other. Furthermore, obtaining liberation through the intermediate state is called 'wisdom'. Third is detachment from desire, which has two types: first, external, which is external virtue arising from causes such as wealth; and second, internal, which is detachment from afflictions, called liberation. The term 'sovereignty' (自在, freedom, being at ease) has eight aspects: first, the ability to transform into a subtle body adjacent to emptiness; second, being subtle and wonderful, with unobstructed mind and spirit; third, pervading all of space; fourth, obtaining the Samadhi of wish fulfillment; fifth, obtaining the position of emperor of the three worlds; sixth, being able to use all dust particles simultaneously; seventh, not being subject to others; and eighth, being free to go and stay without obstruction. Possessing these four virtues is how one perfects oneself. Kapila (迦毗羅), seeing the world submerged in blindness and darkness, arose with great compassion, exclaiming: 'Alas, life and death are immersed in blindness and darkness!' He surveyed the world and saw a Brahmin named Āsuri (阿修利), who performed a sacrifice to the gods once every thousand years. Kapila, appearing in the sky with a red glow, said to Āsuri: 'Are you playing?' Āsuri replied: 'Yes, I am playing.' This continued for a thousand years, and Kapila appeared again. After the third thousand years, Kapila finally said: 'Are you able to cultivate the path?' Āsuri replied: 'Yes.' Kapila then spoke to him about the three sufferings: first, internal suffering, which includes wind, heat, and phlegm. From below the navel is the region of wind, from above the navel to the heart is the region of heat, and from above the heart is the region of phlegm. The eight branches of medicine can cure these sufferings. Second is external suffering, which includes suffering from tigers and wolves. Third is heavenly suffering.

謂風雨等。時婆羅門即便信受如說修行。因說二十五諦。度脫為弟子。從是已來有迦毗羅。故名世尊。優樓迦此云鵂鹠仙亦云鵂角仙亦云臭胡仙。此人釋迦未興八百年前已出世。而白日造論夜半遊行。欲供養之當於夜半營辦飲食。仍與眷屬來受供養。所說之經名衛世師。有十萬偈明於六諦。因中無果神覺異。義以斯為宗。勒沙婆者此云苦行仙。其人計身有苦樂二分。若現世並受苦盡而樂法自出。所說之經名尼健子有十萬偈。如方便心論云。有五智六障四濁以為經宗。五智者謂聞智思智自覺智慧智義智。六障者。一不見障。二苦受障。三愚癡障。四命障。五姓障。六名障。四濁者。一嗔二慢三貪四諂也。而明因中亦有果亦無果。亦一亦異以為經宗。故名世尊。等仙人者。外道九十六種。略舉前之五師等取諸異計也。此之三師並是釋迦未興盛行天竺。釋迦出時但值十八一切智人。釋此不同。興皇法師云。初六人從聞慧生。即阿蘭迦蘭等。中六人從思慧生。即尼健子若提子等。后六人從修慧生。謂須跋陀等。什師云。六師有三部。大同小異皆以苦行為本。初六誦四韋陀。中六人稱一切智。即是六師。后六得五神通。詳此意猶是十八人。初是聞慧。次是思慧。后是修慧也。六師者。一富蘭那迦葉。迦葉姓也。富蘭那從母得名。

其人計斷。謂無君臣父子因果之義。二末伽梨俱舍梨子。俱舍梨子從母立名。末伽梨是字。其人計一切法自然為宗。三刪阇夜毗羅伲子。毗羅伲子是母。從母立名。刪阇夜是字。其人計道不須修。經八萬劫自然而得。如轉縷丸于高山縷盡則止。四阿耆多翅舍欽婆羅。阿耆多是字。欽婆羅粗弊衣名。其人計身有苦樂二分現受苦盡樂法自出。第五迦羅鳩馱迦旃延。迦旃延姓也。迦羅鳩馱是其母名。其人計亦有亦無應物起見。他問有耶答云有。他問無耶答云無。第六尼揵陀若提子。若提子從母作名。尼健陀是出家總號。其人計業決定得報。今雖修道不能中斷也。汝何以獨言下第二次明呵內。內曰下第四舉德顯人。自上已來直辨人尊。從此已去舉法成人。人無貴賤。道在則尊故也。佛具二義故獨稱尊。一者內德知于實相。二者外德巧說隨緣。內知實相即是波若。外能巧說所謂慈悲。又內知實相即是實慧。外能巧說名為方便。又內知實相名為自覺。外巧說法名為覺他。自覺覺他故名為佛獨名世尊。即酬上二難。一以獨佛為尊故汝生疑為過。二者以獨佛為尊故我言無過。外曰下第五舉德齊內。就文為二。第一正舉德成人第二呵責論主。初又二。前總舉德成人。次別明三寶化世。初明諸師亦具內外二德則同爲世尊。汝不應言獨佛是也

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本此人斷絕計較，認為沒有君臣、父子、因果的道理。第二位是末伽梨俱舍梨子（Makali Gosaliputta），俱舍梨子（Gosaliputta）是隨母姓而立的名字，末伽梨（Makali）是他的字。此人認為一切法以自然為根本。第三位是刪阇夜毗羅伲子（Sanjaya Belatthiputta），毗羅伲子（Belatthiputta）是他的母親，隨母姓立名，刪阇夜（Sanjaya）是他的字。此人認為道不需要修習，經過八萬劫自然就能得到，就像在高山上轉線團，線用完就停止一樣。第四位是阿耆多翅舍欽婆羅（Ajita Kesakambali），阿耆多（Ajita）是他的字，欽婆羅（Kesakambali）是粗劣衣服的名稱。此人認為身體有苦樂兩部分，現在承受的苦盡了，快樂的法則自然會顯現。第五位是迦羅鳩馱迦旃延（Pakudha Kaccayana），迦旃延（Kaccayana）是他的姓，迦羅鳩馱（Pakudha）是他的母親的名字。此人認為既有也有沒有，應事物而產生見解。別人問『有嗎？』他回答『有』。別人問『沒有嗎？』他回答『沒有』。第六位是尼揵陀若提子（Nigantha Nataputta），若提子（Nataputta）隨母親立名，尼揵陀（Nigantha）是出家人的總稱。此人認為業決定會得到報應，現在即使修行也不能中斷。你為什麼獨自說？下面第二次說明呵斥的內在原因。內在原因在於下面第四點，舉出德行來彰顯人。從上面以來，直接辨別人是尊貴的。從這以後，舉出佛法來成就人。人沒有貴賤之分，道存在就尊貴，所以這樣說。佛具有兩種意義，所以獨自被稱為世尊。一是內在的德行，瞭解實相。二是外在的德行，善巧說法，隨順因緣。內在瞭解實相就是般若（Prajna）。外在能夠善巧說法就是慈悲。又，內在瞭解實相就是真實的智慧。外在善巧說法名為方便。又，內在瞭解實相名為自覺。外在善巧說法名為覺他。自覺覺他，所以名為佛，獨自名為世尊。這就回答了上面的兩個責難。一是認為只有佛是尊貴的，所以你產生懷疑是錯誤的。二是認為只有佛是尊貴的，所以我說沒有過錯。外道說：下面第五點，舉出德行與內在的德行相同。就文義來說分為兩部分。第一部分是正式舉出德行來成就人，第二部分是呵責論主。第一部分又分為兩點。前面是總的舉出德行來成就人。其次是分別說明三寶（Triratna）教化世間。首先說明諸位老師也具有內外兩種德行，那麼就同樣是世尊。你不應該說只有佛才是世尊。

【English Translation】 English version That person's calculations are cut off, claiming there is no righteousness in ruler and subject, father and son, or cause and effect. The second is Makali Gosaliputta (末伽梨俱舍梨子), Gosaliputta (俱舍梨子) being named after his mother, and Makali (末伽梨) being his given name. This person believes that all dharmas are based on nature. The third is Sanjaya Belatthiputta (刪阇夜毗羅伲子), Belatthiputta (毗羅伲子) being his mother's name, and Sanjaya (刪阇夜) being his given name. This person believes that the path does not need cultivation; it will be attained naturally after eighty thousand kalpas, like a ball of thread rolling down a high mountain, stopping when the thread runs out. The fourth is Ajita Kesakambali (阿耆多翅舍欽婆羅), Ajita (阿耆多) being his given name, and Kesakambali (欽婆羅) being the name of coarse clothing. This person believes that the body has two parts, suffering and pleasure; when the suffering currently experienced is exhausted, the law of pleasure will naturally appear. The fifth is Pakudha Kaccayana (迦羅鳩馱迦旃延), Kaccayana (迦旃延) being his surname, and Pakudha (迦羅鳩馱) being his mother's name. This person believes that there is both existence and non-existence, arising views according to things. If someone asks, 'Is there existence?' he answers, 'There is.' If someone asks, 'Is there non-existence?' he answers, 'There is not.' The sixth is Nigantha Nataputta (尼揵陀若提子), Nataputta (若提子) being named after his mother, and Nigantha (尼揵陀) being a general term for renunciates. This person believes that karma is definitely rewarded; even if one cultivates the path now, it cannot be interrupted. Why do you speak alone? The second time below explains the inner reason for rebuke. The inner reason lies in the fourth point below, raising up virtue to manifest the person. From above, it directly distinguishes that the person is venerable. From here on, it raises up the Dharma to accomplish the person. People have no distinction of nobility or lowliness; where the path exists, it is venerable, hence this is said. The Buddha has two meanings, so he is uniquely called World Honored One. First, inner virtue, knowing the true nature. Second, outer virtue, skillful speech, according with conditions. Inner knowing of true nature is Prajna (般若). Outer skillful speech is compassion. Also, inner knowing of true nature is true wisdom. Outer skillful speech is called expedient means. Also, inner knowing of true nature is called self-awakening. Outer skillful speech is called awakening others. Self-awakening and awakening others, therefore called Buddha, uniquely called World Honored One. This answers the two difficulties above. First, thinking that only the Buddha is venerable, so your arising doubt is a mistake. Second, thinking that only the Buddha is venerable, so my saying is without fault. The outsider says: The fifth point below, raising up virtue is the same as inner virtue. In terms of the text, it is divided into two parts. The first part is formally raising up virtue to accomplish the person, and the second part is rebuking the debater. The first part is further divided into two points. The first is generally raising up virtue to accomplish the person. The second is separately explaining the Three Jewels (Triratna) transforming the world. First, it explains that the various teachers also possess both inner and outer virtues, so they are equally World Honored Ones. You should not say that only the Buddha is the World Honored One.

。如迦毗羅下第二廣明三寶化世。此中凡列十師。一迦毗羅三寶行世。三優樓迦三寶行世。三勒沙婆三寶行世。第四師以自餓為道。第五師以投淵求聖。第六師以赴火為道。第七自墜高巖求道。第八以寂默為道。第九以常立為道。第十以持牛戒為道。前之三師廣列經法以三寶行化。后之七師直辨苦行而已。迦毗羅謂佛寶。弟子謂僧寶。僧佉經謂法寶也。僧佉此云制數論。明一切法不出二十五諦。故一切法攝入二十五諦中名為制數論。說諸善法總相別相者。一云。在家出家同受五戒名為總相。而在家外道許有開通。如遇難無全身故為行道故。除牛餘者得殺。如為全身。急難除金餘者得盜。于淫戒中除制婦善知識妻童女餘者得開。如不飲酒戒若至寒鄉天祀中得開一瀝兩瀝。如不妄語戒若遇急難亦得開道。名為別相。又總萬法為大有。是為總相。瓶衣不同名為別相。知此總別二法名為總別相。智稱為善法。如佛一切智為總相。一切種智為別相也。二十五諦者。此論智度論金七十論涅槃經阇提首那及俱舍論此五處並解釋之。今略和會序其綱要。所言冥諦者。舊云。外道修禪得五神通。前後各知八萬劫內事。自八萬劫外不能了知。故云冥。智度論云。覺諦者。此是中陰識。外道思惟。此識為從因緣得。為不從因緣。若從因緣。因

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如迦毗羅下第二廣明三寶化世。此中凡列十師：一、迦毗羅（Kapila，人名）三寶行世；二、優樓迦（Ulūka，人名）三寶行世；三、勒沙婆（Ṛṣabha，人名）三寶行世；第四師以自餓為道；第五師以投淵求聖；第六師以赴火為道；第七師自墜高巖求道；第八師以寂默為道；第九師以常立為道；第十師以持牛戒為道。前三位導師廣泛宣講經法，以三寶教化世人。后七位導師則僅僅強調苦行。迦毗羅指的是佛寶，弟子指的是僧寶，《僧佉經》（Sāṃkhya，數論）指的是法寶。《僧佉》意為『制數論』，闡明一切法不出二十五諦（tattva，真諦），因此一切法都可歸納到這二十五諦中，故名『制數論』。關於善法的總相和別相：一種說法是，在家和出家之人共同遵守五戒，這稱為總相。但在家外道允許有開緣的情況，例如遇到危難，爲了保全性命，除了牛之外，其餘動物可以殺；爲了保全性命，緊急情況下，除了金子之外，其餘東西可以偷；在淫戒中，除了自己受約束的妻子、善知識的妻子和童女之外，其餘可以開緣。如不飲酒戒，如果到了寒冷的地方或祭祀時，可以喝一兩滴。如不妄語戒，如果遇到緊急情況，也可以開緣。這稱為別相。又將萬法總括為『大有』，這是總相。瓶子和衣服不同，這是別相。瞭解這總相和別相兩種法，稱為總別相智，這被認為是善法。例如，佛陀的一切智是總相，一切種智是別相。關於二十五諦，在《智度論》（Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa）、《金七十論》、《涅槃經》（Nirvāṇa Sūtra）、《阇提首那經》以及《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośabhāṣya）這五個地方都有解釋。現在簡要地綜合並梳理其綱要。所說的冥諦，舊說是外道通過修禪獲得五神通，能夠知曉前後各八萬劫內的事情，但對於八萬劫之外的事情就無法瞭解，所以稱為『冥』。《智度論》中說，覺諦指的是中陰識。外道思考，這個識是從因緣產生的，還是不從因緣產生？如果從因緣產生，那麼因

【English Translation】 English version: As in the second section under Kapila, 'Extensive Elucidation of the Three Jewels Transforming the World.' Here, a total of ten teachers are listed: 1. Kapila (Kapila, a proper noun) propagates the Three Jewels; 2. Ulūka (Ulūka, a proper noun) propagates the Three Jewels; 3. Ṛṣabha (Ṛṣabha, a proper noun) propagates the Three Jewels; the fourth teacher takes self-mortification as the path; the fifth teacher seeks holiness by throwing himself into an abyss; the sixth teacher takes rushing into fire as the path; the seventh teacher seeks the path by jumping off a high cliff; the eighth teacher takes silence as the path; the ninth teacher takes constant standing as the path; the tenth teacher takes holding the cow vow as the path. The first three teachers extensively expound the scriptures and transform beings with the Three Jewels. The latter seven teachers directly emphasize ascetic practices only. Kapila refers to the Buddha Jewel, disciples refer to the Sangha Jewel, and the Sāṃkhya (Sāṃkhya, enumeration) scripture refers to the Dharma Jewel. Sāṃkhya means 'Treatise on Enumeration,' clarifying that all dharmas do not go beyond the twenty-five tattvas (tattva, truths), therefore all dharmas are incorporated into these twenty-five tattvas, hence the name 'Treatise on Enumeration.' Regarding the general and specific characteristics of virtuous dharmas: one explanation is that lay and monastic individuals commonly observe the five precepts, which is called the general characteristic. However, non-Buddhist lay people are allowed exceptions, such as encountering danger, to preserve life, animals other than cows may be killed; to preserve life, in emergencies, things other than gold may be stolen; in the precept against sexual misconduct, exceptions are allowed for those other than one's own bound wife, the wife of a virtuous friend, and young girls. As for the precept against drinking alcohol, if one is in a cold region or during a sacrificial ceremony, one or two drops may be consumed. As for the precept against false speech, if one encounters an emergency, exceptions may also be made. This is called the specific characteristic. Furthermore, encompassing all dharmas as 'Great Existence' is the general characteristic. The difference between a bottle and clothing is the specific characteristic. Knowing these two dharmas of general and specific characteristics is called the wisdom of general and specific characteristics, which is considered a virtuous dharma. For example, the Buddha's omniscience is the general characteristic, and all-knowing wisdom is the specific characteristic. Regarding the twenty-five tattvas, they are explained in five places: the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa), the Sāṃkhyakārikā, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra (Nirvāṇa Sūtra), the Jātaka-Śuna Sūtra, and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya). Now, I will briefly synthesize and organize their outline. The so-called Pradhāna-tattva (primordial nature), it is said that non-Buddhists attain the five supernormal powers through meditation, able to know events within eighty thousand kalpas before and after, but unable to know events beyond eighty thousand kalpas, hence it is called 'Pradhāna.' In the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, it is said that the Vijñāna-tattva (consciousness) refers to the intermediate state consciousness. Non-Buddhists contemplate whether this consciousness arises from causes and conditions or not from causes and conditions? If it arises from causes and conditions, then the cause

緣是何物耶。若不從者。那得此識。既思惟不能了知。便計此識從前冥漠處生。故稱冥諦。亦名世性。一切世間以此冥諦為其本性。覺諦者。中陰識即是覺諦。以中陰識微弱異於木石之性故稱為覺。我心者惑心。稍粗持於我相故名我心。即佛法識支。以識支是染污識外道謂為我心。從我心生五微塵者。五微塵即為五諦。我心既粗則外有五塵應之。于佛法即是名色支。外道不達謂從我心生五微塵。從五塵生五大者。五大即為五諦。塵細大粗故從塵生大。地具五塵。水有四除香。火具三塵除香味。風具二唯有聲觸。空唯有聲。外道云。地藉塵多。是故無力最在其上。空藉塵小。是故有力最在其下。此就成世界五輪判之。成內身亦爾。從五大生十一根者。大是因。根是果。故從大生根。于佛法義即是六入支已去也。外道不達謂從大成根。十一根者。謂眼耳鼻舌身意手腳及大小二道及心平等根。故云十一根。眼等五種名為知根。謂能有所覺知。手腳等名五業根。業是作用之名。謂此五能有所造作。心平等根有二種釋。一云。實是心識之心而稱平等者。眼等五根各緣一塵。心識能遍緣五。故云平等。二云。詺肉芙蓉心以為平等。以其處一身之中故云平等。釋五大成五根不同。一云遍造。是優樓迦義。二云遍造。遍造者。五大成眼

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『緣』（Hetu，因）是什麼？如果不是從『緣』而來，那麼這個『識』（Vijnana，了別）從何而來？既然思惟不能完全瞭解，就推測這個『識』是從先前幽暗不明之處產生，所以稱之為『冥諦』（Avyakta），也叫做『世性』（Pradhana）。一切世間都以這個『冥諦』作為其根本性質。『覺諦』（Buddhi）指的是中陰識，因為中陰識微弱，不同於木石的性質，所以稱為『覺』（Buddhi，覺性）。『我心』（Ahamkara）指的是迷惑之心，稍微粗糙，執持于『我相』（Atman），所以叫做『我心』。這相當於佛法中的『識支』（Vijnana-skandha）。因為『識支』是染污的『識』，外道就認為這是『我心』。從『我心』產生『五微塵』（Tanmatra）指的是『五微塵』就是『五諦』（Panca-tattva）。『我心』既然粗糙，那麼外在就有『五塵』（Panca-bhuta）相應。在佛法中，這相當於『名色支』（Nama-rupa）。外道不明白，認為從『我心』產生『五微塵』。從『五塵』產生『五大』（Mahabhuta）指的是『五大』就是『五諦』。『塵』細『大』粗，所以是從『塵』產生『大』。『地』（Prthivi）具備五種『塵』，『水』（Ap）有四種，除去『香』（Gandha），『火』（Tejas）具備三種『塵』，除去『香』和『味』（Rasa），『風』（Vayu）具備兩種，只有『聲』（Shabda）和『觸』（Sparsha），『空』（Akasha）只有『聲』。外道說，『地』憑藉的『塵』多，所以無力，最在上面。『空』憑藉的『塵』少，所以有力，最在下面。這是就構成世界的『五輪』（Panca-mandala）來判斷的。構成內身也是這樣。從『五大』產生『十一根』（Ekadasendriya）指的是『大』是因，『根』是果，所以是從『大』產生『根』。在佛法義理中，這相當於『六入支』（Sadayatana）之後的內容。外道不明白，認為從『大』構成『根』。『十一根』指的是眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意、手、腳以及大小二便道和『心平等根』（Manas）。所以說『十一根』。眼等五種叫做『知根』（Jnana-indriya），指的是能夠有所覺知。手腳等叫做『五業根』（Karma-indriya），『業』是作用的意思，指的是這五種能夠有所造作。『心平等根』有兩種解釋。一種說法是，實際上是『心識』（Manovijnana）的『心』，而稱之為『平等』，是因為眼等五根各自緣一種『塵』，『心識』能夠普遍緣五種，所以叫做『平等』。另一種說法是，將肉團心稱為『平等』，因為它處在身體之中，所以叫做『平等』。解釋『五大』構成『五根』的不同之處。一種說法是普遍造作，這是優樓迦（Ulluka）的觀點。另一種說法是普遍造作。普遍造作者，『五大』構成『眼』。

【English Translation】 English version What is 『Hetu』 (cause)? If not from 『Hetu』, from where does this 『Vijnana』 (consciousness) come? Since contemplation cannot fully understand it, it is speculated that this 『Vijnana』 arises from a previously obscure place, hence it is called 『Avyakta』 (unmanifested) or 『Pradhana』 (primordial nature). All the world takes this 『Avyakta』 as its fundamental nature. 『Buddhi』 (intellect) refers to the intermediate state consciousness, because the intermediate state consciousness is weak and different from the nature of wood and stone, so it is called 『Buddhi』. 『Ahamkara』 (ego) refers to the deluded mind, slightly coarse, clinging to 『Atman』 (self), so it is called 『Ahamkara』. This is equivalent to the 『Vijnana-skandha』 (aggregate of consciousness) in Buddhism. Because 『Vijnana-skandha』 is defiled consciousness, outsiders consider it to be 『Ahamkara』. 『Tanmatra』 (subtle elements) arising from 『Ahamkara』 refers to the 『Tanmatra』 being the 『Panca-tattva』 (five elements). Since 『Ahamkara』 is coarse, there are corresponding 『Panca-bhuta』 (five gross elements) externally. In Buddhism, this is equivalent to 『Nama-rupa』 (name and form). Outsiders do not understand and think that 『Tanmatra』 arises from 『Ahamkara』. 『Mahabhuta』 (great elements) arising from 『Tanmatra』 refers to the 『Mahabhuta』 being the 『Panca-tattva』. 『Tanmatra』 is subtle and 『Mahabhuta』 is coarse, so 『Mahabhuta』 arises from 『Tanmatra』. 『Prthivi』 (earth) possesses five 『Tanmatra』, 『Ap』 (water) has four, excluding 『Gandha』 (smell), 『Tejas』 (fire) possesses three 『Tanmatra』, excluding 『Gandha』 and 『Rasa』 (taste), 『Vayu』 (wind) possesses two, only 『Shabda』 (sound) and 『Sparsha』 (touch), 『Akasha』 (space) only has 『Shabda』. Outsiders say that 『Prthivi』 relies on many 『Tanmatra』, so it is weak and at the top. 『Akasha』 relies on few 『Tanmatra』, so it is powerful and at the bottom. This is judged based on the 『Panca-mandala』 (five wheels) that constitute the world. The constitution of the inner body is also the same. 『Ekadasendriya』 (eleven senses) arising from 『Mahabhuta』 refers to 『Mahabhuta』 being the cause and 『Indriya』 (sense) being the result, so 『Indriya』 arises from 『Mahabhuta』. In Buddhist doctrine, this is equivalent to the content after 『Sadayatana』 (six sense bases). Outsiders do not understand and think that 『Indriya』 is formed from 『Mahabhuta』. 『Ekadasendriya』 refers to the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, mind, hands, feet, and the two excretory organs, and 『Manas』 (mind). Therefore, it is said to be 『Ekadasendriya』. The five senses such as eyes are called 『Jnana-indriya』 (cognitive senses), which means they can perceive. The hands and feet are called 『Karma-indriya』 (active senses), 『Karma』 means action, which means these five can act. There are two explanations for 『Manas』. One explanation is that it is actually the 『Manovijnana』 (mind consciousness), and it is called 『Manas』 because the five senses such as eyes each perceive one 『Tanmatra』, and 『Manovijnana』 can universally perceive five, so it is called 『Manas』. Another explanation is that the fleshy heart is called 『Manas』 because it is in the body, so it is called 『Manas』. Explaining the difference between 『Mahabhuta』 forming 『Indriya』. One explanation is universal creation, which is the view of Ulluka. Another explanation is universal creation. Universal creators, 『Mahabhuta』 forms 『eyes』.

根火大偏多。色是火家求那。眼還見色。五大成耳根空大偏多。聲是空家求那故耳還聞聲。五大成鼻根地大偏多。香是地家求那故鼻還聞香。五大成舌根水大偏多。味是水家求那故舌還知味。五大成身根風大偏多。觸是風家求那故身還覺觸。次偏造是迦毗羅義。以色成火大。火大成眼根。眼根還見色。聲塵成空大。空大成耳根。耳根還聞聲。香塵成地大。地大成鼻根。鼻根還聞香。味塵成水大。水大成舌根。舌根還知味。觸塵成風大。風大成身根。故身還覺觸。五知根勝故各用一大而成。五業根劣故具五大而成。心平等根有二釋。若是肉心具五大所成。心識之心非大所造。撿迦毗羅論。是心識之心以能分別故也。問僧佉計十一根。衛世師計幾根。答婆沙云。但計五根。尼乾子計內外物有命根。故不斷生草不飲冷水。復有外道計百二十根。謂兩眼兩耳兩鼻孔舌身意命為十。信等五根五受根合二十。六道各二十故百二十也。及神為主名二十五諦。次迦毗羅論明二十五諦者。一者自性。或名勝因。以能為余諦作因故。或名冥。難知曉故。亦名眾生性。能成諸物故。第二生大者。或名覺或名相等也。次從大生慢。慢或名炎熾等。次慢生五塵。五塵生十六法。謂五大五知根五作業根手腳及男女隨取一及取大遺。大遺者棄于糞故也

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本根（indriya）由火大偏盛構成。色（rūpa）是火大的特性（guṇa），因此眼（cakṣus）能見色。五大（mahābhūta）構成耳根（śrotra-indriya），空大偏盛。聲（śabda）是空大的特性，因此耳能聞聲。五大構成鼻根（ghrāṇa-indriya），地大偏盛。香（gandha）是地大的特性，因此鼻能聞香。五大構成舌根（jihvā-indriya），水大偏盛。味（rasa）是水大的特性，因此舌能知味。五大構成身根（kāya-indriya），風大偏盛。觸（sparśa）是風大的特性，因此身能覺觸。以上偏盛的構成方式是迦毗羅（Kapila）的理論。以色塵（rūpa-viṣaya）形成火大（tejas-mahābhūta），火大形成眼根，眼根因此能見色。聲塵（śabda-viṣaya）形成空大（ākāśa-mahābhūta），空大形成耳根，耳根因此能聞聲。香塵（gandha-viṣaya）形成地大（pṛthivī-mahābhūta），地大形成鼻根，鼻根因此能聞香。味塵（rasa-viṣaya）形成水大（āpas-mahābhūta），水大形成舌根，舌根因此能知味。觸塵（sparśa-viṣaya）形成風大（vāyu-mahābhūta），風大形成身根，因此身能覺觸。五知根（pañca jñānendriyāṇi）殊勝，因此各自用一大構成。五作業根（pañca karmendriyāṇi）較弱，因此具足五大構成。心（citta）作為平等根（sama-indriya）有兩種解釋。如果是肉團心（māṃsa-hṛdaya），則由五大構成。心識之心（citta-vijñāna）並非由大種所造。考察迦毗羅論，心識之心以其能分別而存在。問：僧佉（Sāṃkhya）學派認為有十一根，衛世師（Vaiśeṣika）學派認為有幾根？答：婆沙（Vibhāṣā）中說，只計五根。尼乾子（Nirgrantha，耆那教）認為內外之物皆有命根（jīva-indriya），因此不斷生草，不飲冷水。又有外道計一百二十根，即兩眼、兩耳、兩鼻孔、舌、身、意、命為十，信等五根（śraddhādi pañcendriyāṇi）、五受根（pañca vedanā-indriyāṇi）合為二十，六道（ṣaṭ-gati）各有二十，故為一百二十。以及神我（ātman）為主，名為二十五諦（pañcaviṃśati tattva）。其次，迦毗羅論說明二十五諦：一者自性（prakṛti），或名勝因（pradhāna），因為它能為其餘諦作為因；或名冥（avyakta），難以知曉；也名眾生性（bhūta-prakṛti），能成就諸物。第二生大（mahat），或名覺（buddhi），或名相等（sattva）。其次從大生慢（ahaṃkāra），慢或名炎熾等。其次慢生五塵（pañca tanmātrāṇi）。五塵生十六法，即五大、五知根、五作業根、手腳（hasta-pāda）以及男女（puruṣa-strī）隨取其一，以及取大遺（mahā-utsarga）。大遺者，指棄于糞便。

【English Translation】 English version The root (indriya) is predominantly composed of the fire element (tejas-mahābhūta). Form (rūpa) is the quality (guṇa) of the fire element, therefore the eye (cakṣus) can see form. The five great elements (mahābhūta) constitute the ear organ (śrotra-indriya), with the space element (ākāśa-mahābhūta) being predominant. Sound (śabda) is the quality of the space element, therefore the ear can hear sound. The five great elements constitute the nose organ (ghrāṇa-indriya), with the earth element (pṛthivī-mahābhūta) being predominant. Smell (gandha) is the quality of the earth element, therefore the nose can smell. The five great elements constitute the tongue organ (jihvā-indriya), with the water element (āpas-mahābhūta) being predominant. Taste (rasa) is the quality of the water element, therefore the tongue can taste. The five great elements constitute the body organ (kāya-indriya), with the wind element (vāyu-mahābhūta) being predominant. Touch (sparśa) is the quality of the wind element, therefore the body can feel touch. The above predominant composition is the theory of Kapila (迦毗羅). From the object of form (rūpa-viṣaya) arises the fire element (tejas-mahābhūta), the fire element forms the eye organ, and thus the eye can see form. From the object of sound (śabda-viṣaya) arises the space element (ākāśa-mahābhūta), the space element forms the ear organ, and thus the ear can hear sound. From the object of smell (gandha-viṣaya) arises the earth element (pṛthivī-mahābhūta), the earth element forms the nose organ, and thus the nose can smell. From the object of taste (rasa-viṣaya) arises the water element (āpas-mahābhūta), the water element forms the tongue organ, and thus the tongue can taste. From the object of touch (sparśa-viṣaya) arises the wind element (vāyu-mahābhūta), the wind element forms the body organ, and thus the body can feel touch. The five sense organs (pañca jñānendriyāṇi) are superior, therefore each is composed of one predominant element. The five active organs (pañca karmendriyāṇi) are weaker, therefore they are composed of all five elements. The mind (citta) as an equalizing organ (sama-indriya) has two explanations. If it is the physical heart (māṃsa-hṛdaya), then it is composed of the five elements. The mind of consciousness (citta-vijñāna) is not created by the great elements. Examining the Kapila's treatise, the mind of consciousness exists because of its ability to discriminate. Question: The Sāṃkhya (僧佉) school believes in eleven organs, how many organs does the Vaiśeṣika (衛世師) school believe in? Answer: The Vibhāṣā (婆沙) says that it only counts five organs. The Nirgrantha (尼乾子, Jain) believes that both internal and external things have a life organ (jīva-indriya), therefore they do not cut growing grass and do not drink cold water. There are also heretics who count one hundred and twenty organs, namely two eyes, two ears, two nostrils, tongue, body, mind, and life as ten, the five faculties of faith, etc. (śraddhādi pañcendriyāṇi), and the five feeling faculties (pañca vedanā-indriyāṇi) combined as twenty, each of the six realms (ṣaṭ-gati) has twenty, hence one hundred and twenty. And with the self (ātman) as the master, it is called the twenty-five truths (pañcaviṃśati tattva). Next, the Kapila's treatise explains the twenty-five truths: First is nature (prakṛti), also called the primary cause (pradhāna), because it can act as the cause for the other truths; also called the unmanifest (avyakta), because it is difficult to know; also called the nature of beings (bhūta-prakṛti), because it can accomplish all things. Second is the great one (mahat), also called intellect (buddhi), or equality (sattva). Next, from the great one arises ego (ahaṃkāra), ego is also called inflammation, etc. Next, from ego arise the five subtle elements (pañca tanmātrāṇi). The five subtle elements give rise to sixteen dharmas, namely the five great elements, the five sense organs, the five active organs, hands and feet (hasta-pāda), and either male or female (puruṣa-strī), and the great abandonment (mahā-utsarga). The great abandonment refers to discarding into feces.

。並及知者。知者即是我亦名總御。故為二十五。迦毗羅論問言。云何分別本性反異及知者。答偈云。本性非變異。大等亦本反。十六但反異。知者非本反。本性者。能生一切不從他生故稱本性。本效能生大等。是故偈本名不從他生。是故非反異。覺與我心五塵此七亦本亦反異。大從本性生故反異。能生我慢故名本。我慢從本大生故反異。能生五塵故名本。塵從慢生故反異。能生五大及諸根故秤本。聲塵生空及耳根故名本。乃至香生地及鼻根。如是七亦反異。十六但反異者。五大五作根五知根及心。此十六但從他生不能生他。故但反異。知者非本非反異。知者是我。我以知為體。我不從他生又不能生他。故非本非反異。問五大生十一根。五大何故非本。答詳彼義。直明五塵生五大及十一根。不復明五大生十一根。是故五大不名為本。問世性生大等果者。為世性中有果。為無果。為非有非無。答金七十論破二家義立因中有果。一破勒沙婆因中非有非無。若非有則是無。若非無則是有。是有無相違不得一處立。如人死生不俱他。二破衛世師因中無果。凡有五義不成。一者無不可作故。如沙中無油終不可取沙作油。如世性中有大等。從世性生大等也。二必須取因者。如求酪取乳不取水也。故知乳有酪性。故世性中有大等也。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本並及知者（Purusha，覺悟者）。知者即是我，亦名總御，故總數為二十五。迦毗羅（Kapila）論問言：『如何分別本性（Prakriti，自性）、反異（Vikriti，變異）及知者？』答偈云：『本性非變異，大等亦本反，十六但反異，知者非本反。』本性者，能生一切，不從他生，故稱本性。本效能生大等（Mahat，大 तत्व）。是故偈本名不從他生，是故非反異。覺（Buddhi，覺性）與我（Ahamkara，我慢）心（Manas，心意）五塵（Tanmatras，五唯）此七亦本亦反異。大從本性生故反異，能生我慢故名本。我慢從本大生故反異，能生五塵故名本。塵從慢生故反異，能生五大（Mahabhutas，五大元素）及諸根（Indriyas，感官）故稱本。聲塵（Shabda-tanmatra，聲唯）生空（Akasha，空）及耳根（Shrotra，聽覺）故名本。乃至香塵（Gandha-tanmatra，香唯）生地（Prithvi，地）及鼻根（Ghrana，嗅覺）。如是七亦反異。十六但反異者，五大、五作根（Karmendriyas，行動器官）、五知根（Jnanendriyas，感覺器官）及心。此十六但從他生，不能生他，故但反異。知者非本非反異，知者是我。我以知為體，我不從他生，又不能生他，故非本非反異。問：『五大生十一根，五大何故非本？』答：『詳彼義，直明五塵生五大及十一根，不復明五大生十一根。是故五大不名為本。』問：『世性（Prakriti，自性）生大等果者，為世性中有果？為無果？為非有非無？』答：『金七十論（Samkhya Karika）破二家義，立因中有果。一破勒沙婆（Rishabha）因中非有非無。若非有則是無，若非無則是有。是有無相違，不得一處立，如人死生不俱他。二破衛世師（Vaisheshika）因中無果。凡有五義不成。一者無不可作故，如沙中無油，終不可取沙作油。如世性中有大等，從世性生大等也。二必須取因者，如求酪取乳，不取水也。故知乳有酪性，故世性中有大等也。』

【English Translation】 English version And also the Knower (Purusha). The Knower is 'I', also called the Supreme Controller, hence totaling twenty-five. Kapila asked: 'How to distinguish between Prakriti (Nature), Vikriti (Modifications), and the Knower?' The answer is in the verse: 'Prakriti is not a modification, Mahat (the Great Principle) and others are both Prakriti and Vikriti, sixteen are only Vikriti, the Knower is neither Prakriti nor Vikriti.' Prakriti is that which generates everything but is not generated by anything else, hence it is called Prakriti. Prakriti can generate Mahat and others. Therefore, the verse states that Prakriti is not generated by anything else, hence it is not Vikriti. Buddhi (Intellect), Ahamkara (Ego), Manas (Mind), and the five Tanmatras (Subtle Elements) are both Prakriti and Vikriti. Mahat is born from Prakriti, hence it is Vikriti, and it can generate Ahamkara, hence it is called Prakriti. Ahamkara is born from Mahat, hence it is Vikriti, and it can generate the five Tanmatras, hence it is called Prakriti. The Tanmatras are born from Ahamkara, hence they are Vikriti, and they can generate the five Mahabhutas (Gross Elements) and the Indriyas (Senses), hence they are called Prakriti. Shabda-tanmatra (Sound Element) generates Akasha (Space) and Shrotra (Hearing), hence it is called Prakriti. Similarly, Gandha-tanmatra (Smell Element) generates Prithvi (Earth) and Ghrana (Smell). Thus, these seven are both Prakriti and Vikriti. The sixteen that are only Vikriti are the five Mahabhutas, the five Karmendriyas (Organs of Action), the five Jnanendriyas (Organs of Perception), and Manas (Mind). These sixteen are only generated by others and cannot generate others, hence they are only Vikriti. The Knower is neither Prakriti nor Vikriti; the Knower is 'I'. 'I' has knowledge as its essence. 'I' am not generated by others, nor can 'I' generate others, hence 'I' am neither Prakriti nor Vikriti. Question: 'The five Mahabhutas generate the eleven Indriyas, why are the five Mahabhutas not Prakriti?' Answer: 'Examine the meaning closely. It is directly stated that the five Tanmatras generate the five Mahabhutas and the eleven Indriyas, but it is not stated that the five Mahabhutas generate the eleven Indriyas. Therefore, the five Mahabhutas are not called Prakriti.' Question: 'When Prakriti generates the effects such as Mahat, does Prakriti contain the effects, or does it not contain the effects, or is it neither containing nor not containing?' Answer: 'The Samkhya Karika refutes the views of two schools and establishes that the cause contains the effect. First, it refutes the view of Rishabha that the cause is neither existent nor non-existent. If it is not existent, then it is non-existent; if it is not non-existent, then it is existent. Existence and non-existence are contradictory and cannot exist in the same place, just as death and birth do not occur together. Second, it refutes the view of Vaisheshika that the cause does not contain the effect. There are five reasons why this is not valid. First, because what is non-existent cannot be produced, just as oil cannot be extracted from sand. Similarly, Prakriti contains Mahat and others, and Mahat and others are generated from Prakriti. Second, one must take the cause to obtain the effect, just as one takes milk to obtain butter, not water. Therefore, it is known that milk has the property of butter, hence Prakriti contains Mahat and others.'

三一切不生故者。若因中無果。則應一物中生一切物。而實不爾。故知有果也。四能作所作故。如陶師是能作故取土作瓶。不取草等作瓶。故知因中有果。故世效能作大等果。則世性中有大等也。五各隨因有果故。如麥還生麥等。若因中無果則因果不相似。以此五事故破衛世師無立因中有果也。問世性與大等何異。答略明九異。一者因非因異。世性但是因。十六法但是果。大慢五塵此七亦因亦果。從世性生故是果。能生他故為因。二常無常異。世性是常大等無常。故五大沒歸五塵。五塵沒歸慢。慢沒歸大。大沒歸世性。世性則常也。三一多異。世性唯是一。多人所共故。大慢等則多。人不同故也。四遍不遍異。世性與我遍一切處。大等則不遍也。五有事不有事異。大等申縮往還生死。世性則不爾也。六沒不沒異。大等諸物沒歸世性中。世性則不可沒。世性無有流轉沒也。七有形無形異。世性無形。大等有形故有異。八依他不依他異。如十六物依五塵。乃至大依世性。世性無所依。九從他不從他異。大等從世性生。故依世性不得自在。而世性無所依也。問世性與大九種不同。復有同義不。答除世性及我餘二十三法皆有三。一樂二苦三癡闇。則知世性中亦有三性也。是名同義。問相生有二。一轉反生。如乳作酪。二不轉反

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本三、一切事物都不可能無中生有。如果原因中沒有結果，那麼就應該一個東西能生出所有東西，但事實並非如此。所以，可知原因中必然存在結果。四、能作和所作的關係證明了這一點。比如陶工是能作者，所以取土來製作瓶子，而不會取草等來製作瓶子。因此可知原因中存在結果。所以，『世性』（Prakriti）能夠產生『大』（Mahat）等結果，那麼『世性』中就必然存在『大』等。五、各種事物都隨其原因產生相應的結果。比如麥子只能生出麥子等。如果原因中沒有結果，那麼原因和結果就不會相似。通過這五個理由，可以駁斥衛世師（Vaisheshika）『原因中無果』的觀點。問：『世性』（Prakriti）與『大』（Mahat）等有什麼區別？答：簡要說明九種區別：一、因和非因的區別。『世性』只是因，十六種法只是果，『大』、『慢』（Ahamkara）、五塵（Tanmatras）這七種既是因也是果。從『世性』產生，所以是果；能夠產生其他事物，所以是因。二、常和無常的區別。『世性』是常，『大』等是無常。所以五大（Mahabhutas）消逝歸於五塵，五塵消逝歸於『慢』，『慢』消逝歸於『大』，『大』消逝歸於『世性』，而『世性』則是常住不變的。三、一和多的區別。『世性』唯一，是眾人所共有的；『大』、『慢』等則是多的，因為人各不相同。四、遍和不遍的區別。『世性』和『我』（Atman）遍及一切處，『大』等則不遍及。五、有事和無事的區別。『大』等有伸縮、往還、生死等變化，『世性』則沒有這些變化。六、沒和不沒的區別。『大』等諸物消逝歸於『世性』中，而『世性』則不可消逝。『世性』沒有流轉和消逝。七、有形和無形的區別。『世性』無形，『大』等有形，所以有區別。八、依他和不依他的區別。比如十六種事物依賴五塵，乃至『大』依賴『世性』，而『世性』則無所依賴。九、從他和不從他的區別。『大』等從『世性』產生，所以依賴『世性』而不得自在，而『世性』則無所依賴。問：『世性』與『大』有九種不同，還有相同的意義嗎？答：除了『世性』和『我』，其餘二十三種法都有三種屬性：樂、苦、癡暗。由此可知『世性』中也有這三種屬性。這就是相同的意義。問：相生有兩種，一是轉化生，如乳變成酪；二是不轉化生。

【English Translation】 English version 3. All things cannot arise from nothing. If there were no result in the cause, then one thing should be able to produce all things, but this is not the case. Therefore, it is known that there must be a result in the cause. 4. The relationship between the agent and the object proves this. For example, a potter is the agent, so he takes clay to make a pot, and does not take grass etc. to make a pot. Therefore, it is known that there is a result in the cause. Therefore, 'Prakriti' (primordial nature) can produce results such as 'Mahat' (the great principle), then 'Prakriti' must contain 'Mahat' etc. 5. Various things produce corresponding results according to their causes. For example, wheat can only produce wheat, etc. If there were no result in the cause, then the cause and the result would not be similar. With these five reasons, the view of the Vaisheshikas (who believe that there is no result in the cause) can be refuted. Question: What are the differences between 'Prakriti' and 'Mahat' etc.? Answer: Briefly explain nine differences: 1. The difference between cause and non-cause. 'Prakriti' is only the cause, the sixteen dharmas are only the result, and 'Mahat', 'Ahamkara' (ego), and the five Tanmatras (subtle elements) are both cause and result. Because they are produced from 'Prakriti', they are the result; because they can produce other things, they are the cause. 2. The difference between permanent and impermanent. 'Prakriti' is permanent, and 'Mahat' etc. are impermanent. Therefore, the five Mahabhutas (gross elements) disappear and return to the five Tanmatras, the five Tanmatras disappear and return to 'Ahamkara', 'Ahamkara' disappears and returns to 'Mahat', 'Mahat' disappears and returns to 'Prakriti', and 'Prakriti' is permanent and unchanging. 3. The difference between one and many. 'Prakriti' is unique and shared by all; 'Mahat', 'Ahamkara' etc. are many, because people are different. 4. The difference between pervasive and non-pervasive. 'Prakriti' and 'Atman' (self) pervade all places, while 'Mahat' etc. do not pervade. 5. The difference between having affairs and not having affairs. 'Mahat' etc. have changes such as stretching, going back and forth, birth and death, while 'Prakriti' does not have these changes. 6. The difference between disappearing and not disappearing. 'Mahat' etc. disappear and return to 'Prakriti', while 'Prakriti' cannot disappear. 'Prakriti' has no flow and disappearance. 7. The difference between having form and being formless. 'Prakriti' is formless, and 'Mahat' etc. have form, so there is a difference. 8. The difference between depending on others and not depending on others. For example, the sixteen things depend on the five Tanmatras, and even 'Mahat' depends on 'Prakriti', while 'Prakriti' does not depend on anything. 9. The difference between coming from others and not coming from others. 'Mahat' etc. are produced from 'Prakriti', so they depend on 'Prakriti' and cannot be independent, while 'Prakriti' does not depend on anything. Question: 'Prakriti' and 'Mahat' have nine differences, are there any same meanings? Answer: Except for 'Prakriti' and 'Atman', the remaining twenty-three dharmas have three attributes: pleasure, pain, ignorance and darkness. From this, it can be known that 'Prakriti' also has these three attributes. This is the same meaning. Question: There are two types of arising, one is transformation, such as milk turning into cheese; the other is non-transformation.

生。如母生子。世性生大等。是何生耶。答是轉反相生也。問世性是一。云何生二十三異法耶。答如天雨是一至地反成種種味。彼亦爾也。問世性為自能生。為共他生。答世性與我和合共生大等。余不盡者如金七十論具釋。次俱舍論與此大同。但初三云一喜樂二憂苦三癡。餘者並同。詳此三。非是別數。猶屬二十四諦攝故。上已論之竟也。涅槃經阇提首那與此有三異。一云。男女二根此應取男根有二。女根亦二耳。不爾略舉其一。則大遺可知也。二者二十一法。根本有三。謂黑染粗。黑即無明。染是愛。粗為嗔。釋此三有二。一云。此三屬覺諦攝。非二十五數。二依金七十論。此三猶是上苦樂暗耳。則屬二十四諦中故非別數也。三者涅槃經不數我者。當是略故也。問有人言。神伏為冥。神起為覺。是事云何。答若爾則無二十五諦。今言冥者。都是二十四諦之本故名世間本性。二十四諦都由冥有也。凈覺分者。舊云覺有二種。一垢二凈。凈中有四。一者福德。謂殺生祀天。二者智慧。謂二十五諦智。三者不著。謂四禪。四者自在。謂五通。不凈覺中亦四。翻上四也。謂罪癡著欲不自在。今為明善法但舉凈不舉不凈。故云分也。依金七十論。覺諦有八分。則四分名為喜。四分為癡暗。喜四分者如上釋。迦毗羅論中其已出竟

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：問：『生』，比如母親生孩子，『世性』（Prakriti，根本自性）產生『大』（Mahat，覺）等等，這是什麼『生』呢？答：這是『轉反相生』（parinama，轉變）的『生』。問：『世性』是唯一的，為什麼會產生二十三種不同的法呢？答：比如天上的雨是同一種，落到地上卻變成各種各樣的味道。『世性』也是這樣。問：『世性』是自己能夠產生，還是和其它東西一起產生？答：『世性』和『我』（Purusha，神我）和合，共同產生『大』等等。其餘沒有詳細說明的，可以參考《金七十論》的詳細解釋。接下來，《俱舍論》與此大體相同，只是最初的三種說法是：一是喜樂，二是憂苦，三是癡。其餘的都相同。詳細考察這三種，並非是單獨的數目，仍然屬於二十四諦所包含的，以上已經討論完畢。《涅槃經》中阇提首那的說法與此有三點不同。一是說，男女二根，這裡應該理解為男根有兩種，女根也有兩種。如果不是這樣，只是簡略地舉出一個，那麼大部分遺漏是可以知道的。二是二十一種法，根本上有三種，即黑染粗。黑就是無明，染是愛，粗是嗔。解釋這三種有兩種說法。一種說法是，這三種屬於覺諦所包含的，不是二十五數。另一種依據《金七十論》，這三種仍然是上面的苦樂暗，因此屬於二十四諦之中，不是單獨的數目。三是《涅槃經》沒有計算『我』，應該是省略的緣故。問：有人說，神伏藏起來就是『冥』（Avidya，無明），神顯現出來就是『覺』（Buddhi，覺）。這件事怎麼樣？答：如果這樣，就沒有二十五諦了。現在說『冥』，是所有二十四諦的根本，所以叫做世間本性。二十四諦都是由『冥』產生的。『凈覺分』，舊的說法是『覺』有兩種，一是垢，二是凈。凈中有四種，一是福德，即殺生祭祀天神。二是智慧，即二十五諦的智慧。三是不著，即四禪。四是自在，即五通。不凈覺中也有四種，是上面四種的反面，即罪、癡、著欲、不自在。現在爲了說明善法，只舉出凈而不舉出不凈，所以說是『分』。依據《金七十論』，覺諦有八分，其中四分叫做喜，四分叫做癡暗。喜的四分如上面所解釋的。迦毗羅的論述中，這些已經全部闡述完畢。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: 'Birth,' such as a mother giving birth to a child, and 'Prakriti' (primordial nature) producing 'Mahat' (intellect), etc., what kind of 'birth' is this? Answer: This is 'parinama' (transformation) birth. Question: 'Prakriti' is one, so how can it produce twenty-three different dharmas? Answer: It's like rain from the sky is the same, but when it reaches the ground, it becomes various flavors. It's the same with 'Prakriti'. Question: Is 'Prakriti' able to produce by itself, or does it produce together with something else? Answer: 'Prakriti' combines with 'Purusha' (the self) to jointly produce 'Mahat,' etc. For the rest that is not explained in detail, refer to the detailed explanation in the 'Samkhyakarika' (Golden Seventy Treatise). Next, the 'Abhidharmakosa' is largely the same as this, except that the first three statements are: first, joy and pleasure; second, sorrow and suffering; and third, delusion. The rest are the same. Examining these three in detail, they are not separate numbers, but still belong to the twenty-four tattvas (truths), which has already been discussed above. In the 'Nirvana Sutra,' the statements of Jatisarasmara differ from this in three points. First, it says that there are two roots of male and female. Here, it should be understood that there are two types of male roots and two types of female roots. If not, if only one is briefly mentioned, then most of the omissions can be known. Second, among the twenty-one dharmas, there are three fundamental ones, namely black, stained, and coarse. Black is ignorance (Avidya), stained is attachment (raga), and coarse is anger (dvesha). There are two explanations for these three. One explanation is that these three belong to the category of 'Buddhi-tattva' (intellect principle) and are not among the twenty-five numbers. The other explanation, according to the 'Samkhyakarika,' is that these three are still the above-mentioned suffering, pleasure, and darkness, and therefore belong to the twenty-four tattvas and are not separate numbers. Third, the 'Nirvana Sutra' does not count 'Purusha,' which should be due to omission. Question: Some people say that when the spirit is hidden, it is 'Avidya' (ignorance), and when the spirit appears, it is 'Buddhi' (intellect). What about this matter? Answer: If that were the case, there would be no twenty-five tattvas. Now, when we say 'Avidya,' it is the root of all twenty-four tattvas, so it is called the primordial nature of the world. All twenty-four tattvas are produced by 'Avidya.' 'Pure Buddhi-part,' the old saying is that there are two types of 'Buddhi,' one is defiled and the other is pure. There are four types in purity, one is merit, which is killing and sacrificing to the gods. The second is wisdom, which is the wisdom of the twenty-five tattvas. The third is non-attachment, which is the four dhyanas (meditative states). The fourth is freedom, which is the five abhijñas (supernatural powers). There are also four types in impure Buddhi, which are the opposite of the above four, namely sin, delusion, attachment to desire, and non-freedom. Now, in order to explain good dharmas, only purity is mentioned and not impurity, so it is called 'part.' According to the 'Samkhyakarika,' there are eight parts of Buddhi-tattva, of which four parts are called joy, and four parts are called delusion and darkness. The four parts of joy are as explained above. In Kapila's treatise, these have all been fully explained.

。翻此四分即是癡暗也。優樓迦弟子下第二師亦三寶化世。優樓迦佛寶。弟子僧寶。衛世師經為法寶。衛世師此云異勝論。異於僧法故秤為異。明義自在破他令懷故秤為勝。今言六諦者。一陀羅驃。秤為主諦亦云所依諦。謂地水火風空時方神意。此九法為一切物主故云主諦。又解。一切法悉有依主。故破神品云。黑是求那。疊是陀羅驃。破異品云。瓶是陀羅驃。一是求那。故知依主通於萬法。二者求那。此云依諦。有二十一法。謂一異合離數量好醜八也。次有苦樂憎愛愚智勤墮亦八也。次有五塵即色聲香味觸也。以五塵依地水火風空五主諦也。苦樂愚智等以神意二主諦。餘八通依。三者羯摩帝。此云作諦。謂舉下屈申有所造作也。四者三摩若帝。此云總相諦。謂總萬法為一大有等。五毗尸沙諦。此云別相諦。謂瓶衣不同也。六三摩婆夜諦。此云無障礙諦。如一柱色香遍有而不相障。問一切物皆具六諦也。答具。今略舉內外二物。瓶為主塵依之。即依主二諦。瓶為他所作。即是作諦。瓶有總別。瓶上五塵不相障礙。即餘三諦也。身為主二法依之。一諸塵二心數。身有所作身具總別。身上諸塵不相障礙。即不相障也。俱舍論云。地臘脾此雲物也。但物有九種。一地二水三火四風五空六方七時八我九心。此九物有遍不遍。地

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果推翻這四分，那就是愚昧無知。優樓迦（Uloujia，印度六派哲學之一勝論派的創始人）的弟子是第二位老師，也以三寶教化世人。優樓迦代表佛寶，他的弟子代表僧寶，《衛世師經》代表法寶。《衛世師》在這裡被稱為『異勝論』，因為它不同於僧和法，所以用『異』來衡量。因為它能清楚地闡明義理，駁倒他人觀點，所以用『勝』來衡量。現在所說的六諦是：一、陀羅驃（Tuoluopiao，實體），被稱為主諦，也稱為所依諦。指的是地、水、火、風、空、時、方、神、意這九種法，因為這九種法是一切事物的主宰，所以稱為主諦。另一種解釋是，一切法都有所依之主。因此，在駁斥神我時說，『黑是求那（Qiuna，屬性），疊是陀羅驃』。在駁斥異品時說，『瓶是陀羅驃，一是求那』。由此可知，依主適用於萬法。二、求那（Qiuna，屬性），這裡稱為依諦，有二十一種法。包括一、異、合、離、數量、好、丑這八種；其次是苦、樂、憎、愛、愚、智、勤、墮這八種；再次是五塵，即色、聲、香、味、觸。因為五塵依附於地、水、火、風、空這五種主諦，苦、樂、愚、智等依附於神、意這兩種主諦，其餘八種普遍依附。三、羯摩帝（Jiemodi，業），這裡稱為作諦，指的是舉、下、屈、伸等有所造作的行為。四、三摩若帝（Sanmoruodi，總相），這裡稱為總相諦，指的是將萬法總括為一個大的整體等。五、毗尸沙諦（Pishishadi，別相），這裡稱為別相諦，指的是瓶子和衣服的不同。六、三摩婆夜諦（Sanmobaye di，和合），這裡稱為無障礙諦，例如一根柱子上同時存在顏色和香味，但彼此不互相妨礙。問：一切事物都具備這六諦嗎？答：具備。現在簡單舉例說明內外兩種事物。瓶子以主和塵為所依，這就是依主二諦。瓶子是他人所造作的，這就是作諦。瓶子有總相和別相，瓶子上的五塵互不障礙，這就是其餘三諦。身體以主和二法為所依，一是諸塵，二是心數。身體有所造作，身體具備總相和別相，身體上的諸塵互不障礙，這就是不相障礙。俱舍論中說，地、臘、脾，這裡稱為物，但物有九種：一地，二水，三火，四風，五空，六方，七時，八我，九心。這九種物有的是普遍存在的，有的不是普遍存在的。地...

【English Translation】 English version: To overturn these four divisions is to be foolish and ignorant. The disciple of Uloujia (founder of Vaisheshika school, one of the six major schools of Indian philosophy) is the second teacher, who also transforms the world with the Three Jewels. Uloujia represents the Buddha Jewel, his disciples represent the Sangha Jewel, and the 'Vaisheshika Sutra' represents the Dharma Jewel. 'Vaisheshika' here is called 'Distinguished Victory Theory' because it is different from the Sangha and Dharma, so it is measured by 'distinction'. Because it can clearly explain the meaning and refute other people's views, it is measured by 'victory'. The six truths now spoken of are: first, Dravya (Tuoluopiao, substance), called the main truth, also called the dependent truth. It refers to the nine dharmas of earth, water, fire, wind, space, time, direction, spirit, and mind, because these nine dharmas are the masters of all things, so they are called the main truth. Another explanation is that all dharmas have a dependent master. Therefore, when refuting the self, it is said, 'Black is Guna (Qiuna, attribute), and the stack is Dravya'. When refuting different kinds, it is said, 'The bottle is Dravya, and one is Guna'. From this, it can be known that the dependent master applies to all dharmas. Second, Guna (Qiuna, attribute), here called the dependent truth, has twenty-one dharmas. Including one, different, combined, separated, quantity, good, ugly these eight kinds; secondly, suffering, joy, hatred, love, ignorance, wisdom, diligence, fall these eight kinds; again, the five dusts, namely color, sound, smell, taste, and touch. Because the five dusts depend on the five main truths of earth, water, fire, wind, and space, suffering, joy, ignorance, wisdom, etc. depend on the two main truths of spirit and mind, and the remaining eight are universally dependent. Third, Karma (Jiemodi, action), here called the action truth, refers to actions such as lifting, lowering, bending, stretching, and other creations. Fourth, Samanya (Sanmoruodi, generality), here called the general characteristic truth, refers to summarizing all dharmas into a large whole, etc. Fifth, Vishesha (Pishishadi, particularity), here called the specific characteristic truth, refers to the difference between a bottle and clothes. Sixth, Samavaya (Sanmobaye di, inherence), here called the unobstructed truth, such as the simultaneous existence of color and fragrance on a pillar, but they do not hinder each other. Question: Do all things possess these six truths? Answer: Yes. Now, let's briefly illustrate two kinds of things, internal and external. The bottle relies on the main and dust, which are the two truths of dependence and master. The bottle is made by others, which is the action truth. The bottle has general and specific characteristics, and the five dusts on the bottle do not hinder each other, which are the remaining three truths. The body relies on the main and two dharmas, one is the dusts, and the other is the mental numbers. The body has actions, the body has general and specific characteristics, and the dusts on the body do not hinder each other, which is non-obstruction. The Abhidharmakosha says, earth, wax, spleen, here called things, but there are nine kinds of things: one earth, two water, three fire, four wind, five space, six directions, seven time, eight self, nine mind. Some of these nine kinds of things are universally present, and some are not universally present. Earth...

水火風心此五物不遍。空時方我此四則遍一切處。此四物別有合離法。如行時舉一腳即是離。下腳著地即是合。一切業行悉如是。求那此云德而有十七種。一色二香三味四觸五聲六數七量八名九合十離十一此十二彼十三智十四苦十五樂十六憂十七憎。依物住。是物家德。自有三類。一能造。如色等五是能造德。色是火德。香是地德。味是水德。觸是風德。聲是空德也。二數等有七種德。是平等德。此七通九物德均故稱平等德。三者智等有五德。是我德也。求那非止有十七。如法非法功用長短老少等皆是求那。此十七為本也。物唯自生物不生德。德唯自相生不生物。由非類生故不相生也。物有三時。一方便二正有三後有。若鄰虛塵未與有和合時名方便爾時鄰虛塵獨住未與大有合。不可說有亦不可言無。必有故不如兔角。鄰虛與大有合時即生德。於物德中此德但是物德。德亦非業。德物有動轉去來等名業。九物中唯地水火風心五物有鄰虛。余物無也。求那諦中日三洗再供養火等和合生神分善法者。若樂愚智是求那帝體。若能日三洗再供養火即是智性。若不作者便是愚性。所以于求那帝中明修行也。外道謂恒河是吉河。入中洗者便得罪滅。彼見上古聖人入中洗浴便成聖道故。就朝瞑及日中三時洗也。智度論破云。河水既洗罪

亦應洗福也。再供養火者。三洗明滅罪。再供養火為欲生福。外道謂火是天口。故就朝暝二時再供養火。問外道何故謂火為天口耶。答俱舍論云。有天從火中出語言。諸天口中有光明謂言是火。故云天口。方便心論云。事火有四法。一辰朝禮敬。二殺生祭祀。三燃眾香木。四獻諸油燈。問智度論云。火本為天口。而今一切啖。此言何謂。答外道謂火是天口。正燒蘇等十八種物。令香氣上達諸天。天得食之。令人獲福。將欲燒時前遣人咒然後燒。而今一切啖者。此是無常反異令一切凈不凈悉皆燒之。故云一切啖。和合生神分善法者明崇。向三洗以除罪。再供養火以生福。罪滅福生與神和合。神是常不可生。但神為主。善依神生。故言生神分善。然神具生善惡。今但明善故稱為分。勒沙婆弟子誦尼揵子經者。尼揵子此云無結。依經修行離煩惱結故以為名。亦名那耶修摩。舊云尼揵子。經說有十六諦。聞慧生八。一天文地理。二算數。三醫方。四咒術。及四事陀故云八也。次修慧生八者。修六天行為六。及事星宿天行為七。修長仙行為八。問僧佉二十五。今偏明覺諦。世師偏引依諦。今十六中用何諦耶。答修長仙法。意欲舍無常苦故求常樂。即第十六諦也。又摩醯首羅天說十六諦義。一量諦。二所量。三疑。四用。五譬喻。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：也應該洗滌以求得福報。再次供養火，三次洗滌是爲了消除罪業，再次供養火是爲了希望獲得福報。外道認為火是天的口，所以在早晚兩個時辰再次供養火。問：外道為什麼認為火是天的口呢？答：《俱舍論》中說，有天從火中發出語言，諸天的口中有光明，認為語言就是火，所以說火是天的口。方便心論中說，侍奉火有四種方法：一是早晨禮敬，二是殺生祭祀，三是燃燒各種香木，四是獻上各種油燈。問：《智度論》中說，火本來是天的口，而現在卻什麼都吃，這是什麼意思？答：外道認為火是天的口，專門焚燒酥油等十八種物品，讓香氣上達諸天，天得到食物，使人獲得福報。將要焚燒時，先派人唸咒，然後再焚燒。而現在什麼都吃，這是因為無常變化，使一切乾淨和不乾淨的東西都燒掉，所以說什麼都吃。和合生神分善法，是說崇尚先前三次洗滌以消除罪業，再次供養火以獲得福報，罪業消除，福報產生，與神和合。神是常住不變的，不可生滅，但神是主宰，善依附於神而生，所以說生神分善。然而神具有產生善惡的能力，現在只說明善，所以稱為分。勒沙婆（Ṛṣabha）的弟子誦讀尼揵子（Nirgrantha，意為無結）經，尼揵子，意思是無結，依據經書修行，脫離煩惱的束縛，所以以此為名。也叫那耶修摩（Jñātaputra Śramaṇa），舊譯為尼揵子。經中說有十六諦，聞慧產生八種，一是天文地理，二是算數，三是醫方，四是咒術，以及四事陀，所以說是八種。其次修慧產生八種，修六天行為六，以及侍奉星宿天行為七，修長仙行為八。問：僧佉（Sāṃkhya）有二十五諦，現在偏重說明覺諦，世間的老師偏重引用依諦，現在十六諦中用的是哪一諦呢？答：修長仙法，意在捨棄無常的痛苦，所以尋求常樂，就是第十六諦。又摩醯首羅天（Maheśvara）說十六諦的意義：一量諦，二所量，三疑，四用，五譬喻。

【English Translation】 English version: One should also purify oneself to obtain blessings. Furthermore, offering to the fire involves three ablutions to extinguish sins, and offering to the fire again is to generate blessings. The heretics believe that fire is the mouth of the gods, so they offer to the fire again during the morning and evening. Question: Why do the heretics believe that fire is the mouth of the gods? Answer: The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya says that a god speaks from the fire, and the mouths of the gods have light, considering speech to be fire, hence it is said to be the mouth of the gods. The Upāyahṛdaya says that serving the fire has four methods: first, morning reverence; second, killing living beings for sacrifice; third, burning various fragrant woods; fourth, offering various oil lamps. Question: The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says that fire was originally the mouth of the gods, but now it consumes everything. What does this mean? Answer: The heretics believe that fire is the mouth of the gods, specifically burning eighteen kinds of items such as ghee, allowing the fragrance to reach the gods, so that the gods obtain food, enabling people to obtain blessings. When about to burn, they first send someone to chant mantras and then burn. But now it consumes everything, this is because of impermanent changes, causing everything clean and unclean to be burned, so it is said to consume everything. 'Harmonizing and generating divine sharing of good dharma' means advocating the previous three ablutions to eliminate sins, and offering to the fire again to obtain blessings. Sins are eliminated, blessings are generated, and one harmonizes with the divine. The divine is constant and unchanging, not subject to birth and death, but the divine is the master, and goodness relies on the divine to arise, so it is said to generate divine sharing of goodness. However, the divine has the ability to generate both good and evil, but now only goodness is explained, so it is called sharing. The disciples of Ṛṣabha recite the Nirgrantha (meaning 'without knots') Sutra. Nirgrantha means 'without knots,' practicing according to the scriptures, freeing oneself from the bonds of afflictions, hence the name. It is also called Jñātaputra Śramaṇa, formerly translated as Nirgrantha. The sutra says there are sixteen truths. Hearing wisdom generates eight: first, astronomy and geography; second, arithmetic; third, medicine; fourth, incantations; and the four sattvas, hence it is said to be eight. Next, cultivation wisdom generates eight: cultivating the practices of the six heavens is six, and serving the celestial constellations is seven, cultivating the practices of the long-lived immortals is eight. Question: Sāṃkhya has twenty-five tattvas, now focusing on explaining the buddhi-tattva, worldly teachers focus on quoting the āśraya-tattva, which of the sixteen truths is used now? Answer: Cultivating the practices of the long-lived immortals, intending to abandon the suffering of impermanence, therefore seeking constant joy, which is the sixteenth truth. Furthermore, Maheśvara explains the meaning of the sixteen truths: first, the truth of measure; second, the measurable; third, doubt; fourth, use; fifth, metaphor.

六悉檀。七語言分別。八思擇。九決。十論議。十一修諸義。十二壞義。十三自證。十四難難。十五諍論。十六墮負。量諦者有四種。一現知。如眼見色耳聞聲等。二比知。如見一分即知余分見煙知有火等。三不能知。信聖人語。四譬喻知。如見日去等。所量者如身有我乃至解脫也。疑者如見杌似人等。用者如依此物作事也。譬喻者如見牛知有水牛也。悉檀者。自對義由異他義。如數人根是實法論明根是假名等也。語言分別者分別自他義也。思擇者思擇道理如此也。決者義理可決定也。論議者由語言顯真實道理。諸義以立真實義。壞義者由立難難他立義。證者五種。一不定。二相違。三相生疑。四未成。五即時也。難難者。聞山林有白象。難草頭亦有白象。諍論者有二十四種。墮負者如墮負論說。此十六諦異勒沙婆十六諦也。又有諸師下此皆勒沙婆部中枝流出也。自餓法者。或一日食三果。或吸風服蘇或服氣也。寂默者。若提子論師說有六障六自在。一不見障。二苦受障。三愚癡障。四命盡障。五不得好性障。六惡名障。若翻此六障即六自在。其人立非有非無為宗明一切法。若言是有無一法可取。若言是無而萬物歷然。以心取境無境稱心。以境取心無心稱境。故云非有非無。默然無言。持牛戒者如俱舍論說。閤眼低頭

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本六悉檀（六種根本原則）。七語言分別（七種語言的區分）。八思擇（八種思辨）。九決（九種決斷）。十論議（十種論辯）。十一修諸義（修習各種意義）。十二壞義（破壞意義）。十三自證（自我證明）。十四難難（以困難來詰難）。十五諍論（爭論）。十六墮負（失敗）。量諦者有四種：一現知（如眼見色耳聞聲等），二比知（如見一分即知余分，見煙知有火等），三不能知（信聖人語），四譬喻知（如見日去等）。所量者如身有我乃至解脫也。疑者如見杌似人等。用者如依此物作事也。譬喻者如見牛知有水牛也。悉檀者，自對義由異他義，如數論的補盧沙（Purusha，神我）和自性（Prakriti，自然）是實法，而明論則認為是假名等。語言分別者，分別自他義也。思擇者，思擇道理如此也。決者，義理可決定也。論議者，由語言顯真實道理。諸義以立真實義。壞義者，由立難難他立義。證者五種：一不定，二相違，三相生疑，四未成，五即時也。難難者，聞山林有白象，難草頭亦有白象。諍論者有二十四種。墮負者如墮負論說。此十六諦異勒沙婆（Rishabha）十六諦也。又有諸師下此皆勒沙婆部中枝流出也。自餓法者，或一日食三果，或吸風服蘇或服氣也。寂默者，若尼犍子（Nigantha，耆那教）論師說有六障六自在：一不見障，二苦受障，三愚癡障，四命盡障，五不得好性障，六惡名障。若翻此六障即六自在。其人立非有非無為宗明一切法。若言是有，無一法可取。若言是無而萬物歷然。以心取境，無境稱心。以境取心，無心稱境。故云非有非無。默然無言。持牛戒者如俱舍論說。閤眼低頭

【English Translation】 English version Six Siddhantas (six fundamental principles). Seven language distinctions. Eight considerations. Nine decisions. Ten debates. Eleven cultivating various meanings. Twelve destroying meanings. Thirteen self-proving. Fourteen difficult questions. Fifteen disputes. Sixteen defeats. There are four kinds of valid means of knowledge: 1. Direct perception (such as the eye seeing color, the ear hearing sound, etc.). 2. Inference (such as seeing a part and knowing the rest, seeing smoke and knowing there is fire, etc.). 3. Non-cognition (believing the words of sages). 4. Analogy (such as seeing the sun go away, etc.). What is to be measured is like the self in the body leading to liberation. Doubt is like seeing a stump resembling a person. Use is like doing things based on this object. Analogy is like seeing a cow and knowing there is a water buffalo. Siddhanta is the meaning of oneself versus the meaning of others, such as the Purusha (self) and Prakriti (nature) of the Samkhya school being real dharmas, while the Minglun school considers them to be false names, etc. Language distinction is distinguishing the meaning of oneself and others. Consideration is considering the truth in this way. Decision is that the meaning can be determined. Debate is revealing the true principle through language. Various meanings are used to establish the true meaning. Destroying meaning is establishing difficulties to challenge the established meaning of others. There are five kinds of proof: 1. Uncertain. 2. Contradictory. 3. Giving rise to doubt. 4. Unaccomplished. 5. Immediate. Difficult question is, hearing that there are white elephants in the mountains and forests, questioning whether there are also white elephants on the grass. There are twenty-four kinds of disputes. Defeat is as described in the treatise on defeat. These sixteen truths are different from the sixteen truths of Rishabha. Furthermore, the following teachers are all branches of the Rishabha school. The practice of self-starvation is either eating three fruits a day, or inhaling wind and consuming ghee, or consuming air. Silence is, if the Nigantha (Jaina) teachers say there are six obstacles and six freedoms: 1. Obstacle of not seeing. 2. Obstacle of suffering. 3. Obstacle of ignorance. 4. Obstacle of the end of life. 5. Obstacle of not obtaining good qualities. 6. Obstacle of bad reputation. If these six obstacles are reversed, they are the six freedoms. These people establish the doctrine of neither existence nor non-existence to explain all dharmas. If it is said to exist, there is no single dharma that can be grasped. If it is said to be non-existent, yet all things are clearly present. The mind grasps the object, but the object does not match the mind. The object grasps the mind, but the mind does not match the object. Therefore, it is said to be neither existent nor non-existent. Silent and without words. Holding the cow vow is as described in the Abhidharmakosha. Closing the eyes and lowering the head.

食草以為牛法。彼見牛死得生天上。即尋此牛。八萬劫來猶受牛身。不達爾前有于天因。謂牛死得生天。是故相與持于牛戒。成論云。持牛戒若成則墮牛中。如其不成則入地獄。然外道苦行世人信之。如見今人精進。自言是道又為他所信。若聞本不生滅。自不能信他亦不信。智度論明巧拙度。須深得其旨。聲聞精進尚是苦道名為拙度。外道苦行非但是拙亦不能度。非但不度更增生死。故龍樹呵云。是為癡道。法華明。以苦欲舍苦。為此起大悲。四法受中即是現苦后苦也。何以言獨佛能說耶此第二呵論主。內曰是皆邪見下第六懸非指后。略有四意。一云。外道狂謂實無此理。如熱病人無物見物。良醫總呵之。二者自有總立別破別立總破。即此文是也。三者且欲挫其立鋒令義勢萎折。四欲引彼令發后問。所言皆邪見者外道所立。於三毒中是屬癡使攝。以癡增上故名邪見。雜阿含云。三事覆即妙開則不妙。一謂愚人。二婆羅門語。三女人。三事開則妙覆則不妙。謂日月及佛語。論主今聞外人所說如其非妙。是故呵之。雜阿含云。虛空無足跡外道無沙門。今論主知其無有正法。是故總呵云邪見。又百論二種破外道。一總破一切外道。如此文也。二從惡止已去竟論別破外道。前總后別釋破義之方也。外曰佛說何等善法相下論有三

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：他們以吃草為牛的修行方法。他們看到牛死後能夠升到天上，就尋找這樣的牛。八萬劫以來仍然承受著牛的身軀，不明白在成為牛之前就已經有了昇天的原因，卻認為牛死後就能昇天。因此，他們互相堅持持守牛戒。《成實論》說，持牛戒如果成功，就會墮入牛道；如果不能成功，就會墮入地獄。然而，外道的苦行卻被世人相信。例如，看到現在有人精進修行，就自稱是得道之人，也被他人所相信。如果聽到『本不生滅』的道理，自己不能相信，他人也不會相信。《智度論》闡明了巧拙之分，必須深刻領會其中的旨意。聲聞乘的精進修行尚且是苦道，被稱為拙度，外道的苦行非但屬於拙度，也不能解脫，非但不能解脫，反而會增加生死輪迴。所以龍樹菩薩呵斥說，這是愚癡之道。《法華經》闡明，以苦欲舍苦，為此生起大悲心。四法受中，就是指現在的苦和將來的苦。為什麼說只有佛才能說呢？這是第二次呵斥論主。『內曰是皆邪見』以下第六句是懸示，並非指後面。大概有四種意思：一是說，外道狂妄，認為確實沒有這樣的道理。如同熱病之人，無中生有，良醫會全部呵斥他們。二是說，自己有總立別破，也有別立總破，這段文字就是這種情況。三是想要挫敗他們立論的鋒芒，使他們的義理氣勢衰弱。四是想要引導他們提出後面的問題。所說的都是邪見，是指外道所立的觀點，在三毒中屬於癡使所攝，因為癡心增長的緣故，所以稱為邪見。《雜阿含經》說，三件事覆蓋，妙理就不顯現；三件事顯現，妙理就被覆蓋。三件事覆蓋是指：愚人、婆羅門語、女人。三件事顯現是指：日月以及佛語。論主現在聽到外人所說，如果不是妙理，所以呵斥他們。《雜阿含經》說，虛空中沒有足跡，外道中沒有沙門。現在論主知道他們沒有正法，所以總的呵斥他們是邪見。另外，《百論》有兩種破斥外道的方法：一是總的破斥一切外道，就像這段文字一樣。二是從『從惡止已去竟論別破外道』開始，分別破斥外道。前面是總破，後面是別破，這是解釋破斥義理的方法。外道說：佛說了什麼樣的善法相呢？下面論述有三種。

【English Translation】 English version: They take eating grass as the practice of a cow. They see that cows are reborn in heaven after death, so they seek out such cows. For eighty thousand kalpas, they still endure the body of a cow, not understanding that the cause of being born in heaven existed before becoming a cow, yet they believe that cows can be reborn in heaven after death. Therefore, they mutually adhere to the cow vow. The Satyasiddhi Shastra says that if the cow vow is successfully kept, one will fall into the cow realm; if it is not successful, one will fall into hell. However, the ascetic practices of non-Buddhists are believed by the world. For example, seeing someone diligently practicing now, they claim to be enlightened and are believed by others. If they hear the principle of 'inherent non-arising and non-ceasing', they cannot believe it themselves, nor will others believe it. The Mahaprajnaparamita Shastra clarifies the distinction between skillful and unskillful, and one must deeply understand its meaning. The diligent practice of the Shravakas is still a path of suffering and is called unskillful liberation. The ascetic practices of non-Buddhists are not only unskillful but also cannot liberate; not only do they not liberate, but they increase the cycle of birth and death. Therefore, Nagarjuna Bodhisattva rebukes them, saying that this is a foolish path. The Lotus Sutra clarifies that one uses suffering to abandon suffering, and for this, great compassion arises. Among the four kinds of reception, it refers to present suffering and future suffering. Why is it said that only the Buddha can speak of this? This is the second rebuke of the Shastra master. 'Innerly, it is all wrong views' (內曰是皆邪見) below, the sixth sentence is a suspension, not referring to what follows. There are roughly four meanings: First, it says that non-Buddhists are arrogant and think that there is no such principle. Like a person with a fever who sees things that are not there, a good doctor will rebuke them all. Second, it says that one has a general establishment and specific refutation, and also specific establishment and general refutation; this passage is such a case. Third, it is to weaken the sharpness of their arguments, causing their reasoning to weaken. Fourth, it is to guide them to ask the questions that follow. What is said to be wrong views refers to the views established by non-Buddhists, which are included in the afflictions of the three poisons and are governed by ignorance, so they are called wrong views because of the increase of ignorance. The Samyutta Agama says that when three things cover, the wonderful principle is not revealed; when three things are revealed, the wonderful principle is covered. The three things that cover are: fools, the words of Brahmins, and women. The three things that reveal are: the sun, the moon, and the Buddha's words. The Shastra master now hears what non-Buddhists say, and if it is not a wonderful principle, he rebukes them. The Samyutta Agama says that there are no footprints in the sky, and there are no Shramanas among non-Buddhists. Now the Shastra master knows that they do not have the right Dharma, so he generally rebukes them as wrong views. Furthermore, the Shatashastra has two ways of refuting non-Buddhists: First, it generally refutes all non-Buddhists, like this passage. Second, starting from 'stopping from evil and going to the end of the discussion, specifically refuting non-Buddhists' (從惡止已去竟論別破外道), it specifically refutes non-Buddhists. The former is a general refutation, and the latter is a specific refutation; this is the method of explaining the meaning of refutation. Non-Buddhists say: What kind of good Dharma characteristics did the Buddha speak of? The following discussion has three types.

章。初章已竟。今是第二反邪歸正辨論大宗。就文為二。一者從此竟品明二善三空示於始學入道之方。謂申佛漸舍之教。第二從破神品至破空品末明破邪歸正而正辨于破邪。就此二章亦得為一亦得為二亦得開三。所言一者。雖在文前後不同同明破病顯道。斯處無異也。所言二者。前後二章各為二也。初章二者。一明依福舍罪。二明依空舍福。后章二者。一者破神品明眾生空。二者破一品下辨於法空。言各三者。此品一明舍罪。二辨舍福。三明能捨空無相智。即品名三事。謂舍罪福。後門三者。一破神品明眾生空。二破一品至破常辨諸法空。第三明破空一品空病亦空。即凈名經有疾菩薩用三空自調。就初有三。一依福舍罪。二傍破吉義。三伏流辨宗。就初前問次答。問有近遠三處生。遠生者。前偈云諸佛世尊之所說。外道初領偈但定其人尊。今此外曰領偈問人所說法。故自上三番正諍人真偽。從此竟論但諍法是非。若即以此分章者。論雖十品唯有二意。一者諍人。二者諍法也。二從上佛知諸法實相明瞭無礙又能說深凈法生。若我師皆是邪見不能說深諍法者。汝師說何等善法耶。三近生者。外道前廣列十師。論主總非皆云邪見。外道今問。若我師所說並是邪見。汝師說何善法。內曰惡止善行下第二答也。問佛教無窮。何故

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：章。初章已經結束。現在是第二次反駁邪說、歸於正道的辨論大宗。就文章結構來說分為兩部分。一是從此品到結束，闡明二善三空，以此啟示初學者進入佛道的方法，即闡述佛陀逐漸捨棄的教義。第二是從《破神品》到《破空品》末尾，闡明破除邪說、歸於正道，重點在於辨析破除邪說。就這兩章來說，可以合為一章，也可以分為兩章，也可以展開為三章。說合為一章，是因為雖然在文章前後有所不同，但都闡明破除病根、顯現真道，這方面沒有區別。說分為兩章，是因為前後兩章各有側重。初章分為兩部分，一是闡明依靠福報捨棄罪業，二是闡明依靠空性捨棄福報。后章分為兩部分，一是《破神品》闡明眾生空，二是《破一品》之後辨析法空。說分為三部分，此品（指初章）一是闡明捨棄罪業，二是辨析捨棄福報，三是闡明能捨棄一切的空無相智，即品名所說的三件事：捨棄罪業、福報。后章分為三部分，一是《破神品》闡明眾生空，二是《破一品》到《破常品》辨析諸法空，三是闡明《破空品》中空病亦空的道理。就像《維摩詰經》中患病的菩薩用三空來調理自己一樣。就初章來說，分為三部分：一是依靠福報捨棄罪業，二是旁敲側擊地駁斥吉義，三是埋下伏筆，辨明宗義。就第一部分來說，先是提問，然後是回答。提問有近、遠三種情況。遠的情況是，前面的偈頌說『諸佛世尊之所說』（一切都是諸佛世尊所說）。外道最初領會偈頌時，只是確定了人的尊貴。現在從外面說，領會偈頌，詢問人所說的法。所以從上面三次正面爭論人的真偽，到這裡開始只爭論法的是非。如果以此來劃分章節，那麼論述雖然有十品，但只有兩個意思：一是爭論人，二是爭論法。二是，從上面『佛知諸法實相，明瞭無礙，又能說深凈法』（佛陀了知諸法實相，明瞭通達沒有障礙，又能說深奧清凈的法）開始。如果我的老師都是邪見，不能說深奧清凈的法，那麼你的老師說什麼樣的善法呢？三是近的情況，外道前面廣泛列舉了十位老師，論主全部否定，都說是邪見。外道現在提問，如果我的老師所說的都是邪見，那麼你的老師說什麼樣的善法？內道回答說『惡止善行』（停止作惡，行持善事）。下面是第二部分回答。提問：佛教無窮無盡，為什麼……

【English Translation】 English version: Chapter. The first chapter is already finished. Now is the second major debate on refuting heresy and returning to the right path. In terms of the structure of the text, it is divided into two parts. The first is from this chapter to the end, elucidating the Two Goods and Three Emptinesses, thereby enlightening beginners on the path to Buddhahood, which is to expound the Buddha's gradually relinquished teachings. The second is from the 'Destruction of Gods' chapter to the end of the 'Destruction of Emptiness' chapter, elucidating the refutation of heresy and return to the right path, with the focus on analyzing and refuting heresy. In terms of these two chapters, they can be combined into one chapter, divided into two chapters, or expanded into three chapters. Saying they are combined into one chapter is because, although they differ in the order of the text, they both elucidate the eradication of illness and the manifestation of the truth, and there is no difference in this aspect. Saying they are divided into two chapters is because the two chapters each have their own emphasis. The first chapter is divided into two parts: one is to elucidate relying on merit to abandon sin, and the other is to elucidate relying on emptiness to abandon merit. The latter chapter is divided into two parts: one is the 'Destruction of Gods' chapter, which elucidates the emptiness of sentient beings, and the other is after the 'Destruction of One' chapter, which analyzes the emptiness of phenomena. Saying they are divided into three parts, this chapter (referring to the first chapter) first elucidates abandoning sin, second analyzes abandoning merit, and third elucidates the non-dual wisdom of emptiness that can abandon everything, which are the three things mentioned in the chapter title: abandoning sin and merit. The latter chapter is divided into three parts: first, the 'Destruction of Gods' chapter elucidates the emptiness of sentient beings; second, the 'Destruction of One' chapter to the 'Destruction of Permanence' chapter analyzes the emptiness of all phenomena; and third, the 'Destruction of Emptiness' chapter elucidates the principle that even the illness of emptiness is empty. Just like the sick Bodhisattva in the 'Vimalakirti Sutra' uses the Three Emptinesses to regulate himself. In terms of the first chapter, it is divided into three parts: one is relying on merit to abandon sin, the second is indirectly refuting the meaning of auspiciousness (吉義), and the third is foreshadowing and clarifying the meaning of the sect. In terms of the first part, there is first a question and then an answer. The question has three situations: near, far, and close. The far situation is that the previous verse said 'All that is spoken by the Buddhas and World Honored Ones' (諸佛世尊之所說). When the heretics first understood the verse, they only determined the nobility of the person. Now, from the outside, understanding the verse, asking about the Dharma spoken by the person. Therefore, from the above three times of directly arguing about the authenticity of the person, from here on, only the right and wrong of the Dharma are argued. If this is used to divide the chapters, then although the discussion has ten chapters, there are only two meanings: one is to argue about the person, and the other is to argue about the Dharma. Second, from above, 'The Buddha knows the true nature of all phenomena, is clear and unobstructed, and can speak profound and pure Dharma' (佛知諸法實相，明瞭無礙，又能說深凈法). If my teachers are all heretical views and cannot speak profound and pure Dharma, then what kind of good Dharma do your teachers speak? Third, the near situation is that the heretics widely listed ten teachers in front, and the debater completely denied them, saying they were all heretical views. The heretics now ask, if what my teachers say is all heretical views, then what kind of good Dharma do your teachers speak? The inner path answers 'Stop evil and practice good' (惡止善行). Below is the second part of the answer. Question: Buddhism is endless, why...

偏答二善。答凡有七義。一者前敬贊三寶乃至諍于真偽。此令外道回邪信正受於三歸。今明二善授其戒法故。佛法大宗以歸戒為首。二者示始學之方。前明依福舍罪。次依空舍福。故下文云生道次第法故如垢衣浣染。三者為破外道顛倒。殺生祀天以惡為善。言不行此事即便是惡。以善為惡。今欲示其善惡之相。故殺等諸惡宜應須止。不殺等善宜應奉行。故下云。斷邪見故說是經。即其證也。四者外以二字總貫眾經。內法亦明二善該佛教。五者佛法大宗唯誡與勸。惡止明諸惡莫作。謂誡門也。善行則諸善奉行明勸門也。七佛相承未制別戒已來皆前說通戒。今外道初入佛法未剃頭出家不得授其別戒。宜前明通戒也。六者為明佛法遠難二邊顯示中道。惡止明其所離。謂非有義。善行明於所得。即非無義。非有非無故名中道。七者一切諸義無有定相。隨問而答。外人前既問善。今還答善也。問前外曰何故無修妒路而此偈本有之。答今見文意。論主歸敬既畢則登高座。仍豎惡止善行。但天親假勢發起前問耳。又遍釋二善有四義二義一義。四義者。惡牒邪教也。止破邪也。善牒正教。行勸修行也。二義者。前二破邪。后二顯正也。一義者。惡止者止凡夫二乘有所得生心動念身口意業。皆違實相故是須止也。止即累無不寂。善行者實

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：偏答二善（兩種善行）。回答共有七個意義：第一，前面已經敬贊三寶，乃至辯論真偽。這是爲了讓外道捨棄邪見，信奉正道，接受三皈依（皈依佛、皈依法、皈依僧）。現在說明兩種善行，是授予他們戒法的緣故。佛法的大宗旨是以皈依和受戒為首要。第二，指示初學者的方法。前面說明依靠福德捨棄罪惡，然後依靠空性捨棄福德。所以下文說，產生道次第的法，就像洗滌染污的衣服。第三，爲了破除外道的顛倒見。他們殺生祭祀天神，以惡為善。說不行此事，實際上就是惡。以善為惡。現在想要指示他們善惡的真相。所以殺生等各種惡行應該停止，不殺生等善行應該奉行。所以下文說，『斷除邪見，所以說這部經』，就是證明。第四，『二』字總括了眾多經典。內在的佛法也說明兩種善行涵蓋了佛教。第五，佛法的大宗旨唯有告誡和勸勉。『惡止』說明諸惡莫作，是告誡之門。『善行』則是諸善奉行，是勸勉之門。七佛相承，在沒有制定別戒之前，都先說通戒。現在外道初入佛法，沒有剃頭出家，不能授予他們別戒，所以應該先說明通戒。第六，爲了說明佛法遠離難行二邊，顯示中道。『惡止』說明所要遠離的，是非有之義。『善行』說明所要得到的，即非無之義。非有非無，所以名為中道。第七，一切諸義沒有定相，隨問題而回答。外人在前面已經問了善，現在還是回答善。有人問，前面外道說為什麼《修妒路》（梵語Sūtra，經）沒有，而這個偈頌的原本有。回答說，現在看文意，論主歸敬完畢后就登上高座，於是樹立『惡止善行』。只是天親（Vasubandhu）菩薩假借外道之勢發起前面的問題罷了。又普遍解釋兩種善行有四義、二義、一義。四義是：『惡』是指邪教，『止』是破除邪教，『善』是指正教，『行』是勸勉修行。二義是：前面兩個是破除邪教，後面兩個是顯明正教。一義是：『惡止』是止息凡夫二乘有所得的生心動念，身口意業，都違背實相，所以需要止息。止息就是累贅都寂滅。『善行』是真實。 English version: The partial answer concerns the two kinds of goodness. The answer has seven meanings: First, previously, the Three Jewels (Buddha, Dharma, Sangha) have been praised and venerated, and even debates about truth and falsehood have occurred. This is to cause non-Buddhists to abandon wrong views, believe in the right path, and receive the Three Refuges (taking refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha). Now, explaining the two kinds of goodness is to impart the precepts to them. The great principle of Buddhism is to take refuge and receive precepts as the foremost. Second, it shows the method for beginners. Previously, it was explained to rely on merit to abandon sins, and then to rely on emptiness to abandon merit. Therefore, the following text says that the Dharma of the stages of the path arises, just like washing dyed and dirty clothes. Third, it is to break the inverted views of non-Buddhists. They kill living beings to sacrifice to the gods, taking evil as good. Saying that not doing this is actually evil, taking good as evil. Now, it is intended to show them the true nature of good and evil. Therefore, evils such as killing should be stopped, and good deeds such as not killing should be practiced. Therefore, the following text says, 'Because of cutting off wrong views, this sutra is spoken,' which is the proof. Fourth, the word 'two' encompasses many sutras. The inner Dharma also explains that the two kinds of goodness encompass Buddhism. Fifth, the great principle of Buddhism is only admonishment and encouragement. 'Stopping evil' explains that all evils should not be done, which is the gate of admonishment. 'Practicing good' is to practice all good deeds, which is the gate of encouragement. The Seven Buddhas have passed down that before specific precepts were established, the general precepts were spoken first. Now, non-Buddhists are newly entering Buddhism, and they have not shaved their heads and left home, so they cannot be given specific precepts. Therefore, the general precepts should be explained first. Sixth, it is to explain that Buddhism is far from the two extremes of difficulty and shows the Middle Way. 'Stopping evil' explains what is to be abandoned, which is the meaning of non-existence. 'Practicing good' explains what is to be obtained, which is the meaning of non-non-existence. Neither existence nor non-existence is called the Middle Way. Seventh, all meanings have no fixed form, and they are answered according to the question. Non-Buddhists have already asked about goodness before, and now they are still answering about goodness. Someone asked why the Sūtra (Sūtra) was not there before, but the original of this verse has it. The answer is that now looking at the meaning of the text, after the author has finished paying homage, he ascends the high seat, and then establishes 'stopping evil and practicing good.' It is just that Vasubandhu (Vasubandhu) Bodhisattva borrowed the power of non-Buddhists to initiate the previous question. Also, the universal explanation of the two kinds of goodness has four meanings, two meanings, and one meaning. The four meanings are: 'Evil' refers to heretical teachings, 'stopping' is to break heretical teachings, 'good' refers to the right teachings, and 'practice' is to encourage practice. The two meanings are: the first two are to break heretical teachings, and the last two are to reveal the right teachings. The one meaning is: 'Stopping evil' is to stop the thoughts and actions of ordinary people and those of the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) who have attachments, and their actions of body, speech, and mind all violate reality, so they need to be stopped. Stopping is the annihilation of all burdens. 'Practicing good' is reality.

【English Translation】 English version: The partial answer concerns the two kinds of goodness. The answer has seven meanings: First, previously, the Three Jewels (Buddha, Dharma, Sangha) have been praised and venerated, and even debates about truth and falsehood have occurred. This is to cause non-Buddhists to abandon wrong views, believe in the right path, and receive the Three Refuges (taking refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha). Now, explaining the two kinds of goodness is to impart the precepts to them. The great principle of Buddhism is to take refuge and receive precepts as the foremost. Second, it shows the method for beginners. Previously, it was explained to rely on merit to abandon sins, and then to rely on emptiness to abandon merit. Therefore, the following text says that the Dharma of the stages of the path arises, just like washing dyed and dirty clothes. Third, it is to break the inverted views of non-Buddhists. They kill living beings to sacrifice to the gods, taking evil as good. Saying that not doing this is actually evil, taking good as evil. Now, it is intended to show them the true nature of good and evil. Therefore, evils such as killing should be stopped, and good deeds such as not killing should be practiced. Therefore, the following text says, 'Because of cutting off wrong views, this sutra is spoken,' which is the proof. Fourth, the word 'two' encompasses many sutras. The inner Dharma also explains that the two kinds of goodness encompass Buddhism. Fifth, the great principle of Buddhism is only admonishment and encouragement. 'Stopping evil' explains that all evils should not be done, which is the gate of admonishment. 'Practicing good' is to practice all good deeds, which is the gate of encouragement. The Seven Buddhas have passed down that before specific precepts were established, the general precepts were spoken first. Now, non-Buddhists are newly entering Buddhism, and they have not shaved their heads and left home, so they cannot be given specific precepts. Therefore, the general precepts should be explained first. Sixth, it is to explain that Buddhism is far from the two extremes of difficulty and shows the Middle Way. 'Stopping evil' explains what is to be abandoned, which is the meaning of non-existence. 'Practicing good' explains what is to be obtained, which is the meaning of non-non-existence. Neither existence nor non-existence is called the Middle Way. Seventh, all meanings have no fixed form, and they are answered according to the question. Non-Buddhists have already asked about goodness before, and now they are still answering about goodness. Someone asked why the Sūtra (Sūtra) was not there before, but the original of this verse has it. The answer is that now looking at the meaning of the text, after the author has finished paying homage, he ascends the high seat, and then establishes 'stopping evil and practicing good.' It is just that Vasubandhu (Vasubandhu) Bodhisattva borrowed the power of non-Buddhists to initiate the previous question. Also, the universal explanation of the two kinds of goodness has four meanings, two meanings, and one meaning. The four meanings are: 'Evil' refers to heretical teachings, 'stopping' is to break heretical teachings, 'good' refers to the right teachings, and 'practice' is to encourage practice. The two meanings are: the first two are to break heretical teachings, and the last two are to reveal the right teachings. The one meaning is: 'Stopping evil' is to stop the thoughts and actions of ordinary people and those of the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) who have attachments, and their actions of body, speech, and mind all violate reality, so they need to be stopped. Stopping is the annihilation of all burdens. 'Practicing good' is reality.

相法身是第一善。令修行之謂德無不圓也。就天親釋中為二。前總后別。就總別中各有四。總中四者。一能說人二所說法三名四義。佛者明能說人也。所以標佛者。外道前問佛說何等善法。今還答之是故稱佛。略說善法二種者第二明所說。諸佛說法有略有廣。今是攝廣為略。止相行相者第三列名。息一切惡下第四釋義。問他釋二善其義云何。答舊有四釋。一云。發無作為止。不發為行。二云。作止噁心行善是止。不作止噁心直泛爾而作名為行善。三云。從息緣後生善體能止惡為止善。從息緣後生善體不能止惡為行善。四云。從息緣後生為止。隨事起滅為行。成論師又作四句。一心止無作止。二心行無作行。三心行無作止。四心止無作行。如人慾受戒發初作止惡意。請師僧等中間未發無作。此是心止無作止。心行無作行者。即是興心正受戒時發無作也。心行無作止者即是道定戒。第四可知耳。問道定心及無作屬何善。答一釋云屬行善。開善云。定伏惑道斷惑。從伏斷惑心生無作是止善。道定伏斷後心所生善屬行。又釋一切戒皆屬止善。問攝善法等三聚戒屬何善耶。答一云。攝律儀屬止餘二屬行。二云。三種戒並是止善。如動身口及求戒心。發得作戒。從作戒即生無作。謂誓息一切惡。誓行一切善。誓度一切眾生。並生三

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本相法身（通過觀察身體特徵來了解命運的方法）是第一等的善。使修行被稱為德行，沒有不圓滿的。在天親（Vasubandhu）的解釋中分為兩部分：前面是總說，後面是別說。在總說和別說中，各自有四個方面。總說中的四個方面是：一、能說法的人；二、所說的法；三、名稱；四、意義。佛（Buddha）表明了能說法的人。之所以標明佛，是因為外道先前問佛說了什麼善法，現在仍然回答這個問題，所以稱之為佛。簡略地說兩種善法，這是第二點，說明所說的法。諸佛說法有簡略有廣博，現在是將廣博攝為簡略。止相（cessation aspect）和行相（activity aspect）是第三點，列出名稱。息滅一切惡（cessation of all evils）以下是第四點，解釋意義。有人問，其他解釋兩種善的意義是什麼？回答說，舊有四種解釋。第一種說法是：發起無作（non-action）為止，不發起為行。第二種說法是：阻止噁心，行善是止；不阻止噁心，只是泛泛地行善，稱為行善。第三種說法是：從息滅因緣后產生的善體能夠阻止惡，是為止善；從息滅因緣后產生的善體不能阻止惡，是為行善。第四種說法是：從息滅因緣后產生為止，隨事而起滅為行。成論師（Sthiramati）又作了四句：一心止無作止；二心行無作行；三心行無作止；四心止無作行。例如，有人想要受戒，最初發起作止惡意，請師僧等，中間未發起無作，這是心止無作止。心行無作行，就是興起心念正式受戒時，發起無作。心行無作止，就是道定戒（path of fixed precepts）。第四種情況可以理解。有人問道定心及無作屬於哪種善？回答說，一種解釋認為屬於行善。開善（Kai Shan，人名）說：定伏惑（samadhi subdues delusion），道斷惑（path cuts off delusion）。從伏斷惑的心生起的無作是止善。道定伏斷後，心所生起的善屬於行。又有一種解釋認為一切戒都屬於止善。有人問，攝善法等三聚戒（three categories of precepts）屬於哪種善？回答說，一種說法認為，攝律儀戒（precepts of discipline）屬於止，其餘兩種屬於行。另一種說法認為，三種戒都是止善。如動身口及求戒心，發起得到作戒（active precepts）。從作戒即生無作（non-active precepts），即誓願息滅一切惡，誓願行一切善，誓願度一切眾生，並生三種無作。

【English Translation】 English version The method of observing physical characteristics (Xiang Fa Shen) is the foremost good. It makes the practice called virtue complete and without deficiency. In Vasubandhu's (Tian Qin) explanation, it is divided into two parts: the former is a general explanation, and the latter is a specific explanation. Within the general and specific explanations, there are four aspects each. The four aspects in the general explanation are: first, the person who can speak the Dharma; second, the Dharma that is spoken; third, the name; and fourth, the meaning. Buddha (Fo) indicates the person who can speak the Dharma. The reason for specifying Buddha is that the heretics previously asked the Buddha what kind of good Dharma he spoke, and now this question is still being answered, so it is called Buddha. Briefly speaking of two kinds of good Dharma, this is the second point, explaining the Dharma that is spoken. The Buddhas' Dharma teachings are sometimes brief and sometimes extensive; now, the extensive is condensed into the brief. Cessation aspect (Zhi Xiang) and activity aspect (Xing Xiang) are the third point, listing the names. 'Cessation of all evils' (Xi Yi Qie E) below is the fourth point, explaining the meaning. Someone asks, what is the meaning of the other explanations of the two kinds of good? The answer is that there are four old explanations. The first explanation is: initiating non-action (wu zuo) is cessation; not initiating is activity. The second explanation is: stopping evil thoughts and practicing good is cessation; not stopping evil thoughts, but just generally practicing good, is called practicing good. The third explanation is: the good entity that arises after the cessation of conditions can stop evil, which is cessation good; the good entity that arises after the cessation of conditions cannot stop evil, which is activity good. The fourth explanation is: arising from the cessation of conditions is cessation; arising and ceasing according to events is activity. Sthiramati (Cheng Lun Shi) also made four sentences: first, mind cessation, non-action cessation; second, mind activity, non-action activity; third, mind activity, non-action cessation; fourth, mind cessation, non-action activity. For example, someone wants to receive precepts, initially initiating active stopping of evil thoughts, inviting monks, etc., in the middle not initiating non-action, this is mind cessation, non-action cessation. Mind activity, non-action activity, is when one raises the mind to formally receive precepts, initiating non-action. Mind activity, non-action cessation, is the path of fixed precepts (Dao Ding Jie). The fourth situation can be understood. Someone asks, to which kind of good does the path of fixed mind and non-action belong? The answer is that one explanation considers it to belong to activity good. Kai Shan (a person's name) said: samadhi subdues delusion (Ding Fu Huo), the path cuts off delusion (Dao Duan Huo). The non-action that arises from the mind of subduing and cutting off delusion is cessation good. The good that arises from the mind after the path of fixed precepts subdues and cuts off belongs to activity. Another explanation considers that all precepts belong to cessation good. Someone asks, to which kind of good do the three categories of precepts (San Ju Jie), such as the collection of good Dharma, belong? The answer is that one explanation considers that the precepts of discipline (She Lu Yi Jie) belong to cessation, and the other two belong to activity. Another explanation considers that all three kinds of precepts are cessation good. For example, moving the body and mouth and the mind seeking precepts, initiating and obtaining active precepts (Zuo Jie). From active precepts, non-active precepts (Wu Zuo Jie) arise, that is, vowing to cease all evils, vowing to practice all good, vowing to liberate all sentient beings, and generating three kinds of non-action.

種無作。如誓行一切善。即有攝善法無作生。止不行一切善之惡也。而後遂行一切善者。此是隨順持戒耳。不以此為戒后不行一切善。即破此戒。攝眾生戒亦爾。故三戒並屬止善攝。問今明二善與數論律師何異。答語言雖同其心則異。他有惡可止有善可行。故名有所得義。今明就道門。本性清凈未曾止與不止行與不行。但空倒眾生有惡無善。今欲拔其空倒故令止惡行善耳。此是以倒善拔其倒惡。以輕出重也。又他謂止行決定為二。今明止即是行。止一切有所得生心動念名之為止。畢竟無所行稱之為行。今一往為緣故開之為二。雖說於二為令眾生因二了于不二。故涅槃云。善法惡法愚者謂二。智者了達知其無二也。而就善惡明三種義。一習應義。菩薩從初發心不習善惡。習無所應。習無所應故與波若相應。即是實慧。二者方便能有善惡二用即鳥二翼義。三者昔日覆惡開善。今雙開佛性善惡。善如阿難羅云。惡如善星調達。即半滿義。今此中正是習應義。但習應有二。一漸舍習二頓舍習。今是漸舍習也。何等為惡下第二別釋四字。即為四別。一一中皆三。謂標釋結。今是標也。身邪行下第二釋。就文為三。一明三惡二明十惡三明十惡外惡。此從略至廣也。初明三惡者。此義通於淺深。據淺而言。凡夫三業行乖於三業之正故

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『種無作』（śūnyatā，空性）。例如，發誓奉行一切善行，就會產生攝取善法的『無作』（asaṃskṛta，非造作）。停止不行一切善的惡行。然後才奉行一切善行，這才是隨順持戒。不能因為受戒后不行一切善，就說破了此戒。攝取眾生戒也是如此。所以，三種戒都屬於止惡行善的範疇。問：現在所說的二善（止惡、行善）與數論派律師有什麼不同？答：語言雖然相同，但心境則不同。他們認為有惡可以止，有善可以行，所以名為『有所得義』。現在所說的是就道門而言，本性清凈，未曾有止與不止，行與不行。只是空倒的眾生有惡無善，現在想要拔除他們的空倒，所以讓他們止惡行善。這是用倒善來拔除倒惡，以輕出重。而且，他們認為止行是決定的二者，現在說明止即是行。停止一切有所得的生心動念，名為『止』。畢竟無所行，稱之為『行』。現在姑且爲了方便，所以開為二者。雖然說為二，是爲了讓眾生因二而了悟不二。所以《涅槃經》說：『善法惡法，愚者認為是二，智者了達，知道它們沒有二。』而就善惡說明三種意義：一、習應義。菩薩從最初發心就不習善惡，習無所應。因為習無所應，所以與般若（prajñā，智慧）相應，這就是實慧。二、方便能有善惡二用，就像鳥的兩個翅膀。三、昔日覆惡開善，現在雙開佛性善惡。善的如阿難（Ānanda，佛陀的十大弟子之一）、羅睺羅（Rāhula，佛陀的兒子），惡的如善星、調達（Devadatta，提婆達多，佛陀的堂兄弟）。這就是半滿義。現在這裡正是習應義。但習應有兩種：一、漸舍習，二、頓舍習。現在是漸舍習。『何等為惡』，下面第二部分分別解釋『四字』，即分為四個部分。每一個部分中都有三個方面，即標、釋、結。現在這是標。『身邪行』，下面第二部分解釋。就文義分為三個方面：一、說明三惡，二、說明十惡，三、說明十惡之外的惡。這是從略到廣。首先說明三惡，這個意義通於淺深。就淺而言，凡夫的三業行為違背了三業的正道。

【English Translation】 English version 『Śūnyatā』 (種無作, emptiness). For example, vowing to practice all good deeds will generate the 『asaṃskṛta』 (無作, unconditioned) of embracing good dharmas. Ceasing to not perform all good deeds is evil. Only then practicing all good deeds is in accordance with upholding precepts. One cannot say that one has broken the precepts if one does not perform all good deeds after receiving the precepts. The precept of embracing sentient beings is also like this. Therefore, the three types of precepts all belong to the category of ceasing evil and performing good. Question: What is the difference between the two goods (ceasing evil, performing good) now being discussed and the lawyers of the Sāṃkhya school? Answer: Although the language is the same, the state of mind is different. They believe that there is evil that can be ceased and good that can be performed, so it is called 『the meaning of something to be attained』. What is being discussed now is in terms of the path, the original nature is pure, there has never been ceasing or not ceasing, performing or not performing. It is just that deluded sentient beings have evil and no good, now wanting to remove their delusion, so they are made to cease evil and perform good. This is using inverted good to remove inverted evil, using the light to bring out the heavy. Moreover, they believe that ceasing and performing are definitely two. Now it is explained that ceasing is performing. Ceasing all arising thoughts and movements of mind that have something to be attained is called 『ceasing』. Ultimately having nothing to perform is called 『performing』. Now, for the sake of convenience, it is opened up as two. Although it is said to be two, it is to allow sentient beings to understand non-duality through duality. Therefore, the Nirvana Sutra says: 『Good dharmas and evil dharmas, fools consider them to be two, wise people understand and know that they are not two.』 And regarding good and evil, three meanings are explained: 1. The meaning of habitual response. Bodhisattvas from the initial aspiration do not practice good or evil, they practice responding to nothing. Because they practice responding to nothing, they are in accordance with prajñā (般若, wisdom), which is true wisdom. 2. The expedient ability to have the two uses of good and evil, like the two wings of a bird. 3. In the past, evil was covered and good was opened, now both the good and evil of Buddha-nature are opened. Good ones are like Ānanda (阿難, one of the Buddha's ten great disciples) and Rāhula (羅睺羅, the Buddha's son), evil ones are like Devadatta (調達, the Buddha's cousin). This is the meaning of half and full. Now this is precisely the meaning of habitual response. But there are two types of habitual response: 1. Gradually abandoning habit, 2. Suddenly abandoning habit. Now it is gradually abandoning habit. 『What is evil』, the second part below separately explains the 『four words』, that is, divides them into four parts. In each part there are three aspects, namely, the heading, the explanation, and the conclusion. Now this is the heading. 『Evil bodily conduct』, the second part below explains. In terms of the meaning of the text, it is divided into three aspects: 1. Explaining the three evils, 2. Explaining the ten evils, 3. Explaining the evils outside of the ten evils. This is from brief to broad. First, explaining the three evils, this meaning applies to both shallow and deep. In terms of the shallow, the actions of ordinary people's three karmas violate the correct path of the three karmas.

名為邪。若深論者。凡夫二乘有所得身口意業悉違正道故秤為邪。身殺盜下第二明十惡。三惡則名略體廣。十惡則名廣體略。但取根本業道故也。殺具四緣。一是眾生二眾生想三起殺心四命斷。盜亦四緣。一知前物屬他。二作屬他想。三欲作盜意。四離本處。淫亦具四。一知是前人二作前人想三作淫意四正行淫。然口意不必具四緣。惡口直出惡言以罵於他。離他眷屬名為兩舌。余並易知。問曰。口四。身亦四不。答亦具四。智度論云身口律儀有八種。謂不惱害不劫盜不邪淫不妄語不兩舌不惡口不綺語不飲酒。飲酒還屬身攝。故知身亦具四也。

百論疏捲上之中(畢)

百論疏捲上之餘

釋吉藏撰

復有十不善道下第三明十惡外惡。又開二別。初明十惡所不攝惡。二明十惡前後方便惡。十惡所不攝惡者。十八部論明身口中有八。身中四者。如鞭杖等不斷命。此非殺業攝。又如燒人屋即失財或障他行施令傍人不得財物並非盜業攝。若俗人非時非處非道行淫名為邪淫。若直爾摩觸非邪淫攝。此三是身業攝。非十惡攝。故知身中有四。口業又四。故合有八種。因嗔故妄語等。故有口四業。因癡故起口四業。故口具八種業。因嗔癡起身四。覆成八。因貪起身口八。合三八為二十四邪業。依此復四種。一

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：名為邪。若深入討論，凡夫和二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）有所得的身口意業都違背正道，所以稱為邪。身殺盜下第二段說明十惡。三惡則名稱簡略而本體廣泛，十惡則名稱廣泛而本體簡略。但取根本的業道。殺業具備四種因緣：一是眾生（有情生命），二是眾生想（認為對方是眾生），三是生起殺心，四是命斷。盜亦有四種因緣：一知道前面的物品屬於他人，二作屬於他人的想法，三想要作盜竊的意圖，四離開原來的位置。淫亦具備四種因緣：一知道是對方，二作對方的想法，三作淫慾的意圖，四正在行淫。然而口意不一定具備四種因緣。惡口直接說出惡毒的言語來謾罵他人。離間他人眷屬，這叫做兩舌。其餘的都容易理解。問：口有四種（惡業），身也有四種嗎？答：也具備四種。智度論說，身口律儀有八種，即不惱害、不劫盜、不邪淫、不妄語、不兩舌、不惡口、不綺語、不飲酒。飲酒還屬於身所攝。所以知道身也具備四種（惡業）。百論疏捲上之中（完）百論疏捲上之餘釋吉藏撰復有十不善道下第三段說明十惡之外的惡。又分為兩種類別。首先說明十惡所不包括的惡，其次說明十惡前後的方便惡。十惡所不包括的惡是指，十八部論說明身口中有八種。身中四種，如鞭打等不斷人性命，這不屬於殺業所攝。又如燒燬別人的房屋導致失去財產，或者阻礙他人行佈施，使旁邊的人得不到財物，這並非盜業所攝。如果俗人在不適當的時間、不適當的地點、不適當的方式行淫，稱為邪淫。如果只是觸控，不屬於邪淫所攝。這三種是身業所攝，不是十惡所攝。所以知道身中有四種（惡業）。口業又有四種，所以合起來有八種。因為嗔恨的緣故而妄語等，所以有口的四種業。因為愚癡的緣故而生起口的四種業，所以口具備八種業。因為嗔癡而起身四種，又成為八種。因為貪婪而起身口八種，合起來三種八為二十四種邪業。依據此又分為四種，一

【English Translation】 English version: It is called 'wrong'. If deeply discussed, the body, speech, and mind actions of ordinary people and the two vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) that are attached to something all violate the right path, so they are called 'wrong'. The second section under 'body, killing, stealing' explains the ten evils. The three evils have brief names but broad substance, while the ten evils have broad names but brief substance. Only the fundamental karmic paths are taken. Killing has four conditions: first, a sentient being; second, the thought of a sentient being (thinking the other party is a sentient being); third, the arising of the intention to kill; and fourth, the termination of life. Stealing also has four conditions: first, knowing that the object belongs to another; second, having the thought that it belongs to another; third, having the intention to steal; and fourth, moving it from its original place. Adultery also has four conditions: first, knowing who the other person is; second, having the thought of the other person; third, having the intention of adultery; and fourth, actually engaging in adultery. However, speech and mind do not necessarily have four conditions. Harsh speech directly utters malicious words to scold others. Separating others' family members is called divisive speech. The rest are easy to understand. Question: Speech has four (evil deeds), does the body also have four? Answer: It also has four. The Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra says that there are eight kinds of body and speech precepts, namely, not harming, not stealing, not engaging in sexual misconduct, not lying, not engaging in divisive speech, not engaging in harsh speech, not engaging in frivolous speech, and not drinking alcohol. Drinking alcohol is still included in the body. Therefore, it is known that the body also has four (evil deeds). The End of Chapter One, Middle Section, of the Śataśāstra Commentary The Remainder of Chapter One, Upper Section, of the Śataśāstra Commentary Composed by Śhì Jízàng (a famous Chinese Buddhist monk) The third section under 'Furthermore, there are ten non-virtuous paths' explains the evils outside the ten evils. It is further divided into two categories. First, it explains the evils not included in the ten evils, and second, it explains the expedient evils before and after the ten evils. The evils not included in the ten evils refer to the eighteen schools' explanation that there are eight kinds in body and speech. Four in the body, such as whipping without taking life, are not included in the act of killing. Also, burning someone's house, resulting in loss of property, or obstructing others from giving alms, preventing bystanders from obtaining wealth, are not included in the act of stealing. If a layperson engages in sexual activity at an inappropriate time, in an inappropriate place, or in an inappropriate manner, it is called sexual misconduct (kāma mithyācāra). If it is merely touching, it is not included in sexual misconduct. These three are included in bodily actions, but not in the ten evils. Therefore, it is known that there are four (evil deeds) in the body. There are also four in speech, so there are eight in total. Because of anger, there is lying, etc., so there are four actions of speech. Because of ignorance, the four actions of speech arise, so speech has eight kinds of actions. Because of anger and ignorance, the four actions of the body arise, again becoming eight. Because of greed, the eight actions of body and speech arise, adding up to three eights, which are twenty-four wrong actions. Based on this, it is further divided into four kinds, one

信邪行此二十四。二正行二十四。三教他行二十四。四見他行隨喜。合成九十六。此九十六中有正是十惡攝非正十惡攝。及十不善道下第二明十惡前後方便惡。如行杖有二。一為殺故行杖。此是殺家方便。二直爾行杖。但是身業。謂十不善道所不攝也。何等為止下釋止亦三。謂標釋結。釋中又三。息惡不作者。此第一句總釋止義。若心生下第二別釋受戒方法。此中明三業得戒。一者上根人心生得戒。隨大小乘。大乘人于佛像前或無佛像想念五師。從今身盡未來劫誓息。一切惡。誓修一切善。誓度一切眾生。即便得戒。故普賢觀云。但生心請五師。不須和上及以阇梨。即便得戒。次中根人得口語得。如迦葉等自誓佛為我師我為弟子。作是語時即便發戒。若受戒者。謂下根人內有求戒之心。外具人法二緣。方乃得戒。人緣謂十師。法緣白四羯磨。問受菩薩戒具得心生口語受戒三種不。答得也。八戒等亦爾。但多就師受耳。問受菩薩戒具幾種受。答通具三受。一就大乘師受。二者若千里內無師就像前受。三直對想十方佛受。出普賢觀經。余戒亦通方例之。又釋此文。一人受戒必具三業。意為求戒之心故云若心生。口隨順師僧故云若口語。合掌禮拜即是身業故云若受戒。問此中三種攝十種得戒盡不。答十種得戒不出三根及以三

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本信邪行此二十四：相信邪惡的修行有二十四種。二正行二十四：正確的修行有二十四種。三教他行二十四：教導他人修行有二十四種。四見他行隨喜：見到他人修行而隨喜讚歎。合成九十六：總共合為九十六種。此九十六中有正是十惡攝非正十惡攝：這九十六種行為中，有些屬於十惡所包含的，有些不屬於十惡所包含的。及十不善道下第二明十惡前後方便惡：接下來闡明十惡的前後方便惡。如行杖有二：例如使用棍杖有兩種情況。一為殺故行杖：一種是爲了殺人而使用棍杖，這是殺人的方便。二直爾行杖：另一種只是單純地使用棍杖，這只是身業，不屬於十不善道所包含的。何等為止下釋止亦三：什麼是止呢？下面解釋止也有三種，即標示、解釋、總結。謂標釋結：包括標示、解釋和總結。釋中又三：解釋中又分為三種。息惡不作者：停止作惡，不去做惡事，這是第一句，總的解釋了『止』的含義。若心生下第二別釋受戒方法：如果內心生起（求戒之心），下面分別解釋受戒的方法。此中明三業得戒：這裡說明通過身、口、意三業獲得戒律。一者上根人心生得戒：第一種是上等根器的人，內心生起（求戒之心）就能獲得戒律，無論大乘還是小乘。大乘人于佛像前或無佛像想念五師：大乘修行人在佛像前，或者沒有佛像時，心中憶念五位阿阇黎（Acharya）。從今身盡未來劫誓息一切惡：從現在起直到未來永劫，發誓停止一切惡行。誓修一切善：發誓修一切善行。誓度一切眾生：發誓度一切眾生。即便得戒：這樣就能獲得戒律。故普賢觀云：所以《普賢觀經》（Universal Worthy Contemplation Sutra）說：『但生心請五師，不須和上及以阇梨，即便得戒。』次中根人得口語得：其次是中等根器的人，通過口語表達（求戒）而獲得戒律。如迦葉等自誓佛為我師我為弟子：例如迦葉（Kasyapa）等人，自己發誓說：『佛是我的老師，我是佛的弟子。』作是語時即便發戒：說這些話的時候，就能獲得戒律。若受戒者：如果是受戒的人，指下等根器的人，內心有求戒之心，外在具備人法兩種因緣，才能獲得戒律。謂下根人內有求戒之心：指下等根器的人，內心有求戒之心。外具人法二緣：外在具備人法兩種因緣。方乃得戒：才能獲得戒律。人緣謂十師：人緣指的是十位律師（Vinaya Master）。法緣白四羯磨：法緣指的是白四羯磨（Karma）。問受菩薩戒具得心生口語受戒三種不：問：受菩薩戒是否具備內心生起、口語表達、受戒這三種方式？答得也：答：是的，具備。八戒等亦爾：八關齋戒等也是如此。但多就師受耳：但大多是向師父求受。問受菩薩戒具幾種受：問：受菩薩戒有幾種方式？答通具三受：答：通常具備三種方式。一就大乘師受：一是向大乘的律師求受。二者若千里內無師就像前受：二是如果千里之內沒有師父，就在佛像前求受。三直對想十方佛受：三是直接面對並觀想十方諸佛求受。出普賢觀經：出自《普賢觀經》。余戒亦通方例之：其他的戒律也可以參照這種方式。又釋此文：再解釋這段文字。一人受戒必具三業：一個人受戒必然具備身、口、意三業。意為求戒之心故云若心生：內心有求戒之心，所以說『若心生』。口隨順師僧故云若口語：口中隨順師父僧眾，所以說『若口語』。合掌禮拜即是身業故云若受戒：合掌禮拜就是身業，所以說『若受戒』。問此中三種攝十種得戒盡不：問：這三種方式是否包含了十種得戒方式？答十種得戒不出三根及以三：答：十種得戒方式沒有超出三種根器和三種（受戒）方式。

【English Translation】 English version Believing in evil practices has twenty-four aspects. Practicing correctly has twenty-four aspects. Teaching others to practice has twenty-four aspects. Rejoicing in the practices of others. Combined, these make ninety-six. Among these ninety-six, some are included in the ten evils, and some are not. Next, the second part clarifies the preliminary and subsequent evil actions related to the ten evils. For example, using a stick has two aspects. One is using a stick with the intention to kill, which is a means to killing. The other is simply using a stick, which is merely a physical action and not included in the ten unwholesome paths. What is cessation? The explanation of cessation also has three aspects: introduction, explanation, and conclusion. These include introduction, explanation, and conclusion. The explanation is further divided into three. Ceasing evil and not committing it: This first sentence generally explains the meaning of 'cessation'. If the mind arises, the second part separately explains the methods of receiving precepts. Here, it clarifies obtaining precepts through the three karmas (body, speech, and mind). First, those with superior faculties obtain precepts through the arising of the mind, whether in Mahayana or Hinayana. Mahayana practitioners, in front of a Buddha image or without a Buddha image, contemplate the five Acharyas. From this life until the end of future kalpas, they vow to cease all evil. They vow to cultivate all good. They vow to liberate all sentient beings. Then they obtain the precepts. Therefore, the Universal Worthy Contemplation Sutra (普賢觀經) says: 'Simply generate the mind and invite the five Acharyas; there is no need for an Upadhyaya (和上) or Acharya (阇梨), and then you obtain the precepts.' Next, those with intermediate faculties obtain precepts through verbal expression. For example, Kasyapa (迦葉) and others vowed: 'The Buddha is my teacher, and I am the Buddha's disciple.' When these words are spoken, the precepts are generated. If one receives precepts, referring to those with inferior faculties, they must have the intention to receive precepts internally and possess both human and Dharma conditions externally to obtain the precepts. Referring to those with inferior faculties, they must have the intention to receive precepts internally. Externally, they must possess both human and Dharma conditions. Only then can they obtain the precepts. The human condition refers to the ten Vinaya Masters (律師). The Dharma condition refers to the white four karmas (白四羯磨). Question: Does receiving the Bodhisattva precepts fully encompass the three methods of mind arising, verbal expression, and receiving precepts? Answer: Yes, it does. The eight precepts and others are also like this. But mostly they are received from a teacher. Question: How many ways are there to receive the Bodhisattva precepts? Answer: Generally, there are three ways. One is to receive from a Mahayana teacher. Second, if there is no teacher within a thousand li, one receives in front of a Buddha image. Third, one directly faces and contemplates the Buddhas of the ten directions to receive. This comes from the Universal Worthy Contemplation Sutra (普賢觀經). Other precepts can also be exemplified in this way. Furthermore, explain this passage. One who receives precepts must possess the three karmas. The intention is the mind seeking precepts, hence 'if the mind arises'. The mouth follows the teacher and Sangha, hence 'verbal expression'. Joining palms and bowing is physical action, hence 'receiving precepts'. Question: Do these three methods encompass all ten ways of obtaining precepts? Answer: The ten ways of obtaining precepts do not go beyond the three faculties and the three (methods of receiving precepts).

業。今明此三則攝十種。問辟支佛於十種中是何得戒。答依俱舍論是自然得戒。與佛同。問佛定是何時得戒。答舊引二文明兩種得戒。一引彌沙塞律十九捲雲。佛剃頭著出家衣時得自然戒。二用僧祇律二十三卷。云種智初心得戒。有人會之云。依前得是共聲聞戒。依后得不共聲聞戒。故佛具二木叉。今依俱舍論同僧祇。所以爾前不得戒者。若爾前得戒。佛六年苦行受外道法。應當破戒。而未得戒雖受外道法不破戒也。從今日終不復作下此第三明要期受戒時有三。一短時謂今旦至明旦。二中時謂盡形也。三長時至佛。以初時必同后則三種有異。是故今文但明要期前時不明後也。問無作於前何時生耶。答成論師云。從止噁心第二念生無作心。作是因無作是習果。因果不俱生故至第二念方生無作。道定無作亦爾。數人在道定心時有戒。出道定心即無。論人出定時亦成就。屬行人故常有無作。問于眾生及草木發戒云何異。答一云于眾生邊別發多無作。于草木邊總髮一無作。又釋。眾生與草木同。于眾生邊總得一不殺戒。於一一眾生邊皆得不殺戒。以殺一一眾生皆犯不殺戒故。于草木邊總得一不殺草木戒。別於一一草木得無作戒。以殺一一草木皆犯此戒故。問制戒意本取不惱眾生。云何于草木發戒。答以殺草木惱于眾生故就草木

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本業。現在闡明這三者涵蓋十種情況。問：辟支佛（Pratyekabuddha，獨覺佛）在這十種情況中，通過什麼方式獲得戒律？答：根據《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa，論述佛教認知的論著），辟支佛是自然獲得戒律，與佛陀相同。問：佛陀究竟在何時獲得戒律？答：舊說引用兩種說法來闡明兩種獲得戒律的方式。一種引用《彌沙塞律》（Mahīśāsaka Vinaya）第十九卷，說佛陀在剃頭、穿上出家衣服時，自然獲得戒律。另一種引用《僧祇律》（Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya）第二十三卷，說在生起種智（sarvajñāna，一切智）的最初一念時獲得戒律。有人調和這兩種說法，認為依據前者獲得的是與聲聞（Śrāvaka，聽聞佛法者）相同的戒律，依據後者獲得的是不與聲聞相同的戒律。因此，佛陀具有兩種戒律（Prātimokṣa，波羅提木叉）。現在依據《俱舍論》，與《僧祇律》相同。為什麼在此之前沒有獲得戒律呢？如果在此之前獲得戒律，那麼佛陀六年苦行，接受外道法，就應當破戒。而未獲得戒律，即使接受外道法也不會破戒。從今天結束之後不再做，這第三點闡明要期受戒時有三種情況。一是短時，指從今天早上到明天早上。二是中時，指盡此一生。三是長時，直到成佛。因為最初的短時必定與後面的情況相同，所以三種情況有所不同。因此，現在的經文只闡明要期之前的時段，不闡明後面的時段。問：無作（asaṃvara，不作惡業的力量）在前一個時段何時產生？答：成論師（Siddhanta master，宗教學者）說，從停止惡念的第二念產生無作心。作是因，無作是習果。因為因果不同時產生，所以到第二念才產生無作。道定（meditative absorption，禪定）中的無作也是如此。一些人在道定心中有戒律，出道定心就沒有了。論師認為，出定時也成就戒律，因為屬於修行人，所以常有無作。問：對於眾生和草木發起戒律，有什麼不同？答：一種說法是，在眾生這邊分別發起，產生多個無作。在草木這邊總共發起，產生一個無作。另一種解釋是，眾生與草木相同。在眾生這邊總共得到一個不殺戒。在每一個眾生這邊都得到不殺戒。因為殺害每一個眾生都違反不殺戒。在草木這邊總共得到一個不殺草木戒。分別在每一棵草木上得到無作戒。因為殺害每一棵草木都違反此戒。問：制定戒律的本意是不要惱害眾生，為什麼要在草木上發起戒律？答：因為殺害草木會惱害眾生，所以就草木而言。

【English Translation】 English version Karma. Now, clarifying these three encompasses ten situations. Question: Among these ten situations, how does a Pratyekabuddha (Solitary Buddha) obtain precepts? Answer: According to the Abhidharmakośa (Treasury of Higher Knowledge), a Pratyekabuddha naturally obtains precepts, the same as a Buddha. Question: When exactly does a Buddha obtain precepts? Answer: Old accounts cite two explanations for obtaining precepts. One cites the Mahīśāsaka Vinaya (rules of discipline) Volume 19, saying that when the Buddha shaved his head and put on monastic robes, he naturally obtained precepts. The other uses the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya (rules of discipline) Volume 23, saying that precepts are obtained at the initial thought of sarvajñāna (all-knowing wisdom). Some reconcile these two explanations by saying that the former obtains precepts shared with Śrāvakas (listeners), while the latter obtains precepts not shared with Śrāvakas. Therefore, the Buddha possesses two Prātimokṣas (codes of monastic discipline). Now, according to the Abhidharmakośa, it is the same as the Mahāsāṃghika. Why were precepts not obtained before this? If precepts were obtained before, then the Buddha's six years of ascetic practice, accepting non-Buddhist teachings, should have broken the precepts. However, without having obtained precepts, even accepting non-Buddhist teachings does not break the precepts. 'From today onward, I will never do it again,' this third point clarifies that there are three situations for vowing to uphold precepts. First, a short period, meaning from this morning to tomorrow morning. Second, a medium period, meaning for the rest of one's life. Third, a long period, until Buddhahood. Because the initial short period is necessarily the same as the later situations, the three situations are different. Therefore, the current text only clarifies the period before the vow, not the period after. Question: When does asaṃvara (non-doing, the force of abstaining from evil) arise in the preceding period? Answer: A Siddhanta master (scholar of established doctrines) says that the mind of non-doing arises from the second thought of ceasing evil thoughts. Action is the cause, and non-doing is the habitual result. Because cause and effect do not arise simultaneously, the mind of non-doing arises in the second thought. It is the same with non-doing in meditative absorption (samādhi). Some people have precepts in the state of meditative absorption, but not when they exit the state. The masters say that one also achieves precepts when exiting samādhi, because it belongs to the practitioner, so there is always non-doing. Question: What is the difference between generating precepts towards sentient beings and towards plants? Answer: One explanation is that generating precepts towards sentient beings separately produces multiple non-doings. Generating precepts towards plants collectively produces one non-doing. Another explanation is that sentient beings and plants are the same. On the side of sentient beings, one collectively obtains one precept of not killing. On the side of each individual sentient being, one obtains the precept of not killing. Because killing each individual sentient being violates the precept of not killing. On the side of plants, one collectively obtains one precept of not killing plants. Separately, on each individual plant, one obtains the precept of non-doing. Because killing each individual plant violates this precept. Question: The original intention of establishing precepts is not to harm sentient beings, so why generate precepts towards plants? Answer: Because killing plants harms sentient beings, it is considered in terms of plants.

邊制耳。數人但現在發戒。以現在有眾生去來無眾生。問三歸為屬止為屬行。答因三歸得戒。三歸屬行善。戒屬止善。問三歸止邪。云何屬行。答雖復止邪意在歸向。如下云佈施雖止慳而善行為本。問俗人亦得授他八戒不。答得也。如夫前受后為婦授。如昔有輪王授人八戒。八戒既爾。五戒類然。但多從出家人受耳。何等為善下第三釋善亦三。此總標也。釋義有五。一云。善是符理惡是乖理。二云。善是清升惡是腐墜。三云。善是利他惡是損他。四云。善是感樂惡是感苦。五云。並有四義。但前二為體后二為用也。身正行下第二解釋為三。一明三善二明十善三明十善外善。初如文。身迎送下第二明於十善。迎送翻殺。合手翻盜。恭敬翻淫。翻口四易知。慈對嗔。悲對貪。正見對邪見。又不凈觀對貪。慈悲觀對嗔。因緣觀對癡。問前明十善與今何異。答前是止十善。今是行十善。如是種種清凈法者下第三明十善外善。智度論問云。尸羅總是一切戒。不飲酒不過中食不杖加眾生是事十善道不攝。何故但說十善。答云。十善為總相戒。別相則無量戒。不飲酒不過中食入不貪中攝。不加眾生入不嗔中攝。此明攝之則入十善。若不攝則不入也。龍樹十住婆沙引寶頂經明尸羅。身口各有四種。如前所說。此八種戒從受生。身口心受

合二十四戒。教他受隨喜受修習行時亦二十四。合九十六戒。今但言十善戒者但是略說耳。何等為行下第四釋行。外曰汝經有過下第二傍破吉義。問何故傍破吉。答上標二善總辨三世佛出世大意。謂誡惡勸善。今總明破一切邪。以一切外道經初皆說吉。此義既破則一切邪破也。若就外人難立名者。論主標二善舍罪。外道始末凡有三雙六難。第一作兩不吉難。次作兩顛倒難。第三作兩煩重難。論主通其六難。即明二善無不吉過離顛倒過非是煩重。則二善義成。故得依之以舍罪。問外人就何義作六難耶。答舍惡行善內外理同。此不可咎。但外人謂。論主立言不巧故招六過也。初二難正在今文。后四難在後流章也。又初四字標二善章門。下六難六答都是科簡釋章門也。今前作有無二難者。外人廣述師宗。論主撥云諸師內有邪見外不能說深凈法。外人仍問論主。佛說何等善法。論主答云。惡止善行。外今即云。若惡止善行有二不吉過。一者建惡在初故初不吉。初既不吉中后亦然。法既是惡則人非世尊。行此法者不名上眾。故三寶皆壞。即名有難。二者一切諸經阿漚在初名之為吉。汝經無有阿漚名為不吉。故名無難。問何故作二難。答二義。一者明有惡故就內難內。次明無吉將外難內。二者初明有惡二明無善。一切過中莫出斯二

。問文有此事不。答偈本即有。此文汝經有過謂初文也。初不吉故第二文也。又初句標過次句釋過。注中為二。第一明外經無過。第二明內經有過失。就初又四。一標經體二明經用三出經名四結經德。而言諸師三師二天皆作此說也。若智人下第二明經用。讀誦唸知此是三業行經。便得增壽威德尊重明行經。得二種果。內感長壽外為物尊。如有經名下第三齣經名字。廣主經者。明治化之道廣明國主之德。或言是彗星天子所造。或云鎮星天子所造。如是經等初皆言吉者第四結彼經德。外云。昔有梵王。在世說七十二字以教世間。名佉樓書。世間之敬情漸薄。梵王貧吝心起收取吞之。唯阿漚兩字從口兩邊墮地。世人責之以為字王。故取漚字置四韋陀首。以阿字置廣主經初。四韋陀者外道十八大經。亦云十八明處。四皮陀為四。復有六論。合四皮陀為十。復有八論。足為十八。四皮陀者。一荷力皮陀明解脫法。二冶受皮陀明善道法。三三摩皮陀明欲塵法。謂一切婚嫁欲樂之事。四阿闥皮陀明咒術算數等法。本云皮陀此間語訛故云韋陀。六論者。一式叉論釋六十四能法。二毗伽羅論釋諸音聲法。三柯刺波論釋諸天仙上古以來因緣名字。四豎底(張理反)沙論釋天文地理算數等法。五闡陀論釋作首盧迦法。佛弟子五通仙第說偈名首

盧迦(強河反)。六尼鹿多論釋立一切物名因緣。復有八論。一肩亡婆論簡擇諸法是非。二那邪毗薩多論明諸法道理。三伊底呵婆論明傳記宿世事。四僧佉論解二十五諦。五課伽論明攝心法。此兩論同釋解脫法。六陀菟論釋用兵杖法。七楗闡婆論釋音樂法。八阿輸論釋醫方。毗婆沙云。瞿毗陀婆羅門造梵書。佉盧仙人造佉盧書。大婆羅門造皮陀論。汝經初說下第二明論主有過有二。初正明過。第二結過論主。內曰斷邪見故說是經第二論主答。答中有二。初總非不然。第二別酬其有無二難。即二別。初答有難。次答無難。答有難者。汝言我經初有惡者。以惡先出故前明於惡。所言惡者。謂阿漚在初則吉。無不吉。此是邪見。以佛未出世諸外道等前有此邪見惡。是故如來出世止於此惡。故言惡止。佛之正教宜須奉行故云善行。今欲斷汝邪見惡故說惡止善行經。此是反擲答也。外聞論主經初明惡。云是論主內經之惡。今明經初乃說外道之惡。是故惡屬外經內教無過。故名反擲答也。問此是何等邪見。答非是撥無因果故云邪見。乃是無而謂有乖于正理故稱邪見也。然數論律師不得輒用百論明二善義。此乃是一往破邪。為欲舍罪故說之耳。罪去福則不留。邪去不存於正。不應定謂有二善也。注云是吉是不吉是邪見氣者。內懷邪見

【現代漢語翻譯】盧迦（Lujia）：六尼鹿多論（Liuni Liduolun）解釋了所有事物的名稱和因緣。還有八種論典：一、肩亡婆論（Jianwangpolun）：簡擇諸法的正確與錯誤。二、那邪毗薩多論（Naxie Bisaduolun）：闡明諸法的道理。三、伊底呵婆論（Yidihualun）：講述傳記和過去世的事情。四、僧佉論（Sengqielun）：解釋二十五諦（ershiwudi）。五、課伽論（Kejialun）：闡明攝心的方法。這兩部論典共同解釋解脫的方法。六、陀菟論（Tuotulun）：解釋使用兵器的方法。七、楗闡婆論（Jianchanpolun）：解釋音樂的方法。八、阿輸論（Ashulun）：解釋醫學。《毗婆沙論》（Piposhalun）中說：瞿毗陀婆羅門（Qupituo Poluomen）創造了梵書，佉盧仙人（Qielu Xianren）創造了佉盧書，大婆羅門（Da Poluomen）創造了皮陀論。你的經文一開始說，下面第二段說明論主有過失，有兩種情況。首先是正面說明過失，其次是總結論主的過失。內部說：爲了斷除邪見，所以說了這部經。第二位論主回答。回答中有兩種情況：首先是總體上否定，認為不是這樣；其次是分別回答關於有和無的兩種詰難。也就是兩種分別。首先回答有難，其次回答無難。回答有難的是：你說我的經文一開始有惡，因為惡先出現，所以先說明惡。所說的惡，是指『阿漚』（A Ou）在開始就是吉祥的，沒有不吉祥的。這是一種邪見。因為在佛陀未出世之前，各種外道等早就有了這種邪見的惡。所以如來出世是爲了止息這種惡，所以說『惡止』。佛陀的正教應該奉行，所以說『善行』。現在想要斷除你的邪見惡，所以說了《惡止善行經》（Ezhishanxingjing）。這是一種反駁式的回答。外面聽到論主在經文一開始就說明惡，就說是論主內部經文的惡。現在說明經文一開始說的是外道的惡，所以惡屬於外經，內部教義沒有過失，所以稱為反駁式的回答。問：這是什麼樣的邪見？答：不是否定因果，所以說是邪見，而是沒有卻說有，違背了正理，所以稱為邪見。然而，數論（Shulun）的律師不得隨意用百論（Bailun）來說明兩種善的意義。這只是一種破除邪見的方式，爲了捨棄罪過才這樣說。罪過去除，福德就不會留下；邪見去除，就不會存在於正見之中。不應該一定認為有兩種善。註釋說：『是吉是不吉是邪見氣』，是指內心懷有邪見。

【English Translation】 Lujia: The Liuni Liduolun explains the names and causes of all things. There are also eight treatises: 1. Jianwangpolun: Discerns the correctness and errors of all dharmas. 2. Naxie Bisaduolun: Elucidates the principles of all dharmas. 3. Yidihualun: Narrates biographies and events of past lives. 4. Sengqielun: Explains the twenty-five Tattvas (ershiwudi). 5. Kejialun: Elucidates the method of focusing the mind. These two treatises together explain the method of liberation. 6. Tuotulun: Explains the method of using weapons. 7. Jianchanpolun: Explains the method of music. 8. Ashulun: Explains medicine. The Piposhalun says: Qupituo Poluomen created the Sanskrit script, Qielu Xianren created the Kharosthi script, and Da Poluomen created the Pituo treatise. Your scripture initially states that the second part below explains the faults of the author, in two ways. First, it directly explains the faults, and second, it summarizes the author's faults. Internally, it says: To eliminate wrong views, this scripture is spoken. The second author replies. There are two situations in the reply: first, a general denial, considering it not to be so; second, separate answers to the two challenges of existence and non-existence. That is, two distinctions. First, answer the challenge of existence, and second, answer the challenge of non-existence. The answer to the challenge of existence is: You say that my scripture initially has evil, because evil appears first, so evil is explained first. The so-called evil refers to 'A Ou' being auspicious at the beginning, with nothing inauspicious. This is a wrong view. Because before the Buddha appeared in the world, various external paths and others already had this evil of wrong views. Therefore, the Tathagata appeared in the world to stop this evil, so it is said 'evil ceases'. The Buddha's correct teachings should be followed, so it is said 'good conduct'. Now, wanting to eliminate your evil of wrong views, the Ezhishanxingjing is spoken. This is a rebuttal-style answer. The outside hears that the author explains evil at the beginning of the scripture, and says that it is the evil of the author's internal scripture. Now it is explained that the scripture initially speaks of the evil of external paths, so the evil belongs to the external scripture, and there is no fault in the internal teachings, so it is called a rebuttal-style answer. Question: What kind of wrong view is this? Answer: It is not denying cause and effect, so it is called a wrong view, but saying that there is what is not, violating correct reasoning, so it is called a wrong view. However, the lawyers of Samkhya (Shulun) should not arbitrarily use the Bailun to explain the meaning of the two kinds of good. This is only a way to eliminate wrong views, and it is said in order to abandon sins. When sins are removed, blessings will not remain; when wrong views are removed, they will not exist in correct views. It should not be definitely thought that there are two kinds of good. The commentary says: 'Auspicious is not auspicious is the breath of wrong views', which refers to harboring wrong views in the heart.

外宣之於口故稱為氣。又初起此計為邪見體。遂至於今枝流不絕秤之為氣。又撥無善惡名邪見正體。謂吉不吉是邪見餘勢。故秤為氣。是故無過下自免。複次無吉故下第二酬其無難。汝言無有阿漚則是不吉者。若道理有之而我不安。是則為過。以道理實無無故無所安。所以無咎。又道理實無而汝謂有。無而謂有則是邪見。故過在於外。內經無咎。又斷邪見謂標二章門。謂邪見及斷章門。從此下釋二章門。以求之不得無而謂有故名邪見。而釋邪見章門。求之不得邪見便壞。故是釋斷章門。又開二別。初理奪破次縱關。破理奪者。妄情謂有道理實無故云無吉。故莊周一色從三情。欲明無有定性色。攝論明一境從四人。亦明無有定境。又一色從二情。凡謂色為有。聖知色為空。色未曾空有。註文為四。一縱二奪三釋四呵。若少有吉者此縱關也。若少有吉。我經應安亦許汝立。此實無吉者奪也。以道理實無故我無所安汝不應立。何以故下第三釋。愚人無方便下第四呵。以外道求樂不達樂因。妄作此執言是樂因也。複次下第二縱破。前明道理實無。今縱有之。故開三門檢也。又恐外人言有一物從於三情。故復以三門責之。又云。約一人故說之為吉。如女色從愛者說之為好。又如破方中雲。於一天下說有定方。故開三門以責之也。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：從口中說出，所以外道（指不信奉佛教的人）的邪說被稱為『氣』。最初產生這種想法是由於邪見（錯誤的見解）的本質。直到現在，這種邪說的分支仍然層出不窮，所以稱之為『氣』。否定善惡的存在，這被稱為邪見的根本。認為有吉利或不吉利，這是邪見的餘波。因此，說沒有過錯，是因為我已經避免了（邪見）。其次，因為沒有吉利，所以下面第二段迴應你的疑問，說明沒有災難。你說沒有『阿漚』（此處指某種吉祥的徵兆），那就是不吉利的。如果道理上確實有『阿漚』，而我卻不接受，那就是我的過錯。但因為道理上實際上沒有『阿漚』，所以我沒有什麼可接受的，因此沒有過錯。而且，道理上實際上沒有『阿漚』，你卻說有，無中生有，這就是邪見，所以過錯在你。我內心沒有過錯。再者，斷除邪見，是指標立兩個章節的門徑，即邪見和斷除邪見的章節。從這裡開始解釋這兩個章節的門徑。因為追求『阿漚』而不可得，卻無中生有地認為有，所以稱為邪見。解釋邪見章節的門徑，就是因為追求『阿漚』而不可得，邪見自然破滅，所以這也是解釋斷除邪見章節的門徑。又分為兩種不同的方式。首先是從理上破除，其次是放縱（對方的觀點）再進行辯駁。從理上破除，是指錯誤的認知認為有『阿漚』，但道理上實際上沒有，所以說沒有吉利。所以莊周說，同一種顏色，不同的人有不同的感受，這是爲了說明顏色沒有固定的性質。《攝大乘論》說明，同一境界，不同的人有不同的看法，也是爲了說明境界沒有固定的性質。又如同一顏色，不同的人有不同的感受，凡夫認為顏色是實有的，聖人知道顏色是空性的，顏色本身並沒有實有或空性之分。註文分為四種：一是放縱，二是破除，三是解釋，四是呵斥。如果稍微有一點吉利，這就是放縱對方的觀點。如果稍微有一點吉利，我的經典就應該接受，也允許你立論。但實際上沒有吉利，所以我不接受，你不應該立論。為什麼呢？下面第三段進行解釋。愚人沒有方便法門，下面第四段進行呵斥。因為外道追求快樂，卻不瞭解快樂的真正原因，所以錯誤地認為這種執著是快樂的原因。其次，下面第二段是放縱對方的觀點再進行破除。前面說明道理上實際上沒有『阿漚』，現在假設有『阿漚』。所以開啟三個門徑來檢驗。又恐怕外道說有一種事物可以滿足三種不同的情感，所以再次用三個門徑來責問。又說，根據一個人的情況來說，可以說它是吉利的，比如女人對於愛她的人來說是美好的。又如破方中說，在同一個天下，可以說有固定的方位，所以開啟三個門徑來責問。

【English Translation】 English version: That which is proclaimed from the mouth is therefore called 'qi' (vital energy/influence). Furthermore, the initial arising of this notion is due to the very nature of false views (xie jian). Consequently, down to the present day, the branches of this stream have been unceasing, and it is weighed as 'qi'. Moreover, the denial of good and evil is named the very essence of false views. To say that there is auspiciousness or inauspiciousness is the residual influence of false views. Therefore, there is no fault because I have avoided (false views). Secondly, because there is no auspiciousness, the second section below responds to your question, explaining that there is no calamity. You say that there is no 'a-ou' (auspicious omen), which is inauspicious. If there were indeed 'a-ou' in principle, and I did not accept it, then it would be my fault. But because there is actually no 'a-ou' in principle, I have nothing to accept, and therefore there is no fault. Moreover, there is actually no 'a-ou' in principle, but you say there is; to claim existence where there is none is a false view, so the fault lies with you. Internally, I have no fault. Furthermore, the cutting off of false views refers to establishing the gateways of two chapters, namely, false views and the cutting off of false views. From here onwards, the gateways of these two chapters are explained. Because 'a-ou' is sought but cannot be obtained, yet it is falsely claimed to exist, it is called a false view. To explain the gateway of the chapter on false views is because 'a-ou' is sought but cannot be obtained, and false views naturally perish, so this is also explaining the gateway of the chapter on cutting off false views. Moreover, it is divided into two different methods. First, it is refuted from the perspective of principle; second, it is conceded (to the opponent's view) and then refuted. To refute from the perspective of principle means that erroneous cognition believes there is 'a-ou', but in principle, there is actually none, so it is said that there is no auspiciousness. Therefore, Zhuang Zhou said that the same color evokes different feelings in different people, which is to illustrate that color has no fixed nature. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra explains that the same realm evokes different views in different people, which is also to illustrate that the realm has no fixed nature. Furthermore, like the same color evoking different feelings in different people, ordinary people believe that color is real, while sages know that color is empty; color itself has neither reality nor emptiness. The commentary is divided into four: first, concession; second, refutation; third, explanation; fourth, rebuke. If there is even a little auspiciousness, this is conceding to the opponent's view. If there is even a little auspiciousness, my sutras should accept it, and you would also be allowed to establish your argument. But in reality, there is no auspiciousness, so I do not accept it, and you should not establish your argument. Why? The third section below explains. Foolish people have no expedient means; the fourth section below rebukes. Because externalists seek happiness but do not understand the true cause of happiness, they mistakenly believe that this attachment is the cause of happiness. Secondly, the second section below is conceding to the opponent's view and then refuting it. The previous section explained that there is actually no 'a-ou' in principle; now, it is assumed that there is 'a-ou'. Therefore, three gateways are opened to examine it. Furthermore, fearing that externalists would say that there is one thing that can satisfy three different emotions, the three gateways are used again to question. It is also said that, according to one person's situation, it can be said to be auspicious, such as a woman being beautiful to the one who loves her. Furthermore, like in the Breaking the Directions, it is said that in the same world, it can be said that there are fixed directions, so three gateways are opened to question.

問何故破吉乃破生耶。答吉是有為必是生法故破生也。又寄破吉生顯一切法都無有生。令諸外道悟無生忍。註釋為二。初別釋三門次總結。前釋不自中前奪后縱。明無有吉法還從吉自體生。若從吉自體生者。不假梵王及筆墨等而生阿漚。亦二相過故下第二縱關。若言還從自體生者。則有體所從有物能從生。便成因果不同。不名為自也。破他有三。一相待破二無窮破三重生破。相待易知。無窮者。吉望一法為他。望一切法並皆是他。既從一他而生。便應遍從一切他生。故云無窮。又此是逆推無窮。吉既從他他復從他。是則無窮。無窮則無因。無因則非他。故得他墮無窮。免無窮則失他重生破者。他中無一既得生一。亦無百千應生百千。問破他中有無窮。破自中亦有以不。答二體之中有二種無窮。一者能生同所生。所生既有從能生亦應有從。若有從則無窮。若窮墮無因。又若能不更從能則所亦不從能也。次以所生同能生。能生既有所生。所生亦應更有能生他。是則無窮。若不能生他亦應不從他生。破共有二義。一者理奪既無自他合何為共。二縱合自他以為共者則合二過以為一過。凡生法有三種下第二總結凡二義。一者結上三門明無生義以示外人。二明此三門攝一切法遮其異計。問若就情有三。理無阿漚兩字。又就理自他共

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本問：為何要破斥『吉』（吉祥）才能破斥『生』（產生）呢？答：因為『吉』是有為法，必定是生法，所以要破斥『生』。而且，破斥『吉』的產生，是爲了顯示一切法都沒有產生。讓那些外道領悟到無生忍。註釋分為兩部分。首先分別解釋三個方面，然後總結。前面的解釋是不從自身中產生，先否定后肯定。說明沒有『吉』法是從『吉』的自體產生的。如果從『吉』的自體產生，就不需要梵天（Brahma）和筆墨等來產生阿漚（A-ū）。也有兩種過失。所以下面第二部分肯定關聯。如果說還是從自體產生，那麼就有體所從屬，有物能夠產生。就變成了因果不同，不能稱為『自』了。破斥『他』（其他）有三個方面：一是相待破，二是無窮破，三是重生破。相待破容易理解。無窮破是，『吉』相對於一個法是『他』，相對於一切法都是『他』。既然從一個『他』而產生，就應該普遍地從一切『他』產生。所以說是無窮。而且這是逆推無窮。『吉』既然從『他』產生，『他』又從『他』產生，這樣就是無窮。無窮就沒有原因。沒有原因就不是『他』。所以得出『他』墮入無窮，避免無窮就失去了『他』。重生破是，『他』中沒有一個既然能夠產生一個，也沒有百千個應該產生百千個。問：破斥『他』中有無窮，破斥『自』中也有無窮嗎？答：在兩個體中，有兩種無窮。一是能生同所生，所生既然有從屬，能生也應該有從屬。如果有從屬，就是無窮。如果窮盡就墮入無因。而且如果能不再次從能，那麼所也不從能。其次是以所生同能生。能生既然有所生，所生也應該更有能生他。這樣就是無窮。如果不能生他，也應該不從他生。破斥『共』（共同）有兩個含義。一是理奪，既然沒有自他，合什麼為共？二是縱合，把自他和在一起作為共，那麼就把兩個過失合為一個過失。凡是生法有三種，下面是第二部分總結，分為兩個含義。一是總結上面三個方面，說明沒有產生的含義，以展示給外人。二是說明這三個方面涵蓋一切法，遮蔽其不同的觀點。問：如果就情來說有三種，理上沒有阿漚兩個字。而且就理來說，自他共

【English Translation】 English version Question: Why is it necessary to refute 『吉』 (jí, auspicious) in order to refute 『生』 (shēng, arising)? Answer: Because 『吉』 (auspiciousness) is a conditioned dharma, it must be a dharma of arising, therefore 『arising』 must be refuted. Moreover, refuting the arising of 『吉』 (auspiciousness) is to show that all dharmas have no arising. Let those heretics realize the forbearance of non-arising (anutpattika-dharma-kshanti). The commentary is divided into two parts. First, explain the three aspects separately, and then summarize. The previous explanation does not arise from itself, first negating and then affirming. It explains that there is no 『吉』 (auspicious) dharma arising from its own nature. If it arises from its own nature, then there is no need for Brahma (梵王) and pen and ink, etc., to produce A-ū (阿漚). There are also two faults. So the second part below affirms the connection. If it is said that it still arises from itself, then there is a substance to which it belongs, and a thing that can arise. It becomes different causes and effects, and cannot be called 『self』. There are three aspects to refuting 『other』 (他): first, refuting by relativity; second, refuting by infinity; and third, refuting by rebirth. Refuting by relativity is easy to understand. Refuting by infinity is that 『吉』 (auspiciousness) is 『other』 relative to one dharma, and 『other』 relative to all dharmas. Since it arises from one 『other』, it should universally arise from all 『others』. Therefore, it is said to be infinite. Moreover, this is an infinite reverse inference. Since 『吉』 (auspiciousness) arises from 『other』, and 『other』 arises from 『other』, then it is infinite. Infinity has no cause. Without a cause, it is not 『other』. Therefore, it is concluded that 『other』 falls into infinity, and avoiding infinity loses 『other』. Refuting by rebirth is that since there is not one in 『other』 that can produce one, there are also not hundreds or thousands that should produce hundreds or thousands. Question: Is there infinity in refuting 『other』, and is there also infinity in refuting 『self』? Answer: In the two entities, there are two kinds of infinity. One is that the producer is the same as the produced. Since the produced has dependence, the producer should also have dependence. If there is dependence, it is infinity. If it is exhausted, it falls into no cause. Moreover, if the producer does not again come from the producer, then the produced also does not come from the producer. Secondly, the produced is the same as the producer. Since the producer has the produced, the produced should also have another producer. This is infinity. If it cannot produce another, it should also not arise from another. Refuting 『both』 (共) has two meanings. One is the principle of deprivation. Since there is no self or other, what is combined as both? The second is the longitudinal combination. Combining self and other as both, then combining two faults into one fault. All arising dharmas have three kinds. The following is the second part of the summary, divided into two meanings. One is to summarize the above three aspects, explaining the meaning of no arising, to show to outsiders. The second is to explain that these three aspects cover all dharmas, obscuring their different views. Question: If there are three kinds in terms of sentiment, there are no two words A-ū in principle. And in terms of principle, self, other, both

求無三。理實無者佛經初既標如是等六事亦同此責。若爾亦無如是之字亦同皆破不。答二義。一者阿漚實非吉。外道橫謂故被破。如是六事實是吉。故不被破。二者佛經明如是字即具二諦。以字是因緣因緣常寂即第一義。第一義常寂因緣字即世諦。外道決定執性有不知二諦。是故被破也。外曰是吉自生故如鹽下自上已來破其自吉。從此已后雙破自他。上有五難。今並救之。言五難者。初明邪見。二者理奪。后自他共三門。外救初云。若定有吉不吉是邪見者。亦應有咸不咸應為邪見。而世諦之中有咸不咸。既是正見。吉亦如是。通第二云。從情有三理實無吉者。亦應從情有咸理實無咸。然於一切情皆咸者。吉亦然矣。通第三三門難者。他共二關本非我義。何所難耶。前雖破自。今正救云鹽體自咸非是外物堿鹽令咸。吉義亦爾故無前過。內曰前已破故者。偈本為二。一指前破其自咸。二正破其咸他。破自即破其體。破能咸他謂破其用。又指前即是奪破。謂奪無有自。次縱其有自。不能咸他。言指前破者凡有二義。一者我前破自遍破天下之自。汝立鹽自已漏我破中。但外道心粗不覺已破更復救之。則是墮負。問上云何破鹽自耶。答自則非咸。咸別非自。如指自則非觸觸則非自。故漏前破也。亦鹽相鹽中住者。此第二縱自破他

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本求無三（求證沒有第三種可能性）。如果『理實無』（從究竟真理上來說沒有）的說法成立，那麼佛經一開始就提出的『如是』等六件事（『如是』、『我聞』、『一時』、『佛』、『在』、『某處』）也同樣會受到這種責難。如果這樣，那麼『如是』這個詞也不應該存在，所有這些都會被否定嗎？回答有兩種解釋。第一，『阿漚』（梵文元音）實際上並非吉祥的，外道（指佛教以外的宗教）錯誤地認為它是吉祥的，所以才被駁斥。而『如是』等六件事實際上是吉祥的，所以不會被駁斥。第二，佛經中明確指出『如是』這個詞包含了二諦（世俗諦和勝義諦）。因為字是因緣和合而成的，因緣和合的事物本質上是寂靜的，這就是第一義諦（勝義諦）。第一義諦是常寂靜的，而因緣和合的字則是世俗諦。外道執著於事物有自性，不瞭解二諦，所以他們的觀點會被駁斥。外道說：『吉祥是自身產生的，就像鹽自身是鹹的一樣。』前面已經駁斥了他們認為吉祥是自身產生的觀點，從現在開始，將同時駁斥吉祥是自身產生和他物產生的觀點。前面有五種詰難，現在一併進行辯護。這五種詰難是：第一，闡明邪見；第二，從道理上駁奪；後面是自身、他身、共生三種方式。外道首先辯解說：『如果說一定有吉祥和不吉祥是邪見，那麼也應該說一定有咸和不咸是邪見。但是在世俗諦中，有咸和不咸，這是一種正見，吉祥也應該如此。』對於第二種詰難，外道說：『從情理上來說有咸，但從究竟真理上來說沒有咸，那麼對於一切情理來說都是鹹的，吉祥也應該如此。』對於第三種三種方式的詰難，外道說：『他生和共生兩種方式本來就不是我的觀點，有什麼可詰難的呢？』前面雖然駁斥了自身產生，現在正式辯解說，鹽的本體自身就是鹹的，不是外物堿讓鹽變鹹的，吉祥的意義也是如此，所以沒有之前的過失。內道（佛教）說：『前面已經駁斥過了。』偈頌原本包含兩層意思：一是指出前面已經駁斥了他們認為咸是自身產生的觀點；二是正式駁斥了咸是他物產生的觀點。駁斥自身產生就是駁斥了它的本體，駁斥能使他物產生鹹味，就是駁斥了它的作用。又說『指前』就是奪破，意思是奪取了沒有自身產生的觀點。其次，即使承認有自身產生，也不能使他物產生鹹味。說『指前破』，凡是有兩種含義：一是我前面駁斥自身產生，就已經普遍駁斥了天下所有的自身產生。你建立鹽自身是鹹的觀點，已經落入了我之前駁斥的範圍中。但是外道心粗，沒有意識到已經被駁斥，還繼續辯解，這就是自取失敗。問：上面是如何駁斥鹽自身是鹹的呢？答：如果是自身，就不是鹹的；咸是另外產生的，就不是自身。就像指頭如果是自身，就不是觸覺；觸覺是另外產生的，就不是自身，所以已經落入之前的駁斥中了。『亦鹽相鹽中住者』，這是第二種，即使承認自身產生，也要駁斥他物產生。

【English Translation】 English version Seeking the absence of a third (Seeking proof that there is no third possibility). If the statement 'Li Shi Wu' (Ultimately, there is nothing) is valid, then the six matters initially presented in the Buddhist scriptures, such as 'Thus I have heard' (Rushi), 'At one time' (Yishi), 'Buddha' (Fo), 'In' (Zai), 'Such' (Rushi), and 'A certain place', would also be subject to this criticism. If so, then the word 'Thus' (Rushi) should also not exist, and all of these would be negated? There are two explanations. First, 'A-Ou' (Sanskrit vowels) are not actually auspicious; external paths (referring to religions other than Buddhism) mistakenly consider them auspicious, so they are refuted. However, the six matters such as 'Thus' (Rushi) are actually auspicious, so they are not refuted. Second, the Buddhist scriptures clearly state that the word 'Thus' (Rushi) contains the two truths (conventional truth and ultimate truth). Because words are formed by causes and conditions, and things formed by causes and conditions are essentially quiescent, this is the first meaning of truth (ultimate truth). The first meaning of truth is constant quiescence, while the word formed by causes and conditions is the conventional truth. External paths are attached to the inherent nature of things and do not understand the two truths, so their views are refuted. The external path says: 'Auspiciousness arises from itself, just as salt is salty by itself.' The view that auspiciousness arises from itself has already been refuted earlier. From now on, the view that auspiciousness arises from itself and from others will be refuted simultaneously. There are five kinds of difficulties mentioned earlier, and now they will be defended together. These five difficulties are: first, clarifying wrong views; second, refuting from the perspective of reason; and later, the three ways of self, other, and co-arising. The external path first argues: 'If it is a wrong view to say that there must be auspiciousness and inauspiciousness, then it should also be a wrong view to say that there must be saltiness and unsaltiness. But in conventional truth, there is saltiness and unsaltiness, which is a correct view, and auspiciousness should be the same.' Regarding the second difficulty, the external path says: 'From the perspective of sentiment, there is saltiness, but from the perspective of ultimate truth, there is no saltiness. Then, for all sentiments, there is saltiness, and auspiciousness should be the same.' Regarding the third difficulty of the three ways, the external path says: 'The two ways of other-arising and co-arising are not originally my views, so what is there to criticize?' Although self-arising has been refuted earlier, now it is formally argued that the substance of salt is salty by itself, and it is not the external alkali that makes the salt salty. The meaning of auspiciousness is also the same, so there is no previous fault. The internal path (Buddhism) says: 'It has already been refuted earlier.' The verse originally contains two layers of meaning: one is to point out that the view that saltiness arises from itself has already been refuted earlier; the other is to formally refute the view that saltiness arises from others. Refuting self-arising is refuting its substance, and refuting the ability to make others salty is refuting its function. Also, saying 'pointing to the previous' is to seize and refute, meaning to seize the view that there is no self-arising. Secondly, even if self-arising is admitted, it cannot make others salty. Saying 'pointing to the previous refutation' has two meanings: one is that I have refuted self-arising earlier, and I have already universally refuted all self-arising in the world. You establish the view that salt is salty by itself, and you have already fallen into the scope of my previous refutation. However, the external path is crude and does not realize that it has been refuted, and continues to argue, which is self-defeating. Question: How was the saltiness of salt itself refuted above? Answer: If it is self, it is not salty; saltiness is produced separately, so it is not self. Just as if the finger is self, it is not touch; touch is produced separately, so it is not self, so it has already fallen into the previous refutation. 'Also, the saltiness of salt resides in salt,' this is the second, even if self-arising is admitted, other-arising must also be refuted.

。鹽守咸自性則不能咸他。既失咸他亦無自性。問現見鹽與食合。是故食咸。豈非咸他。答食中之咸為是鹽咸為是食咸。若是食咸則失自咸。若是鹽咸則失咸他。考而言之。食中之咸終是鹽咸。故守自性失於咸他。考而言之。世間粗心言食中鹽此是食咸。然共終是鹽咸耳。則食不咸也。註文前釋奪破。複次下第二縱破解此云三。今正意者開文為二。一取外人意。二正破之。汝意謂鹽從因緣出者。外人立咸凡有二義。一者鹽不假余物故咸是自性咸。二食中之咸假鹽故咸名因緣咸。故體咸是自咸。用咸為因緣咸。故自是自咸。他是因緣咸。是故鹽不自性咸者。此是食中之咸是因緣咸。故無自性。非外人改自性咸立因緣。此句是外人本宗亦非是論主破也。故舊之二釋于文並謬。我不受汝語下第二明論主破。不受汝語者。外人鹽咸能使他物咸是因緣咸。此二語相違是故不受。今當還以汝語破汝所說者。二語既其相違。故還捉自性咸語破其他物咸語。如鉾楯相違。鹽雖他物合物不為鹽。此正破。以鹽守鹽性食則不咸。如牛守牛性雖與馬合牛終非馬。此文正爾也。不須異釋。若破舊義者。數人謂淡物有堿性假緣發之。成論淡物有咸理緣會則咸。今問。理之與性為是淡為異淡耶。若是淡者畢竟無咸。雖與咸合但是鹽咸則非物咸也。又

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：鹽如果保持其鹹的自性，就不能使其他東西變咸。如果失去了使其他東西變鹹的能力，也就失去了自性。有人問：現在看到鹽和食物混合，所以食物變咸，難道不是鹽使其他東西變咸嗎？回答：食物中的鹹味，是鹽的鹹味還是食物本身的鹹味？如果是食物本身的鹹味，那麼鹽就失去了其自身的鹹味。如果是鹽的鹹味，那麼鹽就失去了使其他東西變鹹的能力。仔細考察，食物中的鹹味終究是鹽的鹹味。所以，保持自性就失去了使其他東西變鹹的能力。仔細考察，世俗之人粗略地說食物中的鹽是食物的鹹味，但最終還是鹽的鹹味。那麼食物本身並不咸。註釋：前面解釋了『奪破』。下面的『複次』是第二重『縱破解』，這裡分為三部分。現在說明正意，將文章分為兩部分：一是採納外人的觀點，二是正面駁斥它。你認為鹽是從因緣產生的。外人認為鹹味有兩種含義：一是鹽不依賴其他事物而咸，這是自性咸；二是食物中的鹹味依賴於鹽，所以稱為因緣咸。所以，本體的鹹味是自性咸，作用的鹹味是因緣咸。所以，自身是自性咸，他物是因緣咸。因此，鹽不是自性咸，食物中的鹹味是因緣咸，所以沒有自性。不是外人改變自性咸而建立因緣咸，這句話是外人本來的宗旨，也不是論主所要駁斥的。所以舊的兩種解釋在文義上都是錯誤的。『我不受汝語』以下是第二部分，說明論主的駁斥。『不受汝語』，外人認為鹽的鹹味能使其他事物變咸，這是因緣咸，這兩句話是相互矛盾的，所以不接受。現在應當用你的話來駁斥你所說的話。因為這兩句話相互矛盾，所以用自性咸來駁斥其他事物咸。就像矛和盾相互矛盾一樣。鹽即使和其他東西混合，也不會變成鹽。這是正面駁斥。因為鹽保持其鹽的性質，食物就不會變咸。就像牛保持其牛的性質，即使和馬混合，牛最終也不是馬。這段文字就是這個意思，不需要其他的解釋。如果駁斥舊的解釋，有些人認為淡的東西有堿性，依靠因緣而顯現出來。成論認為淡的東西有鹹的道理，因緣聚合就變咸。現在問，道理和性質，是淡的還是不同於淡的？如果是淡的，那麼畢竟沒有鹹味。即使和鹹的東西混合，也只是鹽的鹹味，而不是物體的鹹味。又又

【English Translation】 English version: If salt maintains its salty self-nature, it cannot make other things salty. If it loses the ability to make other things salty, it also loses its self-nature. Someone asks: Now we see that salt mixes with food, so the food becomes salty. Isn't this salt making other things salty? The answer is: The saltiness in the food, is it the salt's saltiness or the food's own saltiness? If it is the food's own saltiness, then the salt loses its own saltiness. If it is the salt's saltiness, then the salt loses the ability to make other things salty. Upon careful examination, the saltiness in the food is ultimately the salt's saltiness. Therefore, maintaining self-nature loses the ability to make other things salty. Upon careful examination, worldly people roughly say that the salt in the food is the food's saltiness, but ultimately it is the salt's saltiness. Then the food itself is not salty. Commentary: The previous explanation was 'seizing and refuting'. The following 'furthermore' is the second 'progressive refutation', which is divided into three parts here. Now, to explain the true meaning, the text is divided into two parts: first, adopting the views of outsiders; second, directly refuting them. You believe that salt arises from conditions. Outsiders believe that saltiness has two meanings: first, salt is salty without relying on other things, which is self-nature saltiness; second, the saltiness in food relies on salt, so it is called conditional saltiness. Therefore, the saltiness of the substance is self-nature saltiness, and the saltiness of the function is conditional saltiness. Therefore, the self is self-nature saltiness, and other things are conditional saltiness. Therefore, salt is not self-nature saltiness, and the saltiness in food is conditional saltiness, so it has no self-nature. It is not that outsiders change self-nature saltiness to establish conditional saltiness; this sentence is the original doctrine of outsiders and is not what the treatise master wants to refute. Therefore, the old two explanations are both wrong in meaning. 'I do not accept your words' below is the second part, explaining the treatise master's refutation. 'I do not accept your words', outsiders believe that the saltiness of salt can make other things salty, which is conditional saltiness. These two sentences are contradictory, so they are not accepted. Now we should use your words to refute what you said. Because these two sentences are contradictory, we use self-nature saltiness to refute the saltiness of other things. Just like a spear and shield contradict each other. Even if salt mixes with other things, it will not become salt. This is a direct refutation. Because salt maintains its salt nature, food will not become salty. Just like a cow maintains its cow nature, even if it mixes with a horse, the cow is ultimately not a horse. This passage is what it means, and no other explanation is needed. If we refute the old explanation, some people think that bland things have alkalinity, which manifests through conditions. The Cheng Lun believes that bland things have the principle of saltiness, and when conditions come together, they become salty. Now we ask, is the principle and nature bland or different from bland? If it is bland, then there is ultimately no saltiness. Even if it mixes with salty things, it is only the saltiness of the salt, not the saltiness of the object. Furthermore Furthermore

破外道者。咸有堿性亦淡有淡性。今淡遂反成咸則失淡性。若無淡性云何有咸。又若汝淡性可反成咸。亦堿性可反為淡。如少鹽投于多水則失堿性。亦應少吉入多不吉失於吉性。又如色心雖合不可相反。鹹淡亦爾不可相反。若可相反即無自性。無性則空。不應執有。外曰如燈。破燈為二。一破明能見闇故破于闇。二破明不見闇而能破闇。破此二義則明破闇理盡。初四。一立二破三救四破救。前一番破已成明不能見闇故不破闇。次一問答破初生燈不能破闇。夫論明能破闇不出此二。此二不成則明破闇理盡。問何故舍鹽立燈耶。答鹽守自性則他物不咸。他物若咸則失自性。燈守自照不失照他。雖能照他不失自性。是以舍鹽而立燈也。問佛法誰立燈自照照他。答婆沙云。僧祇人明。智自知知他。如燈自照照他。評家破之云。此喻非三藏中。世俗法與賢聖法異故不應引。又破云。燈若自照復何所照。燈若非照則是暗。復何能照。內曰燈自他無暗者。上鹽得自失他得他失自。今引燈自他俱失。炎內無暗故無自照。炎外亦無故無照他。自他無闇則無所照。既無所照亦無能照。故墮不闇不明不能不所一切都失。又若言自照則自體有闇。若言照他則他處有闇。若兩處有闇唯有所照竟無能照。既無能照亦無所照亦墮一切都失。又若言自照

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本破斥外道者認為，一切事物都有堿性，也都有淡性。如果淡性反而變成了堿性，那就失去了淡性。如果沒有淡性，又怎麼會有堿性呢？如果你的淡性可以反過來變成堿性，那麼堿性也可以反過來變成淡性。就像少量鹽投入大量水中，就會失去堿性一樣，少量吉祥投入大量不吉祥中，也應該失去吉祥的性質。又如色（rupa, 物質）和心（citta, 精神）雖然結合在一起，但不能互相轉化。咸和淡也是如此，不能互相轉化。如果可以互相轉化，那就沒有自性（svabhava, 固有不變的性質）。沒有自性就是空（sunyata, 無自性），不應該執著為實有。外道說：『比如燈，打破燈可以分為兩種情況：一是打破光明，能看見黑暗，所以是打破了黑暗；二是打破光明，不能看見黑暗，但能打破黑暗。』打破這兩種說法，那麼光明破除黑暗的道理就講完了。首先是四步：一、立論；二、破斥；三、救護；四、破斥救護。前一種破斥已經成立，光明不能看見黑暗，所以不能破除黑暗。接下來是問答，破斥初生的燈不能破除黑暗。總之，光明能夠破除黑暗，不外乎這兩種情況。這兩種情況不成立，那麼光明破除黑暗的道理就講完了。問：『為什麼捨棄鹽而立論燈呢？』答：『鹽如果保持自己的性質，那麼其他東西就不會是鹹的；如果其他東西是鹹的，那麼鹽就失去了自己的性質。燈保持自己的照亮，不失去照亮其他東西的能力。雖然能照亮其他東西，但不失去自己的性質。所以捨棄鹽而立論燈。』問：『在佛法中，誰立論燈的自照和照他呢？』答：『《婆沙論》（Vibhasa）說，僧祇部（Samghika）的人認為，智慧是自己知道，也知道他人，就像燈自己照亮，也照亮他人。』評家破斥說：『這個比喻不是三藏（Tripitaka, 佛教經典）中的。世俗法和賢聖法不同，所以不應該引用。』又破斥說：『燈如果自己照亮，又照亮什麼呢？燈如果不是照亮，那就是黑暗，又怎麼能照亮呢？』內道說：『燈自身沒有黑暗，燈外也沒有黑暗。』上面說鹽得到自身就失去其他，得到其他就失去自身。現在引用燈，自身和其他都失去。火焰內部沒有黑暗，所以沒有自照；火焰外部也沒有黑暗，所以沒有照他。自身和其他都沒有黑暗，那就沒有什麼可照亮的。既然沒有什麼可照亮的，也就沒有什麼能照亮的。所以墮入不黑暗、不光明、不能、不所，一切都失去。如果說自照，那麼自體就有黑暗；如果說照他，那麼他處就有黑暗。如果兩處都有黑暗，只有所照，最終沒有能照。既然沒有能照，也沒有所照，也就墮入一切都失去。如果說自照

【English Translation】 English version Those who refute externalist doctrines argue that everything has alkalinity and also has blandness. If blandness turns into alkalinity, then it loses its blandness. If there is no blandness, how can there be alkalinity? If your blandness can be reversed into alkalinity, then alkalinity can also be reversed into blandness. Just as a small amount of salt thrown into a large amount of water will lose its alkalinity, a small amount of auspiciousness entering a large amount of inauspiciousness should also lose its auspicious nature. Furthermore, just as form (rupa, matter) and mind (citta, spirit), although combined, cannot be transformed into each other, saltiness and blandness are also like that, they cannot be transformed into each other. If they can be transformed into each other, then there is no self-nature (svabhava, inherent unchanging nature). Without self-nature, it is emptiness (sunyata, no self-nature), and one should not cling to it as real. Externalists say: 'For example, a lamp. Breaking a lamp can be divided into two situations: first, breaking the light, one can see the darkness, so it is breaking the darkness; second, breaking the light, one cannot see the darkness, but it can break the darkness.' Refuting these two statements, then the principle of light dispelling darkness is completely explained. First, there are four steps: 1. Establishing a thesis; 2. Refuting; 3. Defending; 4. Refuting the defense. The previous refutation has already established that light cannot see darkness, so it cannot dispel darkness. Next is a question and answer, refuting that a newly lit lamp cannot dispel darkness. In short, light being able to dispel darkness is nothing more than these two situations. If these two situations are not established, then the principle of light dispelling darkness is completely explained. Question: 'Why abandon salt and establish the lamp as an argument?' Answer: 'If salt maintains its own nature, then other things will not be salty; if other things are salty, then salt loses its own nature. The lamp maintains its own illumination and does not lose the ability to illuminate other things. Although it can illuminate other things, it does not lose its own nature. Therefore, we abandon salt and establish the lamp as an argument.' Question: 'In the Buddha-dharma, who establishes the lamp's self-illumination and illuminating others?' Answer: 'The Vibhasa (Commentary) says that the Samghika (a Buddhist school) believe that wisdom is knowing oneself and also knowing others, just as a lamp illuminates itself and also illuminates others.' The commentator refutes: 'This analogy is not found in the Tripitaka (Buddhist scriptures). Worldly laws and the laws of the sages are different, so it should not be cited.' He further refutes: 'If the lamp illuminates itself, then what does it illuminate? If the lamp is not illuminating, then it is darkness, so how can it illuminate?' The internalist says: 'There is no darkness within the lamp itself, and there is no darkness outside the lamp.' Above, it was said that salt, by obtaining itself, loses others, and by obtaining others, loses itself. Now, the lamp is cited, losing both itself and others. There is no darkness inside the flame, so there is no self-illumination; there is also no darkness outside the flame, so there is no illuminating others. Since there is no darkness within or without, there is nothing to illuminate. Since there is nothing to illuminate, there is also nothing that can illuminate. Therefore, it falls into not darkness, not light, not able, not what, everything is lost. If it is said to illuminate itself, then the self has darkness; if it is said to illuminate others, then the other place has darkness. If both places have darkness, there is only what is illuminated, and ultimately there is no one who can illuminate. Since there is no one who can illuminate, and there is nothing to illuminate, it also falls into everything being lost. If it is said to illuminate itself

。則自體有闇復自體有明。則一燈之中具明闇兩質。若有具兩質則應相害。既其相害則無明闇亦一切都失。又若言有自照之明覆有所照之闇。則一燈內具有明闇。亦應即自吉體應有不吉。而吉體無有不吉。則燈體有明而無有暗還墮無自他之失。注為三。初釋自無暗。次釋他無暗。三總結無照。釋自二破。夫論照義不出二種。一者照暗。二者照明。初辨炎內無暗故不名照暗也。燈亦無能照下第二辨不能照明。前辨無暗可照。今辨有明不能照。故無有明暗一切不照。此有二破。初奪次縱。燈無能照者。亦炎無有自照之能也。不能照故者。此句釋上所以。無自照己體之能者。以其自體不能還照自體故。如指如刀。無有自斫自觸故。亦二相過故者第二縱也。有自照己體之能。則應有受照之體。便成二炎兩燈。故前得自失照。今得照失自。進退墮負。余文易知。外曰初生時二俱照故。自上已來破已成燈無照暗義。今破初生燈不能破暗。救意云。已成之燈暗體已滅故無兩暗可照。今初生燈二俱有暗故有所照。以有所照便有能照。故照義得成。如燈未生時暗體未滅。一豪明生則一豪暗滅。明體漸成暗便漸滅。明若都成暗便都滅。當知破闇是初明之功。初生之燈照體未足故有自照。住處亦昧故有照他。然外人立初生明凡二義。一者明暗

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果燈自身既有黑暗，自身又有光明，那麼一盞燈中就同時具備光明和黑暗兩種性質。如果具備兩種性質，那麼它們應該互相妨害。既然互相妨害，那麼光明和黑暗都應該完全消失。又如果說有能自我照耀的光明，又有被照耀的黑暗，那麼一盞燈內就同時具有光明和黑暗。也應該自身這個吉祥的本體就應該有不吉祥的部分。而吉祥的本體不可能有不吉祥的部分。那麼燈的本體只有光明而沒有黑暗，還是會陷入沒有『自』和『他』的過失。註釋分為三部分：首先解釋自身沒有黑暗，其次解釋他物沒有黑暗，第三總結沒有照耀。解釋自身又分為兩部分來破斥：一般討論照耀的意義，不外乎兩種：一是照耀黑暗，二是照耀光明。首先辨明燈的火焰內部沒有黑暗，所以不能稱為照耀黑暗。燈也沒有能力照耀。下面第二點辨明燈不能照耀光明。前面辨明沒有黑暗可以被照耀，現在辨明有光明卻不能照耀，所以沒有光明和黑暗，一切都不能照耀。這裡有兩重破斥：先否定，后肯定。燈沒有照耀的能力，也就是火焰沒有自我照耀的能力。『不能照耀』這句解釋了上面的原因。沒有自我照耀自身的能力，是因為它自身不能反過來照耀自身，就像手指和刀，不能自己砍自己、自己觸碰自己一樣。『也是兩種狀態的過失』這是第二重肯定。如果有自我照耀自身的能力，那麼就應該有接受照耀的本體，這樣就變成了兩個火焰、兩盞燈。所以前面得到了失去『自』的照耀，現在得到了照耀失去了『自』。進退兩難，都陷入了失敗。後面的文字容易理解。外道說：初生的時候，光明和黑暗都能照耀。從上面開始已經破斥了已成之燈沒有照耀黑暗的意義。現在破斥初生的燈不能破除黑暗。外道的想法是：已成之燈，黑暗的本體已經滅亡，所以沒有兩種黑暗可以被照耀。現在初生的燈，光明和黑暗都存在，所以有所照耀。因為有所照耀，所以有能照耀。所以照耀的意義才能成立。就像燈未產生的時候，黑暗的本體沒有滅亡，一絲光明產生，就有一絲黑暗滅亡。光明的本體逐漸形成，黑暗就逐漸滅亡。光明如果完全形成，黑暗就完全滅亡。應當知道破除黑暗是最初光明的功勞。初生的燈，照耀的本體還不充足，所以有自我照耀。所處的地方也昏暗，所以有照耀他物。然而外道立論初生之明，大概有兩層含義：一是光明和黑暗 English version: If the lamp itself has darkness and also has light, then a single lamp possesses both light and darkness. If it possesses both qualities, then they should harm each other. Since they harm each other, both light and darkness should completely disappear. Furthermore, if it is said that there is light that illuminates itself and darkness that is illuminated, then a single lamp contains both light and darkness. Its own auspicious essence should also have inauspicious aspects. However, the auspicious essence cannot have inauspicious aspects. Therefore, the lamp's essence only has light and no darkness, still falling into the fault of lacking 'self' and 'other'. The commentary is divided into three parts: first, explaining that the self has no darkness; second, explaining that others have no darkness; and third, summarizing that there is no illumination. The explanation of the self is divided into two parts to refute: Generally discussing the meaning of illumination, it does not go beyond two types: first, illuminating darkness; second, illuminating light. First, it is clarified that there is no darkness within the flame of the lamp, so it cannot be called illuminating darkness. The lamp also has no ability to illuminate. The second point below clarifies that the lamp cannot illuminate light. Previously, it was clarified that there is no darkness to be illuminated; now, it is clarified that there is light but it cannot illuminate, so there is no light and darkness, and nothing can be illuminated. There are two layers of refutation here: first, negation, then affirmation. The lamp has no ability to illuminate, that is, the flame has no ability to self-illuminate. 'Cannot illuminate' this sentence explains the above reason. There is no ability to self-illuminate because it cannot illuminate itself in return, just like a finger and a knife, cannot cut itself or touch itself. 'It is also the fault of two states' this is the second affirmation. If there is the ability to self-illuminate, then there should be a body that receives illumination, thus becoming two flames, two lamps. Therefore, previously, the illumination of losing 'self' was obtained, and now, illumination loses 'self'. Advancing and retreating are both failures. The following text is easy to understand. The heretic says: At the time of initial birth, both light and darkness can illuminate. From above, it has already refuted the meaning of the completed lamp not illuminating darkness. Now it refutes that the newly born lamp cannot dispel darkness. The heretic's idea is: The completed lamp, the essence of darkness has already perished, so there are no two darknesses that can be illuminated. Now the newly born lamp, both light and darkness exist, so there is something to illuminate. Because there is something to illuminate, there is the ability to illuminate. Therefore, the meaning of illumination can be established. Just like when the lamp has not yet been produced, the essence of darkness has not perished, a trace of light arises, and a trace of darkness perishes. The essence of light gradually forms, and darkness gradually perishes. If light is completely formed, darkness completely perishes. It should be known that dispelling darkness is the merit of the initial light. The newly born lamp, the essence of illumination is not yet sufficient, so there is self-illumination. The place where it is located is also dim, so there is illumination of other things. However, the heretic establishes the initial light with roughly two meanings: first, light and darkness

【English Translation】 English version: If the lamp itself has darkness and also has light, then a single lamp possesses both light and darkness. If it possesses both qualities, then they should harm each other. Since they harm each other, both light and darkness should completely disappear. Furthermore, if it is said that there is light that illuminates itself and darkness that is illuminated, then a single lamp contains both light and darkness. Its own auspicious essence should also have inauspicious aspects. However, the auspicious essence cannot have inauspicious aspects. Therefore, the lamp's essence only has light and no darkness, still falling into the fault of lacking 'self' and 'other'. The commentary is divided into three parts: first, explaining that the self has no darkness; second, explaining that others have no darkness; and third, summarizing that there is no illumination. The explanation of the self is divided into two parts to refute: Generally discussing the meaning of illumination, it does not go beyond two types: first, illuminating darkness; second, illuminating light. First, it is clarified that there is no darkness within the flame of the lamp, so it cannot be called illuminating darkness. The lamp also has no ability to illuminate. The second point below clarifies that the lamp cannot illuminate light. Previously, it was clarified that there is no darkness to be illuminated; now, it is clarified that there is light but it cannot illuminate, so there is no light and darkness, and nothing can be illuminated. There are two layers of refutation here: first, negation, then affirmation. The lamp has no ability to illuminate, that is, the flame has no ability to self-illuminate. 'Cannot illuminate' this sentence explains the above reason. There is no ability to self-illuminate because it cannot illuminate itself in return, just like a finger and a knife, cannot cut itself or touch itself. 'It is also the fault of two states' this is the second affirmation. If there is the ability to self-illuminate, then there should be a body that receives illumination, thus becoming two flames, two lamps. Therefore, previously, the illumination of losing 'self' was obtained, and now, illumination loses 'self'. Advancing and retreating are both failures. The following text is easy to understand. The heretic says: At the time of initial birth, both light and darkness can illuminate. From above, it has already refuted the meaning of the completed lamp not illuminating darkness. Now it refutes that the newly born lamp cannot dispel darkness. The heretic's idea is: The completed lamp, the essence of darkness has already perished, so there are no two darknesses that can be illuminated. Now the newly born lamp, both light and darkness exist, so there is something to illuminate. Because there is something to illuminate, there is the ability to illuminate. Therefore, the meaning of illumination can be established. Just like when the lamp has not yet been produced, the essence of darkness has not perished, a trace of light arises, and a trace of darkness perishes. The essence of light gradually forms, and darkness gradually perishes. If light is completely formed, darkness completely perishes. It should be known that dispelling darkness is the merit of the initial light. The newly born lamp, the essence of illumination is not yet sufficient, so there is self-illumination. The place where it is located is also dim, so there is illumination of other things. However, the heretic establishes the initial light with roughly two meanings: first, light and darkness

並。二明除暗。初生之燈猶有細暗。故明闇並已破于粗。故有除暗。內曰不然一法有無相不可得者。已成之明無暗可破。如前說之。初生之明不離已未。已生則是有。未生為無。有無相乖。何名一體。故云不可得也。注中為二。一奪二縱。奪中又二。一奪初燈二奪兩照。奪初燈者。外謂有初生燈異於已未。今奪云。初生名半生半未生。還墮已未故無初生燈也。生不能照下次奪兩照。半生是已則無闇可照。又不能自照半明。故云生不能照也。何況未生。未生是闇有所照無能照。云何名照。複次下第二縱。有初燈若不受兩半而言是一體者。則應明闇共體生死一命。何得然乎。複次不到闇故。自上已來破其明到闇能破闇義。此下次破明不到闇而能破闇。此一偈本亦是結前發后。結前者。莫問已成初生。凡厥有明悉不到暗。若不到暗悉不破暗。所以然者。明暗相乖。暗若現在明在未來。明若現在暗便過去。不相見理故不相破。發後者。今外人引咒星譬立不到闇而能破闇而能破闇義。外曰如咒星者。論主上云明不到闇則不破闇。外受不到不受不破。故引咒星不到於物而有功用。內曰太過實者。明所引之喻過彼燈實。故云太過實也。又以燈例咒。咒能及遠。燈亦應爾。則燈壞。以咒例燈。燈不及遠。咒亦應爾。則咒壞。又俱相類並

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本並。二，光明驅除黑暗。（外人認為）新生的燈光仍然有細微的黑暗，所以光明與黑暗並存，（光明）已經驅除了粗重的黑暗，所以說能驅除黑暗。（內道）反駁說：不是這樣的，（因為）一個法（事物）的有和無的相狀是不可得的。已經存在的光明，沒有黑暗可以驅除，就像前面所說的那樣。新生的光明不離已生和未生。（如果）已生就是有，未生就是無，有和無相互矛盾，怎麼能說是一個整體呢？所以說不可得。（窺基法師）的註釋中分為兩種方式：一是破斥，二是順縱。破斥中又分為兩種：一是破斥初生之燈，二是破斥兩半（已生和未生）都能照。破斥初生之燈是說，外道認為有初生之燈，不同於已生和未生。現在破斥說，初生（之燈）名為半生半未生，仍然屬於已生和未生，所以沒有初生之燈。已生不能照，下面破斥兩半都能照。半生是已生，就沒有黑暗可以照；又不能自己照亮一半的光明，所以說已生不能照。何況未生？未生是黑暗，有所照就沒有能照的，怎麼能叫照呢？下面是第二種方式，順縱。如果有初生之燈，如果不接受兩半（已生和未生）的說法，而認為是一個整體，那麼光明和黑暗就應該共用一個本體，生死共用一個命運，怎麼可能這樣呢？下面說，不到達黑暗的緣故。從上面已經破斥了光明到達黑暗才能破除黑暗的觀點。這次下面破斥光明不到達黑暗也能破除黑暗。這一偈頌本來也是總結前面，引發後面的。總結前面是說，不要問已生還是初生，凡是光明都不能到達黑暗。如果不能到達黑暗，就不能破除黑暗。之所以這樣，是因為光明和黑暗相互矛盾，黑暗如果現在存在，光明就在未來；光明如果現在存在，黑暗就已過去。不能相見，所以不能相互破除。引發後面是說，現在外道引用咒語和星辰的譬喻，來建立不到達黑暗也能破除黑暗的觀點。外道說，就像咒語和星辰那樣，論主上面說光明不到達黑暗就不能破除黑暗，外道接受不到達就不能破除的觀點，所以引用咒語和星辰不到達物體也能起作用。內道反駁說，太過分了，（因為）光明所引用的比喻超過了燈的實際情況，所以說太過分了。又用燈來比喻咒語，咒語能及遠，燈也應該這樣，那麼燈就壞了；用咒語來比喻燈，燈不能及遠，咒語也應該這樣，那麼咒語就壞了。又都相互類似並

【English Translation】 English version Furthermore. Secondly, light dispels darkness. A newly lit lamp still has subtle darkness. Therefore, light and darkness coexist, and (light) has already dispelled the gross darkness, so it is said to dispel darkness. (The inner school) refutes, saying: It is not so, because the characteristics of existence and non-existence of a dharma (thing) are unattainable. The light that already exists has no darkness to dispel, just as mentioned before. The newly lit light is inseparable from the already-arisen and not-yet-arisen. (If) already-arisen is existence, and not-yet-arisen is non-existence, existence and non-existence contradict each other, how can they be said to be a whole? Therefore, it is said to be unattainable. In (Kuei-chi's) commentary, it is divided into two methods: one is refutation, and the other is compliance. Refutation is further divided into two types: one is refuting the newly lit lamp, and the other is refuting that both halves (already-arisen and not-yet-arisen) can illuminate. Refuting the newly lit lamp means that the externalists believe that there is a newly lit lamp, which is different from the already-arisen and not-yet-arisen. Now refuting, saying that the newly lit (lamp) is called half-arisen and half-not-yet-arisen, still belongs to the already-arisen and not-yet-arisen, so there is no newly lit lamp. The already-arisen cannot illuminate, and below refutes that both halves can illuminate. Half-arisen is already-arisen, so there is no darkness to illuminate; and it cannot illuminate half of the light itself, so it is said that the already-arisen cannot illuminate. How much more so the not-yet-arisen? The not-yet-arisen is darkness, and if there is something to illuminate, there is no ability to illuminate, so how can it be called illumination? Below is the second method, compliance. If there is a newly lit lamp, if one does not accept the statement of two halves (already-arisen and not-yet-arisen), but believes it to be a whole, then light and darkness should share one entity, and life and death should share one fate, how is this possible? Below it says, because it does not reach darkness. From above, it has already refuted the view that light must reach darkness to dispel darkness. This time below, it refutes that light can dispel darkness without reaching darkness. This verse was originally summarizing the previous and initiating the following. Summarizing the previous means that, do not ask whether it is already-arisen or newly-arisen, all light cannot reach darkness. If it cannot reach darkness, it cannot dispel darkness. The reason for this is that light and darkness contradict each other. If darkness exists now, light is in the future; if light exists now, darkness has passed. They cannot see each other, so they cannot dispel each other. Initiating the following means that, now the externalists cite the analogy of mantras and stars to establish the view that one can dispel darkness without reaching darkness. The externalists say, just like mantras and stars, the master above said that light cannot dispel darkness if it does not reach darkness. The externalists accept the view that one cannot dispel if one does not reach, so they cite mantras and stars that can function without reaching objects. The inner school refutes, saying that it is too much, because the analogy cited by light exceeds the actual situation of the lamp, so it is said to be too much. Also, using the lamp to compare to the mantra, the mantra can reach far, and the lamp should also be like this, then the lamp is broken; using the mantra to compare to the lamp, the lamp cannot reach far, and the mantra should also be like this, then the mantra is broken. Also, they are all similar and

是神靈同爲頑礙。又吉應懸吉。不煩貫初。又我經亦應是吉。則一切是吉便無有不吉。不吉無故亦無有吉也。又就此凡有四並。一近遠俱不到則近遠俱破。二遠近俱不到遠近俱不破。三破近不破遠。應到近不到遠。則有到有不到。四若俱不到破近不破遠。亦應破遠不破近。注中雲振旦者。此雲漢國也。複次若初吉余不吉。自下已來破其初吉及中后皆吉。從此已下偏破中后吉。以上來破譬既窮。今還歸法說也。又從此文去至眾手皆䨥開起。若初吉者促自吉。余不吉者破他吉也。汝言阿漚在初以為吉者。中后既無。云何名吉。故言余應不吉。注中開二種妄語以破外人。若吉性通三。汝言初吉則隱於中后。有而言無故名妄語。若言吉唯在初中后無吉。汝言以初吉故余亦吉。即是無而言有故為妄語。外曰初吉故余亦吉者通二妄語也。吉唯在初中后無吉。故無無而言有過。以初吉力潤益中后相與皆吉。則無有而言無過。內曰不吉多故吉為不吉。此有二難。一者少多相敵。以少吉力令多不吉皆吉。亦應以多不吉不吉于吉皆成不吉。二者就二力難。汝義吉與不吉各有自性不應移改。今不吉不能自守為吉所吉遂成吉者。吉亦應不能自守吉性為不吉所不吉皆成不吉。外曰如象手。此救上以少從多難也。像有七枝。以手勝故從勝受名為有手

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：神靈也同樣會受到阻礙。而且吉祥的感應會懸掛著吉祥，不需要從一開始就貫穿。而且我的經典也應該是吉祥的，那麼一切都是吉祥的，就沒有不吉祥的。沒有不吉祥的原因，也就沒有吉祥。此外，就此而言，總共有四種情況：一是近處和遠處都無法到達，那麼近處和遠處都被破除。二是遠處和近處都無法到達，遠處和近處都不會被破除。三是破除近處而不破除遠處，應該是到達近處而無法到達遠處，那麼就存在到達和無法到達的情況。四是如果都無法到達，破除近處而不破除遠處，也應該破除遠處而不破除近處。註釋中說『振旦』，這裡指的是漢國。再次，如果一開始是吉祥的，其餘的則不吉祥，從下往上破除其最初的吉祥，以及中間和後面的吉祥。從這以下，偏重於破除中間和後面的吉祥。以上用比喻來說明已經窮盡，現在回到佛法來說。此外，從這段文字開始，到『眾手皆䨥開起』。如果一開始是吉祥的，就促使自身吉祥，其餘不吉祥的，就破除他人的吉祥。你說『阿漚』在開始時認為是吉祥的，中間和後面既然沒有，怎麼能稱為吉祥？所以說其餘的應該是不吉祥的。註釋中開啟兩種妄語來駁斥外人。如果吉祥的性質貫通三時，你說一開始是吉祥的，那麼就隱藏在中間和後面，有卻說沒有，所以稱為妄語。如果說吉祥只在開始，中間和後面沒有吉祥，你說因為一開始是吉祥的，其餘的也是吉祥的，這就是沒有卻說有，所以是妄語。外人說一開始是吉祥的，所以其餘的也是吉祥的，這貫通了兩種妄語。吉祥只在開始，中間和後面沒有吉祥，所以沒有無卻說有的過失，因為一開始吉祥的力量滋潤和增益中間和後面，相互之間都是吉祥的，那麼就沒有有卻說沒有的過失。內部說不吉祥的太多，所以吉祥變為不吉祥。這裡有兩個難點：一是少數和多數相對抗，用少數吉祥的力量使多數不吉祥都變為吉祥，也應該用多數不吉祥使吉祥變得不吉祥，都變成不吉祥。二是就兩種力量來說，按照你的理論，吉祥和不吉祥各有自己的性質，不應該改變。現在不吉祥不能自守，被吉祥所吉祥，於是變成吉祥，吉祥也應該不能自守吉祥的性質，被不吉祥所不吉祥，都變成不吉祥。外人說：『如象手』。這是爲了補救上面用少數服從多數的難點。像有七個分支，因為手勝過其他分支，所以按照勝者接受名稱，稱為有手。 English version: The deities are equally subject to obstruction. Moreover, auspicious responses hang upon auspiciousness, not needing to be threaded through from the beginning. Furthermore, my scripture should also be auspicious, so everything is auspicious, and there is nothing inauspicious. Without a cause for inauspiciousness, there is also no auspiciousness. Moreover, regarding this, there are four possibilities: first, neither near nor far can be reached, then both near and far are broken. Second, neither far nor near can be reached, then neither far nor near are broken. Third, the near is broken but not the far, it should be that the near is reached but not the far, then there is reaching and not reaching. Fourth, if neither can be reached, breaking the near but not the far, then the far should also be broken but not the near. The commentary says 'Zhendan' (振旦) [ancient name for China], which here refers to the Han country (漢國) [China]. Furthermore, if the beginning is auspicious but the rest is not, from below upwards, break the initial auspiciousness, as well as the auspiciousness of the middle and the end. From here onwards, focus on breaking the auspiciousness of the middle and the end. The above uses analogies to explain exhaustively, now returning to the Dharma to speak. Furthermore, from this text onwards, to 'all hands open together' (眾手皆䨥開起). If the beginning is auspicious, it promotes self-auspiciousness; if the rest is not auspicious, it breaks the auspiciousness of others. You say that 'A-ou' (阿漚) [seed syllables] is considered auspicious at the beginning, but since it is absent in the middle and the end, how can it be called auspicious? Therefore, it is said that the rest should be inauspicious. The commentary opens up two kinds of false speech to refute outsiders. If the nature of auspiciousness pervades the three times, you say that the beginning is auspicious, then it is hidden in the middle and the end, having but saying not having, therefore it is called false speech. If you say that auspiciousness is only at the beginning, and there is no auspiciousness in the middle and the end, you say that because the beginning is auspicious, the rest is also auspicious, which is not having but saying having, therefore it is false speech. The outsider says that because the beginning is auspicious, the rest is also auspicious, which encompasses both kinds of false speech. Auspiciousness is only at the beginning, and there is no auspiciousness in the middle and the end, so there is no fault of not having but saying having, because the power of the initial auspiciousness nourishes and benefits the middle and the end, and they are all auspicious with each other, then there is no fault of having but saying not having. The insider says that because there is too much inauspiciousness, auspiciousness becomes inauspicious. There are two difficulties here: first, the few oppose the many, using the power of the few auspiciousnesses to make the many inauspiciousnesses all become auspicious, it should also be that the many inauspiciousnesses make the auspiciousness become inauspicious, all becoming inauspicious. Second, regarding the two powers, according to your theory, auspiciousness and inauspiciousness each have their own nature and should not be changed. Now the inauspiciousness cannot defend itself, and is auspiciousized by the auspiciousness, thus becoming auspicious, the auspiciousness should also not be able to defend its auspicious nature, and be inauspiciousized by the inauspiciousness, all becoming inauspicious. The outsider says: 'Like the elephant's hand.' This is to remedy the difficulty above of the few following the many. An elephant has seven branches, because the hand is superior to the other branches, so it is named according to the victor, called having a hand.

【English Translation】 The deities are equally subject to obstruction. Moreover, auspicious responses hang upon auspiciousness, not needing to be threaded through from the beginning. Furthermore, my scripture should also be auspicious, so everything is auspicious, and there is nothing inauspicious. Without a cause for inauspiciousness, there is also no auspiciousness. Moreover, regarding this, there are four possibilities: first, neither near nor far can be reached, then both near and far are broken. Second, neither far nor near can be reached, then neither far nor near are broken. Third, the near is broken but not the far, it should be that the near is reached but not the far, then there is reaching and not reaching. Fourth, if neither can be reached, breaking the near but not the far, then the far should also be broken but not the near. The commentary says 'Zhendan' (振旦) [ancient name for China], which here refers to the Han country (漢國) [China]. Furthermore, if the beginning is auspicious but the rest is not, from below upwards, break the initial auspiciousness, as well as the auspiciousness of the middle and the end. From here onwards, focus on breaking the auspiciousness of the middle and the end. The above uses analogies to explain exhaustively, now returning to the Dharma to speak. Furthermore, from this text onwards, to 'all hands open together' (眾手皆䨥開起). If the beginning is auspicious, it promotes self-auspiciousness; if the rest is not auspicious, it breaks the auspiciousness of others. You say that 'A-ou' (阿漚) [seed syllables] is considered auspicious at the beginning, but since it is absent in the middle and the end, how can it be called auspicious? Therefore, it is said that the rest should be inauspicious. The commentary opens up two kinds of false speech to refute outsiders. If the nature of auspiciousness pervades the three times, you say that the beginning is auspicious, then it is hidden in the middle and the end, having but saying not having, therefore it is called false speech. If you say that auspiciousness is only at the beginning, and there is no auspiciousness in the middle and the end, you say that because the beginning is auspicious, the rest is also auspicious, which is not having but saying having, therefore it is false speech. The outsider says that because the beginning is auspicious, the rest is also auspicious, which encompasses both kinds of false speech. Auspiciousness is only at the beginning, and there is no auspiciousness in the middle and the end, so there is no fault of not having but saying having, because the power of the initial auspiciousness nourishes and benefits the middle and the end, and they are all auspicious with each other, then there is no fault of having but saying not having. The insider says that because there is too much inauspiciousness, auspiciousness becomes inauspicious. There are two difficulties here: first, the few oppose the many, using the power of the few auspiciousnesses to make the many inauspiciousnesses all become auspicious, it should also be that the many inauspiciousnesses make the auspiciousness become inauspicious, all becoming inauspicious. Second, regarding the two powers, according to your theory, auspiciousness and inauspiciousness each have their own nature and should not be changed. Now the inauspiciousness cannot defend itself, and is auspiciousized by the auspiciousness, thus becoming auspicious, the auspiciousness should also not be able to defend its auspicious nature, and be inauspiciousized by the inauspiciousness, all becoming inauspicious. The outsider says: 'Like the elephant's hand.' This is to remedy the difficulty above of the few following the many. An elephant has seven branches, because the hand is superior to the other branches, so it is named according to the victor, called having a hand.

。故外國人呼象以為有手。婆沙云。佛經說信是象手。如象手能取眾生數非眾生數物。信能取善法。故知外國道俗通詺象為有手。雖有多分不以少從多。問譬喻無窮。何故破象手耶。答傍破吉義。大有二門。自上已來破其外法。即是外空。今破內法明其內空。欲使外道悟內外法畢竟皆空故也。所以明內外空者。以見有內外法故生凡失二乘有所得煩惱。今悟本性空故不起煩惱便得解脫。若言外道見有提婆明空。則各一是見耳。內曰無象過故。有百論師釋云。諸法實相畢竟空寂故云無象。又云。此是標無象章門。下自解釋故云無象。所言過故者。外人引于象手墮無象之過故云無象過也。今明。都非釋不足彈之。今開為二。無象者奪破也。過故者縱關也。所言奪者。外人引于象手。以手標象。以象從手。若爾即墮無象。所以然者。外道既名象為有手。則像與手異。如人有手人與手異。母有子母與子異。若象與手異亦與頭異。四支百體一一皆然。故除諸分外則無有象。問四外道中是何人過。答俱有此失。異於手外無有總象。故衛世師墮于無象。若象即手但見於手則無總象。是故僧佉墮于無象也。勒沙婆亦一亦異俱墮二無。亦異則別外無總。亦一則唯別無總。若提子非一非異。非一還墮異無。非異還墮一無。又四處無象。一者具

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因此，外國人稱呼大象為『有手』（指象鼻）。《婆沙論》中說，佛經說『信』（信仰）是象的手。如同象手能取眾生數和非眾生數的物品一樣，『信』能獲取善法。因此可知，外國的道士和俗人都通稱大象為『有手』。雖然有很多部分，但不能因為少就順從多。問：譬喻是無窮無盡的，為什麼單單要破斥『象手』這個譬喻呢？答：這是從側面破斥他們吉祥的意義。『大有』有兩扇門。從上面開始，就已經破斥了他們的外道之法，這就是『外空』。現在破斥他們的內法，是爲了闡明他們的『內空』。想要使外道領悟到內外之法畢竟都是空性的緣故。之所以要闡明內外空，是因為見到有內外之法，就會產生凡夫和二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的有所得的煩惱。現在領悟到本性是空性的，所以就不會生起煩惱，便能得到解脫。如果說外道見到有提婆（天神）而闡明空性，那麼各自都只是一種見解而已。內道說：因為沒有大象的過失。有《百論》的論師解釋說：諸法的實相畢竟是空寂的，所以說是『無象』。又說：這是標立『無象』的章節。下面自己解釋，所以說是『無象』。所說的『過故』，是說外人引用大象的手，卻墮入了『無象』的過失，所以說是『無象過』。現在闡明，全部都不是解釋，不足以彈劾。現在分為兩種：『無象』是奪破，『過故』是縱關。所說的『奪』，是說外人引用大象的手，用手來標示大象，用大象來順從手。如果這樣，就墮入了『無象』。之所以這樣，是因為外道既然稱大象為『有手』，那麼大象和手就是不同的。如同人有手，人和手是不同的；母親有兒子，母親和兒子是不同的。如果大象和手是不同的，也和頭是不同的，四肢百體，一一都是如此。所以，除去諸多分之外，就沒有大象了。問：四外道中，是誰有這個過失呢？答：都有這個過失。在手之外沒有總體的象，所以衛世師（Vaisheshika）墮入了『無象』。如果象就是手，只見到手，就沒有總體的象，所以僧佉（Samkhya）墮入了『無象』。勒沙婆（Rishabha）既是一又是異，都墮入了兩種『無』。既是異，那麼在別之外就沒有總；既是一，那麼只有別而沒有總。若提子（Nirgrantha）非一非異，非一還是墮入異無，非異還是墮入一無。又有四處沒有象：一者，具現代漢語譯本：足

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, foreigners call the elephant 'having a hand' (referring to the trunk). The Mahavibhasa says that the sutras say 'faith' (shraddha) is the elephant's hand. Just as an elephant's hand can grasp countable and uncountable things, 'faith' can grasp good dharmas. Therefore, it is known that foreign ascetics and laypeople commonly call the elephant 'having a hand.' Although there are many parts, one cannot follow the majority because of the minority. Question: Parables are endless, why specifically refute the parable of the 'elephant's hand'? Answer: This is indirectly refuting their auspicious meaning. 'Great Existence' has two doors. From the beginning, their externalist dharmas have been refuted, which is 'external emptiness.' Now, their internal dharmas are refuted to clarify their 'internal emptiness.' The intention is to make the externalists realize that both internal and external dharmas are ultimately empty. The reason for clarifying internal and external emptiness is that seeing internal and external dharmas gives rise to the afflictions of attachment for ordinary beings and the two vehicles (Shravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana). Now, realizing that the inherent nature is empty, afflictions will not arise, and liberation will be attained. If it is said that externalists see Deva (a deity) and clarify emptiness, then each is just a view. The internal path says: Because there is no fault of the elephant. The teacher of the Shatashastra explains: The true nature of all dharmas is ultimately empty and still, therefore it is called 'no elephant.' It is also said: This is the chapter heading of 'no elephant.' The explanation is given below, therefore it is called 'no elephant.' The so-called 'fault' is that externalists cite the elephant's hand but fall into the fault of 'no elephant,' therefore it is called 'fault of no elephant.' Now it is clarified that none of it is an explanation, insufficient to impeach. Now it is divided into two: 'No elephant' is deprivation and refutation, 'fault' is allowing access. The so-called 'deprivation' is that externalists cite the elephant's hand, using the hand to indicate the elephant, using the elephant to follow the hand. If so, they fall into 'no elephant.' The reason is that since externalists call the elephant 'having a hand,' then the elephant and the hand are different. Just as a person has a hand, the person and the hand are different; a mother has a son, the mother and the son are different. If the elephant and the hand are different, they are also different from the head, and each of the four limbs and hundreds of parts are different. Therefore, apart from all the parts, there is no elephant. Question: Among the four externalist schools, who has this fault? Answer: All have this fault. Outside the hand, there is no total elephant, therefore the Vaisheshika falls into 'no elephant.' If the elephant is the hand, only seeing the hand, there is no total elephant, therefore the Samkhya falls into 'no elephant.' Rishabha is both one and different, both fall into two 'nos.' If it is different, then outside the particular there is no total; if it is one, then there is only the particular and no total. If Nirgrantha is neither one nor different, not one still falls into different no, not different still falls into one no. Also, there are four places where there is no elephant: first, complete English version: foot

在中無。二者分在中無。三者總即別無。四者別則有總無。所言過故者第二縱有也。縱有別象則四師俱墮過。故衛世則有頭中有足之過。僧佉則有頭是足過。勒沙婆亦一則頭足一過。亦異則頭有足過。非一非異還招兩失也。注中為二。一釋偈本破其譬說。二結無吉明無法義。釋偈為二。初就衛世釋無象過故。次就僧佉釋無象過故。問此論皆前破一后破于異。今何故前異后一。答外人立於象手以象從手。則手外有象。以手標象。則像外有手。正墮異義。故前就異破。一一門中開為三別。異門三者。一無像二釋過故三指后品。若象與手異者。此牒外義也。外道明。手外有象故以象從手。像外有手故以手標象。如其無異。則無別象從手。無手標象。既有從標則知異也。頭足等亦異者。此是論主次破之也。像與手既異。與頭足亦異也。如是則無別象者。正明無象也。若分中有分具者。此釋過故。即是縱關。若離諸分外別有一象故以象從手以手標象。則有一全像在於頭中。故頭中有足。頭內既有全像則頭內具有七枝。但據顛倒過甚故偏言有足。如破異品中說者。第三指后品。所以指后品者。后明分在具在二門。今但破具在余有分在故指后品說。若象與手不異。第二就僧佉釋無象過故亦三。初明無象次辨過故三指后品。若象即手亦

即余分。則但見諸分無別總象也。若有分與分不異者。第二縱關次釋過故。若言總攬手足諸分以為象者。頭足二分既與像一。則頭足亦一。前明以總即別。得別失總。今明以別即總。得總失別。失別無手標象。失總無象從手。云何引于象手救以多從少耶。如破一品中說者。第三指后。此中略破未盡指后廣說。大師於此文廣破由來。五陰成人四微為柱。得文意者可例破之。如犢子計四大和合有眼法。五陰和合有人法。則別有總眼總人。莊嚴假有體有用有名。此二師既別有總象。則墮無象與過故。以除別不見有總故墮無象。必言別外有總則墮頭中有足。開善無假體有假用。此不成義。既以實法作體無假體。假用附何物耶。無有假家之用將實作體。若以實為體還是實用。既實法和合別有假用起。則實法和合別有假體起。光宅無假體假用但有實法體。亦不然。無假云何有實。無總云何有別耶。今恐于文意為煩故直釋而已。如是吉事下第二總結。外曰惡止止妙下自上已來傍破吉竟。今是第三伏流辨宗。邪教覆正經其義不明照。在邪已破故二善義成。故伏流說也。若答難明者。自上已來答兩不吉難竟。今第二次酬兩顛倒難及兩煩重難即成二別。就答兩顛倒為二章。第一答其止善顛倒。次酬其行善顛倒。即顯如來說於二善其義深遠其

言巧妙無顛倒失。外人前與顛倒難者。自上已來立外破內。從此已后就內難內。惡止者牒二字也。止妙者明粗妙也。惡是所止之粗。止是能止妙戒也。何不在初者。止既妙止於惡。何不前言止惡而言惡止。故知顛倒。內曰行者要前知惡然後能止。明惡止粗妙。實如所言。但行者要前知惡過患然然受戒止之。如來制戒亦得如是。故經云。見衣有孔然後乃補。是故前惡后止。問一切制戒皆先犯然後以制耶。答就釋迦聲聞戒如此耳。菩薩戒皆是在華臺上舍那佛說。爾時無起惡緣。此是頓制也。外曰善行應在初。第二合說就二善作顛倒難。難有二意。一併決難。若要前知惡過故前惡后止。亦應要前知善有妙果然後方能止惡。則應前說善行后明惡止。二者汝之二善言巧理深。今應前為眾生說善行有于妙果。眾生為貪妙果然後受戒止惡故。前應明善行后說惡止。內曰次第法故前除粗垢次除細垢。此是偈本。但為脫落故無修妒路。就文為二。前法次譬。法門有二。一修行次第門。二說法次第門。前示妙果此就說門。修行次第要前離過然後受戒息于粗垢。次行善法除于細垢。內外清凈方可受聖道染也。若行者不止惡下第二註釋。前釋法說。譬如下釋譬說。外曰已說惡止下。就答難者明此二善體相不同無二煩重過。初明止不攝行行非煩重

。次明行不攝止故止非煩重。外難云。無惡即是善。如無癡即是慧。既已說惡止。不應復言善行。惡止者不言無惡而已。乃明惡止有戒善。既其有善即是善行。何煩重說善行。又從上生者。垢雖粗細止義無殊。但言惡止已攝善行。而復說者豈非煩重。內曰佈施是善行者。惡止任運無作而生。善行修習方有。故止不攝行。如不盜他物名為止善。以物施他秤為行善。故止行不同。故非重說。複次如大菩薩下。前就身口明止行異。今約意地辨止行異。諸大菩薩無惡可止而行於善。當知善行非是止惡。故不得惡止而攝善行。又前就凡夫辨止行異。以凡夫有惡可止復有施善可行。今就聖無惡可止有善可行。故二文異也。外曰佈施是止慳法者。佈施破慳法。故當知行善屬止攝。內曰下答有五。一返並答。二無慳可止答。三有慳不能止答。四本末答。五總結答。今是初。若言佈施是止慳者。凡聖之人不行施時應有慳罪。複次諸漏盡下無慳可止答。若言佈施是止慳者。無慳人施何所止耶。或有雖行佈施下第三有慳不能止答。現有人雖行佈施慳心不止。故知佈施非是止慳。縱復能止下第四本末答。夫佈施者必前起慧與之心后為求世出世果。雖復因此止慳。非其本意故以善行為本。是故佈施第五總結。外曰已說善行第二明行不攝止。故說止

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本次明行不攝止，故止非煩重。外難云：『無惡即是善，如無癡即是慧。』既已說惡止，不應復言善行。惡止者不言無惡而已，乃明惡止有戒善，既其有善即是善行，何煩重說善行？又從上生者，垢雖粗細止義無殊，但言惡止已攝善行，而復說者豈非煩重？內曰：佈施是善行者，惡止任運無作而生，善行修習方有，故止不攝行。如不盜他物名為止善，以物施他秤為行善，故止行不同，故非重說。複次如大菩薩下，前就身口明止行異，今約意地辨止行異。諸大菩薩無惡可止而行於善，當知善行非是止惡，故不得惡止而攝善行。又前就凡夫辨止行異，以凡夫有惡可止復有施善可行，今就聖無惡可止有善可行，故二文異也。外曰：佈施是止慳法者，佈施破慳法，故當知行善屬止攝。內曰：下答有五。一返並答，二無慳可止答，三有慳不能止答，四本末答，五總結答。今是初。若言佈施是止慳者，凡聖之人不行施時應有慳罪。複次諸漏盡下無慳可止答。若言佈施是止慳者，無慳人施何所止耶？或有雖行佈施下第三有慳不能止答。現有人雖行佈施慳心不止，故知佈施非是止慳。縱復能止下第四本末答。夫佈施者必前起慧與之心后為求世出世果，雖復因此止慳，非其本意故以善行為本。是故佈施第五總結。外曰：已說善行第二明行不攝止，故說止。

【English Translation】 English version Next, it is explained that 'action' (行) does not encompass 'cessation' (止), therefore 'cessation' is not redundant. An external objection states: 'The absence of evil is equivalent to good, just as the absence of ignorance is equivalent to wisdom.' Since 'cessation of evil' has already been discussed, it should not be necessary to mention 'good action' again. 'Cessation of evil' does not merely mean the absence of evil; it clarifies that 'cessation of evil' includes the goodness of precepts (戒善). Since there is goodness, it is 'good action.' Why redundantly speak of 'good action'? Furthermore, regarding those who arise from above, although defilements (垢) may be coarse or subtle, the meaning of 'cessation' remains the same. Simply stating 'cessation of evil' already encompasses 'good action,' so isn't it redundant to mention it again? The internal response is: 'Giving (佈施) is a good action.' 'Cessation of evil' arises spontaneously without effort, while 'good action' requires cultivation. Therefore, 'cessation' does not encompass 'action.' For example, not stealing from others is called 'cessation of good,' while giving things to others is considered 'action of good.' Thus, 'cessation' and 'action' are different, so it is not redundant to mention them separately. Furthermore, as with the great Bodhisattvas (大菩薩), the previous discussion clarified the difference between 'cessation' and 'action' in terms of body and speech, while this discussion distinguishes between 'cessation' and 'action' in terms of the mind. Great Bodhisattvas have no evil to cease but still engage in good actions. It should be understood that 'good action' is not merely 'cessation of evil,' so 'cessation of evil' cannot encompass 'good action.' Also, the previous discussion distinguished between 'cessation' and 'action' in terms of ordinary beings (凡夫), as ordinary beings have evil to cease and good deeds to perform. This discussion concerns sages (聖) who have no evil to cease but still have good deeds to perform. Therefore, the two passages are different. An external objection states: 'Giving is a method to cease stinginess (慳法). Giving overcomes stinginess, so it should be understood that performing good deeds belongs to the category of cessation.' The internal response is: There are five answers below: 1. A combined answer, 2. An answer that there is no stinginess to cease, 3. An answer that even with stinginess, it cannot be ceased, 4. An answer about the root and branch, 5. A concluding answer. This is the first. If it is said that giving is to cease stinginess, then ordinary beings and sages should have the sin of stinginess when they are not giving. Furthermore, regarding those whose outflows (諸漏) are exhausted, there is no stinginess to cease. If it is said that giving is to cease stinginess, what is there for those without stinginess to cease when they give? Or, although some may practice giving, their stingy mind does not cease. Therefore, it is known that giving is not to cease stinginess. Even if it can cease, the act of giving necessarily involves first generating wisdom (慧) and giving with the mind, and later seeking worldly and other-worldly results. Although it may cease stinginess as a result, it is not the primary intention, so good action is the root. Therefore, giving is the fifth conclusion. An external objection states: 'Good action has already been discussed; the second point clarifies that action does not encompass cessation, therefore cessation is discussed.'

非是煩重。外意惡止善行同皆是善。則應但說善行不須說于惡止。而今說于善行復說惡止。即是煩重。內曰止相息行相作者。外人明善義既通說一則得於二。內辨二善體性恒別。故說一不得兼二。故止善冥伏任運而生。體是靜義。行善是興起修習其相是動。既動靜不同不得說一攝二。外曰是事實爾。我不言動靜體一。但善義無異故應相攝。內曰應說惡止善行者。答中為三。謂標釋結。二善凡有兩異。一者通局異。止善三性心中皆有。是故止通。行善唯善心有二性則無。所以為局。二者止善常生。行善修習方有。不作則無。何以故下第二釋也。釋中為三。一明二善達心各異。止善達心為欲息惡。行善達心為欲修善。域心既異故二善不同也。若但說下第二反難答。但說行善不說止善。行善唯善心中有餘二心中無。止善亦應爾餘二心中無。若無止善應非比丘道。以無戒故。是時惡止故下第三順釋。亦有福者。三性心中有無作福。問何以故知止惡別有善耶。答從善心生必有善果。又持此戒者必得樂果。故應有善因。又得此戒故則改卑成貴。故知有也。是故下第三總結。是惡止善行法下。自上已來明舍罪竟。今第二次明舍福。然通而為言皆是舍罪。以悉乖道故皆是罪。宜並舍之。但今就於乖中自有輕重。乖中之重故秤之為罪。乖

中之輕目之為福。故前言舍罪今言舍福耳。然利根者知罪福是相對而明罪既其舍福則不留。但為鈍根人明次第法門。故前舍于罪今明舍福。罪福既爾。萬義皆類。對三說一。在三既去亦不存一。既捨生死亦不依于涅槃。就文亦三。第一明開二善為三人。二明三教垢凈。三正明舍福。故舍罪三章。舍福亦三。初偈本中前牒二善者凡有二義。一者前牒二善為欲舍惡。今牒二善為欲舍福。二者欲證上止行不同體不相攝故重牒來也。隨眾生意故者。明佛隨緣開二善為三教。初雙標緣教。隨眾生意謂標緣也。佛三種分別即標教也。下中上人者釋緣也。施戒智釋教也。註釋為三。第一明為三緣說三教。二明三教體相。三明三教差別。問前舍罪中前戒后施。今何故前明佈施后持戒耶。答前明修行次第。要前止惡然後行善。故前戒后施。今就人優劣難易故前後為異。外財易舍故配以下人。戒防身口。此則為難故教於中智。智慧最勝故教上智也。智度論釋三次第品。明次第行次第學次第道。論有多釋。一與此同。故云行名佈施學名持戒道名智慧。今文正明次第之義。故以三教配彼三根。又雜心明。為三怖說三法。為貧窮怖說施。為三惡道怖說戒。為生死怖說智慧。與今大同。佈施名利益他舍財相應思者第二明三教體相。智度論十卷三解。

一云。相應思數以為檀體。二云。非但善思。假身口業及以外財三義助成以為施體。三云。施者受者財物三事和合生於舍數以為施體。今此中正用第二解明以思為體身口助成也。釋戒體亦有三。數人以無作色為體。論人非色非心無作為體。譬喻部云。離思無報因離受無報果。此明無無作義。但以心為戒體。今此文但出得戒因緣不別明其體。當時是適緣為用也。不復作三種身邪行四種口邪行者。上人持戒通防三業。既是中人但遮七非。智慧名諸法相中心定不動者。未得智慧多生疑惑。猶預不定故名為動。若得智慧決了諸法故秤不動。此中智慧通世出世及大小乘。今既欲舍之。多是世間智慧。故佈施之業未免三塗。持戒得欲界人天。智慧是色無色界諸智慧也。何以說下中上第三釋三教差別又三。謂問釋結。初即問也。釋中為二。一明利益少多。二辨報有三品。利益就現在果報約未來。亦得利益據前人。果報屬自己。佈施者少利益者。施於珍財濟彼窮乏。正可令行者現有名聲為人所敬。故名小利。若望前人者。但施衣食施其外命亦是少利益。戒能防於七枝。又使內結羸弱。若望前人則佈施無此益。故云中利。智慧能斷于疑心及除結使。若望前人通利群品。生他慧解名為上利。施報少者。佈施果報能衣食自然受諸欲樂。而未離

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本一說認為，與佈施相應的思念和計算是佈施的本體（檀體）。（檀：梵語Dāna的音譯，佈施的意思；體：本體，本質。）二說認為，不僅僅是善意的思念，還需要通過身口的行為以及外在的財物這三種因素的幫助才能成就佈施的本體。三說認為，佈施者、接受者和財物這三件事物的和合，產生了捨棄的意願，以此作為佈施的本體。這裡採用第二種解釋，認為思念是本體，身口的行為是輔助。關於戒體的解釋也有三種。一些人認為無作色是戒體。（無作色：佛教術語，指受戒后在身心上產生的一種無形的力量。）論師認為非色非心，以無作為戒體。譬喻部的觀點是：離開思念就沒有回報的原因，離開接受就沒有回報的結果。這表明沒有無作的意義，只是以心為戒體。本文只是闡述了得戒的因緣，沒有特別說明戒體。當時只是以適當的因緣作為作用。不再做三種身體的邪惡行為，四種口頭的邪惡行為。上等持戒之人能夠全面地防止身口意三業的過失。既然是中等之人，就只是遮止七種非法的行為。智慧是指在諸法實相中心念堅定不動搖。未獲得智慧時，容易產生疑惑，猶豫不定，所以稱為動搖。如果獲得智慧，就能決斷了解諸法，所以像秤一樣不動搖。這裡的智慧包括世間智慧和出世間智慧，以及大乘和小乘的智慧。現在既然想要捨棄，大多是世間智慧，所以佈施的行為仍然無法避免三惡道。持戒可以得到欲界人天的果報，智慧是色界和無色界的各種智慧。為什麼這樣說呢？下面從下、中、上三個層次解釋三種教法的差別，又分為三個部分，即提問、解釋和總結。首先是提問。解釋分為兩個部分：一是說明利益的多少，二是辨別果報有三種品級。利益是就現在的果報而言，果報是就未來而言。也可以說利益是針對佈施的對象而言，果報是屬於自己。佈施者得到的利益少，是因為佈施珍貴的財物來救濟貧困的人，只能使佈施者現在獲得名聲，被人尊敬，所以說是小利益。如果從接受佈施的人來看，只是施捨衣食，救濟他們的生命，也是小利益。持戒能夠防止七種惡行，又能使內在的煩惱減弱。如果從接受佈施的人來看，佈施沒有這樣的利益，所以說是中等利益。智慧能夠斷除疑惑和消除煩惱。如果從接受佈施的人來看，能夠普遍利益大眾，使他們產生智慧和理解，稱為上等利益。佈施的果報少，是因為佈施的果報只能使人衣食自然，享受各種欲樂，而沒有脫離輪迴。

【English Translation】 English version One view is that the thoughts and calculations associated with Dāna (giving) are the essence of Dāna (Dāna: transliteration of the Sanskrit word Dāna, meaning giving; essence: the main body, the essence). A second view is that it is not only good thoughts, but also the assistance of the three factors of physical and verbal actions and external wealth that can accomplish the essence of giving. A third view is that the combination of the three things of the giver, the receiver, and the property produces the intention of abandonment, which is taken as the essence of giving. Here, the second interpretation is adopted, which considers thought to be the essence, and physical and verbal actions to be auxiliary. There are also three explanations for the essence of precepts (戒體, jiè tǐ). Some people consider non-outflow form (無作色, wú zuò sè) to be the essence of precepts. (Non-outflow form: a Buddhist term referring to an invisible force generated in the body and mind after receiving precepts.) Those who discuss it consider it to be neither form nor mind, and take non-outflow as the essence of precepts. The view of the Sautrāntika school (譬喻部, Pìyù bù) is: without thought, there is no cause for reward; without acceptance, there is no result of reward. This shows that there is no meaning of non-outflow, but only the mind is taken as the essence of precepts. This text only explains the causes and conditions for obtaining precepts, and does not specifically explain the essence of precepts. At that time, it was only using appropriate causes and conditions as the function. No longer committing the three evil actions of the body and the four evil actions of the mouth. Those who uphold the precepts at the highest level can comprehensively prevent the faults of the three karmas of body, speech, and mind. Since they are people of the middle level, they only prevent the seven illegal actions. Wisdom refers to the mind being firm and unwavering in the center of the true nature of all dharmas. When wisdom is not attained, doubts are easily generated, and hesitation is uncertain, so it is called wavering. If wisdom is attained, one can decisively understand all dharmas, so it is as unwavering as a scale. The wisdom here includes worldly wisdom and transcendental wisdom, as well as the wisdom of Mahayana and Hinayana. Now that one wants to abandon it, it is mostly worldly wisdom, so the act of giving still cannot avoid the three evil realms. Upholding precepts can obtain the reward of the desire realm (欲界, yù jiè) humans and heavens, and wisdom is the various wisdoms of the form realm (色界, sè jiè) and formless realm (無色界, wúsè jiè). Why is this said? The following explains the differences between the three teachings from the three levels of lower, middle, and upper, which are divided into three parts, namely questioning, explaining, and summarizing. First is the question. The explanation is divided into two parts: one is to explain the amount of benefit, and the other is to distinguish that there are three grades of karmic retribution. Benefit is in terms of present karmic retribution, and karmic retribution is in terms of the future. It can also be said that benefit is for the object of giving, and karmic retribution belongs to oneself. Those who give receive little benefit because giving precious wealth to relieve the poor can only make the giver gain fame and be respected in the present, so it is called a small benefit. If viewed from the person receiving the giving, it is only giving food and clothing and saving their lives, which is also a small benefit. Upholding precepts can prevent the seven evil actions and weaken inner afflictions. If viewed from the person receiving the giving, giving does not have such benefits, so it is called a medium benefit. Wisdom can cut off doubts and eliminate afflictions. If viewed from the person receiving the giving, it can universally benefit the masses and enable them to generate wisdom and understanding, which is called a superior benefit. The karmic retribution of giving is small because the karmic retribution of giving can only make people have natural food and clothing and enjoy various pleasures, but they have not escaped reincarnation.

三塗。如龍金翅鳥等。戒能防諸惡離於三塗得人天報。故名為中。智慧多聞修禪棄結得色無色天。又能捨凡成聖。是故為上。是故下第三結也。外曰佈施下第二明三法垢凈。所以明垢凈者凡有二義。一者以三法配三人其言未盡。然此三法一一併通三人。今欲簡之故論垢凈。二者欲明舍福故辨凈不凈。凈不須舍不凈須舍。又提婆論本但明不凈三法。為成舍福。罪則內外同見其過。不須彰之。福過難明。故須敘其過然後方明其舍。如天親三法並明垢凈者。欲憐愍末世眾生令善巧修福等。是一施。無方便行則墮不凈。有方便行便成清凈故也。又開垢凈者。欲示五乘根性。自有樂求人天而行佈施則說不凈施。求三乘行施明於凈施。餘二亦爾。外曰已下第二明三種凈不凈即三。外人今問有二意。一明若施是下智。佛行施時便應是下。二者若佛行施非下智人。則違前宗下智人教佈施。后是違言負。前是違理負。內曰下開施垢凈答於二難。不凈行施是下智人故不違言。清凈佈施上人所行故不違理。但上總相說故言佈施教下智人。外曰何等名不凈施者。前雖雙標未出其事。故今問之。內曰下答中有二。初是法說。如市易故謂譬說也。智度論中明四種檀。一凈不凈。二世出世。三聖所秤譽所不秤譽。四有魔檀佛檀。施既有四。戒智例然。

今但說凈不凈者。彼是廣說。此是略說。又雖有四攝在二中。凈出世聖所秤譽佛檀此四攝在凈中。餘四攝不凈中。故但明二也。今云爲報是不凈者通而言之。一切心有所希求悉名為報施。今此中略說。為今世後世二種果報名為不凈。外曰何等名凈施下外道意局。唯言前施是凈不知更有不凈施。是故問也。內曰下出于凈施。愛敬利益他故者。此明但為利他故也。田有三。一悲二敬三亦悲亦敬。如施苦惱眾生為悲田。施聖人等名敬田。施老病父母亦敬亦悲。老病故為悲。父母故為敬。不求今世後世者。前明利他此辨不自為己。問眾菩薩上人云何異。答如普賢等為菩薩。初發心行施是上人。問菩薩行凈施有何利耶。答能以一粒白米凈心佈施勝十萬黃金。則四智皆圓五百便度。問此是何言。答大品云。雖有所施實無所與。實無所與故不著有。雖有所施故不染無。不著有則度三百由旬。不染無則度二百。又不著有則波若。不染無是方便。任運如此是自然慧。不復須師謂無師智。故具四智。便是佛也。既為佛行施復是大悲。故行一佈施萬行圓足。問經中何故簡福田及不簡耶。答明簡不簡各有其意。言不簡者。就己心知實相平等。又欲等以樂法與前人故。所言簡者。域心雖等為欲將勵前人令持戒勿犯。外曰持戒下第二次辨戒凈不凈。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本現在只說凈與不凈，那是廣義的說法，這是簡略的說法。而且，雖然四攝（佈施、愛語、利行、同事）都包含在這兩種之中，但清凈的屬於出世聖人所稱讚的佛陀的佈施，這四攝屬於清凈之中；其餘四攝屬於不清凈之中，所以只說明這兩種。現在說『爲了回報是不清凈的』，這是總的來說，一切心中有所希求的都稱為報施。現在這裡是簡略的說法，爲了今世後世兩種果報而施捨的稱為不清凈。外道問：『什麼叫做清凈的佈施？』這是外道的想法侷限，只說之前的施捨是清凈的，不知道還有不清凈的施捨，所以才這樣問。內部回答說：『出於清凈的施捨，因為愛敬和利益他人。』這是說明只是爲了利益他人。田地有三種：一是悲田，二是敬田，三是亦悲亦敬。比如施捨給受苦惱的眾生是悲田，施捨給聖人等稱為敬田，施捨給年老生病的父母是亦敬亦悲，因為年老生病是悲，因為是父母是敬。『不求今世後世的果報』，前面說明利益他人，這裡辨別不為自己。問：菩薩和上人有什麼不同？答：像普賢菩薩等是菩薩，初發心行佈施的是上人。問：菩薩行清凈的佈施有什麼利益呢？答：能以一粒白米，以清凈心佈施，勝過十萬黃金，那麼四智都圓滿，五百種障礙都得以度過。問：這是什麼意思？答：《大品般若經》說：『雖然有所施捨，實際上沒有所給予。』因為實際上沒有所給予，所以不執著于有；雖然有所施捨，所以不染著于無。不執著于有，就能度過三百由旬；不染著于無，就能度過二百由旬。而且，不執著于有是般若，不染著于無是方便，自然而然如此是自然智慧，不再需要老師，稱為無師智，所以具備四智，就是佛了。既然是佛，行施又是大悲，所以行一次佈施，萬行都圓滿具足。問：經中為什麼有的地方簡擇福田，有的地方不簡擇呢？答：說明簡擇與不簡擇各有其意義。說不簡擇，是因為就自己的心而言，知道實相是平等的，又想用快樂的佛法給予對方。所說簡擇，是因為內心雖然平等，但爲了勉勵對方持戒不要犯戒。外道問：『持戒』，下面第二次辨別戒的清凈與不清凈。

【English Translation】 English version Now, we only discuss pure and impure, which is a broad explanation, while this is a concise one. Furthermore, although the Four Embracing Dharmas (giving, kind speech, beneficial action, and cooperation) are contained within these two categories, the pure ones belong to the almsgiving of the Buddha, praised by the world-transcending saints; these Four Embracing Dharmas belong to the pure category. The remaining Four Embracing Dharmas belong to the impure category, so only these two are explained. Now, saying 'doing it for reward is impure' is a general statement; everything with desires in the heart is called reward-giving. Here, it is a concise explanation; giving for the sake of rewards in this life and the next is called impure. The outsider asks: 'What is called pure giving?' This is the outsider's limited view, only saying that previous giving is pure, not knowing that there is also impure giving, so they ask this question. The internal response says: 'Giving arises from purity because of love, respect, and benefiting others.' This explains that it is only for the sake of benefiting others. There are three types of fields: one is the field of compassion (悲田, beitian), the second is the field of respect (敬田, jingtain), and the third is both compassion and respect. For example, giving to suffering beings is the field of compassion, giving to saints is called the field of respect, and giving to elderly and sick parents is both respect and compassion; because of old age and sickness, it is compassion, and because they are parents, it is respect. 'Not seeking rewards in this life or the next'—the previous explanation was about benefiting others; this distinguishes not doing it for oneself. Question: What is the difference between Bodhisattvas and superior people? Answer: Those like Samantabhadra (普賢, Puxian) Bodhisattva are Bodhisattvas; those who initially aspire to practice giving are superior people. Question: What are the benefits of a Bodhisattva practicing pure giving? Answer: Being able to give even a single grain of white rice with a pure heart is superior to ten thousand pieces of gold; then the Four Wisdoms are perfected, and five hundred obstacles are overcome. Question: What does this mean? Answer: The Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra (大品般若經, Dapin Borejing) says: 'Although there is giving, in reality there is nothing given.' Because in reality there is nothing given, one is not attached to existence; although there is giving, one is not tainted by non-existence. Not being attached to existence allows one to cross three hundred yojanas; not being tainted by non-existence allows one to cross two hundred yojanas. Moreover, not being attached to existence is Prajna (般若, Bore), not being tainted by non-existence is skillful means; being naturally like this is natural wisdom, no longer needing a teacher, called teacherless wisdom, so one possesses the Four Wisdoms, and is thus a Buddha. Since one is a Buddha, practicing giving is also great compassion, so performing one act of giving perfects all ten thousand practices. Question: Why do some sutras select fields of merit and others do not? Answer: Explaining selection and non-selection each has its own meaning. Saying non-selection is because, from one's own heart, one knows that the true nature is equal, and also wants to give the other person the Dharma of happiness. Saying selection is because, although the heart is equal, it is to encourage the other person to uphold the precepts and not violate them. The outsider asks: 'Upholding the precepts'—below, the second time, it distinguishes the purity and impurity of precepts.

亦如二意如施中說。內曰下明戒凈不凈還答二問。亦如上說。外曰下偏問不凈。內曰下答于不凈。初正答。如覆相者此引難陀覆相事來證。內有求樂外現清白名為覆相。注為二。前釋求樂報。次釋覆相。施中以今後為二報。戒中以人天為二報。一者互現。二明持戒多現若后樂。就現在彰報不顯。故就未來說。二釋覆相中前正釋。次引難陀事證。凈飯王見千羅漢形不端正云如鳥集紫金山。后度難陀等竟云如鳳集須彌頂。難陀短佛二指。昔在家為婦莊嚴。佛與阿難乞食至其門。即出看佛。佛授缽與之。將缽取飯。婦語云。汝送缽疾歸。授佛佛不取。次授阿難亦不取。遂至祇洹。佛遣剃頭師剃難陀頭。難陀弩惓不肯受剃。云汝何不剃一切人頭。后佛遂逼之出家。乃至周曆天宮地獄。因求天女故一心持戒。佛見其道緣應熟語阿難云。我化不得。汝與其同類。宜可化之。法師云。此阿難陀事出出曜經。是故阿難說此二偈。偈為三。半行譬說。一行合譬。合譬之中半行總合。次半行別合。第三半行呵責。難陀聞之遂迴心為道持戒得於三果。佛更為說法仍證羅漢。外曰何等名凈持戒次問凈戒。內曰答凈戒也。一切善法戒為根本者。戒如大地為眾善之根。地持云。如來三十二大人相由持戒得。若不持戒尚不得下賤人身。況大人相。則心

不悔者。犯戒違道則心生熱悔。持戒之人則無此過。悔故生憂。無悔便喜。喜心內發則樂遍五識。故云即心樂。既無苦緣心便靜一。故云得一心。在心既一實智便生。實智內生便不樂世間。故云得厭。既厭有為怖須永息。故云離欲。有欲即縛。無便解脫。未得解脫則受生死苦。既得解脫苦果永亡。故得涅槃樂。此文有因有果。初明持戒。從得一心下明因戒發定。一心則生實智明因定發智。此則三學次第明於因也。從離欲得解脫前明三因。今明二果。解脫謂有為解脫果。涅槃謂無為解脫果。瞿沙人云。生實智既是見地。厭是離地。解脫是無學地。陰不生是涅槃。問此中明何等三學及二涅槃。答對世間不凈持戒。總明出世三乘凈戒也。餘二亦然。問厭與離欲何異。答厭為伏道。離欲為斷道。解脫為證道也。故持一凈戒則三行圓二果滿也。外曰若智上者第三論智垢凈。外人聞前智配上人。理不可咎故不難之。但引取上智以配彼師。問前列三師二天。何不配之而指二外道耶。答為欲譏呵論主。佛未成道就此二人受學。涅槃經云。從阿羅羅學無想定。從郁頭蘭弗學非想定。此之二人既是佛師。應上智故以此譏內。注中雲外道者蓋是天親之言。非彼自說也。內曰下亦開凈不凈。如文。余並可解。外曰何等名不凈智下問不凈智。內曰

為世界繫縛故者為二。前法次譬。阿羅羅修無想定生無想天。為色界繫縛。郁頭藍弗修非想定生非想天。為無色界繫縛。如怨來親者譬說也。此智誘人至上界如親。后還墮落故是怨詐親。阿羅羅生無想天定壽五百劫。壽將盡時起于邪見便墮地獄。郁頭藍弗非想報盡受飛貍身亦入地獄。問施戒皆明凈不凈。智中何不明凈智耶。答去下空無相慧文近故此中不說也。外曰但是智慧增長生死。作此問者。上來辨過不同。明不凈施戒但言為求報故名為不凈。說智之咎乃言增長生死。以辨過有異故致斯問。施戒亦爾耶者。問此施戒感報亦同智增長生死耶。內曰取福舍惡是行法者論主總答。明取一切福舍一切惡同是行生死法義無異也。又智是勝法尚行生死。施行戒故自爾也。有所得人行善乃是增長生死法。一何可傷。注中釋偈本四字即為四別。初釋福字。前標福名為報。次問答料簡。問云。若福名報。偈本中何故但說福。答云。福是名因福報名果。此定因果兩義。或說因為果或說果為因。泛明眾義受名不同也。此中說因為果者。福受報名凡有二義。一為舍罪。二為舍福。為舍罪者。福以富饒為義。行於善因得富饒果。罪以摧折為義。行於惡因得摧折果。行者聞此故舍惡修福。為成舍福者。福報滅時生於大苦。故須舍福。為成兩舍故因

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本因為被世界束縛的緣故，可以分為兩種情況。第一種情況是先舉例後作比喻。阿羅羅（Ārāḍa Kālāma，一位老師的名字）修習無想定，死後生到無想天，這屬於繫縛。郁頭藍弗（Udraka Rāmaputra，另一位老師的名字）修習非想定，死後生到非想天，這屬於無繫縛。如同怨家裝作親近一樣，這是一種譬喻的說法。這種智慧引誘人升到上界，如同親人一樣，但最終還是會墮落，所以說是怨家假裝親近。阿羅羅生到無想天，壽命有五百劫。當壽命將要結束時，生起邪見，便會墮入地獄。郁頭藍弗非想天的果報結束后，會轉世為飛貍，最終也進入地獄。有人問：『佈施和持戒都有明凈和不凈之分，那麼智慧中為什麼沒有明凈的智慧呢？』回答是：『因為前面關於空無相慧的經文很接近，所以這裡沒有說。』外道說：『但是智慧只能增長生死。』提出這個問題的人，是因為前面辨別過失的方式不同。說明不凈的佈施和持戒，只是說因為求回報的緣故，所以稱為不凈。而說智慧的過失，卻說是增長生死。因為辨別過失的方式不同，所以才提出這個問題。『佈施和持戒也是這樣嗎？』這是在問：『這種佈施和持戒所感得的果報，也和智慧一樣會增長生死嗎？』內部回答說：『獲取福報，捨棄罪惡，這是修行佛法的人的觀點。』論主總的回答是，說明獲取一切福報，捨棄一切罪惡，同樣是行生死之法，意義上沒有區別。而且智慧是殊勝的佛法，尚且會增長生死，更何況是佈施和持戒呢？有所得的人行善，乃是增長生死的法，有什麼可悲傷的呢？註釋中解釋偈頌的原本四個字，就分為四種不同的解釋。首先解釋『福』字。前面標明福是果報。其次是問答式的分析。問：『如果福是果報，那麼偈頌的原本中為什麼只說福呢？』回答說：『福是因的名字，福報是果的名字。』這確定了因果兩種含義。或者說因是果，或者說果是因，泛泛地說明各種含義，所受的名稱也不同。這裡說因是果的情況是，福受報的名稱凡是有兩種含義：一是爲了捨棄罪惡，二是為捨棄福報。爲了捨棄罪惡，福以富饒為含義，行於善因，得到富饒的果報。罪以摧折為含義，行於惡因，得到摧折的果報。修行的人聽到這些，所以捨棄罪惡，修習福報。爲了成就捨棄福報，福報滅盡時會產生巨大的痛苦，所以必須捨棄福報。爲了成就兩種捨棄，因為...

【English Translation】 English version There are two reasons for being bound by the world. The first is example followed by analogy. Ārāḍa Kālāma (a teacher's name) cultivated the state of non-perception and was born in the Heaven of Non-Perception, which is considered bound. Udraka Rāmaputra (another teacher's name) cultivated the state of neither perception nor non-perception and was born in the Heaven of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception, which is considered unbound. It is like an enemy pretending to be a friend, which is a metaphorical way of speaking. This wisdom lures people to ascend to the higher realms, like a friend, but ultimately they will still fall, so it is said to be an enemy pretending to be a friend. Ārāḍa was born in the Heaven of Non-Perception with a lifespan of five hundred kalpas. When his lifespan was about to end, he developed wrong views and fell into hell. When Udraka Rāmaputra's reward in the Heaven of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception was exhausted, he was reborn as a flying fox and also entered hell. Someone asked: 'Giving and precepts have both pure and impure aspects, so why is there no pure wisdom in wisdom?' The answer is: 'Because the sutra text about the wisdom of emptiness and non-characteristics is close by, it is not mentioned here.' An outsider said: 'But wisdom can only increase birth and death.' The person who raised this question did so because the way of distinguishing faults was different earlier. Explaining impure giving and precepts, it is only said that they are called impure because they seek reward. But when speaking of the fault of wisdom, it is said to increase birth and death. Because the way of distinguishing faults is different, this question is raised. 'Are giving and precepts also like this?' This is asking: 'Does the karmic reward obtained from giving and precepts also increase birth and death like wisdom?' The internal answer is: 'Obtaining blessings and abandoning evil are the views of those who practice the Dharma.' The main point of the treatise is that obtaining all blessings and abandoning all evils are equally practices of the law of birth and death, and there is no difference in meaning. Moreover, wisdom is a superior Dharma, yet it still increases birth and death, let alone giving and precepts? People who have attachments to gain perform good deeds, which are laws that increase birth and death, so what is there to be sad about? The commentary explains that the original four words of the verse are divided into four different explanations. First, the word 'blessing' (福) is explained. Earlier, it was stated that blessing is karmic reward. Second, there is question-and-answer analysis. The question is: 'If blessing is karmic reward, then why does the original verse only mention blessing?' The answer is: 'Blessing is the name of the cause, and karmic reward is the name of the effect.' This confirms the two meanings of cause and effect. Either the cause is said to be the effect, or the effect is said to be the cause, generally explaining various meanings, and the names received are also different. The situation where the cause is said to be the effect here is that the name of blessing receiving reward has two meanings: one is to abandon sins, and the other is to abandon blessings. To abandon sins, blessing has the meaning of wealth and abundance, and by practicing good causes, one obtains the fruit of wealth and abundance. Sin has the meaning of destruction, and by practicing evil causes, one obtains the fruit of destruction. Practitioners hear this, so they abandon sins and cultivate blessings. To achieve the abandonment of blessings, great suffering arises when the reward of blessings is exhausted, so blessings must be abandoned. To achieve both abandonments, because...

受果名也。食金譬因中說果。見書譬果中說因也。取名著者釋偈本取字。惡前已說釋偈本惡字。行名下釋偈本行字。不釋舍者后俱舍中自明之也。外曰何等是不行法下第三正明舍福。舍福三章前二已竟。今正明舍福。此中有二。初總問。第二福不應舍已下別為六難。問意若取一切福舍一切惡皆是行生死者。何等是不行耶。內曰俱舍者。以有取捨故行生死。若能俱舍便不行也。不言罪福但稱俱者。橫舍萬法豎舍四句。問但應舍福。上已明舍罪。何故稱俱。答外問不行。罪福俱行生死故答俱也。外曰福不應舍。從此已下第二上明依福舍罪外有六種難之。今標俱舍亦有六難。六難者。一福果妙。二不說所以。三佛令于福莫畏。四相違。五常福。六本不應作。以有六事不應舍福。問上六難與今何異。答上就言難。今就理難。就言難者。依福舍罪內外理同。但言不巧故招六過。今就理難者。內明舍福外明不捨。以違彼道理故興六難。此初二難。一明罪報是苦粗可得言舍。福果樂妙故不應舍。二罪有過患則有可舍因緣。福果無患無可舍因緣。因緣者所以也。一難在註文。內曰福滅時苦答二難也。福滅大苦何得稱妙。以其滅生苦即是可舍因緣。亦得以滅故非妙。有苦故可舍。注云助道應行者答第三難。彼既引經。今會通之。答福有助

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本受果名也。（受果：承受果報的名稱）食金譬因中說果。（用吃金子的比喻，說明在因地談論果報）見書譬果中說因也。（看到書的比喻，說明在果地談論因緣）取名著者釋偈本取字。（『取名著者』解釋偈頌原本中的『取』字）惡前已說釋偈本惡字。（『惡前已說』解釋偈頌原本中的『惡』字，之前已經說過）行名下釋偈本行字。（『行名下』解釋偈頌原本中的『行』字）不釋舍者后俱舍中自明之也。（沒有解釋『舍』字，之後在《俱舍論》中會自行闡明）外曰何等是不行法下第三正明舍福。（外道問：什麼是不行之法？下面第三部分正式闡明捨棄福報）舍福三章前二已竟。（捨棄福報的三章，前兩章已經結束）今正明舍福。（現在正式闡明捨棄福報）此中有二。（這裡面有兩點）初總問。（首先是總的提問）第二福不應舍已下別為六難。（第二，『福不應舍』以下分別提出六種詰難）問意若取一切福舍一切惡皆是行生死者。（提問的意圖是：如果取一切福，舍一切惡，都是在行生死輪迴，）何等是不行耶。（那麼什麼是不行生死輪迴呢？）內曰俱舍者。（內道回答：能夠全部捨棄的人，）以有取捨故行生死。（因為有取捨，所以才行生死輪迴。）若能俱舍便不行也。（如果能夠全部捨棄，便不行生死輪迴。）不言罪福但稱俱者。（不只說罪福，而說『俱』，）橫舍萬法豎舍四句。（是橫向捨棄萬法，縱向捨棄四句。）問但應舍福。（提問：只應該捨棄福報，）上已明舍罪。（上面已經闡明捨棄罪惡，）何故稱俱。（為什麼說『俱』呢？）答外問不行。（回答：外道問的是『不行』，）罪福俱行生死故答俱也。（罪福都導致生死輪迴，所以回答『俱』。）外曰福不應舍。（外道說：福報不應該捨棄。）從此已下第二上明依福舍罪外有六種難之。（從這裡以下，第二部分闡明依靠福報捨棄罪惡，外道有六種詰難。）今標俱舍亦有六難。（現在標明全部捨棄也有六種詰難。）六難者。（這六種詰難是：）一福果妙。（一、福報的果報美妙。）二不說所以。（二、沒有說明捨棄的原因。）三佛令于福莫畏。（三、佛陀教導我們不要畏懼福報。）四相違。（四、自相矛盾。）五常福。（五、常恒的福報。）六本不應作。（六、本來就不應該做。）以有六事不應舍福。（因為有這六件事，所以不應該捨棄福報。）問上六難與今何異。（提問：上面的六種詰難和現在的有什麼不同？）答上就言難。（回答：上面是就言語上的詰難，）今就理難。（現在是就道理上的詰難。）就言難者。（就言語上的詰難是說，）依福舍罪內外理同。（依靠福報捨棄罪惡，內道和外道的道理相同，）但言不巧故招六過。（只是言語表達不巧妙，所以招致六種過失。）今就理難者。（現在就道理上的詰難是說，）內明舍福外明不捨。（內道闡明捨棄福報，外道闡明不捨棄，）以違彼道理故興六難。（因為違背了他們的道理，所以提出六種詰難。）此初二難。（這是最初的兩種詰難。）一明罪報是苦粗可得言舍。（一、闡明罪惡的報應是痛苦、粗劣，所以可以捨棄。）福果樂妙故不應舍。（福報的果報是快樂、美妙，所以不應該捨棄。）二罪有過患則有可舍因緣。（二、罪惡有過患，所以有可以捨棄的因緣。）福果無患無可舍因緣。（福報的果報沒有過患，所以沒有可以捨棄的因緣。）因緣者所以也。（因緣，就是原因。）一難在註文。（第一種詰難在註文中。）內曰福滅時苦答二難也。（內道說：福報滅盡時是痛苦的，回答了兩種詰難。）福滅大苦何得稱妙。（福報滅盡時是巨大的痛苦，怎麼能稱為美妙呢？）以其滅生苦即是可舍因緣。（因為它的滅盡會產生痛苦，這就是可以捨棄的因緣。）亦得以滅故非妙。（也可以說因為它會滅盡，所以不是美妙的。）有苦故可舍。（因為有痛苦，所以可以捨棄。）注云助道應行者答第三難。（註文說：有助於修道的應該實行，回答了第三種詰難。）彼既引經。（他們既然引用了經典，）今會通之。（現在會通它。）答福有助 English version These are the names of the fruits of actions. 'Eating gold' is a metaphor for discussing the fruit in the cause. 'Seeing a book' is a metaphor for discussing the cause in the fruit. 'Taking name author' explains the word 'taking' in the original verse. 'Evil previously spoken' explains the word 'evil' in the original verse, which has been said before. 'Action name below' explains the word 'action' in the original verse. The meaning of 'abandoning' is not explained here, but will be clarified later in the Abhidharmakośa. The outsider asks: 'What is the non-acting dharma?' The third part below clarifies abandoning merit. The first two chapters of abandoning merit have already been completed. Now, we are clarifying abandoning merit. There are two points here. First, a general question. Second, from 'Merit should not be abandoned' onwards, six difficulties are presented separately. The intention of the question is: If taking all merit and abandoning all evil are both actions that lead to samsara (cycle of birth and death), what is non-action? The insider replies: Those who abandon everything, because they have taking and abandoning, they act in samsara. If they can abandon everything, then they do not act. Not mentioning sin and merit, but calling it 'everything', is horizontally abandoning all dharmas and vertically abandoning the four sentences. The question is: 'Only merit should be abandoned. The above has clarified abandoning sin, why call it 'everything'?' The answer is: 'The outsider asks about non-action. Sin and merit both lead to samsara, so the answer is 'everything'.' The outsider says: 'Merit should not be abandoned.' From here onwards, the second part clarifies relying on merit to abandon sin, and the outsider has six difficulties. Now, we mark that abandoning everything also has six difficulties. The six difficulties are: 1. The fruit of merit is wonderful. 2. The reason for abandoning is not explained. 3. The Buddha instructs us not to fear merit. 4. Contradiction. 5. Constant merit. 6. It should not be done in the first place. Because of these six things, merit should not be abandoned. The question is: 'What is the difference between the above six difficulties and the current ones?' The answer is: 'The above is a difficulty in terms of words, and the current one is a difficulty in terms of reason.' The difficulty in terms of words is that relying on merit to abandon sin, the inner and outer principles are the same, but the words are not skillful, so they cause six faults. The current difficulty in terms of reason is that the inner clarifies abandoning merit, and the outer clarifies not abandoning it. Because it violates their principles, six difficulties arise. These are the first two difficulties. 1. It clarifies that the retribution of sin is suffering, coarse, and can be said to be abandoned. The fruit of merit is happiness and wonderful, so it should not be abandoned. 2. Sin has faults, so there is a condition for abandoning it. The fruit of merit has no faults, so there is no condition for abandoning it. The condition is the reason. The first difficulty is in the commentary. The insider says: 'The suffering at the time of the destruction of merit' answers the two difficulties. The great suffering at the time of the destruction of merit, how can it be called wonderful? Because its destruction produces suffering, this is the condition for abandoning it. It can also be said that because it will be destroyed, it is not wonderful. Because there is suffering, it can be abandoned. The commentary says: 'Those who help the path should practice' answers the third difficulty. Since they have quoted the sutra, now we will reconcile it. The answer is that merit helps

【English Translation】 These are the names of the fruits of actions. 'Eating gold' is a metaphor for discussing the fruit in the cause. 'Seeing a book' is a metaphor for discussing the cause in the fruit. 'Taking name author' explains the word 'taking' in the original verse. 'Evil previously spoken' explains the word 'evil' in the original verse, which has been said before. 'Action name below' explains the word 'action' in the original verse. The meaning of 'abandoning' is not explained here, but will be clarified later in the Abhidharmakośa. The outsider asks: 'What is the non-acting dharma?' The third part below clarifies abandoning merit. The first two chapters of abandoning merit have already been completed. Now, we are clarifying abandoning merit. There are two points here. First, a general question. Second, from 'Merit should not be abandoned' onwards, six difficulties are presented separately. The intention of the question is: If taking all merit and abandoning all evil are both actions that lead to samsara (cycle of birth and death), what is non-action? The insider replies: Those who abandon everything, because they have taking and abandoning, they act in samsara. If they can abandon everything, then they do not act. Not mentioning sin and merit, but calling it 'everything', is horizontally abandoning all dharmas and vertically abandoning the four sentences. The question is: 'Only merit should be abandoned. The above has clarified abandoning sin, why call it 'everything'?' The answer is: 'The outsider asks about non-action. Sin and merit both lead to samsara, so the answer is 'everything'.' The outsider says: 'Merit should not be abandoned.' From here onwards, the second part clarifies relying on merit to abandon sin, and the outsider has six difficulties. Now, we mark that abandoning everything also has six difficulties. The six difficulties are: 1. The fruit of merit is wonderful. 2. The reason for abandoning is not explained. 3. The Buddha instructs us not to fear merit. 4. Contradiction. 5. Constant merit. 6. It should not be done in the first place. Because of these six things, merit should not be abandoned. The question is: 'What is the difference between the above six difficulties and the current ones?' The answer is: 'The above is a difficulty in terms of words, and the current one is a difficulty in terms of reason.' The difficulty in terms of words is that relying on merit to abandon sin, the inner and outer principles are the same, but the words are not skillful, so they cause six faults. The current difficulty in terms of reason is that the inner clarifies abandoning merit, and the outer clarifies not abandoning it. Because it violates their principles, six difficulties arise. These are the first two difficulties. 1. It clarifies that the retribution of sin is suffering, coarse, and can be said to be abandoned. The fruit of merit is happiness and wonderful, so it should not be abandoned. 2. Sin has faults, so there is a condition for abandoning it. The fruit of merit has no faults, so there is no condition for abandoning it. The condition is the reason. The first difficulty is in the commentary. The insider says: 'The suffering at the time of the destruction of merit' answers the two difficulties. The great suffering at the time of the destruction of merit, how can it be called wonderful? Because its destruction produces suffering, this is the condition for abandoning it. It can also be said that because it will be destroyed, it is not wonderful. Because there is suffering, it can be abandoned. The commentary says: 'Those who help the path should practice' answers the third difficulty. Since they have quoted the sutra, now we will reconcile it. The answer is that merit helps

道之功故勸使行之耳。外曰福罪相違故。此第四作相違難。此中相違凡有三對。一罪福二生滅三苦樂。外以罪福相對用生滅苦樂掎角為難。既罪福相違。生滅苦樂亦應相違。若福滅苦應罪生樂。若罪生苦應福滅樂也。內曰罪生住苦。此答二意。一者成俱舍義。前偈明福滅苦。今明罪住苦。二俱是苦宜並舍之。二答外相違難。罪住既苦福住便樂。福滅既苦罪滅便樂。即是相違。註釋二意即二釋。初如文。汝言罪福下答上相違難。然福自有生滅苦樂。罪亦如是。汝云何以福家之滅對罪家之生。外曰常福下第五明福常故不應舍。前問次答。問意云。汝福有二義。一滅二苦。是故應舍。我明福常無滅無苦不應舍。自上已來就內難內。今此一義以外難內。由來云。凡夫迴向三有福有所得故須舍。為求常住佛果而修福此不應舍。然有所得常猶同外義。注云作馬祀者。眾生初起稟于妙氣得妙四大則生常天。若稟粗氣得粗四大則生人中。為求常天故修馬祀。取一白馬放之百日。或云三年。尋其足跡以布黃金用施一切。然後取馬殺之。當殺馬時唱言。婆藪殺汝。馬因祀殺亦得生天。真諦三藏云。四韋陀中有馬祀法。智度論亦云。六十四能中祀天。即是一能。作祀法者。豎一柱高十七肘有三丈四尺。案蘭篸以種種物而莊嚴之。取一白馬繫著

此柱。諸婆羅門在邊燃火誦咒散華香著火中。取草縛馬腹火邊炙。莫令毛燋。馬遂死之咒力既成。謂馬死無罪。馬既死即剝並出肉骨盡。頭尾宛然無異。與金銀寶物置馬皮裹縫之。諸婆羅門更燃火誦咒。咒事亦成馬則起走。少時還躄地。齊馬行處作方蘭界城。以諸寶物佈置城內令遍滿。又取馬腹內寶物悉用置中。作大功德佈施一切。婆羅門云。若一兩過作生天猶退。若能滿三過作永不復退。故名為常。福報常生處常者。上明度衰老辨所離。今明所得。福報常據正報。生處常據依報。內曰下有七破。一二相破。二苦樂破。三以因徴果破。四變異破。五無常破。六舉況破。七徴經破。二相破者。外雖言是常理實是無常。故還有滅苦二相。故還用前文破之。又所以還作二相破者。汝之常天不出無想非想。彼二仙人尚非是常。況復余耶。故還作二相破也。又修因之時有苦樂二相。如放馬三年為樂。后殺之則苦。因既苦樂。在果亦然。複次有福報下第二就苦樂破。福非但滅時方苦。未滅之時亦已是苦也。成實論云。外道說。三祠故得生處常。外經又云。外道帝釋作百祠亦得退落。又汝經梵天作祠持戒功德。故知無常。若是常者。何用修因。又汝言下第三以因徴果破。馬祠之因或三年百日。因既有量果亦然也。若因無常果是常者。

有語無義。故云但也。成實論又破云。三界因皆有量。故知無常。複次下第四變異破。天若是常應無嗔喜。今嗔喜變異。故知非常。涅槃云。自在天嗔眾生苦惱。自在天喜眾生安樂。智度論引自在韋紐鳩摩羅伽云。愛之令所愿皆得。惡之令七世皆滅。成實論又云。聞汝梵天有惡欲。惡欲必有嗔等煩惱。故知非常。又汝馬祀下第五無自性破。由時節及馬布施等既緣合而有。必緣離則無。故知非常。複次下第六舉況破。不殺行施尚應須舍。況殺馬布施而不捨耶。複次下第七徴經破。金七十論出四皮陀中惡事。如韋陀中說。作馬祠法汝父母及眷屬悉皆隨喜。汝舍此身必生天上。彼偈云。盡殺六百獸。少三不具足。則不得生天。為戲等五事。若人說妄語。諸天仙人說此為非罪。此實是罪。皮陀經說為非罪。故伽毗羅論自呵之也。問馬祠是僧佉義不。答非也。僧佉立世性是根本而破馬祠法。故云僧佉說馬祠法不凈無常也。外曰下第六難。明作故不應舍。外難云。若必舍者初不應作。若作初不應舍。如涅槃經呵責童子取果還棄。內曰下有三種人。一不捨不作。如菩薩正觀。二作不捨。謂無聞非法眾生。以人天善根而成熟之未堪舍也。三亦作亦舍。為舍罪故須作。為入道故宜舍。注中浣衣喻舍罪。凈喻修福。染喻受涅槃道。外曰舍福

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本有語無義。所以說是『但也』（danye）。《成實論》（Chengshi Lun）又反駁說，三界的因緣都有數量限制，所以可知是無常的。其次，下面第四個『變異破』（bianyi po）。如果天是常住不變的，就不應該有嗔恨和喜悅。現在有嗔恨和喜悅的變異，所以可知不是常住的。《涅槃經》（Nirvana Sutra）說，自在天（zizai tian，a deva）嗔恨眾生的苦惱，自在天喜悅眾生的安樂。《智度論》（Zhi Du Lun）引用自在天、韋紐（Weiniu，Vishnu）、鳩摩羅伽（Jiumoluojia，Kumāraka）的話說，愛他，就讓他所希望的都能得到；恨他，就讓他七世都滅亡。《成實論》又說，聽說你梵天（Fantian，Brahma）有惡欲，有惡欲必定有嗔恨等煩惱，所以可知不是常住的。還有，你『馬祀』（ma si，horse sacrifice）下面第五個『無自性破』（wuzixing po）。由於時節以及馬的佈施等都是因緣和合而有的，必定因緣離散就沒有了，所以可知不是常住的。其次，下面第六個『舉況破』（jukuang po）。不殺生、行佈施尚且應該捨棄，何況是殺馬布施而不捨棄呢？其次，下面第七個『徴經破』（zhengjing po）。《金七十論》（Jin Qishi Lun）指出四《皮陀》（Pituo，Vedas）中的惡事，如《韋陀》（Weituo，Veda）中說，作馬祭祀法，你的父母及眷屬都隨喜，你捨棄此身必定生天上。那裡的偈頌說，殺盡六百隻獸，少三隻不滿足，就不能得生天上。爲了嬉戲等五件事，如果有人說妄語，諸天仙人說這不是罪。這實際上是罪。《皮陀經》說這不是罪，所以伽毗羅論（Jabiluo Lun，Kapila's treatise）自己呵斥它。問：馬祭祀是僧佉（Sengqie，Samkhya）的義理嗎？答：不是。僧佉立世性（shixing，Prakriti）是根本，而破斥馬祭祀法，所以說僧佉說馬祭祀法是不凈、無常的。外道說：下面第六個『難』（nan，objection）。說明作了就不應該捨棄。外道反駁說，如果必定要捨棄，當初就不應該做；如果做了，當初就不應該捨棄。如同《涅槃經》呵責童子取果又丟棄。內道說：下面有三種人。一是不捨不作，如菩薩的正觀。二是作不捨，指沒有聽聞佛法的眾生，以人天善根來成熟他們，還不能捨棄。三是既作也舍，爲了舍罪所以要做，爲了入道所以應該捨棄。註釋中用浣洗衣物比喻舍罪，乾淨比喻修福，染污比喻接受涅槃之道。外道說：捨棄福德。

【English Translation】 English version Words without meaning. Therefore, it is said 'danye'. The Chengshi Lun (Tattvasiddhi Shastra) further refutes, saying that the causes of the three realms are all limited, hence they are impermanent. Furthermore, the fourth refutation below is the 'refutation by change' (bianyi po). If the heavens were permanent, there should be no anger or joy. Now there are changes of anger and joy, so it is known to be impermanent. The Nirvana Sutra says that the zizai tian (a deva) is angry at the suffering of sentient beings, and the zizai tian rejoices in the happiness of sentient beings. The Zhi Du Lun (Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra) quotes the zizai (deva), Weiniu (Vishnu), Jiumoluojia (Kumāraka) saying, 'Love him, and let all his wishes be fulfilled; hate him, and let him be destroyed for seven generations.' The Chengshi Lun also says, 'I have heard that you, Fantian (Brahma), have evil desires. Evil desires must have afflictions such as anger, so it is known to be impermanent.' Also, your 'horse sacrifice' (ma si) below is the fifth 'refutation of no self-nature' (wuzixing po). Since the seasons and the giving of horses, etc., are all caused by the combination of conditions, they will surely cease to exist when the conditions are separated, so it is known to be impermanent. Furthermore, the sixth below is the 'refutation by analogy' (jukuang po). Even non-killing and giving alms should be abandoned, how much more so should killing horses for alms not be abandoned? Furthermore, the seventh below is the 'refutation by citing scripture' (zhengjing po). The Jin Qishi Lun points out the evil deeds in the four Pituo (Vedas), such as the Weituo (Veda) saying, 'Performing the horse sacrifice ritual, your parents and relatives will all rejoice, and you will surely be reborn in heaven after abandoning this body.' The verse there says, 'Killing all six hundred beasts, lacking three, one will not be reborn in heaven.' For the five things such as play, if someone tells a lie, the gods and immortals say that this is not a sin. This is actually a sin. The Pituo says that this is not a sin, so Jabiluo Lun (Kapila's treatise) rebukes it himself. Question: Is the horse sacrifice the meaning of Sengqie (Samkhya)? Answer: No. Sengqie establishes shixing (Prakriti) as the root and refutes the horse sacrifice ritual, so it is said that Sengqie says that the horse sacrifice ritual is impure and impermanent. The outsider says: The sixth 'objection' (nan) below. Explains that what has been done should not be abandoned. The outsider retorts, 'If it must be abandoned, it should not have been done in the first place; if it has been done, it should not be abandoned in the first place.' It is like the Nirvana Sutra rebuking the boy for taking the fruit and then discarding it. The insider says: Below are three kinds of people. The first is not abandoning and not doing, like the correct view of a Bodhisattva. The second is doing but not abandoning, referring to sentient beings who have not heard the Dharma, using the roots of goodness of humans and gods to mature them, and they cannot yet be abandoned. The third is both doing and abandoning, doing in order to abandon sins, and abandoning in order to enter the path. In the commentary, washing clothes is used as a metaphor for abandoning sins, cleanliness is a metaphor for cultivating blessings, and defilement is a metaphor for accepting the path of Nirvana. The outsider says: Abandoning blessings.

依何等。自上已來明舍罪福二章竟。今第三次明能捨空無相慧。外道情近。謂罪外有福故依福舍罪。福外更無妙可依故不應舍福。內曰無相最上答外人問。明依無相以舍于福。問有空無相無愿。何故不列初後偏引無相。答此無相是無依無得不住不著之異名。正為外道心多取相故偏說無相。此無相是總三空名也。又依智度論。見多者說空。愛多者說無作。愛見等者為說無相。外道具足愛見。是故今明於無相。最上者略有三品。作罪墮三惡道名為下品。修善生三善道名為中品。無相智慧出於六趣故名最上也。今略釋三門要義前明來意。問何故說三空門耶。答小乘人云。道理有三。如諦唯有四。開四以為十六觀。十六諦理名十六行。攝十六行以為三空。大乘明義此無定也。今略明四種。一明展轉破病。為破有病是以說空。破取空相故說無相。于無相中起心造作故說無作。又空門破有。無相門破空。此明非空非有中道之法。觀中道者名為正觀。次說無作者。前二雖泯空有之境。今次息于能觀之心。此三門明非空非有不緣不觀。明義既足。故但說於三。又智度論云。為好實者說空。空最實故。為好寂靜者說無相。以涅槃最寂靜故。為好遠離者說無作。以遠離無所求作故。又為見多者說空。愛多者說無作。愛見等者說無相。問若爾

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『依何等』。自從上文已經闡明了舍罪和福德兩章之後，現在第三次闡明能夠捨棄的空、無相智慧。外道的想法很淺近，認為罪惡之外有福德，所以依靠福德來捨棄罪惡。福德之外再沒有更美妙可以依靠的，所以不應該捨棄福德。內道說無相是最上的，以此來回答外人的問題，闡明依靠無相來捨棄福德。問：有空、無相、無愿，為什麼不把開始和結尾都列出來，而只偏重引用無相？答：這個無相是無依、無得、不住、不著的另一種稱呼，正是因為外道心中多有取相，所以偏重說無相。這個無相是總括三種空的名字。又依據《智度論》，見解多的人說空，愛慾多的人說無，見解相等的人說無相。外道兼具愛慾和見解，所以現在闡明無相。最上，略有三種品類：作罪墮入三惡道，稱為下品；修善生於三善道，稱為中品；無相智慧超出六道輪迴，所以稱為最上。現在簡要解釋三門（三空門）的要義，首先闡明來意。問：為什麼要說三空門呢？答：小乘人說，道理有三種，就像諦理只有四種，展開四種諦理成為十六觀，十六諦理稱為十六行，總攝十六行成為三空。大乘闡明義理，這沒有定論。現在簡要闡明四種：一是闡明輾轉破除病患。爲了破除有病，所以說空；爲了破除取空之相，所以說無相；在無相中生起心念造作，所以說無作。又，空門破除有，無相門破除空，這闡明了非空非有的中道之法。觀察中道的人稱為正觀。其次說無作者，前兩種雖然泯滅了空有的境界，現在接著止息能觀的心。這三門闡明了非空非有，不緣不觀。義理既然足夠，所以只說三種。又，《智度論》說，為喜歡真實的人說空，因為空最真實；為喜歡寂靜的人說無相，因為涅槃最寂靜；為喜歡遠離的人說無作，因為遠離就沒有所求所作。又，為見解多的人說空，愛慾多的人說無，見解相等的人說無相。問：如果這樣

【English Translation】 English version: 『Based on what』. Since the previous two chapters on abandoning sin and merit have been explained, now for the third time, it explains the wisdom of emptiness and non-appearance that can be abandoned. The views of externalists are shallow, believing that there is merit outside of sin, so they rely on merit to abandon sin. There is nothing more wonderful to rely on outside of merit, so merit should not be abandoned. The inner path says that non-appearance is the supreme, answering the questions of externalists, clarifying that relying on non-appearance abandons merit. Question: There are emptiness, non-appearance, and non-desire, why not list the beginning and the end, but only emphasize quoting non-appearance? Answer: This non-appearance is another name for non-reliance, non-attainment, non-dwelling, and non-attachment. It is precisely because externalists have many attachments to appearances in their minds that non-appearance is emphasized. This non-appearance is the general name for the three emptinesses. Also, according to the Mahaprajnaparamita Shastra (智度論), those with many views speak of emptiness, those with much desire speak of non-, and those with equal views speak of non-appearance. Externalists possess both desire and views, so now non-appearance is explained. Supreme, there are roughly three categories: committing sins and falling into the three evil realms is called the lower category; cultivating goodness and being born in the three good realms is called the middle category; non-appearing wisdom transcends the six realms of reincarnation, so it is called the supreme. Now, briefly explain the essentials of the three gates (three emptiness gates), first clarifying the intention. Question: Why speak of the three emptiness gates? Answer: The Hinayana (小乘) people say that there are three principles, just as there are only four noble truths, expanding the four noble truths into sixteen contemplations, the sixteen noble truths are called sixteen aspects, and the sixteen aspects are summarized into three emptinesses. The Mahayana (大乘) clarifies the meaning, and there is no fixed conclusion. Now, briefly clarify four types: one is to clarify the cycle of breaking down illnesses. To break down the illness of existence, emptiness is spoken of; to break down the appearance of grasping emptiness, non-appearance is spoken of; in non-appearance, thoughts arise and actions are created, so non-action is spoken of. Also, the emptiness gate breaks down existence, and the non-appearance gate breaks down emptiness, which clarifies the middle way of non-emptiness and non-existence. Those who observe the middle way are called correct observers. Next, speaking of non-action, although the previous two have extinguished the realm of emptiness and existence, now it continues to cease the mind that can observe. These three gates clarify non-emptiness and non-existence, non-attachment and non-observation. Since the meaning is sufficient, only three are spoken of. Also, the Mahaprajnaparamita Shastra (智度論) says that emptiness is spoken for those who like reality, because emptiness is the most real; non-appearance is spoken for those who like tranquility, because Nirvana (涅槃) is the most tranquil; non-action is spoken for those who like detachment, because detachment has no seeking or action. Also, emptiness is spoken for those with many views, non-* is spoken for those with much desire, and non-appearance is spoken for those with equal views. Question: If so

治惑有少多耶。答約小乘義。攝十六行以為三門。攝行既有少多。治惑亦有少多。今明。為治見人說于空門。則破見多人一切煩惱。乃至為治愛見等人說于無相。亦破此人一切煩惱。故治惑無多少也。依地持論說三門者。彼明法唯有二。一者有二者無。所言有者。謂有為及無為也。所言無者。謂我我所也。于有為厭離名為無愿。于無為欣樂名為無相。觀有為無為皆空故名空。又經云。為治婆羅門三諦故說三門。外道自稱言。是婆羅門修行梵行而殺生祀天。謂是實義。佛言。不害一切生命名真婆羅門。即是空解脫門。二者外道為天女色修行梵行令有所得。佛言。不應為天女色而修梵行。我非彼所有彼非我所有。即是說無作解脫門。三者外道貪著諸見謂。言諸因集皆是有法。佛言。一切法集即是滅相。名無相解脫門。問云何名三昧。答依小乘。五陰法體無我我所故名為空。觀空之智相應靜定離亂調直故名三昧。從境受名。無有十相故名無相。觀無相智相應靜定離亂調直故名三昧。亦從境立名。於三有因果更不願求故名無愿。觀無愿智相應靜定離亂調直名為三昧。亦從境立名。成論師二釋。一云。明慧自體凝寂故名三昧。二云。從三昧生真慧。果中說因故名三昧。又言三解脫門者有二種義。一者當體立名。即此三昧離三種系

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本治惑有少多嗎？回答：從小乘的意義上來說，將十六行歸納為三個門。既然所包含的修行有少有多的區別，那麼對治迷惑也有少有多的區別。現在說明，爲了對治有常見的人而宣說空門，就能破除常見之人的一切煩惱。乃至爲了對治愛見等人而宣說無相，也能破除此人的一切煩惱。所以說，對治迷惑沒有多少之分。依據《地持論》所說的三門，其中闡明法只有兩種：一是有，二是無。所說的有，是指有為法及無為法。所說的無，是指我及我所。對於有為法厭離，名為無愿（Anabhilāṣa）。對於無為法欣樂，名為無相（Animitta）。觀察有為法和無為法皆空，所以名為空（Śūnyatā）。又有經文說，爲了對治婆羅門的三種執著而宣說三門。外道自稱是婆羅門，修行梵行卻殺生祭祀天神，認為這是真實的意義。佛說：『不傷害一切生命，才叫做真正的婆羅門。』這就是空解脫門（Śūnyatā vimoksha）。第二，外道爲了得到天女的美色而修行梵行。佛說：『不應該爲了天女的美色而修行梵行，我不是她的所有，她也不是我的所有。』這就是宣說無作解脫門（Apranihita vimoksha）。第三，外道貪著各種見解，認為一切因緣和合都是有法。佛說：『一切法因緣和合即是滅相。』這叫做無相解脫門（Animitta vimoksha）。問：什麼叫做三昧（Samādhi）？答：從小乘的角度來說，五陰（Skandha）的法體沒有我及我所，所以叫做空。觀察空的智慧相應，靜定而沒有散亂，調和正直，所以叫做三昧。這是從境界而得名。沒有十種相狀，所以叫做無相。觀察無相的智慧相應，靜定而沒有散亂，調和正直，所以叫做三昧。這也是從境界而立名。對於三有（Tribhava）的因果不再愿求，所以叫做無愿。觀察無愿的智慧相應，靜定而沒有散亂，調和正直，叫做三昧。這也是從境界而立名。《成實論》的論師有兩種解釋。一種說法是：明慧的自體凝定寂靜，所以叫做三昧。另一種說法是：從三昧產生真慧，這是在果中說因，所以叫做三昧。又說，三種解脫門有兩種意義。一種是當體立名，就是這三昧遠離三種系縛。

【English Translation】 English version Is there a small or large amount of cure for delusion? The answer, according to the meaning of the Hinayana, is that the sixteen practices are summarized into three doors. Since the practices included are few or many, the cure for delusion is also few or many. Now, it is explained that for those who have views, the teaching of the door of emptiness (Śūnyatā) will break all the afflictions of those who have views. Even for those who have love and views, the teaching of the signless (Animitta) will also break all the afflictions of these people. Therefore, there is no small or large amount of cure for delusion. According to the three doors mentioned in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, it clarifies that there are only two kinds of dharmas: one is existence, and the other is non-existence. What is meant by existence refers to conditioned (Saṃskṛta) and unconditioned (Asaṃskṛta) dharmas. What is meant by non-existence refers to self (Ātman) and what belongs to self (Ātmīya). To be disgusted with conditioned dharmas is called wishlessness (Anabhilāṣa). To be delighted with unconditioned dharmas is called signlessness. Observing that both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty is called emptiness. Moreover, the sutra says that the three doors are taught to cure the three attachments of the Brahmins. The heretics claim to be Brahmins, practicing Brahma conduct but killing living beings to sacrifice to the gods, considering this to be the true meaning. The Buddha said, 'Not harming all living beings is called a true Brahmin.' This is the emptiness liberation door (Śūnyatā vimoksha). Second, the heretics practice Brahma conduct to obtain the beauty of heavenly women. The Buddha said, 'One should not practice Brahma conduct for the beauty of heavenly women; I do not possess her, and she does not possess me.' This is the teaching of the signlessness liberation door (Apranihita vimoksha). Third, the heretics are attached to various views, believing that all aggregates of causes are existent dharmas. The Buddha said, 'All dharmas aggregated by causes are the aspect of cessation.' This is called the signless liberation door (Animitta vimoksha). Question: What is called Samadhi (Samādhi)? Answer: From the perspective of the Hinayana, the nature of the five aggregates (Skandha) has no self or what belongs to self, so it is called emptiness. Observing the wisdom of emptiness in accordance, being tranquil and not distracted, harmonious and upright, is called Samadhi. This is named from the object. Having no ten characteristics is called signlessness. Observing the wisdom of signlessness in accordance, being tranquil and not distracted, harmonious and upright, is called Samadhi. This is also named from the object. No longer seeking the causes and effects of the three realms of existence (Tribhava) is called wishlessness. Observing the wisdom of wishlessness in accordance, being tranquil and not distracted, harmonious and upright, is called Samadhi. This is also named from the object. The masters of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra have two explanations. One explanation is that the self-nature of clear wisdom is solidified and tranquil, so it is called Samadhi. The other explanation is that true wisdom arises from Samadhi, which is speaking of the cause in the effect, so it is called Samadhi. Furthermore, it is said that the three doors of liberation have two meanings. One is to establish the name based on the entity itself, which is that this Samadhi is free from the three bonds.

縛故名解脫。如空離有縛。無相離相縛。無作離作縛也。二者無餘涅槃名真解脫。此三通至解脫。從果立名。而言門者。依前義。當體虛通稱之為門。依后義。通至涅槃為涅槃之門。問要由三門入涅槃耶。答小乘畢定備用於三。智度論云。一人不得從三門入。若知諸法本來無所有從空門入。若復言有此空則不名門。餘二亦爾。問單空重空云何異耶。答數人單空通因果通利鈍。重空但果但利根人。單空通漏無漏。重空但有漏。成論明重空亦通因果及以鈍利。問單空重空云何淺深。答依數人。重空唯不動人得故深。成論單空空境。重空空智。大乘單空破法淺。重空破法深。約人則名不定。利根人聞單空則悟。鈍人聞單空不悟。更須破空。則鈍根用於重空。問此三昧依何身起。何地攝。答依數人。初起在法界身。說身起故。終成色無色界身。依禪作故。大乘則通依。數人三三昧通漏無漏。若無漏在九地。六禪三無色。若有漏在十一地。加欲界及非想。又三解脫但無漏。三三昧通漏無漏。注前遂近釋最上。無相下第二次釋無相。又開三別。前釋無相。次明舍福。三明用無相意。就初又三。標釋結。初則標也。名一切相不憶念下第二釋無相也。然相本自無。由想念謂有。若能內無憶念則外相自無。故云一切相不憶念也。離一切受

者。上明不取外相。今明內無愛著。過去未來現在心無所著者。前明於一世中不念外相內無愛著。今明於三世法亦不取外相內無愛著。一切法自性無故則無所依釋上也。所以不取外相者。以一切法自性無故。則無所依者。釋內無愛著也。是名無相總結也。以是方便故能捨福者。第二明用無相舍福。而稱方便者。巧用無相也。若拙用之。舍相而著無相。則無相還成相。今巧用無相。舍相不著無相。故名方便。何以故下第三釋用三解脫門意。所以必須用此三者。以此三是解脫之門故也。第一利者即是涅槃也。

百論疏捲上大正藏第 42 冊 No. 1827 百論疏

百論疏卷中

釋吉藏撰

破神品第二

破邪歸正論體之中凡有二門。自上已來明申佛漸舍教門明於顯正。此章已去今是第二次辨破邪門。上漸舍或二或三。言二者。初舍罪次舍福。言三者。一舍罪二舍福三辨能捨無相智慧。並是從淺至深以為次第。今破邪門對上亦二亦三。言二者。一破神二破法。所言三者。一破神二破法三破空。具如前說。所以前破神者。大品經云。譬如我見攝六十二見。以有見故有愛。愛見故有業。業故有生老病死。則知神為眾見之本。今欲伐其見本使柯條自傾故初破神矣。故下云如是舍我名得解

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

這是說，上面解釋了不執著于外在的表象（外相），現在解釋的是內心沒有愛戀執著。對於過去、未來、現在的心，都沒有任何執著。前面解釋的是在一世之中不念外在的表象，內心沒有愛戀執著。現在解釋的是對於三世的法，也不執著于外在的表象，內心沒有愛戀執著。一切法的自性本空，所以無所依賴，這是對前面內容的解釋。之所以不執著于外在的表象，是因為一切法的自性本空，所以無所依賴，這是對內心沒有愛戀執著的解釋。這被稱為『無相』的總結。因為這個方便法門，所以能夠捨棄福報，這是第二點，說明運用『無相』來捨棄福報。稱之為『方便』，是因為巧妙地運用『無相』。如果笨拙地運用，捨棄了『相』卻執著于『無相』，那麼『無相』反而變成了另一種『相』。現在巧妙地運用『無相』，捨棄了『相』而不執著于『無相』，所以稱為『方便』。『何以故』（為什麼）以下是第三點，解釋運用三解脫門（三解脫門：空解脫門、無相解脫門、無作解脫門）的意義。之所以必須運用這三者，是因為這三者是解脫之門。第一種利益就是涅槃（Nirvana）的境界。

《百論疏》捲上大正藏第42冊 No. 1827 《百論疏》

《百論疏》卷中釋吉藏撰

破神品第二

《破邪歸正論》的體系中，總共有兩個方面。從前面開始，闡明了佛陀逐漸捨棄教法，是爲了顯明正法。從這一章開始，現在是第二次辨析破斥邪法。前面逐漸捨棄，或者說二，或者說三。說『二』，是指先捨棄罪業，然後捨棄福報。說『三』，是指一捨棄罪業，二捨棄福報，三辨明能夠捨棄的『無相』智慧。都是從淺到深，以此為次第。現在破斥邪法，對應前面，也是或者說二，或者說三。說『二』，是指一破斥神，二破斥法。說『三』，是指一破斥神，二破斥法，三破斥空。具體情況如前所述。之所以先破斥神，是因為《大品經》（Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra）中說：『譬如我見攝六十二見』，因為有『見』所以有『愛』，因為『愛見』所以有『業』，因為『業』所以有生老病死。由此可知，神是各種見解的根本。現在想要砍伐這些見解的根本，使枝條自然傾倒，所以首先破斥神。所以下面說『如是舍我名得解』（像這樣捨棄我，才叫做得到解脫）。

【English Translation】 English version:

That is to say, the above explained not being attached to external appearances (外相, wài xiàng), and now it explains that there is no love or attachment in the heart. There is no attachment to the past, future, or present mind. The previous explanation was about not thinking about external appearances and having no love or attachment in the heart in one lifetime. The current explanation is that for the Dharma (法, fǎ) of the three times (三世, sān shì), one should also not be attached to external appearances and have no love or attachment in the heart. Because the self-nature of all Dharmas is empty, there is nothing to rely on, which is an explanation of the previous content. The reason for not being attached to external appearances is that the self-nature of all Dharmas is empty, so there is nothing to rely on, which is an explanation of having no love or attachment in the heart. This is called the summary of 'no-appearance' (無相, wú xiàng). Because of this expedient method, one can give up blessings, which is the second point, explaining the use of 'no-appearance' to give up blessings. It is called 'expedient' (方便, fāng biàn) because of the skillful use of 'no-appearance'. If it is used clumsily, abandoning 'appearance' but being attached to 'no-appearance', then 'no-appearance' becomes another 'appearance'. Now, skillfully using 'no-appearance', abandoning 'appearance' without being attached to 'no-appearance', so it is called 'expedient'. 'Why' (何以故, hé yǐ gù) below is the third point, explaining the meaning of using the three doors of liberation (三解脫門, sān jiě tuō mén: emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness). The reason why these three must be used is that these three are the doors of liberation. The first benefit is the state of Nirvana (涅槃, Niè pán).

Shastra on the Hundred Verses, Scroll 1 Tripitaka Volume 42 No. 1827 Shastra on the Hundred Verses

Shastra on the Hundred Verses, Scroll 2 Composed by Jizang

Chapter 2: Refuting the God

In the system of 'Treatise on Refuting Heterodoxy and Returning to Orthodoxy' (破邪歸正論, Pò xié guī zhèng lùn), there are two aspects in total. From the beginning, it has been clarifying that the Buddha gradually abandoned the teachings in order to reveal the orthodox Dharma. Starting from this chapter, it is now the second time to analyze and refute heterodox Dharmas. The previous gradual abandonment can be said to be two or three. Saying 'two' means first abandoning sins and then abandoning blessings. Saying 'three' means one abandoning sins, two abandoning blessings, and three distinguishing the wisdom of 'no-appearance' that can be abandoned. All are from shallow to deep, in this order. Now, refuting heterodox Dharmas corresponds to the previous, also either two or three. Saying 'two' means one refuting the god and two refuting the Dharma. Saying 'three' means one refuting the god, two refuting the Dharma, and three refuting emptiness. The specific situation is as described before. The reason for first refuting the god is that the Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra (大品經, Dà pǐn jīng) says: 'For example, my view encompasses sixty-two views', because there is 'view' so there is 'love', because of 'love and view' so there is 'karma', because of 'karma' so there is birth, old age, sickness, and death. From this, it can be known that the god is the root of various views. Now, wanting to cut down the root of these views so that the branches naturally fall, so first refuting the god. Therefore, it says below 'Thus abandoning the self is called obtaining liberation' (如是舍我名得解, Rú shì shě wǒ míng dé jiě).

脫。二者僧佉衛世蓋是外道之宗盛行天竺。僧佉經十萬偈。二十五諦為宗。以神為主諦。衛世師經亦十萬偈。用六諦為宗。亦以神為主諦。今破其主諦則余法自崩。三者尋大小二乘觀門階漸。要先辨生空后得法空。今明破神即是生空。后除一異謂法空也。問何故先明生空次辨法空。答生空易得故淺。法空難成故深。所以然者。眾生五情取之不得。但是凡夫希望為有。是故易破。諸法為眼見耳聞即事為有。此則難破。故法空為深。然空無淺深。但約所空以為階級。問何故次舍罪福明破神耶。答凡有五意。若就賓主而言。自上已來是提婆升座明於二舍。外道論義難無不酬酬無不塞。兼外道反羅其弊。今第二外道升座立於神法。而提婆論義疑無不摧通無不屈。故有一章來也。二者諸佛菩薩出世為令眾生得於解脫。但眾生繫縛凡有二種。一者業縛二煩惱縛。上舍罪福解其業系。今明破神除煩惱縛。煩惱之中身見為本故前破神。三者為成前舍義。外人云罪福是神之所作。神是能作罪福之人。既有能作之人。不應無有所作之法。故上舍罪福明無所作之法。今破神明無能作之人。人法既空。舍義方成。故有此品。四者因言次生。上品末云無相最上。外道不受斯言。故立有神法。今破彼計神則成前無相。故有此品。五者論主欲遍釋大小

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本脫。二者，僧佉（Samkhya，數論派）和衛世（Vaisheshika，勝論派）是天竺盛行的外道宗派。僧佉經有十萬頌，以二十五諦為宗，以神我（Purusha）為主諦。衛世師經也有十萬頌，用六諦為宗，也以神我為主諦。現在破斥他們的主諦，那麼其餘的法自然崩塌。三者，尋覓大小乘的觀行門徑和階梯，要先辨明生空，然後才能證得法空。現在闡明破斥神我就是生空，之後去除一異的執著就是法空。問：為什麼先闡明生空，然後辨明法空？答：因為生空容易證得，所以淺顯；法空難以成就，所以深奧。之所以這樣說，是因為眾生的五種感官無法把握神我，只是凡夫希望它存在，所以容易破斥。諸法為眼睛所見、耳朵所聞，就認為事物是存在的，這就難以破斥，所以法空是深奧的。然而，空性本身沒有淺深之分，只是根據所空的對境來區分階級。問：為什麼在捨棄罪福之後，接著闡明破斥神我呢？答：凡有五種用意。如果就賓主而言，從前面開始是提婆（Deva，天）升座闡明二舍（舍罪、舍福）。外道的論義難以應對，沒有不被駁倒的，反過來外道也暴露了自己的弊端。現在第二位外道升座，立論神我之法，而提婆的論義，疑問沒有不被摧毀的，觀點沒有不被駁倒的，所以有這一章。二者，諸佛菩薩出世是爲了令眾生得到解脫。但是眾生的繫縛凡有兩種：一是業的繫縛，二是煩惱的繫縛。上面捨棄罪福，解脫了業的繫縛；現在闡明破斥神我，去除煩惱的繫縛。煩惱之中，身見是根本，所以前面破斥神我。三者，爲了成就前面的捨棄之義。外人說罪福是神我所造作的，神我是能造作罪福之人。既然有能造作之人，就不應該沒有所造作之法。所以上面捨棄罪福，闡明沒有所造作之法；現在破斥神我，闡明沒有能造作之人。人法既然都空，捨棄之義才能成就，所以有這一品。四者，因言語的次第而生。上一品末尾說無相是最上的，外道不接受這種說法，所以立論有神我之法。現在破斥他們的神我之計，就成就了前面的無相，所以有這一品。五者，論主想要普遍解釋大小乘的教義。

【English Translation】 English version 』Tuo』. The two, Samkhya (enumeration) and Vaisheshika (atomism), were prominent non-Buddhist schools in India. The Samkhya Sutra has one hundred thousand verses, with twenty-five Tattvas (principles) as its doctrine, and Purusha (the Self) as the primary Tattva. The Vaisheshika Sutra also has one hundred thousand verses, using six Tattvas as its doctrine, also with Purusha as the primary Tattva. Now, if we refute their primary Tattva, then the remaining doctrines will naturally collapse. Thirdly, in seeking the gradual stages of the contemplation gates of the Mahayana and Hinayana, one must first discern the emptiness of self (生空, shengkong), and then attain the emptiness of phenomena (法空, fakong). Now, clarifying the refutation of Purusha is the emptiness of self, and subsequently removing the attachment to oneness and difference is the emptiness of phenomena. Question: Why clarify the emptiness of self first, and then discern the emptiness of phenomena? Answer: Because the emptiness of self is easier to attain, hence it is shallow; the emptiness of phenomena is difficult to achieve, hence it is profound. The reason for this is that the five senses of sentient beings cannot grasp Purusha, but ordinary people hope for its existence, so it is easy to refute. Phenomena are seen by the eyes and heard by the ears, and things are considered to exist based on events, which is difficult to refute, so the emptiness of phenomena is profound. However, emptiness itself has no shallow or deep distinctions, but is classified according to the object being emptied. Question: Why, after abandoning merit and demerit, is the refutation of Purusha clarified next? Answer: There are five intentions. If speaking in terms of host and guest, from above, Deva (提婆, deity) ascends the seat to clarify the two abandonments (舍罪, abandoning demerit; 舍福, abandoning merit). The arguments of non-Buddhists are difficult to counter, and none are not refuted, and conversely, non-Buddhists also expose their own shortcomings. Now, the second non-Buddhist ascends the seat, establishing the doctrine of Purusha, and Deva's arguments, no doubts are not destroyed, and no views are not refuted, so there is this chapter. Secondly, the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas appear in the world to liberate sentient beings. However, the bondage of sentient beings is of two kinds: one is the bondage of karma, and the other is the bondage of afflictions. Above, abandoning merit and demerit liberates the bondage of karma; now, clarifying the refutation of Purusha removes the bondage of afflictions. Among afflictions, the view of self is the root, so Purusha is refuted first. Thirdly, to accomplish the meaning of the previous abandonment. Non-Buddhists say that merit and demerit are created by Purusha, and Purusha is the one who can create merit and demerit. Since there is one who can create, there should be phenomena that are created. Therefore, above, abandoning merit and demerit clarifies that there are no phenomena that are created; now, refuting Purusha clarifies that there is no one who can create. Since both self and phenomena are empty, the meaning of abandonment can be accomplished, so there is this chapter. Fourthly, arising from the sequence of words. At the end of the previous chapter, it was said that non-appearance is the most supreme, but non-Buddhists do not accept this statement, so they establish the doctrine of Purusha. Now, refuting their calculation of Purusha accomplishes the previous non-appearance, so there is this chapter. Fifthly, the author of the treatise wants to universally explain the doctrines of the Mahayana and Hinayana.

乘經破我明無我義故有此品。問此論正應釋大乘無我。云何亦釋小耶。答外道通障大小。今通破通申。但以大乘為正也。但解神有內外二道。外道有四師。一者僧佉計神與覺一。二者衛世明神與覺異。三者勒沙婆計神覺亦一亦異。第四若提子計神覺非一非異。內道計神亦有四師。一莊嚴云。假神有體有用有名。二光宅云。神有名無體無用。三開善云。神有名有用而無有體。第四犢子計。有神體用而非即離所攝。故神在第五不可說藏中。問此間九流七略明有神不。答周孔老莊但明一世事亦不論神。故云義經丘而未曉。理涉耳而猶昏。問計神三性中屬何性耶。答數人云。身見是隱沒無記。以計有神不妨行於施戒故也。婆沙出佛陀提婆義云。神為眾惑之本故但是不善。俱舍論云。我有二種。一生得我二邪執我。生得我者。含識之流皆有我心。生而即得名生得我。此我即是無記。若外道所計一異之我名為不善。問我見何所緣。答毗婆阇婆提人無所緣。以無而見。有故無所緣。評家云。有所緣。謂緣五陰。緣五陰謂是我。如謂杭為人。問二十身見幾是我見。幾是我所見。答五是身見。十五是我所見。如計色是我。色異我色屬我。我在色中。一陰皆四故云二十。依中論長行有一句。謂色在我中也。問但有二十身見。更有餘耶。答略

說則一我見。依我我所分則成二見。三界分則三見。依地分則有九見。欲界地乃至非想故成九。乃至分別所起處凡有九百三十六我見也。問頗有一時總計五陰為我不。答婆沙二釋。一云無也。若計色為我。余受等則屬我所也。二云亦有總計五陰為我。如計內入為我者即計外入為我所。計外入為我即計內入為我所。問頗有計微塵是我不。答亦有二釋。一云無也。二云亦有計微塵為我。評家用初解。問一切眾生為共一我。為各有我。答金七十論出二釋。有論師明一切眾生同一我。僧佉明一切眾生各有一我。若一切人一我者。一人生兒應一切生。而實不爾故知各有一我。問經云我見為六十二見本。又云邊見為本。定云何耶。答能生諸見則身見為本。守護長養則邊見為本。問曰何名身見。答從自身生從有身生不從他身生不從無身生故名身見。問邊見亦不從他身生亦不從無身生。何故不名身見。答身見已前受名故。邊見更從別義立稱。問阿毗曇等云內離人故空。不自在故無我。興此論破我何異。答同明無外道邪我與此處不異。但數論破我住于無我。此論明我既不留無我亦舍。乃至五句一無所存。又雖無所有而無所不有。故具說我與無我。如中論云。諸佛或說我或說無我。諸法實相中非我非無我。數論闕斯體用。是故不同。又凈名

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本如果說只有一個『我』的見解，那麼執著于『我』和『我所』（屬於我的東西）就會形成兩種見解。如果將三界（欲界、色界、無色界）進行劃分，就會產生三種見解。如果依據不同的『地』（指眾生所處的境界）來劃分，就會有九種見解。這是因為欲界地乃至非想非非想處天，總共有九種『地』。乃至通過分別而產生的，總共有九百三十六種『我見』。問：是否有人會一時之間將五蘊（色、受、想、行、識）總合起來認為是『我』呢？答：對此，《婆沙論》有兩種解釋。第一種觀點認為沒有。如果認為『色』是『我』，那麼其餘的『受』、『想』等就屬於『我所』（屬於我的）。第二種觀點認為也有人會將五蘊總合起來認為是『我』。例如，如果認為『內入』（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）是『我』，那麼就會認為『外入』（色、聲、香、味、觸、法）是『我所』。反之，如果認為『外入』是『我』，那麼就會認為『內入』是『我所』。問：是否有人會認為微塵是『我』呢？答：對此也有兩種解釋。第一種觀點認為沒有。第二種觀點認為也有人會認為微塵是『我』。評論家採用第一種解釋。問：一切眾生是共同擁有一個『我』，還是各自擁有一個『我』呢？答：《金七十論》中提出了兩種解釋。有些論師認為一切眾生擁有同一個『我』。僧佉（Samkhya，數論派）認為一切眾生各自擁有一個『我』。如果所有人都只有一個『我』，那麼一個人出生孩子，所有人都應該同時出生孩子，但事實並非如此，因此可知每個人都各自擁有一個『我』。問：經書中說『我見』是六十二見的根本，又說『邊見』是根本，這應該如何理解呢？答：如果說能夠產生各種見解，那麼『身見』是根本。如果說守護和滋養各種見解，那麼『邊見』是根本。問：什麼叫做『身見』呢？答：從自身產生，從有身而產生，不從他身產生，不從無身產生，所以叫做『身見』。問：『邊見』也不從他身產生，也不從無身產生，為什麼不叫做『身見』呢？答：因為『身見』已經先獲得了這個名稱，而『邊見』是從別的意義上建立名稱的。問：《阿毗曇》等論典說，因為內在離開了『人』，所以是『空』；因為不自在，所以是『無我』。興起這些論點來破斥『我』，與此處（指本論）有什麼不同呢？答：都是爲了闡明沒有外道所執著的邪『我』，與此處並沒有不同。但是，數論派破斥『我』，是停留在『無我』的觀點上。而此論闡明『我』既不保留『無我』，也捨棄『無我』，乃至五句（指五蘊皆空）都一無所存。又雖然什麼都沒有，但又無所不有。所以同時闡述了『我』和『無我』。如同《中論》所說：『諸佛或者說我，或者說無我，諸法的實相中，既非我，也非無我。』數論派缺少這種體用兼備的觀點，所以與此不同。又如《凈名經》（Vimalakirti Sutra）...

【English Translation】 English version To say there is one 'I' view leads to two views when clinging to 'I' and 'mine' (what belongs to me). Dividing the Three Realms (Desire Realm, Form Realm, Formless Realm) results in three views. Dividing according to different 'grounds' (realms where beings reside) leads to nine views. This is because the Desire Realm up to the Realm of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception constitutes nine 'grounds'. Furthermore, through discrimination, there arise nine hundred and thirty-six 'self-views' (I-views). Question: Does anyone ever collectively consider the Five Skandhas (form, feeling, perception, mental formations, consciousness) as 'I'? Answer: The Vibhasa (Mahavibhasa, a commentary on the Abhidharma) offers two explanations. The first view is no. If 'form' is considered 'I', then the remaining 'feeling', 'perception', etc., belong to 'mine' (what belongs to me). The second view is that some do collectively consider the Five Skandhas as 'I'. For example, if 'internal entrances' (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind) are considered 'I', then 'external entrances' (form, sound, smell, taste, touch, dharma) are considered 'mine'. Conversely, if 'external entrances' are considered 'I', then 'internal entrances' are considered 'mine'. Question: Does anyone consider a dust mote as 'I'? Answer: There are also two explanations for this. The first view is no. The second view is that some do consider a dust mote as 'I'. Commentators adopt the first explanation. Question: Do all sentient beings share one common 'I', or does each have their own 'I'? Answer: The Samkhyakarika (Golden Seventy Treatise, a foundational text of Samkhya philosophy) presents two explanations. Some philosophers assert that all sentient beings share the same 'I'. The Samkhya (Samkhya, a school of Indian philosophy) asserts that each sentient being has their own 'I'. If all people had one 'I', then when one person gives birth, everyone should give birth simultaneously, but this is not the case, so it is known that each has their own 'I'. Question: The sutras say that 'self-view' (I-view) is the root of the sixty-two views, and also that 'extreme view' (view of extremes) is the root. How should this be understood? Answer: If speaking of what can generate various views, then 'self-view' is the root. If speaking of what protects and nourishes various views, then 'extreme view' is the root. Question: What is called 'self-view'? Answer: It arises from oneself, arises from having a body, does not arise from another's body, does not arise from having no body, therefore it is called 'self-view'. Question: 'Extreme view' also does not arise from another's body, nor does it arise from having no body. Why is it not called 'self-view'? Answer: Because 'self-view' has already received that name. 'Extreme view' establishes its name from a different meaning. Question: The Abhidharma and other treatises say that because internally it is separated from 'person', it is 'empty'; because it is not self-governing, it is 'no-self'. How is raising these arguments to refute 'self' different from here (referring to this treatise)? Answer: Both are to clarify that there is no heretical 'self' clung to by external paths, and there is no difference from here. However, the Samkhya school refutes 'self' by remaining in the view of 'no-self'. This treatise clarifies that 'self' neither retains 'no-self' nor abandons 'no-self', even to the point where nothing remains in the five phrases (referring to the emptiness of the five skandhas). And although there is nothing, there is also nothing that is not. Therefore, it simultaneously explains 'self' and 'no-self'. As the Madhyamaka-karika (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way) says: 'The Buddhas either speak of self or speak of no-self; in the true nature of dharmas, there is neither self nor no-self.' The Samkhya school lacks this view that encompasses both substance and function, so it is different from this. Furthermore, like the Vimalakirti Sutra (Vimalakirti Sutra)...

云。於我無我不二。是無我義。故我宛然而無我。不壞假我明無我也。數論亦無此意。是故不同。問若破一切我者。涅槃云我是佛性亦被破耶。答佛性未曾是我無我乃至四句。必明佛性是真我者亦須破之。此但斷取著。實不破佛性我也。又凡夫于虛妄中計真實我。二乘既聞無虛妄我亦無佛性真我。故成八倒。此論既破凡夫虛妄我。亦無二乘虛妄無我。此我無我並是佛性所離除。此我無我見始得顯佛性。非我無我而有我無我方便用也。問何故名佛性為我耶。答佛性累無不寂德無不圓。自在無礙是故名我。問此論何處破二乘無我。答破空品即是破無我。破神品即是破我。是故此論斥凡呵聖顯示中道。令一切眾生見於佛性也。又數論云。所計之神此畢竟無耳。能計之心則是有法。今明能計如其所計。故大品常以十六知見例色等萬法。問此論何處有佛性真我耶。答此論明中道非我無我。中道是佛亦名佛性。知有真我。此品中開為六別。第一三師總立有神。論主總破。第二僧佉人出論義。論主即破。第三衛世師出論義。論主即破。第四僧佉人重出論義。論主重破。第五衛世師重出論義。論主重破。第六諸外道亂出救義。論主亂破。雖有六章不出總別。初一總立總破。后五別立別破。所以明總別者。一欲示觀門次第。如中論前總破

【現代漢語翻譯】云：於我與無我之間，並非二元對立，而是『不二』。這便是『無我』的真義。因此，『我』雖然宛然存在，卻又等同於『無我』。不執著于虛假的『我』，才能明白真正的『無我』。數論（Samkhya）學派也未能領悟此意，因此與我們的觀點不同。問：如果破除一切『我』，那麼《涅槃經》（Nirvana Sutra）中所說的『我是佛性』，是否也被破除了呢？答：佛性（Buddha-nature）從未落入『我』、『無我』乃至四句（四種邏輯可能性）的範疇。如果有人執意認為佛性是真實的『我』，那也必須破除這種執著。這裡只是爲了斷除執著，實際上並未破除佛性之『我』。此外，凡夫在虛妄之中妄計有真實的『我』，而二乘（Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas）之人聽聞沒有虛妄之『我』，便也認為沒有佛性的真『我』，因此形成了八種顛倒見。此論既破除了凡夫的虛妄之『我』，也破除了二乘的虛妄之『無我』。『我』與『無我』都是佛性所要超越的。只有超越了『我』與『無我』的見解，才能顯現佛性。並非在『我』與『無我』之外，還有一種方便之用。問：為何稱佛性為『我』呢？答：佛性積累了無盡的寂靜功德，圓滿了所有的德行，自在無礙，因此稱之為『我』。問：此論在何處破斥二乘的『無我』呢？答：破『空』品（Sunyata chapter）即是破斥『無我』，破『神』品（Atman chapter）即是破斥『我』。因此，此論既斥責凡夫，又呵斥聖人，從而顯示中道（Madhyamaka），使一切眾生得以見到佛性。又，數論認為，他們所計度的『神』（Purusha）畢竟是不存在的，而能計度的『心』（Buddhi）則是存在的。現在說明，能計度的『心』也如其所計度的『神』一樣，都是虛妄的。因此，《大品般若經》（Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra）常常以十六知見來比喻色等萬法。問：此論在何處體現了佛性的真『我』呢？答：此論闡明中道，既非『我』，也非『無我』。中道即是佛，也稱為佛性。認識到有真『我』的存在。此品中開出了六種不同的辯論。第一，三師（指三種不同的外道）總括地立論有『神』，論主（作者）總括地破斥。第二，僧佉人（Samkhya）提出論義，論主立即破斥。第三，衛世師（Vaisheshika）提出論義，論主立即破斥。第四，僧佉人重新提出論義，論主重新破斥。第五，衛世師重新提出論義，論主重新破斥。第六，各種外道雜亂地提出救護之義，論主雜亂地破斥。雖然有六個章節，但沒有超出總論和別論的範疇。最初一個總括地立論和破斥，後面五個分別地立論和破斥。之所以要闡明總論和別論，一是想要展示觀修的次第，如同《中論》（Madhyamakakarika）前面總括地破斥一樣。

【English Translation】 Here it says: Between 'I' and 'non-I', there is no duality, but 'non-duality'. This is the true meaning of 'non-I' (anatman). Therefore, 'I' exists distinctly, yet is equivalent to 'non-I'. Not clinging to the false 'I' allows one to understand the true 'non-I'. The Samkhya school also fails to grasp this meaning, thus differing from our view. Question: If all 'I' is refuted, is the statement in the Nirvana Sutra, 'I am Buddha-nature', also refuted? Answer: Buddha-nature has never fallen into the category of 'I', 'non-I', or even the four logical possibilities. If someone insists that Buddha-nature is a real 'I', then that attachment must also be refuted. Here, it is only to cut off attachment; in reality, the 'I' of Buddha-nature is not refuted. Furthermore, ordinary beings falsely imagine a real 'I' in delusion, while those of the Two Vehicles (Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas), hearing that there is no false 'I', also believe there is no true 'I' of Buddha-nature, thus forming the eight inverted views. This treatise refutes both the false 'I' of ordinary beings and the false 'non-I' of the Two Vehicles. 'I' and 'non-I' are both what Buddha-nature transcends. Only by transcending the views of 'I' and 'non-I' can Buddha-nature be revealed. It is not that there is a convenient use of 'I' and 'non-I' beyond 'I' and 'non-I'. Question: Why is Buddha-nature called 'I'? Answer: Buddha-nature accumulates endless merits of tranquility, perfects all virtues, and is free and unobstructed; therefore, it is called 'I'. Question: Where in this treatise is the 'non-I' of the Two Vehicles refuted? Answer: The chapter on emptiness (Sunyata chapter) refutes 'non-I', and the chapter on the self (Atman chapter) refutes 'I'. Therefore, this treatise both criticizes ordinary beings and admonishes the saints, thereby revealing the Middle Way (Madhyamaka), enabling all beings to see Buddha-nature. Moreover, the Samkhya school believes that the 'self' (Purusha) they conceive is ultimately non-existent, while the 'mind' (Buddhi) that conceives it exists. Now it is explained that the conceiving 'mind' is as illusory as the 'self' it conceives. Therefore, the Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra often uses the sixteen knowledges to exemplify the myriad dharmas such as form. Question: Where in this treatise is the true 'I' of Buddha-nature manifested? Answer: This treatise elucidates the Middle Way, which is neither 'I' nor 'non-I'. The Middle Way is the Buddha, also called Buddha-nature. Recognizing the existence of the true 'I'. In this chapter, six different debates are opened up. First, the three teachers (referring to three different non-Buddhist schools) collectively argue for the existence of a 'self', and the author collectively refutes them. Second, the Samkhya person presents arguments, and the author immediately refutes them. Third, the Vaisheshika person presents arguments, and the author immediately refutes them. Fourth, the Samkhya person re-presents arguments, and the author re-refutes them. Fifth, the Vaisheshika person re-presents arguments, and the author re-refutes them. Sixth, various non-Buddhists confusedly present arguments for defense, and the author confusedly refutes them. Although there are six chapters, they do not go beyond the scope of general and specific arguments. The first one generally establishes and refutes, and the latter five specifically establish and refute. The reason for clarifying the general and specific arguments is, first, to show the order of contemplation, just as the Madhyamakakarika generally refutes at the beginning.

四緣后別破也。二者前明無相總破眾師。是故眾師總立。既有總立。宜須總破。總立總破則為二別。前外總立次內總破。就外立中復有二句。一者非內空。二立外有。不應言一切法空者非論主空也。神等諸法有故者立外有也。亦是將有證釋非空。都是難於論主。論主初明舍罪。外設六難。次明舍福亦設六難。上明無相。此下竟破空品九品並是立有破論主空。論主破外有悉為成無相義也。註釋為二。初逐近前釋外人立有。次云何言無下釋非論主空。釋立有中前總釋即雙標。迦毗羅言下第二別釋即雙釋。問何故明二十五諦耶。答有二義。一者二十五諦是神始終。又神為二十五主。是故列之。二者釋上偈本中雲神等諸法有故。二十四諦即是諸法主諦即是于神。欲雙釋神法。是故列之。列二十五諦為二。初列二十五諦境。次明迷悟成於解惑。從冥初生覺者。此初可兩用。一者冥為二十五初。二者從冥最初生覺。神為主者釋主諦有五。一正明神為主。二出神相。三明住處。四明神體。五明神用。所以廣說神者。為成此品破神故也。常覺相者。僧佉人神覺一體有神即有覺故云常覺相。此句明神相也。處中者第三句明神住處。謂處在十一根中。常住第四句論神體。不為四相遷故云常住。不敗不壞者釋成常住簡異諸根。攝受諸法者第五

句明神有統御之用也。能知下上來明境此辨迷悟。所以明迷悟者。為欲自立破他。自立者明從境生智斷生死得涅槃。破他者論主明空無相無有人法。無法故迷彼二十四諦。無人故迷彼神諦。是以外人謂得解脫。言論主不離生死。優樓迦言下第二齣世師義。問初師既明二十五諦。今何以不辨六諦耶。答二十五諦明神始終。今為破神。所以須列。六諦通明神法。非正辨神故不明也。今此師但舉相立有神。初以身相證有于神。複次以欲恚下第二舉心相證神。又前直舉外相證神。今舉能依證有所依。又云。此複次是勒沙婆義。今謂不然。如向釋也。是故神是實有釋偈本初句。排論主三空。謂論主撥有言無。即是謗彼真諦故無解脫。內曰下第二總破。若有而言無。論主則應有過。以無而言無。是故無失。猶如兔角實無而言無。所以無過。次翻此語若有而言有。外道無過。今無而言有。故是惡邪。如無兔角謂有兔角名為顛倒。諦觀察之實無有神者。論主云。無而言無是故無過。謂外人無而言有。所以有失。外人復云。有而言有是故無過。謂論主有而言無。所以有失。如莊周云彼此俱一是非。是故此句釋內外之紛。內諦觀察故無而言無。知外無而言有。外不諦察故無而言有。謂內有而言無。又諸異外道還自相破。若以出入息為神相者

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：句明神（Juming Shen，一種神祇的名稱）具有統御的作用。能夠知曉下情上達，從而明辨迷途和覺悟。之所以要闡明迷途和覺悟，是爲了樹立自己，破斥他人。所謂樹立自己，是指明白從境界生出智慧，斷絕生死，證得涅槃。所謂破斥他人，是指論主闡明空無自性，既沒有人，也沒有法。因為沒有法，所以迷惑于外道的二十四諦；因為沒有人，所以迷惑于神我（Atman）的真諦。因此，外道認為自己得到了解脫，但論主卻無法脫離生死輪迴。優樓迦（Ulukha，印度哲學流派勝論的創始人）的言論是第二種出世師的觀點。有人問：『最初的老師已經闡明了二十五諦，為什麼現在不辨析六諦呢？』回答說：『二十五諦闡明了神我的始終，現在是爲了破斥神我，所以必須列出。六諦則普遍闡明神我和法，並非專門辨析神我，所以不闡明。』現在的這位老師只是舉出表相來立論有神我。最初以身體的表相來證明有神我，其次以慾望和嗔恚來證明有神我。而且之前是直接舉出外在的表相來證明神我，現在是舉出能依靠的事物來證明有所依靠的事物。又有人說：『這個『複次』是勒沙婆（ ऋषभ，Rishabha，耆那教的祖師）的意義。』我認為不是這樣，就像之前解釋的那樣。因此，『神我是真實存在的』，這是解釋偈頌的最初一句，是爲了排斥論主的三種空性。所謂論主否定存在而說無，這就是誹謗真諦，所以無法解脫。『內曰下』是第二部分，總括性地破斥。如果存在卻說不存在，論主就應該有過失；如果本來就不存在而說不存在，就沒有過失，就像兔角本來就不存在，所以說不存在就沒有過失。反過來說，如果存在卻說存在，外道就沒有過失；如果本來不存在卻說存在，那就是邪惡的。就像沒有兔角卻說有兔角，這就是顛倒。仔細觀察，實際上沒有神我。論主說：『不存在卻說不存在，所以沒有過失。』外道說：『不存在卻說存在，所以有過失。』外道又說：『存在卻說存在，所以沒有過失。』論主說：『存在卻說不存在，所以有過失。』就像莊周所說，彼此都認為自己是對的，對方是錯的。所以這句話解釋了內外兩方的紛爭。內在仔細觀察，所以知道不存在而說不存在；外道不仔細觀察，所以不存在卻說存在。認為內在存在卻說不存在。而且各種不同的外道還會互相破斥。如果以外呼吸作為神我的表相，那麼……

【English Translation】 English version: Juming Shen (a deity's name) has the function of governance. It can know the lower circumstances and convey them upwards, thereby distinguishing between delusion and enlightenment. The reason for clarifying delusion and enlightenment is to establish oneself and refute others. Establishing oneself means understanding that wisdom arises from the realm, cutting off birth and death, and attaining Nirvana. Refuting others means that the proponent elucidates emptiness and non-self, with neither person nor dharma. Because there is no dharma, they are deluded by the twenty-four Tattvas (principles) of the external paths; because there is no person, they are deluded by the truth of Atman (self). Therefore, externalists believe they have attained liberation, but the proponent cannot escape the cycle of birth and death. The words of Ulukha (founder of the Vaisheshika school of Indian philosophy) represent the view of the second transcendent teacher. Someone asks: 'The initial teacher has already elucidated the twenty-five Tattvas, why not analyze the six Tattvas now?' The answer is: 'The twenty-five Tattvas elucidate the beginning and end of Atman. Now, it is to refute Atman, so it must be listed. The six Tattvas universally elucidate Atman and dharma, but do not specifically analyze Atman, so they are not elucidated.' The current teacher merely puts forward appearances to establish the existence of Atman. Initially, the physical appearance is used to prove the existence of Atman, and then desire and anger are used to prove the existence of Atman. Moreover, previously, external appearances were directly used to prove Atman; now, the dependent is used to prove the existence of the supported. Someone also says: 'This 'furthermore' is the meaning of Rishabha (the first Tirthankara in Jainism).' I think it is not so, as explained before. Therefore, 'Atman is truly existent' is the initial sentence explaining the verse, to reject the proponent's three emptinesses. The so-called proponent denies existence and says non-existence, which is slandering the true truth, so there is no liberation. 'Inner says below' is the second part, comprehensively refuting. If something exists but is said to be non-existent, the proponent should have a fault; if something does not exist and is said to be non-existent, there is no fault, just like a rabbit's horn does not exist, so saying it does not exist has no fault. Conversely, if something exists and is said to exist, the externalist has no fault; if something does not exist and is said to exist, that is evil. Just like saying there is a rabbit's horn when there is none, that is delusion. Upon careful observation, there is actually no Atman. The proponent says: 'Non-existence is said to be non-existence, so there is no fault.' The externalist says: 'Non-existence is said to be existence, so there is a fault.' The externalist also says: 'Existence is said to be existence, so there is no fault.' The proponent says: 'Existence is said to be non-existence, so there is a fault.' Just like Zhuang Zhou said, each thinks they are right and the other is wrong. So this sentence explains the disputes between the inner and outer sides. Inner careful observation, so knowing non-existence and saying non-existence; the externalist does not carefully observe, so non-existence is said to be existence. Thinking that inner existence is said to be non-existence. Moreover, various different external paths will also refute each other. If breathing in and out is taken as the appearance of Atman, then...

。第四禪已上應當無我。以無出入息故。若以視眴為神相者。諸天目及魚眼不眴。應當無有我。又無色界眾生及無眼人悉應無我。若以壽命為我相者。外道以暖觸為壽命。若爾大日等有暖觸亦應有我。外曰下第二僧佉別立義。始末七番。前五法說后二列譬。僧佉前論義凡三意。一者道術最前行於世。二者惑人多執。三者計一為四句之初。故成論云。一等四執。初雲實有神。對論主上明空義無神。彼謂提婆立空故自立於有。是以內外互相杭執也。又論主上云諦觀察之故無而言無。外人不諦觀察故無而言有。外今亦云。內不諦觀察故有而言無。謂我無而言有。我今諦察。知內有而言無。非無而言無。即明我立有而言有非無而言有。如僧佉經中說者。引經證上實有。覺相是神者。以有覺知即名為神。如死人木人無有覺知。是故無神。俱舍論云。智為我體。只我即是智。終是體相一義耳。內曰下第二定關。論義法須前定。以前定故則有二屈。受定則有住宗之屈。如其改轉則有違宗之過。問論主何故偏就一異定耶。答凡有八義。一者知四外道所立正就一異亦一亦異。是故就一異定之。二者一異是十四難本。又為六十二見之根。今欲前除其根故就一異定也。三者諸破之中一異兩難其言最顯。故就一異以定義宗。四者內外諸師皆立一

異。如成實者云。假有即實名為一義。假有異實稱為異義。今欲遍窮內外故以一異定之。五者寄神覺一異欲遍破諸法。如心與苦樂善惡為一為異。真俗二諦一體異體。妄想與真一之與異。乃至僧祇上座因果一之與異。是故就一異定也。六者此之一異非但橫破萬法。亦豎摧四句。如一異為本。餘二為末。在本既破。其末自傾。又亦一之與非異猶屬一攝。亦異之與非一猶屬異攝。一異既破。餘四即傾。七者一異之難畢竟無通。如其答也則住言而屈。若不答之則自啞死。八者一異雙定則墮二負門。僧佉受一名為細負。若改宗執異則是違言名為粗負。如佛定長爪。其人利根故。如見鞭影。自知墮負。慢心則摧。提婆今定外道義亦同矣。但彼不覺知故猶受定耳。外曰神覺一也。外所以受定者。劫初已來相承立一。謂合理秤機。是故受定。又有所得人心有所依言有所住。必當作一種解。是故受定。問神覺既一。云何立二諦耶。答彼云。體一義異。體一故即覺為神。則神為覺。義異者。統御為神。了別名覺。由如數人苦集是一物因果義分故說二。內曰覺若神相神無常。常無常中有五難。一者以神從覺。覺無常故神亦無常。二者以覺從神。神體既常覺亦應常。三覺無常神不無常。則神與覺異。四神常覺不常。則覺與神異。五欲令神覺體

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本異。如同《成實論》所說，『假有』（暫時存在的現象）和『即實』（真實存在的本體）如果被認為是一個意思，就稱為『一義』；如果認為『假有』和『實有』是不同的，就稱為『異義』。現在想要徹底探究內外各種觀點，所以用『一』和『異』來確定。第五，藉助神識和感覺的『一』和『異』，想要普遍破除各種法。例如，心與苦樂、善惡是『一』還是『異』？真諦和俗諦是一體還是異體？妄想與真如是一體還是異體？乃至僧祇（無數）和上座部（佛教部派名）的因果是『一』還是『異』？所以就用『一』和『異』來確定。第六，這種『一』和『異』不僅橫向破除萬法，也縱向摧毀四句（四種邏輯可能性）。例如，以『一』和『異』為根本，其餘兩種（亦一亦異、非一非異）為末端。根本既然被破除，末端自然傾覆。而且，『亦一』與『非異』仍然屬於『一』的範疇，『亦異』與『非一』仍然屬於『異』的範疇。『一』和『異』既然被破除，其餘四句也就傾覆了。第七，『一』和『異』的辯論畢竟無法溝通。如果回答，就會因為言語而理屈詞窮；如果不回答，就會像啞巴一樣無言以對。第八，如果同時肯定『一』和『異』，就會陷入二負門（兩種失敗）。僧佉（古印度哲學流派）接受『一』，這被稱為『細負』（細微的失敗）；如果改變宗派而執著于『異』，這就是違背自己說過的話，被稱為『粗負』（明顯的失敗）。如同佛陀降伏長爪梵志（外道修行者），那個人根器敏銳，就像看到鞭子的影子，就知道自己已經失敗，傲慢之心就會摧毀。提婆（佛教論師）現在評定外道的觀點也是一樣的，只是他們沒有覺察到，所以仍然接受評定。外道說：神識和感覺是『一』。外道之所以接受評定，是因為從劫初以來就相承地認為它們是『一』，認為這合乎道理，符合時機，所以接受評定。而且，有所得的人，內心有所依賴，言語有所執著，必定會作某種解釋，所以接受評定。問：神識和感覺既然是『一』，為什麼又建立二諦（兩種真理）呢？答：他們說，本體是『一』，意義不同。本體是『一』，所以感覺就是神識，神識就是感覺。意義不同，是因為統御稱為神識，了別稱為感覺。猶如數論派（古印度哲學流派）認為苦和集是一件事物，只是因果的意義不同，所以說成兩種。內道（佛教）說：如果感覺是神識的相，那麼神識就是無常的。如果神識是常，那麼常與無常之中有五種困難。第一，以神識從屬於感覺，感覺是無常的，所以神識也是無常的。第二，以感覺從屬於神識，神識的本體既然是常，感覺也應該是常。第三，感覺是無常的，神識不是無常的，那麼神識與感覺就是『異』。第四，神識是常的，感覺不是常的，那麼感覺與神識就是『異』。第五，想要讓神識和感覺的本體

【English Translation】 English version Different. As the Satyasiddhi Shastra says, 'provisional existence' (假有) and 'actual existence' (即實) are considered 'one meaning' if they are regarded as the same; if 'provisional existence' and 'actual existence' are considered different, it is called 'different meaning'. Now, wanting to thoroughly investigate all internal and external views, we use 'one' and 'different' to determine them. Fifth, using the 'one' and 'different' of consciousness (神覺) and sensation to universally refute all dharmas. For example, are mind and suffering, happiness, good, and evil 'one' or 'different'? Are the two truths (真俗二諦), the conventional truth and the ultimate truth, one entity or different entities? Are delusion and Suchness (真如) one or different? Even the cause and effect of Asamkhya (僧祇, countless) and the Sthavira school (上座部, a Buddhist school) are 'one' or 'different'? Therefore, we determine based on 'one' and 'different'. Sixth, this 'one' and 'different' not only horizontally refutes all dharmas but also vertically destroys the four sentences (四句, four logical possibilities). For example, taking 'one' and 'different' as the root, the other two (both one and different, neither one nor different) are the ends. Since the root is destroyed, the ends naturally collapse. Moreover, 'both one' and 'not different' still belong to the category of 'one', and 'both different' and 'not one' still belong to the category of 'different'. Since 'one' and 'different' are destroyed, the remaining four sentences also collapse. Seventh, the debate of 'one' and 'different' is ultimately impossible to communicate. If you answer, you will be defeated by words; if you don't answer, you will be speechless like a mute. Eighth, if you affirm both 'one' and 'different' at the same time, you will fall into the two negative gates (二負門, two kinds of defeat). The Samkhya (僧佉, an ancient Indian philosophical school) accepts 'one', which is called 'subtle defeat' (細負); if you change your sect and cling to 'different', it is a violation of your own words, called 'gross defeat' (粗負). Just as the Buddha subdued Dirghanakha (長爪梵志, an ascetic of another path), that person had sharp faculties, just like seeing the shadow of a whip, he knew that he had been defeated, and his arrogance would be destroyed. Deva (提婆, a Buddhist philosopher) is now judging the views of other paths in the same way, but they are not aware of it, so they still accept the judgment. The outsider says: consciousness and sensation are 'one'. The reason why the outsider accepts the judgment is that they have inherited the idea that they are 'one' since the beginning of the kalpa (劫初), believing that it is reasonable and in accordance with the times, so they accept the judgment. Moreover, those who have something to gain, whose minds are dependent, and whose words are attached, will definitely make some kind of explanation, so they accept the judgment. Question: Since consciousness and sensation are 'one', why establish the two truths (二諦, two kinds of truth)? Answer: They say that the essence is 'one', but the meanings are different. The essence is 'one', so sensation is consciousness, and consciousness is sensation. The meanings are different because governing is called consciousness, and distinguishing is called sensation. Just as the Samkhya school (數論派, an ancient Indian philosophical school) believes that suffering and accumulation are one thing, but the meanings of cause and effect are different, so they are called two. The inner path (佛教, Buddhism) says: If sensation is the aspect of consciousness, then consciousness is impermanent. If consciousness is permanent, then there are five difficulties between permanence and impermanence. First, since consciousness belongs to sensation, and sensation is impermanent, consciousness is also impermanent. Second, since sensation belongs to consciousness, and the essence of consciousness is permanent, sensation should also be permanent. Third, sensation is impermanent, and consciousness is not impermanent, then consciousness and sensation are 'different'. Fourth, consciousness is permanent, and sensation is not permanent, then sensation and consciousness are 'different'. Fifth, wanting to make the essence of consciousness and sensation

一而不相從。則神覺俱墮二相。謂亦常亦無常。又合此五難以為三關。初之二難名住宗難。得於一義而神墮無常覺墮于常。次有兩難。得於神常。得覺無常。墮神覺異義違宗之屈。第三得神覺一復得神常覺無常而墮亦一亦異。神常覺無常則墮異義。神覺體一即是一義。又初二關得一宗失二諦。失二諦者。神覺俱無常失神諦。俱常失覺諦。次兩得二諦而失一宗。后一具有前二失也。論文唯出二難。一神無常。二體不一。所以無將覺從神者。若以覺從神即是破覺。此中不破覺。是故無也。下遍不遍中有二相。今文無也又是舉一例之。義可知矣。若破舊義者。舊云。常住佛只是一圓智而照用不同。知青異黃照真殊俗。今問照用與體為一為異。若體用一者。在體既一居用亦一。則萬用便是一用。若有萬用應有萬體。若體用異。體常用應非常。又舊云。心是體。苦樂解惑是心上用。今問體用若一。常有心應常有解惑。既其斷惑應當斷心。若解惑苦樂與心異者。惑應自惑心則不惑。解亦然也。又問真俗若一。應同常同無常同說同不說。真俗若異。俗在真外真在俗外。註釋舉熱是火相者。提婆四宗論中僧佉人自引此喻譬于神覺體相是一。今天親引將來也。今覺實無常者三義顯覺無常。一者苦樂不同故云相各異故。二假違順等三緣生故

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『一』而不相互統一，就會導致神識和覺知都陷入二元對立的境地，認為既是常又是無常。又將這五種困難結合起來作為三重關卡。最初的兩種困難稱為『住宗難』（堅持宗義的困難），執著于『一』的意義，神識就會墮入無常，覺知就會墮入常。其次有兩種困難，執著于神識是常，執著于覺知是無常，就會陷入神識和覺知相異，違背宗義的困境。第三種困難，既執著于神識和覺知為一，又執著于神識是常而覺知是無常，就會陷入既一又異的境地。神識是常而覺知是無常，就會墮入相異的意義；神識和覺知的本體為一，就是『一』的意義。此外，最初的兩重關卡執著于『一宗』（唯一的宗義）而失去『二諦』（真諦和俗諦）。失去『二諦』是指，神識和覺知都認為是無常，就失去了神諦；都認為是常，就失去了覺諦。其次兩種情況是執著于『二諦』而失去『一宗』。最後一種情況兼具前兩種情況的缺失。論文中只提出了兩種困難：一是神識是無常的，二是本體不是一。之所以沒有將覺知歸屬於神識，是因為如果以覺知歸屬於神識，就是破斥覺知。這裡不破斥覺知，所以沒有這樣說。下文的『遍』（普遍）和『不遍』（不普遍）中有兩種對立的相，本文中沒有，這只是舉一個例子，其中的道理可以類推得知。如果破斥舊的觀點，舊的觀點認為，常住佛（永遠存在的佛）只有一個圓滿的智慧，只是照用不同，認知青色和黃色不同，照見真諦和俗諦不同。現在問，照用和本體是一還是異？如果本體和作用是一，那麼本體既然是一，作用也應該是一，那麼所有的作用就應該是一個作用。如果有萬種作用，就應該有萬個本體。如果本體和作用是不同的，本體常用就應該不是常。此外，舊的觀點認為，心是本體，苦樂、解惑是心上的作用。現在問，本體和作用如果是一，常有心就應該常有解惑，既然斷除了迷惑，就應當斷除心。如果解惑、苦樂和心是不同的，迷惑應該自己迷惑自己，心就不會迷惑，解脫也是這樣。又問，真諦和俗諦如果是一，應該同於常，同於無常，同於可說，同於不可說。真諦和俗諦如果是不同的，俗諦就在真諦之外，真諦就在俗諦之外。註釋中舉例說熱是火的相，提婆（Deva）的四宗論中，僧佉（Samkhya）派的人自己引用這個比喻來比喻神識和覺知的本體和相是一。現在天親（Vasubandhu）引用過來。現在說覺知確實是無常的，用三種意義來顯示覺知是無常的：一是苦樂不同，所以說是相各異；二是依靠違順等三種因緣而生起。

【English Translation】 English version If 『one』 does not conform to itself, then both consciousness (神覺, shen jue) and awareness (覺, jue) fall into dualistic appearances, asserting that it is both permanent and impermanent. Furthermore, these five difficulties are combined into three barriers. The first two difficulties are called the 『Difficulty of Abiding in the Doctrine』 (住宗難, zhu zong nan), clinging to the meaning of 『one,』 consciousness falls into impermanence, and awareness falls into permanence. Next, there are two difficulties: clinging to consciousness as permanent and clinging to awareness as impermanent, falling into the predicament of consciousness and awareness being different, contradicting the doctrine. The third difficulty is clinging to both consciousness and awareness as one, and clinging to consciousness as permanent while awareness is impermanent, falling into the state of being both one and different. Consciousness being permanent while awareness is impermanent leads to the meaning of difference; the essence of consciousness and awareness being one is the meaning of 『one.』 Moreover, the first two barriers cling to 『one doctrine』 (一宗, yi zong) and lose the 『two truths』 (二諦, er di) [conventional truth and ultimate truth]. Losing the 『two truths』 means that if both consciousness and awareness are considered impermanent, the truth of consciousness is lost; if both are considered permanent, the truth of awareness is lost. The next two situations cling to the 『two truths』 and lose 『one doctrine.』 The last situation has the deficiencies of the previous two. The treatise only presents two difficulties: first, consciousness is impermanent; second, the essence is not one. The reason for not attributing awareness to consciousness is that if awareness is attributed to consciousness, it would be refuting awareness. Here, awareness is not refuted, so it is not said that way. In the following text, 『pervasive』 (遍, bian) and 『non-pervasive』 (不遍, bu bian) have two opposing aspects, which are not present in this text. This is just an example, and the principle can be inferred. If refuting the old view, the old view holds that the eternally abiding Buddha (常住佛, chang zhu fo) has only one complete wisdom, but the functions of illumination are different, the cognition of blue and yellow are different, and the illumination of ultimate truth and conventional truth are different. Now, the question is whether the illumination and function are one or different from the essence? If the essence and function are one, then since the essence is one, the function should also be one, so all functions should be one function. If there are myriad functions, there should be myriad essences. If the essence and function are different, the essence and constant function should not be permanent. Furthermore, the old view holds that the mind is the essence, and suffering, joy, liberation, and delusion are functions of the mind. Now, the question is, if the essence and function are one, the constant mind should have constant liberation and delusion. Since delusion is eliminated, the mind should be eliminated. If liberation, suffering, joy, and the mind are different, delusion should delude itself, and the mind would not be deluded; liberation is also the same. Also, if ultimate truth and conventional truth are one, they should be the same as permanence, the same as impermanence, the same as speakable, and the same as unspeakable. If ultimate truth and conventional truth are different, conventional truth is outside ultimate truth, and ultimate truth is outside conventional truth. The commentary cites the example of heat being a characteristic of fire. In Deva's (提婆, Deva) Four Treatises, the Samkhya (僧佉, Samkhya) school themselves cite this metaphor to compare the essence and characteristics of consciousness and awareness as one. Now, Vasubandhu (天親, Vasubandhu) cites it. Now, it is said that awareness is indeed impermanent, using three meanings to show that awareness is impermanent: first, suffering and joy are different, so it is said that the characteristics are different; second, it arises depending on three conditions such as favorable and unfavorable.

云屬因緣故。三者墮於三世故云本無今有。外曰不生故常。救上神無常難也。神若始生可是無常。神既本有是故為常。故二十五諦云從冥初生覺。覺有于生是故無常。不云生神故神體是常。此但總相答難。猶未分明也。內曰若爾覺非神相。論主答中就二對難之。一常無常難。二遍不遍難。常無常難上明。神覺若一覺無常故神亦無常。此是得宗墮于無常。今明若覺無常而神是常則神覺便異。此是得常而失於一。故常無常中前後二難進退墮負。今云覺非神相者非體相也。僧佉人立覺是神體相。衛世人立覺是神標相。僧佉人如火以熱為相。衛世人如火以煙為相。是故今難。覺自無常神自是常。則覺非神體相。故云若爾覺非神相。複次下第二就遍不遍門亦有五難。一以神從覺覺不遍神亦不遍。二以覺從神相與俱遍。三神不從覺則神與覺異。四覺不從神覺與神異。五若欲令一而不相從則墮遍不遍二相。次還合五為三。初兩難得宗而失神覺遍不遍義。次兩難得神覺遍不遍義而失一宗。第五亦得一宗復得遍不遍義而墮亦一亦異。今文唯有三難。一者得遍不遍而失一宗。二者得於一宗而失遍不遍義。三墮亦一亦異。問常無常對中前以神從覺。覺無常故神亦無常。今遍不遍中何故不以神從覺令神應不遍。答上常無常第二難中明神常覺無常

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：外道認為，萬物是因緣和合而生，並且存在於過去、現在、未來這三個時間段中，所以說是本來沒有而現在才有的。外道又說，因為神不生不滅，所以是永恒不變的，這是爲了反駁認為神是無常的觀點。如果神是剛開始產生的，那就可以說是無常的；但神如果是本來就存在的，那麼就是永恒的。所以，二十五諦中說，從冥性中最初產生覺性，覺性是後來才有的，所以是無常的。但他們不說神是被生出來的，所以神本身是永恒的。這只是一個總體的回答，還不夠明確。內道反駁說：如果這樣，那麼覺性就不是神的體相。論主在回答中，就兩個方面進行反駁：一是常與無常的矛盾，二是周遍與不周遍的矛盾。常與無常的矛盾，前面已經說明，如果神和覺性是同一個，那麼覺性是無常的，神也應該是無常的。這就會導致他們的宗義落入無常的境地。現在說明，如果覺性是無常的，而神是永恒的，那麼神和覺性就是不同的。這就會導致他們得到了永恒，卻失去了神和覺性是同一個的觀點。所以，在常與無常的矛盾中，無論前進還是後退，都會陷入失敗。現在說覺性不是神的體相，不是指覺性不是神的本體。數論派（Samkhya）認為覺性是神的體相，勝論派（Vaisheshika）認為覺性是神的表相。數論派就像認為熱是火的相，勝論派就像認為煙是火的相。所以現在反駁說，覺性本身是無常的，神本身是永恒的，那麼覺性就不是神的體相。所以說，如果這樣，那麼覺性就不是神的體相。其次，下面第二點，就周遍與不周遍的方面，也有五種矛盾：一是如果神從屬於覺性，那麼覺性是不周遍的，神也應該是不周遍的。二是如果覺性從屬於神，那麼神和覺性都應該是周遍的。三是如果神不從屬於覺性，那麼神和覺性就是不同的。四是如果覺性不從屬於神，那麼覺性和神就是不同的。五是如果想要使神和覺性是同一個，但又不相互從屬，那麼就會陷入周遍與不周遍這兩種狀態。接下來，將這五種矛盾合併爲三種：最初兩種矛盾，得到了宗義，卻失去了神和覺性周遍與不周遍的含義。接下來兩種矛盾，得到了神和覺性周遍與不周遍的含義，卻失去了一體的宗義。第五種矛盾，既得到了一體的宗義，又得到了周遍與不周遍的含義，卻陷入了既是一體又是不同的境地。現在文中只有三種矛盾：一是得到了周遍與不周遍，卻失去了一體的宗義。二是得到了一體的宗義，卻失去了周遍與不周遍的含義。三是陷入了既是一體又是不同的境地。問：在常與無常的對立中，前面是以神從屬於覺性，覺性是無常的，所以神也是無常的。現在在周遍與不周遍中，為什麼不以神從屬於覺性，使神也應該是不周遍的呢？答：在前面常與無常的第二種矛盾中，已經說明了神是永恒的，覺性是無常的。

【English Translation】 English version: The heretics claim that all things arise from causes and conditions and exist in the three periods of time—past, present, and future—so they say that they were originally non-existent but now exist. The heretics also say that because the Self (神, Shen) does not arise or cease, it is eternal and unchanging. This is to refute the view that the Self is impermanent. If the Self were newly created, it could be said to be impermanent; but if the Self is originally existent, then it is eternal. Therefore, in the twenty-five Tattvas (二十五諦, Ershiwu Di), it is said that from Prakriti (冥性, Mingxing) initially arises Buddhi (覺性, Juexing). Buddhi is something that comes into being later, so it is impermanent. But they do not say that the Self is born, so the Self itself is eternal. This is only a general answer and is not clear enough. The internal school refutes: If that is the case, then Buddhi is not the characteristic of the Self. The commentator refutes from two aspects: first, the contradiction between permanence and impermanence; second, the contradiction between pervasiveness and non-pervasiveness. The contradiction between permanence and impermanence has been explained earlier. If the Self and Buddhi are the same, then Buddhi is impermanent, and the Self should also be impermanent. This would lead their doctrine to fall into the realm of impermanence. Now it is explained that if Buddhi is impermanent, and the Self is eternal, then the Self and Buddhi are different. This would lead them to gain eternity but lose the view that the Self and Buddhi are the same. Therefore, in the contradiction between permanence and impermanence, whether advancing or retreating, they will fall into failure. Now it is said that Buddhi is not the characteristic of the Self, not meaning that Buddhi is not the essence of the Self. The Samkhya (數論派, Shulun Pai) school believes that Buddhi is the essential characteristic of the Self, and the Vaisheshika (衛世人, Weishi Ren) school believes that Buddhi is the indicative characteristic of the Self. The Samkhya school is like considering heat as the characteristic of fire, and the Vaisheshika school is like considering smoke as the characteristic of fire. Therefore, it is now refuted that Buddhi itself is impermanent, and the Self itself is eternal, then Buddhi is not the essential characteristic of the Self. Therefore, it is said, 'If that is the case, then Buddhi is not the characteristic of the Self.' Secondly, below in the second point, regarding the aspect of pervasiveness and non-pervasiveness, there are also five contradictions: First, if the Self is subordinate to Buddhi, then Buddhi is non-pervasive, and the Self should also be non-pervasive. Second, if Buddhi is subordinate to the Self, then the Self and Buddhi should both be pervasive. Third, if the Self is not subordinate to Buddhi, then the Self and Buddhi are different. Fourth, if Buddhi is not subordinate to the Self, then Buddhi and the Self are different. Fifth, if one wants to make the Self and Buddhi the same but not mutually subordinate, then one will fall into the two states of pervasiveness and non-pervasiveness. Next, these five contradictions are merged into three: The first two contradictions gain the doctrine but lose the meaning of the Self and Buddhi being pervasive and non-pervasive. The next two contradictions gain the meaning of the Self and Buddhi being pervasive and non-pervasive but lose the doctrine of oneness. The fifth contradiction gains both the doctrine of oneness and the meaning of pervasiveness and non-pervasiveness but falls into the state of being both one and different. Now there are only three contradictions in the text: First, one gains pervasiveness and non-pervasiveness but loses the doctrine of oneness. Second, one gains the doctrine of oneness but loses the meaning of pervasiveness and non-pervasiveness. Third, one falls into the state of being both one and different. Question: In the opposition between permanence and impermanence, earlier it was based on the Self being subordinate to Buddhi, Buddhi being impermanent, so the Self is also impermanent. Now in pervasiveness and non-pervasiveness, why not base it on the Self being subordinate to Buddhi, so that the Self should also be non-pervasive? Answer: In the second contradiction of permanence and impermanence earlier, it has already been explained that the Self is eternal and Buddhi is impermanent.

則墮神覺體異。今接此文重就遍不遍義顯神覺體異。故不得以神從覺。若覺是神相重牒正破也。無有是處總非也。覺行一處者正破也。五道之中唯行一道。六塵之中偏覺一塵。五受之中偏行一受。乃至一身之中偏行一處。而神遍六塵五道乃至一身。則遍不遍殊神覺體異。是故覺非神之體相也。註釋中以覺從神者此是勢破。為成神覺不一耳。複次第二以神從覺破。若必言神與覺一則神與覺等。覺既不遍神亦不遍。此難與前翻覆相成。前得遍不遍墮神覺異。今得神覺一則失遍不遍。注云火無熱不熱者。熱是火相。唯有于熱無有不熱。神亦應爾。唯有不遍無有于遍。複次下第三二相破。所以有此破來者。外慾避前二難立兩義俱成者。一神覺體一。二者神遍而覺不遍。是故今作二相難之。若欲令神遍覺有不遍。不遍處有神。此神則無覺。覺處有神。神則有覺。若爾神亦有覺相亦無覺相。汝不應言神但以覺為相。上亦不應言常覺無不覺時。又神以覺為相。則有覺有不覺。火以熱為相。應有熱有不熱。熱是火體相。無熱則無火。覺是神體相。無覺則無神。若無覺之處有神。無熱之處有火。又無覺之處有神。應有覺之處無神。又無覺之處有神。一切草木悉應有神。若草木有神。眾生應無神。又若神有覺不覺相則墮亦一亦異。覺處有神

【現代漢語翻譯】則會陷入神與覺知在本體上的差異。現在繼續探討這段文字，再次從遍與不遍的意義上顯明神與覺知的本體差異。因此，不能認為神從屬於覺知。如果認為覺知就是神，這是重複論述，正面駁斥。『無有是處』，總而言之是不對的。認為覺知和行為在同一處，這是正面駁斥。在五道之中，只行於一道；在六塵之中，偏執於一塵；在五受之中，偏行於一受；乃至在自身之中，偏行於一處。而神遍及六塵、五道乃至自身，那麼遍與不遍就顯現出神與覺知的本體差異。因此，覺知不是神的本體和表相。註釋中說覺知從屬於神，這是一種權宜之計，爲了說明神與覺知不是一體。再次，第二點，從神從屬於覺知的角度進行駁斥。如果一定要說神與覺知是一體的，那麼神與覺知就是等同的。既然覺知不是普遍存在的，那麼神也不是普遍存在的。這個難點與前面的論述相互呼應。前面得出遍與不遍導致神與覺知的差異，現在得出神與覺知一體則會失去普遍性。註釋中說火沒有熱與不熱的狀態，熱是火的表相，只有熱的狀態，沒有不熱的狀態。神也應該如此，只有不遍的狀態，沒有普遍的狀態。再次，下面第三點，從二者相互對立的角度進行駁斥。之所以有這樣的駁斥，是因為對方想要避免前兩個難點，提出兩種觀點都能成立：一是神與覺知本體是一體的，二是神是普遍存在的，而覺知不是普遍存在的。因此，現在從兩個方面進行反駁。如果想要讓神是普遍存在的，而覺知有不普遍存在的地方，那麼在不普遍存在的地方有神，這個神就沒有覺知；在有覺知的地方有神，這個神就有覺知。如果這樣，神既有覺知的表相，也有沒有覺知的表相。你不應該說神祇是以覺知為表相。上面也不應該說常覺沒有不覺的時候。又，神以覺知為表相，那麼就應該有覺知和不覺知。火以熱為表相，就應該有熱和不熱。熱是火的本體和表相，沒有熱就沒有火。覺知是神的本體和表相，沒有覺知就沒有神。如果沒有覺知的地方有神，沒有熱的地方有火。又，沒有覺知的地方有神，那麼一切草木都應該有神。如果草木有神，眾生就應該沒有神。又如果神有覺知和不覺知的表相，那麼就會陷入亦一亦異的境地。有覺知的地方有神。

【English Translation】 Then one falls into the difference in the essence of Shen (神, spirit/divinity) and Jue (覺, awareness/perception). Now, continuing with this text, we further clarify the difference in the essence of Shen and Jue from the meaning of 'pervasive' and 'non-pervasive'. Therefore, one cannot consider Shen as subordinate to Jue. If one considers Jue to be Shen, this is a redundant statement, a direct refutation. 'There is no such place', in short, it is incorrect. To think that Jue and action are in the same place is a direct refutation. Within the five realms, one only acts in one realm; within the six senses, one is attached to one sense object; within the five types of feeling, one acts upon one feeling; even within oneself, one acts in one place. But Shen pervades the six senses, the five realms, and even oneself, then the difference between pervasive and non-pervasive reveals the difference in the essence of Shen and Jue. Therefore, Jue is not the essence and appearance of Shen. The commentary that Jue is subordinate to Shen is an expedient measure, to illustrate that Shen and Jue are not one and the same. Again, secondly, refuting from the perspective of Shen being subordinate to Jue. If one must say that Shen and Jue are one, then Shen and Jue are equal. Since Jue is not universally present, then Shen is also not universally present. This difficulty echoes the previous discussion. The previous discussion concluded that the difference between pervasive and non-pervasive leads to the difference between Shen and Jue, and now it is concluded that if Shen and Jue are one, then universality is lost. The commentary says that fire has no state of hot and not hot, heat is the appearance of fire, there is only the state of heat, there is no state of not hot. Shen should also be like this, there is only the state of non-pervasiveness, there is no state of pervasiveness. Again, thirdly, refuting from the perspective of the two being mutually opposed. The reason for this refutation is that the other party wants to avoid the previous two difficulties and propose that both views can be established: one is that the essence of Shen and Jue is one, and the second is that Shen is universally present, while Jue is not universally present. Therefore, now refuting from two aspects. If one wants to make Shen universally present, and Jue has places where it is not universally present, then in places where it is not universally present there is Shen, and this Shen has no Jue; in places where there is Jue there is Shen, and this Shen has Jue. If so, Shen has both the appearance of Jue and the appearance of no Jue. You should not say that Shen only takes Jue as its appearance. Above, you should also not say that constant Jue has no time of non-Jue. Also, Shen takes Jue as its appearance, then there should be Jue and non-Jue. Fire takes heat as its appearance, then there should be heat and non-heat. Heat is the essence and appearance of fire, without heat there is no fire. Jue is the essence and appearance of Shen, without Jue there is no Shen. If there is Shen in a place without Jue, there is fire in a place without heat. Also, if there is Shen in a place without Jue, then all plants and trees should have Shen. If plants and trees have Shen, then sentient beings should have no Shen. Also, if Shen has the appearance of Jue and non-Jue, then it will fall into the state of being both one and different. There is Shen in a place with Jue.

神與覺一。無覺處有神則神與覺異。問常無常中二難遍不遍三難為是亂難為次第來耶。答並次第來也。常無常中二關䨱卻。遍不遍中接常無常。汝非但有常無常異。復有遍不遍異。故有第一難。次明若言不異則神同覺不遍。三若不同覺不遍而言神遍神則二相。故五難宛轉釣鎖而來。外曰力遍故無過。力者理也體也。有力用也事也。以覺有于用故名有力。問明何物體用。答正論覺體用也。凡有二義。一力二有力。以覺力與神俱常俱遍。若有力則不遍。以覺力與神俱常則通常中五難。以覺力與神俱遍則通遍中五難。故力常力遍免上十難也。今總括常遍始終凡有十難。今文內常中有二。遍中有三。故成五也。通第一難云。若覺無常神常。可以神從覺令覺無常神則無常。今覺力既常。神與覺一。則覺常神亦常故無神無常過。通第二難云。若神常覺無常。則神覺體異覺非神相。今以覺力常故在神亦常。故神覺體一無覺非神相過。通第三難者。若神遍覺不遍。則神覺體異覺非神相。以神遍覺力亦遍故覺是神相。無覺非神相過。通第四難者。若覺不遍神遍。以神從覺覺不遍神亦不遍。今覺力遍。以神從覺覺遍神亦遍。故無不遍過也。通第五難者。若覺不遍而神遍。神墮覺處則覺。墮不覺處則不覺。今覺力遍。神唯墮覺處不墮不覺處。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：神與覺（Bodhi，覺悟）是一體的。如果沒有覺悟的地方有神存在，那麼神與覺悟就是不同的。問題：常與無常、遍與不遍這兩種難題，是同時出現還是依次出現的呢？回答：是依次出現的。常與無常之中有兩重關卡阻礙，遍與不遍之中又連線著常與無常。你不僅有常與無常的差異，還有遍與不遍的差異，所以有第一重難題。接下來闡明，如果說神與覺悟沒有差異，那麼神就等同於覺悟，不周遍。第三，如果說神與覺悟不同，覺悟不周遍，而說神周遍，那麼神就具有兩種自相矛盾的屬性。所以這五重難題就像宛轉的釣鎖一樣接連而來。外道辯駁說，『力』（能量、力量）是周遍的，所以沒有過失。這裡的『力』指的是理、本體，有力量的作用和事用。因為覺悟具有作用，所以稱為『有力』。問題：闡明什麼是本體和作用？回答：正是論述覺悟的本體和作用。凡是有兩種含義：一是『力』，二是『有力』。因為覺悟的力量與神一同是常、一同是周遍的。如果有『力』，就不周遍。因為覺悟的力量與神一同是常，那麼就貫通常中的五重難題。因為覺悟的力量與神一同是周遍的，那麼就貫通遍中的五重難題。所以『力常』、『力遍』可以避免上面的十重難題。現在總括常與遍，從始至終總共有十重難題。現在文中有常中的兩種，遍中的三種，所以構成五重難題。貫通第一重難題說，如果覺悟是無常的，神是常的，那麼可以讓神順從覺悟，使覺悟成為無常，神也成為無常。現在覺悟的力量既然是常的，神與覺悟是一體的，那麼覺悟是常的，神也是常的，所以沒有神是無常的過失。貫通第二重難題說，如果神是常的，覺悟是無常的，那麼神與覺悟的本體是不同的，覺悟不是神的相。現在因為覺悟的力量是常的，所以在神也是常的，所以神與覺悟的本體是一體的，沒有覺悟不是神的相的過失。貫通第三重難題說，如果神是周遍的，覺悟是不周遍的，那麼神與覺悟的本體是不同的，覺悟不是神的相。因為神是周遍的，覺悟的力量也是周遍的，所以覺悟是神的相，沒有覺悟不是神的相的過失。貫通第四重難題說，如果覺悟是不周遍的，神是周遍的，那麼神順從覺悟，覺悟不周遍，神也不周遍。現在覺悟的力量是周遍的，因為神順從覺悟，覺悟是周遍的，神也是周遍的，所以沒有不周遍的過失。貫通第五重難題說，如果覺悟是不周遍的而神是周遍的，神落入覺悟的地方，那麼覺悟就落入不覺悟的地方，就不覺悟。現在覺悟的力量是周遍的，神祇落入覺悟的地方，不落入不覺悟的地方。

【English Translation】 English version: God and Bodhi (覺, enlightenment) are one. If there is God where there is no enlightenment, then God and enlightenment are different. Question: Do the two difficulties of permanence and impermanence, pervasiveness and non-pervasiveness, come simultaneously or sequentially? Answer: They come sequentially. There are two barriers in permanence and impermanence, and pervasiveness and non-pervasiveness are connected to permanence and impermanence. You not only have the difference between permanence and impermanence, but also the difference between pervasiveness and non-pervasiveness, so there is the first difficulty. Next, it is explained that if it is said that there is no difference between God and enlightenment, then God is the same as enlightenment and is not pervasive. Third, if it is said that God and enlightenment are different, enlightenment is not pervasive, and it is said that God is pervasive, then God has two contradictory attributes. Therefore, these five difficulties come one after another like winding hooks and locks. The heretics argue that 'power' (力, energy, strength) is pervasive, so there is no fault. The 'power' here refers to principle, the essence, and has the function and use of power. Because enlightenment has function, it is called 'having power'. Question: Explain what is essence and function? Answer: It is precisely discussing the essence and function of enlightenment. Generally, there are two meanings: one is 'power' (力), and the other is 'having power' (有力). Because the power of enlightenment and God are both permanent and pervasive. If there is 'power' (力), it is not pervasive. Because the power of enlightenment and God are both permanent, then it connects the five difficulties in permanence. Because the power of enlightenment and God are both pervasive, then it connects the five difficulties in pervasiveness. Therefore, 'power permanence' (力常) and 'power pervasiveness' (力遍) can avoid the above ten difficulties. Now, summarizing permanence and pervasiveness, there are a total of ten difficulties from beginning to end. Now there are two types in permanence and three types in pervasiveness in the text, so it constitutes five difficulties. Connecting the first difficulty, if enlightenment is impermanent and God is permanent, then God can follow enlightenment, making enlightenment impermanent and God also impermanent. Now that the power of enlightenment is permanent, and God and enlightenment are one, then enlightenment is permanent and God is also permanent, so there is no fault that God is impermanent. Connecting the second difficulty, if God is permanent and enlightenment is impermanent, then the essence of God and enlightenment are different, and enlightenment is not the aspect of God. Now because the power of enlightenment is permanent, it is also permanent in God, so the essence of God and enlightenment are one, and there is no fault that enlightenment is not the aspect of God. Connecting the third difficulty, if God is pervasive and enlightenment is not pervasive, then the essence of God and enlightenment are different, and enlightenment is not the aspect of God. Because God is pervasive and the power of enlightenment is also pervasive, so enlightenment is the aspect of God, and there is no fault that enlightenment is not the aspect of God. Connecting the fourth difficulty, if enlightenment is not pervasive and God is pervasive, then God follows enlightenment, enlightenment is not pervasive, and God is also not pervasive. Now the power of enlightenment is pervasive, because God follows enlightenment, enlightenment is pervasive, and God is also pervasive, so there is no fault of non-pervasiveness. Connecting the fifth difficulty, if enlightenment is not pervasive and God is pervasive, and God falls into the place of enlightenment, then enlightenment falls into the place of non-enlightenment and is not enlightened. Now the power of enlightenment is pervasive, and God only falls into the place of enlightenment and does not fall into the place of non-enlightenment.

故無二相過也。問外道何故言覺與神齊俱常俱遍。答彼計神覺一體。統御義說神。了別義說覺。統御之神既遍五道。即此統御之神有覺知理亦遍五道。統御之神其體既常。有覺之理亦常。是故神既遍常覺理亦遍常也。注云有處覺雖無用此中亦有覺力者。此是遍五道覺理之處。五道之中雖無覺用而有覺體。是故無無覺過偏答最後二相難也。以覺理遍故神則遍。覺無有不覺。既通常中二難則具通五。既答遍中三亦具答遍中五也。內曰不然力有力不異故者。力有力者牒外義也。不異者正責也有無俱不異覺力既遍。有力即遍。此是有力不異力也。此亦是以用同體。體遍用亦遍若有力不遍力亦不遍。此是力不異有力。亦是將體同用。用既不遍體亦不遍。唯有此二更無第三體遍用不遍。有力不遍力亦不遍。則覺成不遍還墮遍中五難。若有力不遍則力亦不遍。覺既不遍覺則無常還墮常中五難若力遍常有力亦遍常乃免十難。應一時之中遍覺六道之苦。亦一時之中遍覺六塵。則僧佉之人現身之中應墮地獄煮燒之弊乃至應有餓鬼飢渴等苦。又力有力不異者。有力是現用力是體何以知耶。外云。力遍故知力是體也。今言不異者。只見有力實無力遍。正破其力遍之言也。既無力遍。以何異於有力。故云不異。注云若有覺力處。此牒外義也。是中

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本因此，不存在『二相過』（dualistic fallacy）的過失。問：外道（指佛教以外的其他學派）為什麼說『覺』（覺知）與『神』（自在神）是齊同、常恒、周遍的呢？答：他們認為『神』與『覺』是一體的。『統御』之義稱為『神』，『了別』（辨別）之義稱為『覺』。統御之神既然周遍五道（地獄、餓鬼、畜生、人、天），那麼這個統御之神具有覺知的道理也周遍五道。統御之神的本體既然是常恒的，那麼具有覺知的道理也是常恒的。所以，神既然周遍且常恒，覺知的道理也周遍且常恒。註釋說：『有些地方覺雖然沒有作用，但其中也有覺的力量。』這是指覺的道理周遍五道之處。五道之中雖然沒有覺的作用，但有覺的本體。因此，沒有『無覺過』（the fallacy of non-sentience），這只是片面地回答了最後的兩個『相難』（aspectual difficulties）。因為覺的道理周遍，所以神就周遍。覺沒有不覺的時候。既然貫通『常中二難』（two difficulties in permanence），那麼就完全貫通『五難』（five difficulties）。既然回答了『遍中三』（three difficulties in pervasiveness），也就完全回答了『遍中五』（five difficulties in pervasiveness）。內道（佛教）說：『不是這樣的，力（作用）與有力（具有作用者）不是沒有差異的。』『力』與『有力』是引用外道的觀點。『不異』是正面的駁斥。如果『覺力』（power of awareness）是周遍的，那麼『有力』就是周遍的。這就是『有力不異力』（the possessor of power is not different from power）。這也是以作用等同於本體。本體周遍，作用也周遍。如果『有力』不周遍，那麼『力』也不周遍。這就是『力不異有力』（power is not different from the possessor of power）。這也是將本體等同於作用。作用既然不周遍，本體也不周遍。只有這兩種情況，沒有第三種『本體周遍而作用不周遍』的情況。如果『有力』不周遍，那麼『力』也不周遍，那麼覺就成為不周遍的，還是會落入『遍中五難』。如果『有力』不周遍，那麼『力』也不周遍，覺既然不周遍，那麼覺就沒有常恒性，還是會落入『常中五難』。如果『力』周遍且常恒，『有力』也周遍且常恒，才能免除這十種困難。應該在一時之中普遍覺知六道（地獄、餓鬼、畜生、人、天、阿修羅）的痛苦，也應該在一時之中普遍覺知六塵（色、聲、香、味、觸、法）。那麼，僧佉派（數論派，印度哲學流派）的人在現身之中就應該墮入地獄遭受煮燒的痛苦，乃至應該有餓鬼的飢渴等痛苦。又，『力有力不異』，『有力』是現在的，『力』是本體，為什麼知道呢？外道說：『因為力是周遍的，所以知道力是本體。』現在說『不異』，只是看到『有力』，實際上沒有『力』的周遍，正是爲了駁斥他們『力』周遍的說法。既然沒有『力』的周遍，用什麼來區別于『有力』呢？所以說『不異』。註釋說：『如果有覺力的地方』，這是引用外道的觀點。『是中』

【English Translation】 English version Therefore, there is no fallacy of 'dualistic fallacy'. Question: Why do the heretics (referring to schools other than Buddhism) say that '覺' (覺知, awareness) and '神' (自在神, Ishvara) are equal, constant, and pervasive? Answer: They believe that '神' and '覺' are one entity. '統御' (governance) is called '神', and '了別' (辨別, discernment) is called '覺'. Since the governing 神 is pervasive throughout the five realms (地獄, hell; 餓鬼, hungry ghosts; 畜生, animals; 人, humans; 天, gods), then the principle of awareness of this governing 神 is also pervasive throughout the five realms. Since the essence of the governing 神 is constant, then the principle of awareness is also constant. Therefore, since 神 is pervasive and constant, the principle of awareness is also pervasive and constant. The commentary says: 'In some places, although awareness has no function, there is also the power of awareness.' This refers to the places where the principle of awareness pervades the five realms. Although there is no function of awareness in the five realms, there is the essence of awareness. Therefore, there is no '無覺過' (the fallacy of non-sentience), which only partially answers the last two '相難' (aspectual difficulties). Because the principle of awareness is pervasive, 神 is pervasive. Awareness has no time when it is not aware. Since it penetrates the '常中二難' (two difficulties in permanence), it completely penetrates the '五難' (five difficulties). Since it answers the '遍中三' (three difficulties in pervasiveness), it also completely answers the '遍中五' (five difficulties in pervasiveness). The inner school (Buddhism) says: 'It is not so, 力 (作用, action) and 有力 (具有作用者, the possessor of action) are not without difference.' '力' and '有力' are quoting the views of the heretics. '不異' (not different) is a direct refutation. If '覺力' (power of awareness) is pervasive, then '有力' is pervasive. This is '有力不異力' (the possessor of power is not different from power). This is also equating function with essence. If the essence is pervasive, the function is also pervasive. If '有力' is not pervasive, then '力' is also not pervasive. This is '力不異有力' (power is not different from the possessor of power). This is also equating essence with function. Since the function is not pervasive, the essence is also not pervasive. There are only these two situations, there is no third situation of 'essence is pervasive but function is not pervasive'. If '有力' is not pervasive, then '力' is also not pervasive, then awareness becomes non-pervasive, and it will still fall into the '遍中五難'. If '有力' is not pervasive, then '力' is also not pervasive, since awareness is not pervasive, then awareness has no permanence, and it will still fall into the '常中五難'. If '力' is pervasive and constant, and '有力' is also pervasive and constant, then these ten difficulties can be avoided. One should universally be aware of the suffering of the six realms (地獄, hell; 餓鬼, hungry ghosts; 畜生, animals; 人, humans; 天, gods; 阿修羅, asuras) in one moment, and one should also universally be aware of the six dusts (色, form; 聲, sound; 香, smell; 味, taste; 觸, touch; 法, dharma) in one moment. Then, the people of the Samkhya school (數論派, an Indian philosophical school) should fall into hell and suffer the pain of being boiled in their present bodies, and even have the hunger and thirst of hungry ghosts. Also, '力有力不異', '有力' is the present, '力' is the essence, how do we know? The heretics say: 'Because 力 is pervasive, we know that 力 is the essence.' Now saying '不異', only sees '有力', but there is actually no pervasiveness of '力', which is precisely to refute their claim that '力' is pervasive. Since there is no pervasiveness of '力', what is used to distinguish it from '有力'? Therefore, it is said '不異'. The commentary says: 'If there is a place of the power of awareness', this is quoting the views of the heretics. '是中'

覺應有用正明有力不異於力也。而無用者明五道之中無有覺用。既無覺用即無覺體。是故汝言非也。此非其五道無用處亦有覺力也。若如是說下重取意非之。即明無第三有體而無用。外云。體遍用不遍體用不同。不應將用同體令體遍用亦遍。亦不應以體同用令無用處則無有體。故取意牒之。但有是語者總非也。五道之中無有覺用而有覺體。有語無義故云但也。外曰因緣合故覺力有用者。救上力有力不異難也。力與神齊故神遍力亦遍。以無五道遍緣合故有力不遍。一處緣合則一處有用。故有力不遍。是故力有力異也。內曰墮生相者。前明覺與神齊神遍用亦遍。今明用假緣發體亦應然。故云墮生相也。外曰如燈者。緣能發用不能生體。如燈顯照物不能成物。如舊明本有義假緣得顯緣不能生。內曰下明五塵成瓶。若無燈時身觸亦得。又有瓶用。若因緣未合時取覺不得。亦無有用。二義不同故非喻也。外曰如色者。前就能了為喻。內以所了為難。今舍燈就色明瓶具五塵色之一分。燈若未照取色不得。又無發識之用。如緣未合取覺不得又無覺知之用。兩義全同故云如色。或言是壁上之色。此亦無失。但就瓶色為勝。內曰下汝舍瓶就色。雖勉前過而更招后失。然青黃之色燈未照時其相已了。汝覺以了別為相。緣未合時未能了別。云

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：覺的作用、應驗、光明和力量，與力量本身並無不同。而所謂『無用』，是指在五道（地獄道、餓鬼道、畜生道、阿修羅道、人道）之中，沒有覺的作用。既然沒有覺的作用，也就沒有覺的本體。因此，你的說法是不對的。這並非說五道沒有作用之處，也有覺的力量。如果這樣說，下面會再次駁斥這種觀點，說明沒有第三種有本體而無作用的情況。外道說：『本體是普遍存在的，而作用不是普遍存在的，本體和作用是不同的。不應該將作用等同於本體，從而認為本體普遍存在，作用也普遍存在。也不應該因為本體等同於作用，就認為沒有作用的地方就沒有本體。』所以，這裡再次強調這個觀點。但凡有這種說法的人，都是不對的。五道之中沒有覺的作用，但有覺的本體。這種說法沒有意義，所以說是『但也』。外道說：『因為因緣和合，所以覺的力量才有用。』這是爲了反駁前面所說的『力量有力，沒有不同』的觀點。力量與神識是相等的，所以神識普遍存在，力量也應該普遍存在。因為沒有五道普遍的因緣和合，所以力量不是普遍存在的。一處因緣和合，則一處有用，所以力量不是普遍存在的。因此，力量和力量是有區別的。內道說：『墮入生滅相。』前面說明覺與神識相等，神識普遍存在，作用也普遍存在。現在說明作用是憑藉因緣而生髮的，本體也應該如此，所以說是『墮入生滅相』。外道說：『如同燈一樣。』因緣能夠引發作用，但不能產生本體，如同燈光照亮物體，但不能產生物體。如同舊有的光明，本來就存在，憑藉因緣才得以顯現，因緣不能產生光明。內道說：『下面說明五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸）構成瓶子。』如果沒有燈光，身體的觸覺也能感受到，並且瓶子也有作用。如果因緣沒有和合，就無法獲得覺，也沒有作用。這兩種含義不同，所以這個比喻是不恰當的。外道說：『如同顏色一樣。』前面是用能了別的燈光來做比喻，內道用所了別的顏色來反駁。現在捨棄燈光，用顏色來說明瓶子具有五塵中的色塵。燈光如果沒有照耀，就無法獲得顏色，也沒有產生識別的作用。如同因緣沒有和合，就無法獲得覺，也沒有覺知的作用。這兩種含義完全相同，所以說是『如同顏色』。或者有人說是墻壁上的顏色，這也沒有什麼不對。但用瓶子的顏色來做比喻更好。內道說：『下面你捨棄瓶子，用顏色來做比喻，雖然勉強彌補了前面的過失，但又招致了後面的錯誤。』然而，青色和黃色的顏色，在燈光沒有照耀的時候，它的相狀已經很明顯了。你的覺是以了別為相狀的，在因緣沒有和合的時候，不能夠了別，說現代漢語譯本：覺的作用、應驗、光明和力量，與力量本身並無不同。而所謂『無用』，是指在五道（地獄道、餓鬼道、畜生道、阿修羅道、人道）之中，沒有覺的作用。既然沒有覺的作用，也就沒有覺的本體。因此，你的說法是不對的。這並非說五道沒有作用之處，也有覺的力量。如果這樣說，下面會再次駁斥這種觀點，說明沒有第三種有本體而無作用的情況。外道說：『本體是普遍存在的，而作用不是普遍存在的，本體和作用是不同的。不應該將作用等同於本體，從而認為本體普遍存在，作用也普遍存在。也不應該因為本體等同於作用，就認為沒有作用的地方就沒有本體。』所以，這裡再次強調這個觀點。但凡有這種說法的人，都是不對的。五道之中沒有覺的作用，但有覺的本體。這種說法沒有意義，所以說是『但也』。外道說：『因為因緣和合，所以覺的力量才有用。』這是爲了反駁前面所說的『力量有力，沒有不同』的觀點。力量與神識是相等的，所以神識普遍存在，力量也應該普遍存在。因為沒有五道普遍的因緣和合，所以力量不是普遍存在的。一處因緣和合，則一處有用，所以力量不是普遍存在的。因此，力量和力量是有區別的。內道說：『墮入生滅相。』前面說明覺與神識相等，神識普遍存在，作用也普遍存在。現在說明作用是憑藉因緣而生髮的，本體也應該如此，所以說是『墮入生滅相』。外道說：『如同燈一樣。』因緣能夠引發作用，但不能產生本體，如同燈光照亮物體，但不能產生物體。如同舊有的光明，本來就存在，憑藉因緣才得以顯現，因緣不能產生光明。內道說：『下面說明五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸）構成瓶子。』如果沒有燈光，身體的觸覺也能感受到，並且瓶子也有作用。如果因緣沒有和合，就無法獲得覺，也沒有作用。這兩種含義不同，所以這個比喻是不恰當的。外道說：『如同顏色一樣。』前面是用能了別的燈光來做比喻，內道用所了別的顏色來反駁。現在捨棄燈光，用顏色來說明瓶子具有五塵中的色塵。燈光如果沒有照耀，就無法獲得顏色，也沒有產生識別的作用。如同因緣沒有和合，就無法獲得覺，也沒有覺知的作用。這兩種含義完全相同，所以說是『如同顏色』。或者有人說是墻壁上的顏色，這也沒有什麼不對。但用瓶子的顏色來做比喻更好。內道說：『下面你捨棄瓶子，用顏色來做比喻，雖然勉強彌補了前面的過失，但又招致了後面的錯誤。』然而，青色和黃色的顏色，在燈光沒有照耀的時候，它的相狀已經很明顯了。你的覺是以了別為相狀的，在因緣沒有和合的時候，不能夠了別，說

【English Translation】 English version: The function, response, brightness, and power of awareness are no different from power itself. And 'uselessness' refers to the absence of the function of awareness in the five realms (Gati) (hell realm, hungry ghost realm, animal realm, Asura realm, and human realm). Since there is no function of awareness, there is no substance of awareness. Therefore, your statement is incorrect. This does not mean that the five realms have no place for function; they also have the power of awareness. If you say so, the following will refute this view again, explaining that there is no third case of having substance without function. The outsider says: 'Substance is universal, but function is not universal; substance and function are different. One should not equate function with substance, thereby thinking that if substance is universal, function is also universal. Nor should one equate substance with function, thereby thinking that where there is no function, there is no substance.' Therefore, this point is emphasized again here. Anyone who makes such a statement is incorrect. In the five realms, there is no function of awareness, but there is the substance of awareness. This statement is meaningless, so it is said 'but also'. The outsider says: 'Because conditions come together, the power of awareness is useful.' This is to refute the previous statement that 'power is powerful, there is no difference'. Power is equal to consciousness, so if consciousness is universal, power should also be universal. Because there is no universal combination of conditions in the five realms, power is not universal. Where conditions come together, there is usefulness, so power is not universal. Therefore, power and power are different. The insider says: 'Falling into the phase of arising and ceasing.' The previous explanation stated that awareness is equal to consciousness, consciousness is universal, and function is also universal. Now it is explained that function arises by relying on conditions, and substance should also be like this, so it is said 'falling into the phase of arising and ceasing'. The outsider says: 'Like a lamp.' Conditions can trigger function, but cannot produce substance, just as a lamp illuminates objects but cannot create objects. Like the old light, it exists originally, and it is revealed by relying on conditions; conditions cannot produce light. The insider says: 'The following explains that the five aggregates (form, sound, smell, taste, touch) constitute a bottle.' If there is no light, the sense of touch can still be felt, and the bottle also has a function. If the conditions have not come together, awareness cannot be obtained, and there is no function. These two meanings are different, so this analogy is inappropriate. The outsider says: 'Like color.' The previous analogy used the light of the lamp that can distinguish, and the insider refutes with the color that is distinguished. Now, abandoning the lamp, color is used to explain that the bottle has the aggregate of form among the five aggregates. If the light does not shine, color cannot be obtained, and there is no function of generating consciousness. Just as if the conditions have not come together, awareness cannot be obtained, and there is no function of awareness. These two meanings are completely the same, so it is said 'like color'. Or some say it is the color on the wall, which is also not wrong. But it is better to use the color of the bottle as an analogy. The insider says: 'Below, you abandon the bottle and use color as an analogy, although you barely make up for the previous mistake, you have caused a later mistake.' However, the colors of blue and yellow, when the light has not shone, their appearance is already very clear. Your awareness takes distinction as its appearance, and when the conditions have not come together, it cannot distinguish, saying English version: The function, response, brightness, and power of awareness are no different from power itself. And 'uselessness' refers to the absence of the function of awareness in the five realms (Gati) (hell realm, hungry ghost realm, animal realm, Asura realm, and human realm). Since there is no function of awareness, there is no substance of awareness. Therefore, your statement is incorrect. This does not mean that the five realms have no place for function; they also have the power of awareness. If you say so, the following will refute this view again, explaining that there is no third case of having substance without function. The outsider says: 'Substance is universal, but function is not universal; substance and function are different. One should not equate function with substance, thereby thinking that if substance is universal, function is also universal. Nor should one equate substance with function, thereby thinking that where there is no function, there is no substance.' Therefore, this point is emphasized again here. Anyone who makes such a statement is incorrect. In the five realms, there is no function of awareness, but there is the substance of awareness. This statement is meaningless, so it is said 'but also'. The outsider says: 'Because conditions come together, the power of awareness is useful.' This is to refute the previous statement that 'power is powerful, there is no difference'. Power is equal to consciousness, so if consciousness is universal, power should also be universal. Because there is no universal combination of conditions in the five realms, power is not universal. Where conditions come together, there is usefulness, so power is not universal. Therefore, power and power are different. The insider says: 'Falling into the phase of arising and ceasing.' The previous explanation stated that awareness is equal to consciousness, consciousness is universal, and function is also universal. Now it is explained that function arises by relying on conditions, and substance should also be like this, so it is said 'falling into the phase of arising and ceasing'. The outsider says: 'Like a lamp.' Conditions can trigger function, but cannot produce substance, just as a lamp illuminates objects but cannot create objects. Like the old light, it exists originally, and it is revealed by relying on conditions; conditions cannot produce light. The insider says: 'The following explains that the five aggregates (form, sound, smell, taste, touch) constitute a bottle.' If there is no light, the sense of touch can still be felt, and the bottle also has a function. If the conditions have not come together, awareness cannot be obtained, and there is no function. These two meanings are different, so this analogy is inappropriate. The outsider says: 'Like color.' The previous analogy used the light of the lamp that can distinguish, and the insider refutes with the color that is distinguished. Now, abandoning the lamp, color is used to explain that the bottle has the aggregate of form among the five aggregates. If the light does not shine, color cannot be obtained, and there is no function of generating consciousness. Just as if the conditions have not come together, awareness cannot be obtained, and there is no function of awareness. These two meanings are completely the same, so it is said 'like color'. Or some say it is the color on the wall, which is also not wrong. But it is better to use the color of the bottle as an analogy. The insider says: 'Below, you abandon the bottle and use color as an analogy, although you barely make up for the previous mistake, you have caused a later mistake.' However, the colors of blue and yellow, when the light has not shone, their appearance is already very clear. Your awareness takes distinction as its appearance, and when the conditions have not come together, it cannot distinguish, saying

何將已了之色喻未了之覺。問何故破燈無修妒路。破色有修妒路也。答外道根本燈色合譬。燈喻于緣色譬如覺。燈未照色取色不得。亦無發識之用。如緣未合取覺不得。覺亦無用。但天親開外燈色以為兩救義。生內曰以破于燈。故破燈無修妒路。還用提婆本答。以破於色故有修妒路。複次以無相故。前明瞭不了異故法譬不同。今辨有相無相別故法譬有異。是故重破。此中色有三句覺亦三句。色三者。一無相故標色無相也。明色無有人知之相故云無相。色相不以人知為色相者。第二句釋色無相也。色自有青黃為相。不以人知為相。是故下第三句結無相也。以色不以人知為相故人不知時常有色體也。汝知是神相者。標神以知為相也。不應以無知處為知。第二句呵外人未有知時有于覺體。汝法中知覺一義。故外謂人不知時有覺。即是無知時有覺義。是故今責之。知即是覺。若無知即無覺。若有覺即有知。云何言無知時有覺。若無知時有覺。應無覺時有知也。又知覺一義。無知即無覺。無覺即無神。以神覺一體也。外曰優樓迦下第三別出論義。其人後論凡有五義。一者道術后興。二者行世不盛。三依一異四句是第二異義故后出論也。四者見一義有失。謂異無過。五者見論主借異以破一。謂異有道理是故出論。往復五番皆引喻明

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本如何用已經熄滅的燈光來比喻尚未產生的覺知？有人問：為什麼打破燈沒有過失（修妒路，指責），而破壞顏色卻有過失呢？回答：外道的根本在於將燈光和顏色合在一起作比喻。燈光比喻為緣（條件），顏色比喻為覺知。燈光沒有照到顏色，就無法獲取顏色，也沒有產生識別的作用。同樣，如果緣沒有聚合，就無法獲取覺知，覺知也就沒有作用。但是，天親菩薩將外道的燈光和顏色分為兩種救濟的意義。生起內在的意義在於破除燈光。所以，打破燈沒有過失。仍然用提婆菩薩的本來回答，因為破除了顏色，所以有過失。再次，因為無相的緣故。前面因為明瞭和不明瞭的差異，所以法和譬喻不同。現在辨別有相和無相的區別，所以法和譬喻有差異。因此，再次破斥。這裡顏色有三句話，覺知也有三句話。顏色三句話：第一句，因為無相的緣故，標明顏色是無相的。說明顏色沒有人能知曉的相，所以說是無相。顏色的相不是以人知曉作為顏色的相。第二句，解釋顏色是無相的。顏色自身有青色、黃色作為相，不是以人知曉作為相。所以，下面第三句總結無相。因為顏色不是以人知曉作為相，所以人在不知曉的時候，顏色本體仍然存在。你認為知覺是神（Atman）的相，標明神是以知覺作為相的。不應該以沒有知覺的地方作為知覺。第二句呵斥外道，在沒有知覺的時候有覺知的本體。你們的法中，知覺是一個意思。所以外道認為人在不知曉的時候有覺知，就是沒有知覺的時候有覺知的意義。所以現在責備他。知就是覺，如果沒有知覺就沒有覺知，如果有覺知就有知覺。怎麼能說沒有知覺的時候有覺知呢？如果沒有知覺的時候有覺知，那麼沒有覺知的時候應該有知覺。而且知覺是一個意思，沒有知覺就沒有覺知，沒有覺知就沒有神，因為神和覺知是一體的。外道說：優樓迦（Ulukas）下面第三句分別提出論義。這個人後來的論點凡有五種意義。一是道術后興，二是行世不盛，三是依據一異四句，這是第二種異義，所以後出論點。四是見解在一義上有缺失，認為異沒有過失。五是見論主借異來破斥一，認為異有道理，所以提出論點。來回五次都引用比喻來說明。

【English Translation】 English version How can the extinguished light be used to exemplify the unarisen awareness? Someone asks: Why is there no fault (studura, accusation) in breaking the lamp, but there is a fault in destroying color? The answer is: The fundamental principle of the heretics lies in combining the light and color as a metaphor. The light is likened to conditions (緣), and the color is likened to awareness. If the light does not illuminate the color, the color cannot be obtained, and there is no function of recognition. Similarly, if the conditions do not come together, awareness cannot be obtained, and awareness has no function. However, Vasubandhu (天親) divides the heretics' light and color into two meanings of salvation. The arising of the inner meaning lies in breaking the light. Therefore, there is no fault in breaking the lamp. Still using Deva's (提婆) original answer, because the color is destroyed, there is a fault. Again, because of the absence of characteristics (無相). Earlier, because of the difference between clarity and unclearness, the Dharma and the metaphor were different. Now, distinguishing between the difference between having characteristics and not having characteristics, the Dharma and the metaphor are different. Therefore, it is refuted again. Here, there are three sentences about color, and there are also three sentences about awareness. The three sentences about color: The first sentence, because of the absence of characteristics, indicates that color has no characteristics. It explains that color has no characteristics that can be known by people, so it is said to be without characteristics. The characteristic of color is not based on human knowledge as the characteristic of color. The second sentence explains that color is without characteristics. Color itself has blue and yellow as characteristics, not based on human knowledge as characteristics. Therefore, the third sentence below concludes that it is without characteristics. Because color is not based on human knowledge as a characteristic, the color body still exists when people do not know it. You think that awareness is the characteristic of Atman (神), indicating that Atman is based on awareness as a characteristic. It should not be regarded as awareness where there is no awareness. The second sentence rebukes the heretics, that there is a body of awareness when there is no awareness. In your Dharma, awareness is one meaning. Therefore, the heretics believe that when people do not know, there is awareness, which means that there is awareness when there is no awareness. So now blame him. Knowing is awareness, if there is no knowing, there is no awareness, if there is awareness, there is knowing. How can you say that there is awareness when there is no knowing? If there is awareness when there is no knowing, then there should be knowing when there is no awareness. Moreover, knowing and awareness are one meaning, without knowing there is no awareness, without awareness there is no Atman, because Atman and awareness are one. The heretic said: Ulukas (優樓迦) The third sentence below separately puts forward the argument. This person's later arguments have five meanings. First, the Taoist arts arose later, second, the practice in the world is not prosperous, and third, based on the four sentences of one and different, this is the second different meaning, so the argument is put forward later. Fourth, there is a lack of insight in one meaning, thinking that difference is not a fault. Fifth, seeing the debater borrowing difference to refute one, thinking that difference is reasonable, so put forward the argument. The five times back and forth all use metaphors to illustrate.

義。優樓迦謂佛寶也。弟子謂僧寶也。誦衛世師經謂法寶也。言知與神異者立己宗也。訶梨傳云。優樓迦弟子自稱我師優樓迦。說經名衛世。繁文以六諦為主。簡旨明知異乎神。若能屈我此言斬首相謝。與今文相似也。其人立神知異者。既在僧佉后出見一宗有過。是故立論名衛世師。衛世師稱為勝異。異於僧佉勝於僧佉故名勝異。是故神不墮無常中者。僧佉知與神一。知無常神即無常。知不遍神則不遍。神既常遍知亦常遍。是故今明知與神異。知自無常神自是常。亦不墮無知者。釋伏難防僧佉及提婆也。何以故知神合故如有牛者。就法譬釋上無知也。神與知合神受知名。如人與牛合人名有牛也。釋中前解譬者逐文近故也。四合知生者欲顯神受知名也。內曰牛相牛中住。但破其神受知名異宗自壞。以角峰等相但在於牛。雖與人合人無牛相。若爾神雖與知合。知住知中神則非知。註釋云。汝言下明四合生知。知生則知塵。知不生則不知塵。此是知能知非是神知。外人神知並立。論主奪其神知縱其知知。譬如火能燒者此譬二意。一者成前知則能知。二欲發起后救故也。外曰能用法故。此中含有用燈之譬。前明人牛雖合人無牛相。神知雖合神無知相。今有二義。一明神有知。二用知方知。如人有見性用燈能見。成實者云。假人

御五陰而人不當陰。陰自能知而人不知。如是行自起善惡亦非人起。而今云人起者。以人有御陰之功故言人起耳。內曰不然知即能知故者。破上能用之言也。明知體自能知不須神用。故神無用知之能。汝若神有知性。即應自知何假用他。前番奪其神知明知自知。今奪其神能明知自能知。若爾神體非知又復無能。何處有神。燈喻非也此破其譬。神用知知。知具二義。一體是知。二有能知。人用燈見。燈無兩義。一體非見。二不能見。故非喻也。又眼為闇所障故不能見。假燈除闇方見。汝神為誰障故不知而假知能知。注云若不知色不名為知者。以名定體破。知既名知即應能知。若不能知則不名知。是故縱有能知彼能何用者。前奪神知及以神能明知具二義。今明知具二義縱神復具二義者則無用也。外曰馬身合故神為馬。上初番破外人知自知神不知。次番奪。其神無能知自能。外人今雙救二義。一明神在馬中而神名馬。如神在知中神名為知。二者馬形不能知神御方能知。如知不能知神御方知。故神有知有能則二義俱立。問神馬與人牛何異。答人牛二形二神故疏。今身神共合則密。又得反責。內家若知自知不須神御。亦應馬形自能不假神御也。內曰身中神非馬者明外人不識馬也。世間正以馬形為馬。實不以神為馬。故以知自知神

終非知。以神喻神則墮負處者。神御于知神御于馬。兩神無異。前神未了而引后神。以過證過轉增其過。是故墮負。又所御之知即知即能。所御之形無知無能。同上燈譬。前引無知救知既以墮負。今重引之名為重負。外曰如黑疊。問黑疊與神馬何異舍于神馬引黑疊耶。答離神別有馬。世間詺馬形作馬。不詺神為馬。疊與黑合疊受黑名。世間名為黑疊。不可云黑自黑而疊不黑。故與上異也。內曰若爾無神。自上三番破神無知無能。謂奪神兩義也。今此一番縱之。縱汝神是能是知。便成於知無復有神。所以然者。知是知復是能。神若是知亦是能。此便成知則無復神。故云若爾無神。又知是能是知。既其非神。神是知是能。亦非神也。故云若爾無神。又並。云神體非知與知合故神名知者。知體非神。若神非神合應名非神。故云若爾無神。又並。神本非如。與知合故從知名知。知體無常。神與無常合神名無常。神與不遍合應名不遍。與多和合應名為多。若無常不遍及以多者則無有神。又知是能是知。神若無能無知。與草木不異虛空無別。又是無神。又反並之。汝以有知有能名為神者。知具此二則應是神。神具此二神應名知。注有三種難。一釋無神難。若他合故下第二互從並。若神從知名知。知亦從神名神。若知與神合不從神名

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：最終還是不能明白。如果用『神』（指某種精神或意識）來比喻『神』，就會陷入失敗的境地。『神』駕馭『知』（指知識或認知），就像駕馭馬一樣。兩個『神』沒有區別。前面的『神』還沒有理解透徹，又引入後面的『神』，用一個錯誤來證明另一個錯誤，只會增加錯誤。所以說會陷入失敗。而且，被駕馭的『知』，既是『知』，也是『能』（指能力）。被駕馭的形體，既沒有『知』，也沒有『能』。這就像前面的燈的譬喻一樣。先前引入沒有『知』的來拯救『知』，就已經陷入失敗，現在又重新引入，這叫做重負。外面說，比如『黑疊』（指黑色的疊加）。問：『黑疊』和『神馬』（指被神駕馭的馬）有什麼區別？為什麼要捨棄『神馬』而引入『黑疊』呢？回答：離開『神』，另外有馬。世間把馬的形狀叫做馬，不會把『神』叫做馬。『疊』和黑色結合，『疊』接受了黑色的名字，世間稱之為『黑疊』。不能說黑色自己是黑的，而『疊』不是黑的。所以和上面不同。內在說，如果這樣，就沒有『神』了。從上面三次破斥『神』沒有『知』沒有『能』，是說剝奪了『神』的兩種屬性。現在這一次是縱容它。縱容你說『神』是『能』是『知』，那就變成了只有『知』，而沒有『神』了。為什麼這樣說呢？『知』是『知』又是『能』，『神』如果是『知』也是『能』，這樣就變成了只有『知』而沒有『神』。所以說如果這樣，就沒有『神』了。而且，『知』是『能』是『知』，既然它不是『神』，『神』是『知』是『能』，也不是『神』。所以說如果這樣，就沒有『神』了。又進一步說，如果說『神』的本體不是『知』，因為和『知』結合，所以『神』才被稱為『知』，那麼『知』的本體不是『神』，如果『神』和非『神』結合，應該被稱為非『神』。所以說如果這樣，就沒有『神』了。又進一步說，『神』本來不是如常不變的，因為和『知』結合，所以才隨著『知』而被稱為『知』。『知』的本體是無常的，『神』如果和無常結合，『神』就應該被稱為無常。『神』和不普遍結合，就應該被稱為不普遍。和多結合，就應該被稱為多。如果『神』是無常、不普遍以及多，那就沒有『神』了。而且，『知』是『能』是『知』，如果『神』沒有『能』沒有『知』，就和草木沒有區別，和虛空沒有分別。這也是沒有『神』。又反過來合併說，你用有『知』有『能』來稱之為『神』，那麼『知』具備這兩種屬性，就應該是『神』。『神』具備這兩種屬性，『神』就應該被稱為『知』。註釋有三種難點。一是解釋沒有『神』的難點。如果其他東西結合的緣故。下面第二是互相跟隨合併。如果『神』因為跟隨『知』而被稱為『知』，『知』也因為跟隨『神』而被稱為『神』。如果『知』和『神』結合，不因為跟隨『神』而被稱為『知』 English version: Ultimately, it cannot be understood. If one uses 'Shen' (神, referring to a kind of spirit or consciousness) to喻(metaphor) 'Shen', one will fall into a state of failure. 'Shen' governs 'Zhi' (知, referring to knowledge or cognition), just like governing a horse. The two 'Shen' are no different. The previous 'Shen' has not been thoroughly understood, and then the latter 'Shen' is introduced, using one mistake to prove another mistake, only increasing the error. Therefore, it is said that one will fall into failure. Moreover, the 'Zhi' that is governed is both 'Zhi' and 'Neng' (能, referring to ability). The form that is governed has neither 'Zhi' nor 'Neng'. This is like the previous metaphor of the lamp. Previously, introducing the one without 'Zhi' to save 'Zhi' had already fallen into failure, and now re-introducing it is called a heavy burden. Externally, it is said, for example, 'Hei Die' (黑疊, referring to black superposition). Question: What is the difference between 'Hei Die' and 'Shen Ma' (神馬, referring to the horse governed by Shen)? Why abandon 'Shen Ma' and introduce 'Hei Die'? Answer: Apart from 'Shen', there is another horse. The world calls the shape of a horse a horse, and will not call 'Shen' a horse. 'Die' combines with black, and 'Die' receives the name of black, and the world calls it 'Hei Die'. It cannot be said that black is black by itself, and 'Die' is not black. Therefore, it is different from the above. Internally, it is said, if this is the case, there is no 'Shen'. From the above three refutations of 'Shen' having no 'Zhi' and no 'Neng', it is said that the two attributes of 'Shen' are deprived. Now this time it is tolerated. Tolerate you saying that 'Shen' is 'Neng' and 'Zhi', then it becomes only 'Zhi' and no 'Shen'. Why is this so? 'Zhi' is 'Zhi' and also 'Neng', and if 'Shen' is 'Zhi' and also 'Neng', then it becomes only 'Zhi' and no 'Shen'. Therefore, it is said that if this is the case, there is no 'Shen'. Moreover, 'Zhi' is 'Neng' and 'Zhi', since it is not 'Shen', and 'Shen' is 'Zhi' and 'Neng', it is also not 'Shen'. Therefore, it is said that if this is the case, there is no 'Shen'. Furthermore, if it is said that the substance of 'Shen' is not 'Zhi', because it combines with 'Zhi', so 'Shen' is called 'Zhi', then the substance of 'Zhi' is not 'Shen', and if 'Shen' combines with non-'Shen', it should be called non-'Shen'. Therefore, it is said that if this is the case, there is no 'Shen'. Furthermore, 'Shen' was originally not constant, because it combined with 'Zhi', so it is called 'Zhi' following 'Zhi'. The substance of 'Zhi' is impermanent, and if 'Shen' combines with impermanence, 'Shen' should be called impermanent. If 'Shen' combines with non-pervasiveness, it should be called non-pervasive. If it combines with many, it should be called many. If 'Shen' is impermanent, non-pervasive, and many, then there is no 'Shen'. Moreover, 'Zhi' is 'Neng' and 'Zhi', and if 'Shen' has no 'Neng' and no 'Zhi', it is no different from grass and trees, and there is no difference from emptiness. This is also no 'Shen'. Furthermore, merging it in reverse, you use having 'Zhi' and having 'Neng' to call it 'Shen', then 'Zhi' possesses these two attributes, it should be 'Shen'. 'Shen' possesses these two attributes, 'Shen' should be called 'Zhi'. The commentary has three difficulties. One is to explain the difficulty of no 'Shen'. If other things combine for the reason. The second below is to follow each other and merge. If 'Shen' is called 'Zhi' because it follows 'Zhi', 'Zhi' is also called 'Shen' because it follows 'Shen'. If 'Zhi' and 'Shen' combine, it is not called 'Zhi' because it follows 'Shen'.

【English Translation】 Ultimately, it cannot be understood. If one uses 'Shen' (神, referring to a kind of spirit or consciousness) to metaphor 'Shen', one will fall into a state of failure. 'Shen' governs 'Zhi' (知, referring to knowledge or cognition), just like governing a horse. The two 'Shen' are no different. The previous 'Shen' has not been thoroughly understood, and then the latter 'Shen' is introduced, using one mistake to prove another mistake, only increasing the error. Therefore, it is said that one will fall into failure. Moreover, the 'Zhi' that is governed is both 'Zhi' and 'Neng' (能, referring to ability). The form that is governed has neither 'Zhi' nor 'Neng'. This is like the previous metaphor of the lamp. Previously, introducing the one without 'Zhi' to save 'Zhi' had already fallen into failure, and now re-introducing it is called a heavy burden. Externally, it is said, for example, 'Hei Die' (黑疊, referring to black superposition). Question: What is the difference between 'Hei Die' and 'Shen Ma' (神馬, referring to the horse governed by Shen)? Why abandon 'Shen Ma' and introduce 'Hei Die'? Answer: Apart from 'Shen', there is another horse. The world calls the shape of a horse a horse, and will not call 'Shen' a horse. 'Die' combines with black, and 'Die' receives the name of black, and the world calls it 'Hei Die'. It cannot be said that black is black by itself, and 'Die' is not black. Therefore, it is different from the above. Internally, it is said, if this is the case, there is no 'Shen'. From the above three refutations of 'Shen' having no 'Zhi' and no 'Neng', it is said that the two attributes of 'Shen' are deprived. Now this time it is tolerated. Tolerate you saying that 'Shen' is 'Neng' and 'Zhi', then it becomes only 'Zhi' and no 'Shen'. Why is this so? 'Zhi' is 'Zhi' and also 'Neng', and if 'Shen' is 'Zhi' and also 'Neng', then it becomes only 'Zhi' and no 'Shen'. Therefore, it is said that if this is the case, there is no 'Shen'. Moreover, 'Zhi' is 'Neng' and 'Zhi', since it is not 'Shen', and 'Shen' is 'Zhi' and 'Neng', it is also not 'Shen'. Therefore, it is said that if this is the case, there is no 'Shen'. Furthermore, if it is said that the substance of 'Shen' is not 'Zhi', because it combines with 'Zhi', so 'Shen' is called 'Zhi', then the substance of 'Zhi' is not 'Shen', and if 'Shen' combines with non-'Shen', it should be called non-'Shen'. Therefore, it is said that if this is the case, there is no 'Shen'. Furthermore, 'Shen' was originally not constant, because it combined with 'Zhi', so it is called 'Zhi' following 'Zhi'. The substance of 'Zhi' is impermanent, and if 'Shen' combines with impermanence, 'Shen' should be called impermanent. If 'Shen' combines with non-pervasiveness, it should be called non-pervasive. If it combines with many, it should be called many. If 'Shen' is impermanent, non-pervasive, and many, then there is no 'Shen'. Moreover, 'Zhi' is 'Neng' and 'Zhi', and if 'Shen' has no 'Neng' and no 'Zhi', it is no different from grass and trees, and there is no difference from emptiness. This is also no 'Shen'. Furthermore, merging it in reverse, you use having 'Zhi' and having 'Neng' to call it 'Shen', then 'Zhi' possesses these two attributes, it should be 'Shen'. 'Shen' possesses these two attributes, 'Shen' should be called 'Zhi'. The commentary has three difficulties. One is to explain the difficulty of no 'Shen'. If other things combine for the reason. The second below is to follow each other and merge. If 'Shen' is called 'Zhi' because it follows 'Zhi', 'Zhi' is also called 'Shen' because it follows 'Shen'. If 'Zhi' and 'Shen' combine, it is not called 'Zhi' because it follows 'Shen'.

神。神與知合亦不從知名知。第三違經破者。明外人疊與黑合疊便是黑。則違依主二義。外曰如有杖。此救上三難。通第一無神難云。人雖與杖合人名有杖。非是無人。神雖與知合神名為知。非是無神。通第二互從難云。人與杖合但得名人有杖。不得杖與人合杖名有人。以人能御杖非杖御人。如是神與知合神名為知。不得知與神合知名為神。以神御知非知御神。通第三難云。人杖雖合人不作杖。依主雖合主不作依。問人杖人牛此有何異。答大宗是同。但來意有異。人牛為明其合。人杖為辨其離。前為明合者。人與牛合人名有牛。神與知合神名有知。今為明離者。人與杖合雖名有杖人非是杖。神與知合雖名為知神非是知。又上但為防於他難立自義宗。今亦立義宗又通三難。是故異也。注中就人與杖合有二句。杖與人合亦有二句。四句之中用一廢三。人與杖合人名有杖。用此句也。不得云人是杖。廢此句也。杖與人合二句並不用之。以杖與人合不名有人亦不名人。故四句之中立一廢三。立一正是義宗。廢三通前三難。內曰有杖非杖。破同人牛。杖自是杖人終非杖。知自是知神終無知。衛世五番凡有二失。前三后一得於神義而墮于無知。破黑疊譬得有知義而墮無神。外曰僧佉下第四重出論義凡有二義。一者見異家過失。謂一

【現代漢語翻譯】神（deva）。神與知結合，也不能因為知名而知名。第三重違背經義的駁斥是，外道認為重疊與黑色結合，重疊就是黑色，這違背了依主二義。外道說，『如有杖』，這是爲了解決以上三個難題。解決第一個『無神』的難題，說人雖然與杖結合，人被稱為『有杖』，但並非沒有這個人。神雖然與知結合，神被稱為『知』，但並非沒有神。解決第二個『互相依從』的難題，說人與杖結合，只能說人『有杖』，不能說杖與人結合，杖『有人』。因為人能駕馭杖，而不是杖駕馭人。同樣，神與知結合，神被稱為『知』，不能說知與神結合，知被稱為『神』。因為神駕馭知，而不是知駕馭神。解決第三個難題，說人與杖雖然結合，人不會變成杖，依主雖然結合，主不會變成依。問：『人杖』與『人牛』有什麼不同？答：大體上是相同的，但來意不同。『人牛』是爲了說明其結合，『人杖』是爲了辨別其分離。前面是爲了說明結合，人與牛結合，人被稱為『有牛』，神與知結合，神被稱為『有知』。現在是爲了說明分離，人與杖結合，雖然被稱為『有杖』，但人不是杖。神與知結合，雖然被稱為『知』，但神不是知。而且，前面只是爲了防止他人責難，樹立自己的義宗。現在也樹立義宗，又解決三個難題，所以不同。註釋中關於『人與杖結合』有兩句話，『杖與人結合』也有兩句話，四句話中用一句，廢三句。『人與杖結合，人名有杖』，用這句話。不能說『人是杖』，廢掉這句話。『杖與人結合』的兩句話都不用，因為杖與人結合，不叫『有人』，也不叫『人』。所以四句話中，立一句，廢三句。立一句正是義宗，廢三句是爲了解決前面的三個難題。內道說，『有杖非杖』，是爲了駁斥同於『人牛』。杖自己是杖，人終究不是杖。知自己是知，神終究沒有知。衛世五番共有兩個過失，前三后一，得到了神義，卻墮入了無知。破黑疊的比喻，得到了有知義，卻墮入了無神。外道說，僧佉派以下是第四重，重出論義，共有兩個含義。一是看到其他學派的過失，即一。

【English Translation】 Deva (god). A deva's union with knowledge does not result in knowing simply by being known. The third refutation against scripture is that externalists claim that the combination of 'overlapping' and 'black' results in 'overlapping' being 'black', which violates the two meanings of 'dependent-master'. The externalist says, 'Like having a staff,' to resolve the above three difficulties. To address the first difficulty of 'no deva', it is said that although a person is combined with a staff, the person is called 'having a staff', but it does not mean there is no person. Although a deva is combined with knowledge, the deva is called 'knowledge', but it does not mean there is no deva. To address the second difficulty of 'mutual dependence', it is said that when a person is combined with a staff, one can only say that the person 'has a staff', but one cannot say that when a staff is combined with a person, the staff 'has a person'. This is because the person can wield the staff, not the staff wielding the person. Similarly, when a deva is combined with knowledge, the deva is called 'knowledge', but one cannot say that when knowledge is combined with a deva, knowledge is called 'deva'. This is because the deva wields knowledge, not knowledge wielding the deva. To address the third difficulty, it is said that although a person is combined with a staff, the person does not become a staff, and although a dependent is combined with a master, the master does not become a dependent. Question: What is the difference between 'person-staff' and 'person-cow'? Answer: They are largely the same, but the intention is different. 'Person-cow' is to illustrate their combination, while 'person-staff' is to distinguish their separation. The former is to illustrate combination: when a person is combined with a cow, the person is called 'having a cow'; when a deva is combined with knowledge, the deva is called 'having knowledge'. The latter is to illustrate separation: when a person is combined with a staff, although called 'having a staff', the person is not the staff. When a deva is combined with knowledge, although called 'knowledge', the deva is not knowledge. Moreover, the former was only to prevent others from criticizing and to establish one's own doctrine. Now, we also establish the doctrine and resolve the three difficulties, so it is different. In the commentary, there are two sentences about 'a person combined with a staff', and two sentences about 'a staff combined with a person'. Among the four sentences, one is used and three are discarded. 'A person combined with a staff, the person is called having a staff' - this sentence is used. One cannot say 'the person is the staff' - this sentence is discarded. The two sentences about 'a staff combined with a person' are not used at all, because when a staff is combined with a person, it is not called 'having a person' nor 'a person'. Therefore, among the four sentences, one is established and three are discarded. Establishing one is precisely the doctrine, and discarding three is to resolve the previous three difficulties. The inner school says, 'Having a staff is not a staff', to refute being the same as 'person-cow'. The staff is itself a staff, and the person is ultimately not a staff. Knowledge is itself knowledge, and the deva ultimately has no knowledge. The fivefold defense of the world has two faults in total. The first three and the last one obtain the meaning of deva but fall into ignorance. The analogy of breaking the overlapping obtains the meaning of having knowledge but falls into having no deva. The externalist says, the Samkhya school and below is the fourth level, repeating the arguments, having two meanings in total. One is to see the faults of other schools, namely one.

義無咎。故重出論義。二見論主上借一破異。謂異義為短一義為長。故出論義。問何故不破一為一類破異為一類而相間出耶。答凡有四義。一示破有多門。如一異品類例破。今相間破。二者欲明一異兩家自相破斥即併爲虛妄。是故間出。三者執一之人與提婆論義。當時理屈辭窮而異家便出立義。一家在坐靜聽便謂。一有道理異義為過。是故重出論義。衛世師重出論義亦同之。四者僧佉部內自有多人。雖一人墮負而餘人出論。世師亦爾故相間出也。此文三番所以前七后三者。僧佉始末合有十番。但前義勢已窮后則辭理易屈。故前七后三。若知與神異有如上過者。僧佉靜聽。執異之家五番往復墮於二過。一得神失知。二得知失神。我經中者明己執無過。何以故下釋無過。以神即覺故不墮無知。覺即神亦不墮無神。故離前二也。內曰破有三。初指前破。上有二對。一常無常二遍不遍。合十難前已說之。今當更說指下破也。若覺相神不一者。前僧佉立一義。始末二番有三對過失。一神常覺無常。二神遍覺不遍。三神一覺不一。此三相違而言其一。故招十五種過也。上已明二對十過。今就一多。中復有五過。一以神從覺相與俱多。二以覺從神相與俱一。三神不從覺多即神與覺異。四覺不從神一則覺與神異。五欲令其一而不相從。

則神墮亦多不多覺墮亦一不一。攝此五難為三。初二互相從得神覺一宗而失神覺一多。次兩互不相從得神覺一多而墮神覺異義。后得神覺不異亦得神覺一多而墮亦一亦異。得神覺一多義則墮亦異得神覺一義。名之為一。攝一多為五難既為三類。常遍五難亦各三類。故合十五開為九難也。而今文中以神從覺令覺多神亦多者。正為破其一神以為多神故則無一神。一神無故亦無多神。亦一亦多非一非多皆悉不立。破神既爾。破覺亦然。覺與神一則失多覺。多既無一亦無。如是四句悉皆不成。外曰不然一為種種如頗梨。救為二意。一法二喻。法中二句。一通前難二釋疑。所言一者此明覺體一也。內前以神從覺覺多神亦多。外今以覺從神神一覺亦一。神既與覺一則覺一神亦一。無多神過。問何故神一覺亦一。答僧佉立宗義甚精密。神覺體一故神常覺亦常。神遍覺亦遍。神一覺亦一。但約義不同。故開神覺二諦耳。為種種者第二釋疑也。伏疑雲。若以覺從神神一覺亦一。乃勉多神之過墮一覺之咎。是故釋云。雖體是一覺隨緣故多。不失多覺故不墮苦樂一過。如頗梨者第二喻說。喻上體一隨緣故異。體一故免多神過。隨緣異故免一覺過。故神覺俱成一多義立。內曰下偈本但有一破亦含五難。一者以罪福從覺覺一罪福一。二以覺從罪福

罪福若二在覺亦二。三覺一罪福不一罪福與覺異。四罪福二覺不二覺與罪福異。五欲令其一而復罪福不同則墮亦一亦異。還攝五難以為三開。初兩得一義宗而罪福失多覺失於一。次兩得於一多兩墮異義。三得於一多亦得不異而隨亦一亦異。問何故以罪福難覺也。答非是以外罪福以並於覺。正言罪福即是覺。如損他覺為罪。益他覺為福罪福既是覺故覺一罪福一。問上破與今破何異。答上以神從覺覺多神亦多。此是破神。今以罪福從覺覺一罪福亦一。此是破覺。注云施盜亦一者。前明罪福就心。今約身口也。如珠先有者。提婆但破法說而譬自壞。天親義破譬也。珠則本有覺則始生。豈得以本有之珠喻始生之覺。複次珠新新生滅者破前一珠義也。內外雖異同知珠是無常。唸唸生滅故非一珠。汝覺不生滅體則是一。云何以不一喻一無常喻常。二者離珠無色離色無珠。色既有青黃等五便成五珠。珠若是一五色便一。若色五珠不五珠一色不一。則離色有珠離珠有色。若離色有珠。離於苦樂應當有覺。亦離覺應有苦樂。外曰果雖多作者一如陶師答上三難也。果雖多謂罪福多也。作者一一覺體也。如陶師體一而作瓶瓫多果。不可關陶師一故謂瓶瓫亦一。不可關瓶瓫多故謂師亦多。不可關覺一故罪福亦一罪福多故謂覺亦多。故前五難三關

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本罪與福如果被認為是二元對立的，那麼覺悟（覺，Buddhi）也被認為是二元的。如果三種覺悟歸於一體，罪與福就不是一體的，罪與福與覺悟是不同的。如果罪與福是二元的，而覺悟不是二元的，那麼覺悟與罪福就是不同的。如果想要使它們成為一體，但罪與福又是不同的，那麼就會陷入亦一亦異的境地。總而言之，這五個難題可以歸結為三個關鍵點。最初的兩個難題傾向於認為覺悟是一體的，但罪福的區分卻喪失了，覺悟的一體性也喪失了。接下來的兩個難題傾向於認為覺悟是多樣的，從而陷入了異的境地。第三個難題傾向於認為覺悟是一體的，也承認覺悟不是異的，但又隨之陷入了亦一亦異的境地。問：為什麼用罪福來為難覺悟呢？答：不是因為外在的罪福可以與覺悟並列，而是要說明罪福本身就是覺悟。例如，損害他人的覺悟就是罪，增益他人的覺悟就是福。罪福既然是覺悟，那麼覺悟是一體的，罪福也是一體的。問：之前的破斥與現在的破斥有什麼不同？答：之前是以神識依從於覺悟，覺悟多則神識也多，這是破斥神識。現在是以罪福依從於覺悟，覺悟一體則罪福也一體，這是破斥覺悟。註疏中說，施捨和盜竊也是一體的，之前是從心念上說明罪福，現在是從身口行為上說明罪福。就像珠子原本就存在一樣，提婆（Deva）只是破斥了法義的說法，而譬喻本身就站不住腳。天親（Vasubandhu）的義理破斥了譬喻。珠子是原本就有的，而覺悟是開始才產生的，怎麼能用原本就有的珠子來比喻開始才產生的覺悟呢？再者，珠子是新新生滅的，這是破斥前面所說的一顆珠子的意義。內外雖然不同，但都知道珠子是無常的，唸唸生滅，所以不是一顆珠子。你的覺悟是不生不滅的，本體是一體的，怎麼能用不一的珠子來比喻一體的覺悟，用無常的珠子來比喻常住的覺悟呢？二者，離開珠子就沒有顏色，離開顏色就沒有珠子。顏色既然有青黃等五種，就變成了五顆珠子。珠子如果是一體的，五種顏色就應該是一體的。如果顏色是五種，珠子不是五種，珠子是一體的，顏色不是一體的，那麼就是離開了顏色有珠子，離開了珠子有顏色。如果離開了顏色有珠子，那麼離開了苦樂就應該有覺悟，同樣，離開了覺悟就應該有苦樂。外道說：果雖然多，但作者是一體的，就像陶師一樣。這是對前面三個難題的回答。果雖然多，指的是罪福多。作者一體，指的是覺悟的本體。就像陶師的本體是一體的，卻製作出瓶瓶罐罐等多種果。不能因為陶師是一體的，就認為瓶瓶罐罐也是一體的。也不能因為瓶瓶罐罐多，就認為陶師也是多的。不能因為覺悟是一體的，就認為罪福也是一體的，也不能因為罪福多，就認為覺悟也是多的。所以前面的五個難題可以歸結為三個關鍵點。

【English Translation】 English version If sin and merit are considered dualistic, then enlightenment (覺, Buddhi) is also considered dualistic. If three enlightenments are unified, sin and merit are not unified; sin and merit are different from enlightenment. If sin and merit are dualistic, but enlightenment is not dualistic, then enlightenment is different from sin and merit. If one wants to make them one, but sin and merit are different, then one falls into the state of being both one and different. In summary, these five difficulties can be reduced to three key points. The first two difficulties tend to think that enlightenment is one, but the distinction between sin and merit is lost, and the oneness of enlightenment is also lost. The next two difficulties tend to think that enlightenment is diverse, thus falling into the state of difference. The third difficulty tends to think that enlightenment is one, and also admits that enlightenment is not different, but then falls into the state of being both one and different. Question: Why use sin and merit to challenge enlightenment? Answer: It is not because external sin and merit can be juxtaposed with enlightenment, but to explain that sin and merit themselves are enlightenment. For example, harming others' enlightenment is sin, and increasing others' enlightenment is merit. Since sin and merit are enlightenment, then enlightenment is one, and sin and merit are also one. Question: What is the difference between the previous refutation and the current refutation? Answer: Previously, it was based on consciousness following enlightenment, and if enlightenment is many, then consciousness is also many. This is refuting consciousness. Now, it is based on sin and merit following enlightenment, and if enlightenment is one, then sin and merit are also one. This is refuting enlightenment. The commentary says that giving and stealing are also one. Previously, sin and merit were explained from the perspective of the mind, and now sin and merit are explained from the perspective of physical and verbal actions. Just like the pearl originally exists, Deva (提婆) only refuted the statement of Dharma, and the metaphor itself is untenable. Vasubandhu's (天親) reasoning refutes the metaphor. The pearl is originally there, while enlightenment is only produced at the beginning. How can the pearl that originally exists be used to compare the enlightenment that is only produced at the beginning? Furthermore, the pearl is newly born and perishing, which refutes the meaning of the one pearl mentioned earlier. Although the inside and outside are different, it is known that the pearl is impermanent, arising and ceasing in every moment, so it is not one pearl. Your enlightenment is neither arising nor ceasing, and its essence is one. How can you use the non-one pearl to compare the one enlightenment, and use the impermanent pearl to compare the permanent enlightenment? Secondly, without the pearl, there is no color; without color, there is no pearl. Since color has five kinds such as blue and yellow, it becomes five pearls. If the pearl is one, then the five colors should be one. If the colors are five, and the pearl is not five, the pearl is one, and the color is not one, then there is a pearl without color, and there is color without a pearl. If there is a pearl without color, then there should be enlightenment without suffering and joy. Similarly, there should be suffering and joy without enlightenment. The heretics say: Although the fruits are many, the creator is one, just like the potter. This is the answer to the previous three difficulties. Although the fruits are many, it refers to the many sins and merits. The creator is one, which refers to the essence of enlightenment. Just like the potter's essence is one, but he makes many fruits such as bottles and jars. One cannot think that the bottles and jars are also one because the potter is one. One cannot think that the potter is also many because the bottles and jars are many. One cannot think that sin and merit are also one because enlightenment is one, and one cannot think that enlightenment is also many because sin and merit are many. Therefore, the previous five difficulties can be reduced to three key points.

並皆壞也。救第二有無難者。前有陶師後作瓶瓫。亦前有覺體后隨緣苦樂等。故非本無今有。救第三不一難者。實是一師而作瓶瓫。實是一覺而有苦樂。若言新新生滅非是一珠。亦應新新生滅非是一師。而百年相續終是一人。珠亦爾也。內曰陶師無別異者此有二過。一者有異喻不異過。陶師與瓶瓫實有異。而苦樂與覺不異。故不應以異喻不異。二者不異喻異過。陶師一體無有別異。而覺實有苦樂二體。故不應將不異喻異。又若苦樂即覺則瓶瓫即陶師。亦有五難。一苦樂與覺一則瓶瓫與陶師一。則師一瓶瓫一。二覺與苦樂一。苦樂多則覺多。亦師與瓶瓫一。瓶瓫既多師亦應多。例上五可知也。外曰實有神比知相故。此第五世師重出救義。來意亦三。一思道更生。二見論主借異破一謂一有過異義無失。三別更有人也。問此立與初立何異。答初就異宗立。但異宗既壞。今但就相立故與前異。然就相立正立有神義。今破則正顯無神也。有三番問答。初云。實有神者道理神體不無。比知相故者舉相證有神體也。知有四種。一理知二比知三譬知四信聖人語知。今因比知證有于神。所言相者。僧佉神知一體知是神體相。今神知異知是神標相。此中比知有二。一者將人比日。人從東至西人既有去。法與人合。將人比日。日從東至西亦有

去。法與日合。二者見草木依地苦樂覺知亦應依神。故云比知相故。內曰下有二。初指前破。雖舉比知而神知終異還墮二過。一得神失知。二得知失神。今當更說不知非神者正破有二。初指前破神與知合。次破比知故神與知合。前破法說后破譬說也。汝以知相證有神者。若爾知相有故神有。知相無故神無。凡有二義無有知相。一者神遍而知不遍。二者常有于神而知不恒。若爾則無知應當無神。外曰行無故知無。救上無知之時無神難也。有法譬二句。法說正解無知所以。神若行境是則有知。若不行境是時無知。故云行無故知無。如煙者此釋知是神相正答論主難也。如煙是火相雖復無煙而有炭火。知是神相知雖復無而終有神。內曰不然神能知故者。破其無知時有神也。汝神有二義。一者體效能知。二者以知為相。今無知時無此二義。是則無神。又法譬不同。汝神雖無知有生知之能。炭火無煙不能生煙。何得為喻。複次汝說下第二破其比知又三。一牒二非三釋。汝說見共相比知故有神者牒外義也。人之與日共有去相。見人去比知日亦去。名為共相比知。草木苦樂共有依相。以草木有依比知苦樂亦依于神也。此亦非也第二句總非也。所以者何下第三句釋。此意縱其人日共有去相將人比日。奪其草木覺知共有依相將草木有依比苦

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本去。『法』（dharma，佛法）與『日』（太陽）的執行相合。二者觀察草木依附於大地，感受痛苦與快樂，認為覺知也應依附於『神』（ātman，自我）。所以說這是通過『比知相』（anumāna-lakṣaṇa，推比認知）得出的結論。內曰：下面分兩部分。首先是針對前面的駁斥。雖然舉出了『比知』，但『神』的認知終究不同，還是會陷入兩種過失：一是得到了『神』卻失去了『知』（jñāna，知識），二是得到了『知』卻失去了『神』。現在我將進一步說明『不知』並非『神』，這主要分為兩部分來駁斥：首先是針對前面『神』與『知』相合的觀點進行駁斥，其次是駁斥通過『比知』認為『神』與『知』相合的觀點。前者駁斥的是『法說』（dharma-vacana，佛法之說），後者駁斥的是『譬說』（upamā-vacana，譬喻之說）。你用『知相』（jñāna-lakṣaṇa，知識的表象）來證明有『神』存在。如果這樣，『知相』存在，『神』就存在；『知相』不存在，『神』就不存在。通常有兩種情況沒有『知相』：一是『神』是普遍存在的，而『知』不是普遍存在的；二是『神』是常有的，而『知』不是恒常的。如果這樣，沒有『知』的時候就應該沒有『神』。外曰：因為『行』（gati，運動）不存在，所以『知』不存在。這是爲了迴應上面『沒有知的時候就沒有神』的詰難。『有法譬』兩句。『法說』是正確解釋沒有『知』的原因。如果『神』是『行』的對境，那麼就有『知』；如果不是『行』的對境，那麼就沒有『知』。所以說『行不存在，所以知不存在』。『如煙者』，這是解釋『知』是『神』的表象，正面回答論主的詰難。就像煙是火的表象，即使沒有煙，也有炭火。『知』是『神』的表象，即使沒有『知』，最終還是有『神』。內曰：不是這樣的，『神』能夠認知。這是爲了駁斥『沒有知的時候就有神』的觀點。你的『神』有兩種含義：一是本體具有認知的能力，二是以『知』作為表象。現在沒有『知』的時候，這兩種含義都不存在，那麼就沒有『神』。而且『法』和『譬』不同。你的『神』即使沒有『知』，也有產生『知』的能力，而炭火沒有煙就不能產生煙，怎麼能作為比喻呢？再次，你說：下面第二部分駁斥通過『比知』的觀點，又分為三部分：一是重複對方的觀點，二是否定，三是解釋。你說看到共同的表象，通過『比知』就知道有『神』存在，這是重複外道的觀點。人與太陽有共同的運動表象，看到人運動，就推知太陽也在運動，這叫做『共相比知』（sādharmya-anumāna，共同屬性的推比）。草木的痛苦與快樂有共同的依附表象，因為草木有依附，就推知痛苦與快樂也依附於『神』。這也是不對的，第二句是總體的否定。『所以者何』，下面第三句是解釋。這裡的意思是，即使人和太陽有共同的運動表象，用人來比太陽；剝奪草木的覺知，認為痛苦

【English Translation】 English version He departs. 『Dharma』 (law, Buddhist teachings) aligns with the 『Sun』 (solar movement). Observing that plants and trees rely on the earth, experiencing suffering and joy, they believe that awareness should also rely on 『Ātman』 (self). Hence, it is said to be concluded through 『anumāna-lakṣaṇa』 (inferential cognition). The inner party says: Below are two parts. First, it refutes the previous argument. Although 『anumāna』 is cited, the cognition of 『Ātman』 ultimately differs, still falling into two errors: one is gaining 『Ātman』 but losing 『jñāna』 (knowledge), and the other is gaining 『jñāna』 but losing 『Ātman』. Now, I will further explain that 『non-knowing』 is not 『Ātman』, which is mainly refuted in two parts: first, refuting the previous view that 『Ātman』 and 『jñāna』 are aligned; second, refuting the view that 『Ātman』 and 『jñāna』 are aligned through 『anumāna』. The former refutes 『dharma-vacana』 (teachings of Dharma), and the latter refutes 『upamā-vacana』 (teachings of analogy). You use 『jñāna-lakṣaṇa』 (the appearance of knowledge) to prove the existence of 『Ātman』. If so, when 『jñāna-lakṣaṇa』 exists, 『Ātman』 exists; when 『jñāna-lakṣaṇa』 does not exist, 『Ātman』 does not exist. Usually, there are two situations where 『jñāna-lakṣaṇa』 is absent: one is that 『Ātman』 is universally present, while 『jñāna』 is not universally present; the other is that 『Ātman』 is constant, while 『jñāna』 is not permanent. If so, when there is no 『jñāna』, there should be no 『Ātman』. The outer party says: Because 『gati』 (movement) does not exist, 『jñāna』 does not exist. This is to respond to the above difficulty of 『when there is no knowledge, there is no Ātman』. The two sentences 『with Dharma and analogy』. 『Dharma-vacana』 is the correct explanation for the reason for the absence of 『jñāna』. If 『Ātman』 is the object of 『gati』, then there is 『jñāna』; if it is not the object of 『gati』, then there is no 『jñāna』. Therefore, it is said that 『movement does not exist, so knowledge does not exist』. 『Like smoke』, this explains that 『jñāna』 is the appearance of 『Ātman』, directly answering the question of the debater. Just as smoke is the appearance of fire, even if there is no smoke, there is charcoal fire. 『Jñāna』 is the appearance of 『Ātman』, even if there is no 『jñāna』, there is ultimately 『Ātman』. The inner party says: It is not like this, 『Ātman』 is capable of cognition. This is to refute the view that 『there is Ātman when there is no knowledge』. Your 『Ātman』 has two meanings: one is that the essence has the ability to cognize, and the other is to take 『jñāna』 as the appearance. Now, when there is no 『jñāna』, these two meanings do not exist, then there is no 『Ātman』. Moreover, 『Dharma』 and 『analogy』 are different. Your 『Ātman』, even if it does not have 『jñāna』, has the ability to generate 『jñāna』, while charcoal fire cannot generate smoke without smoke, how can it be used as a metaphor? Again, you say: The second part below refutes the view through 『anumāna』, which is divided into three parts: one is to repeat the other party's point of view, two is to deny, and three is to explain. You say that seeing the common appearance, through 『anumāna』, you know that 『Ātman』 exists, which is repeating the view of the heretics. People and the sun have a common appearance of movement. Seeing people move, they infer that the sun is also moving. This is called 『sādharmya-anumāna』 (inference of common attributes). The suffering and joy of plants and trees have a common appearance of dependence. Because plants and trees have dependence, they infer that suffering and joy also depend on 『Ātman』. This is also incorrect. The second sentence is a general denial. 『What is the reason』, the third sentence below is the explanation. The meaning here is that even if people and the sun have a common appearance of movement, using people to compare the sun; depriving plants and trees of awareness, thinking that suffering

樂亦依神也。所以縱一奪一者。文自釋之。見去者去法到彼故。見人從東至西人既有去。亦見日從東至西日亦有去。故可得以人比日。不得云見草木有依謂苦樂亦應依神。注前釋縱其人日相比。若離神無知是事不然。此釋奪其二依相比。汝言草木必依地離地無草木。知必依神離神無知。作此比知者是事不然也。是故不應以知故知有神者。破其二比既竟。故結呵之。不可見龜而有毛相下此取意重破之。外云。天下之物皆悉有依。如外草木既依于地。內之人民則依于王。不應苦樂覺知獨自無依。是故呵言。汝見草木依地見苦樂亦依神者。見余鳥有毛。見龜亦有毛。外曰如手取。取是手相。雖復不取而常有手。知是神相。雖復不知而常有神。救上無知無能無神難。問此與煙火何異。答炭時無煙不能生煙。手雖不取欲取即能。是故異也。內曰取非手相。以角峰為牛相。以指掌為手相。不以取為手相。汝以知為神相。故非喻也。若無知相而有神者。無指掌等相應當有手。外曰定有神覺苦樂故。山中舊云。此第六勒沙婆人出論義。見前偏執一異並皆有失。謂亦一亦異應無有過。故出立義。又云。還是第二師重出論義。又云。此是一切外道立有神者亂出論義。論主亂破。即第六章也。就文凡有六轉攝。計神事盡破神義周。第一舉苦樂

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本快樂也依賴於神。至於『縱一奪一』，文中的解釋是：看到離去的人到達彼岸，所以說人有離去；也看到太陽從東邊到西邊，太陽也有離去。因此可以用人來比喻太陽。不能說看到草木有所依賴，就認為苦樂也應該依賴於神。註釋前面解釋了縱使人與太陽相似，如果離開神就沒有知覺，這是不對的。這裡解釋了否定他們將二者進行類比。你說草木必定依賴於土地，離開土地就沒有草木；知覺必定依賴於神，離開神就沒有知覺。用這種方式進行類比是不對的。因此，不應該因為有知覺就認為有神。駁斥了他們的兩種類比之後，所以最後加以呵斥。不能因為看到烏龜就認為它有毛，這是從更深層次上否定他們的觀點。外道說：天下萬物都有所依賴，比如外在的草木依賴於土地，內在的人民則依賴於君王。不應該認為苦樂覺知是獨自沒有依賴的。所以呵斥說：你看到草木依賴於土地，就認為苦樂也依賴於神，就像看到其他鳥類有毛，就認為烏龜也有毛一樣。外道說：就像手有拿取的功能，拿取是手的特徵。即使不拿取，手也一直存在。知覺是神的特徵，即使沒有知覺，神也一直存在。這是爲了迴應前面提出的『無知、無能、無神』的詰難。問：這和煙與炭火有什麼不同？答：沒有燃燒的炭就沒有煙，不能產生煙。手雖然不拿取東西，但想要拿取的時候就能拿取。所以這是不同的。內道說：拿取不是手的特徵，應該用角峰作為牛的特徵，用指掌作為手的特徵，而不是用拿取作為手的特徵。你用知覺作為神的特徵，所以這個比喻是不恰當的。如果無知覺卻有神，就像沒有指掌等相應的部分卻有手一樣。外道說：一定有神才能覺知苦樂。山中舊說：這是第六勒沙婆人（Leshaporen, 印度六大外道之一）提出的論點。他們認為之前偏執于『一』或『異』都有缺失，所以認為『亦一亦異』應該沒有過錯，因此提出了這個觀點。又說：還是第二師重新提出論點。又說：這是一切外道建立有神論者胡亂提出的論點，論主胡亂駁斥。這就是第六章的內容。就文章而言，總共有六個轉折，窮盡了對神的存在和作用的論述，周全地駁斥了有神論的觀點。第一點是舉出苦樂。

【English Translation】 English version Pleasure also relies on a god. As for 'establishing one and refuting one,' the text explains it itself: Seeing a person departing and reaching the other shore, thus it is said that a person departs; also seeing the sun moving from east to west, the sun also departs. Therefore, one can use a person to compare to the sun. One cannot say that seeing plants and trees have something to rely on, one should think that suffering and pleasure also rely on a god. The commentary earlier explained that even if a person and the sun are similar, if separated from a god there would be no awareness, which is incorrect. This explains the negation of their analogy between the two. You say that plants and trees must rely on the earth, and without the earth there are no plants and trees; awareness must rely on a god, and without a god there is no awareness. Making this kind of analogy is incorrect. Therefore, one should not think that because there is awareness, there is a god. After refuting their two analogies, therefore, it is finally rebuked. One cannot think that because one sees a turtle, it has hair, which is negating their view on a deeper level. The outsider says: All things in the world have something to rely on, such as external plants and trees relying on the earth, and internal people relying on the king. One should not think that suffering and pleasure awareness is alone without reliance. Therefore, it is rebuked by saying: You see plants and trees relying on the earth, and think that suffering and pleasure also rely on a god, just like seeing other birds have hair, and thinking that turtles also have hair. The outsider says: Just like a hand has the function of grasping, grasping is a characteristic of the hand. Even if it doesn't grasp, the hand always exists. Awareness is a characteristic of a god, even if there is no awareness, the god always exists. This is to respond to the earlier challenge of 'no awareness, no ability, no god.' Question: How is this different from smoke and charcoal fire? Answer: Without burning charcoal, there is no smoke, and smoke cannot be produced. Although the hand does not grasp things, it can grasp them when it wants to. Therefore, this is different. The insider says: Grasping is not a characteristic of the hand, one should use horn peaks as a characteristic of a cow, and use fingers and palms as a characteristic of the hand, not grasping as a characteristic of the hand. You use awareness as a characteristic of a god, so this analogy is inappropriate. If there is no awareness but there is a god, it's like having a hand without corresponding parts like fingers and palms. The outsider says: There must be a god to be aware of suffering and pleasure. Old sayings in the mountains say: This is the argument put forward by the sixth Leshaporen (Leshaporen, one of the six major heretical schools in India). They believe that previously being fixated on 'one' or 'different' both have shortcomings, so they think that 'both one and different' should have no fault, therefore they put forward this view. It is also said: The second teacher is re-presenting the argument. It is also said: This is all the heretics establishing theists randomly putting forward arguments, and the debater randomly refuting them. This is the content of the sixth chapter. As for the article, there are a total of six turns, exhausting the discussion of the existence and function of a god, and comprehensively refuting the views of theism. The first point is to bring up suffering and pleasure.

證有神。二舉各取色證有神。三舉異情動證有神。四以宿習念證有神。五舉左見右識證有神。六舉念屬神證有神。涅槃云。是諸外道計神不同。終不離於陰界入也。今此六轉舉五陰相證有于神。初舉受陰相。次舉色陰。三舉想陰。四舉行陰。五舉識陰。第六還舉想陰破此六立即有六破。成實身見品云。粗思惟者計受是我。以木石中無受則知有受是我。中思惟者說。想是我。苦樂雖過猶有我相。細思惟者說。行是我。以瓶等相雖過猶思我妙。深思惟者計識是我。知思亦粗。是思雖過猶故有識我心故。若爾計色是我應最是粗。以色相五陰中最粗故也。又五陰是有為。有為有相貌故證神。無為無相貌故不舉證神。覺苦樂者。外云。四大諸根並是色法。事同草木不應有所覺知。而今有覺定應有神。又死人木人不能覺知。今能覺知定是神也。內曰若惱亦斷。上雖舉覺苦樂證有神。今偏難其覺苦邊也。若神覺苦樂神可惱者。亦應可斷。若言神常不可惱。又神無形不可斷。亦神無形不可惱。此亦得破舊義。斷身時身識覺惱。則識亦可斷。識無形不可斷。識無形不可惱。無形依有形惱有形。故無形可惱。亦斷有形無形可斷。外曰不然無觸故如空。夫斷害必由相與有觸。身有觸刀亦有觸。故可斷刀有觸。神無觸。云何以有觸斷無觸耶。如

空者舉譬。舍有觸可燒可熱。空無觸不可燒而有熱。合喻可解。內曰若爾無去。神若如空不可斷者。神亦如空不可動去。今害身時神不能避則受害也。去從二事生。一者身能運動。二心思量欲動。今身神互無。神欲動不能動。身能動不知動。則身神並無去。而汝神無避害。就安可去之義。神若可去則神應可斷。外曰如盲跛者。昔優禪尼國為劫所破。各分散走。有一生盲生跛。遂相假得至余處。外道引此為救義。數論師云。色陰有依因有手足等而無心思惟故如盲。四陰有慮知而無身運動故如跛。五陰和合而去同外道。內曰異相故。盲跛兩神兩身可得去。身神互無故不得去。又盲人不跛有柱杖而去。神無身可得然耶。若不爾有如上斷過者。必言身神互無而相隨去者。亦應相隨而斷。又上奪其去。今從破也。縱神無觸得去。亦應無觸故被斷破。數論亦然。五陰共合而去。亦應共合被斷。複次下。自上已來破法說竟。今始破其如空譬說。又欲發后救義故作此破。空實不熱亦應神實不惱。空遂可熱空應可斷。神義亦然。外曰如舍主惱。上空不可斷不可熱。此義既壞。是故舍空引于舍主。內曰無常故燒。論主調外人義破其法說。舍無常可燒可熱。舍內空常不可燒熱。身無常可斷惱。神既常不可斷惱。複次舍主不遍可得遠火。汝神既

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本關於『空』的譬喻。如果說『有』就像房屋，可以被火燒，可以被加熱，那麼『空』就沒有觸感，不能被燒，但卻有熱量。這個比喻可以這樣理解：如果像你說的，沒有『去』（運動，變化），那麼神（ātman）如果像空一樣不可斷滅，也應該像空一樣不可移動。如果身體受到傷害時，神不能躲避，那麼神也會受到傷害。『去』（運動）由兩件事產生：一是身體能夠運動，二是心能思考並想要運動。現在身和神之間互不相干，神想要動卻不能動，身體能動卻不知道要動，那麼身和神都沒有『去』（運動）。既然你的神不能躲避傷害，又怎麼能說『去』呢？如果神可以『去』，那麼神就應該可以被斷滅。外道（Tirthika）反駁說：就像盲人和跛子一樣。過去，優禪尼國（Ujjeni，古印度十六雄國之一）被劫匪攻破，人們各自逃散。有一個天生的盲人和一個天生的跛子，於是他們互相幫助，到達了其他地方。外道引用這個例子來證明救助的意義。數論師（Samkhya）說，色蘊（rūpa-skandha）有依靠，有手腳等，但沒有思考，就像盲人。識蘊（vijñāna-skandha）、受蘊（vedanā-skandha）、想蘊（saṃjñā-skandha）、行蘊（saṃskāra-skandha）有考慮和認知，但沒有身體的運動能力，就像跛子。五蘊（pañca-skandha）和合在一起才能運動，這和外道的觀點相同。內道（佛教）反駁說：因為盲人和跛子是不同的個體。盲人和跛子是兩個神和兩個身體，所以可以一起『去』。而身和神之間互不相干，所以不能一起『去』。而且，盲人不依靠跛子，拄著枴杖也能『去』。神沒有身體，怎麼能『去』呢？如果不能，那麼就會有上面所說的斷滅的過失。如果一定要說身和神互不相干，但卻能一起『去』，那麼也應該能一起被斷滅。而且，上面已經駁斥了『去』的可能性，現在進一步駁斥。即使神沒有觸感，可以『去』，也應該因為沒有觸感而被斷滅。數論師也是一樣，五蘊共同和合才能『去』，也應該共同和合被斷滅。進一步說，從上面開始，已經駁斥了法（dharma）的說法，現在開始駁斥他們用『空』（ākāśa）來作比喻的說法。而且，爲了引出後面的救助之義，所以才這樣駁斥。如果空真的不熱，那麼神也應該真的不被惱害。如果空可以被加熱，那麼空就應該可以被斷滅。神也是一樣的道理。外道反駁說：就像房屋的主人會感到惱怒一樣。上面說空不可斷滅，不可加熱，這個說法既然已經被破壞，所以用房屋的空來比喻房屋的主人。內道反駁說：因為房屋是無常的，所以可以被燒，可以被加熱。房屋內的空是常的，所以不可被燒，不可被加熱。身體是無常的，可以被斷滅，被惱害。神既然是常的，就不可被斷滅，不可被惱害。進一步說，房屋的主人不能遍及所有地方，可以遠離火。你的神既然...

【English Translation】 English version An analogy is given for emptiness. If 'existence' is like a house, which can be burned and heated, then 'emptiness' has no contact, cannot be burned, but has heat. This analogy can be understood as follows: If, as you say, there is no 'going' (movement, change), then the ātman (self), if it is indestructible like emptiness, should also be immovable like emptiness. If the body is harmed and the ātman cannot avoid it, then the ātman will also be harmed. 'Going' (movement) arises from two things: first, the body is capable of movement, and second, the mind can think and want to move. Now, the body and the ātman are independent of each other. The ātman wants to move but cannot, and the body can move but does not know to move. Then, neither the body nor the ātman has 'going' (movement). Since your ātman cannot avoid harm, how can you say 'going'? If the ātman can 'go', then the ātman should be able to be destroyed. The Tirthika (non-Buddhist) objects: It's like a blind man and a lame man. In the past, the kingdom of Ujjeni (one of the sixteen ancient Indian kingdoms) was attacked by robbers, and the people scattered. There was a man born blind and a man born lame, so they helped each other and reached other places. The Tirthika cites this example to prove the meaning of rescue. The Samkhya says that the rūpa-skandha (form aggregate) has support, with hands and feet, but no thinking, like a blind man. The vijñāna-skandha (consciousness aggregate), vedanā-skandha (feeling aggregate), saṃjñā-skandha (perception aggregate), and saṃskāra-skandha (mental formations aggregate) have consideration and cognition, but no physical movement, like a lame man. The five skandhas (pañca-skandha) combine to move, which is the same as the Tirthika's view. The Buddhist refutes: Because the blind man and the lame man are different individuals. The blind man and the lame man are two ātman and two bodies, so they can 'go' together. But the body and the ātman are independent of each other, so they cannot 'go' together. Moreover, the blind man does not rely on the lame man; he can 'go' with a cane. The ātman has no body, how can it 'go'? If it cannot, then there will be the fault of destruction mentioned above. If you insist that the body and the ātman are independent of each other but can 'go' together, then they should also be able to be destroyed together. Moreover, the possibility of 'going' has already been refuted above, and now it is further refuted. Even if the ātman has no contact and can 'go', it should also be destroyed because it has no contact. The Samkhya is the same; the five skandhas combine to 'go', and they should also be destroyed together. Furthermore, from above, the dharma (doctrine) has been refuted, and now we begin to refute their analogy of using 'ākāśa' (emptiness). Moreover, in order to elicit the meaning of rescue later, this is why it is refuted in this way. If emptiness is really not hot, then the ātman should also really not be harmed. If emptiness can be heated, then emptiness should be able to be destroyed. The same principle applies to the ātman. The Tirthika objects: It's like the owner of a house will feel annoyed. Above, it was said that emptiness cannot be destroyed or heated. Since this statement has been broken, the emptiness of the house is used to compare to the owner of the house. The Buddhist refutes: Because the house is impermanent, it can be burned and heated. The emptiness inside the house is permanent, so it cannot be burned or heated. The body is impermanent, it can be destroyed and harmed. Since the ātman is permanent, it cannot be destroyed or harmed. Furthermore, the owner of the house cannot be everywhere and can stay away from the fire. Since your ātman...

遍應無避火。神若同空是常便不覺惱。若同舍主無常則同上斷過。又神若是常不能避火。遂能避火則是無常。外曰必有神取色等故。第二舉色陰證有神。五情不能各知諸塵。而有知者此是神能。犢子部亦言人見與此義同。成實者云。根不能見用識能見。雖用識見要須人御。名為人見。內曰何不用耳見。若根不能見而神見者。神用眼見何不用耳見。若不能用耳見唯用眼見。則是眼見非神見也。注云如火能燒處處皆燒者。火以燒為性。觸物皆燒。神以見為性。觸根皆見。亦得以此破成論人。既言識見。識托于耳何不見耶。又識有見性觸根皆見不待眼也。外曰所用定故如陶師。神雖能見必須用眼。如陶師能作不得離泥。泥於器定。眼色亦然。成實論義亦爾。雖以識見要須用眼。內曰若爾盲者。若神與眼一不應言神見眼不見。若神與眼異神則無眼。是故神盲。若無眼不盲則盲不無眼。又若無眼不盲則有眼應盲。又依中論六情品破者。若以見見則見中有見相。見者無見相故見者盲也。依智度論意破者。若神御眼見色者神應見眼。而今一切人皆有神。皆應見眼。而不見眼故知神盲。汝陶師喻者。此破其譬說。外云譬有三事。一陶師二用泥三作瓶。內合亦三。一有神二用眼三見色。疏親言同而實大異。用泥作瓶。離泥無瓶。用眼見色

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本遍身應無避火之處。如果神像虛空一樣是常住不變的，那麼就不會感覺到痛苦。如果神像房子的主人一樣是無常的，那麼就和前面的推斷一樣有過失。而且，如果神是常住不變的，就不能躲避火。如果能夠躲避火，那就是無常的。外道說：必定有神來攝取色等（六塵），所以存在神。第二，用色陰來證明有神的存在。五種感官不能各自知道各種塵境，而有能知覺的，這就是神的功能。犢子部（Vatsiputriya）也說，人的見解與此義相同。成實論（Satya-siddhi shastra）的作者說：根不能見，是用識能見。雖然是用識見，也必須有人來駕馭，這稱為人見。內道反駁說：為什麼不用耳朵見？如果根不能見，而是神見，神用眼睛見，為什麼不用耳朵見？如果不能用耳朵見，只能用眼睛見，那麼就是眼睛見，不是神見。註釋說：如同火能燃燒，到處都能燃燒一樣，火以燃燒為本性，接觸物體就燃燒。神以見為本性，接觸根就見。也可以用這個來駁斥成實論的人。既然說識見，識依託于耳朵，為什麼不見呢？而且識有見性，接觸根就見，不必等待眼睛。外道說：所用的工具是固定的，就像陶師一樣。神雖然能見，必須用眼睛。如同陶師能製作，不能離開泥土，泥土對於器物是固定的，眼睛和色塵也是這樣。成實論的義理也是這樣，雖然用識見，也必須用眼睛。內道反駁說：如果這樣，盲人怎麼辦？如果神和眼睛是一體的，就不應該說神見而眼睛不見。如果神和眼睛是不同的，神就沒有眼睛，所以神是盲的。如果沒有眼睛而不盲，那麼盲人就沒有眼睛。而且，如果沒有眼睛而不盲，那麼有眼睛就應該盲。而且，依據中論（Madhyamaka-karika）六情品（Indriya-pariksa）的破斥：如果用見來見，那麼見中有見相。見者沒有見相，所以見者是盲的。依據智度論（Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra）的意旨破斥：如果神駕馭眼睛見色，神應該能見眼睛。而現在所有的人都有神，都應該能見眼睛，但是卻不能見眼睛，所以知道神是盲的。你們用陶師作比喻，這是破斥你們的比喻。外道說：譬喻有三件事，一是陶師，二是泥土，三是製作瓶子。內道合起來也是三件事，一是有神，二是用眼睛，三是見色。表面上相同，實際上大不相同。用泥土製作瓶子，離開泥土就沒有瓶子。用眼睛見色

【English Translation】 English version Everywhere should be without escape from fire. If the spirit is constant like space, then it will not feel annoyance. If it is impermanent like the master of a house, then it has the same fault as the previous deduction. Moreover, if the spirit is constant, it cannot avoid fire. If it can avoid fire, then it is impermanent. The outsider says: There must be a spirit that takes in form, etc. (the six sense objects), therefore there is a spirit. Secondly, use the skandha of form to prove the existence of a spirit. The five senses cannot each know the various dusts (sense objects), but there is one who can know, this is the function of the spirit. The Vatsiputriya school also says that people's views are the same as this meaning. The author of the Satyasiddhi Shastra says: The root (sense organ) cannot see, it is the consciousness that can see. Although it is consciousness that sees, there must be someone to control it, this is called 'human seeing'. The insider refutes: Why not use the ear to see? If the root cannot see, but the spirit sees, and the spirit uses the eye to see, why not use the ear to see? If it cannot use the ear to see, but only uses the eye to see, then it is the eye that sees, not the spirit that sees. The commentary says: Just as fire can burn, it can burn everywhere. Fire takes burning as its nature, and it burns when it touches objects. The spirit takes seeing as its nature, and it sees when it touches the root. This can also be used to refute the people of the Satyasiddhi Shastra. Since it is said that consciousness sees, and consciousness relies on the ear, why does it not see? Moreover, consciousness has the nature of seeing, and it sees when it touches the root, without waiting for the eye. The outsider says: The tool used is fixed, like a potter. Although the spirit can see, it must use the eye. Just as a potter can make things, he cannot leave the mud. The mud is fixed for the vessel, and so are the eye and form. The meaning of the Satyasiddhi Shastra is also like this, although it is consciousness that sees, it must use the eye. The insider refutes: If that is the case, what about the blind? If the spirit and the eye are one, it should not be said that the spirit sees but the eye does not see. If the spirit and the eye are different, the spirit has no eye, so the spirit is blind. If there is no eye and yet it is not blind, then the blind person has no eye. Moreover, if there is no eye and yet it is not blind, then if there is an eye, it should be blind. Moreover, according to the refutation in the chapter on the six senses (Indriya-pariksa) of the Madhyamaka-karika: If seeing is used to see, then there is a seeing aspect in seeing. The seer has no seeing aspect, so the seer is blind. According to the meaning of the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra, if the spirit controls the eye to see form, the spirit should be able to see the eye. But now all people have a spirit, and they should all be able to see the eye, but they cannot see the eye, so it is known that the spirit is blind. Your analogy of the potter is a refutation of your analogy. The outsider says: The analogy has three things, one is the potter, two is the mud, and three is making the pot. The insider combines them into three things, one is the spirit, two is using the eye, and three is seeing form. They are the same on the surface, but actually very different. Using mud to make a pot, there is no pot without mud. Using the eye to see form

。離眼有色。故喻非也。外曰有神異情動故。此下第三舉想陰證神。論主前責其何不用耳見令其互用。外道以所伺各定不得互用。內破定義不立。今從內所責還明互用。就立中為二。初明一根知二。次辦二根知一。今是初明眼見果色即知果味。故令舌動稱為異情。複次一物眼身知故。第二明二根知一。然眼無知味之理身無見瓶之義。而知味識瓶並是神用。故知有神。內曰如盲修妒路中已破者。破中為二。第一天親指前破。第二正破。既言眼見他食果而口中生涎。則神與眼異。故稱為盲。又既是神見何不用舌見。若不用舌見終是眼見神則不見。故復是盲。複次下天親義作內答以答于外。今回提婆偈本以為複次。所以無修妒路釋者。以易解故不釋之。破彼二事即為二別。前破一根知二。果中五塵具足。遂眼見眼即知果味令舌動者。眼中何故不即聞香聽聲覺觸令三情亦動也。身亦如是者破二根知一。瓶中亦五塵具足。身既能得瓶者。就身根中何不得瓶聲香味即發耳鼻舌三情也。外曰如人燒。此救上盲及餘情何不動難。如人雖能知燒要唯用火。神雖能見要須用眼。不得聞用眼見便謂神盲。問此與上陶師何異。答離泥無瓶。今離薪有火。是故為異救。餘情何不動者。人雖用火燒不得余物燒。唯眼見舌動餘情不得動。內曰火燒。火

效能燒非人燒。眼能見非神見。又無人火亦燒。無神眼亦應見。又火性自熱不假人方熱。眼性自見不假神方見。若眼假神方見。火應假人方燒。外曰如意。外云。要須神情意塵合見。四合之中少一猶不見。況但眼能見。汝上不應難云火自能燒眼自能見。若眼自見。死人有眼何竟不見。內曰下此作神無用破也。有意托眼則見。無意托眼則不見。則意有見能神無用也。此破舊義云。識托根故見。不託則不見。何用假人。外曰意不自知。此救神無用也。意但知法無有自知之理。若更有餘意知此意者。此意不滅復知未來意。如是則無量意聚在眼門。我義神是妙一能知于意。故有知意之功。非是無用。亦無無窮意聚眼門失。內曰神亦神者。問前一內外曰何故無修妒路。此獨有耶。答提婆論本前明外曰如意。今內曰神亦神便是破之。汝既言神用意行眼門者。則應有神知神。但天親義生內答以答前問。義作外問反於后破。是故中間內外兩曰無修妒路也。今依天親破上義者。汝但知立。神知意而未悟。誰復知神。若神神相知是亦無窮。若不須神知神亦不須神知意。破假人亦爾。我法以現在下通外人無窮意聚眼門過也。明意是無常。唸唸不住。寧有多意聚在眼門。外曰云何除神。外道非是請除于神。但反難論主若除于神意云何能自知塵。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本效能燒非人燒。眼能見非神見。又無人火亦燒。無神眼亦應見。又火性自熱不假人方熱。眼性自見不假神方見。若眼假神方見。火應假人方燒。外曰如意（外道）。外道云：『要須神（靈魂）、情（情感）、意（意志）、塵（感覺對像）合見。四合之中少一猶不見。況但眼能見。』你上面不應該反駁說火自己能燒，眼自己能見。若眼自己能見，死人有眼為何竟不能見？內曰（佛教）：下面這樣說是爲了破斥神（靈魂）無用。有意（意志）托眼則見，無意（意志）托眼則不見。那麼意（意志）有見的能力，神（靈魂）就沒有用了。』這是爲了破斥舊的觀點，即『識（意識）依託根（感覺器官）才能見，不依託就不能見，何用假借神（靈魂）？』外曰（外道）：意（意志）不能自己知道。』這是爲了挽救神（靈魂）的無用。意（意志）只能知道法（事物），沒有自己知道的道理。若更有其餘的意（意志）知道這個意（意志），這個意（意志）不滅，又知道未來的意（意志）。這樣則無量的意（意志）聚集在眼門。我的觀點是神（靈魂）是妙一，能知道意（意志），所以有知意（意志）的功用，不是沒有用。也沒有無窮的意（意志）聚集在眼門而失誤。』內曰（佛教）：神（靈魂）也需要神（靈魂）來認知嗎？』問：前面一內外道所說為何沒有修妒路（梵語：sūtra，經）？』答：提婆（聖天）論本前面說明外道如意（觀點），現在內道說『神（靈魂）也需要神（靈魂）來認知嗎』便是破斥它。你既然說神（靈魂）用意（意志）行眼門，那麼就應該有神（靈魂）知道神（靈魂）。但天親（世親）的義理產生，內道回答以回答前面的問題，義理作為外道的問題，反而用來破斥後面。所以中間內外兩道所說沒有修妒路（經）。現在依照天親（世親）破斥上面的觀點，你只知道立論，神（靈魂）知道意（意志）而沒有領悟到，誰又來知道神（靈魂）？若神（靈魂）和神（靈魂）互相知道，這也是無窮的。若不需要神（靈魂）知道神（靈魂），也不需要神（靈魂）知道意（意志）。破斥假借人（靈魂）也是這樣。我的法（佛法）以現在下文來駁斥外道無窮的意（意志）聚集在眼門的過失。』說明意（意志）是無常的，唸唸不住，哪裡有多意（意志）聚集在眼門？外曰（外道）：如何去除神（靈魂）？』外道不是請求去除神（靈魂），只是反過來責難論主，若去除神（靈魂），意（意志）如何能自己知道塵（感覺對像）？

【English Translation】 English version 'The nature of fire is to burn, it is not that a non-human burns it. The eye can see, it is not that a spirit sees it. Moreover, even without a person, fire still burns. Without a spirit, the eye should still see. Furthermore, the nature of fire is inherently hot, it does not need a person to make it hot. The nature of the eye is to see, it does not need a spirit to make it see. If the eye needs a spirit to see, then fire should need a person to burn.' The outsider (non-Buddhist) says, 'As you wish (as we believe).' The outsider says, 'It is necessary for the spirit (soul), emotion (feeling), intention (will), and object (sense object) to combine to see. If one of these four is missing, one still cannot see. How can the eye alone see?' You should not refute by saying that fire can burn by itself and the eye can see by itself. If the eye can see by itself, why can't a dead person with eyes see?' The insider (Buddhist) says, 'What follows is to refute the uselessness of the spirit (soul). If there is intention (will) relying on the eye, then there is seeing. If there is no intention (will) relying on the eye, then there is no seeing. Then intention (will) has the ability to see, and the spirit (soul) is useless.' This is to refute the old view that 'consciousness (vijñāna) relies on the root (sense organ) to see, and if it does not rely on it, it cannot see. Why borrow a spirit (soul)?' The outsider (non-Buddhist) says, 'Intention (will) does not know itself.' This is to save the uselessness of the spirit (soul). Intention (will) can only know phenomena (dharmas), it does not have the principle of knowing itself. If there is another intention (will) that knows this intention (will), then this intention (will) does not cease and knows the future intention (will). In this way, countless intentions (wills) gather at the eye-gate. My view is that the spirit (soul) is wonderfully one and can know intention (will), so it has the function of knowing intention (will), it is not useless. Nor is there a loss of countless intentions (wills) gathering at the eye-gate.' The insider (Buddhist) says, 'Does the spirit (soul) also need a spirit (soul) to know it?' Question: 'Why is there no sūtra (Sanskrit: sūtra, scripture) in what the former insider and outsider said?' Answer: 'The original text of Deva's (Āryadeva's) treatise explains the outsider's view as you wish (as we believe). Now the insider says, 'Does the spirit (soul) also need a spirit (soul) to know it?' This is to refute it. Since you say that the spirit (soul) uses intention (will) to act at the eye-gate, then there should be a spirit (soul) that knows the spirit (soul). But the meaning of Vasubandhu arises, and the insider answers to answer the previous question. The meaning is used as the outsider's question, but it is used to refute the latter. Therefore, there is no sūtra (scripture) in what the insider and outsider said in the middle.' Now, according to Vasubandhu, to refute the above view, you only know how to establish a theory, the spirit (soul) knows intention (will) but has not realized, who will know the spirit (soul)? If the spirit (soul) and the spirit (soul) know each other, this is also endless. If there is no need for the spirit (soul) to know the spirit (soul), there is also no need for the spirit (soul) to know intention (will). Refuting the borrowing of a person (soul) is also like this.' My Dharma (Buddha's teachings) uses the following text to refute the outsider's fault of countless intentions (wills) gathering at the eye-gate.' Explaining that intention (will) is impermanent, it does not stay for a moment, how can many intentions (wills) gather at the eye-gate? The outsider (non-Buddhist) says, 'How to remove the spirit (soul)?' The outsider is not asking to remove the spirit (soul), but is only questioning the treatise master, if the spirit (soul) is removed, how can intention (will) know the object (sense object) by itself?

內曰如火熱相。無有不熱之火。何有不知之意。意體效能知。何用神耶。此是借意以破神。不如數論破神存意。外曰應有神第四舉行陰證神。初總標有神。宿習念下舉二世法證有于神。宿習是過去世習貪成貪習瞋成瞋。若無神統御誰使習耶。生時憂喜行者舉現在世也。過去習瞋生時知憂。過去習貪生時知喜。連持二世不斷皆是神功。又初生之時無人教之令其憂喜。而初生行憂喜此是神使之然。而言相續生者。神遍三世無有代謝。但憂喜之念有于代謝。過去曾生現在始起未來當生。過去念滅續生現在。現在續生未來。故云相續。內曰遍云何念者。縱其神遍奪念生也。念即是上憂喜也。神既常遍。常遍者一遍五道二遍六塵。在神既遍。遍無更生念理。夫論生念。要須此有彼無。故舍此念彼。神既常遍。未曾不念故不更生念。云何有舍此念彼也。問上舉三世證有神義。今破何世耶。答神遍三世。於三世中都不生念。故總破三世生念也。複次若念一切處生。上提婆縱其神遍奪生念義。今天親縱其生念開二關責之。神既遍念亦遍。則應遍五道六塵中。應一時生念。若念分生者。前明以念從神神遍念亦遍。此以神從唸唸既分生神亦分生。複次若神無知若知非神者。明知自知神無知。亦應念自念神無念。若知非神者。神若能知則便成

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本內（佛教內部觀點）曰：『如火有熱的性質一樣，沒有不熱的火。為何說意（manas，意識）沒有知覺的能力呢？如果意的本體和效能能夠知覺，那要神（ātman，靈魂）做什麼用呢？』這是借用對意的理解來駁斥神的存在。但這種方式不如數論（Sāṃkhya）學派那樣，駁斥神的存在卻保留意的存在。外（佛教外部觀點）曰：『應該有神的存在，我可以用第四種舉陰（蘊）的方式來證明神的存在。』首先總的標明有神。『宿習念』以下，舉出過去世和現在世的現象來證明神的存在。宿習（pūrva-saṃskāra）是指過去世習慣於貪婪就形成貪婪的習氣，習慣於嗔恨就形成嗔恨的習氣。如果沒有神來統領和駕馭，是誰使我們形成這些習氣呢？『生時憂喜行者』，這是舉出現在的例子。過去習慣於嗔恨，出生時就知道憂愁；過去習慣於貪婪，出生時就知道喜悅。連線過去世和現在世，使之不斷，這都是神的功能。而且，剛出生的時候，沒有人教他，他就知道憂愁和喜悅，這是神使他這樣的。『而言相續生者』，神遍佈三世，沒有新陳代謝。只有憂愁和喜悅的念頭有新陳代謝。過去曾經生起，現在開始生起，未來將要生起。過去的念頭滅去，繼續生起現在的念頭；現在的念頭繼續生起未來的念頭，所以說是相續不斷。內曰：『遍佈又怎麼能產生念頭呢？』這是縱容對方認為神是遍佈的，從而否定念頭的產生。念頭就是上面所說的憂愁和喜悅。神既然是常在且遍佈的，『常遍者一遍五道二遍六塵』，神既然是遍佈的，那麼遍佈就沒有產生念頭的道理。要說產生念頭，必須要有『此有彼無』的狀態，所以要捨棄這個念頭而產生那個念頭。神既然是常在且遍佈的，從來沒有不產生念頭的時候，所以不可能再產生新的念頭。又怎麼能說捨棄這個念頭而產生那個念頭呢？問：『上面舉出三世的例子來證明有神的意義，現在要駁斥哪一世呢？』答：『神遍佈三世，在三世中都不產生念頭，所以總的駁斥三世產生念頭的說法。』複次，如果念頭在一切處產生，上面提婆（Deva）縱容對方認為神是遍佈的，從而否定念頭的產生。現在天親（Vasubandhu）縱容對方認爲念頭是產生的，從而提出兩個問題來責難對方：神既然是遍佈的，念頭也是遍佈的，那麼就應該在五道（五趣）和六塵（六境）中同時產生念頭。如果念頭是分別產生的，前面已經說明念頭是從神產生的，神是遍佈的，所以念頭也是遍佈的。這裡又說神是從念頭產生的，念頭是分別產生的，那麼神也應該是分別產生的。複次，如果神沒有知覺，或者說知覺不是神的功能，那麼明確知道自己知道的神是沒有知覺的。也應該說念頭自己產生念頭，神沒有念頭。如果說知覺不是神的功能，那麼神如果能夠知覺，就變成了...

【English Translation】 English version The Inner (Buddhist internal view) says: 'Like fire has the nature of heat, there is no fire that is not hot. Why say that manas (consciousness) has no ability to perceive? If the essence and function of manas can perceive, then what is the use of ātman (soul)?' This is to refute the existence of ātman by using the understanding of manas. But this method is not as good as the Sāṃkhya school, which refutes the existence of ātman but retains the existence of manas. The Outer (Buddhist external view) says: 'There should be an ātman, and I can use the fourth way of raising skandha (aggregate) to prove the existence of ātman.' First, generally state that there is an ātman. Below 'pūrva-saṃskāra-smṛti (past habit memory)', examples of past and present lives are given to prove the existence of ātman. Pūrva-saṃskāra (past habit) refers to the habit of greed in the past life forming the habit of greed, and the habit of hatred forming the habit of hatred. If there is no ātman to lead and control, who makes us form these habits? 'Birth time sorrow and joy practitioner', this is an example of the present. In the past, being accustomed to hatred, one knows sorrow at birth; in the past, being accustomed to greed, one knows joy at birth. Connecting the past and present lives to make them continuous, these are all functions of ātman. Moreover, at the time of birth, no one teaches him, and he knows sorrow and joy, this is what ātman makes him like. 'And speaking of continuous birth', ātman pervades the three times and has no metabolism. Only the thoughts of sorrow and joy have metabolism. The past has arisen, the present is beginning to arise, and the future will arise. The past thought disappears and continues to give rise to the present thought; the present thought continues to give rise to the future thought, so it is said to be continuous. The Inner says: 'How can pervading produce thoughts?' This is to indulge the other party in thinking that ātman is pervasive, thereby denying the production of thoughts. Thoughts are the sorrow and joy mentioned above. Since ātman is constant and pervasive, 'constant and pervasive, one pervades the five paths and two pervades the six dusts', since ātman is pervasive, then pervading has no reason to produce thoughts. To say that thoughts are produced, there must be a state of 'this exists and that does not', so one must abandon this thought and produce that thought. Since ātman is constant and pervasive, and has never not produced thoughts, it is impossible to produce new thoughts. How can one say to abandon this thought and produce that thought? Question: 'Above, examples of the three times are given to prove the meaning of ātman, which time is to be refuted now?' Answer: 'Ātman pervades the three times, and does not produce thoughts in the three times, so the statement that thoughts are produced in the three times is generally refuted.' Furthermore, if thoughts arise in all places, above, Deva (Deva) indulged the other party in thinking that ātman is pervasive, thereby denying the production of thoughts. Now Vasubandhu (Vasubandhu) indulges the other party in thinking that thoughts are produced, thereby raising two questions to question the other party: Since ātman is pervasive and thoughts are also pervasive, then thoughts should arise simultaneously in the five paths (five realms) and six dusts (six objects). If thoughts are produced separately, it has been explained earlier that thoughts are produced from ātman, and ātman is pervasive, so thoughts are also pervasive. Here it is said that ātman is produced from thoughts, and thoughts are produced separately, then ātman should also be produced separately. Furthermore, if ātman has no perception, or if perception is not a function of ātman, then clearly knowing that the self-knowing ātman has no perception. It should also be said that thoughts produce thoughts themselves, and ātman has no thoughts. If perception is not a function of ātman, then if ātman can perceive, it becomes...

知無復有神。神若逐念則便成念便無有神。此事前已說者。初破衛世師中五番有此二過。有人言。若神無知者無能知也。若知非神者知非神相也。又釋此事前破者。如煙喻中。若無知時亦有神者。今將彼以破此者。神不生念時爾時既無念相亦無能念也。外曰合故念生者救上遍云何念也。神體實遍而生念者。神於此法作意思量則生念。神于彼法不作意思量則不生念。故神雖遍而能生念。何故神遍不生念耶。通第二難者。念由緣發。非與神齊。雖余處有神要待緣具方得生念。以無一切緣一時具故不得一時遍。念神雖分。唸唸自有分而神無分也。通第三難者。神使念生名為神念。故神受念名。而念恒非神。故不墮無神。注云勢發故者。作意思量前事名為勢發。神雖與意合。若未作意思量前事。念則不生也。內曰雖前已破者。上遍云何念三門破之已竟也。今當重說。縱許生念重撿責之。神若知相即自能知。何須與意合方生念耶。若非知相猶如木石。何能生念。複次若念知。此文破前遍云何念。正是提婆偈本而中間諸破並是天親義立兩偈。本為異者。前是奪破明神常遍不應生念。今縱開破。縱神生念能知塵者。念生則知念不生不知。則是念知神無用也。外曰應有神左見右識故第五舉左見右識。即是舉識陰證神。然就病眼不病眼俱

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本神識無處不在，無所不能。如果神識隨著念頭逐一產生，那麼就變成了念頭，而不是神識本身。這件事之前已經說過了。當初在破斥衛世師的理論時，已經五次提到了這兩個過失。有人說，如果神識沒有知覺，那就什麼都無法感知；如果知覺不是神識的本質，那麼知覺就不是神識的特徵。又解釋這件事，之前已經用煙的例子來破斥過了。如果在沒有知覺的時候也有神識存在，那麼現在就用那個例子來反駁：神識不產生念頭的時候，既沒有念頭的表象，也沒有產生念頭的能力。外道辯駁說，因為結合所以念頭產生，以此來反駁上面所說的『如何周遍產生念頭』的說法。神識的本體實際上是周遍的，之所以產生念頭，是因為神識對某個事物進行思考和衡量，於是就產生了念頭；神識對另一個事物不進行思考和衡量，於是就不產生念頭。所以神識雖然周遍，卻能夠產生念頭。為什麼神識周遍卻不產生念頭呢？解釋第二個難題：念頭由因緣而生髮，不是與神識同時產生的。即使其他地方有神識，也要等待因緣具足才能產生念頭。因為沒有一切因緣同時具足的情況，所以念頭不可能同時周遍產生。念頭和神識雖然有分別，但每個念頭都有自己的部分，而神識沒有部分。解釋第三個難題：神識使念頭產生，就稱為神識的念頭。所以神識接受念頭的名稱，而念頭始終不是神識，所以不會陷入沒有神識的境地。註釋說，『勢發故』，就是指在進行思考和衡量之前的事情稱為『勢發』。神識雖然與意念結合，但如果沒有對之前的事情進行思考和衡量，念頭就不會產生。內道反駁說，雖然之前已經破斥過了，上面所說的『如何周遍產生念頭』的三種方式已經破斥完畢了。現在應當重新說明。即使允許產生念頭，也要重新加以責難：如果神識的本質就是知覺，那麼自己就能知覺，何必與意念結合才能產生念頭呢？如果不是知覺的本質，就像木頭和石頭一樣，怎麼能產生念頭呢？再次，如果念頭知覺，這段文字破斥了前面所說的『周遍如何產生念頭』。這正是提婆（Deva）偈頌的原本，而中間的各種破斥都是天親（Vasubandhu）的義理，建立了兩個偈頌。原本的不同之處在於：前面是奪取破斥，說明神識常住周遍，不應該產生念頭；現在是縱容開解破斥，即使神識產生念頭能夠知覺塵境，念頭產生就能知覺，念頭不產生就不能知覺，那麼就是念頭知覺，神識沒有用處。外道辯駁說，應該有神識，因為左邊看見右邊知道，所以第五個例子舉出左邊看見右邊知道，就是舉出識蘊來證明神識。然而，就病眼和不病眼來說，都是如此。 English version The spirit is omnipresent and omnipotent. If the spirit arises with each thought, then it becomes the thought itself, not the spirit. This has been said before. Initially, when refuting the theories of the Vaisheshika school, these two faults were mentioned five times. Some say that if the spirit has no awareness, then nothing can be perceived; if awareness is not the essence of the spirit, then awareness is not a characteristic of the spirit. Furthermore, explaining this matter, it was previously refuted using the analogy of smoke. If the spirit exists even when there is no awareness, then now that example will be used to refute this: when the spirit does not generate thoughts, there is neither the appearance of thoughts nor the ability to generate thoughts. The heretics argue that thoughts arise because of combination, thereby refuting the above statement of 'how thoughts arise pervasively'. The essence of the spirit is actually pervasive, and the reason why thoughts arise is because the spirit thinks and measures something, and thus thoughts arise; the spirit does not think and measure another thing, and thus thoughts do not arise. Therefore, although the spirit is pervasive, it is able to generate thoughts. Why does the spirit not generate thoughts even though it is pervasive? Explaining the second difficulty: thoughts arise from conditions, not simultaneously with the spirit. Even if the spirit is present elsewhere, it must wait for the conditions to be complete before thoughts can arise. Because there is no situation where all conditions are complete at the same time, thoughts cannot arise pervasively at the same time. Although thoughts and spirit are distinct, each thought has its own part, while the spirit has no parts. Explaining the third difficulty: the spirit causes thoughts to arise, and this is called the spirit's thought. Therefore, the spirit accepts the name of thought, but thought is never the spirit, so it does not fall into the state of having no spirit. The commentary says that '勢發故 (shì fā gù)' refers to the matter before thinking and measuring, which is called '勢發 (shì fā)'. Although the spirit is combined with intention, if there is no thinking and measuring of the previous matter, thoughts will not arise. The inner school refutes that although it has been refuted before, the three ways of 'how thoughts arise pervasively' mentioned above have been refuted. Now it should be explained again. Even if it is allowed to generate thoughts, it must be blamed again: if the essence of the spirit is awareness, then it can be aware by itself, why does it need to combine with intention to generate thoughts? If it is not the essence of awareness, like wood and stone, how can it generate thoughts? Again, if thoughts are aware, this passage refutes the previous statement of 'how thoughts arise pervasively'. This is exactly the original verse of Deva, and the various refutations in the middle are the doctrines of Vasubandhu, establishing two verses. The difference between the original is that the former is to seize and refute, stating that the spirit is permanent and pervasive, and should not generate thoughts; now it is to indulge in opening and refuting, even if the spirit generates thoughts and can perceive the dust realm, thoughts can be perceived when they arise, and thoughts cannot be perceived when they do not arise, then it is the thoughts that are aware, and the spirit is useless. The heretics argue that there should be a spirit, because the left sees and the right knows, so the fifth example cites the left seeing and the right knowing, which is to cite the skandha of consciousness to prove the spirit. However, this is the case for both diseased and non-diseased eyes.

【English Translation】 The spirit is omnipresent and omnipotent. If the spirit arises with each thought, then it becomes the thought itself, not the spirit. This has been said before. Initially, when refuting the theories of the Vaisheshika school, these two faults were mentioned five times. Some say that if the spirit has no awareness, then nothing can be perceived; if awareness is not the essence of the spirit, then awareness is not a characteristic of the spirit. Furthermore, explaining this matter, it was previously refuted using the analogy of smoke. If the spirit exists even when there is no awareness, then now that example will be used to refute this: when the spirit does not generate thoughts, there is neither the appearance of thoughts nor the ability to generate thoughts. The heretics argue that thoughts arise because of combination, thereby refuting the above statement of 'how thoughts arise pervasively'. The essence of the spirit is actually pervasive, and the reason why thoughts arise is because the spirit thinks and measures something, and thus thoughts arise; the spirit does not think and measure another thing, and thus thoughts do not arise. Therefore, although the spirit is pervasive, it is able to generate thoughts. Why does the spirit not generate thoughts even though it is pervasive? Explaining the second difficulty: thoughts arise from conditions, not simultaneously with the spirit. Even if the spirit is present elsewhere, it must wait for the conditions to be complete before thoughts can arise. Because there is no situation where all conditions are complete at the same time, thoughts cannot arise pervasively at the same time. Although thoughts and spirit are distinct, each thought has its own part, while the spirit has no parts. Explaining the third difficulty: the spirit causes thoughts to arise, and this is called the spirit's thought. Therefore, the spirit accepts the name of thought, but thought is never the spirit, so it does not fall into the state of having no spirit. The commentary says that '勢發故 (shì fā gù)' (the momentum arises) refers to the matter before thinking and measuring, which is called '勢發 (shì fā)' (the momentum arises). Although the spirit is combined with intention, if there is no thinking and measuring of the previous matter, thoughts will not arise. The inner school refutes that although it has been refuted before, the three ways of 'how thoughts arise pervasively' mentioned above have been refuted. Now it should be explained again. Even if it is allowed to generate thoughts, it must be blamed again: if the essence of the spirit is awareness, then it can be aware by itself, why does it need to combine with intention to generate thoughts? If it is not the essence of awareness, like wood and stone, how can it generate thoughts? Again, if thoughts are aware, this passage refutes the previous statement of 'how thoughts arise pervasively'. This is exactly the original verse of Deva (提婆), and the various refutations in the middle are the doctrines of Vasubandhu (天親), establishing two verses. The difference between the original is that the former is to seize and refute, stating that the spirit is permanent and pervasive, and should not generate thoughts; now it is to indulge in opening and refuting, even if the spirit generates thoughts and can perceive the dust realm, thoughts can be perceived when they arise, and thoughts cannot be perceived when they do not arise, then it is the thoughts that are aware, and the spirit is useless. The heretics argue that there should be a spirit, because the left sees and the right knows, so the fifth example cites the left seeing and the right knowing, which is to cite the skandha of consciousness to prove the spirit. However, this is the case for both diseased and non-diseased eyes.

得作之。如右眼病不見於人但左眼見人。后右眼差還識前左眼所見人。然兩眼體異不應左見右識。有神統御。是故能然。內曰共合二眼。凡有三義故秤為共。外云。左眼見則是見眼。右眼識即是識眼。今答左眼自見非神見。右眼自識非神識。但破見眼即破識眼。不須兩番破之。故云共合二眼。二者以彼答此。一答答於二立。名為共合。前明念生則知念不生不知。此是念知不名神知。即以此答答於二眼。若有二眼則能見識。無二眼則不見識。此是眼能見識。何用於神。故云共合二眼。三者依天親意。更不別開破門。但后二前四合有六門。共破左見右識。故云共合二眼。所以不別更答而指前後共答者凡有二義。一者破神將竟。外人上來以五番救義。今恐其引事無窮欲遮其後救。汝設更千端立者。並墮諸破之中故也。二者欲明觀門縱橫通徹無礙略明四句。自有一立一破多立多破一立多破多立一破。是故總指多破一立也。分知不名知者。七複次為三。初二用后。次四用前。次一當破。即顯后得破前前得破后。又顯當破也。一部論有此三勢破義也。神體既遍。知唯在一分。正可名為分知。不名神知合。今亦爾。在神既遍。見識亦遍。而今此見彼識但應言分見分識。不應言神見神識。複次若爾無知此第二破。若言分知故名神知。分

見識名神見識者。應從多不知名為不知。從多不見識名為不見識。此二複次指后也。複次遍云何念。神既遍無生念理。神亦遍不生見識之理。複次若念知者第四破也。若念故知不念不知。此是念知神則無用。眼看故見不有不見。此是眼見。神無用也。此二複次指第四轉中縱奪二破。複次何不用耳見。若言神見神識。何不用左耳見右耳識。複次若爾盲。若言要用眼見眼識。則非神見神識。故是無見之神。此引第二轉中二破。複次如左眼見下第七注家正破。眼有左右分而無見識。神能見識。神既常遍。不應有此分見彼分識。又若以左眼見而不識以顯神能者。則是無識之神。若以右識而無見。謂有神者便為無見之神也。如是則有多神之過。外曰念屬神故神知此第六轉舉念屬神以識有神。有人言。救七複次中第四複次。今謂不然。七複次並是天親引之。不應救也。又既有七破。何猶獨救第四。今明此救第四轉中最後複次若有念知之難也。上難云。念生故知。念不生故不知。此是念知。神則無用。外救云。念不自在必有所依。能御念者則是神。用何得空。有念知而無所屬故念屬於神。以念知故名為神知。神有用念之功。非無用也。問此既救前第四轉中難。何故至第六轉中方乃救耶。答有二義。一者此第六轉應接前第四。論主作念

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本見識名神見識者。應從多不知名為不知。從多不見識名為不見識。此二複次指后也。複次遍云何念。神既遍無生念理。神亦遍不生見識之理。複次若念知者第四破也。若念故知不念不知。此是念知神則無用。眼看故見不有不見。此是眼見。神無用也。此二複次指第四轉中縱奪二破。複次何不用耳見。若言神見神識。何不用左耳見右耳識。複次若爾盲。若言要用眼見眼識。則非神見神識。故是無見之神。此引第二轉中二破。複次如左眼見下第七注家正破。眼有左右分而無見識。神能見識。神既常遍。不應有此分見彼分識。又若以左眼見而不識以顯神能者。則是無識之神。若以右識而無見。謂有神者便為無見之神也。如是則有多神之過。外曰念屬神故神知此第六轉舉念屬神以識有神。有人言。救七複次中第四複次。今謂不然。七複次並是天親（Vasubandhu）引之。不應救也。又既有七破。何猶獨救第四。今明此救第四轉中最後複次若有念知之難也。上難云。念生故知。念不生故不知。此是念知。神則無用。外救云。念不自在必有所依。能御念者則是神。用何得空。有念知而無所屬故念屬於神。以念知故名為神知。神有用念之功。非無用也。問此既救前第四轉中難。何故至第六轉中方乃救耶。答有二義。一者此第六轉應接前第四。論主作念

【English Translation】 English version To perceive and name something as a 'self' (Atman), one must often not know its true name, and to perceive something without recognition is to not perceive it at all. These two '複次' (fù cì, again) refer to what follows. Furthermore, how can '遍' (biàn, pervasive) be conceived? If the 'self' is pervasive, there is no principle of arising thought. Likewise, there is no principle of arising perception for the 'self'. Furthermore, if knowledge arises from thought, this is the fourth refutation. If knowing arises from thought and not knowing arises from the absence of thought, then this 'thought-knowing' renders the 'self' useless. If seeing arises from the eye, then there is no non-seeing. This is eye-seeing, and the 'self' is useless. These two '複次' refer to the two refutations of seizing and relinquishing in the fourth turning. Furthermore, why not use the ear to see? If it is said that the 'self' sees and the 'self' perceives, why not use the left ear to see and the right ear to perceive? Furthermore, if so, then blindness. If it is said that one must use the eye to see and the eye to perceive, then it is not the 'self' that sees and the 'self' that perceives. Therefore, it is a non-seeing 'self'. This cites the two refutations in the second turning. Furthermore, as the left eye sees, the seventh commentator below correctly refutes. The eyes have left and right divisions but no seeing or perceiving. The 'self' is capable of seeing and perceiving. Since the 'self' is constant and pervasive, it should not have this division of seeing in one part and perceiving in another. Moreover, if the left eye sees but does not perceive to demonstrate the ability of the 'self', then it is a non-perceiving 'self'. If the right perceives but does not see, then the so-called 'self' is a non-seeing 'self'. Thus, there is the fault of having multiple 'selves'. The outsider says that thought belongs to the 'self', therefore the 'self' knows. This sixth turning raises the belonging of thought to the 'self' to recognize the existence of the 'self'. Some say that this refutes the fourth '複次' among the seven '複次'. Now, I say it is not so. All seven '複次' are cited by Vasubandhu (天親). It should not be refuted. Moreover, since there are already seven refutations, why only refute the fourth? Now, it is clear that this refutes the last '複次' in the fourth turning, which has the difficulty of thought-knowing. The above difficulty says that knowing arises when thought arises, and not knowing arises when thought does not arise. This is thought-knowing, and the 'self' is useless. The outsider's rescue says that thought is not independent and must have something to rely on. The one who controls thought is the 'self'. How can its function be empty? Because there is thought-knowing without belonging, thought belongs to the 'self'. Because of thought-knowing, it is called 'self'-knowing. The 'self' has the function of thought, so it is not useless. Question: Since this rescues the difficulty in the previous fourth turning, why is it rescued only in the sixth turning? Answer: There are two meanings. First, this sixth turning should connect to the previous fourth. The author contemplates.

知難竟。外人即舉念屬神以通此難。論主破念屬神竟。外人方左見右識以證有神。故共答二眼最後破之。所以最後明共答二眼者。恐外道救義無窮。是故最後共指眾破以破外人。汝雖有眾多之立理不出前六門破也。而今共答二眼在第五者。翻論者誤。不爾梵文失也。二者念屬神理實救前第四若念知難。但當時理屈辭窮未暇得救。別有餘人舉左見右識更復立義。破此立竟其人思道還生。故重救前破。提婆與外人對面交言。破立之中有此斷續形勢。故撰之以示末代所以問答不接連也。內曰不然分知不名知。神體既遍。一分生知。一分者五道六塵一處生也。正可分知不名神知。外曰神知非分知。此明雖復分知神名知也。如一身手有所作名為身作。內曰若爾無知。汝以多從少神名之知者。亦應以少從多不知名為不知。外曰如衣分燒。救以多從少。如一領衣若燒一孔則名燒衣。神一分知名為神知。內曰燒亦如是。有二種例前。一者應名分燒不名為燒。二者若從少燒名為燒衣者。亦應從多不燒名為不燒。問何故例破之耶。答以少從多以多從少。類例無窮。恐外人引喻不已。是故遮其後救而例破之也。

百論疏卷中(終)

百論疏卷中之餘

釋吉藏撰

破一品第三

破邪門有二。一破神品明眾生空此

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本知難竟（知道困難最終結束）。外人即舉念屬神以通此難（外道立即提出念頭歸屬於神，來解決這個難題）。論主破念屬神竟（論主駁斥念頭歸屬於神的觀點結束）。外人方左見右識以證有神（外道才開始用片面的見解和認識來證明有神）。故共答二眼最後破之（所以共同回答的兩種觀點最後才駁斥它）。所以最後明共答二眼者（之所以最後才闡明共同回答的兩種觀點），恐外道救義無窮（是害怕外道的辯解沒有窮盡）。是故最後共指眾破以破外人（所以最後共同指出眾多的駁斥來駁倒外道）。汝雖有眾多之立理不出前六門破也（你們雖然有眾多的立論，也逃不出前面六種駁斥）。而今共答二眼在第五者（現在共同回答的兩種觀點放在第五個），翻論者誤（是翻譯論著的人的錯誤）。不爾梵文失也（不然就是梵文原文有誤）。二者念屬神理實救前第四若念知難（其次，念頭歸屬於神的道理實際上是爲了挽救前面第四個關於念頭認知困難的觀點）。但當時理屈辭窮未暇得救（但當時理屈詞窮，沒有時間挽救）。別有餘人舉左見右識更復立義（另外有人提出片面的見解和認識，重新建立理論）。破此立竟其人思道還生（駁斥這個立論之後，那個人思考佛道又產生了）。故重救前破（所以重新挽救前面的駁斥）。提婆（Deva，論主名）與外人對面交言（與外道面對面辯論）。破立之中有此斷續形勢（駁斥和立論之中有這種斷斷續續的情形）。故撰之以示末代所以問答不接連也（所以撰寫下來以昭示後世，問答才不是緊密相連的）。內曰不然分知不名知（內道說：不是這樣的，片面的認知不能稱為認知）。神體既遍（神體既然是普遍存在的）。一分生知（一部分產生認知）。一分者五道六塵一處生也（一部分，指的是五道六塵在同一個地方產生）。正可分知不名神知（只能說是片面的認知，不能稱為神的認知）。外曰神知非分知（外道說：神的認知不是片面的認知）。此明雖復分知神名知也（這說明即使是片面的認知，也可以稱為神的認知）。如一身手有所作名為身作（比如一個人的手有所動作，就稱為身體的動作）。內曰若爾無知（內道說：如果這樣，那就是無知）。汝以多從少神名之知者（你用多數服從少數，把神稱為認知），亦應以少從多不知名為不知（也應該用少數服從多數，把不知稱為不知）。外曰如衣分燒（外道說：比如衣服的一部分被燒）。救以多從少（用多數服從少數來辯解）。如一領衣若燒一孔則名燒衣（比如一件衣服如果燒了一個洞，就稱為燒了衣服）。神一分知名為神知（神的一部分被認知，就稱為神的認知）。內曰燒亦如是（內道說：燒也是這樣）。有二種例前（有兩種情況和前面一樣）。一者應名分燒不名為燒（一種是應該稱為部分燒燬，不能稱為燒燬）。二者若從少燒名為燒衣者（第二種是如果從少數燒燬就稱為燒了衣服），亦應從多不燒名為不燒（也應該從多數沒有燒燬就稱為沒有燒燬）。問何故例破之耶（問：為什麼用類比來駁斥呢？）。答以少從多以多從少（答：用少數服從多數，用多數服從少數）。類例無窮（類比的例子是無窮無盡的）。恐外人引喻不已（是害怕外道引用比喻沒有窮盡）。是故遮其後救而例破之也（所以阻止他們後面的辯解，而用類比來駁斥他們）。百論疏卷中(終)（百論疏卷中結束）百論疏卷中之餘（百論疏卷中剩餘部分）釋吉藏撰（釋吉藏撰寫）破一品第三（破一品第三）破邪門有二（駁斥邪門有兩種）。一破神品明眾生空此（一是駁斥神品，闡明眾生皆空） English version Knowing the difficulty ends. Outsiders immediately raise the thought of attributing to God to overcome this difficulty. The master of the treatise finishes refuting the thought of attributing to God. Outsiders then use biased views and knowledge to prove the existence of God. Therefore, the two eyes of common answers are refuted last. The reason for clarifying the two eyes of common answers last is to prevent the endless defense of the heretics. Therefore, the numerous refutations are jointly pointed out at the end to refute the outsiders. Although you have many arguments, they do not escape the first six types of refutations. The reason why the two eyes of common answers are now in the fifth is a mistake by the translator of the treatise. Otherwise, the Sanskrit text would be wrong. Secondly, the principle of attributing thoughts to God actually saves the fourth point, which is the difficulty of knowing thoughts. However, at that time, the argument was weak and the words were exhausted, and there was no time to save it. Others raised biased views and knowledge to re-establish the theory. After refuting this theory, that person's thoughts on the Tao were revived. Therefore, the previous refutation was saved again. Deva (name of the master of the treatise) argued face-to-face with the outsiders. There is this intermittent situation in the midst of refutation and establishment. Therefore, it is written to show future generations why the questions and answers are not connected. The inner school says: It is not so. Partial knowledge is not called knowledge. Since the divine body is pervasive, one part produces knowledge. One part refers to the five paths and six dusts arising in the same place. It can only be said that partial knowledge is not called divine knowledge. The outsider says: Divine knowledge is not partial knowledge. This clarifies that even if it is partial knowledge, it can be called divine knowledge. For example, if a person's hand does something, it is called the body's action. The inner school says: If so, it is ignorance. You use the majority to follow the minority, calling God knowledge, and you should also use the minority to follow the majority, calling ignorance ignorance. The outsider says: It is like burning a part of a garment. It is saved by the majority following the minority. For example, if a hole is burned in a garment, it is called burning the garment. If a part of God is known, it is called divine knowledge. The inner school says: Burning is also the same. There are two kinds of examples as before. One is that it should be called partial burning, not burning. Second, if burning a small part is called burning the garment, then not burning a large part should also be called not burning. Question: Why is it refuted by analogy? Answer: Using the minority to follow the majority and the majority to follow the minority. The examples are endless. It is feared that the outsiders will continue to cite metaphors. Therefore, their subsequent rescue is blocked and refuted by analogy. The end of the middle volume of the Shatashastra Commentary The remainder of the middle volume of the Shatashastra Commentary Written by Jizang Chapter 3: Refuting the One There are two ways to refute the heretical schools. First, refuting the 'God' chapter to clarify the emptiness of sentient beings.

【English Translation】 Modern Chinese Translation Knowing the difficulty ends. Outsiders immediately raise the thought of attributing to God to overcome this difficulty. The master of the treatise finishes refuting the thought of attributing to God. Outsiders then use biased views and knowledge to prove the existence of God. Therefore, the two eyes of common answers are refuted last. The reason for clarifying the two eyes of common answers last is to prevent the endless defense of the heretics. Therefore, the numerous refutations are jointly pointed out at the end to refute the outsiders. Although you have many arguments, they do not escape the first six types of refutations. The reason why the two eyes of common answers are now in the fifth is a mistake by the translator of the treatise. Otherwise, the Sanskrit text would be wrong. Secondly, the principle of attributing thoughts to God actually saves the fourth point, which is the difficulty of knowing thoughts. However, at that time, the argument was weak and the words were exhausted, and there was no time to save it. Others raised biased views and knowledge to re-establish the theory. After refuting this theory, that person's thoughts on the Tao were revived. Therefore, the previous refutation was saved again. Deva (name of the master of the treatise) argued face-to-face with the outsiders. There is this intermittent situation in the midst of refutation and establishment. Therefore, it is written to show future generations why the questions and answers are not connected. The inner school says: It is not so. Partial knowledge is not called knowledge. Since the divine body is pervasive, one part produces knowledge. One part refers to the five paths and six dusts arising in the same place. It can only be said that partial knowledge is not called divine knowledge. The outsider says: Divine knowledge is not partial knowledge. This clarifies that even if it is partial knowledge, it can be called divine knowledge. For example, if a person's hand does something, it is called the body's action. The inner school says: If so, it is ignorance. You use the majority to follow the minority, calling God knowledge, and you should also use the minority to follow the majority, calling ignorance ignorance. The outsider says: It is like burning a part of a garment. It is saved by the majority following the minority. For example, if a hole is burned in a garment, it is called burning the garment. If a part of God is known, it is called divine knowledge. The inner school says: Burning is also the same. There are two kinds of examples as before. One is that it should be called partial burning, not burning. Second, if burning a small part is called burning the garment, then not burning a large part should also be called not burning. Question: Why is it refuted by analogy? Answer: Using the minority to follow the majority and the majority to follow the minority. The examples are endless. It is feared that the outsiders will continue to cite metaphors. Therefore, their subsequent rescue is blocked and refuted by analogy. The end of the middle volume of the Shatashastra Commentary The remainder of the middle volume of the Shatashastra Commentary Written by Jizang Chapter 3: Refuting the One There are two ways to refute the heretical schools. First, refuting the 'God' chapter to clarify the emptiness of sentient beings.

文已竟。今是第二七品破法明於法空。若利根者既知無人即悟無法。所以然者。人本法末。本無故末即無。二人法相待無人可待。即知無法。但鈍根未悟。雖知無人猶言有法故次破法。又外道神病未除。上就神救。神義既不立。自此已下舉法證神。今破無法為顯無神。故次破法。問何故前破神后破法。答智度論云。世間顛倒如亂糸相系無定詮緒。隨立而破。有病則治。故無定次第。二者欲顯論雖有三破內外二病。中論十二門破其內病。前破於法后傍破人。正以佛之弟子多識無我而著於法故前破法。故少有計人故后傍破人。此論破外道病。外道之人具執人法。但人為其本故先破人。三者依二空次第。生空易得故前破人。法空難得故后破法。此義通大小乘。小乘中如成論等前以陰除人。次明以空除陰。大乘前明菩薩得眾生空。次得法空也。又先破人後破法者。如大品諸方等經多以我喻萬法。今亦爾。前我不可得故后舉我例法也。問大小二空云何同異。答小乘雲。有假名人有陰實法。故以實過假以空過實。故成實師明空無我行。引論文云。五陰中不見眾生為空行。見陰亦無為無我行。大乘明。人法未曾是有亦未曾無亦有亦無。如是五句。但為眾生偏著有病是故明空。有病若除空義亦舍。適化所宜教無定相。又問此論破人法為

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本文義已經結束。現在是第二十七品，通過破除對法的執著來闡明法空的道理。如果根器銳利的人，既然已經明白沒有『人』（補特伽羅，pudgala），自然就能領悟到沒有『法』（達磨，dharma）。之所以這樣說，是因為『人』是根本，『法』是末端。根本不存在，末端自然也就不存在。『人』和『法』相互依存，既然沒有『人』可以依賴，自然就知道沒有『法』。但是根器遲鈍的人沒有領悟，即使知道沒有『人』，仍然說有『法』，所以接下來破除對『法』的執著。另外，外道的『神』（自在天，Isvara）的執念沒有消除，前面是針對『神』來救治。既然『神』的意義不能成立，從這裡開始就舉出『法』來證明沒有『神』。現在破除沒有『法』是爲了顯明沒有『神』，所以接下來破除『法』。問：為什麼前面破除『神』，後面破除『法』？答：《智度論》（Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra）說，世間的顛倒就像亂麻一樣相互糾纏，沒有固定的頭緒，隨著所立的觀點而破除。有什麼病就治療什麼病，所以沒有固定的次第。其次，想要顯明本論雖然有三種破除，即破除內道和外道的兩種病，而《中論》（Mūlamadhyamakakārikā）的十二門破除的是內道的病。前面破除『法』，順帶破除『人』，主要是因為佛的弟子大多認識到無我，卻執著于『法』，所以先破除『法』。很少有人執著于『人』，所以後面順帶破除『人』。這部論是破除外道的病。外道之人同時執著于『人』和『法』，但是『人』是根本，所以先破除『人』。第三，依據二空的次第，『生空』（補特伽羅空，pudgala-sunyata）容易證得，所以前面破除『人』，『法空』（達磨空，dharma-sunyata）難以證得，所以後面破除『法』。這個意義通於大小乘。小乘中，如《成實論》（Satyasiddhi-śāstra）等，先用『陰』（蘊，skandha）來破除『人』，其次說明用『空』來破除『陰』。《成實論》的論師闡明『空無我行』，引用論文說：『在五陰中不見眾生，這是空行；見到陰也是無，這是無我行。』大乘闡明，『人』和『法』未曾是有，也未曾是無，也是有也是無，像這樣的五句。只是因為眾生偏執于『有』的病，所以才闡明『空』。『有』的病如果消除，『空』的意義也應該捨棄。適應教化所需，教義沒有固定的相。又問：這部論破除『人』和『法』是爲了什麼？

【English Translation】 English version The text has been completed. Now is the twenty-seventh chapter, which clarifies the emptiness of dharmas by refuting attachment to them. If someone has sharp faculties, once they understand that there is no 'person' (pudgala), they will naturally realize that there are no 'dharmas' (dharma). The reason for this is that the 'person' is the root, and 'dharmas' are the branches. If the root does not exist, then the branches will naturally not exist. 'Person' and 'dharmas' are interdependent; since there is no 'person' to rely on, one will naturally know that there are no 'dharmas'. However, those with dull faculties have not realized this; even though they know there is no 'person', they still say there are 'dharmas', so next, we refute attachment to 'dharmas'. In addition, the externalists' attachment to 'God' (Isvara) has not been eliminated; previously, we were trying to cure them by addressing 'God'. Since the meaning of 'God' cannot be established, from here on, we will use 'dharmas' to prove that there is no 'God'. Now, refuting the existence of 'dharmas' is to reveal that there is no 'God', so next, we refute 'dharmas'. Question: Why do we refute 'God' first and then 'dharmas'? Answer: The Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra says that worldly inversions are like tangled threads, intertwined without a fixed beginning. We refute them according to what is established. We treat whatever illness arises, so there is no fixed order. Secondly, we want to show that although this treatise has three refutations, namely refuting the two illnesses of internal and external paths, the twelve gates of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā refute the illnesses of the internal path. Previously, we refuted 'dharmas' and incidentally refuted 'person', mainly because the Buddha's disciples mostly recognize no-self but are attached to 'dharmas', so we refute 'dharmas' first. Few people are attached to 'person', so we refute 'person' incidentally later. This treatise refutes the illnesses of externalists. Externalists are attached to both 'person' and 'dharmas', but 'person' is the root, so we refute 'person' first. Thirdly, according to the order of the two emptinesses, 'emptiness of self' (pudgala-sunyata) is easier to attain, so we refute 'person' first; 'emptiness of dharmas' (dharma-sunyata) is difficult to attain, so we refute 'dharmas' later. This meaning applies to both the Great and Small Vehicles. In the Small Vehicle, such as the Satyasiddhi-śāstra, we first use the 'skandhas' to refute the 'person', and then explain that we use 'emptiness' to refute the 'skandhas'. The teachers of the Satyasiddhi-śāstra explain the 'practice of emptiness and no-self', quoting the text: 'In the five skandhas, one does not see sentient beings; this is the practice of emptiness. Seeing the skandhas as also non-existent is the practice of no-self.' The Great Vehicle explains that 'person' and 'dharmas' have never been existent, nor have they ever been non-existent, nor are they both existent and non-existent, like these five statements. It is only because sentient beings are attached to the illness of 'existence' that we explain 'emptiness'. If the illness of 'existence' is eliminated, the meaning of 'emptiness' should also be abandoned. Adapting to what is needed for teaching, the teachings do not have a fixed form. Again, the question is: What is the purpose of this treatise refuting 'person' and 'dharmas'?

但是大乘為通耶。答具三義。一者依楞伽等經攝大乘等論。明二乘但得人無我菩薩得法無我。則前破人明小乘。今破法明大乘。二者今明二空俱是大乘。三者俱是小乘。問何故此論具明大小乘。答邪言具障大小。今破一切邪顯一切正。故此論名為通論也。問應非大小乘論。答雖具申大小。而正申大傍申小。又具申大小始名為大。如大乘經初具大小始名大乘。問此論破人法與中論何異。答一往中論破學佛二諦而失二諦人法。此論破不學二諦人法。即破二諦外人法也。二者於時外言與內無異。破外即破內。故二論無異。三者此論正破外傍破內故異也。問何故破人但有一品破法有七品耶。答廣略互現。又人易法難故人略法廣。又人一法多故略人廣法。就破法七品開為二章。六品破無常法。第七一品破于常法。所以破斯二者。一欲攝法無遺。雖萬像不同皆在常無常內。既破斯二則無法不空。若是中論開二十五品為世出世二章。與今大意相似。二者欲顯外道之過。墮在斷常不會中道。計法無常名為斷見。明於常住復是常見。涅槃經云。眾生起見凡有二種。一斷二常。如是二見不名中道。中論成壞品云。若有所受法即墮于斷常。當知所受法若常若無常也。問何故破斷常。答是諸見根故障中道故。中道是佛性法身等。又斷常見障大小

乘故也。三者破常無常。根本二句既無。亦常亦無常諸句自壞。又智度論云。十八空中畢竟空最深。是佛所行。而有為無為空后明畢竟空。今亦爾。破有為無為即顯畢竟空義。故顯此論名為甚深。就破有為凡有六品以為三雙。初一異一雙。二情塵一雙。三有果無果一雙。若就總別明者。一異兩品總破諸法。謂大有與萬像一體異體。破此一異名為總破萬法。自下四章皆是萬法中別。故次破于別。前總后別亦是觀門次第。又為立義前後故前總立后別立。破神品亦然。若常無常判者。一異兩品總破常無常。四品別破無常。破常一品別破于常。初總破常無常者。二家計大有是常萬法無常。今破總別一體異體。即是破常無常一體異體。故名總破常無常也。情塵有果無果是無常法。此事易知。五種常法名之為常。故次五品破常無常也。前總后別。是立義常體。又為觀門次第。問此論自破外道一異。於今人何益。答天竺外道一異盛興則障佛正教。提婆破之則佛教興世。故是大益。問乃利天竺。于震旦何益。答今人立義與外道大同。如立世諦是總萬像為別與外道同則障于佛法。今破有所得世諦。總別不成故亦無真諦。此性有無盡方得申佛法因緣二諦。又有所得十地師執六相義。謂同相異相總相別相成相壞相。亦同今破也。又世間外道有

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：這是因為依賴於『乘』（條件）。這三種破斥了『常』（永恒）和『無常』（變化）。如果根本的兩個論點不存在，那麼『亦常亦無常』（既是永恒的又是變化的）等論點自然崩潰。《智度論》中說，十八空中，『畢竟空』（最終空性）最為深刻，是佛陀所行之道。『有為』（有條件的事物）和『無為』（無條件的事物）之後闡明『畢竟空』。現在也是這樣，破斥『有為』和『無為』，就顯現了『畢竟空』的意義。因此，這部論著被稱為『甚深』（非常深刻）。在破斥『有為』方面，總共有六品，分為三對：第一對是『一』（相同）和『異』（不同），第二對是『情』（感覺）和『塵』（對像），第三對是『有果』（有結果）和『無果』（無結果）。如果從總體和個別的角度來看，『一』和『異』兩品總括性地破斥了諸法。也就是說，破斥了『大有』（本體）與萬象是一體還是異體。破斥這種『一異』，就等於總括性地破斥了萬法。接下來的四章都是萬法中的個別現象，所以接下來破斥個別現象。前面總括性地破斥，後面個別地破斥，這也是觀修次第。另外，爲了確立義理的前後關係，所以前面總括性地確立，後面個別地確立。破斥『神』（靈魂）的一品也是這樣。如果從『常』和『無常』的角度來判斷，『一』和『異』兩品總括性地破斥了『常』和『無常』。四品個別地破斥『無常』，破斥『常』的一品個別地破斥『常』。最初總括性地破斥『常』和『無常』，是因為二家認為『大有』是『常』，萬法是『無常』。現在破斥總體和個別、一體和異體，就是破斥『常』和『無常』的一體和異體，所以稱為總括性地破斥『常』和『無常』。『情塵』和『有果無果』是『無常』法，這件事很容易理解。五種『常』法被稱為『常』，所以接下來的五品破斥『常』和『無常』。前面總括性地破斥，後面個別地破斥，是爲了確立義理的『常』體。另外，也是爲了觀修次第。有人問：這部論著自己破斥外道的一異之說，對現在的人有什麼好處？回答說：在天竺，外道的一異之說非常盛行，這會障礙佛陀的正教。提婆破斥了它，佛教才能興盛於世，所以這是很大的好處。有人問：這只是有利於天竺，對震旦（中國）有什麼好處？回答說：現在的人確立義理，與外道非常相似。例如，確立『世諦』（世俗諦）是總體，萬象是個別，這與外道相同，就會障礙佛法。現在破斥有所得的『世諦』，總體和個別都不能成立，所以也沒有『真諦』（勝義諦）。只有這種自性有無盡，才能闡明佛法的因緣二諦。另外，有所得的十地師執著於六相義，即同相、異相、總相、別相、成相、壞相，也與現在所破斥的相同。另外，世間外道有...

【English Translation】 English version: It is because of relying on 'causes' (conditions). These three refute 'permanence' (eternality) and 'impermanence' (change). If the fundamental two arguments do not exist, then arguments such as 'both permanent and impermanent' naturally collapse. The Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra says that among the eighteen emptinesses, 'ultimate emptiness' (śūnyatā) is the most profound and is the path practiced by the Buddha. 'Conditioned' (saṃskṛta) and 'unconditioned' (asaṃskṛta) are followed by the explanation of 'ultimate emptiness'. It is the same now; refuting 'conditioned' and 'unconditioned' reveals the meaning of 'ultimate emptiness'. Therefore, this treatise is called 'very profound'. In terms of refuting the 'conditioned', there are a total of six sections, divided into three pairs: the first pair is 'one' (identity) and 'different' (difference), the second pair is 'feeling' (sensation) and 'object' (sense object), and the third pair is 'with result' (having consequences) and 'without result' (without consequences). If viewed from the perspective of general and specific, the two sections of 'one' and 'different' comprehensively refute all dharmas. That is, refuting whether the 'great being' (essence) and the myriad phenomena are identical or different. Refuting this 'one and different' is equivalent to comprehensively refuting all dharmas. The following four chapters are all specific phenomena among the myriad dharmas, so the specific phenomena are refuted next. The comprehensive refutation first and the specific refutation later is also the order of contemplation. In addition, to establish the relationship between the preceding and following meanings, the comprehensive establishment is done first, and the specific establishment is done later. The section on refuting 'self' (ātman) is also like this. If judged from the perspective of 'permanence' and 'impermanence', the two sections of 'one' and 'different' comprehensively refute 'permanence' and 'impermanence'. The four sections specifically refute 'impermanence', and the section refuting 'permanence' specifically refutes 'permanence'. The initial comprehensive refutation of 'permanence' and 'impermanence' is because the two schools believe that the 'great being' is 'permanent' and the myriad dharmas are 'impermanent'. Now, refuting the general and specific, identity and difference, is refuting the identity and difference of 'permanence' and 'impermanence', so it is called comprehensively refuting 'permanence' and 'impermanence'. 'Feeling and object' and 'with result and without result' are 'impermanent' dharmas, which is easy to understand. The five kinds of 'permanent' dharmas are called 'permanent', so the following five sections refute 'permanence' and 'impermanence'. The comprehensive refutation first and the specific refutation later is to establish the 'permanent' essence of the meaning. In addition, it is also for the order of contemplation. Someone asks: This treatise itself refutes the non-Buddhist's theory of one and different, what benefit is there for people now? The answer is: In India, the non-Buddhist's theory of one and different is very prevalent, which hinders the Buddha's true teachings. Deva refuted it, and Buddhism can flourish in the world, so this is a great benefit. Someone asks: This only benefits India, what benefit is there for China? The answer is: People now establish meanings that are very similar to those of non-Buddhists. For example, establishing 'conventional truth' (saṃvṛti-satya) as the general and the myriad phenomena as the specific is the same as non-Buddhists, which will hinder the Dharma. Now, refuting the 'conventional truth' of what is obtained, neither the general nor the specific can be established, so there is no 'ultimate truth' (paramārtha-satya) either. Only when this nature has no end can the two truths of dependent origination in Buddhism be explained. In addition, the ten-ground masters of what is obtained are attached to the six characteristics, namely, the same characteristic, the different characteristic, the general characteristic, the specific characteristic, the formation characteristic, and the destruction characteristic, which is also the same as what is being refuted now. In addition, worldly non-Buddhists have...

所得大小乘皆言。內身為總頭足為別。瓶為總四塵為別。有此總別故生煩惱業苦。今求總別無從。則煩惱業苦不起名得解脫。是為大利。初二品即二別。前破一后破異者凡有四義。一者一家最初興世。二者天竺盛行。三者提義精巧。四者一為眾句之初。但一有二種。一者通一。即一數通於二家。二者別一。謂總別一體。今此品正破總別一體。破于別一故以目品。問成實論具破一等四執。謂一異及不可說及以執無。今何故但破一異。答破空品具破不可說及破于無。是故今兩品但破一異。問若爾成實具破四。與今何異。答彼就小乘門破四。今就大乘門破四。彼破四竟立小乘義。此論言而無當破無所立。品開為二。初總立總破。次別立別破。外日應有神有一瓶等神所有故者。上以神救神義既不立。今舉法救神也。有者總。于萬法並皆有。瓶者此則是別。又外道頂有周羅執云奇杖。修于凈法多捉瓶行故舉瓶興論。一者是數名。以一于萬法。問大有二十五諦中何諦所攝。答總別分之。大有為總。二十五諦為別。人法分之。屬法所攝。故此文云有一瓶等是神所有。問外道立大有與內何異。答他云。外總萬法名之為有。而有體是常與萬法一體。內義亦總萬法名為世諦。而無別一世諦是常與萬法一體。是故為異。內義總四微假說為瓶。

無別實瓶與有為一。今責。攬瓶衣成世諦無別總世諦。亦假五陰成人無別有人。假四塵成柱應無別柱。而莊嚴義別有假人柱體。應別有假世諦體。開善亦應別有假世諦用。又雖言是假終有此假與外道何異。又僧佉只瓶是有隻瓶是一。佛法內大小乘人可不爾耶。又大小乘人云攬四微成瓶為一無別一法以一于瓶。今將外難內亦成難。解若離瓶無別一以一于瓶。亦應離瓶無別生以生於瓶。今遂立非色非心生瓶者一亦應然。內曰此總破二意。一奪二縱。奪者。神本法末。本已前無。寧有于末。外人上明法有以證人有。論主以無人類法亦無。二義應齊。但人無已彰。法有未顯。故外屈內申。今思惟下次縱破。縱無人有法。更開一異責之。為三法一體故有三法。為三法異體故有三法。故云若以一有若以異有也。問破有百端。神品已開一異定之。今何故復說。答破乃千端。但外道義宗唯有一異。上立神覺一異。今立總別一異。是故論主還以一異定之。又一異破顯愚智皆知。是故偏用。又前用一異以破人無。今令其發悟故還用已悟曉其未悟也。外曰下第二別立別破又開三別。第一正破自宗三法一體。第二破外引他證三法一體。第三破外舉因證果。此是文三而義有四。初段破自立義。次章破引他立。此二破總別果法。后一破總別之因。故

是自他因果四也。今前受定立三法一體故有三法。所以立三法一體者。義甚精密非都孟浪。離有無瓶離瓶無有。故有體即瓶體瓶體即有體。而開總別者。正言天下之物皆悉是有。故有語是通。瓶有既爾。一數亦然離瓶無一。故即一是瓶。但一數語通。故別立之耳。內破為三。一牒法二舉譬三正破。若有一瓶一者。此牒三法一體也。如一者舉譬也。猶如天主是一體有三種義故立三名。一切成下第三破也。有三種破。謂一切成不成及顛倒也。一切成者有三種成。一者體成。二者義成。三者名成。三法互成。則是三種體成三種義成三種名成。則一切法體皆成一物體。一切物義皆成一物義。一切物名皆成一物名。若爾則無有萬物。既無萬物亦無一物。故一切物空。又若有物有可有物空。既無物有亦無物空。如是亦有亦空非有非空。即四境絕四心斷四言滅。即證實相法身也。又如此四境四心在邪乃盡。方得申因緣二諦。故前是二諦外空是有所無空。後方得辨二諦。無所有空也。問何故作此二意。答若外義與內同者。如上意破。無四境四心即悟實相發正觀。若外義異內義。破外竟始得明內二諦。因世諦有故悟第一義空。因二諦悟中道。此是佛法內外大意。不可不知也。言體成者捉有與一併皆成瓶。有一既其成瓶。則萬法並皆成瓶。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：是自他因果四（自因、他因、自他因、無因）也。現在，爲了確立前述所說的『受』、『定』、『立』這三法為一體，所以才設立這三法。之所以要確立三法為一體，是因為其中的道理非常精密，並非隨意而為。離開『有』，就沒有『瓶』；離開『瓶』，也就沒有『有』。所以，『有』的本體就是『瓶』的本體，『瓶』的本體也就是『有』的本體。而區分總相和別相的原因是，爲了明確說明天下萬物都存在，所以用『有』這個詞來概括。『瓶有』是這樣，『一數』也是這樣，離開『瓶』就沒有『一』，所以『一』就是『瓶』。但『一數』這個詞是通用的，所以才特別設立它。內在的破斥分為三部分：第一，列舉法；第二，舉例說明；第三，正式破斥。如果說『有一瓶』，這個『一』，就是列舉三法一體。『如一者』，這是舉例說明。猶如天主是一體，但有三種意義，所以設立三個名稱。『一切成下』，這是第三部分破斥。有三種破斥，即一切成、不成以及顛倒。一切成，有三種成就：一是體成就，二是義成就，三是名成就。三法互相成就，就是三種體成就、三種義成就、三種名成就。那麼，一切法的本體都成就為一個物體的本體，一切物的意義都成就為一個物體的意義，一切物的名稱都成就為一個物體的名稱。如果這樣，就沒有萬物了。既然沒有萬物，也就沒有一物，所以一切物都是空。又如果說有物，那麼可有物，也可有物空。既然沒有物有，也就沒有物空。這樣，亦有亦空，非有非空，就是四境（有、無、亦有亦無、非有非無）斷絕，四心（有想、無想、亦有亦無想、非有非無想）斷滅，四言（有說、無說、亦有亦無說、非有非無說）滅絕，就證得了實相法身。又，這四境四心在邪見中才能窮盡，才能闡明因緣二諦。所以，前面所說是二諦之外的空，是有所無的空；後面才能辨明二諦，是無所有空。問：為什麼要作這兩種意思？答：如果外道的意義與內道的意義相同，就用上面的意思來破斥，沒有四境四心，就能領悟實相，發起正觀。如果外道的意義與內道的意義不同，破斥外道之後，才能闡明內道的二諦，因為有世俗諦，才能領悟第一義空，因為二諦才能領悟中道。這是佛法內外的大意，不可不知。說到體成就，就是抓住『有』和『一』，一起成就為『瓶』。『有一』既然成就為『瓶』，那麼萬法就都成就為『瓶』。

【English Translation】 English version: These are the four causes and conditions of self and others (self-cause, other-cause, both self and other-cause, and no cause). Now, in order to establish the aforementioned 'reception' (受), 'determination' (定), and 'establishment' (立) as a unity of three dharmas, these three dharmas are established. The reason for establishing the unity of three dharmas is that the principle is very precise and not arbitrary. Without 'existence' (有), there is no 'bottle' (瓶); without 'bottle', there is no 'existence'. Therefore, the essence of 'existence' is the essence of 'bottle', and the essence of 'bottle' is the essence of 'existence'. The reason for distinguishing between the general and the specific is to clearly state that all things in the world exist, so the word 'existence' is used to encompass them. 'Bottle-existence' is like this, and 'one-number' (一數) is also like this. Without 'bottle', there is no 'one', so 'one' is 'bottle'. However, the term 'one-number' is general, so it is specifically established. The internal refutation is divided into three parts: first, listing the dharma; second, giving an example; and third, formal refutation. If it is said 'there is one bottle' (有一瓶), this 'one' is listing the unity of the three dharmas. 'Like one' (如一者) is giving an example. It is like the Lord of Heaven (天主) being a unity, but having three meanings, so three names are established. 'Everything is accomplished below' (一切成下) is the third part of the refutation. There are three types of refutation, namely, everything is accomplished, not accomplished, and inverted. Everything is accomplished has three accomplishments: first, the accomplishment of essence; second, the accomplishment of meaning; and third, the accomplishment of name. The three dharmas accomplish each other, which means three accomplishments of essence, three accomplishments of meaning, and three accomplishments of name. Then, the essence of all dharmas is accomplished as the essence of one thing, the meaning of all things is accomplished as the meaning of one thing, and the name of all things is accomplished as the name of one thing. If this is the case, there are no myriad things. Since there are no myriad things, there is no one thing, so all things are empty. Also, if it is said that there is a thing, then there can be thing-existence and thing-emptiness. Since there is no thing-existence, there is no thing-emptiness. Thus, both existence and emptiness, neither existence nor emptiness, is the cessation of the four realms (existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence, neither existence nor non-existence), the extinction of the four minds (thought of existence, thought of non-existence, thought of both existence and non-existence, thought of neither existence nor non-existence), and the annihilation of the four words (speaking of existence, speaking of non-existence, speaking of both existence and non-existence, speaking of neither existence nor non-existence), which is the realization of the true aspect of the Dharma body. Furthermore, these four realms and four minds can only be exhausted in wrong views, and then the two truths of dependent origination can be elucidated. Therefore, what was said earlier is the emptiness outside the two truths, the emptiness of what is not; later, the two truths can be distinguished, which is the emptiness of nothing. Question: Why make these two meanings? Answer: If the meaning of the external path is the same as the meaning of the internal path, then use the above meaning to refute, without the four realms and four minds, one can realize the true aspect and generate correct views. If the meaning of the external path is different from the meaning of the internal path, after refuting the external path, one can clarify the two truths of the internal path, because there is conventional truth, one can realize the ultimate truth of emptiness, and because of the two truths, one can realize the Middle Way. This is the general meaning of both internal and external Buddhism, which must be known. Speaking of the accomplishment of essence, it is to grasp 'existence' and 'one' together and accomplish them as 'bottle'. Since 'one-existence' is accomplished as 'bottle', then all dharmas are accomplished as 'bottle'.

言義成者。瓶是無常義。有是常義。瓶是別義。有是總義。有與瓶一。瓶既無常有亦無常。總別亦爾。言名成者。瓶名既其成瓶。有名亦應成瓶。舉瓶對有既有三成。舉瓶對一亦有三成。舉瓶為端既有六成。有一亦爾。合有十八種成。一切不成者。翻十八種成則成十八種不成。故云一切不成。今略示一。若萬物體不併成瓶。則瓶體亦不成瓶。謂體不成也。若有常義不成瓶無常義。則瓶無常義亦不成瓶無常義。謂義不成。若有名不成瓶名。則瓶名亦不成瓶名。謂名不成。余皆類爾。顛倒者亦有十八種倒。謂體倒義倒名倒。欲成瓶體應成有體。名為體倒。欲成瓶義應成有義。名為義倒。欲成瓶名應成有名。秤為名倒。欲見此意顯在註文。註釋三為四。一牒法二牒辟三合譬四釋難。若有一瓶一者此牒法也。如因陀羅下釋上如一譬喻也。因陀羅此雲天主。釋迦為能。憍尸迦是過去世姓。如是隨有處下第三合譬也。若爾下第四正釋難也。釋難有三。一一中皆二。初正釋。次牒偈本結成。釋初有七複次。總明三種成義。開為二別。初五複次略明三成。后二複次廣明義成。前五複次明三成有三別。初三難明體成。次一明義成。次一明說成。就三又二。初兩句捉有一併應成瓶。次一捉瓶等悉皆成一。初二即二。前句捉有成瓶。次句捉一

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本言義成者：如果從意義上來說成立，那麼『瓶』（Ping，一種容器）是無常的意義，『有』是常的意義。『瓶』是特殊的意義，『有』是普遍的意義。『有』和『瓶』如果是一體的，那麼既然『瓶』是無常的，『有』也應該是無常的。總的意義和特殊的意義也是如此。言名成者：如果『瓶』這個名稱成立，那麼『有』這個名稱也應該成立。舉『瓶』與『有』相對，就有三種成立的方式。舉『瓶』與『一』相對，也有三種成立的方式。以『瓶』為開端，就有六種成立的方式。以『有』為開端也是一樣。總共有十八種成立的方式。一切不成者：反過來說，如果將十八種成立的方式反過來，就成了十八種不成立的方式。所以說一切都不成立。現在簡單地舉一個例子：如果萬物不能同時構成『瓶』，那麼『瓶』的本體也不能構成『瓶』，這就是說本體不成立。如果『有』的常義不能構成『瓶』的無常義，那麼『瓶』的無常義也不能構成『瓶』的無常義，這就是說意義不成立。如果『有』的名稱不能構成『瓶』的名稱，那麼『瓶』的名稱也不能構成『瓶』的名稱，這就是說名稱不成立。其餘的情況都可以依此類推。顛倒者：也有十八種顛倒的情況，也就是本體顛倒、意義顛倒、名稱顛倒。想要成立『瓶』的本體，應該先成立『有』的本體，這叫做本體顛倒。想要成立『瓶』的意義，應該先成立『有』的意義，這叫做意義顛倒。想要成立『瓶』的名稱，應該先成立『有』的名稱，這叫做名稱顛倒。想要理解這個意思，可以參考註文中的解釋。註釋分為四個部分：一是照錄原文，二是駁斥異議，三是結合比喻，四是解釋疑問。若有一瓶一者：這是照錄原文。『如因陀羅下』是解釋上面所說的『如一』的比喻。『因陀羅』（Indra）這裡翻譯為『天主』（Lord of the Gods）。『釋迦』（Shakya）是能仁。『憍尸迦』（Kaushika）是過去世的姓氏。『如是隨有處下』是第三部分，結合比喻。『若爾下』是第四部分，正式解釋疑問。解釋疑問分為三個部分，每個部分又分為兩個小部分。首先是正式解釋，然後是照錄偈頌的原本，最後是總結。解釋第一個部分有七個『複次』。總的來說，闡明了三種成立的意義，展開來說分為兩個部分。首先用五個『複次』簡要地闡明三種成立，然後用兩個『複次』廣泛地闡明意義的成立。前面的五個『複次』闡明三種成立又分為三個小部分。首先用兩個『複次』來論證『有』和『一』應該同時成立『瓶』。然後用一個『複次』來論證『瓶』等等都應該成立『一』。最初的兩個『複次』又分為兩個小部分。前一句是論證『有』成立『瓶』，后一句是論證『一』成立『瓶』。

【English Translation】 English version Regarding the establishment of meaning: If it is established in terms of meaning, then 'bottle' (Ping, a container) is the meaning of impermanence, and 'existence' (You) is the meaning of permanence. 'Bottle' is a specific meaning, and 'existence' is a general meaning. If 'existence' and 'bottle' are one, then since 'bottle' is impermanent, 'existence' should also be impermanent. The general meaning and the specific meaning are also like this. Regarding the establishment of name: If the name 'bottle' is established, then the name 'existence' should also be established. Taking 'bottle' and 'existence' as opposites, there are three ways to establish it. Taking 'bottle' and 'one' as opposites, there are also three ways to establish it. Taking 'bottle' as the starting point, there are six ways to establish it. It is the same with taking 'existence' as the starting point. In total, there are eighteen ways to establish it. Regarding all non-establishment: Conversely, if the eighteen ways of establishment are reversed, they become eighteen ways of non-establishment. Therefore, it is said that everything is not established. Now, let's give a simple example: If all things cannot simultaneously constitute a 'bottle', then the substance of the 'bottle' cannot constitute a 'bottle' either, which means that the substance is not established. If the permanent meaning of 'existence' cannot constitute the impermanent meaning of 'bottle', then the impermanent meaning of 'bottle' cannot constitute the impermanent meaning of 'bottle' either, which means that the meaning is not established. If the name of 'existence' cannot constitute the name of 'bottle', then the name of 'bottle' cannot constitute the name of 'bottle' either, which means that the name is not established. The rest can be inferred by analogy. Regarding inversion: There are also eighteen kinds of inversion, which are the inversion of substance, the inversion of meaning, and the inversion of name. If you want to establish the substance of 'bottle', you should first establish the substance of 'existence', which is called the inversion of substance. If you want to establish the meaning of 'bottle', you should first establish the meaning of 'existence', which is called the inversion of meaning. If you want to establish the name of 'bottle', you should first establish the name of 'existence', which is called the inversion of name. If you want to understand this meaning, you can refer to the explanation in the commentary. The commentary is divided into four parts: first, transcribing the original text; second, refuting objections; third, combining metaphors; and fourth, explaining doubts. If there is one bottle, one: This is transcribing the original text. 'As Indra below' explains the metaphor of 'as one' mentioned above. 'Indra' (Indra) is translated here as 'Lord of the Gods'. 'Shakya' (Shakya) is the capable one. 'Kaushika' (Kaushika) is the surname of a past life. 'As it is wherever it exists below' is the third part, combining metaphors. 'If so below' is the fourth part, formally explaining doubts. The explanation of doubts is divided into three parts, and each part is divided into two sub-parts. First is the formal explanation, then transcribing the original text of the verse, and finally summarizing. There are seven 'furthermore' in explaining the first part. In general, it clarifies the meaning of the three establishments, and expands it into two parts. First, five 'furthermore' briefly clarify the three establishments, and then two 'furthermore' extensively clarify the establishment of meaning. The previous five 'furthermore' clarifying the three establishments are divided into three sub-parts. First, two 'furthermore' are used to argue that 'existence' and 'one' should simultaneously establish 'bottle'. Then, one 'furthermore' is used to argue that 'bottle' and so on should establish 'one'. The initial two 'furthermore' are divided into two sub-parts. The previous sentence argues that 'existence' establishes 'bottle', and the next sentence argues that 'one' establishes 'bottle'.

成瓶。初句明有與瓶一。有既成瓶。萬法與有一。有既成瓶。萬法亦成瓶。此體成也。其有一物皆應是瓶者。有人言。有之與一如此等物皆應是瓶。有人言。凡是有一之物皆應是瓶。今明此二釋悉非。上既明有是瓶則衣等萬物悉皆成瓶。云何重說也。今所明者。前句捉有成瓶。此句捉一成瓶。明萬物之數皆應成瓶也。今瓶衣等物悉皆是一者。此捉萬物悉成一數。複次有常故萬物亦應常。此捉萬法悉成有。即是義成。但外人以萬物成有不名為過故。今就大有但明義成。有以常遍為義。一瓶既是有亦應常遍也。複次若說有即說一瓶。此明說成。今欲喚物但應喚有即得一切物。以有與萬物不異故。所以詺此為說成者。說有之說即成說瓶之說故也。複次一是數。自上已來五複次略論三種成竟。此兩複次重就一瓶論其義成。一既是數義。有瓶亦是數義。第二複次就瓶構三並。初二法與瓶一則同瓶並具五身。次同瓶並有形。三同瓶並皆無常。將有一同瓶既有此三。以瓶有同一亦有此三。則三法並無數並無形並無五。今但取要切者論之故偏舉瓶耳。是名如一下第二牒偈本總結。是名如一牒立也。一切成牒破也。破不成中四複次明三不成。初二複次明體不成。次一辨名不成。后一義不成。還翻上三成故有三不成。初二複次為異者。有人

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本成瓶。第一句說明『有』（存在）與瓶子是一體的。『有』既然成了瓶子，萬法（一切事物）也就與『有』合一了。『有』既然成了瓶子，萬法也就都成了瓶子。這是本體的成就。如果說任何事物都應該是瓶子，有人會說，『有』與『一』這樣的東西都應該是瓶子。也有人會說，凡是具有『一』的事物都應該是瓶子。現在說明這兩種解釋都是錯誤的。上面已經說明『有』就是瓶子，那麼衣服等萬物就都成了瓶子，為什麼還要重複說明呢？現在所要說明的是，前一句是抓住『有』來成就瓶子，這一句是抓住『一』來成就瓶子，說明萬物的數量都應該成為瓶子。現在瓶子、衣服等事物都是『一』，這是抓住萬物都成為一個數量。再次，如果『有』是常，那麼萬物也應該是常。這是抓住萬法都成為『有』，這就是義理上的成就。但是外道認為萬物成為『有』並不算過失，所以現在就以『大有』來說明義理上的成就。『有』以常和普遍為意義，一個瓶子既然是『有』，也應該是常和普遍的。再次，如果說『有』就是說一個瓶子，這是說明說法的成就。現在想要稱呼事物，只要稱呼『有』就可以得到一切事物，因為『有』與萬物沒有區別。所以稱之為說法成就，因為說『有』的說法就成就了說瓶子的說法。再次，『一』是數量。從上面開始，五個複次（進一步的解釋）簡略地論述了三種成就。這兩個複次重新就一個瓶子論述其義理上的成就。『一』既然是數量的意義，『有瓶』也是數量的意義。第二個複次就瓶子構成三種並列關係。首先是二法與瓶子合一，就與瓶子並列具備五身（色、受、想、行、識）。其次是與瓶子並列具有形狀。第三是與瓶子並列都是無常的。將『有』與『一』同瓶子一樣，既然有這三種，因為瓶子有，『同一』也有這三種。那麼三種法並列，無數並列，無形並列，無五身並列。現在只取重要且切要的來論述，所以偏舉瓶子。這叫做『如一』。下面第二部分是依照偈頌的原本進行總結。這叫做『如一』的建立。『一切成』是依照『破』來建立的。在破除不成就中，用四個複次來說明三種不成就。最初兩個複次說明本體的不成就。接著一個辨別名稱的不成就。最後一個是義理的不成就。還是翻轉上面的三種成就，所以有三種不成就。最初兩個複次是針對不同的人。有人

【English Translation】 English version Becoming a bottle. The first sentence clarifies that 'existence' (有, yǒu) and the bottle are one. Since 'existence' has become a bottle, the myriad dharmas (萬法, wànfǎ) (all things) are also one with 'existence'. Since 'existence' has become a bottle, the myriad dharmas have all become bottles. This is the accomplishment of the substance (體成, tǐ chéng). If it is said that anything should be a bottle, some might say that things like 'existence' and 'oneness' (一, yī) should all be bottles. Others might say that anything that has 'oneness' should be a bottle. Now it is explained that both of these interpretations are wrong. It has already been explained above that 'existence' is the bottle, then the myriad things like clothing have all become bottles, why repeat it? What is to be explained now is that the previous sentence grasps 'existence' to accomplish the bottle, this sentence grasps 'oneness' to accomplish the bottle, explaining that the number of myriad things should all become bottles. Now the bottle, clothing, and other things are all 'one', this is grasping that the myriad things all become one number. Furthermore, if 'existence' is constant, then the myriad things should also be constant. This is grasping that the myriad dharmas all become 'existence', which is the accomplishment in terms of meaning (義成, yì chéng). However, outsiders consider that the myriad things becoming 'existence' is not a fault, so now the accomplishment in meaning is explained in terms of 'great existence' (大有, dà yǒu). 'Existence' takes constancy and pervasiveness as its meaning, since a bottle is 'existence', it should also be constant and pervasive. Furthermore, if saying 'existence' is saying a bottle, this is explaining the accomplishment of speech (說成, shuō chéng). Now if one wants to call things, one only needs to call 'existence' to obtain all things, because 'existence' is not different from the myriad things. Therefore, it is called the accomplishment of speech, because the speech of saying 'existence' accomplishes the speech of saying bottle. Furthermore, 'one' is a number. From above, the five further explanations (複次, fù cì) briefly discuss the three accomplishments. These two further explanations re-discuss the accomplishment in meaning of one bottle. Since 'one' is the meaning of number, 'existing bottle' is also the meaning of number. The second further explanation constitutes three parallel relationships with the bottle. First, the two dharmas are one with the bottle, then they are parallel with the bottle and possess the five skandhas (五身, wǔ shēn) (form, feeling, perception, volition, consciousness). Second, they are parallel with the bottle and have form. Third, they are parallel with the bottle and are all impermanent. Taking 'existence' and 'oneness' as the same as the bottle, since the bottle has these three, 'same oneness' also has these three. Then the three dharmas are parallel, countless are parallel, formless are parallel, and the five skandhas are not parallel. Now only the important and essential ones are discussed, so the bottle is mentioned specifically. This is called 'like one' (如一, rú yī). The second part below is a summary based on the original verse. This is called the establishment of 'like one'. 'All accomplishment' (一切成, yīqiè chéng) is established according to 'breaking' (破, pò). In breaking non-accomplishment, four further explanations are used to explain three non-accomplishments. The first two further explanations explain the non-accomplishment of the substance. Then one distinguishes the non-accomplishment of the name. The last one is the non-accomplishment of meaning. It still reverses the above three accomplishments, so there are three non-accomplishments. The first two further explanations are for different people. Someone

言。處處有據所依處。如一州一寺處。事事有據能依處。有即瓶衣等事有。有人言。處處有是瓶衣上有。事事有據五塵有。即是假實處。有人言。處處有據大有體。事事有就瓶衣論有。眾師相承多用此釋。今謂不成本翻于成。上成中初句云。有與瓶不異。有既成瓶。有與衣等萬物不異。衣等諸物亦應成瓶。今翻之云若處處有非瓶衣等物亦非瓶者。若爾瓶亦非瓶。此翻初句也。上第二句云。其有一物皆應是瓶。取萬物上有一皆應成瓶。今還翻之若萬物上一數之有此既非瓶。則瓶亦非瓶。故處處有約瓶衣等物有。事事約衣等一數之有。是故為異也。複次若說有第三明說不成。翻上第三說成。上明欲說有應說瓶。今明說有之說既不成說瓶之說。今說瓶之說亦不應成說瓶之說。複次若有非瓶下有人言。此句煩長。凡論有不出二。一處處有名為總有。二事事有即是別有。此二既非瓶則明有事盡矣。今復明有故為煩長。若以此句為正。前即煩長。有人言。初句是總有體。事事有是衣等諸物有。今直明瓶中有故三處有異。有人言。就相待破。瓶底平腹大。有亦應爾。有無此相。瓶亦應然。今明瓶中之有與上兩有不異。不應作此釋也。今明此就義不成難之還翻上義成。有是常義總義既非是瓶。瓶是無常別義亦非是瓶。第二總結如文。釋

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

有人說：『處處都有依據和依靠的地方，比如一個州或一座寺廟，事事都有依據可以依靠。』存在，指的是瓶子、衣服等事物的存在。有人說：『處處都有，是指在瓶子、衣服上存在。』事事都有依據，是指五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸）的存在，這就是假和實的區別。有人說：『處處都有依據，是指「大有」的本體。』事事都有，是指就瓶子、衣服來論述存在。』許多老師都沿用這種解釋。我認為這是把成立的說法反而說成不成立的說法。前面『成立』中的第一句說：『有』與瓶子沒有區別，『有』既然成立為瓶子，那麼『有』與衣服等萬物也沒有區別，衣服等事物也應該成立為瓶子。現在反過來說，如果處處都有，但不是瓶子、衣服等物，那麼也不是瓶子。這是對第一句的反駁。前面第二句說：『其中有一物，都應該是瓶子。』取萬物之上有一個，都應該成立為瓶子。現在反過來說，如果萬物之上一個數量的『有』，它既然不是瓶子，那麼瓶子也不是瓶子。所以，處處都有，是就瓶子、衣服等物來說的『有』；事事都有，是就衣服等一個數量的『有』來說的。因此，它們是不同的。其次，如果說『有』，第三次明確說明不成立，這是把前面第三次說成立的說法反過來說。前面說明想要說『有』，應該說瓶子。現在說明說『有』的說法既然不能成立說瓶子的說法，那麼現在說瓶子的說法也不應該成立說瓶子的說法。其次，如果『有』不是瓶子，下面有人說，這句話太繁瑣冗長。凡是論述『有』，不外乎兩種：一種是處處都有，名為總『有』；另一種是事事都有，即是別『有』。這兩種既然不是瓶子，那麼說明『有』的事情就窮盡了。現在又說明『有』，所以顯得繁瑣冗長。如果把這句話作為正面的說法，那麼前面就顯得繁瑣冗長。有人說，第一句是總『有』的本體，事事都有，是衣服等事物的『有』。現在直接說明瓶子中的『有』，所以三處的『有』是不同的。有人說，這是就相對待的角度來破斥。瓶子的底部是平的，腹部是大的，『有』也應該這樣。『有』沒有這種形狀，瓶子也應該這樣。現在說明瓶子中的『有』與上面兩種『有』沒有不同，不應該作這種解釋。現在說明這是就義理上不成立來反駁，反而使前面的義理成立。『有』是常義、總義，既然不是瓶子，瓶子是無常、別義，也不是瓶子。第二段總結如原文。 English version:

Someone says: 'Everywhere has a basis and a place to rely on, such as a state or a temple; everything has a basis to rely on.' Existence refers to the existence of things like bottles and clothes. Someone says: 'Everywhere has it, meaning it exists on bottles and clothes.' Everything has a basis, meaning the existence of the five skandhas (form, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness), which is the difference between the false and the real. Someone says: 'Everywhere has a basis, referring to the essence of the 'Great Existence'.' Everything has it, referring to discussing existence in terms of bottles and clothes.' Many teachers follow this explanation. I think this is turning an established statement into an unestablished one. The first sentence in the previous 'establishment' says: 'Existence' is no different from a bottle. Since 'existence' is established as a bottle, then 'existence' is no different from clothes and all things, and clothes and other things should also be established as bottles. Now, to say it the other way around, if it exists everywhere, but it is not bottles, clothes, etc., then it is not a bottle. This is a rebuttal to the first sentence. The second sentence in the previous one says: 'If there is one thing, it should be a bottle.' Taking one above all things, it should be established as a bottle. Now, to say it the other way around, if the 'existence' of a number above all things is not a bottle, then the bottle is not a bottle. Therefore, everywhere has it, referring to the 'existence' of bottles, clothes, etc.; everything has it, referring to the 'existence' of a number of clothes, etc. Therefore, they are different. Secondly, if 'existence' is mentioned, the third explicit statement is that it is not established, which is reversing the previous third statement that it is established. The previous statement explains that if you want to talk about 'existence', you should talk about a bottle. Now, explaining that the statement of 'existence' cannot establish the statement of a bottle, then the statement of a bottle should not establish the statement of a bottle. Secondly, if 'existence' is not a bottle, someone below says that this sentence is too cumbersome and lengthy. All discussions of 'existence' are nothing more than two types: one is everywhere, called total 'existence'; the other is everything, which is separate 'existence'. Since these two are not bottles, then the matter of explaining 'existence' is exhausted. Now, explaining 'existence' again seems cumbersome and lengthy. If this sentence is taken as a positive statement, then the previous one seems cumbersome and lengthy. Someone says that the first sentence is the essence of total 'existence', and everything has it, which is the 'existence' of clothes and other things. Now, directly explaining the 'existence' in the bottle, so the 'existence' in the three places is different. Someone says that this is to refute from a relative perspective. The bottom of the bottle is flat, and the belly is big, and 'existence' should also be like this. 'Existence' does not have this shape, and the bottle should also be like this. Now, explaining that the 'existence' in the bottle is no different from the above two types of 'existence', this explanation should not be made. Now, explaining that this is to refute from the perspective of unestablished meaning, but instead makes the previous meaning established. 'Existence' is a constant meaning and a general meaning. Since it is not a bottle, a bottle is an impermanent and separate meaning, and it is not a bottle. The second paragraph summarizes as in the original text.

【English Translation】 Someone said: 'Everywhere there is a basis and a place to rely on, such as a state or a temple; everything has a basis to rely on.' 'Existence' refers to the existence of things like bottles and clothes. Someone said: 'Everywhere there is it, meaning it exists on bottles and clothes.' 'Everything has a basis,' meaning the existence of the five skandhas (form, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness), which is the difference between the false and the real. Someone said: 'Everywhere there is a basis, referring to the essence of the 'Great Existence'.' 'Everything has it,' referring to discussing existence in terms of bottles and clothes.' Many teachers follow this explanation. I think this is turning an established statement into an unestablished one. The first sentence in the previous 'establishment' says: ''Existence' is no different from a bottle. Since 'existence' is established as a bottle, then 'existence' is no different from clothes and all things, and clothes and other things should also be established as bottles. Now, to say it the other way around, if it exists everywhere, but it is not bottles, clothes, etc., then it is not a bottle. This is a rebuttal to the first sentence. The second sentence in the previous one says: 'If there is one thing, it should be a bottle.' Taking one above all things, it should be established as a bottle. Now, to say it the other way around, if the 'existence' of a number above all things is not a bottle, then the bottle is not a bottle. Therefore, everywhere has it, referring to the 'existence' of bottles, clothes, etc.; everything has it, referring to the 'existence' of a number of clothes, etc. Therefore, they are different. Secondly, if 'existence' is mentioned, the third explicit statement is that it is not established, which is reversing the previous third statement that it is established. The previous statement explains that if you want to talk about 'existence', you should talk about a bottle. Now, explaining that the statement of 'existence' cannot establish the statement of a bottle, then the statement of a bottle should not establish the statement of a bottle. Secondly, if 'existence' is not a bottle, someone below says that this sentence is too cumbersome and lengthy. All discussions of 'existence' are nothing more than two types: one is everywhere, called total 'existence'; the other is everything, which is separate 'existence'. Since these two are not bottles, then the matter of explaining 'existence' is exhausted. Now, explaining 'existence' again seems cumbersome and lengthy. If this sentence is taken as a positive statement, then the previous one seems cumbersome and lengthy. Someone says that the first sentence is the essence of total 'existence', and everything has it, which is the 'existence' of clothes and other things. Now, directly explaining the 'existence' in the bottle, so the 'existence' in the three places is different. Someone says that this is to refute from a relative perspective. The bottom of the bottle is flat, and the belly is big, and 'existence' should also be like this. 'Existence' does not have this shape, and the bottle should also be like this. Now, explaining that the 'existence' in the bottle is no different from the above two types of 'existence', this explanation should not be made. Now, explaining that this is to refute from the perspective of unestablished meaning, but instead makes the previous meaning established. 'Existence' is a constant meaning and a general meaning. Since it is not a bottle, a bottle is an impermanent and separate meaning, and it is not a bottle. The second paragraph summarizes as in the original text.

顛倒中二難。初七中四后二者廣略互現。又示三門。一廣門二處中門三略說門。二難即二。初明名倒次總辨體義二倒。名倒者。欲喚瓶應喚有。欲喚有應喚瓶。複次汝瓶成故第二合明體義兩倒。瓶體始成。瓶外有一皆悉應成。瓶無常義別義既成。瓶外有一總常義亦應成。瓶外有一體既成瓶亦應成。有總常義既本成。瓶別無常義亦應成。又瓶無常始成。大有亦無常始成。有既是常名為本成。瓶亦應爾。外曰物有一故無過。此文有二句。一者物有一自立宗也。無過通三難也。自立宗者。外義說。總不得攝別。如人口中直言有何必攝瓶。以一切物皆有故也。口中直言一何必攝瓶以一切物各有一故。說別必攝總。既其言瓶。則知非無故必是有也。既其言瓶。豈是二物。故必一也。通上難者。上難云有與瓶不異。有與萬物又不異。有既成瓶則萬物皆成瓶者。此事不然。若總有攝別瓶總有既成瓶。則萬物悉成瓶。以總有不攝瓶。則總有不成瓶。總有既不成瓶則萬物亦不成瓶。故無一切成過。通不成難者。難云。總有既不成瓶瓶亦不成瓶者不然。瓶攝得有。瓶有自成瓶。故瓶體得成。故無一切不成過也。故以二不攝瓶則通一切不成難。通第三難者。前難云。說有應說瓶說瓶應說有者不然。以總有不攝瓶故。說有不得瓶。瓶必攝於有。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本顛倒中和二者難以理解。初七中四之後，廣和略兩種說法交替出現。又展示了三門：一是廣門，二是處中門，三是略說門。二難指的是兩種困難。首先是名倒，其次是總辨體義二倒。名倒指的是，想稱呼『瓶』（Kalasa），應該稱呼『有』（asti）；想稱呼『有』，應該稱呼『瓶』。進一步說，因為你的『瓶』成立，所以第二點是結合體義來闡明兩種顛倒。『瓶』的體性開始成立，『瓶』外面的『有一』（ekatva）都應該成立。『瓶』的無常之義和差別之義既然成立，『瓶』外面的『有一』的總常之義也應該成立。『瓶』外面的『有一』的體性既然成立，『瓶』也應該成立。『有』的總常之義既然本來成立，『瓶』的差別無常之義也應該成立。而且，『瓶』的無常開始成立，『大有』（mahat-asti）的無常也開始成立。『有』既然是常，名為本來成立，『瓶』也應該如此。外道說：『事物有一，所以沒有過失。』這段文字有兩句話。一句是『事物有一』，這是自立宗；『沒有過失』，是通用於三種困難。自立宗是外道的觀點，總不能包含別，比如人口中直接說『有』，何必包含『瓶』呢？因為一切事物都有『有』。口中直接說『一』，何必包含『瓶』呢？因為一切事物各自有一。說別一定包含總，既然說了『瓶』，就知道不是沒有，所以一定是有。既然說了『瓶』，怎麼會是兩個事物呢？所以必定是一。通用於上面的困難是，上面的困難說『有』和『瓶』沒有區別，『有』和萬物也沒有區別，『有』既然成立『瓶』，那麼萬物都成了『瓶』，這件事是不對的。如果總『有』包含別『瓶』，總『有』既然成立『瓶』，那麼萬物都成了『瓶』。因為總『有』不包含『瓶』，那麼總『有』就不成立『瓶』。總『有』既然不成立『瓶』，那麼萬物也不成立『瓶』，所以沒有一切都成立的過失。通用於不成立的困難是，困難說總『有』既然不成立『瓶』，『瓶』也不成立『瓶』，不是這樣的。『瓶』包含『有』，『瓶』有自己成立的『瓶』，所以『瓶』的體效能夠成立，所以沒有一切都不成立的過失。所以用二者不包含『瓶』，就通用於一切不成立的困難。通用於第三種困難是，前面的困難說，說『有』應該說『瓶』，說『瓶』應該說『有』，不是這樣的。因為總『有』不包含『瓶』，所以說『有』不能得到『瓶』，『瓶』必定包含『有』。

【English Translation】 English version It is difficult to understand the inversion of the middle and the two extremes. After the initial seven, the middle four, and then the two, the broad and concise explanations appear alternately. Furthermore, three gates are shown: first, the broad gate; second, the middle gate; and third, the concise explanation gate. The two difficulties refer to two kinds of difficulties. The first is the inversion of names (nama-viparyasa), and the second is the inversion of the overall discernment of essence and meaning (samanya-visesa-artha-viparyasa). The inversion of names refers to wanting to call 'jar' (Kalasa), one should call 'existence' (asti); wanting to call 'existence', one should call 'jar'. Furthermore, because your 'jar' is established, the second point is to clarify the two inversions by combining essence and meaning. The essence of 'jar' begins to be established, and the 'oneness' (ekatva) outside the 'jar' should all be established. Since the impermanence and difference of 'jar' are established, the general permanence of 'oneness' outside the 'jar' should also be established. Since the essence of 'oneness' outside the 'jar' is established, the 'jar' should also be established. Since the general permanence of 'existence' is originally established, the difference and impermanence of 'jar' should also be established. Moreover, the impermanence of 'jar' begins to be established, and the impermanence of 'great existence' (mahat-asti) also begins to be established. Since 'existence' is permanent, named as originally established, the 'jar' should also be so. The outsider says: 'Things have oneness, so there is no fault.' This passage has two sentences. One sentence is 'things have oneness', which is the self-established tenet; 'there is no fault' is applicable to the three difficulties. The self-established tenet is the outsider's view, the general cannot include the specific, such as directly saying 'existence' in the mouth, why must it include 'jar'? Because all things have 'existence'. Directly saying 'one' in the mouth, why must it include 'jar'? Because all things each have one. Saying the specific must include the general, since 'jar' is said, it is known that it is not non-existent, so it must be existent. Since 'jar' is said, how can it be two things? So it must be one. Applicable to the above difficulties is that the above difficulties say that 'existence' and 'jar' are no different, 'existence' and all things are no different, 'existence' having established 'jar', then all things become 'jar', this matter is not right. If the general 'existence' includes the specific 'jar', the general 'existence' having established 'jar', then all things become 'jar'. Because the general 'existence' does not include 'jar', then the general 'existence' does not establish 'jar'. Since the general 'existence' does not establish 'jar', then all things do not establish 'jar', so there is no fault of everything being established. Applicable to the difficulty of non-establishment is that the difficulty says that since the general 'existence' does not establish 'jar', 'jar' also does not establish 'jar', it is not like this. 'Jar' includes 'existence', 'jar' has its own established 'jar', so the essence of 'jar' can be established, so there is no fault of everything not being established. Therefore, using the two not including 'jar' is applicable to all difficulties of non-establishment. Applicable to the third difficulty is that the previous difficulty said that saying 'existence' should say 'jar', saying 'jar' should say 'existence', it is not like this. Because the general 'existence' does not include 'jar', so saying 'existence' cannot obtain 'jar', 'jar' must include 'existence'.

故說瓶自得瓶故無一切顛倒過。雙用二不攝瓶瓶攝二。答第三難。三難大宗既通。其間枝流不言自遣也。註釋為二初就體總別。別體攝總。總體體不攝別體。次就通別。說別必攝通。說通不攝別。略舉名體萬義皆收。內曰瓶有二何故二無瓶。前定三物一體。汝言三物之中兩通一別。別得攝通通不攝別。然此通別終是一體。既是一體便招四難。若三物一體則三物俱相攝。二明俱不相攝。三明瓶攝二可與二一體。二不攝瓶應與二異體。四明瓶不異二。二不異瓶。而言瓶攝二二不攝瓶。亦應二攝瓶瓶不攝二。釋中為二。初牒次責。若有一瓶一此句牒三物一體也。何故下第二責又二。前責體攝不攝。複次下責說攝不攝。上既二通。今還兩責。外曰瓶中瓶有定故。答上瓶有二。二無瓶之所以也。今前開四句。瓶有攝二不攝二。二有攝瓶不攝瓶故成四句也。瓶攝瓶家二不攝於通二。故言瓶攝二不攝二也。瓶二則攝瓶通二不攝瓶。故言二有攝瓶不攝瓶也。問若爾二具攝瓶不攝瓶。瓶具攝二不攝二。云何答上瓶攝二二不攝瓶也。答瓶攝瓶家二故瓶得即於二。通二不攝瓶故二不即于瓶。至此文通上三難始得分明。通有不成瓶。瓶有自成瓶。何得云瓶有既成瓶謂通有亦成瓶。作一切成難也。何得聞通有不成瓶謂瓶有亦不成瓶。作一切不成難

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本因此說瓶子自身獲得瓶子的屬性，所以沒有一切顛倒的過失。『雙用二不攝瓶，瓶攝二』，這是回答第三個難題。這三個難題的大方向既然已經貫通，那麼其中細枝末節的問題，也就不需要多說自然就消解了。註釋分為兩部分：首先就本體而言，有總體和別體之分，別體可以包含總體，而總體不能包含別體；其次就普遍性和特殊性而言，說特殊性必定包含普遍性，說普遍性不一定包含特殊性。簡略地舉出名和體，萬種義理都包含在其中。對方說：『瓶子中存在二，為什麼二中不存在瓶子？』前面已經確定三者是一體的。你說三者之中，兩者是普遍的，一個是特殊的，特殊可以包含普遍，普遍不能包含特殊。然而這普遍和特殊終究是一體的。既然是一體，就會招致四個難題：如果三者是一體，那麼三者就應該互相包含；二是說明三者互相不包含；三是說明瓶子包含二，可以與二成為一體，二不包含瓶子，應該與二成為異體；四是說明瓶子不異於二，二不異於瓶，卻說瓶子包含二，二不包含瓶子，也應該說二包含瓶子，瓶子不包含二。』解釋分為兩部分：首先是照錄，然後是責難。『若有一瓶一』，這句是照錄三者是一體的說法。『何故下』是第二部分責難，又分為兩點。前面責難本體的包含與不包含，『複次下』責難言說的包含與不包含。上面既然說了兩者是普遍的，現在就用兩點來責難。對方說：『瓶子中的瓶子是確定的。』回答上面『瓶子有二，二沒有瓶子』的原因。現在先開出四句：瓶子有包含二和不包含二，二有包含瓶子和不包含瓶子，所以形成四句。瓶子包含瓶子所屬的二，但不包含普遍的二，所以說『瓶子包含二，不包含二』。瓶子的二則包含瓶子，普遍的二不包含瓶子，所以說『二有包含瓶子，不包含瓶子』。問：『如果這樣，二既包含瓶子又不包含瓶子，瓶子既包含二又不包含二，怎麼回答上面瓶子包含二，二不包含瓶子呢？』回答：『瓶子包含瓶子所屬的二，所以瓶子可以等同於二；普遍的二不包含瓶子，所以二不等同於瓶子。』到這裡，才把上面三個難題解釋清楚。普遍的有不能成就瓶子，瓶子的有自身成就瓶子。怎麼能說瓶子的有既然成就了瓶子，就認為普遍的有也能成就瓶子，從而作出一切成就的難題呢？怎麼能聽到普遍的有不能成就瓶子，就認為瓶子的有也不能成就瓶子，從而作出一切不成就的難題呢？

【English Translation】 English version Therefore, it is said that the 'bottle' itself attains the attribute of 'bottle', so there is no fault of any inverted views. 'Using two does not encompass the bottle, the bottle encompasses two,' this is the answer to the third difficulty. Since the main direction of these three difficulties has been understood, then the minor details within them do not need to be discussed and will naturally be resolved. The commentary is divided into two parts: first, regarding the substance itself, there is the distinction between the general substance and the specific substance. The specific substance can contain the general substance, while the general substance cannot contain the specific substance; second, regarding universality and particularity, stating the particularity necessarily includes the universality, stating the universality does not necessarily include the particularity. Briefly mentioning the name and substance, all meanings are contained within them. The opponent says: 'Within the bottle, there exists two, why does the bottle not exist within the two?' It has already been determined that the three are one entity. You say that among the three, two are universal, and one is specific, the specific can contain the universal, the universal cannot contain the specific. However, this universality and particularity are ultimately one entity. Since they are one entity, it will lead to four difficulties: if the three are one entity, then the three should mutually contain each other; second, it is explained that the three do not mutually contain each other; third, it is explained that the bottle contains two, and can become one entity with two, two does not contain the bottle, and should be a different entity from two; fourth, it is explained that the bottle is not different from two, two is not different from the bottle, but it is said that the bottle contains two, two does not contain the bottle, it should also be said that two contains the bottle, the bottle does not contain two.' The explanation is divided into two parts: first, quoting, then questioning. 'If there is one bottle one,' this sentence is quoting the statement that the three are one entity. '何故下' is the second part of questioning, which is further divided into two points. The first part questions the inclusion and non-inclusion of the substance, '複次下' questions the inclusion and non-inclusion of the statement. Since it has been said that the two are universal, now use two points to question. The opponent says: 'The bottle within the bottle is definite.' The reason for answering above 'The bottle has two, two does not have the bottle'. Now, first open up four sentences: the bottle has containing two and not containing two, two has containing the bottle and not containing the bottle, so four sentences are formed. The bottle contains the two belonging to the bottle, but does not contain the universal two, so it is said 'The bottle contains two, does not contain two'. The two of the bottle contains the bottle, the universal two does not contain the bottle, so it is said 'Two has containing the bottle, not containing the bottle'. Question: 'If so, two both contains the bottle and does not contain the bottle, the bottle both contains two and does not contain two, how to answer the above that the bottle contains two, two does not contain the bottle?' Answer: 'The bottle contains the two belonging to the bottle, so the bottle can be equal to two; the universal two does not contain the bottle, so two is not equal to the bottle.' Up to this point, the above three difficulties are explained clearly. The universal existence cannot accomplish the bottle, the existence of the bottle itself accomplishes the bottle. How can it be said that since the existence of the bottle has accomplished the bottle, it is considered that the universal existence can also accomplish the bottle, thus creating the difficulty of all accomplishments? How can it be heard that the universal existence cannot accomplish the bottle, and it is considered that the existence of the bottle cannot accomplish the bottle, thus creating the difficulty of all non-accomplishments?

也。何得謂瓶有成通有即成。作一切顛倒難耶。問外人成二有義不。答只是一總有約萬物便成萬有。如只是一空約眾器故有眾器中空也。偈文瓶中瓶有定者有二種定。一者瓶中之有定不異瓶。此即瓶攝二二攝瓶。二者瓶中之有定異於衣物等。此即通二不攝瓶瓶不攝通二也。注中為二。前明異不異。次辨攝不攝。瓶中瓶有與瓶不異者。此明瓶中之有與瓶不異也。而異於衣物等者。瓶中之有與衣物等異也。是故下第二明攝不攝。初明瓶攝瓶家有有攝有家瓶也。非在在有處有瓶者。明通有不攝瓶。亦應明瓶不攝通有。但舉一則可知也。內曰不然瓶有不異故者。瓶家之有與總有不異故通名一大有。若爾即招四難。一者瓶既攝瓶家有亦攝於總有。二者總有既不攝瓶瓶家有亦不攝瓶。三者瓶家有不攝於總有則瓶家有異總有。四者總有不攝瓶則總有異瓶家有。注意明總則攝得別瓶別不攝得總。則總別體異不名為一。問此直明總別體異云何釋偈本也。答天親釋偈本多種形勢。自有順偈而釋。偈既明不異注還釋論于不異。自有偈明不異註明其異。此有二義。一者欲反覆相成。偈明不異則應俱攝俱不攝。注意若有攝有不攝別總別體異。二者欲反下父子譬救。有攝得瓶瓶不攝有。則總別體異。不應言一故有父子譬生。外曰如父子者。一人而父

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本也。怎麼能說瓶子的『有』是普遍的『有』，因此瓶子的『有』就變成了普遍的『有』呢？這是在製造一切顛倒的難題啊。問：外道認為『成』和『有』是兩種不同的存在嗎？答：他們只承認一個總體性的『有』，從萬物的角度來說，就變成了萬『有』。就像只有一個空，因為有各種器皿，所以才有了器皿中的各種空。偈文說：『瓶中的瓶有是確定的，有兩種確定。一是瓶中的『有』確定不異於瓶子本身，這說明瓶子包含瓶子的『有』，瓶子的『有』也包含瓶子。二是瓶中的『有』確定不同於衣服等物，這說明普遍的『有』包含瓶子的『有』，但不被瓶子包含，瓶子也不包含普遍的『有』。』註釋中分為兩部分。前面說明『異』和『不異』，後面辨別『包含』和『不包含』。『瓶中的瓶有與瓶不異』，這說明瓶中的『有』與瓶子本身沒有區別。『而異於衣物等』，說明瓶中的『有』與衣服等物是不同的。『是故下第二明攝不攝』，因此下面第二部分說明『包含』和『不包含』。首先說明瓶子包含瓶子家裡的『有』，『有』包含『有』家裡的瓶子。『非在在有處有瓶者』，說明普遍的『有』不包含瓶子。也應該說明瓶子不包含普遍的『有』，但舉一個例子就可以明白了。內道反駁說：『不是這樣的，瓶子的『有』是不異於普遍的『有』的』，瓶子家裡的『有』與總體性的『有』沒有區別，所以可以統稱為一個大的『有』。如果這樣，就會招致四種難題。一是瓶子既然包含瓶子家裡的『有』，也就包含了總體性的『有』。二是總體性的『有』既然不包含瓶子，瓶子家裡的『有』也不包含瓶子。三是瓶子家裡的『有』不包含總體性的『有』，那麼瓶子家裡的『有』就異於總體性的『有』。四是總體性的『有』不包含瓶子，那麼總體性的『有』就異於瓶子家裡的『有』。注意說明總體就包含個別，個別不包含總體，那麼總體和個別在本體上是不同的，不能稱為一體。問：這裡只是說明總體和個別在本體上是不同的，怎麼解釋偈文的本意呢？答：天親菩薩解釋偈文有多種形式。有的是順著偈文的意思來解釋，偈文既然說明『不異』，註釋就仍然解釋『不異』。有的是偈文說明『不異』，註釋卻說明『異』。這有兩種含義。一是想要反覆互相成就，偈文說明『不異』，那麼就應該俱包含或俱不包含。註釋說如果有包含，有不包含，個別和總體在本體上是不同的。二是想要用下面的父子譬喻來救濟，『有』包含瓶子，瓶子不包含『有』，那麼總體和個別在本體上是不同的，不應該說是一體，所以才有了父子的譬喻產生。外道說：『就像父子一樣，是一個人，既是父親

【English Translation】 English version Also. How can it be said that the 'existence' (有) of the bottle is the universal 'existence' (通有), and therefore the 'existence' of the bottle becomes the universal 'existence'? This is creating all kinds of inverted difficulties. Question: Do outsiders believe that 'becoming' (成) and 'existence' (有) are two different existences? Answer: They only acknowledge one total 'existence' (一總有), from the perspective of all things, it becomes all 'existences' (萬有). Just as there is only one emptiness, because there are various vessels, there are various emptinesses in the vessels. The verse says: 'The existence in the bottle is definite, there are two kinds of definiteness. First, the existence in the bottle is definitely not different from the bottle itself, which means the bottle contains the existence of the bottle, and the existence of the bottle also contains the bottle. Second, the existence in the bottle is definitely different from clothes and other things, which means the universal existence contains the existence of the bottle, but is not contained by the bottle, and the bottle does not contain the universal existence.' The commentary is divided into two parts. The first part explains 'difference' (異) and 'non-difference' (不異), and the second part distinguishes 'containment' (攝) and 'non-containment' (不攝). 'The existence in the bottle is not different from the bottle', which means the existence in the bottle is no different from the bottle itself. 'But different from clothes and other things', which means the existence in the bottle is different from clothes and other things. 'Therefore, the second part explains containment and non-containment', therefore the second part explains 'containment' and 'non-containment'. First, it explains that the bottle contains the existence of the bottle's family, and 'existence' contains the bottle of the 'existence' family. 'Not where there is existence, there is a bottle', which means the universal existence does not contain the bottle. It should also be explained that the bottle does not contain the universal existence, but one example is enough to understand. The inner school refutes: 'It is not like this, the existence of the bottle is not different from the universal existence', the existence of the bottle's family is no different from the total existence, so it can be collectively called a large existence. If so, it will lead to four difficulties. First, since the bottle contains the existence of the bottle's family, it also contains the total existence. Second, since the total existence does not contain the bottle, the existence of the bottle's family does not contain the bottle. Third, the existence of the bottle's family does not contain the total existence, then the existence of the bottle's family is different from the total existence. Fourth, the total existence does not contain the bottle, then the total existence is different from the existence of the bottle's family. Note that the whole contains the individual, and the individual does not contain the whole, then the whole and the individual are different in essence and cannot be called one. Question: This only explains that the whole and the individual are different in essence, how to explain the original meaning of the verse? Answer: Vasubandhu (天親) explains the verses in various forms. Some explain according to the meaning of the verse, and since the verse explains 'non-difference', the commentary still explains 'non-difference'. Some verses explain 'non-difference', but the commentary explains 'difference'. This has two meanings. One is to repeatedly achieve each other, the verse explains 'non-difference', then it should be both contained or both not contained. The commentary says that if there is containment, there is non-containment, and the individual and the whole are different in essence. The second is to use the following father-son analogy to save, 'existence' contains the bottle, and the bottle does not contain 'existence', then the whole and the individual are different in essence, and it should not be said to be one, so the father-son analogy is produced. The outsider says: 'Just like father and son, it is one person, both father

子一體而有總別。以通上二難。一者偈本作不異難。二者注中作異難。今明總別有異不異。如雖有總別義異只是一體。如雖有父子義異終是一人。不可聞父子體一謂父子義亦一。不可言父子義異謂體亦異。不可聞總攝別別不攝總。總別義異。便言體異。不可聞總別體一令攝不攝義亦一。內曰子故父者。世間父子凡有三事。一但是父而非子。謂無前父時也。二但子而非父。謂未生子時也。三亦子亦父形二處也。汝無有一物是總非別。是別非總。亦總亦別。故不得為喻。若言唯取第三亦父亦子為喻者。是亦不然。汝取婦生子竟方是父。爾前但是子。此子父不一時。汝總別一時。即總時有別。即別時有總。無有前別而非后總。后總而非別。故不得為喻。又汝若言時雖異體終一者。子生為父可父子一體。子未生決定是子不得是父。則父子異體便總別異體也。註釋為二。一者釋父子不一體。複次是喻同我者。我明父子體異破汝一體也。又子而為父父而為子。則父子無有定性。無有定性則空。乃同我上明空無相義。故明無相門無十相。謂五塵生住滅及男女也。外曰應有瓶皆信故。自上已來第一破自立三法一體竟。今第二破外人引他證立。今前立次破。立中不明三法一體直言有瓶者有三種義。一世人未必皆執三法一體。而世人皆執有

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本子一體而有總別（總體和部分）。以此來貫通以上兩種詰難。第一種詰難是偈頌原本提出的『不異』之難，第二種是註釋中提出的『異』之難。現在說明總體和部分有相同和不同之處，如同雖然有總體和部分的意義差別，但終究是一個整體。如同雖然有父子名義上的不同，但終究是一個人。不能因為聽說父子在本體上是一體的，就認為父子的意義也是一樣的。也不能因為說父子的意義不同，就認為本體也不同。不能因為聽說總體包含部分，部分不包含總體，總和別的意義不同，就說本體也不同。不能因為聽說總體和部分本體是一體的，就認為包含和不包含的意義也是一樣的。你所說的『因為是兒子所以是父親』，世間的父子關係通常有三種情況：一是隻有父親而不是兒子，指的是沒有生兒子之前的父親；二是隻有兒子而不是父親，指的是還沒有生兒子的時候；三是既是兒子又是父親，指的是父子以兩種身份存在於不同地方。你沒有一樣東西是隻有總沒有別，或者只有別沒有總，或者既是總又是別，所以不能作為比喻。如果說只取第三種情況，既是父親又是兒子的狀態作為比喻，那也是不對的。你娶妻生子后才成為父親，在此之前只是兒子。這種父子關係不是同時存在的。你的總和別是同時存在的，即是總的時候就有別，即是別的時候就有總，沒有先別而後總，或者先總而後別的情況，所以不能作為比喻。而且，如果你說時間雖然不同，但本體終究是一樣的，兒子長大成為父親，可以說父子一體。兒子未出生時，一定是兒子，不可能成為父親，那麼父子就是不同的本體，總和別也是不同的本體。註釋分為兩點：一是解釋父子不是一體的。其次，這個比喻和我所說的相同，我說明父子本體不同，是爲了破斥你所說的一體。而且，兒子成為父親，父親成為兒子，那麼父子就沒有固定的性質，沒有固定的性質就是空性，這和我上面所說的空無相的意義相同。所以說明無相之門沒有十相，即五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸）的生住滅以及男女相。外人說：『應該有瓶子，因為大家都相信。』從上面開始，第一是破斥你自立的三法一體的觀點。現在第二是破斥外人引用其他證據來建立自己的觀點。現在先立后破。在立論中，不直接說明三法一體，而是說有瓶子，有三種意義：一是世人未必都執著三法一體，但世人都執著有瓶子。

【English Translation】 English version The son is one entity with both totality and particularity (general and specific). This is to connect the above two difficulties. The first difficulty is the 'non-difference' difficulty originally proposed in the verse, and the second is the 'difference' difficulty proposed in the commentary. Now, it is explained that totality and particularity have similarities and differences, just as although there are differences in the meaning of totality and particularity, they are ultimately one entity. Just as although there are differences in the meaning of father and son, they are ultimately one person. One cannot, upon hearing that father and son are one in essence, think that the meaning of father and son is also the same. Nor can one, upon saying that the meaning of father and son is different, think that the essence is also different. One cannot, upon hearing that the totality includes the particular and the particular does not include the totality, and that the meanings of totality and particularity are different, say that the essence is also different. One cannot, upon hearing that the totality and particularity are one in essence, think that the meaning of inclusion and non-inclusion is also the same. What you say, 'because it is a son, therefore it is a father,' the relationship between father and son in the world usually has three situations: one is only a father and not a son, referring to the father before having a son; the second is only a son and not a father, referring to the time before having a son; the third is both a son and a father, referring to the father and son existing in two different places. You do not have anything that is only totality and not particularity, or only particularity and not totality, or both totality and particularity, so it cannot be used as a metaphor. If you say that you only take the third situation, the state of being both a father and a son, as a metaphor, that is also incorrect. You only become a father after marrying and having a son, and before that you are only a son. This father-son relationship does not exist simultaneously. Your totality and particularity exist simultaneously, that is, when it is totality, there is particularity, and when it is particularity, there is totality. There is no situation of first being particular and then being totality, or first being totality and then being particular, so it cannot be used as a metaphor. Moreover, if you say that although the time is different, the essence is ultimately the same, and the son grows up to become a father, it can be said that the father and son are one entity. When the son is not yet born, he is definitely a son and cannot become a father, then the father and son are different entities, and the totality and particularity are also different entities. The commentary is divided into two points: one is to explain that father and son are not one entity. Secondly, this metaphor is the same as what I said, I explain that the father and son have different essences, in order to refute what you said about being one entity. Moreover, the son becomes the father, and the father becomes the son, then the father and son have no fixed nature, and having no fixed nature is emptiness, which is the same as the meaning of emptiness and non-form that I said above. Therefore, it is explained that the gate of non-form does not have the ten forms, namely the arising, abiding, and ceasing of the five dusts (form, sound, smell, taste, touch) and the male and female forms. The outsider says: 'There should be a bottle, because everyone believes it.' From above, the first is to refute your self-established view of the three dharmas being one entity. Now the second is to refute the outsider's use of other evidence to establish their own view. Now, first establish and then refute. In establishing the argument, it does not directly state that the three dharmas are one entity, but rather says that there is a bottle, which has three meanings: one is that people may not all cling to the three dharmas being one entity, but people all cling to the existence of a bottle.

瓶。故偏舉瓶。二者既秤有瓶。當知世人即信有是瓶。故知有即是瓶信瓶是一。不可二瓶故一即是瓶。故此文含一體之義。三者自上已來破大總別義。從此已后破細總別。總別中凡有二種。一者外瓶。二者內身。破此內外即明內外皆空。故今文偏舉瓶也。注中秤眼見者。上舌救辭理已窮。是故舉眼。內曰有不異故一切無。雖引世證終明一體。則自立他證一切不成。故云一切無。二者自他同立三法一體。瓶與有一則失別。有與瓶一則失總。故一切無。又瓶與有不異有與萬物不異。汝用瓶盛水時應用一切物盛水。一切物不堪盛水則瓶亦應然。故瓶盛水義壞。故一切無。瓶義既壞余物例然。故一切無。又以常于無常則無常不成無常。無常于常不成常。故云一切無。外曰如足分等名身。前破外總別今破內總別。故外人舉內證外。救上一切無難。應言一切有也。攬頭足為身故總別一體。頭足相異故總別不同。故一體義成總別又立。即是一切有也。注中明二義。一辨內法二例外法。明內法有二。前辨總別一體故云頭足分等雖不異身。非但足為身者。此明總別義異。此云非但者。非是也足是別故非總。身總身故總別義異。如是瓶下次明外法亦二。初別不異總明總別一體。而瓶非總相第二明總別義異。內曰下破上總別一體義異也。初牒

一體。何故足不為頭破一體也。足與身既一頭與身亦一。身既一頭足便一。則失別相。總別既一失別則失總。還隨一切無也。外曰諸分異故無過。救上頭足不異之難也。我明頭足不異身。不言頭足自不異。故頭足相望恒別非總。頭足之別以成總身。恒總非別故二義俱成。不應偏難。內曰若爾無身。縱其頭足異義。則但見諸分無別總身也。總觀文前後可有六句。一以別從總。總一別則一。得總而失別。二以總從別。別總成別得別失總。三別不從總。別與總異。四總不從別。總與別異。五欲令總別體一而不相從。則墮亦一亦異。六反並之。汝總別一體而總一別不一。亦應別一總不一。外曰下救上無身難也。前法次譬。多因者謂頭足也。一果現一總身也。攬頭足多因成一總身果。何故言無身。如色等是瓶。前舉內證外。今舉外證內。注云非但色為瓶者。色望香是別而非總。亦不離色為瓶者。攬色成瓶。攬色成瓶明總別一體。非但色為瓶明總別義異。故就體恒一就義常異。內曰如色等瓶亦不一。上舉外證內。今破外同內。亦有六難。一以總從別。得別失總。二以別從總。得總失別。次三四互不相從應互異。五欲令一體而不互從。則亦一亦異。次六總別一體。別多而總一亦應總多而別一。合此六難以為四過。初兩得一宗而失總別

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本一體。為何腳不能打破頭成為一體呢？腳與身體既然是一體，頭與身體也是一體。身體既然是一體，頭和腳便是一體。這樣就失去了區別的相狀。如果總體和區別成為一體，失去區別就失去了總體。最終將隨一切歸於虛無。外道說：諸部分是不同的，所以沒有過失。這是爲了反駁上面頭和腳沒有區別的責難。我方闡明頭和腳對於身體來說沒有區別，而不是說頭和腳自身沒有區別。所以頭和腳相互觀望，永遠是區別的，而不是總體。頭和腳的區別成就了總體的身體。永遠是總體而不是區別，所以兩種意義都成立。不應該片面地責難。內道說：如果這樣，就沒有身體了。縱容你所說的頭和腳有區別的意義，那麼就只能看到諸多的部分，而沒有區別于部分的總體身體了。總的來看，文中的前後可以有六句話。第一，以區別服從總體，總體統一，區別也就統一。得到總體而失去區別。第二，以總體服從區別，區別總體成就區別，得到區別而失去總體。第三，區別不服從總體，區別與總體相異。第四，總體不服從區別，總體與區別相異。第五，想要讓總體和區別的本體成為一體而不相互服從，那麼就墮入亦一亦異的境地。第六，反過來合併它們。你說總體和區別是一體，而總體統一，區別不統一。也應該區別統一，總體不統一。外道說：下面是爲了反駁上面沒有身體的責難。前面是法，後面是譬喻。多因指的是頭和腳。一果顯現的是一個總體的身體。彙集頭和腳多種原因成就一個總體的身體果，為什麼說沒有身體呢？比如顏色等是瓶子。前面舉內證外，現在舉外證內。註釋說：不僅僅是顏色成為瓶子。顏色相對於香味是區別而不是總體。也不是離開顏色成為瓶子。彙集顏色成就瓶子。彙集顏色成就瓶子，說明總體和區別是一體。不僅僅是顏色成為瓶子，說明總體和區別的意義不同。所以就本體而言永遠統一，就意義而言常常相異。內道說：如顏色等同於瓶子，也不是統一的。上面舉外證內，現在破斥外道等同於內道。也有六種責難。第一，以總體服從區別，得到區別而失去總體。第二，以區別服從總體，得到總體而失去區別。第三和第四，相互不服從，應該相互差異。第五，想要讓一體而不相互服從，那麼就亦一亦異。第六，總體和區別是一體，區別多而總體一，也應該總體多而區別一。合併這六種責難，成為四種過失。前兩種得到一種主張而失去總體和區別。

【English Translation】 English version One body. Why can't the foot break the head to become one body? Since the foot and the body are one, the head and the body are also one. Since the body is one, the head and foot are one. Then the distinct characteristics are lost. If the totality and the distinction become one, losing the distinction loses the totality. Eventually, it will all return to nothingness. The outsider says: The various parts are different, so there is no fault. This is to refute the above criticism that the head and foot are not different. We clarify that the head and foot are not different in relation to the body, but not that the head and foot are not different in themselves. Therefore, the head and foot, looking at each other, are always distinct, not a totality. The distinction between the head and foot constitutes the total body. It is always a totality and not a distinction, so both meanings are valid. One should not criticize one-sidedly. The insider says: If so, there is no body. If you indulge in the meaning that the head and foot are different, then you can only see the many parts, and not the total body that is distinct from the parts. Overall, there can be six sentences in the text before and after. First, with distinction obeying the totality, the totality is unified, and the distinction is also unified. Gaining the totality and losing the distinction. Second, with the totality obeying the distinction, the distinction and totality achieve distinction, gaining the distinction and losing the totality. Third, the distinction does not obey the totality, the distinction is different from the totality. Fourth, the totality does not obey the distinction, the totality is different from the distinction. Fifth, wanting to make the substance of the totality and distinction one without obeying each other, then one falls into the state of being both one and different. Sixth, conversely, merge them. You say that the totality and distinction are one, and the totality is unified, but the distinction is not unified. It should also be that the distinction is unified, but the totality is not unified. The outsider says: The following is to refute the above criticism of not having a body. The former is the Dharma, and the latter is a metaphor. 'Many causes' refers to the head and foot. 'One result' manifests as one total body. Gathering the many causes of the head and foot achieves one total body result, why say there is no body? For example, color etc. is a bottle. The former cites the internal to prove the external, and now cites the external to prove the internal. The commentary says: It is not only color that becomes a bottle. Color in relation to fragrance is a distinction and not a totality. Nor is it leaving color to become a bottle. Gathering color achieves a bottle. Gathering color achieves a bottle, illustrating that the totality and distinction are one. It is not only color that becomes a bottle, illustrating that the meanings of totality and distinction are different. Therefore, in terms of substance, it is always unified, and in terms of meaning, it is often different. The insider says: Like color etc. being equal to a bottle, it is also not unified. The above cites the external to prove the internal, and now refutes the outsider equating it with the insider. There are also six criticisms. First, with the totality obeying the distinction, gaining the distinction and losing the totality. Second, with the distinction obeying the totality, gaining the totality and losing the distinction. Third and fourth, not obeying each other, they should be different from each other. Fifth, wanting to make one body without obeying each other, then it is both one and different. Sixth, the totality and distinction are one, the distinction is many and the totality is one, it should also be that the totality is many and the distinction is one. Merging these six criticisms becomes four faults. The first two gain one proposition and lose the totality and distinction.

。次兩得總別而墮異義。第三俱得而成勒沙婆。第四顛倒並失三宗。尋僧佉總別常有二義。一者攬別成總總別不異。二者別別相望則是異義。如非但色為瓶。此是別別相望恒異義。不離色為瓶。此是別不異總義。論主始終還捉二義。破其二義。若別不異總則總一別亦一。便失別異義。若別別恒異則失總義。照此二條一品皆曉也。外曰如軍林救上瓶不多難也。外國象軍上有四人下一人。馬軍上一人下二人。車軍亦四人。步軍四人相著。從品初至此凡有四意。一者通立總別一體。二從外曰應有瓶皆信故別立外法總別一體。三者從如足分等名身別立內法總別一體。四今此文雙立內外。軍內林外。故是別立猶是一類。而翻覆四章者。但內外之法惑人多愚故隨執破之。又凈名云。何謂病本。謂有攀緣。云何斷攀緣。謂無所得。云何無所得。謂內見外見是無所得。令欲息其病本故曆法破之。內曰眾亦如瓶。此可二意讀之。一者眾終音明外人引事無究。今欲遮其後救。明如是眾多猶為一類並同瓶說。二者外云軍林內略軍林。二言總名為眾。並同于瓶招六種過也。註文中具二意。從初是眾音。如松樹下是終音讀之也。外曰受多瓶。自上已來捉立為立。今捉破作立。汝上不許我一瓶者必欲受多瓶。若受多瓶豈無一瓶。內曰非色等多故瓶多

。非我義立色多瓶多。此是汝立耳。汝未識彼我。呼之汝為我。豈不惑哉。又汝言我云色多瓶亦多。此為是難為是立。此實是難。而汝謂立。汝乃不識破立。何猶解總別義耶。又汝既受一亦受于多。以破一故見多。破多故見一。破一多故見亦一亦多。乃至見非一非多。如破有見無破無見有等。故並是汝過。我一無所受一亦不受多。如是五句。又就汝覓一不得。何處有多。如是五句有無亦爾。外曰下品開三章。二段已竟。今是第三破總別因。若假實義上來破假今次破實。前問次答。外云。汝上但明塵多故瓶多分多故身多。但是破果。今既有因。必應有果。注中複次者明色亦因亦果。望瓶為因望塵為果。內曰如果無因亦無者二義。一者汝謂因有故果有。我明果無故因無。果無已彰因有未顯。故外屈內申。二者徴宗破。汝因果既一。果無即因無。複次三世為一。上立因果一法體壞。今立因果一三時壞。上破因成今破相續。因若即果無土可謝便無過去。果若即因瓶非未起故無未來。既無過未何有三世。又過未二時攝入現在故云一也。已作今作當作者如是語壞者。上明體壞今辨名壞。外曰因果相待成故如長短。自上已來破因成相續。自此已后破相待。若具作三假分章者。初破因成三世為一破相續。今破相待。外舉長短救三世一也

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『非我義立色多瓶多』（不是我主張色[rupa，物質]多、瓶[ghata，瓶子]多）。這是你自己的主張。你沒有理解我，卻稱呼我為『我』，豈不是迷惑嗎？而且你說我主張色多、瓶也多。這到底是難（無法成立）還是立（可以成立）？這實際上是難，而你卻說是立。你是不理解破立（駁斥和成立），又怎麼能理解總別義（總相和別相的意義）呢？而且你既然接受一，也接受多。因為破斥一，所以見到多；破斥多，所以見到一；破斥一和多，所以見到既一又多；乃至見到非一非多。如同破斥有，就見到無；破斥無，就見到有等等。所以這些都是你的過失。我對於一無所受，對於一也不接受多。像這樣的五句（五種情況）。而且就你而言，尋找一找不到，又哪裡有多呢？像這樣的五句，有和無也是如此。外道說下品開三章。二段已經結束。現在是第三，破斥總別因（總相和別相的因）。如果說假實義（虛假和真實的意義）是上來破斥假，那麼現在就是破斥實。前面是問，後面是答。外道說，你上面只是說明塵多所以瓶多分多所以身多，這只是破斥果（結果）。現在既然有因（原因），必定應該有果。注中『複次』（再次）表明色既是因也是果。相對於瓶來說是因，相對於塵來說是果。內道說，如果果沒有，因也沒有，這有兩種意義。一種是你認為因為因有所以果有，我說明果沒有所以因沒有。果沒有已經彰顯，因有還沒有顯現。所以外道屈服，內道伸張。二是征宗破（通過宗義來駁斥）。你的因果既然是一，果沒有那麼因也就沒有。再次，三世（過去、現在、未來）為一。上面立論因果一法體壞（本體壞滅），現在立論因果一三時壞（三個時間段壞滅）。上面是破斥因的成立，現在是破斥相續（連續性）。因如果是果，沒有土可以消散，那麼就沒有過去。果如果是因，瓶子不是未生起，所以沒有未來。既然沒有過去和未來，哪裡有三世？而且過去和未來兩個時間段攝入現在，所以說是一。『已作、今作、當作者』，像這樣的話語壞滅，上面說明本體壞滅，現在辨別名稱壞滅。外道說，因果相互對待才能成立，如同長短。從上面以來是破斥因的成立和三世為一，破斥相續。從這以後是破斥相互對待。如果詳細地分為三假分章，那麼最初是破斥因的成立和三世為一，破斥相續。現在是破斥相互對待。外道舉長短來挽救三世為一。

【English Translation】 English version 'Non-self asserts that there are many colors and many pots' (It is not I who asserts that there are many rupa [form, matter] and many ghata [pots]). This is your own assertion. You do not understand me, yet you call me 'I'; isn't that confusing? Moreover, you say that I assert that there are many colors and many pots. Is this a nanda (impossible to establish) or a sthapana (possible to establish)? This is actually a nanda, but you say it is a sthapana. You do not understand parapaksha and svapaksha (refutation and establishment), so how can you understand the meaning of samanya and vishesha (general and specific characteristics)? Furthermore, since you accept one, you also accept many. Because you refute one, you see many; because you refute many, you see one; because you refute one and many, you see both one and many; and even see neither one nor many. Just as when you refute existence, you see non-existence; when you refute non-existence, you see existence, and so on. Therefore, these are all your faults. I do not accept one, nor do I accept many in one. Such are the five statements (five situations). Moreover, as for you, if you cannot find one, where is the many? Such are the five statements; existence and non-existence are also like this. The outsider says that the lower category opens three chapters. The second section is finished. Now is the third, refuting the cause of general and specific characteristics. If the meaning of false and real is to refute the false, then now it is to refute the real. The former is a question, the latter is an answer. The outsider says, 'You only explain above that because there are many dust particles, there are many parts of the pot, and because there are many parts, there are many bodies; this is only refuting the effect (result). Now that there is a cause (reason), there must be an effect.' The note 'again' indicates that color is both cause and effect. Relative to the pot, it is the cause; relative to the dust, it is the effect. The insider says, 'If there is no effect, there is no cause,' which has two meanings. One is that you think that because there is a cause, there is an effect; I explain that because there is no effect, there is no cause. The absence of the effect has been revealed, but the presence of the cause has not yet been shown. Therefore, the outsider yields, and the insider asserts. The second is to refute by pratijna (proposition). Since your cause and effect are one, if there is no effect, then there is no cause. Again, the three times (past, present, future) are one. Above, the theory that cause and effect are one destroys the dharma-dhatu (essence of phenomena); now, the theory that cause and effect are one destroys the three times. Above is the refutation of the establishment of the cause; now is the refutation of continuity. If the cause is the effect, there is no earth to dissipate, then there is no past. If the effect is the cause, the pot is not unarisen, so there is no future. Since there is no past and future, where are the three times? Moreover, the past and future two times are included in the present, so it is said to be one. 'What has been done, what is being done, what will be done,' such words are destroyed; above explains the destruction of the essence, now distinguishes the destruction of the name. The outsider says, 'Cause and effect are established by mutual dependence, like long and short.' From above, it is the refutation of the establishment of the cause and the three times as one, refuting continuity. From this point onwards, it is the refutation of mutual dependence. If we divide it into three false chapters in detail, then the first is the refutation of the establishment of the cause and the three times as one, refuting continuity. Now it is the refutation of mutual dependence. The outsider uses long and short to salvage the three times as one.

。如五尺形一丈為短。比三尺為長。一物而有長短。亦一物而有三世。注曰因長見短因短見長者。因一丈物見五尺為短也。觀瓶即是因者。觀猶望也。泥望瓶為因望土為果。數論皆有此義。數云。一念有漏酬前為果望后為因。成論習因義亦如是。內曰下偈本為二。初標章門次釋章門。因他相違共過故者標三門也。因果之義已漏。前責外以長短為喻。今但破喻則所喻自亡。非長中長者釋上因他。長若自長何須因他。又若長在長中則長應待長。又若長自待長指還觸指。又若長自待長則長不待短。此則以不待為待待為不待。義成大亂。又長既待長長復待短。是則一切皆待無有不待。云何有待。亦非短中釋上相違。若短中有長則長短相害。長在短中短者為長長者成短。是則顛倒。又長在短中終成短則無有長。以何待短。又由短故長。長在短中。由涅槃故生死。生死在涅槃中。凈穢等萬義皆爾。中假義云。他有長可長。不由短故長。此是長在長中。今無長可長由短故長。此義墮在短中。若言長名由短起長體不由短。當知此長通在二處。入第三句破。又長名由短起長名在短中。則長名不自長。若長體不由短長體不待短。長體應自待長。若長名體俱待于短。則長名體俱在於短。若俱在短則長短並短無復有長。既無有長云何有短。一切

皆無及共中者釋上共過。若二處有長則具招兩失。注為二。初破長短二明無相待。初又二。前破長次例短。初又四。一牒二定三非四釋。若實有長初句牒。若長中有第二定也。是不可得第三非也。何以故第四釋也。余文易知。開善有定待如色心。有不定待如長短。莊嚴云有相開避待如色心。有相傾奪待如長短。併入今門所責。

破異品第四

異有三種。一別異相。如此人彼人。二反異。如牛糞團反為灰團。三合異。如有一合成瓶。今破合異也。世師后立義者亦有三義。如神品初說之。一出世在後。二義不盛行。三約句次第異為第二也。彼立三法異體者略有五義。一約六諦異。瓶為主諦。一是依諦。有為總諦。二常無常異。瓶一無常。大有是常。三生了異。瓶一為生因所生。有是了因。四名字異。五能知智異。以有五異故三法異體。今破異者。上破一見。今破異見。又今破異為成無一。上破一為成無異。問外立總別一異與內何義同耶。答與內真俗一體異體。同外明大有是常而別法無常。常無常一體異體。何異內真常俗無常而真俗一異體耶。又外謂大有遍與萬法一異體。內真亦遍萬法一異體。又僧佉前計一。世師后立異。如開善前立一體。龍光后明異體。又設令義異者。提婆既用一異破外道。亦將一異以破內

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『皆無及共中者釋上共過』：這句話解釋了『共』的過失。如果兩個地方都有『長』，那麼就會同時招致兩種過失。註釋分為兩部分：第一部分破斥『長短』，第二部分闡明『無相待』。第一部分又分為兩部分：前面破斥『長』，後面類比『短』。前面又分為四個部分：第一部分是重複，第二部分是確定，第三部分是否定，第四部分是解釋。如果確實有『長』，第一句是重複。如果『長』中有，第二部分是確定。這是不可能得到的，第三部分是否定。為什麼呢？第四部分是解釋。其餘的文字容易理解。開善的觀點是，『定待』就像『色心』，『不定待』就像『長短』。莊嚴的觀點是，『有相開避待』就像『色心』，『有相傾奪待』就像『長短』。這些都被納入現在所要責難的範圍。

破異品第四

『異』有三種：第一種是『別異相』，比如『這個人』和『那個人』。第二種是『反異』，比如『牛糞團』反過來變成『灰團』。第三種是『合異』，比如用一些東西合成一個瓶子。現在要破斥的是『合異』。世間的老師和後來建立義理的人也有三種意義，就像《神品》最初所說的那樣：第一，出世在後；第二，義理不盛行；第三，按照句子的次第不同作為第二種『異』。他們建立三種法是不同本體，大概有五種意義：第一，從『六諦』（六種真理）的角度來說是『異』，瓶子是『為主諦』（主要真理），『有』是『依諦』（依存的真理），『有為』是『總諦』（總括的真理）。第二，從『常無常』的角度來說是『異』，瓶子是『無常』，『大有』是『常』。第三，從『生了』的角度來說是『異』，瓶子是由『生因』（產生的原因）所生，『有』是『了因』（完成的原因）。第四，名字不同。第五，能知的智慧不同。因為有這五種不同，所以三種法是不同本體。現在破斥『異』，上面破斥『一』的見解，現在破斥『異』的見解。而且現在破斥『異』是爲了成就『無一』，上面破斥『一』是爲了成就『無異』。問：外道建立『總別』（總體和個體）的『一異』，與我們內部的什麼意義相同呢？答：與我們內部的『真俗』（真諦和俗諦）的『一體異體』相同。外道認為『大有』是『常』，而『別法』（個別的法）是『無常』，『常無常』是『一體異體』。這與我們內部認為『真』是『常』，『俗』是『無常』，而『真俗』是『一異體』有什麼區別呢？而且外道認為『大有』普遍存在於萬法中，與萬法是『一異體』，我們內部的『真』也普遍存在於萬法中，與萬法是『一異體』。而且僧佉派（Samkhya）先前主張『一』，世間的老師後來建立『異』，就像開善先前主張『一體』，龍光後來闡明『異體』。而且假設義理是不同的，提婆（Deva）既然用『一異』來破斥外道，也將用『一異』來破斥內部。

【English Translation】 English version '皆無及共中者釋上共過' (Jie wu ji gong zhong zhe shi shang gong guo): This explains the fault of 'togetherness' (共, gong). If there is 'long' (長, chang) in two places, then both faults will be incurred simultaneously. The commentary is divided into two parts: the first part refutes 'long and short' (長短, changduan), and the second part elucidates 'no interdependence' (無相待, wu xiangdai). The first part is further divided into two parts: the front refutes 'long', and the back analogizes 'short'. The front is further divided into four parts: the first part is repetition, the second part is determination, the third part is negation, and the fourth part is explanation. If there is indeed 'long', the first sentence is repetition. If there is 'in long', the second part is determination. This is impossible to obtain, the third part is negation. Why? The fourth part is explanation. The rest of the text is easy to understand. The view of Kai Shan is that 'fixed dependence' (定待, dingdai) is like 'form and mind' (色心, se xin), and 'unfixed dependence' (不定待, budingdai) is like 'long and short'. The view of Zhuang Yan is that 'mutually avoiding dependence' (有相開避待, you xiang kaibi dai) is like 'form and mind', and 'mutually usurping dependence' (有相傾奪待, you xiang qingduo dai) is like 'long and short'. These are all included in the scope of what is to be questioned now.

Refuting Difference Fourth

'Difference' (異, yi) has three types: the first type is 'different appearance' (別異相, bie yi xiang), such as 'this person' and 'that person'. The second type is 'reverse difference' (反異, fan yi), such as 'cow dung ball' reversing into 'ash ball'. The third type is 'combined difference' (合異, he yi), such as combining some things into a bottle. What is to be refuted now is 'combined difference'. Worldly teachers and those who later established doctrines also have three meanings, just as the 'Divine Chapter' (神品, Shen Pin) initially said: first, emergence into the world is later; second, the doctrine is not prevalent; third, the difference in the order of sentences is taken as the second type of 'difference'. Those who establish that the three dharmas are different entities have roughly five meanings: first, from the perspective of the 'six truths' (六諦, liu di) they are 'different', the bottle is the 'primary truth' (為主諦, wei zhu di), 'existence' (有, you) is the 'dependent truth' (一是依諦, yi shi yi di), 'conditioned existence' (有為, you wei) is the 'general truth' (有為總諦, you wei zong di). Second, from the perspective of 'permanence and impermanence' (常無常, chang wuchang) they are 'different', the bottle is 'impermanent', 'great existence' (大有, da you) is 'permanent'. Third, from the perspective of 'production and completion' (生了, sheng liao) they are 'different', the bottle is produced by the 'cause of production' (生因, sheng yin), 'existence' is the 'cause of completion' (了因, liao yin). Fourth, the names are different. Fifth, the knowing wisdom is different. Because there are these five differences, the three dharmas are different entities. Now refuting 'difference', above refuting the view of 'oneness' (一, yi), now refuting the view of 'difference'. Moreover, now refuting 'difference' is to achieve 'no oneness' (無一, wu yi), above refuting 'oneness' is to achieve 'no difference' (無異, wu yi). Question: What meaning does the 'oneness and difference' (一異, yi yi) of 'totality and particularity' (總別, zong bie) established by externalists have in common with our internal meaning? Answer: It is the same as our internal 'oneness and difference of essence and convention' (真俗一體異體, zhen su yiti yiti). Externalists believe that 'great existence' is 'permanent', while 'particular dharmas' (別法, bie fa) are 'impermanent', and 'permanence and impermanence' are 'one entity and different entities'. What is the difference between this and our internal view that 'essence' is 'permanent', 'convention' is 'impermanent', and 'essence and convention' are 'one entity and different entities'? Moreover, externalists believe that 'great existence' is universally present in all dharmas, and is 'one entity and different entities' with all dharmas, and our internal 'essence' is also universally present in all dharmas, and is 'one entity and different entities' with all dharmas. Moreover, the Samkhya school (僧佉派, Sengqie pai) previously advocated 'oneness', and worldly teachers later established 'difference', just as Kai Shan previously advocated 'one entity', and Long Guang later elucidated 'different entities'. Moreover, assuming that the doctrines are different, since Deva (提婆, Ti Po) used 'oneness and difference' to refute externalists, he will also use 'oneness and difference' to refute internalists.

也。舊十地論師謂真常妄無常。亦得以一異破之。可以意得也。品開為四。第一破外總別異體義。二破內總別異體。第三破內外總別之因。第四破外人橫過論主。此四即成次第。初外人牒論主明三法異體為過請陳其失。又外謂三法一體是則有過。三法異體謂其無過。汝言有者可為出之。又上借異破一。外謂一法有過異法無失。所以問也。又一異相待有過無過相待一。有過故異宗無過。問此外曰何故無修妒路。答提婆百偈每存要略。但明破異。則知立異。故略于外立。天親為欲發起義生外問。亦可實是本問。但易解不釋。故無修妒路。內曰若有等異一一無。前破三法一體互望有於三過。謂成不成及以顛倒。今破三法異體亦三法互望亦有三過。謂都無三法。若瓶與兩異用何為瓶。一與兩異以何為一。有與兩異用何為有。故都無三法。註釋前品多一番往復釋。此品多以雙雙相對。今有二難。一都失難。複次下第二互失難。三法異體互有去留。望前應具四句。一俱去。二俱留。三四互有去留。外曰不然救都失也。三法體異若不共合則三法都失。以三法雖異而共合故三法都成。外人正取不得相離為合。非三物各離而後共合。註釋為二。一明三法共合救都失難。汝言瓶失下救互失難。又開四別。一牒難。是語非也第二總非。何以故

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：也。舊《十地論》的論師認為真如是常住不變的，而妄想是無常變化的。也可以用『一』和『異』的觀點來駁斥他們，這其中的道理是可以領會的。這一品分為四個部分。第一部分是駁斥外道的總相和別相的異體論。第二部分是駁斥內道的總相和別相的異體論。第三部分是駁斥內外道的總相和別相的因。第四部分是駁斥外道之人橫加指責論主。這四個部分就構成了次第。首先，外道之人引用論主的觀點，說明三種法是異體的，認為這是過失，請論主陳述其中的過失。外道又說，如果三種法是一體的，那麼就有過失；如果三種法是異體的，就認為沒有過失。你（論主）說有，那就請你指出來。前面借用『異』來駁斥『一』。外道認為，一種法有過失，不同的法就沒有過失，所以才這樣問。外道又問：為什麼沒有修妒路（sūtra，經）？回答是：提婆（Deva）的《百偈論》總是保留要點，只說明破斥『異』，就知道是建立『異』，所以省略了外道的立論。天親（Vasubandhu）爲了引發義理，才生起外道的提問。也可以認為這實際上是本來的提問，只是容易理解所以沒有解釋，因此沒有修妒路。內道說：如果『有』等是不同的，那麼每一法都是不存在的。前面駁斥三種法是一體，互相觀望有三種過失，即『成』、『不成』以及『顛倒』。現在駁斥三種法是異體，三種法互相觀望也有三種過失，即完全沒有三種法。如果瓶子和兩個東西是不同的，用什麼作為瓶子？『一』和『兩』是不同的，用什麼作為『一』？『有』和『兩』是不同的，用什麼作為『有』？所以完全沒有三種法。註釋：前面的品大多是一番往復地解釋，這一品大多是雙雙相對。現在有兩個難點：一是都失去的難點。『複次』（Furthermore）以下是第二個互相失去的難點。三種法是異體，互相之間有去有留。對照前面應該具備四句：一是都失去，二是都保留，三是互相之間有去有留。外道說：不是這樣的，這是爲了挽救都失去的難點。三種法的體性是不同的，如果不共同結合，那麼三種法就都失去了。因為三種法雖然不同，但是共同結合，所以三種法才能成立。外道之人正是取『不得相離』作為『合』，而不是三種事物各自離開然後共同結合。註釋分為兩個部分：一是說明三種法共同結合，挽救都失去的難點。『汝言瓶失』（You say the pot is lost）以下是挽救互相失去的難點。又分為四個部分：一是引用難點。『是語非也』（This statement is not true）是第二部分，總的否定。『何以故』（Why is that?）

【English Translation】 English version: Also. The old Ten Bhumi Sutra masters believed that true reality (tathata) is permanent and unchanging, while delusion is impermanent. One can also refute them using the concepts of 'one' and 'different,' and the reasoning behind this can be understood. This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part refutes the externalist's theory of distinct entities in general and specific aspects. The second part refutes the internalist's theory of distinct entities in general and specific aspects. The third part refutes the causes of general and specific aspects of both internal and external views. The fourth part refutes the externalist's unreasonable criticism of the author. These four parts form a sequence. First, the externalist quotes the author's view, stating that the three dharmas are distinct entities, considering this a fault, and asks the author to explain the fault. The externalist also says that if the three dharmas are one entity, then there is a fault; if the three dharmas are distinct entities, then there is no fault. If you (the author) say there is, then please point it out. Previously, 'different' was used to refute 'one.' The externalist believes that one dharma has a fault, while different dharmas have no fault, which is why they ask this question. The externalist further asks: Why is there no sutra (sūtra)? The answer is: Deva's (Deva) Hundred Verses always retains the essentials, only explaining the refutation of 'different,' from which it is known that 'different' is being established, so the externalist's establishment is omitted. Vasubandhu (Vasubandhu), in order to elicit the meaning, raises the externalist's question. It can also be considered that this is actually the original question, but it is easy to understand so it is not explained, therefore there is no sutra. The internalist says: If 'existence' etc. are different, then each dharma does not exist. Previously, the refutation of the three dharmas being one entity, mutually observing each other, has three faults, namely 'becoming,' 'not becoming,' and 'inversion.' Now, the refutation of the three dharmas being distinct entities, the three dharmas mutually observing each other, also has three faults, namely the complete absence of the three dharmas. If a pot and two things are different, what is used as the pot? 'One' and 'two' are different, what is used as 'one'? 'Existence' and 'two' are different, what is used as 'existence'? Therefore, there are completely no three dharmas. Commentary: The previous chapters mostly explain back and forth, this chapter mostly deals with pairs in opposition. Now there are two difficulties: one is the difficulty of complete loss. 'Furthermore' below is the second difficulty of mutual loss. The three dharmas are distinct entities, with mutual going and staying. In comparison to the previous, it should have four sentences: one is complete loss, two is complete retention, three and four are mutual going and staying. The externalist says: It is not like this, this is to save the difficulty of complete loss. The nature of the three dharmas is different, if they do not combine together, then the three dharmas will all be lost. Because the three dharmas are different, but they combine together, therefore the three dharmas can be established. The externalist precisely takes 'cannot be separated' as 'combination,' rather than three things each leaving and then combining together. The commentary is divided into two parts: one is to explain that the three dharmas combine together, saving the difficulty of complete loss. 'You say the pot is lost' below is to save the difficulty of mutual loss. It is further divided into four parts: one is quoting the difficulty. 'This statement is not true' is the second part, the general negation. 'Why is that?'

下第三釋非。以異合故下第四結成彼義。彼謂論主不解異義執于別異難彼合異。是故今舉合異簡除別異。內曰若爾多瓶。前明三法若異都無三法。今明三法若合則墮多三也。有與瓶合名為有瓶。一與瓶合一復為瓶。當瓶又瓶。故成三瓶。所以作三瓶難者。彼有三物體。以二物與一物合從一物受名故成三也。在瓶既三。有一亦三。成九法也。注中為二。一釋多瓶難。汝言下破上第二合異。雖有兩異不同終是于異。若合不名異。則是不異今合猶是異。以異救異。如以神救神。應更說因者。因名所以也。外曰總故求那故有一非瓶。救多瓶難也。三法之中二是義合。是故非瓶。瓶是主諦。唯瓶是瓶故無多瓶亦無有多有一。又答上應更說因。明二非瓶即是義理名為說因。故以一答答前二難。內曰若爾無瓶。若簡除二法以何為瓶。故云無瓶。亦應云若爾無有若爾無一。前即得有墮多。今則免多墮無。亦是破其說因。汝雖作此說因終非義理。不名說因。外曰受多瓶。上來以立為立。今捉破為立。上以立為立中唯有二難。一有則多。二者不多則無。但外無以更救故執破為立。問論主有多無二難。外何故謂內瓶多不言論主執無。答外謂論主受彼多瓶則瓶義成。外人不立無瓶故不謂論主受彼無瓶。又是答因。以汝立多必知有一名為所以也。

內曰一無故者亦無此有二破。初明體一無故無多。次明數一無故無多。今體一無故無多者。外人立三法體異而共合則成多瓶。故本無一瓶。一瓶無故則無有多。前明無一故論主不受其一。亦無有多故不受其多。若有一多然後方受。竟無一多何所受耶。複次初數無故者。第二明數一無故無多。此破與前異者。前明立一瓶體不成故無一。無一即無多。今明瓶與一數本異。即瓶體上無一數。一數無故亦無多。故前是無瓶體。今縱有瓶體但瓶體上原無有一數。所以為異也。外曰瓶有有合故。上來至此翻䨱遂三。初以立為立義既不成。次捉破為立義亦不成。今還更捉立故有此文來也。又初立一瓶。論主破一無不成。次救多瓶。論主不受其多。今還立一也。問今立一瓶與前何異。答上雖翻䨱多開大宗有二。一者若立有瓶則墮于多。若避多瓶則墮無瓶。外今更整理義宗雙通兩難。明以三性不同會成一體。然雖合而異。雖異而合。雖異而合故非是無。雖合而異故非是多。所以然者。瓶是自體之名。有一從他受稱。從他受稱故瓶名有一。而有一性恒非瓶故無多瓶。而瓶是當體之名不失已性故無無瓶。汝不可聞瓶名有一即謂有一是瓶便有多瓶。亦不可聞有一非瓶便謂瓶亦無體。大宗雖救有瓶即是三都立也。注前舉瓶與有合雙通二難。瓶與有

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本內部說，如果『一』沒有原因，那麼『有二』也就不成立。這裡分為兩部分來破斥。首先闡明本體『一』沒有原因，因此沒有『多』。其次闡明數量『一』沒有原因，因此沒有『多』。現在討論本體『一』沒有原因，因此沒有『多』的情況。外道認為，三種法（dharma）的本體不同，但共同結合就能形成多個瓶子，因此原本不存在一個瓶子。如果一個瓶子沒有原因，那麼就不會有多個瓶子。前面已經說明了沒有『一』，所以論主不接受『一』的說法，也沒有『多』，所以不接受『多』的說法。如果存在『一』和『多』，然後才能接受。既然根本沒有『一』和『多』，又接受什麼呢？其次，最初的數量沒有原因。第二部分闡明數量『一』沒有原因，因此沒有『多』。這種破斥與前面不同之處在於，前面闡明建立一個瓶子的本體不成立，所以沒有『一』，沒有『一』也就沒有『多』。現在闡明瓶子和數量『一』原本就不同，也就是說，瓶子的本體上沒有數量『一』。數量『一』沒有原因，因此也沒有『多』。所以前面是沒有瓶子的本體，現在即使有瓶子的本體，但瓶子的本體上原本就沒有數量『一』，這就是不同之處。外道說，瓶子具有『有』，所以可以結合。從上面到這裡，反覆辯論了三次。最初以『立』為『立義』，但『立義』沒有成立。其次用捉住錯誤來破斥，但『立義』也沒有成立。現在又重新捉住『立』，所以才有這段文字出現。而且，最初建立一個瓶子，論主破斥『一』沒有成立。其次救護多個瓶子，論主不接受『多』。現在又重新建立『一』。問：現在建立一個瓶子與前面有什麼不同？答：上面雖然反覆辯論，但多方開啟了大宗，有兩種情況。一是如果建立『有瓶』，就會陷入『多』的困境。如果避免『多瓶』，就會陷入『無瓶』的困境。外道現在重新整理義宗，雙方面都打通了兩種困境。闡明用三種不同的性質會合成為一體。然而，雖然結合但又不同，雖然不同但又結合。雖然不同但又結合，所以不是『無』。雖然結合但又不同，所以不是『多』。為什麼這樣說呢？瓶子是自體（svabhāva）的名稱，『有』是從他處接受的稱謂。因為是從他處接受的稱謂，所以瓶子被稱為『有』。而『有』的性質始終不是瓶子，所以沒有多個瓶子。而瓶子是當體（present entity）的名稱，不失去自身的性質，所以沒有沒有瓶子。你不能因為聽到瓶子的名稱是『有』，就認為『有』就是瓶子，從而有多個瓶子。也不能因為聽到『有』不是瓶子，就認為瓶子也沒有本體。大宗雖然救護『有瓶』，但實際上是三方面都成立了。註釋：前面舉出瓶子與『有』結合，雙方面都打通了兩種困境。瓶子與『有』。

【English Translation】 English version Internally, it is said that if 'one' (eka) has no cause, then 'two' (dvi) also cannot be established. This is refuted in two parts. First, it clarifies that the substance 'one' has no cause, therefore there is no 'many' (bahutva). Second, it clarifies that the number 'one' has no cause, therefore there is no 'many'. Now, let's discuss the situation where the substance 'one' has no cause, therefore there is no 'many'. The outsider (opponent) argues that the substances of three dharmas are different, but when combined together, they can form multiple jars (ghata), therefore there is originally no single jar. If a single jar has no cause, then there will be no multiple jars. It has been explained earlier that there is no 'one', so the proponent (logician) does not accept the statement of 'one', and there is no 'many', so he does not accept the statement of 'many'. If 'one' and 'many' exist, then they can be accepted. Since there is fundamentally no 'one' and 'many', what is there to accept? Secondly, the initial number has no cause. The second part clarifies that the number 'one' has no cause, therefore there is no 'many'. The difference between this refutation and the previous one is that the previous one clarified that establishing the substance of a jar is not established, so there is no 'one', and if there is no 'one', there is no 'many'. Now it clarifies that the jar and the number 'one' are originally different, that is, there is no number 'one' on the substance of the jar. The number 'one' has no cause, therefore there is no 'many'. So the previous one is that there is no substance of the jar, now even if there is a substance of the jar, there is originally no number 'one' on the substance of the jar, which is the difference. The outsider says that the jar has 'existence' (asti), so it can be combined. From above to here, there have been repeated debates three times. Initially, 'establishing' is used as 'establishing meaning', but 'establishing meaning' is not established. Secondly, grasping the error is used to refute, but 'establishing meaning' is also not established. Now, 'establishing' is grasped again, so this passage appears. Moreover, initially a jar is established, and the proponent refutes that 'one' is not established. Secondly, multiple jars are defended, and the proponent does not accept 'many'. Now 'one' is re-established. Question: What is the difference between establishing a jar now and before? Answer: Although there have been repeated debates above, the great principle has been opened up in many ways, and there are two situations. One is that if 'existing jar' (asti ghata) is established, it will fall into the predicament of 'many'. If 'many jars' (bahutva ghata) is avoided, it will fall into the predicament of 'no jar' (nasti ghata). The outsider is now reorganizing the meaning of the principle, and both sides have opened up the two predicaments. It clarifies that three different natures are combined into one entity. However, although combined, they are different, and although different, they are combined. Although different, they are combined, so it is not 'non-existence'. Although combined, they are different, so it is not 'many'. Why is this so? The jar is the name of the self-nature (svabhāva), and 'existence' is a term received from elsewhere. Because it is a term received from elsewhere, the jar is called 'existence'. And the nature of 'existence' is always not the jar, so there are no multiple jars. And the jar is the name of the present entity, and does not lose its own nature, so there is no non-existence of the jar. You cannot think that because you hear the name of the jar is 'existence', you think that 'existence' is the jar, so there are multiple jars. Nor can you think that because you hear that 'existence' is not the jar, you think that the jar has no substance. Although the great principle saves 'existing jar', in fact, all three aspects are established. Note: The previous example of combining the jar with 'existence' opens up both predicaments on both sides. Jar and 'existence'.

合故瓶名有。此明雖異而合故瓶受有名。免無瓶難。非盡有此明雖合而異瓶非盡體是有。免多瓶難。問何故前免無瓶難。答論主上二門破之。初云一無故多亦無。次云初數無故。此二並明外人墮無瓶過。是故今前通無瓶。瓶與有合故瓶名為有。非是無瓶。偈本正意爾也。是以天親前釋通無瓶難。恐乃免無瓶還墮多瓶。是故又云非盡有免於多瓶。如是瓶與一合瓶名一。此就瓶與一合亦通兩難。問偈本但就有門通於兩難。天親何故更就一作耶。答此有深旨。論主上有雙破。初云一無故多亦無。此是正無瓶難。故今明瓶與有合瓶名有以通之也。上第二複次云初數無。故今明瓶與一合瓶名為一。即用通之。瓶雖與一數異。瓶與一數合故瓶名一數。非初數無。自講百論諸師多不見斯意。謂文為煩。內曰下亦有二。一指前二正破。指前者。汝雖異而合還墮于多。雖合而異不離無失。故已漏前關不應重立。但有是語者。雖有不多不無之言無不多不無之義。故云但也。若有非瓶則無瓶者。前具有多無二門。今略指無門。所以偏指無門者。外云瓶有有合則正救于無故今偏指無也。今當更說瓶應非瓶第二正破也。瓶與有合遂從有名有。有體非瓶。瓶與非瓶合。從非名非應名非瓶。若不從非名非。亦不從有名有。問何故作此破耶。答凡有三義

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因為組合的緣故，才有了『瓶』這個名稱。這說明雖然『明』（指構成瓶子的各種元素）是不同的，但因為組合在一起，所以『瓶』這個概念才成立，從而避免了『沒有瓶子』的難題。並非所有『有』都完全等同於瓶子，雖然『明』組合在一起，但瓶子並非完全由『有』構成，從而避免了『多個瓶子』的難題。問：為什麼前面可以避免『沒有瓶子』的難題？答：論主（指《中論》的作者龍樹菩薩）用前面的兩個方面來破斥。首先說『一不存在，所以多也不存在』，其次說『最初的數不存在』。這兩點都說明外道落入了『沒有瓶子』的過失。因此，現在前面貫通了『沒有瓶子』的說法，瓶子和『有』組合在一起，所以瓶子才被稱為『有』，而不是『沒有瓶子』。偈頌的根本意思就是這樣。因此，天親（指世親菩薩）在前面的解釋中貫通了『沒有瓶子』的難題，恐怕避免了『沒有瓶子』卻又陷入『多個瓶子』的困境。所以又說『並非所有「有」』，從而避免了『多個瓶子』。像這樣，瓶子和『一』組合在一起，瓶子就被稱為『一』。這是就瓶子和『一』組合在一起，也貫通了兩個難題。問：偈頌只是就『有』的方面來貫通兩個難題，天親為什麼還要就『一』來解釋呢？答：這有很深的含義。論主在上面有雙重的破斥。首先說『一不存在，所以多也不存在』，這是直接針對『沒有瓶子』的難題，所以現在說明瓶子和『有』組合在一起，瓶子才被稱為『有』，以此來貫通它。上面第二次又說『最初的數不存在』，所以現在說明瓶子和『一』組合在一起，瓶子才被稱為『一』，就用這個來貫通它。瓶子雖然和『一』這個數不同，但瓶子和『一』這個陣列合在一起，所以瓶子被稱為『一』這個數，而不是最初的數不存在。自己講解《百論》的各位法師大多不明白這個意思，認為文字是多餘的。『內曰』下面也有兩個方面。一個是指前面的兩個直接破斥。指前者，你們雖然不同而組合在一起，還是會陷入『多個』的困境；雖然組合在一起而不同，也擺脫不了『沒有』的缺失。所以已經錯過了前面的關卡，不應該重新設立。只有『有』這個說法，雖然有『不多不少』的說法，但沒有『不多不少』的意義，所以說『但也』。如果『有』不是瓶子，那麼就沒有瓶子，前面已經具備了『多』和『無』兩個方面，現在略微指出『無』的方面。之所以偏重指出『無』的方面，是因為外道認為瓶子和『有』組合在一起，正是爲了救助『無』，所以現在偏重指出『無』。現在應當再說『瓶子應該不是瓶子』，這是第二次直接破斥。瓶子和『有』組合在一起，於是就從『有』而有了名稱，『有』的本體不是瓶子，瓶子和『非瓶』組合在一起，從『非』而得名，應該被稱為『非瓶』。如果不從『非』而得名，也不從『有』而得名。問：為什麼要作這樣的破斥呢？答：總共有三個意義。 English version: Because of the combination, the name 'bottle' exists. This clarifies that although the 'elements' (referring to the various components that make up the bottle) are different, the concept of 'bottle' is established because they are combined, thus avoiding the difficulty of 'no bottle'. Not all 'existence' is completely identical to the bottle. Although the 'elements' are combined, the bottle is not entirely composed of 'existence', thus avoiding the difficulty of 'multiple bottles'. Question: Why can the difficulty of 'no bottle' be avoided earlier? Answer: The author of the treatise (referring to Nāgārjuna, the author of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā) refutes it with the previous two aspects. First, he says, 'If one does not exist, then many do not exist either.' Second, he says, 'The initial number does not exist.' Both of these points illustrate that the outsiders fall into the fault of 'no bottle'. Therefore, now the previous statement of 'no bottle' is connected. The bottle and 'existence' are combined, so the bottle is called 'existence', rather than 'no bottle'. This is the fundamental meaning of the verse. Therefore, Vasubandhu (referring to the Bodhisattva Vasubandhu) connects the difficulty of 'no bottle' in the previous explanation, fearing that avoiding 'no bottle' would lead to the predicament of 'multiple bottles'. So he also says, 'Not all "existence"', thus avoiding 'multiple bottles'. In this way, the bottle and 'one' are combined, and the bottle is called 'one'. This is in terms of the bottle and 'one' being combined, which also connects the two difficulties. Question: The verse only connects the two difficulties in terms of 'existence'. Why does Vasubandhu explain it in terms of 'one' as well? Answer: This has a profound meaning. The author of the treatise has a double refutation above. First, he says, 'If one does not exist, then many do not exist either.' This is directly aimed at the difficulty of 'no bottle', so now it is explained that the bottle and 'existence' are combined, and the bottle is called 'existence' to connect it. The second time above, he says, 'The initial number does not exist', so now it is explained that the bottle and 'one' are combined, and the bottle is called 'one', which is used to connect it. Although the bottle is different from the number 'one', the bottle and the number 'one' are combined, so the bottle is called the number 'one', rather than the initial number not existing. Most of the masters who explain the Śataśāstra themselves do not understand this meaning and think that the text is redundant. 'Nei Yue' (內曰) also has two aspects below. One refers to the previous two direct refutations. Referring to the former, even if you are different and combined, you will still fall into the predicament of 'multiple'; even if you are combined and different, you cannot get rid of the lack of 'non-existence'. Therefore, you have already missed the previous checkpoint and should not re-establish it. Only the statement of 'existence' has the saying of 'not too much and not too little', but there is no meaning of 'not too much and not too little', so it is said 'but also'. If 'existence' is not a bottle, then there is no bottle. The previous already has the two aspects of 'many' and 'non-existence'. Now, slightly point out the aspect of 'non-existence'. The reason why the aspect of 'non-existence' is emphasized is that the outsiders believe that the bottle and 'existence' are combined precisely to help 'non-existence', so now the aspect of 'non-existence' is emphasized. Now it should be said again that 'the bottle should not be a bottle', which is the second direct refutation. The bottle and 'existence' are combined, so it gets its name from 'existence'. The substance of 'existence' is not a bottle. The bottle and 'non-bottle' are combined, and it is named from 'non-', and should be called 'non-bottle'. If it is not named from 'non-', it is also not named from 'existence'. Question: Why is such a refutation made? Answer: There are a total of three meanings.

【English Translation】 English version: Because of the combination, the name 'bottle' (ping ming) exists. This clarifies that although the 'ming' (明, referring to the various elements that make up the bottle) are different, the concept of 'bottle' is established because they are combined, thus avoiding the difficulty of 'no bottle'. Not all 'existence' is completely identical to the bottle. Although the 'ming' are combined, the bottle is not entirely composed of 'existence', thus avoiding the difficulty of 'multiple bottles'. Question: Why can the difficulty of 'no bottle' be avoided earlier? Answer: The author of the treatise (lun zhu, 論主, referring to Nāgārjuna, the author of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā) refutes it with the previous two aspects. First, he says, 'If one does not exist, then many do not exist either.' Second, he says, 'The initial number does not exist.' Both of these points illustrate that the outsiders fall into the fault of 'no bottle'. Therefore, now the previous statement of 'no bottle' is connected. The bottle and 'existence' (you) are combined, so the bottle is called 'existence', rather than 'no bottle'. This is the fundamental meaning of the verse (jie song). Therefore, Vasubandhu (Tian Qin, 天親, referring to the Bodhisattva Vasubandhu) connects the difficulty of 'no bottle' in the previous explanation, fearing that avoiding 'no bottle' would lead to the predicament of 'multiple bottles'. So he also says, 'Not all "existence"', thus avoiding 'multiple bottles'. In this way, the bottle and 'one' are combined, and the bottle is called 'one'. This is in terms of the bottle and 'one' being combined, which also connects the two difficulties. Question: The verse only connects the two difficulties in terms of 'existence'. Why does Vasubandhu explain it in terms of 'one' as well? Answer: This has a profound meaning. The author of the treatise has a double refutation above. First, he says, 'If one does not exist, then many do not exist either.' This is directly aimed at the difficulty of 'no bottle', so now it is explained that the bottle and 'existence' are combined, and the bottle is called 'existence' to connect it. The second time above, he says, 'The initial number does not exist', so now it is explained that the bottle and 'one' are combined, and the bottle is called 'one', which is used to connect it. Although the bottle is different from the number 'one', the bottle and the number 'one' are combined, so the bottle is called the number 'one', rather than the initial number not existing. Most of the masters who explain the Śataśāstra (Bai Lun, 百論) themselves do not understand this meaning and think that the text is redundant. 'Nei Yue' (內曰) also has two aspects below. One refers to the previous two direct refutations. Referring to the former, even if you are different and combined, you will still fall into the predicament of 'multiple'; even if you are combined and different, you cannot get rid of the lack of 'non-existence'. Therefore, you have already missed the previous checkpoint and should not re-establish it. Only the statement of 'existence' has the saying of 'not too much and not too little', but there is no meaning of 'not too much and not too little', so it is said 'but also'. If 'existence' is not a bottle, then there is no bottle. The previous already has the two aspects of 'many' and 'non-existence'. Now, slightly point out the aspect of 'non-existence'. The reason why the aspect of 'non-existence' is emphasized is that the outsiders believe that the bottle and 'existence' are combined precisely to help 'non-existence', so now the aspect of 'non-existence' is emphasized. Now it should be said again that 'the bottle should not be a bottle', which is the second direct refutation. The bottle and 'existence' are combined, so it gets its name from 'existence'. The substance of 'existence' is not a bottle. The bottle and 'non-bottle' are combined, and it is named from 'non-', and should be called 'non-bottle'. If it is not named from 'non-', it is also not named from 'existence'. Question: Why is such a refutation made? Answer: There are a total of three meanings.

。一者縱奪二門。向指前破云若有非瓶則無瓶。此奪破也。今縱有瓶。瓶與有合從有名有。應從非名非。二者兩文破其二義。外云。雖合而異雖異而合。向指前破。破其雖合而異。今破其雖異而合。雖合而異即著無瓶之難。雖異而合弊非瓶之並。三者欲顯二義俱墮無瓶。雖合而異既墮無瓶。雖異而合從非名非亦墮無瓶也。注中為三。初牒外義。是有非瓶第二句將設並而詺外義定宗大有。有自無他。故言是有非瓶。若瓶與非瓶合下第三正設並。有人言。此舉異類並。汝瓶與有異亦與空異與有異從有名有。與空異從空名空。今謂此可勢破。非文正意也。外曰無無合故非非瓶。外云。有有二義。一者有有義。二者無瓶義。有有義是有故瓶與有合從有名有。非瓶義邊是無。無則無合故瓶不與無合從無名無也。然但轉側一字故有內破外通也。注中有二。一通后並二解前難。明有非瓶邊無合不得從非名非以通上並。今有有故下明非瓶有邊是有有故有合從有名有通上。指前無瓶難也。若通上虛空並者。大有是有可得瓶與有合。虛空是無。無故無所合。亦得更逐語並文。若爾大有可與瓶異虛空應當不異。若俱異應俱合外答云。有物異可得合如二手。無物異如一手。有一手無不得合也。內曰今有合瓶故者亦有二難。一縱合破二奪合破。縱

【現代漢語翻譯】一者，縱奪二門（兩種辯論方法）。先前（對方）指出，如果存在『非瓶』（非瓶子之物），那麼就不存在『瓶』（瓶子）。這是一種『奪破』（否定對方前提）的方法。現在，即使存在『瓶』，『瓶』與『有』（存在）結合，也只能從『有名有』（有存在之名）而來，應該從『非名非』（無存在之名）而來。二者，用兩段文字來駁斥對方的兩種觀點。對方說：『雖然結合但不同，雖然不同但結合。』先前（我方）指出，駁斥了其『雖然結合但不同』的觀點。現在，駁斥其『雖然不同但結合』的觀點。『雖然結合但不同』會陷入『無瓶』的困境，『雖然不同但結合』則會產生『非瓶』的弊端。三者，想要表明兩種觀點都會陷入『無瓶』的境地。『雖然結合但不同』已經陷入『無瓶』的境地，『雖然不同但結合』，從『非名非』的角度來看，也會陷入『無瓶』的境地。註釋中分為三點。首先，引用對方的觀點，即『是有非瓶』（存在非瓶之物）。第二句將設定並列關係，並確定對方的觀點大體上是『有』（存在）。『有』來自『無他』（沒有其他），所以說『是有非瓶』。如果『瓶』與『非瓶』結合，以下是第三點，正式設定並列關係。有人說，這是舉出不同類別的並列。你的『瓶』與『有』不同，也與『空』（空無）不同。與『有』不同，從『有名有』而來；與『空』不同，從『空名空』而來。現在我認為這可以用來反駁，但並非原文的真正含義。對方說：『無無合故非非瓶』（因為不存在無與無的結合，所以不存在非非瓶）。對方說，『有有』有兩種含義：一是『有有義』（存在的含義），二是『無瓶義』（不存在瓶子的含義）。『有有義』是因為『有』（存在），所以『瓶』與『有』結合，從『有名有』而來。『非瓶義』這邊是『無』（不存在），『無』則不存在結合，所以『瓶』不與『無』結合，從『無名無』而來。然而，僅僅是轉換一個字，所以既有內部的駁斥，也有外部的貫通。註釋中有兩點：一是貫通後面的並列關係，二是解釋前面的難題。表明『有非瓶』這邊不存在結合，不能從『非名非』而來，以此貫通上面的並列關係。現在『有有故』（因為存在存在），表明『非瓶』這邊是『有有』，所以存在結合，從『有名有』而來，以此貫通上面指出的『無瓶』的難題。如果貫通上面的虛空並列關係，那麼『大有』（極大的存在）是『有』，可以使『瓶』與『有』結合。『虛空』是『無』，因為『無』所以沒有可以結合的東西。也可以逐字逐句地並列。如果這樣，『大有』可以與『瓶』不同，『虛空』應該不相同。如果都不同，應該都結合。對方回答說，『有物』（存在之物）的不同可以結合，就像兩隻手。『無物』（不存在之物）的不同就像一隻手，只有一隻手無法結合。我方說，現在『有合瓶故』（因為存在結合的瓶子），也有兩種難題：一是縱合破（假設結合來反駁），二是奪合破（否定結合來反駁）。縱... 。

【English Translation】 Firstly, there are two approaches: affirmation and negation. Previously, it was pointed out that if there is a 'non-pot' (something that is not a pot), then there is no 'pot' (a pot). This is a method of 'negation by denial' (refuting the opponent's premise). Now, even if there is a 'pot', the 'pot' combined with 'existence' (being) can only come from 'having the name of existence' (having a name of existence), and should come from 'not having the name of non-existence' (not having a name of non-existence). Secondly, use two passages to refute the opponent's two viewpoints. The opponent says: 'Although combined, they are different; although different, they are combined.' Previously, (we) pointed out, refuting their viewpoint of 'although combined, they are different.' Now, refute their viewpoint of 'although different, they are combined.' 'Although combined, they are different' will fall into the difficulty of 'no pot'; 'although different, they are combined' will produce the drawback of 'non-pot'. Thirdly, (we) want to show that both viewpoints will fall into the state of 'no pot'. 'Although combined, they are different' has already fallen into the state of 'no pot'; 'although different, they are combined', from the perspective of 'not having the name of non-existence', will also fall into the state of 'no pot'. The commentary is divided into three points. First, quote the opponent's viewpoint, which is 'there is a non-pot' (there exists something that is not a pot). The second sentence will set up a parallel relationship and determine that the opponent's viewpoint is generally 'existence' (being). 'Existence' comes from 'no other' (no other), so it is said 'there is a non-pot'. If 'pot' and 'non-pot' are combined, the following is the third point, formally setting up a parallel relationship. Someone says that this is citing the parallel of different categories. Your 'pot' is different from 'existence', and also different from 'emptiness' (void). Being different from 'existence' comes from 'having the name of existence'; being different from 'emptiness' comes from 'emptiness having the name of emptiness'. Now I think this can be used to refute, but it is not the true meaning of the original text. The opponent says: 'Because there is no combination of non-existence and non-existence, there is no non-non-pot.' The opponent says that 'existence-existence' has two meanings: one is 'the meaning of existence' (the meaning of being), and the other is 'the meaning of no pot' (the meaning of not existing a pot). 'The meaning of existence' is because of 'existence' (being), so 'pot' and 'existence' combine, coming from 'having the name of existence'. On the side of 'the meaning of non-pot' is 'non-existence' (not being), and 'non-existence' does not have a combination, so 'pot' does not combine with 'non-existence', coming from 'non-existence having the name of non-existence'. However, it is only changing one word, so there is both internal refutation and external connection. There are two points in the commentary: one is to connect the parallel relationship behind, and the other is to explain the previous difficulty. It shows that there is no combination on the side of 'there is a non-pot', and it cannot come from 'not having the name of non-existence', in order to connect the above parallel relationship. Now 'because there is existence' (because there is being), it shows that on the side of 'non-pot' there is 'existence-existence', so there is a combination, coming from 'having the name of existence', in order to connect the difficulty of 'no pot' pointed out above. If connecting the above parallel relationship of emptiness, then 'great existence' (great being) is 'existence', which can make 'pot' combine with 'existence'. 'Emptiness' is 'non-existence', because 'non-existence' has nothing to combine with. It can also be parallel word by word. If so, 'great existence' can be different from 'pot', and 'emptiness' should not be the same. If they are all different, they should all combine. The opponent replied that the difference of 'existing things' (existing things) can be combined, like two hands. The difference of 'non-existing things' (non-existing things) is like one hand, and only one hand cannot be combined. We say that now 'because there is a combined pot' (because there is a combined pot), there are also two difficulties: one is affirmation by assuming combination (refuting by assuming combination), and the other is negation by denying combination (refuting by denying combination). Affirmation... .

合破者。汝若言有體是有故瓶與有合瓶名有者。有多與瓶合有應生瓶。則有是生因有便應無常。則破汝義也。二奪合破者。既秤今有合瓶故。瓶有則知本未與有合時無瓶。若無瓶誰與有合。猶是無無合耳。註釋為二。初釋縱合破。今有合瓶故有應生瓶。從若汝謂下第二取意奪合破。汝謂瓶未與有合未有瓶。爾時既無瓶。將何與有合耶。外曰有了瓶等故如燈通上二難也。有如燈瓶如物也。燈但了出物非生物。有但了出瓶非生瓶。故無初過。二者未為燈照時非是無物。瓶未與有合時亦非無瓶。是故有瓶得與有合。通上無無合難。注云有非但瓶等諸物因。此但字訓是也。故破一品中頻有但言。亦明有非是瓶等諸物生因。亦能了瓶等諸物者。此亦字應秤為但。謂大有但能了瓶等諸物耳。內曰若有法能瞭如燈瓶中先有者。就文始末總有三破別成六關。初就瓶有瓶無以破于有成於兩難。次就瓶相可相破覆成二關。三就燈縱奪覆成兩難。合六關也。謂有三雙。前二破法后一破譬。就初為二。若有法能瞭如燈者牒外義也。瓶中先有者設二難也。一者有難。燈未照瓶則暗中瓶前有。有未與瓶合時瓶亦先有。瓶既前有。何用有也。故得於合義而有墮無用。問暗中有瓶。燈有了出之用。亦前有于瓶。有了出用。何故無用。答有小異燈。汝有本

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本合破斥：如果你說『有』（bhava）的自性是『有』，所以『瓶』（ghaṭa）與『有』結合，因此稱『瓶』為『有』。那麼，當『有』與『瓶』結合時，『有』應該產生『瓶』。這樣，『有』就成了『生』（utpāda）的原因，『有』就應該是無常的。這就破斥了你的觀點。二、奪合破斥：既然現在『有』與『瓶』結合，那麼『瓶』是『有』的。由此可知，最初在未與『有』結合時，沒有『瓶』。如果沒有『瓶』，誰與『有』結合呢？這仍然是『無』與『無』結合罷了。註釋分為兩部分。首先解釋縱合破斥：現在『有』與『瓶』結合，所以『有』應該產生『瓶』。從『如果你說』以下，第二部分是取意奪合破斥。你說『瓶』在未與『有』結合時，沒有『瓶』。那時既然沒有『瓶』，拿什麼與『有』結合呢？外道反駁說：因為有了『瓶』等，就像燈照亮物體一樣，這可以解釋以上兩種詰難。『有』就像燈，『瓶』就像物體。燈只是照亮物體，而不是產生物體。『有』只是顯現『瓶』，而不是產生『瓶』，所以沒有第一個過失。第二，在燈未照亮時，並非沒有物體。『瓶』在未與『有』結合時，也並非沒有『瓶』。所以『有』與『瓶』可以結合，從而避免了『無』與『無』結合的詰難。註釋說：『有』不僅僅是『瓶』等諸物的因。這裡的『但』字是『是』的意思。所以在《破一品》中，經常有『但』這個詞，也是爲了說明『有』不是『瓶』等諸物的生因，而只是能夠顯現『瓶』等諸物。這裡的『亦』字應該理解為『但』，意思是說，『大有』只是能夠顯現『瓶』等諸物罷了。內道反駁說：如果『有』法能夠像燈一樣照亮『瓶』中先有的東西，那麼從文章的開頭到結尾，總共有三重破斥，分別形成六個關卡。首先，就『瓶』的『有』和『無』來破斥『有』，形成兩難。其次，就『瓶』的『相』（lakṣaṇa）的可相破來形成兩個關卡。第三，就燈的縱奪來形成兩難。總共六個關卡，也就是三對。前兩個是破法，后一個是破譬喻。就第一個破法來說，分為兩部分。『如果『有』法能夠像燈一樣照亮』，這是引用外道的觀點。『『瓶』中先有的東西』，這是設定兩個詰難。第一是『有』的詰難：燈未照亮『瓶』時，黑暗中『瓶』已經存在。『有』未與『瓶』結合時，『瓶』也已經存在。既然『瓶』已經存在，還要『有』做什麼呢？所以『合』的意義就成立了，而『有』就變得無用了。有人問：黑暗中有『瓶』，燈有照亮顯現的作用。『有』也先有于『瓶』，有顯現的作用，為什麼說無用呢？回答說：『有』與燈略有不同。你的『有』本來...

【English Translation】 English version Refutation of Combination (合破者): If you say that the nature of 'existence' (bhava) is 'existence', therefore, the 'pot' (ghaṭa) combines with 'existence', hence the 'pot' is called 'existence'. Then, when 'existence' combines with the 'pot', 'existence' should produce the 'pot'. Thus, 'existence' becomes the cause of 'arising' (utpāda), and 'existence' should be impermanent. This refutes your argument. Second, Refutation by Taking Away Combination (奪合破者): Since 'existence' now combines with the 'pot', the 'pot' is 'existence'. From this, it is known that initially, when not combined with 'existence', there was no 'pot'. If there is no 'pot', what combines with 'existence'? This is still 'non-existence' combining with 'non-existence'. The commentary is divided into two parts. First, explain the refutation of permissive combination (縱合破). Now 'existence' combines with the 'pot', so 'existence' should produce the 'pot'. From 'If you say' onwards, the second part is the refutation of taking away combination by extracting the meaning (取意奪合破). You say that when the 'pot' is not combined with 'existence', there is no 'pot'. Since there was no 'pot' at that time, what combines with 'existence'? The outsider retorts: Because there is 'pot' etc., just like a lamp illuminates an object, this can explain the above two difficulties. 'Existence' is like a lamp, and the 'pot' is like an object. The lamp only illuminates the object, it does not produce the object. 'Existence' only manifests the 'pot', it does not produce the 'pot', so there is no first fault. Second, when the lamp has not illuminated, it is not that there is no object. When the 'pot' has not combined with 'existence', it is not that there is no 'pot'. Therefore, 'existence' and 'pot' can combine, thus avoiding the difficulty of 'non-existence' combining with 'non-existence'. The commentary says: 'Existence' is not only the cause of 'pot' etc. The word 'only' here means 'is'. Therefore, in the 'Chapter on Refutation of One' (破一品), there is often the word 'only', which is also to explain that 'existence' is not the cause of the arising of 'pot' etc., but only able to manifest 'pot' etc. The word 'also' here should be understood as 'only', meaning that 'Great Existence' (大有) is only able to manifest 'pot' etc. The insider retorts: If the 'existence' dharma (有法) can illuminate something pre-existing in the 'pot' like a lamp, then from the beginning to the end of the text, there are a total of three refutations, forming six barriers respectively. First, refute 'existence' based on the 'existence' and 'non-existence' of the 'pot', forming a dilemma. Second, form two barriers based on the mutual refutation of the 'characteristics' (lakṣaṇa) of the 'pot'. Third, form a dilemma based on the permissive taking away of the lamp. There are a total of six barriers, which are three pairs. The first two are refutations of dharma, and the last one is a refutation of analogy. Regarding the first refutation of dharma, it is divided into two parts. 'If the 'existence' dharma can illuminate like a lamp', this is quoting the outsider's view. ''Something pre-existing in the 'pot'', this is setting up two difficulties. The first is the difficulty of 'existence': When the lamp has not illuminated the 'pot', the 'pot' already exists in the darkness. When 'existence' has not combined with the 'pot', the 'pot' also already exists. Since the 'pot' already exists, what is the use of 'existence'? Therefore, the meaning of 'combination' is established, and 'existence' becomes useless. Someone asks: There is a 'pot' in the darkness, and the lamp has the function of illuminating and manifesting. 'Existence' also pre-exists in the 'pot', having the function of manifesting, why is it said to be useless? The answer is: 'Existence' is slightly different from the lamp. Your 'existence' originally...

令物有耳。今物未與有合先已有竟。何用有也。若言有瓶性者。此性有異無。終自是有。又性有本來自有不由有有。亦事有本來自有亦不由有有。又大有了性有成有。陶師亦能爾。陶師既是生因大有亦是生因。第二就無難者。若未與有合未有瓶。與有合方有瓶。則有是生因前得了墮無用過。后得用墮生因。問今偈本破燈與破神品破燈何異。答上暗中瓶本有而覺體本無。有無不同故非譬。今偈縱其瓶法先有而有墮無用過。問上何故就無破今就有破。答道理之中緣未合時五道之中實無覺體。故就無破。道理之中瓶未與大有合時不無有瓶。故就有破。偈本二。一者就瓶已有破。二就瓶未有破。就瓶已有破法譬乃同而有墮無用之失。若有未合時下就未有義破。法譬不同得於有用而有墮生因之過。複次若以相可相成何故一不二者。就相可相破。若以相可相成者牒外義也。大有是相瓶是可相。要以大有之相瓶為可相。然後瓶方得成故云若以相可相成也。何以故一不二者第二正破。瓶既有相復有可相。二義方成者。大有何故唯是能相之一不具能相所相二也。牒文正爾。若縱橫難者。以有同瓶則並應有二。若並有二則有更須有。如是無窮。次以瓶同有。有若自有不更須有者。瓶亦自有不須有有瓶。二顛倒難。汝若有不須有而瓶須有者。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果事物有『耳』（指聽聞、理解的能力），那麼在事物與『有』（存在）結合之前，就已經有了結果。既然如此，又何必需要『有』呢？如果說瓶子具有『瓶性』，那麼這種『瓶性』是有還是無呢？最終還是歸於『有』。而且，如果說『瓶性』是本來就有的，不是因為『有』才產生的，那麼事物也應該是本來就有的，也不是因為『有』才產生的。此外，如果說『大有』（指普遍存在）產生了『性有』（指事物本性），『性有』又產生了『成有』（指事物形成），那麼陶匠也能做到這一點。既然陶匠是產生的原因，那麼『大有』也是產生的原因嗎？第二，從『無』的角度進行反駁：如果事物未與『有』結合，就沒有瓶子；只有與『有』結合，才產生瓶子。那麼，『有』就是產生的原因，之前所得到的就成了無用的東西，之後得到的就成了產生的原因。問：現在這個偈頌（指佛經中的詩句）所破斥的，與《破燈品》中破斥燈有什麼不同？答：之前說的是在黑暗中瓶子本來就存在，而覺悟的本體本來不存在，『有』和『無』不同，所以不能類比。現在這個偈頌是縱容瓶子的法（指規律）先存在，但『有』卻成了無用的東西。問：之前為什麼從『無』的角度破斥，現在卻從『有』的角度破斥？答：從道理上講，因緣未聚合時，在五道輪迴中確實沒有覺悟的本體，所以從『無』的角度破斥。從道理上講，瓶子在未與『大有』結合時，並非不存在瓶子，所以從『有』的角度破斥。這個偈頌分為兩部分：一是就瓶子已經存在進行破斥，二是就瓶子尚未存在進行破斥。就瓶子已經存在進行破斥，法和譬喻雖然相同，但卻有『有』成了無用的過失。如果從『未結合時』的角度，就『未有』的意義進行破斥，法和譬喻不同，卻能得到有用的東西，但卻有『有』成了產生原因的過失。再次，如果用『相』（指事物的表象）可以相互認可、相互成就，那麼為什麼『一』不是『二』呢？這是就『相』可以相互認可進行破斥。如果說用『相』可以相互成就，這是引用外道的觀點。『大有』是『相』，瓶子是『可相』（指可以被認識的表象）。需要用『大有』的『相』作為瓶子的『可相』，然後瓶子才能形成，所以說『如果用相可以相互成就』。為什麼『一』不是『二』呢？這是第二層破斥。瓶子既有『相』，又有『可相』，兩種意義才能成立。那麼，『大有』為什麼只是能作為『能相』（指能認識事物的表象）的『一』，而不具備『能相』和『所相』（指被認識的事物的表象）兩種意義呢？這是直接引用原文。如果從縱橫的角度進行詰難：如果『有』與瓶子相同，那麼就應該同時存在兩個。如果同時存在兩個，那麼『有』就需要另一個『有』來產生，這樣就無窮無盡了。其次，如果瓶子與『有』相同，如果『有』是自己存在的，不需要另一個『有』來產生，那麼瓶子也是自己存在的，不需要『有』來產生瓶子。這是兩種顛倒的詰難。如果你們認為『有』不需要『有』來產生，而瓶子需要『有』來產生，那麼...

【English Translation】 English version: If things have 'ears' (referring to the ability to hear and understand), then before a thing combines with 'existence' (being), there is already a result. If that's the case, what's the use of 'existence'? If you say a pot has 'pot-ness' (the nature of a pot), is this 'pot-ness' existent or non-existent? Ultimately, it still belongs to 'existence'. Moreover, if 'pot-ness' is said to be originally existent, not produced by 'existence', then things should also be originally existent, not produced by 'existence'. Furthermore, if 'Great Existence' (referring to universal existence) produces 'Nature-Existence' (the inherent nature of things), and 'Nature-Existence' produces 'Formed-Existence' (the formation of things), then the potter can also do this. Since the potter is the cause of production, is 'Great Existence' also the cause of production? Secondly, refuting from the perspective of 'non-existence': If a thing is not combined with 'existence', there is no pot; only when combined with 'existence' does a pot arise. Then, 'existence' is the cause of production, what was obtained before becomes useless, and what is obtained later becomes the cause of production. Question: What is the difference between what this verse (referring to a verse in a Buddhist scripture) refutes and what is refuted in the 'Lamp-Breaking Chapter' regarding the breaking of a lamp? Answer: Previously, it was said that the pot inherently exists in darkness, while the essence of enlightenment inherently does not exist. 'Existence' and 'non-existence' are different, so they cannot be compared. This verse now indulges the law of the pot (referring to the rules) as existing first, but 'existence' becomes useless. Question: Why was the refutation previously from the perspective of 'non-existence', but now from the perspective of 'existence'? Answer: From the perspective of reason, when conditions are not met, there is indeed no essence of enlightenment in the five paths of reincarnation, so the refutation is from the perspective of 'non-existence'. From the perspective of reason, when the pot is not combined with 'Great Existence', it is not that there is no pot, so the refutation is from the perspective of 'existence'. This verse is divided into two parts: one is to refute based on the pot already existing, and the other is to refute based on the pot not yet existing. Refuting based on the pot already existing, the law and the metaphor are the same, but there is the fault of 'existence' becoming useless. If refuting from the perspective of 'when not combined', based on the meaning of 'not yet existing', the law and the metaphor are different, but something useful can be obtained, but there is the fault of 'existence' becoming the cause of production. Again, if 'form' (referring to the appearance of things) can mutually recognize and mutually accomplish, then why is 'one' not 'two'? This is to refute based on 'form' being able to mutually recognize. If you say that 'form' can mutually accomplish, this is quoting the views of external paths. 'Great Existence' is 'form', and the pot is 'recognizable form' (referring to the appearance that can be recognized). It is necessary to use the 'form' of 'Great Existence' as the 'recognizable form' of the pot, and then the pot can be formed, so it is said 'if form can mutually accomplish'. Why is 'one' not 'two'? This is the second layer of refutation. The pot has both 'form' and 'recognizable form', and only with these two meanings can it be established. Then, why is 'Great Existence' only 'one' that can serve as 'able-form' (referring to the appearance that can recognize things), and does not possess both 'able-form' and 'formed-form' (referring to the appearance of things that are recognized)? This is directly quoting the original text. If questioning from the perspective of horizontal and vertical: If 'existence' is the same as the pot, then there should be two existing simultaneously. If two exist simultaneously, then 'existence' needs another 'existence' to produce it, and so on endlessly. Secondly, if the pot is the same as 'existence', if 'existence' exists on its own and does not need another 'existence' to produce it, then the pot also exists on its own and does not need 'existence' to produce the pot. These are two inverted questions. If you believe that 'existence' does not need 'existence' to produce it, but the pot needs 'existence' to produce it, then...

亦應瓶不須有而有須有也。所以須作顛倒難。一切諸法要須相可相義方得成。而汝瓶須相可相有不須相可相。此義既偏故招顛倒過也。燈喻前已破者第三次破燈。前破法說今次破譬。亦二。一者奪破明前已破燈。汝何所引。複次下第二縱破。外有燈並破之。外將燈喻有。內回燈譬瓶。燈自照不假外照。瓶亦自有不待外有。此捉瓶同燈。若瓶不能自有須有有瓶。亦燈不能自照須照照燈。次有顛倒之難。若瓶不自而燈自者。亦應燈不自而瓶自也。外曰如身相。自上已來破外總別。今第二破內總別。即明內外空義。上有三破六關。今備救之。要須足為身相。足則有用非足無用。有足能了出身非生於身。故無生因之難。如足為身相。身為可相故身具能相可相。二而不一。而足更不求相。別足但一而不二。瓶有亦爾。故無第二難。而燈能自照不假外照。而身不能自有要須足為相。如瓶不能自有須有有瓶。故無第三難也。內曰下此文但破其譬。則法說自亡。又但破譬者。即是求撿此身畢竟不得。觀身實相觀佛亦然。令外人得佛道也。就內破為二。一破有分身。二破諸分。所以破此二者。外云。身具能相可相二。諸分但是能相無相可相二。今破身與諸分。即是破外能相可相義盡也。就破總身為二。一破粗總二破細總。初又二。一具在

破二分在破。初牒具在。何故頭中無足正破也。一身既具在頭中。是故頭中應有于足。問何故前作具在破也。答外人以足分等為總身之相。既見諸分則知有分之身。若爾有分之身應具在諸分之中。然外人前舉足為身相。今應云足中有頭。而言頭中有足者。隨寄一處以論之耳。註釋為二。前開二關定之。若有身法者下牒外人義。外云。諸分和合別有總身法異於諸分。如假有體家義。別有假體異於實體。亦如犢子四大和合別有眼法。五陰和合別有人法。故具在分在破假身有體及犢子義。于足分等中為具有耶為分有耶。所以偏定之於足分者。以外人舉足分為身家相故。就足分中以定之耳。若具有者下正作難也。身法一故者。犢子四大和合有眼法。五陰和合有人法。假有體亦五陰和合別有總假法。與今外道同。有一總身之法。在於足中則足中有頭。若在頭中則頭中有足。若分有者第二分在破。初牒。次非何以故下正破。若唯分在如有分之頭在分頭中有分之足在分足中。此則頭處有頭足處有足。乃免頭中有足之過。而有有分同諸分過。故言有分如分。注三。一牒二破三結。若足中有分與足分等余分中亦爾者。此明有分足在分足中。余分亦爾此並是牒外義也。則有分與分為一者正破也。此言一者凡有兩義。一者有有分頭復有分頭。

則有分與分齊等故名為一。則有兩頭八足之過。二者有分即是諸分故名為一。乃至兩頭八足則失有分唯有諸分也。是故下總結也。如是足等下。自上已來破粗總別。今第二破細總別。足為有分指名為分。亦應作分在具在破之。有分無故諸分亦無。自上已來破粗細二總。即是破有分竟。今第二破無粗細二家之分。外曰微塵在故。自上已來二段破內外總別果竟。今第二次破內外總別之因。此文來意有其近遠。遠意舉塵總別救上總別之果。衛世師云。三災起時世界粗物既是有為悉皆滅盡。唯有鄰虛塵常住不滅為內外法因。若無此塵者後世界起時即成無因有果。今此微塵在後生諸物。則有因有果。次近生者。上破分有分皆無外人云。微塵圓而是常。無十方分故不墮前分有分中破。雖非分有分能作分有分因。故分有分不無數人義從此塵整合一切物。一切物散還為此塵。與外道異者凡有二義。一體具三相。是共有因故是無常。二從所作因生。故雜心云。若從一因生當知則無有。莊嚴云。鄰虛塵無方分。剎那亦無初中后。開善云。鄰虛塵有方分。剎那有初中后。而同明從細成粗粗成世界。內曰若集為瓶一切瓶。內破有二。若集為瓶牒外義也。所以牒其集者。彼明微塵是常又無諸分。據其體性一一皆非是瓶。要須聚集方能成瓶。故牒彼

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本如果認為『則有』（整體）是由『分』（部分）平等組合而成，所以稱為『一』（整體），那麼就會出現『兩頭八足』的過失。（因為如果整體僅僅是部分的簡單組合，那麼任何部分的組合都可能成為整體，導致荒謬的結果。）如果認為兩個部分組合起來就是『有分』，也就是各個部分，所以稱為『一』，那麼就會導致即使是『兩頭八足』的東西，也因為有部分而成為整體，這樣就失去了『有分』的意義，只剩下各個部分了。所以下面總結說：『如是足等下』。從上面開始，已經破斥了粗略的總體和個別。現在第二部分破斥精細的總體和個別。『足為有分指名為分』，也應該把『分』當作『在具』（存在的事物）來破斥。『有分』不存在了，各個『分』也就不存在了。從上面開始，已經破斥了粗略和精細的兩種總體，也就是破斥了『有分』的觀點。現在第二部分破斥沒有粗略和精細兩種『分』的觀點。外道說：『微塵』（最小的物質單位）是存在的。從上面開始，兩段破斥了內外總別之果。現在第二次破斥內外總別之因。這段文字的用意有遠近之分。從長遠來看，舉出『塵』的總體和個別是爲了挽救上面總體和個別的『果』。衛世師說：『三災』（火災、水災、風災）發生時，世界上的粗略物質都是有為法，全部都會滅盡，只有『鄰虛塵』（與虛空相鄰的微塵）常住不滅，作為內外法的因。如果沒有這種『塵』，那麼後來的世界產生時，就會成為無因而有果。現在這種『微塵』存在，後來就能產生各種事物，這樣就是有因有果。從眼前的角度來看，上面破斥了『分』和『有分』都不存在，外人說：『微塵』是圓形的，而且是常住的，沒有十方之分，所以不會落入前面『分』和『有分』的破斥中。雖然不是『分』和『有分』，但能作為『分』和『有分』的因，所以『分』和『有分』並不是沒有意義。數論派的觀點認為，一切事物都是由這種『塵』聚集而成，一切事物散開后又還原成這種『塵』。與外道的不同之處在於有兩個方面：一是本體具有三種相，是共同的因，所以是無常的；二是從所作的因產生。所以《雜心論》說：『如果從一個因產生，應當知道那就是沒有的。』《莊嚴論》說：『鄰虛塵沒有方分，剎那也沒有初中后。』開善說：『鄰虛塵有方分，剎那有初中后。』但都認為從細微的物質形成粗大的物質，粗大的物質形成世界。內道說：『如果聚集起來成為瓶子，一切瓶子...』內道的破斥分為兩部分。『如果聚集起來成為瓶子』，這是引用外道的觀點。之所以引用『聚集』，是因為他們認為『微塵』是常住的，而且沒有各個部分。根據它的體性，每一個都不是瓶子，必須聚集起來才能成為瓶子，所以引用他們的觀點。

【English Translation】 English version If it is considered that 'ze you' (the whole) is composed of 'fen' (parts) equally, so it is called 'one' (the whole), then there will be the fault of 'two heads and eight feet'. (Because if the whole is merely a simple combination of parts, then any combination of parts could become the whole, leading to absurd results.) If it is considered that two parts combined are 'you fen', which are the various parts, so it is called 'one', then it would lead to even things with 'two heads and eight feet' becoming a whole because they have parts, thus losing the meaning of 'you fen' and only leaving the various parts. Therefore, the following summarizes: 'Ru shi zu deng xia'. From above, the rough general and individual have been refuted. Now the second part refutes the fine general and individual. 'Zu wei you fen zhi ming wei fen', the 'fen' should also be treated as 'zai ju' (existing things) to be refuted. If 'you fen' does not exist, then the various 'fen' also do not exist. From above, the rough and fine two generals have been refuted, which is the refutation of the view of 'you fen'. Now the second part refutes the view of not having rough and fine two 'fen'. The externalists say: 'Wei chen' (the smallest unit of matter) exists. From above, the two sections have refuted the internal and external general and individual results. Now the second time refutes the internal and external general and individual causes. The intention of this text has near and far distinctions. From a long-term perspective, citing the general and individual of 'chen' is to save the 'fruit' of the above general and individual. The Vaisheshika says: 'When the three disasters (fire, water, wind) occur, the rough matter in the world are all conditioned dharmas and will all be destroyed. Only 'lin xu chen' (dust adjacent to emptiness) constantly abides and does not perish, serving as the cause of internal and external dharmas. If there is no such 'chen', then when the later world arises, it will become a result without a cause. Now that this 'wei chen' exists, it can later produce various things, so there is cause and effect. From the immediate perspective, the above refutes that 'fen' and 'you fen' do not exist, and the externalists say: 'Wei chen' is round and permanent, without the ten directions, so it will not fall into the previous refutation of 'fen' and 'you fen'. Although it is not 'fen' and 'you fen', it can serve as the cause of 'fen' and 'you fen', so 'fen' and 'you fen' are not meaningless. The Samkhya school believes that all things are formed by the aggregation of this 'chen', and all things scatter and return to this 'chen'. The difference from the externalists lies in two aspects: first, the substance has three aspects and is a common cause, so it is impermanent; second, it is produced from the cause of what is made. Therefore, the Abhidharmasamuccaya says: 'If it is produced from one cause, it should be known that it does not exist.' The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'Lin xu chen has no directions, and a kshana has no beginning, middle, or end.' Kai Shan said: 'Lin xu chen has directions, and a kshana has a beginning, middle, and end.' But they all believe that fine matter forms coarse matter, and coarse matter forms the world. The internalists say: 'If they gather to become a bottle, all bottles...' The internalist's refutation is divided into two parts. 'If they gather to become a bottle', this is quoting the externalist's view. The reason for quoting 'gather' is that they believe that 'wei chen' is permanent and has no parts. According to its nature, each one is not a bottle, and it must be gathered to become a bottle, so they quote their view.

集也。一切瓶者第二破有二義。一者大集二者小集。言大集者。若微塵有瓶性。則天下一切塵並應成瓶。不應成余物。若微塵或生瓶或生余物。則微塵無有瓶性。若無瓶性則一切塵雖復聚集都不成瓶。次就細集難者。此是小分一切。謂瓶中一切。若微塵中有于瓶性。應一一塵各成一瓶。若一一塵不能各生一瓶。多聚亦不能生。古今但作前二難。余聽及講來常怏怏此文。今詳天親意。並不與此二釋相應。此二釋乃可勢破耳。今所明者。外人直計塵能成瓶。今開二關定之。汝為都集天下塵成瓶。為不都集天下塵成瓶。則汝若都集天下塵成瓶則天下塵皆應成瓶。汝若不都集天下塵成瓶則天下塵皆非瓶。既有都集不都集則招都成都不成之過。文意正爾也。註釋為二。初指后破塵體。次正破破塵用。又指后即奪破明無此塵。次縱有以二關責也。將此注望前二釋。並不相應也。外曰下外人引縷渧集力為例通上都集不都集二難。縷渧一一不能。多集則能。以一一不能故非都不集之難。多集則能非都集難。諸百論師多不見此意也。內曰不定故者。外謂一一定不能。以通都不集難。多集定能通都集難。今非此二定故云不定。二定既壞則前兩難還成盲沙。一定不能多亦不能。云何言一定不能多定能也。外曰分分有力故非不定。明微塵一定不

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本集也（聚集）。一切瓶者第二破有二義（一切瓶的第二種破斥有兩種含義）：一者大集（大的聚集），二者小集（小的聚集）。言大集者（所謂大的聚集）：若微塵有瓶性（如果微小的塵埃具有瓶子的性質），則天下一切塵並應成瓶（那麼天下所有的塵埃都應該變成瓶子），不應成余物（不應該變成其他東西）。若微塵或生瓶或生余物（如果微小的塵埃或者產生瓶子，或者產生其他東西），則微塵無有瓶性（那麼微小的塵埃就沒有瓶子的性質）。若無瓶性則一切塵雖復聚集都不成瓶（如果沒有瓶子的性質，那麼所有的塵埃即使聚集在一起，也不會變成瓶子）。次就細集難者（接下來就小的聚集進行詰難）：此是小分一切（這是指瓶子中的所有小部分），謂瓶中一切（也就是瓶子中的所有微塵）。若微塵中有于瓶性（如果微小的塵埃中具有瓶子的性質），應一一塵各成一瓶（那麼每一個塵埃都應該各自成為一個瓶子）。若一一塵不能各生一瓶（如果每一個塵埃不能各自產生一個瓶子），多聚亦不能生（那麼多個塵埃聚集在一起也不能產生瓶子）。古今但作前二難（過去和現在都只提出前面兩種詰難），余聽及講來常怏怏此文（其餘聽眾和講解者常常對這段文字感到不滿）。今詳天親意（現在仔細推敲天親菩薩的用意），並不與此二釋相應（與這兩種解釋並不相符）。此二釋乃可勢破耳（這兩種解釋只是可以用來進行權宜的破斥）。今所明者（現在所要說明的是），外人直計塵能成瓶（外道直接認為塵埃能夠形成瓶子）。今開二關定之（現在設定兩個關卡來確定這一點）：汝為都集天下塵成瓶（你是認為聚集天下所有的塵埃才能形成瓶子），為不都集天下塵成瓶（還是認為不聚集天下所有的塵埃也能形成瓶子）？則汝若都集天下塵成瓶則天下塵皆應成瓶（那麼，如果你認為聚集天下所有的塵埃才能形成瓶子，那麼天下所有的塵埃都應該變成瓶子）。汝若不都集天下塵成瓶則天下塵皆非瓶（如果你認為不聚集天下所有的塵埃也能形成瓶子，那麼天下所有的塵埃都不是瓶子）。既有都集不都集則招都成都不成之過（既然有聚集和不聚集，那麼就會招致全部形成和全部不形成的過失）。文意正爾也（文中的意思正是如此）。註釋為二（註釋分為兩部分）：初指后破塵體（首先指出，然後破斥塵埃的本體），次正破破塵用（其次正式破斥破斥塵埃的作用）。又指后即奪破明無此塵（又指出，然後奪取破斥，說明沒有這種塵埃），次縱有以二關責也（其次，即使有，也用兩個關卡來責難）。將此注望前二釋（將這個註釋與前面的兩種解釋相比），並不相應也（並不相符）。外曰下（外道說）：外人引縷渧集力為例通上都集不都集二難（外道引用線和水滴聚集的力量為例，來解釋上面全部聚集和不全部聚集的兩種詰難）。縷渧一一不能（線和水滴單獨一個不能），多集則能（多個聚集在一起就能）。以一一不能故非都不集之難（因為單獨一個不能，所以不是不全部聚集的詰難），多集則能非都集難（多個聚集在一起就能，所以不是全部聚集的詰難）。諸百論師多不見此意也（許多《百論》的論師都沒有看到這個意思）。內曰不定故者（內道說：因為不確定）：外謂一一定不能（外道認為一個一定不能），以通都不集難（用來解釋不全部聚集的詰難），多集定能通都集難（多個聚集在一起一定能，用來解釋全部聚集的詰難）。今非此二定故云不定（現在否定這兩種確定，所以說不確定）。二定既壞則前兩難還成盲沙（兩種確定被破壞，那麼前面的兩種詰難就如同盲人摸沙一樣）。一定不能多亦不能（一個一定不能，多個也一定不能），云何言一定不能多定能也（怎麼能說一個一定不能，多個一定能呢）？外曰分分有力故非不定（外道說：因為每個部分都有力量，所以不是不確定）。明微塵一定不（說明微塵一定不）

【English Translation】 English version Collection also (gathering). 'All about the pot' second refutation has two meanings: 1. Large collection, 2. Small collection. Speaking of large collection: If a dust mote has the nature of a pot, then all dust in the world should become pots, and should not become other things. If a dust mote either produces a pot or produces other things, then the dust mote does not have the nature of a pot. If there is no pot nature, then all dust, even if gathered together, will not form a pot. Next, regarding the difficulty of small collection: This refers to all the small parts, namely everything within the pot. If a dust mote has the nature of a pot, then each dust mote should individually become a pot. If each dust mote cannot individually produce a pot, then a large gathering also cannot produce one. In the past and present, only these two difficulties have been raised; listeners and lecturers often feel dissatisfied with this passage. Now, upon careful consideration of Āryadeva's intent, it does not correspond with these two explanations. These two explanations can only be used for expedient refutation. What is being clarified now is that the outsider directly assumes that dust can form a pot. Now, two gates are opened to determine this: Do you claim that gathering all the dust in the world forms a pot, or that not gathering all the dust in the world forms a pot? If you claim that gathering all the dust in the world forms a pot, then all the dust in the world should become pots. If you claim that not gathering all the dust in the world forms a pot, then all the dust in the world are not pots. Since there is both gathering and not gathering, it invites the fault of either all becoming or all not becoming. The meaning of the text is precisely this. The commentary is in two parts: First, it points out and then refutes the substance of the dust; second, it formally refutes the function of refuting the dust. Furthermore, it points out and then takes away the refutation, clarifying that there is no such dust. Next, even if there is, it uses the two gates to question. Comparing this commentary with the previous two explanations, they do not correspond. The outsider says: The outsider cites the example of the combined force of threads and drops to address the above two difficulties of complete and incomplete gathering. A single thread or drop cannot, but many gathered together can. Because a single one cannot, it is not the difficulty of incomplete gathering; many gathered together can, so it is not the difficulty of complete gathering. Many Śāstrakāra of the Śataśāstra do not see this meaning. The insider says: Because it is uncertain, the outsider claims that one definitely cannot, to address the difficulty of incomplete gathering; many gathered together definitely can, to address the difficulty of complete gathering. Now, these two certainties are denied, so it is said to be uncertain. Once the two certainties are destroyed, then the previous two difficulties become like groping in the sand for a blind person. One definitely cannot, and many also cannot. How can it be said that one definitely cannot, but many definitely can? The outsider says: Because each part has power, it is not uncertain. Clarifying that a dust mote definitely does not.

能多定能。以一一塵各有力故盲沙一定不能多亦不能。以各無力故有二種定非是不定。定義既成即兩難便壞。內曰分有分一異過故。破其一定不能多定能也。汝言分不能有分能者。若分與有分一。分既不能。有分亦不能。有分既能。分亦應能。若有分能而分不能。即是異義。亦應有五難。如以神從覺等也。又有分與分一如眾糸成絙一。絙一眾糸一。如身一頭足一。若絙與眾糸一。眾糸既多在絙亦多。亦即五難。如破一品說。若分與有分異。離眾糸之外別應有絙。眾糸既滅而絙應在。若糸滅則絙滅。不得言異。又縱離眾糸別有絙者。絙為具在一糸中。為分在一糸中。若具在一糸中。即一糸之中便有眾糸。又偏在一糸中。即余糸中應無絙。若余糸皆有絙者。即有多絙。若一絙分在眾糸中者。即有分如分。注為二。初釋偈一異過故。複次下義生有無破。初就無門破。當衆糸時未有于絙。何所待故名之為分。若眾糸時已有于絙。何用分力。外曰汝是破法人。自上已來三番破外人總別異體義竟。今第四破外人橫過。論主前破外人過同破法人者此有近遠。遠而為論。從神品竟於此文若法若人一之與異並皆破之。故名壞法人。此是眾師總罵。非獨衛世瞋呵。二近生者。自上已來文三義四。文三者。一破外總別。二破內總別。三破微塵

。破總別因也。義四者。謂因果內外也。此四總攝諸法。汝並破之名破法人。內答有二。一天親義生免過答。二提婆推過答。免過答者。汝謂總別體異。就汝覓異義不成。非我過也。又此即是推過答。以外計有與瓶異覓異不成。不成之過還是汝也。又汝上來橫自立義。今復橫過於他。故重招罪也。複次無見有有見無等第二推過答。今前通釋此義。有見外道名無見有。無見外道名有見無。就內法。薩婆多等是無見有。方廣之流謂有見無。就文釋者。明衛世立異凡有二過。一者佛法頭足因緣名之為身。而外道謂非是身名有見無。離頭足外實無別總身。而謂別有總身名無見有。又假有體家離四微別有假柱體。離五陰別有假人體。是無見有。假無體義云。唯有五陰但有四微。是有見無義。無體有用具有二義。別有用名無見有。無有體是有見無。注為二。初標二門次釋二門。標二門者。汝與破法人同謂破法章門也。乃復過甚標過甚章門也。破法人同是有見無。乃復過甚謂無見有。何以故下釋二門也。又二。前就內法次就外法。就內法釋二者。初釋破法人同章門明因緣和合為身。汝言非身即是破因緣法。若破因緣即破空義亦破中假。故一切俱破。如中論四諦品說。離是已別有身釋第二過甚章門。明破法之人但撥有令無不計無為有。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本破斥總相和別相的因緣。『義四者』，指的是因、果、內、外四種關係。這四者總括了一切諸法。你全部破斥它們，所以被稱為『破法人』。內部的回答分為兩部分。第一部分是天親菩薩通過闡釋『義生』來避免過失的回答，第二部分是提婆菩薩通過反推對方的過失來回答。關於避免過失的回答：你認為總相和別相的本體是不同的，但就你的觀點來尋找這種不同之處卻找不到，這不是我的過失。這同時也屬於反推過失的回答。因為外道認為『有』與瓶子是不同的，但尋找這種不同之處卻找不到，找不到的過失還是在你。而且你之前橫加立論，現在又橫加指責他人，所以是罪加一等。其次，『無見有』、『有見無』等是第二種反推過失的回答。現在先總的解釋這個含義。『有見外道』指的是『無見有』，『無見外道』指的是『有見無』。就內部佛法來說，薩婆多部等是『無見有』，方廣部等認為是『有見無』。就文句解釋來說，衛世（Vaisheshika）立異有兩種過失。一是佛法的頭、足、因緣被稱為身體，而外道認為這不是身體，這就是『有見無』。離開頭、足、因緣之外，實際上沒有別的總的身體，卻認為另外存在總的身體，這就是『無見有』。又比如假有的本體，離開四微塵之外，另外存在假立的柱子本體；離開五蘊之外，另外存在假立的人體，這就是『無見有』。假無本體的含義是說，只有五蘊，只有四微塵，這就是『有見無』的含義。沒有本體，但有作用，具有兩種含義。別相的作用稱為『無見有』，沒有本體就是『有見無』。註釋分為兩部分。首先標出兩扇門，然後解釋這兩扇門。標出兩扇門是指，你和破法的人都認為這是破法章的門徑。『乃復過甚』是標出過甚的章門。破法的人相同之處在於『有見無』，『乃復過甚』是指『無見有』。為什麼呢？下面解釋這兩扇門。又分為兩部分，先就內部佛法，再就外部佛法。就內部佛法解釋這兩者，首先解釋破法的人相同的章門，說明因緣和合而成身體。你說不是身體，就是破斥因緣法。如果破斥因緣，就是破斥空義，也破斥中假。所以一切都被破斥了，如《中論·四諦品》所說。離開這些之外，另外存在身體，這是解釋第二種過甚的章門，說明破法之人只是撥『有』為『無』，不考慮『無』可以變為『有』。

【English Translation】 English version Refuting the causes and conditions of the general and specific characteristics. 『The four meanings』 refer to the four relationships of cause, effect, internal, and external. These four encompass all dharmas. You refute them all, so you are called a 『destroyer of the Dharma』. The internal answer is divided into two parts. The first part is Vasubandhu (Tianqin Pusa) answering to avoid fault by explaining 『arising from meaning (yi sheng)』, and the second part is Aryadeva (Tiba Pusa) answering by pushing back the other party's fault. Regarding the answer to avoid fault: you think that the essence of the general and specific characteristics are different, but you cannot find this difference based on your point of view, which is not my fault. This is also a response that pushes back the fault. Because the heretics think that 『existence』 is different from a vase, but they cannot find this difference, and the fault of not finding it is still yours. Moreover, you have previously made arbitrary arguments and are now arbitrarily accusing others, so the crime is compounded. Secondly, 『invisible existence (wu jian you)』, 『visible non-existence (you jian wu)』 etc. are the second type of response that pushes back the fault. Now, let's first generally explain this meaning. 『Heretics with views』 refer to 『invisible existence』, and 『heretics without views』 refer to 『visible non-existence』. In terms of internal Buddhism, the Sarvastivada (Sapoduo) school etc. are 『invisible existence』, and the Vaipulya (Fangguang) school etc. think it is 『visible non-existence』. In terms of sentence explanation, the Vaisheshika (Weishi) school has two faults in establishing differences. First, the head, feet, and causes and conditions of the Buddha's Dharma are called the body, but the heretics think that this is not the body, which is 『visible non-existence』. Apart from the head, feet, and causes and conditions, there is actually no other general body, but they think that there is another general body, which is 『invisible existence』. Also, for example, the essence of the hypothetical existence, apart from the four subtle particles, there is another hypothetical pillar essence; apart from the five skandhas, there is another hypothetical human body, which is 『invisible existence』. The meaning of hypothetical non-existence is that there are only five skandhas, only four subtle particles, which is the meaning of 『visible non-existence』. There is no essence, but there is function, which has two meanings. The function of the specific characteristic is called 『invisible existence』, and the absence of essence is 『visible non-existence』. The commentary is divided into two parts. First, mark the two doors, and then explain the two doors. Marking the two doors means that you and the person who destroys the Dharma both think that this is the path to the chapter on destroying the Dharma. 『Moreover, excessively (nai fu guo shen)』 marks the chapter on excessive faults. The similarity between those who destroy the Dharma is 『visible non-existence』, and 『moreover, excessively』 refers to 『invisible existence』. Why? The following explains these two doors. It is also divided into two parts, first in terms of internal Buddhism, and then in terms of external religions. Explaining these two in terms of internal Buddhism, first explain the chapter on the similarities between those who destroy the Dharma, explaining that the body is formed by the combination of causes and conditions. If you say it is not the body, you are refuting the Dharma of causes and conditions. If you refute the causes and conditions, you are refuting the meaning of emptiness, and you are also refuting the middle way and the provisional. Therefore, everything is refuted, as stated in the 『Four Noble Truths』 chapter of the Madhyamaka-karika (Zhonglun). Apart from these, there is another body, which is explaining the second chapter on excessive faults, explaining that the person who destroys the Dharma only turns 『existence』 into 『non-existence』, and does not consider that 『non-existence』 can become 『existence』.

汝遂撥有令無。又計無為有。豈非過甚。次就外法釋。如文。

百論疏卷中之中(終)

百論疏卷中之餘

釋吉藏撰

破情品第五

破法有三雙。前破一異次破情塵者。一為曆法觀行。雖知一異已空未語情塵非有。今欲曆法明空令觀心觸境斯凈故次破情塵。二者顛倒虛妄起無根本。聊亂而生。有病便治。隨救即破。故前破一異之病今洗情塵之執。三者菩薩作論本為通經。而方等眾經皆明六情本性空寂。但經中散說。利根能悟鈍者未了。今廣釋之故有此品。四者一切眾生有此情故起諸煩惱。在家之者因情塵而起愛。出家外道由情塵而見生。佛法有所得大小乘人義亦如是。今觀此情塵。究竟無從故大小內外愛見便息。故有此品。又諸方等經皆明六根懺悔悟六本空即六根罪滅。四依欲為末世懺悔故觀六根空。又法華等明六根清凈。今悟六本空故六根凈耳。今欲釋如此等經故破六情。皆是通來意也。次別來意者。前破一異總破諸法。以萬法與于大有一體異體義皆不成。從此已后別破諸法。謂萬像之中有情塵因果。前總后別。觀門次第。亦是立義前後。故有此品。二者前破一異通破常與無常法。今次別破無常法。亦是前總后別。以為次第。三者一異理隱情塵義顯。故舍彼一異更立情塵。故有此品

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本你竟然撥弄有，使之變為無，又計較無，使之變為有，豈不是太過分了。下面就用外道之法來解釋，就像文中所說的那樣。

《百論疏》卷中之終

《百論疏》卷中之餘

釋吉藏撰

破情品第五

破法有三雙。前面破斥一異，接下來破斥情塵，原因如下：一是為曆法觀行。即使知道一異已經空無，但未曾談及情塵並非實有。現在想要通過歷法來闡明空性，使觀心觸境得以清凈，所以接下來破斥情塵。二是顛倒虛妄，沒有根本，雜亂而生。有病就治療，隨之救治就能破除。所以前面破斥一異之病，現在洗滌情塵之執。三是菩薩造論本來是爲了通達經義。而方等眾經都闡明六情（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）的本性空寂。但經中分散地講述，利根之人能夠領悟，鈍根之人則不明白。現在廣泛地解釋它，所以有此品。四是一切眾生因為有此情，所以生起各種煩惱。在家之人因為情塵而生起愛慾，出家外道因為情塵而產生對生的執見。佛法中有所得的小乘和大乘之人，道理也是如此。現在觀察這情塵，究竟無從產生，所以大小乘內外的愛慾和執見便會止息。所以有此品。而且諸方等經都闡明六根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）懺悔，領悟六根本性空寂，那麼六根的罪業就消滅了。四依（比丘、比丘尼、優婆塞、優婆夷）想要為末世之人懺悔，所以觀察六根空。而且《法華經》等闡明六根清凈。現在領悟六根本性空，所以六根就清凈了。現在想要解釋如此等等的經義，所以破斥六情。這些都是總體的來意。接下來是分別的來意。前面破斥一異，總的破斥諸法。因為萬法與大有一體異體的意義都不能成立。從此以後分別破斥諸法。所謂萬象之中有情塵因果。前面是總的，後面是分別的。觀門的次第，也是立義的前後，所以有此品。二是前面破斥一異，總的破斥常與無常法。現在接下來分別破斥無常法。也是前面總的，後面分別的，作為次第。三是一異的道理隱晦，情塵的意義明顯。所以捨棄那一異，而另立情塵。所以有此品。

【English Translation】 English version You then manipulate existence into non-existence, and then consider non-existence as existence. Isn't that going too far? Next, I will explain it using externalist (外道) methods, as stated in the text.

Commentary on the Hundred Treatises, Middle Volume (End)

Remaining Sections of the Commentary on the Hundred Treatises, Middle Volume

Composed by Śīlabhadra (吉藏)

Chapter 5: Refuting Sentient Dust (破情品)

There are three pairs of refutations of dharmas. First, refuting oneness and difference, and then refuting sentient dust (情塵). The reasons are as follows: First, it is for the practice of contemplating dharmas. Even if one knows that oneness and difference are empty, one has not yet spoken of sentient dust as non-existent. Now, one wants to clarify emptiness through the contemplation of dharmas, so that the mind's contact with objects can be purified. Therefore, one refutes sentient dust next. Second, delusion and falsehood arise without a root, chaotically. When there is a disease, one treats it; as soon as one remedies it, one breaks it. Therefore, one refutes the disease of oneness and difference first, and now washes away the attachment to sentient dust. Third, Bodhisattvas compose treatises primarily to understand the sutras. And the Vaipulya sutras (方等眾經) all clarify that the nature of the six senses (六情) (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind) is fundamentally empty and still. However, the sutras speak of it in a scattered way. Those with sharp faculties can understand, but those with dull faculties do not. Now, one explains it extensively, so there is this chapter. Fourth, all sentient beings give rise to various afflictions because of this sentient dust. Those who are householders give rise to love because of sentient dust, and externalists who have left home see birth because of sentient dust. The meaning is also the same for those of the Buddhist Dharma who have attainment, whether they are of the Small Vehicle or the Great Vehicle. Now, one observes this sentient dust, and ultimately it has no origin, so the love and views of both the Small and Great Vehicles, internal and external, will cease. Therefore, there is this chapter. Moreover, all the Vaipulya sutras clarify that the six roots (六根) (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind) repent, and when they realize that the nature of the six roots is empty, then the sins of the six roots are extinguished. The Four Reliances (四依) (bhikṣus, bhikṣuṇīs, upāsakas, upāsikās) want to repent for the people of the degenerate age, so they observe the emptiness of the six roots. Moreover, the Lotus Sutra (法華經) and others clarify the purity of the six roots. Now, one realizes that the nature of the six roots is empty, so the six roots are pure. Now, one wants to explain such sutra meanings, so one refutes the six senses. These are all general intentions. Next are the separate intentions. Previously, one refuted oneness and difference, generally refuting all dharmas. Because the meaning of the myriad dharmas being one or different in substance with the Great One cannot be established. From now on, one will separately refute all dharmas. Among the myriad phenomena, there are sentient dust, cause, and effect. The former is general, and the latter is separate. The order of the gates of contemplation is also the order of establishing meaning, so there is this chapter. Second, previously, one refuted oneness and difference, generally refuting permanent and impermanent dharmas. Now, one will separately refute impermanent dharmas. It is also the former being general and the latter being separate, as the order. Third, the principle of oneness and difference is obscure, and the meaning of sentient dust is clear. Therefore, one abandons that oneness and difference and establishes sentient dust instead. Therefore, there is this chapter.

。四者一異偏是外道所計。情塵內外同執。故別計不成故引通來救。故有此品。五者上破異品末論主呵外人云無見有有見無。今接此故舉實有情塵。而有見有。非無見有亦非有見無。論主若破情塵則有見於無而別立佛法。謂無見有。故有此品。前破情次破塵者。情內塵外。親疏不同故破前後。問今破一異與破情塵義齊以不。答通義則齊。外道橫計一異故謂于大有與萬法一體異體。亦外道橫計。偏造遍造之情及瓶等可見之塵實無此法。故破義是齊而小異者。大有一體異體唯外道所執。故余處云。外道大有經說此則破而不取。若是情塵通於內外。故亦取亦破。若橫謂有者。則破而不取。因緣假名情塵取而不破。問此品破情與中論破情品何異。答中論但破于情不破知生義。今則具足。中論通破見義不別開到不到。此論別破到不到義所以然者。中論破內學。內學大小乘人但明不到能見。故中論直破其見。外道具執到不到見。故此論具破二迷。所言情者。智度論云。九十六術不說意識。意識難解故但明五情及以于意。神御于意行眼等中故能見色。問既稱外道不說意識。云何言意行眼門。答外道不明從意根生意識。但言有心平等根名之為意。神御此意行眼等門耳。今言破情者有二義。一者正破外道無六計六。傍破內人橫謂之六。二

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本四種觀點，認為事物要麼相同，要麼不同，這是外道的錯誤觀念。他們執著于情識和塵境，無論是內在的還是外在的。因為單獨區分無法成立，所以試圖通過普遍聯繫來補救，因此有了這一品。五者，前面破斥了『異』的觀點，最後論主呵斥外人說，不存在『無見有』或『有見無』的情況。現在接著前面的內容，提出真實存在的情識和塵境，並且它們是『有見有』的，既不是『無見有』，也不是『有見無』。如果論主破斥情識和塵境，那就等於承認『有見於無』，從而另外建立佛法，即所謂的『無見有』。因此有了這一品。前面先破斥情識，再破斥塵境，是因為情識是內在的，塵境是外在的，有親疏之別，所以破斥有先後。問：現在破斥『一』和『異』，與破斥情識和塵境的意義相同嗎？答：從普遍意義上講是相同的。外道橫加臆測，認為『大有』與萬法要麼是一體，要麼是異體。這也是外道的橫加臆測。他們虛構了普遍創造的情識，以及瓶子等可見的塵境，實際上並不存在這些法。所以破斥的意義是相同的，但也有小小的不同。『大有』的一體和異體，只有外道才執著，所以其他地方說，外道的大有經是破斥而不採納的。而情識和塵境則普遍存在於內外，所以既有采納也有破斥。如果橫加臆測認為它們是真實存在的，那就破斥而不採納。因緣和合的假名情識和塵境，則採納而不破斥。問：這一品破斥情識，與中論破斥情識品有什麼不同？答：中論只是破斥情識本身，不破斥知覺產生的意義。而現在這一品則兩者都破斥。中論普遍破斥見解，不分別開示到與不到。此論則分別破斥到與不到的意義。之所以這樣，是因為中論破斥的是內學。內學的大小乘人都只說明不到也能見。所以中論直接破斥他們的見解。外道則執著于到與不到的見解，所以此論全面破斥這兩種迷惑。所說的情識，智度論說，九十六種外道學術不談意識，因為意識難以理解，所以只說明五情以及意。神識駕馭意，通過眼等器官，才能看到顏色。問：既然說外道不談意識，為什麼又說意通過眼門等活動？答：外道不明白意識是從意根產生的，只是說有一種心，普遍的根，稱之為意。神識駕馭這個意，通過眼等器官活動。現在說破斥情識，有兩種意義。一是正面破斥外道沒有六種計算方式，二是順便破斥內學之人橫加臆測的六種計算方式。

【English Translation】 English version The four views, that things are either the same or different, are the mistaken notions of externalists (外道, wàidào, non-Buddhist schools of thought). They are attached to emotions (情, qíng) and sense objects (塵, chén), whether internal or external. Because separate distinctions cannot be established, they attempt to remedy this through universal connections, hence this chapter. Fifthly, the previous section refuted the view of 'difference' (異, yì), and at the end, the author rebuked the externalists, saying that there is no such thing as 'seeing existence without seeing' (無見有, wú jiàn yǒu) or 'seeing non-existence with seeing' (有見無, yǒu jiàn wú). Now, following the previous content, it is proposed that emotions and sense objects truly exist, and they are 'seeing existence with seeing' (有見有, yǒu jiàn yǒu), neither 'seeing existence without seeing' nor 'seeing non-existence with seeing'. If the author were to refute emotions and sense objects, it would be equivalent to admitting 'seeing non-existence with seeing', thereby establishing a separate Dharma, the so-called 'seeing existence without seeing'. Hence this chapter. Emotions are refuted first, followed by sense objects, because emotions are internal and sense objects are external, with different degrees of closeness, so the refutation has an order. Question: Is the refutation of 'oneness' (一, yī) and 'difference' now the same in meaning as the refutation of emotions and sense objects? Answer: In a general sense, they are the same. Externalists arbitrarily speculate that 'Great Being' (大有, dà yǒu) is either one with all phenomena or different from all phenomena. This is also the arbitrary speculation of externalists. They fabricate universally creating emotions and visible sense objects such as bottles, but these dharmas do not actually exist. Therefore, the meaning of refutation is the same, but there is a slight difference. The oneness and difference of 'Great Being' are only clung to by externalists, so it is said elsewhere that the externalist Great Being Sutra is refuted but not adopted. Emotions and sense objects, however, are universally present internally and externally, so there is both adoption and refutation. If they are arbitrarily speculated to be truly existent, then they are refuted but not adopted. Emotions and sense objects that are the result of causes and conditions and are nominally existent are adopted but not refuted. Question: How does this chapter's refutation of emotions differ from the Middle Treatise's (中論, Zhōnglùn) chapter on refuting emotions? Answer: The Middle Treatise only refutes emotions themselves, not the meaning of the arising of cognition. This chapter refutes both. The Middle Treatise universally refutes views, without distinguishing between arriving and not arriving. This treatise separately refutes the meaning of arriving and not arriving. The reason for this is that the Middle Treatise refutes internal learning. The people of both the Great and Small Vehicles of internal learning only explain that one can see even without arriving. Therefore, the Middle Treatise directly refutes their views. Externalists, however, are attached to the views of arriving and not arriving, so this treatise comprehensively refutes these two confusions. As for emotions, the Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise (智度論, Zhìdùlùn) says that the ninety-six externalist schools of thought do not discuss consciousness (意識, yìshí), because consciousness is difficult to understand, so they only explain the five emotions and the mind (意, yì). The spirit (神, shén) controls the mind, and through organs such as the eyes, one can see colors. Question: Since it is said that externalists do not discuss consciousness, why is it said that the mind acts through the eye gate, etc.? Answer: Externalists do not understand that consciousness arises from the mind-root (意根, yìgēn), but only say that there is a mind, a universal root, which is called the mind. The spirit controls this mind and acts through organs such as the eyes. Now, saying that emotions are refuted has two meanings. First, it directly refutes the externalists' lack of six ways of calculating, and second, it incidentally refutes the six ways of calculating that internal learners arbitrarily speculate.

者若內若外有此六情名皆起佛法。成論云。劫初物未有名字。聖人為受用故假為立名。如瓶衣等。問聖人何故說六。答道門未曾六不六。但為顛倒故受此六根。聖人慾令其悟六無。是故說六。如經云爲令悟第一義故說世諦。所以令悟六無。六者三世諸佛出世皆為一大事。謂開示悟入諸佛知見。諸佛知見即是四智。觀此六情本來寂滅名如來智。雖復寂滅于顛倒眾生宛然而六即是佛智。悟六無六。了無六六任運現前名自然智。此之三智不從師得名無師智。此之四智是佛知見。三世諸佛為欲開示悟入此智見故出現於世。此四智觸處皆得明之。但約眾生心為正意。故就情品說之。品開為二。一破眼情二例餘五。初又二。初破情令生知。二正破情。初是破果次名破因。因果既破情事盡矣。外曰定有我我所有法現前有故。破一品初以法證人。今此品初以法證法。定有我所者謂有一瓶也。有法現前有故者。舉五情生知證有一瓶等我所法也。現前者五識知現在法也。又現事可信也。誰不知青黃者哉。所言知者。六根皆四合。四合中皆生知眼與塵合知青黃。乃至意與法合能知法。今但取五知不論意知者有二種義。一者外道不說意識。如上所明。二者意通知三世。非顯現法故不舉之五情對五塵生於五知。是顯現法故偏舉也。問觀此文既言生

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本如果（眾生）無論是內在還是外在，有這六種情識（六根，即眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意），那麼一切佛法都由此而生起。《成實論》中說，劫初之時，萬物還沒有名字，聖人爲了方便受用，才假立名字，比如瓶子、衣服等等。有人問：聖人為什麼只說六根呢？回答是：道門之中，從來沒有六與不六的分別，只是因為眾生顛倒迷惑，才承受這六根。聖人想要讓他們領悟六根本空，所以才說六根。如同經中所說，爲了讓人領悟第一義諦，才說世俗諦。所以，（說六根）是爲了讓人領悟六根本無自性。這六根，是三世諸佛出世所為的一件大事，即開示悟入諸佛的知見。諸佛的知見就是四智（大圓鏡智、平等性智、妙觀察智、成所作智）。觀察這六種情識，本來就是寂滅的，這叫做如來智。雖然（六根）本來寂滅，但在顛倒的眾生看來，（六根）依然存在，這六根就是佛智。領悟六根本無自性，了達沒有六根的執著，任運自在地顯現，這叫做自然智。這三種智慧不是從老師那裡學來的，叫做無師智。這四種智慧就是佛的知見。三世諸佛爲了開示悟入這種知見，才出現於世。這四種智慧，處處都可以明白，但主要是針對眾生的心意。所以，就在情識品中加以解說。這一品分為兩部分：一是破斥眼識，二是類比其餘五識。首先是破斥眼識，又分為兩部分：一是破斥情識，使人產生智慧；二是正式破斥情識。前者是破斥（眼識的）結果，後者是破斥（眼識的）原因。原因和結果都被破斥了，情識的事情也就結束了。外道說：一定有『我』和『我所』的法，因為它們是現前存在的。破斥這一品，開始是用法來證明人（的存在），現在這一品，開始是用法來證明法（的存在）。所謂『一定有我所』，就是說有一個瓶子。所謂『有法現前存在』，就是舉出五種情識所產生的知覺，來證明有瓶子等『我所』的法。所謂『現前』，就是五識能夠知曉現在的事物。而且，現前的事物是可信的。誰不知道青色和黃色呢？所謂『知』，是六根都是四種因素和合而成。在四種因素和合之中，都會產生知覺，眼睛和塵境和合，就能知曉青色和黃色，乃至意識和法塵和合，就能知曉法。現在只取五識的知覺，而不論意識的知覺，有兩種原因：一是外道不承認意識，如上面所說；二是意識能夠通達三世，不是顯現的法，所以不舉出。五種情識對五種塵境，產生五種知覺，這是顯現的法，所以只舉出五識。有人問：觀察這段文字，既然說是『生』，

【English Translation】 English version If (sentient beings), whether internal or external, have these six emotions (the six roots, namely eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind), then all Buddha-dharma arises from this. The Tattvasiddhi Shastra says that at the beginning of the kalpa, things did not have names. Sages provisionally established names for the sake of enjoyment, such as bottles, clothes, and so on. Someone asks: Why do sages only talk about the six roots? The answer is: In the gate of the Tao, there has never been a distinction between six and not six, but because sentient beings are confused and deluded, they endure these six roots. Sages want them to realize that the six roots are empty in nature, so they talk about the six roots. As the sutra says, in order to make people realize the first meaning, the mundane truth is spoken. Therefore, (speaking of the six roots) is to make people realize that the six roots have no self-nature. These six roots are a major event for which the Buddhas of the three worlds appear in the world, namely, to reveal, instruct, awaken, and enter the knowledge and vision of the Buddhas. The knowledge and vision of the Buddhas are the four wisdoms (the Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom, the Equality Wisdom, the Wonderful Observing Wisdom, and the Accomplishing Wisdom). Observing these six emotions, they are originally quiescent and extinct, which is called the Tathagata Wisdom. Although (the six roots) are originally quiescent and extinct, in the eyes of deluded sentient beings, (the six roots) still exist, and these six roots are the Buddha Wisdom. Realizing that the six roots have no self-nature, understanding that there is no attachment to the six roots, and manifesting freely and naturally, this is called the Natural Wisdom. These three wisdoms are not learned from a teacher, and are called the Wisdom without a Teacher. These four wisdoms are the knowledge and vision of the Buddha. The Buddhas of the three worlds appeared in the world in order to reveal, instruct, awaken, and enter this knowledge and vision. These four wisdoms can be understood everywhere, but they are mainly aimed at the minds of sentient beings. Therefore, they are explained in the chapter on emotions. This chapter is divided into two parts: first, refuting eye consciousness, and second, analogizing the other five consciousnesses. The first is to refute eye consciousness, which is further divided into two parts: first, refuting emotions to generate wisdom; and second, formally refuting emotions. The former refutes the result (of eye consciousness), and the latter refutes the cause (of eye consciousness). Once the cause and effect are refuted, the matter of emotions is over. The heretics say: There must be 'I' and 'what belongs to me' because they are present. Refuting this chapter, it begins by using the Dharma to prove the existence of man, and now this chapter begins by using the Dharma to prove the existence of Dharma. The so-called 'there must be what belongs to me' means that there is a bottle. The so-called 'Dharma exists in the present' is to cite the perceptions produced by the five emotions to prove that there are Dharmas such as bottles that 'belong to me'. The so-called 'present' means that the five consciousnesses can know the present things. Moreover, present things are credible. Who doesn't know blue and yellow? The so-called 'knowing' is that the six roots are all composed of four elements. In the combination of the four elements, there will be perception. The eye and the dust combine to know blue and yellow, and even the mind and the Dharma combine to know the Dharma. Now, only the perception of the five consciousnesses is taken, and the perception of the mind is not discussed, for two reasons: first, the heretics do not recognize consciousness, as mentioned above; second, consciousness can penetrate the three worlds and is not a manifest Dharma, so it is not mentioned. The five emotions respond to the five dusts and produce five perceptions, which are manifest Dharmas, so only the five consciousnesses are mentioned. Someone asks: Observing this passage, since it says 'arise',

知。即似偏破衛世師義。答正破衛世以接上破異品。故世師立四合生知通前無見有有見無難。而僧佉明緣合故有覺知用。約義用邊亦得論生但體不生耳。問此中何故但明三合。答外人舉法證法不復存神。若重存神則便墮負故但立於法。法義若成人義自立。是故文云定有我所。內曰見色已知生何用。內破知生有三門。謂前後一時也。今是前見後知破。本為未見青黃之色可須青黃之知。今眼見青黃已分明則知生無用。此正破數義。眼根既能見色。何用識耶。若必須識方了青黃。何名眼見。若眼識和合方能見者。則違義宗立眼能見。若前知生下第二破前知后見。然前知后見。知則有用。但以見無故知不得生。二者復有違宗之過。汝云四合生知。今四未合而知遂生。故違前宗。前得宗知墮無用。今知得用墮違宗。外曰若一時生者。救云。見色時即知生。知生時即見色。故無上二過。問何故無修妒路耶。答有二義。一者外人前立現前一知。提婆頻構三難。謂前後一時。但天親欲發一時之破故義生外立。故無修妒路也。亦可易解故不釋。所以無也。內曰下偈本為四。一牒二非三難四釋。若一時生牒也。是事不然下非也。生無生共不一時生第三難也。問此就何難。答正就無生門難以外人立一時生故。今但破其生則一時自壞。又生通前

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本知，這就像是片面地破斥衛世師的義理。答：這是爲了正確地破斥衛世師，以接續前面破斥異品的論述。所以衛世師立論四種要素聚合產生知覺，貫通了前面所說的『無見』和『有見』，沒有困難。而僧佉派闡明因緣和合，所以有覺知的作用。從義理作用的方面來說，也可以論述產生，但本體是不生的。問：這裡為什麼只闡明三合？答：外道之人舉出法來證明法，不再保留神我。如果重新保留神我，那麼就陷入了失敗的境地，所以隻立足於法。法的義理如果成立，人的義理自然成立。因此經文中說『必定有我所』。內：如果說見到顏色就已經產生了知覺，那又有什麼用呢？內部破斥知覺的產生有三種方式，即前、后、一時。現在是先見後知的破斥。本來是爲了沒有見到青黃之色，才需要青黃之知。現在眼睛見到青黃已經很分明，那麼知覺的產生就沒有用了。這正是破斥數論派的義理。眼根既然能夠見到顏色，還要意識做什麼呢？如果必須要有意識才能瞭解青黃，那還叫什麼眼見？如果眼識和合才能見到，那就違背了義宗所立的眼能見的說法。如果先知后見，那麼知覺是有用的，但是因為沒有見到，所以知覺無法產生。這兩種情況都存在違背宗義的過失。你說四種要素聚合產生知覺，現在四種要素還沒有聚合，知覺就產生了，所以違背了之前的宗義。之前是宗義的知覺沒有用處，現在是知覺有用處卻違背了宗義。外：如果是一時產生呢？辯解說：見到顏色的時候知覺就產生，知覺產生的時候就見到顏色，所以沒有上面兩種過失。問：為什麼沒有修妒路（梵文：Sūtra，意為『經』）呢？答：有兩種含義。一是外道之人先立足於現前一知，提婆（梵文：Deva，意為『天』或『神』）多次構建三種困難，即前、后、一時。但是天親（梵文：Vasubandhu，佛教論師）想要闡發一時的破斥，所以義理產生，外道立論，所以沒有修妒路。也可以很容易理解，所以不解釋，因此沒有。內：下面的偈頌本來有四個部分：一是牒，二是非，三是難，四是釋。『如果是一時產生』是牒。『這件事是不對的』是非。『生、無生、共同、不一時生』是第三個困難。問：這是針對哪種困難？答：正是針對無生門來提出困難，因為外道之人立足於一時產生，現在只是破斥它的產生，那麼一時的說法自然就壞了。而且產生貫通了前面。

【English Translation】 English version Knowing, this is like partially refuting the meaning of the Vaisheshika (衛世師) school. Answer: This is to correctly refute the Vaisheshika in order to continue the previous refutation of different categories. Therefore, the Vaisheshika establishes that the combination of four elements produces cognition, connecting the previously mentioned 'non-seeing' and 'seeing,' without difficulty. The Samkhya (僧佉) school clarifies that due to the combination of causes and conditions, there is the function of awareness. From the perspective of meaning and function, one can also discuss production, but the essence is not produced. Question: Why does this only clarify the combination of three elements? Answer: Outsiders cite the Dharma (法) to prove the Dharma, no longer retaining the self (神我). If the self is retained again, then they fall into a state of failure, so they only stand on the Dharma. If the meaning of the Dharma is established, the meaning of the person is naturally established. Therefore, the text says 'there must be what is mine.' Internal: If seeing color already produces cognition, then what is the use? The internal refutation of the production of cognition has three ways, namely, before, after, and simultaneously. Now it is the refutation of seeing first and knowing later. Originally, it was because one had not seen the colors of blue and yellow that one needed the knowledge of blue and yellow. Now that the eyes see blue and yellow clearly, then the production of cognition is useless. This is precisely refuting the meaning of the Samkhya school. Since the eye-sense is able to see color, what is the use of consciousness? If consciousness is necessary to understand blue and yellow, then what is called eye-seeing? If the eye-consciousness combines to see, then it violates the statement established by the meaning-school that the eye can see. If knowing comes before seeing, then cognition is useful, but because there is no seeing, cognition cannot arise. Both of these situations have the fault of violating the tenets of the school. You say that the combination of four elements produces cognition, but now that the four elements have not yet combined, cognition arises, so it violates the previous tenets. Before, the cognition of the tenets was useless, now the cognition is useful but violates the tenets. External: What if it arises simultaneously? The defense says: When seeing color, cognition arises, and when cognition arises, color is seen, so there are no two faults above. Question: Why is there no Sutra (修妒路)? Answer: There are two meanings. First, outsiders first establish the present one-cognition, and Deva (提婆) repeatedly constructs three difficulties, namely, before, after, and simultaneously. However, Vasubandhu (天親) wanted to elucidate the refutation of simultaneity, so the meaning arose, and the outsiders established the theory, so there is no Sutra. It can also be easily understood, so it is not explained, therefore there is none. Internal: The following verse originally has four parts: first, a citation; second, a negation; third, a difficulty; and fourth, an explanation. 'If it arises simultaneously' is a citation. 'This matter is not right' is a negation. 'Arising, non-arising, together, not simultaneously arising' is the third difficulty. Question: Which difficulty is this aimed at? Answer: It is precisely aimed at the difficulty of non-arising, because outsiders stand on simultaneous arising, and now only refuting its arising, then the statement of simultaneity will naturally be broken. Moreover, arising connects to the front.

后一時。今破于生則備破三義。又若但破見知一時則不得兼破余法。今若破生得兼顯萬法無生。有故無故前破故第四釋破。有故釋上生。無故釋無生。前破故釋上共。但前破有二。一者有無望共則為在前。故破有無名為破共。二者依天親以初二偈本名之為共。初偈破前見後知。此是有見無知。次偈破前知后見。是有知無見。前二既破有無則名破共。故云前破。又偈本中明云有故無故。此二即是二修妒路。還指此二故云二修妒路也。注中為二。前釋偈本次義破一時。所以明此二者。外立一時生。偈本破其生。天親義破一時有。則二義盡矣。初又三。一牒。於三中下次總非。何故下三正破。複次若一時者第二義破一時。見則是因。知名為果。若知見一時便為並失相待也。複次眼為到色見耶。自上已來破知生義。今第二次破其見亦開三門。一到不到門破。二破眼性自見。三重破到不到見。內法大小乘義乃不同。並云眼是遙矚不到能見。僧佉亦云眼可懸矚。所以眼見惡事即須避之。逢見好事須就之。耳聞聲亦爾。此與佛法全同。鼻舌身三根為成身故到根方知。與內義亦同。提婆今總破眾家故開二關責也。初破到色見易解。複次下天親欲難上破到見義生破不到見。應有四難。一者近遠俱不到應俱不見。二近遠俱不到則應俱見。三

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本后一時期。現在如果從『生』的角度來破除，就能完整地破除『生』所包含的三重含義。另外，如果僅僅破除『見』和『知』的一時性，就不能同時破除其他的法。現在如果破除了『生』，就能同時彰顯萬法皆無生的道理。有故無故，前破故，這是第四種解釋『破』的方式。『有故』解釋了『生』，『無故』解釋了『無生』。『前破故』解釋了『共』。但『前破』有兩種情況：一是『有』和『無』相對於『共』來說是在前面，所以破除『有』和『無』就叫做破除『共』。二是依據Vasubandhu（天親）的觀點，將最初的兩頌偈本身稱為『共』。第一頌偈破除的是先見後知，這是有見無知。第二頌偈破除的是先知后見，這是有知無見。既然前面兩種情況都被破除了，就可以稱為破除了『共』。所以說『前破』。另外，偈頌的原文中明確地說『有故無故』，這兩種情況就是指兩個Sutra（修妒路，經）。仍然是指這兩個Sutra，所以說『二修妒路』。註釋中分為兩種情況。前面解釋偈頌的原文，破除一時性。之所以要說明這兩種情況，是因為外道立論說『生』是一時性的，而偈頌的原文破除了這種『生』。Vasubandhu（天親）的論義破除了『有』的一時性，這樣兩種含義就都包含了。最初又分為三部分：一是照錄原文。在『於三中』之後，總的否定。『何故』之後，是三種正式的破除。其次，如果是一時性的，這是第二種論義，破除一時性。『見』是因，『知』是果。如果『知』和『見』是一時性的，那就變成了同時失去相互依存的關係。其次，眼睛是到達了顏色才能看見嗎？從上面開始，破除了『知』和『生』的含義。現在第二次破除『見』，也分為三個方面：一是通過到達與否來破除。二是破除眼睛的自見性。三是著重破除到達與否的『見』。內道（佛教）的大小乘的觀點不同，都認為眼睛是遙望而不到達就能看見。Samkhya（僧佉）學派也認為眼睛可以懸空觀看。所以眼睛看到壞事就要避開，看到好事就要靠近。耳朵聽到聲音也是這樣。這與佛法完全相同。鼻子、舌頭、身體這三種根是爲了成就身體，所以到達根才能感知，這與內道的觀點也相同。Aryadeva（提婆）現在總的破除各家的觀點，所以開啟兩個關卡來責問。首先破除到達顏色才能看見的觀點，這很容易理解。其次，Vasubandhu（天親）想要反駁上面破除到達才能看見的觀點，從而引申出破除不到達也能看見的觀點，應該有四種責難：一是近處和遠處都不能到達，應該都看不見。二是近處和遠處都不能到達，那就應該都能看見。三

【English Translation】 English version The later time. Now, if we break through from the perspective of 'birth', we can completely break through the three meanings contained in 'birth'. Furthermore, if we only break through the simultaneity of 'seeing' and 'knowing', we cannot simultaneously break through other dharmas. Now, if we break through 'birth', we can simultaneously reveal the principle that all dharmas are without birth. 'Because of existence, because of non-existence, breaking through the former, therefore', this is the fourth way to explain 'breaking through'. 'Because of existence' explains 'birth', 'because of non-existence' explains 'non-birth'. 'Breaking through the former, therefore' explains 'common'. However, there are two situations for 'breaking through the former': first, 'existence' and 'non-existence' are in front of 'common', so breaking through 'existence' and 'non-existence' is called breaking through 'common'. Second, according to Vasubandhu's (天親) view, the first two verses themselves are called 'common'. The first verse breaks through seeing before knowing, which is seeing without knowing. The second verse breaks through knowing before seeing, which is knowing without seeing. Since the previous two situations have been broken through, it can be called breaking through 'common'. Therefore, it is said 'breaking through the former'. In addition, the original text of the verses clearly says 'because of existence, because of non-existence', these two situations refer to the two Sutras (修妒路). It still refers to these two Sutras, so it is said 'two Sutras'. The commentary is divided into two situations. The former explains the original text of the verses, breaking through simultaneity. The reason for explaining these two situations is that the heretics argue that 'birth' is simultaneous, while the original text of the verses breaks through this 'birth'. Vasubandhu's (天親) argument breaks through the simultaneity of 'existence', so both meanings are included. The beginning is further divided into three parts: first, transcribing the original text. After 'in the three', the general negation. After 'why', there are three formal breakings through. Secondly, if it is simultaneous, this is the second argument, breaking through simultaneity. 'Seeing' is the cause, 'knowing' is the effect. If 'knowing' and 'seeing' are simultaneous, then they become losing the relationship of interdependence at the same time. Secondly, does the eye see only when it reaches the color? From above, the meaning of 'knowing' and 'birth' has been broken through. Now, the second time to break through 'seeing' is also divided into three aspects: first, breaking through by reaching or not reaching. Second, breaking through the self-seeing nature of the eye. Third, focusing on breaking through 'seeing' whether it reaches or not. The views of the inner path (Buddhism), both Mahayana and Hinayana, are different, and they all believe that the eye can see remotely without reaching. The Samkhya (僧佉) school also believes that the eye can watch in the air. Therefore, if the eye sees bad things, it should avoid them, and if it sees good things, it should approach them. The same is true for the ear hearing sounds. This is exactly the same as Buddhism. The three roots of nose, tongue, and body are for the sake of accomplishing the body, so they can only perceive when they reach the root, which is also the same as the view of the inner path. Aryadeva (提婆) is now generally breaking through the views of various schools, so he opens two barriers to question. First, breaking through the view that one can only see when reaching the color is easy to understand. Secondly, Vasubandhu (天親) wants to refute the above view of breaking through seeing only when reaching, so as to extend the view of breaking through seeing even without reaching, there should be four kinds of accusations: first, if neither near nor far can reach, they should not be able to see. Second, if neither near nor far can reach, then they should be able to see. Third

若見近不見遠應到近不到遠。四若見近不見遠應見遠不見近。複次下開二門重責到色見義。初云。若見色已方去墮無用過。若不見而去得有見用而違意所取。複次無眼處亦不取下重開二門破到不到。初明若眼去到色得取色義而面上失眼。不去下明面不失眼而失取義。複次下重破眼不到色亦有四難。一等是不到則障內外俱見。二俱不見。三見障內不見外亦應見外不見內。四有見不見有到不到。以內外兩家皆云不到。宜委曲破之。涅槃經云。若到見者今眼見火火應燒眼。眼見水水應濕眼。智度論二十八卷解。知眾生心趣向。外人問云。知眾生心趣向。為去不去。若去則同死人。不去則不與境合。又若不去經那云因眼緣色生於眼識論主答云不去不住而能知。此猶難解。若言心法非去不去。亦應非知不知。若云心是慮智故知者。今問慮智為云不去。終不免責。外曰眼相見故。自上已來破到不到見。今第二破眼自見。上以到不到二門責之。辭理俱屈。外無以救。但云眼是見相。不有眼而已。有即體效能見。何論到與不到。內曰若眼見應自見眼。熱是火體相而自他俱熱。見是眼體相應自他俱見。開眼則睹外青黃。閤眼應見內黑白。又問眼為是見為非見耶。眼若是見既自是眼應當自見。若自不見自應非眼。又見若是眼。若常有眼則應

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本如果認為近處可見而遠處不可見，那就應該到達近處而無法到達遠處。如果認為近處可見而遠處不可見，那就應該看到遠處而看不到近處。進一步，下面開啟兩扇門，著重責難『到色見』的觀點。首先說，如果眼睛到達顏色之後才去觀看，就會陷入無用的過失。如果眼睛沒有到達顏色就能觀看，雖然能夠實現觀看的作用，但卻違背了意根所取境的原則。進一步，在沒有眼睛的地方也不能取境，下面再次開啟兩扇門，破斥『到』與『不到』的觀點。首先說明，如果眼睛到達顏色就能取色，那麼面部就會失去眼睛。如果眼睛沒有到達顏色，那麼面部雖然沒有失去眼睛，卻失去了取色的作用。進一步，下面再次破斥眼睛不到達顏色也有四個難點：一是同樣是不到達，那麼障礙物內外都應該能看見；二是內外都看不見；三是能看見障礙物內部卻看不見外部，也應該能看見外部卻看不見內部；四是存在能看見和不能看見，有到達和沒有到達的情況。因為內外兩家都認為眼睛沒有到達顏色，所以應該詳細地破斥這種觀點。《涅槃經》（Nirvana Sutra）中說，如果到達才能看見，那麼眼睛看見火，火就應該燒傷眼睛；眼睛看見水，水就應該浸濕眼睛。《智度論》（Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra）第二十八卷解釋說，（菩薩）知道眾生的心之趣向。外道（指不信佛法的其他學派）問道：『知道眾生的心之趣向，是去還是不去？如果去，就和死人一樣；如果不去，就不能與境界結合。』又如果心不去，經文中為什麼說『因眼緣色生於眼識』？論主回答說：『心不去也不住，卻能知道。』這仍然難以理解。如果說心法不是去也不是不去，那麼也應該不是知也不是不知。如果說心是慮智所以能知，現在問慮智是去還是不去，最終也無法避免被責難。外道說：『眼睛的相就是能見。』從上面開始，已經破斥了『到』與『不到』的見解，現在第二點破斥眼睛能自己看見自己。上面用『到』與『不到』兩扇門來責難，對方的言辭和道理都顯得理屈詞窮，外道無力辯解，只能說眼睛是能見的相，不需要有眼睛這個實體。有了眼睛這個實體就能見，何必討論到達與不到達呢？內道反駁說：『如果眼睛能見，就應該能自己看見自己。熱是火的體相，所以能使自己和他人感到熱；見是眼睛的體相，所以應該能使自己和他人都能看見。睜開眼睛就能看到外面的青色和黃色，閉上眼睛就應該能看到裡面的黑色和白色。』又問：『眼睛是能見還是不能見呢？如果眼睛是能見，既然自己就是眼睛，就應該能自己看見自己；如果自己不能看見自己，就應該不是眼睛。』又如果見就是眼睛，如果眼睛常在，就應該...

【English Translation】 English version If one perceives that what is near can be seen but what is far cannot, then one should reach the near but be unable to reach the far. If one perceives that what is near can be seen but what is far cannot, then one should see the far but not see the near. Furthermore, the following opens two doors to heavily criticize the view of 'reaching the color to see'. Firstly, it says, if the eyes go to see only after reaching the color, then one falls into the useless fault. If one can see without going, one can have the use of seeing but violate the principle of what the mind takes. Furthermore, one cannot take the object in a place without eyes. The following reopens two doors to refute 'reaching' and 'not reaching'. Firstly, it clarifies that if the eyes reach the color, one can take the meaning of the color, but the eyes are lost on the face. If the eyes do not go, the face does not lose the eyes, but loses the meaning of taking. Furthermore, the following re-refutes that there are also four difficulties if the eyes do not reach the color: First, if it is the same as not reaching, then both inside and outside the obstacle should be seen. Second, both should not be seen. Third, one should see inside the obstacle but not outside, and one should also see outside but not inside. Fourth, there is seeing and not seeing, reaching and not reaching. Because both the internal and external schools say that the eyes do not reach, one should thoroughly refute this view. The Nirvana Sutra says, 'If seeing requires reaching, then when the eyes see fire, the fire should burn the eyes; when the eyes see water, the water should wet the eyes.' The 28th volume of the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra explains, '(Bodhisattvas) know the inclinations of sentient beings' minds.' An outsider (referring to other schools that do not believe in Buddhism) asks: 'Knowing the inclinations of sentient beings' minds, is it going or not going? If it is going, it is the same as a dead person; if it is not going, it cannot combine with the object.' Also, if the mind does not go, why does the sutra say 'eye-consciousness arises from the eye and color'? The master replies: 'The mind does not go and does not stay, but it can know.' This is still difficult to understand. If it is said that the mind-dharma is neither going nor not going, then it should also be neither knowing nor not knowing. If it is said that the mind is thoughtful wisdom, so it can know, now ask whether thoughtful wisdom is going or not going, and ultimately one cannot avoid being criticized. The outsider says: 'The appearance of the eye is seeing.' From above, the views of 'reaching' and 'not reaching' have been refuted. Now, the second point refutes that the eye can see itself. Above, the two doors of 'reaching' and 'not reaching' were used to criticize, and the other party's words and reasoning were exhausted. The outsider could not argue and could only say that the eye is the appearance of seeing and does not need to have the entity of the eye. With the entity of the eye, one can see, so why discuss reaching or not reaching? The internal school refutes: 'If the eye can see, it should be able to see itself. Heat is the nature of fire, so it can make oneself and others feel hot; seeing is the nature of the eye, so it should be able to make oneself and others see. Opening the eyes can see the blue and yellow outside, and closing the eyes should be able to see the black and white inside.' Also ask: 'Is the eye seeing or not seeing? If the eye is seeing, since it is itself the eye, it should be able to see itself; if it cannot see itself, it should not be the eye.' Also, if seeing is the eye, if the eye is always present, it should...

常見。若有時見不見則有時眼不眼。若見異眼則見自見應非眼見。又若見異眼熱應異火。外曰如指。論主舉火為難。外用指為通。當時未必發言。亦可直舉于指。內曰觸指業故。眼以見為相。指不以觸為相。故非喻也。又若觸即是指。不觸之時應當無指。若常有于指亦常有于觸。又觸即是指。既自是指則應自觸。若不自觸應不自指。又若見即是眼自既不見。自應非眼。自若是眼自應能見。又自不見而是眼。則見他應非眼。又三節是指相。何異見是眼相。今無見遂有眼。無三節應有指。若取指動搖為指相。亦應取眼開閉為眼相。外曰光意去故見色。第三重破到不到。所以重破到不到者。外人聞內初作到不到破。當時辭理俱屈。無以取通。但云眼體效能見。論主乘言仍責見相不成。今外智思更生重通前到不到義云。我義具有到不到。眼光與意去到於色。而眼體不到於色。所以須意去者。一者意欲見前色故往就之。二者眼光無知須意導御。是故意與眼光共去。成論師云。眼光不去而意非去不去。內曰若意去到色此則無覺。縱去奪覺也。若意遂去。身則無意由如死人。以此譏于外道。外看內面是死。外道何能言論。又亦應云。眼光若去眼體無光。是盲外道。注為二。前釋偈本。然意實不去不有兩義釋意不去。一者近遠一時。知

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：外道：常見。如果有時能看見，有時不能看見，那麼有時眼睛起作用，有時眼睛不起作用。如果看見的是不同的眼睛，那麼看見的『自見』（自己的見性）應該不是眼睛看見的。又如果看見不同的眼睛會發熱，那麼應該有不同的火。外道說：『就像手指一樣。』論主用火來反駁，外道用手指來解釋。當時可能沒有發言，也可以直接舉起手指。內道說：『因為接觸手指是業力所致。』眼睛以看見為特性，手指不以接觸為特性，所以這不是一個恰當的比喻。又如果接觸就是手指，那麼沒有接觸的時候應該沒有手指。如果手指一直存在，那麼接觸也應該一直存在。又如果接觸就是手指，既然自己就是手指，那麼應該自己接觸自己。如果不自己接觸自己，應該不自己就是手指。又如果看見就是眼睛，自己既然看不見自己，那麼應該不是眼睛。自己如果是眼睛，自己應該能看見。又自己看不見而是眼睛，那麼看見其他事物應該不是眼睛。又三節是指的特性，這和看見是眼睛的特性有什麼不同？現在沒有看見，所以有眼睛；沒有三節，應該有手指。如果認為手指的動搖是手指的特性，也應該認為眼睛的睜開和閉合是眼睛的特性。外道說：『是光和意念一起去，所以才能看見顏色。』這是第三重破斥『到』和『不到』。之所以要重複破斥『到』和『不到』，是因為外道聽到內道最初提出的『到』和『不到』的破斥時，當時在道理和言辭上都顯得理屈詞窮，無法解釋。只能說眼睛的本體具有能看見的效能。論主趁著外道的言論，繼續責難『見相』不能成立。現在外道的智慧再次產生，重新解釋之前的『到』和『不到』的含義，說：『我的意思是兼具『到』和『不到』。眼光和意念去到顏色那裡，而眼睛的本體沒有去到顏色那裡。之所以需要意念去，一是意念想要看見前面的顏色，所以前往那裡；二是眼光沒有知覺，需要意念引導和駕馭。所以意念和眼光一起去。』成論師說：『眼光不去，而意念並非去或不去。』內道說：『如果意念去到顏色那裡，那麼就沒有感覺了。即使去了，也會奪走感覺。如果意念離開了，身體就沒有意念了，就像死人一樣。』這是用來譏諷外道的。外道看內道就像看死人一樣，外道怎麼能說話呢？』又也可以說：『如果眼光去了，眼睛的本體就沒有光了，就是盲人外道。』註釋分為兩部分。前面解釋偈頌的原本。然而意念實際上沒有去，有『不去』和『不有』兩種含義來解釋意念不去。一是近和遠同時知道。

【English Translation】 English version: Outsider: It is often seen. If sometimes there is seeing and sometimes there is no seeing, then sometimes the eye functions and sometimes it does not. If what is seen is a different eye, then the 'self-seeing' (one's own nature of seeing) that is seen should not be seen by the eye. Furthermore, if seeing a different eye causes heat, then there should be a different fire. The outsider says: 'It's like a finger.' The debater uses fire to refute, and the outsider uses the finger to explain. At that time, there might not have been a statement, or one could directly raise a finger. The insider says: 'Because touching the finger is due to karma.' The eye has seeing as its characteristic, while the finger does not have touching as its characteristic, so this is not an appropriate analogy. Furthermore, if touching is the finger, then when there is no touching, there should be no finger. If the finger always exists, then touching should also always exist. Furthermore, if touching is the finger, since it is itself the finger, then it should touch itself. If it does not touch itself, it should not be itself the finger. Furthermore, if seeing is the eye, since it does not see itself, then it should not be the eye. If it is itself the eye, it should be able to see. Furthermore, if it does not see itself but is the eye, then seeing other things should not be the eye. Furthermore, the three segments are the characteristic of the finger, how is this different from seeing being the characteristic of the eye? Now, without seeing, there is the eye; without three segments, there should be a finger. If one considers the movement of the finger as the characteristic of the finger, one should also consider the opening and closing of the eye as the characteristic of the eye. Outsider says: 'It is light and intention that go together, so one can see colors.' This is the third refutation of 'reaching' and 'not reaching'. The reason for repeatedly refuting 'reaching' and 'not reaching' is that when the outsider heard the initial refutation of 'reaching' and 'not reaching' from the insider, they were at that time rendered speechless and without reason, unable to explain. They could only say that the essence of the eye has the ability to see. The debater, taking advantage of the outsider's statement, continued to criticize that the 'appearance of seeing' cannot be established. Now, the outsider's wisdom arises again, reinterpreting the meaning of the previous 'reaching' and 'not reaching', saying: 'My meaning encompasses both 'reaching' and 'not reaching'. The light of the eye and intention go to the color, while the essence of the eye does not go to the color. The reason why intention needs to go is that, firstly, intention wants to see the color in front, so it goes there; secondly, the light of the eye has no awareness and needs intention to guide and control it. Therefore, intention and the light of the eye go together.' The commentator says: 'The light of the eye does not go, while intention neither goes nor does not go.' The insider says: 'If intention goes to the color, then there is no sensation. Even if it goes, it will take away sensation. If intention leaves, the body has no intention, like a dead person.' This is used to ridicule the outsider. The outsider looks at the insider as if looking at a dead person, how can the outsider speak?' It can also be said: 'If the light of the eye goes, the essence of the eye has no light, it is a blind outsider.' The commentary is divided into two parts. The previous part explains the original meaning of the verse. However, intention does not actually go, there are two meanings of 'not going' and 'not existing' to explain intention not going. One is knowing near and far simultaneously.

非是去法。二者過去已謝意若遂去意亦應謝未來未起。意緣未來亦應未起。而實不爾故知不去。外曰如意在身。通上無覺之難也。意在身非是無覺。意力能遠知諸塵。則二義成也。內曰若爾不合。意本去得合。既其不去是則不合。乃免無覺之過。復墮不合之咎。外曰意光色合故見。諸立之中此救最巧。眼意在身離無覺無眼之咎意力能運眼光到於前色則與色合。故免無合之過。內曰若合故見生無見者。縱合奪見也。此者乃者於人乃者于主。明五種和合。一眼二光三意四意力五色。五法之中見定屬誰。誰為見者。五合方見。則不應言見定屬眼。外曰受合故者。捉破為立也。內以和合用破于見。外即執合以之為立。但令有合則有于見。內曰明三法體異終不得合。又三法體異各無見理。雖復共合終不能見。如三盲共聚終無見性耳。上明不合不得見。今明合不得見。故畢竟無見。如呵迦葉見色與盲等。呵善吉不見佛乃是識佛耳。大品等明諸法無所見無所知。並是此品意也。耳鼻下第二例破餘情。

破塵品第六

然根內塵外。因緣相待既其無內。何有外耶。但鈍根未悟。雖言無內猶謂有外。故次破之。又聞上明無內而不信故舉外證內。故復破之。又欲曆法觀行令悟。觸事皆是道故前破內今破于外。又欲示內外不二。所

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：不是『去』（qu，運動）的法。如果『過去』（guo qu，已發生）已經消失，那麼『意』（yi，意識）如果想要遂行『去』的意義，也應該消失，『未來』（wei lai，尚未發生）尚未產生。『意』緣于『未來』，也應該尚未產生。但事實並非如此，所以知道『意』並沒有『去』。外道說：『意』在身體里，可以通達上面沒有感覺的難題。『意』在身體里，並非沒有感覺。『意』的力量能夠遙遠地知曉各種塵境，那麼這兩個意義就成立了。內道說：如果這樣，就不合理了。『意』本來可以『去』才合理，既然它沒有『去』，這就是不合理。這樣雖然免除了沒有感覺的過失，又陷入了不合理的罪過。外道說：『意』的光和色（se，顏色）結合，所以能夠看見。在各種立論之中，這種辯解最為巧妙。眼和『意』在身體里，離開了沒有感覺和沒有眼的過失，『意』的力量能夠運轉眼光到達前面的色境，那麼就和色境結合了，所以免除了沒有結合的過失。內道說：如果結合就能看見，那麼就會產生沒有看見的人。縱然結合，也奪走了看見的能力。『此』（ci，這個）字是相對於人而言，『乃』（nai，是）字是相對於主而言，說明五種和合。一是眼，二是光，三是『意』，四是『意』力，五是色。五法之中，看見必定屬於誰？誰是看見者？五種和合才能看見，那麼就不應該說看見必定屬於眼。外道說：是『受』（shou，感受）和合的緣故。抓住破綻作為立論。內道用和合來破斥看見，外道就執著于和合來作為立論。只要有和合，就有看見。內道說：明確三種法的體性不同，終究不能和合。又三種法的體性不同，各自沒有看見的道理。即使共同和合，終究不能看見。如同三個盲人聚集在一起，終究沒有看見的本性。上面說明不和合就不能看見，現在說明和合也不能看見。所以畢竟沒有看見。如同呵責迦葉看見色境和盲人一樣。呵責善吉沒有看見佛，實際上是認識了佛。大品等經典說明諸法沒有所見，沒有所知，都是這個品的意思。耳鼻等下文是第二個例子，用來破斥其餘的情感。破塵品第六然而根在內，塵在外，因緣相互對待，既然沒有內，哪裡有外呢？只是遲鈍的根器沒有領悟，雖然說沒有內，仍然認為有外，所以接著破斥外。又聽說上面說明沒有內而不相信，所以舉出外來證明內，所以再次破斥外。又想要歷經諸法進行觀行，使人領悟，接觸事物都是道，所以前面破斥內，現在破斥外。又想要顯示內外不二，所以...

【English Translation】 English version: It is not the dharma of 'going' (qu, movement). If the 'past' (guo qu, already happened) has vanished, then 'consciousness' (yi, awareness) should also vanish if it intends to fulfill the meaning of 'going', and the 'future' (wei lai, not yet happened) has not yet arisen. 'Consciousness' is conditioned by the 'future', so it should also not have arisen. But the reality is not like this, so we know that 'consciousness' has not 'gone'. The heretics say: 'Consciousness' is in the body, and can understand the difficulty of not having sensation above. 'Consciousness' is in the body, it is not without sensation. The power of 'consciousness' can remotely know all kinds of sense objects, then these two meanings are established. The insiders say: If this is the case, it is not reasonable. It is reasonable that 'consciousness' can originally 'go', since it has not 'gone', this is unreasonable. Although this avoids the fault of not having sensation, it falls into the fault of being unreasonable. The heretics say: The light of 'consciousness' combines with form (se, color), so it can see. Among all the arguments, this defense is the most ingenious. The eye and 'consciousness' are in the body, avoiding the fault of not having sensation and not having eyes, the power of 'consciousness' can move the light of the eye to the form in front, then it combines with the form, so it avoids the fault of not combining. The insiders say: If combining can see, then there will be people who cannot see. Even if they combine, they also take away the ability to see. The word 'this' (ci, this) is relative to people, the word 'nai' (nai, is) is relative to the master, explaining the five kinds of harmony. One is the eye, two is the light, three is 'consciousness', four is the power of 'consciousness', and five is form. Among the five dharmas, to whom does seeing definitely belong? Who is the seer? The five kinds of harmony can see, then it should not be said that seeing definitely belongs to the eye. The heretics say: It is because of the harmony of 'feeling' (shou, sensation). Grasping flaws as arguments. The insiders use harmony to refute seeing, and the heretics cling to harmony as arguments. As long as there is harmony, there is seeing. The insiders say: It is clear that the nature of the three dharmas is different, and they can never be in harmony. Also, the nature of the three dharmas is different, and each has no reason to see. Even if they are in harmony, they cannot see. It is like three blind people gathering together, and they will never have the nature of seeing. The above explains that not being in harmony cannot see, and now it explains that being in harmony cannot see. So after all, there is no seeing. It is like scolding Kasyapa for seeing form like a blind person. Scolding Subhuti for not seeing the Buddha is actually recognizing the Buddha. The Great Perfection of Wisdom Sutra and other sutras explain that all dharmas have nothing to see and nothing to know, and this is the meaning of this chapter. The following text about the ears and nose is the second example, which is used to refute the rest of the emotions. Chapter 6: Refuting Dust However, the root is inside, and the dust is outside. Conditions depend on each other. Since there is no inside, where is the outside? It's just that the dull roots have not realized that although they say there is no inside, they still think there is an outside, so they continue to refute the outside. Also, I heard that the above explanation does not believe that there is no inside, so I cited the outside to prove the inside, so I refuted the outside again. Also, I want to experience all dharmas and practice contemplation to make people realize that touching things is the Tao, so I refuted the inside before, and now I refute the outside. Also, I want to show that inside and outside are not two, so...

以然者。外大充身則便成內。內根散壞則便歸外。故知內外性本來無二。今欲示無二之性故曆法明之。欲釋諸方等經明內外空義。如大品明云何內空謂眼空乃至意空。云何外空謂色空乃至法空。經但略釋於前利根聞即了悟。論廣數。於後鈍根因而獲曉。又六塵是生死之根。所以然者。由此六塵起凈不凈倒。由凈不凈倒故生三毒。三毒因緣故起三業。三業因緣故生三界。今撿六塵無從則惑業便滅。是故破塵。又不住六塵故萬行成。如金剛般若。不住六塵行施與十方空等。下又云以心不住六塵能成就眾生莊嚴佛土。又如維摩。何謂病本。謂有攀緣。攀緣於六塵。今撿無六塵則無所攀緣。則病本滅故一切人法及空病皆除。今釋如此諸方等經故破塵也。又諸外道計有鄰虛微塵為萬化之本。萬化若滅還歸本塵。今品從粗至細求一切塵悉皆無從。則破其計本。在本既傾萬化便壞。是故破塵。問今此論明無塵與攝大乘唯識何異。答彼總相明無。今別相明無。又彼論由識變異故成六塵。故有于識而無塵。今明非但無塵亦無有識。所以然者。若有于塵可得生識。撿塵不得。識何由生。又今非但撿塵識有不得。撿塵識無亦不得。所以然者。塵識本自不有無。從何生無塵之妄。亦無真實。五句自去不如他但住三無性理。故中論法品云一切實不

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果外在的『大』（四大：地、水、火、風）充滿身體，那麼身體就成為內在。內在的根源散壞，那麼就會歸於外在。因此可知，內外之性本來沒有差別。現在想要揭示這無二之性，所以歷數諸法來闡明它。想要解釋諸方等經所說的內外皆空的意義，例如《大品般若經》中說明什麼是內空，即眼空乃至意空；什麼是外空，即色空乃至法空。經文只是簡略地解釋，對於聰慧的人來說，聽了就能立即領悟。而本論則廣泛地列舉，使那些根器遲鈍的人也能因此而明白。而且，六塵（色、聲、香、味、觸、法）是生死輪迴的根本。為什麼這麼說呢？因為從這六塵會產生清凈與不清凈的顛倒。由於清凈與不清凈的顛倒，所以產生貪、嗔、癡三毒。由於三毒的因緣，所以產生身、口、意三業。由於三業的因緣，所以產生欲界、色界、無色界三界。現在檢查六塵，找不到它的來源，那麼迷惑和業障就會消滅。所以要破除六塵。而且，不住於六塵，那麼萬行就能成就。例如《金剛般若經》所說，不住於六塵而行佈施，與十方虛空相等。下面又說，以心不住於六塵，能夠成就眾生，莊嚴佛土。又如《維摩詰經》所說，什麼是疾病的根本？就是有所攀緣。攀緣於六塵。現在檢查沒有六塵，那麼就沒有可以攀緣的，那麼疾病的根本就消滅了，所以一切人法以及空病都消除了。現在解釋這些方等經，所以要破除六塵。而且，一些外道認為有鄰虛微塵是萬物變化的根本。萬物變化如果滅亡，還會迴歸到根本的微塵。現在本品從粗到細地探求一切塵，都找不到它的來源，那麼就破除了他們認為微塵是萬物根本的說法。根本既然傾覆，萬物變化也就壞滅。所以要破除微塵。問：現在這部論典所闡明的『無塵』，與《攝大乘論》的唯識思想有什麼不同？答：他們是從總相上說明『無』，我們是從別相上說明『無』。而且，《攝大乘論》認為由於識的變異，所以形成六塵，所以有識而無塵。現在我們闡明，非但無塵，也沒有識。為什麼這麼說呢？如果有塵，就可以產生識。檢查塵都找不到，識又從何而生呢？而且，現在我們非但檢查塵和識的『有』不可得，檢查塵和識的『無』也不可得。為什麼這麼說呢？塵和識本來就沒有『有』，又從何處產生『無塵』的虛妄呢？也沒有真實。五句自去，不如他但住三無性理。所以《中論·觀法品》說，一切實不實都是不存在的。

【English Translation】 English version: If the external 'Great Elements' (earth, water, fire, wind) fill the body, then the body becomes internal. If the internal roots scatter and decay, then they return to the external. Therefore, it is known that the nature of internal and external are originally not different. Now, wanting to reveal this non-dual nature, we enumerate the dharmas to clarify it. Wanting to explain the meaning of emptiness of both internal and external as explained in the Vaipulya Sutras, such as the Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra explaining what is internal emptiness, namely the emptiness of the eye, and so on, up to the emptiness of the mind; what is external emptiness, namely the emptiness of form, and so on, up to the emptiness of dharma. The sutra only briefly explains, and those with sharp faculties immediately understand upon hearing it. But this treatise extensively enumerates, so that those with dull faculties can thereby gain understanding. Moreover, the six dusts (form, sound, smell, taste, touch, dharma) are the root of birth and death. Why is this so? Because from these six dusts arise pure and impure inversions. Due to pure and impure inversions, the three poisons (greed, hatred, delusion) arise. Due to the causes and conditions of the three poisons, the three karmas (body, speech, mind) arise. Due to the causes and conditions of the three karmas, the three realms (desire realm, form realm, formless realm) arise. Now, examining the six dusts, their source cannot be found, then delusion and karmic obstacles will be extinguished. Therefore, the dusts must be destroyed. Moreover, by not dwelling in the six dusts, the myriad practices are accomplished. For example, as the Diamond Sutra says, not dwelling in the six dusts, one practices giving, which is equal to the emptiness of the ten directions. Further below it says, with a mind not dwelling in the six dusts, one can accomplish sentient beings and adorn the Buddha land. Also, as the Vimalakirti Sutra says, what is the root of illness? It is clinging. Clinging to the six dusts. Now, examining, there are no six dusts, then there is nothing to cling to, then the root of illness is extinguished, so all illnesses of person, dharma, and emptiness are eliminated. Now explaining these Vaipulya Sutras, therefore the dusts must be destroyed. Moreover, some heretics believe that there are paramanus (smallest indivisible particles) that are the basis of all transformations. If all transformations cease, they will return to the fundamental particles. Now, this chapter seeks from coarse to fine, all dusts cannot be found, then it refutes their view that particles are the basis of all things. Since the basis is overturned, all transformations are destroyed. Therefore, the dusts must be destroyed. Question: Now, how does this treatise's explanation of 'no dust' differ from the Mahayana-samgraha's (Compendium of the Mahayana) Yogacara (Consciousness-only) thought? Answer: They explain 'no' from the general aspect, we explain 'no' from the specific aspect. Moreover, the Mahayana-samgraha believes that due to the transformation of consciousness, the six dusts are formed, so there is consciousness but no dust. Now we explain that not only is there no dust, but there is also no consciousness. Why is this so? If there is dust, then consciousness can arise. Examining, dust cannot be found, then how can consciousness arise? Moreover, now we not only cannot find the 'existence' of dust and consciousness, but we also cannot find the 'non-existence' of dust and consciousness. Why is this so? Dust and consciousness originally did not have existence, so from where does the delusion of 'no dust' arise? There is also no reality. The five phrases go away by themselves, it is better to just abide in the principle of the three non-natures. Therefore, the Madhyamaka-karika (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way), chapter on examination of dharmas, says that all real and unreal do not exist.

實皆絕。即其證也。問此品破何等塵。答遍破內外大小諸塵。但內外釋塵不同。開十二入義。今略述之。品開為三。第一破塵法。第二破塵時。第三明得益。初又二。第一破外道計塵。第二破內學計塵。初亦是破所造塵果。次破能造大因。就初又二。第一前破色塵。第二次破四塵。破色塵又二。第一破外自立三種塵。第二破外引他證有三種塵。初破三塵即成三別。第一破瓶是現見。次破色是現見。三破微塵是現見。夫論可見不出此三。此三不成則可見便壞。又此三之中初一是外道所見之塵。以外道言瓶是可見。佛法大小乘人明瓶非可見。故初破瓶可見破于外道。破色及微塵則通破內外。故破此三塵則塵義盡矣。外曰應有情瓶等可取故者。情品舉別證通。此品舉別證別。故將塵救情。若無有情誰取瓶耶。若無情取塵應非情能取。非情既不能取。當知情能取塵既有所即能取不無。內曰非獨色是瓶是故瓶非現見者。然若理奪之。汝以所取證於能取。我亦以能取例于所取。能取既無。寧有所取。但論主慈悲縱言隨破。然能見之眼為六情之首。所見之塵為六塵之初。故上品破能見。此品破所見。破意云。汝義五塵成瓶。今但見色非是見瓶。汝何得言瓶是現見。若瓶是現見。瓶獨為色所成。不應五塵成瓶。若五塵成瓶瓶遂可見。則

五塵皆可見。若五塵皆可見。是則塵亂。在塵既亂五根亦亂。而塵實不亂故瓶非現見。又瓶為可見色成故可見者。為聲等不可見成應不可見。又瓶具有可見不可見二物成。則應具可見不可見也。然外道言。總瓶是可見亦總男女可見。乃至言總國土等可見。此非但是外道。今有所得大小乘人舉眼皆作是見。今破瓶一分可見。不得言瓶可見。亦男女一分可見不得男女可見。國土一分可見不得國土可見。此遍破內外大小一切顛倒心也。然好體論之。總之與別一分多分皆不可見。以畢竟無有顛倒塵故。如愚癡獸謂陽炎為水。有何總別一多分耶。論主慈悲恐鈍根不能信解。借別妄止其總妄。故言一分可見多分不可見耳。問何以得知借妄止妄。答若一分可見是實。不應破色及鄰虛塵可見也。而諸小乘人如數論之流外道計。總色可見是無耳色一分便實有。此是不解諸佛菩薩借妄止妄意也。外曰取分故一切取信故。救上瓶非現見也。取色一分名為取瓶。世人皆信非獨我也。取分故一切取。是自立宗。信故引他為證。內曰若取分不一切取。此明見色一分非一切見。如情一根能見餘一切根不名為見。今亦色一分可見餘四分不名可見。汝若言見色一分名一切可見。亦應眼是能見餘一切根皆名能見。又若見色一分則一切見。五塵並應可見。若五

塵並可見。眼既見色應見五塵則眼根中應具五根。又一分是色一切名瓶。瓶是有分色名為分。若見分即見有分。則分有分一。如破一破異中說。若分與有分異。今見分云何見有分耶。外曰有瓶可見受色現見故。自上已來破瓶是現見破外道人及世俗義竟。今第二破色是現見通破一切內外。今救意是捉破為立。上立義云。瓶是現見。論主二關云眼但見色實不見瓶。此是借色破瓶。外人之言。汝既受我色是現見。本以色成瓶。能成之色既可見。所成之瓶亦應可現見。二者從勝為秤。如五塵謂皆是色而色受色名。餘香等從別受秤。今亦例然。瓶雖有多微所成。色既勝。從色受名名為現見。三者並通。若不許瓶是現見。亦應不許色是現見。既許色現見。亦應許瓶現見。內曰若此分現見彼分不現見。破外色是現見也。色是障礙法如一柱色但見此分不見彼分。云何言色是現見。若見此分名現見者。不見彼分應名不現見。又在色之此不見於彼故彼名不現見。在色之彼不見於此故此分亦不現見。前是借色破瓶。今是借色破色。謂互破彼此。非是論主立色障障礙以破外也。此即破數論人義。論人云。識得瓶實想追作瓶解。今明眼不見色想何所解。數人云。長短等色為眼所見。亦作此破云。長有彼此。見此不見彼。云何見長。注為二。初釋偈

本云。彼分中分不現見者。略說就三分明之。見色此分。不見色內中分及以彼分。此明見一不見二不名現見。此分亦如是。上明見一不見二。今明三分都不可見。以二分障此分故提婆二分決之。一分現見一分不現見不得名現見。若天親就三分釋之。一分現見二分不現見不應名現見。若以十方分釋之。但一分現見九分不現見。如柱有十方分見一不見九也。複次下第二義生取意以破外人。外救云。色雖三分見一分故名一切見。是故今明瓶為五塵成。見一不見四不名一切見。今明瓶為三分成。見一不見二不名一切見。用於彼文以答於此。外曰微塵無分故不盡破。破色三番自上已來二番已竟。今第三破微塵是可見。救意云。瓶由五塵成。見一不見四故瓶非現見。色為三分成。見一不見二故色非現見。今微塵異斯二種。不為五塵成故異瓶。無有見一不見四過。微塵無十方分。無有見此不見彼過。故不盡墮上二種破中。以其體圓不見而已。見則都見。以有此塵。為色瓶本。本既可見。末亦可見。數人及莊嚴明。微塵無十方分。與此全同。內曰微塵非現見。提婆妙通內教精識外經。復有無礙之惠及無方之辨還用彼文以破此說。汝經自言塵非現見。何得違經言現見也。二者微塵既非現見。云何能成現見。以本不可見故瓶色之末亦不可見

。三者縱汝微塵是可見。色既有粗色細色亦有粗礙細礙。便見此不見彼。云何言都見。若言粗有礙細無礙。亦應粗故是色。細應非色。若粗細俱色且粗細俱礙。如其俱礙則有十方。見此不見彼。又若有無礙之色亦應有無色之礙。無色之法必不可礙。有色之法雲何無礙。又初破微塵非現見正破外道。外道經說塵不見。微塵若可見此破內義。內道計鄰虛塵為天眼見故。智度論反覆破之。若有極微色則有十方分。若有十方分則有見此不見彼。又有十方分不名為極微。若無十方分則不名為色也。外曰瓶應現見世人信故。自上已來破外人自立義宗。從粗至細一章竟也。今第二破外人舉他證有現見。今前立義。問品初已舉世人信與今何異。答上舉世信證瓶現見。今舉世信證瓶是有。若汝言三法都不可見者應無有瓶。世人相與信有于瓶。必定瓶應可見。內曰現見無非瓶無者。釋此不同俗人河東徴注百論十卷疏。昔梁末諸師亦從其受業用成實意釋此文云。瓶是假名為想心所得。今但見實不見假瓶。但無外人現見之瓶。非無假名之瓶。故云現見無非瓶無。此釋有二過。一與注違。二立義破他非提婆氣。故肇公云。言而無當。破而無執。云何執義而破他耶。有人言。現見無顛倒自性之瓶耳。非無因緣假名瓶。此釋亦有二過。一與注違。二用

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本三者縱然你的微塵是可見的，既然色有粗色和細色，那麼也應該有粗礙和細礙。如果能看見這個就不能看見那個，怎麼能說都看見了呢？如果說粗色有障礙，細色沒有障礙，那麼就應該因為粗色是色，細色就應該不是色。如果粗細都是色，並且粗細都有障礙，如果它們都有障礙，那麼就存在十方，看見這個就看不見那個。另外，如果存在沒有障礙的色，那麼也應該存在沒有色的障礙。沒有色的法必定不可能有障礙，有色的法怎麼可能沒有障礙呢？當初破斥微塵並非是針對現見，而是主要破斥外道。外道的經典說微塵是看不見的。如果微塵是可見的，這就破斥了內道的義理。內道認為鄰虛塵是天眼所能看見的。《智度論》反覆破斥這種觀點。如果極微之色有十方分，那麼就會有看見這個看不見那個的情況。如果存在十方分，就不能稱之為極微。如果沒有十方分，就不能稱之為色。外道說：『瓶子應該是現見的，因為世人都相信它。』從上面開始，都是破斥外人自己建立的義理宗派。從粗到細這一章結束。現在第二部分是破斥外人引用其他證據來證明存在現見。現在先確立義理。問：在《問品》的開頭已經引用了世人的相信，這和現在有什麼不同？答：上次引用世人的相信是爲了證明瓶子是現見的，這次引用世人的相信是爲了證明瓶子是存在的。如果你說三種法都不可見，那麼就不應該存在瓶子。世人相互相信存在瓶子，必定瓶子應該是可見的。內道說：『現見沒有，並非瓶子不存在。』解釋這種不同之處，俗人河東徵註釋百論十卷疏。以前梁末的各位法師也從他那裡接受學業，用成實宗的觀點解釋這段文字說：『瓶子是假名，是想像心所得到的。現在只是看見了實，沒有看見假瓶。只是沒有外人現見的瓶子，並非沒有假名的瓶子。』所以說『現見沒有，並非瓶子不存在』。這種解釋有兩個過失：一是與註釋相違背，二是確立自己的義理來破斥他人，不是提婆的氣概。所以肇公說：『言語沒有恰當之處，破斥沒有抓住要點。』怎麼能執著于自己的義理來破斥他人呢？有人說：『現見沒有顛倒自性的瓶子罷了，並非沒有因緣假名的瓶子。』這種解釋也有兩個過失：一是與註釋相違背，二是使用

【English Translation】 English version Even if your subtle dust particles were visible, since color has both coarse and fine forms, there should also be coarse and fine obstructions. If one can see this, one cannot see that, so how can it be said that everything is seen? If you say that coarse color has obstruction, but fine color does not, then it should be that because coarse color is color, fine color should not be color. If both coarse and fine are color, and both have obstruction, then if they both have obstruction, there exist the ten directions, seeing this but not seeing that. Furthermore, if there exists color without obstruction, then there should also exist obstruction without color. A dharma without color must be without obstruction, so how can a dharma with color be without obstruction? Initially, the refutation of subtle dust was not directed at direct perception, but mainly at refuting externalist (外道) views. Externalist scriptures say that subtle dust is invisible. If subtle dust were visible, this would refute the internalist (內道) doctrine. Internalists believe that the 'neighboring void dust' (鄰虛塵) is seen by the heavenly eye. The 智度論 (Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom) repeatedly refutes this view. If extremely subtle color has ten directional parts, then there will be cases of seeing this but not seeing that. If there are ten directional parts, it cannot be called extremely subtle. If there are no ten directional parts, it cannot be called color. The externalist says: 'The pot should be directly perceived because people believe in it.' From above, all is refuting the externalists' self-established doctrines. The chapter from coarse to fine ends here. Now, the second part is refuting the externalists' citation of other evidence to prove the existence of direct perception. Now, let's first establish the doctrine. Question: At the beginning of the Question Chapter (問品), the belief of people has already been cited, so how is this different from now? Answer: Last time, the belief of people was cited to prove that the pot is directly perceived; this time, the belief of people is cited to prove that the pot exists. If you say that the three dharmas are all invisible, then there should be no pot. People mutually believe in the existence of the pot, so the pot must be visible. The internalist says: 'Direct perception is absent, but it doesn't mean the pot is absent.' To explain this difference, the layman He Dong Zheng (河東徵) annotated the 百論十卷疏 (Śataśāstra, Treatise in One Hundred Verses, with commentary in ten scrolls). Previously, the masters at the end of the Liang dynasty also received learning from him, using the 成實宗 (Tattvasiddhi, Establishing Reality School) perspective to explain this passage, saying: 'The pot is a provisional name, obtained by the imagining mind. Now, only the real is seen, not the false pot. There is only no pot directly perceived by externalists, not no pot with a provisional name.' Therefore, it is said 'Direct perception is absent, but it doesn't mean the pot is absent.' This explanation has two faults: first, it contradicts the annotation; second, establishing one's own doctrine to refute others is not the spirit of Deva (提婆). Therefore, Zhao Gong (肇公) said: 'Words are without appropriateness, refutation does not grasp the essentials.' How can one cling to one's own doctrine to refute others? Someone says: 'Direct perception is only without a pot of inverted self-nature, not without a pot of causal provisional name.' This explanation also has two faults: first, it contradicts the annotation; second, it uses

義失所以。中論作者品云。是業從眾緣生假名為有。無有決定。非如汝所說。此明無自性有假名。以破外斷見。非今用時。外今正立瓶是有。若更說有轉增其患。有人言。無汝想謂之瓶故言現見無。非前有瓶法破之令無。如但除其病無法可破。如但破水想無水可破。此釋過亦同前違文害義。今所明者。前須識立乃見破。上外立有二義。一者世間皆信有瓶。必是現見。二者若無現見是則無瓶。今破此二義。汝言有瓶必現見者。暗中有瓶而無現見。何得言有瓶必現見耶。是故當知瓶非現見。二者眼未對瓶時此是無現見而瓶不無。何得無現見即無瓶耶。欲見此解當睹註文。注為四。初牒外義。是事不然第二總非。瓶雖不現見下第三正破。此明不現見時非是無瓶。正釋偈本現見無非瓶無。是故瓶非現見第四前破無現見則無瓶。今破有瓶必現見。又此文結成上破。以無現見時有瓶故知瓶非現見。外曰眼未合故無過。將此文望前諸解並非。問答今明。外人救上二過。明瓶體是現見法是故有瓶必現見。內義亦然。如雲二法攝一切法謂可見不可見法。色等屬可見法。又如三種色一可見有對二不可見有對三不可見無對。今色是可見有對法。故知色定是可見法。但眼未對瓶時人自不見耳。非是瓶體不現見。不得云有瓶無現見無現見有瓶。內

曰如現見生無有亦非實。破上瓶體是現見法眼合時受現見名也。破有二意。初責其現見相生無。二倒破。瓶有體亦無則體相俱失。汝眼未對瓶時未有現見相生。若對瓶時有現見相生。異未見者許瓶與眼合受現見名。而眼對瓶時無現見相生。與未見時不異。未見時既不名現見。今眼對時云何受現見名。故云現見生無。問論主何故作此破耶。答須長觀始終破意。外人前立有瓶必現見。論主破云。眼不對瓶時有瓶而無現見。當知瓶未必是現見。汝遂言眼合時受現見名。則眼合時應有現見相生異未見時。若無現見相生猶是本瓶。當知本瓶未必是現見。故作此破也。有亦非實者。汝以現見是瓶。今現見有故瓶有。現見無瓶即無。外曰五身一分破余有。自上已來破可見色塵義竟。今第二次破四塵。外救云。汝上來但破可見色塵不破餘四。既有餘四必應有色。若有於色必應可見。內曰若不一切觸云何色等合正破。五塵不得共合成瓶故無五塵。五塵若得共合可有五塵。五塵既不得共合云何有五塵耶。成論云。對身是別觸。餘四皆非別觸。乃是通觸。更相當觸也。今外道明。色可割截故是觸。餘四非觸也。汝觸非觸既異。不可合為一。云何共合成一瓶。外曰瓶合故者。此救意云。實如上難。色塵是觸餘四非觸。觸非觸異不可合而成一。今

但五塵合共成一瓶。故云瓶合故。如成論云。四微各異不可合為一。但合共成一瓶耳。五陰不可共合一陰。而五陰共合成一人。犢子亦爾。四大共合有眼法。五陰共合有人。亦同此立。內曰異除云何瓶觸合。此有二破。一者異二者除。異者。色塵是觸瓶非是觸。則觸非觸異。云何瓶與觸合。汝上既信五塵觸非觸異不得合為一者。今瓶望塵亦有觸非觸異。云何合成一瓶。破四微成柱五陰成人亦爾。所言除者。若除五有瓶。可五與瓶合。除五無瓶。五與誰合。偈本有標章與解釋。異除者標二章也。云何瓶觸合釋二章也。瓶釋除觸釋異也。外曰色應現見信經故。此文來者凡有三義。一者若就內義明之。上來破無五塵明無所造之色。今破四大明無能造。此就毗曇義以立色也。二者上破無五塵破成實等義。今破四大造色破毗曇義。三者上破外道今破內人。又經中雲。眾生內有四大毒蛇外有六賊。今舍遠之。上明無五塵即舍六賊。以外道計法塵亦屬色故破色即破六也。又經云色性自空。又云習色空與波若相應。又云舍無常色佛世利根聞皆悟道。今釋方等眾經。色畢竟空故明能造之因所造色果皆不可得也。然提婆妙通內典精解外經。故前引彼文以徴其說。故云微塵非現見。外道洞知外典亦具攬內經。故今用內經以徴提婆。若提婆遂信

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：但是五種塵埃合在一起形成一個瓶子。所以說瓶子是組合而成的。就像《成實論》所說，四種微塵各自不同，不能合成為一個整體。但它們合在一起形成一個瓶子。五陰不能合成為一個陰，但五陰合在一起形成一個人。犢子部也是這樣認為的。四大組合在一起產生了眼識。五陰組合在一起形成了人。這也是同樣的道理。對方說，如果去除五塵，瓶子怎麼能與觸覺結合呢？這裡有兩種駁斥。一是『異』，二是『除』。『異』是指，色塵是觸覺，瓶子不是觸覺。那麼觸覺和非觸覺是不同的。瓶子怎麼能與觸覺結合呢？你既然相信五塵的觸覺和非觸覺是不同的，不能合為一體，那麼瓶子相對於塵埃也有觸覺和非觸覺的不同。怎麼能合成一個瓶子呢？駁斥四微塵合成柱子，五陰合成人的說法也是同樣的道理。所說的『除』是指，如果去除五塵還有瓶子，那麼五塵可以與瓶子結合。如果去除五塵就沒有瓶子，那麼五塵與誰結合呢？偈頌本身有標題和解釋。『異』和『除』是兩個標題。『瓶觸如何結合』是解釋這兩個標題。瓶子解釋了『除』，觸覺解釋了『異』。對方說，色塵應該是可以親眼見到的，因為經典上是這樣說的。引用這段經文有三個目的。一是如果從內在的意義來解釋，上面駁斥了沒有五塵，說明沒有被造之色。現在駁斥四大，說明沒有能造之因。這是就毗曇宗的觀點來建立色法的。二是上面駁斥了沒有五塵，駁斥了成實宗等的觀點。現在駁斥四大造色，駁斥毗曇宗的觀點。三是上面駁斥了外道，現在駁斥內道的人。而且經典中說，眾生內在有四大毒蛇，外在有六個盜賊。現在捨棄遠處的。上面說明沒有五塵，就是捨棄六個盜賊。因為外道認為法塵也屬於色法，所以駁斥色法就是駁斥六個盜賊。而且經典說，色性本空。又說，修習色空與般若相應。又說，捨棄無常之色，佛陀在世時，利根的人聽了都能悟道。現在解釋方等眾經，色法畢竟是空，所以說明能造之因和所造之色果都是不可得的。然而提婆具有神通，精通內典，也精通外經。所以前面引用他的經文來質疑他的說法，所以說微塵不是可以親眼見到的。外道洞察外典，也具備瞭解內經的能力。所以現在用內經來質疑提婆。如果提婆相信這些。

【English Translation】 English version: However, the five dusts combine to form a single bottle. Hence, it is said that the bottle is a composite. As the Chengshi Lun (成實論, Satyasiddhi Shastra) states, the four subtle particles are distinct and cannot be combined into one. They merely combine to form a bottle. The five skandhas (五陰, aggregates) cannot be combined into a single skandha, but the five skandhas combine to form a person. The Vatsiputriyas (犢子部, Vātsīputrīya) also hold this view. The four great elements combine to produce the eye faculty. The five skandhas combine to form a person. The same principle applies here. The opponent says, 'If the five dusts are removed, how can the bottle be in contact?' There are two refutations to this. The first is 'difference' (異), and the second is 'removal' (除). 'Difference' means that color dust is touch, but the bottle is not touch. Therefore, touch and non-touch are different. How can the bottle be combined with touch? Since you believe that the touch and non-touch of the five dusts are different and cannot be combined into one, then the bottle also has touch and non-touch differences in relation to the dusts. How can it be combined into a single bottle? The refutation of the four subtle particles forming a pillar and the five skandhas forming a person is the same principle. 'Removal' means that if there is a bottle after removing the five dusts, then the five dusts can be combined with the bottle. If there is no bottle after removing the five dusts, then with whom do the five dusts combine? The gatha (偈, verse) itself has a title and explanation. 'Difference' and 'removal' are the two titles. 'How can the bottle be in contact?' is the explanation of these two titles. The bottle explains 'removal,' and touch explains 'difference.' The opponent says, 'Color should be visible, as the sutras (經, scriptures) state.' There are three purposes for citing this passage. First, if explained from an internal perspective, the above refutes the absence of the five dusts, indicating the absence of created color. Now, the refutation of the four great elements indicates the absence of the cause of creation. This establishes color according to the Abhidharma (毗曇, Abhidharma). Second, the above refutes the absence of the five dusts, refuting the views of the Satyasiddhi School (成實宗, Satyasiddhi School) and others. Now, the refutation of the four great elements creating color refutes the views of the Abhidharma. Third, the above refutes the heretics (外道, tirthikas), and now refutes the internal practitioners. Moreover, the sutras state that sentient beings have four great poisonous snakes internally and six thieves externally. Now, abandon the distant ones. The above explanation of the absence of the five dusts is the abandonment of the six thieves. Because the heretics believe that dharma-dust (法塵, dharma-dhatu) also belongs to color, refuting color is refuting the six thieves. Moreover, the sutras say that the nature of color is inherently empty. It also says that practicing color emptiness is in accordance with Prajna (波若, Prajñā). It also says that abandoning impermanent color, the sharp-witted people in the Buddha's time could attain enlightenment upon hearing it. Now, explaining the Vaipulya Sutras (方等眾經, Vaipulya Sutras), color is ultimately empty, so it is explained that both the cause of creation and the result of created color are unattainable. However, Deva (提婆, Deva) possesses supernatural powers, is proficient in the internal scriptures, and is also proficient in the external scriptures. Therefore, his scriptures were cited earlier to question his views, so it is said that subtle particles are not visible. The heretics have insight into the external scriptures and also have the ability to understand the internal scriptures. Therefore, the internal scriptures are now used to question Deva. If Deva believes these.

佛經則不應破色現見。若破色現見則自破內經。前已破外今復破內。定是破法人也。問外但應引內經。何故云信經也。答然內外立義有異有同。彼謂內外兩經明色是可見。此義大同。是故可信。故云信經故。汝經言色名四大及四大造者。今略為四宗。一者外道明造色義。僧佉塵細大粗。故從五塵而生五大。謂偏造義也。世師亦從塵生大。而是遍造。此二如初品釋之。次成論亦從塵生大。兩義異於外道。一者塵實大假。二但四塵生大。聲非大因亦非大所造。但擊發四大離合出聲。是四大之果。三依毗曇正明從大造色總有十一種色。謂五根五塵及以無作。就十一中十種但是所造。觸塵有二。堅濕暖動是于能造。飢飽澀滑輕重冷七觸是于所造。約世論者。過去四大造過去色及現色。現在四大造現在及未來。未來四大但造未來。約同異論者凡有四句。一異相四大造同相色。謂堅濕暖動四造十一種觸。自有同相四大造異相色。謂四大同是觸入名為同相。而造色香等名為異相。自有同相四大造同相色。四大是觸性還造于觸。自有異相四大造異相色。四大各性造色香等色。具如雜心所說。問四大造色六因中是何因耶。答但是所作因。問四大造色誰造四大。答昔有人言。三大造一大。鏡師云。色不具四大則不得生。四大亦爾。故不得言

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：不應該否定佛經中關於色（rupa，物質現象）的顯現和認知。如果否定了色（rupa，物質現象）的顯現和認知，那就是自我否定內經。之前已經駁斥了外道，現在又來否定內經，這一定是破壞佛法的人。有人問：駁斥外道應該引用內經，為什麼說『信經』呢？回答：雖然內外兩經在立義上有不同，也有相同之處。他們認為內外兩經都說明色（rupa，物質現象）是可見的，這個觀點非常一致，所以可以相信。因此說『信經』。你的經典說色（rupa，物質現象）名為四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）以及四大所造之物。現在略分為四種宗派：第一種是外道闡明造色（rupa，物質現象）的意義。僧佉派認為微塵有粗細之分，因此從五塵（五種微細的物質元素）產生五大（五種粗大的物質元素），意思是偏造義。世間師也認為從微塵產生粗大的物質，但是是普遍的創造。這兩種觀點如同初品所解釋的。其次，成實論也認為從微塵產生粗大的物質，但兩種意義與外道不同。一是微塵是真實的，粗大的物質是虛假的。二是隻有四塵產生粗大的物質，聲音不是粗大物質的原因，也不是粗大物質所造，只是撞擊四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）分離聚合而發出聲音，是四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）的結果。第三種是依據《阿毗達摩》，正確地闡明從四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）造色（rupa，物質現象），總共有十一種色（rupa，物質現象），即五根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身）、五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸）以及無作色（無表色）。在十一種色（rupa，物質現象）中，有十種只是所造之物，觸塵（觸覺的對象）有兩種，堅、濕、暖、動是能造的，饑、飽、澀、滑、輕、重、冷七觸是所造的。按照世俗的觀點，過去的四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）造過去的色（rupa，物質現象）和現在的色（rupa，物質現象），現在的四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）造現在的色（rupa，物質現象）和未來的色（rupa，物質現象），未來的四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）只造未來的色（rupa，物質現象）。按照同異的觀點，總共有四句：一是異相的四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）造同相的色（rupa，物質現象），即堅、濕、暖、動四種造十一種觸。二是同相的四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）造異相的色（rupa，物質現象），即四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）同是觸入，名為同相，而造色（rupa，物質現象）、香等，名為異相。三是同相的四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）造同相的色（rupa，物質現象），四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）是觸性，還造觸。四是異相的四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）造異相的色（rupa，物質現象），四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）各自的性質造色（rupa，物質現象）、香等色（rupa，物質現象）。具體如《雜心論》所說。有人問：四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）造色（rupa，物質現象）在六因中是什麼因？回答：只是所作因。有人問：四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）造色（rupa，物質現象），誰造四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）？回答：以前有人說，三大（三大元素）造一大（一大元素）。鏡師說：色（rupa，物質現象）如果不具備四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）就不能產生，四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）也是如此，所以不能說。

【English Translation】 English version: One should not refute the visible manifestation of rupa (matter) in the Buddhist scriptures. If one refutes the visible manifestation of rupa (matter), then one is refuting one's own internal scriptures. Having already refuted external doctrines, now refuting internal ones, one is certainly a destroyer of the Dharma. Someone asks: When refuting external doctrines, one should cite internal scriptures. Why do you say 'trusting the scriptures'? The answer is: Although internal and external doctrines differ in their established meanings, they also have similarities. They believe that both internal and external scriptures state that rupa (matter) is visible, which is a very consistent view, so it can be trusted. Therefore, it is said 'trusting the scriptures'. Your scriptures say that rupa (matter) is named the four great elements (earth, water, fire, wind) and what is made by the four great elements. Now, briefly, there are four schools of thought: The first is the externalist explanation of the meaning of creating rupa (matter). The Samkhya school believes that dust particles have fine and coarse distinctions, so the five great elements arise from the five dust particles, meaning partial creation. Worldly teachers also believe that great elements arise from dust particles, but it is universal creation. These two views are as explained in the first chapter. Secondly, the Tattvasiddhi school also believes that great elements arise from dust particles, but the two meanings differ from externalists. One is that dust particles are real, and great elements are false. The second is that only four dust particles produce great elements. Sound is not the cause of great elements, nor is it made by great elements, but sound is produced by the striking, separation, and aggregation of the four great elements, which is the result of the four great elements. The third is based on the Abhidharma, which correctly explains that rupa (matter) is created from the four great elements, totaling eleven types of rupa (matter), namely the five sense organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body), the five sense objects (form, sound, smell, taste, touch), and non-revealing form. Among the eleven types of rupa (matter), ten are merely what is created. There are two types of tangible objects: solidity, fluidity, heat, and motion are the creators, while hunger, satiety, roughness, smoothness, lightness, heaviness, and coldness are what is created. According to the worldly view, the past four great elements create past rupa (matter) and present rupa (matter), the present four great elements create present rupa (matter) and future rupa (matter), and the future four great elements only create future rupa (matter). According to the view of similarity and difference, there are four statements in total: First, dissimilar four great elements create similar rupa (matter), that is, solidity, fluidity, heat, and motion create eleven types of touch. Second, similar four great elements create dissimilar rupa (matter), that is, the four great elements are the same as touch, called similar, while creating form, smell, etc., are called dissimilar. Third, similar four great elements create similar rupa (matter), the four great elements are the nature of touch and still create touch. Fourth, dissimilar four great elements create dissimilar rupa (matter), the respective natures of the four great elements create form, smell, and other forms. As described in the Miscellaneous Abhidharma Heart Treatise. Someone asks: Among the six causes, what cause is the creation of rupa (matter) by the four great elements? The answer is: It is only the cause of being made. Someone asks: If the four great elements create rupa (matter), who creates the four great elements? The answer is: In the past, some people said that three great elements create one great element. The mirror maker says: If rupa (matter) does not possess the four great elements, it cannot arise, and the four great elements are also like this, so it cannot be said.

三大以造一大。問四大相望是共有因不。答婆沙一釋云。四大勢無偏者地大於三大是共有。共有因三大亦爾。于地大復有一釋。評家用前。今通牒十一種色義。故云色名四大及四大造。此出佛經非毗曇偏用。俱舍論評數論義云。應用四大造色。破經部人塵成大義。造色分中色入所攝是現見者。能造四大但不可見。所造之中具有二種。若是色入此則可見。余並不可見。內曰四大非現見云何生現見。正破四大造色。問論主云何對外而破內耶。答此論正破外迷傍洗內執。是故破內。又此破即是申佛隨世俗說四大造塵而因緣之造實無所造。內外但聞造名不達其義。所以然者。佛明因緣造無所造即是二諦。故所言皆實。諸小乘人但知造不知無所造。既不知造無所造亦不達無所造而造。故不達二諦。則是破于佛法。論主今云其造無所造。因世諦悟第一義。故有今破也。問佛有二諦。何故今偏明無所造耶。答佛雖有二諦但意在第一義。聖所行處。是故就本明之也。問外人乃是不知無所造。云何言不解造色。答此是假名如幻夢造。而外人執有性實。故是不識造也。又論主破造色者。外人計有實造。實有色則同外道。今乃是破外道義非破佛經。問外人乃不解大乘如幻夢炎而造。今引小乘經。論主何故破小乘方便。答二義。一者小是大小。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本三大（地、水、火）以造一大（地、水、火、風）。問：四大（地、水、火、風）相互依存，是共有的原因嗎？答：《婆沙論》的一種解釋說：四大勢力沒有偏頗，地大（地界）大於三大（水、火、風），是共有的。共有因，三大也是這樣。對於地大，還有一種解釋。評論家採用前一種解釋。現在通告十一種色的意義，所以說色名為四大以及四大所造。這出自佛經，並非《毗曇》偏用。《俱舍論》評論數論的觀點說：應該用四大造色，破斥經部人認為微塵形成大地的觀點。所造的色法包含在色入（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意所對的色境）之中，是現見的。能造的四大（地、水、火、風）但不可見。所造的之中具有兩種。如果是色入，那麼就可以看見，其餘都不可見。內問：四大不是現見的，怎麼產生現見？這是直接破斥四大造色。問：論主為什麼對外而破內呢？答：這部論正是爲了破斥外道的迷惑，順便洗刷內道的執著。所以破斥內道。而且這種破斥就是闡明佛隨順世俗的說法，說四大造塵，而因緣的造作實際上沒有造作什麼。內外只是聽到『造』這個名稱，不瞭解它的意義。所以這樣說是因為佛闡明因緣造作而無所造作，這就是二諦（真諦和俗諦）。所以說的一切都是真實的。各個小乘人只知道造作，不知道無所造作。既然不知道造作而無所造作，也不瞭解無所造作而造作，所以不通達二諦。這就是破斥佛法。論主現在說它的造作無所造作，通過世俗諦領悟第一義諦。所以有現在的破斥。問：佛有二諦，為什麼現在偏偏闡明無所造作呢？答：佛雖然有二諦，但意在第一義諦，是聖人所行之處。所以就根本來闡明它。問：外人是不瞭解無所造作，為什麼說不了解造色呢？答：這是假名，如幻夢所造。而外人執著于有自性真實。所以是不認識造作。而且論主破斥造色，是因為外人認為有真實的造作，真實有色，那就和外道相同了。現在是破斥外道的觀點，不是破斥佛經。問：外人是不瞭解大乘如幻夢火焰而造作，現在引用小乘經。論主為什麼破斥小乘的方便法門？答：有兩個原因。一是小是大小。

【English Translation】 English version The three great elements (earth, water, fire) create the one great element (earth, water, fire, wind). Question: Are the four great elements (earth, water, fire, wind) interdependent, and are they a common cause? Answer: One interpretation in the Vibhasa states: If the power of the four great elements is not biased, then the earth element is greater than the three great elements (water, fire, wind), and it is common. The common cause is also the same for the three great elements. Regarding the earth element, there is another interpretation. Commentators adopt the former interpretation. Now, to explain the meaning of the eleven types of colors, it is said that color is named as the four great elements and what is created by the four great elements. This comes from the Buddhist scriptures, not exclusively from the Abhidharma. The Abhidharmakosha comments on the Samkhya view, saying: The four great elements should be used to create color, refuting the view of the Sautrantikas that dust particles form the great earth. The created color is contained within the color-sphere (objects of sight, sound, smell, taste, touch, and mind), and it is directly perceived. The four great elements that can create are invisible. Among what is created, there are two types. If it is a color-sphere, then it can be seen; the rest are invisible. Internal question: The four great elements are not directly perceived, so how can direct perception arise? This directly refutes the creation of color by the four great elements. Question: Why does the author of the treatise refute the internal by refuting the external? Answer: This treatise is precisely to refute the delusions of external paths and incidentally cleanse the attachments of internal paths. Therefore, it refutes the internal. Moreover, this refutation is to clarify that the Buddha follows the conventional saying that the four great elements create dust, but the creation of causes and conditions actually creates nothing. Both internal and external only hear the name 'creation' but do not understand its meaning. The reason for this is that the Buddha clarifies that creation by causes and conditions creates nothing, which is the two truths (ultimate truth and conventional truth). Therefore, everything said is true. All the Hinayana practitioners only know creation but do not know non-creation. Since they do not know creation and non-creation, they also do not understand non-creation and creation, so they do not understand the two truths. This is refuting the Buddha's teachings. The author of the treatise now says that its creation creates nothing, and through conventional truth, one realizes the ultimate truth. Therefore, there is the current refutation. Question: The Buddha has two truths, so why does he now specifically clarify non-creation? Answer: Although the Buddha has two truths, his intention is in the ultimate truth, which is the place where sages go. Therefore, he clarifies it from the root. Question: Outsiders do not understand non-creation, so why say they do not understand the creation of color? Answer: This is a false name, like what is created by illusions and dreams. But outsiders are attached to the reality of self-nature. Therefore, they do not recognize creation. Moreover, the author of the treatise refutes the creation of color because outsiders believe in real creation and that there is real color, which is the same as external paths. Now, it is refuting the views of external paths, not refuting the Buddhist scriptures. Question: Outsiders do not understand the creation of Mahayana like illusions, dreams, and flames, but now they quote Hinayana scriptures. Why does the author of the treatise refute the expedient methods of Hinayana? Answer: There are two reasons. First, 'small' is small and large.

說小通大。既不解大何猶達小。又小乘亦明因緣小。不如定性但小之義。故須破之也。又一切法有三重無義。一者就理明畢竟空。無一切色等法。二者眾生無而謂見有。如無炎水妄故見有。此亦無也。三者佛隨凡夫說有。此是點空為有亦無此法。而外道及毗曇不知此三。今示三無也。成實雖言色空不知三本性空。亦是不知三無。不知三無即是顛倒無明。今破無明令得般若正觀。是故破造色也。破意者將因徴果也。能造大因是不可見。所造之色云何可見。如大論云。五指中無師子。共合不生師子。四大中無可見色。共合云何生可見色。又並本是不可見能生可見者。亦應本是四礙生一無礙。彼云四礙共生一礙者。亦應四不可見共生一不可見。互類難之。義可知也。外曰身根取故四大有。上以因徴果。今還以因救果。四大是有造色亦有。有性既同故得相造。而言身根取故者證有義也。四大是觸為身根得之。是故知實有四大。既實有大故能造色。內曰火中一切熱者。前破四大造色謂破果。今破四大則是破因。四大欲造於色必須共合。今問火大之中三都熱不。若三都熱則失三大性。若三不熱則失火用。今實見火中一切皆熱。當知失三。既失於三亦失於一。故都無四大。注為二。初破火大二例破餘三。初又二。一牒。今火中四大下

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本說小通大。既然不瞭解什麼是『大』，又怎麼能通達什麼是『小』呢？而且小乘也只是明白因緣之『小』，不如直接認定其『小』的定義。所以必須破除這種觀念。還有，一切法有三重『無』的含義：一是就理上來說，畢竟是空，沒有一切色等法；二是眾生本來沒有卻認為有，就像沒有火焰卻妄見有水一樣，這也是『無』；三是佛隨順凡夫的說法而說『有』，這是指點空為有，實際上並沒有這個法。而外道和毗曇宗不瞭解這三重『無』，現在就揭示這三重『無』。成實宗雖然說色是空，但不知道三本性空，也是不瞭解這三重『無』。不瞭解這三重『無』就是顛倒無明，現在破除無明，使人得到般若正觀，所以要破除造色之說。破除『意』，就是將『因』來推究『果』。能造就『大因』是不可見的，那麼所造的『色』怎麼會是可見的呢？如《大智度論》所說：『五個手指中沒有師子（Simha），共同合在一起也不會生出師子。四大中沒有可見的色，共同合在一起怎麼會生出可見的色呢？』而且，如果原本是不可見的能生出可見的，也應該原本是四種障礙能生出一種無礙。他們說四種障礙共同生出一種障礙，那也應該四種不可見共同生出一種不可見。用類似的道理來反駁他們，道理就明白了。外道說：『身體的根（身根）能夠取到，所以四大是存在的。』上面是用『因』來推究『果』，現在用『因』來反過來證明『果』。四大是存在的，所以造色也是存在的。『有』的性質既然相同，所以能夠相互造作。說『身體的根能夠取到』，這是爲了證明『有』的意義。四大是觸，身體的根能夠得到它，所以知道確實有四大。既然確實有四大，所以能夠造色。內道說：『火中一切都是熱的。』前面破除四大造色，是破除『果』，現在破除四大，就是破除『因』。四大要造色，必須共同合在一起。現在問你，火大之中，三者（地、水、風）都是熱的嗎？如果三者都是熱的，那就失去了三大（地、水、風）的自性；如果三者不熱，那就失去了火的作用。現在實際看到火中一切都是熱的，應當知道失去了三者（的自性）。既然失去了三者，也就失去了一者（火大）。所以根本沒有四大。』注為二：首先破除火大，然後用類比的方法破除其餘三大。首先又分為二：一、牒，『現在火中四大下』

【English Translation】 English version To speak of the small to understand the great. If one does not understand the 'great', how can one comprehend the 'small'? Moreover, the Hinayana (Small Vehicle) only understands the 'smallness' of dependent origination (因緣). It is better to directly define it as 'small'. Therefore, this view must be refuted. Furthermore, all dharmas (法) have three meanings of 'non-existence': First, from the perspective of principle (理), they are ultimately empty (空), without any form (色) or other dharmas. Second, sentient beings (眾生) perceive existence where there is none, like falsely seeing water in flames where there is no water. This is also 'non-existence'. Third, the Buddha (佛) speaks of 'existence' in accordance with the understanding of ordinary people (凡夫), pointing to emptiness as existence, but in reality, this dharma does not exist. However, the heretics (外道) and the Abhidharma (毗曇) school do not understand these three 'non-existences'. Now, these three 'non-existences' are revealed. Although the Satyasiddhi School (成實宗) speaks of the emptiness of form, it does not understand the emptiness of the three fundamental natures (三本性空), and thus does not understand these three 'non-existences'. Not understanding these three 'non-existences' is inverted ignorance (顛倒無明). Now, ignorance is refuted to enable people to attain prajna (般若) correct view (正觀), therefore, the theory of the creation of form (造色) must be refuted. Refuting the 'intention' (意) is to investigate the 'result' (果) by examining the 'cause' (因). If the 'great cause' (大因) that creates is invisible, how can the created 'form' (色) be visible? As the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra (大智度論) says: 'There is no lion (師子, Simha) in the five fingers; even if they are joined together, a lion will not be produced. There is no visible form in the four great elements (四大); how can a visible form be produced by joining them together?' Moreover, if something originally invisible can produce something visible, then the four obstructions (四礙) should be able to produce one unobstructed thing. If they say that four obstructions together produce one obstruction, then four invisible things should together produce one invisible thing. Refute them with similar reasoning, and the principle will be clear. The heretics say: 'The body's sense organ (身根) can perceive it, so the four great elements exist.' Above, the 'result' was investigated by examining the 'cause'; now, the 'cause' is used to prove the 'result'. The four great elements exist, so the creation of form also exists. Since the nature of 'existence' is the same, they can create each other. Saying that 'the body's sense organ can perceive it' is to prove the meaning of 'existence'. The four great elements are touch, and the body's sense organ can obtain it, so it is known that the four great elements truly exist. Since the four great elements truly exist, they can create form. The inner school says: 'Everything in fire is hot.' Previously, refuting the creation of form by the four great elements was refuting the 'result'; now, refuting the four great elements is refuting the 'cause'. If the four great elements are to create form, they must be joined together. Now I ask you, within the fire element, are the three (earth, water, wind) all hot? If the three are all hot, then the nature of the three great elements (earth, water, wind) is lost; if the three are not hot, then the function of fire is lost. Now, it is actually seen that everything in fire is hot; it should be known that the three (natures) are lost. Since the three are lost, one (the fire element) is also lost. Therefore, there are no four great elements at all.' Commented as two: First, refute the fire element, and then use analogy to refute the remaining three great elements. First, it is divided into two: One, citation, 'Now the four great elements in fire below.'

第二破。以火中四大都成熱故失餘三大。是故火不為四身。問此應言三大都成熱。云何言火不為四身。答二義。一者火火中都成熱無復四身。故言不為四身。二者三大同火成熱。火不同餘三。故云火不為四身。若余不熱不名為火者。前得火失三。今得三失火。是故火不為四身。還重結成偈本火中一切熱耳。外曰色應現見現在時有故。自上以來第一破內外可見法。今第二次破於時。今時法都寂則一切皆空。外云。過未二時不得取色。正是現在時取。既有取色之時。寧無色可取。內曰若法后故初亦故。破現在住時也。若法后故牒外義也。外謂后時方乃有故。初亦故者破外義也。若言后時有故。當知初生即已有故。若初無故后不應生。是即常新。當知初生即已有故。若初生即有故則唸唸生滅。無有住時故無現在。長行有六。若法后故相現牒外義也。是相非故時生破外義釋偈本初亦故也。微故不知者釋疑也。疑雲。若初生已有故何不覺知。是故釋云。微細故不知。前法說釋。如人著屐次舉喻釋。若初無故第四難也。雖舉法譬釋疑外猶未受。故重破之。若必言初新無有故者。是應常無。是以初故隨之下第五總結。今諸法不住下第六結無住時。外曰受新故故有現在時。上借新故以破現在。外人便謂。論主受彼新故。若有新故則有二

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本第二重破斥。如果火中的四大元素都導致熱，那麼就失去了其餘三大元素。因此，火不能被認為是四身（四大假合之身）。問：這應該說是三大元素都導致熱，為什麼說火不是四身呢？答：有兩個原因。一是火在火中完全是熱，沒有其餘的四身，所以說不是四身。二是三大元素與火一同產生熱，而火不同於其餘三大元素，所以說火不是四身。如果其餘元素不熱就不能稱為火，那麼之前得到火就失去了三，現在得到三就失去了火。因此，火不是四身。再次總結成偈頌的根本：火中一切都是熱。外道說：色法應該可以被看見，因為它存在於現在時。從上面開始，第一次破斥內外可見的法。現在第二次破斥時間。如果時間之法完全寂靜，那麼一切都是空。外道說：過去和未來二時無法取得色法，只有現在時才能取得。既然有取得色法的時候，怎麼能說沒有色法可以取得呢？內道說：如果法是後來的，那麼最初也是後來的。這是爲了破斥現在住時。『如果法是後來的』，這是重複外道的觀點。外道認為後來的時間才會有，『最初也是後來的』，這是爲了破斥外道的觀點。如果說後來的時間才有，那麼應當知道最初生起時就已經有了。如果最初沒有，那麼後來就不應該生起，這就成了常新。應當知道最初生起時就已經有了。如果最初生起時就已經有了，那麼就是念念生滅，沒有住時，所以沒有現在。長行有六個部分。『如果法是後來的相』，這是重複外道的觀點。『是相非故時生』，這是破斥外道的觀點，解釋偈頌的根本『最初也是後來的』。『微故不知者』，這是解釋疑惑。疑惑在於，如果最初生起時就已經有了，為什麼不能覺知？所以解釋說，因為非常微細所以不能覺知。前面是用法來說明，接下來像人穿鞋一樣舉例說明。『若初無故』，這是第四個難點。雖然舉了法和譬喻來解釋疑惑，但外道仍然不接受，所以再次破斥。如果一定要說最初是新生的，沒有的，那麼就應該永遠沒有。因此，『是以初故』，這是第五個總結。『今諸法不住』，這是第六個總結，沒有住時。外道說：因為接受新生和舊有，所以有現在時。上面借用新生和舊有來破斥現在。外道就認為，論主接受了新生和舊有，如果有新生和舊有，那麼就有二。

【English Translation】 English version Second refutation. If the four great elements in fire all cause heat, then the remaining three are lost. Therefore, fire cannot be considered the four skandhas (the aggregation of the four great elements). Question: It should be said that the three great elements all cause heat, why say that fire is not the four skandhas? Answer: There are two reasons. First, fire in fire is entirely heat, without the remaining four skandhas, so it is said not to be the four skandhas. Second, the three great elements and fire together produce heat, but fire is different from the remaining three elements, so it is said that fire is not the four skandhas. If the remaining elements are not hot, they cannot be called fire, then previously obtaining fire loses three, and now obtaining three loses fire. Therefore, fire is not the four skandhas. Re-summarizing the essence of the verse: everything in fire is heat. The outsider says: Form should be visible because it exists in the present time. From above, the first refutation is of the internally and externally visible dharmas. Now, the second refutation is of time. If the dharma of time is completely quiescent, then everything is empty. The outsider says: The past and future two times cannot grasp form, only the present time can grasp it. Since there is a time to grasp form, how can it be said that there is no form to grasp? The insider says: If a dharma is later, then the beginning is also later. This is to refute the present abiding time. 'If a dharma is later', this is repeating the outsider's view. The outsider believes that there will only be a later time, 'the beginning is also later', this is to refute the outsider's view. If it is said that there is only a later time, then it should be known that it already exists when it first arises. If there is no beginning, then it should not arise later, which becomes eternally new. It should be known that it already exists when it first arises. If it already exists when it first arises, then it is constantly arising and ceasing, without an abiding time, so there is no present. There are six parts in the long passage. 'If the appearance of the dharma is later', this is repeating the outsider's view. 'This appearance is not old, so it arises', this is to refute the outsider's view, explaining the essence of the verse 'the beginning is also later'. 'Not knowing because it is subtle', this is to explain the doubt. The doubt is, if it already exists when it first arises, why can't it be perceived? So it is explained that it cannot be perceived because it is very subtle. The previous explanation was using dharma, and next, it is explained with an example like a person wearing shoes. 'If there is no beginning', this is the fourth difficulty. Although dharma and metaphors were used to explain the doubt, the outsider still does not accept it, so it is refuted again. If it must be said that the beginning is newly born and does not exist, then it should never exist. Therefore, 'therefore the beginning is old', this is the fifth summary. 'Now all dharmas do not abide', this is the sixth summary, there is no abiding time. The outsider says: Because of accepting the new and the old, there is present time. The above borrowed the new and the old to refute the present. The outsider then believes that the proponent accepts the new and the old, and if there is the new and the old, then there are two.

義。一者既有新故始終則有中間現在。二者取新故必現在時取。既有所取之新故必有取新故之時也。內曰生故新異故故。前借新故破現在。今破新故也。生故新者破新也。汝言始生為新者。故法始生便應是新。汝新法始出空入有既名為新。故法亦始出空入有。豈非新也。此有四難。一同始出空入有則應同新。二者則應同故。三若以初者為新後者為故。亦應後者為新初者為故。四者汝有新有故則應有始生不始生。異故故者破故也。新相反異。所以為故。有何定故也。註釋為二。初正破新故。次結歸真俗。初又二。前逐近釋異故故。若故相生次釋生故新。結歸二諦也。如文。外曰若爾得何利。自上已來二章破無時法。今第三次明得益。此文來有遠近。遠者從初品至此品一切皆破。有何利。近者外謂法有四時可益眾生。今既無。此得何等利。內曰得永離者。外道著法情深。是故今明著便是縛離得解脫。而言永離者。外道斷結有暫時離義終歸退還。回邪入正則得永離。又從初品竟於此章明無復凡夫二乘有所得縛則是畢竟永離。離離則累無不寂。故德無不圓證中道法身。又不見新物故物則知物空。不見新人故人則知人空。悟二空破一切病故云永離也。又二生死因為故。二死果為新。離此因果一切離也。長行雲新不作中中不作故者

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本義：第一，既然有新、舊、始終，那麼就有中間和現在。第二，選取新、舊必定在現在時選取。既然有所選取的新、舊，必定有選取新、舊的時候。內在含義是：因為產生變化所以是新的，因為不同所以是舊的。前面借用新、舊來破斥現在，現在破斥新、舊。因為產生變化所以是新的，這是破斥『新』。你說開始產生為『新』，那麼舊法開始產生就應該是『新』。你的新法開始從空無進入存在，因此被稱為『新』，那麼舊法也開始從空無進入存在，難道不是『新』嗎？這裡有四個難點：第一，同樣開始從空無進入存在，就應該同樣是『新』。第二，那麼就應該同樣是『舊』。第三，如果以最初的為『新』，後來的為『舊』，也應該後來的為『新』，最初的為『舊』。第四，你既有『新』又有『舊』，就應該有開始產生和不開始產生。因為不同所以是舊的，這是破斥『舊』。與『新』相反，因為不同，所以是『舊』。有什麼確定的『舊』呢？註釋分為兩部分：首先是正面破斥新、舊，其次是總結歸於真俗二諦。首先又分為兩部分：前面順著近處解釋『因為不同所以是舊的』，如果舊的相互產生；其次解釋『因為產生變化所以是新的』。總結歸於真俗二諦，就像文中所說。外道說：『如果這樣，能得到什麼利益？』從上面開始，兩章破斥沒有時間性的法，現在第三次說明得到利益。這段文字有遠近之分。從遠處來說，從初品到此品，一切都在破斥，有什麼利益？從近處來說，外道認為法有四個時間階段，可以利益眾生，現在既然沒有，這能得到什麼利益？內在回答說：『得到永遠脫離』。外道執著於法的情感很深，所以現在說明執著就是束縛，脫離就能得到解脫。說『永遠脫離』，是因為外道斷除煩惱結有暫時脫離的意義，最終還是會退轉。迴轉邪見進入正道，就能得到永遠脫離。又從初品到這一章，說明沒有凡夫二乘的所得，束縛就是畢竟永遠脫離。脫離了脫離，那麼累贅沒有不寂靜的，所以功德沒有不圓滿證得中道法身。又不見新物舊物，就知道事物是空性的。不見新人舊人，就知道人是空性的。領悟到二空，破除一切病，所以說『永遠脫離』。又有二種生死的因為『舊』，二種死亡的果為『新』，脫離了這種因果，就一切都脫離了。長行中說，『新不造作，中間不造作，舊不造作』。

【English Translation】 English version Meaning: First, since there is new, old, beginning, and end, then there is middle and present. Second, the selection of new and old must be done in the present time. Since there is a selection of new and old, there must be a time for selecting new and old. The inner meaning is: because of arising and change, it is new; because of difference, it is old. Previously, new and old were used to refute the present; now, new and old are refuted. Because of arising and change, it is new; this is refuting 'new'. You say that the beginning of arising is 'new', then the old dharma that begins to arise should be 'new'. Your new dharma begins to enter existence from emptiness, therefore it is called 'new', then the old dharma also begins to enter existence from emptiness, isn't it 'new'? There are four difficulties here: First, if they both begin to enter existence from emptiness, they should both be 'new'. Second, then they should both be 'old'. Third, if the initial one is considered 'new' and the later one is considered 'old', then the later one should also be considered 'new' and the initial one considered 'old'. Fourth, since you have both 'new' and 'old', there should be both beginning to arise and not beginning to arise. Because of difference, it is old; this is refuting 'old'. Opposite to 'new', because of difference, it is 'old'. What is the definite 'old'? The commentary is divided into two parts: first, directly refuting new and old; second, summarizing and returning to the two truths of conventional and ultimate. The first is further divided into two parts: first, following the immediate context to explain 'because of difference, it is old', if the old arise from each other; second, explaining 'because of arising and change, it is new'. Summarizing and returning to the two truths, as stated in the text. The outsider says: 'If so, what benefit is obtained?' From above, two chapters refute the dharma without time; now, for the third time, it is explained what benefit is obtained. This passage has near and far meanings. From a distance, from the first chapter to this chapter, everything is being refuted, what benefit is there? From nearby, the outsider believes that dharma has four time stages that can benefit sentient beings; now that there are none, what benefit can be obtained? The inner answer is: 'Obtaining eternal liberation'. Outsiders are deeply attached to the emotions of dharma, so now it is explained that attachment is bondage, and liberation is obtained through detachment. Saying 'eternal liberation' is because outsiders sever afflictions and have a temporary meaning of liberation, but eventually they will regress. Turning away from wrong views and entering the right path will lead to eternal liberation. Also, from the first chapter to this chapter, it is explained that there is no attainment for ordinary people and those of the two vehicles; bondage is ultimately and eternally liberated. Liberating from liberation, then no burden is not tranquil, so merit is not perfectly realized, attaining the Dharma body of the Middle Way. Also, not seeing new things or old things, one knows that things are empty. Not seeing new people or old people, one knows that people are empty. Realizing the two emptinesses, breaking all illnesses, therefore it is said 'eternal liberation'. Also, the cause of the two kinds of birth and death is 'old', and the fruit of the two kinds of death is 'new'. Liberating from this cause and effect, everything is liberated. The long passage says, 'The new does not create, the middle does not create, the old does not create'.

。從無明行新感於五果名新作中。現在三因作未來兩果名中作故。故十二緣但有二分。七為前分五為後分。如種子芽莖節者。十二因緣譬如大樹。二因為根五果為體三因為華二果為實。根體既傾則華實不合。是故此中舉穀子喻之。

百論疏卷中之餘大正藏第 42 冊 No. 1827 百論疏

百論疏卷下

釋吉藏撰

破因中有果品第七

六品三雙二雙已竟。今破第三有果無果。然一異情塵攝法並盡。大有與物一體異體。破此一異則外典法空。情塵是十二入。十二入攝一切法。情塵既空則一切空。若爾上來二雙破法已盡。今更破者凡有通別二義。通義有四。一者上破法雖盡但鈍根未悟。是故重立更復破之。二者受悟不同觀門各異。上已明二種觀門。謂非一非異非內非外。今次說非有非無非因非果悟入實相。三者造論通經。經有種種異說。上以二門通之。今諸大乘經如涅槃師子吼品破因有果無果義。今欲釋此等經故說今品。四者此論正破于外傍破于內。佛滅度后至八百年時枝流成五百部。執因有果無果障翳佛經。今破僧佉衛世兼洗上座僧祇。故有此品來也。次別生起者亦有四義。一者神品破人四品破法。今舉因果總救人法。因中之人名為作者。果中之人名受者。因中之法即是善

【現代漢語翻譯】從無明行（avidyā and saṃskāra）新感於五果，名新作中。現在三因作未來兩果，名中作故。故十二緣但有二分，七為前分，五為後分。如種子、芽、莖、節者，十二因緣譬如大樹。二因為根，五果為體，三因為華，二果為實。根體既傾，則華實不合。是故此中舉穀子喻之。從無明和行這兩種因緣，新產生了五種果報，這被稱為『新作中』。現在這三種因緣造作了未來兩種果報，這被稱為『中作』。因此，十二因緣只有兩個部分，七支屬於前部分，五支屬於後部分。就像種子、芽、莖、節一樣，十二因緣就像一棵大樹。兩種因是樹根，五種果是樹幹，三種因是花朵，兩種果是果實。如果樹根和樹幹傾斜了，那麼花朵和果實就不會結合在一起。所以這裡用穀子的例子來比喻。

【English Translation】 Commentary on the Hundred Treatises, Scroll Lower Composed by Jizang Chapter 7: Refuting the Existence of Effect in Cause The six chapters and three pairs, two pairs have already been completed. Now, the third [topic] of whether the effect exists or does not exist in the cause is refuted. However, the emotions and defilements (情塵) of oneness and otherness encompass all dharmas. The great existence is either one with things or different from things. Refuting this oneness and otherness empties the laws of external scriptures. Emotions and defilements are the twelve entrances (十二入, dvādaśa āyatanāni). The twelve entrances encompass all dharmas. If emotions and defilements are empty, then everything is empty. If that is the case, the two pairs above have already exhausted the refutation of dharmas. The reason for further refutation now is that there are both general and specific meanings. There are four general meanings. First, although the refutation of dharmas above is exhaustive, those of dull faculties have not awakened. Therefore, it is re-established and refuted again. Second, the reception of enlightenment differs, and the gates of contemplation vary. The two types of contemplation gates have already been clarified above, namely, neither one nor different, neither internal nor external. Now, it is said that neither existence nor non-existence, neither cause nor effect, leads to the realization of true reality. Third, the creation of treatises is connected to the scriptures. There are various different interpretations in the scriptures. The above two gates connect them. Now, various Mahayana sutras, such as the 'Lion's Roar' chapter of the Nirvana Sutra, refute the meaning of whether the effect exists or does not exist in the cause. This chapter is now explained to interpret these sutras. Fourth, this treatise primarily refutes external [views] and secondarily refutes internal [views]. After the Buddha's parinirvana, over eight hundred years, branches flowed into five hundred schools. They clung to the existence or non-existence of the effect in the cause, obscuring the Buddhist scriptures. Now, it refutes the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika schools, and also washes away the Theravada Saṃghas. Therefore, this chapter has come about. Next, there are also four meanings for the specific arising. First, the 'Spirit' chapter refutes people, and the four chapters refute dharmas. Now, the cause and effect are taken up to generally save people and dharmas. The person in the cause is called the 'maker' (作者). The person in the effect is called the 'receiver' (受者). The dharma in the cause is good.

惡。果中之法謂苦樂等。既有因果則人法不空。二者救上情塵。情塵各有因果。如從塵生大從大成根謂情因果也。微塵成色色成於瓶謂塵因果也。既有因果則情塵不空。三者有為之法有體相。因果是有為法體。三相是有為家相。既有體相則有諸法。寧無情塵。四者接次相生從塵品起。文自辨之也。又生起此二品來外云。一異內外皆不可得者。因果是眾義大宗立信根本不可云無。若無便是邪見死入地獄。故應有因果。有因果則有內外總別。有內外總別之法則有於人。故一切立也。先破有次破無者。內外略同。內先有上座計三世有。次大眾計二世無。先有毗曇二世有。次成實二世無。外亦爾。先有僧佉出世計有。次世師計無。二者四句次第。有第一無第二也。所言破因中有果者。大明九十六術所計有三。一執無因無果。如六師中一師云。無有黑業無黑業報。白等亦爾。二計無因有果。六師之中亦有此人。三執有因有果。就有因果復有四師。一僧佉執因中有。二世師執因中無。三勒沙婆亦有亦無。四若提子非有非無。佛法內有小乘大乘並明有因果義。小乘中有于數論。數人六因五果。言六因者。一相應二共有三報四遍五自分六所作。言五果者。一解脫果從道諦生。若緣由為言。亦從所作因有。但六因正生有為。解脫果是無為

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本惡。果中之法指的是苦、樂等等。既然有因果，那麼人法就不是空性的。這兩種觀點是爲了救濟上面所說的情塵。情塵各有因果。比如，從微塵產生大的東西，從大的東西形成根，這就是情塵的因果。微塵形成，形成瓶子，這就是塵的因果。既然有因果，那麼情塵就不是空性的。第三，有為法有體相。因果是有為法的體，三相（生、住、滅）是有為法的家相。既然有體相，那麼就有諸法，怎麼會沒有情塵呢？第四，接連不斷地相生，從微塵的品類開始產生。文義自然可以辨明。又，生起這兩種品類，外道說：『一異、內外都不可得。』因果是眾多意義的大綱，是建立信仰的根本，不可說沒有。如果沒有，那就是邪見，死後會墮入地獄。所以應該承認有因果。有因果，那麼就有內外、總別。有內外、總別的法則，那麼就有人。所以一切才能成立。先破有，再破無，內外略同。內道先有上座部計執三世有，其次大眾部計執二世無。先有毗曇宗計執二世有，其次成實宗計執二世無。外道也是這樣。先有僧佉（Samkhya）出世計執有，其次世勝論（Vaisheshika）計執無。二者四句的次第是：有第一，無第二。所說的破斥『因中有果』，是爲了說明九十六種外道術所計執的三種觀點。一是執著無因無果。如六師中的一位說：『沒有黑業，沒有黑業的報應。』白業等等也是這樣。二是計執無因有果。六師之中也有這樣的人。三是執著有因有果。在執著有因果的之中，又有四種師：一是僧佉（Samkhya）執著因中有。二是世勝論（Vaisheshika）執著因中無。三是耆那教（Jainism，勒沙婆 Rishabha 是耆那教的祖師）認為亦有亦無。四是若提子認為非有非無。佛法內有小乘、大乘，都闡明有因果的義理。小乘中類似於數論（Samkhya）。數論者認為有六因五果。所說的六因是：一、相應因，二、共有因，三、報因，四、遍行因，五、自分因，六、所作因。所說的五果是：一、解脫果，從道諦生。如果從緣由來說，也從所作因產生。但六因主要產生有為法，解脫果是無為法。

【English Translation】 English version Evil. The laws within the result refer to suffering, pleasure, and so on. Since there is cause and effect, then neither persons nor dharmas are empty. These two views are to remedy the aforementioned emotional defilements (情塵, qing chen). Emotional defilements each have their own causes and effects. For example, from dust arises something large, and from something large, roots are formed; this is the cause and effect of emotional defilements. Dust forms **, and ** forms a vase; this is the cause and effect of dust. Since there is cause and effect, then emotional defilements are not empty. Third, conditioned dharmas have substance and characteristics. Cause and effect are the substance of conditioned dharmas, and the three characteristics (arising, abiding, ceasing) are the family characteristics of conditioned dharmas. Since there are substance and characteristics, then there are all dharmas; how could there be no emotional defilements? Fourth, continuous arising, starting from the categories of dust. The meaning can be naturally discerned. Furthermore, regarding the arising of these two categories, externalists say: 'Oneness and difference, internal and external, are all unattainable.' Cause and effect are the great principles of numerous meanings, the foundation for establishing faith, and cannot be said to be non-existent. If they are non-existent, then that is a heretical view, and after death, one will fall into hell. Therefore, it should be acknowledged that there is cause and effect. If there is cause and effect, then there are internal and external, general and specific. If there are laws of internal and external, general and specific, then there are people. Therefore, everything can be established. First refuting existence, then refuting non-existence, the internal and external are roughly the same. Within the internal, first there was the Sthavira school (上座部, Shangzuo Bu) which held that the three times exist, then the Mahasamghika school (大眾部, Dazhong Bu) which held that the two times do not exist. First there was the Sarvastivada (毗曇宗, Pitanzong) which held that the two times exist, then the Satyasiddhi school (成實宗, Chengshizong) which held that the two times do not exist. The externalists are also like this. First there was the Samkhya (僧佉, Sengqie) which held that there is existence, then the Vaisheshika (世勝論, Shishenglun) which held that there is no existence. The order of the four sentences is: existence first, non-existence second. The so-called refutation of 'result existing in the cause' is to explain the three views held by the ninety-six types of externalist arts. First, there is the adherence to no cause and no effect. As one of the six teachers said: 'There is no black karma, and no retribution for black karma.' White karma and so on are also like this. Second, there is the view of no cause but there is effect. Among the six teachers, there are also people like this. Third, there is the adherence to cause and effect. Among those who adhere to cause and effect, there are four teachers: First, the Samkhya (僧佉, Sengqie) adheres to the existence of the result in the cause. Second, the Vaisheshika (世勝論, Shishenglun) adheres to the non-existence of the result in the cause. Third, the Jainas (勒沙婆, Leshaba, Rishabha is the founder of Jainism) believe in both existence and non-existence. Fourth, the Youtikas (若提子, Ruotizi) believe in neither existence nor non-existence. Within Buddhism, both the Hinayana and Mahayana explain the meaning of cause and effect. Within the Hinayana, it is similar to the Samkhya. The Samkhyas believe in six causes and five results. The six causes are: 1. Co-existent cause, 2. Common cause, 3. Retribution cause, 4. Pervasive cause, 5. Self-nature cause, 6. Active cause. The five results are: 1. Liberation result, arising from the path truth. If speaking from the reason, it also arises from the active cause. But the six causes mainly produce conditioned dharmas, and the liberation result is an unconditioned dharma.

非六因生也。餘四果從六因生。自分遍因生於依果。報因生報果。相應共有生功用果。所作因生增上果。成論三因四緣有二種因果。若習報兩因前後相生。因果復有同時義。如無明初念義論因果。若依因因果一時而有。即相緣因果。如五陰成人四微成柱一時而有。大判為言。數人執二世有義因中有果。論人明二世無義因中無果。大乘明因果者如地持論明十因五果。五果與數義名同。十因如論說。但大乘人解出世因果有當現二常。明生死中已有法身體用具足。現常義名之為有。為妄所覆故不現名為無果。當常義者。當有于果名為有義。即時未有名為無果。問今破外因果。云何乃辨世出世因果等耶。答師子吼寄乳酪而論佛性。何妨提婆約泥瓶而辨法身因果。正一切世出世皆正。出世即是佛性。佛性正則性佛正。性佛正則三寶正。故因果事大。所以論之。問何故偏破因有果無果。答有無障中道故。是諸見根故。眾生多執故。盛行於世故也。又僧佉二十五諦因中有果為宗。世師六諦因中無果為宗。今破其大宗則枝條自破也。品開為四。一破外人有不失義。二破舉因證有果義。三破各取因證有果義。四破橫過論主斷滅見義。外曰諸法非不住。立有三意。一彈論主二自立宗三非衛世。上品末諸法念念生滅無有住時。外今彈內此言故

【現代漢語翻譯】非六因生也。其餘四種果是從六因（hetu，根本原因）產生的。自分遍因（svabhāva-hetu，自性遍因）產生於依果（āśraya-phala，所依果）。報因（vipāka-hetu，異熟因）產生報果（vipāka-phala，異熟果）。相應共有生功用果（sahabhū-hetu，俱有因產生作用果）。所作因（kāraṇa-hetu，能作因）產生增上果（adhipati-phala，增上果）。《成實論》認為三因四緣有兩種因果關係。如果習因（āśraya-hetu，習因）和報因（vipāka-hetu，異熟因）前後相生，那麼因果關係就具有同時的意義，就像無明（avidyā，無明）的最初一念一樣。如果依因（āśraya-hetu，所依因）因果同時存在，那就是相緣因果（pratyaya-hetu，緣因果），就像五陰（pañca-skandha，五蘊）構成人，四微構成柱子一樣，都是同時存在的。總的來說，數論派（Sāṃkhya，數論）認為二世有義，因中存在果。而論師則認為二世無義，因中不存在果。大乘（Mahāyāna，大乘）所說的因果，如《地持論》所說的十因五果。五果與數論派的名稱相同。十因如論中所說。但大乘修行者認為出世間的因果有當常和現常兩種。說明生死之中已經具備法身（dharma-kāya，法身）的體和用。現常的意義稱為『有』，因為被妄想所覆蓋，所以不顯現，稱為『無果』。當常的意義是，將來會有果，稱為『有義』，但暫時還沒有，稱為『無果』。問：現在破斥外道的因果，為什麼還要辨別世間和出世間的因果呢？答：就像獅子吼（siṃhanāda，獅子吼）借用乳酪來論述佛性（buddhatā，佛性）一樣，提婆（Deva，提婆）借用泥瓶來辨別法身（dharma-kāya，法身）的因果，又有什麼妨礙呢？正確的世間和出世間都是正確的。出世間就是佛性（buddhatā，佛性）。佛性（buddhatā，佛性）正確，那麼自性佛（svabhāva-buddha，自性佛）就正確。自性佛（svabhāva-buddha，自性佛）正確，那麼三寶（triratna，三寶）就正確。所以因果這件事非常重要，因此要討論它。問：為什麼偏偏要破斥因中有果和因中無果的觀點呢？答：因為有和無會障礙中道（madhyamā-pratipad，中道），是各種見解的根源，眾生大多執著於此，並且在世間盛行。而且，僧佉派（Sāṃkhya，數論）以二十五諦因中有果為宗旨，世間的老師以六諦因中無果為宗旨。現在破斥他們的大宗旨，那麼枝條自然就被破斥了。本品分為四個部分：一是破斥外道認為『有』不會消失的觀點；二是破斥舉出『因』來證明『有果』的觀點；三是破斥各自選取『因』來證明『有果』的觀點；四是破斥橫加指責論主為斷滅見的觀點。外道說：諸法不是不『住』的。立『有』有三種意思：一是彈劾論主，二是自己立宗，三是非難衛世。上品末尾說，諸法念念生滅，沒有停留的時候。外道現在彈劾內道說此言的緣故。

【English Translation】 It is not produced by the six hetus (hetu, root cause). The remaining four fruits arise from the six hetus (hetu, root cause). The svabhāva-hetu (svabhāva-hetu, self-pervading cause) gives rise to the āśraya-phala (āśraya-phala, dependent fruit). The vipāka-hetu (vipāka-hetu, maturation cause) produces the vipāka-phala (vipāka-phala, maturation fruit). The sahabhū-hetu (sahabhū-hetu, co-existent cause) produces the kāraṇa-phala (kāraṇa-phala, functional fruit). The kāraṇa-hetu (kāraṇa-hetu, efficient cause) produces the adhipati-phala (adhipati-phala, dominant fruit). The Satyasiddhi Śāstra argues that the three hetus and four conditions give rise to two types of cause and effect. If the āśraya-hetu (āśraya-hetu, habit cause) and vipāka-hetu (vipāka-hetu, maturation cause) arise sequentially, then the cause-and-effect relationship has a simultaneous meaning, like the initial thought of ignorance (avidyā, ignorance). If the āśraya-hetu (āśraya-hetu, dependent cause) and its effect exist simultaneously, then it is a pratyaya-hetu (pratyaya-hetu, condition cause) and its effect, like the five skandhas (pañca-skandha, five aggregates) forming a person, or the four elements forming a pillar, which exist simultaneously. Generally speaking, the Sāṃkhya (Sāṃkhya, enumeration) school believes in the existence of meaning in the two worlds, with the effect existing within the cause. The teachers argue that there is no meaning in the two worlds, with the effect not existing within the cause. The cause and effect described in Mahāyāna (Mahāyāna, Great Vehicle), such as the ten causes and five effects in the Bodhisattvabhūmi, share the same names as those in the Sāṃkhya school. The ten causes are as described in the treatise. However, Mahāyāna practitioners believe that supramundane cause and effect have two constants: present constant and future constant. It explains that within saṃsāra, the essence and function of the dharma-kāya (dharma-kāya, dharma body) are fully present. The meaning of present constant is called 'existence,' but because it is covered by delusion, it does not appear and is called 'no effect.' The meaning of future constant is that there will be an effect in the future, called 'existence of meaning,' but it is not yet present, called 'no effect'. Question: Now that we are refuting the externalist's cause and effect, why do we still need to distinguish between mundane and supramundane cause and effect? Answer: Just as the lion's roar (siṃhanāda, lion's roar) uses milk and cheese to discuss buddha-nature (buddhatā, buddha nature), what prevents Deva (Deva, Deva) from using a clay pot to distinguish the cause and effect of the dharma-kāya (dharma-kāya, dharma body)? Correct mundane and supramundane are both correct. Supramundane is buddha-nature (buddhatā, buddha nature). If buddha-nature (buddhatā, buddha nature) is correct, then svabhāva-buddha (svabhāva-buddha, self-nature buddha) is correct. If svabhāva-buddha (svabhāva-buddha, self-nature buddha) is correct, then the Three Jewels (triratna, three jewels) are correct. Therefore, the matter of cause and effect is very important, and thus it must be discussed. Question: Why specifically refute the views of effect existing in the cause and effect not existing in the cause? Answer: Because existence and non-existence obstruct the Middle Way (madhyamā-pratipad, middle way), they are the root of all views, beings are mostly attached to them, and they are prevalent in the world. Moreover, the Sāṃkhya (Sāṃkhya, enumeration) school takes the twenty-five tattvas with the effect existing in the cause as its doctrine, while the worldly teachers take the six tattvas with the effect not existing in the cause as their doctrine. Now, by refuting their major doctrines, the branches will naturally be refuted. This chapter is divided into four parts: first, refuting the externalist's view that 'existence' does not disappear; second, refuting the view of using 'cause' to prove 'effect exists'; third, refuting the view of each selecting 'cause' to prove 'effect exists'; fourth, refuting the view of wrongly accusing the author of being a nihilist. The externalists say: 'Things are not non-abiding.' Establishing 'existence' has three meanings: first, to impeach the author; second, to establish one's own doctrine; third, to criticize the defender of the world. The end of the previous chapter says that things are constantly arising and ceasing, without any abiding. The externalists are now impeaching the internalist for saying this.

云非不住。有不失故第二自立義宗。轉因為果而不失因。所以明不失者。蓋是僧佉二十五諦大宗故。智度論出彼義云。從冥生覺乃至從大生根。謂從細生粗。根散歸大乃至從覺還冥。謂從粗歸細。雖從細生粗從粗歸細而都無所失。是故立有不失義。又舉有不失證非不住也。無不生故破衛世也。此不釋非不住。註文釋后二句開為四別。先釋有不失以彈內失。若因中無果下斥於世師。但因變為果防提婆及世師二家之難。因既不失果云何生。是故釋云因變為果。故有果生而果體即是因體。故有不失。是故有諸法第四證有情塵及一異等。內曰下破上有不失也。偈本有二。若果生故有不失牒外義也。因失故有失內破也。果生故有果。故果有不失。因失故無因。因有應失。又因果相對失不失亦相對。果既不失因則失也。又並因若不失果則不生。在果若生則因應失。又並因既不失因應不變。若變則失。又若不失則因果不異。既因果有異則應失也。注初牒外不失。瓶即是泥團正破之也。凡有四難。初作即是難。若瓶果生者第二失因難。若泥團不失下第三作無異難。今實見形時力知名等有異者第四舉五事異驗失難。五事者。一泥瓶兩形異。謂泥形滅瓶形生。謂形失也。二泥時滅瓶時生。三泥力滅瓶力生。四知泥智滅知瓶智生。五泥名滅瓶

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『云非不住』（一切事物並非永恒不變）。『有不失故第二自立義宗』（因為存在『不失』的性質，所以建立了第二種自立的義理宗派）。轉變是因到果的轉變，但不會失去其作為『因』的本質。之所以要闡明『不失』，是因為這關係到僧佉（Samkhya）的二十五諦（tattva）這一重要的宗義。智度論（Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra）中闡述了他們的觀點：從冥（Prakrti，自性）生覺（Buddhi，覺性），乃至從大（Mahat，大 तत्व）生根（indriya，感官），這指的是從細微到粗大的演變；根散歸大，乃至從覺還冥，這指的是從粗大回歸細微的狀態。雖然從細微生出粗大，又從粗大回歸細微，但本質上沒有任何東西失去。因此，他們建立了『有不失』的義理。又舉出『有不失』來證明『非不住』（並非永恒不變）。『無不生故破衛世也』（因為沒有不產生的事物，所以破斥了衛世師的觀點）。這裡沒有解釋『非不住』。註文將後面的兩句話分為四個部分來解釋。首先解釋『有不失』，以此來反駁內在的錯誤觀點。『若因中無果下斥於世師』（如果原因中沒有結果，那麼就斥責了世間的老師）。僅僅是原因轉變為結果，是爲了防止提婆（Deva）以及世間老師兩家的責難。原因既然沒有失去，結果又是如何產生的呢？因此解釋說，原因是轉變為結果的。所以有結果產生，而結果的本體就是原因的本體，所以說『有不失』。因此，『有諸法第四證有情塵及一異等』（存在諸法，第四種證明有情、塵埃以及單一性和差異性等等）。『內曰下破上有不失也』（內在的觀點是用來破斥『有不失』的）。偈頌原本有兩句：『若果生故有不失牒外義也』（如果因為結果產生所以有『不失』，這是引用外道的觀點）。『因失故有失內破也』（因為原因失去所以有『失』，這是內在的破斥）。結果產生，所以有結果，因此結果有『不失』。原因失去，所以沒有原因，原因就應該有『失』。而且，原因和結果相對，『失』和『不失』也是相對的。結果既然沒有失去，那麼原因就失去了。而且，如果原因沒有失去，那麼結果就不會產生。如果結果產生了，那麼原因就應該失去。而且，如果原因沒有失去，那麼原因就不應該改變。如果改變了，那麼就失去了。而且，如果不失去，那麼原因和結果就沒有區別。既然原因和結果有區別，那麼就應該失去。註釋首先引用外道的『不失』。『瓶即是泥團正破之也』（瓶子就是泥團，這正是要破斥的觀點）。總共有四個難點。首先是『作即是難』（製造即是困難）。如果瓶子是結果產生的，那麼第二是『失因難』（失去原因的困難）。如果泥團沒有失去，那麼第三是『作無異難』（製造沒有差異的困難）。現在實際上看到形狀、時間、力量、名稱等有差異，這是第四個『舉五事異驗失難』（舉出五種事物的差異來驗證失去的困難）。五件事是：一是泥和瓶兩種形狀不同，指的是泥的形狀消失，瓶的形狀產生，指的是形狀的失去。二是泥的時間消失，瓶的時間產生。三是泥的力量消失，瓶的力量產生。四是知道泥的智慧消失，知道瓶的智慧產生。五是泥的名稱消失，瓶的名稱產生。

【English Translation】 English version 'Clouds do not abide' (all things are not permanent). 'Having no loss, therefore the second self-established principle' (because the nature of 'no loss' exists, the second self-established principle is established). Transformation is the transformation from cause to effect, but it does not lose its essence as a 'cause'. The reason for clarifying 'no loss' is because it relates to the important doctrine of the twenty-five tattvas (principles) of Samkhya (a school of Indian philosophy). The Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra (Great Wisdom Sutra) explains their view: from Prakrti (primordial nature) arises Buddhi (intellect), and from Mahat (the Great One) arise indriyas (senses), which refers to the evolution from subtle to coarse; the senses scatter and return to Mahat, and from intellect return to Prakrti, which refers to the return from coarse to subtle. Although the subtle gives rise to the coarse, and the coarse returns to the subtle, nothing is lost in essence. Therefore, they established the principle of 'having no loss'. Furthermore, they cite 'having no loss' to prove 'not abiding' (not being permanent). 'Having no non-arising, therefore refuting the Vaisheshika school' (because there is nothing that does not arise, the views of the Vaisheshika school are refuted). There is no explanation of 'not abiding' here. The commentary divides the following two sentences into four parts to explain. First, explain 'having no loss' to refute the internal erroneous views. 'If there is no effect in the cause, then the worldly teachers are rebuked' (if there is no result in the cause, then the worldly teachers are rebuked). The mere transformation of cause into effect is to prevent the criticism from both Deva and the worldly teachers. Since the cause is not lost, how does the effect arise? Therefore, it is explained that the cause is transformed into the effect. Therefore, there is the arising of the effect, and the substance of the effect is the substance of the cause, so it is said 'having no loss'. Therefore, 'having all dharmas, the fourth proves sentient beings, dust, and oneness and difference, etc.' 'The internal says below to refute having no loss' (the internal view is used to refute 'having no loss'). The gatha (verse) originally has two lines: 'If the effect arises, therefore having no loss, quoting the external meaning' (if because the effect arises, there is 'no loss', this is quoting the external view). 'Because the cause is lost, therefore having loss, internal refutation' (because the cause is lost, there is 'loss', this is the internal refutation). The effect arises, so there is an effect, therefore the effect has 'no loss'. The cause is lost, so there is no cause, the cause should have 'loss'. Moreover, cause and effect are relative, 'loss' and 'no loss' are also relative. Since the effect is not lost, then the cause is lost. Moreover, if the cause is not lost, then the effect will not arise. If the effect arises, then the cause should be lost. Moreover, if the cause is not lost, then the cause should not change. If it changes, then it is lost. Moreover, if it is not lost, then there is no difference between cause and effect. Since there is a difference between cause and effect, then it should be lost. The commentary first quotes the external 'no loss'. 'The pot is the lump of clay, which is precisely what is to be refuted' (the pot is the lump of clay, which is precisely the view to be refuted). There are a total of four difficulties. The first is 'making is the difficulty' (manufacturing is the difficulty). If the pot is produced as a result, then the second is 'the difficulty of losing the cause' (the difficulty of losing the cause). If the lump of clay is not lost, then the third is 'the difficulty of making no difference' (the difficulty of making no difference). Now, in reality, seeing differences in shape, time, power, name, etc., this is the fourth 'citing five differences to verify the difficulty of loss' (citing the differences in five things to verify the difficulty of loss). The five things are: first, the shapes of clay and pot are different, referring to the disappearance of the shape of clay and the appearance of the shape of the pot, referring to the loss of shape. Second, the time of clay disappears, and the time of the pot appears. Third, the power of clay disappears, and the power of the pot appears. Fourth, the wisdom of knowing clay disappears, and the wisdom of knowing the pot appears. Fifth, the name of clay disappears, and the name of the pot appears.

名生。外曰如指屈伸救上因失義也。外未必發言但動搖于指。如智度論法師說五戒國王興難而舉指答之。今亦爾也。指雖屈伸形異而指體不失。如泥瓶形異而有性不異。又上以五事異證因失。指亦五事異而指不失。問外人何故舉指通耶。答有三義。一者現事可見。二不必須口言直動指而已。三大明有不失有二法。上來已明外瓶等有不失。從此去欲明內有不失。內法中有二。一別指法二少壯老。總人此二總一切內事盡。內曰不然業能異故者。屈伸動搖是指家之業。能是指體。所以詺體為能者。以指能屈能申故名能也。然指與屈伸為異。汝有性與泥瓶不異。不應以異喻于不異。若屈申與指不異者凡有七難。一以屈申從指。指一則屈申一。二以指從屈申。屈申既二指亦應二。三指一屈申不一。指與屈申異。四屈申二指不二。則屈申與指異。五者欲令體一而不相從則墮亦一亦異。上已說之。第六屈申與指一。屈時無復申屈時應無指。若屈時猶有指則屈時猶有申。七屈申與指一。指一屈申二。亦應屈申與指一指二屈申一也。外曰如少壯老救上業能異之難也。雖有少壯老異終是一人。雖有屈申異終是一指。雖有土泥瓶異終是一體。成論師始終相續終是一人。故初托胎名名色人。次名五陰人。乃至少壯老人。又如心神正目為主。至佛

不異而名字異耳。婆沙出二種論。一物性變論。謂變少為老故始終是一人。二有物性往來論。云不變少作老。但年少來在老中。故老人憶少時事。婆沙云。此皆八邪義非佛所說也。內曰不一故者破上老少一體也。謂少形名力知時五事滅前老五事生后。豈一體也。若一體者老應具少五事。則是于少何名老耶。亦應有五難三關。老少與人一。人一則老少一。人與老少一。老少異則人異。例上可知也。複次若有不失者。此破有近遠二生。遠生者就彼大宗義破之。汝二十五諦皆是有法。雖從細至粗從粗至細而有性不失。有既不失。虛空無法。無中無失。若爾天下都無有失。本對失論得。在失既無。故得亦無。二者自上已來別明內外法無失竟。今總彰內外無失之過。三接上破老少生。老時不失此是有法不失。無老之中無無所失。破意同前。注云泥團不應變為瓶者。此亦得是並。不失則不變。若變則失。又相對破之。有對無失對不失。有既不失無應失也。外曰無失有何咎。二十五諦有性不失。是彼大宗故不以為過。注云泥團不變為瓶者。馮師云。天親與外作義太過。彼但云變故不失。非不變故不失。今明一義。一上以不變並不失。外道滯並改宗例之。二變有二種。一失滅名變。二轉變稱變。今言不變者無失滅之變。故文云無無常。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本只是名稱不同而已。婆沙（Vibhasa，一種佛教論著）提出了兩種理論。一是物性變論，認為雖然從年輕變老，但始終是一個人。二是有物性往來論，認為不是年輕變老，而是年輕時的事物來到了老年之中，所以老年人能回憶起年輕時的事情。婆沙（Vibhasa）說，這些都是八邪之義，不是佛陀所說的。內文說『不一故』，是爲了破斥上面老少一體的說法。意思是說，少年時的形、名、力、知、時這五事滅去之後，老年時的五事才產生，怎麼能說是一體呢？如果是一體的話，老年應該具備少年時的五事，那對於少年來說，又何來老年之說呢？也應該有五難三關。老少與人是一體的，人是一體，那麼老少就是一體。人與老少是一體的，老少不同，那麼人就不同。道理和上面一樣。再次，如果有什麼東西不會失去，這是爲了破斥有近生和遠生兩種說法。遠生是指針對他們大宗的理論來破斥。你們的二十五諦都是有法，雖然從細到粗，從粗到細，但其性質不會失去。既然有不會失去，虛空是無法，無中沒有失去。如果這樣，天下都沒有失去。本來是針對失去來討論得到，既然失去不存在，那麼得到也不存在。第二，從上面開始，分別說明了內外法沒有失去的過失。現在總的來說明內外沒有失去的過失。第三，接著上面破斥老少生。老的時候不失去，這是有法不失去。沒有老的時候，沒有無所失去。破斥的意義和前面相同。註釋說泥團不應該變為瓶子，這也可以說是並列的。不失去就不會改變，如果改變就會失去。又相對地破斥它。有對無，失去對不失去。既然有不失去，那麼無就應該失去。外道說，沒有失去有什麼過錯？二十五諦的性質不會失去，這是他們大宗的觀點，所以不認為是過錯。註釋說泥團不變為瓶子，馮師說，天親和外道辯論太過。他們只是說改變所以不失去，而不是不變所以不失去。現在說明一個道理。一是上面用不變並列不失去，外道拘泥於並列而改變了宗派的例子。二是改變有兩種，一是失滅叫做改變，二是轉變叫做改變。現在說的不變是沒有失滅的改變，所以文中說沒有無常。

【English Translation】 English version They are not different, only the names are different. The Vibhasa (a type of Buddhist treatise) puts forth two theories. One is the theory of the change of the nature of things, which holds that although one changes from young to old, one is always the same person. The second is the theory of the coming and going of the nature of things, which holds that it is not that the young change to old, but that the things of youth come into old age, so that the old can remember the things of youth. The Vibhasa says that these are all eight heretical meanings, not what the Buddha said. The inner text says 'not one,' in order to refute the above statement that old and young are one. It means that after the five things of youth—form, name, strength, knowledge, and time—have disappeared, the five things of old age arise, so how can they be said to be one? If they were one, old age should possess the five things of youth, so what would be called old age for youth? There should also be five difficulties and three barriers. Old age and youth are one with the person, if the person is one, then old age and youth are one. The person is one with old age and youth, if old age and youth are different, then the person is different. The reasoning is the same as above. Furthermore, if there is something that is not lost, this is to refute the two theories of near birth and far birth. Far birth refers to refuting their major sect's theory. Your twenty-five tattvas (principles) are all existing dharmas, although they go from subtle to coarse and from coarse to subtle, their nature is not lost. Since existence is not lost, space (akasha) is a non-existent dharma, and there is no loss in non-existence. If this is the case, there is no loss in the world. Originally, the discussion of gain was in relation to loss, since loss does not exist, then gain does not exist either. Second, from above, the faults of not losing internal and external dharmas have been explained separately. Now, the faults of not losing internal and external dharmas are explained in general. Third, following the above, the birth of old age and youth is refuted. Not losing in old age means that existing dharmas are not lost. When there is no old age, there is nothing to lose. The meaning of the refutation is the same as before. The commentary says that a lump of clay should not be transformed into a bottle, which can also be said to be parallel. Not losing means not changing, and if it changes, it will be lost. It is also refuted relatively. Existence is opposed to non-existence, and loss is opposed to non-loss. Since existence is not lost, then non-existence should be lost. The outsider says, what is wrong with not losing? The nature of the twenty-five tattvas is not lost, which is their major sect's view, so they do not consider it a fault. The commentary says that a lump of clay does not change into a bottle. Master Feng said that Vasubandhu (a famous Buddhist philosopher) argued too much with the outsiders. They only said that change does not lead to loss, not that not changing does not lead to loss. Now, let's explain one principle. First, the above uses not changing in parallel with not losing, and the outsiders are attached to the parallel and change the example of the sect. Second, there are two kinds of change: one is called change by loss and destruction, and the other is called change by transformation. The unchanging we are talking about now is the change without loss and destruction, so the text says there is no impermanence.

驗知爾也。內曰若無無常無罪福等破上不失義也。罪既無失則常是罪故無福。福亦爾。又若無無常亦無有常則一切無。又若無有失則煩惱永不可失無得解脫。又罪若不失福亦不生。則一切法猶如虛空則不生不滅。外曰因中前有果下。自上已來第一破彼二十五諦大宗明有不失義。今第二正破因中前有果。今外前舉因有證因中有果。若無果與非因不異。今既有因非因異。非因既無果。則驗因中已有果。如數人云因有果性。論因有果理異非性理。內曰下有二。一牒二破。若因中前有果故有果牒外義也。果無故因無果次破也。汝實不見因中有果。但見果從因生。謂因中前有果者。亦應見瓶果后時破壞。應說因中無果。若見果壞不言因中無。亦見果成不說因中有。又例並云。若見后時無而因中前有者。亦見後有應因中無。又無非因中無乃是后時無。則無自然為亦當有是自然有。又若因中本無此無後方無者。亦因中本無此有後自有耳。外曰因果一故救上因中無果義。我因果體一。壞因為果。既不無因。今果破壞。豈是無果。如變泥為瓶瓶不失土。變瓶為土亦不失瓶。雖覆成壞不同而常是有義。故非因中無果。內曰若因果一無未來破因果一義也。明泥時本以瓶為未來。泥即是瓶故無未來。捉瓶望泥泥為過去。只瓶是泥亦無過去。又捉

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本驗知就是這樣。內方觀點認為，如果說沒有無常、沒有罪福等等，這破壞了『不失』的意義。如果罪過不會失去，那麼常態就是罪過，因此沒有福報。福報也是同樣的道理。而且，如果沒有無常，也就沒有常，那麼一切都將不存在。此外，如果沒有失去，那麼煩惱將永遠無法失去，也就無法得到解脫。而且，如果罪過不失去，福報也不會產生。那麼一切法就如同虛空一樣，不生不滅。外方觀點認為，原因中先前就存在結果。從上面開始，第一是駁斥對方二十五諦的大宗，闡明『有不失』的意義。現在第二是正面駁斥原因中先前就存在結果。現在外方首先舉出原因中有結果的證據，如果原因中沒有結果，那麼原因就和非原因沒有區別。現在既然有原因和非原因的區別，非原因既然沒有結果，那麼就可以驗證原因中已經有結果。就像數論者所說的，原因具有結果的性質。論證原因中有結果的道理不同於性質的道理。內方觀點認為，下面有兩點。第一是重複，第二是駁斥。如果原因中先前就存在結果，所以有結果，這是重複外方的觀點。因為沒有結果，所以原因中沒有結果，這是接下來的駁斥。你實際上沒有看到原因中有結果，只是看到結果從原因中產生。如果說原因中先前就存在結果，那麼也應該看到瓶子這個結果在之後破壞。應該說原因中沒有結果。如果看到結果破壞，卻不說原因中沒有結果，也看到結果形成，卻不說原因中存在結果。又例如並列的說法，如果看到之後沒有，而原因中先前有，那麼也看到之後有，就應該說原因中沒有。而且，沒有非原因中的沒有，而是之後才沒有。那麼沒有自然而然地存在，也應當有自然而然地存在。而且，如果原因中本來沒有，這種沒有之後才沒有，那麼原因中本來沒有，這種有之後才自己有罷了。外方觀點認為，原因和結果是一體的，所以要挽救上面原因中沒有結果的說法。我的原因和結果的本體是一體的。破壞原因就是結果。既然不是沒有原因，現在結果破壞，怎麼能說是沒有結果呢？就像把泥土變成瓶子，瓶子不會失去泥土。把瓶子變成泥土，也不會失去瓶子。雖然形成和破壞不同，但常態是有意義的。所以不是原因中沒有結果。內方觀點認為，如果原因和結果是一體的，那麼就沒有未來，這是駁斥原因和結果是一體的說法。說明泥土的時候，本來把瓶子作為未來。泥土就是瓶子，所以沒有未來。拿著瓶子看泥土，泥土就是過去。只有瓶子是泥土，也沒有過去。而且拿著

【English Translation】 English version It is known to be so. The internal view says that if there is no impermanence, no sin and merit, etc., it violates the meaning of 'non-loss'. If sin is not lost, then the constant state is sin, so there is no merit. Merit is also the same. Moreover, if there is no impermanence, then there is no permanence, so everything will not exist. Furthermore, if there is no loss, then afflictions will never be lost, and there will be no liberation. Moreover, if sin is not lost, merit will not arise. Then all dharmas are like empty space, neither arising nor ceasing. The external view says that the result exists in the cause beforehand. From above, the first is to refute the opponent's great principle of twenty-five truths, clarifying the meaning of 'existence without loss'. Now the second is to directly refute the existence of the result in the cause beforehand. Now the external party first cites the evidence that the result exists in the cause. If there is no result in the cause, then the cause is no different from the non-cause. Now that there is a difference between cause and non-cause, and since non-cause has no result, then it can be verified that the result already exists in the cause. Just like what the Samkhya (a school of Indian philosophy) people say, the cause has the nature of the result. Arguing that there is a result in the cause is different from the principle of nature. The internal view says that there are two points below. The first is repetition, and the second is refutation. If the result exists in the cause beforehand, so there is a result, this is repeating the external party's view. Because there is no result, so there is no result in the cause, this is the next refutation. You do not actually see the result in the cause, but only see the result arising from the cause. If you say that the result exists in the cause beforehand, then you should also see the destruction of the result of the pot later. It should be said that there is no result in the cause. If you see the result destroyed but do not say that there is no result in the cause, and you also see the result formed but do not say that the result exists in the cause. Also, for example, parallel statements, if you see that there is nothing later, but there was something in the cause beforehand, then you also see that there is something later, and you should say that there is nothing in the cause. Moreover, the absence is not the absence in the non-cause, but only the absence later. Then there is no naturally existing, and there should also be naturally existing. Moreover, if there was originally nothing in the cause, and this absence only exists later, then there was originally nothing in the cause, and this existence only exists by itself later. The external view says that the cause and result are one, so it is necessary to save the above statement that there is no result in the cause. My cause and result are one entity. Destroying the cause is the result. Since it is not without cause, now that the result is destroyed, how can it be said that there is no result? Just like turning clay into a pot, the pot will not lose the clay. Turning the pot into clay will not lose the pot either. Although formation and destruction are different, the constant state is meaningful. So it is not that there is no result in the cause. The internal view says that if the cause and result are one, then there is no future, this is refuting the statement that the cause and result are one. Explaining the time of clay, originally regarded the pot as the future. Clay is the pot, so there is no future. Holding the pot and looking at the clay, the clay is the past. Only the pot is the clay, and there is no past either. Moreover, holding

泥望于瓶土名為過未。瓶土即泥故無過未。外曰名等失生故。以名失名生故有三世通內難也。體無生失故因果不異。自宗便成。注云瓶甕安在。瓶甕之體安然而在。謂體不失則有宗便成。但名有失生故有在不在三世立也。內曰若爾無果。破上名有失生體無失生也。凡有二難。一者捉名難體。本以名召體以體應名。若前有果體應前有果名。若前無果名亦前無果體。二者因中若前無果名體名是一物。因中既前無果名。即是因中無果。外曰不定故者救上因中無果難也。所以因中前有果體未立果名者。以因中不定出一器。是故未得為果作名。故雖無有名而有果體。內曰若泥不定果亦不定。若泥不定者牒外義也。果亦不定正破也。汝言不定作一物故不得為瓶立名故無名者。亦應不得定作一物有義亦應不定。所以有不定者。此泥或作瓶或作余物故也。外曰微形有故者。泥中定有微形故有義定也。肉眼乃不見天眼既見未來則見泥中微形。注為三。一釋偈本明有定。有二種不可知者第二防難。難云。既是微形何由可知。既不可知何得言有。是故今明二不可知。一無不可知。如不知兔角。二有不可知。同於八緣。如是泥團中瓶下第三舉非因推驗因中有。以要從因出不從非因出。非因既無則知因有。內曰若前有微形因中無果。此縱細奪有也

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本外曰：如果認為泥土在瓶子（指用泥土製作的器皿）中，就有了『過去』和『未來』的概念。如果瓶子的本質就是泥土，那麼就不存在『過去』和『未來』。外道說，這是因為名稱等會消失和產生。因為名稱的消失和產生，所以有了三世（過去、現在、未來）的說法，這與內道（佛教）的觀點相悖。內曰：如果本體沒有消失和產生，那麼因和果就沒有區別。如果這樣，你們自己的宗義就成立了。註釋說：瓶子和甕在哪裡？瓶子和甕的本體安然存在。意思是說，如果本體沒有消失，那麼你們的宗義就成立了。只是名稱有消失和產生，所以才有了『在』和『不在』的三世的說法。內曰：如果這樣，就沒有果了。這是爲了駁斥上面所說的『名稱有消失和產生，本體沒有消失和產生』的觀點。總共有兩個難點：一是執著于名稱而忽略本體。本來是用名稱來指代本體，用本體來應和名稱。如果先前有果的本體，就應該先前有果的名稱。如果先前沒有果的名稱，那麼先前也沒有果的本體。二是因中如果先前沒有果的名稱，那麼本體和名稱就是一回事。因中既然先前沒有果的名稱，那就是因中沒有果。外曰：『不定』，是爲了反駁上面所說的『因中沒有果』的難點。之所以因中先前有果的本體，但沒有建立果的名稱，是因為因中不確定會產生什麼器物。所以，雖然沒有名稱，但有果的本體。內曰：如果泥土是不確定的，那麼果也是不確定的。如果泥土是不確定的，這是重複外道的觀點。『果也是不確定的』，這是直接駁斥。你說因為不確定會做什麼東西，所以不能為瓶子立名，所以沒有名稱。那麼，也應該不能確定會做什麼東西，也應該是不確定的。之所以說不確定，是因為這泥土或者可以做成瓶子，或者可以做成其他東西。外曰：因為有微細的形狀，所以有確定的意義。泥土中一定有微細的形狀，所以有確定的意義。肉眼看不見，但天眼能看見未來，所以能看見泥土中的微細形狀。註釋分為三點：一是解釋偈頌的根本，說明有確定性。有二種不可知。二是防止責難。責難說：既然是微細的形狀，怎麼能知道？既然不可知，怎麼能說有？所以現在說明二種不可知：一，沒有不可知，比如不知道兔角。二，有不可知，如同八緣。如同泥團中瓶子。三是舉出非因，推驗因中有。一定要從因中產生，不能從非因中產生。非因既然沒有，就知道因中有。內曰：如果先前有微細的形狀，那麼因中就沒有果。這是縱容細微之處，奪取大的方面。

【English Translation】 English version The outsider says: If one considers the clay in the pot (referring to a vessel made of clay), then the concepts of 'past' and 'future' arise. If the essence of the pot is simply clay, then there is no 'past' or 'future'. The outsider argues that this is because names, etc., disappear and arise. Because of the disappearance and arising of names, the concept of the three times (past, present, future) exists, which contradicts the inner path's (Buddhist) view. The insider says: If the substance does not disappear or arise, then there is no difference between cause and effect. If this is the case, your own doctrine is established. The commentary says: Where are the pot and the urn? The substance of the pot and the urn exists peacefully. This means that if the substance does not disappear, then your doctrine is established. It is only because names disappear and arise that the three times of 'existence' and 'non-existence' are established. The insider says: If that is the case, then there is no effect. This is to refute the above statement that 'names disappear and arise, but the substance does not disappear or arise'. There are two main difficulties: first, clinging to names while ignoring the substance. Originally, names are used to refer to substances, and substances are used to correspond to names. If there is a substance of the effect beforehand, then there should be a name of the effect beforehand. If there is no name of the effect beforehand, then there is no substance of the effect beforehand. Second, if there is no name of the effect beforehand in the cause, then the substance and the name are the same thing. Since there is no name of the effect beforehand in the cause, it means that there is no effect in the cause. The outsider says: 'Indeterminate' is to refute the above difficulty of 'no effect in the cause'. The reason why there is a substance of the effect beforehand in the cause, but no name of the effect is established, is because it is uncertain what kind of vessel will be produced from the cause. Therefore, although there is no name, there is a substance of the effect. The insider says: If the clay is indeterminate, then the effect is also indeterminate. If the clay is indeterminate, this is repeating the outsider's view. 'The effect is also indeterminate' is a direct refutation. You say that because it is uncertain what will be made, a name cannot be established for the pot, so there is no name. Then, it should also be uncertain what will be made, and it should also be indeterminate. The reason why it is said to be indeterminate is because this clay can either be made into a pot or into something else. The outsider says: Because there are subtle forms, there is a definite meaning. There must be subtle forms in the clay, so there is a definite meaning. The physical eye cannot see it, but the heavenly eye can see the future, so it can see the subtle forms in the clay. The commentary is divided into three points: first, to explain the root of the verse, explaining that there is certainty. There are two kinds of unknowable things. Second, to prevent criticism. The criticism says: Since they are subtle forms, how can they be known? Since they are unknowable, how can it be said that they exist? Therefore, now explain two kinds of unknowable things: one, there is no unknowable, such as not knowing rabbit horns. Two, there is the unknowable, like the eight conditions. Like the pot in the lump of clay. Third, to cite non-causes and infer that there is something in the cause. It must be produced from the cause, and cannot be produced from the non-cause. Since the non-cause does not exist, it is known that there is something in the cause. The insider says: If there are subtle forms beforehand, then there is no effect in the cause. This is indulging in the subtle aspects and taking away the big picture.

。因中有細而無有粗。當知粗果本無今有。又有細無粗則亦有亦無。同勒沙婆義。又因中無粗則粗果從非因生。又汝有義定細亦應定因。內有細應還生細果。又若粗細不定有亦不定。又因中有果粗細並有即應並生。又若生粗不生細則粗有而細無。外曰因中應有果各取因故第三破外人各取因證有果。與前第二番異者。前直明因有故證有果。此簡異因非因。今明各取因者就因簡。因以諸因。以生果各異則驗因中有果。若因中無果者則諸因便亂生。又果亦亂從。而因不亂生果不亂從。則驗因中定有果也。注云埏埴成器堪受燒故者。本起經云。埏埴調柔。謂和泥也。莊子外篇馬蹄篇云柔治埴。司馬彪注云。埴者土也。可以為器者也。尚書禹貢赤埴亦謂土也。𡋺者和也。以手柔治之耳。其輪謂之鈞。內曰若當有有若當無無破上各取因證因中有果也。此與上破異者。上明眼見瓶從泥出。驗因中有果。亦眼見瓶破應因中無果。此就現成壞驗因中有無。今就當義破之。汝果非是現有必是當有。泥中之瓶有當成義復有當破義。若泥中瓶當成義遂言因中有果者。亦因中瓶當破義亦應當無果。二者上就體成壞破。今就相成壞破也。外曰生住壞次第有故無過救上當無之難也。泥中之瓶雖有當成當破。但當成在當破前當破在當成后。以當成在前今

【現代漢語翻譯】因中只有細微的成分而沒有粗大的成分。應當知道粗大的果實本來沒有，現在才有的。又有細微的成分而沒有粗大的成分，那麼可以說是有，也可以說是沒有，如同勒沙婆（Leśa，微少）的意義。又如果因中沒有粗大的成分，那麼粗大的果實就成了從非因產生的。又按照你的說法，既然確定有細微的成分，也應該確定有作為因的成分。內部有細微的成分，應該還會產生細微的果實。又如果粗細不定，那麼有也不確定。又如果因中既有粗大的果實也有細微的果實，就應該同時產生。又如果產生粗大的果實而不產生細微的果實，那麼就是粗大的果實有而細微的果實沒有。外人說，因中應該有果實，因為各自取因的緣故。這是第三次破斥外人各自取因來證明因中有果的觀點。與前面第二次不同的是，前面直接說明因為有因，所以證明有果。這裡簡要區分了異因和非因。現在說明各自取因，是從因的角度來簡別。以諸因，因為產生的果實各不相同，所以可以驗證因中是有果實的。如果因中沒有果實，那麼諸因就會混亂地產生，果實也會混亂地產生。而因不混亂地產生果實，果實也不混亂地產生，那麼就可以驗證因中一定有果實。註釋說，『埏埴成器堪受燒故』，本起經說，『埏埴調柔』，是指和泥。莊子外篇馬蹄篇說『柔治埴』，司馬彪註釋說，『埴者土也，可以為器者也』。尚書禹貢赤埴也是指土。𡋺者是和的意思，用手柔和地治理它。那個輪子叫做鈞。內人說，如果應當有，那麼就有；如果應當沒有，那麼就沒有。這是爲了破斥上面各自取因來證明因中有果的觀點。這與上面的破斥不同的是，上面是說明眼見瓶子從泥土中產生，驗證因中有果；也眼見瓶子破碎，應該因中沒有果。這是就現成的成壞來驗證因中的有無。現在就應當的意義來破斥它。你的果實不是現在有的，一定是將來有的。泥土中的瓶子有將要成就的意義，也有將要破滅的意義。如果泥土中的瓶子有將要成就的意義，就說因中有果，那麼因中的瓶子有將要破滅的意義，也應當沒有果。前者是就體（本體）的成壞來破斥，現在是就相（現象）的成壞來破斥。外人說，因為生、住、壞依次存在，所以沒有當無的過失，可以用來補救上面當無的責難。泥土中的瓶子雖然有將要成就和將要破滅，但是將要成就的在將要破滅的前面，將要破滅的在將要成就的後面。因為將要成就的在前面，現在

【English Translation】 In the cause, there are only subtle elements and no coarse elements. It should be known that the coarse fruit originally did not exist and only exists now. Also, if there are subtle elements but no coarse elements, then it can be said to exist or not exist, like the meaning of Leśa (微少, a small amount). Furthermore, if there are no coarse elements in the cause, then the coarse fruit would be produced from a non-cause. Also, according to your argument, since the subtle elements are determined, the elements that serve as the cause should also be determined. If there are subtle elements inside, they should also produce subtle fruits. Moreover, if the coarse and subtle are not determined, then existence is also uncertain. Furthermore, if there are both coarse and subtle fruits in the cause, they should be produced simultaneously. Also, if coarse fruits are produced but subtle fruits are not, then the coarse fruits exist while the subtle fruits do not. The outsider says that there should be fruit in the cause because each takes the cause. This is the third refutation of the outsider's view of each taking the cause to prove that there is fruit in the cause. The difference from the second time before is that the previous one directly stated that because there is a cause, it proves that there is fruit. Here, it briefly distinguishes between different causes and non-causes. Now, explaining each taking the cause is to distinguish from the perspective of the cause. With all causes, because the fruits produced are different, it can be verified that there is fruit in the cause. If there is no fruit in the cause, then all causes will produce in a chaotic manner, and the fruits will also be produced in a chaotic manner. However, the cause does not produce fruit in a chaotic manner, and the fruit is not produced in a chaotic manner, then it can be verified that there must be fruit in the cause. The commentary says, '埏埴成器堪受燒故 (shān zhí chéng qì kān shòu shāo gù, molding clay into a vessel that can be fired),' the Benqi Sutra says, '埏埴調柔 (shān zhí tiáo róu, molding clay is pliable),' which refers to mixing mud. The Outer Chapters of Zhuangzi, 'The Hoof,' says '柔治埴 (róu zhì zhí, gently working the clay),' and Sima Biao's commentary says, '埴者土也，可以為器者也 (zhí zhě tǔ yě, kě yǐ wéi qì zhě yě, clay is earth, which can be made into vessels).' The Tribute of Yu in the Book of Documents also refers to earth as 赤埴 (chì zhí, red clay). 𡋺者 (𡋺 zhě) means harmony, gently working it with the hands. That wheel is called 鈞 (jūn). The insider says, if it should exist, then it exists; if it should not exist, then it does not exist. This is to refute the above view of each taking the cause to prove that there is fruit in the cause. The difference between this and the above refutation is that the above explains that seeing the bottle produced from the mud verifies that there is fruit in the cause; also seeing the bottle broken, there should be no fruit in the cause. This is to verify the existence or non-existence in the cause based on the existing formation and destruction. Now, it is refuted based on the meaning of what should be. Your fruit is not what exists now, it must be what will exist in the future. The bottle in the mud has the meaning of being about to be accomplished, and also has the meaning of being about to be destroyed. If the bottle in the mud has the meaning of being about to be accomplished, and it is said that there is fruit in the cause, then the bottle in the cause has the meaning of being about to be destroyed, and there should also be no fruit. The former is to refute based on the formation and destruction of the substance (體, tǐ), and now it is to refute based on the formation and destruction of the phenomena (相, xiàng). The outsider says that because birth, dwelling, and decay exist in sequence, there is no fault of 'should not exist,' which can be used to remedy the above accusation of 'should not exist.' Although the bottle in the mud has what is about to be accomplished and what is about to be destroyed, what is about to be accomplished is before what is about to be destroyed, and what is about to be destroyed is after what is about to be accomplished. Because what is about to be accomplished is in front, now

從前故言因中當有。當破既在後那得跨從后而言因中無果。如生住壞次第有者。引相例法體也。要前生次住后壞。當有瓶生時未有成壞。將何物來壞瓶今瓶無耶。譬喻部明。三剎那為三相。當初剎那生時未有住壞。與此義同。成實師實法三相一念六十剎那。前二十為生。次二十為住。后二十為滅。與此亦同。內曰若生前非后無果同破上生住滅次第也。泥中之瓶但有當生未有當住當滅。是則因中無住滅兩相。故無果同也。此住滅兩相即是于果。既無二相故名無果。又泥中之瓶具有三相。汝但從有生相言因中有果者。無住滅兩相。應因中無果。又三相相待既無住滅。待何說生。是故無生以無三相則無法體。故因中無果。又當有生時未有住滅。則法體不備三相便非有為法。若非有為亦非無為即無此物。又是因中無果。注為二。初破三相一時。即破毗曇等義。若言泥中瓶有三相同時在未來者。何故要前生后壞不前壞後生。汝言未生故下第二破三相前後。即破譬喻等義。外曰汝破因中有果故有斷過第四破外人橫過論主。今前外過於內。一者見因果之理不出有無。既見內破有即謂內執無。二者上借無破有謂內執無。若因中無果則果不生。果既不生無果起續。故名為斷。三者涅槃經云。眾生起見凡有二種。一斷二常。前執有成常。今

舍常入斷。有所得心必依倚故也。內曰續故不斷壞故不常。續故不斷破其斷見。壞故不常破其常見。以其前執于斷故前破斷。除斷恐還入常。故次破常。問舊亦云。實滅不常假續不斷。與今何異。答彼義實滅不常猶是斷義。續故不斷猶是常義。故乃執常為不斷。執斷為不常。此乃斷常互存。猶是斷常義耳。今明蓋是兩彈非雙取也。言其非常者。明其非是常。非謂是非常。不斷亦爾。又常雲實滅不常假續不斷乃無斷常而有生滅。今明既不斷常即不生滅。故中論云。深求不常不斷即是不生不滅。又舊雖明不斷不常而猶執二世無義。數人不斷不常執二世有義。今明不斷不常即非無非有。顯在註文。問論主何故作續故不斷壞故不常。答云。若論始末有二破。一就緣破。如就執有求有無從。二對緣破。但對緣破有二。一借無破有借邪破邪。二申正破邪。即今文是也。以外通不出因中有無。有即是常無即是斷。今對有無斷常明非有非無不斷不常故。是中道即對偏明中。問今續故不斷壞故不常云何是非有非無。答續故不斷破因中無。壞故不常破因中有。僧佉執因中有。因不失壞故也。

破因中無果品第八

內外二家根本有無兩執。僧佉執有衛世計無。內上座計有大眾部執無。前正破外有傍破內有。今正破外無傍破內無。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本捨棄常的觀念而趨向斷滅的觀念，是因為有所得的心必然有所依賴的緣故。內在的觀點認為，相續不斷所以不是斷滅，壞滅所以不是常。相續不斷是爲了破除斷見，壞滅所以不是常是爲了破除常見。因為之前執著于斷見，所以先破除斷見，去除斷見后又恐怕陷入常見，所以接著破除常見。有人問：舊的理論也說，實體滅盡所以不是常，假相延續所以不是斷，這和現在的說法有什麼不同？回答說：舊的理論認為實體滅盡所以不是常，仍然是斷滅的含義；相續不斷所以不是斷，仍然是常的含義。所以他們執著于常，認為它是不斷滅的；執著于斷，認為它不是常。這實際上是斷和常相互依存，仍然是斷常的含義。現在所闡明的，大概是同時否定兩者，而不是同時肯定兩者。說它不是常，是說明它不是常，而不是說它非常。不斷也是這樣。而且，舊的理論說實體滅盡所以不是常，假相延續所以不是斷，這實際上是沒有斷常而有生滅。現在所闡明的是，既然不斷常，就是不生滅。所以《中論》說，深入探求不常不斷，就是不生不滅。而且，舊的理論雖然闡明不斷不常，但仍然執著於二世（過去世和未來世）沒有意義。數論者認為不斷不常，執著於二世有意義。現在所闡明的是，不斷不常就是非無非有，這在註文中已經很明顯了。有人問：論主為什麼說相續不斷所以不是斷，壞滅所以不是常？回答說：如果從始末來論，有兩種破除的方法。一是就緣起而破，比如就執著于有來尋求有，那是沒有結果的。二是對緣起而破，但對緣起而破有兩種：一是借無破有，借邪破邪；二是闡明正理來破除邪見，也就是現在的文句。外道普遍不能超出因中是否有。有就是常，無就是斷。現在針對有無斷常，闡明非有非無、不斷非常，所以是中道，也就是針對偏頗來闡明中道。有人問：現在說相續不斷所以不是斷，壞滅所以不是常，怎麼能說它是非有非無呢？回答說：相續不斷是爲了破除因中無，壞滅所以不是常是爲了破除因中有。僧佉（Samkhya，數論）認為因中是有，因為因不會失壞的緣故。破因中無果品第八內外兩家根本上有有和無兩種執著。僧佉（Samkhya，數論）執著于有，衛世（Vaisheshika，勝論）計執著于無。內道中，上座部計執著于有，大眾部執著于無。前面是正面破除外道的有，同時從側面破除內道的有。現在是正面破除外道的無，同時從側面破除內道的無。

【English Translation】 English version Abandoning the notion of permanence and leaning towards the notion of cessation is because a mind that gains something inevitably relies on something. Internal views state that continuity prevents cessation, and decay prevents permanence. Continuity prevents cessation to refute the view of annihilation, and decay prevents permanence to refute the view of eternalism. Because of the previous attachment to the view of annihilation, it is refuted first. After removing the view of annihilation, there is fear of falling into eternalism, so permanence is refuted next. Someone asks: The old theory also says that the substance ceases so it is not permanent, and the false appearance continues so it is not cessation. How is this different from the current statement? The answer is: The old theory believes that the substance ceases so it is not permanent, which still carries the meaning of annihilation; continuity prevents cessation, which still carries the meaning of permanence. Therefore, they cling to permanence, believing it is not cessation; they cling to cessation, believing it is not permanence. This is actually permanence and cessation coexisting, still carrying the meaning of permanence and cessation. What is now clarified is probably denying both at the same time, rather than affirming both at the same time. Saying it is not permanent is explaining that it is not permanent, not saying that it is very permanent. The same goes for non-cessation. Moreover, the old theory says that the substance ceases so it is not permanent, and the false appearance continues so it is not cessation, which actually means there is no permanence or cessation, but there is arising and ceasing. What is now clarified is that since there is no permanence or cessation, there is no arising or ceasing. Therefore, the Madhyamaka-karika (中論, Treatise on the Middle Way) says that deeply seeking non-permanence and non-cessation is non-arising and non-ceasing. Moreover, although the old theory clarifies non-cessation and non-permanence, it still clings to the idea that the two existences (past and future) have no meaning. The Samkhya (數論) philosophers believe in non-cessation and non-permanence, clinging to the idea that the two existences have meaning. What is now clarified is that non-cessation and non-permanence are neither non-existence nor existence, which is already clear in the commentary. Someone asks: Why did the author of the treatise say that continuity prevents cessation and decay prevents permanence? The answer is: If we discuss it from beginning to end, there are two methods of refutation. One is to refute based on dependent origination, such as seeking existence based on clinging to existence, which yields no result. The second is to refute in contrast to dependent origination, but there are two types of refutation in contrast to dependent origination: one is to use non-existence to refute existence, using wrong views to refute wrong views; the other is to explain the correct principle to refute wrong views, which is the current passage. Externalists universally cannot go beyond whether there is existence or non-existence in the cause. Existence is permanence, and non-existence is cessation. Now, in response to existence, non-existence, permanence, and cessation, it is clarified that there is neither existence nor non-existence, neither cessation nor permanence, so it is the Middle Way, which is clarifying the Middle Way in response to bias. Someone asks: Now saying that continuity prevents cessation and decay prevents permanence, how can it be said that it is neither existence nor non-existence? The answer is: Continuity prevents cessation to refute the non-existence in the cause, and decay prevents permanence to refute the existence in the cause. The Samkhya (數論) believes that there is existence in the cause, because the cause will not be lost. Chapter 8: Refuting the Absence of Effect in the Cause The fundamental attachments of both internal and external schools are the two views of existence and non-existence. The Samkhya (數論) clings to existence, and the Vaisheshika (勝論) clings to non-existence. Within the internal schools, the Sthavira (上座部) clings to existence, and the Mahasanghika (大眾部) clings to non-existence. The previous section directly refuted the existence of external schools, while indirectly refuting the existence of internal schools. This section directly refutes the non-existence of external schools, while indirectly refuting the non-existence of internal schools.

良以有無是眾見根障中道本。所以洗之。又上破僧佉之有今改宗捉無。是故破無。又上借無破有。則有是所破無是能破。上破所破今破能破。又破無為成除有。以有無是相待法。若不破無還生有見。是以破無令有心都息。又此品正破于生不正破無。但為對僧佉之有故破無耳。問何故破生耶。答提婆撰論破有為法凡有四門。一者破一畢竟。因有果品破有為體門。此品破有為相門。體相既除則有為法盡。是故破生。二者論主凡破二法從一異竟。因有果破于別法。謂眾家所計不同。亦法體差別為異。今次破其通法。三相通相有為故名為通。又眾師通立故名為通。是故破生。三者欲示諸法本自無生今亦無滅。令外道悟無生忍。是故無生。四者論主上品末借果生因滅破其斷常。斷常之見雖除生滅之病便起。如他雲實滅不常假續不斷。雖無斷常而有生滅。是故今明既無斷常即不生滅。故次破生滅。上破斷常破外道義。今破假實生滅破內道義。故生此品。品有五段。第一破外人能生證有可生因果義。第二破外可生證有能生義。第三破外人雙舉生可生證有諸法義。第四破舉滅證有生義。第五破引因果證有生可生義。外曰生有故一當成者。生有故者捉論主上明續故不斷之言也。以因滅故不常果生故不斷。汝乃不立斷常而立有生滅。若立有

生滅則與我同。此正是數論及有所得大乘人明有為之法無有斷常而有生滅故言生有故也。一當成者。上立生相今立法體。既有生相。于因中有果無果亦有亦無非有非無四句之中必當有一。內曰生無生不生。前借生滅破斷常。若玄悟者既不執斷常亦不執生滅。但中下鈍根雖不執斷常更執生滅。今次破生滅也。此偈本可有二義。所言生者。謂因中前有果也。無生者。因中前無果也。此二牒彼一當成也。不生者。明生相不能生有果無果故有果無果並皆不生。即破彼生有故之言也。此釋是勢破之耳。非正文意。又望下釋。生者已有法體也。無生者未有法體也。不生者生相不生。此二種法體已有不須生相。未有則生相不能生也。次云。生者明已有生相也。無生者未有生相也。不生者已有生相及未有生相併不能生法體也。汝何得云生有故一當成也。此釋為正。以外人正舉生相證有法體。是故正破生相明不能生法體。又生者離法體外別有生相。如毗曇之流。無生者離法體外無別生相。如即法沙門之例。又生者計生相是有為也。如數論之流。無生者計生相是無為。如毗婆阇婆提之流。此即法離法有為無為並不能生法體。文具含此破意。註釋為二。初就生相有無不能生法體。次明法體有無生相不能生。以天親有此二意故前作兩義釋之。若

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『生滅則與我同』。這正是數論（Samkhya，古印度哲學流派，認為世界由自性和原人構成）以及有所得的大乘修行人所闡明的有為法（conditioned phenomena）的觀點，他們認為有為法並非斷滅或恒常，而是有生有滅，所以說『生有』。『一當成者』，前面確立了生相（mark of arising），現在確立法體（essence of dharma）。既然有生相，那麼在『因中有果』、『因中無果』、『亦有亦無』、『非有非無』這四句之中，必定有一種成立。內曰：『生無生不生』。前面借用生滅來破斥斷常。如果能夠深刻領悟的人，既不執著于斷常，也不執著于生滅。但是中下根器的人，雖然不執著于斷常，卻更加執著于生滅。現在進一步破斥生滅。這句偈頌原本可以有兩種解釋。所說的『生』，是指在因中預先存在果。『無生』，是指在因中預先不存在果。這兩種說法都是針對『一當成』而說的。『不生』，是說明生相不能產生有果或無果，因此有果和無果都不能產生。這便是破斥他們所說的『生有故』。這種解釋是順勢破斥，並非正文的本意。再看下面的解釋，『生』是指已經有了法體。『無生』是指還沒有法體。『不生』是指生相不能產生。這兩種法體，已經存在的，不需要生相；還沒有存在的，生相也不能產生。接下來又說，『生』是說明已經有了生相。『無生』是說明還沒有生相。『不生』是說已經有了生相以及還沒有生相，都不能產生法體。你們怎麼能說『生有故一當成』呢？這種解釋是正確的。因為外道正是舉出生相來證明有法體，所以要正面破斥生相，說明它不能產生法體。另外，『生』是指在法體之外，另有生相，如毗曇（Abhidharma，佛教論藏）的流派。『無生』是指在法體之外，沒有另外的生相，如即法沙門（those who practice dharma）的例子。還有，『生』是認為生相是有為法，如數論的流派。『無生』是認為生相是無為法（unconditioned dharma），如毗婆阇婆提（Vaibhashika，說一切有部）的流派。這即是說，離法、即法、有為、無為，都不能產生法體。文句中包含了這種破斥的含義。註釋分為兩部分。首先就生相的有無，說明不能產生法體。其次說明法體的有無，生相不能產生。因為天親（Vasubandhu）有這兩種意思，所以前面作了兩種解釋。如果

【English Translation】 English version 'Arising and ceasing are the same as me.' This is precisely the view of the Samkhya (an ancient Indian philosophical school that believes the world is composed of Purusha and Prakriti) and those Mahayana practitioners who have attained something, clarifying the conditioned phenomena (arising dharma). They believe that conditioned phenomena are neither annihilated nor constant, but arise and cease, hence the saying 'arising exists'. 'One must be accomplished', the above establishes the mark of arising (utpada-lakshana), now establishing the essence of dharma (dharma-kaya). Since there is a mark of arising, among the four statements 'cause has effect', 'cause has no effect', 'both exists and not exists', 'neither exists nor not exists', one must be established. Internally it says: 'arising, non-arising, not arising'. The previous uses arising and ceasing to refute annihilation and permanence. If those who can profoundly understand, neither cling to annihilation and permanence, nor cling to arising and ceasing. But those of middle and lower capacity, although not clinging to annihilation and permanence, cling more to arising and ceasing. Now further refute arising and ceasing. This verse originally can have two interpretations. The so-called 'arising' refers to the effect that pre-exists in the cause. 'Non-arising' refers to the effect that does not pre-exist in the cause. These two statements are both directed at 'one must be accomplished'. 'Not arising' is to explain that the mark of arising cannot produce the existence or non-existence of the effect, therefore the existence and non-existence of the effect cannot be produced. This is to refute their saying 'arising exists, therefore one must be accomplished'. This explanation is a forceful refutation, not the original meaning of the text. Looking at the following explanation, 'arising' refers to already having the essence of dharma. 'Non-arising' refers to not yet having the essence of dharma. 'Not arising' refers to the mark of arising cannot produce. These two kinds of essence of dharma, already existing, do not need the mark of arising; not yet existing, the mark of arising cannot produce. Next it says, 'arising' is to explain already having the mark of arising. 'Non-arising' is to explain not yet having the mark of arising. 'Not arising' is to say that already having the mark of arising and not yet having the mark of arising, both cannot produce the essence of dharma. How can you say 'arising exists, therefore one must be accomplished'? This explanation is correct. Because the heretics are precisely citing the mark of arising to prove the existence of the essence of dharma, therefore it is necessary to directly refute the mark of arising, explaining that it cannot produce the essence of dharma. In addition, 'arising' refers to having a separate mark of arising outside the essence of dharma, such as the Abhidharma (Buddhist philosophical treatises) school. 'Non-arising' refers to not having a separate mark of arising outside the essence of dharma, such as the example of those who practice dharma. Also, 'arising' is to believe that the mark of arising is conditioned dharma, such as the Samkhya school. 'Non-arising' is to believe that the mark of arising is unconditioned dharma, such as the Vaibhashika (Sarvastivada) school. This is to say that, separate from dharma, identical to dharma, conditioned, unconditioned, all cannot produce the essence of dharma. The sentence contains this meaning of refutation. The commentary is divided into two parts. First, regarding the existence or non-existence of the mark of arising, it explains that it cannot produce the essence of dharma. Secondly, it explains that the existence or non-existence of the essence of dharma, the mark of arising cannot produce. Because Vasubandhu has these two meanings, therefore the previous made two explanations. If

有生者。此牒偈本中生字。因中前有因中前無下此釋偈本中不生字。縱汝有生相。因中前有果不須生相生。因中先無果生相不能生。故無生相也。何況無生下釋偈本中無生字。以有生相於有果無果尚不能生法體。況無生相能生法體也。汝若有瓶生下第二就法體已有未有生相不能生。就此中有兩複次。就瓶有二初。泥有二后。顯法體有無。明生相不能生。瓶有二初者。一瓶初成竟名為瓶初。此是已有不須生相生。二始造瓶初名之為初。此是未有生相不能生。泥有二後者。一是用泥盡竟名為泥后。此是已有不須生相生。二是作泥始竟名為泥后。此是未有生相不能生。而文初複次明一初一后。謂瓶初成及造泥始竟。就此二門撿無生瓶之生。第二複次就用泥盡后及始作瓶初。此是一已一未。驗無生瓶之生。就初又三。一牒二定三破。汝若有瓶生者。縱生牒外人有生瓶之生也。瓶初瓶時下開二關定也。瓶初者作瓶成初也。瓶時者既是瓶成即是瓶時也。為泥團後者造泥始竟名為泥后。非瓶時者既是泥團未有于瓶故云非瓶時也。若瓶初下第三雙難。即為兩別。初又四。一牒。是事不然下總非。何以故下正作難。既是瓶竟則已有不須生相生也。是初中后共相因待者釋成難也。此用瓶口成為初造。瓶腹成為中。瓶底成為后。若無中后則無

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『有生者』：這是指《偈本》中的『生』字。（『因中前有』、『因中前無』）以下解釋《偈本》中的『不生』字。即使你有『生』的表象，如果結果在原因中已經存在，就不需要『生』的表象來產生；如果結果在原因中原本不存在，『生』的表象也無法使其產生。因此，沒有『生』的表象。『何況無生』：以下解釋《偈本》中的『無生』字。因為有『生』的表象，對於有果或無果的情況，尚且不能產生法體，更何況沒有『生』的表象能夠產生法體呢？『汝若有瓶生』：以下第二部分，討論就法體而言，已有的或未有的『生』的表象都不能使其產生。這裡面包含兩次『複次』。第一次『複次』，就瓶子而言，分為『瓶初』和『瓶后』兩種情況；就泥土而言，也分為『泥初』和『泥后』兩種情況。目的是爲了闡明法體的有無，說明『生』的表象不能使其產生。瓶子的情況分為兩種：一是瓶子剛剛完成，稱為『瓶初』，這是已經存在的，不需要『生』的表象來產生；二是開始製造瓶子的時候，稱為『初』，這是未有的，『生』的表象不能使其產生。泥土的情況分為兩種：一是泥土用盡的時候，稱為『泥后』，這是已經存在的，不需要『生』的表象來產生；二是開始製作泥土的時候，稱為『泥后』，這是未有的，『生』的表象不能使其產生。而文中的第一次『複次』，闡明了一個『初』和一個『后』，即瓶子初成和開始製作泥土完成。就這兩個方面來檢驗沒有『生』的瓶子的產生。第二次『複次』，就用盡泥土之後和開始製作瓶子之初，這是一個已有的和一個未有的狀態，驗證沒有『生』的瓶子的產生。就『初』而言，又分為三個步驟：一是提出，二是確定，三是破斥。『汝若有瓶生者』：假設『生』的表象存在於外人所認為的瓶子的產生中。『瓶初瓶時』：以下分為兩個方面來確定。『瓶初』是指製作瓶子完成之初。『瓶時』是指瓶子已經完成的時刻。『為泥團後者』是指開始製作泥土完成的時候，稱為『泥后』。『非瓶時者』是指因為還是泥團，還沒有成為瓶子，所以說不是『瓶時』。『若瓶初』：以下第三部分，進行雙重駁斥，即分為兩個方面。首先又分為四個步驟：一是提出。『是事不然』：總體的否定。『何以故』：正式的駁斥。因為瓶子已經完成，那麼它已經是存在的，不需要『生』的表象來產生。『是初中后共相因待者』：解釋並完成駁斥。這裡用瓶口成為『初』，瓶腹成為『中』，瓶底成為『后』。如果缺少『中』和『后』，那麼就沒有...

【English Translation】 English version 'Having birth': This refers to the word 'birth' ('生') in the Gatha text (Jie Ben) (因中前有 - yin zhong qian you: existing before cause, 因中前無 - yin zhong qian wu: not existing before cause). The following explains the word 'non-birth' ('不生') in the Gatha text. Even if you have the appearance of 'birth', if the result already exists in the cause, then the appearance of 'birth' is not needed to produce it; if the result originally does not exist in the cause, the appearance of 'birth' cannot make it produce. Therefore, there is no appearance of 'birth'. 'How much more so non-birth': The following explains the word 'non-birth' ('無生') in the Gatha text. Because having the appearance of 'birth', in the case of having a result or not having a result, it still cannot produce the dharma body (法體 - fa ti: dharma body), how much more so can not having the appearance of 'birth' produce the dharma body? 'If you have a pot birth': The following second part discusses that, in terms of the dharma body, neither the existing nor the non-existing appearance of 'birth' can make it produce. This contains two 'repetitions' (複次 - fu ci). The first 'repetition', in terms of the pot, is divided into two cases: 'pot beginning' ('瓶初 - ping chu') and 'pot end' ('瓶后 - ping hou'); in terms of the mud, it is also divided into two cases: 'mud beginning' ('泥初 - ni chu') and 'mud end' ('泥后 - ni hou'). The purpose is to clarify the existence or non-existence of the dharma body, explaining that the appearance of 'birth' cannot make it produce. The pot situation is divided into two types: one is when the pot is just completed, called 'pot beginning', which already exists and does not need the appearance of 'birth' to produce it; the other is when starting to make the pot, called 'beginning', which does not yet exist, and the appearance of 'birth' cannot make it produce. The mud situation is divided into two types: one is when the mud is used up, called 'mud end', which already exists and does not need the appearance of 'birth' to produce it; the other is when starting to make the mud, called 'mud end', which does not yet exist, and the appearance of 'birth' cannot make it produce. And the first 'repetition' in the text clarifies one 'beginning' and one 'end', that is, the initial completion of the pot and the completion of starting to make the mud. Examine the production of a pot without 'birth' in these two aspects. The second 'repetition' is about after the mud is used up and at the beginning of making the pot, which is an existing and a non-existing state, verifying the production of a pot without 'birth'. In terms of 'beginning', it is further divided into three steps: first, propose; second, determine; third, refute. 'If you have a pot birth': Assuming that the appearance of 'birth' exists in what outsiders consider to be the production of a pot. 'Pot beginning pot time': The following is determined in two aspects. 'Pot beginning' refers to the beginning of making the pot complete. 'Pot time' refers to the moment when the pot is already completed. 'Being the mud ball end' refers to when starting to make the mud is completed, called 'mud end'. 'Not pot time' refers to because it is still a mud ball and has not yet become a pot, so it is said to be not 'pot time'. 'If pot beginning': The following third part conducts a double refutation, that is, divided into two aspects. First, it is divided into four steps: first, propose. 'This matter is not so': overall negation. 'Why is it so': formal refutation. Because the pot has already been completed, then it already exists and does not need the appearance of 'birth' to produce it. 'This beginning middle end mutually depend on each other': explain and complete the refutation. Here, the pot mouth becomes the 'beginning', the pot belly becomes the 'middle', and the pot bottom becomes the 'end'. If the 'middle' and 'end' are missing, then there is no...

初者。無有底腹即無口也。若有瓶初必有中後者。既有瓶口必有底腹。是故瓶已先有者第四結難。若泥團后釋第二亦四。一牒。是亦不然第二總非。何以故下第三正難。若瓶無初中後者釋成難。意泥既始成未有瓶口底腹也。若無瓶下第四結難。複次下第二就泥后瓶初責無瓶生。又三。一牒能生。若泥團后第二定。泥團後者用泥盡后也。瓶時者。用泥既盡后瓶則已成故云瓶時。若瓶初泥團時者。始欲造底故名瓶初。猶是泥團名泥團時。泥團後下第三作難破二。即二文易見也。外曰生時生故無咎。上就二門已未破之。一就生相已未不能生法體。次就法體明於已未生相不能生外今避二種已未立生時有生。正量部人多用此義。內曰生時亦如是者。點于生時還同已未。生時始起未全。始起謂半有。未全則半空。故還同已未。外生曰成一義故。自上已來二問答。初一問答破已未生。次問答破生時生。都破三時生竟。夫論有生不出三世。三世既無生義盡矣。外理屈辭窮無以能救。但就眼見而立見瓶現成。即是生也。內曰若爾生后破產生一義也。初中后三分滿足方名為成。若成是生者。成既在後則生亦在後。初中既無成則初中無生。若初中無生則無初中。初中無故亦無成。若初中有生則初中有成。此則未成說成名為顛倒。若未成是成應

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本初學者認為，如果瓶子沒有底部和腹部，那就是沒有口。如果一個瓶子有開始，那麼必然有中間和後來。既然有了瓶口，就必然有底部和腹部。因此，瓶子已經先存在了，這是第四個結難（Purvokta-virodha，前言相違）。如果泥團之後才出現瓶子，那麼第二種情況也有四個方面：1. 簡述；2. 總體否定，即『不是這樣的』；3. 正式駁難，即『為什麼』；4. 如果瓶子沒有開始、中間和後來，那麼就解釋這個難題。意思是說，泥土剛剛開始形成時，還沒有瓶口、底部和腹部。如果不存在瓶子，那麼就是第四個結難。其次，第二點是針對泥團之後瓶子才開始出現的情況，責難說沒有瓶子產生。這又分為三個方面：1. 簡述能產生瓶子的東西；2. 確定。泥團之後，用盡了泥土之後，瓶子才出現。瓶子出現的時候，泥土已經用盡，所以說『瓶子時』。如果瓶子剛開始出現，泥團還在的時候，剛開始想要製造底部，所以叫做『瓶子初』。仍然是泥團，所以叫做『泥團時』。泥團之後，第三點是作難，破斥兩種觀點。這兩段文字很容易理解。外道說，產生的時候產生，所以沒有過錯。上面已經從兩個方面（已和未）破斥了這種觀點。一是就產生的相狀來說，已和未不能產生法體。二是就法體來說，已和未產生的相狀不能產生。外道現在爲了避免這兩種已和未的情況，而立論說產生的時候有產生。正量部（Sammitiya）的人大多采用這種觀點。內道說，產生的時候也是這樣。指出產生的時候，仍然和已未一樣。產生的時候剛剛開始，還沒有完全。剛剛開始，就是一半有。沒有完全，就是一半空。所以仍然和已未一樣。外道說，因為成就是一種意義。從上面以來的兩個問答，第一個問答是破斥已未產生，第二個問答是破斥產生時產生。完全破斥了三種時間的產生。如果討論有產生，就離不開過去、現在、未來這三個時間。既然這三個時間都沒有產生的意義，那麼產生的意義就完全沒有了。外道的道理已經窮盡，無力辯解，只能就眼睛所見而立論說，現在瓶子已經形成，這就是產生。內道說，如果是這樣，那麼產生之後，破斥成就也是一種意義。開始、中間、後來三部分都滿足了，才叫做成就。如果成就就是產生，那麼成就既然在後來，那麼產生也在後來。開始和中間既然沒有成就，那麼開始和中間就沒有產生。如果開始和中間沒有產生，那麼就沒有開始和中間。開始和中間沒有，也就沒有成就。如果開始和中間有產生，那麼開始和中間就有成就。這樣，還沒有成就就說成就，叫做顛倒。如果未成就就是成就，那麼應該……' English version Initially, the uninitiated think that if a pot has no base and belly, then it has no mouth. If a pot has a beginning, then it must have a middle and an end. Since there is a mouth, there must be a base and a belly. Therefore, the pot already exists, which is the fourth fallacy (Purvokta-virodha, contradiction of previous statement). If the pot appears after the clay lump, then the second case also has four aspects: 1. Brief statement; 2. Overall negation, i.e., 'it is not so'; 3. Formal refutation, i.e., 'why'; 4. If the pot has no beginning, middle, and end, then explain this difficulty. It means that when the clay has just begun to form, there is no mouth, base, and belly of the pot yet. If the pot does not exist, then it is the fourth fallacy. Secondly, the second point is directed at the situation where the pot only begins to appear after the clay lump, blaming that no pot is produced. This is further divided into three aspects: 1. Brief statement of what can produce the pot; 2. Determination. After the clay lump, after the clay is used up, the pot appears. When the pot appears, the clay has been used up, so it is called 'pot time'. If the pot has just begun to appear, when the clay lump is still there, just beginning to make the base, so it is called 'pot beginning'. It is still a clay lump, so it is called 'clay lump time'. After the clay lump, the third point is to make it difficult, refuting the two views. These two passages are easy to understand. The outsider says that it is produced when it is produced, so there is no fault. The above has already refuted this view from two aspects (already and not yet). One is in terms of the appearance of production, already and not yet cannot produce the dharma body. The second is in terms of the dharma body, the appearance of already and not yet cannot produce. The outsider now avoids these two situations of already and not yet, and argues that there is production when it is produced. The Sammitiya mostly adopt this view. The insider says that it is the same when it is produced. Pointing out that when it is produced, it is still the same as already and not yet. When it is produced, it has just begun, not yet complete. Just beginning is half existent. Not yet complete is half empty. So it is still the same as already and not yet. The outsider says that because accomplishment is a meaning. From the above two questions and answers, the first question and answer is to refute the production of already and not yet, and the second question and answer is to refute the production of the time of production. Completely refuting the production of the three times. If we discuss having production, we cannot be separated from the past, present, and future three times. Since these three times have no meaning of production, then the meaning of production is completely gone. The outsider's reasoning has been exhausted and unable to argue, and can only argue based on what the eyes see, that the pot has now been formed, which is production. The insider says that if this is the case, then after production, refuting accomplishment is also a meaning. The beginning, middle, and end three parts are all satisfied, then it is called accomplishment. If accomplishment is production, then since accomplishment is later, then production is also later. Since there is no accomplishment in the beginning and middle, then there is no production in the beginning and middle. If there is no production in the beginning and middle, then there is no beginning and middle. There is no beginning and middle, so there is no accomplishment. If there is production in the beginning and middle, then there is accomplishment in the beginning and middle. In this way, saying accomplishment before it is accomplished is called inversion. If unaccomplished is accomplishment, then it should be...

【English Translation】 Modern Chinese Translation A beginner thinks that if a pot has no bottom and belly, then it has no mouth. If a pot has a beginning, then it must have a middle and an end. Since there is a mouth, there must be a bottom and a belly. Therefore, the pot already exists, which is the fourth knot difficulty (Purvokta-virodha, contradiction of previous statement). If the pot appears after the clay lump, then the second case also has four aspects: 1. Brief statement; 2. Overall negation, i.e., 'it is not so'; 3. Formal refutation, i.e., 'why'; 4. If the pot has no beginning, middle, and end, then explain this difficulty. It means that when the clay has just begun to form, there is no mouth, bottom, and belly of the pot yet. If the pot does not exist, then it is the fourth knot difficulty. Secondly, the second point is directed at the situation where the pot only begins to appear after the clay lump, blaming that no pot is produced. This is further divided into three aspects: 1. Brief statement of what can produce the pot; 2. Determination. After the clay lump, after the clay is used up, the pot appears. When the pot appears, the clay has been used up, so it is called 'pot time'. If the pot has just begun to appear, when the clay lump is still there, just beginning to make the bottom, so it is called 'pot beginning'. It is still a clay lump, so it is called 'clay lump time'. After the clay lump, the third point is to make it difficult, refuting the two views. These two passages are easy to understand. The outsider says that it is produced when it is produced, so there is no fault. The above has already refuted this view from two aspects (already and not yet). One is in terms of the appearance of production, already and not yet cannot produce the dharma body. The second is in terms of the dharma body, the appearance of already and not yet cannot produce. The outsider now avoids these two situations of already and not yet, and argues that there is production when it is produced. The Sammitiya mostly adopt this view. The insider says that it is the same when it is produced. Pointing out that when it is produced, it is still the same as already and not yet. When it is produced, it has just begun, not yet complete. Just beginning is half existent. Not yet complete is half empty. So it is still the same as already and not yet. The outsider says that because accomplishment is a meaning. From the above two questions and answers, the first question and answer is to refute the production of already and not yet, and the second question and answer is to refute the production of the time of production. Completely refuting the production of the three times. If we discuss having production, we cannot be separated from the past, present, and future three times. Since these three times have no meaning of production, then the meaning of production is completely gone. The outsider's reasoning has been exhausted and unable to argue, and can only argue based on what the eyes see, that the pot has now been formed, which is production. The insider says that if this is the case, then after production, refuting accomplishment is also a meaning. The beginning, middle, and end three parts are all satisfied, then it is called accomplishment. If accomplishment is production, then since accomplishment is later, then production is also later. Since there is no accomplishment in the beginning and middle, then there is no production in the beginning and middle. If there is no production in the beginning and middle, then there is no beginning and middle. There is no beginning and middle, so there is no accomplishment. If there is production in the beginning and middle, then there is accomplishment in the beginning and middle. In this way, saying accomplishment before it is accomplished is called inversion. If unaccomplished is accomplishment, then it should be...

成是未成。亦是倒也。又初中有成則違前言。前明現成為生故也。又汝本謂瓶不能自生鬚生生瓶。即生應在前瓶應在後。而今瓶成方名生者。此乃瓶在於前而生居后。此乃是瓶生生。何關生生瓶也。又若瓶現成而說生者。瓶成是已。汝前避于已未。何故更立已耶。外曰初中后次第生故無咎。此是外道密悔前言以通上生后之難也。外云。生通三分。但據最後成分故說生耳。故無生在後過。又初分亦生亦成。後分亦爾。如瓶底生即瓶底成乃至口生即是口成。故生通三分。成亦如之。故無生在後過。注為二。一立三分有生。非泥團下舉三種非顯成生義。初非未有法體而有于生。亦非瓶時下非已有法體方有生相。亦非無瓶生下非都無法體而有生瓶之生。內曰初中后非次第生。十地三十心及一切初中后次第亦用今文責之。二偈本破初中后是次第義。初就前後破。次一時破。前後破者。如中論破相待前定有何法也。若前定有初。初不因后。云何有初。若初不因后。后亦不因初。若后因初而後名後者。初因於后初亦名后。既互相因則互為初后。唯是次第。既無次第。云何言次第生耶。注為三。初為外作相待義。若離云何有下第二正破彼。有初時未有中后。即是相離也。是故下第三結。次破一時者。一時則皆初皆中皆后。又一時並有無

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本成是未成：意思是說，『成』這個概念，如果從『未成』的角度來看，實際上也是一種顛倒的看法。又初中有成則違前言：如果最初的階段就有了『成』，那就和之前所說的『生』的概念相違背了。因為之前已經明確說明，『現成』是『生』的結果。又汝本謂瓶不能自生鬚生生瓶：你原本認為瓶子不能自己產生，需要『生』來產生瓶子，也就是『生生瓶』。即生應在前瓶應在後：那麼，『生』應該在瓶子之前，瓶子應該在『生』之後。而今瓶成方名生者：但現在瓶子已經完成了才叫做『生』，此乃瓶在於前而生居后：這實際上是瓶子在『生』之前，而『生』在瓶子之後。此乃是瓶生生：這實際上是瓶子產生了『生』。何關生生瓶也：這和『生』產生瓶子（生生瓶）有什麼關係呢？又若瓶現成而說生者：如果瓶子已經完成了才說『生』，瓶成是已：那麼瓶子已經完成了。汝前避于已未：你之前一直在迴避『已』和『未』的概念，何故更立已耶：為什麼現在又要重新提出『已』的概念呢？外曰初中后次第生故無咎：外道辯稱，因為最初、中間、最後是依次產生的，所以沒有過錯。此是外道密悔前言以通上生后之難也：這實際上是外道暗中後悔之前說過的話，用來解釋上面所說的『生』在『后』的難題。外云。生通三分。但據最後成分故說生耳。故無生在後過：外道說，『生』貫穿了最初、中間、最後三個階段，只是根據最後完成的部分才說『生』，所以沒有『生』在『后』的過錯。又初分亦生亦成。後分亦爾。如瓶底生即瓶底成乃至口生即是口成。故生通三分。成亦如之。故無生在後過：而且，最初的部分也是既『生』又『成』，最後的部分也是這樣。比如瓶底產生就是瓶底完成，乃至瓶口產生就是瓶口完成。所以『生』貫穿了三個階段，『成』也是這樣，所以沒有『生』在『后』的過錯。注為二。一立三分有生。非泥團下舉三種非顯成生義。初非未有法體而有于生。亦非瓶時下非已有法體方有生相。亦非無瓶生下非都無法體而有生瓶之生：這裡有兩種解釋。第一種是說，建立三個階段都有『生』，而不是像泥團那樣舉出三種情況來顯示『成』和『生』的意義。最初不是在沒有法體的時候就有了『生』，也不是在瓶子已經存在的時候才有了『生』的現象，也不是在完全沒有法體的時候就有了產生瓶子的『生』。內曰初中后非次第生。十地三十心及一切初中后次第亦用今文責之：內道認為，最初、中間、最後不是依次產生的。可以用這段文字來責難十地、三十心以及一切最初、中間、最後依次產生的情況。二偈本破初中后是次第義。初就前後破。次一時破。前後破者。如中論破相待前定有何法也。若前定有初。初不因后。云何有初。若初不因后。后亦不因初。若后因初而後名後者。初因於后初亦名后。既互相因則互為初后。唯是次第。既無次第。云何言次第生耶：第二種解釋是說，偈頌本身是爲了破斥最初、中間、最後是依次產生的觀點。首先是從前後關係來破斥，然後是從同時關係來破斥。從前後關係來破斥，就像《中論》破斥相互依賴的關係一樣，如果事先已經確定了『初』，那麼『初』就不依賴於『后』，那麼怎麼會有『初』呢？如果『初』不依賴於『后』，那麼『后』也不依賴於『初』。如果『后』依賴於『初』才叫做『后』，那麼『初』依賴於『后』，『初』也就叫做『后』了。既然互相依賴，那麼就互相成為『初』和『后』，這只是次第關係。既然沒有次第關係，怎麼能說依次產生呢？注為三。初為外作相待義。若離云何有下第二正破彼。有初時未有中后。即是相離也。是故下第三結。次破一時者。一時則皆初皆中皆后。又一時並有無：這裡有三種解釋。第一種是為外道建立相互依賴的意義。第二種是正式破斥他們，如果在有『初』的時候沒有『中』和『后』，那就是相互分離的。第三種是總結。接下來破斥同時關係，如果是一時，那麼一切都是『初』、『中』、『后』。而且一時並存『有』和『無』。

【English Translation】 English version 'Accomplishment is non-accomplishment': This means that the concept of 'accomplishment,' when viewed from the perspective of 'non-accomplishment,' is actually a reversed view. 'If there is accomplishment in the beginning, it contradicts the previous statement': If there is 'accomplishment' in the initial stage, it contradicts the previously stated concept of 'birth' (生). This is because it was previously clarified that 'present accomplishment' is the result of 'birth'. 'Furthermore, you originally said that a pot cannot arise by itself and needs 'birth' to produce the pot, which is 'birth-producing-pot' (生生瓶)': You originally believed that a pot cannot arise on its own and requires 'birth' to produce the pot, which is 'birth-producing-pot'. 'Then 'birth' should be before the pot, and the pot should be after 'birth'': Then, 'birth' should precede the pot, and the pot should follow 'birth'. 'But now, only when the pot is completed is it called 'birth'': But now, only when the pot is completed is it called 'birth'. 'This is actually the pot being before 'birth' and 'birth' being after the pot': This is actually the pot being before 'birth' and 'birth' being after the pot. 'This is actually the pot producing 'birth'': This is actually the pot producing 'birth'. 'What does this have to do with 'birth-producing-pot'?': What does this have to do with 'birth' producing the pot ('birth-producing-pot')? 'Furthermore, if 'birth' is spoken of when the pot is already accomplished': Furthermore, if 'birth' is spoken of when the pot is already accomplished, 'The pot is already accomplished': Then the pot is already accomplished. 'You previously avoided the concepts of 'already' and 'not yet'': You previously avoided the concepts of 'already' (已) and 'not yet' (未), 'Why bring up 'already' again?': Why bring up the concept of 'already' again? 'The outsider says that there is no fault because the beginning, middle, and end arise in sequence': The outsider argues that there is no fault because the beginning, middle, and end arise in sequence. 'This is actually the outsider secretly regretting the previous statement to explain the difficulty of 'birth' being after': This is actually the outsider secretly regretting the previous statement to explain the difficulty of 'birth' being after. 'The outsider says that 'birth' pervades the three parts, but 'birth' is spoken of only based on the final completed part, so there is no fault of 'birth' being after': The outsider says that 'birth' pervades the three stages of beginning, middle, and end, but 'birth' is spoken of only based on the final completed part, so there is no fault of 'birth' being after. 'Furthermore, the initial part is both 'birth' and 'accomplishment', and so is the final part. For example, the bottom of the pot being born is the bottom of the pot being accomplished, and so on until the mouth being born is the mouth being accomplished. Therefore, 'birth' pervades the three parts, and so does 'accomplishment', so there is no fault of 'birth' being after': Moreover, the initial part is both 'birth' and 'accomplishment', and so is the final part. For example, the bottom of the pot being born is the bottom of the pot being accomplished, and so on until the mouth being born is the mouth being accomplished. Therefore, 'birth' pervades the three parts, and so does 'accomplishment', so there is no fault of 'birth' being after. 'Commentary in two parts. First, establishing that there is 'birth' in three parts. The three examples cited below, not the mud ball, do not reveal the meaning of 'accomplishment' and 'birth'. Initially, there is no 'birth' when there is no dharma-body. Also, when there is a pot, there is no appearance of 'birth' when there is already a dharma-body. Also, there is no 'birth' of a pot when there is no dharma-body at all': Here are two explanations. The first is to establish that there is 'birth' in all three stages, rather than citing three cases like the mud ball to show the meaning of 'accomplishment' and 'birth'. Initially, there is no 'birth' when there is no dharma-body. Also, when there is a pot, there is no appearance of 'birth' when there is already a dharma-body. Also, there is no 'birth' of a pot when there is no dharma-body at all. 'The inner school says that the beginning, middle, and end do not arise in sequence. The ten grounds (十地), thirty minds (三十心), and all sequences of beginning, middle, and end can also be challenged with this text': The inner school believes that the beginning, middle, and end do not arise in sequence. This text can be used to challenge the ten grounds, thirty minds, and all sequences of beginning, middle, and end. 'Second, the verse itself refutes the meaning of the beginning, middle, and end being sequential. First, it refutes from the perspective of before and after. Then, it refutes from the perspective of simultaneity. Refuting from the perspective of before and after is like the Madhyamaka (中論) refuting what dharma is predetermined in a dependent relationship. If the beginning is predetermined, the beginning does not depend on the end. How can there be a beginning? If the beginning does not depend on the end, then the end does not depend on the beginning. If the end depends on the beginning and is then called the end, then the beginning depends on the end, and the beginning is also called the end. Since they depend on each other, they become the beginning and the end to each other. This is only a sequence. Since there is no sequence, how can it be said that they arise in sequence?': The second explanation is that the verse itself is to refute the view that the beginning, middle, and end arise in sequence. First, it refutes from the perspective of before and after, then from the perspective of simultaneity. Refuting from the perspective of before and after is like the Madhyamaka refuting what dharma is predetermined in a dependent relationship. If the beginning is predetermined, the beginning does not depend on the end. How can there be a beginning? If the beginning does not depend on the end, then the end does not depend on the beginning. If the end depends on the beginning and is then called the end, then the beginning depends on the end, and the beginning is also called the end. Since they depend on each other, they become the beginning and the end to each other. This is only a sequence. Since there is no sequence, how can it be said that they arise in sequence? 'Commentary in three parts. First, establishing the meaning of interdependence for the outsider. Second, directly refuting them, if there is no middle and end when there is a beginning, then they are separate. Third, concluding. Next, refuting simultaneity. If it is simultaneous, then everything is the beginning, middle, and end. Also, existence and non-existence exist simultaneously': Here are three explanations. The first is to establish the meaning of interdependence for the outsider. The second is to directly refute them, if there is no middle and end when there is a beginning, then they are separate. The third is to conclude. Next, refuting simultaneity. If it is simultaneous, then everything is the beginning, middle, and end. Also, existence and non-existence exist simultaneously.

初中后名。外曰如生住壞救上二難也。三相既前後次第。初中后亦然無初過也。既立前後不立一時故無一時過也。亦得體同時用前後。體同時故離於初過。用前後故離第二過。亦得用前後離初過。體同時免后失。譬喻部三相次第。薩婆多即法沙門體同時用前後。以用前後故有次第。內曰生住壞亦如是。所以破三相者。六品破有為法體。故今破三相則體相俱忘有為盡矣。內有二偈本。並天親義破合以為三。初例同破。二無窮破。三取意破。例同破者。同上二種。一三相不得前後。二亦非一時。非前後破譬喻。非一時破毗曇。又非一時破體同時。非前後破用前後。文易知。複次一切處有一切第二無窮破。一切處者牒外義也。三相遍有為法體故云一切處也。有一切者。此一切中復有一切。即捉法體破相也。法體要須備三相方是有為。若不備三即非有為。相亦如是。生中若不備三則非有為。若生備三便有二過。一相害二無窮。若汝謂下第三天親義。取意破為三。初取意二總非三正破。生生共生者。生謂大生。次生是小生。大小更互相生故云共生。以小生大通無為難。以大生小免無窮失。如父子下譬說也。是事不然第二總非。如是生生下第三正破。初破法次破譬。如是生生者。諸百論師云偏牒小生也。今謂不爾。雙牒大小二生故

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本初、中、后三時之後，立名相。外道說：『如生、住、壞、救』，這是兩種困難。三相既然有前後次第，那麼初、中、后也應該有次第，這樣就犯了『無初』的過失。既然建立了前後關係，就不應該同時存在，否則就犯了『一時』的過失。也可以說，本體是同時的，作用有前後。本體是同時的，所以避免了『無初』的過失；作用有前後，所以避免了第二種過失。也可以說，作用有前後，避免了『無初』的過失；本體是同時的，避免了後面的過失。譬喻部的觀點是三相有次第。薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）的法師認為本體是同時的，作用有前後。因為作用有前後，所以有次第。內道說：『生、住、壞』也是如此。之所以要破斥三相，是因為六品破斥了有為法的本體。所以現在破斥三相，那麼本體和相狀都會被遺忘，有為法也就消失了。內道有兩種偈頌的根本，加上世親（Vasubandhu）的義理，合起來分為三部分。第一部分是例同破，第二部分是無窮破，第三部分是取意破。例同破，和上面兩種情況相同。一是三相不能有前後，二是也不能同時存在。『非前後』破斥譬喻部，『非一時』破斥毗曇宗（Abhidharma）。又，『非一時』破斥本體同時，『非前後』破斥作用前後。文義容易理解。其次，一切處有一切，這是第二種無窮破。『一切處』是指外道的觀點。三相普遍存在於有為法的本體中，所以說『一切處』。『有一切』是指在這『一切』之中又有一切，這就是抓住法體來破斥相狀。法體必須具備三相才能成為有為法，如果不具備三相就不是有為法。相也是如此，生如果不能具備三相就不是有為法，如果生具備三相，就會有兩種過失：一是相互相妨害，二是無窮。『若汝謂下』是第三種世親的義理，取意破分為三部分。首先是取意，其次是總非，最後是正破。『生生共生』，生是指大生，次生是小生，大小互相更生，所以說是『共生』。用小生大，可以通達無為法，難以破斥；用大生小，可以避免無窮的過失。『如父子下』是譬喻說明。『是事不然』是第二種總非。『如是生生下』是第三種正破。首先破斥法，其次破斥譬喻。『如是生生』，諸百論師說是偏指小生。現在我認為不是這樣，是雙指大小兩種生。

【English Translation】 English version After the beginning, middle, and end, names are established. Externalists say: 'Like birth, abiding, decay, and salvation,' these are two difficulties. Since the three characteristics have a sequential order, then the beginning, middle, and end should also have an order, thus committing the fault of 'no beginning.' Since a sequential relationship is established, they should not exist simultaneously, otherwise, the fault of 'simultaneity' is committed. It can also be said that the essence is simultaneous, and the function has a sequence. The essence is simultaneous, thus avoiding the fault of 'no beginning'; the function has a sequence, thus avoiding the second fault. It can also be said that the function has a sequence, avoiding the fault of 'no beginning'; the essence is simultaneous, avoiding the subsequent loss. The view of the Sautrantika (Sautrantika, Sutra School) is that the three characteristics have a sequence. The Sarvastivada (Sarvastivada, the doctrine that 'all exists') masters believe that the essence is simultaneous, and the function has a sequence. Because the function has a sequence, there is an order. The internalists say: 'Birth, abiding, decay' are also like this. The reason for refuting the three characteristics is that the six chapters refute the essence of conditioned dharmas. So now refuting the three characteristics, then the essence and characteristics will be forgotten, and conditioned dharmas will disappear. There are two verses at the root of internalism, plus the meaning of Vasubandhu, combined into three parts. The first part is refutation by analogy, the second part is refutation by infinity, and the third part is refutation by taking the meaning. Refutation by analogy is the same as the above two situations. One is that the three characteristics cannot have a sequence, and the other is that they cannot exist simultaneously. 'Not sequential' refutes the Sautrantika, 'not simultaneous' refutes the Abhidharma. Also, 'not simultaneous' refutes the simultaneous essence, 'not sequential' refutes the sequential function. The meaning of the text is easy to understand. Secondly, 'everything is everywhere,' this is the second kind of refutation by infinity. 'Everywhere' refers to the view of externalists. The three characteristics are universally present in the essence of conditioned dharmas, so it is said 'everywhere.' 'Everything is' means that within this 'everything' there is another 'everything,' which is grasping the essence of the dharma to refute the characteristics. The essence of the dharma must have three characteristics to become a conditioned dharma, if it does not have three characteristics, it is not a conditioned dharma. The characteristics are also like this, if birth cannot have three characteristics, it is not a conditioned dharma, if birth has three characteristics, there will be two faults: one is that the characteristics harm each other, and the other is infinity. 'If you say below' is the third kind of Vasubandhu's meaning, refutation by taking the meaning is divided into three parts. First is taking the meaning, second is total negation, and third is correct refutation. 'Birth births together,' birth refers to the great birth, the next birth is the small birth, the large and small give birth to each other, so it is said 'birth together.' Using small birth to give rise to great birth, one can penetrate unconditioned dharmas, which is difficult to refute; using great birth to give rise to small birth, one can avoid the fault of infinity. 'Like father and son below' is an illustrative metaphor. 'This is not the case' is the second kind of total negation. 'Thus birth births below' is the third kind of correct refutation. First refute the dharma, then refute the metaphor. 'Thus birth births,' the masters of the Hundred Treatises say that it refers only to small birth. Now I think it is not like this, it refers to both large and small births.

云生生。此大小二生二俱有也不須相生。如其俱無無可相生。半有同有半無同無。又俱有但能非所。俱無但所非能。兩半還同前二。而文云因中前有相待者。大小互為因果互相待也。相待即是相生。故破相待即是破生。複次如子前有第二破譬。有二論本。如子前有宋代馮師用之。此文應是舊本。馮師云。子是眾生無始已有。小生不爾。是故非喻。今明此破有二義。一者如馮師。子是眾生先來已有故云前有。二者子生子必先有子然後更生子。如世間兒生兒必前有兒然後取婦更生兒。汝小生不更生小生故非喻。是父更有父者。前破子喻于小。今破父喻于大。父更從父大不從大故亦非喻。若有論本如父前有。此文亦是也。何以知然。彼以子喻小生父喻大生。只此子能生子。即是父義故云如父先有。外曰定有生可生法有故。自上已來破能生證有所生竟。今第二破外可生證有能生。外立二義。一舉可生而證有生。二見內借所破能便謂有所。故舉所證能。內曰若有生無可生者。內有二破。一有無破二三門破。有無破者。外舉所相證有能相。內還捉能相有無以破可相。若有生相生不孤立。必生瓶竟然後名生。今既有生瓶則已成不名可生。故云若有生無可生。所以然者。夫未生名為可生。今有生相。瓶則已生不名可生也。無門破者。已

【現代漢語翻譯】云生生（云的生起）。這種大小二生（大生和小生）的情況，要麼兩者都存在，不需要相互依存；要麼兩者都完全不存在，無法相互依存。如果一半存在，就等同於都存在；如果一半不存在，就等同於都不存在。此外，如果兩者都存在，那麼只能是『能』而非『所』；如果兩者都無，那麼只能是『所』而非『能』。如果各佔一半，情況與前兩種相同。而經文中說，在因緣中，先前存在相互依賴的關係，大小相互作為因果，互相依賴。相互依賴即是相互產生。所以，破除相互依賴，就是破除產生。再次，如果『子』（兒子）之前已經存在，這是第二次破除譬喻。有兩種論本。如果『子』之前存在，宋代的馮師使用了這種說法。這段文字應該是舊版本。馮師說，『子』是眾生，無始以來就已存在，小生不是這樣，所以不是恰當的比喻。現在說明這種破除有兩種含義。一是如馮師所說，『子』是眾生，先前已經存在，所以說是『前有』。二是『子』生『子』，必須先有『子』，然後才能再生『子』。就像世間的兒子生兒子，必須先有兒子，然後娶妻才能再生兒子。你的小生不能再生小生，所以不是恰當的比喻。如果說『父』（父親）更有『父』，這是先前用『子』的比喻來破斥『小』，現在用『父』的比喻來破斥『大』。『父』再從『父』，『大』不從『大』，所以也不是恰當的比喻。如果有的論本說『如父前有』，這段文字也是這個意思。為什麼知道是這樣呢？因為他們用『子』比喻小生，用『父』比喻大生。只有『子』能生『子』，這就是『父』的含義，所以說『如父先有』。外道說，確定有能生之法，所以有可生之法。從上面開始，已經破斥了能生，證明了有所生。現在第二部分，破斥外道用可生來證明有能生。外道立了兩種觀點。一是舉出可生來證明有生。二是看到內部借用所破斥的能，就認為有所。所以舉出所來證明能。內道說，如果沒有能生，就沒有可生。內道有兩種破斥。一是有無破，二是三門破。有無破是說，外道舉出所相來證明有能相，內道反過來抓住能相的有無來破斥可相。如果有生相，生不是孤立的，必須生出瓶子，然後才能稱為生。現在既然有生，瓶子就已經完成了，不能稱為可生。所以說，如果有生，就沒有可生。之所以這樣，是因為未生才稱為可生，現在有了生相，瓶子就已經生出來了，不能稱為可生了。無門破是說，已經... 現代漢語譯本

【English Translation】 'Clouds arise'. In the case of these two births, large and small (Mahat-utpada and Anu-utpada), either both exist and do not need to be interdependent, or both do not exist at all and cannot be interdependent. If half exists, it is equivalent to both existing; if half does not exist, it is equivalent to neither existing. Furthermore, if both exist, it can only be 'energy' (nimitta) and not 'object' (nimitta-dharmata); if both do not exist, it can only be 'object' and not 'energy'. If each is half, the situation is the same as the previous two. However, the text says that in causation, there is a prior mutual dependence, with large and small mutually acting as cause and effect, depending on each other. Mutual dependence is mutual arising. Therefore, breaking mutual dependence is breaking arising. Furthermore, if 'son' (putra) exists before, this is the second refutation of the analogy. There are two versions of the treatise. If 'son' exists before, Venerable Feng of the Song dynasty used this argument. This text should be the old version. Venerable Feng said, 'Son' is a sentient being, existing since beginningless time; small birth is not like this, so it is not an appropriate analogy. Now, explaining this refutation has two meanings. First, as Venerable Feng said, 'son' is a sentient being, existing beforehand, so it is said to 'exist before'. Second, 'son' gives rise to 'son', there must first be a 'son' before another 'son' can be born. Just like in the world, a son gives rise to a son, there must first be a son, then taking a wife, another son can be born. Your small birth cannot give rise to small birth, so it is not an appropriate analogy. If it is said that 'father' (pitṛ) has another 'father', this is previously using the analogy of 'son' to refute 'small', now using the analogy of 'father' to refute 'large'. 'Father' then follows 'father', 'large' does not follow 'large', so it is also not an appropriate analogy. If some versions of the treatise say 'as father exists before', this text also means this. How do we know this? Because they use 'son' to symbolize small birth, and 'father' to symbolize large birth. Only 'son' can give rise to 'son', which is the meaning of 'father', so it is said 'as father exists before'. The outsider says, there is definitely a law that can be born, so there is a law that can be born. From above, the refutation of the able-to-be-born has been done, proving the existence of the born. Now, in the second part, the outsider is refuted for using the able-to-be-born to prove the existence of the able-to-be-born. The outsider establishes two views. First, citing the able-to-be-born to prove the existence of birth. Second, seeing the internal borrowing of the refuted able, they think there is something. So, cite what to prove can. The inner path says, if there is no able to be born, there is no able to be born. The inner path has two refutations. One is the existence and non-existence refutation, and the other is the three-door refutation. The existence and non-existence refutation is that the outsider cites the appearance of the able to prove the existence of the able appearance, and the inner path turns around and grasps the existence and non-existence of the able appearance to refute the able appearance. If there is a birth appearance, birth is not isolated, it must give birth to a bottle, and then it can be called birth. Now that there is birth, the bottle has been completed, and it cannot be called able to be born. Therefore, it is said that if there is birth, there is no able to be born. The reason for this is that what is not born is called able to be born, and now that there is a birth appearance, the bottle has already been born, and it cannot be called able to be born. The no-door refutation is that it has already... English version

有生相尚無有可生。況無生相而有可生也。複次自他共亦如是第二三門破。此三門通破體相。生相自生破不展轉。若從他生破于展轉。共生合破二家。法體自生破即法有相義。如離法體外無別有相。即以法起為生名為自生。法從他生破異法體外別有生相能生法體。共生者合破二義。外曰定有生可生共成故第三俱立生可生也。若有能生則有可生。若有可生則有能生。一時相待而有。所以一時者。內外同明體相必俱。如法在未來則相在未來。二世亦爾。是故一時。內曰生可生不能生。內有二破。一縱待破二奪待破。縱待破者。縱能所互待則能所無定。無定則無能所。同中論若法有待成偈。今文云生可生不能生者。由可生有能生。則能產生可生。故能生非能生。故云生可生不能生。既能成所則非復能。所則成能便非復所。故無能無所。以何相待。複次有無相待不然者第二奪待破。能所是有無義。不得論待。如長短俱有可得待長說短待短說長。今能生是有可生是無。一有一無雲何待耶。問能生云何有耶。答如母生子必前有能生。故能生是有。則所生未有。故有無不得待。問今待有說無待無說有。何故有無非相待耶。答諸百論師言。此文是破有無相待。是事不然。此乃是捉有無破能所相待。外云有能則有所有所則有能故能所一時

相待。今明能有所無雲何得待。如長有短無大有小無。云何待耶。問云何破有無待耶。答三門破。一者有無二體各成不須相待。若二體不成則無有無。用何物待。二者有無為待成為成待。若有無成竟而更待。則有重有重無之過。若待成者則知未待時未成。用何物待。三者如前破一品中三門責之。有非有中亦非無中亦不在二處。云何待耶。外曰生可生相待故諸法成救前二破也。由生可生相待故萬法得成。今現見萬法成。故知生可生相待。何故前云生可生不得互待。復何得云有無相待不然。內曰若二生何以無三。上立有二句。一者生可生相待。二者諸法成。若爾者離生可生外應有第三法成。而離生可生外無第三法。如生相是能生瓶是可生。故知生可生外無第三法成。汝何得言生可生故諸法成耶。若言生可生相待還生可生二法成者。則漏前二破不應更立。問父母生子有第三。今何故無。答父母同是能生則屬生相子屬所相。故唯有二也。外曰應有生因壞故。自上已來三番就生門破生。今就滅義破生。以無滅故所以無生。又上是無生門。今明無滅門明不生不滅義也。救意云。若無果生寧有因滅。既有因滅即有果生。問破何生滅。答六道三乘本不生今不滅。即顯不生死不涅槃等義。內曰因壞故生亦滅。內有三破。此初縱外有壞而奪

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『相待』（相互依存）。如果『有』和『無』是明確的，怎麼會需要相互依存呢？就像長和短，『有』和『無』，大和小，『有』和『無』，怎麼會需要相互依存呢？問：如何破斥『有』和『無』的相互依存呢？答：用三種方式破斥。第一，『有』和『無』是兩種獨立的實體，各自成立，不需要相互依存。如果兩種實體不能各自成立，那麼就不會有『有』和『無』，用什麼來相互依存呢？第二，『有』和『無』是爲了相互依存而成立，還是成立之後才相互依存？如果『有』和『無』已經成立，還需要相互依存，那麼就會有重複的『有』和重複的『無』的過失。如果是爲了成立而相互依存，那麼就知道在沒有相互依存的時候，『有』和『無』還沒有成立，用什麼來相互依存呢？第三，就像前面破斥『一』（第一義諦）時用三種方式責難一樣，『有』不在『非有』中，也不在『非無』中，也不在這兩者之中，怎麼會需要相互依存呢？外道說：『生』和『可生』相互依存，所以諸法才能成立。這是爲了反駁前面兩種破斥。因為『生』和『可生』相互依存，所以萬法才能成立。現在親眼看到萬法成立，所以知道『生』和『可生』是相互依存的。為什麼前面說『生』和『可生』不能相互依存呢？又怎麼能說『有』和『無』不相互依存呢？內道說：如果只有兩種『生』，為什麼沒有第三種呢？你上面立了兩個論點：一是『生』和『可生』相互依存，二是諸法成立。如果是這樣，那麼除了『生』和『可生』之外，應該有第三種法成立。但是除了『生』和『可生』之外，沒有第三種法。比如『生相』（生的狀態）是能生，瓶子是可生，所以知道除了『生』和『可生』之外，沒有第三種法成立。你怎麼能說因為『生』和『可生』，所以諸法成立呢？如果說『生』和『可生』相互依存，反過來『生』和『可生』這兩種法才能成立，那麼就漏掉了前面兩種破斥，不應該再立論。問：父母生孩子有第三者，現在為什麼沒有呢？答：父母同是能生，屬於『生相』（生的狀態），孩子屬於『所相』（被生的狀態），所以只有兩種。外道說：應該有『生因』（生的原因）壞滅，所以有『生』。從上面以來，已經三次就『生』的方面破斥『生』。現在就『滅』的意義破斥『生』。因為沒有『滅』，所以沒有『生』。而且上面是『無生門』（不生之門），現在說明『無滅門』（不滅之門），闡明不生不滅的意義。外道的意圖是說，如果沒有果的生，哪裡會有因的滅？既然有因的滅，那麼就有果的生。問：破斥什麼樣的生滅？答：六道（地獄、餓鬼、畜生、阿修羅、人、天）和三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）本來不生，現在不滅。這就顯示了不生死不涅槃等等的意義。內道說：因為『因』（原因）壞滅，所以『生』也滅了。內道有三種破斥，這是最初的，即使外道承認有壞滅，也要剝奪它。

【English Translation】 English version 'Interdependent'. If 'existence' (有) and 'non-existence' (無) are distinct, how can they be interdependent? Like long and short, 'existence' and 'non-existence', big and small, 'existence' and 'non-existence', how can they be interdependent? Question: How to refute the interdependence of 'existence' and 'non-existence'? Answer: Refute in three ways. First, 'existence' and 'non-existence' are two independent entities, each established on its own, without needing to be interdependent. If the two entities cannot be established on their own, then there will be no 'existence' and 'non-existence', what would be used to be interdependent? Second, are 'existence' and 'non-existence' established for the sake of interdependence, or are they interdependent after being established? If 'existence' and 'non-existence' are already established and still need to be interdependent, then there will be the fault of redundant 'existence' and redundant 'non-existence'. If they are interdependent for the sake of being established, then it is known that when there is no interdependence, 'existence' and 'non-existence' are not yet established, what would be used to be interdependent? Third, just like the three ways of questioning in the previous refutation of 'one' (第一義諦, the ultimate truth), 'existence' is not in 'non-existence', nor is it in 'non-non-existence', nor is it in both, how can they be interdependent? The outsider says: 'Birth' (生) and 'that which can be born' (可生) are interdependent, so all dharmas (諸法) can be established. This is to refute the previous two refutations. Because 'birth' and 'that which can be born' are interdependent, all phenomena (萬法) can be established. Now, seeing all phenomena established, it is known that 'birth' and 'that which can be born' are interdependent. Why did you say earlier that 'birth' and 'that which can be born' cannot be interdependent? And how can you say that 'existence' and 'non-existence' are not interdependent? The insider says: If there are only two kinds of 'birth', why is there no third? You have established two points above: one is that 'birth' and 'that which can be born' are interdependent, and the other is that all dharmas are established. If so, then besides 'birth' and 'that which can be born', there should be a third dharma established. But besides 'birth' and 'that which can be born', there is no third dharma. For example, 'the state of birth' (生相) is the cause of birth, and the bottle is that which can be born, so it is known that besides 'birth' and 'that which can be born', there is no third dharma established. How can you say that because of 'birth' and 'that which can be born', all dharmas are established? If you say that 'birth' and 'that which can be born' are interdependent, and in turn, these two dharmas of 'birth' and 'that which can be born' can be established, then the previous two refutations are missed, and you should not establish the argument again. Question: Parents giving birth to a child has a third party, why is there none now? Answer: Parents are both the cause of birth, belonging to 'the state of birth' (生相), and the child belongs to 'the state of being born' (所相), so there are only two. The outsider says: There should be the destruction of 'the cause of birth' (生因), so there is 'birth'. From above, 'birth' has been refuted three times from the aspect of 'birth'. Now, 'birth' is refuted from the meaning of 'cessation' (滅). Because there is no 'cessation', there is no 'birth'. Moreover, the above is 'the gate of non-birth' (無生門), now explaining 'the gate of non-cessation' (無滅門), elucidating the meaning of non-birth and non-cessation. The outsider's intention is to say that if there is no birth of the result, where would there be the cessation of the cause? Since there is the cessation of the cause, then there is the birth of the result. Question: What kind of birth and cessation is being refuted? Answer: The six realms (六道, hell, hungry ghosts, animals, asuras, humans, devas) and the three vehicles (三乘, Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, Bodhisattvayāna) are originally not born, and now do not cease. This reveals the meaning of non-birth, non-death, non-nirvana, etc. The insider says: Because the 'cause' (因) is destroyed, 'birth' also ceases. The insider has three refutations, this is the first, even if the outsider admits that there is destruction, it must be deprived.

彼生。以外舉壞證生故內就壞撿生。對上生門求生不得。今就滅中求生不得。瓶無別體用泥為瓶。泥因既壞瓶果即壞。又已未二時如注二時破之。複次因中果定故第二就因果定義破生。四傢俱定俱不生。僧佉定有。有定不須生。世師定無。無定不可生。亦有同定有亦無同定無。非有同定無非無同定有。註釋但明二句不生開為三門。初雙牒。二俱下總標無生。何以故下雙釋無生。釋無易知。釋有中雲是因中是果生是事不然者。彼因果既一。不得分別云此是因此是果。因生於果。但得云因生因果生果耳。複次因果多故第三因果多破。四傢俱多。因中有多果者乳中有酪。此酪中即有蘇。一時之中頓具五味。乃至五味之中即應有糞。糞中亦具五味。故果中多因。如涅槃云女有兒性兒有孫性。又如買馬之人應責駒直。因中無果多者。如乳中無五味應頓生五味。醍醐中無五味亦應頓生。又乳中無一物而生一物。無一切物應生一切。外曰因果不破故生可產生第五舉因果證生可生。此文來有遠近。遠來者。從破因中有果品竟於此文外云。汝雖種種破生可生。而因果道理終不可無。若無因果則成邪見。次近生者。從上三破生。汝雖作一多等破。但不許定有定無及合一因多果多因一果。而終不破因果。若有因果必有生可生。內曰下論主既破

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本彼（指外道）認為，可以通過外在的破斥『壞』來證明『生』（產生）。因此，內在就『壞』來檢查『生』。針對之前的『生』門，他們無法求得『生』。現在就『滅』中求『生』，同樣無法得到。比如瓶子，沒有獨立的實體，而是用泥土做成的。泥土這個『因』一旦壞了，瓶子這個『果』也就壞了。另外，就像用『已』、『未』兩個時辰來比喻，如同用兩個時辰來破斥它一樣。進一步說，因為『因』中『果』是確定的，所以第二點就『因果』的定義來破斥『生』。四家（指不同的哲學派別）都認為『果』是確定的，因此『生』是不成立的。僧佉派認為『有』是確定的，如果『有』是確定的，就不需要『生』。世間師（指順世論者）認為『無』是確定的，如果『無』是確定的，就不可能『生』。也有人認為『有』和『無』是相同的，『非有』和『非無』是相同的。註釋只說明瞭『不生』的兩句話，將其展開為三個方面。第一是雙重陳述。第二，『俱下』總標示『無生』。『何以故下』雙重解釋『無生』。解釋『無』容易理解。解釋『有』時說，『是因中是果生是事不然者』，他們的『因』和『果』既然是一體的，就不能分別說『這是因，這是果』，『因生於果』。只能說『因生因』，『果生果』。進一步說，因為『因果』是多重的，所以第三點從『因果』的多重性來破斥。四家都認為『因果』是多重的。如果『因』中有多個『果』，比如牛奶中有奶酪，奶酪中就有酥油。一時之中就具備五種味道，甚至五種味道中就應該有糞便。糞便中也具備五種味道。所以『果』中有很多『因』。比如《涅槃經》中說，『女有兒性，兒有孫性』。又比如買馬的人應該索要小馬的價錢。如果『因』中沒有多個『果』，比如牛奶中沒有五種味道，就應該一下子生出五種味道。醍醐中沒有五種味道，也應該一下子生出。又比如牛奶中沒有一樣東西，卻生出一樣東西。沒有一切東西，就應該生出一切東西。外道說，『因果』是不可破斥的，所以『生』是可以產生的。第五點，舉『因果』來證明『生』是可以產生的。這段文字的來源有遠有近。遠的是，從破斥『因』中有『果』品之後，在這段文字之外說，『你雖然用種種方法破斥『生』是可以產生的，但是『因果』的道理終究是不可缺少的。如果沒有『因果』，就會成為邪見。』近的是，從上面三次破斥『生』。『你雖然做了一多等的破斥，但不允許確定『有』、確定『無』以及合一『因』多『果』、多『因』一『果』。但終究不破斥『因果』。如果有『因果』，必定有『生』是可以產生的。』內曰下，論主既然破斥了『生』，

【English Translation】 English version They (the heretics) believe that 'birth' (arising) can be proven by externally refuting 'destruction'. Therefore, they examine 'birth' internally based on 'destruction'. Addressing the previous 'birth' gate, they cannot obtain 'birth'. Now, seeking 'birth' from 'cessation', they still cannot obtain it. For example, a vase has no independent entity; it is made of clay. Once the 'cause' of clay is destroyed, the 'effect' of the vase is also destroyed. Furthermore, it is like using the two time periods of 'already' and 'not yet' as an analogy, just as refuting it with two time periods. Further, because the 'effect' is determined in the 'cause', the second point refutes 'birth' based on the definition of 'cause and effect'. All four schools (referring to different philosophical schools) believe that the 'effect' is determined, therefore 'birth' is not established. The Samkhya school believes that 'existence' is determined; if 'existence' is determined, there is no need for 'birth'. The Lokayata (materialist) school believes that 'non-existence' is determined; if 'non-existence' is determined, 'birth' is impossible. Some also believe that 'existence' and 'non-existence' are the same, and 'non-existence' and 'not non-existence' are the same. The commentary only explains the two sentences of 'no birth', expanding it into three aspects. The first is a double statement. Second, '俱下' [俱下 - I don't have enough context to translate this] generally indicates 'no birth'. '何以故下' [何以故下 - I don't have enough context to translate this] doubly explains 'no birth'. Explaining 'non-existence' is easy to understand. When explaining 'existence', it says, '是因中是果生是事不然者' [是因中是果生是事不然者 - I don't have enough context to translate this], since their 'cause' and 'effect' are one entity, they cannot distinguish and say 'this is the cause, this is the effect', 'the cause gives rise to the effect'. One can only say 'the cause gives rise to the cause', 'the effect gives rise to the effect'. Further, because 'cause and effect' are multiple, the third point refutes from the multiplicity of 'cause and effect'. All four schools believe that 'cause and effect' are multiple. If there are multiple 'effects' in the 'cause', such as cheese in milk, and ghee in cheese. In one moment, it possesses five flavors, and even in the five flavors, there should be feces. Feces also possess five flavors. Therefore, there are many 'causes' in the 'effect'. For example, the Nirvana Sutra says, 'A woman has the nature of a child, and a child has the nature of a grandchild'. Also, like a person buying a horse should demand the price of a foal. If there are no multiple 'effects' in the 'cause', such as milk having no five flavors, then five flavors should arise all at once. If there are no five flavors in ghee, they should also arise all at once. Also, like milk having nothing, yet one thing arises. Having nothing, everything should arise. The heretics say, 'Cause and effect' cannot be refuted, so 'birth' can occur. The fifth point uses 'cause and effect' to prove that 'birth' can occur. The source of this text is both distant and near. The distant one is that after refuting the 'effect' in the 'cause', it says outside this text, 'Although you refute 'birth' in various ways, the principle of 'cause and effect' is ultimately indispensable. If there is no 'cause and effect', it will become a wrong view.' The near one is from the above three refutations of 'birth'. 'Although you have made refutations of one and many, you do not allow the determination of 'existence', the determination of 'non-existence', and the combination of one 'cause' and many 'effects', and many 'causes' and one 'effect'. But ultimately, you do not refute 'cause and effect'. If there is 'cause and effect', there must be 'birth' that can occur.' 內曰下 [內曰下 - I don't have enough context to translate this], since the proponent has refuted 'birth',

因果將竟。廣開四門攝一切執。若有因果必墮此四。此四若無則因果無寄。文開為二。初總標四句無生。次偏釋初句無生。初為二。一標四句。二辨不生。標四句者。物物明有有不相生。非物非物明無無不相生。互之一字含於二句。有不生無無不生有也。不生者第二總明四句不生。此本定餘本悉非。問外舉因果不破救有諸法。內明四句因果併成不生。便是破一切因果。豈非邪見。答一切經論明無因果有三種義。一者外人作因果不成。無彼所計因果故言無因果也。此是二諦外無也。二者申佛法因緣因果宛然即畢竟空。此是二諦內明無因果。三者外人立有。今正破其有病。論主不言無。外若執無復須破無。如是四句也。註釋為三。一總明四句無生。是則不然下第二總非。何以故下第三釋非。破四句即四破。初句中寄三事。一就母子二約老壯三就映象。此三事並就內法明無因果。品初已來多就外法明無生竟。故今就內法也。內法中事三義二。初就母子明破內法之始。老少內法之終。此二明無真。映象一門明無偽法。無偽法亦二。初明外緣中無果生。次與面相似下明內因中無果。此攝內法真偽事盡。故有四。則例外法亦應有四也。母子中二破。初破云。汝言母是有子亦有言相生者。子是眾生先來已有。寄母胎出非母生子。又子

有因緣。業行為因父母為緣。不得偏從緣也。若謂從母血分第二取意破。以攬血分為母。此乃從母生母。非從母生子。又外人亦謂。本無有子。從血分變作子。亦是不識子因但知現緣。又文正意外謂從母血分生子。言血分與母異。故今明只血是母。云何言從母血生子耶。問答爾應無君臣母子。與闡提六師何異。答如前釋之。生子具有因緣。今偏執緣不達其因。故壞母子義乃外成闡提內非邪見。又從因緣生即寂滅性。外不達此義故其生義不成。非提婆破母子也。余並如文。複次若物生物者第二重破初句凡有二義。一破初類后。二惑情多計故偏破之。就文為三。一牒。是應二種下第二定。若因中有果下第三正破。破二。即二破無中為三。初牒。是則不然下總非。何以故下正破也。因邊異果不可得者二義。一泥能生瓶是因生同果。泥生布等是因生異果。今泥中無同果而能生同果。亦無異果應生異果。而因邊遂無異果可生。故知非因無果。二者執因中無果家謂因異果。今就彼泥因邊求異泥之瓶果不可得。故知非因中無果。二義中此為正意。何以知然。下破因中有果既破其一。則知今破無果破其異也。破有果亦三。若因中前有果牒也。云何生滅破也。不異故釋也。果與因不異果生時因不滅。因與果不異因不應生瓶。以不異故無果

生因滅也。

百論疏卷下之上

百論疏卷下之餘

釋吉藏撰

破常品第九

破法七品二章。前六品破無常法竟。今第二次破常法。生起如前。二者依總別門。一異兩品總破常無常。情塵有果無果別破四種無常。今品別破五種常法。若總若別求常無常皆不可得即畢竟空。令眾生舍斷常見悟入中道。因中發觀得於解脫。三者從有果無果品生。上二品破從因生果。外云。從因生果是無常之法。可得云無。常法不從因生。應當有也。四者接次相生。上破因無果品末四句求因生果無從。今接此興論。果從因有可得云無。不從因法應當有也。次通生起者。諸方等經破無為法明無為法空。今欲釋之故說此品。又如涅槃經正簡邪常正常。明外道所計是于邪常。如來涅槃名為正常。所以稱邪者。求外道常義無從。無而謂有。是故名邪。今欲破外道邪常申佛無所得正常故說此品。又根性不同受悟各異。自有聞上諸品而不得悟。聞于破常即便領解。故說此品。此論始末破外道七種常義。初破神常。次破大有常。今此品破五種常。謂時方虛空微塵涅槃。但前雖破二種常為成破神義。及總別一異義非正破常。今此品中正破五常。問四種外道執常云何同異。答此事難詳。論十品受名有四。一品同而計異。如破神品。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本生是由於滅而產生的。

《百論疏》卷下之上

《百論疏》卷下之餘

釋吉藏撰

破常品第九

破法七品分為兩章。前六品破斥了無常法。現在第二次破斥常法。生起的原因與之前相同。其次，依據總別門，一異兩品總括地破斥常與無常。情塵有果無果兩品分別破斥四種無常。本品則分別破斥五種常法。無論是總括還是分別，尋求常與無常都是不可得的，即畢竟空。使眾生捨棄斷見和常見，領悟並進入中道。在因中發起觀照，從而獲得解脫。第三，從有果無果品生起。前面兩品破斥了從因產生果。外道說：『從因產生果是無常之法，可以說沒有。常法不從因產生，應當是有的。』第四，緊接著相互產生。前面破斥因無果品末尾的四句，尋求因生果而不可得。現在接著這個論點展開討論：果從因有，可以說沒有。不從因的法，應當是有的。』其次，從普遍的生起來看，諸方等經破斥無為法，闡明無為法是空。現在想要解釋它，所以宣說此品。又如《涅槃經》辨別邪常和正常。闡明外道所執著的是邪常，如來的涅槃稱為正常。之所以稱為邪常，是因為尋求外道的常義而不可得，沒有卻說有，所以稱為邪常。現在想要破斥外道的邪常，闡明佛的無所得正常，所以宣說此品。又因為眾生的根性不同，接受領悟的能力也各異，有人聽了前面的各品而不能領悟，聽到破常品就能領悟理解，所以宣說此品。此論從始至終破斥外道的七種常義。最初破斥神常（ātmanitya，神是常存的）。其次破斥大有常（mahatsatyanitya，大有是常存的）。現在此品破斥五種常，即時間（kāla，時間是常存的）、空間（ākāśa，空間是常存的）、虛空（śūnyatā，虛空是常存的）、微塵（paramāṇu，微塵是常存的）和涅槃（nirvāṇa，涅槃是常存的）。但是前面雖然破斥了兩種常，是爲了成就破斥神義，以及總別一異義，並非真正地破斥常。現在此品中，正是破斥五常。問：四種外道執著常的觀點有什麼相同和不同？答：這件事難以詳細說明。《百論》十品的受名有四種情況：一種是品相同而計執不同，如破神品。

【English Translation】 English version Birth arises due to cessation.

Commentary on the Hundred Treatises, Scroll Below, Part One

Continuation of Commentary on the Hundred Treatises, Scroll Below

Composed by Śīlagupta

Chapter Nine: Refuting Permanence

The seven chapters on refuting dharmas are divided into two sections. The first six chapters refuted impermanent dharmas. Now, for the second time, we refute permanent dharmas. The reason for arising is the same as before. Secondly, according to the general and specific aspects, the two chapters on oneness and difference generally refute permanence and impermanence. The two chapters on sentient dust with result and without result separately refute four kinds of impermanence. This chapter specifically refutes five kinds of permanence. Whether generally or specifically, seeking permanence and impermanence is unattainable, which is ultimate emptiness (śūnyatā). It enables sentient beings to abandon the views of annihilationism and eternalism, and to awaken and enter the Middle Way. By cultivating insight in the cause, one attains liberation (moksha). Thirdly, it arises from the chapter on with result and without result. The previous two chapters refuted the arising of result from cause. Externalists say: 'The arising of result from cause is an impermanent dharma, which can be said to be non-existent. Permanent dharma does not arise from cause, so it should exist.' Fourthly, it arises in immediate succession. The last four sentences of the previous chapter refuting cause without result sought the arising of result from cause without success. Now, following this argument, it is discussed: 'Result exists from cause, which can be said to be non-existent. Dharma that does not arise from cause should exist.' Secondly, from a general perspective, the various Vaipulya Sutras refute unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta dharma), clarifying that unconditioned dharmas are empty. Now, wanting to explain it, this chapter is expounded. Furthermore, like the Nirvana Sutra, it distinguishes between false permanence and true permanence. It clarifies that what externalists cling to is false permanence, while the Nirvana of the Tathagata is called true permanence. The reason it is called false permanence is that seeking the meaning of permanence in externalism is unattainable; claiming existence where there is none, hence it is called false. Now, wanting to refute the false permanence of externalists and to expound the unobtainable true permanence of the Buddha, this chapter is expounded. Moreover, because the faculties of sentient beings differ, and their capacity for understanding varies, some may not attain enlightenment by hearing the previous chapters, but upon hearing the chapter on refuting permanence, they can understand and comprehend, hence this chapter is expounded. This treatise, from beginning to end, refutes the seven kinds of permanence held by externalists. Initially, it refutes the permanence of the self (ātmanitya, the self is permanent). Secondly, it refutes the permanence of the Great Being (mahatsatyanitya, the Great Being is permanent). Now, this chapter refutes five kinds of permanence, namely time (kāla, time is permanent), space (ākāśa, space is permanent), emptiness (śūnyatā, emptiness is permanent), atoms (paramāṇu, atoms are permanent), and Nirvana (nirvāṇa, Nirvana is permanent). However, although the previous two kinds of permanence were refuted, it was to accomplish the refutation of the self, as well as the meaning of general and specific, oneness and difference, not truly refuting permanence. Now, in this chapter, it is precisely the five kinds of permanence that are refuted. Question: What are the similarities and differences in the views of permanence held by the four kinds of externalists? Answer: This matter is difficult to explain in detail. The naming of the ten chapters of the Hundred Treatises has four situations: one is that the chapter is the same, but the views held are different, such as the chapter on refuting the self.

同是一品名為品同。而立神不同故名計異。二品異計異。如一異兩品。既有兩品名為品異。而所執又殊名為計異。因中有果無果亦爾。三品異計同。如情塵兩品。既有二品名為品異。而立情塵又同故名計同。四品同計同。即常品是也。同共一品執常又同故名品同計同。問外道辨常與佛法何異。答佛法有大小乘總有五常。小乘有三無為即是三常。大乘長有真諦及以佛果故名五常。此品論者二同三異。謂虛空涅槃內外大小同明是常。時方微塵但是外道所計之常。內說此三並是無常。問此品破何等常。答正破外道五種常法傍破內人五種常義。此則收破二句不同。外道五常但破不收。內道五常有收有破。破能迷之情收所惑之教。就外道五常復有亦收亦破。望涅槃經盜牛之譬。外道偷得常名不達常義。破其常義收取常名。就破收中更二句。虛空涅槃亦破亦收。時方微塵唯破不收也。問若破涅槃常。佛經何故說涅槃耶。答佛為對治生死故說是常。又非常無常嘆美為常。為欲引物。又涅槃有體有用。體非常無常用具常無常。稟教人不識此義故執于常墮在常見也。問舊十地師云。體非常無常用具常無常。與今何異。答今明兩非二是皆是方便用。如法品明實不實四句並是實相家門常無常四句亦是涅槃門。而上以二非為體兩是為用。此對偏

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『同是一品名為品同』，意思是說，雖然是同一類事物，但因為所設立的理論不同，所以稱之為『計異』（不同的見解）。兩種不同的事物，其見解也不同，就像『一』和『異』這兩個品類。既然有了兩個品類，就稱之為『品異』（品類不同），而他們所堅持的觀點又不同，所以稱之為『計異』（見解不同）。因中有果，因中無果，也是同樣的道理。『三品異計同』，例如情（情感）和塵（外在事物）這兩個品類。既然有了兩個品類，就稱之為『品異』（品類不同），但他們都同樣設立情和塵，所以稱之為『計同』（見解相同）。『四品同計同』，指的就是常品。同樣共同屬於一個品類，都執著于常，所以稱之為『品同計同』（品類相同，見解相同）。問：外道（佛教以外的學說）所辨別的『常』與佛法有什麼不同？答：佛法有大乘和小乘，總共有五種『常』。小乘有三種無為法，那就是三種『常』。大乘長有真諦以及佛果，所以稱之為五種『常』。這一品所討論的，有二同三異。所謂虛空（ākāśa），涅槃（nirvāṇa），內外，大小，都共同說明是『常』。時間，空間，微塵，只是外道所計度的『常』。佛法內部說這三種都是無常。問：這一品破斥的是哪一種『常』？答：主要破斥外道的五種『常』法，順帶破斥內道（佛教內部）的五種『常』義。這裡包含了破斥和收攝兩種不同的方式。外道的五常只是破斥而不收攝。內道的五常有收攝也有破斥。破斥那些會使人迷惑的情執，收攝那些被迷惑的教義。就外道的五常來說，也有亦收亦破的情況。參考《涅槃經》中盜牛的比喻。外道偷得了『常』這個名稱，卻不瞭解『常』的真正含義。破斥他們的『常』義，收取『常』這個名稱。在破斥和收攝中，又有兩種情況。虛空和涅槃，既破斥也收攝。時間，空間，微塵，只是破斥而不收攝。問：如果破斥涅槃是『常』，佛經為什麼又說涅槃呢？答：佛陀爲了對治生死，所以說涅槃是『常』。又用非常和無常來讚美『常』，爲了引導眾生。而且，涅槃有體和用。體不是『常』，用則具備『常』和『無常』。接受教義的人不明白這個道理，所以執著于『常』，墮入常見（認為事物是永恒不變的錯誤見解）。問：舊十地師說，體不是『常』，用具備『常』和『無常』，與現在所說的有什麼不同？答：現在說明『兩非』（既不是常也不是無常）和『兩是』（既是常也是無常）都是方便之用。如《法品》所說，實不實四句都是實相的門徑，常無常四句也是涅槃的門徑。而上面以『二非』為體，『兩是』為用，這是針對偏頗的觀點。

【English Translation】 English version 'Being the same category is called 'category same''. This means that although they are the same kind of things, they are called 'different views' because the established theories are different. Two different things have different views, just like the categories 'one' and 'different'. Since there are two categories, it is called 'category different', and their views are different, so it is called 'different views'. The same goes for whether there is a result in the cause or not. 'Three categories different, views same', for example, the two categories of emotion (citta) and dust (dhātu). Since there are two categories, it is called 'category different', but they both establish emotion and dust, so it is called 'views same'. 'Four categories same, views same', which refers to the category of permanence. They belong to the same category and are attached to permanence, so it is called 'category same, views same'. Question: What is the difference between the 'permanence' distinguished by externalists (non-Buddhists) and the Buddha-dharma? Answer: The Buddha-dharma has Mahayana and Hinayana, with a total of five 'permanences'. Hinayana has three unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta dharma), which are the three 'permanences'. Mahayana always has the true reality (tathatā) and the fruit of Buddhahood, so it is called five 'permanences'. This chapter discusses two similarities and three differences. The so-called space (ākāśa), nirvāṇa (nirvāṇa), inside and outside, large and small, all commonly explain that they are 'permanent'. Time, space, and dust are only the 'permanence' measured by externalists. Internally, the Buddha-dharma says that these three are impermanent. Question: Which 'permanence' does this chapter refute? Answer: It mainly refutes the five 'permanent' dharmas of externalists, and incidentally refutes the five 'permanent' meanings of internalists (within Buddhism). This includes two different methods of refutation and inclusion. The five permanences of externalists are only refuted and not included. The five permanences of internalists are both included and refuted. Refute those emotional attachments that can confuse people, and include those doctrines that are confused. Regarding the five permanences of externalists, there are also cases of both inclusion and refutation. Refer to the analogy of stealing a cow in the Nirvana Sutra. Externalists stole the name 'permanence' but did not understand the true meaning of 'permanence'. Refute their meaning of 'permanence' and take the name 'permanence'. In refutation and inclusion, there are two situations. Space and nirvāṇa are both refuted and included. Time, space, and dust are only refuted and not included. Question: If nirvāṇa is refuted as 'permanent', why do the Buddhist scriptures say nirvāṇa? Answer: The Buddha said that nirvāṇa is 'permanent' in order to counteract birth and death. He also uses impermanence and non-permanence to praise 'permanence' in order to guide sentient beings. Moreover, nirvāṇa has substance and function. The substance is not 'permanent', and the function has both 'permanent' and 'impermanent'. Those who accept the teachings do not understand this principle, so they are attached to 'permanence' and fall into the common view (the mistaken view that things are eternal and unchanging). Question: The old Ten Bhumi masters said that the substance is not 'permanent' and the function has both 'permanent' and 'impermanent'. What is the difference from what is said now? Answer: Now it is explained that 'both non-' (neither permanent nor impermanent) and 'both are' (both permanent and impermanent) are expedient uses. As the Dharma Chapter says, the four sentences of real and unreal are all paths to the real aspect, and the four sentences of permanent and impermanent are also paths to nirvāṇa. The above uses 'two non-' as the substance and 'two are' as the function, which is aimed at biased views.

病作此語耳。此品為二。一總破常二別破常。外曰應有諸法無因法不破故。上就有因救有因。今舉無因法證有因。舉無因釋成常義也。有因法可破。無因法常不可破。既有于常必有無常。又滅無常而得於常。內外大小義並同。然無常若無則知有常。此有無相待也。內曰若強以為常無常同。凡三義。一者本有無常可得說常。既無無常亦無有常。而汝謂有常故名強說。若強說常則是無常。二者汝本立無常。上求既無從。今立有常亦同不可得。而汝謂有名強說常。故與無常同。三者為有所以故說常。為無所以漫道常耶。此二俱破于常。若有所以則是有因。汝言無因法常。今既有因則無常也。若無所以漫說常者。既是漫說則是無常。問外人品初已明無因法不破故。今云何更問因無因耶。答上直明無因耳。今問其有所以因無所以因。故異上也。外曰了因故無過救上無常同之難也。因有二種。一者生因二者了因。常法無有生因。是故為常。以有了因非強說常。但了因有二。一別二總。虛空以滅色為因。時以華實為因。方以日合為因。微塵以粗果為因。涅槃無累為因。因此五法知有五常。故以五法為五常因。此是別了因也。總了因有二。一以言說顯示前法令人得知。故以言說為常了因。二因無常法相對故知有常。故以無常法為常了因

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：他說這些話是因為生病了。這一品分為兩部分：一是總破『常』（nitya 永恒），二是分別破『常』。外道說：『應該有諸法是無因而生的，因為無法破斥它。』之前已經用『有因』來辯護『有因』的觀點，現在舉出『無因法』來證明『有因』。舉出『無因』是爲了解釋和成立『常』的意義。『有因法』可以被破斥，而『無因法』是永恒的，不可破斥。既然有『常』，必定有『無常』。又因為滅除了『無常』，才能證得『常』。內外、大小的意義都是相同的。如果『無常』不存在，那麼就知道有『常』，這是有和無相互依存的關係。內道反駁說：『如果勉強認為『常』和『無常』相同，有三種情況：一是本來有『無常』，才可以談論『常』。既然沒有『無常』，也就沒有『常』，而你卻說有『常』，所以是勉強說。如果勉強說『常』，那就是『無常』。二是，你本來立論『無常』，之前尋求『無常』卻找不到，現在立論『有常』，同樣是不可得的。而你卻說有『常』，是勉強說『常』，所以和『無常』一樣。三是，爲了有原因所以說『常』，還是沒有原因隨便說『常』呢？』這兩種說法都是爲了破斥『常』。如果有原因，那就是『有因』，你說是『無因法』是『常』，現在既然有因，那就是『無常』。如果沒有原因隨便說『常』，既然是隨便說，那就是『無常』。外道問：『在品的第一部分已經說明了『無因法』不可破斥，現在為什麼還要問『因』和『無因』呢？』內道回答說：『之前只是說明了『無因』，現在問的是它有原因的『因』還是沒有原因的『因』，所以和之前不同。』外道說：『因為是『了因』（hetu 助緣），所以沒有像之前『無常』一樣的過失。』因有兩種：一是『生因』（janaka-hetu 生起因），二是『了因』。『常法』沒有『生因』，所以是『常』。因為有了『了因』，所以不是勉強說『常』。但『了因』有兩種：一是『別了因』，二是『總了因』。虛空以滅色為因，時間以花和果實為因，方位以太陽的會合為因，微塵以粗大的果實為因，涅槃以沒有累贅為因。因此，通過這五法，知道有五種『常』，所以用這五法作為五種『常』的『因』，這是『別了因』。『總了因』有兩種：一是用言語顯示前面的法，使人得知，所以用言語作為『常』的『了因』。二是，因為『無常法』的相對存在，所以知道有『常』，所以用『無常法』作為『常』的『了因』。

【English Translation】 English version: He speaks these words because of illness. This chapter is divided into two parts: first, a general refutation of 'nitya' (eternality); second, a separate refutation of 'nitya'. The outsider says, 'There should be dharmas that arise without a cause, because they cannot be refuted.' Previously, 'having a cause' was used to defend the view of 'having a cause'; now, 'causeless dharmas' are cited to prove 'having a cause'. Citing 'causelessness' is to explain and establish the meaning of 'eternality'. 'Dharmas with a cause' can be refuted, while 'causeless dharmas' are eternal and cannot be refuted. Since there is 'eternality', there must be 'impermanence'. Moreover, 'eternality' is attained by eliminating 'impermanence'. The meanings of internal and external, large and small, are the same. If 'impermanence' does not exist, then it is known that there is 'eternality'; this is a relationship of interdependence between existence and non-existence. The insider refutes, 'If you insist that 'eternality' and 'impermanence' are the same, there are three possibilities: first, if there is originally 'impermanence', then 'eternality' can be discussed. Since there is no 'impermanence', there is also no 'eternality', but you say there is 'eternality', so it is a forced statement. If you force the statement of 'eternality', then it is 'impermanence'. Second, you originally established 'impermanence', but you could not find it before. Now, establishing 'eternality' is equally unattainable. But you say there is 'eternality', which is a forced statement of 'eternality', so it is the same as 'impermanence'. Third, is 'eternality' spoken because there is a reason, or is 'eternality' spoken randomly without a reason?' Both of these statements are to refute 'eternality'. If there is a reason, then it is 'having a cause'. You say that 'causeless dharmas' are 'eternal', but now that there is a cause, then it is 'impermanent'. If 'eternality' is spoken randomly without a reason, then since it is spoken randomly, it is 'impermanent'. The outsider asks, 'In the first part of the chapter, it has already been explained that 'causeless dharmas' cannot be refuted, so why ask about 'cause' and 'no cause' now?' The insider replies, 'Previously, only 'causelessness' was explained; now, the question is whether it has a 'cause' with a reason or a 'cause' without a reason, so it is different from before.' The outsider says, 'Because it is a 'hetu' (condition, specifically a 'knowing cause'), there is no fault like the previous 'impermanence'.' There are two types of causes: first, 'janaka-hetu' (productive cause); second, 'hetu' (knowing cause). 'Eternal dharmas' do not have a 'productive cause', so they are 'eternal'. Because there is a 'knowing cause', it is not a forced statement of 'eternality'. But there are two types of 'knowing causes': first, 'distinct knowing cause'; second, 'general knowing cause'. Space has the cessation of form as its cause, time has flowers and fruits as its cause, direction has the conjunction of the sun as its cause, minute particles have coarse fruits as their cause, and Nirvana has the absence of defilements as its cause. Therefore, through these five dharmas, it is known that there are five types of 'eternality', so these five dharmas are used as the 'causes' of the five types of 'eternality'; this is a 'distinct knowing cause'. There are two types of 'general knowing causes': first, using speech to reveal the preceding dharma so that people can know it, so speech is used as the 'knowing cause' of 'eternality'. Second, because of the relative existence of 'impermanent dharmas', it is known that there is 'eternality', so 'impermanent dharmas' are used as the 'knowing cause' of 'eternality'.

。內曰是因不然者。凡有四義。夫論有常不出人法。人即是神。法謂大有。是常。上以言說立此二常。求既無從。今以言說證有五常。類同前破故云是因不然。二者無此言說以何證常。夫論言說不出人法。言說若從人有。求人無從。若因法有撿。法不得故無可證常。三者撿汝現事尚皆無從空有言說。云何有法。四者求所說常法實不可得。后當具明汝以言說何所證耶。外曰應有常法作法無常故者。上以言證法。內既不受不許言。今默然不須語。外今直指破壞之瓶顯不破者是常。以見有為起作之法是于無常。則知非起作法名之為常。此即是對有為說無為。生死涅槃真妄等法悉相對而立。內曰無亦共有者。有百論師謂。此文是於一難。今明不然。凡有二難。所言無者此一難也。汝以無常證有于常者此事無也。以上六品求無常法竟。自無從以何證常。故云無也。二依文難者。外既相對而立。內還相對而破。汝言作法無常故不作法常者。亦應有無相對。作法既有無作應無。故云無也。言共有者。上就二門破。作無作異則有無亦異。作法既有無作應無。今就同門破。汝言常法無色香味觸既是常者。心法亦同無色香味觸。此則不作法與作法同。汝本謂與作法異故名無為常。今既與作法同則同皆無常。前是借異破異。今是借同破異。文

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：內（指佛教內部）說：『這是因為不然的。』凡有四種意義。凡是討論常，都離不開人法。人即是神，法指大有。這是常。上面用言說來建立這兩種常，尋求卻無從下手。現在用言說來證明有五常，類似之前破斥的情況，所以說『這是因為不然』。二者，沒有這種言說，用什麼來證明常呢？凡是討論言說，都離不開人法。言說如果從人而來，尋求人無從下手。如果因為法而有，檢查法卻得不到，所以無法證明常。三者，檢查你們現在的事尚且無從下手，憑空有什麼言說呢？怎麼會有法呢？四者，尋求所說的常法，實際上是不可得的。後面會詳細說明，你用言說什麼來證明呢？外（指外道）說：『應該有常法，因為作法是無常的。』上面用言說來證明法，內既然不接受，也不允許言說，現在沉默不須說話。外現在直接指出破壞的瓶子，顯現不破的是常。因為見到有為（saṃskṛta）生起的法是無常的，就知道不是生起的法名為常。這即是對有為說無為（asaṃskṛta），生死（saṃsāra）、涅槃（nirvāṇa）、真、妄等法都相對而立。內說：『無也是共有的。』有百論師說，這段文字是一個難題。現在說明不然。凡有二個難題。所說的『無』，這是一個難題。你用無常來證明有常，這件事是沒有的。以上六品尋求無常法完畢。自己無從下手，用什麼來證明常呢？所以說『無』。二，依照文義來辯難。外既然相對而立，內也還相對而破。你說作法是無常的，所以不作法是常的，也應該有無相對。作法既然有，無作應該沒有。所以說『無』。說到『共有』，上面就二門來破。作、無作不同，則有、無也不同。作法既然有，無作應該沒有。現在就同門來破。你說常法沒有色、香、味、觸，既然是常，心法也同樣沒有色、香、味、觸。這樣，不作法與作法相同。你本來認為與作法不同，所以名為無為常。現在既然與作法相同，則相同都是無常。前面是借異破異，現在是借同破異。文（指文句）。

【English Translation】 English version: The Inner (referring to Buddhism) says: 'This is because it is not so.' There are four meanings in all. Whenever discussing permanence, one cannot depart from person and dharma. Person is deity, and dharma refers to great existence. This is permanence. Above, speech is used to establish these two permanences, but seeking them is impossible. Now, speech is used to prove the existence of five permanences, similar to the previous refutations, so it is said 'This is because it is not so.' Secondly, without this speech, what is used to prove permanence? Whenever discussing speech, one cannot depart from person and dharma. If speech comes from person, seeking the person is impossible. If it exists because of dharma, examining the dharma yields nothing, so permanence cannot be proven. Thirdly, examining your present matters is already impossible, so what is the basis for empty speech? How can there be dharma? Fourthly, seeking the spoken permanent dharma is actually unattainable. It will be explained in detail later, what do you use speech to prove? The Outer (referring to non-Buddhists) says: 'There should be permanent dharma, because created dharma is impermanent.' Above, speech is used to prove dharma, but the Inner neither accepts nor allows speech, so now it is silent and does not need to speak. The Outer now directly points to the broken vase, revealing that what is not broken is permanent. Because seeing that conditioned (saṃskṛta) arising dharmas are impermanent, one knows that what does not arise is called permanent. This is speaking of unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) in relation to conditioned, and phenomena such as birth and death (saṃsāra), nirvana (nirvāṇa), truth, and falsehood are all established in opposition. The Inner says: 'Non-existence is also shared.' Some Śāstrakāras of the Śata Śāstra say that this passage is a difficult problem. Now it is explained that it is not so. There are two difficult problems in all. The 'non-existence' that is spoken of is one difficult problem. You use impermanence to prove the existence of permanence, this matter does not exist. The above six sections seek impermanent dharma to completion. One cannot start with oneself, what is used to prove permanence? So it is said 'non-existence.' Secondly, according to the meaning of the text, to debate. Since the Outer establishes in opposition, the Inner also refutes in opposition. You say that created dharma is impermanent, so uncreated dharma is permanent, there should also be non-existence in opposition. Since created dharma exists, uncreated should not exist. So it is said 'non-existence.' Speaking of 'shared,' above, it is refuted from two aspects. Created and uncreated are different, so existence and non-existence are also different. Since created dharma exists, uncreated should not exist. Now it is refuted from the same aspect. You say that permanent dharma has no form, smell, taste, or touch, since it is permanent, mental dharma also has no form, smell, taste, or touch. In this way, uncreated dharma is the same as created dharma. You originally thought it was different from created dharma, so it is called unconditioned and permanent. Now that it is the same as created dharma, then the same are all impermanent. The former is using difference to refute difference, and the latter is using sameness to refute difference. The text (referring to the sentences).

正爾也。不容異釋。今勢破者。前就異門破之。今作法既有無作應無。外必不受此難作無作乃異而同。是有自有作法有。無作法亦有。如一切有部有三有為有三無為。不可聞為無為異便謂有無亦異。故今破云。若為無為同皆是有則同應無常。故中論云。涅槃若是有。有則老死相。涅槃若是有則應是有為。又作不作同有。同皆是常。又同皆是有而作法無常不作是常。亦應作法是常不作無常。注為二。初釋偈本。二從如是下結前發后釋偈本同異破即二。前釋異破。複次下釋同破。如是遍常不遍常悉已總破者。遍不遍乃異。常義是同。既已破常則破遍不遍也。外曰定有虛空第二別破五常。前總后別。觀門次第亦是立義之方。又是前總破內外一切諸常。今別略破五常。即五。一破空常。二破時常。三破方常。四破微塵常。五破涅槃常。前破虛空者。世間外道小乘大乘共知虛空是常。其義最顯故初立之。涅槃經云。如諸常中虛空第一。如來亦爾。故最初立空常。就破虛空為三。一破空體。二破空住處。三破空相。此三破空略盡。今前立空體。但釋空體不同。一毗曇人云。有有為虛空無為虛空。成外世界及成內身有為虛空即是色法。二無為虛空如天漢等空。問數人何故立虛空是有為。答婆沙云。有去來故能容有。故當知是有。問有

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本這才是正確的理解，不應該有其他的解釋。現在對方的論點已經站不住腳了，之前是從不同的角度來駁斥他們的觀點。現在，如果按照你們的說法，有了『作』（karma, 行為）就應該沒有『無作』（non-action, 無為），但對方肯定不會接受這種反駁，因為他們認為『無作』和『作』是不同的，但本質上是相同的。也就是說，『作法』（karma, 行為）是存在的，『無作法』（non-action, 無為）也是存在的。就像一切有部認為有三種有為法和三種無為法一樣。不能因為『不可聞』（inaudible）的無為法不同，就認為『有』和『無』也是不同的。所以現在反駁說，如果認為『無為』和『有』相同，都是『有』，那麼就應該都是無常的。所以《中論》說，如果涅槃是『有』，那麼就應該有衰老和死亡的現象。如果涅槃是『有』，那麼就應該是『有為』的。而且，如果『作』和『不作』相同，都存在，那麼就應該都是常的。或者說，如果它們都是『有』，而『作法』是無常的，『不作』是常的，那麼就應該『作法』也是常的，『不作』也是無常的。註釋分為兩部分。第一部分解釋偈頌的原文，第二部分從『如是』開始，總結前面的內容，並引出後面的內容，解釋偈頌的原文，即對『同』和『異』的駁斥，分為兩部分。前面解釋對『異』的駁斥，『複次』（又）開始解釋對『同』的駁斥。『如是遍常不遍常悉已總破者』，『遍』和『不遍』是不同的，『常』的意義是相同的。既然已經駁斥了『常』，那麼也就駁斥了『遍』和『不遍』。對方說，一定有虛空，這是第二次分別駁斥五種常。前面是總的駁斥，後面是分別的駁斥。觀察的順序也是立論的方法。前面是總的駁斥內外一切諸常，現在是分別簡略地駁斥五常，即五種常：一、駁斥空常（虛空是常）；二、駁斥時常（時間是常）；三、駁斥方常（方位是常）；四、駁斥微塵常（微塵是常）；五、駁斥涅槃常（涅槃是常）。前面駁斥虛空，世間的外道、小乘、大乘都知道虛空是常。這個道理最明顯，所以首先提出。涅槃經說，在各種常之中，虛空是第一位的，如來也是如此。所以最先提出空常。駁斥虛空分為三個方面：一、駁斥空的本體；二、駁斥空的存在之處；三、駁斥空的相狀。這三個方面駁斥空，就比較全面了。現在先立空體，但對空體的解釋不同。一、毗曇（Abhidharma）的人認為，有有為虛空和無為虛空。形成外在世界和內在身體的有為虛空就是色法。二、無為虛空就像天上的銀河等空。問：數論派的人為什麼認為虛空是有為法？答：婆沙（Vibhasa）說，因為虛空有來去，能夠容納事物，所以應當知道它是有為法。問：有...

【English Translation】 English version That is the correct understanding, and there should be no other interpretations. Now, the opponent's argument is untenable, as we previously refuted their views from different angles. Now, according to your argument, if there is 'karma' (action), there should be no 'non-action' (wuwei, inaction), but the opponent will certainly not accept this refutation because they believe that 'non-action' and 'action' are different but essentially the same. That is to say, 'karma' exists, and 'non-action' also exists. Just as the Sarvastivadins believe that there are three conditioned dharmas (有為法, youwei fa) and three unconditioned dharmas (無為法, wuwei fa). One cannot assume that because 'inaudible' unconditioned dharmas are different, 'existence' and 'non-existence' are also different. Therefore, the current refutation states that if 'non-action' and 'existence' are considered the same, and both are 'existence', then they should both be impermanent. Therefore, the Madhyamaka-karika (中論, Zhonglun) says that if Nirvana (涅槃, Niepan) is 'existence', then there should be phenomena of aging and death. If Nirvana is 'existence', then it should be a conditioned dharma. Moreover, if 'action' and 'non-action' are the same, and both exist, then they should both be permanent. Or, if they are both 'existence', and 'karma' is impermanent while 'non-action' is permanent, then 'karma' should also be permanent, and 'non-action' should be impermanent. The commentary is divided into two parts. The first part explains the original text of the verses, and the second part, starting from 'ru shi' (如是, thus), summarizes the previous content and introduces the following content, explaining the original text of the verses, which is the refutation of 'sameness' and 'difference', divided into two parts. The first part explains the refutation of 'difference', and 'fu ci' (複次, again) begins to explain the refutation of 'sameness'. 'Ru shi bian chang bu bian chang xi yi zong po zhe' (如是遍常不遍常悉已總破者, Thus, the pervasive-permanent and non-pervasive-permanent have all been generally refuted), 'pervasive' and 'non-pervasive' are different, and the meaning of 'permanent' is the same. Since 'permanent' has already been refuted, then 'pervasive' and 'non-pervasive' have also been refuted. The opponent says that there must be space (虛空, xukong), which is the second separate refutation of the five permanents. The previous was a general refutation, and the following is a separate refutation. The order of observation is also the method of establishing arguments. The previous was a general refutation of all internal and external permanents, and now it is a separate and brief refutation of the five permanents, namely the five permanents: 1. Refuting the permanence of space; 2. Refuting the permanence of time; 3. Refuting the permanence of direction; 4. Refuting the permanence of atoms; 5. Refuting the permanence of Nirvana. Previously, space was refuted. The worldly heretics, Hinayana, and Mahayana all know that space is permanent. This principle is the most obvious, so it is proposed first. The Nirvana Sutra (涅槃經, Niepan Jing) says that among all permanents, space is the first, and so is the Tathagata (如來, Rulai). Therefore, the permanence of space is proposed first. Refuting space is divided into three aspects: 1. Refuting the substance of space; 2. Refuting the place where space exists; 3. Refuting the characteristics of space. These three aspects refute space relatively comprehensively. Now, the substance of space is established first, but the explanation of the substance of space is different. 1. The Abhidharma (毗曇, Pitan) people believe that there is conditioned space and unconditioned space. The conditioned space that forms the external world and the internal body is form (色法, sefa). 2. Unconditioned space is like the Milky Way in the sky. Question: Why do the Samkhya (數論, Shulun) school people think that space is a conditioned dharma? Answer: The Vibhasa (婆沙, Posha) says that because space has coming and going and can accommodate things, it should be known that it is a conditioned dharma. Question: Is there...

為空與無為空何異。答有為空是色。故二十一色中空是一色。無為空非色。有為空可見無為空不可見。有異部云。虛空非色非非色但隨世俗故說名虛空。次成論人明虛空一向是無法。三外道立空即如今文所說。就偈本為二。第一標章門二釋章門。標章門為三。一明虛空是有簡異成實。又簡異計無虛空家。常者第二標常章門。簡異毗曇有為虛空。所言遍者第三標遍章門。簡異余不遍常。又簡異計虛空是不遍者。無分明空體是一不可分為多分。簡異計有多虛空者也。一切處下第二解釋三門。一切處逐近釋遍及無分義。一切時釋前常義。信有故釋初定有虛空法。又有者通釋常遍可信。內曰分中分合故分不異破上虛空是常遍也。問何故破空。答一破病。大小內外有所得人謂瓶等為有虛空是無。因此有無生煩惱業苦。故今破之明無此有無。二者欲通經。諸方等經借空為喻。若如外道空者則法亦同外道。今破除外道邪空申空義故破空也。分中者瓶中空也。分合故者。此瓶中之空是有分空家一分與瓶合也。分不異者。上二句是牒外義。今是破也。瓶中之空是有分。空一分來與瓶合。空則可分便與諸分不異。若爾不應言無分。亦不應言是于遍常。此三義便壞也。注中為四。一雙牒二雙定三雙難四雙結。若瓶中向中虛空。此雙牒瓶向二處

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『為空』（Śūnyatā，空性）與『無為空』有何不同？答：『有為空』是色（Rūpa，物質），因此在二十一種色法中，空（Ākāśa，虛空）是一種色法。『無為空』不是色法。『有為空』是可見的，『無為空』是不可見的。有異部（Vibhajyavāda，分別說部）認為，虛空（Ākāśa）既非色法也非非色法，只是隨順世俗的說法才稱之為虛空。其次，《成實論》（Satyasiddhi-śāstra）的作者認為虛空始終是無法（非實在）。三種外道（Tīrthika，佛教以外的修行者）所立的空，就如現在文中所說。就偈頌的原本來說，分為二部分：第一是標章門，第二是釋章門。標章門分為三部分：一是說明虛空是『有』，以此區別于『成實』（實在）。又區別于計執沒有虛空的學派。『常』（Nitya，永恒）者，第二是標示『常』的章門，以此區別于毗曇（Abhidharma，阿毗達摩）所說的『有為』虛空。所說的『遍』（Vyāpaka，周遍）者，第三是標示『遍』的章門，以此區別于其他不周遍的『常』。又區別于計執虛空是不周遍的學派。『無分』（Abhāga，不可分割）說明空（Ākāśa）的本體是唯一的，不可分割為多個部分，以此區別于計執有多個虛空的學派。『一切處』（Sarvatra，一切處所）以下是第二部分，解釋這三個門。『一切處』是就近解釋『遍』及『無分』的含義。『一切時』（Sarvadā，一切時間）解釋前面的『常』的含義。『信有故』解釋最初確定有虛空法。『又有者』是通盤解釋『常』、『遍』是可以相信的。內文說『分中分合故分不異』，這是爲了破斥上面所說的虛空是『常』、『遍』的觀點。問：為什麼要破斥空（Ākāśa）？答：一是爲了破除病癥。大小內外有所得的人，認為瓶子等是『有』，虛空是『無』。因此，因為『有』和『無』而產生煩惱、業和痛苦。所以現在破斥它，是爲了說明沒有這種『有』和『無』。二是爲了貫通經典。《諸方等經》（Vaipulya-sūtra，方廣經典）借用空作為比喻。如果像外道所說的空那樣，那麼佛法也就等同於外道了。現在破除外道的邪空，是爲了闡明空的真正含義，所以要破斥空。『分中者』指的是瓶子中的空。『分合故者』指的是，這個瓶子中的空是有『分』的，空的一部分與瓶子結合在一起。『分不異者』，上面兩句是引述外道的觀點，現在是要破斥它。瓶子中的空是有『分』的，空的一部分來與瓶子結合。空如果可以分割，就與各個部分沒有區別。如果這樣，就不應該說是『無分』，也不應該說是『遍』和『常』。這三個含義就都被破壞了。註釋中分為四個部分：一是雙重引述，二是雙重肯定，三是雙重詰難，四是雙重總結。如果瓶子中的空朝向中間的虛空，這雙重引述了瓶子和朝向這兩個地方。

【English Translation】 English version What is the difference between 『Śūnyatā』 (emptiness) and 『non-Śūnyatā』? Answer: 『Śūnyatā with form』 (having form) is Rūpa (matter), therefore, among the twenty-one types of Rūpa, Ākāśa (space) is one type of Rūpa. 『Śūnyatā without form』 is not Rūpa. 『Śūnyatā with form』 is visible, while 『Śūnyatā without form』 is invisible. The Vibhajyavāda (a branch of Buddhism) believes that Ākāśa is neither Rūpa nor non-Rūpa, but is named Ākāśa according to worldly conventions. Secondly, the author of the Satyasiddhi-śāstra clarifies that Ākāśa is always non-existent (unreal). The 『emptiness』 established by the three Tīrthikas (non-Buddhist practitioners) is as described in the current text. Regarding the original verses, they are divided into two parts: first, the chapter on marking characteristics; second, the chapter on explaining characteristics. The chapter on marking characteristics is divided into three parts: first, clarifying that Ākāśa 『exists』, thereby distinguishing it from 『Satyasiddhi』 (real existence). It also distinguishes it from schools that claim there is no Ākāśa. 『Nitya』 (eternal), second, is the chapter on marking 『eternality』, thereby distinguishing it from the 『conditioned』 Ākāśa described in the Abhidharma. 『Vyāpaka』 (pervasive), third, is the chapter on marking 『pervasiveness』, thereby distinguishing it from other non-pervasive 『eternals』. It also distinguishes it from schools that claim Ākāśa is not pervasive. 『Abhāga』 (indivisible) explains that the essence of Ākāśa is unique and cannot be divided into multiple parts, thereby distinguishing it from schools that claim there are multiple Ākāśas. 『Sarvatra』 (everywhere) below is the second part, explaining these three chapters. 『Sarvatra』 closely explains the meaning of 『pervasive』 and 『indivisible』. 『Sarvadā』 (always) explains the meaning of 『eternal』 mentioned earlier. 『Because it is believed to exist』 explains the initial determination that the Dharma of Ākāśa exists. 『And there are those』 comprehensively explains that 『eternal』 and 『pervasive』 are believable. The text says 『dividing in division, combining, therefore division is not different』, which is to refute the above view that Ākāśa is 『eternal』 and 『pervasive』. Question: Why refute Ākāśa? Answer: First, to eliminate the disease. People who have gained something from large, small, inner, and outer things think that bottles, etc., 『exist』, and Ākāśa does not 『exist』. Therefore, because of 『existence』 and 『non-existence』, afflictions, karma, and suffering arise. So now refuting it is to explain that there is no such 『existence』 and 『non-existence』. Second, to connect the scriptures. The Vaipulya-sūtra (extensive sutras) uses emptiness as a metaphor. If emptiness is like that described by non-Buddhists, then the Dharma would be the same as non-Buddhism. Now, refuting the non-Buddhist』s false emptiness is to clarify the true meaning of emptiness, so Ākāśa must be refuted. 『Dividing in division』 refers to the emptiness in the bottle. 『Combining, therefore division』 refers to the emptiness in this bottle having 『parts』, and part of the emptiness combines with the bottle. 『Division is not different』, the above two sentences are quoting the views of non-Buddhists, and now they are being refuted. The emptiness in the bottle has 『parts』, and part of the emptiness comes to combine with the bottle. If emptiness can be divided, then it is no different from each part. If so, it should not be said to be 『indivisible』, nor should it be said to be 『pervasive』 and 『eternal』. These three meanings are all destroyed. The commentary is divided into four parts: first, double quotation; second, double affirmation; third, double questioning; fourth, double conclusion. If the emptiness in the bottle faces the emptiness in the middle, this double quotation refers to the two places of the bottle and facing.

空也。即釋偈本分中兩字。是中虛空下第二雙定。雙定者且據瓶中空以定外也。定意云。瓶中之空為都有十方空。為有一分空。若都有者下第三雙破有二義。一者若瓶中都有十方空。則十方空並在瓶內瓶外應無有空。空則不遍不常。若是為遍下第二義。若瓶內之空遂遍瓶亦應遍。空既常瓶亦應常。前句得瓶不遍而空墮不遍。今得空遍而瓶失不遍也。若分有者下第二破分合。正牒偈本中分合兩字。虛空但是分下釋偈本分不異。是故虛空下第四雙結非遍非常。帖文正爾。今更義破。問瓶內空與瓶外空為一為異。若一者一切空皆在一瓶中。空則不遍。空若遍瓶亦遍。若瓶內空與瓶外空異者。便有二空則墮有分。有分故無常。又問空與瓶為一為異。若空與瓶一。空常瓶即常。瓶無常空即無常。若瓶與空異。空常瓶無常。亦應瓶常空無常。遍不遍亦爾。空與瓶一俱遍俱不遍。若空遍瓶不遍。亦應瓶遍空不遍。若瓶與空異。則瓶處無空空則不遍。不遍則不常。破真俗一體二體皆作此責之。成論云。虛空是無法而終有此空。是於法塵異於兔角。若撥無虛空則成邪見。今問空若是無法應非法塵。既是法塵便是有法。又舊云。虛空無丈尺。丈尺約虛空虛空名丈尺。若爾虛空非無常用。無常約虛空詺虛空作無常。覆結可知。又問柱內空與柱

【現代漢語翻譯】空也。（即是解釋偈語『本分』中的兩個字。）這是『中虛空』下的第二雙重否定。雙重否定是暫且根據瓶中的空間來確定外部空間。確定的意思是說，瓶中的空間是包含了全部十方虛空，還是隻包含了一部分虛空？如果包含了全部十方虛空，那麼下面是第三雙重否定，包含兩種含義。第一種含義是，如果瓶中包含了全部十方虛空，那麼十方虛空就都在瓶內，瓶外應該沒有虛空。沒有虛空，那麼虛空就不周遍，也不是永恒的。如果是周遍的，那麼下面是第二種含義。如果瓶內的虛空是周遍的，那麼瓶子也應該是周遍的。虛空既然是永恒的，那麼瓶子也應該是永恒的。前一句得出瓶子不周遍，而虛空也陷入不周遍。現在得出虛空周遍，而瓶子失去了不周遍的特性。如果只包含一部分虛空，那麼下面是第二重否定，否定部分和整體的結合。正是對應偈語中的『分』和『合』兩個字。『虛空但是分』，是解釋偈語中『本分不異』的意思。『是故虛空』，是第四雙重結論，否定周遍和永恒。帖文正是如此。現在進一步從義理上進行破斥。問：瓶內的空間和瓶外的空間是一樣的還是不同的？如果是一樣的，那麼一切空間都在一個瓶子中，空間就不周遍。如果空間周遍，那麼瓶子也周遍。如果瓶內的空間和瓶外的空間不同，那麼就有兩個空間，就落入了有部分。有部分，所以不是永恒的。又問：空間和瓶子是一樣的還是不同的？如果空間和瓶子一樣，空間是永恒的，瓶子就是永恒的。瓶子是無常的，空間就是無常的。如果瓶子和空間不同，空間是永恒的，瓶子是無常的，也應該是瓶子是永恒的，空間是無常的。周遍和不周遍也是如此。空間和瓶子一樣，就都周遍，或者都不周遍。如果空間周遍，瓶子不周遍，也應該是瓶子周遍，空間不周遍。如果瓶子和空間不同，那麼瓶子所在的地方就沒有空間，空間就不周遍。不周遍，那麼就不是永恒的。破斥真諦和俗諦一體或二體，都可以用這種方式來責難。《成實論》說：『虛空是無法，但最終有此空，這和法塵不同於兔角。』如果否定沒有虛空，就成了邪見。現在問：如果空間是無法，就不應該是法塵。既然是法塵，就是有法。還有舊的說法：『虛空沒有丈尺，丈尺是根據虛空來確定的，虛空被稱為丈尺。』如果這樣，虛空就不是無常的。無常是根據虛空來確定的，虛空被稱為無常。反過來總結，道理是相同的。又問：柱子內的空間和柱子

【English Translation】 Emptiness. (This explains the two words 'original nature' (本分) in the verse.) This is the second double negation under 'space within'. Double negation here is based on using the space within a bottle to define the external space. The meaning being defined is whether the space within the bottle contains all of the ten directions of space, or only a portion of it. If it contains all of the ten directions, then the following is the third double negation, containing two meanings. The first meaning is, if the bottle contains all of the ten directions of space, then the ten directions of space are all within the bottle, and there should be no space outside the bottle. If there is no space, then space is not pervasive and not eternal. If it is pervasive, then the following is the second meaning. If the space within the bottle is pervasive, then the bottle should also be pervasive. Since space is eternal, then the bottle should also be eternal. The previous sentence concludes that the bottle is not pervasive, and space also falls into non-pervasiveness. Now it is concluded that space is pervasive, and the bottle loses its non-pervasive characteristic. If it only contains a portion of space, then the following is the second negation, negating the combination of part and whole. This corresponds to the words 'division' (分) and 'combination' (合) in the verse. 'Space is only a part', explains the meaning of 'original nature is not different' (本分不異) in the verse. 'Therefore, space' is the fourth double conclusion, negating pervasiveness and eternity. The text is exactly like this. Now, further refute it from the perspective of principle. Question: Is the space inside the bottle the same as or different from the space outside the bottle? If they are the same, then all space is in one bottle, and space is not pervasive. If space is pervasive, then the bottle is also pervasive. If the space inside the bottle is different from the space outside the bottle, then there are two spaces, and it falls into having parts. Having parts, therefore it is not eternal. Also ask: Are space and the bottle the same or different? If space and the bottle are the same, space is eternal, and the bottle is eternal. The bottle is impermanent, and space is impermanent. If the bottle and space are different, space is eternal, and the bottle is impermanent, it should also be that the bottle is eternal, and space is impermanent. Pervasiveness and non-pervasiveness are also like this. Space and the bottle are the same, then they are both pervasive, or both not pervasive. If space is pervasive and the bottle is not pervasive, it should also be that the bottle is pervasive and space is not pervasive. If the bottle and space are different, then there is no space where the bottle is, and space is not pervasive. Not pervasive, then it is not eternal. Refuting the oneness or twoness of truth and convention can all be done with this kind of questioning. The Chengshi Lun (成實論) says: 'Space is non-existence, but ultimately there is this space, which is different from the objects of mind (法塵) and different from rabbit horns.' If you deny that there is space, you become heretical. Now ask: If space is non-existence, it should not be an object of mind. Since it is an object of mind, it is existence. There is also an old saying: 'Space has no measure, measure is determined according to space, and space is called measure.' If so, space is not impermanent. Impermanence is determined according to space, and space is called impermanent. Summarizing in reverse, the principle is the same. Also ask: The space inside the pillar and the pillar

外空為是一空為是二空。若是一空柱外空既容柱。柱內空何不容柱。彼釋云。柱自礙柱。非空為礙。今問我不安柱置柱內。理但安柱置柱空內。柱空內何故不容柱耶。若言為柱礙故不容。即礙處應無空。若礙處有空即應容柱。又礙處有礙復有空。無礙亦礙亦無礙。應亦容亦不容。若柱內無空。空則不遍。外曰定有虛空遍相亦常有作故。上一番破虛空體竟。今第二破虛空用。立中為二。初三句牒體。一虛空是有二遍三常也。有作故下第二舉用證體。空有容納之用故得有舉下去來施為造作。若無容納之用使不得有所造作。內曰不然虛空處虛空。內有二破並責虛空住處。所以責住處者。外既云有法住虛空中得有造作。則空是有物住處故。今次問虛空。虛空既是一法亦應有住處。若虛空無住處者。則有法亦不在空中住。又有二種法。一者礙法二無礙法。礙法既在無礙法中住。無礙法亦應有其處。是故今文責住處也。就責住處開為二別。前責空還在空中住便有二空。一空是能住一空是所住既有二空則有分。有分故無常不遍也。問何故前責空在空中住。答外人謂。空無礙能容於有。則知空亦無礙還能容空。故前就空處責空也。亦不實中住下第二破。其在實中住實則滿塞不容於空。故空不在實中住。前明空得容空而墮二空。今免於二

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：外道問：『外面的空間是一個空，還是兩個空？』如果是一個空，柱子在外面的空間中既然能夠容納柱子，為什麼柱子內部的空間就不能容納柱子呢？對方解釋說：『是柱子自身阻礙了柱子，而不是空間阻礙了柱子。』現在我問：我不把柱子安放在柱子裡面，道理上應該把柱子安放在柱子所佔據的空間里。柱子所佔據的空間為什麼不能容納柱子呢？如果說是因為柱子阻礙的緣故不能容納，那麼阻礙的地方應該沒有空間。如果阻礙的地方有空間，就應該能容納柱子。而且阻礙的地方既有阻礙又有空間，既無阻礙又阻礙又無阻礙，應該既能容納又不能容納。如果柱子內部沒有空間，那麼空間就不周遍。外道說：『一定有虛空，周遍的相也是常有的，因為有作用的緣故。』上面一段是破斥虛空的本體，現在第二段是破斥虛空的作用。立論分為兩點。首先三句是重述本體：一是虛空是有，二是周遍，三是常有。『有作故下』第二點是舉出作用來證明本體。空間有容納的作用，所以才能有所舉動、來去、施為、造作。如果沒有容納的作用，就不能有所造作。內道反駁說：『不是這樣的，虛空處在虛空之中。』這裡有兩點破斥，並且責問虛空的住處。之所以責問住處，是因為外道既然說有法存在於虛空中才能有所造作，那麼空間就是有物的住處。現在反問虛空：虛空既然是一種法，也應該有住處。如果虛空沒有住處，那麼有法也不應該在空中居住。而且有兩種法，一種是礙法，一種是無礙法。礙法既然在無礙法中居住，無礙法也應該有它的住處。所以現在責問住處。就責問住處分為兩點。前面責問空間還住在空間中，就有了兩個空間。一個空間是能住的，一個空間是所住的，既然有兩個空間，就有分別。有分別的緣故就無常不周遍。問：為什麼前面要責問空間住在空間中？答：外道認為，空間沒有阻礙，能夠容納有。那麼就知道空間也沒有阻礙，還能容納空間。所以前面就空間所處的位置責問空間。『亦不實中住下』第二點是破斥它住在實體中，實體是充滿堵塞的，不能容納空間。所以空間不在實體中居住。前面說明空間能夠容納空間而落入二空的境地，現在是爲了避免二空。

【English Translation】 English version: The heretic asks: 'Is the space outside one space or two spaces?' If it is one space, since the pillar can be accommodated in the space outside, why can't the space inside the pillar accommodate the pillar? The opponent explains: 'It is the pillar itself that obstructs the pillar, not the space that obstructs the pillar.' Now I ask: I am not placing the pillar inside the pillar; logically, I should place the pillar in the space occupied by the pillar. Why can't the space occupied by the pillar accommodate the pillar? If it is said that it cannot be accommodated because the pillar obstructs it, then there should be no space where it obstructs. If there is space where it obstructs, it should be able to accommodate the pillar. Moreover, the place of obstruction has both obstruction and space, both no obstruction and obstruction and no obstruction, and should be able to accommodate and not accommodate. If there is no space inside the pillar, then space is not pervasive. The heretic says: 'There must be empty space, and the pervasive aspect is also constant, because it has function.' The above paragraph refutes the substance of emptiness, and now the second paragraph refutes the function of emptiness. The argument is divided into two points. First, the three sentences reiterate the substance: first, emptiness exists; second, it is pervasive; and third, it is constant. '有作故下' The second point is to cite function to prove the substance. Space has the function of accommodating, so it can be moved, come and go, act, and create. If there is no function of accommodating, it cannot be created. The inner path refutes: 'It is not like this; emptiness is in emptiness.' There are two refutations here, and the dwelling place of emptiness is questioned. The reason for questioning the dwelling place is that since the heretic says that 有法 (Dharma) exists in emptiness in order to create, then space is the dwelling place of things. Now ask emptiness: Since emptiness is a kind of Dharma, it should also have a dwelling place. If emptiness has no dwelling place, then 有法 (Dharma) should not live in the air either. And there are two kinds of Dharma, one is 礙法 (obstructive Dharma) and the other is 無礙法 (unobstructed Dharma). Since 礙法 (obstructive Dharma) lives in 無礙法 (unobstructed Dharma), 無礙法 (unobstructed Dharma) should also have its place. So now I am questioning the dwelling place. The question of the dwelling place is divided into two points. The previous question was that space still lives in space, and there are two spaces. One space is the one that can live, and the other space is the one that lives in. Since there are two spaces, there is a distinction. Because there is a distinction, it is impermanent and not pervasive. Q: Why did you ask about space living in space before? A: The heretic believes that space has no obstruction and can accommodate existence. Then you know that space has no obstruction and can also accommodate space. So before, I questioned space about the location of space. '亦不實中住下' The second point is to refute that it lives in the entity, and the entity is full of blockage and cannot accommodate space. So space does not live in the entity. The previous explanation that space can accommodate space and fall into the realm of two emptinesses is now to avoid two emptinesses.

空墮無住處。故進退失也。又實中無空空則不遍。實中有空則應容空。實若容空則不名實。複次下天親義破上舉住處證空。空中得有造作可得有空。實中無作應無空。汝以作有故有空。作無故應無空。複次無相故下第三破虛空相。就文為三。一破二救三破救。破云。有為無為並皆有相。是故有法。空若無相即應無法。又五種是有有法有相。虛空若無無應無相即無空。外曰第二救。空有二相。一者標相二者體相。因五種之有知空種為無。因有為是有知無為是無名為標相。二滅有得無為空家體相。空具二相。而汝不知謂為無相。內曰下第三破救。但破體相即為三別。初作無體破。無色乃辨色無。非更有法。自立為空故無有此物。以何為空體相耶。複次下第二明無有相。本以滅色為空相。若色未生則無可滅。是故無相。複次色無常下第三就常破。色是無常則始生。空是常法本來已有。已有則知本來無相。問第三破與第二何異。答前明相未有故無相。今明可相本來有故本來無相。反覆互相成也。問破空有三。初二何故有偈本后破相無偈本耶。答后都是天親義生故無耳。問提婆何故不破相耶。答二論主製作更相開避。中論六種品已廣破相。故提婆不更破之。但天親欲破虛空三義。一體二用三相。對前破二故義生破相耳。外曰有時

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本空無所住，所以進退都會迷失。而且，真實之中沒有空，如果空不存在，就不能周遍一切。如果真實之中有空，就應該能容納空。如果真實能容納空，就不能稱之為真實。再次，下文天親菩薩的論義是爲了駁斥上文所舉的以住處來證明空的觀點。如果空中可以有造作，那麼就可以有空。如果真實中沒有造作，就應該沒有空。你認為因為有造作所以有空，那麼沒有造作就應該沒有空。再次，『無相故』以下是第三部分，駁斥虛空的相狀。這一部分分為三點：一是駁斥，二是辯解，三是駁斥辯解。駁斥說：『有為法和無為法都有相狀，所以是有法。』如果空沒有相狀，就應該是無法。而且，五種是有法，有法就有相狀。虛空如果沒有，就應該沒有相狀，也就是沒有空。外道說：第二是辯解。空有兩種相狀：一是標相，二是體相。因為五種有法，所以知道空這種是無。因為有為法是有，所以知道無為法是無，這叫做標相。二是通過滅有而得到無，這是空家的體相。空具有兩種相狀，而你不知道，認為空沒有相狀。內道說：下文第三是駁斥辯解。只駁斥體相，分為三個方面。首先，通過『無色』來證明沒有體相。沒有顏色才能辨別出沒有顏色，而不是另外有法。自己設立空，所以沒有這個東西。用什麼作為空的體相呢？再次，下文第二部分說明沒有相狀。本來是用滅色作為空的相狀。如果顏色沒有產生，就沒有什麼可以滅的，所以沒有相狀。再次，『色無常』以下是第三部分，就常的方面進行駁斥。顏色是無常的，所以會開始產生。空是常法，本來就存在。既然本來就存在，就知道本來就沒有相狀。問：第三部分的駁斥和第二部分有什麼不同？答：前面是說明相狀沒有產生，所以沒有相狀。現在是說明可以作為相狀的東西本來就存在，所以本來就沒有相狀。反覆互相成就。問：駁斥空有三點，為什麼前兩點有偈頌，而後面駁斥相狀沒有偈頌呢？答：因為後面都是天親菩薩自己產生的論義，所以沒有偈頌。問：提婆菩薩為什麼不駁斥相狀呢？答：兩位論主在著作時互相避讓。龍樹菩薩在《中論》的六種品中已經廣泛地駁斥了相狀，所以提婆菩薩不再駁斥。只是天親菩薩想要駁斥虛空的三種含義：一體性、二作用、三相狀。針對前面駁斥了體性和作用，所以產生了駁斥相狀的論義。外道說：有時

【English Translation】 English version Emptiness has no fixed abode, therefore one loses one's way in advancing or retreating. Moreover, within reality there is no emptiness; if emptiness did not exist, it could not pervade everything. If there were emptiness within reality, it should be able to contain emptiness. If reality could contain emptiness, it could not be called reality. Furthermore, the following argument by Āryadeva refutes the above-mentioned view of proving emptiness by means of a fixed abode. If there can be creation within emptiness, then there can be emptiness. If there is no creation within reality, then there should be no emptiness. You believe that because there is creation, there is emptiness; therefore, if there is no creation, there should be no emptiness. Again, 『Because of no characteristic』 below is the third part, refuting the characteristics of space. This part is divided into three points: first, refutation; second, defense; and third, refutation of the defense. The refutation says: 『Both conditioned and unconditioned phenomena have characteristics, therefore they are existent phenomena.』 If emptiness has no characteristic, it should be non-existent. Moreover, the five kinds are existent phenomena, and existent phenomena have characteristics. If space does not exist, it should have no characteristic, which means there is no emptiness. The outsider says: The second is a defense. Emptiness has two characteristics: first, a designated characteristic; and second, a substantial characteristic. Because of the existence of the five kinds, it is known that the element of emptiness is non-existent. Because conditioned phenomena exist, it is known that unconditioned phenomena are non-existent; this is called a designated characteristic. Second, obtaining non-existence through the extinction of existence is the substantial characteristic of the school of emptiness. Emptiness has two characteristics, but you do not know this and consider it to have no characteristic. The insider says: The third part below refutes the defense. Only the substantial characteristic is refuted, which is divided into three aspects. First, the absence of substance is proven through 『no form』. The absence of color can only be discerned when there is no color, not when there is another phenomenon. One establishes emptiness oneself, so there is no such thing. What is taken as the substantial characteristic of emptiness? Again, the second part below explains that there is no characteristic. Originally, the extinction of color was taken as the characteristic of emptiness. If color has not arisen, there is nothing to extinguish, so there is no characteristic. Again, 『Color is impermanent』 below is the third part, refuting from the aspect of permanence. Color is impermanent, so it begins to arise. Emptiness is a permanent phenomenon, which has always existed. Since it has always existed, it is known that it originally had no characteristic. Question: What is the difference between the third part of the refutation and the second part? Answer: The former explains that the characteristic has not arisen, so there is no characteristic. The latter explains that what can be taken as a characteristic originally existed, so it originally had no characteristic. They repeatedly complement each other. Question: There are three points in refuting emptiness. Why do the first two points have verses, while the later refutation of characteristics has no verses? Answer: Because the latter are all arguments generated by Āryadeva himself, so there are no verses. Question: Why did Āryadeva not refute characteristics? Answer: The two masters avoided each other in their writings. Nāgārjuna had already extensively refuted characteristics in the six chapters of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way), so Āryadeva did not refute them again. It was only that Āryadeva wanted to refute the three meanings of space: first, substance; second, function; and third, characteristic. In response to the previous refutation of substance and function, the argument for refuting characteristics arose. The outsider says: Sometimes

法常相有故第二次破時常。次虛空破時者。外道情近與世人同既見恒有四時則謂時常。此亦粗顯故次空破之。釋時有二。一內二外。內外各二。外中二者。一計時常是萬物了因。故智度論云。時是不變因。時體是常故名不變。了出萬物故稱為因。又名不變者。物自去來而時無改易故名不變。衛世師九法中時是主諦之一法。二者計時是生因能生萬物。亦名生殺因。謂由時故萬物滅也。內法二者。一數論明因法假名時。離法無別時。二譬喻部別有時體是非色非心。如三相之類。依智度論有假實二時。一迦羅時謂實法時。多是小乘律中所用。以制時食時衣必須明實有時。則結戒義成佛法久住。二三摩耶是假名時。是經中所用。經既通化道俗。若明實有時外道聞之則生邪見。故說假名時。此義難明。若為結戒故明實時者。為結殺戒應明實有眾生。為結處戒應實有方也。外偈本立有三。初明實有時者。異數論時無別體家也。常者異計時是無常也。相有故者。時微細不可見。假相故知即是防於他難。又上立時體今立時相。釋中前逐近解相有故。從無不有時次釋常。初又二。前就時標相證有時。有法雖不可現見以共相比知故證有者。明人日共有去相。見人從東至西既有去法。雖不見日去將人比日日亦有去也。如是時雖細不可見合日去

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本法常（Dharmasthira，人名）認為『相』（lakṣaṇa，事物特徵）是實在的，因此第二次破斥『時』（kāla，時間）的常恒性。接下來破斥『虛空』（ākāśa，空間）的時候，外道的觀點接近世俗之人，他們看到四季恒常運轉，就認為『時』是常恒的。這種觀點比較粗淺，所以接下來破斥它。解釋『時』有內外兩種。內外又各有兩種。外道中的兩種觀點：一是認為『時』是常恒的，是萬物的了因（hetu，直接原因）。所以《智度論》（Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa，大乘佛教論書）中說，『時是不變的因』，『時』的本體是常恒的，所以稱為『不變』。因為它能了達產生萬物，所以稱為『因』。又稱為『不變』，是因為事物自身有來去變化，而『時』沒有改變，所以稱為『不變』。衛世師（Vaiśeṣika，勝論學派）的九法中，『時』是主諦（padārtha，實體）之一。二是認為『時』是生因，能生萬物，也稱為生殺因，意思是由於『時』的緣故，萬物會滅亡。內道（佛教內部）的兩種觀點：一是數論（Sāṃkhya，數論派）認為『因法』（hetu-dharma，原因法則）只是假名『時』，離開『法』（dharma，事物）就沒有別的『時』。二是譬喻部（Dṛṣṭāntavāda，經量部）認為『時』有獨立的本體，不是色（rūpa，物質）也不是心（citta，精神），類似於三相（trilakṣaṇa，三法印）之類。根據《智度論》，有假『時』和實『時』兩種。一是迦羅時（kāla-samaya，實際時間），指實在法（dravya-dharma，實體事物）的『時』，多用於小乘律（Vinaya，戒律）中，因為制定時食（規定進食時間）、時衣（規定穿著時間）必須明確有實在的『時』，這樣結戒（bandhana，約束）的意義才能成立，佛法才能長久住世。二是三摩耶（samaya，約定時間），是假名『時』，是經（Sūtra，佛經）中所用的。因為經既要教化僧侶也要教化世俗之人，如果說明有實在的『時』，外道聽了就會產生邪見，所以說假名『時』。這個意義難以明白。如果爲了結戒的緣故而說明實在的『時』，那麼爲了結殺戒（pāṇātipātā veramaṇī，不殺生戒）就應該說明實在有眾生，爲了結處戒（居住戒）就應該實在有方位。外道偈頌（gāthā，偈頌）原本立有三種觀點。首先說明有實在的『時』，這是不同於數論認為『時』沒有獨立本體的觀點。『常』（nitya，常恒）是不同於認為『時』是無常的觀點。『相有故』（lakṣaṇasadbhāvāt，因為有相），『時』是微細不可見的，通過『相』才能知道，這是爲了防止他人的詰難。上面立『時』的本體，現在立『時』的『相』。解釋中，首先順著接近的觀點解釋『相有故』。從『無不有時』（na kadācid asti，沒有不存在的時候）開始解釋『常』。最初又分為兩部分。前面就『時』標立『相』來證明有『時』。有法（dharma，事物）雖然不能直接看見，但可以通過共同的『相』來比較認知，因此證明有『時』。例如，明眼人和太陽共同具有執行的『相』。看到人從東向西走，既然有走的『法』，雖然看不見太陽走，但將人比作太陽，太陽也有執行。像這樣，『時』雖然細微不可見，但和太陽的執行結合在一起。

【English Translation】 English version Dharmasthira (法常, a person's name) argues that 'lakṣaṇa' (相, characteristics of things) is real, therefore, he refutes the permanence of 'kāla' (時, time) for the second time. Next, when refuting 'ākāśa' (虛空, space), the views of externalists are close to those of ordinary people. They see the constant movement of the four seasons and believe that 'time' is permanent. This view is relatively superficial, so it is refuted next. There are two types of explanations for 'time': internal and external. Each has two types. The two views among externalists: First, they believe that 'time' is permanent and is the 'hetu' (了因, direct cause) of all things. Therefore, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (智度論, a Mahayana Buddhist treatise) says, 'Time is an unchanging cause.' The essence of 'time' is permanent, so it is called 'unchanging.' Because it can fully produce all things, it is called 'cause.' It is also called 'unchanging' because things themselves come and go, but 'time' does not change, so it is called 'unchanging.' Among the nine categories of the Vaiśeṣika (衛世師, the Vaisheshika school), 'time' is one of the main 'padārtha' (諦, realities). Second, they believe that 'time' is the cause of birth, capable of producing all things, and is also called the cause of birth and death, meaning that due to 'time,' all things perish. The two views within the internal path (Buddhism): First, the Sāṃkhya (數論, Samkhya school) believes that 'hetu-dharma' (因法, the law of cause) is just a nominal 'time.' There is no other 'time' apart from 'dharma' (法, things). Second, the Dṛṣṭāntavāda (譬喻部, Sautrāntika school) believes that 'time' has an independent essence, which is neither 'rūpa' (色, matter) nor 'citta' (心, mind), similar to the 'trilakṣaṇa' (三相, three marks of existence). According to the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, there are two types of 'time': false 'time' and real 'time.' One is 'kāla-samaya' (迦羅時, actual time), which refers to the 'time' of 'dravya-dharma' (實在法, real entities), mostly used in the 'Vinaya' (律, monastic rules) of the Hinayana, because the establishment of 'time-food' (時食, prescribed eating time) and 'time-clothing' (時衣, prescribed wearing time) must clearly have real 'time,' so that the meaning of 'bandhana' (結戒, precepts) can be established, and the Buddha's teachings can last long in the world. The other is 'samaya' (三摩耶, conventional time), which is nominal 'time,' used in the 'Sūtra' (經, Buddhist scriptures). Because the scriptures are used to teach both monks and laypeople, if it is explained that there is real 'time,' externalists will develop wrong views upon hearing it, so nominal 'time' is spoken of. This meaning is difficult to understand. If real 'time' is explained for the sake of establishing precepts, then for the sake of establishing the precept of not killing (pāṇātipātā veramaṇī, 不殺生戒), it should be explained that there are real sentient beings, and for the sake of establishing the precept of dwelling, there should be real directions. The externalist 'gāthā' (偈頌, verse) originally established three views. First, it explains that there is real 'time,' which is different from the view of the Samkhya school that 'time' has no independent essence. 'Nitya' (常, permanence) is different from the view that 'time' is impermanent. 'Lakṣaṇasadbhāvāt' (相有故, because there are characteristics), 'time' is subtle and invisible, and can only be known through 'characteristics,' which is to prevent others' challenges. Above, the essence of 'time' is established, and now the 'characteristics' of 'time' are established. In the explanation, first, the explanation of 'lakṣaṇasadbhāvāt' is followed according to the close view. The explanation of 'nitya' begins from 'na kadācid asti' (無不有時, there is no time when it does not exist). Initially, it is divided into two parts. In the front, 'characteristics' are established for 'time' to prove that there is 'time.' Although 'dharma' (法, things) cannot be seen directly, it can be compared and recognized through common 'characteristics,' so it is proved that there is 'time.' For example, a sighted person and the sun both have the 'characteristic' of movement. Seeing a person walking from east to west, since there is the 'dharma' of walking, although the sun's walking cannot be seen, the sun is compared to the person, and the sun also has movement. In this way, although 'time' is subtle and invisible, it is combined with the movement of the sun.

。以節氣等合人去也。複次一時不一時舉體相證有時也。一剎那為一時。第二剎那以去至無量劫非一時也。一日為近一劫為久。內曰過去未來中無是故無未來。此偈本破三世時是常。而正捉外過去是常破無未來也。過去時既常。則過去定住過去不轉作未來故未來中無過去。故云過去未來中無。以過去住過去不轉作未來。是故無未來。此猶少二句。亦應言過去現在中無是故無現在。二者應云現在未來中無是故無未來。但論主偏明過去未來中無是故無未來者。此是舉極始極終為言端耳。註釋為二。一者捉過去破未來。二者例破現在。破未來中為二。一者就果中無因破未來。二者就因中無果破于未來。就果中無因破又二。一就不作門破。二就作門破。初又二。一明過去不作未來。二明過去不作現在。初又二。一者正破二徴經破。初文前牒三世時相。此則時相常故者。外明時體是常。但體不離相相為體所制故體常相亦常。又相是常家相。以體常故相亦常。故云時相常故。過去時不作未來時者正破也。過去時體既常不轉作未來者。相是時相。相亦不轉作未來。汝經言時是一法者第二徴經破。所以須徴經者欲明二義。一者依經則有不作之失。二若言作則有違經之過。是一法者是一常法也。雖四時三世相殊而時體但是一常法。又過去

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本用節氣等來配合人事的變遷。再次說明，一時和不一時，整體相互印證，有時成立。一剎那可以視為一時。從第二剎那開始，直到無量劫，就不是一時了。一日可以視為近，一劫可以視為久。內在的觀點認為，過去、未來之中沒有（未來），因此沒有未來。這首偈頌原本是爲了破斥三世時是常的觀點，而主要針對外道認為過去是常的觀點，破斥了沒有未來的說法。既然過去時是常，那麼過去就固定停留在過去，不會轉變為未來，所以未來之中沒有過去。因此說『過去未來中無』。因為過去停留在過去，不會轉變為未來，所以沒有未來。這裡好像少了兩個句子，也應該說『過去現在中無，是故無現在』。其次應該說『現在未來中無，是故無未來』。但論主偏重說明『過去未來中無，是故無未來』，這是舉起始和終結兩個極端來說明問題。註釋分為兩部分。一是抓住過去來破斥未來，二是類比破斥現在。破斥未來又分為兩部分。一是就果中無因來破斥未來，二是就因中無果來破斥未來。就果中無因來破斥又分為兩部分。一是不作門破，二是作門破。首先是不作門破，又分為兩部分。一是說明過去不作未來，二是說明過去不作現在。首先說明過去不作未來，又分為兩部分。一是正面破斥，二是引用經文來破斥。首先是正面破斥，先引述三世時的相狀。這裡說『這時相是常故』，外道認為時的本體是常。但本體不離相，相被本體所制約，所以本體是常，相也是常。而且相是常的家的相，因為本體是常，所以相也是常。因此說『時相常故』。『過去時不作未來時』，這是正面破斥。過去時的本體既然是常，不會轉變為未來，那麼相是時的相，相也不會轉變為未來。『汝經言時是一法者』，這是第二部分，引用經文來破斥。之所以要引用經文，是爲了說明兩個含義。一是依據經文，就會有不作的過失。二是如果說作，就會有違背經文的過錯。『是一法者』，是指一個常法。雖然四季三世的相狀不同，但時的本體只是一個常法。又過去

【English Translation】 English version It uses seasonal divisions etc. to align with human affairs. Furthermore, 'one time' and 'not one time' are mutually validated as a whole, and sometimes they hold true. A kshana (moment) can be considered 'one time'. From the second kshana onwards, up to immeasurable kalpas (eons), it is 'not one time'. A day can be considered near, a kalpa can be considered long. The internal view holds that there is no (future) within the past and future, therefore there is no future. This verse originally aimed to refute the view that the three times (past, present, future) are constant, and primarily targets the externalist view that the past is constant, refuting the notion that there is no future. Since the past time is constant, then the past is fixed in the past and will not transform into the future, so there is no past within the future. Therefore, it says 'no past within the past and future'. Because the past remains in the past and does not transform into the future, there is no future. It seems like two sentences are missing here, it should also say 'no past within the past and present, therefore there is no present'. Secondly, it should say 'no present within the present and future, therefore there is no future'. But the treatise master emphasizes 'no past within the past and future, therefore there is no future', this is to illustrate the problem by citing the two extremes of beginning and end. The commentary is divided into two parts. One is to grasp the past to refute the future, and the other is to refute the present by analogy. Refuting the future is further divided into two parts. One is to refute the future by arguing that there is no cause in the effect, and the other is to refute the future by arguing that there is no effect in the cause. Refuting by arguing that there is no cause in the effect is further divided into two parts. One is the 'non-doing' approach, and the other is the 'doing' approach. First is the 'non-doing' approach, which is further divided into two parts. One is to explain that the past does not make the future, and the other is to explain that the past does not make the present. First, explaining that the past does not make the future, which is further divided into two parts. One is direct refutation, and the other is refutation by quoting scriptures. First is the direct refutation, first citing the characteristics of the three times. Here it says 'this time characteristic is constant', the externalists believe that the substance of time is constant. But the substance is inseparable from the characteristic, and the characteristic is constrained by the substance, so the substance is constant, and the characteristic is also constant. Moreover, the characteristic is the characteristic of a constant family, because the substance is constant, so the characteristic is also constant. Therefore, it says 'time characteristic is constant'. 'The past time does not make the future time', this is direct refutation. Since the substance of the past time is constant and will not transform into the future, then the characteristic is the characteristic of time, and the characteristic will also not transform into the future. 'Your scripture says that time is one dharma', this is the second part, refuting by quoting scriptures. The reason for quoting scriptures is to illustrate two meanings. One is that according to the scriptures, there will be the fault of non-doing. Second, if it is said to be doing, there will be the fault of contradicting the scriptures. 'Is one dharma' refers to one constant dharma. Although the characteristics of the four seasons and the three times are different, the substance of time is only one constant dharma. Also, the past

但過去不雜當現故名一法。亦不作現在時者。上捉過去常不作未來。今明過去常不作現在也。若過去時作未來者。上依彼義宗則有不作之失。今縱關就作破。若過去作當現二時則有雜亂之咎。前得宗失二時。今得二時則失宗也。又上得宗三世不亂而失當現二時。今得當現二時則三世便亂也。又過去中無未來時。上就未來中無過去。是果中無因故無未來。今就過去中無未來。因中無果亦無未來。現在亦如是破者。憑師云。此文煩長。上已明不作現在。今復破現在。是故為煩。今謂不爾。智度論亦有此文故不應煩也。今明自上已來捉過去為端。破未來有二雙。一當中無過過中無當。例今亦應當中無現現中無當。二者上明過不作當及過作當。今亦明現作于當現不作當。故云現在亦如是破。非是煩也。外曰受過去故有時。上內明過住於過過不作當故當中無過。故無有當。外今捉破為立。汝但不許有當受有過去。既有過去必有未來。內曰非未來相過去。有人言。非者無也。既無未來。云何有過去。故云非未來相過去。有人言。我前明非未來相耳。非是受汝過去。故云非未來相過去。今明此是二破。諸百論師合作一破釋之。致令于文乖錯。所言二破者非未來相此是一破。謂過去土住過去不作未來。是故無未來也。過去者此是第二破

。縱汝過去作于未來則失過去。所以作此二破者。前明過不作當則無當。今明過若作當即便無過。前得過失當。今得當失過去。故三世並破。又前是住宗破今縱關破。住宗明不相作則失於未來。縱其相作則失於過去。問何以知此文是二破耶。答今不敢自推。專觀智度及天親此文知有二破。天親釋二破即二。汝不聞我前說過去土不作未來瓶。此釋偈本非未來相。以過去土相自住過去不作未來瓶相故也。若墮未來相中者釋偈本中過去字。前明過去不作未來瓶故非未來相。今明過去作未來則是未來相故無過去。外曰應有時自相別故。自上已來兩番問答。初問答破未來。次問答破過去。則三世盡矣。而外人無辭可救。直明現見有三世相別。又初問答就不作門破三世。次問答就作門破三世。此二既窮則主三世並壞。今不知何救。但問論主應有時。所以知有者。現見三世相別。若無三世則無因果。又若無三世則無三達智。又上來別破外道時是常義。此下通破內外。明三世有義四種。薩婆多事異相異等並云三世有相略同外道。成論師云。若太虛無不說去來。是曾當義以說去來。是曾當有故異太虛。則知三世並有其相。內曰若爾一切現在。上明三世作與不作有互失之咎。若不作得過失當。若作得當失過。故有互失。汝今若立三世皆有自

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本縱然你認為過去的行為會影響未來，那麼過去就失去了意義（因為已經被未來所改變）。之所以要進行這兩種破斥，是因為前面已經說明，如果過去的行為不影響未來，那麼未來就不會產生。現在要說明的是，如果過去的行為影響了未來，那麼過去本身就不存在了。前面是得到了過去的錯誤，失去了未來。現在是得到了未來，失去了過去。因此，三世（過去、現在、未來）都被破斥了。此外，前面是從『住宗』（認為事物保持不變的觀點）來破斥，現在是從『縱關』（認為事物相互關聯的觀點）來破斥。『住宗』認為，如果不相互作用，就會失去未來。如果相互作用，就會失去過去。問：怎麼知道這段文字是兩種破斥呢？答：現在不敢妄自推斷，專門參考《智度論》和天親菩薩的著作，才知道這段文字包含兩種破斥。天親菩薩解釋這兩種破斥就是兩種。你難道沒聽我說過，過去的泥土不能變成未來的瓶子嗎？這個解釋的偈頌的根本含義不是未來相，因為過去的泥土的相狀停留在過去，不會變成未來的瓶子的相狀。如果落入未來相中，就是解釋偈頌中的『過去』這個字。前面說明過去不變成未來的瓶子，所以不是未來相。現在說明過去變成未來，就是未來相，所以沒有過去。外道說：應該有時相的差別，所以三世存在。從上面開始，經過兩番問答。第一次問答破斥未來，第二次問答破斥過去，那麼三世就都被破斥了。而外道無話可說，只是說明現在看到有三世的相狀差別。此外，第一次問答是從不作用的角度破斥三世，第二次問答是從作用的角度破斥三世。這兩種破斥窮盡了，那麼主張三世的觀點就被徹底摧毀了。現在不知道如何挽救，只是問論主『應該有時』。之所以知道有時相的差別，是因為現在看到三世的相狀差別。如果不存在三世，那麼就沒有因果。又如果不存在三世，那麼就沒有三達智（宿命智、天眼智、漏盡智）。又上面分別破斥外道時，是針對常恒的意義。下面是普遍破斥內外道，說明三世存在的意義有四種。薩婆多部（一切有部）認為事相、異相不同等，都說三世有相，略微類似於外道。成實論師說：如果虛空什麼都不說，就不會有過去和未來。因為說了過去和未來，就是曾經有和將要有，所以不同於虛空。由此可知，三世都有其相。內道反駁說：如果這樣，一切都是現在。上面說明三世的作用與不作用都有相互失去的過失。如果不作用，就會得到過去的過失，失去未來。如果作用，就會得到未來，失去過去，所以有相互失去的過失。你現在如果主張三世都有自

【English Translation】 English version Even if you believe that past actions affect the future, then the past loses its meaning (because it has been changed by the future). The reason for making these two refutations is that it has already been explained that if past actions do not affect the future, then the future will not arise. Now it must be explained that if past actions affect the future, then the past itself does not exist. The former is to obtain the error of the past and lose the future. The latter is to obtain the future and lose the past. Therefore, the three times (past, present, and future) are all refuted. In addition, the former is to refute from the 'abiding school' (the view that things remain unchanged), and the latter is to refute from the 'interdependent school' (the view that things are interconnected). The 'abiding school' believes that if they do not interact with each other, they will lose the future. If they interact with each other, they will lose the past. Question: How do you know that this passage contains two refutations? Answer: Now I dare not speculate, but specifically refer to the works of the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra and Vasubandhu (Bodhisattva Vasubandhu), to know that this passage contains two refutations. Vasubandhu explains that these two refutations are two. Haven't you heard me say that past clay cannot become a future bottle? The fundamental meaning of the gatha (verse) of this explanation is not the future aspect, because the aspect of past clay stays in the past and will not become the aspect of a future bottle. If it falls into the future aspect, it is to explain the word 'past' in the gatha. The former explains that the past does not become a future bottle, so it is not a future aspect. Now it is explained that the past becomes the future, which is the future aspect, so there is no past. The Tirthika (non-Buddhist) says: There should be differences in time, so the three times exist. From above, after two rounds of questions and answers. The first question and answer refute the future, and the second question and answer refute the past, then the three times are all refuted. And the Tirthika has nothing to say, but only explains that now it is seen that there are differences in the aspects of the three times. In addition, the first question and answer refute the three times from the perspective of non-action, and the second question and answer refute the three times from the perspective of action. These two refutations are exhausted, then the view that advocates the three times is completely destroyed. Now I don't know how to save it, but only ask the acharya (teacher) 'there should be time'. The reason why we know that there are differences in time is because we now see the differences in the aspects of the three times. If the three times do not exist, then there is no karma (cause and effect). Also, if the three times do not exist, then there is no tri-vidya (three kinds of knowledge: knowledge of previous lives, knowledge of the divine eye, and knowledge of the extinction of outflows). Also, when refuting the Tirthika separately above, it was aimed at the meaning of permanence. The following is a universal refutation of both internal and external paths, explaining that there are four meanings for the existence of the three times. The Sarvastivadins (the 'All Exists' school) believe that the aspects of things, different aspects, etc., all say that the three times have aspects, which are slightly similar to the Tirthika. The Satyasiddhi (Tattvasiddhi) acharya says: If space says nothing, there will be no past and future. Because the past and future are said, it is that there was and will be, so it is different from space. From this, it can be known that the three times all have their aspects. The internal path refutes: If so, everything is now. The above explains that the actions and non-actions of the three times have the fault of mutual loss. If there is no action, the fault of the past will be obtained, and the future will be lost. If there is action, the future will be obtained, and the past will be lost, so there is a fault of mutual loss. If you now advocate that the three times all have their own

相。則三世皆在現在。便失去來。既失去來亦失現在。此正破數論義。數人三世皆有。若三世皆有則三世皆現。有現不現有有不有。得有宗則墮三世皆現。得三世不現則失有宗。成論師若三世皆有則應皆現。若去來是無則與太虛不異。便失去來。亦進退失也。外曰過去未來行自相故無咎救上一切現在難也。我前言自相有者。不言過去未來同有現在相。但過去自行過去未來自行未來。以兩世不同行現在。如數論云。現在行於事有之相。去來行性有之相。如成論云。去來行曾當之相。現在行現起之相。故不得三世皆現在也。內曰過去非過去。上捉有相明三世皆現。今捉行相明過去非過去。若法在過去猶不捨自相。自相不捨應名現在不名過去。故云過去非過去。若過現而去舍于自相則無其自體。既是無法不名過去。此亦是過去非過去。前文正也。又此是二難。過去者一難也。汝遂言過現而去。如土謝滅則無復過去也。非過去者第二難。若土不去則是現在不名過去。現註文百論師多作一難。故不中詣也。註釋為二。一別解偈本。是故時法下總結無時。初又二。前開二關破過去。次例未來。二門破過去即二。初門有四。一牒二難三釋四舉譬顯。若過去過去者牒也。土為過去是一過去也。此土復謝滅無復土相。復是一過去故云過去

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本相（lakṣaṇa，特徵）。如果這樣，三世（過去、現在、未來）都存在於現在，就會失去未來。既然失去了未來，也就失去了現在。這正是爲了駁斥數論派（Sāṃkhya）的觀點。數論派認為三世都存在。如果三世都存在，那麼三世就都顯現。有顯現的，也有不顯現的；有存在的，也有不存在的。如果接受存在宗的觀點，就會陷入三世都顯現的境地；如果認為三世都不顯現，就會失去存在宗的立場。《成實論》（Satya-siddhi-śāstra）的論師認為，如果三世都存在，那麼就應該都顯現。如果過去和未來是無，那麼就和虛空沒有區別，就會失去過去和未來，也會進退失據。外道辯駁說，過去和未來各自執行自己的相，所以沒有過失，這是爲了應對前面一切都是現在的詰難。我之前說自相存在，並不是說過去和未來與現在具有相同的相，而是說過去自行過去，未來自行未來，兩世的執行不同於現在。就像數論派所說，現在執行於事物存在的相，過去和未來執行于性質存在的相。就像《成實論》所說，過去和未來執行于曾經和將要的相，現在執行于現在生起的相。所以不能說三世都是現在。內道反駁說，過去非過去。前面抓住有相來闡明三世都是現在，現在抓住執行的相來闡明過去非過去。如果法在過去仍然不捨棄自相，自相不捨棄就應該稱為現在，不應該稱為過去，所以說過去非過去。如果過去在過去時捨棄了自相，那麼就沒有了它的自體，既然是無法，就不能稱為過去。這也是過去非過去。前面的文是正面的論述。這又是兩個詰難。過去是一個詰難。你說過去在過去，就像泥土消散滅亡，就不再有泥土的相，這又是一個過去，所以說過去。非過去是第二個詰難。如果泥土沒有過去，那就是現在，不能稱為過去。現註文，《百論》（Śata-śāstra）的論師大多隻作一個詰難，所以不中肯。註釋分為兩種。一種是分別解釋偈頌的原本。『是故時法』以下總結為沒有時間。最初又分為兩種。前面開啟兩道關卡來駁斥過去，其次是類比未來。兩道門來駁斥過去即分為兩種。第一道門有四點：一、引述兩個詰難；二、解釋；三、舉例來顯明。『若過去過去者』是引述。泥土作為過去是一個過去。這個泥土又消散滅亡，沒有了泥土的相，這又是一個過去，所以說過去。

【English Translation】 English version Lakṣaṇa (characteristic). If so, all three times (past, present, and future) exist in the present, and the future will be lost. Since the future is lost, the present is also lost. This is precisely to refute the view of the Sāṃkhya school. The Sāṃkhya school believes that all three times exist. If all three times exist, then all three times are manifested. There are manifested and unmanifested; there are existent and non-existent. If you accept the view of the existent school, you will fall into the situation where all three times are manifested; if you think that all three times are not manifested, you will lose the position of the existent school. The teachers of the Satya-siddhi-śāstra believe that if all three times exist, then they should all be manifested. If the past and future are non-existent, then there is no difference from emptiness, and the past and future will be lost, and there will be advance and retreat losses. The heretics argued that the past and future each operate their own characteristics, so there is no fault, which is to respond to the difficulty that everything is now. I said before that the self-nature exists, not that the past and future have the same appearance as the present, but that the past operates the past and the future operates the future, and the operation of the two times is different from the present. Just as the Sāṃkhya school says, the present operates on the appearance of the existence of things, and the past and future operate on the appearance of the existence of nature. As the Satya-siddhi-śāstra says, the past and future operate on the appearance of what has been and what will be, and the present operates on the appearance of what is now arising. Therefore, it cannot be said that all three times are now. The inner school retorted that the past is not the past. The previous article grasped the existence of phenomena to clarify that the three times are all present, and now grasp the appearance of operation to clarify that the past is not the past. If the Dharma is still not abandoning its self-nature in the past, and the self-nature is not abandoned, it should be called the present, not the past, so it is said that the past is not the past. If the past abandons its self-nature in the past, then there is no self-nature, and since it is impossible, it cannot be called the past. This is also the past is not the past. The previous article is a positive statement. This is another two difficulties. The past is a difficulty. You said that the past is in the past, just like the soil dissipates and perishes, and there is no longer the appearance of soil, which is another past, so it is said that the past. Non-past is the second difficulty. If the soil has not passed, it is now and cannot be called the past. The current commentary, the teachers of the Śata-śāstra mostly only make one difficulty, so it is not pertinent. The commentary is divided into two types. One is to explain the original verse separately. 'Therefore, the Dharma of time' below concludes that there is no time. Initially, it is divided into two types. The previous two gates were opened to refute the past, and the second is to analogize the future. The two gates to refute the past are divided into two types. The first gate has four points: 1. Quoting two difficulties; 2. Explanation; 3. Give an example to clarify. 'If the past is the past' is a quote. Soil as the past is a past. This soil has dissipated and perished, and there is no appearance of soil, which is another past, so it is said that the past.

過去也。不名為過去第二難也。土既滅后無復有土。故不名過去。何以故離自相故者第三釋也。土既謝滅則離土自相故無復過去。如火舍熱下第四舉譬顯。易知。若過去不過去者第二關正釋偈本。又二。初牒次破。牒云過去不過去者。明過去土住過去土不謝滅故云過去不過去。今不應說過去時行過去相者第二破也。若過去土不謝滅則猶是現在。汝不應言過去行謝滅之相。未來亦如是破者第二例破未來。亦應開兩關問之。一云。若未來未來則無瓶相。以瓶是未來名一未來。復未有此瓶複名未來。若爾便無未來。若未來不未來已有瓶相便是現在。汝不應言未來行未有之相。外曰實有方常相有故。次時破方者。方相粗顯道俗共知故次時破之。智度論云。汝四法藏中無方。我六法藏中有。四法藏無則四諦不攝彼六諦。九法中方為其一故云六法藏有。今言實有方者。明簡四諦中無即六諦中有也。常者內法大乘中說。有假名十方。是無常法。今簡異之故云常。此二句出方體。相有故方體是常而不可見。假日為相故知有方。內曰東方無初故此破方也。智度論云。世間法中大謂方。出世法中大謂涅槃。破世間法大故十八空名為大空。今言東方無初者。破其日初出是東方也。四天下皆有初出。則四天下皆是東方。若爾此東方豈是定初。亦

四天下皆有日沒。則無定有西。四天下皆有背日。無定有背。皆有向日無定有向。今略舉一邊故名無初。又弗于逮日中閻浮提日出。是則南方之初是東方之中。定從何方而判初耶。故云無初。注為三。一釋偈本。複次日不合處下第二外人以相有故方有。今明相無故方無。如鐵圍間恒不見日應無方也。複次不定故下第三就不定破。上就四天下論無定有初。今隨就一處顯方無定。猶如一柱此觀為東彼觀為西。在柱上為下在柱下為上。故柱無定方。又上直明東方非定初。今明無定東西。又前明無初后故初后不定。今明無東西東西不定。又前破其相今破方體。外曰是方相一天下說故救上三難。若四天下說可得東方無初。今就一天下說。故日初出定是東方。故東方非無初過。救第二云。若四天下說或可有無日之處。今就一天下說方相。一天下皆有日合故常有方相。則知有方。救第三云。一天下說方相故一天下方定無有不定過。內曰若爾有邊。乃免三難而墮有邊。有邊則無常。無常故無方。外曰雖無遍常下第四破微塵常。微塵至細世間不知。唯外道所執故次三常后破于微塵。又前破三種遍常今次破不遍。以遍義明常明顯故前破。不遍明常義昧故后破。釋微塵不同。今略明八種。一衛世師云。微塵至細無十方分四相不遷。故名為常。

二毗曇人云。明亦有十方亦無十方。以其極細不可分為十方。在塵東則塵為西故亦有十方。問鄰虛塵為礙不礙。答亦礙不礙。不礙於粗而礙於細。若細細不相礙則多亦不礙則終無礙也。又若不礙重則不高並則不大。而實不爾故知礙也。數論師答釋論難云。以無十方分故名微塵。以體是礙故名為色。三經部人明有十方分。明窮此一十方分。四是達摩郁梨明無十方分。而具八微共相合著。此塵極細亦動則俱。空而具有。三相所遷。五是大迦旃延造昆勒論。此云假名論。明鄰虛塵亦有八微而不相著。若相著則成一。雖有八微而不相礙。六開善云。析析無窮故有十方分。引釋論云。若有極微色則有十方分。若無十方分則不名為色。釋論實是破微塵義。而謬引證釋微塵。七莊嚴明無十方分。與前數義大同。八建初明有鄰虛方。只有一方無有十方。次唯識論明無此微塵。如魚人見水水具四微。餓鬼見火唯有色觸。故知無有一微塵質。羅什答匡山遠師云。佛不說有至細微塵。但說一切色若粗若細皆是苦空無常無我不凈令人得道。以諸論義師自推斥言有鄰虛塵。外立中有二。雖無遍常如前三也。有不遍常立后義也。又上就遍救遍。今舉不遍救遍。微塵是者出不遍常體也。果相有故舉相證有。所以舉果證因者如塵品云。外道明微塵不可見

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本二毗曇人說：『明』（Ming，指某種理論或觀點）認為有十方，也認為沒有十方。因為微塵極其細小，無法分割成十個方向。如果微塵在塵埃的東邊，那麼塵埃的西邊就成了東邊，所以也有十方。問：『鄰虛塵』（Linxuchen，指與空相鄰的微塵）有阻礙嗎？答：既有阻礙，也沒有阻礙。它不阻礙粗大的物體，但阻礙細微的物體。如果細微的物體之間互不阻礙，那麼多的物體之間也不會有阻礙，最終就沒有任何阻礙了。而且，如果不阻礙，重的物體就不會高，並列的物體就不會大。但事實並非如此，所以可知是有阻礙的。數論師回答並解釋論中的難題說：因為沒有十方的分割，所以稱為『微塵』（Weichen，指極小的塵埃）。因為本體具有阻礙性，所以稱為『色』（Se，指物質）。三經部人認為有十方的分割，並認為窮盡了這一個十方的分割。四是達摩郁梨（Damo Yuli，人名）認為沒有十方的分割，而是具有八個微粒共同結合在一起。這種微塵極其細小，一旦移動，所有微粒都會一起移動。它是空性的，但具有三種相（Sanxiang，指生、住、滅）。五是大迦旃延（Da Jiazhanyan，人名）造了《昆勒論》（Kunle Lun），也稱為《假名論》（Jiaming Lun）。該論認為鄰虛塵也有八個微粒，但它們並不互相接觸。如果互相接觸，就會成為一個整體。雖然有八個微粒，但它們互不阻礙。六是開善（Kaishan，地名或人名）認為，可以無限地分析下去，所以有十方的分割。他引用《釋論》（Shilun，論名）說：『如果有極微的色，那麼就有十方的分割。如果沒有十方的分割，那麼就不能稱為色。』《釋論》實際上是破斥微塵的意義，卻錯誤地引用它來證明微塵。七是莊嚴（Zhuangyan，人名）認為沒有十方的分割，與前面的數論師的觀點大致相同。八是建初（Jianchu，人名）認為有鄰虛方，但只有一方，沒有十方。接下來，《唯識論》（Weishi Lun，論名）認為沒有這種微塵。例如，魚人看到水，水具有四種微粒。餓鬼看到火，只有色和觸。因此可知沒有一種微塵的實體。鳩摩羅什（Kumarajiva）回答匡山遠師（Kuangshan Yuanshi）說：『佛不說有極其細微的微塵，只是說一切色，無論是粗大的還是細微的，都是苦、空、無常、無我、不凈的，可以令人得道。』因為各論義師自己推論說有鄰虛塵，所以在外建立了『中有』（Zhongyou，指中陰身）兩種。雖然沒有普遍和常恒，但與前面的三種情況相同。有不普遍和常恒的，是建立在後面的意義上的。又，上面是就普遍性來救濟普遍性，現在是舉出不普遍性來救濟普遍性。微塵是，是指出不普遍和常恒的本體。因為果的相存在，所以舉出相來證明存在。所以舉出果來證明因，就像《塵品》（Chen Pin，佛經中的一品）所說的那樣，外道認為微塵是不可見的。

【English Translation】 English version The second Abhidharma person says: 『Ming』 (Ming, referring to a certain theory or viewpoint) believes that there are ten directions, and also believes that there are no ten directions. Because the micro dust is extremely small and cannot be divided into ten directions. If the micro dust is to the east of the dust, then the west of the dust becomes the east, so there are also ten directions. Question: Does 『Linxuchen』 (Linxuchen, referring to micro dust adjacent to emptiness) have obstacles? Answer: It has both obstacles and no obstacles. It does not hinder coarse objects, but it hinders fine objects. If fine objects do not hinder each other, then many objects will not hinder each other, and ultimately there will be no obstacles. Moreover, if there is no hindrance, heavy objects will not be high, and juxtaposed objects will not be large. But this is not the case, so it can be known that there are obstacles. The numerologist answers and explains the difficulties in the theory, saying: Because there is no division of the ten directions, it is called 『Weichen』 (Weichen, referring to extremely small dust). Because the body has obstacles, it is called 『Se』 (Se, referring to matter). The people of the three Sutra schools believe that there is a division of the ten directions, and believe that this one division of the ten directions is exhausted. Fourth, Damo Yuli (Damo Yuli, a person's name) believes that there is no division of the ten directions, but has eight micro particles that are combined together. This kind of micro dust is extremely small, and once it moves, all the micro particles will move together. It is empty in nature, but has three characteristics (Sanxiang, referring to arising, abiding, and ceasing). Fifth, Da Jiazhanyan (Da Jiazhanyan, a person's name) created the 『Kunle Lun』 (Kunle Lun), also known as the 『Jiaming Lun』 (Jiaming Lun). This theory believes that Linxuchen also has eight micro particles, but they do not touch each other. If they touch each other, they will become a whole. Although there are eight micro particles, they do not hinder each other. Sixth, Kaishan (Kaishan, a place name or a person's name) believes that it can be analyzed infinitely, so there is a division of the ten directions. He quoted 『Shilun』 (Shilun, the name of a theory) saying: 『If there is extremely small matter, then there is a division of the ten directions. If there is no division of the ten directions, then it cannot be called matter.』『Shilun』 actually refutes the meaning of micro dust, but mistakenly quotes it to prove micro dust. Seventh, Zhuangyan (Zhuangyan, a person's name) believes that there is no division of the ten directions, which is roughly the same as the views of the previous numerologist. Eighth, Jianchu (Jianchu, a person's name) believes that there is a Linxu direction, but there is only one direction, not ten directions. Next, 『Weishi Lun』 (Weishi Lun, the name of a theory) believes that there is no such micro dust. For example, fish people see water, and water has four micro particles. Hungry ghosts see fire, and only have form and touch. Therefore, it can be known that there is no substance of micro dust. Kumarajiva answered Kuangshan Yuanshi saying: 『The Buddha does not say that there are extremely fine micro dust, but only says that all matter, whether coarse or fine, is suffering, emptiness, impermanence, non-self, and impurity, which can lead people to enlightenment.』 Because the theorists themselves infer that there is Linxuchen, they externally established two kinds of 『Zhongyou』 (Zhongyou, referring to the intermediate state). Although there is no universality and permanence, it is the same as the previous three situations. Having non-universality and permanence is based on the later meaning. Also, the above is to save universality with universality, and now it is to save universality by citing non-universality. Micro dust is, is to point out the body of non-universality and permanence. Because the characteristics of the result exist, the characteristics are cited to prove existence. Therefore, citing the result to prove the cause is like what is said in the 『Chen Pin』 (Chen Pin, a chapter in a Buddhist scripture), the heretics believe that micro dust is invisible.

。今但見其粗果故舉果證因。註釋為二。前逐近釋果相有故。初列二章門。如見牙等釋見果知因章門。世界法下釋見因知果章門。可知二微塵下於二義中取見果知因。問極細果起自兩塵。云何是極粗果。答外極粗如世界。內極粗如大自在天身一萬六千由旬也。是故有微塵圓而常釋偈本有不遍常。微塵是無十方分故稱圓。以其至細故不從因生。圓論其體無因釋其常。內曰二微塵非一切身合果不圓故者此有五破。所以破塵者。毗曇等知人空亦知余法空。唯不知塵空故名小智。今令知塵空即一切法空。回小入大名為大智。大品三慧品云。破壞一切法乃至微塵名為摩訶波若。今第一以果徴因破。眼見二塵果不圓。當知非一切身合。非一切身合則不圓。若一分合。一分合則無常。又有分則可分不名極細。若一切身合果則應圓。複次若一切身合二亦同壞。前是舉果不圓驗因不合。今縱其因合則二亦同壞。二同壞者。要須壞二微塵。和成一體然後乃圓。若爾則微塵無常。前門破其圓義。此文破其常義。此文是修妒路。從若塵重合下天親釋也。複次微塵無常與虛空別故。虛空是常無十方分。若微塵無十方分則與空為一。今既與虛空異。虛空無十方則塵有十方。複次以色等別故。前明與虛空別。今明與有法別。微塵既與香味等異。若五塵

各別是則有分。若其無分則與五塵不異。便是一塵。若是一塵則失五塵。多無故亦無一。複次有形法有相故。此亦是偈本。前明微塵與五塵別。今明微塵是色。則有方圓長短。有方圓長短則是有分。若無長短則非是色。此與智度論同。若有極微色則有十方分。若有十方分則不名極微。若無十方分則不名為色。外曰有涅槃法常無煩惱涅槃不異故。第五最後破涅槃者。上四種明世間常。今是出世常。以世間人不知唯出世人知義最隱昧。故后破之。又涅槃是究竟法凡聖終歸。故最後破。亦如中論大乘觀行最後破于涅槃。又外道云。內外雖異同明涅槃。若無涅槃則是邪見。故最後論之。釋涅槃不同。中論疏已具出。問中百二論何故最後論涅槃。答釋迦及三世佛應化等身常皆最後明涅槃。二論欲通經故亦最後論之。問二論同最後論有何異。答大意同。轉勞異。中論一品廣論。今一章略論。中論豎破四句涅槃。今橫破四計。而大意並破邪涅槃申正涅槃。此處無異。問二論申正涅槃無異。應無二論異。答非但二論無異。一切經皆為明涅槃。一切經無異論亦無異。良由所論之道既一。能論之教無二也。中論疏未盡者今略述之。楞伽經出外道義明有四種涅槃。一者自體相涅槃。明本相而有。此似大乘本有涅槃。二種種相有無涅槃。明涅槃

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『各別是則有分』（如果每個微塵都是獨立的，那麼它們就具有可區分的部分）。如果它們沒有可區分的部分，那麼它們就與五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸）沒有區別，那麼它就只是一個塵。如果它只是一個塵，那麼就失去了五塵的意義。如果微塵多，則沒有『一』的概念，反之亦然。此外，有形法因為有相，所以這也是偈頌的根本。前面說明了微塵與五塵的區別，現在說明微塵是色，因此有方圓長短。有方圓長短就是有可區分的部分。如果沒有長短，那就不是色。這與《智度論》相同。如果極微色有十方分，那麼就不能稱為極微。如果沒有十方分，那麼就不能稱為色。外道說有涅槃法，它是常住的，沒有煩惱，涅槃與此沒有區別。第五個也是最後一個破斥涅槃的觀點。前面四種說明世間是常住的，現在這個是出世間的常住。因為世間人不知道，只有出世間的人才知道，意義最為隱晦，所以最後破斥它。而且，涅槃是究竟的法，凡夫和聖人最終都要歸於它，所以最後破斥。也像《中論》和大乘觀行一樣，最後破斥涅槃。此外，外道說，內外雖然不同，但都說明涅槃。如果沒有涅槃，那就是邪見，所以最後討論它。解釋涅槃的不同，《中論疏》已經詳細說明。問：《中百二論》為什麼最後討論涅槃？答：釋迦牟尼佛和三世諸佛的應化身，通常都是最後說明涅槃。這兩部論典想要貫通佛經的意義，所以也最後討論它。問：這兩部論典都最後討論涅槃，有什麼不同？答：大意相同，但側重點不同。《中論》用一品來廣論，現在用一章來略論。《中論》豎向破斥四句涅槃，現在橫向破斥四種計度。但大意都是破斥邪涅槃，闡明正涅槃。在這點上沒有不同。問：這兩部論典闡明正涅槃沒有不同，那應該沒有兩部論典的區別。答：不僅僅是這兩部論典沒有不同，一切佛經都是爲了說明涅槃，一切佛經沒有不同，論典也沒有不同。正因為所論的道是同一個，所以能論的教法也沒有兩種。《中論疏》沒有完全說明的，現在簡略地敘述一下。《楞伽經》提出了外道的義理，說明有四種涅槃。第一種是自體相涅槃（Nirvana of Self-nature），說明本相而有。這類似於大乘的本有涅槃。第二種是種種相有無涅槃（Nirvana of various characteristics, existence and non-existence），說明涅槃

【English Translation】 English version: 'Each being separate implies having parts' (If each micro-dust is independent, then they have distinguishable parts). If they do not have distinguishable parts, then they are no different from the five dusts (form, sound, smell, taste, touch), then it is just one dust. If it is just one dust, then the meaning of the five dusts is lost. If there are many micro-dusts, then there is no concept of 'one', and vice versa. Furthermore, a formed dharma has characteristics, so this is also the root of the verse. The previous section explained the difference between micro-dust and the five dusts, and now it explains that micro-dust is form, therefore it has squareness, roundness, length, and shortness. Having squareness, roundness, length, and shortness means having distinguishable parts. If there is no length and shortness, then it is not form. This is the same as the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra. If the ultimate micro-form has ten directional parts, then it cannot be called ultimate micro. If it does not have ten directional parts, then it cannot be called form. The heretics say that there is Nirvana-dharma, which is permanent and without afflictions, and Nirvana is no different from this. The fifth and last is to refute the view of Nirvana. The previous four kinds explain that the world is permanent, and now this is the permanence of the transcendent world. Because worldly people do not know, only transcendent people know, the meaning is the most obscure, so it is refuted last. Moreover, Nirvana is the ultimate dharma, and ordinary people and sages will eventually return to it, so it is refuted last. It is also like the Madhyamaka-karika and Mahayana contemplation, which refute Nirvana last. In addition, the heretics say that although the internal and external are different, they both explain Nirvana. If there is no Nirvana, then it is a heretical view, so it is discussed last. Explaining the differences of Nirvana, the Madhyamaka-karika-vrtti has already explained in detail. Question: Why does the Sata-dvaya-sastra discuss Nirvana last? Answer: Shakyamuni Buddha and the emanated bodies of the Buddhas of the three times all explain Nirvana last. These two treatises want to connect the meaning of the sutras, so they also discuss it last. Question: These two treatises both discuss Nirvana last, what is the difference? Answer: The general meaning is the same, but the emphasis is different. The Madhyamaka-karika uses one chapter to discuss it extensively, and now it uses one section to discuss it briefly. The Madhyamaka-karika vertically refutes the four-sentence Nirvana, and now it horizontally refutes the four kinds of calculations. But the general meaning is to refute the heretical Nirvana and clarify the correct Nirvana. There is no difference in this point. Question: These two treatises clarify the correct Nirvana without difference, then there should be no difference between the two treatises. Answer: Not only are these two treatises not different, but all sutras are for explaining Nirvana, all sutras are not different, and the treatises are also not different. Precisely because the path being discussed is the same, the teachings that can be discussed are not two. What the Madhyamaka-karika-vrtti has not fully explained, I will now briefly describe. The Lankavatara Sutra puts forward the heretical doctrines and explains that there are four kinds of Nirvana. The first is svabhavasamata-nirvana (Nirvana of Self-nature), explaining that it has original nature. This is similar to the inherent Nirvana of Mahayana. The second is nanatva-bhava-abhava-nirvana (Nirvana of various characteristics, existence and non-existence), explaining Nirvana

實有無諸苦事。此似內義涅槃體有空與不空。空無生死。不空者謂常樂我凈。三自覺體有無涅槃。明此涅槃有靈智之性故名為有。無諸闇惑故稱為無。此似成論大乘圓智涅槃。四諸陰自相同相斷相續涅槃。明得涅槃不更受生死。故云斷相續。此亦大小乘義。問外道計生死為涅槃是五見中何見。答是獨頭見取。無樂凈計樂凈故。問計生死為涅槃為迷生死為迷涅槃。答迷於生死。如謂杌為人是迷杌也。問外道計無想非想為涅槃。是五陰中何陰攝耶。答彼修得無想非想定無復出入息。即是舍受故計舍受為涅槃。數人別有無為法。是善是常在生死外。為煩惱覆。修解斷惑起得得於無為。屬彼行人。與地論師本有涅槃義大同也。問數人何故立涅槃是有耶。答一是第三諦故有。二者為滅智知故有。三者為無為名有相故有。四無為是常故有也。成論文破之。汝經泥洹名無相。若是有者當有相。又衣壞名無衣。應別有無衣之法是有。成論小乘涅槃是惑無處。無別有法。不當三性。從善因得故名為善。數人破云。若泥洹是無應無泥洹。答云。非無泥洹。但泥洹是無法。地論有四種涅槃。一性凈二方便凈三圓凈四如如凈。攝大乘亦有四種。一本性凈二有餘三無餘四無住處。如彼文說之。就破涅槃為二。初破所得涅槃。二破能得之人。破所得

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本實有和無有各種痛苦的事情嗎？這類似於內義的涅槃，本體是有空還是不空。空，意味著沒有生死；不空，指的是常、樂、我、凈。三種自覺的本體是有涅槃還是沒有涅槃？說明這種涅槃具有靈智的性質，所以稱為『有』；沒有各種黑暗迷惑，所以稱為『無』。這類似於《成實論》的大乘圓智涅槃。四種涅槃：諸陰（skandha，構成個體的要素）自相同、相斷、相續的涅槃。說明獲得涅槃后不再承受生死，所以說是『斷相續』。這也是大小乘的含義。問：外道認為生死就是涅槃，這是五見（pañca dṛṣṭi，五種錯誤的見解）中的哪一種見？答：是獨頭見取（ekatva dṛṣṭiparāmarśa，執著于錯誤的見解）。因為沒有樂和凈，卻執著於樂和凈。問：認為生死是涅槃，是迷惑于生死，還是迷惑于涅槃？答：是迷惑于生死。就像把木樁看成人，是迷惑于木樁。問：外道認為無想和非想（saṃjñā-vedayitanirodha，無知覺和感覺的狀態）是涅槃，這屬於五陰（pañca skandha，構成個體的五種要素）中的哪一陰？答：他們通過修行獲得無想非想定，沒有了出入息，就是舍受（upekṣā-vedanā，捨棄的感受），所以認為舍受是涅槃。數論派（Sāṃkhya，古印度哲學流派）另外有無為法（asaṃskṛta dharma，非因緣和合的法），認為是善的、常的，存在於生死之外，被煩惱覆蓋。通過修行解脫斷除迷惑，獲得無為，屬於那些修行者。與《地論》（Daśabhūmika-sūtra，十地經論）師的本有涅槃的含義非常相似。問：數論派為什麼認為涅槃是『有』呢？答：一是涅槃是第三諦（satya，真諦）的緣故，所以是『有』；二是為滅智所知（nirodha-jñāna，滅盡智）的緣故，所以是『有』；三是無為名為有相的緣故，所以是『有』；四是無為是常的緣故，所以是『有』。《成實論》（Tattvasiddhi-śāstra，成實論）駁斥他們說：你們經書中的涅槃名為無相，如果是『有』，就應該有相。又比如衣服壞了叫做沒有衣服，應該另外有『沒有衣服』的法是『有』。《成實論》的小乘涅槃是迷惑消失的地方，沒有另外的法，不屬於三性（tri-svabhāva，三種自性）。從善因獲得，所以稱為善。數論派反駁說：如果涅槃是『無』，就應該沒有涅槃。回答說：不是沒有涅槃，只是涅槃是無法。《地論》有四種涅槃：一、性凈（prakṛti-viśuddhi，自性清凈）；二、方便凈（upāya-viśuddhi，方便清凈）；三、圓凈（pari-viśuddhi，圓滿清凈）；四、如如凈（tathatā-viśuddhi，真如清凈）。《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha，攝大乘論）也有四種：一、本性凈（prakṛti-viśuddhi，自性清凈）；二、有餘（sopadhiśeṣa，有餘依）；三、無餘（nirupadhiśeṣa，無餘依）；四、無住處（apratiṣṭhita，無住處）。如那部經文所說。就破斥涅槃分為兩部分：首先破斥所得的涅槃，其次破斥能獲得涅槃的人。先破斥所得的涅槃。

【English Translation】 English version Are there truly existing or non-existing sufferings? This resembles the inner meaning of Nirvāṇa, whether its essence is empty or not empty. 'Empty' means there is no birth and death; 'not empty' refers to permanence, bliss, self, and purity (nitya, sukha, ātman, śubha). Do the three kinds of self-awareness have Nirvāṇa or not? It explains that this Nirvāṇa has the nature of spiritual wisdom, so it is called 'existing'; it is without all darkness and confusion, so it is called 'non-existing'. This is similar to the Mahāyāna perfect wisdom Nirvāṇa in the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra (Treatise on the Establishment of Truth). Four kinds of Nirvāṇa: the Nirvāṇa of the skandhas (aggregates constituting an individual) being the same, discontinuous, and continuous. It explains that after attaining Nirvāṇa, one no longer undergoes birth and death, so it is called 'discontinuous continuation'. This is also the meaning of both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. Question: The heretics consider birth and death as Nirvāṇa. Which of the five views (pañca dṛṣṭi, five kinds of wrong views) is this? Answer: It is clinging to a solitary view (ekatva dṛṣṭiparāmarśa, clinging to wrong views). Because there is no bliss and purity, yet they cling to bliss and purity. Question: Is considering birth and death as Nirvāṇa being deluded about birth and death, or being deluded about Nirvāṇa? Answer: It is being deluded about birth and death. It's like mistaking a stump for a person, which is being deluded about the stump. Question: The heretics consider the state of non-perception and non-non-perception (saṃjñā-vedayitanirodha, the state of neither perception nor non-perception) as Nirvāṇa. Which of the five skandhas (pañca skandha, the five aggregates) does this belong to? Answer: They attain the state of non-perception and non-non-perception through practice, and there is no more inhalation or exhalation, which is the feeling of equanimity (upekṣā-vedanā, feeling of indifference), so they consider the feeling of equanimity as Nirvāṇa. The Sāṃkhya school (Sāṃkhya, an ancient Indian philosophical school) also has unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta dharma, unconditioned elements), which they consider to be good, permanent, and existing outside of birth and death, covered by afflictions. Through practicing liberation and cutting off delusions, they attain the unconditioned, which belongs to those practitioners. This is very similar to the meaning of the inherent Nirvāṇa of the Daśabhūmika-sūtra (Ten Stages Sutra) masters. Question: Why does the Sāṃkhya school consider Nirvāṇa to be 'existing'? Answer: First, because Nirvāṇa is the third noble truth (satya, truth), so it is 'existing'; second, because it is known by the knowledge of cessation (nirodha-jñāna, knowledge of cessation), so it is 'existing'; third, because the unconditioned is named as having characteristics, so it is 'existing'; fourth, because the unconditioned is permanent, so it is 'existing'. The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra (Treatise on the Establishment of Truth) refutes them, saying: The Nirvāṇa in your scriptures is named as without characteristics. If it is 'existing', it should have characteristics. Also, like broken clothes are called no clothes, there should be a separate dharma of 'no clothes' that is 'existing'. The Hīnayāna Nirvāṇa in the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra is the place where delusion disappears, there is no separate dharma, and it does not belong to the three natures (tri-svabhāva, three natures). It is obtained from good causes, so it is called good. The Sāṃkhya school retorts: If Nirvāṇa is 'non-existing', there should be no Nirvāṇa. The answer is: It's not that there is no Nirvāṇa, but Nirvāṇa is a dharma that is not. The Daśabhūmika-sūtra (Ten Stages Sutra) has four kinds of Nirvāṇa: 1. Purity of nature (prakṛti-viśuddhi, purity of essence); 2. Purity of means (upāya-viśuddhi, purity of skillful means); 3. Perfect purity (pari-viśuddhi, complete purity); 4. Purity of suchness (tathatā-viśuddhi, purity of thusness). The Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahāyāna) also has four kinds: 1. Inherent purity (prakṛti-viśuddhi, purity of essence); 2. With remainder (sopadhiśeṣa, with remainder of clinging); 3. Without remainder (nirupadhiśeṣa, without remainder of clinging); 4. Without abiding place (apratiṣṭhita, without fixed abode). As that scripture says. The refutation of Nirvāṇa is divided into two parts: first, refuting the Nirvāṇa that is attained; second, refuting the person who can attain Nirvāṇa. First, refuting the Nirvāṇa that is attained.

涅槃又開四別。初破涅槃與無煩惱不異。二破涅槃是無煩惱因。三破涅槃是無煩惱果。四破斷無以為涅槃。四計之中初三破彼有餘。第四破外無餘。初又二。前一明涅槃與無煩惱不異。后二明涅槃與無煩惱異。與無煩惱不異。此是成論小乘義。與無煩惱異。是毗曇及大乘人義。故此中破四涅槃內外大小乘一切皆盡。中論破邪涅槃申正涅槃。故亦破亦取。若外道計生死以為涅槃但破不收。若就偷得涅槃之名而不識涅槃之義。則收名不收其義。故亦破亦收也。就立中三句。初明有涅槃者。涅槃是出世常法。上舉世救世。今舉出世救世。故言有也。又簡異撥無涅槃之人。是故言有。又斥于提婆執一切空。是故言有。常明涅槃體。無煩惱涅槃不異故者釋常義也。有煩惱則有生死。是故無常。若無煩惱則無生死。是故名常。正是成實義也。內曰涅槃作法故。破外涅槃與無煩惱不異之言也。有煩惱時未有無煩惱。由修道故斷煩惱始得無煩惱。此無煩惱本無今有是起作之法。既本無今有則已有還無。體是起作之法故非常法也。又言作法者。為道諦所造作故名作法。釋中有二。初明涅槃是作法。次明無有涅槃。前是縱破。后名奪破。文處易知。次論毗曇成實義。毗曇人云。本有善常涅槃生死煩惱外。為煩惱所障故眾生不得涅槃。則不著

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：涅槃又分為四種不同的觀點。第一種是破斥涅槃與沒有煩惱（無煩惱）沒有區別的觀點。第二種是破斥涅槃是無煩惱之因的觀點。第三種是破斥涅槃是無煩惱之果的觀點。第四種是破斥斷滅（斷無）可以作為涅槃的觀點。這四種觀點中，前三種是破斥有餘涅槃，第四種是破斥外道的無餘涅槃。第一種觀點又分為兩種情況：前一種是闡明涅槃與無煩惱沒有區別，后兩種是闡明涅槃與無煩惱有區別。認為涅槃與無煩惱沒有區別，這是成實論小乘的觀點；認為涅槃與無煩惱有區別，這是毗曇宗以及大乘的觀點。因此，這裡破斥了關於涅槃的四種觀點，涵蓋了內道、外道、大乘、小乘的所有觀點。中論破斥的是邪見的涅槃，闡明的是正見的涅槃，所以既有破斥也有采納。如果外道認為生死就是涅槃，那麼就只是破斥而不採納。如果有人盜用了涅槃這個名稱，卻不理解涅槃的真正含義，那麼就採納其名稱，而不採納其含義，所以既有破斥也有采納。關於建立涅槃的觀點，分為三句話。第一句是闡明有涅槃存在，涅槃是出世間的常法。前面舉了世間的救世，現在舉出世間的救世，所以說『有』。另外，也爲了區別于那些否定涅槃存在的人，所以說『有』。還有，也是爲了駁斥提婆主張一切皆空的觀點，所以說『有』。『常』是闡明涅槃的本體，『無煩惱涅槃不異故』是解釋『常』的含義。有煩惱就有生死，所以是無常的；如果沒有煩惱就沒有生死，所以稱為『常』，這正是成實宗的觀點。『內曰涅槃作法故』，這是爲了破斥外道認為涅槃與無煩惱沒有區別的說法。有煩惱的時候還沒有無煩惱，通過修行道才能斷除煩惱，從而獲得無煩惱。這種無煩惱是本來沒有現在才有的，是起作用的法。既然是本來沒有現在才有的，那麼已經有的還會消失，其本體是起作用的法，所以不是常法。還有，說『作法』，是因為它是被道諦所造作的，所以稱為作法。解釋『中』有兩層含義：第一層是闡明涅槃是作法，第二層是闡明沒有涅槃。前面是縱向的破斥，後面是徹底的破斥，文句的位置容易辨別。接下來討論毗曇宗和成實宗的觀點。毗曇宗的人認為，本來就有常住的涅槃，它在生死煩惱之外，因為被煩惱所障礙，所以眾生無法獲得涅槃，因此不執著。

【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, 'Nirvana' is divided into four distinct perspectives. The first refutes the view that 'Nirvana' is no different from the absence of afflictions (no-afflictions). The second refutes the view that 'Nirvana' is the cause of no-afflictions. The third refutes the view that 'Nirvana' is the result of no-afflictions. The fourth refutes the view that annihilation (utter extinction) can be regarded as 'Nirvana'. Among these four views, the first three refute the 'Nirvana' with remainder, and the fourth refutes the non-Buddhist 'Nirvana' without remainder. The first view is further divided into two situations: the former clarifies that 'Nirvana' is no different from no-afflictions, and the latter two clarify that 'Nirvana' is different from no-afflictions. The view that 'Nirvana' is no different from no-afflictions is the meaning of the 'Chengshi' school of 'Hinayana'; the view that 'Nirvana' is different from no-afflictions is the meaning of the 'Vibhasa' school and 'Mahayana'. Therefore, this refutes the four views on 'Nirvana', covering all views of insiders, outsiders, 'Mahayana', and 'Hinayana'. The 'Madhyamaka-shastra' refutes the heretical 'Nirvana' and clarifies the correct 'Nirvana', so it both refutes and adopts. If non-Buddhists think that 'samsara' is 'Nirvana', then it is only refuted and not adopted. If someone steals the name of 'Nirvana' but does not understand the true meaning of 'Nirvana', then the name is adopted, but the meaning is not adopted, so it is both refuted and adopted. Regarding the establishment of the view of 'Nirvana', it is divided into three sentences. The first sentence clarifies that there is 'Nirvana', and 'Nirvana' is a 'permanent dharma' (chang fa) that transcends the world. The previous example was the salvation of the world, and now the salvation of the world is cited, so it is said 'exists'. In addition, in order to distinguish it from those who deny the existence of 'Nirvana', it is said 'exists'. Also, in order to refute 'Devadatta's' view that everything is empty, it is said 'exists'. 'Permanent' clarifies the substance of 'Nirvana', 'no-afflictions 'Nirvana' is not different, therefore' explains the meaning of 'permanent'. If there are afflictions, there is 'samsara', so it is impermanent; if there are no afflictions, there is no 'samsara', so it is called 'permanent', which is exactly the view of the 'Chengshi' school. 'The inner says 'Nirvana' is created', this is to refute the non-Buddhist statement that 'Nirvana' is no different from no-afflictions. When there are afflictions, there is no no-afflictions. Only through the practice of the path can afflictions be eliminated, so as to obtain no-afflictions. This no-afflictions is originally non-existent and only now exists, and is a functioning 'dharma'. Since it was originally non-existent and only now exists, then what already exists will disappear, and its substance is a functioning 'dharma', so it is not a 'permanent dharma'. Also, saying 'created' is because it is created by the 'Truth of the Path' (dao di), so it is called created. There are two levels of explanation of 'middle': the first level clarifies that 'Nirvana' is created, and the second level clarifies that there is no 'Nirvana'. The former is a longitudinal refutation, and the latter is a thorough refutation, and the position of the sentences is easy to distinguish. Next, discuss the views of the 'Vibhasa' school and the 'Chengshi' school. People of the 'Vibhasa' school believe that there is originally a permanent 'Nirvana', which is outside of 'samsara' and afflictions. Because it is obstructed by afflictions, sentient beings cannot obtain 'Nirvana', so they are not attached.

今文破。今問成實師。既以無煩惱為涅槃者。為本有此無。為本無此無。若本有此無則與數同。若本無此無因修治道斷惑得之。則同外道起作之法也。外曰作因故此第二計。明涅槃與無煩惱異。前觀涅槃然後生解斷惑得於無累。如因中發觀觀生惑滅。故名作因。亦如會真生解及數人因境發智境為無煩惱因。此是成論本有及地論性凈數人無為皆是有法。在生死外故修解斷惑然後得之也。內曰能破非破破上涅槃是無煩惱因也。能破者牒外義也。外謂。涅槃是無煩惱因。由涅槃故能無煩惱。由涅槃故能得解脫。由涅槃故能得於破。破解脫無煩惱此三皆是異名。今欲存略故作破名也。非破者論主難也。涅槃是于破因即是解脫因。便應非是解脫。然涅槃是解脫異名。豈得言非解脫耶。又涅槃是果名解脫亦是果名。今若言是解脫因則失果義。以果為因則名顛倒。又涅槃若是因者。道諦便應是果。是亦顛倒。又反並若涅槃能解脫非解脫。亦生死能繫縛非繫縛。註釋亦二。初縱因破。複次下奪因破。外曰無煩惱果此第三計。亦立涅槃與無煩惱異。名由斷惑而得故是無煩惱果。此是成實始有義。故成實師斷五住惑盡二生死滅然後得大涅槃。即地論方便凈義。由息妄故然後顯真名無煩惱果。注中三句。初非初立。二亦非無煩惱因下非第二立

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：現在來駁斥。現在問《成實論》的論師：既然以沒有煩惱作為涅槃（Nirvana，寂滅），那麼這種『無』是本來就有的，還是本來沒有的？如果本來就有這種『無』，那就和數論（Samkhya，古印度哲學流派，認為世界由自性（Prakriti）和神我（Purusha）構成）相同了。如果本來沒有這種『無』，而是通過修行正道、斷除迷惑而得到的，那就和外道（非佛教的修行者）的造作之法相同了。外道說，因為有造作的因，所以這是第二種計較。這表明涅槃和沒有煩惱是不同的。先觀察涅槃，然後產生理解，斷除迷惑，從而獲得沒有累贅的狀態，就像在因地中生起觀照，觀照產生，迷惑消滅，所以稱為造作的因。也像會真（指領悟真理）產生理解，以及數論的人因境界而生髮智慧，境界是無煩惱的因。這是《成實論》的本有義，以及《地論》的自性清凈，數論的無為，都是有法。在生死之外，所以通過修行理解、斷除迷惑，然後才能得到它。內部觀點說，能夠破斥，不是破斥，破斥上面的涅槃是無煩惱的因。『能夠破斥』是針對外道的觀點。外道認為，涅槃是無煩惱的因，因為有涅槃，所以能夠沒有煩惱；因為有涅槃，所以能夠得到解脫；因為有涅槃，所以能夠得到破斥。破斥、解脫、沒有煩惱，這三者都是不同的名稱。現在想要簡略，所以用『破斥』這個名稱。『不是破斥』是論主的詰難。涅槃是破斥的因，也就是解脫的因，那麼就不應該是解脫。然而涅槃是解脫的別名，怎麼能說不是解脫呢？而且涅槃是果的名稱，解脫也是果的名稱。現在如果說是解脫的因，那就失去了果的意義。以果為因，就叫做顛倒。而且涅槃如果是因，那麼道諦（Dukkha-nirodha-gamini-patipada，八正道，通向滅苦的道路）就應該是果，這也是顛倒。而且反過來說，如果涅槃能夠解脫非解脫，那麼生死也能繫縛非繫縛。註釋也有兩種。首先是縱容因的破斥，其次是奪取因的破斥。外道說，沒有煩惱的果，這是第三種計較。也認為涅槃和沒有煩惱是不同的，名義上是由斷除迷惑而得到的，所以是沒有煩惱的果。這是《成實論》的始有義。所以《成實論》的論師斷除五住煩惱（五種根本煩惱）的盡頭，二種生死（分段生死和變易生死）滅盡，然後得到大涅槃。也就是《地論》的方便凈義。因為止息妄想，然後顯現真如，名為沒有煩惱的果。註釋中有三句話。第一句不是最初的立論，第二句『也不是沒有煩惱的因』，不是第二種立論。

【English Translation】 English version: Now, a refutation. Now, I ask the Satyasiddhi (成實論) master: Since you consider the absence of afflictions as Nirvana (涅槃, cessation), is this 'absence' originally present or originally absent? If it is originally present, then it is the same as Samkhya (數論, a school of Indian philosophy that posits the world is composed of Prakriti (自性, primordial nature) and Purusha (神我, the self)). If it is originally absent, and is obtained through cultivating the path and severing delusions, then it is the same as the created methods of the tirthikas (外道, non-Buddhist practitioners). The tirthikas say that because there is a cause for creation, this is the second calculation. This clarifies that Nirvana is different from the absence of afflictions. First, one observes Nirvana, then generates understanding, severs delusions, and thereby obtains a state free from burdens, just as contemplation arises in the causal ground, contemplation arises, and delusions are extinguished, hence it is called a created cause. It is also like generating understanding through encountering truth, and like the Samkhya followers generating wisdom through encountering an object, the object being the cause of the absence of afflictions. This is the Satyasiddhi's inherent existence, as well as the Dasabhumika Sutra's (地論) inherently pure nature, and the Samkhya's unconditioned, all of which are existing dharmas. They are outside of birth and death, so one obtains them after cultivating understanding and severing delusions. The internal view says that it is capable of refuting, not refuting, refuting the above Nirvana as the cause of the absence of afflictions. 'Capable of refuting' refers to the external meaning. The tirthikas believe that Nirvana is the cause of the absence of afflictions; because of Nirvana, one can be without afflictions; because of Nirvana, one can attain liberation; because of Nirvana, one can attain refutation. Refutation, liberation, and the absence of afflictions are all different names. Now, wanting to be brief, I use the name 'refutation'. 'Not refuting' is the acharya's (論主) challenge. Nirvana is the cause of refutation, which is the cause of liberation, so it should not be liberation. However, Nirvana is another name for liberation, how can it be said that it is not liberation? Moreover, Nirvana is the name of a result, and liberation is also the name of a result. Now, if it is said to be the cause of liberation, then the meaning of result is lost. Taking the result as the cause is called inversion. Moreover, if Nirvana is the cause, then the Dukkha-nirodha-gamini-patipada (道諦, the path leading to the cessation of suffering) should be the result, which is also an inversion. Furthermore, conversely, if Nirvana can liberate non-liberation, then samsara (生死, the cycle of birth and death) can also bind non-binding. The commentary also has two aspects. First, refuting by conceding the cause; second, refuting by seizing the cause. The tirthikas say that the result of the absence of afflictions is the third calculation. They also establish that Nirvana is different from the absence of afflictions, nominally obtained through severing delusions, so it is the result of the absence of afflictions. This is the Satyasiddhi's newly arisen meaning. Therefore, the Satyasiddhi master severs the end of the five aggregates of affliction (五住煩惱, five fundamental afflictions), the extinction of the two kinds of birth and death (二種生死, segmented birth and death and variable birth and death), and then attains great Nirvana. That is, the Dasabhumika Sutra's expedient pure meaning. Because of ceasing false thoughts, then manifesting true suchness, it is called the result of the absence of afflictions. There are three sentences in the commentary. The first sentence is not the initial establishment; the second sentence, 'nor is it the cause of the absence of afflictions', is not the second establishment.

也。第三句正釋偈本。內曰縛可縛方便異此無用破上是無煩惱果也。破中二。初牒次破。牒中又二。縛可縛牒繫縛也。方便者牒斷縛之方便也。異此無用者內破也。破意云。有煩惱是繫縛。無煩惱得解脫。故此解脫便是有用。涅槃若是無煩惱果即無用也。又涅槃非煩惱故不能繫縛用。非眾生故不能修道用。非八正故不能斷滅用。異此三法故名無用。正意云。異縛可縛即涅槃非是生死縛。異正觀故涅槃非是解脫用。此何為邪。注中有二。前縱是果明無用過。次奪明無煩惱。既無因故涅槃不名無煩惱果。外曰有涅槃是若無第四立斷無為涅槃。即是立無餘也。外云。有于身智故名為患。若灰身滅智此即無患。肇師立小乘涅槃義云。大患莫若於有身。故滅身以歸無。勞勤莫前于有智。故絕智以淪虛。若爾便是大用。上何得云離三法是無用耶。又深取此立意者似三論義。外人云。我涅槃異上二種。即是大用。異縛可縛非縛義。異方便非脫義。故非縛非脫非妄非真非眾生非佛名為深妙涅槃。是大用。所以然者。但能除縛不能除解。但能除妄不能息真。此是非用。今能兩忘故是大用。內曰畏處何染。無身無心是永死之坑大怖畏處。汝等外道何故貪染。正呵數論灰身滅智涅槃義也。答后兩忘義。汝無妄無真無縛無脫是大邪見。現世斷善

{ "translations": [ "也。第三句正釋偈本。內曰縛可縛（可以被束縛的事物）方便異此無用破上是無煩惱果也。破中二。初牒次破。牒中又二。縛可縛（可以被束縛的事物）牒繫縛也。方便者牒斷縛之方便也。異此無用者內破也。破意云。有煩惱是繫縛。無煩惱得解脫。故此解脫便是有用。涅槃若是無煩惱果即無用也。又涅槃非煩惱故不能繫縛用。非眾生故不能修道用。非八正故不能斷滅用。異此三法故名無用。正意云。異縛可縛（可以被束縛的事物）即涅槃非是生死縛。異正觀故涅槃非是解脫用。此何為邪。注中有二。前縱是果明無用過。次奪明無煩惱。既無因故涅槃不名無煩惱果。外曰有涅槃是若無第四立斷無為涅槃。即是立無餘也。外云。有于身智故名為患。若灰身滅智此即無患。肇師立小乘涅槃義云。大患莫若於有身。故滅身以歸無。勞勤莫前于有智。故絕智以淪虛。若爾便是大用。上何得云離三法是無用耶。又深取此立意者似三論義。外人云。我涅槃異上二種。即是大用。異縛可縛（可以被束縛的事物）非縛義。異方便非脫義。故非縛非脫非妄非真非眾生非佛名為深妙涅槃。是大用。所以然者。但能除縛不能除解。但能除妄不能息真。此是非用。今能兩忘故是大用。內曰畏處何染。無身無心是永死之坑大怖畏處。汝等外道何故貪染。正呵數論灰身滅智涅槃義也。答后兩忘義。汝無妄無真無縛無脫是大邪見。現世斷善", "現代漢語譯本：", "第三句正是解釋偈頌的根本。其中說，『可以被束縛的事物』和『方便』不同於此，沒有用處，破斥上面所說的『沒有煩惱的果』。破斥分為兩部分。首先是依照次序破斥。破斥中又分為兩部分，『可以被束縛的事物』是指繫縛，『方便』是指斷除束縛的方便。『不同於此沒有用處』是內在的破斥。破斥的意思是，有煩惱就是被繫縛，沒有煩惱就得到解脫，因此這種解脫就是有用的。如果涅槃是沒有煩惱的果，那就沒有用處了。而且涅槃不是煩惱，所以不能用來繫縛；不是眾生，所以不能用來修道；不是八正道，所以不能用來斷滅。不同於這三種法，所以叫做沒有用處。真正的意思是，不同於『可以被束縛的事物』，涅槃不是生死的束縛；不同於正觀，涅槃不是解脫的作用。這有什麼不對嗎？註釋中有兩點，前面縱容說是果，說明沒有用處的過失；其次是剝奪說明沒有煩惱，既然沒有原因，所以涅槃不能稱為沒有煩惱的果。外道說，有涅槃，如果沒有第四種，就設立斷滅的無為涅槃，這就是設立無餘涅槃。外道說，有身體和智慧，所以叫做禍患。如果灰飛煙滅身體，斷絕智慧，這就沒有禍患了。肇法師立小乘涅槃的意義說，最大的禍患莫過於有身體，所以滅掉身體而歸於無；勞苦莫過於有智慧，所以斷絕智慧而沉淪於虛無。如果這樣，那就是大用處。上面怎麼能說離開三種法就沒有用處呢？而且深刻地採取這種立意，類似於三論宗的意義。外人說，我的涅槃不同於上面兩種，就是大用處。不同於『可以被束縛的事物』，不是束縛的意義；不同於方便，不是解脫的意義。所以非束縛、非解脫、非虛妄、非真實、非眾生、非佛，叫做深妙的涅槃，是大用處。之所以這樣，是因為只能去除束縛，不能去除解脫；只能去除虛妄，不能止息真實，這不是大用。現在能夠兩方面都忘掉，所以是大用處。內在說，畏懼的地方有什麼可染著的？沒有身體沒有心，是永死的深坑，是大恐怖的地方。你們這些外道為什麼貪戀染著？這是正面的呵斥數論派灰身滅智的涅槃意義。回答後面兩方面都忘掉的意義。你們沒有虛妄、沒有真實、沒有束縛、沒有解脫，這是大邪見，現在就斷絕善根。", "english_translations": [ "Also. The third sentence directly explains the meaning of the verse. Internally, it says that 'what can be bound' (things that can be bound) and 'expedient means' are different from this, and are useless, refuting the above statement of 'the fruit of no affliction'. The refutation is divided into two parts. First, refute in order. The refutation is further divided into two parts. 'What can be bound' (things that can be bound) refers to bondage. 'Expedient means' refers to the expedient means to cut off bondage. 'Different from this is useless' is an internal refutation. The meaning of the refutation is that having afflictions is being bound, and being without afflictions is attaining liberation. Therefore, this liberation is useful. If Nirvana is the fruit of no affliction, then it is useless. Moreover, Nirvana is not affliction, so it cannot be used to bind; it is not a sentient being, so it cannot be used to cultivate the path; it is not the Eightfold Path, so it cannot be used to extinguish. Being different from these three dharmas is why it is called useless. The true meaning is that being different from 'what can be bound' (things that can be bound), Nirvana is not the bondage of birth and death; being different from right view, Nirvana is not the function of liberation. What is wrong with this? There are two points in the commentary. First, indulging in saying it is the fruit, clarifying the fault of being useless; second, depriving the explanation of no affliction. Since there is no cause, Nirvana cannot be called the fruit of no affliction. The outsider says that having Nirvana, if there is no fourth, then establishing the extinction of unconditioned Nirvana is establishing no remainder. The outsider says that having body and wisdom is called suffering. If the body is reduced to ashes and wisdom is extinguished, then there is no suffering. Master Zhao establishes the meaning of Hinayana Nirvana, saying that the greatest suffering is having a body, so extinguish the body and return to nothing; the greatest labor is having wisdom, so cut off wisdom and sink into emptiness. If so, then it is of great use. How can it be said above that being apart from the three dharmas is useless? Moreover, deeply adopting this intention is similar to the meaning of the Three Treatise School. The outsider says that my Nirvana is different from the above two, which is of great use. Being different from 'what can be bound' (things that can be bound), it is not the meaning of bondage; being different from expedient means, it is not the meaning of liberation. Therefore, being neither bondage nor liberation, neither false nor true, neither sentient being nor Buddha, is called profound Nirvana, which is of great use. The reason for this is that it can only remove bondage but cannot remove liberation; it can only remove falsehood but cannot stop truth, which is not of great use. Now being able to forget both sides is why it is of great use. Internally, it says, what is there to be attached to in a place of fear? Having no body and no mind is a pit of eternal death, a place of great terror. Why do you outsiders greedily cling to it? This is a direct rebuke of the Nirvana meaning of the Samkhya school's reducing the body to ashes and extinguishing wisdom. Answering the meaning of forgetting both sides later. You have no falsehood, no truth, no bondage, no liberation, which is a great heresy, and now cut off the roots of goodness.", "English version:" ] }

來世入地獄甚可怖畏。云何染著無耶。註釋為二。初破外道斷無涅槃。從涅槃名離一切著下略申正涅槃破邪涅槃。前是就緣假破。今是對緣假破。離一切著者外無所著。滅一切憶想者內無有心。即肇公云。于外無數于內無心。彼已寂滅乃名涅槃。非有非無者非上三家之有非第四家之無。又非小乘涅槃斷無非大乘涅槃妙有。又于外無數于內無心名為涅槃。即有此涅槃。是故云非有。非有即著無復云非無。非物非非物者。既聞非有非無終言有於一切。是故云非物。既聞非物便謂非物。故明亦非非物。以非物不物則心行處滅。譬如燈滅明語言道斷。外曰誰得涅槃。自上已來破所得之法。今破能得之人。問有兩意。一舉能得之人證有上所得四種之法。二問論主正涅槃。若言涅槃言斷心忘誰得之耶。內曰無得涅槃亦有兩意。一者前破無所得之法。今破無能得之人。若以神得求神無從。又設令有神神是常遍不應有得。若五陰得。求五陰無從。設有五陰無常失滅亦不應得。若答外人問論主誰得正涅槃。上明所得之法絕於四句。今辨能得之人。義亦如是。是則無能得所得。如中論明涅槃絕四句竟后明如來亦絕四句。今亦爾。問若爾應無得涅槃。答若能不見能得所得便是得涅槃也。故肇師云。大像隱於無形故不見以見之。玄道存乎絕域故

不得以得之。如大品云。無所得即是得。以是得無所得。問文中何故破神及五陰。答凡論得不出人法。故人法並破。又破人破外道得。破法破內人得。又破人明常無得。破陰明無常亦不得。今云聞熏習故得報佛證法身者。不出常無常等。故並著今文破。問若爾不應從佛聞法應得成佛耶。答今明從佛聞法。熏習得者息常無常見息能得所得報法等見方得佛耳。

百論疏卷下之中

百論疏卷下之餘

釋吉藏撰

破空品第十

此品非但是一論之玄宗。亦方等之心髓。言約而義顯。辭巧而致深。用之通正則正無不通。假之摧邪則邪無不屈。可以降天魔制外道折小乘挫大見。依之伐惑即累無不夷。用之行道即觀無不照。能發曚人之慧生訥者之辯。實調心之要方亦懺洗之明術。余息慈之歲玩此希微。將耳順之年秉為心鏡。但疏記零落今存其大綱。來意不同略明十義。一者若就三段分之。破神一品明眾生空。破一已后竟於破常辨諸法空。今此一品明空病亦空。凈名以此三門為調心之術。故略闡於前。提婆亦以此三為練神之方。廣敷於後。二者若二段分之。舍罪福有二。一明舍罪二辨舍福。破邪亦二。一破有見二破空見。從神訖常破有見也。今此一品次破空見。有無是眾見之根障中道之本。故須破之。則

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：不能通過追求『得』來獲得。正如《大品般若經》（大品）所說：『無所得』就是『得』。因為這樣才能獲得『無所得』。問：為什麼文中要破斥神我和五蘊（panchaskandha）？答：凡是討論『得』，都離不開人與法。所以人和法都要破斥。此外，破斥人是爲了破斥外道的『得』，破斥法是爲了破斥內道凡夫的『得』。又，破斥人是爲了闡明常恒之『無得』，破斥五蘊是爲了闡明無常也『不得』。現在說因為聽聞熏習而獲得報佛的果報，證得法身（Dharmakaya），這仍然沒有超出常與無常等見解。所以一併在此文中破斥。問：如果這樣，難道不應該從佛陀聽聞佛法就能成就佛果嗎？答：現在闡明從佛陀聽聞佛法，通過熏習而獲得，是爲了止息常與無常等見解，止息能得、所得、報、法等見解，這樣才能成佛。

《百論疏》卷下之中

《百論疏》卷下之餘

釋吉藏撰

破空品第十

這一品不僅是一部論著的精髓，也是方等經典（Vaipulya Sutra）的核心。言簡意賅，辭藻精巧，意義深刻。運用它，通達正理，則一切無不通達；藉助它，摧毀邪見，則一切邪見無不屈服。它可以降伏天魔，制服外道，折服小乘，挫敗大乘的錯誤見解。依靠它來破除迷惑，那麼一切煩惱都會被剷平；運用它來修行，那麼一切觀行都會明照。能夠啓發愚昧之人的智慧，激發遲鈍之人的辯才。實在是調伏內心的重要方法，也是懺悔洗滌罪業的明智之術。我在息慈寺的歲月里研讀這部精微的論著，希望在六十歲耳順之年，把它作為心中的明鏡。但是疏和記已經零落不全，現在只保留其大綱。來意不同，略微闡明十個方面。第一，如果從三段來劃分，破神我一品闡明眾生空（Sattvasunya）。破神我之後，一直到破常，都是爲了辨明諸法空（Dharmasunya）。現在這一品闡明空病也是空。維摩詰經（Vimalakirti Sutra）用這三門作為調心的法術，所以略微地在前面闡述。提婆菩薩（Aryadeva）也用這三門作為鍛鍊精神的方法，廣泛地在後面敷演。第二，如果從兩段來劃分，舍罪福有兩方面：一是闡明舍罪，二是辨明舍福。破邪見也有兩方面：一是破有見，二是破空見。從破神我到破常，都是爲了破有見。現在這一品接著破空見。有和無是各種見解的根源，是障礙中道的根本。所以必須破除它們。

【English Translation】 English version: It cannot be obtained through seeking 'gain'. As the Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra (Dapinpra) says, 'No-attainment' is 'attainment'. It is through this that one attains 'no-attainment'. Question: Why does the text refute the Atman (self) and the five skandhas (panchaskandha)? Answer: Whenever 'attainment' is discussed, it cannot be separated from persons and dharmas (phenomena). Therefore, both persons and dharmas must be refuted. Furthermore, refuting the person is to refute the 'attainment' of external paths; refuting the dharma is to refute the 'attainment' of internal ordinary people. Also, refuting the person is to clarify the 'no-attainment' of permanence; refuting the skandhas is to clarify that impermanence also cannot be 'attained'. Now, saying that one attains the reward of the Buddha and realizes the Dharmakaya (Dharmakaya) through hearing and cultivation, this still does not go beyond views of permanence and impermanence, etc. Therefore, they are all refuted in this text. Question: If that is the case, shouldn't one be able to attain Buddhahood simply by hearing the Dharma from the Buddha? Answer: Now, it is explained that hearing the Dharma from the Buddha and attaining through cultivation is to cease views of permanence and impermanence, to cease views of the able-to-attain, the attained, the reward, and the Dharma, and only then can one attain Buddhahood.

Sata-sastra-tika Scroll Down (Middle)

Sata-sastra-tika Scroll Down (Remainder)

Composed by Jizang

Chapter Ten: Refuting Emptiness

This chapter is not only the profound essence of this treatise but also the core of the Vaipulya Sutras (Vaipulya Sutra). The words are concise and the meaning is clear; the language is skillful and the significance is profound. Using it to understand the principle, then everything is understood. Using it to destroy heterodoxies, then all heterodoxies are subdued. It can subdue the heavenly demons, control the external paths, defeat the Hinayana, and thwart the wrong views of the Mahayana. Relying on it to eliminate delusion, then all afflictions will be leveled. Using it to practice the path, then all contemplations will be illuminated. It can awaken the wisdom of the ignorant and inspire the eloquence of the dull. It is truly an essential method for taming the mind and a bright technique for repentance and cleansing of karma. During my years at Xici Temple, I studied this subtle treatise, hoping to use it as a mirror for my mind in my sixtieth year when my ears are attuned to the truth. However, the commentaries are scattered and incomplete; now only the outline remains. The intentions are different, so I will briefly explain ten aspects. First, if divided into three sections, the chapter on refuting the Atman (self) clarifies the emptiness of beings (Sattvasunya). After refuting the Atman, up to the refutation of permanence, it is to clarify the emptiness of all dharmas (Dharmasunya). Now, this chapter clarifies that the disease of emptiness is also empty. The Vimalakirti Sutra (Vimalakirti Sutra) uses these three doors as methods for taming the mind, so it is briefly explained earlier. Aryadeva (Aryadeva) also uses these three doors as methods for training the spirit, so it is extensively elaborated later. Second, if divided into two sections, there are two aspects to abandoning sin and merit: one is to clarify the abandonment of sin, and the other is to distinguish the abandonment of merit. There are also two aspects to refuting heterodoxies: one is to refute the view of existence, and the other is to refute the view of emptiness. From refuting the Atman to refuting permanence, it is to refute the view of existence. Now, this chapter continues to refute the view of emptiness. Existence and non-existence are the roots of all views and the foundation for obstructing the Middle Way. Therefore, they must be refuted.

諸見根傾中實便顯也。三者能破所破分之。從論初已來破于所破。今此一品次破能破。令能所並夷破立俱泯則儻然靡據。事不失真蕭焉無寄。理自玄會。四者若就緣觀分之。自上已來明緣盡于觀。今此一章明觀盡于緣。緣盡于觀者。謂若罪若福若法若人生死涅槃凡聖解惑求並無從。盡于觀內故名緣盡于觀。觀盡于緣者。在緣既盡正觀便息。緣盡于觀是則不緣。觀盡于緣是則非觀。故非緣非觀。不知何以目之。強名正觀。亦假號波若佛性法身。故隨義目之。如雲波若。是一法佛說種種名。隨諸眾生力為之立異字。五者賓主明之。從破神竟於破常是外道立義提婆論義。此之一品明提婆明宗外道論義。外道立義提婆論義。則難無不摧通無不屈。提婆明宗外道論義。難無不酬酬無不塞。所以然者。外道不依空問答。故問不成問答不成答。論主依空而問故難無不摧。依空而答答無不塞。以此示末代眾生。明世間問答尚須依空。況欲離苦求寂滅之道而存著有耶。六者自上以來名為破邪。今此一品稱為破正。然本對外道之邪故有內之正。邪既不立故正亦不留。如是生死涅槃真之與妄乃至理外理內有得無得義並類然。釋迦一期亦爾。從初鹿苑逐諸外道。窮至雙林六師邪道既亡。釋迦之正亦息。提婆亦爾。故前除外邪今息內正。如胡公之

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：諸種見解的根源傾倒，中正的實相便會顯現。第三，這一品能破除能破和所破的分別。從本論開始以來，一直在破除所破之物。現在這一品接著破除能破之物，使能破和所破一同消滅，破除和建立都歸於泯滅，那麼就會坦然無所依據，事情不會失去真相，清靜空寂無所寄託，真理自然玄妙地融會貫通。第四，如果就緣起的角度來觀察，可以這樣劃分：從前面開始，闡明緣起終結于觀照。現在這一章闡明觀照終結于緣起。緣起終結于觀照，是指罪業、福報、佛法、人生、生死、涅槃（Nirvana，佛教術語，指解脫后的境界）、凡夫、聖人、解脫、迷惑，都無從尋求，全部終結于觀照之內，所以叫做緣起終結于觀照。觀照終結于緣起，是指在緣起已經終結時，正確的觀照便會止息。緣起終結于觀照，就是不依賴緣起；觀照終結于緣起，就是不是觀照。所以，既不是緣起，也不是觀照，不知道用什麼來稱呼它，勉強稱之為正觀。也只是假借名稱為般若（Prajna，智慧）、佛性（Buddha-nature，眾生皆具的成佛的可能性）、法身（Dharmakaya，佛的真身）。所以根據意義來稱呼它，比如說到般若，就是一法，佛陀（Buddha，佛教創始人）說了種種名稱，隨著眾生的能力而為之設立不同的字眼。第五，從賓主關係來闡明：從破除神我之後到破除常恒，是外道（non-Buddhist religions）建立義理，提婆（Deva，聖天論師，大乘佛教中觀派論師）論證義理。這一品闡明提婆闡明宗旨，外道論證義理。外道建立義理，那麼辯難沒有不能摧毀的，通達沒有不能屈服的。提婆闡明宗旨，外道論證義理，辯難沒有不能迴應的，迴應沒有不能堵塞的。之所以這樣，是因為外道不依據空性（Emptiness，佛教核心概念，指諸法無自性）來問答，所以問題不成問題，回答不成回答。論主依據空性來提問，所以辯難沒有不能摧毀的；依據空性來回答，所以回答沒有不能堵塞的。用這個來昭示末代的眾生，明白世間的問答尚且需要依據空性，何況想要脫離痛苦，尋求寂滅的道路，卻還執著于實有呢？第六，從前面開始叫做破除邪見，現在這一品稱為破除正見。然而本來是針對外道的邪見，所以才有內在的正見。邪見既然不能成立，所以正見也不保留。像這樣，生死和涅槃，真和妄，乃至理外和理內，有得和無得的意義都類似這樣。釋迦（Sakyamuni，釋迦牟尼佛）一生的教化也是這樣，從最初的鹿野苑（Sarnath，佛陀初轉法輪之地）開始，驅逐各種外道，直到拘尸那迦（Kushinagar，佛陀涅槃之地）的雙林，六師外道的邪見既然消亡，釋迦的正見也止息。提婆也是這樣，所以前面破除外在的邪見，現在止息內在的正見，如同胡公的……

【English Translation】 English version: When the roots of all views are overturned, the true essence of the Middle Way will become manifest. Thirdly, this chapter is able to dismantle the distinction between the 'that which can be refuted' and the 'that which is refuted'. From the beginning of this treatise, we have been refuting that which is to be refuted. Now, this chapter proceeds to refute that which can refute, so that both the refuter and the refuted are equally annihilated, and both refutation and establishment are extinguished. Then, one will be naturally without any basis, and things will not lose their truth, serene and without attachment. The truth will naturally and mysteriously converge. Fourthly, if we analyze it from the perspective of dependent origination, we can divide it as follows: From the beginning, it has been clarifying that dependent origination ends in contemplation. Now, this chapter clarifies that contemplation ends in dependent origination. That dependent origination ends in contemplation means that whether it is sin or merit, Dharma or life, birth and death, Nirvana (the state of liberation), ordinary beings, sages, liberation, or delusion, there is nowhere to seek them. All end within contemplation, hence it is called dependent origination ending in contemplation. That contemplation ends in dependent origination means that when dependent origination has ended, correct contemplation will cease. Dependent origination ending in contemplation is then non-dependent origination; contemplation ending in dependent origination is then non-contemplation. Therefore, it is neither dependent origination nor contemplation. We do not know what to call it, so we forcibly call it Right Contemplation. It is also just a borrowed name for Prajna (wisdom), Buddha-nature (the potential for all beings to become Buddhas), and Dharmakaya (the body of truth). Therefore, we name it according to its meaning, such as saying Prajna is one Dharma, and the Buddha (the founder of Buddhism) spoke of various names, establishing different terms according to the capacity of sentient beings. Fifthly, we clarify it from the perspective of host and guest: From the refutation of the self to the refutation of permanence, it is the establishment of doctrines by non-Buddhists (non-Buddhist religions) and the argumentation of Deva (Aryadeva, a Mahayana Buddhist philosopher of the Madhyamaka school). This chapter clarifies Deva clarifying the tenets, and non-Buddhists arguing the doctrines. When non-Buddhists establish doctrines, there is no debate that cannot be destroyed, and no understanding that cannot be subdued. When Deva clarifies the tenets and non-Buddhists argue the doctrines, there is no debate that cannot be answered, and no answer that cannot be blocked. The reason for this is that non-Buddhists do not rely on emptiness (the core concept of Buddhism, referring to the lack of inherent existence of all phenomena) in their questions and answers, so the question does not become a question, and the answer does not become an answer. The master of the treatise relies on emptiness to ask questions, so there is no debate that cannot be destroyed; he relies on emptiness to answer, so there is no answer that cannot be blocked. With this, he shows the sentient beings of the later generations that even worldly questions and answers must rely on emptiness, let alone wanting to escape suffering and seek the path of Nirvana, yet still clinging to existence? Sixthly, from the beginning, it is called refuting the heterodox, and now this chapter is called refuting the orthodox. However, it was originally aimed at the heterodoxy of non-Buddhists, so there is the orthodoxy within. Since heterodoxy cannot be established, orthodoxy is also not retained. Like this, birth and death and Nirvana, truth and falsehood, and even what is beyond reason and within reason, the meaning of having attainment and not having attainment are all similar. Sakyamuni's (Sakyamuni Buddha) entire life of teaching was also like this, starting from the Deer Park (Sarnath, the place where the Buddha first turned the wheel of Dharma), driving out various non-Buddhists, and reaching the twin trees in Kushinagar (Kushinagar, the place where the Buddha entered Nirvana), when the heterodox views of the six teachers of non-Buddhists were extinguished, Sakyamuni's orthodox views also ceased. Deva is also like this, so he first eliminates external heterodoxy and now stops internal orthodoxy, like the Duke Hu's...

藥既隱即胡公亦藏事亦爾也。七者上來別破諸師。此品總破一切外道。八約人論之。上破有見外道今破空見外道。上破薩婆多今破方廣。上破愛多今破見多。故智度論云。愛多者著有見多者著空。九者上來正破外道。今此一品名為釋破。釋破者破妄見。止於水想故名破耳。實無水可破故名釋破。十者上來正破今此一品名為簡破。所以然者。九十六種外道亦互相破。小乘五百論師亦互相破。乃至有所得大乘人亦互相破。而智力強者則勝智力劣者墮負。今提婆亦破外道異彼眾師。眾師皆心有所得言有所住。是故破他。提婆心無所依言無所住。故非破不破。但為妄謂所存求之無從。是故云破。實無所破故異彼眾師。大業四年為對長安三種論師。謂攝論十地地持三種師明二無我理及三無性為論大宗。今立此一品正為破之。應名破二無我品及破三無性品。何以知之。破神明人無我理。破一已下明法無我理竟。今言破空即是破人法二空。豈非破二無我理耶。此是提婆自爾。勿咎講人。言破三無性理品者。汝以生死塵識等為分別依他二性。以涅槃為真實性。上並破此三性竟。今復破空。豈非破三無性耶。亦是論主自明。非余橫造也。問二無我三無性並破欲明何物耶。答道豈是我無我性無性耶。如是五句自可知也。又序此品來意者。非

但結成提婆一期出世意。亦是重結釋龍樹出世意。以人講龍樹四論不識論意。是故提婆破外道竟更撰斯論申明龍樹出世破申之意。既敘提婆出世及龍樹意。及釋迦一期並十方三世諸佛大意爾也。又敘此品來意者。明正論解惑義。一切大小乘人言。以空解斷惑。惑即是所破解為能破。故無礙正斷解脫證破。又無礙正破解脫遮破。乃至言佛智斷障。是故今立此一品明不立不破。即明無惑可斷。有何解之能破。故說此一品。又辨諸方等經明懺悔意。世間人皆云。無始世來所造眾罪今欲懺悔。即謂罪為所破懺悔為能破。如此懺悔者名為罪過懺悔。何以知之。有能破所破既是外道。今復云有懺為能破罪是可破。豈非外道。此言正可為入理人說耳。昔山中大師云。出講堂不許人語。意正在此。恐聞之而起疑謗故也。又序此品來者。欲釋諸大乘經本性清凈不生滅義。所言不生者。本無人生本無法生。何有立耶。竟無有滅。何所破耶。故不立不破即不生不滅義也。又釋諸方等經不斷煩惱亦不與俱。以不立故不俱。無所破不斷。如是一切義類可知。吉藏昔在江左陳此品有十七條。老年多忘故略述一二數耳。所言破空品者凡有二義。一者諸外道等執萬化為有。上求之無從。故人法並空便墮空見。今破外人橫謂之空故名破空。故涅槃云。眾生

起見凡有二種。一斷二常。又云要因斷常。所以然者。要由常起斷見因斷起常見。二者論主初品明依福舍罪依空舍福。從破神竟破常求人法無從釋成空義。空義既成舍福便顯。若利根外道從此空門便入正道。但鈍根之者更復著空。則空便非門。今此一品破除此空令得悟入故云破空。問空是無法。何所破耶。故外道呵提婆云。譬如愚人慾破虛空有徒勞之弊。今何因緣言破空耶。答破其執空之病故言破空。實無空可破。問若爾應云破病品不應云破空品。答病是能執空是所執。若言破病品者十品皆是破病。今將所執之空顯其能執之病故云破空品。問論主上破外之有。外既受屈。今此一品外道難提婆之空。提婆何故能通。答外人有有可破。是以受屈。論主無無可責。是故蕭然。問此品但破于空亦破四句。答空有四句皆破。但對前八品破有故今明破空耳。又有空有有有亦空亦有非空非有。皆名為有。無此四句乃稱為空。作此論之破空即四句內外皆悉破也。問若四句內外皆悉破者應無有申。答破此內外諸見便悟諸法實相。即是申也。問若爾但申實相應不申教門。答教本詮理。既得見月何須指耶。問若爾後應不明二諦。答若了悟者亦無須二諦。又上來破外道四句無遺。壅障始除方得申明二諦。品開為二。一破外道斷滅空。第二申二諦

中道結論旨歸。所以有此二者。自上已來破其有病。今此品次破空病。然此想謂空有障佛二諦。要須前破壅障始得申明二諦也。又前破空有明非空非有。即是中實義。以非空非有然後始得假說空有。此假名空有為欲顯非空非有不二之道故明二諦中道。又前破空有外人便起斷見。故次說二諦接其斷心。又前明空有等四句畢竟無所有。即是第一義諦。次明無所有有名為世諦。故如來依二諦說法。論主學佛亦依二諦。若離二諦發言即是虛妄。是故前明第一義后明世諦。但宜熟觀文勿信人語。然總括一論有五節意。論初已來破外所立一節意也。品初破破二節意也。次破他法故汝是破人已下明不成不破三節意也。次應有諸法相待有故已下破外謂內終有所存四節意也。次若空不應有說已下外沒于斷無不識二諦五節意也。此五節非止是斯論所用。觀一切佛法六根所對四儀動靜皆須用之。所以有此五節者。須精密取之能離菩薩微細礙相。裁起一毫人法生死涅槃等見即心行道外。名為外道。即是立也。自論初已來破如此立故名破立。即初節意也。次謂有一無生正觀破上來所立。言上來所立是所破。無生正觀是能破。作此想謂則墮能所見中。破立心起。故第二節明本不曾生死涅槃等為所破。亦未曾有無生正觀是能破。能破所破並出謂情故有

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：中道結論的旨歸。之所以有空和有這二者，是因為前面已經破除了『有』的執著。現在這一品是爲了破除對『空』的執著。然而，這種對『空』的執著會障礙對佛陀所說的二諦（satya-dvaya，真諦和俗諦）的理解。所以必須先破除這些障礙，才能闡明二諦的道理。而且，前面破除『空』和『有』，是爲了闡明『非空非有』，這才是中道的真實含義。因為既非空也非有，然後才能假立『空』和『有』。這種假名安立的『空』和『有』，是爲了彰顯『非空非有』的不二之道，所以才要闡明二諦的中道。此外，前面破除『空』和『有』，外道就會產生斷滅見。所以接著說二諦，是爲了接引那些心懷斷滅見的人。而且，前面說明『空』、『有』等四句，畢竟都是沒有自性的，這就是第一義諦（paramārtha-satya）。接著說明這種『無所有』，就名為世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya）。所以如來（Tathāgata）依據二諦說法，論主（指龍樹菩薩，Nāgārjuna）學習佛法也依據二諦。如果離開二諦而說話，那就是虛妄的。因此，前面闡明第一義諦，後面闡明世俗諦。但應該仔細觀察經文，不要輕信別人的說法。總括這部論（指《中論》，Mūlamadhyamakakārikā）有五個要點：從論的開頭到現在，破除外道的觀點是一個要點。這一品的開頭是破除『破』，這是第二個要點。接著因為破除了其他宗派的觀點，所以『你是破人』以下，闡明『不成不破』，這是第三個要點。接著『應有諸法相待有故』以下，破除外道認為內心終究有所存留，這是第四個要點。接著『若空不應有說』以下，外道陷入斷滅，不認識二諦，這是第五個要點。這五個要點不僅僅是這部論所使用的，觀察一切佛法，六根所面對的一切，四威儀（行住坐臥）的動靜，都需要運用這五個要點。之所以有這五個要點，是因為需要精密地理解它們，才能遠離菩薩的微細障礙。只要稍微生起人、法、生死、涅槃等見解，心就走在道之外，這就叫做外道，也就是『立』。從這部論的開頭到現在，破除的就是這種『立』，所以叫做『破立』，這就是第一個要點。接著認為有一個『無生』的正觀，是爲了破除上面所建立的觀點。意思是說，上面所建立的觀點是『所破』，『無生』的正觀是『能破』。如果這樣想，就會落入能見和所見的對立之中，破立之心就會生起。所以第二個要點闡明，本來就不曾有生死涅槃等作為『所破』，也未曾有『無生』的正觀作為『能破』。能破和所破都是出於情見，所以才會有。

【English Translation】 English version: The ultimate aim of the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) conclusion. The reason for having these two (emptiness and existence) is that the attachment to 'existence' has been refuted earlier. This chapter is to refute the attachment to 'emptiness'. However, this attachment to 'emptiness' obstructs the understanding of the two truths (satya-dvaya, ultimate truth and conventional truth) taught by the Buddha. Therefore, these obstructions must be removed first in order to clarify the doctrine of the two truths. Moreover, the previous refutation of 'emptiness' and 'existence' is to elucidate 'neither emptiness nor existence', which is the true meaning of the Middle Way. Because it is neither empty nor existent, then 'emptiness' and 'existence' can be provisionally established. This nominally established 'emptiness' and 'existence' is to reveal the non-dual path of 'neither emptiness nor existence', so the Middle Way of the two truths must be clarified. In addition, the previous refutation of 'emptiness' and 'existence' will cause outsiders to generate nihilistic views. Therefore, the two truths are then discussed to guide those with nihilistic views. Moreover, the previous explanation that the four propositions such as 'emptiness' and 'existence' are ultimately without self-nature is the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). Then it is explained that this 'non-existence' is called conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya). Therefore, the Tathāgata (Thus-Gone One, Buddha) teaches according to the two truths, and the author of the treatise (referring to Nāgārjuna) also studies the Buddha's teachings according to the two truths. If one speaks apart from the two truths, then it is false. Therefore, the ultimate truth is explained first, and then the conventional truth is explained later. But one should carefully observe the scriptures and not lightly believe the words of others. In summary, this treatise (referring to the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā) has five key points: From the beginning of the treatise to the present, refuting the views of outsiders is one key point. The beginning of this chapter is to refute 'refutation', which is the second key point. Then, because the views of other schools have been refuted, from 'you are a refuter' onwards, it is explained that 'neither establishing nor refuting' is the third key point. Then, from 'since things exist dependently' onwards, it refutes the outsider's view that something ultimately remains in the mind, which is the fourth key point. Then, from 'if emptiness, there should be no saying' onwards, the outsider falls into nihilism and does not recognize the two truths, which is the fifth key point. These five key points are not only used in this treatise, but also in observing all Buddhist teachings, everything that the six senses face, and the movement and stillness of the four postures (walking, standing, sitting, lying down). The reason for having these five key points is that they need to be understood precisely in order to stay away from the subtle obstacles of a Bodhisattva. As long as one slightly generates views of person, dharma, birth and death, Nirvana, etc., the mind is walking outside the path, which is called an outsider, that is, 'establishing'. From the beginning of this treatise to the present, what has been refuted is this kind of 'establishing', so it is called 'establishing and refuting', which is the first key point. Then, thinking that there is a 'non-arising' correct view is to refute the views established above. It means that the views established above are 'what is to be refuted', and the 'non-arising' correct view is 'what can refute'. If you think this way, you will fall into the opposition between what can be seen and what is seen, and the mind of establishing and refuting will arise. Therefore, the second key point explains that there has never been birth and death, Nirvana, etc. as 'what is to be refuted', nor has there ever been a 'non-arising' correct view as 'what can refute'. What can refute and what is to be refuted both come from emotional views, so they exist.

第二節意。外人復謂。若無生死涅槃是所破。亦無無生正觀是能破。此則無正無邪無內無外。破滅一切法是大邪見人也。是故明諸法本不曾成何所論破。汝橫謂言成橫謂言破。以過內者則翻是破法之人。故有第三節不成不破意來也。外人復謂。若言都無成破。云何能無難不通無通不難。既能無難不通無通不難。必應有一妙術。則終有所存。故論主明。若有一法不存可有其存。竟無一法不存。云何有一法可存。故有第四節來意也。外又云。若言不得有一毫可存。復不得無一毫可存。三世諸佛云何說十二部經八萬法藏教化人耶。是故次明雖未曾有無非有非無為眾生故隨俗而說。故有第五明於二諦。就五節意中。初節屬前九品。第五屬此品內第二段。餘三節在初段中。即為三意。此論本是長安舊義。昔在江左常云。關河相承晚有所得人不學斯論。多是相著。今為對此病亦作四節生起之。初節正破二無我及三無性。第二節外人便云。空品前破三性。空品破三無性。若三性三無性二我二無我一切破。則是破法人及滅佛法人。是故答云。汝見有成法及破法生法與滅法。汝是破法人耳。我不曾成法亦不破法。不曾生法亦不滅法故我非破法人也。第三節云。汝若言我有成破及生滅我義為非。汝無成破及生滅汝義為是。則終有所得所依。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本第二節的意義。外人又說：『如果既沒有生死涅槃這些被破斥的對象，也沒有無生正觀這種能破斥的主體，那麼就既沒有正確也沒有邪惡，沒有內部也沒有外部。破滅一切法，這是大邪見之人啊！』因此，要說明諸法本來就不曾成立，還談論什麼破斥呢？是你自己橫生出『成立』的觀念，又橫生出『破斥』的觀念。以這種觀念來責難我，那麼反而是你成了破法之人。所以有了第三節『不成不破』的意義。外人又說：『如果說完全沒有成立和破斥，怎麼能沒有困難和不通，沒有通達和不困難呢？既然能沒有困難和不通，沒有通達和不困難，必定應該有一種奇妙的法術，那麼終究還是有所執存。』所以論主說明：『如果有一法不執存，還可以說有其執存。但實際上沒有一法是不執存的，怎麼能有一法可執存呢？』所以有了第四節的意義。外人又說：『如果說不得有一毫可執存，又不得無一毫可執存，那麼三世諸佛怎麼說十二部經、八萬法藏來教化人呢？』所以接著說明，雖然未曾有非有非無，但爲了眾生的緣故，隨順世俗而說。所以有了第五節，說明二諦。就這五節的意義中，第一節屬於前面的九品，第五節屬於此品內的第二段，其餘三節在第一段中，即為三種意義。此論本是長安舊義。過去在江左常說，關河相承，晚有所得的人不學習此論，大多是執著于有。現在爲了對治這種毛病，也作四節生起之。第一節，正是破斥二無我（dvi-nairātmya，人無我和法無我）及三無性（tri-niḥsvabhāvatā，遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性皆無自性）。第二節，外人就說：『空品前面破斥三性，空品破斥三無性。如果三性、三無性、二我、二無我一切都破斥了，那就是破法人及滅佛法人。』所以回答說：『你見到有成立的法及破斥的法，生起的法與滅去的法，你才是破法人啊。我不曾成立法，也不破斥法，不曾生起法，也不滅去法，所以我不是破法人啊。』第三節說：『你如果說我有成立和破斥及生滅，我的義理就是錯誤的；你沒有成立和破斥及生滅，你的義理就是正確的。』那麼終究還是有所得、有所依賴。

【English Translation】 English version The meaning of the second section. An outsider further says: 'If there is neither birth-and-death nor Nirvāṇa (liberation) as objects to be refuted, and there is no non-origination right view as the subject capable of refuting, then there is neither right nor wrong, neither inside nor outside. To destroy all dharmas (phenomena) is the view of a greatly heretical person!' Therefore, it must be explained that dharmas originally never came into being, so what is there to discuss about refutation? It is you who arbitrarily create the concept of 'establishment' and arbitrarily create the concept of 'refutation.' Using this concept to criticize me, then you are the one who becomes a destroyer of the Dharma. Therefore, there is the meaning of the third section, 'neither establishment nor refutation.' The outsider further says: 'If you say there is absolutely no establishment and refutation, how can there be no difficulty and non-understanding, no understanding and non-difficulty? Since there can be no difficulty and non-understanding, no understanding and non-difficulty, there must be a wonderful technique, so there is ultimately something to cling to.' Therefore, the author of the treatise explains: 'If there were one dharma that is not clung to, it could be said that there is something to cling to. But in reality, there is not a single dharma that is not clung to, so how can there be one dharma that can be clung to?' Therefore, there is the meaning of the fourth section. The outsider further says: 'If you say that not even a hair's breadth can be clung to, and yet it cannot be said that not even a hair's breadth can be clung to, then how do the Buddhas of the three times teach people by speaking the twelve divisions of scriptures and the eighty-four thousand Dharma treasures?' Therefore, it is then explained that although there has never been neither existence nor non-existence, it is spoken in accordance with worldly conventions for the sake of sentient beings. Therefore, there is the fifth section, explaining the two truths (dve satye, conventional truth and ultimate truth). Among the meanings of these five sections, the first section belongs to the previous nine chapters, the fifth section belongs to the second part within this chapter, and the remaining three sections are in the first part, which are three meanings. This treatise is originally the old meaning of Chang'an. In the past, it was often said in Jiangzuo that those who inherit the tradition late and gain something do not study this treatise, and most of them are attached to existence. Now, in order to counter this problem, four sections are also created. The first section is precisely to refute the two non-selves (dvi-nairātmya, the non-self of persons and the non-self of phenomena) and the three non-natures (tri-niḥsvabhāvatā, the lack of inherent existence of the imagined nature, the dependent nature, and the perfected nature). In the second section, the outsider then says: 'The emptiness chapter previously refuted the three natures, and the emptiness chapter refutes the three non-natures. If the three natures, the three non-natures, the two selves, and the two non-selves are all refuted, then that is destroying the Dharma and destroying the Buddha's Dharma.' Therefore, the answer is: 'You see that there are established dharmas and refuted dharmas, arising dharmas and ceasing dharmas; you are the one who destroys the Dharma. I have never established a dharma, nor have I refuted a dharma; I have never caused a dharma to arise, nor have I caused a dharma to cease, so I am not a destroyer of the Dharma.' The third section says: 'If you say that I have establishment and refutation and arising and ceasing, then my meaning is wrong; if you have no establishment and refutation and arising and ceasing, then your meaning is correct.' Then ultimately there is something gained and something relied upon.

云何言無依無得。是故答云。汝自謂我有所依得。我未曾有一毫法可依得也。第四節云。若無依得不依得。云何經云從法身流出十二部經八方法藏教化眾生習因成佛。是故答云。此是佛隨俗言耳。至道未曾一言。況復八萬法藏。像法決疑經云。從初成道乃至涅槃。不曾說一句亦不度一人。而眾生自見說法度人耳。此是用長安舊義答晚攝論師等人也。就初二問答明破于破即為二意。第一破外人謂論主用空破有。故破外空破。次問答破外人謂論主用有破諸法。明無有此破。又初問答破外謂內用就緣假破。次問答破外謂內用對緣假破。又初問答破外謂內用正破邪。次問答破外謂內借邪破邪。夫一切能破所破不出此之三雙。今明實未曾有此所破。亦未曾有斯能破。初番前問次答。問有二意。外曰應有諸法破有故。此就有門破能破也。凡有五義。一者既有能破則有所破。故一切法有不應言空。二汝有能破我有所破。二俱是有我所破既被汝能破。破汝能破亦被破。若爾則提婆與眾人無異。云何謂外為所破內為能破。三者能破所破二俱是有。若以能破所亦應用所破能。則內為所破外為能破。四者能破所破二俱是有。俱是所破。則無能破。既無能破則無所破。若爾則無能無所。何有屈申。五者若能所俱有則虛設三空。舍福義壞。若舍福

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本如何說『無依無得』呢？所以回答說：『你自己認為我有所依賴、有所獲得。我未曾有一絲一毫的法可以依賴、可以獲得啊。』第四節說：『如果無所依賴、無所獲得，那麼經典中怎麼說從法身流出十二部經（Dvadashanga，佛經的十二種分類）八方法藏教化眾生，通過習因成就佛果呢？』所以回答說：『這只是佛陀隨順世俗的說法罷了。至道從未說過一句話，更何況八萬法藏（Ashtasahasrika Prajnaparamita Sutra，般若經）呢？』《像法決疑經》說：『從最初成道乃至涅槃，不曾說過一句話，也不曾度化過一個人。』而眾生自己看到佛在說法度人罷了。這是用長安舊義來回答晚期攝論師等人。就最初的兩個問答來說，闡明『破于破』就是兩個意思。第一，破斥外人認為論主用空性來破斥有。所以破斥外人的空性破斥。其次，問答破斥外人認為論主用有來破斥諸法。闡明沒有這種破斥。另外，最初的問答破斥外人認為內部用就緣假來破斥。其次，問答破斥外人認為內部用對緣假來破斥。另外，最初的問答破斥外人認為內部用正來破斥邪。其次，問答破斥外人認為內部借邪來破斥邪。一切能破和所破都離不開這三對關係。現在闡明實際上未曾有所破，也未曾有能破。最初一番是先問后答。問有兩個意思。外人說：『應該有諸法來破斥有，所以這是用有門來破斥能破。』總共有五個意思。一者，既然有能破，就有所破。所以一切法是有，不應該說是空。二者，你有能破，我有所破，二者都是有，我所破既然被你的能破所破，你的能破也被破。如果這樣，那麼提婆（Deva，印度論師，主張中觀學說）與眾人就沒有區別了。怎麼能說外是所破，內是能破呢？三者，能破所破二者都是有。如果用能破破所破，也應用所破破能破。那麼內就是所破，外就是能破。四者，能破所破二者都是有，都是所破。那麼就沒有能破。既然沒有能破，就沒有所破。如果這樣，就沒有能無所，哪裡還有屈伸？五者，如果能所都是有，那麼就是虛設三空，捨棄福德的意義就破壞了。如果捨棄福德

【English Translation】 English version How can it be said 'no reliance, no attainment'? Therefore, the answer is: 'You yourself think that I have something to rely on, something to attain. I have never had a single dharma (law, principle) to rely on or attain.' The fourth section says: 'If there is no reliance, no attainment, then how does the scripture say that the twelve divisions of scriptures (Dvadashanga, the twelve categories of Buddhist scriptures) and the eight methods of Dharma treasures flow from the Dharmakaya (Dharmakāya, the body of the Dharma, the ultimate nature of reality), teaching sentient beings, and achieving Buddhahood through the cause of practice?' Therefore, the answer is: 'This is just the Buddha's conventional way of speaking according to the world. The ultimate path has never spoken a single word, let alone the eighty-four thousand Dharma treasures (Ashtasahasrika Prajnaparamita Sutra, the Perfection of Wisdom Sutra)?' The Sutra on Resolving Doubts in the Semblance Dharma says: 'From the initial attainment of enlightenment to Nirvana (Nirvana, liberation from suffering), not a single word has been spoken, nor has a single person been liberated.' It is only sentient beings themselves who see the Buddha preaching the Dharma and liberating people. This is using the old meaning of Chang'an to answer the late She Lun masters and others. Regarding the initial two questions and answers, clarifying 'breaking the break' has two meanings. First, refuting the outsiders' view that the master of the treatise uses emptiness to break existence. Therefore, refuting the outsiders' emptiness-breaking. Second, the question and answer refute the outsiders' view that the master of the treatise uses existence to break all dharmas. Clarifying that there is no such breaking. In addition, the initial question and answer refute the outsiders' view that the internal uses the provisional based on conditions to break. Second, the question and answer refute the outsiders' view that the internal uses the provisional based on conditions to break. In addition, the initial question and answer refute the outsiders' view that the internal uses the correct to break the wrong. Second, the question and answer refute the outsiders' view that the internal borrows the wrong to break the wrong. All that can be broken and what is broken cannot be separated from these three pairs of relationships. Now it is clarified that in reality, there has never been what is broken, nor has there ever been what can break. The first part is the question first, then the answer. The question has two meanings. Outsiders say: 'There should be dharmas to break existence, so this is using the gate of existence to break what can break.' There are five meanings in total. First, since there is what can break, there is what is broken. Therefore, all dharmas exist, and it should not be said that they are empty. Second, you have what can break, and I have what is broken. Both are existent. Since what I break is broken by what you can break, what you can break is also broken. If so, then Deva (Deva, an Indian philosopher who advocated Madhyamaka) is no different from the crowd. How can it be said that the outside is what is broken and the inside is what can break? Third, both what can break and what is broken are existent. If what can break is used to break what is broken, then what is broken should also be used to break what can break. Then the inside is what is broken, and the outside is what can break. Fourth, both what can break and what is broken are existent, and both are what is broken. Then there is nothing that can break. Since there is nothing that can break, there is nothing that is broken. If so, there is no can, no what, where is there bending and stretching? Fifth, if both can and what are existent, then the three emptinesses are falsely established, and the meaning of abandoning merit is destroyed. If abandoning merit

壞則一切不成。若無破余法有故者。次就無門以破能破亦有五義。一者若無能破以何破我。既無能破則我義還成。二者若無能破有無相對。待于無能則便有所。三者若無能破我有所破。我有所破我是有見。汝無能破汝是空見。則我是薩衛汝為方廣。則二俱有過。四者我有所破則不失因果。汝無能破便無罪福。故寧起身見不惡取空。不以是見墮惡道中。故有過義輕無執最重。五者若無能破亦無能申。汝云何建立三論欲申正教耶。內曰破如可破答上有無難也。今不作有答無答。若作有答還著其有難。若作無答還著其無難。亦不作非有無答。墮愚癡論故。又平鈍故。亦不默然答。以外見默然謂無答故。今答者反擲還外人也。汝上來見立今見有破。故擲此破立還於外人。今言如者有二種如。一計如二破如。計如者。汝上計可破今計能破。二破如者。上就汝覓可破無從。今就汝覓能破亦不可得。又今過甚於上。上計有可破。我就汝覓無從。汝今計能破。汝自將有無破之。故此能破自無。不須我破也。又汝將有無乃破立能破家。不問我也。我立能破可受汝問。我不立能破故不受汝問。如十二門懸構責中說也。又汝問為有能破為無能破。今將有無還問于汝。汝為有所破為無所破。若有所破上求何故無從。若無所破只汝是所破。所破既

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果（能破之法）壞滅，那麼一切都不能成立。如果沒有破除『其餘法是有』的緣故，接下來就從『無』的角度來破斥，其中有五種意義：一、如果沒有能破之法，用什麼來破斥我？既然沒有能破之法，那麼我的觀點就仍然成立。二、如果沒有能破之法，有和無是相對的。依賴於沒有能破之法，那麼就有所破之法。三、如果我有所破之法，我就是有所破的，我就是有見。你沒有能破之法，你是空見。那麼我是薩衛（Sarvastivada，一切有部），你是方廣（Vaipulya，大乘）。那麼我們雙方都有過失。四、我有所破之法，那麼就不會失去因果。你沒有能破之法，就沒有罪福。所以寧可起身見（Satkayadrishti，有身見），也不要錯誤地執取空性。不要因為這種見解而墮入惡道之中。所以有過失的意義較輕，而沒有執取最為嚴重。五、如果沒有能破之法，也就沒有能申之法。你如何建立三論（Sanlun，中觀學派的三部主要論著），想要闡明正教呢？（對方）辯駁說：『破如（Tathata，如如）是可以被破斥的。』回答說：『上面已經有了有和無的詰難。』現在我不作有或無的回答。如果作有的回答，還會落入執著于有的困境。如果作無的回答，還會落入執著于無的困境。也不作非有非無的回答，因為會墮入愚癡的論調。而且顯得遲鈍。也不默然不答，因為外道會認為這是沒有回答。現在的回答是將問題反過來拋給對方。你之前的觀點是建立，現在的觀點是有破斥。所以將這個破斥和建立反過來拋給對方。現在說『如』有兩種『如』。一是計如（認為如是可以被計度的），二是破如（認為如是可以被破斥的）。計如是說，你之前認為可破，現在認為能破。二破如是說，之前在你那裡尋找可破之法，卻無從找到。現在在你這裡尋找能破之法，也是不可得的。而且現在的過失比之前更嚴重。之前你認為有可破之法，我向你尋找卻無從找到。你現在認為有能破之法，你自己用有和無來破斥它。所以這個能破之法自身就是沒有的，不需要我來破斥它。而且你用有和無來破斥建立能破之家，並沒有問我。我建立能破之法，可以接受你的提問。我不建立能破之法，所以不接受你的提問。如同《十二門論》（Dvadasanikaya Sastra）懸構責中說的那樣。而且你問是有能破還是無能破，現在將有和無反過來問你。你是有所破還是無所破？如果有所破，之前尋求為什麼無從找到。如果沒有所破，那麼只有你是所破。所破既然...

【English Translation】 English version: If (the method of refutation) is destroyed, then nothing can be established. If there is no reason to refute 'the remaining dharmas are existent,' then next, from the perspective of 'non-existence,' there are five meanings to refute: 1. If there is no method of refutation, what is used to refute me? Since there is no method of refutation, then my view still stands. 2. If there is no method of refutation, existence and non-existence are relative. Relying on the absence of a method of refutation, then there is something to be refuted. 3. If I have something to be refuted, I am something to be refuted, I have a view. You have no method of refutation, you are a view of emptiness. Then I am Sarvastivada (everything exists), you are Vaipulya (Mahayana). Then both of us have faults. 4. If I have something to be refuted, then I will not lose cause and effect. You have no method of refutation, there is no merit or demerit. So it is better to have Satkayadrishti (the view of a self) than to wrongly grasp emptiness. Do not fall into evil paths because of this view. So the meaning of having faults is lighter, and not grasping is the most serious. 5. If there is no method of refutation, then there is no method of declaration. How do you establish the Sanlun (Three Treatises of the Madhyamaka school), wanting to clarify the correct teaching? (The opponent) argues: 'Tathata (suchness) can be refuted.' The answer is: 'There have already been the difficulties of existence and non-existence above.' Now I will not answer with existence or non-existence. If I answer with existence, I will still fall into the difficulty of clinging to existence. If I answer with non-existence, I will still fall into the difficulty of clinging to non-existence. Nor will I answer with neither existence nor non-existence, because it will fall into a foolish argument. And it seems dull. Nor will I remain silent, because outsiders will think that there is no answer. The current answer is to throw the question back to the opponent. Your previous view was establishment, and your current view is refutation. So throw this refutation and establishment back to the opponent. Now there are two kinds of 'suchness.' One is 'calculated suchness' (thinking suchness can be calculated), and the other is 'refuted suchness' (thinking suchness can be refuted). 'Calculated suchness' means that you previously thought it could be refuted, and now you think it can refute. 'Refuted suchness' means that before, I looked for something to be refuted in you, but I could not find it. Now I am looking for a method of refutation in you, but it is also unattainable. And the current fault is more serious than before. Before, you thought there was something to be refuted, and I looked for it in you but could not find it. Now you think there is a method of refutation, and you yourself use existence and non-existence to refute it. So this method of refutation itself is non-existent, and I do not need to refute it. And you use existence and non-existence to refute the establishment of the house of refutation, without asking me. If I establish a method of refutation, I can accept your questions. I do not establish a method of refutation, so I do not accept your questions. It is like what is said in the 'Suspended Construction Blame' of the Dvadasanikaya Sastra (Twelve Gates Treatise). And you ask whether there is a method of refutation or no method of refutation, now I will ask you back with existence and non-existence. Do you have something to be refuted or nothing to be refuted? If there is something to be refuted, why could it not be found before? If there is nothing to be refuted, then only you are to be refuted. Since what is to be refuted...

無誰問能破。又能破若有還是汝有。能破若無還是汝無。汝有所破所破既被破。能破是有還是所破。汝便無能破亦無所破。何所問耶。又上來實不成。今何有破。汝本不成。我何曾破。今忽問能破之有無。如人言汝以兔角刀斷我馬角。既失兔角。今問覓馬角也。又破如可破者。能破若有如可破有。能破若無如可破無。如是五門皆如可破。又破如可破者。汝計有破可破。皆是汝計。則皆是可破。故云破如可破。又本有物然後論破可破耳。未曾有物論何破可破耶。如空中華論何物破可破耶。問乃無法可破而汝破病則有病可破。乃無水可破而止水想則應有破。答汝言想水是無水想是有。故作是問。只汝水想還如想水。論何破可破耶。註釋為二。一序外情二答外難。汝著破故者。明外人上來實無可破而著可破。亦實無能破今著能破。即是罪重鈍根也。又釋。明外道有四癡。一者是無立謂立是一癡。二者此品復無破謂有破是二癡。二者復將有無二破欲破此破是三癡。四者此三並是外道自謂。而今安置論主上。此是四癡也。此四癡並各反擲答。次天親還用外道二難即為論主雙答。此是不動尺兵寸刀而令外軍土崩瓦解。現在註文。以有無法欲破是破。明外人自計有破。復自將有無還破外破。是為失中之失。倒中起倒。竟不關我。汝不

知耶下第二答外難。始終有六轉意。初縱有能破答。明破義既成則一切皆空。所以然者。既稱為破則能破所破一切皆破。則一切皆空。以破是空之異名故也。是破若有者第二句。外人即云。若破成者便有此破。則著我有難。是故今明。此破若有則已墮可破中。云何更問有耶。是破若無者第三意。外人即云。若能破墮可破中便無能破。則著我無難。是故今明。能破既無則所破亦無。則無外無內。誰欲難耶。如說無第二頭者第四意。外云。若言能破所破皆悉無者。汝上來何故破我神耶。乃至破我法耶。既破我人法。則知有人法可破。便有能破。云何言破可破相與俱無。是故今明。如說無第二頭。不以破故便言有頭。第二頭本來自無。汝神法亦爾。不以破故便有神法。神法本來無。既本來無所破何有能破。如人言無者第五意。外人云。若第二頭本來無者能破亦本來無。若爾則不應言無。今遂言無即有能無之無。以無前物。若爾即有諸法可無復有能無之無。是故有能破可破也。故今明。如人言無此是實無。以無能無所故名為無。非是將一無以無前物。破可破亦如是者第六總答合上義。外曰應有諸法執此彼故。上來一番破外人謂論主用空破有。今第二破外人謂論主用有破有。前問次答。問有二。應有諸法此立所破也。執此彼故立

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本知耶下第二答外難。始終有六轉意。最初，假設對方有能力反駁，以此來回答。闡明一旦『破』（否定）的意義成立，那麼一切皆空。之所以這樣說，是因為既然稱之為『破』，那麼能破（施加否定的一方）和所破（被否定的一方）都會被否定，那麼一切皆空。因為『破』是『空』的另一種說法。如果『破』是存在的，這是第二層意思。對方會說，如果『破』成立，那麼就存在這個『破』，這樣就落入了『我』（自我）的執著之中，這是個難題。因此現在闡明，如果這個『破』是存在的，那麼它就已經落入了可被破的範疇之中，為什麼還要問它是否存在呢？如果『破』是不存在的，這是第三層意思。對方會說，如果能破落入了可被破的範疇之中，那麼就沒有能破了，這樣就落入了『我』不存在的執著之中，這也是個難題。因此現在闡明，既然能破不存在，那麼所破也不存在，那麼就沒有外也沒有內，誰還會提出疑問呢？就像說沒有第二個頭一樣，這是第四層意思。對方會說，如果說能破和所破都不存在，那麼你之前為什麼要否定我的『神』（精神）呢？甚至否定我的『法』（事物）呢？既然否定了我和法，那麼就知道有我和法可以被否定，那麼就存在能破。為什麼說『破』和『可破』相互之間都不存在呢？因此現在闡明，就像說沒有第二個頭一樣，不能因為否定了它就說存在頭。第二個頭本來就不存在，你的神和法也是如此，不能因為否定了它就說存在神和法。神和法本來就不存在，既然本來就沒有所破，哪裡來的能破呢？就像人說『無』一樣，這是第五層意思。對方會說，如果第二個頭本來就不存在，那麼能破也本來就不存在。如果是這樣，那麼就不應該說『無』。現在卻說了『無』，那麼就存在能使事物不存在的『無』。因為否定了之前的存在。如果是這樣，那麼就存在可以被否定的諸法，也存在能使之不存在的『無』。所以存在能破和可破。因此現在闡明，就像人說『無』，這才是真正的『無』。因為沒有能使之不存在的原因，也沒有被否定的對象，所以稱之為『無』。而不是用一個『無』來否定之前的存在。否定可破也是如此，這是第六層意思，總結並結合了上面的意思。對方說，應該存在諸法，因為執著於此和彼。上面一番辯論是對方認為論主用空來否定有。現在第二番辯論是對方認為論主用有來否定有。前面是提問，後面是回答。提問有兩個方面。『應該存在諸法』，這是確立所要否定的對象。『執著於此彼』，這是確立... （神：精神，法：事物）

【English Translation】 English version The second answer to external difficulties in Zhi Ye Xia. There are six shifts in meaning from beginning to end. Initially, it responds by conceding the opponent's ability to refute, clarifying that once the meaning of 'destruction' (negation) is established, everything is empty. The reason for this is that since it is called 'destruction,' both the destroyer (the one who negates) and the destroyed (the one being negated) are destroyed, then everything is empty. Because 'destruction' is another term for 'emptiness.' If 'destruction' exists, this is the second meaning. The opponent will say, if 'destruction' is established, then this 'destruction' exists, thus falling into the attachment of 'I' (self), which is a difficulty. Therefore, it is now clarified that if this 'destruction' exists, then it has already fallen into the category of being destructible. Why ask if it exists again? If 'destruction' does not exist, this is the third meaning. The opponent will say, if the destroyer falls into the category of being destructible, then there is no destroyer, thus falling into the attachment of 'I' does not exist,' which is also a difficulty. Therefore, it is now clarified that since the destroyer does not exist, then the destroyed also does not exist, then there is no outside and no inside. Who would raise questions? It's like saying there is no second head, this is the fourth meaning. The opponent will say, if you say that both the destroyer and the destroyed do not exist, then why did you previously negate my 'spirit' (神) (shen, mind/spirit)? Even negate my 'dharma' (法) (fa, phenomena/things)? Since you negated me and the dharma, then you know that there are me and dharma that can be negated, then there exists a destroyer. Why say that 'destruction' and 'destructible' do not exist together? Therefore, it is now clarified that just like saying there is no second head, one cannot say that there is a head because it was negated. The second head originally did not exist, your spirit and dharma are also like this, one cannot say that there is spirit and dharma because it was negated. Spirit and dharma originally did not exist, since there is originally nothing to be destroyed, where does the destroyer come from? It's like a person saying 'nothingness,' this is the fifth meaning. The opponent will say, if the second head originally did not exist, then the destroyer also originally did not exist. If that is the case, then one should not say 'nothingness.' Now you say 'nothingness,' then there exists a 'nothingness' that can make things not exist. Because it negates the previous existence. If that is the case, then there exist dharmas that can be negated, and there exists a 'nothingness' that can make them not exist. Therefore, there exist a destroyer and a destructible. Therefore, it is now clarified that just like a person saying 'nothingness,' this is true 'nothingness.' Because there is no cause to make it not exist, and there is no object to be negated, so it is called 'nothingness.' It is not using a 'nothingness' to negate the previous existence. Negating the destructible is also like this, this is the sixth meaning, summarizing and combining the above meanings. The opponent says, there should exist dharmas, because of attachment to this and that. The above debate is the opponent thinking that the debater uses emptiness to negate existence. Now the second debate is the opponent thinking that the debater uses existence to negate existence. The former is a question, the latter is an answer. There are two aspects to the question. 'There should exist dharmas,' this is establishing the object to be negated. 'Attachment to this and that,' this is establishing...

能破也。我謂汝以空破有。汝遂言無空。是為上來用有破有。又我言汝用汝義破我。汝遂言無汝義以破於我。若爾應還用我義破我義。如是有得無得內外等亦類然。又有二破。一就緣假。謂就外覓外無從。即初問答也。二對緣假。即今文是也。問何故不言執一破異執異破一。而言執此彼耶。答一異語局彼此語該。此常彼無常此生死彼涅槃。如是一切也。注中但偏計一異。以一異是彼大宗故。內曰一非所執異亦爾。上明不以空破有汝自謂空。今不以有破有亦出汝謂情。上不以正破邪。今不以邪破邪。又我就汝覓一異不得。何所執耶。又我若執一則同僧佉。執異便同衛世。執亦一亦異同勒沙婆。執不一不異同若提子。非是四師故無所執。又提婆不與四師同故言不一。不與四師異故言不異。求四師得可論同異。求竟無從。云何同異。又本無一異。妄見一異。我上來欲止妄情故借妄破妄。實無妄可借亦無妄可破。問若言借妄破妄者。誰借妄耶。若有能借必有所借。答若作此問應云借如所借。由汝故謂汝義為所借。謂我為能借。並出汝之謂情。我未曾有能借。問若爾上何得言借。答心生於有心。像出於有像。借見於有借。註釋為二。前釋內通。複次下教作難。若有人言汝無所執者。假設有人明他無執也。我執一異法者。彼自立一

{ "translations": [ "能破斥。我說我用空性來破斥有，你卻說沒有空性。這是用有來破斥有。我又說你用你的義理來破斥我，你卻說沒有你的義理來破斥我。如果這樣，就應該反過來用我的義理來破斥我的義理。像這樣，有得無得、內外等等也是同樣的道理。又有兩種破斥，一是就緣假（依託因緣和合而成的假象）而言，即就外境尋求外境而不可得，就是最初的問答。二是針對緣假，就是現在這段經文所說的。問：為什麼不說執著於一破斥執著于異，執著于異破斥執著於一，而說執著於此彼呢？答：一異的範圍侷限，此彼的範圍廣泛。此可以指常，彼可以指無常；此可以指生死，彼可以指涅槃。像這樣，指代一切。註釋中只偏重於一異，因為一異是他們（指外道）的主要宗義。內道說一不是所執著的，異也是一樣。上面說明不以空破有，是你自己認為有空性。現在說不以有破有，也是爲了破除你的情執。上面不以正破邪，現在不以邪破邪。我又在你那裡尋求一異而不可得，你執著什麼呢？我又如果我執著於一，就和僧佉派相同；執著于異，就和衛世派相同；執著于亦一亦異，就和勒沙婆派相同；執著于非一非異，就和若提子派相同。我不是這四種外道，所以沒有什麼可以執著的。又提婆（Deva）不與四師相同，所以說不一；不與四師相異，所以說不異。尋求四師的觀點，可以討論相同和相異。尋求最終無所得，怎麼能說相同或相異呢？又本來就沒有一異，是虛妄地看到了一異。我上面想要止息虛妄的情執，所以借用虛妄來破斥虛妄，實際上沒有虛妄可以借用，也沒有虛妄可以破斥。問：如果說借用虛妄來破斥虛妄，是誰借用虛妄呢？如果有能借用的，必定有所借用的。答：如果這樣問，應該說借用就像所借用的。因為你的緣故，認為你的義理是所借用的，認為我是能借用的。這都是你的情執。我從來沒有能借用的想法。問：如果這樣，上面怎麼能說借用呢？答：心生於有心，像出於有像，借見於有借。註釋分為兩部分。前面解釋內通。下面教人如何發難。如果有人說你沒有什麼執著，這是假設有人說明他人沒有執著。我執著於一異法，這是他自己立一", "現代漢語譯本：能破斥。我說我用空性來破斥有，你卻說沒有空性。這是用有來破斥有。我又說你用你的義理來破斥我，你卻說沒有你的義理來破斥我。如果這樣，就應該反過來用我的義理來破斥我的義理。像這樣，有得無得、內外等等也是同樣的道理。又有兩種破斥，一是就緣假（依託因緣和合而成的假象）而言，即就外境尋求外境而不可得，就是最初的問答。二是針對緣假，就是現在這段經文所說的。問：為什麼不說執著於一破斥執著于異，執著于異破斥執著於一，而說執著於此彼呢？答：一異的範圍侷限，此彼的範圍廣泛。此可以指常，彼可以指無常；此可以指生死，彼可以指涅槃。像這樣，指代一切。註釋中只偏重於一異，因為一異是他們（指外道）的主要宗義。內道說一不是所執著的，異也是一樣。上面說明不以空破有，是你自己認為有空性。現在說不以有破有，也是爲了破除你的情執。上面不以正破邪，現在不以邪破邪。我又在你那裡尋求一異而不可得，你執著什麼呢？我又如果我執著於一，就和僧佉派相同；執著于異，就和衛世派相同；執著于亦一亦異，就和勒沙婆派相同；執著于非一非異，就和若提子派相同。我不是這四種外道，所以沒有什麼可以執著的。又提婆（Deva）不與四師相同，所以說不一；不與四師相異，所以說不異。尋求四師的觀點，可以討論相同和相異。尋求最終無所得，怎麼能說相同或相異呢？又本來就沒有一異，是虛妄地看到了一異。我上面想要止息虛妄的情執，所以借用虛妄來破斥虛妄，實際上沒有虛妄可以借用，也沒有虛妄可以破斥。問：如果說借用虛妄來破斥虛妄，是誰借用虛妄呢？如果有能借用的，必定有所借用的。答：如果這樣問，應該說借用就像所借用的。因為你的緣故，認為你的義理是所借用的，認為我是能借用的。這都是你的情執。我從來沒有能借用的想法。問：如果這樣，上面怎麼能說借用呢？答：心生於有心，像出於有像，借見於有借。註釋分為兩部分。前面解釋內通。下面教人如何發難。如果有人說你沒有什麼執著，這是假設有人說明他人沒有執著。我執著於一異法，這是他自己立一" ], "english_translations": [ 'It can be refuted. I said I use emptiness to refute existence, but you say there is no emptiness. This is using existence to refute existence. I also said you use your meaning to refute me, but you say there is no your meaning to refute me. If so, it should be reversed to use my meaning to refute my meaning. Like this, gain and no gain, inside and outside, etc., are the same principle. There are also two kinds of refutation, one is based on conditioned fabrication (the illusion formed by relying on the aggregation of causes and conditions), that is, seeking the external realm from the external realm and not being able to obtain it, which is the initial question and answer. The second is directed at conditioned fabrication, which is what this passage is saying now. Question: Why not say clinging to one refutes clinging to different, clinging to different refutes clinging to one, but say clinging to this and that? Answer: The scope of one and different is limited, and the scope of this and that is broad. This can refer to permanence, and that can refer to impermanence; this can refer to birth and death, and that can refer to Nirvana. Like this, it refers to everything. The commentary only focuses on one and different, because one and different are their (referring to externalists) main tenets. The inner path says that one is not what is clung to, and different is the same. The above explains not using emptiness to refute existence, but you yourself think there is emptiness. Now saying not using existence to refute existence is also to eliminate your emotional attachments. The above does not use the correct to refute the wrong, and now does not use the wrong to refute the wrong. I also seek one and different from you and cannot obtain it, what do you cling to? Also, if I cling to one, I am the same as the Samkhya school; clinging to different, I am the same as the Vaisheshika school; clinging to both one and different, I am the same as the Nirgrantha school; clinging to neither one nor different, I am the same as the Ajivika school. I am not these four external paths, so there is nothing to cling to. Also, Deva (提婆) is not the same as the four teachers, so he says not one; not different from the four teachers, so he says not different. Seeking the views of the four teachers, one can discuss the same and the different. Seeking ultimately without obtaining, how can one say the same or the different? Also, there is originally no one and different, it is falsely seeing one and different. I above wanted to stop false emotional attachments, so I borrowed falsehood to refute falsehood, but in reality there is no falsehood to borrow, and there is no falsehood to refute. Question: If you say borrowing falsehood to refute falsehood, who is borrowing falsehood? If there is something that can be borrowed, there must be something that is borrowed. Answer: If you ask this way, you should say borrowing is like what is borrowed. Because of you, you think your meaning is what is borrowed, and you think I am the one who borrows. These are all your emotional attachments. I have never had the idea of being able to borrow. Question: If so, how can you say borrowing above? Answer: The mind arises from the mind of existence, the image comes from the image of existence, borrowing is seen in borrowing. The commentary is divided into two parts. The previous explanation is internally consistent. The following teaches how to make things difficult. If someone says you have nothing to cling to, this is assuming someone is explaining that others have nothing to cling to. I cling to the Dharma of one and different, this is he himself establishing one", "English version: It can be refuted. I said I use emptiness to refute existence, but you say there is no emptiness. This is using existence to refute existence. I also said you use your meaning to refute me, but you say there is no your meaning to refute me. If so, it should be reversed to use my meaning to refute my meaning. Like this, gain and no gain, inside and outside, etc., are the same principle. There are also two kinds of refutation, one is based on conditioned fabrication (the illusion formed by relying on the aggregation of causes and conditions), that is, seeking the external realm from the external realm and not being able to obtain it, which is the initial question and answer. The second is directed at conditioned fabrication, which is what this passage is saying now. Question: Why not say clinging to one refutes clinging to different, clinging to different refutes clinging to one, but say clinging to this and that? Answer: The scope of one and different is limited, and the scope of this and that is broad. This can refer to permanence, and that can refer to impermanence; this can refer to birth and death, and that can refer to Nirvana. Like this, it refers to everything. The commentary only focuses on one and different, because one and different are their (referring to externalists) main tenets. The inner path says that one is not what is clung to, and different is the same. The above explains not using emptiness to refute existence, but you yourself think there is emptiness. Now saying not using existence to refute existence is also to eliminate your emotional attachments. The above does not use the correct to refute the wrong, and now does not use the wrong to refute the wrong. I also seek one and different from you and cannot obtain it, what do you cling to? Also, if I cling to one, I am the same as the Samkhya school; clinging to different, I am the same as the Vaisheshika school; clinging to both one and different, I am the same as the Nirgrantha school; clinging to neither one nor different, I am the same as the Ajivika school. I am not these four external paths, so there is nothing to cling to. Also, Deva (提婆) is not the same as the four teachers, so he says not one; not different from the four teachers, so he says not different. Seeking the views of the four teachers, one can discuss the same and the different. Seeking ultimately without obtaining, how can one say the same or the different? Also, there is originally no one and different, it is falsely seeing one and different. I above wanted to stop false emotional attachments, so I borrowed falsehood to refute falsehood, but in reality there is no falsehood to borrow, and there is no falsehood to refute. Question: If you say borrowing falsehood to refute falsehood, who is borrowing falsehood? If there is something that can be borrowed, there must be something that is borrowed. Answer: If you ask this way, you should say borrowing is like what is borrowed. Because of you, you think your meaning is what is borrowed, and you think I am the one who borrows. These are all your emotional attachments. I have never had the idea of being able to borrow. Question: If so, how can you say borrowing above? Answer: The mind arises from the mind of existence, the image comes from the image of existence, borrowing is seen in borrowing. The commentary is divided into two parts. The previous explanation is internally consistent. The following teaches how to make things difficult. If someone says you have nothing to cling to, this is assuming someone is explaining that others have nothing to cling to. I cling to the Dharma of one and different, this is he himself establishing one" ] }

異也。若有此問應如是破者。應將一異破有執家也。此意欲明論主不執一異故不應將一異難論主。若餘人執一異。可用一異以破之耳。又釋。若有人言汝無所執。我執一異假設。外問內言。汝無所執耶。內言。我無所執。外言。恐汝執法破我。汝若無執我自執一異。何懼汝破我耶。若有是問應如是破者。教內答外也。我雖無執非不借一異以破于汝。汝寧得無懼。外曰破他法故汝是破法人。自上已來第一破外人謂有能破。今第二破外人謂論主是破法人。問意云。從論初已來破于所破。品初二番復破能破。是則破能破所。觸法斯無。破法無道。故是破法人。又爾前破所破明無外邪義。品初已來破于能破則破內正義。若邪若正有得無得一切皆破。故名破法罪人。內曰汝破法人。明如我懷中無破可破故非破人。汝執法執破故汝是破人。又汝作此執破于實相。若破實相三寶四諦一切皆破。故是破人。我無所執與實相相應故不破實相。則一切不破故非破人。又汝欲自成破他故是破人。我不自成又不破汝故我非破法人。汝義本成可言我破名破法人。汝義本不成。本不成是汝不成故汝是破法人。又諸法非破不破。汝見破不破故汝是破人。我不見破不破亦非見不見故非破人。外曰破他法故自法成。論主上云成己破他名為破人。我無所成故

【現代漢語翻譯】異議在於，如果有人這樣提問，應該這樣駁斥：應該用『一』和『異』來駁斥那些執著于『有』的宗派。這意思是說，論主（指提出論點的人）並不執著于『一』或『異』，所以不應該用『一』和『異』來為難論主。如果其他人執著于『一』或『異』，就可以用『一』和『異』來駁斥他們。另一種解釋是：如果有人說你沒有任何執著，而我執著于『一』和『異』的假設。外方提問，內方回答。外方問：你沒有任何執著嗎？內方答：我沒有任何執著。外方說：恐怕你用法來破斥我。如果你沒有執著，而我執著于『一』和『異』，我有什麼好害怕你破斥我的呢？如果有人這樣提問，應該這樣駁斥：這是內方教導外方。我雖然沒有執著，但並非不能借用『一』和『異』來破斥你。你難道能不害怕嗎？外方說：因為你破斥他人的法，所以你是破法人（指破壞佛法的人）。從上面開始，第一是駁斥外人認為自己有能力破斥。現在第二是駁斥外人認為論主是破法人。提問的意思是：從論述開始以來，破斥所要破斥的。在品（章節）的開頭兩次反過來破斥能破斥的。這樣就破斥了能破斥的和所要破斥的。接觸到的法都消滅了。破斥法是沒有道理的。所以是破法人。還有，之前破斥所要破斥的，是爲了說明沒有外道的邪義。從品（章節）的開頭以來，破斥能破斥的，就是破斥了內道的正義。無論是邪是正，有得無得，一切都破斥。所以被稱為破法罪人。內方說：你說我是破法人，說明我心中沒有可以破斥的東西，所以不是破人。你執著於法，執著于破斥，所以你是破人。還有，你這樣做執著，破斥了實相（指事物的真實面貌）。如果破斥了實相，三寶（佛、法、僧）和四諦（苦、集、滅、道）一切都破斥了。所以是破人。我沒有執著，與實相相應，所以不破斥實相。那麼一切都不破斥，所以不是破人。還有，你想要成就自己，破斥他人，所以是破人。我不成就自己，也不破斥你，所以我不是破法人。你的義理本來就成立，可以說我破斥，名為破法人。你的義理本來就不成立。本來不成立是你的不成立，所以你是破法人。還有，諸法（一切事物）非破斥也非不破斥。你見到破斥和不破斥，所以你是破人。我沒有見到破斥和不破斥，也不是見到或不見到，所以不是破人。外方說：因為破斥他人的法，所以自己的法才能成立。論主上面說成就自己，破斥他人，名為破人。我沒有什麼可以成就的，所以

【English Translation】 The difference lies in this: if someone asks such a question, it should be refuted in this way: one should use 'one' and 'different' to refute those sects that cling to 'existence'. The meaning here is that the debater (referring to the person who proposes the argument) does not cling to 'one' or 'different', so one should not use 'one' and 'different' to make things difficult for the debater. If others cling to 'one' or 'different', then one can use 'one' and 'different' to refute them. Another explanation is: if someone says you have no attachments, and I cling to the assumption of 'one' and 'different'. The external party asks, and the internal party answers. The external party asks: Do you have no attachments? The internal party answers: I have no attachments. The external party says: I am afraid you will use the Dharma (law) to refute me. If you have no attachments, and I cling to 'one' and 'different', what do I have to fear from your refutation? If someone asks such a question, it should be refuted in this way: this is the internal party teaching the external party. Although I have no attachments, it does not mean that I cannot borrow 'one' and 'different' to refute you. Can you not be afraid? The external party says: Because you refute the Dharma (law) of others, you are a Dharma destroyer (referring to a person who destroys the Buddha's teachings). From the beginning, the first is to refute the external person who thinks he has the ability to refute. Now the second is to refute the external person who thinks the debater is a Dharma destroyer. The meaning of the question is: from the beginning of the discussion, refute what is to be refuted. At the beginning of the chapter, refute the refuter twice in reverse. In this way, the refuter and what is to be refuted are refuted. The Dharmas (laws) that are touched are all eliminated. Refuting the Dharma (law) is unreasonable. Therefore, he is a Dharma destroyer. Also, before, refuting what is to be refuted is to explain that there is no heretical meaning of external paths. From the beginning of the chapter, refuting the refuter is to refute the correct meaning of the internal path. Whether it is heretical or correct, whether there is gain or no gain, everything is refuted. Therefore, he is called a Dharma-destroying sinner. The internal party says: You say that I am a Dharma destroyer, which means that there is nothing in my heart that can be refuted, so I am not a destroyer. You cling to the Dharma (law), cling to refutation, so you are a destroyer. Also, you cling to this and refute the 'real aspect' (指事物的真實面貌, referring to the true appearance of things). If you refute the 'real aspect', the Three Jewels (佛、法、僧, Buddha, Dharma, Sangha) and the Four Noble Truths (苦、集、滅、道, suffering, accumulation, cessation, path) are all refuted. So you are a destroyer. I have no attachments and correspond to the 'real aspect', so I do not refute the 'real aspect'. Then everything is not refuted, so I am not a destroyer. Also, you want to achieve yourself and refute others, so you are a destroyer. I do not achieve myself and do not refute you, so I am not a Dharma destroyer. Your righteousness is originally established, and it can be said that I refute it, and it is called a Dharma destroyer. Your righteousness is not originally established. The original non-establishment is your non-establishment, so you are a Dharma destroyer. Also, all Dharmas (一切事物, all things) are neither refuted nor not refuted. You see refutation and non-refutation, so you are a destroyer. I have not seen refutation and non-refutation, nor have I seen or not seen, so I am not a destroyer. The external party says: Because you refute the Dharma (law) of others, your own Dharma (law) can be established. The debater said above that achieving oneself and refuting others is called a destroyer. I have nothing to achieve, so

非破人。外今問內。夫勝必對負屈必對申。我既墮負汝則應勝。我義既破汝義自成。汝既破他自成故是破人。我但被破不成故非破人也。汝破他乃不言汝義成。但他法若壞汝法道理自成。又汝口破他義而心成汝義。若心不自成汝義何故口破他耶。又上來三問答明論主有破論主悉云無破。外今云。若無破則有成。此是對無明有。問上云內無破則外有立與今何異。答上是內無破外有立。今是內若無破內則有立。故與上異。又並他破自不成應闇破明不成。明不成闇何猶破。解若不生惑何由滅。又外人回過還論主。論主上云汝是破人。汝既詺我為破法人。我則為非。汝理數是。則自是非他。是非心生故汝是破法人也。我見汝破他故還述汝所說。我云何是破法人也。又汝從來明因緣義。言無則召有言有則召無。汝既言無成則召成言不破則召破。若言無成不召成。言不破不召破。復墮自性之失。又汝破為有所申為無所申。若無所申應無所敬。那敬三寶。若有所申則有所成。內曰成破不一故。此中始末有三種答。此第一。汝若言汝義既破我義即成。成破便一。勝負屈申應是一。而成破不一。何得言汝義既破我即成。故外人反滯論主成破一難。而論主復離自執之失。成破若一則有四過。一俱是破。二俱是成。三成破若一而成是成破非成

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本非破人：現在我從內部提問。如果勝訴必然對應敗訴，冤屈必然對應申訴。我已經處於敗訴的境地，那麼你就應該勝訴。我的義理已經被駁倒，你的義理自然成立。你駁倒了他人，你的義理自然成立，所以你是在駁倒他人。我只是被駁倒，我的義理沒有成立，所以我不是在駁倒他人。你駁倒他人，卻不承認你的義理成立。如果他人的法被破壞，你的法理自然成立。而且你口頭上駁倒他人的義理，心裡卻成就了自己的義理。如果你的內心沒有成就自己的義理，你又為何要口頭上駁倒他人呢？前面三次問答，論主都說沒有被駁倒。現在外人說：如果沒有被駁倒，那就意味著有所成就。這是針對無明而說有。問：前面說內部沒有被駁倒，外部就有成立，這和現在說的有什麼不同？答：前面說的是內部沒有被駁倒，外部就有成立；現在說的是內部如果沒有被駁倒，內部就有成立。所以和前面說的不同。而且，駁倒他人，自己的義理也不能成立，應該像黑暗不能駁倒光明一樣。光明不能成立，黑暗又如何駁倒呢？解釋：如果不產生迷惑，又如何滅除呢？外人反過來指責論主。論主前面說：『你是駁倒他人的人。』你既然稱我為駁倒佛法的人，我就成了非。你的道理是正確的，那麼你就是在否定他人，肯定自己。因為產生了是非之心，所以你才是駁倒佛法的人。我看到你駁倒他人，所以才反述你所說的話，我怎麼會是駁倒佛法的人呢？而且你向來闡明因緣的道理，說『無』就會召感『有』，說『有』就會召感『無』。你既然說沒有成就，那就應該召感成就；說沒有駁倒，那就應該召感駁倒。如果說沒有成就，卻不召感成就；說沒有駁倒，卻不召感駁倒，那就又陷入了自性的過失。你駁倒他人是爲了有所申訴，還是爲了無所申訴？如果無所申訴，那就不應該有所敬畏，那又為何要敬畏三寶（Buddha, Dharma, Sangha）呢？如果有所申訴，那就有所成就。內部說：成就和駁倒不是一回事。所以，從始至終有三種回答。這是第一種。如果你說你的義理被駁倒，我的義理就成立，那麼成就和駁倒就成了一回事。勝訴、敗訴、冤屈、申訴應該是一回事。但是成就和駁倒不是一回事，怎麼能說你的義理被駁倒，我的義理就成立呢？所以外人反過來抓住論主成就和駁倒是一回事的錯誤，而論主又擺脫了執著于自己的義理的過失。如果成就和駁倒是一回事，就會有四種過失：一、都是駁倒；二、都是成就；三、成就和駁倒如果是一回事，那麼成就就是成就，駁倒就不是成就。

【English Translation】 English version Not a Subverter of Others: Now I question from within. If winning necessarily corresponds to losing, and injustice necessarily corresponds to appeal. Since I am already in a state of losing, then you should be winning. My doctrine has been refuted, so your doctrine naturally becomes established. You refute others, and your doctrine naturally becomes established, so you are subverting others. I am only being refuted, and my doctrine has not become established, so I am not subverting others. You refute others, but do not admit that your doctrine is established. If the Dharma (teachings) of others is destroyed, your Dharma naturally becomes established. Moreover, you verbally refute the doctrines of others, but in your heart, you establish your own doctrine. If your heart has not established your own doctrine, then why do you verbally refute others? In the previous three questions and answers, the debater (論主) always said that he had not been refuted. Now the outsider says: If there is no refutation, then it means there is accomplishment. This is speaking of existence in relation to ignorance. Question: The previous statement that if there is no refutation internally, then there is establishment externally, how is this different from what is being said now? Answer: The previous statement was that if there is no refutation internally, then there is establishment externally; the current statement is that if there is no refutation internally, then there is establishment internally. Therefore, it is different from the previous statement. Moreover, refuting others does not mean that one's own doctrine is established; it should be like darkness not being able to refute light. If light cannot be established, then how can darkness refute it? Explanation: If delusion does not arise, then how can it be extinguished? The outsider turns around and accuses the debater. The debater previously said: 'You are a subverter of others.' Since you call me a subverter of the Buddha's teachings, then I become a non-believer. Your reasoning is correct, then you are negating others and affirming yourself. Because a mind of right and wrong arises, therefore you are a subverter of the Buddha's teachings. I see you refuting others, so I am restating what you said. How can I be a subverter of the Buddha's teachings? Moreover, you have always explained the principle of dependent origination (因緣), saying that 'non-existence' will summon 'existence,' and 'existence' will summon 'non-existence.' Since you say there is no accomplishment, then you should summon accomplishment; if you say there is no refutation, then you should summon refutation. If you say there is no accomplishment but do not summon accomplishment; if you say there is no refutation but do not summon refutation, then you fall into the fault of self-nature (自性). Do you refute others in order to have something to appeal to, or in order to have nothing to appeal to? If there is nothing to appeal to, then you should have no reverence, so why do you revere the Three Jewels (三寶) (Buddha, Dharma, Sangha)? If there is something to appeal to, then there is accomplishment. The insider says: Accomplishment and refutation are not the same thing. Therefore, from beginning to end, there are three kinds of answers. This is the first kind. If you say that your doctrine is refuted and my doctrine is established, then accomplishment and refutation become the same thing. Winning, losing, injustice, and appeal should be the same thing. But accomplishment and refutation are not the same thing, so how can you say that your doctrine is refuted and my doctrine is established? Therefore, the outsider turns around and seizes upon the debater's mistake that accomplishment and refutation are the same thing, while the debater escapes the fault of clinging to his own doctrine. If accomplishment and refutation are the same thing, there will be four faults: 1. Both are refutation; 2. Both are accomplishment; 3. If accomplishment and refutation are the same thing, then accomplishment is accomplishment, and refutation is not accomplishment.

者。亦應破是成而成非成。四有成有破則非一也。又次第答上諸難。汝初云他義若破自理數成者。則成破是一。汝立成破一義者。汝破我即破。云何汝破我成。我成汝即成。云何我成汝破。又現見一物。成時無破破時無成。云何言破即成。汝言惑壞解即成。則惑壞是解成。猶著成破一難。若言惑自壞解即成如闇滅有燈生者。則成壞是異。云何汝壞我即成耶。又現見闇滅燈成。今未曾有。汝義壞何時有我義成。又闇滅燈成。上亦破無。云何更引。汝上云我既無破應當有立者。在破既無。何有立耶。又破不有則不無立。不無則不有。何所待耶。汝上難云。若有所申則有所成。若無所申應無所敬者。正由一無所成故無能申耳。又亦得例答之。本對邪故有申正。而未曾有邪可破。何曾有正可申。余難並漏上諸答通之。複次成有畏第二重顯成破不一。成則有畏破則無畏。畏無畏殊故知成破不一。問此明何義。答斥外道也。汝上來欲成於法不能成。是故怖畏不復敢立。於我法不畏故欲破我。故知成破不一。故用此言以譏外道。非是論主成法有畏破無畏也。若破他法下第三天親義生違言破也。外曰說他執過自執成。問此與上破他法故自法成何異。答前成為成立。今成為成破。是故異。汝乃言成破不一。故不自立法而終破他。若爾終應

為成此破。若成此破則是自成法也。又更一義。汝乃言成破不一不言無有成破。若爾終有成破。若汝不成法則不破他。既破他。終為成立也。內曰破他法故自法成一切不成。外謂內為成於破。內今一往許之。破他法故則破義成。此破若成則一切不成。所以然者。夫論破者。自他一切皆破故名為破。此破若成則自他內外一切不成。既稱一切不成。我義在一切內。我云何獨成耶。此破即是畢竟空之異名。故一切無成。又如以我不平破汝不平。令汝得平則是我平。故一切平也。又一義。夫破他明他不成者。即是自不成也。我以汝為他。汝又以我為他。故一切皆他。既云他不成則一切不成也。此是勢破非正文意。又此就相待門破。破他法故自法成者。明他立被破則破義成也。所以須成此破者。正為外道有所得大小乘人有立病故也。一切不成者。本待立故有破。立既不成無立可待。故無有破。故云一切不成。此正當文意也。外曰不然世間相違故。汝若言成破並空一切不成者。與世間相違。誰信此法。以內外唯有二義。一成二破。成者立己義破者破他義。如僧佉成一破異等。成實成空破毗曇有。大乘成大破小。又成己正破他邪。汝無成破。則與一切相違。誰信此法。內曰是法世間信。答此一問多種形勢。有時云道與俗反。豈為俗信

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本爲了成就這種破斥。如果成就了這種破斥，那就是自我的法得以成立。還有另一種意義。你說成就和破斥不是一也不是沒有，如果這樣，最終還是有成就和破斥。如果你不能成就你的法，那就不能破斥他人。既然破斥他人，最終還是爲了成立（自己的法）。內方說因為破斥他人的法，所以自己的法得以成立，一切都不能成立。外方認為內方是成就了破斥。內方現在暫且允許這種說法。因為破斥他人的法，所以破斥的意義得以成立。這種破斥如果成立，那麼一切都不能成立。為什麼這樣說呢？因為所說的破斥，是自己、他人一切都破斥，所以才叫做破斥。這種破斥如果成立，那麼自己、他人、內外一切都不能成立。既然說一切都不能成立，我的意義就在一切之內，我怎麼能獨自成立呢？這種破斥就是畢竟空的另一種說法，所以一切都不能成立。又比如用我的不平來破斥你的不平，使你得到平等，那就是我的平等，所以一切都是平等的。又有一種意義。破斥他人，說明他人不能成立，也就是自己也不能成立。我以你為他人，你又以我為他人，所以一切都是他人。既然說他人不能成立，那麼一切都不能成立。這是一種趨勢上的破斥，不是正文的意義。這又是就相對待的方面來破斥。因為破斥他人的法，所以自己的法得以成立，說明他人的立論被破斥，那麼破斥的意義就得以成立。之所以必須成就這種破斥，正是因為外道有所得，小乘人有立論的毛病。一切都不能成立，本來是依賴於立論才有破斥。立論既然不能成立，就沒有立論可以依賴，所以就沒有破斥。所以說一切都不能成立。這正是符合文中的意義。外方說：不是這樣的，因為這與世間的常識相違背。如果你說成就和破斥都空，一切都不能成立，那麼就與世間的常識相違背，誰會相信這種法呢？因為內外只有兩種意義，一是成就，二是破斥。成就就是建立自己的義理，破斥就是破斥他人的義理。比如僧佉（Samkhya，數論派）成就一（自性）破異（變化），成實（Satyasiddhi，成實論）成就空破斥毗曇（Abhidharma，阿毗達摩）的有，大乘成就大破斥小。又是成就自己的正見，破斥他人的邪見。你沒有成就和破斥，那麼就與一切相違背，誰會相信這種法呢？內方說：這種法世間是相信的。回答這個問題有多種形式，有時說，道與世俗是相反的，難道是爲了世俗相信嗎？

【English Translation】 English version To accomplish this refutation. If this refutation is accomplished, then it is the self's Dharma that is established. There is another meaning. You say that accomplishment and refutation are neither one nor non-existent; if so, there will ultimately be accomplishment and refutation. If you cannot accomplish your Dharma, then you cannot refute others. Since you refute others, it is ultimately to establish (your own Dharma). The internal party says that because refuting others' Dharma, one's own Dharma is established, and nothing is established. The external party considers the internal party to have accomplished refutation. The internal party now tentatively allows this statement. Because refuting others' Dharma, the meaning of refutation is established. If this refutation is accomplished, then everything is not established. Why is this so? Because what is called refutation is the refutation of oneself, others, and everything, hence it is called refutation. If this refutation is accomplished, then oneself, others, inside and outside, everything is not established. Since it is said that everything is not established, my meaning is within everything; how can I be established alone? This refutation is another name for ultimate emptiness, so nothing is established. Furthermore, just as using my unevenness to refute your unevenness, causing you to attain equality, that is my equality, so everything is equal. There is another meaning. Refuting others, explaining that others cannot be established, is also that oneself cannot be established. I consider you as others, and you consider me as others, so everything is others. Since it is said that others cannot be established, then everything cannot be established. This is a refutation based on trend, not the meaning of the main text. This is again refuting from the aspect of relativity. Because refuting others' Dharma, one's own Dharma is established, explaining that others' establishment is refuted, then the meaning of refutation is established. The reason why it is necessary to accomplish this refutation is precisely because external paths have something to gain, and people of the Small Vehicle have the fault of establishing theories. Everything cannot be established, originally relying on establishment to have refutation. Since establishment cannot be established, there is no establishment to rely on, so there is no refutation. Therefore, it is said that everything cannot be established. This is precisely in accordance with the meaning of the text. The external party says: It is not so, because it contradicts worldly common sense. If you say that accomplishment and refutation are both empty, and everything cannot be established, then it contradicts worldly common sense; who would believe this Dharma? Because internally and externally there are only two meanings, one is accomplishment, and the other is refutation. Accomplishment is establishing one's own principles, and refutation is refuting others' principles. For example, Samkhya (數論派) accomplishes one (Prakriti, 自性) and refutes difference (Vikriti, 變化), Satyasiddhi (成實論) accomplishes emptiness and refutes the existence of Abhidharma (阿毗達摩), the Great Vehicle accomplishes the Great and refutes the Small. It is also accomplishing one's own correct view and refuting others' wrong views. If you have no accomplishment and refutation, then you contradict everything; who would believe this Dharma? The internal party says: This Dharma is believed by the world. There are many forms of answering this question; sometimes it is said that the path is contrary to the mundane, is it for the mundane to believe?

。信俗則不通道。通道則不信俗。如信波若則不信一切法。信一切法則不信波若。又答我所以與世間相違者。世間智淺見於有無見於破立。以如此見不見聖所見見聖所不見。不行聖所行行聖所不行。又答我不與世間同。亦無可與物異。何者是世人何者是我明同異耶。外即難云。即此不同不異便是反於世人。即答云。將何物反耶誰反耶反誰耶。而今論主不作余答明為世人信者。此是破不信以明信也。外謂論主此言無道理不可信。是故今明因緣生法宛然而畢竟空。雖畢竟空因緣宛然了了可信。故中論云。世間現見故世間眼見故。是故明世間信也。註釋為四。一明可信之法。二明不可信法。三結不可信。四結成可信。初如文。汝謂下第二齣不可信法明五家義。皆不可信。第一明僧佉義。又除梁椽下第二齣衛世義。或言因中有果下第三勒沙婆義。問何以知此是第三師義。答上已云乳中有酪出因中有果義竟。今更說者當知是第三師義。或言離因緣諸法生者第四無因外道義。其實空不應言說世事者第五邪見外道義。如邪見人撥無諸法。是人所執誰當信受第三結所不信。我法不爾第四結所信。外曰汝無所執是法成。上來百方求覓論主一毫之義不得。而內遂云我因緣法與世間同。若爾乃不執于自性遂執于因緣。則知有因緣義。為外之所

捉得。二者汝若言不執于性亦不執因緣都無所執。若爾汝畏於執遂守無執。此乃不執于執遂執于無執。則知有執也。三者汝若言無執者不與世同亦不與世異。遂不與世異而與世同。世間既執。汝亦應執。內曰無執不名執如無。答中有二。一法說二譬說。無執不名執者法說也。我明執無故云無執。言其無執者明其無有執。非謂有無執。故不執于執亦不執無執。如無者譬說也。如人口中言無物。其實無物。今言無執其實無執。非是口中言無物便有於物。亦非是無執便是于執。又執既無無執亦無。如對有所得故有無所得。有所得既無無得亦無。答上因緣問者有多種形勢。一者即用因緣答。明因緣生法即寂滅性故無軌跡處所。有所執著便非因緣。二者有時答云。本對性故有因緣。既無性亦無因緣。亦性亦因緣如是五句。外曰汝說無相法故是滅法人。汝言不執于執亦不執無執。則執無執一切滅名滅法人。問與上破法人何異。答上明破立俱破名破法人。今明不見破立無所執著復無此無執。深上一階。是故為異。內曰破滅法人是名滅法人者。當我懷中無滅不滅故非滅法人。我實非滅不滅無所執著。汝謂我有所滅欲破我者。汝是滅法人。文正爾也。又我明因緣法。因緣法即是中道亦是假名。汝今欲滅因緣法。即破于中假乃至三寶四諦因

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：抓住你了。如果你們說不執著于自性，也不執著于因緣，什麼都不執著。如果是這樣，你們因為害怕執著，就固守于不執著。這實際上是不執著于執著，反而執著于不執著。由此可知，你們還是有執著的。再者，如果你們說無執著的人既不與世俗相同，也不與世俗相異，結果是不與世俗相異，卻與世俗相同。既然世俗之人有執著，你們也應該有執著。你們內心說沒有執著，這不能叫做沒有執著，就像『無』一樣。回答中有兩種方式：一是法說，二是譬說。『無執不名執』是法說。我闡明執著是虛無的，所以說沒有執著。說沒有執著，是闡明沒有執著這件事，而不是說存在一個『無執著』。所以，不執著于執著，也不執著于無執著。『如無』是譬說。就像人口中說沒有東西，實際上確實沒有東西。現在說沒有執著，實際上確實沒有執著。不是口中說沒有東西，就真的有東西存在。也不是說沒有執著，就是一種執著。而且，執著既然不存在，無執著也就不存在。就像因為有『有所得』，所以才有『無所得』。『有所得』既然不存在，『無所得』也就不存在。回答上面關於因緣的提問，有多種形式。一是直接用因緣來回答，闡明因緣所生的法，其自性就是寂滅的，所以沒有軌跡和處所。如果有所執著，就不是因緣。二是，有時回答說，本來是針對自性，所以才有因緣。既然沒有自性，也就沒有因緣。或者說，既是自性，又是因緣，像這樣有五種說法。外道說：『你們說無相法，所以是滅法人。你們說不執著于執著，也不執著于無執著，這就是執著于無執著，一切都歸於滅，所以是滅法人。』這種提問與上面破斥滅法人有什麼不同？回答是：上面是闡明破斥和建立都破斥，這叫做破法人。現在是闡明不見破斥和建立，沒有什麼可以執著，甚至連這個『無執著』也沒有，比上面更深一層，所以是不同的。你們內心說：『破斥滅法人，這才是真正的滅法人。』當我的心中沒有滅，也沒有不滅，所以不是滅法人。我實際上既不是滅，也不是不滅，沒有什麼可以執著。你們認為我有什麼要滅的，想要破斥我，你們才是滅法人。』文句正是這個意思。而且，我闡明因緣法，因緣法就是中道，也是假名。你們現在想要滅掉因緣法，就是破斥中道、假名，乃至三寶、四諦。

【English Translation】 English version: You are caught. If you say you are not attached to inherent nature (性, xìng), nor to conditions (因緣, yīnyuán), and are attached to nothing at all. If that is the case, because you fear attachment, you cling to non-attachment. This is actually not being attached to attachment, but instead being attached to non-attachment. From this, it is known that you still have attachments. Furthermore, if you say that a person without attachment is neither the same as the world nor different from the world, the result is not being different from the world, but being the same as the world. Since worldly people have attachments, you should also have attachments. You say inwardly that there is no attachment, but this cannot be called no attachment, just like 'nothingness'. There are two ways to answer: one is through Dharma explanation (法說, fǎshuō), and the other is through analogy (譬說, pìshuō). 'Non-attachment is not called attachment' is a Dharma explanation. I clarify that attachment is illusory, so I say there is no attachment. Saying there is no attachment is clarifying that there is no such thing as attachment, not saying that there exists a 'non-attachment'. Therefore, one is not attached to attachment, nor is one attached to non-attachment. 'Like nothingness' is an analogy. Just like when a person says there is nothing in their mouth, there is actually nothing there. Now, saying there is no attachment, there is actually no attachment. It is not that saying there is nothing in the mouth means there is something there. Nor is it that saying there is no attachment means there is an attachment. Moreover, since attachment does not exist, non-attachment also does not exist. Just like because there is 'something to be gained', there is 'nothing to be gained'. Since 'something to be gained' does not exist, 'nothing to be gained' also does not exist. There are many ways to answer the above question about conditions. One is to directly answer with conditions, clarifying that the Dharma produced by conditions is inherently quiescent, so there is no trace or location. If there is attachment, it is not a condition. Second, sometimes the answer is that originally it was in response to inherent nature, so there are conditions. Since there is no inherent nature, there are also no conditions. Or, it is both inherent nature and conditions, like this there are five statements. The outsider says: 'You speak of the Dharma of no-form (無相法, wúxiàng fǎ), so you are a person who destroys (滅, miè) the Dharma (法人, fǎrén). You say you are not attached to attachment, nor are you attached to non-attachment, this is being attached to non-attachment, everything returns to destruction, so you are a person who destroys the Dharma.' What is the difference between this question and the above refutation of the person who destroys the Dharma? The answer is: the above clarifies that refutation and establishment are both refuted, this is called a person who destroys the Dharma. Now it clarifies that not seeing refutation and establishment, there is nothing to be attached to, even this 'non-attachment' does not exist, which is a deeper level than the above, so it is different. You say inwardly: 'Refuting the person who destroys the Dharma, this is the real person who destroys the Dharma.' When there is no destruction or non-destruction in my heart, so I am not a person who destroys the Dharma. I am actually neither destruction nor non-destruction, there is nothing to be attached to. You think I have something to destroy, wanting to refute me, you are the person who destroys the Dharma.' The sentence is exactly this meaning. Moreover, I clarify the Dharma of conditions, the Dharma of conditions is the Middle Way (中道, zhōngdào), and also a provisional name (假名, jiǎmíng). You now want to destroy the Dharma of conditions, which is destroying the Middle Way, the provisional name, and even the Three Jewels (三寶, sānbǎo) and the Four Noble Truths (四諦, sìdì).

果罪福。名滅法人。又云。我今是滅法人。所以然者。我滅一切戲論諸法名滅法人。又我名斷見人。斷一切見故。又我名闡提。畢竟不信邪見法故。又我名無心。盡一切觀故。我名啞人。以滅一切語故。是故我名滅法人。此並勢破耳。外曰應有諸法相待有故。此品第三段破外人謂論主有所存法。此文來意有近有遠。若遠來者。隨論主所明悉皆有法。若云一切無所依必有依對之。論主若無言則有言對之。若非默非語則有語默對之。若有語默則有非語默對之。若云未曾有如此事則有如此對之。此問實難答也。次近生者。論主上云外是滅法人內非滅法人。若爾則有滅法人待非滅法人。既有所待則便有法。云何言都無所執耶。若都無所執對誰論滅法耶。既無所對則無汝不滅無汝滅法。汝上不應謂我是滅法人汝非滅法人。內曰何有相待一破故。有人言。有是一邊。上已破竟。何所待耶。今謂非無此意。今明有一毫法求並無從。將何待耶。又汝有一毫法論其待者。此一物若在一內一中已破。若在異內異中已破。又一是數法。前已破無。既其無一。云何有萬法欲明相待耶。又一切皆一。如二一名二三一名三。如是皆悉是一。則便無多無多故亦無一。何一耶。此答非是論主向前走避。外人但是向後退覓答。汝言有待者必應有物然後論待

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本果報、罪業和福報，被稱為『滅法人』（one who destroys the Dharma）。又說：『我現在是滅法人。』為什麼這麼說呢？因為我滅除一切戲論諸法，所以名為滅法人。我又名『斷見人』（one who has cut off views），因為斷除一切見解的緣故。我又名『闡提』（icchantika，不信之人），因為畢竟不相信邪見的緣故。我又名『無心』（no-mind），因為窮盡一切觀想的緣故。我又名『啞人』（mute），因為滅除一切語言的緣故。所以，我名為滅法人。』這些都只是權宜之說罷了。外人說：『應該有諸法相互對待而存在。』這一品第三段是駁斥外人認為論主有所執著的法。這段文字的來意有遠有近。從遠來說，無論論主所闡明的是什麼，都必定有法存在。如果說一切都無所依，那麼必定有『依』與之相對；論主如果沒有言語，那麼必定有『言語』與之相對；如果既非沉默也非言語，那麼必定有『語』和『默』與之相對；如果有『語』和『默』，那麼必定有『非語』和『非默』與之相對；如果說未曾有過這樣的事，那麼必定有『如此』與之相對。這些問題實在難以回答。從近來說，論主前面說『外人是滅法人，內心並非滅法人』。如果這樣，那麼就有『滅法人』對待『非滅法人』。既然有所對待，那麼就有了法。怎麼能說完全沒有執著呢？如果完全沒有執著，又和誰談論滅法呢？既然沒有所對待的對象，那麼就沒有你的『不滅』，也沒有你的『滅法』。你先前不應該說『我是滅法人，你不是滅法人』。論主回答說：『哪裡有什麼相互對待呢？』因為『一』已經被破除了。有人說：『有』是一邊，前面已經破除了，還對待什麼呢？現在認為並非沒有這個意思。現在說明，即使有一絲一毫的法，也無從尋求，拿什麼來對待呢？而且，如果你有一絲一毫的法，來談論它的對待，那麼這一物如果在一（one）之內、一之中，就已經被破除了；如果在異（other）之內、異之中，也已經被破除了。而且，『一』是數法，前面已經破除了『無』。既然沒有『一』，怎麼會有萬法想要說明相互對待呢？而且，一切都是『一』，比如二（two）也名為『一』，三（three）也名為『一』，像這樣一切都是『一』，那麼就沒有『多』，沒有『多』也就沒有『一』。什麼『一』呢？這個回答不是論主向前逃避，而是外人只是向後退縮尋找答案。你說有對待，必定應該有事物，然後才能談論對待。

【English Translation】 English version The consequences of actions, sins, and blessings are called 'destroyers of the Dharma' (滅法人, one who destroys the Dharma). It is also said, 'I am now a destroyer of the Dharma.' Why is that? Because I destroy all discursive Dharmas, therefore I am called a destroyer of the Dharma. I am also called 'one who has cut off views' (斷見人, one who has cut off views), because I have cut off all views. I am also called 'icchantika' (闡提, icchantika, an unbeliever), because I ultimately do not believe in heretical views. I am also called 'no-mind' (無心, no-mind), because I have exhausted all contemplation. I am also called 'mute' (啞人, mute), because I have extinguished all language. Therefore, I am called a destroyer of the Dharma.' These are all expedient means. The outsider says, 'There should be Dharmas that exist in mutual dependence.' This third section refutes the outsider's claim that the proponent has some Dharma to which he is attached. The intention of this passage is both distant and near. From a distant perspective, whatever the proponent elucidates, there must be a Dharma that exists. If it is said that everything is without reliance, then there must be 'reliance' to oppose it; if the proponent has no speech, then there must be 'speech' to oppose it; if it is neither silence nor speech, then there must be 'speech' and 'silence' to oppose it; if there is 'speech' and 'silence,' then there must be 'non-speech' and 'non-silence' to oppose it; if it is said that such a thing has never happened, then there must be 'such' to oppose it. These questions are indeed difficult to answer. From a near perspective, the proponent previously said, 'The outsider is a destroyer of the Dharma, but inwardly is not a destroyer of the Dharma.' If so, then there is a 'destroyer of the Dharma' in relation to a 'non-destroyer of the Dharma.' Since there is mutual dependence, then there is a Dharma. How can it be said that there is no attachment at all? If there is no attachment at all, then with whom are you discussing the destruction of the Dharma? Since there is no object of dependence, then there is neither your 'non-destruction' nor your 'destruction of the Dharma.' You should not have said earlier, 'I am a destroyer of the Dharma, you are not a destroyer of the Dharma.' The proponent replies, 'Where is there any mutual dependence?' Because 'one' has already been refuted. Someone says, ''Being' is one side, which has already been refuted, so what is there to depend on?' Now, it is believed that this is not without meaning. Now it is explained that even if there is a trace of Dharma, there is no way to seek it, so what is there to depend on? Moreover, if you have a trace of Dharma to discuss its dependence, then this thing, if it is within one (一, one) or in the midst of one, has already been refuted; if it is within other (異, other) or in the midst of other, it has also been refuted. Moreover, 'one' is a numerical Dharma, and 'non-existence' has already been refuted. Since there is no 'one,' how can there be myriad Dharmas wanting to explain mutual dependence? Moreover, everything is 'one,' such as two (二, two) is also called 'one,' three (三, three) is also called 'one,' like this everything is 'one,' then there is no 'many,' and without 'many' there is also no 'one.' What 'one'? This answer is not the proponent running away, but rather the outsider retreating backward to find an answer. You say there is dependence, there must be things, and then you can talk about dependence.

。今了未知何者是一物而作待問。故為失也。外曰汝無成是成。若依前答有之一邊上已破竟。汝乃不為成有。應當成無。故云無成是成。二者汝言一毫法並已破竟。則都不為成一切法。如此則為成畢竟空。故云無成是成。三者汝言一切無成。此終有成。如雲一切法不生。則波若之不住一切法則住般若。便有波若可住。寧得都無所住。四者若言畢竟無所依者。汝那能難我種種通令我通不通。那能通我種種難令我難不成難。既有難通之能。汝必懷一妙術耳。故若有此妙術則是成也。五者汝既有此妙悟終有所悟之一法。有此一法可學故有此能耳。又無成是成者。不可言成不可言不成。則是妙成。故經云。非成非不成。始是好成。非苦非樂。乃是大樂。又以非成非不成方能知成不成。又無成是成者。汝乃無相待。應有絕待成。註釋云。如言屋無馬者。智度論云。如廟堂上無馬則有無馬法。汝雖無成則有此無成之成。故欣空者聞空則喜。惡空者聞空則憂。故知有此空法能生人心也。又若無此空法。則信之不得福。毀之應無罪。既能生罪福。必有此空法也。內曰不然有無一切無故者。若答為成空問有無一切皆無。既不成有。豈成無耶。答生心問者。既有無皆無。以何生心。如中論云。有無既已無。知有無者誰。故有無皆無。緣觀俱

寂。答終有所成問者。既無不成。云何有成。亦成不成非成不成。既無諸法之不住。寧有波若之可住。答絕待問者。若有相待可有絕待。竟無相待何有絕待。答終有妙術問者。竟不見汝之無術。豈有我之妙術。故云有無一切無。外曰破不然自空故。此難來有近遠。遠來者。總難論主三空也。我法空及本性自空則不應破。若破則非本空。二者若不空而破則違法相。若空而破便是癡人。又若不空而破雖破終不可空。如雖空而不可破。若空而破有應不破。近來意者。從上有無一切無故生。若有無本空何事破有無耶。若本不空汝云何說有無皆空。不空而破則有違理之負。若空而破則有徒勞之弊也。內曰雖自性空取相故縛答進退難也。雖自性空答其一難。然諸法本性自空實無所破。但為汝等外道取相故所以須破。雖破倒想實無所破。故雖破而空雖空而破。義不相違。注為三。謂法譬合。法說如文。譬說中舉愚人者。對上外道呵論主若空而破是為癡人。是故今明。愚人見炎生於水想。外道顛倒無神見神。無法見法無空見空。今欲止其水想。實無水可破。此是但除其病而不除法。謂病故見法。無法可除名不除法。此一問答大明三義。一者論道。謂一切法本性空寂。性空是正道之異名眾經之要意。睿師嘆釋道安。鑿荒涂以開轍標玄旨于

性空。唯性空之宗最得其實。此今問答正論性空。外道謂。性若本空則不應破。破故非本性空。則未解性空意。論主答雖性空應須破。雖破而是性空。此釋成性空意也。二者釋六道三乘人起迷意。謂是性空實無六道亦無三乘。無六謂六無三謂三。故有九道之異。即是釋起迷意。次釋十方三世佛菩薩出世破病意。昔破六道今破三乘者。實無六道三乘可破。但止其想謂故言破耳。故是釋諸佛菩薩破病意也。問乃無所謂六道三乘有能謂之性不。答能謂若有不名為妄及以顛倒。既名為妄則無一毫。故能謂同所謂也。問能謂所謂是無不。答本不有。云何有無。如是五句也。外曰無說法大經無故。自上已來就內難內。此之一番以外難內。難意有二。初牒內九品破有明非有。空品破空明非空。非空不可說空。非有不可說有。名無說。問實相四句不可說。云何言非有非無不可說。答諸外道等多滯空有二邊。今欲破其二邊故明非空非有。而意在舍於二。是不存兩非令悟入實相也。大經無故者引外難內。三種大經此是舊義。無有此法。故不可信。內曰有第四。然答外此問多有形勢。若涅槃經德王品中明聞不聞義。謂外道大經無有此法。唯方等有之。是故名為昔所不聞而今得聞。而今此中引彼經。二有第四者。以諸外道著于有無不信非有非無

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本性空（Śūnyatā）。唯有性空宗（Śūnyavāda）最能把握其實質。現在這段問答正是論述性空。外道（Tīrthika）認為，如果自性本空，就不應該去破斥它。因為破斥，所以不是本性空。這是因為他們沒有理解性空的含義。論主（Ācārya）回答說，即使是性空，也應該破斥。雖然破斥，但它仍然是性空。這解釋了性空的含義。第二點是解釋六道（Gati）和三乘（Triyāna）眾生產生迷惑的原因。他們認為性空意味著實際上沒有六道，也沒有三乘。『無六』是指沒有六道，『無三』是指沒有三乘。因此，才會有九道（Navayāna）的差異。這就是解釋產生迷惑的原因。接下來解釋十方三世（Daśa-diśa-tryadhva）的佛（Buddha）菩薩（Bodhisattva）出世破除迷妄的原因。過去破斥六道，現在破斥三乘，實際上並沒有六道和三乘可以破斥。只是爲了止息他們的妄想執著，所以才說是破斥。因此，這是解釋諸佛菩薩破除迷妄的原因。問：既然沒有所謂的六道三乘，那麼有能說它們是性空的『能謂』嗎？答：如果『能謂』是真實存在的，那就不叫做虛妄和顛倒了。既然稱之為虛妄，那就沒有絲毫真實性。所以『能謂』和『所謂』是一樣的。問：『能謂』和『所謂』是存在還是不存在呢？答：本來就不存在，又怎麼能說存在或不存在呢？這就是五句的含義。外道說：沒有宣說『無』的《大經》（Mahā-sūtra），因為沒有這樣的經典。從上面開始，都是就內部來辯難內部。這一次是從外部來辯難內部。辯難的意圖有兩個。首先，援引內部的九品（Nava-anga）來破斥『有』，闡明『非有』。空品（Śūnyatā-prakaraṇa）破斥『空』，闡明『非空』。『非空』不可說為『空』，『非有』不可說為『有』，所以稱為『無說』。問：實相（Tathatā）的四句（Tetralemma）是不可說的，為什麼說『非有非無』是不可說的呢？答：諸外道大多執著于『空』和『有』兩邊。現在想要破除他們的兩邊執著，所以闡明『非空非有』，而意圖在於捨棄這兩邊，從而悟入實相。『大經無故』是引用外部的觀點來辯難內部。三種《大經》，這是舊的說法，沒有這樣的法，所以不可信。內部回答說：有第四種。然而，回答外道的這個問題有很多形式。例如，《涅槃經》（Nirvāṇa Sūtra）德王品（Guṇavantī-rāja-parivarta）中闡明了『聞』與『不聞』的含義，意思是外道的大經中沒有這樣的法，只有方等經（Vaipulya-sūtra）才有。所以稱為『過去所未聞而今得聞』。而現在這裡引用那部經，第二種是『有第四種』，因為諸外道執著于『有』和『無』，不相信『非有非無』。

【English Translation】 English version Śūnyatā (Emptiness). Only the Śūnyavāda (Doctrine of Emptiness) truly grasps its essence. This present question and answer session is precisely discussing Śūnyatā. The Tīrthikas (Non-Buddhist schools) argue that if inherent nature is originally empty, then it should not be refuted. Because it is refuted, it is not inherently empty. This is because they have not understood the meaning of Śūnyatā. The Ācārya (Master) replies that even if it is Śūnyatā, it should be refuted. Although it is refuted, it is still Śūnyatā. This explains the meaning of Śūnyatā. The second point is to explain the reason why beings in the six Gatis (Realms of Existence) and the followers of the three Triyānas (Vehicles) become deluded. They believe that Śūnyatā means that there are actually no six Gatis and no three Triyānas. 'No six' means there are no six Gatis, and 'no three' means there are no three Triyānas. Therefore, there are differences in the Navayāna (Nine Vehicles). This explains the reason for the arising of delusion. Next, it explains the reason why the Buddhas (Enlightened Ones) and Bodhisattvas (Enlightenment Beings) of the Daśa-diśa-tryadhva (Ten Directions and Three Times) appear in the world to dispel delusion. In the past, the six Gatis were refuted, and now the three Triyānas are refuted. In reality, there are no six Gatis and three Triyānas that can be refuted. It is only to stop their deluded thoughts and attachments that it is said to be refuted. Therefore, this explains the reason why the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas dispel delusion. Question: Since there are no so-called six Gatis and three Triyānas, is there a 'knower' (the one who asserts) that can say they are Śūnyatā? Answer: If the 'knower' were real, it would not be called false and inverted. Since it is called false, there is not a bit of reality in it. Therefore, the 'knower' is the same as the 'known' (that which is asserted). Question: Is the 'knower' and the 'known' existent or non-existent? Answer: They were originally non-existent, so how can one say existent or non-existent? This is the meaning of the five phrases. The Tīrthika says: There is no Mahā-sūtra (Great Sutra) that proclaims 'non-existence' because there is no such scripture. From the beginning, it has been internal debate against internal. This time, it is external debate against internal. There are two intentions in the debate. First, to cite the internal Nava-anga (Nine Divisions of Scripture) to refute 'existence' and clarify 'non-existence'. The Śūnyatā-prakaraṇa (Chapter on Emptiness) refutes 'emptiness' and clarifies 'non-emptiness'. 'Non-emptiness' cannot be said to be 'emptiness', and 'non-existence' cannot be said to be 'existence', so it is called 'no-saying'. Question: The Tetralemma (Four Alternatives) of Tathatā (Suchness) is unspeakable, so why is it said that 'neither existence nor non-existence' is unspeakable? Answer: Most of the Tīrthikas are attached to the two extremes of 'emptiness' and 'existence'. Now, wanting to break their attachment to the two extremes, it is clarified that 'neither emptiness nor existence', and the intention is to abandon these two extremes, thereby realizing Suchness. 'Because there is no Great Sutra' is to cite an external viewpoint to debate internally. The three kinds of Great Sutras, this is an old saying, there is no such Dharma, so it is not believable. The internal reply is: There is a fourth kind. However, there are many forms of answering the Tīrthika's question. For example, in the Guṇavantī-rāja-parivarta (Chapter on King Virtue) of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra (Sutra of Nirvana), the meaning of 'hearing' and 'not hearing' is clarified, meaning that there is no such Dharma in the Tīrthika's Great Sutras, only in the Vaipulya-sūtra (Extensive Sutra). So it is called 'what was not heard in the past is now heard'. And now this sutra is cited here, the second is 'there is a fourth kind', because the Tīrthikas are attached to 'existence' and 'non-existence' and do not believe in 'neither existence nor non-existence'.

。今欲令舍于有無信非有無。故還引彼經明有此法。汝若不信非有無。非但不信于內。亦不信外。如中論及大品欲令小乘人信諸法空故還引小乘中明法空以化小乘。三者又欲恥諸外道明癡如小兒。非但不識于內亦自迷於外。內外無識癡無所知。四者論主欲除第四明非好法是愚癡論耳。如是粗法汝上有之。云何不信。五者欲顯外偷得佛法非有非無安置己典。提婆今還奪取故。彼經有于第四猶是佛說。又外道設有此法。如蟲食木耳。然震旦玄儒但有有無二句無非有無。天竺外道三外道。三大經文亦無之。今言有者直有不可說之言。非是非有無不可說。若有此言便即自見。不應責論主也。三外道之外六十二見及十四難中有第四兩非之言。如非常非無常。此與論主非有無意異也。問涅槃經言外道三種經無。提婆云何言外道有。答如前釋之。涅槃明無者無有顯了辨非有非無中道。論言其有者如聲不名大小等也。又涅槃明無據理實無。今言有者據盜得耳。又涅槃言無如蟲不知字。今言有者偶得成字。注云聲非大小者。一解云。聲及大小俱是求那。求那不自相依皆依陀羅驃。故云聲非大小也。又釋于聽者聲不名小。重聽人聲不名大。又釋如鐘比雷不名為大。比磬不名為小。泥團非瓶非非瓶者。泥形異瓶形故言非瓶。更無別體故非非瓶

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：現在我想讓他們捨棄對『有』和『無』的執著，相信『非有非無』的道理。所以又引用那部經來證明有這種法。如果你不相信『非有非無』，不僅不相信內在的道理，也不相信外在的道理。就像《中論》和《大品般若經》爲了讓小乘修行者相信諸法皆空，就引用小乘經典中關於法空的論述來教化他們。第三，又想揭露外道的愚癡，就像小孩子一樣。他們不僅不認識內在的道理，也迷惑于外在的道理。內外都沒有認識，愚癡無知。第四，論主的目的是爲了破除第四種觀點，即認為『非好』的法是愚癡的論調。像這樣粗淺的道理，你們那裡也有，為什麼不相信呢？第五，想要揭示外道偷取了佛法，將『非有非無』安置在自己的典籍中。提婆現在要奪回這個觀點，因為那部經中的第四種觀點仍然是佛所說的。即使外道有這種法，也像蟲子蛀食木頭一樣。然而，震旦的玄學儒家只有『有』和『無』兩種說法，沒有『非有非無』。印度的外道三大經文也沒有這種說法。現在說有，只是有不可言說的道理，並非『非』、『是』、『非有無』不可言說。如果能理解這種說法，就能自己明白，不應該責怪論主。三外道之外的六十二見和十四難中，有第四種『兩非』的說法，如『非常非無常』。這與論主的『非有無』意思不同。問：涅槃經說外道的三種經沒有這種說法，提婆為什麼說外道有？答：如前面解釋的那樣。《涅槃經》所說的『無』，是沒有明顯辨析『非有非無』的中道。論中所說的『有』，就像聲音不能說是大或小一樣。而且，《涅槃經》所說的『無』是就理性的真實而言的，現在所說的『有』是就偷取而言的。而且，《涅槃經》所說的『無』就像蟲子不認識字一樣，現在所說的『有』是偶然湊成了字。註釋說聲音非大非小，一種解釋是：聲音和大小都是求那（guna，屬性），求那不互相依賴，都依賴陀羅驃（dravya，實體）。所以說聲音非大非小。另一種解釋是：對於聽者來說，聲音不能說是小；對於重聽的人來說，聲音不能說是大。又一種解釋是：像鐘聲比雷聲不能說是大，比磬聲不能說是小。泥團非瓶非非瓶，泥的形狀與瓶子的形狀不同，所以說非瓶。沒有別的實體，所以說非非瓶。

【English Translation】 English version: Now I want to make them abandon their attachment to 'existence' and 'non-existence' and believe in the principle of 'neither existence nor non-existence'. Therefore, I again quote that scripture to prove that this Dharma exists. If you do not believe in 'neither existence nor non-existence', you not only do not believe in the inner principles, but also do not believe in the outer principles. Just as the Madhyamaka-karika (中論) and the Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra (大品般若經) quoted the Small Vehicle (小乘) scriptures on the emptiness of dharmas to teach the Small Vehicle practitioners, in order to make them believe that all dharmas are empty. Third, I also want to expose the ignorance of the heretics (外道), just like children. They not only do not recognize the inner principles, but are also confused by the outer principles. They have no knowledge of either the inner or the outer, and are ignorant and unknowing. Fourth, the purpose of the author is to refute the fourth view, which is that the Dharma of 'not good' is a foolish argument. Such a crude principle, you also have it, why don't you believe it? Fifth, I want to reveal that the heretics stole the Buddha's Dharma and placed 'neither existence nor non-existence' in their own scriptures. Deva (提婆) now wants to take back this view, because the fourth view in that scripture is still what the Buddha said. Even if the heretics have this Dharma, it is like worms eating wood. However, the Xuanxue (玄學) Confucians of China only have the two statements of 'existence' and 'non-existence', and do not have 'neither existence nor non-existence'. The three major scriptures of the Indian heretics also do not have this statement. Now to say that there is, is only to say that there is an unspeakable principle, not that 'not', 'is', 'neither existence nor non-existence' is unspeakable. If you can understand this statement, you can understand it yourself and should not blame the author. Among the sixty-two views and fourteen difficulties outside the three heretical paths, there is a fourth 'two negations' statement, such as 'neither permanent nor impermanent'. This is different from the author's meaning of 'neither existence nor non-existence'. Question: The Nirvana Sutra (涅槃經) says that the three types of heretical scriptures do not have this statement, so why does Deva say that the heretics have it? Answer: As explained earlier, the 'non-existence' stated in the Nirvana Sutra is the absence of a clear analysis of the Middle Way (中道) of 'neither existence nor non-existence'. The 'existence' stated in the treatise is like the sound that cannot be said to be large or small. Moreover, the 'non-existence' stated in the Nirvana Sutra is in terms of rational truth, and the 'existence' now stated is in terms of theft. Moreover, the 'non-existence' stated in the Nirvana Sutra is like a worm not knowing words, and the 'existence' now stated is like accidentally forming words. The commentary says that the sound is neither large nor small. One explanation is: sound and size are both gunas (求那, attributes), and gunas do not depend on each other, but depend on dravya (陀羅驃, substance). Therefore, it is said that sound is neither large nor small. Another explanation is: for the listener, the sound cannot be said to be small; for the hard of hearing, the sound cannot be said to be large. Another explanation is: like the sound of a bell compared to thunder, it cannot be said to be large; compared to the sound of a chime stone, it cannot be said to be small. A lump of clay is neither a pot nor not a pot, because the shape of the clay is different from the shape of the pot, so it is said to be not a pot. There is no other entity, so it is said to be not not a pot.

。光非明非闇者。月光比日故非明。比星故非闇。又釋寸炎為光滿室稱明。而光異闇復殊于明也。外曰若空不應有說。此第二大段明中道二諦結會旨歸。生起具如品初。今更示一勢。此文來意有近有遠。遠來者。九品破有空品破空明非空非有。此是洗顛倒有所得性有無。今明從非有非無始得假說有無名依二諦說法。此假有無為欲表非有非無不二中道。是故有此章也。次近來者。上破有無明非有無。外人著非有無。今破非有無明假有無。欲顯正道未曾非有無亦未曾有無。是故有此章也。外問意云。若言內外二經並以無說法為至極者。汝師何故說善惡法以化物耶。若有所說即不應明於無說。若辨無說即不應說。又若有說即不應明有無皆空。如其不說則受啞法。內曰隨俗故無過者。外道不解二諦。我上不說此是第一義諦。今明說者隨俗故說。即會通前語也。又諸佛體道非說不說。今隨俗說。何失說耶。雖隨俗說實無所說。何曾說耶。注云常依二諦說者。凡夫以有為實故稱為諦。聖人達空為實故稱為諦。以依二實說故二說皆實。問何須明依二實說耶。答欲防外難。上既云諸法不可說。今遂云說。便是妄語。是故今明。依二實說故二語皆實非妄語也。外曰俗諦無不實故。外道聰明懸知二諦義有相違。真有三義可得是諦。一者空是

真實故名實相。可得是諦。二者空于聖人為實。此亦是諦。三既名為真。真故是諦。俗有三義不應名諦。一者有是虛妄不應名諦。二于凡為實不足稱實。三名中無真不得稱諦。故云俗諦無不實故。俗若是諦便入于真。又若二種俱諦則二俱應真。又開真俗異應開諦不諦異。又若俗遂諦真則不諦。又直難云。若諦則不俗若俗則不諦。云何言有于俗諦。內曰相待故如大小答上俗是諦義也。可作二義明之。一者真唯是諦無非諦。二者俗亦得是諦亦得非諦。俗于凡是實故稱諦。于聖不實故不名諦。是故此俗亦諦不諦。如大小者。如㮈形於瓜棗大小皆實。問㮈定譬何物。答異三論師云。㮈譬虛實諦不諦瓜棗譬凡聖二緣。又云㮈譬一色瓜棗譬兩緣。今謂文義俱不然。㮈正譬俗也。如㮈望瓜實小。形棗實大。形棗實大譬俗于凡是諦。望瓜實小譬俗于聖非諦。文意正爾。不得改易一言。問㮈譬一色。何故非耶。答外人正難俗應非諦。今正答俗是諦非諦。故不得譬一色。問若㮈望瓜棗大小皆實者。本以實名為諦。大小皆實則皆應是諦。答譬意不爾。如前釋之。正取俗。于凡實是諦。于聖不實非是諦。取締不諦二實不言。二實以譬二諦。是故文云。俗諦於世人為實。于聖人為不實。故以大小之譬不得作余釋也。又于聖不實。不實故空。以空為

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本真實因此得名為實相（Zhenshi, therefore, is named Shixiang, the true appearance of reality）。可以被認為是真諦。這兩種（真諦和俗諦）對於聖人來說是真實的。這也是真諦。第三種（勝義諦）被稱為真，因為它是真實的，所以是真諦。世俗有三種含義，不應該被稱為真諦。第一，存在是虛妄的，不應該被稱為真諦。第二，對於凡人來說是真實的，但不足以被稱為真實。第三，名稱中沒有真實，不能被稱為真諦。所以說俗諦沒有不真實的。如果俗諦是真諦，那麼它就進入了真諦。而且，如果兩種（真諦和俗諦）都是真諦，那麼兩種都應該是真實的。而且，區分真諦和俗諦的不同，應該區分真諦和非真諦的不同。而且，如果俗諦是真諦，那麼真諦就不是真諦了。又直接質問說：如果是真諦，那麼就不是俗諦；如果是俗諦，那麼就不是真諦。怎麼能說有俗諦呢？內曰：因為是相對的，就像大小一樣，回答上面俗諦是真諦的含義。可以從兩個方面來解釋：一是真諦只是真諦，沒有非真諦；二是俗諦既可以是真諦，也可以是非真諦。俗諦對於凡人來說是真實的，所以稱為真諦；對於聖人來說是不真實的，所以不稱為真諦。因此，這個俗諦既是真諦，也是非真諦。就像大小一樣，就像㮈（Nai，一種水果）相對於瓜和棗，大小都是真實的。問：㮈到底比喻什麼？答：不同的三論師說，㮈比喻虛實、真諦和非真諦，瓜和棗比喻凡人和聖人兩種緣。又說，㮈比喻一種顏色，瓜和棗比喻兩種緣。我認為這些說法在文義上都不對。㮈正是比喻俗諦。就像㮈相對於瓜來說是小的，相對於棗來說是大的。相對於棗來說是大的，比喻俗諦對於凡人來說是真諦；相對於瓜來說是小的，比喻俗諦對於聖人來說不是真諦。文義正是如此，不得更改一字。問：㮈比喻一種顏色，為什麼不對呢？答：外人正是質問俗諦不應該是真諦。現在正是回答俗諦是真諦，也是非真諦。所以不能比喻一種顏色。問：如果㮈相對於瓜和棗來說大小都是真實的，本來以真實為真諦，大小都是真實的，那麼都應該是真諦。答：比喻的意思不是這樣。就像前面解釋的那樣，正是取俗諦，對於凡人來說是真實的，是真諦；對於聖人來說是不真實的，是非真諦。取真諦和非真諦兩種真實，不說兩種真實來比喻兩種諦。所以文中說，俗諦對於世人來說是真實的，對於聖人來說是不真實的。所以用大小的比喻，不得作其他的解釋。又對於聖人來說是不真實的，不真實所以是空，以空為...

【English Translation】 English version Truth is therefore named 'Shixiang' (true appearance of reality). It can be considered '諦' (Di, truth). These two (truth and conventional truth) are true for sages. This is also '諦' (Di, truth). The third (ultimate truth) is called '真' (Zhen, true), because it is true, so it is '諦' (Di, truth). The mundane has three meanings and should not be called '諦' (Di, truth). First, existence is false and should not be called '諦' (Di, truth). Second, it is true for ordinary people, but not enough to be called true. Third, there is no truth in the name, so it cannot be called '諦' (Di, truth). Therefore, it is said that conventional truth has nothing untrue. If conventional truth is '諦' (Di, truth), then it enters '真' (Zhen, true). Moreover, if the two (truth and conventional truth) are both '諦' (Di, truth), then both should be true. Moreover, distinguishing the difference between truth and conventional truth should distinguish the difference between '諦' (Di, truth) and non-'諦' (Di, untruth). Moreover, if conventional truth is '諦' (Di, truth), then truth is not '諦' (Di, truth). It is directly questioned: if it is '諦' (Di, truth), then it is not conventional truth; if it is conventional truth, then it is not '諦' (Di, truth). How can it be said that there is conventional truth? Internally, it is said: because it is relative, like size, answering the meaning of conventional truth being '諦' (Di, truth) above. It can be explained in two ways: first, truth is only '諦' (Di, truth), there is no non-'諦' (Di, untruth); second, conventional truth can be '諦' (Di, truth) or non-'諦' (Di, untruth). Conventional truth is true for ordinary people, so it is called '諦' (Di, truth); it is not true for sages, so it is not called '諦' (Di, truth). Therefore, this conventional truth is both '諦' (Di, truth) and non-'諦' (Di, untruth). Like size, like '㮈' (Nai, a kind of fruit) relative to melon and jujube, the size is real. Question: What exactly does '㮈' (Nai, a kind of fruit) symbolize? Answer: Different Sanlun masters say that '㮈' (Nai, a kind of fruit) symbolizes falsehood and truth, '諦' (Di, truth) and non-'諦' (Di, untruth), melon and jujube symbolize the two conditions of ordinary people and sages. It is also said that '㮈' (Nai, a kind of fruit) symbolizes one color, and melon and jujube symbolize two conditions. I think these statements are not correct in terms of textual meaning. '㮈' (Nai, a kind of fruit) is exactly a metaphor for conventional truth. Just like '㮈' (Nai, a kind of fruit) is small relative to melon, and large relative to jujube. Being large relative to jujube is a metaphor for conventional truth being '諦' (Di, truth) for ordinary people; being small relative to melon is a metaphor for conventional truth not being '諦' (Di, truth) for sages. The textual meaning is exactly like this, and not a single word can be changed. Question: '㮈' (Nai, a kind of fruit) is a metaphor for one color, why is it wrong? Answer: Outsiders are exactly questioning that conventional truth should not be '諦' (Di, truth). Now it is exactly answering that conventional truth is '諦' (Di, truth) and also non-'諦' (Di, untruth). So it cannot be a metaphor for one color. Question: If the size of '㮈' (Nai, a kind of fruit) relative to melon and jujube is real, and originally truth is called '諦' (Di, truth), and the size is real, then all should be '諦' (Di, truth). Answer: The meaning of the metaphor is not like this. Just like the previous explanation, it is exactly taking conventional truth, which is true for ordinary people, is '諦' (Di, truth); it is not true for sages, is non-'諦' (Di, untruth). Taking the two truths of '諦' (Di, truth) and non-'諦' (Di, untruth), not saying that the two truths are used to metaphor the two '諦' (Di, truth). Therefore, the text says that conventional truth is true for the people of the world, and it is not true for sages. Therefore, the metaphor of size cannot be interpreted in other ways. Also, it is not true for sages, and it is not true so it is empty, taking emptiness as...

聖實者。此亦得云此二皆實即是二諦義也。問俗于凡是諦于聖非諦。亦得云真于聖是實為諦。于凡不實故非諦不。答眾師並云。此是一例義。今謂通可例之。凡實是聖虛。聖實是凡虛。凡虛是聖實聖虛是凡實。別則不例。俗有諦不諦義。真唯諦無不諦。以俗是顛倒不實故非是實。但于俗是諦耳。真是實相故是諦。又名之為真。復為聖所證知故唯諦無不諦也。文正爾。不得作余釋之。問今明二諦與他云何異。答就二于論者。然一色未曾真俗。于凡聖二解故成二諦耳。他則道理有真俗二境。是故為異也。又於二緣成二。色未曾二不二。如是五句。亦未曾諦不諦。亦如是五句。問俗于凡稱諦。是何等凡耶。答此文是總想說。世俗凡夫謂有瓶衣地柱。言實有此物故名為諦。問大品云。凡夫不知世諦。若知則是須陀洹。今云何言凡夫有俗諦。答今文就二于論之。于凡是實故名諦。故涅槃云。世人知者名為世諦。大品云不知者。不知此有是空有故不知俗諦。聖人達有無所有即知無所有有。故聖人知世諦也。又有四種義。一者二諦義。二依二諦說法義。三說二諦義。四二諦說義。二諦義者。如前有于凡是實為諦。空于聖為實是諦。依二諦說者。若說空是實依真諦說。說有是實依世諦說。說二諦者。依二諦還說二諦也。二諦說者。一往

【現代漢語翻譯】聖實者（Satyasiddhi）。也可以說這兩個都是真實，這就是二諦（two truths）的含義。問：世俗諦（conventional truth）對於凡夫是真諦，對於聖人則不是真諦嗎？也可以說，勝義諦（ultimate truth）對於聖人是真實為諦，對於凡夫不真實所以不是諦嗎？答：各位論師都說，這只是一個例子。我認為可以普遍地類推。凡夫認為是真實的，聖人認為是虛假的；聖人認為是真實的，凡夫認為是虛假的。凡夫認為是虛假的，聖人認為是真實的；聖人認為是虛假的，凡夫認為是真實的。如果分別來看，就不能類推。世俗諦有真諦和非真諦的含義，而勝義諦只有真諦，沒有非真諦。因為世俗諦是顛倒不實的，所以不是真實，只是在世俗層面是真諦。勝義諦是實相，所以是真諦，又被稱為真，而且為聖人所證知，所以只有真諦，沒有非真諦。經文就是這樣說的，不能做其他的解釋。問：現在所說的二諦與其他人所說的有什麼不同？答：就二諦進行討論的人認為，一種事物本身並沒有真俗之分，只是凡夫和聖人的理解不同，才形成了二諦。而其他人則認為道理上有真俗兩種境界，所以不同。又如二緣形成二，色（rupa）本身並沒有二和不二之分，像這樣有五種說法。也沒有諦和非諦之分，也像這樣有五種說法。問：世俗諦對於凡夫被稱為諦，是哪一種凡夫呢？答：這段經文是總括性的說法。世俗的凡夫認為有瓶子、衣服、土地、柱子，說這些東西是真實存在的，所以稱為諦。問：《大品般若經》（Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra）說，凡夫不知道世俗諦，如果知道就是須陀洹（Srotapanna）。現在為什麼說凡夫有世俗諦呢？答：現在的經文是就二諦進行討論。對於凡夫來說是真實的，所以稱為諦。所以《涅槃經》（Nirvana Sutra）說，世人知道的稱為世俗諦。《大品般若經》說不知道的，是不知道此有是空有，所以不知道世俗諦。聖人通達有無所有，即知道無所有有，所以聖人知道世俗諦。又有四種含義：一是二諦義，二是依二諦說法義，三是說二諦義，四是二諦說義。二諦義，如前面所說，有對於凡夫是真實為諦，空對於聖人是真實為諦。依二諦說法，如果說空是真實，是依真諦說；說有是真實，是依世俗諦說。說二諦，是依二諦還說二諦。二諦說，一往

【English Translation】 The one who has achieved the true reality (Satyasiddhi). It can also be said that both of these are true, which is the meaning of the two truths (dve satye). Question: Is the conventional truth (samvrti-satya) true for ordinary beings but not for the noble ones (aryas)? Can it also be said that the ultimate truth (paramartha-satya) is true for the noble ones, but not true for ordinary beings, and therefore not a truth? Answer: All the teachers say that this is just an example. I think it can be universally analogized. What ordinary beings consider true, noble ones consider false; what noble ones consider true, ordinary beings consider false. What ordinary beings consider false, noble ones consider true; what noble ones consider false, ordinary beings consider true. If we look at them separately, we cannot analogize. Conventional truth has the meaning of truth and non-truth, while ultimate truth only has truth and no non-truth. Because conventional truth is inverted and unreal, it is not true, but only true on the conventional level. Ultimate truth is the true nature of reality, so it is true, and it is also known by the noble ones, so it only has truth and no non-truth. The scripture says it this way, and we cannot make other interpretations. Question: What is the difference between the two truths now being discussed and what others say? Answer: Those who discuss the two truths believe that a thing itself does not have the distinction of true and conventional, but it is only because ordinary beings and noble ones understand it differently that the two truths are formed. Others believe that there are two realms of true and conventional in principle, so they are different. Also, just as two conditions form two, form (rupa) itself does not have the distinction of two and not two, and there are five such statements. There is also no distinction between truth and non-truth, and there are also five such statements. Question: The conventional truth is called truth for ordinary beings, but what kind of ordinary beings are these? Answer: This passage is a general statement. Ordinary beings in the world think that there are bottles, clothes, land, and pillars, and say that these things are real, so they are called truth. Question: The 'Great Perfection of Wisdom Sutra' (Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra) says that ordinary beings do not know the conventional truth, and if they knew it, they would be stream-enterers (Srotapanna). Why do we now say that ordinary beings have conventional truth? Answer: The current scripture is discussing the two truths. It is true for ordinary beings, so it is called truth. Therefore, the 'Nirvana Sutra' (Nirvana Sutra) says that what people in the world know is called conventional truth. The 'Great Perfection of Wisdom Sutra' says that those who do not know, do not know that this existence is empty existence, so they do not know the conventional truth. Noble ones understand that existence and non-existence are both empty, so they know that non-existence exists, so noble ones know the conventional truth. There are also four meanings: first, the meaning of the two truths; second, the meaning of teaching according to the two truths; third, the meaning of speaking about the two truths; and fourth, the meaning of the two truths speaking. The meaning of the two truths, as mentioned earlier, is that existence is true for ordinary beings, and emptiness is true for noble ones. Teaching according to the two truths, if we say that emptiness is true, we are speaking according to the ultimate truth; if we say that existence is true, we are speaking according to the conventional truth. Speaking about the two truths is speaking about the two truths according to the two truths. The two truths speaking, in one direction

言于無言名說真諦。言于言名說世諦。此則世諦說得說世諦得說真諦。真諦不可說。如中論四諦品言說是世俗也。然世諦雖言言而常絕。故世諦雖說即是不說。真諦雖無說而不礙說。故得真諦說。問此事云何。答非但所詮之真絕言。即詮真之言常絕。故此言即無言言。既得即是言無言。無言豈不得即是言。故真諦得說。若爾具得四句俱說俱不說互說互不說也。外曰知是過得何利。論有三分。二分前竟。今是第三回邪入正請求利益。就文為二。初番明得益。次番辨益相。今前外問。始舍罪福終訖破空橫摧萬法豎窮五句。作是知者有何利耶。內曰如是舍我名得解脫正答利也。問上來橫窮豎破無一可存。何故偏言舍我。答外道欲令舍我得解脫故偏言舍我。又上明三空。一我空二法空三空空。我為其初。舉初攝后。又諸外道用我為主諦。今舉主例依。又我見攝六十二見。舉本例末。又我為觀主。言我能作三空之觀。故偏明舍我。興皇大師每登高座常云。不畏煩惱唯畏於我。所以然者。他云。斷除煩惱留眾生置故令眾生作佛。以此見難除故眾生可畏。興皇大師借李耳之言。為學者曰增。為道者曰損。損之又損之。終至於無損。內外並泯緣觀俱寂。乃得道也。外曰何以言名得解脫第二辨得益相。外謂實應得道。云何言假名解脫耶。

如小乘實斷見思實得解脫。大乘人實斷五住二障實得解脫。今外道亦然。內曰畢竟清凈故。此是偈本。而今無者文脫落故。非脫非縛不所不能。不知何以目之。強稱為脫故云名得解脫耳。

百論疏卷下余(終)

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：正如小乘修行者確實斷除了見惑和思惑，從而真正獲得解脫。大乘修行者也確實斷除了五住地煩惱和二障（煩惱障和所知障），從而真正獲得解脫。現在外道也是這樣認為的。內道說，（外道）是畢竟清凈的緣故。這原本是偈頌的原本，但現在沒有了，是因為文字脫落的緣故。既非解脫也非束縛，沒有什麼可以用來描述它。勉強稱之為解脫，所以說名為獲得解脫罷了。

《百論疏》卷下余（終）

【English Translation】 English version: Just as the Hinayana (Small Vehicle) practitioners truly sever the afflictions of views and thoughts (見思, Jian Si), and genuinely attain liberation. The Mahayana (Great Vehicle) practitioners also truly sever the five aggregates of dwelling defilements (五住地, Wu Zhu Di) and the two obscurations (二障, Er Zhang) [afflictive obscurations (煩惱障, Fan Nao Zhang) and cognitive obscurations (所知障, Suo Zhi Zhang)], and genuinely attain liberation. Now, the non-Buddhists (外道, Wai Dao) also think in this way. The inner [Buddhist] path says that [the non-Buddhists] are ultimately pure. This was originally the original text of the verse, but now it is missing because the text has been lost. It is neither liberation nor bondage, and there is nothing that can be used to describe it. It is forcibly called liberation, so it is said to be named 'attaining liberation'.

Remaining part of Chapter Lower of Shatashastra Commentary (End)